2013 I LApp (2d) 130558 No. 2-13-0558 Opinion filed Novembe r 20, 2013

______________________________________________________________________________ I N THE APPEL L ATE COURT OF I L L I NOI S SECOND DI STRI CT

______________________________________________________________________________ In re B’ YATA I ., a Minor

(The People of the State of I llinois , Petitioner-Appellee , v. Keny atta B ., Respondent-Appe llant). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appea l from the Circuit Court of Winnebag o County

. No. 09-JA-124 Honora ble Mary L inn Gree n and Patrick L . Hea slip, J udg es, Presiding

.

______________________________________________________________________________ J USTI CE HUDSON deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion. J ustices Hutchinson and Schostok conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion. OP INION ¶ 1 I n May 2013, the circ uit court of Winnebag o County found re spondent, Keny atta B., to be

an unfit pare nt w ith respec t to her minor daug hter, B ’y ata I ., on three separ ate g rounds. The court later conclude d that the termination of respon dent’s pare ntal rig hts was in B’ y ata’ s best interests. On appeal, respondent challeng es t h e fi ndings of the t rial court with respe ct t o both unfitness and best interests. F or the re asons set for th below, we r emand this ca use for further proce eding s. ¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 B’ y ata was born to responde nt on September 26, 2008. On Marc h 27, 2009, the State filed a five-count petiti on alleg ing that B’ y ata was a negle cted minor. 705 I L CS 405/2-3 (W est 2008). The petition was amende d on April 1, 2009. Both the orig inal and amende d petitions named Be rnar d2013 I LApp (2d) 130558

I

. as B’ y ata’ s fathe r. Respondent is also the mother of two other minors, Amashane ek T. an d 1 Alishawan T. , wh o we re fathe red by a differ ent man, J esse T. Respondent waived her rig ht to a 2 hear ing on whether there was probable cause to believe that B’ y ata was a neg lected minor, and the trial court, J udg e P atrick L

. Hea slip, g rante d temporar y g uardia nship and custody

of B ’y ata to the I llinois Depa

rtment of Children and Family Service s (DCFS). DCFS place d B’ y ata with rela tives. ¶ 4 Following an adjudicator y hear ing in September 2009, the trial court found B’ y ata ne g lected based on count I I I of the State’s petition, which alleg ed that B’ y ata’ s environment was injurious to her welfa re in that her pare nts eng ag ed in domestic violence in her prese nce, thus placing her at risk of harm. 705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)( b) (West 2008). I n a dispositi onal order enter ed in Dec ember 2009, the trial court found it in B’ y ata’ s best interests t h at s h e b e m ade a war d of the court. The court place d custody and g uardia nship o f B’y ata with responde nt. The court also place d custody and g uardia nship of Amashane ek and Alishawan with responde nt. The dispositi on al order require d responde nt to, inter alia , rema in drug and alcohol fre e. At that time, the trial court appointed Court Appointed Special Advoc ates (CASA) a s g uardia n ad litem for a ll three minors.

DNA testing subsequently excluded Be rnar d as B’ y ata’ s fathe r. Respondent later named 1 Michae l G

. as a potential fathe r. After DNA testing confirme d that Michae l is B’ y ata’ s fathe r, the State soug ht to terminate Michae l’s pare ntal rig hts

. T he trial court found Michae l unfit and conclude d that it wa s in B ’y ata’ s best interests that his pa renta l r ights be terminated. I n a sepa rate appea l, this court aff

irmed the trial court’s finding s. See In re B’yata I. , 2013 I L App (2d) 130492-U. Amashane ek and Alishawan wer e subject to separ ate neg lect p et i t i o ns. Neither of their 2

case s, howeve r, is part of this appe al. -2-2013 I LApp (2d) 130558

¶ 5 At a re v i ew h ea ri n g i n J an u ar y 2010, Keith Tabor, the case worke r then assig ned t o

re s p o n d ent’s case , noted that all three minors wer e residing with responde nt, they wer e “[d ] o i n g well,” and they wer e all developmenta lly on targ et. Tabor testified that a service plan had been established for the case . Amon g o t h er things, the service plan require d responde nt to underg o random urine drops and domestic-viol en ce counseling

. Tabor stated that responde nt had beg un domestic-violence counseling and that she had completed a urine drop in J anuar y 2010, which was neg ative. The next revie w hear ing was held on April 27, 2010. By that time, a differ ent case worke r, Amelia Her

nandez, was assig ned to the case . Her nandez noted that B’ y ata and her half-sibling s still resided with responde nt and that the minors wer e “doing g ood” in responde nt’s car e. He rn andez noted that responde nt w as participa ting in domestic-violence counseling , she was on a waiting list for “ WAVE” counse ling, a nd her dr ug scre ening s had bee n neg ative. ¶ 6 At a hearing on October 19 , 2 010, Her nandez reported that the m inors wer e “doing g reat” in responde nt’s custody and that responde nt had completed all require d service s. Her nandez stated that she had no conce rns “whatsoever” about responde nt’s ability to protec t the minors. Her nandez

rec ommended that the case be closed. Howeve r, b ec au s e of CASA’s conce rns reg arding unsupervised contac t betwee n Be rnar d and the family , the court order ed that all previou s o rd ers would rema in in ef

fe ct

. At a hear ing on J anuar y 25, 2011, CASA rec ommended that the case be closed. The trial court, J udg e Mary L inn Hea slip, discharg ed CASA and c ontinued the matter f or possible closure. ¶ 7 Howeve r, on May 20, 2011, the State filed a motion to modify g uardia nship and custody of the three minors. I n the motion, the State alleg ed that responde nt was arr ested for domestic battery

on May 18, 2 0 1 1 , with the vi ctim being Amashane ek. The S tate further alleg ed that this incident

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occur red in the prese nce of the other minors and that responde nt failed to rema in fre e of alcohol as require d by the dispositi onal order enter ed in Dec ember 2009. The State reque sted that g uardia nship and custody

of all three minors be transf err ed to DCFS. The sa

me day , the trial cour

t rea ppointed CASA. The parties waived their rig hts to a temporar y -shelter -ca

re hear ing. The trial court g rante d temporar y g uardia nship and custody of Amashane ek and Alishawan to J esse. The court g rante d temporar y g uardia nship and custody of B’ y ata to DCFS, with discretion to place h er with a responsible rela tive or in traditional foster car e. I n addition, responde nt was order ed to rema in fre e of all illeg al drug s and alc ohol and to submit t o random urine drops upon 24 hours’ notice

. ¶ 8 On J uly 15, 2011, the trial court hear d and g rante d the State’s motion to modify g uardia nship and custody

. On the sam e date, the court enter ed a dispositi onal order g ranting leg al custody of B’ y ata to DCFS , with discretion to place her with a responsible rela tive, in traditional foster care ,
or with J esse. The same order g rante d J esse leg al g uardia nship and custody of Am as h an ee k an d Alishawan. I n addition, the court ag ain order ed responde nt to rema in dr ug and alcohol fre e and to submit to random urine drops upon less than 24 hours’ notice. DCFS eventua lly place d B’ y ata with J esse. ¶ 9 A p er m an ency revie w hearing was scheduled for Aug ust 18, 2011, but was continued due
to the illness of one of the attorney s. Meanw hile, on September 1, 2011, responde nt pleade d g uilty
to ag g ravated battery of a child (720 I L CS 5/12-4.3 (West 2010)), b ased on the May 18, 2011, incident, and was sentenc ed to probation. On September 9, 2011, the court closed the case as to the
two older children. At t h at t ime, J esse was g rante d perma nent leg al custody and g uardia nship of Amashane ek and Alishawan. The court continued the matter as to B’ y ata for a perma nency revie w hear ing on Ma

rch 6, 2012.

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¶ 10 At the M arc h 6, 2012, hear ing, respondent wa s represente d by an attorney , but she her self did not appea

r. At the hear ing, case worke r Amber Rasmussen testified that she had been assig ned
to B’ y ata’ s case since J uly 2011. At t h at t i m e, B’ y ata’ s g oal was return home within 12 months. Rasmussen testified t hat B’y ata had resided with J esse and his wife, A retha , since May 2011, and that all of B’ y ata’ s needs wer e being met. Rasmussen t es t i fi ed t h at responde nt was entitled to supervised visitation and require d to arr ang e visits throug h the ag ency . Rasmussen initially testified that responde nt last visited B’ y ata on September 26, 2011. She later clar ified that responde nt “stopped by for Christmas, too.” Rasmussen stated that responde nt had not provided her with proof that she had completed a drug assessment and had not completed any of the reque sted drug scre ens

as require d by the service plans. Rasmussen acknow ledg ed that responde nt was not provided with

a copy of the curr ent service plan. She explained tha t she had intended to pr ovide the service plan
to responde nt at a family -team meeting

. Rasmussen schedule d two such meeting s, one in Dec ember 2011 and one in J anuar

y 2012, but responde nt did not show up to either meeting

. Ra s m u s s en indicated, howeve r, that she communicated to responde nt by telephone that she neede d to complete

a drug assessment. During the hear ing, the trial court noted that Rasmussen had submitt ed a repor t to the court. The court stated that it did not find the repor t “ver y thoroug h.” The court pointed out that the repor

t did not ref

ere nce the dates that the ag ency tried to contac t responde nt or when she was asked to do the urine drops and that it did not include a copy of th e s er v i ce plan. Ba sed on the fore g oing, the court found that responde nt f ailed to make rea sonable eff orts. The court also found that DCFS failed to make rea sonable eff orts. T h e co u rt set the perma nency g oal at return home within 12 months . The c ase w as continued to Apr il 5, 2012, for a status repor t as t o the ef

forts of DCFS. On that date , the cour t found that DCFS was making r easona ble ef forts.

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¶ 11 I n J une 2012, responde nt was sentenc ed to two y ear s’ incar cer ation for probation violations and a new felony char g e of failure to reg ister as a violent offe nder ag ainst y outh (730 I L CS 154/30 (West 2012) ). At the next per manenc y revie w hear ing, which was held on September 4, 2012, the
court was informed that responde nt was absent due to her incarc eration. Rasmussen testified t hat B’ y ata was doing well with the foster pare nts. She rec ommended chang ing the perma nency g oal to substitut e care pending termination of parental r i gh t s . R asm ussen not ed that she had not had any
contac t with responde nt since her incar cer ation. The court found that responde nt had not made

rea sonable eff

orts or rea sonable prog ress and, based on responde nt’s lack of prog ress, her incar cer ation, and the leng th of time the case had been pendi n g, i t ad o pted Rasmussen’s

rec ommendation to chang e the pe rmane ncy g oal. ¶ 12 On November 28, 2012, the State filed a motion for term i n at i o n of responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts, which was amende d on Dec ember 6, 2012. The amende d motion allege d four counts of unfitness. Count I alleg ed that responde nt had failed to maintai n a re asonable deg ree of interest,

conce rn, or responsibility as to B ’y ata’ s welfa re. See 750 I L CS 50/1(D)( b) (West 2012). Count I I alleg ed that responde nt had failed to protec t B’ y a ta f r o m conditions within the environment injurious
to her welfa

re. See 750 I L CS 50/1(D)( g ) (West 2012). C o u n t I I I alleg ed that responde nt was depra ved. See 750 I L CS 50/ 1(D)( i) (West 2012). Count I V alleg ed that re spondent had failed to 3 make rea sonable prog ress toward B’ y ata’ s return to her within any nine-month period following the first nine-month period afte r B’ y ata’ s adjudication as a neg lected mino r. S ee 750 I L CS

The trial court subsequently g rante d the State’s motion to dismiss count I I I of the amende d 3 motion, and it is not at issue on appea l. -6-2013 I LApp (2d) 130558

50/1(D)( m)(iii) (West 2012). Wit h respe ct to co u n t I V, the State specifie d the following “ninemonth” periods: (1) November 1, 2010, to J uly 1, 2011, and (2) May 17, 2011, to Marc h 17, 2012. ¶ 13 The unfitness phase of the termination proce eding commence d on J anuar y 24, 2013. At that hear ing, Offic er Sean Welsh of the Rockford police depar tment testified that on May 18, 2011, he responde d to a repor

t of a mother “batter ing” her children. When Offic er Welsh arr ived, he observe d responde nt with two children. Rasmussen was then called to lay a foundation for the service plans. Rasmussen identified service plans dated May 12, 2009, J uly 21, 2009, August 18, 2009, September 10, 2009, May 12, 2 0 1 0 , Marc h 4, 2011, November 2, 2011, April 26, 2012, and November 19, 2012. Those service plans wer e admitted into evidenc e and the case was continued to April 3, 2013. ¶ 14 When the hear ing resumed, Rasmussen was rec alled and she testified that since the last court date responde nt had been rele ased from jail a nd had contac ted Rasmussen to se t up visitation with B’ y ata. Rasmussen testified that responde nt had since visited B’ y ata twice, on Marc h 22 and Marc h 2 9 , 2 0 1 3. Rasmussen testified that she supervised the one-hour visit on Marc h 22 an d t h at

r e s p o n d e n t’ s b e h a

v io r was appropr iate. Following Rasmussen’s testimony , the State moved to ad mi t People’s exhibi ts 13 throug h 15 and 22 throug h 24. People’s exhibi t 13 is a cer tificate ref

lecting that

on September 1, 2011, responde nt was convicted of ag g ravated battery of a child. People’s exhibi t 14 is a cer tificate ref

lecting that on J une 26, 2012, responde nt was convicted of failure to reg ister as

a v i o lent offe nder ag ainst y outh. People’s exhibi t 15 is a cer tificate ref

lecting that on Aug ust 4, 2 010, responde nt was convicted of attempted forg ery . See 720 I L CS 5/8-4, 17-3 (West 201 0 ). People’s exhibi t 22 consists of th e b i l l o f i n dictment, g uilty plea, and probation order rela ted to responde nt’s conviction of ag g ravated battery of a child. People’s exhibi t 23 consists of the bill of indictment, g uilty plea, and sentenc e rela ted t o re s pondent’s conviction of failure to reg ister as a

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violent of fende r ag ainst y outh. People’s exhibi t 24 is the information, g uilty plea, and conditional discharg e order rela ted to responde nt’s conviction of attempted forg ery . The trial court g rante d the State’s motion to admit t hese e x hibits. ¶ 15 Respondent t es tified that she had been incar cer ated from May 18, 2011, throug h May 27, 2011, and from Marc h 14, 2012, throug h Fe bruar y 28, 2013. Respondent testified that in April 2012

4 she rec eived a service plan from Rasmussen requiring her to complete a drug and alcohol assessment and to participa te in pare nting classes, an ang er manag ement prog ram, and domestic-violence

coun s el i n g. Respondent stated that she completed all of the require d service s except for ang er manag ement. Respondent testified that she participa ted in a three -month drug and alcohol
assessment prog ram and in Nove m b er 2012 prese nted Rasmussen a letter evidenc ing her participa tion in the prog ram . S h e ac knowledg ed that, to rec eive a cer tificate in the prog ram, she would have had to c omplete a six -month prog ram. Respondent stated that she could not c omplete

a six -month prog ram, beca use she was schedule d to be rele ased from prison befor e she could do so. Respondent further testified that she completed pare nting classes while incar cer ated and prese nted

Wit h respe ct to the first period of imprisonment, the probation order admitted into evidenc e 4

as part of People’s exhibi t 22 indicates that responde nt was actua lly incar cer ated for a period of 107 day s for the offe nse of ag g ravated battery of a child, presumably from May 18, 2011, the date of the offe nse, throug h September 1, 2011, the date responde nt pleade d g uilty

. Wit h respe ct to the second period of imprisonment, People’s exhibi t 23 indicates that responde nt was taken into custody for failing to reg ister as a violent offen d er aga i n s t y outh on Marc h 14, 2012, rele ased on Marc h 22, 2012, and taken into custody ag ain on April 24, 201 2

. S h e was formally sentenc ed to two y ear s’ imprisonment for that offe nse on J une 26, 2012, and rema ined incar cer ated until Fe bruar y 28, 2013. -8-2013 I LApp (2d) 130558

evidenc e of such to Rasmussen in November 2012 and that she beg an domestic-violence counseling in September 2012. Respondent also noted that she place d her name on a waiting list for ang er manag ement while she was incar cer ated, but w as unable to pa rticipate in the prog ram beca use she

was rele ased from prison befor e it started. Responden t ac k n o wl edg ed that her prog ress on her service plans was rate d unsatisfac tory , but she attributed this to the fac t that she could not complete the service s during the rele vant six -month rating p er i o d

. She explained that she had been incar cer ated a

t multi ple fa cilities and that not all service s are available at ea ch prison. ¶ 16 Respondent further testified that she kept in touch with Rasmussen while incar cer ated. She stated, for instance, that she wrote to Rasmussen at least twice a month and reque sted visitation with B’ y ata. She noted that monthly visits at the prison beg an in October 2012. During these visits, she and B’y ata play ed with toy s, talked, and share d hug s and kis ses. Respondent t estified that B’y ata appea red bonded to her

and re fer red to he r as “mommy .” Respondent also rela ted that she kept in touch wit h B’ y ata in other way s while i n prison. Sh e s en t B’ y ata two letters a wee k and spoke to B’ y ata by telephone about five times. I n addition, responde nt testified that she asked Are tha about B’ y ata’ s prog ress in school and her medical appointments. Respondent testified that in November 2012 she was schedule d to participa t e in an administrative case revie w via telephone, but communication problems preve nted her f r o m d o in g so. Respondent stated that she wrote Rasmussen

a letter about the incident and tried to file an appea l. Howeve r, Rasmussen did not rec eive the letter until afte r the time for filing the appea l had expired. Respondent testified that, since being rele ased from prison, she ha d had phone c ontact with B ’y ata a pproxi mately

twice a wee k. ¶ 17 On cross-e x amination, responde nt noted that B’ y ata was initially remove d from her car e in Marc h 2009, as a result of domestic violence, and re m ained in foster car e until Dec ember 2009,

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when c ustody

of B ’y ata wa s returne d to her. Responde nt acknowle dg ed that B ’y ata wa s removed from her car e a second time, in May 2011, beca use of a domestic-violence incident involving herse lf and Amashane ek, which resulted in responde n t ’s co n v i ction of ag g ravated battery of a child. Respondent ag ree d that, as a result of that conviction, she was re q u i re d t o reg ister as a violent offe nder ag ainst y outh and her failure to reg ister re sulted in incarc eration. Respondent s tated that she was awa

re that, beca

use she wa s o n probation, t he commis sion of a new offense would likely result i n her being taken into custody and prevent her from caring for B’y ata. Finally , responde nt admitted that, betwee n May 2011 and September 2012, she did not pursue domestic-violence counseling , but she stated that she ha d been “ out of custody ” during that period of time for “[j ]ust a couple of day s.” ¶ 18 Are tha testified that B’ y ata lived with her, J ess, Amashane ek, and Alishawan. Are tha stated that responde nt wrote to the children about twice a month. Acc ording t o Are tha, howeve r,

re spondent never inquired about B’ y ata’ s medical car e or her educational welfa re. On cr o s s examination, Are tha acknow ledg ed that in her letters responde nt did inquire g ener ally about how the children wer e doing. She also acknow ledg ed that there was a bond betwee n responde nt and B’ y ata and that B ’y ata missed her mother. ¶ 19 Following closing arguments, the trial court continued the mat t er t o M ay 2 , 2 0 1 3, for a deci s i o n o n u n fi tness and a possible best-intere sts hear ing. On that date, the court found that the State had proven responde nt unfit by clea r and convincing evidenc e pursuant to counts I , I I , and I V of the amende d motion to terminate pare ntal rig hts. At the best-intere sts hear ing, which immediately followed, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of the evidenc e prese nted at the unfitness phase.

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¶ 20 Rasmussen then testified that since J une 2011 B’ y ata has resided in a foster home with J esse, Ar etha, and her two older half-siblings. Acc ording to Rasmussen, B’ y ata has a good relatio n s h i p with the foster pare nts, w ho are willing to a dopt he r. Rasmussen further testified that B’ y ata has a close relationship with her half-siblings. B’ y ata shares a room with Amashane ek an d l o o ks up to her a s a role mode l. Rasmussen also noted that B ’y ata a ttends churc h with the foster pa rents, that she is in presc hool, and t h at t he foster pare nts have attended B’ y ata’ s school meeting s and confe renc es. I n addition, B’ y ata has friends at school and in the neig hborhood. Rasmussen acknow ledg ed that there was some conce rn in the fost er home beca use responde nt had named another man as the possible fathe r of Amashane ek and Amashane ek was having some difficulties with this news. Rasmussen rec ommended counseling for B’ y ata to help addres s this matter. I n Rasmussen’s opinion, B’ y ata should be fre ed for adoption so she could have a stable, p er m an ent home wher e she know s the pare nts and is a par t of a fa mily unit. ¶ 21 On cross-e x amination, Rasmussen testified t h at B’ y at a h as a b o n d wi t h re s pondent. R as m u ssen noted that since October 2012 responde nt has regularly visited with B’ y ata. Fur t h er , responde nt has spoken with B’ y ata by tel ep hone through the foster parents, and the foster pare nts have indicated that t hey are willing to allow respondent to continue to have contac t with B’y ata if the adoption is completed. Rasmussen emphasized, howeve r, that even though responde nt and B’ y ata are bonded, she believes that it is in B’ y ata’ s best interests that responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts be terminated. Rasmussen testified that she did not speak to the foster pare nts about establishing a g uardia nship in li eu of a doption. ¶ 22 Respondent testified that she and B’ y ata have a bond. She noted that, since her rele ase from prison late in Fe bruar

y 2013, she has had contac t with B’ y ata by telephone and t h rough letters.

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Respondent stated that she would be in favor of a g uardia nship so that B’ y ata could rema in with the foster pa rents unti l responde nt beca me established. Respondent testified that she r esides with her

m other and g randf

ather and that she recently found a job. She stated t hat s he would be will ing to participa te in any service s that the court rec ommends if it finds that it is not in B’ y ata’ s best interests
to terminate her pare ntal rig hts. Respondent acknow ledg ed the ag g ravated battery of Amashane ek. She stated that to preve nt such incidents in the future, she is participa ting in an ang er- manag ement prog ram. She rela

ted that she has lear

ned to ref rain from “any ty

pe of neg ativity ” by removing herse lf from a

ny confr ontational situations. ¶ 23 The State called J esse as a rebuttal witness. J esse confirme d that he and Are tha are willing
to adopt B’ y ata. He also opined that it is important for B’ y at a to have a rela tionship with her biologica l mother. He stated that he would all o w re s p o n d ent to visit B’ y ata afte r adoption, as responde nt would be having contac t with the two older children, with respe ct to whom responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts are not being terminated. On cross-e x amination, J esse testified that Rasmussen did not discuss a g uardia

nship with him , but he was f amiliar with such an a

rra ng ement bec ause of

the other c hildren. J esse stated that his f ocus is on what is best for B ’y ata a s an individual, whether it be adoption or guardia

nship. ¶ 24 Following closing arguments, the trial court announce d its decision. The court noted that the focus at the best-intere sts phase of the proce eding is B’ y ata and no one else. Noting B’ y ata’ s strong bond with her h al f- s iblings and the unusual position that the foster pare nts have taken in openly ag ree ing to maintain contac t with a biologica l pare nt, t h e court terminated responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts. The formal order of termination was enter ed on May 7, 2013. On May 21, 2013, responde nt filed a notice of appe al.

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¶ 25 I I . ANAL YSI S ¶ 26 Prior to discussing the arguments responde nt raises in her appea l, we addre ss the timeliness of our decision. This case is desig nated as “ac cele rate d” pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010) beca

use it involves a matter aff ecting the best interests of a child. Wit h respe ct to such case s, I llinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (5) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010) provides in rele vant part that “[e]x cept for g ood cause shown, the appellate court shall issue its decision within 150 day s afte r t he filing of the notice of appe al.” In this case, r espondent filed her noti ce of appea l on May 21, 2013. Thus, the 150-day period to issue our decision expired o n Oc tober 18, 2013. We note, howeve r, that on J uly 25, 2013, responde nt filed a motion for an extension of time to file her opening brief. We g rante d responde nt’s reque st and set a r e v ised briefing schedule , allowing responde nt until Aug ust 22, 2013, to file her brief. Respondent did not file her brief by this date, and on September 6, 2013, we issued an overdue warning letter, noti fying respondent that she had seven day s to file her brief or her appea l would be dismiss ed without fu rt h er n o t i ce. Respondent filed her brief on September 13, 2013. There afte r, we ag ain re v i s ed the briefing schedule to allow the State until October 4, 2013, to file its brief, and responde nt until October 11, 2013, to file her reply brief. Since this case was not rea dy for dis position until October 11, 2013, we find g ood cause for issui ng our decision afte r the 150-day deadline. See In re Marriage of W anstreet , 364 I ll. App. 3d 729, 732-33 (2006) (noting that g ranting parties’ reque sts for ex t en s i o n o f time to file their briefs allowed the parties the oppor

tunity to develop and pr esent their positions). ¶ 27 Turning to the merits, responde nt raises three arguments on appea l. First, she contends that this case should be r emande d beca use the trial court failed to make any written or oral findings of fac t to support its unfitness deter mination. Second, she arg ues that the State failed to prove her unfit

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by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Third, she asser ts that the trial court’s finding that it is in B’ y ata’ s best interests to terminate her pare ntal rig hts is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. We find the first issue dispositive of this appeal. ¶ 28 A pare nt’s rig ht to raise his or her biologica l child is a fundame ntal liberty interest, and the involuntary termination of such rig ht is a drastic measure . In re Haley D. , 2011 I L 110886, ¶ 90; In re D.R. , 307 I ll. App. 3d 478, 482 (1999). Acc ording ly , the J uvenile C ourt Act of 1987 ( J uvenile Court Act) provides a two-stag e proce ss f or involuntary termination of par ental rig hts. 705 I L CS 405/2-29(2) (West 2012)

. I nitially , the State must prove that the pa rent is unfit. 705 I L CS 405/2- 29(2), (4) (West 2012); 750 I L CS 50/1(D) (West 2012); In re Adoption of Syck , 138 I ll. 2d 255, 277 (1990); In re Antwan L. , 368 I ll. App. 3d 1119, 1123 (2006). I f the court finds the pare nt unfit, the State must then show that termination of pare ntal rig hts would serve the child’s best interests. 705 I L CS 405/2-29(2) (West 2012); In re Adoption of Syck , 138 I ll. 2d at 277; In re Antwan L. , 368 I ll. App. 3d at 1123. ¶ 29 Wit h respe ct to the first stag e of the termination proce ss, se ction 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 I L CS 50/1(D) (West 2012)) lists various g rounds under which a pare nt may be found unfit. In

re Antwan L. , 368 I ll. App. 3d at 1123. The State has the burden of proving a pare nt’s unfitness by clea r and convincing evidenc e. 705 I L CS 405/2-29(2), (4) (W est 2012); In re An t w a n L. , 368 I ll. App. 3d at 1123. A deter mination of pare ntal unfitness involves fact u al finding s and cre dibilit y assessments that the trial court is in the best position to make. In re Tiff any M. , 353 I ll. App. 3d 883, 888-89 (2004). As such, a trial co u rt ’s d et er m ination of a pare nt’s unfitness will not be reve rsed unless it is contra

ry to the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. In re Brianna B. , 334 I ll. App. 3d 651, 655 (2002). A decision is ag ainst the mani fe s t weight of the evidenc e “if a revie w of the rec ord

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‘cle arly demonstrates that the proper result is the one opposite that rea ched by the trial court.’ ” In re Brianna B. , 334 I ll. App. 3d at 656 (quoting In re M .K. , 271 I ll. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995)). ¶ 30 Respondent initially asser ts that the trial court failed to make any specific finding s of fac t to support its deter

min at i o n that she was an unfit pare nt. Respondent arg ues t hat, when a trial court fails to make finding s of fac t, there is no basis for the revie wing court to deter mine whether the trial court’s finding of unfitness is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. As such, she urg es us to

rema nd the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter an express fac tual basis for its finding s of unfitness. I n support of her position, re spondent cites principally to In re Abel C. , 2013 I LApp (2d) 130263, and In re Madison H. , 215 I ll. 2d 364 (2005). As responde nt rea dily conce des, howeve r, n ei t h er In re Madison H. , nor In re Abel C. conce rned a finding of unfitness at a termination proce eding

. ¶ 31 I n In re Madison H. , the supreme court interpre ted section 2-27(1) of the J uvenile Court A ct (705 I L CS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002)). That provision rela tes to the place ment of a minor following

a dispositi onal hear ing, and it e x pressly require s the trial court to put “in writing ” the fac tual basis for its deter

mination. 705 I L CS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002); In re Madison H. , 215 I ll. 2d at 374. The In re Madison H. court held that oral finding s set forth by a trial court during a dispositi onal hear ing,
to the extent that they are expli cit and advise the parties of the basis for the court’s decision, satisfy the purpose of

the writing require ment, which is to “g ive the parties notice of the rea sons forming
t h e b as i s for the remova l of the child and to prese rve this rea soning for appellate revie w.” In r e Madison H. , 215 I ll. 2d at 374-77. I n In re Abel C. , this court interpre ted section 2-21(1) of the J uvenile Court Act (705 I L CS 405/2-21(1) (West 2010)), which require s written finding s of fac t in neg lect proc eeding s. Noting that neither the written order of adjudication nor the trial court’ s oral

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pronounce ment provided any fac tual basis for the trial court’s finding of neg lect, we conclude d that without clea

r and sufficie nt finding s of fac t we could not proper ly revie w the trial court’s decision. In re Abel C. , 2013 I L App (2d) 130263, ¶¶ 20-22. As a result, we reta ined jurisdiction of the appea l and enter ed a limit ed rema nd requiring the trial court to provide an express fac tual basis supporting its finding of ne g lect. In re Abe l C. , 2013 I LApp (2d) 130263, ¶ 22. ¶ 32 Unlike the statutes involved in In re Madison H. and In re Abel C. , responde nt does not direct

us to an y p ro v i s i o n requiring the trial court to put “in writing ” the fac tual basis for its pare ntal unfitness deter

mination at a termination proce eding

. Howeve r, respondent does not e that in In re G.W

. , 357 I ll. App. 3d 1058 (2005), we admonished trial courts to set forth a factual basis for a finding of unfitness. I n that case , the responde nt mother challeng ed the trial court’s finding that she

was a n unfit pare nt. We emphasized tha t, to deter mine whether a trial court’s finding of unfitness is ag ainst the m anife st weig ht of the e vidence , the appellate court must be able to revie w bot h the evidenc e pre sented a

nd the trial court’s finding s of fac t. In re G.W

. , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 1060. We then stated: “[T] he trial court in this case has failed to enter finding s of fac t. After hear ing the testimony of more than 10 witnesses over a period of approximately nine months, the trial court made

no finding s of fac t in either its oral statement at the end of the fitness hear ing or in its written order

. Whil e we g rant g reat defe renc e to the trial court’s finding s of fac t, our revie w is made

more difficult when no s u ch fi ndings are made and only a blanket finding of ‘prove n’ is pronounce d. We cannot review or defe r t o something that was never ma d e; t h er ef o re, we admonish trial courts to pay particula r attention to making finding s of fac t so that meaning ful

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revie w of the ultimate c urtailment of pare ntal rig hts is g iven.” In re G.W

. , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 1060. Ultimately , we vaca

ted and rema

nded not b ec au s e of the trial court’s lack of fac tual finding s on unfitness, but beca

use of other

err ors by the trial cour

t. In re G.W

. , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 1061-62. ¶ 33 Although not cited by the parties, in In re Richard H. , 376 I ll. App. 3d 162 (2007), the cour t addre ssed whether the trial court’s failure to make either oral or written finding s of fac t conce rning pare ntal unfitness require d reve rsal. There , the State alleg ed that the responde nt was unfit based on three separ ate g rounds, including the failure to maintain a rea sonable deg ree of interest, conce rn, or responsibility as to the minors’ welfa re. The trial court found that the State prese nted clea r and convincing evidenc e of the responde nt’s unfitness on eac h alleg ation. Howeve r, no finding s of fac t

wer e set forth in e ither the trial court’s oral pronounce ment or its written order

. The In re Richard H. court noted tha t, while specific finding s of fa ct are pref era ble, the ruling in In re G.W

. does not stand for the proposition that the lack of such finding s require s reve rsal in ever y case . In re Richard H. , 376 I ll. App. 3d at 166. The court conc l u d ed t h at its revie w was not impeded by the lack of fac tual finding s beca

use the evidenc e was “ove rw h el m ing and undisputed” that the responde nt’s inability to tackle her drug addicti on preve nted her from taking responsibility for the car e and custody of her children. In re Ric hard H. , 376 I ll. App. 3d at 164-66. ¶ 34 Turning to the facts of t he case be fore us, we a g ree with respondent that the trial court did
not set forth a fac tual basis to support its finding that responde nt is unfit to pare nt B’ y ata. I n announcing its decision, the trial co u rt m er ely stated that it had considere d “all of the evidenc e, testimony , witness cre dibilit y , and arguments of counsel, and finds that the State has met its burden of proof and proven the following by clea r and convincing evidenc e: As to mother[,] *** the State

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has proved Parag raph 9, Counts 1, 2, and 4.” Simi larly , the written order decla ring responde nt unfit

mere ly states, “[respondent] unfit ¶ 9 counts 1 , 2 and 4 *** finding s by clea r and convincing evidenc e.” The question thus become s whether the t rial court’s fa i l u re t o set forth a fac tual basis preve nts this court f

rom conducting a meaning ful revie w of the unfitness f inding in this case . We conclude that it does. ¶ 35 As noted ea

rlier, c ount I of the State’s a mended motion to terminate respondent’s pa renta l ri gh ts alleg ed that responde nt was unfit for failing to maintain a rea sonable deg ree of int er es t ,
conce rn, or responsibility as to B’ y ata’ s welfa re (750 I L CS 50/1(D) (b) (West 2012) ). I n assessing

a pare nt’s unfitness under this g round, a cour t considers a pare nt’s eff orts to visit and maintain
contac t with the child, as well as other indicia, such as inquiries by the pare nt int o the child’s welfa re. In re Daphnie E. , 368 I ll. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006). Completion of service plans may also be considere d evidenc e of a pare nt’s interest, conce rn, or responsibility

. In re Daphnie E. , 368 I ll. App. 3 d at 1 0 6 5 ; In re M.J. , 314 I ll. App. 3d 649, 656 (2000). The court should focus on the pare nt’s eff

orts, not his or her succe ss. In re Adoption of Syck , 138 I ll. 2d at 279. I n this reg ard, the pare nt’s conduct is examined in the context of the circ umstances in which that conduct o ccurred. In re Adoption of Syck

, 138 I ll. 2d at 2 7 8

. T h u s , circ umstances such as difficulty in obtaining transporta tion, poverty , actions and statements of others that hinder visitation, and the need to resolve other life issues are rele vant. In re Adoption of Syck , 138 I ll. 2d at 278-79. Fur thermore , if persona l visits with the child ar e somehow impra ctical, other methods of communi cation, such as letters, telephone ca l l s , and g ifts can demonstrate a rea sonable deg ree of interest, conce rn, or responsibility , “depe nding upon the cont en t , t o n e, and fre quency of those contac ts under the circ umstances.” In re Adoption of Syck , 138 I ll. 2d at 279. We are mindful, howeve r, that a pare nt

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is not fit mere ly beca

use he or she has demonstrated some interest or aff ection toward the child. In

re Jaron Z. , 348 I ll. App. 3d 239, 259 (2004). Rathe r, the interest, conce rn, or responsibility must be objec tively

rea sonable. In re Daphnie E. , 368 I ll. App. 3d at 1064. ¶ 36 Her e, the e vidence shows that the ca se wa s pending closure w hen re spondent was a rre sted

on May 18, 2011, for ag g ravated battery of Amashane ek. Following responde nt’s arr est, her contac t with B’ y ata was admittedly sporadic, with only two documented visits betwee n September 1, 2011, when she was rele ased from jail, a nd Marc h 14, 2012, when she was taken into c ustody for failure
to reg ister as a violent offe nder aga i n s t y outh. Howeve r, following her arr est in Marc h 2012, responde nt’s contac ts with B’ y ata g radua lly beca m e m o re consistent. Respondent beg an

corr esponding with Rasmussen to inquire about v i s i t s with B’ y ata, and monthly visits wer e established in October 2012. I n addition, responde nt kept in touch with B’ y ata in other way s while i n ca rc er ated. Acc ording to responde nt, she wrote to B’ y ata twice a wee k and spoke to B’ y ata b y telephone on at least five occa sions. Respondent also testified that she asked Are tha about B’ y ata’ s prog ress in school and her medical appointments. Are tha confirme d that responde nt had written to the children on a reg

ular basis, inquiring g ener ally about how the children wer e doing, but she denied that responde nt had inquired a bout B’y ata’ s health or e ducation. ¶ 37 Moreove r, althoug h responde nt was rate d unsatisfac tory on most of the tasks outlined in the service plans draf

ted afte r her arr est in May 2011, she never theless showed prog ress. Significa ntly , in Marc h 2012, responde nt contac ted Rasmussen to set up a family -team meeting , at which she was provided a copy of the most rec ent service plan. Respondent rec ounted that the service plan require d her to complete a drug and alcohol assessment and to participa te in pare nting classes, ang er manag ement, and domestic-violence counseling

. Respondent testified that she completed pare nting

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classes while incar cer ated and prese nted evidenc e of such to Rasmussen in November 2012. Respondent also testified that she participa ted in a three -mont h drug and alcohol assessment prog ram, beg an domestic -v i o l en ce counseling , and place d her name on a waiting list for ang er manag ement. ¶ 38 The evidence set fort h above is by no means a complete catalog of t he evidence pr esente d
at the unfitness hear ing. Neve rtheless, it demonstrates that, unlike in In re Richard H. , the evidenc e reg arding whether responde nt failed to maintain a re asonable deg ree of interest, conce rn, or resp o n s i b ility as t o B’ y ata’ s welfa re was far from “over

whelming and undis puted.” As such, and in light of the t rial court’s failure to set forth a fac tual basis for its finding that responde nt is unfit for failure to maintain a rea sonable deg ree of interest, conce rn, or responsibility as t o B’ y ata’s welfa re, there is no basis for this court to deter mine whether the trial court’s finding on this g round is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. We are mindful, of course , that the trial court found responde nt unfit on three independe nt g round s any one of which, standing alone, could support a finding of unfitness. In re E.O. , 311 I ll. App. 3d 720, 726 (2000). We conclude , howeve r, that the deter minations on the other g rounds of unfitness suff er f rom similar infirmities. ¶ 39 Co u n t I I o f t h e S t at e’s amende d motion alleg ed that responde nt was unfit for failure to protec t B’ y ata from c o n d it io n s w it hin the environment injurious to her welfa re (750 I L CS 50/1(D)( g ) (West 2012)). At the conclusion of the unfitness hear ing, t h e S tate argued that it had established unfitness as to this g round on the basis of responde nt’s act i o n s toward Amashane ek on May 18, 2011, which occ urre d in B’y ata’ s prese nce a nd for whic h responde nt pleaded guilty to ag g ravated battery of a child. Although proof o f n egl ec t as to one child might be rele vant to the issue of a pare nt’s fitness with respe ct t o another child (see In re D.F. , 201 I ll. 2d 476, 500-01 (2002); In re

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G.V. , 292 I ll. App. 3d 301, 307 (1997)) , there is no per se rule that the n eg lect of one child conclusively establishes a pare nt’s unfitness toward another child in the same household (see In re Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d 441, 468 (2004))

. I n such a case , unfitness based on a fai l u re to protec t a minor from co n d itions within the environment injurious to the minor’s welfa re should be “ ‘mea sured not only by the circ umstances surrounding the sibling, but also by the car e and condition of the child in question.’ ” In re Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d at 468 (quoting In re Edward T. , 343 I ll. App. 3d 778, 797 (2003))

. Her e, althoug h it was undisputed that responde nt pleade d g uilty to ag g ravated battery of Amashane ek, the State does not direc t us to any testimon ial evidenc e at the unfitness hear ing reg arding B’ y ata’ s car e, condition, or environment on or befor e May 18, 2011. Moreove r, the service plans admitted into evidenc e at the unfitness hear ing sug g est that B’ y ata was doing well in responde nt’s car e. The case worke r wrote, for instance, that B’ y ata appea red to be well car ed for by responde nt and that responde nt had display ed a desire to ensure that B’ y ata rema ins healthy

. I n other words, the evidenc e on this g round was also far from overw helming. We there fore conclude that the lack of a fac tual basis by the trial court impedes our ability t o ad eq u at el y revie w the trial court’s f inding on this g round as we ll. ¶ 40 Count I V of the State’s amende d motion alleg ed that responde nt was unfit for failure to make

rea sonable prog ress toward B’ y ata’ s return to her within any ni n e- m o nth period afte r the adjudication of neg lect (750 I L CS 50/1(D)( m)(iii) (West 2012)). The statute require s the State to specify the particular nine-month period relied upon. 750 I L CS 50/1(D)( m ) (W est 2012). I n this

case , the State identified the following two “nine- month” periods: (1) November 1, 2010, to J uly 1, 2010, and (2) May 17, 2011, to Marc h 17, 2012. I n its brief on appea l, the State appea rs to abandon this g round o f u n fi tness. The State points out that in the amende d motion it “inadve rtently listed

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periods that wer e not nine months” and there fore did not comply with the time period set forth in the
statute. I ndeed, the first period identified by the State encompa sses only eig ht months and there fore could not form a basis for unfitness under section 1(D)( m)(iii), which, as noted a bove, re quires an
assessment of prog ress during a nine-month period. The sec ond period c onsists of 10 months and there fore exceeds the statutory period by one month. This latter period could potentially provide a basis for a finding of unfitness had the trial court specifie d the nine-month period upon which it was relying. See In re R.L. , 352 I ll. App. 3d 985, 997-98 (2004) (r ej ec ting the responde nt’s argument that the trial court failed to spe cify the nine-month per iod it considered whe n deter mining that she had failed to m ak e re as o n able prog ress toward the minor’s return wher e the trial court expressly stated that it had considere d the responde nt’s actions during three consec utive six -month periods). Howeve r, beca

use the trial court did not specify the time period upon which it was rely ing or identify the conduct forming the basis for its deter mination that responde nt failed to make re as o n ab le prog ress towa

rd B ’y ata’ s return, w e ar e unable to meaning fully revie w the dete rmination. ¶ 41 I n short, the evidenc e in this case rega rd i n g re s p o n d en t ’s p ar en t al u n fi t n ess is not “over whelming and undisputed,” y et the trial court failed to set forth any fac tual basi s for its decision. Given these circumstances, we are unable to determine w hether the trial cour

t’s finding that responde nt is unfit is ag ainst the manifest weigh t o f t h e ev idence

. Acc ording ly , we are compelled to re mand this cause f or fur ther procee dings. As we did in In re Abel C

. , 2013 I LApp (2d) 130263, ¶ 22, we reta in jurisdiction over this appea l and enter a limit ed rema nd, strictly for the entry of the express fac tual basis supporting the trial court’s finding of unfitness, not for the taking of evidenc e or for additional argument. Consist ent with the policy requiring expeditious resolution of matters involving minors (see I ll. S. Ct. R. 311 (ef f. Feb. 26, 2010); In re D.F

. , 208 I ll. 2d 223,

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231 (2003)) , the trial court shall transmit its fac tual basis to the cler k of this court within 28 day s of this decision. We ex press no opinion reg arding the ultimate outcome of this appe al. ¶ 42 Be fore concluding , we ag ain emphasize the important interests at stake. Proce eding s such

as this can result in the perma nent and irrevoc able termination of a pare nt’s rig ht to raise his or her child. As such, we strong ly encour ag e trial courts to set forth finding s of fac t in support of any d et er m i n at i o n t h at a pare nt is unfit. See In re G.W

. , 357 I ll. App. 3d at 1060. Doing so not o n l y fac ilitates appellate revie w, but ensure s that the minors involved in such case s do not encounte r any needle ss delay

in obtaining pe rmane ncy . ¶ 43 I I I . CONCL USI ON ¶ 44 For t h e re as o n s set forth above, this cause is rema nded to the circ uit court of Winnebag o County for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion. ¶ 45 Remanded.

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