1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42525

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH R. ROCKSTAHL,

Defendant-Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2015 Opinion No. 66

Filed: October 20, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge; Hon. Mick Hodges, 

Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate, 

affirmed. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

Keith R. Roark, Hailey, for respondent. Keith R. Roark argued.

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Joseph R. Rockstahl was found guilty of exhibiting a deadly weapon and disturbing the 

peace. On intermediate appellate review, the district court determined that Rockstahl’s right to 

counsel of choice was denied and it was error to exclude his intended trial character witnesses. 

Accordingly, the district court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a 

new trial. The State appeals, arguing that the district court erred in finding an abuse of discretion 

for excluding Rockstahl’s character witnesses and in finding that Rockstahl was denied his right 

to counsel of choice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s decision.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Surrounding an incident that occurred on July 2, 2012, the State charged Rockstahl on 

November 23, 2012, with three misdemeanors: exhibiting a deadly weapon, aiming a firearm at 
2

others, and disturbing the peace. After Rockstahl initially appeared on his own behalf,1an 

attorney (the trial attorney) substituted in to represent Rockstahl on November 28, 2012. On 

March 21, 2013, the magistrate set the jury trial for May 30 and 31, 2013, with a pretrial 

conference to take place on May 17, 2013.

According to a later-filed affidavit, the attorney-client relationship between Rockstahl 

and the trial attorney experienced a total breakdown. One week after the pretrial order setting 

the trial date, on March 28, 2013, Rockstahl fired the trial attorney. The affidavit also explained 

that Rockstahl indicated he was hiring another attorney (the substitute attorney) to represent him. 

The record does not indicate why the trial attorney did not immediately file a motion to 

withdraw, and the substitute attorney did not file a notice of appearance. On May 15, 2013, a 

month and a half after Rockstahl fired the trial attorney and two days prior to the pretrial 

conference, the trial attorney filed an ex parte motion to withdraw. 

Rockstahl, his trial attorney, his substitute attorney, the prosecutor, and the magistrate 

judge participated in the pretrial conference on May 17, 2013. During the conference, the 

magistrate asked the trial attorney why he waited two months to file a motion to withdraw. The 

trial attorney explained that Rockstahl told him to discontinue working on the case and that the 

substitute attorney would appear on Rockstahl’s behalf. The magistrate then turned to the 

prosecutor, and the prosecutor said that he had no position on the request to withdraw. The 

magistrate returned to the trial attorney and asked about speedy trial, which Rockstahl did not 

originally waive. The trial attorney informed the court that Rockstahl would waive speedy trial 

if the court was willing to continue the trial. The substitute attorney interjected and informed the 

magistrate that he was “ready, willing, and able to do what anyone wants to be done.” The 

discussion then turned to the available dates for the substitute attorney and for the court, which 

were two days in the beginning of August 2013. The prosecutor responded, “this is like a 

misdemeanor case more than a year old, by the time, August would be a year and a month.” 

After further discussion about the trial dates, the magistrate expressed his concern with 

the situation: “I don’t like this a bit, I’m sorry. I don’t--again, we could have had this taken care 

of two months ago and set the date earlier. This is a denial of justice. What about our victims? 

They’re entitled to better than this.” The magistrate then denied the motion seeking withdrawal 

of the trial attorney, explaining that he was “going to order you two [Rockstahl and his trial 

 

1 Rockstahl is an Idaho licensed attorney. 
3

attorney] to work together.” He further noted, “I’m very sorry, but it’s just--I agree, a 

misdemeanor a year old gives me the impression we want to avoid trial. I agree a defendant’s 

rights are important, but under these circumstances, that will be my order.” After denying the 

motion, the magistrate asked for jury instructions and witness lists in a week. Trial counsel then 

raised a scheduling conflict of his own and also moved the court to dismiss the case because 

speedy trial would run prior to the scheduled trial date. In response, the magistrate moved the 

trial up. Rockstahl submitted his intended witness and exhibit list on May 20, 2013.

On May 22, 2013, one day before trial, the magistrate conducted a pretrial hearing and 

addressed Rockstahl’s witness list. The prosecutor objected to the listed witnesses, noting that 

Rockstahl failed to respond to a discovery request on November 29, 2012. Based upon 

Rockstahl’s failure to disclose witnesses in response to the prosecutor’s discovery request, the 

magistrate decided that none of the listed witnesses, except for Rockstahl and his wife, could 

testify. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Rockstahl guilty of exhibiting a deadly 

weapon, I.C. § 18-3303, and disturbing the peace, I.C. § 18-6409. Following the verdict, 

Rockstahl substituted in for the trial attorney and the substitute attorney later substituted in for 

Rockstahl. The magistrate eventually sentenced Rockstahl to consecutive sentences, in addition 

to fifty hours of community service: 180 days with 174 days suspended for exhibiting a deadly 

weapon and 180 days with 176 days suspended for disturbing the peace.2 

Rockstahl filed an appeal with the district court. Rockstahl contended in his appellate 

brief that his right to counsel of choice was denied and that the magistrate erred by excluding 

character witnesses. The district court determined that Rockstahl’s right to counsel of choice 

was denied and also found that the magistrate abused its discretion by excluding the witnesses. 

The district court thus vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 

The State appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred in determining that the magistrate 

denied Rockstahl his right to counsel of choice and in determining that the magistrate abused its 

discretion by excluding Rockstahl’s character witnesses.

 

2 Rockstahl was also placed on twenty-four months of supervised probation. 
4

When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, our 

standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. “When reviewing the 

decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the 

district court’s decision.” State v. Loomis, 146 Idaho 700, 702, 201 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2009). 

Thus, we do not review the decision of the magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 

318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the 

decision of the district court. Id. 

At issue in this appeal is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. The Sixth 

Amendment provides a defendant “who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will 

represent him.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006). A “[d]eprivation of 

the right is ‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by 

the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he received.” Id. at 148. 

Thus, the erroneous denial of the right to counsel of choice is a structural error, and a court need 

not assess whether counsel was ineffective or whether the defendant was prejudiced by the error. 

Id. The right to counsel of choice is qualified, however. Indeed, the United States Supreme 

Court has “recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice 

against the needs of fairness, [Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988)], and against 

the demands of its calendar, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 

U.S. at 152; see also State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793, 760 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Ct. App. 1988).

In this case, the district court ultimately determined that denial of the motion to withdraw, 

the denial of a continuance, and the magistrate’s order that trial counsel and Rockstahl work 

together denied Rockstahl his right to counsel of choice. Although recognizing that the motion 

to withdraw should have been filed earlier, the district court considered several factors in 

reaching its determination. On appeal, the State focuses specifically on the denial of the 

continuance by the magistrate, explaining that the district court did not apply the correct

standard. We understand the State’s argument to also tie into the larger picture: whether 

Rockstahl’s right to counsel of choice was appropriately limited because the trial court balanced 

the right to counsel of choice against the demands of the trial court’s calendar.

Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Gonzalez-Lopez recognized that a trial court 

may balance the right to counsel of choice against the demands of the trial court’s calendar. 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 (majority) (“We have recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in 
5

balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of 

its calendar”) (internal citations omitted); id. at 155 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Similarly, the right to 

be represented by counsel of choice can be limited by mundane case-management 

considerations.”). Both opinions also cited to Morris, in which the United States Supreme Court 

considered whether the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it denied 

defense counsel’s motion for more time to prepare. Morris, 461 U.S. at 11. The Court explained 

that “broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an 

unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for 

delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel.’” Id. at 11-12 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 

376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)).

Relying on Morris, this Court explained that “an accused’s right to counsel does not 

wholly displace the judicial objective of effective court management.” Carman, 114 Idaho at 

793, 760 P.2d at 1209. But we have also explained that when a trial court considers a request 

that new counsel substitute in for withdrawing counsel and a request that a continuance be 

allowed, the trial court should examine the requests “with the rights and interests of the 

defendant in mind, tempered by exigencies of judicial economy.” Id. Although the trial court 

judge has discretion to grant or deny a continuance, such discretion is abused “if denying a 

continuance results in abridgement of [a defendant’s] right to counsel.” In re Interest of Kinley, 

108 Idaho 862, 865, 702 P.2d 900, 903 (Ct. App. 1985). This Court and the Idaho Supreme 

Court have thus recognized that “when a defendant requests new counsel, several factors have 

been identified for use in making the determination of whether his request for a continuance 

should be granted.” State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 555, 873 P.2d 800, 809 (1993); Carman, 114 

Idaho at 793, 760 P.2d at 1209. These factors are:

the timing of the motion; the requested length of delay, including whether the 

delay is an attempt to manipulate the proceedings; the number, if any, of similar 

continuances sought by the defendant; inconvenience to witnesses; any prejudice 

to the prosecution; whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between the accused 

and counsel; and the qualifications possessed by present counsel.

Carman, 114 Idaho at 793, 760 P.2d at 1209. Other courts utilize similar factors or examine the 

circumstances of the ruling and the trial court’s rationale. E.g., United States v. Trestyn, 646 

F.3d 732, 739 (10th Cir. 2011) (analyzing eight factors), People v. Brown, 322 P.3d 214, 221 

(Colo. 2014) (adopting an eleven-factor test); see also United States v. Sellers, 645 F.3d 830, 835 
6

(7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the court considers “both the circumstances of the ruling and the 

reasons given by the judge”).

Because the decision to grant a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, we 

review the decision on the continuance alone for an abuse of discretion. Carman, 114 Idaho at 

793, 760 P.2d at 1209; see also United States v. Maldonado, 708 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2013). 

When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a 

multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as 

one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and

consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether 

the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 

600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). Importantly, we consider whether the trial court balanced the 

right to counsel of choice against the demands of the trial court’s calendar or whether it acted 

arbitrarily. But the larger issue of whether a defendant’s right to counsel of choice was denied 

(which encompasses the motion for a continuance in this case) is a constitutional issue; thus, we 

exercise free review over that issue. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 418, 348 P.3d 1, 32 

(2015) (“Constitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises free 

review.”); State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding “we 

freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found”).

Here, the magistrate said, “I don’t like this a bit, I’m sorry. I don’t--again, we could have 

had this taken care of two months ago and set the date earlier. This is a denial of justice. What 

about our victims? They’re entitled to better than this.” Notably absent here is any inquiry into 

the breakdown in communication between Rockstahl and his trial attorney. Then, without 

analyzing the Carman factors or addressing his court calendar,3the magistrate denied the motion 

to withdraw (and the inherent motion to continue and substitute the other attorney) and 

“order[ed] you two [trial counsel and Rockstahl] to work together.” Applying the Carman 

factors leads to a different result.

 

3

This case uniquely involves the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in that the magistrate 

balanced the right to counsel of choice against the rights of the victims. And while the 

magistrate noted the overall length of the pendency of the case, it made no mention of adverse 

effect on the court’s docket.
7

Turning to the first Carman factor--the timing of the motion--the motion to withdraw 

here was filed only two days before the pretrial conference. However, the motion was still filed 

two weeks prior to the scheduled trial. Next, regarding the requested length of delay, the 

substitute attorney requested a delay of two months from the scheduled trial date, and this 

appeared reasonable considering the substitute attorney’s trial calendar. There is no indication 

that the substitute attorney attempted to manipulate the proceedings. Moreover, the crimes were 

charged only five and a half months prior to the May 22, 2013, pretrial hearing, and Rockstahl 

acknowledged that he would waive speedy trial. Also, the State did not charge Rockstahl with 

the crimes until four and a half months after the date of the alleged incident. As to the third 

factor--whether there were other similar continuances sought by the defendant--there was no 

discussion during the pretrial hearing of any other continuance or motion for extension of time. 

The next factor deals with inconvenience to witnesses, but there was no discussion of 

inconvenience to the State’s witnesses during the pretrial hearing (although it appears there was 

an inconvenience for some of Rockstahl’s witnesses by not continuing the trial). Turning to 

whether there was prejudice to the prosecution, the record is void of such evidence. Perhaps the 

most important factor here is whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between the accused and 

counsel. There indeed was an irreconcilable conflict between Rockstahl’s trial attorney and 

Rockstahl: Rockstahl fired the trial attorney two months before the pretrial hearing due to a 

breakdown in communication. Finally, the last factor analyzes the qualifications possessed by 

present counsel. As the district court discussed, substitute counsel had the requisite 

qualifications to appear on Rockstahl’s behalf and was ready and willing to represent Rockstahl.

The district court considered several of these factors in reaching its decision that the 

magistrate abused its discretion by not granting the continuance.4 This Court agrees with the 

district court’s decision. The issue then becomes how the error in refusing to grant a continuance 

implicates Rockstahl’s right to counsel of choice.

 

4

Specifically, the district court considered: the qualifications possessed by counsel 

(“current counsel is a very skilled defense attorney who has done countless jury trials”); the 

absence of other continuances; the fact that the “requested delay was not an attempt to 

manipulate the proceedings” and was “not unreasonable”; the timing of the motion (“[t]he 

motion should have been filed earlier, but was still filed before the pretrial”); and whether an 

irreconcilable conflict existed between the defendant and counsel (“being discharged is a 

breakdown in the relationship”).
8

Looking at the totality of the denial of the motion to withdraw, motion to continue (in 

order to substitute counsel), and the magistrate’s order that trial counsel and Rockstahl work 

together, this Court concludes that Rockstahl’s right to counsel of choice was violated. 

Rockstahl was forced to proceed through a trial with an attorney he had fired two months before; 

this was a structural error that requires us to vacate the convictions for exhibiting a deadly 

weapon and disturbing the peace. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150 (“We have little trouble 

concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, with consequences that

are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as structural error.”) 

(internal quotations omitted). We recognize the importance of promoting judicial efficiency by 

avoiding delays, but judicial efficiency must be balanced against Rockstahl’s constitutional right 

to counsel of choice. Because we affirm the district court’s decision, we need not address the 

exclusion of the character witnesses, as the witnesses that will be called by each party will have 

to be readdressed in the pretrial proceedings. 

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.