J-S57002-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM ABBOTT

Appellant No. 3190 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009786-2015

 CP-51-CR-0009787-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 19, 2017

A jury convicted Appellant, William Abbott, of first degree murder and 

charges related to his possession of a firearm in the shooting death of Clyde 

Holloman. In this appeal, Abbott challenges the sufficiency and the weight of 

the evidence supporting his murder conviction. After careful review, we 

affirm.

At his trial, Abbott did not contest that he had shot Holloman, or that 

Holloman had died at his hands. Rather, Abbott argued that he did not act 

with premeditation or a specific intent to kill. The jury did not agree.

On appeal, Abbott’s arguments are premised upon the same basis as 

his trial arguments. He first contends that the evidence at trial was 
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insufficient to establish that he acted with premeditation or a specific intent 

to kill. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9-11.

Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to 

the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences 

therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the 

crimes charged is established beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citation omitted). 

“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). Any 

doubt raised as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder. 

See id. “As an appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor do we assign 

weight to any of the testimony of record.” Commonwealth v. Kinney, 863 

A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Therefore, we will not 

disturb the verdict “unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as 

a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances.” Bruce, 916 A.2d at 661 (citation omitted).
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To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an 

“intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). An intentional killing is defined 

as “[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of 

willful, deliberate and premediated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(d). Further, 

our Supreme Court has held that, in order to support a conviction of firstdegree murder, the Commonwealth must establish that: a human being was 

unlawfully killed; the defendant was responsible for the killing; and the 

defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. See

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 967 (Pa. 2013). A jury may 

infer the specific intent to kill, as well as malice, based upon a defendant’s 

use of a deadly weapon on “a vital part of the victim’s body.” 

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133-1134 (Pa. 2011) (citation 

omitted).

Here, it is undisputed that Abbott used a deadly weapon on a vital part 

of the victim’s body. See, e.g., N.T., Jury Trial, 4/19/16, at 49 (witness 

testimony that Abbott shot Holloman); N.T., Jury Trial, 4/20/16, at 12 

(expert testimony that Holloman was killed by a gunshot wound to the 

chest). Abbott focuses on the testimony of Geraldine Holloman, the victim’s 

sister.

Geraldine testified that Abbott and Holloman were involved in an

argument. See N.T., Jury Trial, 4/19/16, at 37-40. The argument culminated 
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in Abbott shooting Holloman in the chest. See id., at 42. After shooting 

Holloman, Abbott threatened Holloman’s wife. See id. Holloman’s wife

ultimately walked away from Abbott, and Abbott proceeded to stand over 

Holloman and say “I [ought] to blow your brains out.” Id. Instead, he 

disposed of his gun and walked away. See id., at 42-43.

Abbott argues that this post-shooting sequence demonstrates that he 

did not have a specific intent to kill Holloman:

[Abbott] did not premeditate a shooting but rather acted from 

fear, aggravation, or whatever other emotion can be attached to 

the confrontation that immediately preceded the shooting.

[C]ounsel can think of no more compelling evidence [than] 

where a defendant claims that he should do something but then 

does not do it. Certainly the [d]efendant had the time to 

premeditate whether he should shoot the victim in the head after 

the victim was already on the ground. Having thought about it, 

and perhaps where clearer heads prevailed, the [d]efendant 

chose not to do it.

Thus, where the words and actions of the [d]efendant himself 

clearly negate any concept of premeditation or specific intent to 

kill, the [d]efendant should not have been convicted of Murder in 

the First Degree.

Appellant’s Brief, at 11.

While this line of reasoning may have made a valid argument to the 

jury, it does not provide a valid legal challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Just as the jury, based upon the evidence presented at trial, was 

not required to find that Abbott intended to kill Holloman, it was not required 

to find that he did not. As noted above, the law permits the jury to infer 

specific intent to kill based upon a defendant’s act in using a deadly weapon 
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upon a vital portion of the victim. Firing a gun into a victim’s chest surely 

permits just such an inference. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 876 A.2d 

916, 925 (Pa. 2005). Abbott’s first argument on appeal merits no relief.

Next, Abbott argues that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence at trial. We do not review this claim de novo on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (Pa. 2009). Rather, we 

only review the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary judgment regarding 

the weight of the evidence presented at trial. See id. “[W]e may only 

reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 

403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). A verdict is said to be contrary to 

the evidence such that it shocks one’s sense of justice when “the figure of 

Justice totters on her pedestal,” or when “the jury’s verdict, at the time of its 

rendition, causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes 

him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial 

conscience.” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (citations omitted).

Abbott’s argument on this issue closely tracks the line of reasoning 

contained in his sufficiency challenge. He once again claims that the 

testimony that he threatened to kill Holloman after shooting him was 

overwhelming evidence of his lack of specific intent.
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The trial court reviewed the entirety of the evidence presented at trial. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/16. After this review, it concluded that the 

evidence did not shock its conscience. See id., at 14. While we once again 

recognize the logic of the line of reasoning highlighted by Abbott, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. It is undisputed that 

Abbott chose to shoot Holloman in the chest. It is certainly reasonable for a 

fact finder to infer that in doing so, he intended to kill Holloman. Abbott’s 

second and final claim on appeal fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/19/2017