[Cite as State v. Renkes, 2012-Ohio-1931.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsCHRISTOPHER J. RENKES 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

Case No. 11CAA070067 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 11CRI020106 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part, Reversed in part and 

 Remanded 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 23, 2012 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

CAROL HAMILTON O'BRIEN J.C. RATLIFF 

Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney JON L. JENSEN 

 JEFF RATLIFF 

DOUGLAS DUMOLT ASHLEY LAWSON 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 200 West Center Street 

140 N. Sandusky St., 3rd Floor Marion, Ohio 43302 

Delaware, Ohio 43015 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 2

Hoffman, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Christopher J. Renkes appeals his conviction in the 

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

{¶2} On May 14, 2009, Detective Marcus Penwell of the Franklin County 

Sheriff’s Office ICAC Task Force was posing online as a fifteen year-old female in an 

online Yahoo chat room. Detective Penwell’s online persona was contacted by a 

person using the screen name “jeff_bark2002.” The screen name was later positively 

identified as belonging to Appellant. During the chat, Detective Penwell immediately 

made clear to Appellant he was chatting with a fifteen year old girl. Appellant replied he 

was twenty-six and asked the on-line persona to come to his house. Appellant 

arranged to meet the online fifteen year-old persona at a CiCi’s restaurant in order to 

pick her up and take her back to his house. He continually stated they would not “have 

sex” and would “sit across the room from each other.” 

{¶3} On June 23, 2009, Appellant again contacted the on-line fifteen year old 

persona via Yahoo Instant Messenger. He asked the persona her age appearing to not 

remember having talked to her. The persona replied she was fifteen, and Appellant 

indicated he was at the meet location and he ate at a nearby restaurant in the same 

parking lot. He then attempted to set up a second meet with the female persona. At 

this time the chat was terminated by Detective Penwell. 

{¶4} Detective Penwell was contacted off and on via Yahoo Messenger by 

Appellant over a two month period. Appellant attempted to arrange for the online 

female persona to meet him to go back to his place to “watch movies and swim.” 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 3

{¶5} On one occasion, Detective Penwell arranged a meet and obtained a 

license plate number from a vehicle in which Appellant arrived at the location. Through 

the license plate, Detective Penwell was able to positively identify Appellant as the 

person he had been chatting with online. 

{¶6} During a three month period, Appellant attempted to meet with the online 

persona on several occasions. On September 22, 2009, Appellant solicited the online 

persona using the screen name renkeschris@ymail.com to engage in sexual 

intercourse and arranged to meet at a designated location. He then changed the 

original location to a hotel parking lot. Detectives with the FCSO ICAC Task Force set 

up surveillance at the arranged meet location. Appellant was arrested at the meet 

location. 

{¶7} On September 8, 2010, Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements 

and evidence. On September 21, 2010, the state of Ohio filed a memorandum in 

opposition to Appellant’s motion to suppress. Via Judgment of October 26, 2010, the 

trial court granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. On November 1, 2010, Appellee 

State filed a motion to clarify the court’s ruling on Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

Appellant responded on November 22, 2010. Via Judgment Entry filed December 2, 

2010, the trial court granted the State’s motion to clarify court’s ruling on Appellant’s 

motion to suppress. The trial court concluded Appellant’s statements should be 

suppressed, but any derivative physical evidence may be admissible at trial. 

{¶8} Appellant was charged in the indictment with fifteen counts of pandering 

sexually oriented matter involving a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1)(counts 1, 

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 29); ten counts of illegal use of minor in nudity-
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 4

oriented material, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3) and (1)(counts 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 

23, 24, 25, 26, 27); and one count of importuning, in violation of R.C. 

2907.07(D)(2)(count 17). The State dismissed counts 9, 16, and 28 prior to trial. Upon 

Appellant’s Rule 29 Motion, the trial court found sufficient evidence of a lesser charge of 

R.C. 2907.323 on count 4. Further, the Court granted the Rule 29 Motion to Dismiss on 

counts 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24. 

{¶9} The trial court found Appellant not guilty of counts 2, 8, 11 and 26, and 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, and 29 of the 

indictment, in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), pandering sexually oriented matter 

involving a minor, felonies of the second degree, and of counts 4 (lesser charge), 13 

(lesser charge), 14 (lesser charge), 25 and 27, violations of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), 

felonies of the fifth degree, and of count 17, a violation of R.C. 2907.07(D)(2), 

importuning, a felony of the fifth degree. 

{¶10} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a 

consecutive collective prison term of four years and ten months in prison. 

{¶11} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error: 

{¶12} “I. THE ONLY RECOURSE AVAILABLE TO THE STATE WHEN THE 

TRIAL COURT SUPPRESSED ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED WAS TO FILE A NOTICE OF 

APPEAL AND CERTIFICATION AS THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS OF APP.R. 4(B)(4) 

CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED. 

{¶13} “II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT THE STATE 

TO RAISE NEW ISSUES THROUGH A MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND THE 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 5

TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER AND MODIFY ITS 

PREVIOUSLY ISSUED FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER. 

{¶14} “III. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE 

SEIZED DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS ADMISSIBLE 

UNDER THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS 

NEITHER SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OR THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶15} “IV. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 

LAW WHEN THE TRIAL COURT RECONSIDERED AND MODIFIED ITS EARLIER 

ORDER AND PERMITTED ORAL ARGUMENT UNDER THE GOOD FAITH 

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WITHOUT CONDUCTING A FURTHER 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 

{¶16} “V. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR PANDERING SEXUALLY 

ORIENTED MATTER INVOLVING A MINOR, IMPORTUNING, AND ILLEGAL USE OF 

A MINOR IN A NUDITY-ORIENTED MATERIAL OR PERFORMANCE WERE NOT 

SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S RULE 29 

MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.” 

I. and II. 

{¶17} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error raise common and 

interrelated issues; therefore, we will address the arguments together. 

{¶18} Appellant asserts the trial court erred in addressing the State’s motion for 

clarification as the State’s only recourse to challenge the trial court’s ruling on the 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 6

motion to suppress was to file a notice of appeal with this Court pursuant to App. R. 

9(B). 

{¶19} Appellant’s September 8, 2010 motion to suppress statements and 

evidence moves the trial court to suppress “statements the Defendant made to the 

investigating/arresting officers while the Defendant was being interrogated and under 

arrest, and that all evidence obtained as fruits of the Defendant’s statements be 

suppressed, including the evidence obtained in the execution of the search warrant of 

the Defendant’s residence on September 23, 2009.” 

{¶20} The State responded on September 21, 2010, arguing: 

{¶21} “All statements made during the interview, and evidence obtained from the 

warrant issued based on those statements, should not be excluded as Defendant 

properly waived his rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.” 

{¶22} At the oral hearing conducted on September 22, 2010 and October 4, 

2010, the trial court heard arguments and testimony as to the statements made during 

the interview and the derivative physical evidence obtained incident to the search 

warrant. Appellant argued the physical evidence obtained as a result of the execution 

of the search warrant was fruit of the poisonous tree and the statements made during 

the interview should be suppressed. 

{¶23} The trial court’s October 26, 2010 Judgment Entry concludes, 

{¶24} “Under the totality of the facts in this case, the Court finds that the 

prosecution failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 7

{¶25} “Therefore, defendant’s motion to suppress is granted for the reasons set 

forth.” 

{¶26} Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(K) provides for the state appeal from 

a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion to suppress: 

{¶27} “(K) When the state takes an appeal as provided by law from an order 

suppressing or excluding evidence, or from an order directing pretrial disclosure of 

evidence, the prosecuting attorney shall certify that both of the following apply: 

{¶28} “(1) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; 

{¶29} “(2) the ruling on the motion or motions has rendered the state's proof with 

respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of 

effective prosecution has been destroyed, or the pretrial disclosure of evidence ordered 

by the court will have one of the effects enumerated in Crim. R. 16(D).” 

{¶30} “The appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence shall not be 

allowed unless the notice of appeal and the certification by the prosecuting attorney are 

filed with the clerk of the trial court within seven days after the date of the entry of the 

judgment or order granting the motion. Any appeal taken under this rule shall be 

prosecuted diligently. 

{¶31} “If the defendant previously has not been released, the defendant shall, 

except in capital cases, be released from custody on the defendant's own recognizance 

pending appeal when the prosecuting attorney files the notice of appeal and 

certification. 

{¶32} “This appeal shall take precedence over all other appeals. 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 8

{¶33} “If an appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence pursuant to 

this division results in an affirmance of the trial court, the state shall be barred from 

prosecuting the defendant for the same offense or offenses except upon a showing of 

newly discovered evidence that the state could not, with reasonable diligence, have 

discovered before filing of the notice of appeal.” 

{¶34} In State v. Malinovsky, 60 Ohio St.3d 20, 573 N.E.2d 22 (1991), the Ohio 

Supreme Court held: 

{¶35} “The General Assembly has granted prosecutors the right of appeal from 

an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress evidence prior to final disposition of a 

criminal prosecution. Crim.R. 12(J) reads: 

{¶36} “ ‘* * * The state may take an appeal as of right from the granting of a 

motion for the return of seized property, or from the granting of a motion to suppress 

evidence if, in addition to filing a notice of appeal, the prosecuting attorney certifies that: 

(1) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (2) the granting of the motion 

has rendered the state's proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety 

that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed. 

{¶37} “ ‘Such appeal shall not be allowed unless the notice of appeal and the 

certification by the prosecuting attorney are filed with the clerk of the trial court within 

seven days after the date of the entry of the judgment or order granting the motion. Any 

appeal taken under this rule shall be diligently prosecuted. 

{¶38} “‘If the defendant has not previously been released, he shall, except in 

capital cases, be released from custody on his own recognizance pending such appeal 

when the prosecuting attorney files the notice of appeal and certification.’ 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 9

{¶39} “Additionally, R.C. 2945.67 provides a similar right to appeal: 

{¶40} “ ‘(A) A prosecuting attorney, village solicitor, city director of law, or the 

attorney general may appeal as a matter or [of] right any decision of a trial court in a 

criminal case, or any decision of a juvenile court in a delinquency case, which decision 

grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, complaint, or information, a 

motion to suppress evidence, or a motion for the return of seized property or grants post 

conviction relief pursuant to sections 2953.21 to 2953.24 of the Revised Code, and may 

appeal by leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision, except the 

final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case or of the juvenile court in a delinquency 

case. 

{¶41} “‘(B) In any proceeding brought pursuant to division (A) of this section, the 

court shall, in accordance with Chapter 120. of the Revised Code, appoint the county 

public defender, joint county public defender, or other counsel to represent any person 

who is indigent, is not represented by counsel, and does not waive his right to counsel.’ 

{¶42} “In State v. Davidson (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 132, 17 OBR 277, 477 N.E.2d 

1141, at the syllabus, we defined ‘motion to suppress’ as used in Crim.R. 12(J) to 

include ‘[a]ny motion, however labeled, which, if granted, restricts the state in the 

presentation of certain evidence and, thereby, renders the state's proof with respect to 

the pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective 

prosecution has been destroyed * * *.’ 

{¶43} “Davidson involved a pretrial motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence, 

not due to constitutional infirmity, but rather, under the Rules of Evidence. We made no 

comment in Davidson as to the applicability of Crim.R. 12(J) to evidentiary rulings at 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 10

trial. Today, we are asked to decide whether a prosecutor may file a Crim.R. 12(J) 

appeal during trial. 

{¶44} “The defendant argues that a mid-trial evidentiary ruling is not a final 

appealable order and, hence, not appealable until final disposition of the case. The 

defendant further argues that because the state cannot appeal during trial, the 

subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute coupled with the Double Jeopardy Clause 

bars reprosecution. 

{¶45} “The defendant's arguments point directly to the problem that Crim.R. 

12(J) was designed to address. A criminal defendant prejudiced by an adverse 

evidentiary ruling has the absolute right of appeal after conviction, and, if successful, 

may obtain meaningful relief. Prior to the adoption of Crim.R. 12(J), the state lacked this 

remedy. If the state was prejudiced by an adverse evidentiary ruling resulting in an 

acquittal, the state had no meaningful recourse, as the Double Jeopardy Clause barred 

retrial. In response, the adoption of Crim.R. 12(J) and enactment of R.C. 2945.67 were 

designed to preclude the loss of a worthy criminal case solely due to an erroneous 

ruling by a trial court. 

{¶46} “While we have not previously considered whether a Crim.R. 12(J) appeal 

lies mid-trial, the state faces the same prospect of losing cases due to mistaken 

evidentiary rulings during trial as it does before trial. Once trial has begun, however, the 

defendant has an important interest in having his or her case decided by the jury 

impaneled to hear same. This interest arises from a defendant's right to a speedy trial 

and a defendant's double jeopardy guarantee to be free from multiple prosecutions. 

However, this interest is not absolute. See United States v. Scott (1978), 437 U.S. 82, 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 11

98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65; State v. Calhoun (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 373, 18 OBR 429, 

481 N.E.2d 624. 

{¶47} “We are thus faced with the question of whether the defendant's interest in 

an uninterrupted trial outweighs the state's interest in effective prosecutions. Because of 

the procedural safeguards provided by certification, we hold that Crim.R. 12(J) allows 

for expedited appeals of evidentiary rulings during trial without impermissibly infringing 

upon a defendant's interest in an uninterrupted trial. 

{¶48} “Crim.R. 12(J) does not provide the state with an unfettered right of 

appeal. The certification element of Crim.R. 12(J) provides the defendant with protection 

from prosecutorial abuse and harmonizes the appeal with the final order requirement of 

the Ohio Constitution.FN1 Under Crim.R. 12(J) the state must certify that the appeal is 

not taken for the purpose of delay and that the complained-of ruling destroys the state's 

case. Because the state certifies that the ruling destroys its case, the ruling is, in 

essence, a final order.” 

{¶49} We find the trial court’s October 26, 2010 Judgment Entry clearly granted 

Appellant’s motion to suppress not only Appellant’s statements but also the derivative 

physical evidence seized incidental to the search of his residence based upon the 

arguments of the parties in the motion, briefing and arguments presented at hearing in 

this matter. We find the trial court’s October 26, 2010 Judgment Entry granting 

Appellant’s motion to suppress was a final appealable order from which the State 

should have appealed. Accordingly, Appellant’s first and second assignments of error 

are sustained. 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 12

III. and IV. 

{¶50} Appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error raise common and 

interrelated issues; therefore, we will address the arguments together. 

{¶51} Appellant maintains the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 

physical evidence seized incident to the search warrant upon ruling on the State’s 

motion for clarification. 

{¶52} Upon review of the record, the trial court conducted a motion hearing on 

November 23, 2010, wherein the parties presented arguments with regard to the State’s 

motion for clarification. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments relative to the trial court’s 

failure to conduct a hearing on the motion are not well-taken. 

{¶53} However, in light of our analysis and disposition of Appellant’s first and 

second assignments of error, Appellant’s arguments relative to the trial court abusing its 

discretion in suppressing the derivative physical evidence incident to the search of 

Appellant’s residence in addition to Appellant’s statements are moot.1

V. 

{¶54} Herein, Appellant argues his convictions for pandering sexually oriented 

matter involving a minor, importuning and illegal use of a minor in a nudity-oriented 

material or performance were against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence. Appellant further argues the trial court erred in denying his Criminal Rule 29 

motion for acquittal. 

 

1

 That is not to say we find the trial court’s subsequent decision based upon Herring v. 

United States (2009) 129 S.Ct. 695 was erroneous had we found it had jurisdiction to 

enter it. 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 13

{¶55} In light of our analysis and disposition of Appellant’s first and second 

assignments of error, we find Appellant’s arguments with regard to his convictions for 

pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor and illegal use of a minor in a 

nudity-oriented material or performance are moot. 

{¶56} However, Appellant’s conviction for importuning was not based upon the 

physical evidence obtained incident to the search warrant. Appellant maintains his 

conviction for importuning was against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. 

{¶57} In determining whether a trial court erred in overruling an appellant's 

motion for judgment of acquittal, the reviewing court focuses on the sufficiency of the 

evidence. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553, 651 N.E.2d 965, 974 

(1995); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at 273, 574 N .E.2d 492 at 503 (1991). 

{¶58} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry focuses 

primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if believed, 

reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541, 546 (1997), (stating, “sufficiency 

is the test of adequacy”); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 

(1991), at 503. The standard of review is whether, after viewing the probative evidence 

and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 

61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273, 574 N.E.2d at 503. 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 14

{¶59} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief. 

State v. Wilson, 713 Ohio St.3d 382, 387–88, 2007–Ohio–2202 at ¶ 25–26, 865 N.E.2d 

1264, 1269–1270. An appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the 

jury, but must find “the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. 

Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. (Quoting State v. Martin, 20 

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721 (1983). Accordingly, reversal on 

manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Thompkins, supra. 

{¶60} Appellant engaged in online chats starting in May 2009, with an 

undercover police officer posing online as a fifteen year-old girl. Appellant used the 

screen name Jeff Bark and initiated contact with the online persona. The chat lead to 

an exchange of cell phone numbers and the online persona received a telephone call 

from a 740 cell phone number. Appellant later tells the online persona his real name is 

Chris. Appellant arranges a meet, and indicates after he picks her up, nothing is going 

to happen, and “you can do whatever you want, but I won’t.” However, Appellant was 

aware the female online persona was 15 years old. 

{¶61} The next online contact between Jeff Bark and the online persona occurs 

on June 23, 2009, wherein Appellant indicates he was at Cici’s restaurant waiting for 

her but she did not show. Appellant again indicates he can drive to meet her. 

{¶62} In September 2009, the online persona and Jeff Bark agree to meet at a 

Steak N Shake restaurant, and Appellant described the car he would be driving and the 

parking lot. Detective Penwell went to the meeting place and located a car backed into 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 15

the parking space matching the description given in the chat. Detective Penwell was 

able to get the license plate number of the vehicle, and saw Appellant in the driver’s 

seat thereof. After running the plate through OHLEG, he was able to determine the 

vehicle was registered to Appellant. 

{¶63} On September 17 and 18, 2009, via online chat, Appellant agreed to be 

the boyfriend of the online persona. He agrees he wants to do boyfriend and girlfriend 

stuff with her, and asks her to explain what that is. A discussion of sex acts ensues. 

{¶64} The final chat occurs on September 22, 2009. While engaged in an online 

chat with the female peronsa Appellant instant messaged the female persona using the 

screen name RenkesChris. The officers identified this as Appellant based on the 

previous meet wherein they traced Appellant’s license plate and visually identified him 

in the parking lot. Appellant asked the female for her age, and was informed she is 15 

years-old. Appellant proceeded to solicit sex and repeatedly propositioned the female 

persona to engage in sexual acts. She told him she is talking with her boyfriend at the 

time. She eventually arranged a meet with Appellant under the screen name JeffBark 

at the Steak N Shake near her home. Appellant later called the cell phone number and 

changed the meet site to a hotel parking lot, alleging there were police cars in the 

parking lot. 

{¶65} Appellant was later arrested in the hotel parking lot, and later charged with 

importuning, in violation of R.C. 2907.07(D)(2). 

{¶66} The statute reads, in pertinent part: 

{¶67} “(D) No person shall solicit another by means of a telecommunications 

device, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, to engage in sexual activity 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 16

with the offender when the offender is eighteen years of age or older and either of the 

following applies: 

{¶68} “*** 

{¶69} “(2) The other person is a law enforcement officer posing as a person who 

is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, the offender believes 

that the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age 

or is reckless in that regard, and the offender is four or more years older than the age 

the law enforcement officer assumes in posing as the person who is thirteen years of 

age or older but less than sixteen years of age.” 

{¶70} Upon review, we find Appellant’s conviction for importuning is not against 

the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and the trial court did not err in 

denying Appellant’s motion for acquittal as to the offense. 

{¶71} Appellant’s assigned error is sustained in part, and overruled in part. 

{¶72} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed 

in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in 

accordance with the law and this opinion. 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Delaney, P.J. and 

Farmer, J. concur s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 s/ Sheila G. Farmer___________________

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER 
Delaware County, Case No. 11CAA070067 17

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

CHRISTOPHER J. RENKES : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 11CAA070067 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the 

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the law and this 

opinion. Costs waived. 

 s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 s/ Sheila G. Farmer___________________

 HON. SHEILA G. FARMER