J-S90029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTON TYRONE JOHNSON

Appellant No. 1816 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated May 2, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0004156-2011

BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J., and JENKINS, J. 

JUDGMENT ORDER BY SOLANO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2016

Pro se Appellant, Anton Tyrone Johnson, appeals from the order 

dismissing his first PCRA petition. We affirm because Appellant failed to 

heed the PCRA court’s order to comply with Rule 1925(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The facts relating to the underlying crime are unnecessary for our 

disposition. The PCRA court docketed pro se Appellant’s first PCRA petition 

on July 27, 2015. Counsel was appointed and he filed a petition for leave to 

withdraw on October 7, 2015. The court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on 

December 7, 2015, and Appellant filed a response. On May 2, 2016, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition and granted counsel’s 

petition to withdraw. On May 24, 2016, Appellant filed a timely notice of 
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appeal.1 On June 22, 2016, the court ordered Appellant to file a statement 

of the errors Appellant planned to raise on appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 

1925(b) within twenty-one days. Although Appellant received the order, he 

did not file a timely Statement of Errors as directed by the court.2

In Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme 

Court observed:

Our jurisprudence is clear and well-settled, and firmly 

establishes that: Rule 1925(b) sets out a simple bright-line rule, 

which obligates an appellant to file and serve a Rule 1925(b) 

statement, when so ordered; any issues not raised in a Rule 

1925(b) statement will be deemed waived; the courts lack the 

authority to countenance deviations from the Rule’s terms; the 

Rule’s provisions are not subject to ad hoc exceptions or 

selective enforcement; appellants and their counsel are 

responsible for complying with the Rule’s requirements; Rule 

1925 violations may be raised by the appellate court sua sponte, 

and the Rule applies notwithstanding an appellee’s request not 

to enforce it; and, if Rule 1925 is not clear as to what is required 

of an appellant, on-the-record actions taken by the appellant 

aimed at compliance may satisfy the Rule. We yet again repeat 

the principle first stated in [Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 

306 (Pa. 1998),] that must be applied here: “[I]n order to 

preserve their claims for appellate review, [a]ppellants must 

comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a Statement 

____________________________________________

1 See generally Commonwealth v. Wilson, 911 A.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (discussing prisoner mailbox rule).

2

In his appellate brief, Appellant included an unsigned and undated letter —

apparently written by Appellant — acknowledging receipt of the court’s June 

22 Rule 1925(b) order and asking for an extension of time. Ex. 3 to 

Appellant’s Brief. The record, however, does not reflect that the PCRA court 

ever received this letter. No extension of time was granted, and Appellant 

never filed any Rule 1925(b) Statement.
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of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be 

deemed waived.” 719 A.2d at 309.

Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). 

Instantly, the court served an order on Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) 

statement within twenty-one days. Appellant, despite acknowledging receipt 

of the court’s order, see Ex. 3 to Appellant’s Brief, failed to comply and did 

not successfully obtain an extension of time. Accordingly, constrained by 

well-settled precedent, we hold that Appellant has waived all issues on 

appeal, and we affirm the order below. See Hill, 16 A.3d at 494.3

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

3 Appellant claimed that because his sentence is cruel and unusual, the court 

imposed an illegal sentence. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate 

mandatory minimum sentence of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for 

robbery and a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (persons not to possess 

firearms) and a consecutive five years’ probation for conspiracy. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 1783 EDA 2013, at 2 (Pa. Super., Mar. 6, 

2014). This was Appellant’s second conviction for a crime of violence and, 

thus, he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of at least ten 

years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714. The court made the sentence consecutive to a 

different ten-to-twenty year sentence imposed by the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas. Johnson, 1783 EDA 2013, at 2. Appellant’s 

illegality claim is undeveloped, and we discern no illegality, as Appellant’s 

sentence was imposed because of his prior conviction. See 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 784 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating 

that in Alleyne v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), “the Supreme Court of the 

United States held that the Sixth Amendment requires that any fact — other 

than a prior conviction — that increases a mandatory minimum sentence 

for an offense must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt” (emphasis added)). Thus, even if Appellant’s claim were 

not waived, there would be no basis for relief.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/8/2016