[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-11955

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-21976-DPG

CHECKER CAB OPERATORS, INC., 

a Florida Corporation, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, 

B&S TAXI CORP., 

a Florida Corporation, 

MIADECO CORP., 

a Florida Corporation, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, 

a political subdivision of the State of Florida, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(August 6, 2018)

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Before MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and HOWARD,∗ District Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge: 

The emergence of Transportation Network Entities such as Uber and Lyft 

(“TNEs”) has threatened the viability of traditional taxicab companies worldwide. 

Amid that competitive struggle, this appeal arises. For years, taxicab, livery, 

limousine, and other for-hire transportation services in Miami-Dade County (“the 

County”) could be offered only by those who possessed a “medallion” -- that is, a 

license to supply those services. In May 2016, the County enacted an ordinance 

authorizing the TNEs to operate in the for-hire transportation market (“the TNE 

Ordinance”). Certain medallion holders filed suit (“the Medallion Holders”), 

attacking the TNE Ordinance’s constitutionality. They claimed that, by disrupting 

their market exclusivity, the TNE Ordinance effected a “taking” of their 

medallions without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the 

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article X § 6 of the Florida 

Constitution. They also claimed that, because it subjected them to more stringent 

regulations than those governing TNEs, the TNE Ordinance discriminated against 

medallion holders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court 

held that the Medallion Holders failed to state either a takings or an equal 

protection claim.

 ∗ Honorable Marcia Morales Howard, United States District Judge for the Middle 

District of Florida, sitting by designation.

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After the district court dismissed this case, the Florida legislature passed a 

new body of laws that preempted the TNE Ordinance, thereby mooting the 

Medallion Holders’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. However, we 

affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing their claims for monetary 

damages arising under the Takings and Equal Protection Clauses, which were not 

moot. The medallions conferred by the County created a license to offer for-hire 

taxicab services in Miami-Dade County; the County did not afford the Medallion 

Holders the right to exclude competition in the marketplace. Moreover, the 

regulatory scheme was rationally related to improving the quality and safety of forhire transportation service and was wholly consonant with the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

I.

A.

The Medallion Holders -- Checker Cab Operators, Inc., B&S Taxi Corp., 

and Miadeco Corp. -- are for-hire taxicab license holders operating in the County. 

Since 1981, the County has extensively regulated its for-hire transportation market 

through the Miami-Dade County Code of Ordinances (“the Code”). It has imposed 

licensing requirements, fixed the overall number of licenses, restricted the licenses’ 

alienability, promulgated rules of operation, capped fares and rates, and prescribed 

insurance requirements, vehicle standards, and penalties for Code violations. In 

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1998, the County adopted Ordinance No. 98-105 (the “1998 Ordinance”) in order 

to improve the quality, reliability, and safety of for-hire transportation services. 

The 1998 Ordinance established the “medallion system,” which renamed for-hire 

transportation licenses “medallions,” deemed them “intangible property,” and 

converted all 1,824 existing for-hire licenses into medallions for a fee. Id. §§ 31-

81(z), (aa), 31-82(c). It also comprehensively conditioned the medallions’ use and 

alienability. Id. § 31-82(j)–(k), (r). It decreed that the medallions may be 

transferred, sold, or assigned only to County-registered taxicab chauffeurs, and

required medallion holders to keep records pertaining to vehicle operations, to 

register their vehicles with the County, and to make those vehicles available for 

inspection. Id. § 31-82(j), (r). Failure to abide by those rules could result in the 

suspension or revocation of a medallion. Id. § 31-82(k). 

Since 1998, the County has amended its for-hire transportation regulations at 

least 33 times, while issuing almost 300 additional medallions, thereby increasing 

the total number of medallions by over 16 percent. Miami-Dade County, Fla., 

Ordinance Nos. 98-105 (Aug. 7, 1998); 01-67 (Apr. 20, 2001); 04-103 (Jun. 28, 

2004); 06-111 (Apr. 20, 2006); 08-139 (Apr. 16, 2009); 11-53 (Dec. 13, 2011); 11-

54 (Dec. 13, 2011); 12-51 (Jun. 26, 2012). Still, the County generally limited the 

total number of medallions in circulation. By maintaining their scarcity and 

permitting their alienability, the County nurtured a secondary market in 

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medallions. In 2012, the County profited handsomely from that market after 

auctioning off medallions for more than $400,000 each. By 2014, the medallions 

traded for approximately $340,000.

That same year, TNEs began operating in the County. They enabled 

customers to use smartphone applications to locate, schedule, and summon drivers, 

who transported them to their destination in exchange for a prearranged fee made 

by credit card payment through the application. Since TNEs provided for-hire 

transportation services in the County without medallions, those services were 

unlawful, and the County responded by ticketing TNE drivers and impounding 

TNE vehicles. 

By 2016, however, the County reconsidered its TNE policy. It enacted the 

TNE Ordinance in order to authorize the TNEs’ market entry and “promote the 

free market, enhance the availability, efficiency and safety of transportation 

systems as well as encourage innovation and enhance residents’ and consumers’ 

transportation options.” Ordinance No. 16-42, Body. Although TNEs were 

required to bear TNE licenses, they were not obliged to carry medallions. Id. § 31-

702(a). As a result of the TNE Ordinance, TNE operators entered the County en 

masse, substantially diluting the medallions’ value. Also in 2016, the County 

modified taxicab regulations (the “2016 Ordinance”) in order to “level the playing 

field [between taxicabs and TNEs] notwithstanding the unique aspects of each 

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form of transportation, and encourage competition under a responsible and fair 

regulatory regime.” Id., Body. Following the promulgation of the TNE and 2016 

Ordinances, regulations of taxicabs diverged in some ways from those imposed on 

TNEs.

In July 2017, the Florida legislature enacted a new law regulating TNEs at 

the state level. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, Laws of Fla. (codified at 

Fla. Stat. § 627.748 (2018)). That law preempted the TNE Ordinance, declaring: 

“It is the intent of the Legislature to provide for the uniformity of laws governing 

[TNEs], [TNE] drivers, and [TNE] vehicles throughout the state. [TNEs], [TNE] 

drivers, and [TNE] vehicles are governed exclusively by state law, including in any 

locality or other jurisdiction that enacted a law or created rules governing [TNEs], 

[TNE] drivers, or [TNE] vehicles before July 1, 2017.” Fla. Stat. § 627.748(15)(a). 

It did not however preempt local laws covering airports and seaports. Id. 

§ 627.748(15)(b).

In addition to preempting local laws, the new state law regulated TNE 

insurance coverage and driver eligibility, and required TNEs to, inter alia, disclose 

fares before commencing rides, display photographs of TNE drivers and license 

plate numbers of TNE vehicles, and transmit electronic receipts listing the ride’s 

origin and destination, the total time and distance traveled, and the total fare paid. 

Id. § 627.748(4)–(6). The law also prescribed insurance and driver-eligibility 

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requirements. Id. § 627.748(7), (11). As a result, the County’s TNE industry is now 

comprehensively governed by state law.

B.

In June 2016, the Medallion Holders filed an amended class action 

complaint on behalf of all medallion holders in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in 

Miami-Dade County. They alleged that the TNE Ordinance effected a “taking” of 

their medallions without just compensation in violation of the United States and 

Florida Constitutions. Specifically, “[t]hrough the [TNE] Ordinance, the County 

has substantially interfered with the private property held by the [Medallion 

Holders] in that their [medallions] will be, and are, significantly devalued as a 

result of the legalization and/or regulation of the [TNEs].” They requested just 

compensation for the diminution of the medallions’ value. 

The Medallion Holders also claimed that the TNE Ordinance subjected 

similarly situated service providers -- taxicabs and TNEs -- to disparate regulatory 

frameworks, which competitively disadvantaged the Medallion Holders and 

violated their right to the equal protection of the laws. They cited six particular 

discrepancies between taxicab and TNE regulations: (1) while the Code required 

taxicabs to secure chauffeur’s agreements with each taxicab driver, it granted 

TNEs broader latitude in hiring drivers; (2) the Code imposed more stringent 

insurance coverage requirements on taxicabs; (3) the Code subjected taxicabs to 

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background checks by the Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources 

(“the Department”), while permitting TNEs to conduct independent background 

checks; (4) while taxicabs were required to undergo Department vehicle 

inspections, TNEs were permitted to perform independent inspections; (5) taxicabs 

were bound by more onerous vehicle-appearance standards; and (6) the County 

established maximum fare rates for taxicabs, but not for TNEs. The Medallion 

Holders argued that those regulatory disparities were “not rationally related to 

legitimate government interests,” but rather were “irrational and wholly arbitrary.” 

They sought monetary damages, a declaration that the TNE Ordinance violated 

their right to equal protection, and an injunction against its enforcement.

The County removed the case to the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court agreed. First, the 

court held that the Medallion Holders failed to state a takings claim. Although the 

medallions enabled their holders to provide for-hire transportation services, they 

conferred no right to block competition in the relevant market. Since the 

diminution of the medallions’ value derived solely from exposure to new 

competition, their takings claims could not succeed. The trial court also rejected 

their equal protection claims, explaining that the regulatory distinctions identified 

by the Medallion Holders simply reflected the important differences found in the 

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taxicabs’ and TNEs’ respective business models. Thus, for example, while taxicabs 

operate primarily through street hails and flat fare rates, TNEs are summoned 

through smartphone applications and calibrate fares according to fluctuations in 

supply and demand. The district court further denied the Medallion Holders’ 

request for leave to amend their complaint, holding that any amendment would be 

futile.

This timely appeal ensued.

II.

“We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and 

construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. To withstand a motion 

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Hunt v. Aimco 

Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotations and citations 

omitted). 

We begin by addressing whether the claims have become moot in light of 

preemptive state law. Next, we discuss the Medallion Holders’ takings claims. 

Finally, we assess their equal protection claims. 

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A.

The Medallion Holders argue, and the County does not dispute that Section 

627.748, Florida Statutes (2018) does not moot this appeal even though it 

preempted the TNE Ordinance. It is well established that “[u]nder Article III of the 

Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or 

controversies.” Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 

1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). In order to invoke the jurisdiction of an 

Article III court, “a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual 

injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision.” Id. That injury “must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the 

time the complaint is filed.” Id. If the injury ceases, or is rendered unamenable to 

judicial relief, then the case becomes moot and thereby incapable of further Article 

III adjudication. Id. (“[E]ven a once-justiciable case becomes moot and must be 

dismissed when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome.”). 

Typically, “[w]hen a party challenges a law as unconstitutional and seeks [ ] 

declaratory and prospective injunctive relief, a superseding statute or regulation 

moots [the] case . . . .” Crown Media, LLC v. Gwinnett Cty., 380 F.3d 1317, 1324 

(11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). The reason is straightforward. When a 

challenged law is preempted, it cannot inflict further injury redressable by 

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declaration or injunction. See Flanigan’s, 868 F.3d at 1255; Adler v. Duval Cty. 

Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997) (describing declaratory and 

injunctive relief as “prospective”). Since declaratory and injunctive relief under 

these circumstances would be futile, they could not issue from an Article III court. 

See Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (mooting appeal due to preempted claim); Griffith v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 303 F.3d 1276, 1282 n.6 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI 

Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 799 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Charles A. Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.6 n.17 (3d ed.) (in light 

of superseding law, “[i]t would be pointless to enjoin enforcement of a policy no 

longer in effect”). When claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are mooted, 

“we do not consider the merits presented, but instead vacate the judgments below 

with directions to dismiss even if a controversy did exist at the time the district 

court rendered its decision.” Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. 

Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2000). 

“Although a case will normally become moot when a subsequent [law] 

brings the existing controversy to an end, when the plaintiff has requested 

damages, those claims are not moot.” Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of 

Marietta, 654 F.3d 1231, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). 

Unlike claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, which are inherently 

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prospective in nature, “a claim for money damages looks back in time and is 

intended to redress a past injury.” Adler, 112 F.3d at 1477. Because an 

“appellant[’s] claim for money damages does not depend on any threat of future 

harm, [the] claim remains a live controversy.” Id. at 1478; see also Havens Realty 

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982) (“Given respondents’ continued 

active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains definite and concrete, touching 

the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”) (quotations omitted). 

At the outset of this lawsuit, the Medallion Holders sought declaratory and 

injunctive relief for their equal protection claims. They also requested damages for 

both their takings and equal protection claims. All of the allegations were 

exclusively directed at the County’s TNE Ordinance. Yet three months after the 

district court dismissed this case, the Florida legislature enacted Section 627.748, 

which preempted the TNE Ordinance. The Medallion Holders do not dispute the 

preemptive effect of the Florida statute. Since it has been preempted by state law, 

the TNE Ordinance is incapable of sowing future harm, mooting the Medallion 

Holders’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Flanigan’s, 868 F.3d at 

1255. Consequently, we are obliged to vacate the judgment of the district court 

dismissing the Medallion Holders’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on 

the merits and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

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jurisdiction. Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1309–

10.

However, because the Medallion Holders also sought damages for their 

takings and equal protection claims, those claims are not moot. Covenant Christian 

Ministries, 654 F.3d at 1244; Adler, 112 F.3d at 1478. The prospect of recovering 

retrospective (monetary) relief for injuries allegedly inflicted on them by the 

County ensures a live controversy between the parties. We turn, therefore, to the 

merits of those claims. 

B.

The Medallion Holders say that the district court erroneously dismissed their 

takings claims because they lacked a property right in excluding competitors from 

the relevant market. It is undisputed that the Code characterized the medallions as 

“intangible property” and, before the TNE Ordinance’s passage, conditioned the 

provision of for-hire transportation services on the possession of a medallion. The 

Medallion Holders conclude that the Code vested in them “a legally protectable 

property right in exclusive provision of for-hire transportation services in MiamiDade County.” They urge that the County “took” their right to market exclusivity 

without just compensation by permitting TNEs to operate as competing for-hire 

transportation service providers.

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The Medallion Holders frame their takings claims under both the United 

States and Florida Constitutions. Florida’s courts have interpreted the Takings 

Clause of its Constitution “coextensively” with the Takings Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1222 

(Fla. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 570 U.S. 595 (2013). We therefore apply the 

same analysis to both claims. 

“[T]o state a Takings claim under [federal] law, a plaintiff must first 

demonstrate that he possesses a ‘property interest’ that is constitutionally 

protected. Only if the plaintiff actually possesses such an interest will a reviewing 

court then determine whether the deprivation or reduction of that interest 

constitutes a ‘taking.’” Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “[W]e are mindful of the basic axiom that property 

interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their 

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 

independent source such as state law.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 

986, 1001 (1984). That independent source must establish that the plaintiff has a 

“legitimate claim of entitlement” on which he may reasonably rely. Bd. of Regents 

of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). If the asserted property interest is 

created entirely by state statutory law, then it follows that the scope of the right 

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would be gleaned from the statute itself. See, e.g., id.; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985).

It is undisputed that the Medallion Holders own an intangible property 

interest in their medallions. We must decide whether that interest includes the right 

to market exclusivity. If the Code did not convey to the Medallion Holders the 

right to block competition in the for-hire transportation market, then the County 

could not have “taken” that right and the Medallion Holders’ takings claims must 

fail. Even the most cursory examination of the Code reveals that the County did 

not give the Medallion Holders the right to enjoin competition. None of the Code’s 

provisions ever explicitly or implicitly conferred that right. Instead, the Code 

reflects the carefully cabined scope of the Medallion Holders’ intangible property 

interest. Moreover, the right to property does not ordinarily encompass the power 

to exclude competition, and nothing in the Code signaled a contrary intent.

The Code delineated the rights conveyed. The 1998 Ordinance defined a 

“medallion” as “an annual, renewable license issued pursuant to this Article which 

authorizes the provision of for-hire transportation services and,” notably, “which 

may expire, be suspended or revoked.” Miami-Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 

98-105, § 31-81(r), (z) (Aug. 17, 1998). The medallions conveyed only a property 

interest in providing taxicab services in Miami-Dade County -- not in barring 

competitors. See Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 839 F.3d 613, 

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616 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The taxi permits issued by the Milwaukee city government 

are property, but have not been ‘taken,’ as they do not confer on the holders a 

property right in, amounting to control over, all transportation by taxi and taxi 

substitutes (such as Uber) in Milwaukee.”). Quite simply, the Code furnished no 

basis for the Medallion Holders’ assertion that they were entitled to, or could 

reasonably rely on a competition-free marketplace. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.

Indeed, the medallions were heavily regulated and narrowly circumscribed 

by County law. The Code regulated medallion holder entry and renewal; the 

number of medallions in circulation; the issuance of additional medallions; 

taxicab-driver eligibility; rules of operation; transfers, sales, bequests, and 

forfeiture of medallions; fares and rates; insurance requirements; vehicle standards 

and inspections; vehicle age; suspension and revocation of licenses; and penalties 

for violations. See generally, e.g., Ordinance No. 16-43 (May 20, 2016). These 

pervasive restrictions in no way revealed an intent to imbue the medallions with 

monopoly power. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006–07 (because plaintiff 

participated in an industry that had “long been the source of public concern and the 

subject of government regulation,” it could not reasonably expect to operate free 

from regulations that constricted the scope of its property interests). The 

medallions granted only the right to operate taxicabs.

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The Code’s designation of the medallions as “intangible property” does not 

suggest otherwise. “Property” typically entails the right to possess, use, and 

dispose of that which one owns. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 

458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“Property rights in a physical thing have been described 

as the rights to possess, use and dispose of it.”) (quotations omitted). However, 

ordinarily, “‘[p]roperty’ does not include a right to be free from competition.” Ill. 

Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2016); see 

also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent 

Domain 112 (1985) (“As a constitutional matter, one end that falls outside the 

scope of the takings clause is the redress of competitive losses that are not 

actionable in principle at the instance of the aggrieved victims.”). The Code’s 

characterization of the medallions as “intangible property” permits the Medallion 

Holders to possess, use, and dispose of their medallions -- that is, their right to 

operate in the for-hire transportation market -- subject to constraints imposed by 

the County. It does not remotely imply, however, that they may exclude 

competitors from entering that market.

The Medallion Holders stress that, before the enactment of the TNE 

Ordinance, the County permitted only medallion holders to provide for-hire 

transportation services, and generally restricted the overall number of medallions 

in circulation. They argue that their exclusive privilege to operate in the market 

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between 1998 and 2016 created a reasonable expectation of, and thus a property 

right to monopoly power in perpetuity. Again, an examination of County law and 

practice suggests quite the opposite.

For starters, any expectation of exclusivity was unreasonable. “[I]n the case 

of personal property, by reason of the State’s traditionally high degree of control 

over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new 

regulation might even render his property economically worthless.” Lucas v. S.C. 

Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992). Miami-Dade County notified all 

medallion holders that any market exclusivity could be eliminated by regulation. 

When the County established the medallion system, it explicitly reserved the 

prerogative to “authorize . . . additional for-hire licenses . . . with such 

modifications or upon such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public 

convenience and necessity may require.” Ordinance No. 98-105, § 31-82(e) 

(emphasis added). And since that time, the County has issued some 300 new 

medallions. Miami-Dade County, Fla., Ordinance Nos. 98-105 (Aug. 17, 1998); 

01-67 (Apr. 20, 2001); 04-103 (June 28, 2004); 06-111 (Apr. 20, 2006); 08-139 

(Apr. 16, 2009); 11-53 (Dec. 13, 2011); 11-54 (Dec. 13, 2011); 12-51 (June 26, 

2012). The County repeatedly exercised its express authority to issue new 

medallions, and the Medallion Holders concede that they were powerless to 

exclude competition from fellow taxi drivers. Likewise, we do not see how they 

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reasonably could have expected to retain the right to block new entrants into the 

market. See Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n, 839 F.3d at 597.

Moreover, the main purpose behind the County’s medallion policy was not 

to enrich medallion holders, but rather to enhance consumer welfare. The County 

sought to “license and regulate the use of [for-hire transportation] vehicles to 

assure the passengers thereof, as well as others utilizing the streets of Miami-Dade 

County, that the vehicles are fit and that their operators and chauffeurs are 

competent to provide such services,” and “to improve the quality, efficiency and 

economy of for-hire [transportation] service.” Ordinance No. 00-139 (Dec. 14, 

2000). The County hoped that the medallion system would serve as “an incentive 

for the taxi driver, who frequently constitutes a traveler’s first and last impression 

of Miami-Dade County, to provide courteous, safe and efficient transportation 

service” in a very busy tourist destination. Ordinance No. 98-105. It was entirely 

foreseeable that the County might erode those restrictions if consumer welfare (and 

demographic changes) demanded it. Once “new technologies, including [TNE] 

reservation and dispatch applications for wireless devices [were] developed to 

permit . . . more efficient reservation, dispatch, payment and utilization of for-hire 

vehicles,” the Medallion Holders should have anticipated that the County would 

authorize the TNEs’ market entry in order to benefit consumers, particularly since 

they have “become extremely popular across the United States.” Ordinance No. 

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16-42. The Medallion Holders’ claim to a perpetual monopoly based on historical 

exclusivity is unpersuasive.

The Medallion Holders also insist that their designation as “intangible 

property” necessarily entails the “right to exclude others,” which is “‘one of the 

most essential sticks’ in the bundle of rights that make up ‘property.’” While the 

right to exclude is a corollary of the right to possess, a property holder may 

exercise the right to exclude only respecting his own property. See Rakas v. 

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). The Medallion Holders may exclude others 

from possessing, using, or disposing of their medallions. But the “right to exclude” 

does not sanction the creation of a market stranglehold.

Similarly, the Medallion Holders cite to their right to freely alienate their 

medallions. Again, the argument sweeps too broadly. While the right to alienability 

is commonly associated with property, blocking competitors, we repeat, is not. 

Compare Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (noting the 

“fundamental maxim of property law that the owner of a property interest may 

dispose of all or part of that interest as he sees fit”), with Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n, 

839 F.3d at 596 (“‘Property’ does not include a right to be free from 

competition.”). Nothing found in the ability to freely alienate one’s own property 

even remotely implies the right to block others from using their own property to 

compete in the marketplace.

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Moreover, the Medallion Holders overstate their right to alienate their 

medallions. The 1998 Ordinance expressly restricted the medallions’ alienability, 

providing, “No new for-hire taxicab license shall be assigned, sold or transferred 

during the five (5) year period following the issuance of said license,” and 

expressly reserved the power to revoke an unlawfully alienated medallion. 

Ordinance No. 98-105, § 31-82(q)(4). The 1998 Ordinance continued this way: 

“Transfer of a taxicab license may be accomplished by purchase, gift, bequest or 

operation of law, and is subject to the written approval of [the Department],” and 

“[n]o for-hire taxicab license shall be assigned, sold (either outright or under a 

conditional sales contract) or transferred without prior approval of [the 

Department].” Id. § 31-82(r). Indeed, one of the 1998 Ordinance’s key reforms was 

to confine the medallions’ alienation to County-registered taxicab chauffeurs. Far 

from suggesting a right to market dominance, the Code’s alienation provisions 

established that the property rights created by the County were carefully calibrated.

The Medallion Holders also cite to a June 2, 2014 letter written by County 

Mayor Carlos A. Gimenez to Jorge Luis Lopez, Lyft’s counsel and registered 

lobbyist, in support of their claim. The Mayor said this:

I am writing you to underscore our conversation concerning the 

County’s for-hire transportation ordinances. Although we may share 

the desire to include on-demand electronic dispatch vehicles into 

future options we provide our community, currently Chapter 31 of the 

Miami-Dade County Code . . . does not allow operation of an 

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unlicensed vehicle providing for-hire services through electronic 

dispatch. 

The letter simply reflected the state of County law in 2014, before the County’s 

2016 promulgation of the TNE Ordinance. It did no more than inform Lyft’s 

lobbyist that the County’s prohibition against TNEs would be enforced. It said 

nothing about medallion holders, let alone establish that the Medallion Holders had 

the power to exclude competition. Nor could it alter or expand whatever rights the 

Code had conferred upon medallion holders. 

Finally, as best we can tell, no case precedent supports the Medallion 

Holders’ theory of exclusivity. What caselaw we can find overwhelmingly holds 

that taxicab medallion holders do not have a property right to bar competitors from 

entering the market. See, e.g., Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n, 839 F.3d at 596; 

Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. v. Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 

2009) (“Even if there is a property interest in a particular license, a takings claim 

cannot be supported by asserting ownership in a property interest that is different 

and more expansive than the one actually possessed.”) (quotations omitted); Joe 

Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc., 839 F.3d at 616. Indeed, in Illinois Transportation Trade 

Association v. Chicago, 839 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit 

dismissed precisely the same takings claim urged upon us. It rejected the theory 

that, by admitting TNEs into the for-hire transportation market, the City “took” the 

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taxicabs’ medallions without just compensation. Id. at 596–97. The court put it this 

way:

When property consists of a license to operate in a market in a particular 

way, it does not carry with it a right to be free from competition in that 

market. . . . Taxi medallions authorize the owners to own and operate taxis, 

not to exclude competing transportation services. The plaintiffs in this case 

cannot exclude competition from buses or trains or bicycles or liveries or 

chartered sightseeing vehicles or jitney buses or walking; indeed they cannot 

exclude competition from taxicab newcomers, for the City has reserved the 

right (which the plaintiffs don’t challenge) to issue additional taxi 

medallions.

Id.

1

The Medallion Holders’ intangible property did not include the right to bar 

competition and the district court properly dismissed their takings claims. 

C.

The Medallion Holders also say that the TNE Ordinance violated their right 

to the equal protection of the laws under both the United States and Florida 

 1 The Medallion Holders cite to a recent district court opinion coming out of Philadelphia. 

Checker Cab Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, No. CV 16-4669, 2017 WL 

2461980 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2017). There, some medallion-holding taxicab operators alleged that 

the admission of TNEs into Philadelphia’s for-hire transportation market effected a “taking” of 

their medallions. Id. at *6–7. The government moved to dismiss the claim, but the district court 

denied the motion. Id. However, the court grounded its ruling on Pennsylvania law, which 

capped the overall number of medallions. Id. at *7 (citing 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5711(c)(2) (2017)

(limiting the total number of authorized medallions to 1,600 before June 1, 2013, and 1,750 after 

June 1, 2013)). In this case, the Medallion Holders do not, and could not, allege that the TNE 

Ordinance imposed a similar ceiling on the number of medallions that the County could issue. 

Indeed, the TNE Ordinance expressly allowed the County to “authorize . . . additional for-hire 

licenses . . . with such modifications or upon such terms and conditions as in its judgment the 

public convenience and necessity may require.” Ordinance No. 98-105, § 31-82(e). And the 

County repeatedly exercised its authority to issue new medallions. The Checker Cab 

Philadelphia case is factually distinguishable. It is not binding precedent. And it does not alter 

our view that the states’ regulatory power includes the power to alter, modify, or limit the 

number of taxicab medallions issued. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28. 

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Constitutions. They contend that the TNE Ordinance “created separate sets of 

regulations for the taxicab industry and the TNEs, resulting in unfair and arbitrary 

disparities between groups engaged in identical business activities, i.e. the business 

of providing transportation services to the public in exchange for payment.” They 

point to discrepancies in taxicab and TNE regulations regarding chauffeur 

agreements, insurance requirements, vehicle inspections, and fare charges, and 

claim that those discrepancies systematically disadvantaged taxicabs. We remain 

unpersuaded.

In the absence of any allegation that the government discriminated on the 

basis of a suspect classification, including race, alienage, national origin, gender, 

or illegitimacy, we evaluate equal protection claims under rational basis review 

and ask only whether “the challenged statutes or ordinances [are] rationally related 

to the achievement of some legitimate government purpose.” Haves v. Miami, 52 

F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995). A challenged ordinance will survive rational basis 

review if it could have been directed toward some legitimate government purpose, 

even if that purpose did not actually motivate the enacting legislature. Id. The 

ordinance will likewise overcome rational basis review if it is not so attenuated 

from that purpose as to be “arbitrary or irrational.” Id. at 922. “[T]hose attacking 

the rationality of [a] legislative classification have the burden to negate every 

conceivable basis which might support it.” Id. (quotations omitted). Not 

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surprisingly, rational basis scrutiny is “easily met.” Lieb v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub. 

Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Williams v. 

Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the Florida Constitution’s 

equal protection clause overlaps entirely with its federal counterpart. Sasso v. Ram 

Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204, 211 (Fla. App. 1983) (in assessing an equal 

protection question, Florida courts “use federal authority as a guide because of the 

parallel commands of the federal and Florida constitutions”), approved, 452 So. 2d 

932 (Fla. 1984).

The Medallion Holders neither assert that the TNE Ordinance employed a 

suspect classification nor dispute the applicability of rational basis review. Under 

that standard, their equal protection claims fail for two reasons: first, they overstate 

the differences in the regulatory treatment afforded taxicabs and TNEs; and, 

second, those regulatory distinctions that were significant were rationally related to 

legitimate government interests.

1.

The Medallion Holders say that the County regulated taxicabs more 

stringently than TNEs regarding insurance requirements, background checks, and 

vehicle inspections. The argument is refuted by the text of the Code. For starters, 

the Medallion Holders claim that the County subjected them to insurance 

requirements that were more onerous than those imposed on TNEs. In fact, the 

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Code prescribed virtually parallel standards for taxicabs and TNEs. It required that 

taxicabs carry an automobile policy with liability limits no less than those required 

by state law. Ordinance No. 16-43, § 31-88(a) (May 20, 2016). Florida law 

required a policy with limits of $125,000/250,000/50,000 that was issued by an 

insurer belonging to the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association. Fla. Stat. 

§§ 324.031–032(1)(a) (2018). Likewise, TNEs were obliged to satisfy “all of the 

applicable insurance provisions of State law” and to “provide supplemental 

insurance for each [TNE] driver and [TNE] vehicle” of “at least $125,000 per 

person for death or bodily injury; $250,000 per incident for death or bodily injury; 

and $50,000 per incident for property damage; or a combined single limit of 

$300,000 per incident.” Ordinance No. 16-42, § 31-707(a) (May 18, 2016). 

Moreover, the County prohibited TNEs from operating without “first 

obtain[ing] and fil[ing] with the Department a certificate of insurance 

demonstrating compliance with Florida insurance laws,” and threatened to sanction 

noncompliance through license revocation. Id. § 31-707(b). Although TNEs could 

certify that their vehicles complied with insurance requirements, while taxicabs 

were required to furnish the Department with specific evidence of adequate 

insurance coverage, the Department nonetheless reserved the right to audit TNEs 

in order to verify compliance. Id. § 31-705(i). Any differences found in taxicabs’ 

and TNEs’ insurance requirements were de minimis. And it was rational for the 

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County to experiment with various manners of enforcement on different service 

providers.

The Medallion Holders also claim that the County subjected them to more 

burdensome background-check requirements than TNEs. Again, their claim is 

belied by the Code, which imposed essentially identical requirements on each. 

Compare Ordinance No. 16-43, § 31-82(d) (requirements for taxicabs), with

Miami-Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 16-42, §§ 31-702(d), 31-703(c) 

(requirements for TNEs). The Code barred from taxicab license eligibility those 

who misrepresented material facts on their applications; were unauthorized to work 

in the United States; or had been convicted of, or pleaded nolo contendere to, a 

felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude relating to sex within the last 

five years. Ordinance No. 16-43, § 31-82(d). The Code applied the same 

prohibitions to TNEs. Ordinance No. 16-42, §§ 31-702(d), 31-703(c).

The Medallion Holders observe, however, that, while the Code permitted 

TNEs to conduct their own independent background checks, it required Medallion 

Holders to submit to Department inspections. Again, the Code’s text largely rebuts 

the claim, since it allowed medallion holders “to authorize a person to operate a 

taxicab as a certified driver . . . after the for-hire taxicab license holder . . . has 

conducted a local, state and national criminal background check through a 

Department approved agency.” Ordinance No. 16-43, § 31-93(f). There, too, the 

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County’s treatment of taxicabs and TNEs was nearly identical, and cannot support 

an equal protection claim. Ordinance No. 16-42, § 31-702(q).

As for vehicle inspections, once again, the Code applied substantially similar 

rules to taxicabs and TNEs. Compare Ordinance No. 16-43, § 31-93(g), with

Ordinance No. 16-42, § 31-708(f). Contrary to the Medallion Holders’ claims, the 

Code permitted both taxicabs and TNEs to undergo independent inspections. 

Ordinance No. 16-43, § 31-93(g). And even though only taxicabs were required to 

submit proof of inspection to the Department, TNEs were obliged to “present and 

submit on demand a copy of the completed inspection form which shall be in [the] 

vehicle.” Ordinance No. 16-42, § 31-708(f). There too, the County’s regulation of 

taxicabs and TNEs was sufficiently consistent to overcome an equal protection 

challenge.

2.

To be sure, some of the County’s regulations of taxicabs were more 

burdensome than those imposed on TNEs. Yet each was rationally related to a 

legitimate government interest. Thus, for example, the Code required only 

medallion holders, but not TNEs, to enter into a written chauffeur’s agreement 

with each taxicab driver. However, unlike TNE licenses, medallions are limited 

intangible personal property. Ordinance No. 98-105, § 31-81(aa) (Aug. 17, 1998). 

Thus, taxicab drivers who did not own a medallion were required to lease the right 

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to operate a taxicab from a medallion holder, which required payment of lease fees 

and security deposits. Id. § 31-82(j)(13). The chauffeur-agreement requirement 

protected taxicab drivers from predatory practices by requiring the medallion 

holder to “state and itemize the compensation to be paid by the chauffeur,” 

including “the amount of compensation that is attributable to the lease, insurance, 

dispatch and deposits, if any.” Id. § 31-82(j)(13)(d). The requirement also 

prohibited the medallion holder from “receiv[ing] any compensation from the 

chauffeur which [was] not specified in the existing chauffeur’s agreement.” Id. 

In contrast, since TNE drivers generally used their own vehicles, they did 

not have to enter into leases or pay security deposits and other fees in order to 

operate in the market. Furthermore, the series of memorialized receipts generated 

through TNEs’ digital platforms rendered the drivers’ compensation more 

transparent. Ordinance No. 16-42, § 31-702(l)(17). The business relationship 

between TNEs and their drivers differed substantially from the one between 

medallion holders and taxicab chauffeurs; mandatory chauffeur agreements were 

not necessary to protect TNE drivers against predation. The County’s imposition of 

the chauffeur-agreement requirement on taxicabs, but not on TNEs, was rationally 

related to a legitimate governmental interest.

The Medallion Holders also point to disparities found in the County’s 

vehicle appearance regulations. The 2016 Ordinance required taxicabs to “be free 

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of grime, oil or other substances and free from cracks, breaks, dents and damaged 

paint that detracts from the overall appearance of the vehicle”; that the vehicles be 

“[e]quipped with hubcaps or wheelcovers on all four (4) wheels”; that “[t]he 

interior of the trunk, or rear portion of for-hire vehicles, . . . be free from dirt, 

grime, oil, trash, or other material which could soil items placed therein”; and that 

“the passenger compartment . . . be clean, free from torn upholstery or floor 

coverings, damaged or broken seats, and protruding sharp edges.” Ordinance 16-

43, § 31-89(a)(9), (11)–(12). On the other hand, the TNE Ordinance required only 

that all TNE vehicles “be kept clean and orderly during all times of active service.” 

Ordinance No. 16-42, § 31-708(a). 

The different treatment of taxicabs and TNEs was supported by a rational 

foundation. Directing the use of property toward certain aesthetic ends -- especially 

property that is uniquely reflective of the surrounding polity -- is a legitimate 

government interest. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 

131 (1978). Taxicabs are typically associated with the County. Consequently, the 

County required taxicab companies to maintain scrupulously clean vehicles in 

order to reflect a positive image for the County. By contrast, because TNE vehicles 

are primarily personal, the County was understandably less concerned with their 

appearance. Moreover, by their nature, taxicabs are always associated with the 

transportation of individuals for hire and, therefore, must maintain a clean 

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appearance at all times. In contrast, the TNE vehicles are primarily personal 

vehicles used only some of the time in the for-hire transportation business. 

Finally, although the County regulated taxicab fares more stringently than 

TNE rates, that disparity was also rational. While the County established price 

ceilings for taxicab fares, it enabled TNEs to set their own rates “based on distance 

traveled and/or time elapsed during service, a flat prearranged rate or a suggested 

donation.” Compare Ordinance No. 16-43, § 31-87(C)(5), with Ordinance No. 16-

42, § 31-706. Taxicabs’ and TNEs’ distinct business models justified that 

regulatory divergence. Taxicabs operate primarily through street hails. Since 

passengers usually cannot confirm ride prices before hailing a cab, price ceilings 

were rationally related to protecting passengers from predatory fares. On the other 

hand, TNEs provide customers with cost and driver data before any contract is 

struck, and enable customers to shop among providers before summoning a ride. 

Since market forces disciplined TNE rates more effectively than taxicab fares, the 

County rationally intervened to establish taxicab price ceilings. Furthermore, those 

price ceilings did not competitively disadvantage medallion holders, since they did 

not bar them from undercutting TNE prices. “There are enough differences 

between taxi service and [TNE] service to justify different regulatory schemes, and 

the existence of such justification dissolve[s] the plaintiffs’ equal protection 

claim[s].” Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n, 839 F.3d at 598–99.

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The long and short of it is that the Medallion Holders’ constitutional claims 

fail. Their takings claims falter because they cannot lay claim to a property interest 

that includes the power to block competitors from the for-hire transportation 

market. And their equal protection claims fail because any disparate regulatory 

treatment that the County afforded taxicabs and TNEs was amply supported by 

legitimate government interests. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.2

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART 

 2 The Medallion Holders also claim that the district court erred in denying them leave to amend 

their complaint on the ground that amendment would be futile. Amendment would be futile if the 

complaint, as amended, would still be subject to dismissal. Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 

1310 (11th Cir. 2007). Requests for leave to amend “should either set forth the substance of the 

proposed amendment or attach a copy of the proposed amendment.” Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 

1279 (11th Cir. 1999). The Medallion Holders seek leave to amend based only on the arguments 

already aired in their briefs. Permitting leave to amend to reprise the same arguments could only 

be futile. The district court properly denied leave. 

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