MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

James E. Robinson

Pendleton Correctional Facility

Pendleton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James E. Robinson,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

December 7, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

12A02-1603-PC-481

Appeal from the Clinton Superior 

Court

The Honorable Justin H. Hunter, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

12D01-1009-PC-2

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 1 of 13
Case Summary

[1] James E. Robinson appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his petition for 

postconviction relief (“PCR”). Robinson argues that the postconviction court 

abused its discretion by denying his renewed motion to amend his PCR petition

and by excluding certain exhibits at the evidentiary hearing. He also contends 

that the judge was biased against him. We conclude that the court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying Robinson’s renewed motion to amend or by 

excluding certain exhibits. We also conclude that Robinson has failed to 

overcome the presumption that the postconviction judge was unbiased. 

Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 29, 2001, Robinson shot and killed his estranged wife Tina. On April 

30, 2001, the State charged Robinson with murder. In July 2001, Robinson

filed a notice of insanity defense. As required by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-

2, the trial court appointed two doctors, Drs. Richard Rahdert and Ned 

Masbaum, to examine Robinson to determine whether at the time of the offense 

he suffered from a mental disease or defect which rendered him unable to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. 

[3] On July 9, 2002, Robinson pled guilty as charged pursuant to a plea agreement, 

which left sentencing to the trial court’s discretion. At the change of plea 

hearing, Robinson acknowledged that, based on the doctors’ examinations, he 

had decided not to pursue the insanity defense and believed that pleading guilty 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 2 of 13
was in his best interest.1

 He also acknowledged that his plea was freely and 

voluntarily given. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State moved to dismiss

six charges against Robinson pending under cause number 12C01-0009-CF-256, 

which included criminal confinement, intimidation, criminal recklessness, 

pointing a firearm, invasion of privacy, and domestic battery against Tina. The 

trial court found that there was a factual basis for the murder charge, took the 

plea agreement under advisement, and set the matter for sentencing. At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Robinson to an executed term of 

sixty years. Robinson did not pursue a direct appeal.

[4] In September 2010, Robinson filed a PCR petition, alleging that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea hearing because “counsel 

advanced pleading guilty without developing expert opinion” as to Robinson’s 

mental health and that his plea agreement was not knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently entered because he was not competent to stand trial. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 1 at 24-25. The postconviction court denied Robinson’s PCR 

petition without a hearing, and Robinson appealed. Another panel of this 

Court reversed the denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, concluding

that Robinson had stated sufficiently specific factual allegations in support of 

his ineffective assistance claim and that the postconviction court erred by failing 

to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

1 The doctors’ opinions were not admitted into evidence at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 3 of 13

 
Robinson v. State, No. 12D01-1009-PC-2, 2014 WL 2192756, at *3 (Ind. Ct. 

App. May 27, 2014).

[5] On September 23, 2015, the postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing 

on Robinson’s PCR petition. Robinson represented himself. At the start of the 

hearing, he sought to introduce exhibits A through O. The State objected to all 

the exhibits, except exhibits C and D, based on lack of authenticity and 

relevance, and the trial court excluded those exhibits. The State did not object 

to exhibits C (the chronological case summary of the underlying case) and D

(the transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing hearings of the underlying 

case), and the postconviction court admitted them. At the end of the hearing, 

the postconviction court took the matter under advisement and requested the 

parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

[6] On October 8, 2015, Robinson filed a motion to amend his PCR petition to 

conform to the evidence and an “Offer of Proof” for exhibits A and B and E 

through O. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 55-61. On October 28, 2015, the 

postconviction court issued an order denying Robinson’s motion to amend, 

stating that he had not provided the specific amendments that he believed were

necessary and that he should consider attaching a prepared amended pleading 

as an exhibit to any motion to amend. On December 7, 2015, Robinson filed a 

renewed motion to amend with the proposed amendments included as an 

exhibit. The proposed amendments included allegations that his attorney 

provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing to proffer 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 4 of 13
Robinson’s mental health issues as a mitigating factor and that the sentencing 

court considered improper aggravating factors to enhance his sentence.

[7] On December 18, 2015, the postconviction court denied Robinson’s Offer of 

Proof. On February 11, 2016, the postconviction court issued its findings of 

fact and conclusions of law denying Robinson’s PCR petition. On February 18, 

2015, the postconviction court denied Robinson’s renewed motion to amend. 

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] The postconviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law as 

required by Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Our review is limited to 

whether the findings are supported by the facts and the conclusions are 

supported by the law. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012). The

petitioner seeking postconviction relief “bears the burden of establishing 

grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ritchie v. State, 875 

N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ind. 2007). A judgment entered against a party bearing the 

burden of proof is a negative judgment. Burnell v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1146, 1149-

50 (Ind. 2016) “When a petitioner appeals from a negative judgment, he or she 

must convince the appeals court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly 

and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the trial court.” 

Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied (2002). Although 

Robinson is “proceeding pro se and lacks legal training, such litigants are held 

to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 5 of 13
rules.” Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied

(2008).

Section 1 – The postconviction court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Robinson’s renewed motion to amend 

his PCR petition.

[9] Robinson first contends that the postconviction court abused its discretion by 

denying his renewed motion to amend his PCR petition. Indiana PostConviction Rule 1(4)(c) provides,

At any time prior to entry of judgment the court may grant leave 

to withdraw the petition. The petitioner shall be given leave to 

amend the petition as a matter of right no later than sixty [60] 

days prior to the date the petition has been set for trial. Any later 

amendment of the petition shall be by leave of the court. 

“[W]e review the post-conviction court’s refusal to amend a petition for abuse 

of discretion because the Post-Conviction Rules state that any motion to amend 

made within 60 days of an evidentiary hearing may be granted only ‘by leave of 

the court.’” Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Ind. PostConviction Rule 1(4)(c)). 

[10] To support his argument that the postconviction court abused its discretion, 

Robinson relies on Indiana Trial Rule 15(B), which provides,

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 

implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects 

as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of 

the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 6 of 13
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion 

of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to

amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 

We note that the Indiana Trial Rules “generally only govern procedure and 

practice in civil cases.” Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind. 2006). 

However, we will consider their applicability in postconviction proceedings “on 

a case-by-case basis where the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction 

Remedies are silent.” Id. 

[11] The State contends that Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(c) addresses the timeframe 

for amendments to PCR petitions, and therefore the postconviction rules govern 

this issue and Trial Rule 15(B) is inapplicable. Although Post-Conviction Rule 

1(4)(c) addresses the time frame for amendments, it does not directly address 

issues tried by express or implied consent of the parties. In Harrington v. State, 

466 N.E.2d 1379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), another panel of this Court cited Trial 

Rule 15(B) in concluding that although the State did not plead laches as an 

affirmative defense in postconviction proceedings, the issue was tried by 

consent and the State’s answer was deemed amended to raise the laches issue. 

Id. at 1381.

[12] Assuming, without deciding, that Trial Rule 15(B) applies to the propriety of 

the postconviction court’s decision to deny Robinson’s renewed motion to 

amend his PCR petition, Robinson’s argument is without merit. One of his

proposed amendments was that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at 

the sentencing hearing by failing to proffer his mental health issues as a 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 7 of 13
mitigating factor. Robinson argues that at the evidentiary hearing, he admitted 

evidence regarding his mental health issues. However, that evidence was 

relevant to the issue of whether his counsel provided ineffective assistance 

during the guilty plea hearing and whether Robinson’s plea was knowing and 

voluntarily given. Robinson provides no citation to the record that shows that 

the parties addressed his mental health issues in the context of his counsel’s 

alleged ineffectiveness during sentencing. Therefore, ineffective assistance of 

counsel at sentencing was not tried by implied or express consent. Permitting 

Robinson to amend his petition to include this issue after the evidentiary 

hearing would prejudice the State because it was not provided an opportunity to 

rebut the mental health evidence in the context of sentencing. Therefore, the 

postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robinson’s request 

to amend his PCR petition to allege that he received ineffective assistance at his 

sentencing hearing.

[13] Robinson also sought to amend his PCR petition to allege that the sentencing 

court considered improper aggravating factors to enhance his sentence. 

However, Robinson could have raised this issue on direct appeal. “It is [] wellsettled that, because a post-conviction relief proceeding is not a substitute for 

direct appeal ..., an issue known and available but not raised on direct appeal 

may not be raised in post-conviction proceedings.” Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 

230, 232 (Ind. 2004). Because the issue of whether the trial court used improper 

aggravating circumstances in sentencing Robinson was available on direct 

appeal, it cannot be raised in postconviction proceedings. See id. (“We hold 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 8 of 13
that the proper procedure for an individual who has pled guilty in an open plea 

to challenge the sentence imposed is to file a direct appeal or, if the time for 

filing a direct appeal has run, to file an appeal under P-C.R.2.”). Accordingly, 

the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robinson’s 

request to amend his PCR petition.

Section 2 - The postconviction court did not abuse its 

discretion by excluding exhibits.

[14] Next, Robinson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 

exhibits A and B and E through O. We will not reverse the postconviction

court’s decision regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence unless its 

decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584, 

592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court.” Id. 

[15] Exhibits A and B and E through O consisted generally of Robinson’s jail and 

medical records. The State objected to the exhibits based on lack of 

authenticity and relevance. We note that none of the exhibits were certified 

copies. Except for exhibits G and J, which we will address below, Robinson 

failed to respond to the State’s objections at the hearing. Therefore, Robinson 

failed to show at the hearing that the exhibits were authentic and relevant. 

About two weeks after the hearing, Robinson submitted his Offer of Proof, 

which presented his arguments regarding the authenticity and relevance of each 

exhibit. This subsequent attempt to show authenticity and relevance was

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 9 of 13
untimely.2

 Cf. State v. Snyder, 732 N.E.2d 1240, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)

(“The proponent of excluded evidence must make a formal offer of proof at trial 

or the error is waived and not preserved for appeal.”). Because Robinson failed 

to make any showing at the hearing regarding the authenticity and relevance of 

those exhibits, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

excluding those exhibits.

[16] We now turn to exhibits G and J. At the hearing, Robinson attempted to 

establish a foundation for exhibits G and J. Exhibit G contains Robinson’s 

August 2000 health records from the Howard Regional Health System. Dr. 

Oleh Dzera testified at the hearing that he completed four pages in exhibit G 

reflecting his August 2000 psychiatric evaluation of Robinson. Exhibit G is 100 

pages long, and Dr. Dzera was not a competent witness to authenticate the 

entire medical record. Even if Robinson established that Dr. Dzera’s four-page 

record was authentic, Robinson failed to show that it was relevant. Dr. Dzera 

testified that his August 2000 psychiatric evaluation of Robinson was not 

relevant to Robinson’s mental health in July 2002, when the guilty plea hearing 

took place. Accordingly, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion 

by excluding exhibit G. 

2 In his appellant’s brief, Robinson attempts to incorporate by reference the arguments made in his Offer of 

Proof in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which provides that an appellant’s argument must 

“contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.” We 

decline to consider arguments outside the brief. See T-3 Martinsville, LLC v. US Holding, LLC, 911 N.E.2d 100, 

104 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]e will consider only the argument presented in Hoosier’s appellee’s brief. 

Any other argument incorporated by reference is waived,”), clarified on reh’g 916 N.E.2d 205, trans. denied

(2010). 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 10 of 13

 
[17] Exhibit J contains Robinson’s September 2000 Clinton County Jail health 

records. Dr. Randy Patee testified at the hearing and authenticated his onepage evaluation of Robinson. However, he was unable to authenticate the 

remaining three pages in the exhibit. As for relevance, Dr. Patee testified that 

his evaluation of Robinson in September 2000 was unlikely to have any bearing 

on Robinson’s state of mind in July 2002. Therefore, we conclude that the 

court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Exhibit J.

Section 3 – The postconviction court was not biased against 

Robinson.

[18] Robinson contends that the postconviction court exhibited actual bias or 

prejudice that placed him in jeopardy. “A trial before an impartial judge is an 

essential element of due process.” Everling v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 

2010). Indiana law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. 

Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (Ind. 2000). To overcome that 

presumption, a “defendant must show that the trial judge’s action and 

demeanor crossed the barrier of impartiality and prejudiced the defendant’s 

case.” Id. at 1061. 

In assessing a trial judge’s partiality, we examine the judge’s 

actions and demeanor while recognizing the need for latitude to 

run the courtroom and maintain discipline and control of the 

trial. Even where the court’s remarks display a degree of 

impatience, if in the context of a particular trial they do not 

impart an appearance of partiality, they may be permissible to 

promote an orderly progression of events at trial. Bias and 

prejudice violate a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial 

only where there is an undisputed claim or where the judge 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 11 of 13
expressed an opinion of the controversy over which the judge 

was presiding. 

Everling, 929 N.E.2d at 1288 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[19] Robinson argues that the following circumstances taken as a whole show that 

the judge was biased against him: specific comments made by the judge that 

purportedly show a negative view of him and his case;

3 the judge’s numerous 

adverse decisions against him; the failure of the judge to rule on his renewed 

motion to amend until after the judge had issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law denying his PCR petition; that the judge allowed the State to 

file its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after the due date; that 

the judge signed the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law the 

day after it was filed; and that the judge and the court clerk did not provide him 

with a copy of the record and transcript until after this Court issued an order

directing the court and the clerk to provide him with a copy of the record and 

transcript or face the possibility of a rule to show cause why they should not be 

held in contempt. 

[20] We are unpersuaded that the judge’s isolated comments and the adverse rulings 

show bias. In addition, our review of the record shows that the judge gave 

3

 Robinson directs us to the following comments made by the judge. To Dr. Dzera, the judge said, “I know 

you’ve come here [] with a great inconvenience [and] you were subpoenaed here. [The] Court of Appeals at 

one point had directed that I do a hearing on this matter.” Tr. at 35. To Robinson, the judge said, “If your 

response is going to be to ask me questions [] we’re not gonna get very far in this hearing today,” and “I don’t 

expect you Mr. Robinson to deliver some sort of coherent closing statement.” Id. at 6 and 119. And, when 

Robinson said, “To show that my state of mind prior to my catching my murder case,” the judge said, “oh 

my goodness.” Id. at 7-8. 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 12 of 13

 
substantial assistance to Robinson when he was trying to introduce exhibits G 

and J into evidence. To the extent that Robinson was able to have his witnesses 

authenticate some of the pages in the exhibits, the judge essentially walked him 

through the questions that he needed to ask the witnesses in order to

authenticate the pages. Although we are troubled by the court’s failure to 

promptly provide Robinson with copies of the record and transcript, we do not 

think that the delay necessarily shows bias as opposed to simple human error. 

We conclude that Robinson has failed to overcome the presumption that the 

judge was unbiased. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Robinson’s PCR 

petition.4

[21] Affirmed. 

Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.

4 Robinson also argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise relevant mitigating 

factors and failing to object to improper aggravating factors. However, these arguments were not raised 

before the postconviction court, and we have concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Robinson’s renewed motion to amend his PCR petition, and therefore they are waived. See Allen v. State, 749 

N.E.2d 1158, 1171 (Ind. 2001) (“Issues not raised in the petition for post-conviction relief may not be raised 

for the first time on post-conviction appeal.”), reh’g denied, cert. denied; Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8) (“All 

grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition.”). He also 

asserts that the sentencing court erred by failing to find mitigating factors and finding improper aggravating

factors when sentencing him and that his sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offense and his 

character. As we observed in Section 2, because the sentencing issue was available on direct appeal, it cannot 

be raised in postconviction proceedings. See Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 232.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1603-PC-481 | December 7, 2016 Page 13 of 13