COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Pett y, O’Brien and Russell Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

DOROTHY ELIZABETH CILWA MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0481-15-4 J UDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN NOVEMBER 29, 2016 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Jane Marum Roush, Judge Shalev Ben-Avraham, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Christopher Schandevel, Assist ant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Dorothy Cilwa (“appellant”) contends that the trial court erred by findin g her in violation of probation. Appellant asserts the following assignments of error: 1. The trial court erred by findi ng Ms. Cilwa in violation of probation as the trial court had no jurisdictio n to hear the case. 2. The trial court erred by finding Ms. Cilwa was properly noticed and served in compliance [with] the Virginia Code, and the Due Process Clauses of the United Stat es and Virginia Constitutions for the alleged probation violat ion of new criminal charges. 1
Because we find that the court did not have jurisdiction to find appe llant in violation of probation, we reverse the judgment.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 We do not address appellant’s second assi gnment of error because we dispose of the case based on the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellant pled guilty to two counts of grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95, and the court entered an order sentencing her on Janu ary 28, 2010. The cour t imposed two years of incarceration for each c onviction, with the senten ces to run concurrently. One year and one month of each sentence was susp ended for a period of th ree years, and appellant was ordered to complete two years of supervised probation up on her release fr om incarceration. At a hearing on January 27, 2012, the court foun d appellant in violation of her probation and imposed ninety days of incarceration on each suspen ded sentence, with the time to run concurrently. In an order dated Februa ry 13, 2012 the court ex tended appellant’s proba tion for two years “from today’s date.” The order did no t specifically impose and re-suspend the remaining ten-month sentence for each charge and did not extend the three-year time peri od for which the sentences were suspended. On June 9, 2014 the court issued a bench warrant for appe llant alleging that she had again violated her probation co nditions. Appellant was served with this bench warrant on February 5, 2015. On February 20, 2 015 the court heard appell ant’s motion to dismiss the bench warrants based on lack of jurisdiction and failure to properly se rve her with notice of th e violations. The court denied the motion and found that appellant violated her probation. It sentenced her to the time she had served awaiting the hear ing and terminated her probati on. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS Appellant contends that the co urt did not have jurisdiction on February 20, 2015 to impose the previously suspended sentences because her sent ence expired on January 28 , 2013. Because this is a question of statutory construction, we review the court’s conclusion using a de novo standard of review. Harris v. Commonwealth, 274 Va . 409, 413, 650 S. E.2d 89, 91 (2007).- 3 - Code § 19.2-303 grants a cour t the authority to “s uspend imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or part an d . . . place the defendant on pr obation . . . as a condition of a suspended sentence.” Furt her, when the court susp ends the imposition of the sentence, or suspends a portion of the sentence, it has the authority to set a time period for whic h the sentence is not imposed. Code § 19.2-303. 1. In setting that period of time , the court is not constrained by the maximum sentence that the defendant could receive on the origin al conviction. Id . Additionally, a court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems su fficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). Here, on January 28, 2010 the court initially suspended a portion of appellant’s two-year sentences for a period of three years and placed her on probation for two years upon her release from incarceration. On February 13, 2012, the court imposed ni nety days of the previously suspended sentences and extende d appellant’s probation for tw o years. The court did not specifically re-suspend the remain ing sentences and also did not ex tend the three-year period of suspension. Accordingly, appellant contends that when she appeared before the court in February 2015, she was not subject to the court’s jurisdiction b ecause her sentence expired on January 28, 2013, three years fro m the date of the court’s or iginal sentencing order. Appellant concedes that the previously un-s erved portion of the sentences, totaling ten months concurren tly, was implicitly impo sed and re-suspended by the Fe bruary 13, 2012 order. See Leitao v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 435, 438, 573 S.E. 2d 317, 319 (2002) (h olding that “[t]he absence of an explicit recitation re-suspending the ba lance of the original se ntence did not implicitly discharge the remaining sentence; it implicitly re-suspended the balance that the defendant had not served” because “[p]robation was meaningless if no sentence remained for the court to impose if the- 4 - defendant violated the terms imposed”). See also Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 538, 738 S.E.2d 519, 523-24 (2013). The Commonwealth argues that the circuit cour t also implicitly extended the time period for which appellant’s sentence was suspended when it extended her probationary period on February 13, 2012. However, “probation an d suspension of sentence are separate and distinct concepts.” Carbaugh v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 119, 126, 449 S.E.2d 264, 268 (1994). We have held that “if the sentencing judge suspends a portion of a sentence and prescribes a period of suspension, once that period of suspension ex pires the defendant is no longer subject to having the suspension revoked.” Id. When the court ex tended appellant’s prob ation, it did not e xplicitly or implicitly extend the three-year pe riod for which the sentence was suspende d. Any period of probation that was no longer concurrent with the three-year time period that began on Janu ary 28, 2010 was ineffective. Accordingl y, because the trial court suspended appellant’s sentence for a three-year period, which expired on Januar y 28, 2013, the trial court lack ed jurisdiction when it found appellant in violation of probation in February 2015.
CONCLUSION For these reasons, we reverse th e judgment of the trial court. Reversed and dismissed.