[Cite as In re S.T. , 2020-Ohio-8.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY IN THE MATTER OF: S.T., III : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case Nos. 2019-CA-23 and 2019-CA-34

Trial Court Case No. B48241(Appeal from Common Pleas CourtJuvenile Division)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 3rd day of January, 2020.

. . . . . . . . . . . NATHANIEL R. LUKEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0087864, Assistant Prosecuti ng Attorney, Greene County Prosecutor’s Office, 55 Greene Street, First Floor, Xeni a, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Appellee, Greene County Children Services Board SEAN BRINKMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0088253, 10 West Monument Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Appellant, Mother ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Atty. Reg. 0067714, No. P.O. Box 340214, B eavercreek, Ohio 45434 Attorney for Appellant, Father

. . . . . . . . . . . . . DONOVAN, J.-2- {¶ 1} Appellants Father and Mother appeal from a judgment of the Gree ne County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating their par ental rights and granting permanent custody of their child, S.T., to Greene County Childr en Services (“GCCS”). Mother filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on May 2 0, 2019. Father filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on May 31, 2019. {¶ 2} The record establishes that S.T. was born on June 6, 2009. Mot her and Father never married, nor did they live together. Prior to his removal, S.T. had been in the sole physical custody of Mother since he was nine months ol d. Father had not seen

S.T. since the child was nine months old and did not have a rel ationship with him. {¶ 3} After a report of unsafe conditions at Mother’s residence, whic h had been condemned, GCCS contacted the juvenile court on June 20, 2017, and requested emergency custody of S.T., which the magistrate granted. 1 On June 21, 2017, GCCS filed a complaint alleging that S.T. was abused, neglected, and dependent. After a shelter care hearing on the same day, the magistrate awarded GC CS interim custody of S.T., finding that reasonable efforts had been made by GCCS to prevent removal of the child from the home, to eliminate the continual removal from th e home, and to make it possible for the child to return home. {¶ 4} At an adjudication hearing on July 18, 2017, the magistrate fou nd S.T. to be an “endangered child” pursuant to R.C. 2919.22. The magistrate also found that S.T. was abused, neglected, and dependent. A dispositional hearing was held on August 31, 2017, after which the magistrate made another reasonable effort finding on behalf of

1 As a result of the unsafe and hazardous conditions at Mother’s residence, both she and her boyfriend were arrested and charged with endangering childr en.-3- GCCS and granted the agency temporary custody of S.T. {¶ 5} We note that in the early pendency of the case, GCCS created a case plan for Mother and Father whereby they could address the issues tha t led to the removal of the children from their care. The initial case plan for Mother included the following: 1) sign all releases of information; 2) obtain and maintain secure, saf e, and stable housing; 3) perform household cleaning duties on a regular basis in order t o prevent hazards in the home; 4) continue with mental health appointments and take medi cations as prescribed; 5) regularly attend S.T.’s specialized medical and educational appointments; 6) develop a better understanding of S.T.’s various medications and diagno ses; 7) complete parenting classes; 8) undergo a parenting-psychological evaluat ion; and 8) demonstrate the ability to provide for S.T.’s basic needs. {¶ 6} GCCS caseworker Amanda Ray testified that prior to and during t he pendency of the instant case, Father resided out-of-state in Ke nt County, Michigan. Ray testified that Father could not be included in the case plan be cause he lived in another state. Nevertheless, GCCS provided Father with a list of objec tives for reunification with S.T.; which included the following: 1) sign all releases of inf ormation; 2) obtain and maintain secure, safe, and stable housing; 3) attend visitation s with S.T.; and 4) attend S.T.’s medical and educational appointments. In January 2018, GCCS became aware that Father’s other child, S.T.’s half-sibling, had been remove d from Father’s custody due to a report of domestic violence. Specifically, Father admitte d to Ray that he struck the mother of his other child “because that’s the only way she know s how to learn.” Tr. 293. Thereafter, Father’s list of objectives was expanded to include the following: 1) comply with the case plan created by the children’s services agency in Kent County, Michigan;-4- 2) attend parenting classes; 3) attend a domestic violence clas s and/or obtain a batterer’s

assessment. {¶ 7} On June 5, 2018, GCCS filed a motion requesting permanent custo dy of S.T. At a review hearing held on June 21, 2018, the juvenile court f ound that GCCS had made reasonable efforts with respect to S.T., Mother, and Father, an d ordered that S.T. remain in the temporary custody of GCCS pending the outcome of the per manent custody hearing. On July 31, 2018, Mother filed a motion for an extens ion of temporary custody. On August 17, 2018, Father filed a motion for legal custody of S.T., or in the alternative a motion for extension of temporary custody with GCCS. {¶ 8} A permanent custody hearing was held before the juvenile court over two days on August 30, 2018, and November 27, 2018. After hearing testimony from witnesses called by GCCS, Mother, and Father, and viewing the e vidence adduced by the parties, the juvenile court granted GCCS's motion for perma nent custody, thereby terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father. {¶ 9} It is from this judgment that Mother and Father separately appe al. Mother’s Appeal {¶ 10} Mother’s sole assignment of error is as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE EXPERT OPINION

TESTIMONY. {¶ 11} Mother contends that the trial court erred in permitting the ex pert opinion testimony of Dr. Casey Kelliher, the psychologist who conducted Mother’s parentingpsychological evaluation. Dr. Kelliher also testified as an ex pert in psychology and parenting evaluation without objection. Specifically, Mother a rgues that Dr. Kelliher’s-5- testimony should have been excluded “because his opinions were not to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty.” {¶ 12} Initially, we note that neither Mother nor Father objected at t he permanent custody hearing to the admission o f Dr. Kelliher's testimony, t o his qualifications, or to any failure to move for his designation as an expert. “Normally, t he failure to timely object at trial to allegedly inadmissible evidence waives all claims of e rror except for plain error.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Bahns , 185 Ohio App.3d 805, 2009-Ohio-5525, 925 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). Plain error does not exist “unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise. Notice of plain er ror under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumst ances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long , 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). After reviewing the record, we see no error or plain e rror justifying reversal based on Dr. Kelliher’s testimony. {¶ 13} Under Evid.R. 702, a witness may testify as an expert if “(A)Th e witness' testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or exp erience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons ; (B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experie nce, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony; and (C) The witn ess' testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical , or other specialized informatio n.” {¶ 14} It is well-established that an expert witness need not be the b est witness on the subject. Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr ., 56 Ohio St.2d 155, 159, 383 N.E.2d 564 (1978). “The test of admissibilit y is whether a particular wit ness offered as an expert will

aid the trier of fact in the search of the truth.” Ishler v. Miller , 56 Ohio St.2d 447, 453, 384-6- N.E.2d 296 (1978). {¶ 15} In Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. , 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998), the Supreme Court of Ohio designated the following four factors, ad opted from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), to be considered in evaluating the reliability of s cientific evidence: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has bee n subjected to peer review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error, and (4 ) whether the methodology has gained general acceptance. Miller at 611, citing Dauber t at 593-594. Both the United States Supreme Court in Daubert and the Supreme Court of Ohio in Miller emphasized

that none of the factors is determinative: ‘the focus is “solel y on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Miller at 613, citing Daubert at 595. “Thus, there is no requirement that an expert utter any ‘ magic language;’ i.e. that his opinion was within the reasonable degree of certainty or re asonable degree of certainty within the particular knowledge of his professional e xperience.” Coe v. Young , 145 Ohio App.3d 499, 504. 763 N.E.2d 652 (11th Dist.2001). {¶ 16} In the instant case, Dr. Kelliher provided factual testimony, n ot opinion testimony, regarding Mother’s actions and inactions with respec t to level of care she provided S.T. when he was in her custody. Specifically, Dr. Ke lliher testified regarding background information relayed to him by GCCS that Mother was i nconsistent in her administration of medications, regularly ran out of medications , was confused by the instructions for administering the medications, and that many o f S.T.’s medications in her home had expired. Dr. Kelliher testified about factual informa tion he received from S.T.’s school that Mother failed to give S.T.’s his medications prior to school. Additionally, Dr.-7- Kelliher testified that he received information that Mother had trouble providing S.T.’s

doctors and other staff with correct and reliable information r egarding the effectiveness of S.T.’s medications and/or if the medications were being admi nistered correctly. Mother herself testified that she had difficulties with getting S.T. to his medical appointments and had trouble administering his medications corr ectly. {¶ 17} With respect to the juvenile court’s discussion of Mother’s men tal health issues in its judgment entry, that information was available fr om Mother’s TCN Behavioral Health records, which were certified and admitted as Exhibit C. Furthermore, Mother testified that she missed several appointments with her TCN cou nselor and had not been taking her medications as prescribed. Ray testified that Mothe r also admitted that she often ran out of her medications, and was “halving” or quarteri ng the pills to make them last longer. There is no evidence in the record that the trial court improperlyreli ed upon any of Dr. Kelliher’s opinions w hen it recited Mother’s mental issues in the judgment entry. {¶ 18} The record also supports the trial court’s finding that Mother had “diminished parenting abilities,” irrespective of Dr. Kelliher’s testimony. While Dr. Kelliher ultimately testified that GCCS should be granted permanent custody of S.T. , the trial court did not cite to or specifically rely on Dr. Kelliher’s recommendation w hen it issued its judgment entry terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights. Appella te courts presume that a trial court only considered relevant and admissible evidence in a bench trial. See White

v. White , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013 CA 86, 2014-Ohio-1288, ¶ 11 (“when co nducting a bench trial, the trial court is presumed to have considered onl y admissible evidence unless the record indicates otherwise”). As previously stated, the record is replete with factual evidence, including the testimony of Mother regarding h er inability to provide-8- adequate care, which supported the juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody

of S.T. to GCCS. {¶ 19} Upon review, we conclude that to the extent Dr. Kelliher testif ied regarding his opinions but not to a reasonab le degree of psychological ce rtainty, the record fails to establish that the trial court relied on said opinions in any w ay in its findings of fact or in its decision to award GCCS permanent custody of S.T. Furthermo re, the majority of the factual information credited to Dr. Kelliher was also presented in the testimony of other witnesses such as Amanda Ray, a s well as indicated in exhibits that were admitted during the hearing. Accordingly, even if the juvenile court failed to disregard any of the improper opinion testimony of Dr. Kelliher, the error was harmless and c ertainly did not rise to the level of plain error. {¶ 20} Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled. Father’s Appeal {¶ 21} Father’s sole assignment of error is as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY OF

S.T. TO GCCS. {¶ 22} Father argues that the trial court erred when it awarded perman ent custody of S.T. to GCCS, thereby terminating his parental rights. Spec ifically, Father contends that the trial court erred when it found the following: 1) that S.T. could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time; 2) that Father abandoned S.T. pursuant to R.C. 2151.414; 3) that GCCS made reasonable efforts to prevent the c ontinued removal of S.T. from Father; and 4) that a grant of permanent custody to G CCS was in S.T.’s best

interest.-9- {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court has described the interest of p arents in the care, custody, and control of their children as “perhaps th e oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). The Ohio Supreme Court has recogn ized that “there is an essential and basic civil right to conceive and raise children. ” In re K.H ., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 39. However, “[t]he fund amental interest of parents is not absolute.” In re D.A ., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 11. “The state has broad authority to intervene to protect c hildren from abuse and neglect.” State ex rel. Allen Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer Cty. Common Pleas Court,

Prob. Div ., 150 Ohio St.3d 230, 2016-Ohio-7382, 81 N.E.3d 380 ¶ 58 (O'Co nnor, C.J., dissenting), citing In re C.F ., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 28. {¶ 24} The termination of parental rights is governed by R.C. 2151.414 . Division (B)(1) of that statute requires a court to determine, “by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody,” and that c ertain other conditions apply. Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “ ‘th at measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence, ” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases,’ ” and which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact “ ‘a firm b elief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” In re K.H . at ¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 25} A court's decision to terminate parental rights will not be ove rturned “if the record contains competent, credible evidence by which the court could have formed a-10- firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory elements for a termination of parental rights have been established.” (Citations omitted.) In re A.U ., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22264, 2008-Ohio-186, ¶ 15. “We review the trial court's judgm ent for an abuse of

discretion.” In re L.C ., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010 CA 90, 2011-Ohio-2066, ¶ 14, citing In re

C.F . at ¶ 48 (applying the abuse-of-discretion standard to trial c ourt's findings under R.C. 2151.414).

Placement with Father within a Reasonable Time {¶ 26} A two-part test applies to determine whether to grant a public children services agency's motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(B )(1) provides that a court may grant permanent custody if it clearly and convincingl y finds that (1) the child's best interest lies in granting permanent custody to the agency, and (2) any of the statutory alternatives apply, one of which is that the child has been aba ndoned pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b). {¶ 27} R.C. 2151.414 provides in relevant part as follows: (B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, t he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court det ermines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by c lear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the chi ld to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the mot ion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or pri vate child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twe nty-two--11- month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one o r more public children services agencies or private child placing agen cies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child' s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's pare nts. (b) The child is abandoned.

* * * R.C. 2151.011(C) provides that “a child shall be presumed aband oned when the parents

of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days.” {¶ 28} R.C. 2151.414 further provides: (E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) o f this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of t he Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the pare nts, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151. 353 of the Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with-12- either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent: (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's ho me and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts b y the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially cau sed the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuous ly and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the c hild to be placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the par ents have substantially remedied those cond itions, the court shall consid er parental utilization of medical, psychiat ric, psychological, and other s ocial and

rehabilitative services and materi al resources that were made a vailable to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to all ow them to resume and maintain parental duties.

* * * (10) The parent has abandoned the child. {¶ 29} As previously stated, Father admitted during his testimony that he had no

contact with S.T. since 2010 when the child was nine months old . Father testified that

this was because Mother had moved with the child to Ohio in 201 0 without providing him any contact information, leaving Father unable to contact S.T. for five years after Mother moved. Conversely, Mother testified that Father was fully awar e of the location of her residence in Ohio since she had to obtain permission from a Mic higan court in order to

relocate to Ohio. Mother further testified that Father was adv ised of the location of her new Ohio residence through the Michigan court process. Further more, Mother testified-13- that while there was never any face-to-face contact between Fat her and S.T. during this time period, there were some phone calls and video chats, “but not very many.” {¶ 30} Additionally, Father testified that he was unable to miss work in order to drive to Ohio to visit S.T. However, Father later conceded tha t he did in fact have time to visit from June 2017 until March 2018, during which time he was unemployed. Although the Visitation Center charged a fee for visiting S.T., GCCS offered Father gas cards to make the trip to Ohio, of which he never took advantag e. Even though he was not on the case plan because he lived in another state, GCCS al so continually informed him of S.T.’s medical and educational appointments, which he fa iled to attend. Furthermore, when Father was provided the opportunity to attend visits with S.T. scheduled around the court hearings in the instant case (which he did attend), Father failed to avail himself of the opportunity to meet with his son

. {¶ 31} In its judgment entry granting permanent custody of S.T. to GCC S, the juvenile court stated the following in relevant part: The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that [S.T.], is an abandoned child pursuant to O.R.C. § 2151.414(B)(1)(b), as defi ned in O.R.C. § 2151.011(C). The Court further finds that GCCS has ha d continuous custody of [S.T.], since June 20, 2017, thus satisfy ing O.R.C. § 21511.414(B)(1)(a). * * * {¶ 32} When making a determination regarding whether a minor child can be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, one of the facto rs the court is to consider is whether the parent has abandoned the child. R.C. 2151.414(E) (10). In the instant case, the evidence adduced at the custody hearing established t hat Father had little to-14- no contact with S.T. since the child was nine months old. Addi tionally, during the course of the instant proceedings, when Father was provided the opport unity to visit with and attempt to form a bond with S.T., he failed to avail himself of the opportunity in every instance. We note that the juvenile court explicitly found the relationship between Father and S.T. to be “nonexistent.” Judgment Entry p. 3. Furthermore , the record establishes that Father failed to obtain and maintain stable housing, and t hat during the pendency of this case, Father had another child removed from his home becau se of domestic violence allegations against him. Having reviewed all the evidence, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court's determination that Father abandoned S.T. was u nsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, the trial court did not err when it found that S.T. could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time. Whether GCCS made reasonable efforts to prevent the continued r emoval

of S.T. from Father {¶ 33} Here, Father argues that the record establishes that GCCS faile d to make reasonable efforts to prevent the continued removal of S.T. Wi th regard to the reunification requirement, this Court noted as follows: * * * “Reasonable efforts are described as being a good faith e ffort which is ‘an honest, purposeful effort, free of malice and the desire to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.’ ” In re Cranford (July 24, 1998), Montgomery App. Nos. 17085 and 17105, citing In re Weaver (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 59, 606 N.E.2d 1011. “The issue is not whether [the agency] could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the ‘reasonableness’ standard under the statute.” [Citation omitted ].-15- In re Secrest , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19377, 2002-Ohio-7096, ¶ 13. {¶ 34} Initially, we note that “[b]y its terms, R.C. 2151.419 applies only at hearings held pursuant to R.C. 2151.28, 2151.31(E), 2151.314, 2151.33, o r 2151.353. See R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).” In re C.F ., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, at ¶ 41. The statute makes no reference to a hearing on a motion for per manent custody. Id

. Therefore, “[b]y its plain terms, the statute does not apply to motions for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or to hearings held on such motions pursuant

to R.C. 2151.414.” Id ., citing In re A.C. , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2004-05-041, 2004- Ohio-5531. Accordingly, GCCS was not required to adduce eviden ce establishing reasonable efforts to reunify the family during the permanent c ustody hearing if the record established that GGCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the fa mily during prior custody proceedings. Id. at ¶ 43. {¶ 35} In the instant case, the record establishes that GCCS made reas onable efforts to prevent the continued removal of S.T. and to reunify the family at proceedings which were held prior to the permanent custody hearing: the she lter care hearing, (Entry, June 6, 2017); the dispositional hearing (Magistrate’s Decision , August 31, 2017); and the review hearing (Magistrate’s Decision, June 21, 2018). The refore, the GCCS was not required to establish at the permanent custody hearing that it made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of S.T. from Father. See In re C.F. at ¶ 43. {¶ 36} Nevertheless, even though it was under no requirement to do so, GCCS still presented competent and credible evidence at the permanent cust ody hearing that it had made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of S.T. from bot h Mother and Father. Specifically, GCCS created a case plan for Mother which include d the following: 1) sign-16- all releases of information; 2) obtain and maintain secure, saf e, and stable housing; 3) perform household cleaning duties on a regular basis in order t o prevent hazards in the home; 4) continue with her mental health appointments and take her medications as prescribed; 5) regularly attend S.T.’s specialized medical and educational appointments; 6) develop a better understanding of S.T.’s various medications and diagnoses; 7) complete parenting classes; 8) undergo a parenting-psychologica l evaluation; and 8) demonstrate the ability to provide for S.T.’s basic needs. {¶ 37} Even though Father lived out-of-state and was not included in t he case plan, GCCS provided Father with a list of objectives for reunificatio n with S.T. which included the following: 1) sign all releases of information; 2) obtain a nd maintain secure, safe, and stable housing; 3) attend visitations with S.T.; and 4) attend S.T.’s medical and educational appointments. When GCCS became aware that Father’s other child had been removed from Father’s custody due to a report of domestic violence, Father’s list of objectives was expanded to include the following: 1) comply wit h the case plan created by the children’s services agency in Kent County, Michigan; 2) attend parenting classes; 3) attend a domestic violence class and/or obtain a batterer’s assessment. {¶ 38} Father argues that GCCS did not do enough to facilitate visitat ion with S.T. because he lived out-of-state and could not afford the $75 fee at the Visitation Center. Father also asserts that GCCS did not give him any gas cards to travel to Ohio to visit S.T. However, Amanda Ray testified that she personally offered to give gas cards to

Father so that he could visit S.T. and attend the child medical and educational appointments. “ ‘Reasonable efforts’ does not mean all availab le efforts. Otherwise, there would always be an argument that one more additional serv ice, no matter how-17- remote, may have made reunification possible.” In re A.T. , 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 28332 and 28355, 2019-Ohio-3527, ¶ 74, quoting In re K.M. , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA 2004-02-052, 2004-Ohio-4152, ¶ 23. {¶ 39} Upon review, we conclude that the record establishes that GCCS did make reasonable efforts to reunify the family prior to moving for pe rmanent custody of S.T. Father failed to establish that GCCS could have made any additi onal efforts to reunify him with S.T., especially when Father made no effort to facilit ate even a single visit with S.T. Thus, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding th at GCCS made reasonable efforts to prevent the continued removal of S.T. and reunify th e child with Father. Whether Permanent Custody to GCCS was in S.T.’s Best Interest {¶ 40} In determining a child's best interest, R.C. 2151.414 instructs courts to consider “all relevant factors,” including five statutory facto rs: (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custodial history of the child * * *; (d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement a nd whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of perma nent custody to the agency; (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of t his section apply in relation to the parents and child.-18- R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). “No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance.” In re C.F. , 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 57. The juvenile court here considered each of these factors. {¶ 41} The evidence adduced at the permanent custody hearing supported the juvenile court’s finding that Mother’s relationship with S.T. w as “dysfunctional.” Judgment Entry p. 3. Based upon her own personal observations, Ray test ified that Mother’s relationship with S.T. reflected “more of two children than it is of a parent and child,” thereby requiring constant supervision. As previously stated, Dr. Kelliher testified regarding background information relayed to him by GCCS that Mo ther was inconsistent in her administration of medications, regularly ran out of medi cations, was confused by the instructions for administering the medications, and that ma ny of S.T.’s medications in her home had expired. Dr. Kelliher testified about factual inf ormation he received from S.T.’s school that Mother failed to give S.T. his medications p rior to school. Additionally,

Dr. Kelliher testified that he received information that Mother had trouble providing S.T.’s

doctors and other staff with correct and reliable information r egarding the effectiveness of S.T.’s medications and/or if the medications were being admi nistered correctly. {¶ 42} Mother herself testified that she had difficulties with getting S.T. to his medical appointments and had trouble administering his medicati ons correctly. Mother also testified that she missed several appointments with her TC N counselor and had not been taking her medications as prescribed. Ray testified that Mother also admitted that she often ran out of her medications, and was “halving” or quar tering the pills to make them last longer. {¶ 43} With respect to Father, the record established that Father had no contact-19- with S.T. since 2010 when the child was nine months old and had abandoned the child. Although Father testified that he was unable to miss work in or der to drive to Ohio in order to visit S.T., he later conceded that he did in fact have time to visit from June 2017 until March 2018, during which time he was unemployed. Although the Visitation Center charged a fee for visiting S.T., GCCS offered Father gas cards to make the trip to Ohio, of which he never took advantage. Even though he was not on th e case plan because he lived in another state, GCCS also continually informed of hi m of S.T.’s medical and educational appointments, which he failed to attend. When Fath er was provided the opportunity to attend visits with S.T.’s scheduled around the c ourt hearings in the case (which he did attend), Father failed to avail himself of the op portunity to meet with his son. Simply put, made no attempt to personally visit with S.T. durin g the pendency of the

instant case. {¶ 44} Although Mother’s cousin had known S.T. for a short time in the past and initially exhibited some interest in taking custody of S.T., at the time of the permanent custody hearing, the cousin was no longer returning calls from GCCS. For his part, Father did not identify any paternal relatives who had a relati onship with S.T. The juvenile court acknowledged that the guardian ad litem’s (GAL) report indicated that S.T. wished to be in Mother’s custody, but S.T. would provide no res ponse to the GAL when

asked if he wished to live with Father. {¶ 45} With respect to S.T.’s need for legally secure permanent placem ent, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings that this could n ot be achieved without a permanent award of custody to GCCS. Mother testified that she had no suitable housing for S.T. While Father testified that he had suitable, stable, independent housing for S.T.,-20- Ray testified that the only evidence Father ever provided was a crumpled piece of notebook paper, written in pencil and allegedly signed by his m other. Upon further investigation, Ray received information from a Michigan childre n’s services agency that Father did not live at the address he provided for the intersta te home study. Rather,

when his other child was removed after the domestic violence ar rest, Father was found to be living at his parents’ residence. {¶ 46} Although sporadically employed full-time at various jobs, Fathe r never provided any support, financial or otherwise, to S.T. In fact, Father testified that he was unaware of how to provide financial support to a dependent resi ding in another state. Although he did obtain a batterer’s assessment, Father failed t o engage in any of the visitation services provided by GCCS, and he never attended a s ingle medical or educational appointment. Finally, the GAL indicated that S.T.' s best interest would be served by granting permanent custody to GCCS. {¶ 47} A juvenile court's decision on termination will not be overturn ed “if the record contains competent, credible evidence by which the court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory elements for a termi nation of parental rights have been established.” (Citations omitted). In re A.U ., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22264, 2008- Ohio-186, at ¶ 15. Furthermore, “issues relating to the credib ility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact.” In re A.J.S. , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2007 CA 2, 2007-Ohio-3433, ¶ 22. The “rationale of g iving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the t rial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice in flections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testi mony.” Seasons Coal Co.,-21- Inc. v. Cleveland , 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984); In re J.Y ., 2d Dist. Miami No. 07-CA-35, 2008-Ohio-3485, ¶ 33. {¶ 48} Our review of the record reveals that there was clear and convi ncing evidence which supported the juvenile court's finding that the statutory elements for termination under R.C. 2151.414(B) had been satisfied. Thus, t he juvenile court did not err when it awarded permanent custody of S.T. to GCCS. {¶ 49} Father's sole assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 50} Mother's and Father’s assignments of error having been overrule d, the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

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WELBAUM, P.J. and FROELICH, J., concur.

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Nathaniel R. Luken Sean Brinkman Robert Alan Brenner Christopher Smith Mari McPherson Hon. Adolfo A. Tornichio