I N T H E S U P R EM E C O U R T

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2024 ND 117

City of Grand Forks, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Roland Clifford Riemers, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20230366

Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, 

the Honorable John A. Thelen, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

Marcus C. Skonieczny (argued) and Joseph E. Quinn (on brief), Grand Forks, N.D., for 

plaintiff and appellee.

Roland C. Riemers, self-represented, Grand Forks, N.D., defendant and appellant.
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City of Grand Forks v. Riemers

No. 20230366

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Roland Riemers appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him 

guilty of disorderly conduct. On appeal, he argues the court lacked jurisdiction because his 

due process rights were violated when the complaint was not properly notarized and the 

information filed by the City was never served on him. He also argues the court erred by 

allowing the City to prosecute him under a city ordinance instead of state law and by not 

ruling or instructing the jury that it is a statutory right to conduct a citizen’s arrest for an 

infraction. He further argues the court and jury erred because no victim was identified and 

a person must be injured to charge disorderly conduct. Last, he argues the jury erred 

because there was not sufficient evidence for a conviction. We affirm.

I

[¶2] Roland Riemers observed a train blocking a street for longer than twenty minutes, 

which he knew was a violation of a city ordinance. As the train started to leave the city, he 

pursued the train and parked his car approximately twenty-five feet from the tracks. The 

train stopped, and Riemers approached the train and informed the BNSF employees the 

train was violating city ordinance. Then, the BNSF employees and Riemers both called the 

police, and one employee left the train to ascertain Riemers’ license plate number. Riemers 

decided to place the employee under citizen’s arrest and ignite a road flare, which he leaned 

against the railroad tracks. Police arrived and Riemers was charged with disorderly 

conduct.

[¶3] Riemers transferred the case from Grand Forks Municipal Court to District Court 

for a jury trial under N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1. At trial, a jury found him guilty of disorderly 

conduct under Grand Forks City Code § 9-0107. He appeals.

II

[¶4] Riemers argues the district court lacked jurisdiction because the uniform complaint 

was not notarized or sworn to under N.D.R.Crim.P. 3 and the information filed in district 

court was not served on him under N.D.R.Crim.P. 49. Either a uniform complaint 

transferred from municipal court or an information is sufficient to commence a 

misdemeanor criminal prosecution in district court. N.D.C.C. § 29-04-05; N.D.R.Crim.P. 

7(a)(2).
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[¶5] Whether the district court lacks jurisdiction because the City did not follow 

procedure when filing the criminal information is a question of law fully reviewable on 

appeal. State v. Arot, 2013 ND 182, ¶ 7, 838 N.W.2d 409.

[¶6] Riemers argues that he was not served properly with the criminal information under 

N.D.R.Crim.P. 49(a), which requires “[a] party must serve on every other party any written 

motion (other than one to be heard ex parte), written notice, designation of the record on 

appeal, or similar document.”

[¶7] Under section 29-01-13(4), N.D.C.C., an information is “an accusation in writing, 

in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense, charging a person with a 

crime or public offense, signed and verified by some person and presented to the district 

court and filed in the office of the clerk of said court.” It is not a written motion or any 

other document subject to Rule 49(a).

[¶8] Riemers transferred the case from municipal court to district court under N.D.C.C. 

§ 40-18-15.1. After a case is transferred to district court, if a criminal information is filed, 

it is by itself sufficient to initiate prosecution. N.D.C.C. § 29-04-05. Once an information 

is filed, the court may issue a warrant for arrest or a summons to appear to the named 

defendant. N.D.R.Crim.P. 9(a) and (b). Then arraignment occurs in open court, and under 

N.D.R.Crim.P. 10, the court ensures a defendant has a copy of the information and the 

information is read. The City was not required under N.D.R.Crim.P. 49 to serve the 

criminal information. The City was only required to file the criminal information, which 

would be provided and read to the Defendant at arraignment. The district court did not lack 

jurisdiction because the information was not served on Riemers under N.D.R.Crim.P. 

49(a).

[¶9] Having determined that the information was sufficient to initiate the charges and 

service on Riemers was not required to provide the district court with jurisdiction, we need 

not address Riemers’s argument about the uniform complaint.

III

[¶10] Riemers argues he should have been prosecuted for disorderly conduct under state 

law and not city ordinance because N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05 states that crimes defined by 

state law shall not be superseded by city ordinance.
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[¶11] Whether a person may be prosecuted under city ordinance rather than state law is a 

question of law fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Linner, 2023 ND 57, ¶ 21, 988 N.W.2d 

586.

[¶12] Section 12.1-01-05, N.D.C.C., states, “This section does not preclude any city or 

county from enacting any ordinance containing penal language when otherwise authorized 

to do so by law.” We have held that a city may prosecute disorderly conduct under its own 

ordinance when the ordinance does not supersede a state statute. City of Bismarck v. 

Schoppert, 450 N.W.2d 757, 758 (N.D. 1990). A city ordinance does not supersede state 

statute when it prohibits only conduct which is prohibited by state statute. Id. Here, the 

state statute and city code are in relevant part similar.

An individual is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with intent to harass, 

annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that 

another person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by the individual’s behavior, 

the individual:

a. Engages in fighting, or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior;

. . . .

d. Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic or the use of a public facility;

. . . .

g. Creates a hazardous, physically offensive, or seriously alarming 

condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose[.]

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-01(1).

It is unlawful for any person to conduct himself or herself in a disorderly 

manner if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless 

disregard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoyed or alarmed by 

said person’s behavior, the person:

(1) Engages in fighting, or in violent, tumultuous or threatening 

behavior;

. . . .

(5) Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or the use of a public 

facility;

. . . .

(8) Creates a hazardous, physically offensive, or seriously alarming 

condition by an act which serves no legitimate purpose.

G.F.C.C. § 9-0107. As they relate to the arguments presented here, the wording of the 

ordinance and statute is identical. The city code prohibits only conduct also prohibited by 

state law, and thus the City may prosecute disorderly conduct under its own ordinance.
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IV

[¶13] Riemers argues the district court erred by not instructing the jury that a person has 

a statutory right to conduct a citizen’s arrest.

[¶14] The district court decided to include a mistake of law instruction because Riemers 

testified that he believed G.F.C.C. § 8-1002 could be enforced against the railroad when a 

train held up traffic for longer than ten minutes and that he could make a citizen’s arrest 

for violation of that ordinance. When asked if he had comments or requests for additional 

instructions, Riemers stated, “I’m satisfied with them, Your Honor.” Therefore, any claim 

of error was waived, and we do not review further. State v. Houle, 2022 ND 96, ¶ 7, 974 

N.W.2d 401.

V

[¶15] Reimers argues the City’s disorderly conduct ordinance, G.F.C.C. § 9-0107, 

requires a “victim,” but the criminal information did not identify a “victim.”

[¶16] “To satisfy Sixth Amendment standards, a criminal information is sufficient if it is 

specific enough to advise the defendant of the charge against him, to enable him to prepare 

for trial, and to plead the result in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” 

State v. Kirkpatrick, 2012 ND 229, ¶ 22, 822 N.W.2d 851 (quoting City of Grand Forks v. 

Mata, 517 N.W.2d 626, 628 (N.D. 1994)).

[¶17] The requirements of a criminal information are set forth in N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1), 

which provides:

The indictment or the information must name or otherwise identify the 

defendant, and must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the 

essential facts constituting the elements of the offense charged. It must be 

signed by the prosecuting attorney. Except for appeals from municipal court 

and municipal ordinance cases transferred under N.D.C.C. § 40-18-06.2, all 

prosecutions must be carried on in the name and by the authority of the State 

of North Dakota and must conclude “against the peace and dignity of the 

State of North Dakota.” Except as required by this rule, the indictment or 

information need not contain a formal commencement, a formal conclusion, 

or any other matter not necessary to the statement.... For each count, the 

indictment or information must give the official or customary citation of the 

statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law which the defendant is 

alleged to have violated.
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We have explained:

It is not necessary to state in an information the details of the acts which 

constitute the crime charged when the essential elements of the crime are set 

forth sufficiently to enable a person of common understanding to know what 

is meant or intended. One test of the sufficiency of an information is whether 

it will protect the accused against a subsequent prosecution for the same 

offense.

Davies v. State, 2018 ND 211, ¶ 21, 917 N.W.2d 8 (quoting State v. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d 

272, 276 (N.D. 1955)). Further, a “victim’s alarm or fear is an element of disorderly 

conduct only if the defendant is charged with those parts of the statute that refer to it.” State 

v. Klindtworth, 2005 ND 18, ¶ 11, 691 N.W.2d 284. 

[¶18] City ordinance § 9-0107 provides in relevant part:

It is unlawful for any person to conduct himself or herself in a disorderly 

manner if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless 

disregard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoyed or alarmed by 

said person’s behavior, the person:

(1) Engages in fighting, or in violent, tumultuous or threatening 

behavior;

. . . .

(5) Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or the use of a public 

facility;

. . . .

(8) Creates a hazardous, physically offensive, or seriously alarming 

condition by an act which serves no legitimate purpose.

And the information states:

That on or about the 10th day of October, 2022, at approximately 3:21 p.m., 

within the City of Grand Forks, State of North Dakota, one Roland Clifford 

Riemers did commit the crime of Disorderly Conduct, in violation of section 

9-0107 of the Grand Forks City Code, a Class B Misdemeanor, by then and 

there conducting himself in a disorderly manner if, with intent to harass, 

annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that 

another person was harassed, annoyed, or alarmed, the person engaged in 

fighting, or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; obstructed 

vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or the use of a public facility; made 

unreasonable noise; and/or created a hazardous, physically offensive, or 

seriously alarming condition by an act which served no legitimate purpose, 

to-wit: That Roland Clifford Riemers did with intent to harass, annoy, or 
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alarm, or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person was harassed, 

annoyed, or alarmed, park his vehicle close to railroad tracks which caused 

the train to stop, ignited a road flare, threw the road flare onto the railroad 

tracks, approached the engine car, and argued with the conductor causing the 

train to hold up traffic. This occurring on or near Demers Avenue and North 

55th Street in the City of Grand Forks, State of North Dakota.

Here, the information is sufficient to protect Riemers from a subsequent prosecution for 

the same offense. The information provides the date, the approximate location, the violated 

ordinance, and the consequences of his actions, which impeded traffic by forcing the train 

to block traffic longer than necessary and alarmed the BNSF employees.

[¶19] In this case, the information charged two alternatives. The first alternative was 

obstruction of traffic, which does not require showing an individual victim was alarmed; 

instead, the City only had to prove that Riemers’ conduct obstructed traffic. Traffic 

necessarily includes as victims the operators of the vehicles in the traffic obstructed. The 

second alternative charged Riemers with creating a seriously alarming condition, which we 

have held requires proving the victim was alarmed. Klindtworth, 2005 ND 18, ¶ 11. The 

information provided notice to Riemers by stating he created a seriously alarming condition 

when his actions caused the train to stop and he argued with the conductor. In general, the 

city ordinance criminalizes conduct which disturbs the peace, and where Riemers’ conduct 

disturbed the peace and alarmed someone under the ordinance, the criminal information 

put Riemers on notice. As to his intent, Riemers testified he “knew that the only way [he] 

was going to get some attention from the railroad [was] to escalate it up a little bit and 

confront them a little bit[.]” He knew and intended that his actions would cause serious 

alarm to the BNSF employees operating the train.

VI

[¶20] Riemers argues the “jury findings were not consistent with testimony” because it 

showed he was making a lawful citizen’s arrest and thus the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of disorderly conduct.

[¶21] At trial, Riemers did not move for a judgment of acquittal. “Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 

29, a defendant in a criminal jury trial must move for a judgment of acquittal to preserve 

the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence for appeal.” State v. Rodriguez, 2020 ND 261, 

¶ 13, 952 N.W.2d 233. We may decline to review a forfeited error “when the appellant fails 

to argue the obvious error standard.” State v. Dahl, 2022 ND 212, ¶ 12, 982 N.W.2d 580. 
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Reimers failed to argue obvious error, so we will not review his arguments asserting the 

evidence was insufficient to prove disorderly conduct.

VII

[¶22] The criminal judgment is affirmed.

[¶23] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr