#### *John Leonard*v. *James A. M’Cool.*

Columbia,

May, 1849.

Tlie Court of Magistrates and Freeholders created by the Acts of Assembly to try eases between, landlord and tenant, holding over, is invested with the ultimate and exclusive jurisdiction over the matters submitted to it under the provisions of the law by which it is created; and there is no right of appeal from its judgments.

The judgment of this Court of Magistrates and Freeholders, is binding and conclusive upon the parties in three particulars; first, as to the question of the *45tenancy; secondly, as to the identity of the premises demised; and thirdly, as to whether the lease has expired, and the tenant is holding over.

If a matter, which legitimately might have been, was not made a ground of de-fence before a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, or if made was overruled, the judgment of the Court is conclusive upon theparties.

Whether a Court have concurrent jurisdiction merely, or whether the law creating it give the right of appeal, and an appeal be not formally prosecuted, its judgment will be final and conclusive between the parties.

*Before*Johnston, Ch. *at*Chester, July, 1848.

Johnston, Ch. *It is*seldom *that we meet with*a case *of*greater apparent hardship that this; or one in which, if there be no remedy, the results of the law appear to be more at variance with the dictates of natural justice,

It sometimes does happen that the equity of a specific case conflicts with the rules of law. Under such circumstances, a still higher justice than that of the particular case requires that it be sacrificed to general principles.

The general good indispensably requires that those comprehensive rules of conduct, without which social order or go-' vernment cannot exist, should be firmly upheld, and never relaxed, nor suffered to be shaken, for the benefit of an individual. This unhappy alternative is, however, very seldom presented.

In many cases, where the- rules of law appear, at first, to be opposed to the justice of the particular case, more thorough investigation and more mature reflection discover that there is no real or essential conflict between them. Those systematic principles which the human judgment has originated and instituted for regulating social conduct and protecting social interests, must necessarily partake of the imperfection and infirmity inherent in the fountain from which they flow.

But it should be remembered that these principles are the best results of the attentive observation, the profound reflection, and the experience of ages. They are the conclusions of sound and upright minds, cautiously attained and gradually'accumulated and modified.

They have been drawn from a careful and patient consideration of actual cases, under almost every imaginable variety of circumstances; in which the bearing of each case was practically developed, ■ and its relation to the wide range ' of social interests, suggested in energetic and sifting arguments, by parties *contending*under the stimulus of adverse claims.

A system of law thus built up, rarely defeats any right founded in morals ; and, therefore, feeling in my conscience that the justice of this case is with the plaintiff, I have bestowed unusual and long continued attention upon it, with *46a most anxious desire to discover some means of relief for j1jm) consistent with established principle.

3 Rich. Rep. 111.

This is substantially the case reported under the style of *the State ex relatione John Leonard.*

The defendant, McCool, has obtained the judgment of a Court of Magistrates and Freeholders, ousting the plaintiff, Leonard, from certain premises described in the pleadings, which he alleged he- demised to him, and the possession of which he held over after the lease expired. The bill is brought to enjoin this judgment, and for general relief.

The land originally belonged to Jane McCool. On the 29th of August, 1837, she conveyed it, in fee, to her daughter, Letitia Hardin, and her three children, Mary J. Hard in, James L. Hardin, and Elizabeth L. M. Hardin, (who were living with her on the land, at the time, or came thither shortly afterwards,) reserving to herself, in the deed, “a sufficient and plentiful support from the above mentioned land, during the time of her natural life.”

Some time in 1843, Letitia Hardin, one of the grantees, died intestateand Mrs. McCool and the three children of her deceased daughter remained the exclusive occupants of the premises. It is in evidence that these children were then minors ; Mary, the oldest of them, having been born the *12th*of August, 1821; James, the 3rd of June, 1823; and Elizabeth, the youngest, the 29th of January, 1825.

In this condition, Mrs. McCool continued in the possession until the close of 1843, endeavoring to support herself on the land, with the aid of her grand childrens’ labor; but finding it difficult to do so, she removed to the residence of her son, the defendant, McCool, taking the youngest grandchild with her. She died there in January, 1845.

McCool, by what authority does not appear, undertook to let the premises. He does not appear to have ever been in the actual possession of any part of them at any time.

He sets forth, in his answer, the copy of a deed, by way of quit claim, bearing date the 22nd of December, 1843, purporting to have been subscribed by James L. Hardin, and attested by Benjamin Alverson’s mark; and another also by way of quit claim, bearing date the 29th of November, 1845, purporting to have been subscribed by Elizabeth L. M. Hardin, and attested by David Bryan. The consideration stated in the first deed is $70, and in the last $50. Both these grantors were minors, at the time these alleged deeds respectively bear date. But this is not the only objection to them. Neither of the deeds was attempted to be proved.

He states in his answer, moreover, that when Mrs. Hardin, his sister, died, she was indebted to him, and that these deeds were executed with a view to enable him to raise the amount of his debt, by renting the land. But there is no proof of any *47such debt, nor of any such understanding or agreement; if, indeed, the infant children could have made any such. ^

He began to rent the land by letting it to the plaintiff, Leonard, for the year 1844.' The supposed deed of Elizabeth could have been no authority for that, for it did not then exist.

There was no formal lease. The rent was secured by Leonard’s note, which McCool has passed off.

The premises were again let for the year 1845, by the following note:

“f 40. On or before the 1st January, 1846,1 promise to pay James A. McCool, or bearer, forty dollars, it being for the hire of the plantation whereon he now lives. In witness wereof I now affix my hand and seal, this 31st of December, 1844. John Leonard, [l. s.]”

“ J. C. KlR.KPATE.ICK.

Leonard remained in possession until the beginning of 1846. On the 4th of February of that year, Mary J. Hardin, being then of full age, and being entitled by the conveyance of her grandmother, and by the death of her mother, to one undivided third part of the premises, in consideration of *one*hundred and fifty dollars, paid her by Leonard, conveyed the same to him by deed of that date, duly executed and proved.

On the ninth of the same month, he was brought before the Magistrates and Freeholders, at the instance of McCool, complaining of his retention of the possession from him, Mc-Cool. At the trial, Leonard submitted a paper, in writing, by way of plea, to the effect — 1st, That if McCool ever had any authority to let the premises to him, it was as agent of his mother, Jane McCool, who was alive at the time of the letting, and that his authority over the premises necessarily expired with his agency, which determined by his mother’s death ; and, 2nd, That he, Leonard, was, by his purchase of Mary J. Hardin’s share, constituted part owner of the premises, and therefore should not be ousted from his own freehold. These matters he offered to prove. The Magistrates, construing the note of Leonard in effect a written acknowledgement of tenancy of these premises under McCool, rejected the proof tendered, and the case was submitted to the Freeholders, as a jury. They could not agree on a verdict, and the Magistrates made an entry of mis-trial, and discharged them. A trial *de novo*was ordered before another jury, to take place the 28th of the same month, (February, 1846.)

The same defence and evidence which had been offered at the former trial, were tendered at this; but were again overruled by the Magistrates, and the jury found a verdict in favor of McCool.

On the 12th of the succeeding month, (March, 1846,) Leo*48nard procured deeds from James L. Hardin and Elizabeth L. M. Hardin for their respective undivided shares of the land; *'*which, with the deed already executed by Mary J. Hardin, completed his title to the entire premises in his possession. This deed was duly proved, and recited a consideration of $100 paid to each of the grantors. Shortly after this latter deed was procured, a suggestion for a prohibition was filed by Leonard, which was brought before Mr. Justice Frost, at Chester, Spring Term, 1846. The prohibition was refused, and the case carried to the Court of Appeals, where the Circuit decision was affirmed in August following, upon which the Magistrates issued their warrant for passing the possession from Leonard to MeCool, the warrant bearing date August 25th, 1846, and thereupon this bill was filed.

1 Hill Ch. 14.

It is a peculiar disadvantage to this plaintiff, that the larger part of his case has been determined against him by Courts of competent jurisdiction. As I have argued in *Maxwell vs. Con-nor,*all points adjudicated against a party by a tribunal having cognisance of the case and of the questions, are conclusive against him in every other Court, not possessing an appellate jurisdiction over the tribunals thus deciding; and even where this appellate jurisdiction exists, the prior decision is still conclusive on the Court possessed of it, unless it is brought before it by direct appeal. It cannot be examined incidentally or collaterally.

The Statute under which the Magistrates acted gives the exclusive and final jurisdiction in the case submitted to them, and whatever errors they may have committed within that jurisdiction, are beyond the supervision or correction of this Court. I have no right to re-examine any question determined either in the suit before the Magistrates, or on the application for a prohibition.

There is no doubt that the general doctrine is, as was laid down by the Magistrates, that a tenant is not permitted to' dispute his landlord’s title to the premises demised to him, and that he cannot, by parol, contradict or vary the recitals or terms of a written instrument operating as a lease under which he was let into possession.

There appears to have been no formal lease in this case. The note of the tenant was taken to have that operation, and undoubtedly a note, or any other instrument, may so operate, provided it sufficiently identifies the premises, and sets forth the relations of the parties and the terms of the letting. It is true, I think, that the primary function of so much of this note as declares that it was given “ for the hire of the land,” was to disclose the *consideration of the note.*But if it shows that the land was “ hired” by MeCool, that it was the tract of land now in question, and the duration of the letting, it may fulfil the additional office of a written lease.

*49I should have entertained doubts upon each of these particulars. Land may belong to one who may for convenience allow the rent note to be given to another, as if he, the landlord, happens to be indebted to that other. I doubt, therefore, whether *the note’s*being given *to*McCool was conclusive that he was the landlord. Again, the premises leased are described as *“*the plantation whereon he,” (McCool) “ now,” (at the date of the note,) *“*lives.” I do not understand that Leonard, at the trial, admitted, at least in writing, that he leased the premises now in question from McCool. The only evidence of the fact was the note. I should have thought that it was competent to show, by parol, (and it could hardly have been shown by any other kind of evidence,) that McCool never did live on these premises, but that, at the date of the note, he lived on another tract of land. This proof was necessary to identify the premises leased. Indeed, I doubt whether McCool was not bound to prove that he lived, at that time, on these premises, before he was entitled to call on the Court to treat them as the leased premises, or to order restitution of them as such. But again, what was the duration of the term? Was it for six months or for two years? When did it begin, and especially when did it end ? How could it be known that Leonard was *holding over*? Does the note answer either of these questions ? It seems to me that too much energy was given to this imperfect instrument, when it was made the ground of excluding all explanatory evidence.

But still, all these matters, if I had a more confident opinion upon them than I have, would not authorize me to reverse or arrest the judgment of the Magistrates. If error was committed in excluding proper testimony, or in giving a loose construction to the lease, this Court has no appellate power to correct it. It was held by the Law Court that errors of this description were not grounds for a prohibition. Neither are they grounds for an injunction.

I may safely apply to the one mode of relief what was said by the Court of Appeals in relation to the other, that *“*inferior tribunals cannot be made amenable, in this way, for mere errors of judgment committed within their conceded jurisdiction.” The same view may be taken in relation to the Magistrates’s rejection of the title acquired from Mrs. Hardin. Surely the construction of the lease was within their province, and therefore it was their *duty*to construe it according to their best judgment. Their construction of it was that McCool was the real landlord under the contract. Certainly, taking this view, it was their duty to put down any attempt of the tenant to procure or show a better title, in whole or in part. The relation of landlord and tenant is one of confidence, and what frauds would ensue if tenants were allowed, insidiously, *50to obtain possession by professions of fealty, and then to ( pick flaws in their landlord’s title, and transfer the advantages of occupancy to an adverse claim, either held by other persons or purchased in by themselves *1*

2 Rich. Eq. 321.

2 Rich. Eq. 404.

This relation stands upon analogous grounds of principle with that of vendor and purchaser let into possession; and the case of *Parr*v. *Van Lew,*and especially the case of *Whiteworth*v. *Stuckey,*may serve to set forth the unanswerable objections against allowing the party intrusted with the premises to defeat the right under which he holds.

But suppose the magistrates had adopted the construction to which I incline: to wit, that the lease did not necessarily import that McCool was himself the landlord, and had allowed the proof offered by Leonard; that he acted as the agent of his mother. And suppose that had been conclusively established; and, moreover, that by her death McCool’s agency had been re-called, and the title had passed over to the grand children, and among them to Mary, from whom Leonard took a conveyance. And after all this, the Magistrates were of opinion that, by the law of landlord and tenant, Leonard must yield the possession to McCool, at whose hands he received it. There is certainly room for such an opinion. But admitting the better opinion to be the other way: what principle of law authorises this Court to correct the error?

The assumption of such an authority involves a principle that would draw every case from every inferior, if not from every superior tribunal, where diversity of judgment might exist, into this Court; and under the guise of injunctions, clothe it with supreme appellate power. Peculiarly absurd would it be to lay the foundations of such a jurisdiction, in a case like the present; where not only this Court had confessedly no appellate power, but the case comes from a Court from which there is no appeal.

In any judgment that I may give in this case, I cannot, therefore, venture to touch or examine any point which came before the Magistrates and Freeholders.

If, however, a discovery of any facts which did not come before them, and varying the rights of the parties, has been obtained here, I think these may be used by this Court, by way of original jurisdiction, and a decree grounded in equity may be drawn from them. My anxiety to grant the relief which justice manifestly requires, may mislead me; but I think the answer of the defendant discloses one ground on which redress may be afforded. Putting together parts of the answer, I understand the defendant to admit that he leased to the plaintiff only the shares of the two younger children, (James and Elizabeth,) and that he lays no claim to Mary’s share, which he admits has been conveyed to the plaintiff. I take it then that he is not entitled to oust the de*51fendant; whom he virtually admits to be his co-tenant. I shall not labor this point, because it must be very plain, one way or the other , and I hope the defendant will appeal, if he does not concur in my view oí the matter.

If satisfied, and he has a better right to the shares of James and Elizabeth than the plaintiff, partition is his remedy.

It is ordered and decreed, that an injunction do issue to restrain the defendant from enforcing the process he has obtained for ousting the plaintiff from the premises described in the pleadings.

The defendant appealed and moved for a new trial:

1st. Because his Honor the Chancellor erred in entertaining jurisdiction in this case, inasmuch as, under the Act of the Legislature, *“*the Court of magistrates and freeholders had exclusive jurisdiction in cases of landlord and tenant,” and their verdict was final and conclusive.

2nd. Because his Honor the Chancellor erred in supposing that the defendent admitted, in his answer, that he leased to complainant only the shares of the two younger children,

(James and Elizabeth,) when in fact, defendant stated in his answer, that he had rented the lands to complainant, and put him in possession, and had full power to do so.

3rd. Because the decree • of the Chancellor is contrary to law and the evidence.

*Matthew Williams,*for the motion.

*Curia, per*

*Dargan,*Ch.

I can add nothing to the force with which the Chancellor, in his Circuit Decree, has so eloquently indicated the necessity of adhering to general and established principles, in the administration of justice. Under all systems or codes there must necessarily arise cases of peculiar hardship, in which individuals must be the victims, and which admit of no remedy or relief, without unsettling the rights of property and shaking the deep foundations of social order. The same inexorable character is impressed, by the divine hand, upon the laws which govern the moral and physical universe. While we may deplore the calamity of him who tumbles from a precipice, or is crushed by the weight of a falling body, none will dare to question the wisdom and benignity of that stupendous law which, while it controls the smallest atom that floats in the atmosphere, extends its influence to the remotest confines of creation, and binds all worlds and beings together in one grand and harmonious system.

There is another topic, felicitously touched by the Chancellor in his decree, and reasoned more elaborately by him in the case of *Maxwell*v. *Conner ;*and which is of the greatest importance to the well being of society. It is essential that *52there should be rules by which tribunals charged with the administration of the law, may enforce a termination of legal controversies. It is beneficent to the parties themselves, that they should not be permitted to wage an interminable and wasting contest. Hence the judgment of a Court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, is conclusive upon the parties, in reference to all questions of law or fact that were or might have been discussed and adjudged. The only qualification of the rule is, where superior and appellate Courts take cognisance of and review the judgments of inferior tribunals, by way of direct appeal, according to the forms prescribed by law. I know of no other exception.

By the principles of the common law, a landlord had no remedy against his tenant holding over after the expiration of the lease, but an action of ejectment; in South Carolina an action to try the title. This, (for a too common and a flagrant wrong,) was a tardy and inadequate remedy. It was provided for, by the Act of 1812, and again by the Act of 1839, which affords a more perfect relief. The Court of Magistrates and Freeholders, created by these Acts, to try such cases between landlord and tenant, is invested with the ultimate and exclusive jurisdiction over the matters submitted to it, under the provisions of law by which it is created. There is no right of appeal from its judgments. The Court of Sessions, under its general supervisory power over inferior tribunals, might, by a writ of prohibition, interpose its authority, to prevent the Court of Magistrates from transcending its jurisdiction. But as long as the proceedings of the latter Court are within the powers with which it is invested, there is no tribunal in the State authorized to reverse or review its decisions, however erroneous they may be.

Upon these principles, and according to the provisions of the Act, the judgment of the Court of Magistrates and Freeholders is binding and conclusive upon the parties, in three particulars ; first, as to the question of the tenancy; secondly, as to the identity of the premises demised; and thirdly, whether the lease has expired and the tenant is holding over. If these questions are all adjudged against the party alleged to be the tenant, it is made the imperative duty of the Court to grant the landlord a writ of *habere facias possessionem.*And the sheriff is required to enforce this writ against the tenant, or any other person who may be in possession of the leased premises. In the case we are now considering, all these questions have been adjudged, or must be presumed to have been adjudged, against the complainant, by a Court of competent and exclusive jurisdiction. And his bill has been filed for the purpose of enjoining the defendant, his landlord, (according to the judgment of the Court) from enforcing that judgment against him. The Chancellor, in a misapprehen*53sion of the facts, supposed that the defendant had admitted in his answer that he had leased only two-thirds of the prem- v ises to the complainant, and that he set up no claim to the remaining third, (Mary Hardin’s share,) which he admitted to have been conveyed to the complainant. Considering the complainant as not being the lessee of the defendant as regards this third, and as being a tenant in common with him, to the extent of Mary Hardin’s share of the premises, the Chancellor thought him entitled to the relief which he sought, and decreed accordingly. If the fact had existed, and if it had been shewn that he had leased only two-thirds of the premises, and that he was legally in possession of the remaining third as tenant in common with the defendant, I incline to the opinion that if available here, it would also have been available as a legitimate ground of defence before the inferior Court. That Court, after finding that the complainant had only leased two-thirds of the premises of the defendant, and was the legal owner of the other third as tenant in common with him, might have forborne to exercise its power, in disturbing the legal relations of tenants in common; all of whom, by familiar principles of law, are equally entitled to the possession. And according to the doctrine which I have heretofore advanced, if by the constitution of the Court that tried the cause, such a matter as a tenancy in common was a legitimate ground of defence, *then,*if it was not made, or having been made, it was overruled, the judgment of the Court is conclusive upon the parties.

But it was conceded by the complainant’s counsel, on the hearing beiore this Court, that the defendant’s answer conceded no such state of facts as that upon which the Chancellor’s decree was predicated. It was broadly admitted, that the defendant did not concede that he had only leased the complainant two thirds of the premises, or the shares of James L. Hardin, and of Elizabeth Hardin only. This admission, in the unanimous opinion of this Court, strips the complainant’s case of every semblance of equity. I mean, of course, that technical equity upon which Chancery bases its measure of relief. In .the case thus presented, the complainant, not seeking a partition, as one tenant in common against another, nor stating or suggesting any equitable ground upon which the interposition of this Court may rest, asks this Court to reverse, or at all events to render null and inoperative, the deliberate judgment of a Court of inferior but exclusive jurisdiction, upon matters of law and fact, clearly within its powers. In the foregoing remarks I have, perhaps, laid too much stress upon the fact, that the Court that tried the cause was possessed of exclusive jurisdiction, without the right of appeal. If it had possessed concurrent jurisdiction merely, or if the act had given the right of appeal, and *54an appeal had not been formally prosecuted, the same legal consequences would follow, and its judgment have been equally final and conclusive between the parties.

rpjie jn£erjor Qour(; not afect to try the title. And if it had, its judgment would have been inoperative; for it had no power to adjudicate such questions. If the complainant is a tenant in common with the defendant, he may file his bill in this Court for a partition. If he is the owner of the whole premises, he may institute an action before the proper legal forum, to try the title. This Court will not entertain, and has not the jurisdiction to entertain, a suit to try titles as to real estate. The complainant’s' case seems to be one entirely of that character. He admits that he leased the premises from the defendant; and that he held over after the expiration of the lease; or, which is the same thing, that a Court of competent jurisdiction has adjudged those questions against him. And he files his bill, perpetually to enjoin the judgment, because, as he says, during the continuance of his possession, acquired as a tenant from the defendant, he has obtained, by purchase from others, the paramount legal title. What is this, but an action to try the title *1*He has attorned to the defendant. He has acknowledged him as his landlord. He has undertaken to hold the land from him, and under him. At least, these facts must now be assumed to be true. And the plainest principles of law, applicable to the relations of landlord and tenant, require that he should re-deliver to him the possession. Without fraud on the part of the lessor, if one, under a misapprehension of his rights, were to lease his own lands from a stranger, there would be no relaxation of this important legal principle, either in a Court of Law or Equity.

It is ordered and decreed, that the decree of the Circuit Court be reversed, and that the complainant’s bill be dismissed.

The whole Court concurred.

*Decree reversed.*