IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-40765

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JUAN ANGULO MORA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:14-CR-362-1

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Angulo Mora (Angulo) was convicted of one count of bulk cash 

smuggling in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5332 and received a within-guidelines 

sentence of 18 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised 

release. Angulo challenges the $160,000 forfeiture order, arguing that the 

district court erred by rejecting his argument that the U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3(b)(3) 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 25, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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safe harbor provision applied and by concluding that the forfeiture did not 

violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

We review the district court’s interpretation or application of the 

Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States 

v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). Under § 2S1.3(b)(3), 

the offense level will be decreased to six if: (1) “subsection (a)(2) applies and 

subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) do not apply;” (2) Angulo “did not act with reckless 

disregard of the source of the funds; (3) “the funds were the proceeds of lawful 

activity; and” (4) “the funds were to be used for a lawful purpose.” Angulo’s 

total offense level was 15, which included a two-level increase pursuant to 

§ 2S1.3(b)(1)(B) because the offense involved bulk cash smuggling. The 

application of the § 2S1.3(b)(1)(B) enhancement means that the safe harbor 

provision cannot apply. See § 2S1.3(b)(3)(A). As Angulo does not challenge the 

application of the § 2S1.3(b)(1)(B) enhancement, he cannot demonstrate that 

the district court erred in denying his request for a reduction under 

§ 2S1.3(b)(3). See Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d at 764; United States v. 

Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the failure to 

brief an argument sufficiently results in its waiver).

“[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly 

disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” United States v. 

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). Among the factors that the Court 

considered in Bajakajian in making the proportionality determination were: 

(a) the essence of the defendant’s crime and its relationship to other criminal 

activity; (b) whether the defendant was within the class of people for whom the 

statute of conviction was principally designed; (c) the maximum sentence, 

including the fine that could have been imposed; and (d) the nature of the harm 

resulting from the defendant’s conduct. See id. at 337-39; see also United 

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States v. Wallace, 389 F.3d 483, 485-88 (5th Cir. 2004). We review de novo the 

district court’s proportionality determination and for clear error the district 

court’s factual findings. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37 & n.10; United States 

v. Wyly, 193 F.3d 289, 303 (5th Cir. 1999).

With respect to the first Bajakajian factor, the essence of Angulo’s crime 

was bulk cash smuggling in violation of § 5332(a), not a reporting offense like 

the defendant in Bajakajian, and the $160,000 at issue was the 

instrumentality of his crime. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107―56, 

§ 371(a)(6), 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Congress has stated that cash smuggling is 

related to other criminal activity, as it “is one of the most reliable warning 

signs of drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, racketeering, tax 

evasion and similar crimes.” PATRIOT ACT § 371(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272.

As to the second Bajakajian factor, the district court found that Angulo 

was within the class of individuals targeted by the statute. Emphasizing the 

manner of Angulo’s transportation of the money, the district court stated that 

Angulo fit the profile of a bulk cash courier. The district court discounted 

Angulo’s assertion that the money was his life savings which he withdrew over 

time, noting that the series of $100 bills found dated back only to 1996; that 

Angulo’s claim of savings was somewhat fantastic given that he claimed from 

seven to nine dependents on his tax returns; and the fact that Angulo had a 

serious drinking problem. Other testimony from the forfeiture hearing 

supported the district court’s conclusion that the money was not Angulo’s life 

savings. Angulo had a negative monthly cash flow and owed medical, child 

support, and credit card debts. Further, in contravention of his claim that he 

withdrew his paychecks after they were deposited, Angulo had two receipts in 

his possession demonstrating that he had deposited a total of $14,300 in 

September 2013 and January 2014, but possessed no bank documents 

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indicating the money was subsequently withdrawn. The district court did not 

clearly err in making the finding that Angulo was within the class of 

individuals targeted by the statute. See Wyly, 193 F.3d at 393.

As to the third Bajakajian factor, the maximum statutory fine that could 

be imposed was $250,000, 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a), and the maximum Guidelines 

fine for a total offense level of 15 was $40,000, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3) (2014). 

While the $160,000 forfeited was four times the maximum guidelines fine, the 

amount forfeited was well within the statutory maximum fine of $250,000. See 

§ 5E1.2(c)(3); § 5322(a). We have cited with approval an Eleventh Circuit case 

which stated that “if the value of the forfeited property is within the range of 

fines prescribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the forfeiture 

is constitutional.” Wallace, 389 F.3d at 486 (quoting United States v. 817 N.E. 

29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999)). Angulo has not rebutted 

this presumption. See id. at 486-88. Finally, as to the fourth Bajakajian factor, 

the nature of the harm caused by Angulo’s conduct, Congress has emphasized 

the seriousness of bulk cash smuggling and its relationship to other types of 

criminal activity such as terrorism, tax evasion, money laundering, and drug 

trafficking. See PATRIOT ACT § 371(a)(5), 115 Stat. 272.

The district court did not clearly err in its factual findings with respect 

to the proportionality determination, nor did the district court err in 

concluding that the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate. See 

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337 n.10; Wyly, 193 F.3d at 303.

AFFIRMED.

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