J. S71003/15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

JABBAR ODELL JAMES, : No. 1223 WDA 2014 

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, February 27, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0011806-2012 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND OTT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 03, 2016 

 Jabbar Odell James appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on 

February 27, 2014, following his conviction of theft by unlawful taking.1

 The trial court provided the following facts: 

 On August 8, 2012, Juana Saunders hosted a 

cookout in her backyard at 216 Amanda Avenue in 

Mount Oliver Borough, Allegheny County. Saunders 

invited approximately thirty people to the party, 

including Appellant. Saunders and Appellant had 

been married for three years as of that date, but 

were separated and no longer living together in 

August of 2012. During the party, Saunders locked 

her bedroom door because she had approximately 

three thousand dollars for her son’s college tuition, 

bills, and cookout incidentals in her nightstand. 

Saunders was the only person with a key to her 

bedroom, which she used a few times during the 

party to retrieve money for ice and other items. 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a). 
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 The cookout ended at approximately 

11:00 P.M. Appellant remained at Saunders’s house,

along with Saunders and her six children. Saunders

unlocked her bedroom door, checked on the money 

in her nightstand, and let Appellant into her bedroom 

to spend the night while she went downstairs to 

sleep. Shortly thereafter Saunders returned 

upstairs, and she and Appellant began to argue. The 

argument progressed from her bedroom down to the 

first floor. The argument ended at approximately 

5:30 A.M. when Appellant went back upstairs and 

Saunders fell asleep on the couch. 

 Saunders woke up at 7:30 A.M. and noticed 

that Appellant was no longer in her home. She 

immediately checked on the money in her nightstand 

and found that it was missing. Saunders called 

Appellant inquiring about the missing money, to 

which Appellant responded, “It’s not so funny now, is 

it?” When Saunders stated that she would give 

Appellant thirty minutes to return the money before

calling the police, he did not respond. Saunders 

subsequently called the police to report the theft.

 Appellant was arrested and charged as noted 

hereinabove. The trial was postponed several times. 

Prior to one of Appellant’s rescheduled trial dates, he 

attempted to contact Saunders’s current paramour, 

Lakesha Harris, to resolve the case outside of the 

court system. Appellant sent Harris a Facebook 

message indicating that he wanted the case to be 

over and he would compromise about taking the 

money. Harris and Appellant conversed through 

their Facebook accounts. At the conclusion of one of 

the conversations Appellant stated, “I was wrong, 

but we both done things to each other.” Appellant 

then called Harris at Saunders’s home and told her,

“Listen, I’m trying to work something out. I want 

this shit to be over. I’ll give her the money. I’ll give 

her half now and half before she go in the 

courtroom.” There was no indication at trial that 

Appellant ever returned any of the money to 

Saunders. 
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Trial court opinion, 3/27/15 at 4-6 (footnote and citations omitted). 

 Following a non-jury trial, appellant was convicted of theft by unlawful 

taking on November 4, 2013. On November 21, 2013, appellant filed a 

motion to vacate the verdict on the grounds that defense counsel was not 

provided with the opportunity to present a closing argument. The trial court 

granted the motion and on January 2, 2014, found appellant guilty following 

closing arguments from both defense counsel and the Commonwealth. 

Appellant was sentenced to two years’ probation and ordered to pay $3,000 

in restitution by the trial court on February 27, 2014. 

 On March 7, 2014, appellant filed post-sentence motions which were 

denied by the trial court on July 10, 2014. Appellant filed a notice of appeal 

on July 30, 2014. On August 27, 2014, the trial court ordered appellant to 

produce a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied with the trial court’s order, and the 

trial court has issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

 Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: 

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in not 

granting [appellant’s] Post-Sentence Motion 

requesting a new trial when the verdict of guilty was 

contrary to the weight of the evidence? 

Appellant’s brief at 4. 

 Our standard of review for determining whether a verdict is compatible 

with the weight of the evidence is well settled: 
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 An appellate court’s standard of review when 

presented with a weight of the evidence claim is 

distinct from the standard of review applied by the

trial court: 

Appellate review of a weight claim is a 

review of the exercise of discretion, 

not of the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 

1177, 1189 (Pa. 1994). Because the 

trial judge has had the opportunity to 

hear and see the evidence presented, an 

appellate court will give the gravest 

consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing a trial court’s determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of 

the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Farquharson, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1976). 

One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the 

lower court’s conviction that the verdict 

was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be 

granted in the interest of justice. 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 

(Pa. 2000). 

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by 

the trial court in granting or denying the motion for a 

new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the

evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a 

trial court’s discretion, we have explained: 

The term “discretion” imports the 

exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill 

so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion 

within the framework of the law, and is 

not exercised for the purpose of giving 

effect to the will of the judge. Discretion 

must be exercised on the foundation of 
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reason, as opposed to prejudice, 

personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 

actions. Discretion is abused where the 

course pursued represents not merely an 

error of judgment, but where the 

judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the 

record shows that the action is a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. 

Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753 (citation omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in 

orginal.) 

 A fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented. Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1087 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (citations omitted). This court cannot assume the task of assessing 

the credibility of the witnesses or evidence presented at trial, as that task is 

within the exclusive purview of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. 

Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 420 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations omitted). 

 Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim is grounded in the theory that 

the testimony presented by the Commonwealth from Saunders and Harris 

was “clearly unreliable, fantastic, and inconsistent, both internally and with 

other, more credible evidence.” (Appellant’s brief at 10.) The trial court, 

functioning as the fact-finder in this case, made the following determination 

of credibility: 

The Trial Court clearly found the Commonwealth 

witnesses credible, and that the combination of 

direct and circumstantial evidence presented during

the trial established Appellant’s guilt beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. The Trial Court properly denied 

the motion for new trial as the verdict was not 

against the weight of the evidence. 

Trial court opinion, 3/27/15 at 7-8 (citations omitted). 

 As noted by the Hankerson court, the fact-finder, and only the 

fact-finder, may determine credibility. An appellate court cannot, on a 

weight of the evidence review, replace the fact-finder’s determination of 

credibility with its own determination. See Commonwealth v. Blackham, 

909 A.2d 315, 320 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 919 A.2d 954 (Pa. 

2007) (“It is not for this Court to overturn the credibility determinations of 

the fact-finder”) (citations omitted). Therefore, we are bound by the trial 

court’s credibility determination. We find that based on its credibility 

determination at trial, the trial court’s denial of appellant’s post-sentence 

motion was not an abuse of discretion. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/3/2016