### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 205 -CV

Co as ta l Ha bit atAl lia nc e , A ppe lla nt

v. P ublic Ut ili tyCo m m iss ion of Te xa s; Bar r y T. Sm it he r m an, Cha ir m an; Ke nneth W. And erson, Jr., C om m ission er; Donna L . Nelson, Com m ission er; Texas Gulf Win d LL C; P P M Energy, Inc.; and AEP Texas Centr al Com pany, Ap pellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0041 64 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE BY RNE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N

At issue in this case is the di s t ri ct cour t’s subject-matter

jurisdiction to review the P ublic U ti li ty

Co mm is s io n ’ s d e n ia l o f a mo ti o nto inte r

v e n e in a p r o c e e d in g b e f

o r e the Com mis sio n. Th e Com mis sio n d e nie d a pp e lla nt C oa sta l Ha

bit a t Al lia nc e ’s mot ion to int e rv e ne in the Commiss ion’s consideration o f an e lectric utilit y ’s application to amend its certificate of convenie nce a

nd nece ssi t y . The Allianc e filed suit in district court in an attempt to appeal or challeng e the or der de nying the reque st to int erve ne. The district court dismissed the Alliance’ s lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We hold that the Administrative Procedur e Ac t does

n o t au t h o rize a non-pa

rty such as the A lliance to indepe ndently pursue judicial r eview of a final orde r or decision of the P ublic Utility Commi ssion. W e also hold dismissal of the Alliance ’s claim for de clar atory

relief to be prope r bec ause, by statute, the denial of the Alliance ’s interve ntionMembers of the Alliance identified in its moti on to intervene include the Ame rica n Bird 1 Conservanc y , the Coastal Be nd Audubon Society , the Houston Audubon Society , the L ower L aguna Madre Foundation, and King Ranch, Inc. 2 wa s a matte r c omm itt e d to the Com mis sio n’ s d isc re ti on . Altho ug h a c on sti tut ion a l du e pr oc e ss claim m ay b e asse rted by a non-pa rty to an administrative proc eeding , the Alliance has fa iled to a ll e g e th e d e p r iv a ti o n o f a v e s te d p r o p e rty r igh t a s a r e s u lt o f th e d e n ia l o f it s inte r v e n ti o n . We

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. Fac tua l an d P

ro c e dural B ackg

ro und On June 25 , 2 00 7, a

pp e lle e AE P Te xas Cent ral Compa ny (A EP T CC) fi le d w ith the P ublic U ti li ty

Co mm is s io no f

T e xa s ana

p p li c a ti o nto a me n d

it s c e rti f ic a te o f c o n v e n ie n ce

a n d n e c e s s i t y

( C C N ) t o c o n s t r

u c t , o w n , an d

o p e r a t e a

2 1

. 6

- m i l e , 3 4 5

- k i l o v o l t , d o u b le -c ir c uit tr ans mis sio n li ne on

Ke ne dy Ranc h in

Ke ne dy Cou nty . T he tr ans missi on lin e is i nte nd e d to interconne ct two proposed w ind ge neration facilities to be constructe d on the ra nch. On August 9, 2007, appellant Coastal Ha bitat Alliance f

iled a motion to intervene in the C ommissi on’s re view of AEP TCC’s application. The Allianc e is an a ssociation of landow n ers and environmenta l gr oups formed f or the purpose of protec ting their environmenta l interests in the coasta l r eg ion on which the transmission line would be located. The motion to intervene alleg ed “adve rse eff ects of this projec t 1 on coasta l wetlands, flora and fa una in the re g ion, and enda ng ere d and mig ratory

specie s.” The Commission denied the Alliance’ s motion to intervene on September 7, 2007, concludingthat the Alliance had not shown a justiciable inter est in the proce eding . The Allianc e timely filed an a

ppeal of t h e d enial to t he Commissi on, see 16 Tex. Admin. C ode § 22.123(a )(2)Af te r t his a ppeal was fi le d, Ke nn e th W. An de rs on , Jr. wa s a pp oin te d to re pla c e Julie C. 2 Parsley as commissioner, and D onna L . Nelson wa s appointed to repla ce Paul Hudson as commissioner. The suc cessor s have be en substituted as appe llees. SeeTex. R. App. P . 7.2(a)

. I n addition, at the di s t ri ct court, a ppellees A EP TCC, Tex as Gulf Wind L L C, and PPM Energ y , I nc. interve ned in the lawsuit. Texas Gulf Wind and PPM Energ y are developingthe proposed wind f

arms to be c onnecte d to AEP TCC’s transmissi on line. After filing the orig inal petition in dis trict court, on De cembe r 17, 2007, the Allianc e filed 3 a motion for rehe aring with the Commi ssion a s to the Notice of Approva l itself. To the extent the motion wa s a viable motion, it was overr uled by operation of law afte r no commissioner took action on it. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.146(c) (West 2008). 3 (2 00 9) (P ub . U til

. Com m’ n, Ap pe a l of an Inte ri m O rd e r a

nd Mo tio ns fo r R e c on sid e ra

tio n o f I nte ri m Orde r I s s u ed by

the Commiss ion), and the Commission is sued a written order denying the appea l on October

29, 2007. The Allianc e then f iled a motion for re consideration, see id. § 22.123(b), but no commissione r p l aced the motion on the ag enda f or an ope n meeting , causingthe motion to be

overr uled by operation of law as of

November

13, 2007, see id. § 22.123(b)( 6)(A)

. On Novem

b e r 2 7 , 2 0 0 7 , th e Co mm is s io nis s u e d a N o ti c e o f

Ap p r o v a l gr an ting AE P TC C’ s a

pp lic a tio n to a me nd

its CCN . O n Decemb er 4, 20 07 , th e Al lia nc e fi le d s uit

in district court ag ainst the Co mm is s io n, as we ll as Chairman B arr y T. Smit herma

n and Commissi oners Julie C. Pa

rs le y and Pa ul H ud so n in

the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s, seekingreve rsal of the order denying 2 its mot ion

to i nte rv e ne and

se e kin g to v a c a te the a dmini str a tiv e a pp ro va l of

the un de rl yingCCN based on the claim t hat t he denial of the Alliance ’s re quest to intervene was improper . I n its original petition, the Alliance a sserted that the denial of its interve ntion violated the T ex as Ut i lity Code and the Allianc e’s r ight to due pr ocess a nd due cour se of law , an d s o ug ht declar atory relief under the Administrative Proce dure A ct, mandamus re lief, and injunctive r elief. 34 By ag ree ment among the parties, a hea ring on the merits was se t for Mar ch 5, 2008, in the district court. On F ebrua ry 21, 200 8 , AE P TCC and the Commis sion filed pleas to the jurisdiction seeking dismiss al of the la wsuit. On M arc h 4, 2008, the All iance filed a r esponse to the pleas to the jurisdi ct i o n , an d filed a motion for le ave to f ile an ame nded petition, by which the Alliance soug ht to add a claim for r elief unde r the Unifor m Decla ratory J udg ments Act as a

n additional basis for declar atory relief

. Following the M arc h 5 hear ing on these pre-trial moti ons, the district court, on Mar ch 6, 2008, denie d the Alliance ’s m otion to amend its orig inal petition, gr anted the ple a s to the jur isd ic tio n, and dis mis se d th e Al lia

nc e ’s laws uit . Co a sta l H a bit a t A lli anc e a

pp e a ls.

Anal y sis A plea to the jur isdiction challeng es the trial c ourt’s authority to determine the subject matter of a specific ca use of a ction. See B land Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 553- 54 (Tex. 2000). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction and whether a plaintiff has alleg ed fac ts that affirmatively

demonstrate subje ct-matter jurisdiction are que stions of law that we revie w de novo. Texas De

p’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 1 3 3 S

. W

. 3 d

2 1 7 , 2 2 6 ( T e x . 2 0 0 4 )

. In decidinga plea to the jurisdiction, we are not to we igh the merits of the plaintiff’ s claims beyond the

e xten t ne c e ssa

ry to de te rm ine jur isd ic tio n, but are to c on sid e r t he pla int if

f’ s p le a din g s, c on str

ue d in the plaintiff’s f

avor, a nd evide n ce p er tinent to the jurisdictional inquiry

. Id. a t 22 7- 28 ; County of Cam e ro n v . B ro wn , 80 S.W .3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).

I n this lawsuit, C oastal Ha bitat Alliance seeks j udicial review of the Comm ission’s inte r lo c u to r

y o r d e r d e n yin g th e A ll ia

n c e ’ s mo ti o nto inte r

v e n e . “ I t i s w e ll r e c o g n iz e d u n der Texas law that there is no right to judicial re view of a n administrative orde r unless a statute pr ovidesTex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 2001.001-.902 (West 2008). 4 5 a ri g ht o r u

nle ss t he or de r a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c ts a vest ed pr op e rt

y ri g ht o r o the rw ise vio late s a constitutional right.” Con tin e nta l Cas

. In s. Co. v . F un c tio na l R esto ra tio n A sso cs. , 19 S.W .3d 393, 3 9 7 (T ex . 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Stone v. Tex as Liquor Control Bd. , 417 S.W .2d 385, 385-86 (Te x . 1967)). The Allianc e arg ues t hat i t has a rig ht to judicial reviewbased on ( 1) the Administrative Proce dure Act, (2) the Uniform De clar atory J udg ments Act, and ( 3) the c onstitut ional rig ht of due proc ess and due cour se of law

. Administrati ve ProcedureAct Th e Al lia nc e ha s a ri g ht t o ju dic ia l r e vie w o f a n a dmi nis tr a ti ve orde r i f a statut e provides that rig ht. See id. The Alli ance asser ts that the Administrative Proce dure A ct (APA) g ives 4 the district court jurisd i ct i on over the Alliance’ s lawsuit that amounts to an appea l of the denia l of its reque st to int erve ne. Section 2001.171 of the APA states a s follows: “A per son who has exhausted all administrative reme dies available within a state ag ency and who is ag g rieve d by a fina l decision in a c ontested ca se is entitled to judicial revie w under this chapter.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.171 (West 2008). The Te x as Supreme Court ha s held that section 2001.171 provide s an independe nt rig ht to judicial review of a decision in a contested c ase. See Tex as Dep’t of Protec tive & R e g u la to r yS e r v s . v . M e ga Ch il d Ca r e, I n c. , 1 4 5 S

. W

. 3d 170, 173 (Tex. 2004). Howe ver, the supreme c ourt limit ed i t s h o l ding to situations in which the ag ency ’s ena bling statute “ neither specific ally

authorizes nor prohibits judicial review of the de cision.” Id.T ex . Util. Code Ann. §§ 11.001-66.016 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008). The PURA is the 5 Public Utili ty

Commi ssion’s enablingstatute. Se e Of fic e of P ub . Ut il

. Cou ns e l v . P ub lic Ut il. Comm’n , 843 S.W .2d 718, 720 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied). 6 The Public Utility

Reg ulatory

Act (PURA) specific ally aut horizes reviewof 5 decisions b y t h e C o m m i ssion. Section 15.001 of the PURA provides that “[a]ny party to a proce eding befor e the c ommissi on is entitled to judicial revie w under the substantial e vidence rule.” Tex. Util . Code Ann. § 15.001 (West 2007). Ho weve r, the Allianc e wa s not a pa rty to the Commi ssion’s re v i ew o f AEP TCC’s application bec ause the Alliance’ s attempt to intervene was de nied. The A PA defines a “par ty ” as “ a per son or state a g ency named or admitted as a pa

rty .” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.003(1) (West 2008). The Alli ance was ne ither name d nor admitted

as a party
. T h e Co mm is s io n ’ s r u le s r e a c hth e s a me r e s u lt , p r o v id in g th a t p arti e s to a p r ocee ding include applica

nts and complainants, re spondents, intervenor s, and commission staff re prese nting the public intere st, see 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 22.102(a) (2009) (Pub. Util. Com m’n, Classification of Parties), but “ [a] ny

person that ha s not i nterve ned in a pr ocee ding, or who has be en denie d permission to intervene, sha ll not be considere d a par ty ,” id. § 2 2

. 1 0 2 (c ). The A lliance wa s not allowed to interve ne. There fore , the P URA specific ally authorizes judicial revie w of a proc eeding befor e the Commission, but in a manner that excludes an entity

—such as the Alliance—who is not a p ar t y t o t h e p ro ce ed i n g. Ba sed on the supre me cour t’s holding in Me

ga Chi ld C

ar e

—tha t A PA section 2001.171 provides a n independe nt rig ht to judicial review in situations in which the ag ency ’s enabling statute “ neither spe cifica lly authorizes nor prohibits judicial review of the de cision,” see 14 5 S. W.3 d at 173 —th is Court ha s hel d that an ind e pe nd e nt ri g ht to jud ic ia l r e vie w und e r t he APAOur holding that there is no statutory basis for a

non -p ar t y t o ap p eal the Comm ission’s 6 denial of a

motion to i nterve ne does not for eclose the pos sibili ty of review via mandamus. Se e Sta te v. Thomas , 766 S.W .2d 217, 218-20 (Te x . 1989) (g rantingpetition fo r writ of mandamus and orde ri n g P u b l ic Utility Commi ssion to vacate its orde r deny ing T exas Attorney

Gene ral’s intervention). The Alliance ha s not appea led the dismissal of its request for mandamus re lief. Th e Al lia

nc e c ite s Railroad Commissi on v. Ennis T r a n s portation Co. , 695 S.W .2d 706 7 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, writ ref ’d n.r.e.), t o demonstrate that this C ourt has exerc ised jurisdiction to re vie w an a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc y ’s de c isi on to de ny int e rv e nti on . Ho we ve r, wh ile thi s Co ur t in Ennis Transpor tation did addre ss the merits of a de nial of interve ntion in an administrative proc e e d in g , th e s o u r c e o f th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s ju

r is d ic ti o no v e r

th e n o n - p arty ’ s a

p p e a l w as not addre ssed. Se e ge ne ra lly 695 S.W .2d 706. Moreo v er , t h e case involved a n administrative proce eding befor e the Railroad Commissi on—not the Public Utili ty Commi ssion—and there fore , PURA section 15.001 would not have a pplied to the proce eding s. See id. at 708. 7 appli es only

“whe n the ag ency ’s ena bling a ct is silent” as to judicial revie w, see W est v. Tex as Com m’n o n E

nv tl. Qu ali ty , 260 S.W .3d 256, 260-61 (Te x . App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) . The PURA is not s ilent on this m atter. It specifica lly authorizes judicial revie w only for pa rties. See Tex. Util . Code Ann. § 15.001. We, there fore , hold that a non-party to a proc eedingbefor e the Com mis sio n is no t st a tut or ily e nti tle d to jud ic ia l r e vie w o f th e Co mmissi on ’s de c isi on to deny intervention under e ither the PURA or the A PA. This holding is consistent with this C ourt’s 6 deter mination in a prior ca se that a non-par ty has no statutory

rig ht to judicial review of a dec ision by the Public Utilit y

Commi ssion: The [plaintiff] di d not participate in the administrative hea ring in any

capa city befor e the Commiss ion issued its decision and did not obtain permission to inter vene in the administrative proc eeding ; the [pl aintiff], there fore , was not a pa rty to the proce eding and does not have a statutory rig ht to judicial revie w of the Commission’s decision. City of Port Art hur v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. , 13 S.W .3d 841, 8 4 4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (c iting Te x . Util. Code Ann. § 15.001; 16 Tex. Admi n. Code § 22.102(c) ). 7I g noring the impact of PURA sec tion 15.001 and foc using on A PA section 2001.171 alone, 8 the Alliance argues it “exhausted all administrative re medies” by time l y ap p ealing to the Com mis sio n th e de nia l of its mot ion

to i nte rv e ne and by fi lin g a mot ion fo r r e c on sid e ra

tio n in acc ordanc e with the Commi s s i o n ’s rules, and w as “a g g rieve d by a fina l decision” that a

pproved t h e co n struction of a tra nsmissi on line contra

ry to the Alliance’ s environmental inter ests. S ee Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.171. I n re s p o n se, appe llees asse rt that the APA itself could be construed to f

orec lose judicial revie w for a non-par ty
. See id. §§ 2001.145(a) (“A timely motion for rehe aringis a prer equisite to an appe al in a conte sted ca se . . . . ”) , 2001.146(a) (“Amotion for rehe aring in a contested case must be filed by a party
. . . .”). But see Thomas , 766 S.W .2d at 225-26 (He cht, J ., dissenting) (ar g uing that denial of motion to intervene should be appea lable). Mor eover , even if the APA would authorize jud i ci al re view for a non-pa rty appea ling a

n interlocutory

order re latin g to t

he de nia l of

int e rv e nti on , a

ppell ees ass ert

that th e Al lia

nc e ’s pe tit ion

wa s unti me ly beca use it was filed be fore the d ec i s i o n i n the ca se bec ame f inal. See Lindsay v . Sterling , 690 S.W .2d 560, 563-64 (Tex. 1985) (dismissing lawsuit revie wing administrative dec ision where plaintiff filed suit befor e motion for re hear ing w as overruled at ag ency level). We ne ed not re solve these issues conc erningthe APA, howeve r, bec ause w e conc lude that the PURA ac ts t o preve nt the APA from pr oviding a n independe nt rig ht to judicial review of a contested ca se bef

ore the Commi ssion. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (West 2008). 9 8 PU RA s e c ti o n 1 5

. 0 0 1 a uthorizes only

a par ty to obtain judicial review

of a pr ocee ding befor e the Commission. See Te x. Ut il. Cod e Ann. § 1 5. 00 1. Th e Al lia nc e wa s n ot a

pa rt y to the administrative proc eedingbelow. See16 Tex. Admin. C ode § 22.102(c ). Consequently , the Alliance ha s no statutory

rig ht under the A PA to judicial r eview of the Commiss ion’s order

denying the Alliance ’s interve ntion. 8 Uniform Dec laratory Judgments Ac t Coastal Habitat Alli an ce ne x t asserts that the Unif orm Dec laratory

J udg ments Act (UDJA) provides a statutory rig ht to judicial review of the administrative orde r deny ing its motion 9 to intervene . The UD J A provides that a person whose righ t s , s t atus , or other le g al re lations are aff ecte d by a st atute may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under theThe orig inal petition soug ht de clar atory relief only under se ction 2001.038 of the APA, 10 which authorizes an action for decla ratory judgme nt to determine the “ validity or applica

bility of a ru le .” Te x. Go v’ t Code Ann. § 2 00 1. 03 8( a ); see Friends of Cany on Lake, Inc . v. Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. , 96 S.W .3d 519, 529 (Tex. App.

— Au s t in 2002, pet. denied) (“[Section 2001.038] a u t h o r i z e s a d i s t r i c t c o u rt t o r e s o l v e t w o i s s u e s : ( 1 ) w h e t h e r a ru le is v ali d , and/or (2) whether a ru le is ap pli c ab le .” ). Th e Al liance do es not c ha lle ng e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the APA se c tio n 2 00 1. 03 8 c la im. 9 statute, and may

obtain a decla

ration of rig hts, status, or other leg al re lations thereunde r. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a ) (W est 2008). The Alli ance contends that the district court ha s jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he Al lia nc e ’s UD JA c la im b e c a

us e it s e e ks the pr op e r c on struc tio n o f P UR A section 37.054(b) and a de clar ation that the All iance is entitled to int erve ne in ac corda nce w ith that statute. Section 37.054(b) of the PURA g overns a

person’ s ability

to intervene in the Commi ssion’s consideration of a utility ’s application to amend a CCN. SeeTex. Util . Code Ann. § 37. 054(b) (West 2007). Specifica lly , that section provides that a per son “intere sted in the application” may intervene

. Id. The Allianc e’s r equest for decla ratory relief in its orig inal petition did not contain a ref ere nce to the U DJ A. The Allianc e soug ht to amend its pleading s to ref ere nce the UDJA, but t he 10 dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d th e mot ion . App e lle e s argue that th e Al lia nc e ’s mot ion fo r l e a ve to a me nd its pleading s, which wa s filed the day befor e the schedule d hear ing on the merits, was prope rly denied beca use the amendment “oper ated as a surprise” to appellee s, see Tex. R. C iv. P. 63, and would have resha ped the Allianc e’s c ause of action, se e Ha rd in v . H

ar din , 597 S.W .2d 347, 349 (Tex. 1980). Th e Al lia nc e c ounte rs that its or ig ina l pe tit ion c on ta ine d su ff ic ie nt f a c ts a nd argume nts to c on sti tut e a UDJA claim and the a

mendment mere ly

supplied the prope r statutory citation. A dec ision to deny

a n am e n dm e n tt o t h e p l e a d i n g s t h a ti s n o tm an d a t o r y m ay b e r e v e r s e d

o n l y i f i ti s a c l e ar a bu se10

of di s cr etion. State Bar v. Kilpatrick , 874 S.W .2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994). We need not de termine whether the district c ourt’s denial of the Allianc e’s motion to amend its pleading s was an a buse of discretion, howe ver, be cause we de termine that appellee s’ pleas to the jurisdiction would have bee n pr op e rl y g ra nte d a s to the Al lia

nc e ’s UD JA c la im. Private par

ties may seek de clar atory

relief ag ainst state offic ials who alleg edly act

w it h o u t le g a l o r s tatuto r

y a u th o rity

. C ity of El Paso v. Heinrich , N o . 0 6

- 0 7 7 8 , 2 0 0 9 T e x . LE X IS 25 3, a t *4 -5 (T e x. May

1, 20 09 ); Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. I T-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 8 4 9 , 8 5 5 ( T e x. 2 0 0 2 )

. A ju s ti c ia b le c o n tr o v e r s y r e g ar d in g w h e th e r a s tate a g e n c y o r o f f ic ial has acte d bey ond its statutory authority provid es a j u ri s d ictional basis for a UDJA action seeking statutory construction of that authority

. Texas Dep’ t of Ins. v. Rec onvey ance Servs., I nc. , 240 S.W .3d 418, 428 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. filed). How ever , a suit that seeks to control a state off icial’s exercise of

discretion within his leg al au t h o ri t y is a suit to control state action, which is ba rre d by sovere ign immunit y absent leg islative consent. Mc Lan e Co. v . S

tra y ho rn , 148 S.W .3d 644, 649 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 04 , p e t. d e nie d) ; s e e H e in r ic h , 2 009 Tex. L EXI S 253, at *9 (suit alleg ing violation of statute “lea

ving no r oom for discre tion” is not barre d). There fore , if the Commissi on’s denia l o f t h e Alliance ’s motion to int erve ne

w a s a v a l i d e x e r c i s e o f d i s c r e t i o n , t h e A l l i an c e ’ s U D J A c l a i mi s b ar r e d b y s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y . In Railroad Commissi on v. Ennis Transportat ion Co. , this Cou rt rec og nized that ge nera lly “the allowanc e or de nial of petitions for interve ntion in adminis trative proc eeding s rests in the discre tion of the a g ency .” 695 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1985, writ ref ’d n. r. e. ). The plaintiffs in Ennis Transpor tation we re c on tr a c t c arr ie rs wh o h a d a pp e a le d a n ag ency ’s de nia l of

the irSi mi la rly , a court’s decision on a pa rty ’s interve ntion is vested in the discretion of the 11 court. See I

n re Lumberme ns Mut. Cas. Co. , 1 84 S.W. 3d 71 8, 72 2- 23 (T e x. 20 06 ) ( c ourt of a pp e a ls’ de nia l of int e rv e nti on re vie we d fo r a buse o f di scr e tio n) ; Ze ifm an v . M ic he ls , 229 S.W .3d 460, 465 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (trial c ourt’s denia l of intervention re vi ew ed for abuse of discretion). The Commission’s rules state, “A person has standing to inter vene if that person: (1) has 12 a rig ht to participate w hich is expressly confe rre d by

statute, commission rule or orde r o r ot her law; or (2) h as o r re prese nts persons with a justiciable intere st which may be adve rsely

aff ecte d by the outcome of the proce eding .” 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 22.103(b) (2009) ( Pub. Util. C omm’n, Standing to Interve ne). 11 participation as parties to an a dminist rative p ro ce ed i n g, and the tria l court had c oncluded that the

car riers w ere “intere sted parties” who wer e entitled to so participate. See id. at 708-09. This C ourt

re ve rs e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt, ho ldi ngthat w hil e the a g e nc y c ou ld a llo w t

he c arr ie rs to intervene , it was not compelled to do so. See id. at 711-12. 11

Se ct i o n 3 7.054(b) of

the PURA provides that a “ person or elec tric coope rative interested in the a

pplication may

intervene at the hear ing.” Tex. Util. Code Ann. § 37.054(b). The 12 Al lia nc e c on te nd s th a t be c a

us e se c tio n 37 .0 54 (b ) of the PUR A us e s the pe rm iss ive ve rb “ may ” wi th the intere sted person a s the subject, a pe rson claimingan i n tere st holds the discretion reg arding his intervention, not the C ommissi on. Acc ording to the Alliance ’s construc tion, section 37.054(b) mandates that the Commi ssion comply with such a pe rson’s exerc ise of discre tion to int erve ne. Ho we ve r, the Al lia

nc e ’s statut or

y c on str uc tio n c on fl ic ts wi th thi s Court’ s an a ly sis in Ennis Transpor tation . I n that case , the g overningstatute—the Motor Carrie r Ac t—provided that in t erested par

ties “may appea r” in the pr ocee ding. See Act of Ma rch 13, 1929, 41st L eg ., R.S., ch

. 3 14, § 12, 1929 Tex. Gen. L aws 698, 703 (r epea led by Act of Ma

y 24, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 705, § 31(a )(4) , 1995 Tex. Gen. L aws 3719, 3740). N ever theless, this Court stated that it had12

“not been shown a provision of the Motor Carrie r Act

. . . requiring the [age ncy ] to allow the contr act

car riers to a ppear and prote st applications for se rvice .” 695 S.W.2d at 710. I n addition, the ag ency had adopte d a rule of pra ctice stating that a party in interest “may appea

r in any proce eding ” bef

ore the ag ency . Id. a t 71 1. Ag a in, thi s Co urt con clu ded fr om t his langua g e tha

t th e re wa s “ no ru le specific ally requiring the [ ag ency] t o allow” the inter vention reque sted. Id. at 711-12. This Court’s interpre tation of the applicable statute and rule in Ennis Transpor tation was based on the fact that the term “ party

in interest” wa s not defined in t h e ag ency ’s rules a nd, there fore , the ag ency was not compelled to allow a person c laiming a n interest to interve ne. Id. The same rea soning a pplies here . Even if we we re to a g ree that PURA section 37.054(b)’ s use of “ may ” plac es discre tion in the hands of a

n interested pe rson, we w ould stil l hold that the Commi ssion has di scre tion to determine whether a per son is in fact “inter ested” in the first place . Ba sed on this Court’s holding in En nis Transport ation , we c onclude that whe ther the Alliance is “ interested” so as to be able to intervene in the administrative proc eedingbelow wa s a matter w ithin the Com mission’s dis cre tion.

Under the amende d petition filed by the Alliance , the Alliance soug ht a dec laration under the UDJA that the Notice of Ap p ro v al i s void and that the Commissi on must allow the Alliance’ s participation as a party in the revie w of AEP TCC’s application. Given th at the denia l of the Allianc e’s inter

vention was a discre tionary act, this UDJA claim is an “attempt to exert control over the state,” w hich is barr ed by sovere ign immunity

. See H einrich , 2009 Tex. L EXI S 253, at *11 (ultra vire s exception to sovere ign immunity does not include c omplaint over g overnme nt office r’s

e xer c ise of

dis c re tio n) ; Nor th A lam o W ater Su pply Cor p. v . Te x as De p’ t of He alt h , 839 S.W .2d 4 5 5 , 4 5 9 ( T e x . A p p . —

A u s t i n 1 9 9 2 , w r i td e n i e d ) ( “ T h e f a c tt h a tt h e [ a g e n c y] m i g h td e c i d e ‘ w r o n g l y’“While the Texas Constit ution is text ually differ ent i n that it ref ers to ‘due c ourse’ rathe r 13 than ‘due proce ss,’ we r eg ard these terms as without meaning ful distinction. As a result, in matters of proc e dura l du e pr oc e ss, we have tr a dit ion a lly fo llo we d c on te mpo ra

ry fe de ra l du e pr oc e ss interpre tations of proce dural due proce ss issues.” University of Tex. M ed. Sch. v . Than , 901 S.W .2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995) (citation omitted). 13 in the ey es of a

n opposing pa

rty do es n o t v i t i at e the a g ency ’s jurisdiction to make an initial decision.”) . There fore , the UDJA does not provide the Allianc e with a r ight to judicial revie w of the Commi ssion’s administrative order . We affir m the dismiss al of the A lliance’ s claim for de clar atory relief for lac k of jurisdiction.

Du e Pr oc ess Under Texas law, a pa

rty may have a rig ht to judicial review of an admi n i strative

or de r i f the or de r ad

ve rs e ly a ff

e c ts a ve ste d pro pe rt

y ri g ht o r o the rw ise vio late s a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht. Continental C

as. Ins. Co. , 19 S.W. 3d

a t 39 7; see Public Util. Comm’n v. Pe dernales Elec . Coop., Inc. , 6 78 S .W.2d

21 4, 22 2 n .6 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 84 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) (n oti ngthat e ve n if leg islature denie s judicial review of ag ency

action, judicial re view is ava ilable for de privation of proper ty without due proce ss). Coastal Habitat Alli ance contends that the Comm ission’s denial of t h e Al l i an ce’s intervention depr ived it of its constitut ional rig ht to due proce ss, see U. S. Co ns t. amend. XIV, § 1, and due course of law, see Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 19. Procedur al due pr ocess r equire s notice and “ an opportunity to be hea

rd at a meaning ful t i m e and in a mea ningf ul manner.” University of Tex. Me d. Sch. v. Than , 9 0 1 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 6 , 9 3 0 (T ex . 1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333 ( 1976)). The Allianc e asse rts that the denial of its int erve ntion violated its right 1314

to due proc ess bec ause it was unable to par ticipate in a mea

ningf ul manner, inc luding the c onduct of dis c ov e ry , th e int

ro du c tio n o f e vid e nc e a t a he ari ng , a

nd the c ro ss- e xami natio n o f w itn e sse s. Be fore consideringwhat proc ess is due, howe ver, our first inquiry

in a proc edura l due proce ss claim is whether the plaintiff has be en depr i v ed of a proper ty or liberty interest dese rving protec tion un d e r th e f

e d e r a l an d s tate c o n s ti tuti o n s . I f a p la inti f f f a il s to a ll e g e th e d e p r iv a ti o n of such an interest, the plaintiff has failed to alleg e a due proce ss claim. See Spring Branc h Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Stamos , 6 95 S.W. 2d 55 6, 56 0- 61 (T e x. 19 85 ); City of Arli ngton v. Centerfolds, Inc. , 232 S.W .3d 238, 248-49 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 2007, pet. denied). Th e Al lia nc e argue s th a t, a s an inte re ste d e nti ty in the a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e e din g s, it ha d a ve ste d inte re st i n s e e kin g a he ari ngand

in p art ic ipatin g a s a part y to pro tect it s in te re sts
. Howeve r, we have a lrea dy deter mined that the denial of the Allianc e’s motion to intervene —and, specific al l y , t h e d eter

mination that the Alliance wa s not an “intere sted” pe rson—was a matter of the Commiss ion’s discretion. See E nnis Trans

p. , 695 S.W .2d at 710. Ther efor e, a pe rson’s desire to intervene in a proc eedingbefor e the Commissio n i s n ot a vested pr operty interest entitled to p r o te c ti o n u n d e r th e f

e d e r a l an d s tate c o nstitut ions. See W eatherford v. City of San Marcos , 157 S.W .3d 473, 483-84 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, pet. denie d ) (findingno vested prope rty rig ht in r e zon inga

pp lic a tion, wh ic h is le g isl a tiv e a c t su bje c t to dis c re tio n o f c ity ). Th e Al lia

nc e mus t demonstrate a vested proper ty interest that will be deprived by the denial of its int erve ntion in the proce eding other than its intere st or desire to inter vene. See P icke ll v. Brooks , 846 S.W .2d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied) ( “[P] roce dural due -proc ess ana ly sis protects only what actua lly belong s to the individual, rather tha n rec og nizi ng that unfairne ss exi sts in the v ery actI n its briefing , the Alliance states that KingRanch “ provi d es 825,000 acres of vested 14 pr op e rt y ri g hts .” Our qu e sti on is no t me re ly wh e the r the Al liance’s mem bers po sse ss vested proper ty rig hts, howeve r, but whether there is any

alleg ation that any

such rig hts have be en deprive d

. Th e re is n o al legat ion th a t th e tr ans mis sio n li ne wo uld tr a ve rs e Ki ngRanc h’ s p ro pe rt y . T he on ly alleg ed harm to K ing Ranch’s rea l pr operty interests is the impact the tra nsmissi on line could have on Ki ngRanc h’ s w ild lif

e -r e late d a c tiv iti e s. 15 of disp os in g o f a

n in div idu a l’ s si tuatio n w ith out a llo wi ngthe ind ivi du a l to pa rt ic ipate in s ome meaning ful way .”).

The Allianc e conte nds that it p o s s es ses prope rty rig hts that will be harmed by the proposed tra

nsmissi on line’s impact on wildlife. Acc ording to the Alliance, the transmission line

and its a sso c iate d win d f

arm s w ou ld d isr

up t a “ un iqu e and

vit a l mi g rator

y bir d c or ri do r” and

c ou ld de str oy a “ kn ow n e nd ang e re d sp e c ie s ha bit a t,” and the se c on se qu e nc e s wo uld , in tu rn, imp a ir the Alliance ’s member s’ intere sts in wild bird conser vation and birdwatc hing. One membe r of the Alliance, K ing Ra

nch, is an a djace nt property owner to Kenedy Ranch, a nd its president alleg es the proposed tra

nsmissi on line’s threat to wildlife habitat will impair the profitability of KingRanch’s b i r dw a t c h i n g , w i l d l i f

e t o u r i s m , an d h u n t i n g e x p e d i t i o n s o ni t s p r o p e rt y. Simi larly , the cha irman 14 of the boa rd of trustee s of the L ower L aguna Madr e Foundation ( another member of the Allianc e)

a lle g e s p ote nti a l ha

rm to h is f ina nc ia l in te re sts in l e a din g bir dw a tc hin g tou rs on the c oa st. T h e A ll ia n c e c it e s n o a

u th o r it y f o r it s p r o p o s it io n th a t a v e s te d p r o p e rty r ight may exis t in wildli fe, or

in the viewing , enjoy

ment, or hunting there of. On the contra ry , under state law, no vested prope rt y i n t er est exist s in wild animals. Hollywood Park HumaneSoc’y v. Town of Ho lly woo d P ar

k, 2 61 S.W. 3d

13 5, 14 0 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n Ant on io 2 00 8, no pe t.) . Wil d b ir ds , a s w ild animals, belon g to the State, and no individual proper ty rig hts ex ist in t hem as longas theyI nd e e d, it s e e ms the Al lia nc e ’s a lle g a tio n o f h arm depends on the fa ct that the birds ar e 15 wild, unconfined, a

nd undomesticated—a

nd thus fit for birdwatching and habitat c onservation. 16 rema in wild, unconfi n ed , an d undomesticated. Id. The Allianc e does not a lleg e that any of the birds that would be har

med b y the transmission line have e ver c ease d beingwild, unconfined,

o r u n d o me s ti c a te d. The Allianc e cites to fe dera l case law holding that environmenta l plaintiffs 15 adequately

alleg e injury

in fac t for purpose s of standing when they aver t h at t h ey u s e the affe cted

are a and a re pe rsons for w hom the aesthe tic and rec reational va lues of the ar ea w ill be lessened by the cha lleng ed ac tivity

. See F riends of the Earth, Inc. v . Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., I nc. , 528 U.S. 167, 18 3 ( 20 00 ); Am e ric an Bi rd Con se rv an c

y , I nc . v . F e de ra l Co mm c ’n s Co un c il , 516 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Whether a plaintiff has standing in fede ral courts to asser t a cause of action is not indicative of the depriva

tion of a vested prope rty

rig ht. See Cantrell v. City of Long Beach , 241 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) (“ That the litiga n t ’s i ntere st [ for pur poses of standing ] m ust be g reater than that of the public at larg e does not imply that the interest must be a substantive r ight sounding in p ro pe rt y or c on tr a c t.” ). Th is C ourt

has hel d th a t “ [a]n

inj ur y ne e d n ot a ff

e c t ‘ ve ste d’ pr op e rt

y ri g hts to confer

standing ” and, thus, “ the har m [ for pur

poses of standing ] m ay

be ec onomic,

rec reational, or environmenta l.” Texas Rive rs Pr o t

. A s s ’n v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n , 910 S.W .2d 147 , 1 5 1 -5 2 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n1 9 9 5 , wr i td en i ed ). T h e A l l i an ce ’s al l ega t i on that its alleg ed har

m would constitute an inj ury in fac t for purpose s of standing , there fore , does not

su ff ic e a s an a lle g a tio n o f a

de pr ivatio n o f a

c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d inte re st. Conse qu e n tl y , th e in te r e s ts a ll e g e d b y th e A ll ia

n c e d o n o t c o n s ti tute a

v e sted proper ty rig ht sufficient to suppor t a due proce ss c laim. Absent any alleg ation of depr ivation of a17

vested prope rty rig ht, the Alliance has not a lleg ed a rig ht to judicial revie w based on an order that adver sely aff ects a vested prope rty

rig ht or otherwise violates a c onstitut ional rig ht. See Continental Cas. Ins. Co. , 1 9 S. W.3 d at 39 7. Th e dis tr ic t c ou rt pr op e rl y dis mis se d th e Al lia nc e ’s du e pr oc e ss claim for la ck of jurisdiction.

Conclu sion We h old

that ( 1) the APAdo e s n ot p ro vid e Coa sta l H a bit a t A lli anc e wi th a

ri g ht t o j u d i ci al re v i ew o f t h e d en i al o f i t s i n t erv en t i o nb ef o re t h e P u b l i c U t i l i t y

C o m m i s s i o n , (2 ) s o v er ei gn i m m u n i t y wo u l d b ar a U DJ A c l a i m b a s e d o ns u ch d en i al , an d (3 ) t h e A l l i an ce fa i l edt o al l ege the depr ivation of any

vested prope rty

interest as a

result of such de nial. There fore , we a ffirm the judgme nt of the di strict court dismissing the Allianc e’s c laims for lac k of subject- matter jurisdiction.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop; Concurringand DissentingOpinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med Filed: Jul y

8, 2009