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June 3, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 853. FERGUSON et al. v . SPRA GGI N S.
B R O W N , J ud ge. I n this c a se arising o u t o f an au to mo bile ac c id ent that resu lted in the d eaths o f

tw o w o men in d if

f erent v ehic les, 1 Eric Fergu so n, as the e xec u to r o f the e s tate o f A my Leigh Fergu so n, and D av id Fergu so n, as her su rv iv ing heir, ( c o llec t i v e l y “ the
p laintif f s” ) assert that the trial co u rt erred by granting su mmary j ud gment in f av or o f
Timo t hy Sp raggins, as exec uto r o f the estate o f Sylv ia Sp raggins (“ the d ef end ant” ).

1 Sylv ia Sp raggins w as driv ing a v ehic le insu red so lely by an A llstate I nsu ranc e Co mp a ny p o lic y w hen she c o llid ed head

- o n w ith a F o r d Ed ge d riv en by A my Fergu so n and insu red by Pro gressiv e I nsu ranc e Co mp any. A s a r esu lt o f this c o llisio n, Ferg u s o n ’ s v ehic le ro tated into the p ath o f a sc ho o l b u s, su s tained a sec o nd ary imp ac t, and w as then s tru c k a third time by a heav y- du t y Fo rd F250 p ic k u p tr u c k t h a t had been f o llo w ing behind Fergu so n. The p laintif f s su ed Sp raggins’ estate, the bu s d riv er, the d r iv e r o f the Fo rd F250 and h i s e mp lo yer, and an o wner o f land c o nd u c ting a c o ntro lled bu rn that red uc ed v isibility in the lo c a tio n w here the ac c id ent o c c u rred

.The p laintif

f s assert that the d ef

end ant sho u ld no t hav e been d isc harged f ro m the c ase af ter they exec u ted a limited liability r elease of A llstate a nd t he d e f en d a n t u nd er OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1 , a s w e ll as a release o f their c laims against Pro gressiv e Premier
I nsu ranc e Co mp any o f I llino is ( “ Pro gressiv e” ), whic h p ro v id ed u ninsu red mo to rist (“ U M ” ) c o v erage to A my Fergu so n. Fo r the reaso ns exp lained belo w , w e af f irm.

“ A d ef end ant mo v ing f

o r su mmary j u d gment based o n an af firmativ e d ef

ense[,

su c h as release, OCGA § 9

- 1 1

- 8 (c )], may no t rely up o n an absenc e o f ev id enc e in the

rec o rd d isp ro v ing the af

f irmativ e d ef

ense. ” (Citatio ns and p u nc tu a t i o n o mitted

. )
Mi ller v . Tu rn er Bro a dca s ti

n g S ys tem , 339 Ga. A p p . 6 38, 6 44 (2) (7 9 4 SE2d 208) (201 6 ). I nstead , the d ef

end ant mu s t “ p resent[ ] ev id e nc e w hic h establi s h e s [ t he]
p rima f ac ie af f irmativ e d e f

ense. ” (Citatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) I d

. at 6 43 (2).
Onc e the def

end ant satisf

ies its bu rd en o f pro o f by p resenting ev id enc e to su p p o rt eac h element o f the af firmativ e d ef

e nse, the same bu r den o f p ro o f it w ou ld hav e at trial, the bu r d en o f p ro d u c tio n o f ev id e nc e shif ts to the p laintif

f , w ho w ill s u rv iv e su mmary j u d gment in t he same f ashio n that she w o u ld su rv iv e a mo t io n f o r d irec ted v erd ic t at trial, i. e . , by p resenting a ny ev id enc e w hic h c reates a j ury issu e o n an e lement o f the af f irmativ e d ef

ense. H o w ev er, if t he p la i n tif f is u nable to meet this bu rd en of pro d u c tio n, the d e f end a nt is entitled to su mmary ju d gment as a matter o f

law

.

2(Citatio n, p u nc t u a tio n, and emp hasis o mitted .) W es to n v . D u n Tra n s

p. & S tri nger , 304
Ga. A p p . 84, 85 (6 9 5 SE2d 27 9 ) (201 0).
Release is d ef

ined as “ liberatio n f

r o m an o bligatio n, d u ty, o r d emand ; the a ct

o f giv ing u p a right o r c laim to the p e rso n against w ho m it c o u ld hav e been enf o rc ed

. ” (Citatio n and p u nc t u atio n o mitted

. ) As hli n e v . Ma ri na s U S A , 336 Ga. A p p . 503, 507 (2) (7 84 SE2d 856 ) (201 6 )

. See also Fo wler v . C o ker , 107 Ga. 81 7 , 820 (33 SE 6 6 1) (1 89 9 ). “ A release is su b j e c t t o the same ru les of c o nstru c tio n as go v ern o rd inary

c o ntrac ts in w riting. ” U

. S

. A n cho r Mfr. v . Ru l

e In du s. , 26 4 Ga. 29 5, 29 8 ( 2) ( 443 SE2d 833) (1 9 9 4). “ Sinc e c o ntrac ts mu st be c o nstru ed ac c o rd ing to t h e i n t en t io n o f the
p arties at the time o f their exec u tio n it w ill no t be p resu m ed that p arties intend to

c o ntrac t aw ay their legal rights in regard to a su b j ec t matter n o t c l e arly ap p earing
therein. ” (Citatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) I d

. I n this case, the p laintif

f s exec u ted a d o cu m e n t titled “ LIM IT E D LIABILIT Y
RE LE AS E PU RS U AN T T O OCG A § 33
- 24
- 4 1. 1 ” o n J u ne 7 , 2022. I n this limited liability release, the p laintif fs, id entif ied as “ the Und ersigned ,” agreed : [to ] ac qu it, remise, release, and f o rev er d isc harge A llstate Pro p erty a nd Casu alty I nsu ranc e Co mp any . . . and d o hereby ac qu it, r emise, release, and f o rev er d isc harge Timo thy Sp raggins and t h e E state o f Sylv ia

3Sp raggins (“ Limited Releasees” ), exc ep t to the extent o ther insu r anc e

c o v erage is av ailable w hic h co v ers the c laim o r c laims o f [ the p laintif fs] against the L imited Releasees, f ro m a ny and all c laims, d emand s , rights,
c au ses o f ac tio n o r su its o f

any k ind o r natu re w hatso ev er.

On the same d ay the p laintif f s exec u ted the lim i t e d liability release, they also

s i g n e d a “ Release and T ru s t A greement Und er U ninsu red M o to rist I nsu ranc e Pro tec tio n Co verage” in w hic h they released and dis c h a r ged “ Pro gressiv e . . . in

c o nnec tio n w ith, a rising o u t o f , o r to arise o r r esu lt f

ro m [the] ac c id ent o r o c c u rrenc e [at issu e in this c ase]. ” The p laintif f s f urther a greed “to tak e, thro u gh rep resentativ es d esignated by Pro gressiv e . . . , a nd at t he so le exp ense o f Pro gressiv e . . . , su c h ac tio n as may be nec essary o r ap pro p riate to rec o v er [ ] f ro m the [d e fend ant], the d amages

resu lting f

ro m o u r inv o lv ement in the .

. . ac c id ent.
. . . ”
B a sed on the u nd isp u ted ev id enc e that there is no o ther insu ranc e av ailable to

c o v er the p laintif

f s’ c laims against the d ef

e nd ant f o llo w ing the p laintif

fs’ s ettlement

w ith Pro gressiv e, the d ef

e nd ant mo v ed f

o r su mmary ju d gment based u p o n the limited liability release. T he p laintif f s o p p o sed the mo tio n by argu ing that the terms of OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1 mand ate that the d ef e nd a nt remain in the c ase t hro u g h t r i al. A fter
ho ld ing a hearing, in w hic h p laintif f s ’ c o u nsel ac k no w led ged that the def end ant’ s

4p resenc e in the c ase w a s nec essary to retain his c ho sen v enu e o f D o u gherty Co u nty,

the trial c o u rt granted su mmary j u d gment in f av o r o f the d ef end ant.
1

. The p laintif

f s assert alternativ e, albeit related , t heo ries as t o w hy OCGA § 33-
24- 41

. 1 requ ires a d if

f erent o u tc o me. The fo u nd atio n fo r eac h rests up o n langu age in
the release stating: “ IT IS U N D ERS T OOD AN D AG RE E D that this Limited
Release is entered into pu rsu ant to the p ro visio ns s et f orth in OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1 , and
it is intend ed that the f

orc e and ef

f ec t of this Limited Release shall be a s intend ed by
the af o resaid Co d e sec tio n. ” I n their f irst argu ment, the p laintif f s c o ntend that the

statu te d o es n o t c o n t e m p late d ismissal o f a d ef end ant f o llo w ing t he exec u tio n o f a limited release. Sec o nd , they c o nt end that the av ailability o f insu ranc e c o v erage to

o ther d e f end ants in t he c ase mand ates that this d ef end ant r e m a i n i n the c ase. See
OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1 (b) (2). Finally, they argu e that A llstate’ s d u ty to def end the
d ef end ant against any su bro gatio n c laim bro ugh t b y P r o gressiv e mand ates the
d ef end ant’ s c o ntinu ed p resenc e in the c ase. B e f o re ad d ressing eac h o f these argu m ents in tu r n, a rev iew o f o u r p ast d esc rip tio n o f

this statu to ry sc heme w ill p ro v id e help f u l c o ntext. Prio r to the 1 9 9 2 enac t ment o f OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1 , a n u n i nsu red
mo to rist carrier c o u ld requ i r e t h at an inj u red c laimant (the c arrier’ s
5insu red ) o btain a j u d gment against the to rtf e a so r in e xc ess o f the liability
c o v erage limit as a c o nd itio n fo r rec o very of u nd erinsu red mo to rist benef its. [ 2 ] To f

a c i l itate settlements, the limited r elease p ro v isio ns o f OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1 w e re enac ted to p ro v id e a statu to ry f ramew o rk f

o r
a claimant inj u red in an au to mo bile ac c id ent to settle w ith t h e to r tf easo r ’ s liability insu r anc e carrier f or the liability c o v e r a g e l i m i t wh i l e p reserv ing the c laim ant’ s p e nd ing c laim f or u nd erinsu red mo to rist benef its against the c lai m a n t ’ s ow n insu ranc e c arrier. T he statu te
au tho riz e s the inj u red c laimant to settle with the to rtf easo r’ s insu r anc e
c arrier by ac c ep t ing p ayment o f the c arrier’ s limits o f liability c o v erage in r etu rn f or the claimant’ s exec u t io n o f “a limited release ap p lic able to the settling c a rrier a nd its insu red based o n inj u ries t o s u c h c laimants. ...” The limited release p ro v id ed f o r in t he statu te releases the s ettling insu ranc e c arrier f

r o m an y l iability to the c laimant, and releases the to r tf easo r f ro m p erso nal liability w hile p reserv ing the claimant’ s right to p u rsu e c laims to j ud gment against t h e to rtf easo r f o r the p u rp o se o f
c o llec ting against o ther av ailable insu ranc e c o v erag e inc lu d ing
u nd erinsu red mo to rist c o v erage.

2 See, e. g. , Da rb

y v . Ma thi

s , 21 2 Ga. A p p . 444, 445 (2) (441 SE2d 9 05) (1 99 4) (“ U nd e r the p ro visio ns o f bo th the Geo rgia Uninsu red M o to r ist A c t (OCGA § 33- 7

- 1 1 ) and ap p ellant’ s o w n au to mo bile insu ranc e p o lic y , the insu rer w as o bligated o nly to p a y the insu r ed all su ms w hic h the insu red shall be ‘ legally entitled to rec o v e r’ as d amage f

ro m the ow ner o r o p erato r o f an u ninsu r e d mo to r v ehic le. OCGA § 33- 7

- 1 1 (a) (1 ). I t is theref

o re a c o nd itio n p rec ed ent to an ac t io n against a n u ninsu red mo to rist c arrier that su it s h a l l h a v e been bro u ght and j u d gment rec o vered against the u ninsu red mo to r ist. ” ) (c itatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted ; emp hasis o mitted ).
6(Citatio ns and p u nc tu atio n omitted

. ) C a rter v . Pro

gres s i v e Mo u n t a i n I n s. , 320 Ga. A p p . 27 1 , 27 3- 27 4 (7 39 SE2d 7 50) (201 3), rev ersed o n o ther gro u nd s, C a rter v . Pro

gres s i v e Mo u n t a i n In s . , 29 5 Ga. 487 (7 6 1 SE2d 26 1 ) (201 4). (a) Relying o n c ase law reiterating generally that a “limited release

. . . d o es no t af f ec t the inj ured p arty’ s ability to o btain a j u d gment against the to rtf easo r, bu t merely
limits the to rtf

easo r ’ s p e rso nal liability to the amo u nt o f av ailable insu ranc e

c o v erage[,]” see Ro dgers v . S t
. P a u l Fi re & Ma ri n e In s . C o . , 228 G a. A p p . 49 9 , 501 (1 ) (49 2 SE2d 26 8) (1 9 97 ), and the a b sen ce o f a p ro v isio n in OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1
sp ec if ying that a limited release is gro u nd s f o r a c o m p lete d ismissal o f the released
p arty, the p laintif

f s c o ntend that the d ef

end ant mu st remain in the c ase thro u gh any trial against the o t her d ef end ants. W e d isagree. First, examinatio n of the statement in Ro dgers rev eals that it w as d ic ta mad e in
the c o ntext o f a c ase in w hic h the insu red exec u t e d a general release rather a limited
release u nd er OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1

. A c c ord ingly, it sho u ld no t be u sed as a su bstitu t e f o r the p lain langu age o f the statu te w hen d etermining w hether the d ef end ant in this

c ase w as entitled t o su mmary j u d gment based u p o n the release. N o r sho u l d c a s es

su bsequ ently c iting this langu age p ro v id e a similar s u c h su b stitu t e , as no ne inv o lv e a

7limited liability release o f a d ef end ant a n d a general release o f the o nly o ther insu ranc e

av ailable to c ov er the p laintif f ’ s c laim against the d ef

end ant. 3
W ith regard to the la ck o f a p ro v isio n e xp ressly p ro v id ing that a limited release
may so metimes be gro u nd s f o r su mmary j u d gment f

o r a t ortf easo r, w e o b serv e that “ a

statu te’ s silenc e [is] exac tly that: silenc e. ” (Citatio n a nd p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) In re E sta te o f W ertz er , 349 G a. A p p . 303, 308 (826 SE2d 1 6 8) (201 9 ). “ The p rinc ip le that

a matter no t c o v ered is no t c o v ered is so o bv io u s that it seems absu rd to r ec ite it. ” (Citatio n and p u nc tu at i o n o mitted

. ) I d

. I nstead , w hen co nsid ering “ the meaning o f

a statu te, w e mu st p resu me t h a t th e G e neral A s sembly meant w hat it said and said

w hat it meant. ” (Ci t a t i o n a nd p u nc tu atio n o m itted

. ) D e al v . C o lema n , 29 4 Ga. 1 7 0 , 1 7 2 ( 1) (a) (7 51 SE2d 337 ) (201 3). A nd “ [a]s in a ll c ases o f statu to r y c o nstru c tio n, w e

3 See Ra mo

s -S i lv a v . S ta te Fa rm Mu t. In s . Co

. , 300 Ga. A p p . 6 9 9 , 7 02 (6 86 SE2d 345) (2009 ) ( ho ld ing UM c arrier c an s u e t o r t f e a s o r f o r su bro gatio n af

ter to rtf easo r entered into limited liability release); E dmo n d v . C

on ti n en ta l In s . C

o . , 249 Ga. A p p . 338, 340 (1 ) ( a ) ( 5 4 8 S E2d 450) (2001 ) (ho ld ing p erso nal liability insu ranc e c arrier o bligated to def

end to rt c ase af

ter insu ranc e c a rrier o f the insu red ’ s emp lo y er entered into limited liability agreement w ith the p laintif f ) ; C o o k v . Sta te Fa rm Mu t. A u to In s . C o . , 237 Ga. A p p . 40 0 , 4 0 2 (51 4 SE2d 48) (1 9 9 9 ) (af f irming grant o f su mmary j u d gment to UM c a rriers based u p o n g e n e r al release signed by to rtf e aso r ); Ken t v . S t a t e Fa rm Mu t. A u to
. In s . C o . , 233 Ga. Ap p . 56 4, 56 5 (1 ) (504 SE2d 7 1 0) (1 99 8) (p hysic al p rec ed ent only) (af firming grant o f su mmary j u d gment to UM c arrier af ter p laintif f exec u ted limited liability release bu t also d ismissed ac tio n against to rtf easo r w ith p rej u d ic e).
8remain mind f u l that we mu st giv e the text its p lain and o rd inary meaning, v iew it in
the c o ntext in w hic h it ap p ears, and read it in its mo st natu ral and reaso nable w ay. ” (Citatio n and p unc tu atio n o m i t t ed ). S ta te v. C oo k , 31 7 Ga. 6 59 , 6 6 0 (1 ) (89 3 SE2d 6 7 0) (2023) I n k eep ing w ith these ad mo nitio ns, w e w ill next c o nsid er t he p laintif f s’
argu ments gro u nd ed in the text o f OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1

. (b) The p laintif

f s c o n t e n d that the av ailability o f insu ranc e co v erage to o ther
d ef end ants in the case mand ates that thi s d ef end ant r emain in the c ase. I n s u p p o rt o f
this co ntentio n, they rely u p o n the f o llo w ing langu age in OCGA § 33- 24- 41

. 1 (b) (2):
The limited r elease p ro v id e d f o r i n s u b s ec t io n (a) o f this Co d e sec t io n shall

. . . [r]elease the insu red to rt- f easo r c o v ered by th e p o l ic y o f the settling carrier f

ro m all p erso nal liability f ro m any and all claims a rising f ro m the oc c u rrenc e o n w h i c h t h e c laim is based e xc ep t to the extent
o ther insu ranc e c ov erage is av ailable w hic h c o v e r s su ch c laim o r c laims. 4

The d e f end a nt c o unters that the p laintif f s’ interp r etatio n o f su bsec tio n (b) (2)
is c o ntrary to the statu t e as a who le and w o u ld rend e r s u bsec tio n (d ) (1 ) su p erf lu o u s,

w hic h p ro v id es: “ The limited release o f the settling c arrier p ro v id ed fo r in su bsec tio n

4 T his langu a ge is bro a d er than the langu age inc lu d ed in the limited releas e signed by the p arties, w hic h p ro v i d es a c arv e ou t fo r “o ther insu ranc e c o v erage . . . av ailable w hic h c o v ers the c laim o r c laims of [th e p la i n ti ffs ] a ga in s t the [defen da n t]

. ” (Emp hasis su p plied

. )
9(a) o f t his Co d e sec tio n shall no t
. . . [b]ar a c laimant’ s rec o v e r y against a ny o ther

to r t- f easo r o r u nd er any other p o l i c y o f insu ranc e o r release any other insu ranc e

c arrier p ro v id ing ap p lic able c ov erage u nless sp ec if ic a lly p ro v id e d fo r i n s u c h release. ”
The d ef end ant p o ints o u t that [s]u b sec tio n (a) o f t he statu te be g i n s by exp ressly ad d ressing the
exec u t io n o f a limited release f o r a claim ap

p licab le to the settling carrier and its insured

. The v ery n e xt su b j ec tio n (b) then sp e c if ies w hat the limited release “ p ro v id ed f o r in su bsec t io n (a)” shall d o . I t releases the insu red exc ep t to t he extent other insu ranc e co v erage is a v ailable w hic h
c o v ers such claim , i. e. [,] the c laim ap plic a ble to the settling carrier a nd its insu red

. Su bsec t i o n ( d ) (1 ) then e xp ressly p reserv e[s] the s ettling p a r t y ’ s right to r ec o v er against any other to rtf e a s o r o r u nd er any o ther p o lic y o f insu ranc e . I f

su bsec tio n (b) (2)’ s “ o ther insu ranc e” langu age
w as mea n t to inc lu d e c o - d ef end ants’ insu ranc e c ov erage, then
su bsec tio n (d ) (1 ) is rend ered su p erf lu o u s . (Emp hasis in o riginal. )

“ T he fu nd amental ru les o f statu to ry c o nstru c tio n requ ire u s t o c o n s tru e [a]

statu te ac c o rd ing t o its ow n terms, to giv e w o rd s their p lain and o r d inary meaning, and

to av o id a c o nstru c tio n that mak es so me langu age m ere s u rp lu s ag e . ” ( C itatio n and
p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) La Fo n ta i n e v . S i gn a tu re Res ea rch, 305 Ga. 107 , 1 0 8 (823 SE2d

7 9 1 ) (201 9 ). “ I n co nstru ing langu age in any o ne p art o f a statu te, a c o u r t sho u ld

c o nsid er the statu te as a who le. ” I d

. A f ter c o nsid e ring the argu m ents o f bo th p arties,
10w e f

ind that, ev en if w e assu me that it is ap p ro p riate to lo o k t o the terms o f the limited liability statu t e rather than o r in c o nj u nc t io n with the langu age in the c o ntrac t o f
release signed by the p arties, OCGA § 33- 24. 41

. 1 (b) (2) d o es no t p rec lu de t he entry

o f su mmary j u d gment o n behalf o f the d ef end ant in this c ase. I n ou r v ie w , t h e

u nd isp u ted lac k o f any o ther insu r anc e a v ailable to t he d ef end ant e n ti t l e s h im to

su mmary j ud gment in his f av o r, w hether lo o k ed at f

ro m t he p o int o f v iew o f the terms

o f the limited liability release o r the statu te. (c ) The p laint i f

f s a s s e r t that the d ef

end ant mu s t remain in the c ase bec au se Pro gressiv e has the right t o assert a su bro g a t i o n c laim against the d ef end ant f o r the

amo u nt it p aid to the p laintif f s fo r UM benef

its in c o nnec tio n w ith the ac c id ent. They
p o int t o OCGA § 33- 24- 41 .1 (d ) (3) in su p p o rt o f this assertio n, w hic h pro v id es: “ The
limited release o f the s ettling c arrier p ro v id ed f o r in su bsec tio n (a) o f this Co d e sec tio n shall no t
. . . [a]f

fec t any d u ty the settling carrier o w e s t o its insu r ed u nd e r its p o lic y, inc lu d ing, w itho u t limitatio n, the d u ty to d ef end a su bro gatio n c laim bro u ght against
its insu red

. ” We f

ind no m erit in this c o ntentio n, a s Allstate’ s o ngo ing d u ty to d ef end
any su bro gatio n c laim a sserted by Pro gressiv e simp ly has no bearing o n whether the pla i n ti ffs hav e released the d ef

end ant f ro m o ngo ing liability in this c ase. Fu r thermo re,

11as ac k no w led ged b y bo th p arties, no su bro gatio n c laim has b een asserted by

Pro gressiv e in this c ase, and a s t h e d e f e n d ant p o ints ou t, und e r the terms o f the
p laintif f s’ agreement w ith Pro gressiv e, Pro gressiv e, no t the p laintif f s, has irrev o c able
p o w er to p r o sec ute any su bro gatio n c laim. Simp ly p u t, the statu to ry langu a ge abo u t the lac k o f an ef

f ec t o n A l l s t a t e’ s p re- existing d u t ies has no bearing on w hether the
d ef end ant w as entitled to s u mmary j u d gment on the p laintif f s’ c laims. Co nv ersely, granting s u mmary j u d gment to the d ef end ant in the u nd erlying liability c a se w ill no t allo w A llstate to esc ap e its o bligatio n t o d ef end a ny su bseq u e nt su bro gatio n c laim
asserted by Pro gressiv e.
2

. T h e p l a intif

f s assert that the p arties “ c o ntemp l a t e d fu t u r e l i t i g a t i o n ” b e ca u s e the limi t e d l i a bility release w as signed eight mo nths bef o re su it w a s f

iled and

“ e xp lic itl y states that ‘ this Limited Release in no way p rej u d ic es the rights o f the
released p a r ti es t o d eny liability in any ac tio n based u p o n said ac cid ent, c asu alty o r

ev ent. ’ ” W e d isagree. A p ro visio n p reserv ing the d ef end ant’ s right t o assert a d ef ense

“ in any ac tio n,” whic h w o u ld inc lu d e any su bro gatio n c a se s u bsequ ently bro u ght by
P r o g r essiv e, c a nno t reaso nably be interp reted to inc lu d e a requ irement that t h e

12d ef

end ant r emain in the liability su it bro u ght by the plaintif f s a f ter o ther insu ranc e

av ailable to the d ef

end ant has been exhau sted

. 3. Finally, the p laintif

f s argu e t hat w e sh o u l d r ev erse the trial c o u rt bec au se eliminating their ability to get a j u d gment against the d ef end ant “ f o r the f u ll v alu e o f
his d amages to [them], as determined by a j u ry, will ad v ersely af f ec t [their] p o tential

rec o v ery against the o ther [d ] e f end ants. ” They co mp lain that “ [ i]f Allstate gets its

w ay and is exc u sed fro m hav ing to p u t u p a def ense . . . , the o ther named D ef end ants

w ill s imp ly heap a ll the liability o n the ‘ emp ty chair,’ w ith t he resu lt that their
ap p o rtio ned sh a r e o f liability is lik ely to be mu c h less than if a f u ll d ef ense is

mo u nted ” o n behalf o f this d ef end ant. (Emp hasis o mitted

. ) See OCGA § 5 1

- 1 2- 33 (d ) (1 ) (u nd er ap p o r tio nment statu te, the “ [n]egligenc e o r f au lt o f a no np arty shall be

c o nsid ered if the plaintif

f entered int o a s e t t l e m ent agreement w ith the no np arty
. .

. ” ). W hile this may be a c o nsequ enc e o f the p laintif f s’ d ec isio n to s ettle w ith bo th the
d ef end ant and Pro gressiv e bef o r e trial, it is no t a gro und to rev erse a n otherw ise
p ro p e r grant o f

su mmary j u d gment to the d ef end ant in this c ase. Ju dgmen t a

ffi rmed. D i lla rd, P. J. , a nd Pa dgett, J. , co n cu r .

13