[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 69 (Friday, April 10, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19358-19370]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-08311]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-302; NRC-2015-0042]


Duke Energy Florida, Inc.; Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear 
Generating Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting 
exemptions in response to a request from Duke Energy Florida, Inc. (DEF 
or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP) 
requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to 
maintain an offsite radiological emergency plan and reduce the scope of 
onsite emergency planning activities at the Crystal River Unit 3 
Nuclear Generating Station (CR-3) based on the reduced risks of 
accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a 
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0042 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0042. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#dc9fbdaeb3b0f29bbdb0b0bdbbb4b9ae9cb2aebff2bbb3aa"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5d1e3c2f3231731a3c31313c3a35382f1d332f3e733a322b">[email protected]</span></a>. For technical questions, contact 
the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section 
of this document.
    <bullet> NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3e4e5a4c104c5b4d514b4c5d5b7e504c5d10595148"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e5958197cb9780968a90978680a58b9786cb828a93">[email protected]</span></a>. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this document 
(if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time 
that a document is referenced.
    <bullet> NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Orenak, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3229; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#8ec3e7ede6efebe2a0c1fcebe0efe5cee0fceda0e9e1f8"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="eba68288838a8e87c5a4998e858a80ab859988c58c849d">[email protected]</span></a>.

I. Background

    The CR-3 facility is a decommissioning power reactor located in 
Citrus County, Florida. The licensee, DEF, is the holder of CR-3 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-72. The license provides, among 
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, 
and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
    By letter dated February 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13056A005), DEF submitted to the NRC a certification in accordance 
with section 50.82(a)(1)(i) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) indicating it would permanently cease power 
operations, and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently defueled 
the reactor vessel at CR-3. On May 28, 2011, DEF completed the final 
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel at CR-3. As a permanently 
shutdown and defueled facility, and in accordance with section 
50.82(a)(2), DEF is no longer authorized to operate the reactor or 
emplace nuclear fuel into the reactor vessel. CR-3 is still authorized 
to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. The spent 
fuel is currently being stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP).
    During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water 
through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the 
reactor. The RCS, operating at high temperatures and pressures, 
transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes converting non-
radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine 
generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios 
postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs) for operating 
power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems,

[[Page 19359]]

which could affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most 
severe postulated accidents, would involve the release of large 
quantities of fission products. With the permanent cessation of reactor 
operations at CR-3 and the permanent removal of the fuel from the 
reactor vessel, such accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, 
RCS, and supporting systems are no longer in operation and have no 
function related to the storage of the spent fuel. Therefore, EP 
provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of 
the reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    Based on the time that CR-3 has been permanently shutdown 
(approximately 64 months), there is no longer any possibility of an 
offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident that could 
exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective 
Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed 
all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory 
provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is 
permanently shutdown and defueled from a reactor that is authorized to 
operate. In order for DEF to modify the CR-3 emergency plan to reflect 
the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled 
condition of CR-3, certain exemptions from the EP regulations must be 
obtained before the CR-3 emergency plan can be amended.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated September 26, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13274A584), ``Crystal River Unit 3--License Amendment Request #315, 
Revision 0, Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action 
Level Scheme, and Request for Exemption to Certain Radiological 
Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50,'' DEF 
requested exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for 
CR-3. More specifically, DEF requested exemptions from certain planning 
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological 
emergency plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power reactors; 
and from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50, appendix E, section IV, 
which establishes the elements that make up the content of emergency 
plans. In a letter dated March 28, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14098A072), DEF provided responses to the NRC staff's request for 
additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions. In a 
letter dated May 7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14139A006), DEF 
provided an additional supplemental response to a separate set of RAIs, 
which contained information applicable to the SFP inventory makeup 
strategies for mitigating the potential loss of water inventory due to 
a beyond-design-basis accident. In a letter dated August 28, 2014 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14251A237), CR-3 provided a supplement, which 
amended its request to align with the exemptions recommended by the NRC 
staff and approved by the Commission in staff requirements memorandum 
(SRM) to SECY-14-0066, ``Request by Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. for 
Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements,'' dated August 
7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366). The information provided by 
DEF included justifications for each exemption requested. The 
exemptions requested by DEF will eliminate the requirements to maintain 
formal offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR 
part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning activities. 
DEF stated that application of all of the standards and requirements in 
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E is not 
needed for adequate emergency response capability based on the reduced 
risks at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility. If offsite 
protective actions were needed for a very unlikely accident that could 
challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at CR-3, provisions exist for 
offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive 
emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System 
to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, 
also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in 
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and 
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness 
Guide 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local 
emergency planning in the United States. It promotes a common 
understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and 
decision making and helps planners at all levels of government in their 
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats 
emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. 
It describes how people and property will be protected; details who is 
responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the 
personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources 
available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A CEMP is 
often referred to as a synonym for ``all hazards planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel 
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are 
significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, 
current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor 
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release 
from credible emergency accident scenarios is significantly reduced. 
The reduced risk for any significant offsite radiological release is 
based on two factors. One factor is the elimination of accidents 
applicable only to an operating power reactor, resulting in fewer 
credible accident scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short-
lived radionuclide inventory and decay heat production due to 
radioactive decay. Due to the permanently defueled status of the 
reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the SFP and the 
radionuclides in the

[[Page 19360]]

current spent fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages. The 
irradiated fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay, 
increasing the available time to mitigate the SFP inventory loss. The 
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and 
defueled power reactors bounded by the assumptions and conditions in 
the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is significantly 
less than for an operating power reactor.
    EP exemptions similar to those requested by DEF were granted to 
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor licensees, such as for 
Zion Nuclear Power Station in 1999 (ADAMS Legacy Accession No. 
9909070079) and Kewaunee Power Station in 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14261A223). However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of 
all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to 
modify their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-
specific risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and 
defueled status. Specifically, approval of the prior exemptions was 
based on demonstrating that: (1) The radiological consequences of 
design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at 
the exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond-
design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer 
from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate 
appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities 
to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to 
protect the health and safety of the public.
    With respect to design-basis accidents at CR-3, the licensee 
provided analyses demonstrating that none would warrant an offsite 
radiological emergency plan meeting the requirements of 10 CFR part 50.
    With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at CR-3, the licensee 
analyzed two bounding beyond-design-basis accidents that have a 
potential for a significant offsite release. One of these beyond-
design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP water inventory, 
where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily accomplished by 
natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent fuel assemblies. 
The licensee's analysis of this accident shows that as of September 26, 
2013, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep 
the fuel within a safe temperature range indefinitely without fuel 
damage or offsite radiological release. The second beyond-design-basis 
accident analysis performed by the licensee could not completely rule 
out the possibility of a radiological release from an SFP. This more 
limiting analysis assumes an incomplete drain down of the SFP water, or 
some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of the SFP 
with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of 
rubble to the SFP) that would effectively impede any decay heat removal 
through all possible modes of cooling. This analysis is commonly 
referred to as an adiabatic heat-up. The licensee's analysis 
demonstrates that, as of September 26, 2013, there would be at least 
19.7 hours under adiabatic heat-up conditions before the spent fuel 
cladding would reach a temperature where the potential for a 
significant offsite radiological release could occur. This analysis 
conservatively does not consider the period of time from the initiating 
event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are 
lost.
    The NRC staff has verified DEF's analyses and its calculations. The 
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested 
exemptions to DEF, there is no design-basis accident that will result 
in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis 
accident affecting the SFP that results in adiabatic heat-up conditions 
(i.e., a complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer), 
the NRC staff has reviewed and verified that there will be at least 
19.7 hours available before an offsite release might occur and, 
therefore, at least 19.7 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating 
actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a 
radiological release were projected to occur under this unlikely 
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and the 
bases for prior EP exemption request approvals, as discussed above. The 
staff determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 
50.12(a) are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. Assessment 
of the DEF EP exemptions is described in SECY-14-0118, ``Request by 
Duke Energy Florida, Inc., for Exemptions from Certain Emergency 
Planning Requirements,'' dated October 29, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14219A444). The Commission approved the NRC staff's intention to 
grant the exemptions in the SRM to SECY-14-0118, dated December 30, 
2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14364A111). Descriptions of the specific 
exemptions requested by DEF and the NRC staff's basis for granting each 
exemption are provided in SECY-14-0118 and summarized in a table at the 
end of this document. The staff's detailed review and technical basis 
for the approval of the specific EP exemptions are provided in the NRC 
staff's safety evaluation enclosed in an NRC letter dated March 30, 
2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15058A906).

A. Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50, appendix E, 
section IV, that would allow DEF to revise the CR-3 Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station. 
As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, 
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, 
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff 
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will 
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by 
law.

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, DEF provided analyses that show the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the 
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, 
formal offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 
50 are no longer needed for protection of the public beyond the 
exclusion area boundary.
    Although very unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-basis 
accident that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses concludes that the event sequences 
important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors 
are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP 
assessments, this is an important difference relative

[[Page 19361]]

to operating power reactors where typically a large number of different 
sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738, 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements under 10 CFR part 50 a few months 
after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk.
    NUREG-1738 further concludes that the change in risk due to 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk 
is low, and because even under current EP requirements for operating 
power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation 
effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. 
Specifically, for ground motion levels that correspond to SFP failure 
in the central and eastern United States, it is expected that 
electrical power would be lost and more than half of the bridges and 
buildings (including those housing communication systems and emergency 
response equipment) would be unsafe even for temporary use within at 
least 10 miles of the plant. This approach is also consistent with 
previous Commission rulings on San Onofre and Diablo Canyon in which 
the Commission found that for those risk-dominant earthquakes that 
cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, 
emergency response would have marginal benefit because of offsite 
damage. All other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite 
radiological emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too 
low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions that eliminate the requirements of 
10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and 
reducing the scope of onsite emergency planning activities will not 
present an undue risk to the public health and safety.

C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by DEF only involve EP requirements under 
10 CFR part 50 and will allow DEF to revise the CR-3 Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at CR-3 are not affected by the 
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite 
emergency planning activities at CR-3 will not adversely affect DEF's 
ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear 
material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with common 
defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these 
regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with 
operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These 
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite 
radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously, because CR-3 is permanently shutdown and 
defueled, there is no longer a risk of offsite radiological release 
from a design-basis accident and the risk of a significant offsite 
radiological release from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly 
reduced when compared to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has 
confirmed the reduced risks at CR-3 by comparing the generic risk 
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site specific conditions 
at CR-3 and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the 
risks presented by CR-3. Furthermore, the staff has recently concluded 
in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water 
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), 
that, consistent with earlier research studies, SFPs are robust 
structures that are likely to withstand severe earthquakes without 
leaking cooling water and potentially uncovering the spent fuel. The 
NUREG-2161 study shows the likelihood of a radiological release from 
spent fuel after the analyzed severe earthquake at the reference plant 
to be about one time in 10 million years or lower.
    The licensee has analyzed site-specific spent fuel air-cooling and 
adiabatic heat-up beyond-design-basis accident scenarios to determine 
the risk of cladding damage, and the time to rapid cladding oxidation. 
The air-cooling analysis shows that as of September 26, 2013, in the 
event of a complete SFP drain down due to a loss of water inventory, 
assuming that natural circulation of air through the spent fuel racks 
was available, the peak fuel clad temperature would remain below 
1049[emsp14][deg]F (565[ordm]C), the temperature at which incipient 
cladding failure may occur. Therefore, in this postulated accident, 
fuel cladding remains intact.
    The beyond-design-basis adiabatic heat-up accident analysis of the 
spent fuel evaluates a postulated condition involving a very unlikely 
scenario where the SFP is drained in such a way that all modes of 
cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable. DEF analysis of 
this beyond-design-basis accident shows that as of September 26, 2013, 
19.7 hours would be available between the time the fuel is uncovered 
(at which time adiabatic heat-up begins), until the fuel cladding 
reaches a temperature of 1652[emsp14][deg]F (900[ordm]C), the 
temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential 
for a significant radiological release.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of 
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 
reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff 
concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the DEF 
requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to 
initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if 
needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a 
CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency plans, 
required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently 
shutdown and defueled facilities.
    Additionally, DEF committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies in 
its letter to the NRC dated May 7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14139A006). The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP 
include: Using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying 
water through hoses to connections to the existing SFP piping using the 
diesel-driven fire service pump; and using a diesel-driven portable 
pump to take suction from CR-3 intake and discharge canals. These 
strategies will continue to be required as license condition 2.C.(14), 
``Mitigation Strategy License Condition.'' Considering the very low 
probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these 
diverse strategies provide

[[Page 19362]]

multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP before 
the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
    For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the 
licensee's requested exemptions to meet the underlying purpose of all 
of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, acceptably satisfy the 
special circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly 
reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the 
permanently shutdown and defueled state of the CR-3 facility.
    The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by 
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness 
at CR-3 and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that 
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and 
local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the unlikely event 
of a radiological emergency at the CR-3 facility. Since the underlying 
purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even 
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to 
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and reduction in 
the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at CR-3, the 
special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's 
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental 
Assessment published March 2, 2015 (80 FR 11233).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), that DEF's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end 
of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEF exemptions from certain EP 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the 
staff's safety evaluation dated March 30, 2015. The exemptions are 
effective as of March 30, 2015.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of March, 2015.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.

                   Table of Exemptions Granted to DEF
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         10 CFR 50.47                NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47(b)..............  In the Statement of Considerations (SOC)
The NRC is granting             for the final rule for emergency
 exemptions from portions of    planning (EP) requirements for
 the rule language that would   independent spent fuel storage
 otherwise require offsite      installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor
 emergency response plans.      retrievable storage installations (MRS)
                                (60 Federal Register (FR) 32430; June
                                22, 1995), the Commission responded to
                                comments concerning offsite EP for
                                ISFSIs or a MRS and concluded that,
                                ``the offsite consequences of potential
                                accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not
                                warrant establishing Emergency Planning
                                Zones [EPZ].''
                               In a nuclear power reactor's permanently
                                defueled state, the accident risks are
                                more similar to an ISFSI or a MRS than
                                an operating nuclear power plant. The EP
                                program would be similar to that
                                required for an ISFSI under section
                                72.32(a) of 10 CFR when fuel stored in
                                the spent fuel pool (SFP) has more than
                                5 years of decay time and would not
                                change substantially when all the fuel
                                is transferred from the SFP to an onsite
                                ISFSI. Exemptions from offsite EP
                                requirements have previously been
                                approved when the site-specific analyses
                                show that at least 10 hours is available
                                until the hottest fuel assembly reaches
                                900[deg]C from a partial drain-down
                                event without any spent fuel cooling.
                                The technical basis that underlied the
                                approval of the exemption request is
                                based partly on the analysis of a time
                                period that spent fuel stored in the SFP
                                is unlikely to reach the zirconium
                                ignition temperature in less than 10
                                hours. This time period is based on a
                                heat-up calculation, which uses several
                                simplifying assumptions. Some of these
                                assumptions are conservative (adiabatic
                                conditions), while others are non-
                                conservative (no oxidation below
                                900[deg]C). Weighing the conservatisms
                                and non-conservatisms, the NRC staff
                                judges that this calculation reasonably
                                represents conditions, which may occur
                                in the event of an SFP accident. The
                                staff concluded that if 10 hours were
                                available to initiate mitigative
                                actions, or if needed, offsite
                                protective actions using a comprehensive
                                emergency management plan (CEMP), formal
                                offsite radiological emergency plans are
                                not necessary for these permanently
                                defueled nuclear power reactor
                                licensees.
                               As supported by the licensee's SFP
                                analysis, the NRC staff believes an
                                exemption to the requirements for formal
                                offsite radiological emergency plans is
                                justified for a zirconium fire scenario
                                considering the low likelihood of this
                                event together with time available to
                                take mitigative or protective actions
                                between the initiating event and before
                                the onset of a postulated fire.
                               The Duke Energy Florida, Inc. (DEF)
                                analysis has demonstrated that due to
                                the considerable time since shutdown,
                                approximately 4 years as of the date of
                                the analysis, the radiological
                                consequences of design-basis accidents
                                will not exceed the limits of the U.S.
                                Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
                                Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at
                                the exclusion area boundary. These
                                analyses also show that for beyond-
                                design-basis events where the SFP is
                                drained, air cooling will prevent the
                                fuel from reaching the lowest
                                temperature where incipient cladding
                                failure may occur (565[deg]C). In the
                                event that air cooling is not possible,
                                19.7 hours is available to take
                                mitigative or, if needed, offsite
                                protective actions using a CEMP from the
                                time the fuel is uncovered until it
                                reaches the auto-ignition temperature of
                                900[deg]C.

[[Page 19363]]

 
                               DEF has also furnished information on its
                                SFP inventory makeup strategies for
                                mitigating the loss of water inventory.
                                Several sources of makeup to the pools
                                are available, such as the fire service
                                system, using the diesel-driven fire
                                service pump for loss of electrical
                                power. If available fresh water sources
                                are depleted, salt water sources with
                                inexhaustible inventory from the Crystal
                                River Unit 3 (CR-3) intake and discharge
                                canal, using portable diesel powered
                                pumps are available.
                               Pool inventory addition can be
                                implemented without accessing the
                                elevation of the pool deck. In a letter
                                dated May 7, 2014, ``Crystal River Unit
                                3--Response to Requests for Additional
                                Information and Supplement 1 to License
                                Amendment Request #316, Revision 0''
                                (ADAMS Accession No. ML14139A006), DEF
                                withdrew its request to remove License
                                Condition 2.C.(14), ``Mitigation
                                Strategy License Condition,'' from its
                                Facility Operating License. This license
                                condition requires CR-3 to maintain its
                                SFP inventory makeup strategies as
                                discussed above.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1)...........  Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require the need
 for Emergency Planning Zones
 (EPZs).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3)...........  Considering the time available to take
The NRC is granting             mitigative or, if needed, offsite
 exemptions from portions of    protective actions using a CEMP between
 the rule language that would   the initiating event and before the
 otherwise require the need     onset of a postulated fire,
 for an Emergency Operations    decommissioning power reactors present a
 Facility (EOF).                low likelihood of any credible accident
                                resulting in a radiological release. As
                                such, an emergency operations facility
                                would not be required. The ``nuclear
                                island,'' control room, or other onsite
                                location can provide for the
                                communication and coordination with
                                offsite organizations for the level of
                                support required.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)...........  Considering the time available to take
The NRC is granting             mitigative or if needed, offsite
 exemptions from portions of    protective actions using a CEMP between
 the rule language that would   the initiating event and before the
 otherwise require reference    onset of a postulated fire,
 to formal offsite              decommissioning power reactors present a
 radiological emergency         low likelihood of any credible accident
 response plans.                resulting in a radiological release. As
                                such, formal offsite radiological
                                emergency response plans are not
                                required.
                               The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
                                document NEI 99-01, ``Development of
                                Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive
                                Reactors'' (Revision 6), was found to be
                                an acceptable method for development of
                                emergency action levels (EALs) and was
                                endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
                                Commission (NRC) in a letter dated March
                                28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
                                ML12346A463). NEI 99-01 provides EALs
                                for non-passive operating nuclear power
                                reactors, permanently defueled reactors,
                                and ISFSIs.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)...........  Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require early
 notification of the public
 and a means to provide
 instructions to the public
 within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6)...........  Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require prompt
 communications with the
 public.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7)...........  Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require
 information to be made
 available to the public on a
 periodic basis about how
 they will be notified and
 what their initial
 protective actions should be.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9)...........  Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require the
 capability for monitoring
 offsite consequences.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)..........  In the unlikely event of an SFP accident,
The NRC is granting             the iodine isotopes, which contribute to
 exemptions from portions of    an offsite dose from an operating
 the rule language that would   reactor accident, are not present, so
 reduce the range of            potassium iodide distribution would no
 protective actions developed   longer serve as an effective or
 for radiological               necessary supplemental protective
 emergencies. Consideration     action.
 of evacuation, sheltering,
 or the use of potassium
 iodide will no longer be
 necessary. Evacuation time
 estimates (ETEs) will no
 longer need to developed or
 updated. Protective actions
 for the ingestion exposure
 pathway EPZ will not need to
 be developed.

[[Page 19364]]

 
                               The CR-3 SFP is considered an ISFSI and
                                is licensed under 10 CFR part 72,
                                subpart K, ``General License for Storage
                                of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites.''
                                The Commission responded to comments in
                                its SOC for the final rule for EP
                                requirements for ISFSIs and MRS
                                facilities (60 FR 32435), and concluded
                                that, ``the offsite consequences of
                                potential accidents at an ISFSI or an
                                MRS would not warrant establishing
                                EPZs.'' Additionally, in the SOC for the
                                final rule for EP requirements for
                                ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR
                                32430), the Commission responded to
                                comments concerning site-specific EP
                                that includes evacuation of surrounding
                                population for an ISFSI not at a reactor
                                site, and concluded that, ``The
                                Commission does not agree that as a
                                general matter emergency plans for an
                                ISFSI must include evacuation
                                planning.''
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)
                                and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2)...........  Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require the
 establishment of a 10 mile
 radius plume exposure
 pathway EPZ and a 50 mile
 radius ingestion pathway EPZ.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
          section IV                 NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    The EP Rule published in the Federal
 section IV.1.                  Register (76 FR 72560; November 23,
The NRC is granting             2011), amended certain requirements in
 exemptions from portions of    10 CFR part 50. Among the changes, the
 the rule language that would   definition of ``hostile action'' was
 otherwise require onsite       added as an act directed toward a
 protective actions during      nuclear power plant or its personnel.
 hostile action.                This definition is based on the
                                definition of ``hostile action''
                                provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02,
                                ``Emergency Preparedness and Response
                                Actions for Security-Based Events.'' NRC
                                Bulletin 2005-02 was not applicable to
                                nuclear power reactors that have
                                permanently ceased operations and have
                                certified that fuel has been removed
                                from the reactor vessel.
                               The NRC excluded non-power reactors from
                                the scope of ``hostile action'' at the
                                time of the rulemaking because, as
                                defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-power
                                reactor is not considered a nuclear
                                power reactor and a regulatory basis had
                                not been developed to support the
                                inclusion of non-power reactors within
                                the scope of ``hostile action.''
                                Similarly, a decommissioning power
                                reactor or an ISFSI is not a ``nuclear
                                reactor'' as defined in 10 CFR part 50.
                                A decommissioning power reactor also has
                                a low likelihood of a credible accident
                                resulting in radiological releases
                                requiring offsite protective measures.
                                For all of these reasons, the NRC staff
                                concludes that a decommissioning power
                                reactor is not a facility that falls
                                within the scope of ``hostile action.''
                               Similarly, for security, risk insights
                                can be used to determine which targets
                                are important to protect against
                                sabotage. A level of security
                                commensurate with the consequences of a
                                sabotage event is required and is
                                evaluated on a site-specific basis. The
                                severity of the consequences declines as
                                fuel ages and, thereby, removes over
                                time the underlying concern that a
                                sabotage attack could cause offsite
                                radiological consequences.
                               Although, this analysis provides a
                                justification for exempting CR-3 from
                                ``hostile action'' related requirements,
                                some EP requirements for security-based
                                events are maintained. The
                                classification of security-based events,
                                notification of offsite authorities and
                                coordination with offsite agencies under
                                a CEMP concept are still required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
 section IV.2.
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language concerning
 the evacuation time analyses
 within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ for the
 licensee's initial
 application.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV.3.                  appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting             50.47(b).
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require use of NRC-
 approved ETEs and updates to
 State and local governments
 when developing protective
 action strategies.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV.4.                  appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting             50.47(b).
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require licensees
 to update evacuation time
 estimates based on the most
 recent census data and
 submit the ETE analysis to
 the NRC prior to providing
 it to State and local
 government for developing
 protective action strategies.

[[Page 19365]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV.5.                  appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting an          50.47(b).
 exemption from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require licensees
 to estimate the EPZ
 permanent resident
 population changes once a
 year between decennial
 censuses.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV.6.                  appendix E, section IV.2 and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting an          50.47(b).
 exemption from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require the
 licensee to submit an
 updated ETE analysis to the
 NRC based on changes in the
 resident population that
 result in exceeding specific
 evacuation time increase
 criteria.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Based on the permanently shutdown and
 section IV.A.1.                defueled status of the reactor, a
The NRC is granting an          decommissioning reactor is not
 exemption from the word        authorized to operate under 10 CFR
 ``operating'' in the           50.82(a). Because the licensee cannot
 requirement to describe the    operate the reactors, the licensee does
 normal plant organization.     not have a ``plant operating
                                organization.''
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    The number of staff at decommissioning
 section IV.A.3.                sites is generally small but is
The NRC is granting an          commensurate with the need to safely
 exemption from the             store spent fuel at the facility in a
 requirement to describe the    manner that is protective of public
 licensee's headquarters        health and safety. Decommissioning sites
 personnel sent to the site     typically have a level of emergency
 to augment the onsite          response that does not require response
 emergency response             by the licensee's headquarters
 organization.                  personnel.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Although, the likelihood of events that
 section IV.A.4.                would result in doses in excess of the
The NRC is granting             EPA PAGs to the public beyond the
 exemptions from portions of    exclusion area boundary based on the
 the rule language that would   permanently shutdown and defueled status
 otherwise require the          of the reactor is extremely low, the
 licensee to identify a         licensee still must be able to determine
 position and function within   if a radiological release is occurring.
 its organization, which will   If a release is occurring, then the
 carry the responsibility for   licensee staff should promptly
 making offsite dose            communicate that information to offsite
 projections.                   authorities for their consideration. The
                                offsite organizations are responsible
                                for deciding what, if any, protective
                                actions should be taken based on
                                comprehensive EP.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.57(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    The minimal systems and equipment needed
 section IV.A.5.                to maintain the spent nuclear fuel in
The NRC is granting an          the SFP in a safe condition requires
 exemption from the             minimal personnel and is governed by the
 requirement for the licensee   technical specifications. As such,
 to identify individuals with   additional employees or other persons
 special qualifications, both   with special qualifications are not
 licensee employees and non-    anticipated
 employees, for coping with    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 emergencies.                   appendix E, section IV.A.3
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Offsite emergency measures are limited to
 section IV.A.7.                support provided by local police, fire
The NRC is granting             departments, and ambulance and hospital
 exemptions from portions of    services, as appropriate. Due to the low
 the rule language that would   probability of design-basis accidents or
 otherwise require a            other credible events to exceed the EPA
 description of the             PAGs, protective actions such as
 assistance expected from       evacuation should not be required, but
 State, local, and Federal      could be implemented at the discretion
 agencies for coping with a     of offsite authorities using a CEMP.
 hostile action.
                               Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
                                appendix E, section IV.1 and 10 CFR
                                50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Offsite emergency measures are limited to
 section IV.A.8.                support provided by local police, fire
The NRC is granting an          departments, and ambulance and hospital
 exemption from the             services, as appropriate. Due to the low
 requirement to identify the    probability of design-basis accidents or
 State and local officials      other credible events to exceed the EPA
 for ordering protective        PAGs, protective actions such as
 actions and evacuations.       evacuation should not be required, but
                                could be implemented at the discretion
                                of offsite authorities using a CEMP.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Responsibilities should be well defined
 section IV.A.9.                in the emergency plan and procedures,
The NRC is granting an          regularly tested through drills and
 exemption from the             exercises audited and inspected by the
 requirement for the licensee   licensee and the NRC. The duties of the
 to provide an analysis         on-shift personnel at a decommissioning
 demonstrating that on-shift    reactor facility are not as complicated
 personnel are not assigned     and diverse as those for an operating
 responsibilities that would    power reactor.
 prevent performance of their
 assigned emergency plan
 functions.
                               The NRC staff considered the similarity
                                between the staffing levels at a
                                permanently shutdown and defueled
                                reactor and staffing levels at an
                                operating power reactor site. The
                                minimal systems and equipment needed to
                                maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the
                                SFP or in an ISFSI in a safe condition
                                requires minimal personnel and is
                                governed by Technical Specifications. In
                                the EP final rule published in the
                                Federal Register (76 FR 72560; November
                                23, 2011), the NRC concluded that the
                                staffing analysis requirement was not
                                necessary for non-power reactor
                                licensees due to the small staffing
                                levels required to operate the facility.

[[Page 19366]]

 
                               The NRC staff also examined the actions
                                required to mitigate the very low
                                probability design-basis events for the
                                SFP. Several sources of makeup to the
                                pools are available, such as the fire
                                service system, using the diesel-driven
                                fire service pump for loss of electrical
                                power. If available fresh water sources
                                are depleted, salt water sources with
                                inexhaustible inventory from the CR-3
                                intake and discharge canal, using
                                portable diesel powered pumps are
                                available. Pool inventory addition can
                                be implemented without accessing the
                                elevation of the pool deck. DEF believes
                                these diverse strategies provide defense-
                                in-depth and ample time to provide
                                makeup or spray to the SFP prior to the
                                onset of zirconium cladding ignition
                                when considering very low probability
                                beyond-design-basis events affecting the
                                SFP. In a letter dated May 7, 2014, DEF
                                withdrew its request to remove License
                                Condition 2.C.(14), ``Mitigation
                                Strategy License Condition,'' from its
                                Facility Operating License. This license
                                condition requires CR-3 to maintain its
                                SFP inventory makeup strategies as
                                discussed above.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was found to be an
 section IV.B.1.                acceptable method for development of
The NRC is granting             EALs. No offsite protective actions are
 exemptions from portions of    anticipated to be necessary, so
 the rule language that would   classification above the alert level is
 otherwise require offsite      no longer required, which is consistent
 emergency actions levels and   with ISFSI facilities.
 offsite protective measures
 and associate offsite
 monitoring for the emergency
 conditions.
In addition, the NRC is
 granting exemption from
 portions of the rule
 language that would
 otherwise require emergency
 action levels based on
 hostile action.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
                                appendix E, section IV.1 and 10 CFR
                                50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Containment parameters do not provide an
 section IV.C.1.                indication of the conditions at a
The NRC is granting             defueled facility and emergency core
 exemptions from portions of    cooling systems are no longer required.
 the rule language that would   SFP level, SFP temperature, and area
 otherwise require emergency    radiation monitors indicate the
 actions levels based on        conditions at CR-3.
 operating reactor concerns,
 such as offsite radiation
 monitoring, pressure in
 containment, and the
 response of the emergency
 core cooling system.
In addition, the NRC is
 striking language that would
 otherwise require offsite
 emergency action levels of a
 site area emergency and a
 general emergency.
                               In the SOC for the final rule for EP
                                requirements for ISFSIs and MRS
                                facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission
                                responded to comments concerning a
                                general emergency at an ISFSI and a MRS,
                                and concluded that, ``an essential
                                element of a General Emergency is that a
                                release can be reasonably expected to
                                exceed EPA PAGs exposure levels off site
                                for more than the immediate site area.''
                               The probability of a condition reaching
                                the level above an emergency
                                classification of alert is very low. In
                                the event of an accident at a defueled
                                facility that meets the conditions for
                                relaxation of EP requirements, there
                                will be available time for event
                                mitigation and, if necessary,
                                implementation of offsite protective
                                actions using a CEMP.
                               NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was found to be an
                                acceptable method for development of
                                EALs. No offsite protective actions are
                                anticipated to be necessary, so
                                classification above the alert level is
                                no longer required.
                               Also, refer to the basis for 10 CFR
                                50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    In the EP rule published in the Federal
 section IV.C.2.                Register (76 FR 72560), non-power
The NRC is granting             reactor licensees were not required to
 exemptions from portions of    assess, classify and declare an
 the rule language that would   emergency condition within 15 minutes.
 otherwise require the          An SFP and an ISFSI are also not nuclear
 licensee to assess,            power reactors as defined in the NRC's
 classify, and declare an       regulations. A decommissioning power
 emergency condition within     reactor has a low likelihood of a
 15 minutes.                    credible accident resulting in
                                radiological releases requiring offsite
                                protective measures. For these reasons,
                                the NRC staff concludes that a
                                decommissioning power reactor should not
                                be required to assess, classify and
                                declare an emergency condition within 15
                                minutes.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
 section IV.D.1.                CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require the
 licensee to reach agreement
 with local, State, and
 Federal officials and
 agencies for prompt
 notification of protective
 measures or evacuations.
In addition, the NRC is
 granting an exemption from
 identifying the associated
 titles of officials to be
 notified for each agency
 within the EPZs.

[[Page 19367]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) ,10
 section IV.D.2.                CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5).
The NRC is granting an
 exemption from the
 requirement for the licensee
 to annually disseminate
 general information on
 emergency planning and
 evacuations within the plume
 exposure pathway EPZ.
In addition, the NRC is
 granting an exemption for
 the need for signage or
 other measures to address
 transient populations in the
 event of an accident.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    While the capability needs to exist for
 section IV.D.3.                the notification of offsite government
The NRC is granting             agencies within a specified time period,
 exemptions from portions of    previous exemptions have allowed for
 the rule language that would   extending the State and local government
 otherwise require the          agencies' notification time up to 60
 licensee to have the           minutes based on the site-specific
 capability to make             justification provided.
 notifications to State and
 local government agencies
 within 15 minutes of
 declaring an emergency.
                               DEF's exemption request provides that CR-
                                3 will make notifications to the State
                                of Florida and the NRC within 60 minutes
                                of declaration of an event. The State
                                Watch Office will perform the
                                notification to the County (Citrus), as
                                well as the Florida Department of
                                Emergency Management. In the permanently
                                defueled condition of the reactor, the
                                rapidly developing scenarios associated
                                with events initiated during reactor
                                power operation are no longer credible.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)
                                and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV.D.4. The NRC is     appendix E, section IV.D.3 regarding the
 granting an exemption from     alert and notification system
 the requirement for the        requirements.
 licensee to obtain FEMA
 approval of its backup alert
 and notification capability.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Due to the low probability of design-
 section IV.E.8.a.(i).          basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting             to exceed the EPA PAGs at the exclusion
 exemptions from portions of    area boundary, the available time for
 the rule language that would   event mitigation at a decommissioning
 otherwise require the          reactor and, if needed, to implement
 licensee to have an onsite     offsite protective actions using a CEMP,
 technical support center and   an EOF and a technical support center
 emergency operations           (TSC) would not be required to support
 facility.                      offsite agency response. Onsite actions
                                may be directed from the control room or
                                other location, without the requirements
                                imposed on a TSC.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    NUREG-0696, ``Functional Criteria for
 section IV.E.8.a.(ii).         Emergency Response Facilities'' (ADAMS
The NRC is granting             Accession No. ML051390358) provides that
 exemptions from portions of    the operational support center (OSC) is
 the rule language that would   an onsite area separate from the control
 otherwise require the          room and the TSC where licensee
 licensee to have an onsite     operations support personnel will
 operational support center.    assemble in an emergency. For a
                                decommissioning power reactor, an OSC is
                                no longer required to meet its original
                                purpose of an assembly area for plant
                                logistical support during an emergency.
                                The OSC function can be incorporated
                                into another facility.
                               Also refer to the basis for 10 CFR part
                                50, appendix E, section IV.E.8.a.(i).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and
 section IV.E.8.b. and          10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
 subpart sections               8.a.(i).
 IV.E.8.b.(1)--E.8.b.(5).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from the
 requirements related to an
 offsite emergency operations
 facility's location, space
 and size, communications
 capability, access to plant
 data and radiological
 information, and access to
 copying and office supplies.
10 CFR part 50, App. E,        Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and
 section IV E.8.c. and          10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
 sections IV E.8.c.(1)--        8.a.(i).
 E.8.c.(3).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from the
 requirements to have an
 emergency operations
 facility with the
 capabilities to obtain and
 display plant data and
 radiological information;
 the capability to analyze
 technical information and
 provide briefings; and the
 capability to support events
 occurring at more than one
 site (if the emergency
 operations center supports
 more than one site).
10 CFR part 50, App. E,        Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV E.8.d.              appendix E, section IV.1; 10 CFR part
The NRC is granting             50, appendix E, section IV.E 8.a.(i);
 exemptions from the            and 10 CFR 50, appendix E, section
 requirements to have an        IV.E.8.a.(ii).
 alternate facility that
 would be accessible even if
 the site is under threat of
 or experiencing hostile
 action, to function as a
 staging area for
 augmentation of emergency
 response staff.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Because of the low probability of design-
 section IV.E.8.e.              basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting an          that would be expected to exceed the EPA
 exemption from the need for    PAGs and the available time for event
 the licensee to comply with    mitigation and, if needed,
 paragraph 8.b of this          implementation of offsite protective
 section that details EOFs      actions using a CEMP, there is no need
 requirements.                  for the EOF.
                               Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) and
                                10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
                                8.a.(i).

[[Page 19368]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    The Plume exposure pathway EPZ is no
 section IV.E.9.a.              longer required by the exemption granted
The NRC is granting             to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The State and
 exemptions from portions of    the local governments in which the
 the rule language that would   nuclear facility is located will still
 otherwise require the          need to be informed of events and
 licensee to have               emergencies, so lines of communication
 communications with            must be maintained.
 contiguous State and local
 governments that are within
 the plume exposure pathway
 EPZ.
                               Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and
                                10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Because of the low probability of design-
 section IV.E.9.c.              basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting exemption   that would be expected to exceed the EPA
 from the requirements for      PAGs and the available time for event
 communication and testing      mitigation and, if needed,
 provisions between the         implementation of offsite protective
 control room, the onsite       actions using a CEMP, there is no need
 TSC, State/local emergency     for the TSC, EOF, offsite field
 operations centers, and        assessment teams, and the communication
 field assessment teams.        and testing provisions that refer to
                                them.
                               Refer to justification for 10 CFR
                                50.47(b)(3) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix
                                E, section IV.E 8.a.(i). Communication
                                with State and local emergency operation
                                centers is maintained to coordinate
                                assistance on site if required.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    The functions of the control room, EOF,
 section IV.E.9.d.              TSC, and OSC may be combined into one or
The NRC is granting             more locations due to the smaller
 exemptions from portions of    facility staff and the greatly reduced
 the rule language that would   required interaction with State and
 otherwise require provisions   local emergency response facilities. The
 for communications from the    licensee is still required to maintain
 control room, onsite TSC,      monthly communication tests with NRC
 and EOF with NRC               Headquarters and the appropriate
 Headquarters and the           Regional Operations Center.
 appropriate Regional
 Operations Center.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b);
                                10 CFR 50, appendix E, section
                                IV.E.8.a.(i); and 10 CFR 50, appendix E,
                                section IV.E.8.a.(ii).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Decommissioning power reactor sites
 section IV.F.1. and section    typically have a level of emergency
 IV F.1.viii.                   response that does not require
The NRC is granting             additional response by the licensee's
 exemptions from portions of    headquarters personnel. Therefore, the
 the rule language that would   NRC staff considers exempting licensee's
 otherwise require the          headquarters personnel from training
 licensee to provide training   requirements to be reasonable.
 and drills for the
 licensee's headquarters
 personnel, Civil Defense
 personnel, or local news
 media.
                               Due to the low probability of design-
                                basis accidents or other credible events
                                to exceed the EPA PAGs, offsite
                                emergency measures are limited to
                                support provided by local police, fire
                                departments, and ambulance and hospital
                                services, as appropriate. Local news
                                media personnel no longer need
                                radiological orientation training since
                                they will not be called upon to support
                                the formal Joint Information Center. The
                                term ``Civil Defense'' is no longer
                                commonly used; references to this term
                                in the examples provided in the
                                regulation are, therefore, not needed.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Because of the low probability of design-
 section IV.F.2.                basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting             that would be expected to exceed the
 exemptions from portions of    limits of EPA PAGs and the available
 the rule language that would   time for event mitigation and offsite
 otherwise require testing of   protective actions from a CEMP, the
 a public alert and             public alert and notification system are
 notification system.           not needed and, therefore, require no
                                testing.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Due to the low probability of design-
 section IV.F.2.a. and          basis accidents or other credible events
 sections IV.F.2.a.(i)          that would be expected to exceed the
 through IV.F.2.a.(iii).        limits of EPA PAGs, the available time
The NRC is granting             for event mitigation and, if necessary,
 exemptions from the            implementation of offsite protective
 requirements for full          actions using a CEMP, no formal offsite
 participation exercises and    radiological emergency plans are
 the submittal of the           required and full participation
 associated exercise            emergency plan exercises that test the
 scenarios to the NRC.          State and local emergency plans are not
                                necessary.
                               The intent of submitting exercise
                                scenarios at an operating power reactor
                                site is to ensure that licensees utilize
                                different scenarios in order to prevent
                                the preconditioning of responders at
                                power reactors. For decommissioning
                                power reactor sites, there are limited
                                events that could occur, and as such,
                                the submittal of exercise scenarios is
                                not necessary.
                               The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR
                                part 50, appendix E, section
                                IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) because the licensee
                                would be exempt from the umbrella
                                provision of 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
                                section IV.F.2.a.
                               Also, refer to the basis for 10 CFR
                                50.47(b) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
                                section IV.C.1.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    The intent of submitting onsite exercise
 section IV.F.2.b.              scenarios at an operating power reactor
The NRC is granting             site is to ensure that licensees utilize
 exemptions from portions of    different scenarios in order to prevent
 the rule language that would   the preconditioning of responders at
 otherwise require the          power reactors. For decommissioning
 licensee to submit scenarios   power reactor sites, there are limited
 for its biennial exercises     events that could occur, and as such,
 of its onsite emergency        the submittal of exercise scenarios is
 plan. In addition, the NRC     not necessary. Biennial exercises are
 is granting exemption from     not required per the exemption from 10
 portions of the rule           CFR part 50, appendix E, section
 language that requires         IV.F.2.c.
 assessment of offsite
 releases, protective action
 decision making, and
 references to the TSC, OSC,
 and EOF.

[[Page 19369]]

 
                               The low probability of design basis
                                accidents or other credible events that
                                would exceed the EPA PAGs, the available
                                time for event mitigation and, if
                                necessary, implementation of offsite
                                protective actions using a CEMP, render
                                a TSC, OSC and EOF unnecessary. The
                                principal functions required by
                                regulation can be performed at an onsite
                                location that does not meet the
                                requirements of the TSC, OSC, or EOF.
                               Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
                                appendix E, section IV.F.2.a; 10 CFR
                                part 50, appendix E, section IV.E
                                8.a.(i); 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
                                section IV.E 8.a.(ii); and 10 CFR
                                50.47(b).
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV.F.2.c. and          appendix E, section IV.F.2.a and 10 CFR
 sections IV F.2.c.(1)          50.47(b).
 through F.2.c.(5).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from the
 requirements regarding the
 need for the licensee to
 exercise offsite plans
 biennially with full
 participation by each
 offsite authority having a
 role under the radiological
 response plan. The NRC is
 also granting exemptions
 from the conditions for
 conducting these exercises
 (including hostile action
 exercises) if two different
 licensees have facilities on
 the same site or on
 adjacent, contiguous sites,
 or share most of the
 elements defining co-located
 licensees.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50, appendix E,
 section IV.F.2.d.              section IV.F.2.a.
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from the
 requirements to obtain State
 participation in an
 ingestion pathway exercise
 and a hostile action
 exercise, with each State
 that has responsibilities,
 at least once per exercise
 cycle.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and
 section IV.F.2.e.              10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from portions of
 the rule language that would
 otherwise require the
 licensee to allow
 participation exercise in
 licensee drills by any State
 and local Government in the
 plume exposure pathway EPZ
 when requested.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    FEMA is responsible for evaluating the
 section IV.F.2.f.              adequacy of offsite response during an
The NRC is granting             exercise. No action is expected from
 exemptions from portions of    State or local government organizations
 the rule language that would   in response to an event at a
 otherwise require FEMA to      decommissioning power reactor site other
 consult with the NRC on        than onsite firefighting, law
 remedial exercises. The NRC    enforcement and ambulance/medical
 is granting exemption from     services support. A memorandum of
 portions of the rule           understanding is in place for those
 language that discuss the      services. Offsite response organizations
 extent of State and local      will continue to take actions on a
 participation in remedial      comprehensive emergency planning basis
 exercises.                     to protect the health and safety of the
                                public as they would at any other
                                industrial site.
                               Also, refer to the basis for 10 CFR 50,
                                appendix E, section IV.F.2.a.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Due to the low probability of design-
 section IV.F.2.i.              basis accidents or other credible events
The NRC is granting             to exceed the EPA PAGs, the available
 exemptions from portions of    time for event mitigation and, if
 the rule language that would   needed, implementation of offsite
 otherwise require the          protective actions using a CEMP, the
 licensee to engage in drills   previously routine progression to
 and exercises for scenarios    general emergency in power reactor site
 that include a wide spectrum   scenarios is not applicable to a
 of radiological release        decommissioning site. Therefore, the
 events and hostile action.     licensee is not expected to demonstrate
                                response to a wide spectrum of events.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
                                appendix E, section IV.1 regarding
                                hostile action.
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    With the permanently shutdown defueled
 section IV.F.2.j.              and conditions of the site, where only
The NRC is granting             the SFP and its related support systems,
 exemptions from the            structures, and components remain, there
 requirements regarding the     are no other facilities in which
 need for the licensee's        emergency response organization
 emergency response             personnel could demonstrate proficiency.
 organization to demonstrate
 proficiency in key skills in
 the principal functional
 areas of emergency response.
In addition, the NRC is
 granting an exemption during
 an eight calendar year
 exercise cycle, from
 demonstrating proficiency in
 the key skills necessary to
 respond to such scenarios as
 hostile actions, unplanned
 minimal radiological
 release, Sec.   50.54(hh)(2)
 implementation strategies,
 and scenarios involving
 rapid escalation to a site
 area emergency or general
 emergency.
                               Also refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
                                appendix E, section IV.F.2.i.

[[Page 19370]]

 
10 CFR part 50, appendix E,    Refer to basis for 10 CFR part 50,
 section IV.I.                  appendix E, section IV.1.
The NRC is granting
 exemptions from the
 requirements regarding the
 need for the licensee to
 develop a range of
 protective action for onsite
 personnel during hostile
 actions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2015-08311 Filed 4-9-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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