Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 70 / Monday, April 13, 2015 / Notices 19697 

Part of the justification for granting 

the exemption was provided by the 

review of the amendment. Because the 

exemption is necessary in order to issue 

the requested license amendment, the 

NRC granted the exemption and issued 

the amendment concurrently, rather 

than in sequence. This included issuing 

a combined safety evaluation containing 

the NRC staff’s review of both the 

exemption request and the license 

amendment. The exemption met all 

applicable regulatory criteria set forth in 

10 CFR 50.12, 10 CFR 52.7, and Section 

VIII.A.4 of Appendix D to 10 CFR part 

52. The license amendment was found 

to be acceptable as well. The combined 

safety evaluation is available in ADAMS 

under Accession No. ML15005A265. 

Identical exemption documents 

(except for referenced unit numbers and 

license numbers) were issued to the 

licensee for VEGP Units 3 and 4 (COLs 

NPF–91 and NPF–92). The exemption 

documents for VEGP Units 3 and 4 can 

be found in ADAMS under Accession 

Nos. ML15005A222 and ML15005A224, 

respectively. The exemption is 

reproduced (with the exception of 

abbreviated titles and additional 

citations) in Section II of this document. 

The amendment documents for COLs 

NPF–91 and NPF–92 are available in 

ADAMS under Accession Nos. 

ML15005A246 and ML15005A256, 

respectively. A summary of the 

amendment documents is provided in 

Section III of this document. 

II. Exemption 

Reproduced below is the exemption 

document issued to Vogtle Units 3 and 

Unit 4. It makes reference to the 

combined safety evaluation that 

provides the reasoning for the findings 

made by the NRC (and listed under Item 

1) in order to grant the exemption: 

1. In a letter dated July 3, 2014, and 

supplemented by letters dated August 

28, September 19, November 6, and 

December 23, 2014, the licensee 

requested from the Commission an 

exemption from the provisions of 10 

CFR part 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, 

as part of license amendment request 

14–001, ‘‘Containment Internal 

Structural Module Design Details (LAR– 

14–001).’’ 

For the reasons set forth in Section 

3.1, ‘‘Evaluation of Exemption,’’ of the 

NRC staff’s Safety Evaluation, which 

can be found in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML15005A265, the 

Commission finds that: 

A. the exemption is authorized by 

law; 

B. the exemption presents no undue 

risk to public health and safety; 

C. the exemption is consistent with 

the common defense and security; 

D. special circumstances are present 

in that the application of the rule in this 

circumstance is not necessary to serve 

the underlying purpose of the rule; 

E. the special circumstances outweigh 

any decrease in safety that may result 

from the reduction in standardization 

caused by the exemption; and 

F. the exemption will not result in a 

significant decrease in the level of safety 

otherwise provided by the design. 

2. Accordingly, the licensee is granted 

an exemption to the provisions of 10 

CFR part 52, Appendix D, Table 3.3–1, 

‘‘Definition of Wall Thicknesses for 

Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine 

Building, and Annex Building’’ and 

Table 3.3–7, ‘‘Nuclear Island Critical 

Structural Sections’’ as described in the 

licensee’s request dated July 3, 2014 and 

supplemented by the letters dated 

August 28, September 19, November 6, 

and December 23, 2014. This exemption 

is related to, and necessary for the 

granting of License Amendment No. 29, 

which is being issued concurrently with 

this exemption. 

3. As explained in Section 5.0, 

‘‘Environmental Consideration,’’ of the 

NRC staff’s Safety Evaluation (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15005A265), this 

exemption meets the eligibility criteria 

for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 

CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 

10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental 

impact statement or environmental 

assessment needs to be prepared in 

connection with the issuance of the 

exemption. 

4. This exemption is effective as of 

January 13, 2015. 

III. License Amendment Request 

By letter dated July 3, 2014, and 

supplemented by letters dated August 

28, September 19, November 6, and 

December 23, 2014, the licensee 

requested that the NRC amend the COLs 

for VEGP, Units 3 and 4, COLs NPF–91 

and NPF–92. The proposed amendment 

is described in Section I of this Federal 

Register Notice. 

The Commission has determined for 

these amendments that the application 

complies with the standards and 

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the 

Commission’s rules and regulations. 

The Commission has made appropriate 

findings as required by the Act and the 

Commission’s rules and regulations in 

10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in 

the license amendment. 

A notice of consideration of issuance 

of amendment to facility operating 

license or combined license, as 

applicable, proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination, 

and opportunity for a hearing in 

connection with these actions, was 

published in the Federal Register on 

August 5, 2014 (79 FR 45480). The 

August 28, September 19, November 6 

and December 23, 2014 licensee 

supplements had no effect on the no 

significant hazards consideration 

determination, and no comments were 

received during the 60-day comment 

period. 

The Commission has determined that 

these amendments satisfy the criteria for 

categorical exclusion in accordance 

with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant 

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental 

impact statement or environmental 

assessment need be prepared for these 

amendments. 

IV. Conclusion 

Using the reasons set forth in the 

combined safety evaluation, the staff 

granted the exemption and issued the 

amendment that the licensee requested 

on July 3, 2014, as supplemented by 

letters dated August 28, September 19, 

November 6 and December 23, 2014. 

The exemption and amendment were 

issued on January 13, 2015 as part of a 

combined package to the licensee 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15005A210). 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day 

of April 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Chandu Patel, 

Acting Chief, Licensing Branch 4, Division 

of New Reactor Licensing, Office of New 

Reactors. 

[FR Doc. 2015–08411 Filed 4–10–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–305; NRC–2015–0089] 

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; 

Kewaunee Power Station 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Exemption; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing an 

exemption from the requirement to 

maintain a specified level of onsite 

property damage insurance in response 

to a request from Dominion Energy 

Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or the licensee) 

dated March 20, 2014. This exemption 

would permit the licensee to reduce its 

onsite property damage insurance from 

$1.06 billion to $50 million. 

DATES: April 13, 2015. 

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19698 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 70 / Monday, April 13, 2015 / Notices 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2015–0089 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2015–0089. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced in this document 

(if that document is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

a document is referenced. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Huffman, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 

20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–2046; 

email: William.Huffman@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) 

facility is a decommissioning power 

reactor located on approximately 900 

acres in Carlton (Kewaunee County), 

Wisconsin, which is 27 miles southeast 

of Green Bay, Wisconsin. The licensee, 

DEK, is the holder of KPS Renewed 

Facility Operating License No. DPR–43. 

The license provides, among other 

things, that the facility is subject to all 

rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC 

now or hereafter in effect. 

By letter dated February 25, 2013 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13058A065), 

DEK submitted a certification to the 

NRC indicating it would permanently 

cease power operations at KPS on May 

7, 2013. On May 7, 2013, DEK 

permanently shut down the KPS reactor. 

On May 14, 2013, DEK certified that it 

had permanently defueled the KPS 

reactor vessel (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13135A209). As a permanently 

shutdown and defueled facility, and 

under Section 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), DEK is no longer authorized to 

operate the KPS reactor or emplace 

nuclear fuel into the reactor vessel. The 

licensee is still authorized to possess 

and store irradiated nuclear fuel. 

Irradiated fuel is currently being stored 

onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP) and in 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation dry casks. 

II. Request/Action 

Under 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions,’’ DEK has requested an 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by 

a letter dated March 20, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14090A111). The 

exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit DEK to 

reduce its onsite property damage 

insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 

million. 

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

requires each licensee to have and 

maintain onsite property damage 

insurance to stabilize and 

decontaminate the reactor and reactor 

site in the event of an accident. The 

onsite insurance coverage must be either 

$1.06 billion or whatever amount of 

insurance is generally available from 

private sources (whichever is less). 

The licensee states that the risk of an 

accident at a permanently shutdown 

and defueled reactor is much less than 

the risk from an operating power 

reactor. In addition, since reactor 

operation is no longer authorized at 

KPS, there are no events that would 

require the stabilization of reactor 

conditions after an accident. Similarly, 

the risk of an accident that that would 

result in significant onsite 

contamination at KPS is also much 

lower than the risk of such an event at 

operating reactors. Therefore, DEK is 

requesting an exemption from 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property 

damage insurance from $1.06 billion to 

$50 million, commensurate with the 

reduced risk of an accident at the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

KPS site. 

III. Discussion 

Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions 

are authorized by law, will not present 

an undue risk to public health or safety, 

and are consistent with the common 

defense and security; and (2) any of the 

special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2) are present. 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after 

the Three Mile Island accident out of 

concern that licensees may be unable to 

financially cover onsite cleanup costs in 

the event of a major nuclear accident. 

The specified $1.06 billion coverage 

amount requirement was developed 

based on an analysis of an accident at 

a nuclear reactor operating at power, 

resulting in a large fission product 

release and requiring significant 

resource expenditures to stabilize the 

reactor conditions and ultimately 

decontaminate and cleanup the site 

(similar to the stabilization and cleanup 

activities at the Fukushima Daiichi 

nuclear power facility following the 

damage from a severe earthquake and 

tsunami). 

These cost estimates were developed 

based on the spectrum of postulated 

accidents for an operating nuclear 

reactor. Those costs were derived from 

the consequences of a release of 

radioactive material from the reactor. 

Although the risk of an accident at an 

operating reactor is very low, the 

consequences can be large. In an 

operating plant, the high temperature 

and pressure of the reactor coolant 

system (RCS), as well as the inventory 

of relatively short-lived radionuclides, 

contribute to both the risk and 

consequences of an accident. With the 

permanent cessation of reactor 

operations at KPS and the permanent 

removal of the fuel from the reactor 

core, such accidents are no longer 

possible. As a result, the reactor, RCS, 

and supporting systems no longer 

operate and, therefore, have no function 

related to the storage of the irradiated 

fuel. Hence, postulated accidents 

involving failure or malfunction of the 

reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are 

no longer applicable. 

During reactor decommissioning, the 

principal radiological risks are 

associated with the storage of spent fuel 

onsite. In its March 20, 2014, exemption 

request, DEK discusses both designbasis and beyond-design-basis events 

involving irradiated fuel stored in the 

SFP. The licensee states that there are 

no possible design-basis events at KPS 

that could result in a radiological 

release exceeding the limits established 

by the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency’s (EPA’s) early-phase Protective 

Action Guidelines (PAGs) of 1 roentgen 

equivalent man at the exclusion area 

boundary. The only accident that might 

lead to a significant radiological release 

at a decommissioning reactor is a 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 70 / Monday, April 13, 2015 / Notices 19699 

zirconium fire. The zirconium fire 

scenario is a postulated, but highly 

unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident 

scenario that involves loss of all water 

inventory from the SFP, resulting in a 

significant heat-up of the spent fuel, and 

culminating in substantial zirconium 

cladding oxidation and fuel damage. 

The probability of a zirconium fire 

scenario is related to the decay heat of 

the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 

Therefore, the risks from a zirconium 

fire scenario continue to decrease as a 

function of the time that KPS has been 

permanently shut down. 

The licensee provided a detailed 

analysis of hypothetical beyond-designbasis accidents that could result in a 

radiological release at KPS in its January 

16, 2014, submittal to the NRC (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14029A076). One of 

these beyond-design-basis accidents 

involves a complete loss of SFP water 

inventory, where cooling of the spent 

fuel would be primarily accomplished 

by natural circulation of air through the 

uncovered spent fuel assemblies. The 

licensee’s analysis of this accident 

shows that by October 30, 2014, aircooling of the spent fuel assemblies will 

be sufficient to keep the fuel within a 

safe temperature range indefinitely 

without fuel damage or radiological 

release. This is important, because the 

NRC staff has previously authorized a 

lesser amount of onsite property damage 

insurance coverage based on analysis of 

the zirconium fire risk. In SECY–96– 

256, ‘‘Changes to Financial Protection 

Requirements for Permanently 

Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,’’ 

dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15062A483), the staff 

recommended changes to the power 

reactor insurance regulations that would 

allow licensees to lower onsite 

insurance levels to $50 million upon 

demonstration that the fuel stored in the 

SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff 

Requirements Memorandum to SECY– 

96–256, dated January 28, 1997 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454), 

the Commission supported the staff’s 

recommendation that, among other 

things, would allow permanently 

shutdown power reactor licensees to 

reduce commercial onsite property 

damage insurance coverage to $50 

million when the licensee was able to 

demonstrate the technical criterion that 

the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the 

spent fuel pool was drained of water. 

The staff has used this technical 

criterion to grant similar exemptions to 

other decommissioning reactors (e.g., 

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, 

published in the Federal Register on 

January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); and Zion 

Nuclear Power Station, published in the 

Federal Register on December 28, 1999 

(64 FR 72700)). These prior exemptions 

were based on these licensees 

demonstrating that the SFP could be aircooled, consistent with the technical 

criterion discussed above. 

In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 

Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28, 

2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy 

Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, 

and Emergency Preparedness 

Regulations at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in 

the Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4, 

2001 (ADAMS Accession Nos. 

ML003721626 and ML011450420, 

respectively), the NRC staff discussed 

additional information concerning SFP 

zirconium fire risks at decommissioning 

reactors and associated implications for 

onsite property damage insurance. 

Providing an analysis of when the spent 

fuel stored in the SFP is capable of aircooling is one measure that can be used 

to demonstrate that the probability of a 

zirconium fire is exceedingly low. 

However, the staff has more recently 

used an additional analysis that bounds 

an incomplete drain down of the SFP 

water, or some other catastrophic event 

(such as a complete drainage of the SFP 

with rearrangement of spent fuel rack 

geometry and/or the addition of rubble 

to the SFP). The analysis postulates that 

decay heat transfer from the spent fuel 

via conduction, convection, or radiation 

would be impeded. This analysis is 

often referred to as an adiabatic heatup. 

The licensee’s analyses, as referenced 

in its March 20, 2014, exemption 

request, demonstrates that under 

conditions where the SFP water 

inventory has drained and only aircooling of the stored irradiated fuel is 

available, there is reasonable assurance 

that after October 2014, the KPS spent 

fuel will remain at temperatures far 

below those associated with a 

significant radiological release. In 

addition, the licensee has also provided 

an adiabatic heatup analysis, 

demonstrating that as of October 21, 

2014, there will be at least 10 hours after 

the loss of all means of cooling (both air 

and/or water), before the spent fuel 

cladding would reach a temperature 

where the potential for a significant 

offsite radiological release could occur. 

The licensee states that should all 

means to cool the spent fuel be lost, 10 

hours is sufficient time for personnel to 

respond with additional resources, 

equipment, and capability to restore 

cooling to the SFP, even after a noncredible, catastrophic event. As 

provided in DEK’s letters dated August 

23, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13242A019), and January 10, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14016A078), 

DEK furnished information concerning 

its makeup strategies, in the event of a 

loss of SFP coolant inventory. The 

multiple strategies for providing 

makeup to the SFP include: using 

existing plant systems for inventory 

makeup; supplying water through hoses 

to a spool piece connection to the 

existing SFP piping; or using a dieseldriven portable pump to take suction 

from Lake Michigan and provide 

makeup or spray to the SFP. These 

strategies will be maintained by a 

license condition. DEK states that the 

equipment needed to perform these 

actions are located onsite, and that the 

external makeup strategy (using a diesel 

driven portable pump) is capable of 

being deployed within 2 hours. DEK 

stated that, considering the very lowprobability of beyond-design-basis 

accidents affecting the SFP, these 

diverse strategies provide defense-indepth and time to mitigate and prevent 

a zirconium fire using makeup or spray 

to the SFP before the onset of zirconium 

cladding rapid oxidation. 

In the safety evaluation of the 

licensee’s request for exemptions from 

certain emergency planning 

requirements dated October 27, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14261A223), 

the NRC staff assessed the DEK accident 

analyses associated with the 

radiological risks from a zirconium fire 

at the permanently shutdown and 

defueled KPS site. The staff has 

confirmed that under conditions where 

cooling airflow can develop, suitably 

conservative calculations indicate that 

by the end of October 2014, the fuel will 

remain at temperatures where the 

cladding will be undamaged for an 

unlimited period. For the very unlikely 

beyond-design-basis accident scenario, 

where the SFP coolant inventory is lost 

in such a manner that all methods of 

heat removal from the spent fuel are no 

longer available, there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours from the 

initiation of the accident until the 

cladding reaches a temperature where 

offsite radiological release might occur. 

The staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient 

time to support deployment of 

mitigation equipment to prevent the 

zirconium cladding from reaching a 

point of rapid oxidation. 

The staff’s basis as to why it considers 

$50 million to be an adequate level of 

onsite property damage insurance for a 

decommissioning reactor, once the 

spent fuel in the SFP is no longer 

susceptible to a zirconium fire, is 

provided in SECY–96–256. The staff has 

postulated that there is still a potential 

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19700 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 70 / Monday, April 13, 2015 / Notices 

for other radiological incidents at a 

decommissioning reactor that could 

result in significant onsite 

contamination besides a zirconium fire. 

In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the 

rupture of a large contaminated liquid 

storage tank, causing soil contamination 

and potential groundwater 

contamination, as the most costly 

postulated event to decontaminate and 

remediate (other than a SFP zirconium 

fire). The postulated large liquid 

radwaste storage tank rupture event was 

determined to have a bounding onsite 

cleanup cost of approximately $50 

million. 

The NRC staff has determined that the 

licensee’s proposed reduction in onsite 

property damage insurance coverage to 

a level of $50 million is consistent with 

SECY–96–256. In addition, the staff 

notes that there is a precedent of 

granting a similar exemption to other 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors. As previously stated, 

the staff concluded that as of October 

30, 2014, sufficient irradiated fuel decay 

time has elapsed at KPS to decrease the 

probability of an onsite radiological 

release from a postulated zirconium fire 

accident to negligible levels. In 

addition, the licensee’s proposal to 

reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 

million is consistent with the maximum 

estimated cleanup costs for the recovery 

from the rupture of a large liquid 

radwaste storage tank. 

A. Authorized by Law 

Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission 

may grant exemptions from the 

regulations in 10 CFR part 50, as the 

Commission determines are authorized 

by law. The NRC staff has determined 

that granting of the licensee’s proposed 

exemption will not result in a violation 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or 

other laws, as amended. Therefore, the 

exemption is authorized by law. 

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and 

Safety 

The onsite property damage insurance 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

were established to provide financial 

assurance that following a significant 

nuclear incident, onsite conditions 

could be stabilized and the site 

decontaminated. The requirements of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level 

of onsite insurance coverage for KPS are 

predicated on the assumption that the 

reactor is operating. However, KPS is a 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

facility. The permanently defueled 

status of the facility has resulted in a 

significant reduction in the number and 

severity of potential accidents, and 

correspondingly, a significant reduction 

in the potential for and severity of 

onsite property damage. The proposed 

reduction in the amount of onsite 

insurance coverage does not impact the 

probability or consequences of potential 

accidents. The proposed level of 

insurance coverage is commensurate 

with the reduced risk and reduced cost 

consequences of potential nuclear 

accidents at KPS. Therefore, the NRC 

staff concludes that granting the 

requested exemption will not present an 

undue risk to the health and safety of 

the public. 

C. Consistent With the Common Defense 

and Security 

The proposed exemption would not 

eliminate any requirements associated 

with physical protection of the site and 

would not adversely affect DEK’s ability 

to physically secure the site or protect 

special nuclear material. Physical 

security measures at KPS are not 

affected by the requested exemption. 

Therefore, the proposed exemption is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. 

D. Special Circumstances 

Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special 

circumstances are present if the 

application of the regulation in the 

particular circumstances would not 

serve the underlying purpose of the rule 

or is not necessary to achieve the 

underlying purpose of the rule. The 

underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable 

assurance that adequate funds will be 

available to stabilize conditions and 

cover onsite cleanup costs associated 

with site decontamination, following an 

accident that results in the release of a 

significant amount of radiological 

material. Because KPS is permanently 

shut down and defueled, it is no longer 

possible for the radiological 

consequences of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events at KPS to 

exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary. The licensee 

has performed site-specific analyses of 

highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis 

zirconium fire accidents involving the 

stored irradiated fuel in the SFP. The 

analyses show that after October 30, 

2014, the probabilities of such an 

accident are minimal. The NRC staff’s 

evaluation of the licensee’s analyses 

confirm this conclusion. 

The NRC staff also finds that the 

licensee’s proposed $50 million level of 

onsite insurance is consistent with the 

bounding cleanup and decontamination 

cost, as discussed in SECY–96–256, to 

account for hypothetical rupture of a 

large liquid radwaste tank at the KPS 

site, should such an event occur. The 

staff notes that KPS’s technical 

specifications provide controls for 

unprotected outdoor liquid storage 

tanks to limit the quantity of 

radioactivity contained in these tanks, 

in the event of an uncontrolled release 

of the contents of these tanks. Therefore, 

the staff concludes that the application 

of the current requirements in 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in 

onsite insurance coverage is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule for the permanently 

shutdown and defueled KPS reactor. 

Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special 

circumstances are present whenever 

compliance would result in undue 

hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated when the regulation was 

adopted, or that are significantly in 

excess of those incurred by others 

similarly situated. 

The NRC staff concludes that if the 

licensee was required to continue to 

maintain an onsite insurance level of 

$1.06 billion, the associated insurance 

premiums would be in excess of those 

necessary and commensurate with the 

radiological contamination risks posed 

by the site. In addition, such insurance 

levels would be significantly in excess 

of other decommissioning reactor 

facilities that have been granted similar 

exemptions by the NRC. 

The NRC staff finds that compliance 

with the existing rule would result in an 

undue hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated when the regulation was 

adopted and are significantly in excess 

of those incurred by others similarly 

situated. 

Therefore, the special circumstances 

required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

The NRC approval of the exemption 

to insurance or indemnity requirements 

belongs to a category of actions that the 

Commission, by rule or regulation, has 

declared to be a categorical exclusion, 

after first finding that the category of 

actions does not individually or 

cumulatively have a significant effect on 

the human environment. Specifically, 

the exemption is categorically excluded 

from further analysis under 

§ 51.22(c)(25). 

Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting 

of an exemption from the requirements 

of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR 

is a categorical exclusion provided that 

(i) there is no significant hazards 

consideration; (ii) there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite; (iii) there is 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 70 / Monday, April 13, 2015 / Notices 19701 

no significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure; (iv) there is no 

significant construction impact; (v) 

there is no significant increase in the 

potential for or consequences from 

radiological accidents; and (vi) the 

requirements from which an exemption 

is sought involve: Surety, insurance, or 

indemnity requirements 

The Director, Division of Operating 

Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, has determined that 

approval of the exemption request 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration because reducing the 

licensee’s onsite property damage 

insurance for KPS does not (1) involve 

a significant increase in the probability 

or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated; or (2) create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated; or (3) involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. The 

exempted financial protection 

regulation is unrelated to the operation 

of KPS. Accordingly, there is no 

significant change in the types or 

significant increase in the amounts of 

any effluents that may be released 

offsite; and no significant increase in 

individual or cumulative public or 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

exempted regulation is not associated 

with construction, so there is no 

significant construction impact. The 

exempted regulation does not concern 

the source term (i.e., potential amount 

of radiation in an accident), nor 

mitigation. Therefore, there is no 

significant increase in the potential for, 

or consequences of, a radiological 

accident. In addition, there would be no 

significant impacts to biota, water 

resources, historic properties, cultural 

resources, or socioeconomic conditions 

in the region. The requirement for onsite 

property damage insurance may be 

viewed as involving surety, insurance, 

or indemnity matters. 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 

environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

approval of this exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants DEK an 

exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1), to permit the licensee 

to reduce its onsite property damage 

insurance to a level of $50 million. 

The exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day 

of April, 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michele G. Evans, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–08395 Filed 4–10–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2014–0247] 

Information Collection: General 

Domestic Licenses for Byproduct 

Material 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of submission to the 

Office of Management and Budget; 

request for comment. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has recently 

submitted a request for renewal of an 

existing collection of information to the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review. The information 

collection is entitled, General Domestic 

Licenses for Byproduct Material.’’ 

DATES: Submit comments by May 13, 

2015. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments directly 

to the OMB reviewer at: Vlad Dorjets, 

Desk Officer, Office of Information, and 

Regulatory Affairs (3150–0016), NEOB– 

10202, Office of Management and 

Budget, Washington, DC 20503; 

telephone: 202–395–1741, email: 

Vladik_Dorjets@omb.eop.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Tremaine Donnell, NRC Clearance 

Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001; telephone: 301–415–6258; email: 

INFOCOLLECTS.Resource@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Obtaining Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2014– 

0247 when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information for this 

action. You may obtain publiclyavailable information related to this 

action by any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2014–0247. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

supporting statement is available in 

ADAMS under Accession No ADAMS 

ML15040A059. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

• NRC’s Clearance Officer: A copy of 

the collection of information and related 

instructions may be obtained without 

charge by contacting the NRC’s 

Clearance Officer, Tremaine Donnell, 

Office of Information Services, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–6258; email: 

INFOCOLLECTS.Resource@NRC.GOV. 

B. Submitting Comments 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information in 

comment submissions that you do not 

want to be publicly disclosed in your 

comment submission. All comment 

submissions are posted at http://

www.regulations.gov and entered into 

ADAMS. Comment submissions are not 

routinely edited to remove identifying 

or contact information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the OMB, then you 

should inform those persons not to 

include identifying or contact 

information that they do not want to be 

publicly disclosed in their comment 

submission. Your request should state 

that comment submissions are not 

routinely edited to remove such 

information before making the comment 

submissions available to the public or 

entering the comment into ADAMS. 

II. Background 

Under the provisions of the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. Chapter 35), the NRC recently 

submitted a request for renewal of an 

existing collection of information to 

OMB for review entitled, ‘‘General 

Domestic Licenses for Byproduct 

Material.’’ The NRC hereby informs 

potential respondents that an agency 

may not conduct or sponsor, and that a 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES