alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AND NONCOMPETITION
AGREEMENT


 


This First Amendment to the Employment and
Noncompetition Agreement (this “Amendment”), effective as of April 30, 2013, is made by and between Gramercy Property
Trust Inc. f/k/a Gramercy Capital Corp., a Maryland corporation (the “Employer”), and Gordon F. DuGan (“Executive”).


 


WHEREAS, the Employer and Executive entered
into that certain Employment and Noncompetition Agreement dated as of July 1, 2012 (the “Employment Agreement”);


 


WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 12 of the Employment
Agreement, the Employer and Executive desire to amend the Employment Agreement to reduce the amount of the Signing Bonus as set
forth in this Amendment; and


 


WHEREAS, unless the context
requires otherwise, capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Employment
Agreement;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
premises and mutual covenants contained herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is mutually
acknowledged, the Employer and Executive agree as follows:


 


1.           The last sentence
of Section 3(b) of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended and restated in its entirety as follows to provide that Executive’s
Signing Bonus is reduced from $400,000 to $200,000, the full amount of which was payable and previously paid on July 1, 2012:


 


“In lieu of a bonus for 2012, the
Employer shall pay Executive a signing bonus of $200,000 (the “Signing Bonus”), all of which was payable and previously
paid as of the Effective Date.”


 


2.           Except as expressly
amended hereby, the Employment Agreement continues in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.


 


3.           This Amendment
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York applicable to agreements made and to be
performed entirely within such State, without regard to the conflicts of law principles of such State.


 


4.           This Amendment
may be executed in one or more counterparts, all of which shall be considered one and the same agreement, and shall become effective
when one or more such counterparts have been signed by each of the parties and delivered to the other party


 


[Remainder of page intentionally left
blank]


  




    	 



    	 



    

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the date first above written.


 





	 	EMPLOYER:
	 	 
	 	 
	 	GRAMERCY PROPERTy TRUST INC.
	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Jon W.  Clark    
	 	Name:	Jon W. Clark
	 	Title:	Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	EXECUTIVE:
	 	 
	 	 
	 	/s/ Gordon F. DuGan
	 	Gordon F. DuGan


 



    	[Signature Page to First Amendment to Employment and Noncompetition Agreement]
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-10-00864-CR

Mark Green, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-DC-10-904077, HONORABLE CHARLES F. BAIRD, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Mark Green seeks to appeal a judgment of conviction for the offense

of evading arrest. Sentence was imposed in open court on September 21, 2010, and no motion

for new trial was filed. Accordingly, Green had 30 days to file his notice of appeal. See Tex. R.

App. P. 26.2(a)(1). However, his notice of appeal was not filed until December 8, 2010. Under

the circumstances, we lack jurisdiction to dispose of the purported appeal in any manner other

than by dismissing it for want of jurisdiction. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim.

App.1998); Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
The appeal is dismissed.

__________________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Rose

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: February 25, 2011

Do Not Publish

2
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 69 (Friday, April 10, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Page 19290]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-08280]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Docket ID: DoD-2015-OS-0032]


Notice of Availability (NOA) of an Environmental Assessment (EA) 
Addressing the Upgrade and Storage of Beryllium Metal at the DLA 
Strategic Materials Hammond, IN

AGENCY: Defense Logistics Agency, DoD.

ACTION: Notice of Availability (NOA) of an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) Addressing the Upgrade and Storage of Beryllium Metal at the DLA 
Strategic Materials Hammond, IN.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) announces the availability 
of an environmental assessment (EA) for the potential environmental 
impacts associated with the Proposed Action to upgrade and store 
beryllium at the DLA Strategic Materials Hammond, IN depot. The EA has 
been prepared as required under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), (1969). In addition, the EA complies with DLA Regulation 
1000.22. DLA has determined that the Proposed Action would not have a 
significant impact on the human environment within the context of NEPA. 
Therefore, the preparation of an environmental impact statement is not 
required.

DATES: Public comments will be accepted on or before May 11, 2015. 
Comments received by the end of the 30-day period will be considered 
when preparing the final version of the document. The EA is available 
electronically at http://www.dla.mil/InstallationSupport/Documents/EA-UpgradeAndStorageOfBeryllium-20141119.pdf.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to one of the following:
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    <bullet> Mail: Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Chief 
Management Officer, Directorate of Oversight and Compliance, Regulatory 
and Audit Matters Office, 9010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-
9010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ira Silverberg at 703-767-0705 during 
normal business hours Monday through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 
p.m. (EST) or by email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2c455e4d025f45405a495e4e495e4b6c48404d02414540"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a4cdd6c58ad7cdc8d2c1d6c6c1d6c3e4c0c8c58ac9cdc8">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: April 7, 2015.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2015-08280 Filed 4-9-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 5001-06-P


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</html>
EX-10.87



 Exhibit 10.87 
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER ACKNOWELDGEMENT 
 RELATING TO RECOUPMENT POLICY

 The undersigned officer of Iconix Brand Group, Inc. hereby acknowledges receipt of the Iconix Brand Group, Inc. Recoupment Policy and
agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions of such policy. The undersigned acknowledges and agrees that the Recoupment Policy applies to all outstanding awards as of the date of this acknowledgement, as well as any future awards. With respect to
clawback or recoupment provisions contained in any outstanding award agreement, the terms of this Recoupment Policy supersede those of such award agreement. The undersigned acknowledges that the restatement of any SEC Report that was filed prior to
the adoption of the Recoupment Policy shall be analyzed under Section 2 of the Recoupment Policy and may require certain incentive compensation to be recouped by the Company in accordance with the terms of the Recoupment Policy. 

 

	
	  
 Name:

	Title:
	
	Date:
Exhibit 32.1 Chief Executive and Financial Officer Certification (Section 906)   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C.,SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002    Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 (as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), I, the undersigned President and Chief Executive and Financial Officer of Global Immune Technologies, Inc., (the Company), herby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended June 30, 2009 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the registrant and will be retained by it and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.   Dated November 12, 2010 /s/ Donald Perks CEO and CFO
22137

#### The STATE, Respondent, v. William James DUNBAR, Appellant.

(318 S. E. (2d) 16)

Supreme Court

*170
      *Asst. Appellate Defender William Isaac Diggs,*Columbia, *for appellant.*

*Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock*and *Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr.,*Columbia, and *Sol. Robert J. Harte,*Aiken, *for respondent.*

Heard June 4, 1984.

Decided July 5, 1984.

Ness, Justice:

Appellant, William James Dunbar, was convicted of housebreaking and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. We reverse.

On October 27, 1982, Mrs. Ima Gibbs, an Aiken County resident, discovered Dunbar in the utility room of her home. This room was connected to her house, and was accessible from the outside by way of a door opening into her carport. After questioning Dunbar as to what he was doing on her premises, Mrs. Gibbs noticed he was attempting to hide something under his coat. Dunbar then fled after Mrs. Gibbs left the carport area to call the police. When the police arrived Mrs. Gibbs identified Dunbar’s picture from a six photo lineup which she was shown by the investigating officers.

Appellant first contends the trial judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal, claiming the State failed to prove the essential element of a “breaking.” We agree.

S. C. Code Ann. § 16-11-320(1) defines housebreaking as the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another, in the daytime, with intent to commit a crime therein. *See also State v. Suttles,*279 S. C. 87, 302 S. E. (2d) 338 (1983). Clearly, “the law of this State requires some proof of a *171‘breaking’ ” in order to convict an individual of this crime. *State v. Brooks,*277 S. C. 111, 112, 283 S. E. (2d) 830, 831 (1981).

“A breaking essential to constitute the crime of housebreaking may be any act of physical force, however slight, whereby *any obstruction to entering is forcibly removed,.”*(Emphasis added.) *In the Matter of Harry C.,*313 S. E. (2d) 287 (S. C. 1984). Mrs. Gibbs testified the door leading from the carport to the utility room had been open at the time in question, as she had removed some clothes from a dryer located in the utility room a short time prior to her encounter with Dunbar. This testimony indicates no obstruction was removed to gain entrance to the utility room. Consequently, we hold the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the housebreaking charge, as the threshold requirement of “breaking” was not satisfied.

Although the facts of this case do not support an indictment for housebreaking, we note for the edification of the solicitors that Dunbar could have properly been indicted under S. C. Code Ann. § 16-13-170 (1976), which provides that “[a]ny person who shall enter, without breaking, or attempt to enter any house ..., with intent to steal or commit any other crime ... shall be guilty of a misde-meanor_” As this crime constitutes a lesser included offense of housebreaking, double jeopardy now precludes re-indictment under § 16-13-170.

Reversed.

Littlejohn, C. J., Gregory and Harwell, JJ., and Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., as Acting Associate Justice, concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0201

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

TOMMY LANE CURRIER,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including February 14, 2024, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 8 2024

01/08/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0201
Exhibit 10.2

 

Termination of Management Continuity Agreement

 

The amended and restated Management Continuity Agreement between The Macerich Company and Arthur M. Coppola dated as of December 29, 2008 is hereby terminated and shall no longer have any force or effect as of March 15, 2013.

 

 

	
 
    	
/s/   Arthur M. Coppola
    
	
 
    	
Arthur   M. Coppola
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
The   Macerich Company,
    
	
 
    	
a   Maryland corporation
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By:
    	
/s/   Thomas J. Leanse
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Thomas   J. Leanse
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Senior   Executive Vice President,
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Chief   Legal Officer and Secretary
Exhibit 31.1

** **

** **

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Craig G. Matthews,certify that:

1. I have reviewedthis quarterly report on Form 10-Q of NUI Corporation;

2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4.The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;

b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and 

c)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant's fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whetheror not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: June 17, 2004

/s/ Craig G.MatthewsPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Opinion filed December 8, 2016

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-16-00249-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF H.A.B. AND J.B., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 29th District Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. C46657

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of the parents of H.A.B. and J.B. The children’s father filed a notice of appeal.

We dismiss the appeal.

The father’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a 

supporting brief in which he professionally and conscientiously examines the record 

and applicable law and concludes that the appeal is frivolous and presents no 

arguable issues of merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See In re 
2

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); High v. State, 573 

S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). In light of a recent holding by 

the Texas Supreme Court, however, an Anders motion to withdraw “may be 

premature” if filed in the court of appeals under the circumstances presented in this 

case. See In re P.M., No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 1274748, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016). 

The court in P.M. stated that “appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by 

filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” Id.

Counsel provided Appellant with a copy of the brief and the motion to 

withdraw and informed Appellant of his right to review the record and file a pro se

response to counsel’s brief. In compliance with Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–

20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), counsel provided Appellant with a motion to file in this 

court to obtain access to the appellate record. We conclude that Appellant’s counsel 

has satisfied his duties under Anders, Schulman, and Kelly. We note that Appellant 

did not file the pro se motion for access to the appellate record. Nor did he file a pro 

se response to counsel’s Anders brief. 

Following the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have 

independently reviewed the record, and we agree that the appeal is without merit and 

should be dismissed. See Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409. However, in light of P.M., 

we deny the motion to withdraw that was filed by Appellant’s court-appointed 

counsel. See P.M., 2016 WL 1274748, at *3. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied, and the appeal is dismissed. 

PER CURIAM

December 8, 2016

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.
#### John Rutledge and others *vs.*Executor of Mr. Williamson.

CABE El,

21, B. p. *19Í,*

Estate ordered to be sold,

Life estate of iued by master.

Chancellor Buxeeeto withdrew from ths bench.

*■*©m reading the master’s report, and on motion of general Pinckney, solicitor for complainants, it was or-dereá and decreed, that the real and personal estate of :hc said Wm. Williamson be sold by the master, on certain terms prescribed by the court: And that it be referred to the mcier to compute the value of the life estate of *160Williamson, (the widow,) in the estate or property to be sold.*

DECEMBER. 1789.

General Pinckney for complainants. — Bee, for defendant.

*

 In this cause two important questions were decided relative to executors* commissions. On the brief of tlie bill and answers in this, case, prepared for the use of chancellor Math ewsy there are the following words in his own hand-writing: *“*In this case, Thompson, the executor, (of Williamson,) charged the usual commission, on delivering up certain bonds, ordered by this court to be delivered up to Gadsden and Bonsall, as so much *money*by him paid: But as the law says, an executor shall receive two and a half per cent, for monies received, or paid, the court could not consider the mere delivery of a bond to be a pay. *ment*— therefore *disallowed this charge.*’

He (the executor) also charged ten per cent, commissions on receiving the-interest on money let out by the testator, but as the law only allows this charge on interest money received by the executor, on money which had by him been let at interest, and made a capital of) *it •was also disallowed:*And referred him to his action at law for compensation for his (extra) services, as the law itself directs.”
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A1841. NEKIO HOLLOWAY v. THE STATE.

On August 30, 2002, a jury found Nekio Holloway guilty of armed robbery,

criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated battery, and three counts of

aggravated assault. R11. 493 The trial court entered its disposition on September 4,

2002. R2. 408 ThisCourt affirmed Holloway’s convictionsin 2004, butremanded the

case with direction that the trial court re-sentence Holloway after the State conceded

two countsshould have merged. Holloway v. State, 269 Ga. App. 500 (604 SE2d 844)

(2004). In 2015, Holloway filed an extraordinary motion for new trial R2. 584 and a

motion for re-sentencing. R2. 604 On February 16, 2016, the trial court denied both

motions, but filed an order re-sentencing Holloway in accordance with our previous

opinion. R2. 614, 616, 618 Holloway filed a Notice of Appeal on March 4, 2016.

Although this Notice of Appeal would be timely from the order re-sentencing him,

Holloway’s Notice of Appeal specifies that he is appealing “from the order and

Judgment entered herein on August 30, 2002.” We lack jurisdiction.

September 15, 2016
A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable

order. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an

absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Rocha v. State, 287 Ga.

App. 446 (1) (a) (651 SE2d 781) (2007). Here, Holloway seeks to appeal an order

filed nearly 14 years ago. As such, his appeal is untimely and is hereby DISMISSED

for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

09/15/2016