J-S20015-22 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRYAN WILLIAM CONLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 935 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0002061-2018

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: AUGUST 8, 2022

Appellant Bryan William Conley appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following the revocation of his county intermediate punishment and

probation. Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw and

an Anders/Santiago1 brief. For the reasons stated herein, we deny Counsel’s

petition to withdraw and direct Counsel to submit an amended 

Anders/Santiago brief or an advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf. 

The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. See

Trial Ct. Op., 6/12/19, at 5-10. Briefly, Appellant and Andrea Delsandro (the 

victim) separated in May of 2018 after dating for approximately five years. At

the time of their separation, they had a three-year-old child and the victim

was pregnant with their second child. On June 25, 2018, the victim obtained

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1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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a Protection From Abuse (PFA) order against Appellant. The victim gave birth

at St. Vincent Hospital on June 27, 2018. Although Appellant had been served

with the PFA order and hospital staff denied him entry, Appellant circumvented

hospital security to reach the victim. During the encounter at the hospital, 

Appellant threatened to kill the victim, their newborn child, and the victim’s

parents. The victim called a nurse for help, and Appellant left the victim’s

hospital room. The nurse alerted hospital security, and the hospital was

placed on lockdown. 

Appellant was subsequently charged with two counts each of terroristic 

threats, disorderly conduct, and harassment, and one count of simple assault.

2

 

Following a non-jury trial on November 28, 2018, Appellant was convicted of

two counts of terroristic threats (one graded as a felony of the third degree

and the other as a misdemeanor of the first degree) and one count each of

simple assault, disorderly conduct, and harassment. The trial court acquitted 

Appellant of one count each of disorderly conduct and harassment. 

The trial court held a sentencing hearing on February 13, 2019. At the 

hearing, Appellant argued that his misdemeanor terroristic threats and simple 

assault convictions should merge with the felony terroristic threats conviction. 

However, the trial court disagreed and sentenced Appellant on all three 

counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of four years 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2706(a)(1), 5503(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), and 2701(a)(3),

respectively.
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of county restrictive intermediate punishment followed by three years of 

probation.3 

On direct appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions for terroristic threats, simple assault, and disorderly

conduct. Commonwealth v. B. Conley, 496 WDA 2019, 2020 WL 3989174,

at *4 (Pa. Super. filed July 15, 2020) (unpublished mem.). Ultimately, a panel 

of this Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s 

convictions. Id. at *4-6. However, the Court did not address whether any of 

Appellant’s convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes. 

While he was serving his sentence of county restrictive intermediate 

punishment, Appellant was detained after admitting to his probation officer 

that he had been using methamphetamine. On July 15, 2021, the trial court

held a violation of probation4 (VOP) hearing. Appellant conceded that he

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3 Specifically, for count one, the felony terroristic threats conviction, the trial 

court sentenced Appellant to four years of county restrictive intermediate 

punishment, which included a term of 205 days’ incarceration followed by 

three months’ electronic monitoring, and then followed by three months’ 

intensive supervision. For count two, the misdemeanor terroristic threats 

conviction, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a consecutive term of two 

years’ probation. For count three, simple assault, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to one year of probation concurrent to count two. For count four, 

disorderly conduct, the trial court imposed a consecutive term of nine months’ 

probation. Lastly, for count six, harassment, the trial court imposed a 

consecutive term of three months’ probation. See Sentencing Order, 2/13/19, 

at 1 (unpaginated). The trial court also gave Appellant credit for ninety-nine 

days’ time served. See id. at 2 (unpaginated). 

4 During the revocation portions of the proceedings on July 15, 2021, the VOP 

court and parties referred to Appellant’s probation, even though at the time 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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violated the conditions of his county restrictive intermediate punishment

because he had used methamphetamine and the trial court revoked his county 

restrictive intermediate punishment and his probation. See N.T. VOP Hr’g,

7/15/21, at 4. Both Appellant and his probation officer, Ashley Clark, testified 

at the VOP hearing. Id. at 6-10, 13-16. Officer Clark stated that Appellant 

had accrued twenty-five misconducts while incarcerated. Id. at 6-7. She also 

stated that she had received letters from Appellant containing sexual 

messages. Id. at 7-8; see also id. at 12-13. Appellant admitted that he 

sent those letters to Officer Clark, but claimed that he had “acted out of 

character to be noticed[,]” because the prison authorities had mistreated him,

and he apologized to Officer Clark during the hearing. Id. at 8-11, 14. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the VOP court resentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of three-and-a-half to seven years’ incarceration followed by

one year of probation.5 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion requesting reconsideration

and modification of his sentence, which the trial court denied. Appellant then

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Appellant was serving his term of county restrictive intermediate punishment. 

Compare N.T. VOP Hr’g, 7/15/21, at 2-4 with id. at 16 and Sentencing 

Order, 2/13/19, at 1 (unpaginated). 

5 Specifically, the VOP imposed consecutive terms of incarceration as follows: 

two to four years for felony terroristic threats, one to two years for the 

misdemeanor terroristic threats, and six months to one year for simple 

assault. The VOP court also reimposed consecutive terms of probation as 

follows: nine months for disorderly conduct and three months for harassment. 

See Sentencing Order, 7/15/21, at 1 (unpaginated). 
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filed a timely appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Counsel has filed an Anders/Santiago brief identifying the

following issue:

Was the sentence in this case manifestly excessive and clearly

unreasonable, and not individualized as required by law, when

[Appellant] argues that he was only revoked and resentenced

based on technical violations, so his sentence was

disproportionate to his actions. 

Anders/Santiago Brief at 1 (formatting altered). 

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review

the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s

request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Counsel must comply with the technical

requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for leave to

withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record,

counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) providing a

copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant that he has

the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional

arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s attention. See

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc). 

Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements

established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago, namely:
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(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

“Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an

independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, nonfrivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113

A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted). 

Here, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for

seeking withdrawal by filing a petition to withdraw, sending Appellant a letter

explaining his appellate rights, and supplying Appellant with a copy of the

Anders/Santiago brief.6 See Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290. Moreover,

Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief complies with the requirements of

Santiago. Specifically, Counsel includes a summary of the relevant factual

and procedural history, refers to portions of the record that could arguably

support Appellant’s claim, and sets forth the conclusion that the appeal is

frivolous. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, we conclude that

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6 Appellant did not file a response to Counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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Counsel has met the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, and

we will proceed to address the issue raised in Counsel’s Anders/Santiago

brief. 

Discretionary Aspects of the Sentence

In the Anders/Santiago brief, Counsel identifies Appellant’s challenge 

to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Anders/Santiago Brief at 6. 

Specifically, Appellant asserts that the VOP court imposed an excessive 

sentence because Appellant only committed a technical violation and has

mental health needs. Id. Counsel notes that because the sentencing court 

specifically stated the information it relied on in fashioning its sentence, which 

included the misconducts that Appellant incurred while he was incarcerated, 

his admission to using methamphetamine, and the inappropriate letters 

Appellant sent to his probation officer, Appellant’s sentence is “supported by 

the information presented at the time of the revocation and sentencing 

hearing . . . .” Id. at 7-8. Therefore, Counsel concludes that Appellant’s 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence is frivolous. Id. at 8. 

It is well settled that

challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle 

an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question 
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that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some 

citations omitted and formatting altered). “A substantial question exists only 

when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant preserved his sentencing issue in a post-sentence 

motion, filed a timely appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and included 

a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in the amended Anders/Santiago brief. See 

id. Appellant has also presented a substantial question for our review. See 

Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(noting that “a claim that a particular probation revocation sentence is 

excessive in light of its underlying technical violations” presents a substantial 

question for our review). Therefore, we will address the merits of Appellant’s 

claim. 

When considering an appeal from a sentence imposed following the 

revocation of probation, “[o]ur review is limited to determining the validity of 

the probation revocation proceedings and the authority of the sentencing court 

to consider the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the time of the 

initial sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 557 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (citations omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). 
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Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9781(c) 

and (d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand 

the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the 

sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines 

erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing 

guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the 

application of the guidelines would be clearly 

unreasonable; or

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

In reviewing the record, we consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some 

citations omitted). 

When a court revokes a defendant’s probation and imposes a new 

sentence, “the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same 

as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being 

given to the time spent serving the order of probation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). 

In revocation proceedings, courts are not required to consider the sentencing 

guidelines.7 See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 

2016). However, the VOP court must impose “a sentence that is consistent 

with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the 

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant[,]” and also consider, among other things, “whether 

the sentence imposed is essential to vindicate the authority of the court, and 

must give due consideration to the time spent serving the order of probation.” 

Id. at 994 (discussing 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(b), 9771(c)). 

VOP courts may not impose a sentence of total confinement unless “(1) 

the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the 

defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is 

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7 We note that the Resentencing Guidelines apply when probation is revoked 

based on an offense committed on or after January 1, 2020. See 204 Pa. 

Code § 307.2(b); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154.4. Here, because Appellant

committed the underlying offense in 2018, the trial court was not required to 

consider the Resentencing Guidelines when imposing Appellant’s VOP 

sentence. 
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not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority 

of the court.” Id. at 994 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c)) (formatting altered).

Criminal Rule of Procedure 702 requires that a sentencing court have a 

pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) or place on the records the reasons 

for dispensing with the PSI whenever a defendant can be sentenced to a 

sentence of incarceration of one year or more. Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(A)(1)-(2)(a). 

This requirement extends to probation revocation hearings. See 

Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 641 (Pa. Super. 2011). “In the 

absence of a PSI, the court must conduct a pre-sentence inquiry such that it 

is apprised of the particular circumstances of the offense, not limited to those 

of record, as well as defendant’s history and background.” Id. at 642 (citation 

omitted and formatting altered). 

When a defendant is being resentenced and a prior PSI exists, the 

sentencing court may rely on the prior PSI if during the sentencing hearing, 

the trial court receives “sufficient information to inform it of any changed 

circumstances from the time the last PSI report was completed, thereby 

allowing a fully informed, individualized sentencing decision.” 

Commonwealth v. Ali, 197 A.3d 742, 763 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). In Ali, this Court affirmed a defendant’s judgment of sentence 

because the record reflected that “the trial court properly considered the PSI 

report from [the defendant’s] original sentencing hearing and conducted a 

proper pre-sentence inquiry at the new sentencing hearing in the absence of 

a second PSI report.” Id. at 764. 
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However, in Kelly, this Court noted that the trial court did not order a 

PSI, nor did the court “satisfy the requirement of Rule 702 that it place on the 

record its reasons for dispensing with a PSI.” Kelly, 33 A.3d at 642. Further, 

the Kelly Court stated that the trial court also failed to address defense 

counsel’s concerns about the defendant’s mental health. Id. Therefore, the

Kelly Court reversed the defendant’s judgment of sentence and remanded for 

resentencing. Id. 

Here, at sentencing, the trial court stated the reasons for Appellant’s 

sentence as follows:

Taking into consideration the statements of both counsel, the 

statement of Ashley Clark, the adult probation/parole officer, as 

well [Appellant], taking into account the documents submitted to 

me by Ms. Clark, as well as the revocation summary, noting that 

not just what we discussed about the results that I mentioned 

there are 25 misconducts on behalf of [Appellant].

So it’s clear that he is not only a danger to females, as noted by 

his prior offenses, the reason we’re originally here for, but by his 

recent conduct.

* * *

[A]ny lesser sentence would diminish the seriousness of this 

matter.

* * *

[Appellant] is a danger to the community. He needs serious 

treatment, and that can be best provided by State incarceration.

N.T. VOP Hr’g at 13, 17-18.

Although the VOP court stated that it had considered the revocation 

summary and the documents provided by Probation Officer Clark, there is no 
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indication that the VOP court considered a PSI report when imposing 

Appellant’s sentence.

8

 See id. at 13. Indeed, the record reflects that the VOP 

court did not mention a PSI report or state that it was relying on the prior PSI

at any point during the VOP hearing. Cf. Ali, 197 A.3d at 763-64 (affirming 

the defendant’s judgment of sentence where the resentencing court expressly 

incorporated the record from the defendant’s initial sentencing hearing into 

the record for the resentencing hearing). The VOP court did not receive any 

evidence relating to Appellant’s current mental health issues, past mental 

health treatment, substance abuse treatment needs, or available rehabilitative 

programs. Under these circumstances, we conclude that because the VOP 

court only considered Appellant’s admission to methamphetamine use, his 

history of prison misconducts, and Appellant’s inappropriate letter to Probation 

Officer Clark, the VOP court did not conduct “a sufficient pre-sentence inquiry 

such that it is apprised of the particular circumstances of the offense, not 

limited to those of record, as well as defendant’s history and background”, nor 

did the court explain its decision to dispense with a PSI. See Kelly, 33 A.3d

at 641-42. Additionally, the VOP court did not recommend any mental health 

or substance treatment in its VOP sentence. See Sentencing Order, 7/15/21, 

at 1-2 (unpaginated). Therefore, it appears that the VOP court abused its 

discretion by imposing Appellant’s sentence without considering the 

appropriate sentencing factors, which could have included the review of a PSI, 

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8 These documents do not appear in the certified record. 
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or other pertinent evidence. See Kelly, 33 A.3d at 641-42; see also Derry, 

150 A.3d at 993 (stating that under the Sentencing Code, the sentence 

imposed should be consistent with, among others, “the rehabilitative needs of 

the defendant” (citation omitted)); cf. Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 

843, 849-50 (Pa. Super. 2006) (reiterating that where the sentencing court

reviewed a PSI, it will be presumed that sentencing court considered the 

defendant’s character and mitigating factors). For these reasons, we conclude 

that Appellant’s discretionary aspects of the sentencing claim is not wholly

frivolous. 

We now turn to our independent review of the record to determine if 

there are “any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” See

Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250. Therefore, we also examine the legality of 

Appellant’s sentence.

Merger

As part of our independent review, we examine whether any of 

Appellant’s convictions merge, which implicates the legality of Appellant’s 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. 2009); 

see also Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1030 n.2 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (noting that the defendant’s merger claim was a non-waivable 

challenge to the legality of his sentence). Our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary. Baldwin, 985 A.2d at 833 (citation

omitted).

Section 9765 of the Sentencing Code provides that:
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No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes 

arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements 

of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other 

offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court 

may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. 

Our Supreme Court has explained that Section 9765 sets forth two 

requirements for crimes to merge: “1) the crimes arise from a single criminal

act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in

the statutory elements of the other.” Baldwin, 985 A.2d at 833. 

We have explained that

When considering whether there is a single criminal act or multiple 

criminal acts, the question is not whether there was a “break in 

the chain” of criminal activity. The issue is whether the actor 

commits multiple criminal acts beyond that which is necessary to 

establish the bare elements of the additional crime, then the actor 

will be guilty of multiple crimes which do not merge for sentencing 

purposes.

In determining whether two or more convictions arose from a 

single criminal act for purposes of sentencing, we must examine 

the charging documents filed by the Commonwealth.

Martinez, 153 A.3d at 1030-31 (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

If the offenses arise from a single criminal act, a merger analysis must

then consider whether “all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are

included in the statutory elements of the other.” Baldwin, 985 A.2d at 833

(citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765). The Baldwin Court further explained that

we cannot ignore the simple legislative reality that individual

criminal statutes often overlap, and proscribe in the alternative

several different categories of conduct under a single banner. 

See, e.g., aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (defining seven
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distinct violations of law); involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,

18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 (setting forth eight separate violations). 

Consequently, in such cases, we caution that trial courts must

take care to determine which particular “offenses,” i.e. violations

of law, are at issue in a particular case.

Id. at 837 n.6 (some citations omitted and formatting altered).

Terroristic threats is defined, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Offense defined.—A person commits the crime of terroristic 

threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a 

threat to:

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize 

another;

* * *

(d) Grading.—An offense under subsection (a) constitutes a 

misdemeanor of the first degree unless the threat causes the 

occupants of the building, place of assembly or facility of public 

transportation to be diverted from their normal or customary 

operations, in which case the offense constitutes a felony of the 

third degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1), (d). 

A person is guilty of simple assault if he “attempts by physical menace 

to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

2701(a)(3). 

Here, the Commonwealth charged Appellant as follows:

[COUNT ONE:]

. . . on or about June 28, 2018, in the said County of Erie and 

[Commonwealth] of Pennsylvania, the said [Appellant] did 

otherwise cause serious public inconvenience, or cause terror or 

serious public inconvenience with reckless disregard of the risk of 

causing such terror or inconvenience, to-wit: the said [Appellant] 

did state to the victim Andrea Delsandro, he was going to kill her 

and/or her new born infant and/or her father at a time when there 
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was an active PFA in place causing the hospital staff to relocate 

the victim as a patient to another room and floor and/or the 

hospital occupants to be diverted from their existing operations . 

. . thereby the said [Appellant] did commit the crime of terroristic 

threats, a felony of the third degree. [18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).]

COUNT TWO:

. . . that on the day and year aforesaid in the said County of Erie 

and [Commonwealth] of Pennsylvania, the said [Appellant] did 

communicate, either directly or indirectly, a threat to commit any 

crime of violence with intent to terrorize another, to-wit: the said 

[Appellant] did state he was going to kill victim Andrea 

Delsandro’s new born infant and/or her father and bury him 

and/or that he would go get his guns and blow off the victim’s 

head . . . thereby the said [Appellant] did commit the crime of 

terroristic threats, a misdemeanor of the first degree. [18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2706(a)(1).

COUNT THREE: 

. . . that on the day and year aforesaid in the said County of Erie 

and [Commonwealth] of Pennsylvania, the said [Appellant], did 

attempt by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent 

serious bodily injury, to-wit: the said [Appellant] did sit on the 

hospital bed next to the victim, Andrea Delsandro and threaten to 

kill her by using a firearm, and/or her newborn infant and/or her 

father at a time when there was an active PFA in place . . . thereby 

the said [Appellant] did commit the crime of simple assault, a 

misdemeanor of the second degree. [18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3)]

Criminal Information, 8/23/18, at 1-2 (formatting altered); see also id. at 4 

(setting forth the statutes under which the Commonwealth charged 

Appellant); Trial Ct. Order, 6/10/19 (amending count three in the sentencing 

order to cite 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3) instead of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1)). 

At Appellant’s original sentencing hearing, the trial court did not 

explicitly rule on Appellant’s merger arguments. However, at sentencing, the 

trial court imposed separate sentences for Appellant’s convictions at counts 
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one, two, and three. See N.T. Sentencing, 2/13/19, at 16. In its 1925(a) 

opinion relating to Appellant’s direct appeal, the trial court concluded that the 

same evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions at counts one 

and two. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/12/19, at 10-11. The trial court also referred 

to the same threats when discussing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

Appellant’s simple assault conviction. See id. at 11-12. 

Based on our review of the record, it appears that the factual basis for 

the two terroristic threats offenses as charged in the criminal information 

described identical conduct by Appellant. Further, all of the elements of the 

misdemeanor-grade terroristic threats offense are included within the felonygrade terroristic threats. Therefore, it appears that the two elements of 

merger are met. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765; Baldwin, 985 A.2d at 833. 

Additionally, the statutory elements of simple assault may be included in the 

statutory elements of terroristic threats. Compare 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1)

(a person commits the offense of terroristic threats “if [that] person 

communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to commit any crime of 

violence with intent to terrorize another”) with 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3) (a 

person commits the offense of terroristic threats if that person “attempts by 

physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury”). 

Accordingly, our independent review of the record has revealed a potential 

non-frivolous challenge to the legality of Appellant’s sentence regarding 

merger. 
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Revocation of Consecutive Probation

We also examine the legality of the VOP court’s revocation of Appellant’s 

consecutive terms of probation, which Appellant had not begun serving at the 

time of the violation. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 262 A.3d 512 (Pa. 

Super. 2021) (en banc). 

In Simmons, this Court overruled Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 

420 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. 1980) and its progeny and held that the trial court 

lacked statutory authority to revoke the defendant’s probation before he 

began serving the probation portion of his sentence.9 In reaching that 

conclusion, the Simmons Court explained:

Simply stated, Wendowski was incorrect in holding that a trial 

court may anticipatorily revoke an order of probation and in 

reasoning that “a term of probation may and should be construed 

for revocation purposes as including the term beginning at the 

time probation is granted.” Wendowski, 420 A.2d at 630 

(quotations omitted). No statutory authority exists to support this 

understanding. Rather, the plain language of the relevant 

statutes provides that: a trial court may only revoke an order of 

probation “upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of 

the probation;” the “specified conditions” of an order of probation 

are attached to, or are a part of, the order of probation; and, when 

the trial court imposes an “order of probation” consecutively to 

another term, the entirety of the “order of probation” – including 

the “specified conditions” – do not begin to commence until the 

prior term ends.

____________________________________________

9 Simmons was decided after Appellant filed his notice of appeal. It is well 

settled that “Pennsylvania appellate courts apply the law in effect at the time 

of the appellate decision. This means that we adhere to the principle that a 

party whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of 

changes in law which occur before the judgment becomes final.” 

Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). 
J-S20015-22

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Simmons, 262 A.3d at 524-25; see also Commonwealth v. K. Conley, 266 

A.3d 1136, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2021) (concluding that “under Simmons, [the 

a]ppellant was not yet required to comply with the probation portion of the 

imposed order of sentence before he began serving it; thus, his 

noncompliance did not permit the anticipatory revocation of his order of 

probation”). 

Here the trial court originally sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term 

of four years’ county restrictive intermediate punishment followed by three 

years of probation.10 As of the date of the revocation hearing, Appellant was 

still serving his four-year term of county restrictive intermediate punishment.

Therefore, he had not yet begun serving his consecutive terms of probation. 

Although this Court has not applied Simmons to the revocation of 

probation which runs consecutive to a term of county intermediate 

punishment, the same rationale may apply in this case. For these reasons, 

our independent review of the record has revealed another potential nonfrivolous challenge to the legality of the sentence regarding the applicability 

of Simmons to the revocation of Appellant’s consecutive terms of probation. 

Therefore, our independent review of the record confirms that there are 

potential non-frivolous issues relating to the legality of Appellant’s sentence. 

____________________________________________

10 As stated above, Appellant’s probationary sentence was composed of three 

consecutive terms of probation: two years for count two, nine months for 

count four, and three months for count six. The trial court also sentenced 

Appellant to one year of probation for count three, but that term was 

concurrent to the two years’ probation imposed at count two. 
J-S20015-22

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For these reasons, we find Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief to be 

insufficient and deny Counsel’s petition to withdraw. Accordingly, we deny 

Counsel’s petition to withdraw and direct Counsel to file either an amended 

Anders/Santiago brief that shall include a thorough discussion of the issues 

identified herein or file an advocate’s brief within thirty days. Failure to file 

either an Anders/Santiago or advocate’s brief within this time frame may 

result in quashal. The Commonwealth shall have thirty days thereafter to file 

a response. 

Petition to withdraw denied with instructions. Panel jurisdiction 

retained. 

Judge Murray joins the memorandum.

Judge King concurs in the result.