UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA
LARRY K

LAYMAN , P la in t if f, v. Ci vilAc ti on N o. 08 -1 00 5 ( JD B) DA VI D B ARM AK, in div idua lly , a nd M IN TZ , LE VI N, CO HN , F ERRI S, GLOVSK

Y, AND P OP EO, P.C., a pr ofe ssi ona l c or por at ion , De fend ant s.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION This is a brea ch of c ontrac t and bre ach of fiduciar y duty case filed by

L arr y Klay man (" plaintiff" ) ag ainst David B armak, an individual, and Mintz, L evin, Cohn, Fe rris, Glovsky , and Popeo, P.C., a law firm (c ollectively , "de fenda nts"). Plaintiff a lleg es that def endants bre ache d their fiducia

ry obligations to hi m by

disclosing f

alse c onfidential information and by counseling his fo rm e r e mpl oye r, Judic ia l Watc h, to a sse rt fa lse c la ims a g a ins t hi m and to i nte rf e re wi th h is profe ssional life. Now be fore the Court is defenda nts' Rule 12( b)(6) motion to di smiss for failure to state a c laim. For the rea sons discussed below, de fenda nts' motion will be denied in pa rt and g ra nte d in pa rt . BACK GR OUND Kl ay man is the fo rm e r c ha ir

man, g e ne ra l c ouns e l, a

nd tr e a sure r o f Jud ic ia l Watc h. Am
. Compl. ¶ 5. He cur

rently resides in F lorida. I d. ¶ 2. B armak resides in Mar yland, pra ctices la

w in Washington, D.C., and is a pa rtner in the la

w firm Mintz, L evin, Cohn, Fe rris, Glovsky , and Pop e o ( " Mintz L e vin " ). I d. ¶ 3 ; D e fs .' De c l. ¶ 1. Mintz L e vin

ha s o ff ic e s in Ma ssa c hu se tts ,2

Connecticut, Ne w York, Califor nia, Washington D.C., and L ondon. I d. ¶ 16. B armak serve s as outside g ener al counse l for Judi cial Watch, and K lay man alleg es that B armak also repr esente d him ind ivi du a lly . A m. C omp l. ¶ 6. Kl ay man c e a se d e mpl oy

me nt w ithJudic ia l Watc h in September 2003. I d. ¶ 5. De fenda nts aided in broker ing a

sever ance ag ree ment betwee n Klay man and Judicial W atch, in which K lay man was r epre sented by

separ ate c ounsel. I d. ¶ 8. Some of the alleg ations in the instant case a rise fr om disag ree ments about the execution of that
sever ance ag ree ment. See id. ¶ 22(E ). In 2006, Klay

man brought suit i n this Court aga inst J udicial Watch and other s alleg ing fr a ud ule nt m isr e pr e se ntatio n, br e a c h o f c ontr a c t, u nju st e nr ic hme nt, vio latio n o f t he L anh am A c t, and def amation (" the 2006 L itigation" ). Some of those c laims are still pending , while others have be en dismissed. See Klay man v. J udicial Watch, Inc., Civ.A.No. 06-670, 2007 WL140978 (D .D .C. Jan. 17 , 2 00 7) . D ur ingthe 20 06 L iti g atio n, Judic ia l Watc h, re pr e se nte d b y de fe nd ants in the pre sent ca se, filed a

counter claim for tr adema rk infring ement, unfa ir competition, and cy bersquatting, and the n filed an a mended c ounterc laim. See Klay man v. J udicial Watch, Inc., 2 4 7 F. R
. D. 1 0 , 1 2 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 7 ). T h i s am en d edco un t er cl ai mi n cl u d ed Kl ay m an 's ex -w i fe 's alleg ations about Klay

man, which we re or igina lly set forth in a se aled divorc e hea ringand subsequently

rela y ed to def endants, in their c apac ity

as Klay man' s persona l counsel, by Klay man himself. I d. at 17. Klay

man then filed a

cross-motion for sa

nctions, arguing that the disclosure of his ex-wife' s alleg ations violated his attorney -client privileg e. The cross-motion was de nied beca use any attorney -client privileg e that prote cted the unde rlying inf ormation was de stroy ed beca use anothe r Judi cial Watch employee ha d been pr esent duringthe disclosure. I d. Klay man brought the prese nt action on Novembe r 1, 2007 in Florida state cour

t.3

Def endants re moved the ca se to the F lorida fe dera l court on the ba sis of diversity jurisdiction. Def endants then move d to dismi ss or for tra nsfer based on la ck of pe rsonal jurisdiction, improper
ve nu e , a nd fo rum no n c onve nie ns . T he Southe rn Di str ic t of

F lor ida tr ans fe rr e d th e c a se to t

his Court un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 14 04 (a ) b ut d id n ot r e a c h d e fe nd ants ' pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n a rgume nts . Def endants re newe d their motion to dism iss in thi s Court, assertingthat decisions in the 2006 L itigation collate rally estopped two of pla intiff' s claims and that the a ction is barre d by the three -y ear D.C. statute of limitations. Thi s Court rejec ted def endants' collater al estoppel argument. Klay

man v. B armak, 602 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116–18 (D.D .C. 2009). On the statute of lim itatio ns iss ue , th e Court no te d th at th e fi ve -ye ar F lor ida statut e of lim itatio ns wo uld

no rm a lly apply to this case under

the rule of

Van Duse n v. Ba

rra ck, 376 U.S. 612, 637–39 (1964), which require s application of the la w of the tra

nsfer or for

um following a

transfe r under

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) . Klay

man, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 115. How ever , the Court noted that Van D usen may be inapplicable be cause Florida may have la cked pe rsonal jurisdiction over de fenda nts. I d. at 116. Thus, the Court "or der[ed] further br iefingto determine whether the Flor ida cour

ts had persona l jurisdiction over def

endants in the fir st place, a nd if not, what that mea

ns for the statute of limit ations." I d. The pa

rties have submitt ed brie fs pursuant to this order , and the statute of limit ations issue is now ripe for resolution.

STANDARD Al l th atth e F ed er al R

u l es o f C i v i l P ro ce d

ure re qu i re o f aco mp l ai n ti s th ati tco n t ai n"'a sh or t and pla in s tate me nt o f t

he c la im s ho wi ngthat th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to re lie f, ' in o rd e r t o

' g ive the de fe nd ant f

a ir no tic e of wh at th e . . . c la im i s a

nd the g ro un ds up on

wh ic h it re sts .' " B e ll Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 474

(1957)) ; acc ord Eric kson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct . 2197, 2200 (2007) ( per c uriam). Al tho ugh " de ta ile d f

a c tua l a lle g atio ns " are no t ne c e ssa ry to w ith sta

nd a Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

to dismiss , to provide the " g rounds" of " entitle[m ent] to relief," a plaintiff must furnish " more than lab els andcon clu si on s" or "a form ul aic reci tat io n o f the el eme nt s o f a cau se o f act io n. " Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555-56; see a lso Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). " To survive a motion to dismiss , a complaint must contain suffic ient fac tual matter, a cce pted as true , to ' state a c la im t o r e lie f t

hat is pla us ibl e on its fa c e .' " As hc ro ft

v. I qb a l, 5 56 U. S. _

__ , 1 29 S. Ct
. 1937, 1949 (2009) ( quoting Tw ombly , 550 U.S. at 570); Atherton v. District of Columbi a Of

fice of the Ma y or , - -- F .3 d -
-- , 2 00 9 WL 15 15 37 3, at *6 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 9) . Ac omp la int is p la us ibl e
on its fa c e " wh e n th e pla int if f p le a ds fa c tua l c onte nt t

hat a llo ws the c ourt

to d ra w the re a so na

ble inf e re nc e that th e de fe nd ant i s li a ble fo r t he mis c on du c t a lle g e d. " I qb a l, 1 29 S. Ct . at 19 49 . T his amounts to a " two-prong ed appr oach" under which a c ourt first identifies the f actua l alleg ations entitled to an assumption of truth and then de termines " whether they plausibly g ive rise to an entitlement to relief." I d. at 1950-51. The notice pleadingrules ar e not meant to impose a great burden on a plaintiff. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. B roudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005); see also Swierkiewic z v. S orema N.A., 534 U. S. 5 06 , 5 12 -1 3 ( 20 02 ). Whe n th e su ff ic ie nc y of a c omp la int

is c ha lle ng e d b y

a mot ion to dis mis s und e r R

ule 12 (b )( 6) , th e pla int if

f' s f a c tua l a lle g atio ns mus t be pr e sume d tr ue and sh ou ld be lib e ra lly

c on str ue d in his or he r f avo r. L e athe rm an v . T arr ant C ounty Na rc oti c s & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Phil lips v. Bure au of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see a lso Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (citing Tw ombly , 127 S. Ct . at 1965)). The plaintiff must be g iven eve ry favor able infe renc e that may be dra wn from the a lleg ations of5

fac t. Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Sparrow v. United Air L ines, Inc., 216 F .3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Howe ver, " the cour t need not ac cept infe renc es dra wn by plaintiffs if su c h in fe re nc e s are un su pp or te d b y the fa c ts s e t out in

the c omp la int ." Ko wa l v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F .3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nor doe s the court a cce pt "a leg al
c on c lus ion

c ou c he d a s a

fa c tua l a lle g atio n, " or

" nake d a sse rt ion s [of

un lawf ul m isc on du c t] devoid of fur

ther fa ctual enha

nceme nt." I qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (internal quotation mar ks omitted); see also Aktiese lskabet AF 21. November 21 v. Fame J eans I

nc., 525 F .3d 8, 17 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (e x plaining that the court ha s "ne ver a cce pted leg al conc lusions cast in the form of fa ctual alleg ations")
. AN AL YSI S I. P ersonal Jurisdiction an d Choice of L aw Whether the lawof the District of Columbia or of Florida applies in this case de pends upon whether

persona l jurisdiction over defe ndants was pr oper in F lorida, whe re the case was filed. Ordina

rily , when a

district court transf

ers ve nue under

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the la w of the transfe ror c ourt -- he re, F lorida -- applies. Klay man, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 115 ( citing V an Duse n, 37 6 U .S. at 63 7– 39 ). B ut i f t he tr ans fe ro r c ourt

la c ke d p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n a nd the de fe nd ants timely objected on jur isdictional gr ounds, then the law of the transf

ere e cour t applies. Manley

v. Eng ram, 755 F .2d 1463, 1467 (11th Cir. 1985); see 14D Charles A. Wrig ht, Arthur R. Miller, and Edwa rd H. Cooper , Fe dera l Practice and Proce dure: Jurisdiction 3d § 3827 n.24 (2007). When the transfe ror c ourt has not deter mined whether

persona l jurisdiction was proper , the transfe ree court must make this deter mination as the transfe ror c ourt would have done. See, e .g ., Da v i s v . C o s t a- Ga v ra s , 5 8 0 F. S u p p . 1 0 8 2 , 1 0 8 6

– 8 8 (S
. D. N. Y. 1 9 8 4 ) ( co n s tru i n g Vi rgi n i a'sW he n e xtra -p l e a di ng m a t e ri a l i s a t t a c he d t o aRul e 12 (b )( 6) m ot i on , c ou rt s mus t 1 norm al ly t

rea t t he m oti on as one f

or sum mary j udgme nt. Fed. R. Ci v. P. 12(d). Here, however, the ext

ra- ple adi ng ma te ri al has bee n suppli ed t o ai d the Court i n resol ving an underl ying j uri sdic ti onal quest ion, and court s may look be yond the ple adi ngs to r esol ve such jur isdi ct iona l i ssues. See Coal it ion f or Underground Expansion v. Minet a, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. C ir . 2003). 6 long- arm statute a fter a

transfe r fr om that state). Thus, re solution of the personal jurisdiction question here require s application of F lorida law. F lorida cour ts conduct a two pa

rt inquiry for persona l jurisdiction: first, at least one prongof F lorida' s long- arm statute, F la. Stat. § 48.193, must be met, and sec ond, constitutional due proce ss limi tations must be satisfied. Vene tian Salami Co. v. P arthe nais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989) . Applying this test, Flor ida lacke d persona l jurisdiction over defe ndants, and D.C. law the ref ore g overns this ca se. A. G eneral P ersonal Jurisdiction Plaintiff first argues that Mintz L evin has suff icient contac ts with Florida indepe ndent of thi s la ws uit to s ub je c t it to g e ne ra l pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n th e re . Pl a int if f a lle g e s th at Mi ntz L e vin "doe s business in Florida," Am. Compl. ¶ 4, in that the firm advises Flor ida clients and pa rt ic ipate s in

F lor ida lit ig atio n, Pl. ' s A ff

. ¶ 28
. Al tho ugh d e fe nd ants a c kn ow le dg e that Mi ntz 1 L evin has " provided leg al advice to clients who are resident in F lorida or c lients who have matters pendingin Florida" and that it has bee n admitted pro hac vice to F lorida cour ts, Defs.' Dec l. ¶ 17, they

argue that these contac ts are insuff icient for g ener al per sonal jurisdiction. Def endants a re c orre ct that the spec ified fa cts do not g ive rise to g ener al per sonal jurisdiction in Florida. The F lorida long -ar m statute confe rs g ener al per sonal jurisdiction if the defe ndant " is eng ag ed in substantial and not isolated ac tivity within" F lorida, whe ther or not that
a c tiv ity pe rt a ins to t

he ins tant l aws uit . F la . St at. § 48 .1 93 (2 ). Th e El e ve nth Cir c uit re c e ntl y7

a pp lie d th is p ro vis ion

to a no nr e sid e nt l aw f

ir m th at w or

ke d w ithloc a l c ouns e l and a pp e are d in Florida courts. Snow v. Dire cTV, Inc., 450 F .3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006). The c ourt conclude d that despite the fir m's a ppear ance s in court, its "lac k of a phy sical pre sence in Florida, its non-solicitation of Florida c lients, and its derivingless than one pe rce nt of its revenue s from matters conne cted with F lorida" defe ated g ener al per sonal jurisdiction under § 48.193(2) . I d. at 1319. In the pre sent ca se, Mintz L evin has no staf f or pr operty

in Florida, a

nd hence , under Snow, its i nvolvement in case s there is more "isolate d" tha n "substantial." See id. No r d o th e se c onta c ts s atis fy c on sti tut ion a l du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e me nts . T he Sup re me Court require s contac ts to be "c ontinuous and sy stematic" for g ener al per sonal jurisdiction. He lic op te ro s N a c ion a le s d e Col omb ia , S. A. , v . H a ll, 46 6 U .S. 40 8, 41 6 ( 19 84 ). In H e lic op te ro s, the Court fo un d n o g e ne ra l pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a c omp any that se nt o ff

ic e rs to a state to neg otiate dea ls, that purchase d helicopter s from a c ompany in the state, and that regularly sent sta ff the re to atte nd

tr a ini ng . I d. Th e c onta c ts t hat Mi ntz L e vin

ha s w ithF lor ida

are signif

ic antl y less continuous and sy stematic than the c ontacts that the de fenda nts had in Helicopter os. Plaintiff has provided no e vidence that Mintz L evin soug ht business in Florida or se nt staff ther e fo r a ny e ng a g e me nt b e y on d th e sc op e of iso late d la

ws uit s. Thus , g e ne ra l pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n in Florida will not li e. B. Sp e c ific P e r so nalJur isdi c ti on fo r Co m m unic at ion s Next, plainti ff a

rgues that spec ific per sonal jurisdiction in Florida is proper in that defe ndants " have significant c ontact with Flor ida" beca use they have se nt him "mail, telephone, and ema il communications" ther e. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff has submitted facsimiles of nine letters sent by

defe ndants to plaintiff or his repr esentatives in Florida, with date s from 20038

throug h 2006, in support of his claim. Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. 2. Defe ndants deny that such communications are "significant." Def s.' Dec l. ¶ 12. These c ontacts do not satisfy Florida ' s long- arm statute f or spec ific per sonal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction is proper if the def endant ha s "c ommitt [ed] a tortious act within" Florida
. F la . St at. § 48 .1 93 (1 )(b) . Co mmunic atio ns se nt t o F lor ida , h ow e ve r i so late d, ma y g ive ri se to pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n und e r t his pr ov isi on

if tho se c omm

un ic atio ns the mse lve s c a

us e d a tor t in F lor ida . H or izon

Ag g re ssi ve Gr ow th, L .P. v. Roths te in- Ka ss, P.A ., 42 1 F .3 d 1 16 2, 11 68 (1 1th Cir. 2005). Howe ver, a lthough the c orre spondence that plaintiff provides discusse s the injury he alleg es, he doe s not alleg e that the c orre spondence itself cause d the injury in Florida. F lorida law
re qu ir e s th at if

pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n is ba se d o n c omm un ic atio ns se nt t o F lor ida , th os e communications must have ca used the injury

at issue. See id. More over, pla intiff seeks r elief under a theory of contra ct bre ach, not unde r a tort theor y . Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 32. T o b e s ur e , s p e c if

ic ju r is d ic ti o nma

y a ls o b e p r o p e r

if th e d e f e n d an t " b r e a c h [e d ] a contra ct . . . by

failingto perfor

m acts re quired by

the contra ct to be per formed in" Florida . Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(g ). B ut this provisi on applies only if the contra ct re quired pe rfor mance , such as a pay ment, in Florida. F uture Te ch. Toda y , Inc. v. OSF H ealthca

re Sy s., 218 F.3d 1247, 1250 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 0) . " [A] c ontr a c tua l duty to t e nd e r p e rf

or manc e to a

F lor ida re sid e nt i s n ot i n it se lf sufficie nt to satisfy

the statute." Posner v. Essex I ns. Co., L td., 178 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11th Cir. 1999) (pe r cur iam). Assumingdefe ndants owed pla intiff a fiduc iary duty or per formanc e of a
c ontr a c t, p la int if

f h a s p ro ff

e re d n o e vid e nc e that th is d uty wa s sp e c if

ic a lly to b e pe rf

or me d in Florida , apar

t from plaintiff' s incidental re sidence there . Section 48.193(1)( g ) is there fore inapplicable a

nd cannot f

orm the basis in this case f or spec ific per sonal jurisdiction in Florida.9

Def endants' communications into Florida a re a lso insufficient to war rant pe rsonal jur isd ic tio n in

F lor ida a s a matte r o f c on sti tut ion a l du e pr oc e ss. In s ome fa c tua l se tti ng s, a pa rt y who bre ache s a contra ct with a re sident of a state may be subjec t to personal jurisdiction in that state e ve n if

the c ontr a c t w a s it s o nly

c onta c t w iththat st ate . Se e , e .g ., Mc Ge e v. Int' l L if e Ins . Cor p. , 3 55 U. S. 2 20 , 2 23 (1 95 7) . In M c Ge e , th e Sup re me Court a pp ro ve d Ca lif

or nia ' s e xer c ise of pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a n in sure r who se on ly

a pp are nt c onta c t w ithCa lif or nia wa s it s contra ct with the plaintiff. The insurer' s prede cessor had ente red into the c ontrac t while the plaintiff lived in California, a nd the insurer

mailed a r einsuranc e ce rtificate to California upon
a ssumin gthe po lic y . I d. at 22 1. Ho we ve r, the fa c ts o f t he pr e se nt c a se are mor e ana log ou s to Hanson v. De nckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) , than to McGe e. In Hanson, a trust company

enter ed int o a c ontr a c t w itha

wo man who su

bs e qu e ntl y

mov e d to F lor ida . Unli ke in M c Ge e , th e tr us t company had not solicited the woman' s business while she wa s a F lorida re sident. The Court held that such c ontacts we re not suff icient to hale the tr

ust company

into a Florida

court. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251–52. In the instant case , as in Hanson, de fenda nts' c ontacts with Florida , insofar a s they

consist of sendingletters ther e af ter a contra ct was ma de else wher e, we re a n artifa ct solely

of plaintiff' s decision to move to Florida . Henc e, this g round for persona l jur isd ic tio n d oe s n ot m e e t th e c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nts of du e pr oc e ss. C. Spe c ific P e r so nalJur isdi c ti on fo r Al le ga ti ons Plaintiff's f

inal possible gr ound for pe rsonal jurisdiction over de fenda nts in Florida is that defe ndants, " [a] s part of the ir leg al advice to J udicial Watch" duringthe 2006 L itigation " and otherwise," "pa

rticipated in c ausingJ udicial Watch to publish in Florida . . . [the] alleg ations
ma de by the Pla int if

f' s e x-w if e [.]" Am . Co mpl . ¶

16 . Pl a int if

f a lso a lle g e s th at de fe nd ants10

" pu bli sh e d th e a lle g atio ns natio nw ide and sp e c if ic a lly in .
. . F lor ida , a

nd in s uc h o the r m e dia outlets as the L eg al Times and the inter net." Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Defe ndants reply that they "ha ve
ne ve r d isc los e d o r c a

us e d th e pu

bli c atio n o f c on fi de nti a l a lle g atio ns re g ard ingthe Pla int if f, in Florida or elsewhere ." D efs.' Dec l. ¶ 2. These c ontacts do not satisfy Florida ' s long- arm statute f or spec ific per sonal jurisdiction. The re levant provisions of § 48.193(1) are ag ain subsections (b) , for tort, a nd (g ), for

contra ct. Subsection (g ) once ag ain does not apply beca use plaintiff ha s not shown that defe ndants wer e obligated to perf

orm any acts in F lorida as pa

rt of their c ontrac t or fiduciar y duty . Subsection (b) d o es n o tap p l y

b ec au s e p l ai n t i ff

fa i l s t o m ee tth e p l ea d i n g s t an d ar d s o f Ru l e 1 2 (b )( 6 ). P l ai n t i ff 's
a lle g atio n th at de fe nd ants pu bli sh e d mate ri a ls i n F lor ida pr ov ide s n o f

a c tua l ba sis fr om whic h to draw an infe renc e in his favor . The mer e alleg ation that defe ndants published damag ing materia ls in Florida is the kind of " naked a ssertion" that "w ithout som e fur ther fa ctual
e nh anc e me nt [] st op s sh or t of the lin e be tw e e n p os sib ili ty and pla us ibi lity of e nti tle me nt t o relief ." T wombly , 550 U.S. at 557 (interna l quotation marks omitted). These c ontacts do not satisfy constitutional due proce ss require ments either. Unde r a
c ontr a c t th e or

y , d e fe nd ants mus t ha

ve purp os e fu lly

dir e c te d th e ir

a c tiv iti e s to F lor ida

in o rd e r t o be subjec t to personal jurisdiction there . Bur g er K ing Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1 98 5) (c on str

uin gF la . St at. § 48 .1 93 (1 )( g )) . A s d e sc ri be d a bo ve , d e fe nd ants ' c onta c ts w ith F lor ida we re inc ide nta l, n ot p ur

po se fu l. Und e r a

tor t th e or y , p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n ma y lie in F lor ida if de fe nd ants the mse lve s h a d p ub lis he d d ama g ingmate ri a l in F lor ida . Ca lde r v . Jon e s, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). Calder allowed pe rsonal jurisdiction over the editor of a mag azine that had published such mate rial in the plaintiff' s home state. Howe ver, in the pr esent c ase,11

plaintiff has not alleg ed that def endants themselve s published the alleg edly false statements. Instead, plaintiff only

claims -- w ithout a fac tual basis -- that " media outlets such as the L eg al Times" published the statements in Florida . Am. Compl. ¶ 19. In s um, pla int if

f o ff e rs thr e e g ro un ds fo r s ub

je c tin gde fe nd ants to p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n in F lor ida , b ut e a c h f

a ils to s atis fy

e ith e r o f t

he tw o r e qu ir e me nts fo r p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n: a ba sis fo r p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n und e r t he F lor ida

lon g -a rm statut e and

c on sti tut ion a l du e pr oc e ss. Thus , be c a us e F lor ida

la c ke d p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r d e fe nd a nts , th is C ourt

mus t a pp ly D. C. l aw t o plaintiff' s claims. Manley , 755 F.2d at 1467. II. St at ut e of Lim it at ion s The D.C. statute of limitations for ac tions for brea ch of c ontrac t is three year s. D.C. Code Ann. § 12-301(7) . The same period a pplies to breac h of fiducia ry duty actions. I d. § 12-301(8) ; Mawa lla v. Hoffma

n, 569 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257 (D.D .C. 2008). Plaintiff bases his ac tion for brea ch of c ontrac t and of fiduc iary duty on two discrete sets of fa cts. First, plaintiff a lleg es that defe ndants, in the course of the 2006 L itigation, disclosed c erta in alleg ations made by his ex -wife duringseale d divorce proce eding s (" disclosure c laims"). Am. Compl . ¶¶ 9–21. Sec ond, plaintiff
c onte nd s th at de fe nd ants c ouns e le d Jud ic ia l Watc h to se e k r e imb ur se me nt f or fa lse e xpe ns e s, thr e ate ne d p la int if

f w ithlit ig atio n, c ouns e le d Jud ic ia l Watc h to int e rf e re wi th p la int if

f' s me dia relationships, counseled J udicial Watch to violate portions of plaintiff' s sever ance ag ree ment, and pr ov ide d mi sle a din ginf

or matio n to Judic ia l Watc h' s a c c ounta nt ( " Judic ia l Watc h c la ims " ). Am
. Compl. ¶ 22. These alleg ations arise f rom plaintiff' s depar

ture fr om J udicial Watch in September 2003. Cla ims are se ve ra ble fo r s tatut e of

lim itatio ns purp os e s if

" br e a c he s o f d

uty [] oc c ur in12

distinct int erva ls or installments, as opposed to beingcontinuous[.] " Union L abor L ife Ins. Co.
v. She e t Me ta l Wor

ke rs Nat' l H e a lthPlan, Civ .A .N o. 90 -2 72 8, 19 91 WL21 22 32 at *5 (D .D .C. Sep. 30, 1991) (a

pplying se vera

bility doctrine to distinct contra ct claims). The J udicial Watch claims and the disclosure claims are distinct alleg ations of bre ach of duty . L ike nonpay

ments on installment contracts, they are separ ated by

time and stand on their own a s claims. Thus, "the statutes of limitations . . . run separately for e ach." See id. The D.C. statute of limitations does not bar plaintiff' s disclosure cla ims. The alleg ed disclosures took place duringthe cour se of the 2006 L itigation, which be g an ea rly in 2006. Plaintiff initi ated this ac tion on November 1, 2007. B eca use fe wer than three y ear s passed betwee n the alleg ed disclosure s and the initiation of this suit , the statute of limitations does not ba r c la ims ba se d o n p a

ra g ra ph s 9 –2 1 o f p la int if

f' s ame nd e d c omp la int
. The a naly sis of plaintiff' s J udicial Watch claims, howe ver, is more complicated. Plaintiff seeks to bringthe entire course of def endants' alleg ed conduc t within the statute of limit ations beca use it has continued up to the pr esent. Pl.' s Mem. at 2. Plaintiff appea rs to be invokingthe doctrine of

continuing wrong s, which applies whe n a plaintiff a lleg es " (1) a continuous and repe titious wrong , (2) with dama g es flowingfrom the a ct as a whole rather than f

rom ea ch ind ivi du a l a c t, a

nd (3 ) at le a st o ne inj ur iou s a c t w ith in t he lim itatio n p e ri od ." Whe lan v . Abe ll, 953 F.2d 663, 673 ( D.C. Cir. 1992) (quotingDeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 988 n.16 (D.C. 1980)). Plaintiff's Judicial Watch claims "state a cla im to relief that is plausible" for mee ting the three -par t Whelan test. See I qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. For example, plaintiff alleg es that defe ndants have brea ched the ir fiduciar y duty by "[c]ounseling a

nd sug g estingto J udicial Watch13

. . . to pu bli shstate me nts that Pla int if f w a s o nly

an e mpl oye e of

Judic ia l Watc h a

nd no t it s f o un d e r an d C h a i r m an , i no r d e r

t o d i m i n i s h
. . . P l a i n t i f

f ' s r e p u t at i o n [
. ] " A m . C o mp l
. ¶ 2 2 ( D )
. It is plausible that defe ndants' advice to J udicial Watch is continuous and that def endants have provided at least some counse l to J udicial Watch within the statutory period. More over, the alleg ation uses the pre sent tense, a nd the cor responde nce that plaintiff has submitted -- bea ring dates a s rec ent as 2006 -- further undersc ores that suc h acts may be ong oing. Pl.' s Mem. at Ex. 2. In addition, to the ext ent that J udicial Watch may have he eded de fenda

nts' a lleg ed advic e, plaintiff' s harm flows f

rom that advice taken tog ether rathe r than fr om isolated piece s of advice
. The Court must draw infe renc es in plaintiff' s favor at this stage of the proc eeding s, and henc e conclude s that the J udicial Watch claims " plausibly g ive rise to an e ntitlement to relief" under the doctrine of

continuing wrong s. I qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51. P laintiff' s other alleg ations in the J udicial Watch claims support similar conc lusions. Am. C ompl. ¶ 22. B ut t he do c tr ine of

c ontin uin gwr on g s d oe s n ot s ave pla int if f' s Judi c ia l Watc h c la ims in their entire ty

beca use plaintiff ha d notice of de fenda nts' a lleg ed ac ts as soon as they beg an.

" [O]nc e the pla int if

f h a s b e e n p la c e d o n n oti c e of an in jur y and the ro le of

the de fe nd ants ' wrong ful conduc t in causingit, the policy disfavoringstale cla ims makes application of the

' continuous tort' doc trine inappropr iate." Be ard v. Edmondson a nd Gallagher, 790 A .2d 541, 548 (D.C. 2002) (quotingHende l v. World P lan Executive Council, 705 A.2d 656, 667 (D.C. 1997));
acc ord Jung v. Mundy , Holt & Ma nce, P.C., 372 F.3d 429, 433–34 ( D.C. Cir. 2004). Plaintiff was on immediate notice of def endants' alleg ed bre ach of duty beca use Judi cial Watch supposedly

took immediate actions pursua nt to defenda

nts' a dvice. F or example, J udicial Watch alleg edly claimed r eimbursement f or expenses and w ithheld plaintiff' s health insuranc e under14

COBRA upon e x ecution of the sever ance ag ree ment in September 2003. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22(A ), 22(E). Under B ear d, plaintiff may not rec over f

or ac tions of which he ha d notice prior to the beg inning of

the three -y ear

statutory period, e ven if the doc trine of c ontinuing wr ong s applies. See B ear d, 790 A.2d at 548. Nonethele ss, "f

iling af ter the limitations period has run doe s not mean that there can be
no rec overy ." Jung, 372 F .3d at 433. Even if the damag es that flow f rom defe ndants' alleg ed conduct a rise princ ipally

from that conduc t as a whole rathe r than fr om the individual actions that comprise it, plaintiff nonethe less may seek r ecove ry

for the individual ac tions that fall within the statutory period. He re, the statutory period be g an thre e year s befor e plaintiff f iled this lawsuit on November

1, 2007. Thus, plaintiff' s suit is not barre d with respec t to actions taken since November

1, 2004 that are actionable independe nt of the ac tions taken befor e Nove mber 1, 2004. Se e B e ard , 7 90 A. 2d

at 54 9. F or

e xamp le , if

de fe nd ants a dv ise d Jud ic ia l Watc h to pu bli sh ha rm fu l mate ri a l a ft e r N ov e mbe r 1 , 2 00 4, pla int if f' s c la im f or that a c tio n ma

y sta nd ; if defe ndants only

provided such a dvice be fore November 1, 2004, plaintiff' s claim is barre d by the D. C. s tatut e of

lim itatio ns . CO NC LU SION B e c a us e F lor ida

la c ke d p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r d e fe nd ants in t he ini tia l a c tio n, D. C. law g overns this ca se followingits transfer to this C ourt. The thre e-year D.C. statute of lim itatio ns ba

rs any c la ims a g a ins t de fe nd ants ari sin gfr om a lle g e d c on du c t oc c ur ri ngpr ior to November

1, 2004. Claims arising f rom conduc t since that date , including c laims reg arding de fe nd ants ' dis c los ur e of

pr ivi le g e d in fo rm atio n in the 20 06 L iti g atio n, are no t ba rr e d. F or the se
re a so ns , d e fe nd ants ' mot ion to d ism iss wi ll b e g ra

nte d w ithre sp e c t to a ll c on du c t pr ior to15

November

1, 2004 and denie d with respec t to all other alleg ations. A separ ate or der
acc ompanies this opinion.
/ s / J OHN D. B ATES Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge Dated: July

14, 2009