Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Taylor v. Dart, 2016 IL App (1st) 143684

Appellate Court 

Caption

PERCY TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff 

of Cook County, and THE COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S MERIT 

BOARD, Defendants-Appellants.

District & No. First District, Fifth Division

Docket No. 1-14-3684

Filed September 23, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 13-CH-26319; the 

Hon. Neil H. Cohen, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Certified questions answered; cause remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Daniel F. Gallagher, 

James C. Pullos, Nicole K. Pasquinelli, Maureen O. Hannon and 

Thomas Cargie, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for 

appellants.

Richard F. Linden, of Law Offices of Richard F. Linden, of Chicago, 

for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Lampkin concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 The defendants, Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County (Sheriff Dart), and the Cook 

County Sheriff’s Merit Board (Merit Board) (collectively, the defendants) filed this 

interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The 

circuit court certified the following questions for our review: 

“Is a Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board member that was appointed on June 2, 

2011 to serve a term which expired on March 19, 2012, a lawfully appointed member 

of the Merit Board when he presided over Percy Taylor’s Merit Board Hearing on 

February 27, 2013? If the Merit Board member was not lawfully appointed to the Merit 

Board, does the decision of October 30, 2013 remain valid or is it rendered void?”

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 I. The Statute 

¶ 4 Section 3-7002 of the Counties Code (Code) provides in pertinent part as follows: 

“There is created the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, hereinafter called the Board, 

consisting of 7 members appointed by the Sheriff with the advice and consent of the 

county board, except that on and after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 

1997, the Sheriff may appoint 2 additional members, with the advice and consent of the 

county board, at his or her discretion. *** 

 Upon the expiration of the terms of office of those first appointed (including the 2 

additional members first appointed under authority of this amendatory Act of 1991 and 

under the authority of this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly), their 

respective successors shall be appointed to hold office from the third Monday in March 

of the year of their respective appointments for a term of 6 years and until their 

successors are appointed and qualified for a like term. As additional members are 

appointed under authority of this amendatory Act of 1997, their terms shall be set to be 

staggered consistently with the terms of the existing Board members. No more than 3 

members of the Board shall be affiliated with the same political party, except that as 

additional members are appointed by the Sheriff under the authority of this amendatory 

Act of 1997 and under the authority of this amendatory Act of the 91st General 

Assembly, the political affiliation of the Board shall be such that no more than one-half 

of the members plus one additional member may be affiliated with the same political 

party. No member shall have held or have been a candidate for an elective public office 

within one year preceding his or her appointment.” 55 ILCS 5/3-7002 (West 2012). 

¶ 5 II. Facts 

¶ 6 On May 5, 2011, Sheriff Dart requested approval from the Cook County Board to appoint 

John R. Rosales to the Merit Board to fill the vacancy of Commissioner Daniel Lynch whose 

term on the Merit Board was to expire on March 19, 2012. The county board approved the 

Rosales appointment on June 1, 2011. After the expiration of Commissioner Lynch’s term on 

March 19, 2012, Sheriff Dart did not reappoint Mr. Rosales to the Merit Board, and he has 

continued to serve as a member of the Merit Board. 
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¶ 7 On October 20, 2011, Sheriff Dart filed a complaint against the plaintiff alleging 

misconduct and seeking to terminate his employment as a Cook County sheriff’s police 

officer. On February 27, 2013, Mr. Rosales presided over the hearing held on Sheriff Dart’s 

complaint against the plaintiff. On October 30, 2013, the Merit Board issued its decision 

terminating the plaintiff’s employment. The October 30, 2013, order was signed by Mr. 

Rosales and seven Merit Board members. 

¶ 8 The plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review of the Merit Board’s decision. On 

May 7, 2014, the circuit court issued a memorandum and order affirming the Merit Board’s 

decision terminating the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the 

order arguing, inter alia, that the appointment of Mr. Rosales to the Merit Board was invalid 

because he was not appointed to a six-year term as required by section 3-7002 of the Code 

(55 ILCS 5/3-7002 (West 2012)). 

¶ 9 The circuit court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, finding that the 

appointment of Commissioner Rosales was invalid because he was appointed to less than a 

six-year term. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the decision of the Merit Board 

remained valid because seven lawful members voted to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. 

The court found that the Merit Board was not lawfully constituted at the time it rendered its 

decision, and therefore, its decision could not be given effect. The circuit court vacated the 

Merit Board’s October 30, 2013, decision terminating the plaintiff’s employment and 

remanded the case for a new hearing on the charges against the plaintiff before a legally 

constituted Merit Board. The court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration 

¶ 10 Following the circuit court’s certification of the questions for review, the defendants filed 

their request for leave to appeal, which was granted by this court on December 23, 2014. 

¶ 11 ANALYSIS 

¶ 12 I. Standards of Review 

¶ 13 Rule 308 requires that the certified questions presented to this court for review be questions 

of law. Therefore, our review is de novo. Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173, ¶ 17. 

This case also requires this court to construe section 3-7002 of the Code, which is also a 

question of law to which the de novo standard of review applies. Majid v. Retirement Board of 

the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2015 IL App (1st) 132182, ¶ 13. 

¶ 14 II. Discussion 

¶ 15 “The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the legislature.” Gilchrist v. Human Rights Comm’n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602 (2000). 

The court looks first at the statutory language as it is the best indication of the intent of the 

drafters. Majid, 2015 IL App (1st) 132182, ¶ 16. Unless defined therein, the unambiguous 

words in the statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. Majid, 2015 IL App 

(1st) 132182, ¶ 16. The statute must be applied so that no part is rendered superfluous. Majid, 

2015 IL App (1st) 132182, ¶ 16. “ ‘Courts must also consider the reason and necessity for the 

law, the evils sought to be remedied and the purpose to be achieved.’ ” Majid, 2015 IL App 

(1st) 132182, ¶ 16 (quoting DiFiore v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit 

Fund, 313 Ill. App. 3d 546, 551 (2000). 
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¶ 16 As an administrative body, the Merit Board obtains its power to act from the legislation 

creating it, and its power to act is strictly confined to that granted in the enabling statute. 

Gilchrist, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 601. Administrative agencies have no general or common-law 

powers. Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 160, 165 (2002) (plurality opinion). Where 

an administrative body acts outside of its specific statutory authority, it acts without 

jurisdiction, and its actions are void and a nullity from their inception. Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 

165. Where an agency’s action is void, it may be attacked at any time, in any court, either 

directly or collaterally. Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 166. 

¶ 17 With these principles in mind, we address the first certified question. 

¶ 18 A. Whether the Appointment of an Individual to the Merit Board 

 for Less Than a Six-Year Term Is Valid? 

¶ 19 From the plain language of the statute, we glean that the purpose of section 3-7002 is to 

select individuals to serve on the Merit Board with the goal of achieving an experienced and 

politically balanced Merit Board. In order to achieve these goals, the statute requires that the 

members’ terms be staggered, insuring that the Merit Board would always contain some 

experienced members and limiting the number of members from any one political party. 

¶ 20 Section 3-7002 provides that members and their respective successors “shall be appointed 

to hold office *** for a term of 6 years and until their successors are appointed and qualified 

for a like term.” 55 ILCS 5/3-7002 (West 2012). The term “shall” in a statute indicates a 

mandatory obligation, unless the context indicates otherwise. Newkirk v. Bigard, 109 Ill. 2d 28, 

33 (1985). “ ‘[S]hall’ will not be given a permissive meaning where it is used with reference to 

any right or benefit to anyone, and the right and benefit depends upon giving a mandatory 

meaning to the word.” Newkirk, 109 Ill. 2d at 33. 

¶ 21 Under the plain language of the statute, an individual appointed to serve as a member of the 

Merit Board has the right to be appointed to a full six-year term. This would be in keeping with 

the statutory goals of experience and political balance, which would be compromised if the 

sheriff could appoint a member for less than the six-year term provided in the statute. 

¶ 22 The supreme court’s analysis in Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation, 208 

Ill. 2d 173 (2003), is instructive. In that case, the department brought a complaint against the 

plaintiff before the Medical Disciplinary Board (Board). The department adopted the 

discipline recommended by the Board. On administrative review, the circuit court set aside the 

Board’s decision and dismissed the department’s complaint against the plaintiff finding, 

inter alia, that the appointment of one Board member was not authorized by law. Vuagniaux, 

208 Ill. 2d at 184. 

¶ 23 In affirming the decision of the circuit court, the supreme court noted that section 7(A) of 

the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (Practice Act) (225 ILCS 60/7(A) (West 1998)), required all 

Board members be appointed by and their vacancies filled “by the Governor by and with the 

advice and consent of the Senate.” Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 185. While the Governor was 

authorized to act without the Senate when the Board recommended the removal of a member 

for misconduct or to make a vacancy appointment, the court determined that “participation by 

the Governor is always required.” Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 186. Neither the Practices Act nor 

the Illinois Constitution of 1970 permitted the appointment or involuntary removal of Board 

members without gubernatorial action. Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 186. 
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¶ 24 We also find Daniels instructive. In Daniels, the plaintiff’s case was assigned to a 

three-member panel of the Industrial Commission (Commission), but before the case could be 

heard, one of the panel members was elevated to Commission chairman. Another member of 

the panel resigned following a medical leave of absence. The new Commission chairman 

appointed individuals to fill his own vacancy and that of the resigning member. Daniels, 201 

Ill. 2d at 163. 

¶ 25 On review, the supreme court found that the vacancies were not filled in accordance with 

section 13 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/13 (West 1992)). Daniels, 

201 Ill. 2d at 163. Section 13 provided that the Governor was vested with the responsibility of 

filling Commission vacancies by and with the consent of the Senate. While the Governor was 

empowered to make a temporary appointment until the next meeting of the Senate, he then 

must nominate some person to fill the position. Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 163. 

¶ 26 The court in Daniels further determined that the statutory procedure for filling vacancies 

was consistent with the purposes of the Act. The court noted that the law was “carefully 

designed to insure that the Industrial Commission represents a balance of interests.” Daniels, 

201 Ill. 2d at 164. Under the Act, the Governor was required to make his appointments to the 

Commission in such a way that the interests of employers, workers, and impartial citizens were 

equally represented. No more than four members could be of the same political party. 

¶ 27 The supreme court noted that arbitrators appointed to be “acting commissioners” were not 

subject to the partisanship restrictions and were deemed to be representative of citizens not 

identifying with employers or employees. The court recognized the risk to the goals of the Act, 

explaining as follows: 

“Accordingly, if arbitrators could be designated as acting commissioners even after the 

commissioners whose workload they were handling left office, there would be no 

mechanism to insure that the balance of interests contemplated by the Act would be 

preserved. Through contrived designations and inaction by the Governor, the departure 

from office of sitting commissioners could be exploited to pack the Commission with 

members of the Governor’s political party or representatives of whatever economic 

class the Governor favored. Such a result would be directly contrary to the Act’s 

objectives.” Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 164-65. 

¶ 28 The supreme court vacated the decision of the Commission and remanded for a new 

hearing before a legally constituted panel. Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 167; see Gilchrist, 312 Ill. 

App. 3d 597 (Human Rights Commission’s decision based on the administrative judge’s 

recommended order and decision was vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing, where 

the Commission had no statutory authority to accept the recommended order and decision of 

the administrative law judge since the judge had not presided over the public hearing as 

required by the Illinois Human Rights Act). 

¶ 29 Like section 13 of the Act, section 3-7002 of the Code is designed to ensure that the goals 

of experienced membership and political balance are met. Like section 13, there is no 

provision for assuring that those goals are met where the appointment is for less than the 

six-year term required by the statute. In this case, once an appointment to a shorter term is 

made, the statute requires that the successor be appointed “for a like term.” In the long run, 

such shorter terms put at risk the makeup of the Merit Board as contemplated by section 

3-7005. 
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¶ 30 The defendants argue that unlike the statutes in Vuagniaux and Daniels, nothing in section 

3-7002 prohibits the sheriff from filling vacancies on the Merit Board. The defendants also 

argue that since the State had not preempted the manner in which vacancies on the Merit Board 

were filled, the Rosales appointment was a proper exercise of the Cook County’s home rule 

powers. However, the question of statutory authority to fill vacancies on the Merit Board was 

not certified to this court. Zlatev, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173, ¶ 17 (review is limited to the 

question certified to the court). 

¶ 31 The defendants contend, next, that the statute implicitly gives the sheriff the power to 

appoint members to less than six-year terms. “The agency’s authority must either arise from 

the express language of the statute or ‘devolve by fair implication and intendment from the 

express provisions of the [statute] as an incident to achieving the objectives for which the 

[agency] was created.’ ” Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173, 

188 (2003) (quoting Schalz v. McHenry County Sheriff’s Department Merit Comm’n, 113 Ill. 

2d 198, 202-03 (1986)). The defendants point out that at least four members are necessary for 

the Merit Board to perform its duties. See 55 ILCS 5/3-7005 (West 2012) (“the number of 

members that must be present to constitute a quorum shall be the number of members that 

constitute at least 40% of the Board”). The defendants argue that the authority to fill vacancies 

must be implied in the statute in order for the Merit Board to continue to conduct its business. 

¶ 32 In Vuagniaux, the supreme court rejected a similar argument. The court concluded that “the 

removal of a Board member from participation in a specific disciplinary action does not 

empower the remaining Board members to sidestep the statutory nomination and confirmation 

process and invite another doctor to join them as a substitute.” Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 

188-89. The Practices Act required only four of the seven voting members to constitute a 

quorum and provided that a vacancy did not impair the right of the quorum to conduct 

business. Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 188. The court concluded that the power to appoint 

temporary members to the Board could not be implied from the statute as incident to achieving 

the Board’s statutory purposes. Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 189. 

¶ 33 In the present case, under section 3-7005 of the Code (55 ILCS 5/3-7005 (West 2012)), 

four Merit Board members are required to constitute a quorum to transact the business of the 

Board. Since there was no need to fill an unexpired term in order for the business of the Merit 

Board to continue, the authority of the sheriff to appoint an individual to an unexpired term 

cannot be implied as necessary to the Merit Board to perform its duties. 

¶ 34 Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Pappas, 309 Ill. App. 3d 779 (1999), relied on by the 

defendants, is distinguishable. In that case, the reviewing court held that the legislative grant to 

the county collector to hold auctions necessarily implied the authority to make rules to deal 

with the conduct of the auction. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 309 Ill. App. 3d at 784. In the 

present case, other than a quorum requirement, which was not challenged, nothing else was 

required for conducting the business of the Merit Board. Therefore, there was no need to imply 

statutory authority for the appointment of individuals for less than the six-year term in order for 

the business of the Merit Board to proceed. 

¶ 35 We reject the defendants’ argument that we should defer to the Merit Board’s 

determination that section 3-7002 permits interim appointments and that interim members 

have the power to act until they are replaced. While deference to an agency’s interpretation of 

its own rules is normally given, the court is not bound by an agency’s interpretation that 
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conflicts with the statute, is unreasonable or is erroneous. Crittenden v. Cook County Comm’n 

on Human Rights, 2013 IL 114876, ¶ 19. 

¶ 36 We answer the first certified question in the negative; section 3-7002 of the Code does not 

authorize the Sheriff of Cook County either explicitly or by implication to appoint an 

individual to the Merit Board for less than a six-year term. We now address the second 

certified question. 

¶ 37 B. If the Merit Board Member Was Not Lawfully Appointed 

 to the Merit Board, Does the Decision of October 30, 2013, 

 Remain Valid or Is It Rendered Void? 

¶ 38 “A decision rendered by an administrative agency which lacks jurisdiction over the parties 

or the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the decision involved, 

is void and may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally.” Board of 

Education of the City of Chicago v. Board of Trustees of the Public Schools Teachers’ Pension 

& Retirement Fund, 395 Ill. App. 3d 735, 739 (2009). In contrast, “ ‘[a] voidable judgment is a 

judgment entered erroneously by a court having jurisdiction.’ ” Babcock v. Wallace, 2012 IL 

App (1st) 111090, ¶ 14 (quoting Juszczyk v. Flores, 334 Ill. App. 3d 122, 126 (2002)). 

¶ 39 The defendants rely on Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 349 Ill. App. 3d 1023 

(2004). In that case, Paul Rink was appointed by the Governor to fill an unexpired term of 

Commissioner Robert Madigan who resigned. Commissioner Madigan’s term ran until 

January 17, 2005, but Mr. Rink’s appointment expired on December 31, 2002. The Governor 

also appointed Diane Ford to Mr. Rink’s position, commencing on January 17, 2003. The 

Senate approved both appointments. The employee’s case was heard by a three-member panel, 

including Mr. Rink. The decision was issued by two commissioners from the original 

Commission panel, and Ms. Ford, who had replaced Mr. Rink. Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1026-27. 

¶ 40 On appeal, the Industrial Division of the Appellate Court sua sponte raised the validity of 

the commission’s decision. The court determined that there was no authority under section 13 

of the Act permitting the Governor to limit the term of a commissioner. Once the Senate 

approved Mr. Rink’s appointment, there was no longer any vacancy to which Ms. Ford could 

be appointed. Therefore, Ms. Ford was never validly appointed a member of the Commission. 

Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1028. 

¶ 41 Nonetheless, the court in Peabody Coal Co., found the Commission’s decision voidable 

rather than void, declining to follow Daniels. The court noted that Daniels was a plurality 

opinion. See Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 269 (2007) (recognizing that 

plurality opinions are not binding precedent); Roark v. Macoupin Creek Drainage District, 

316 Ill. App. 3d 835, 845 (2000) (“ ‘[P]lurality decisions of a state supreme court, in which no 

majority agrees to the reasoning, are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.’ ” (quoting 

5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 602, at 298 (1995))). Of the four concurring justices in 

Daniels, only two held that the Commission’s decision was void because of the illegality of the 

appointments of the two participating commissioners. Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 

1028 (citing Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 165-67). The two specially concurring justices as well as 
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the three dissenting justices would find that the Commission’s decision was not void. Peabody 

Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1028-29.1 

¶ 42 Having determined that the Commission’s decision was voidable rather than void, the 

court in Peabody Coal Co., considered whether the de facto officer doctrine applied. Peabody 

Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1029. Under the de facto officer doctrine, an individual who is 

performing the duties of an office under color of title is considered to be an officer de facto, 

and the acts of the individual as an officer are valid so far as the public and interested third 

parties are concerned. Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1029 (citing Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 

2d at 186-87); cf. Daniels, 201 Ill. 2d at 176-77 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by 

Freeman, J.) (de facto officer doctrine did not apply where the worker raised the validity of the 

Commission’s decision on direct review, but it should apply to preserve the validity of the 

decisions rendered by the Commission); Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 186-87 (de facto officer 

doctrine did not apply where the plaintiff raised the validity of the member’s appointment in 

the disciplinary proceeding). 

¶ 43 The court in Peabody Coal Co., concluded that the de facto officer doctrine applied to 

prevent the invalidation of Ms. Ford’s acts. Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1029. The 

court noted that the plaintiff never challenged the validity of the Commission’s decision based 

on the participation of an illegally appointed panel member. The issue was raised sua sponte

by the reviewing court. Since the decision of the Commission was not void, the court held that 

“any attack on [the decision’s] validity by reason of [Ms.] Ford’s participation has been waived 

by reason of [the plaintiff’s] failure to raise the issue.” Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 

1029. However, even if the Merit Board’s decision was voidable, the de facto officer doctrine 

would not apply in this case because the plaintiff raised the illegality of Mr. Rosales’s 

appointment to the Merit Board on direct review, not in a collateral proceeding. See 

Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 187. 

¶ 44 The defendants also rely on Max Shepard, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 348 Ill. App. 3d 893 

(2004). However, in that case, the reviewing court found that Mr. Rink’s temporary 

appointment was made in accordance with the statute, and the court stated that it need not 

address the Commission’s authority to make appointments for less than the unexpired term of a 

commissioner, the issue in the case before us. Max Shepard, Inc., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 899-900. 

¶ 45 In the present case, section 3-7002 of the Code did not authorize Sheriff Dart to appoint 

Mr. Rosales to less than a six-year term. His participation in the hearing and the decision of the 

Merit Board in this case requires that the Merit Board’s decision be vacated and remanded for 

a hearing before a legally constituted Merit Board as the circuit court ordered. See Vuagniaux, 

208 Ill. 2d at 189 (causes remanded to administrative agencies when original agency decisions 

were found to have been made by or with the participation of public officers, whose 

appointments were not authorized by statute, citing Daniels and Gilchrist). 

¶ 46 The defendants argue that any defect with the Rosales appointment was cured when on 

December 17, 2014, the Cook County Board ratified Mr. Rosales appointment from March 19, 

2012, to the third Monday in March 2018. However, the defendants fail to cite any authority 

 

1

Justice Kilbride concurred in Chief Justice Harrison’s opinion holding that the Commission’s 

decision was void. Justice McMorrow, joined by Justice Freeman, specially concurred. Justice 

Fitzgerald dissented, and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman, dissented. 
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for that argument. Accordingly, the argument is forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 

2013). 

¶ 47 We conclude that the October 30, 2013, decision of the Merit Board was void because the 

Merit Board was illegally constituted at the time of the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s 

employment. In answer to the second certified question, the October 30, 2013, decision of the 

Merit Board is not valid because it is void. 

¶ 48 CONCLUSION 

¶ 49 Certified questions answered; cause remanded.