[Cite as Paridon v. Trumbull Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 2013-Ohio-881.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO 

PATRICIA PARIDON, et al., : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, :

CASE NO. 2012-T-0035

 - vs - :

TRUMBULL COUNTY CHILDRENS :

SERVICES BOARD, 

 Defendant-Appellee. :

Civil Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2011 CV 

02362. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

David L. Engler, 100 DeBartolo Place, #315, Boardman, OH 44512 (For PlaintiffsAppellants). 

William L. Hawley, Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., 108 Main Avenue, S.W., #500, 

P.O. Box 1510, Warren, OH 44482-1510, and William J. Meola, Davis & Young, 

L.P.A., 972 Youngstown-Kingsville Road, P.O. Box 740, Vienna, OH 44473-8618 (For 

Defendant-Appellee). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J. 

{¶1} Appellants, Patricia Paridon, et al., appeal the judgment of the Trumbull 

County Court of Common Pleas, denying their request for an injunction. At issue is 

whether appellee, Trumbull County Children Services Board (“the board”), may require 

attendees of its public meetings to sign in before being admitted to such meetings. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
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{¶2} On October 20, 2011, appellants filed a complaint for injunction alleging 

that, just two days earlier, on October 18, 2011, they attended a public meeting of the 

board, but that they were not permitted to enter the meeting unless they signed a sign-in 

sheet, pursuant to the board’s sign-in procedure. Appellants alleged that the board’s 

rule violated Ohio’s Sunshine Law, R.C. 121.22, and demanded an injunction to prevent 

the board from requiring them to sign in before attending the board’s meetings, a civil 

forfeiture of $500 for each person denied access, and attorney fees. The board filed an 

answer, denying the material allegations of the complaint. 

{¶3} The matter proceeded to trial on appellants’ complaint. Nicholas Kerosky, 

Executive Director of the Trumbull County Children Services Board, testified on crossexamination that the board has a written policy, which prohibits members of the public 

from entering the board’s building unless they sign in and state the nature of their visit. 

The written policy, which was admitted in evidence, provides that these security 

measures are necessary due to the “sometimes volatile nature of child welfare.” 

{¶4} Mr. Kerosky testified that this written policy applies whether the person is 

visiting the board’s facility during the board’s usual business hours to conduct business 

or in the evening to attend the board’s meetings. 

{¶5} Mr. Kerosky testified the purpose of this policy is to protect the children in 

the care and custody of the board, who reside in the board’s facility, and also to protect 

the confidential records maintained there by the board. 

{¶6} Mr. Kerosky said the board does not verify the name of those persons who 

sign in by requiring them to produce their driver’s license or other form of identification. 

Nor does the board perform any check on these individuals, such as a criminal history 
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check. Thus, any member of the public is permitted to attend a meeting of the board by 

simply signing in. 

{¶7} The board’s meetings are held in the board’s facility on Reeves Road in 

Warren, Ohio. Most of the meetings are held in the training room. The October 18, 

2011 meeting, which gave rise to this lawsuit, was held in the gym because attendance 

was expected to be higher than usual. Children in the care and custody of the board 

reside in the board’s facility. The area in which they reside can be accessed from 

various areas in the building, including the gym. 

{¶8} Mr. Kerosky testified that he has directed Mark Massucci, a board 

investigator who provides security at the board’s meetings, to deny admission to anyone 

who refuses to sign in. 

{¶9} Susan Pisegna, a resident of Warren who is not a party to this action, 

testified for appellants that she went to the board’s meeting in November 2011. She 

said she was asked to sign in. She said, “they asked us to sign in so I did not go in.” 

She said that when she attended the December 20, 2011 meeting, she was asked to 

sign in before entering the meeting. She did not sign her true name. Instead, she 

scribbled the fictitious name, “Suzie Homemaker,” which was illegible, and was allowed 

into the meeting. 

{¶10} Appellant, Patricia Paridon, testified she was asked to sign in for the 

board’s October 18, 2011 meeting. She refused and caused a disturbance when Mr. 

Massucci told her she could not attend the meeting if she refused to sign in. She still 

tried to enter the meeting without signing in. She said Mr. Massucci threatened to arrest 

her if she went in the meeting without signing in. He called 911 and officers from the 

Warren Police Department arrived, but she was not arrested. Contrary to appellants’ 
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argument, the record does not show they were ever asked by the board their reason for 

attending this or any other meeting of the board. 

{¶11} Following the trial, both parties submitted trial briefs. On March 28, 2012, 

the court entered judgment, dated March 28, 2012, denying appellants’ request for an 

injunction. The court stated the issue presented was whether the board has the right to 

require persons wishing to attend a board meeting to sign a sign-in sheet prior to being 

admitted to the meeting. The court found that the security of the children in the facility 

would be compromised by not requiring everyone attending the board’s meetings to 

sign in. The court also found that the board was authorized to require attendees at its 

meetings to sign in and that appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that they were entitled to an injunction. 

{¶12} Appellants appeal the trial court’s judgment, asserting the following for 

their sole assignment of error: 

{¶13} “The trial court erred in its finding that respondent-appellee did not violate 

Ohio open meeting law when it permitted a ‘sign-in’ sheet.” 

{¶14} Appellants argue that, pursuant to R.C. 121.22, they have an absolute, 

unfettered right to attend public meetings. They argue that the board is not entitled to 

impose any condition on their right to be admitted to those meetings. Specifically, they 

argue the board’s requirement that those who attend its meetings sign their name to a 

sign-in sheet constitutes a denial of admission. We note that R.C. 121.22 does not 

prevent a public agency from requiring those wishing to attend its public meetings to 

sign a sign-in sheet before attending. 

{¶15} While the parties agree there is no case law authority addressing the 

exact issue before us, we note that appellants cite no pertinent case law, which 
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supports, even by analogy, their argument that a public body may not require members 

of the public to sign in before attending its meetings. 

{¶16} R.C. 121.22, popularly known as the “Sunshine Law,” imposes open 

meeting requirements on public bodies. R.C. 121.22(A) provides that this statute is to 

be “liberally construed to require public officials to take official action and to conduct all 

deliberations upon official business only in open meetings, unless the subject matter is 

specifically excepted by law.” R.C. 121.22(C) also provides that “all meetings of any 

public body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times.” It is 

undisputed that the board is a public body; that the October 18, 2011 meeting at issue 

did not fit any of the exceptions to the Sunshine Law pursuant to R.C. 121.22(G); and 

that this meeting was required to be open to the public. 

{¶17} R.C. 121.22(I)(1) provides that “[a]ny person may bring an action to 

enforce this section. * * * Upon proof of a violation or threatened violation of this section 

in an action brought by any person, the court of common pleas shall issue an injunction 

to compel the members of the public body to comply with its provisions.” Upon proof of 

a violation or threatened violation of the Sunshine Law, irreparable harm and prejudice 

shall be “conclusively and irrebuttably presumed.” R.C. 121.22(I)(3). Upon proof of a 

violation, the court of common pleas is required to issue an injunction. Fayette 

Volunteer Fire Dept. No. 2, Inc. v. Fayette Twp. Bd. of Twp. Trustees, 87 Ohio App.3d 

51, 54 (4th Dist.1993). 

{¶18} This court has held that the plaintiff’s burden of proof for seeking an 

injunction in the context of an alleged Sunshine Law violation is clear and convincing 

evidence. Holeski v. Lawrence, 85 Ohio App.3d 824, 828 (11th Dist.1993). The 

decision to grant an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. See
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Garono v. Ohio, 37 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 (1988). Appellate courts review this decision 

under an “abuse of discretion standard.” However, where the appellant argues that the 

trial court erred in making a factual determination, rather than a discretionary decision, 

we must apply a “weight of the evidence” standard, rather than an “abuse of discretion” 

standard. Myers v. Wild Wilderness Raceway, 181 Ohio App.3d 221, 2009-Ohio-874, 

¶13, fn. 5 (4th Dist.). Under the civil manifest weight standard, the trial court’s judgment 

will not be disturbed if it is supported by some competent, credible evidence. State v. 

Reeves, 11th Dist. No. 2006-T-0099, 2007-Ohio-4765, ¶13. 

{¶19} As noted above, the board has a written policy requiring anyone visiting 

the board’s facility to sign in. According to the undisputed testimony of the board’s 

Executive Director, Nicholas Kerosky, under the board’s written policy, anyone entering 

the board’s facility, whether to conduct business during the day or to attend a board 

meeting in the evening, must sign in. This policy was adopted as a security measure to 

protect the children in the board’s care residing at the board’s facility and also to protect 

the confidential records maintained there regarding such children. 

{¶20} Appellants argue the board has not always required members of the public 

to sign in before attending a meeting because Paridon testified that on one occasion, in 

August 2011, she was not required to sign in. Appellants also argue that the board did 

not require citizens to sign in prior to this controversy. Appellants do not reference the 

record in support of this argument, and our review of the transcript does not support it. 

There is thus no evidence that, prior to this controversy, the board did not have a sign-in 

policy. Moreover, contrary to this argument, Mr. Kerosky testified that the board’s sign-in 

procedure has been in effect “for many, many years” without challenge. 
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{¶21} Next, appellants argue that any condition imposed on the admission to a 

public meeting is null and void. They argue that because there is no sign-in requirement 

in the Sunshine Law, the board lacked authority to impose such a requirement. We do 

not agree. 

{¶22} A meeting of government officials, when opened to the public, is a limited 

public forum for discussion of subjects relating to the duties of those officials. Dayton v. 

Esrati, 125 Ohio App.3d 60, 73 (2d Dist.1997), citing Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. 

Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976). The public body 

may place limitations on the time, place and manner of access to its meetings, as long 

as the restrictions are content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant 

governmental interest. Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 

37, 44-46 (1983); Hansen v. Westerville City School District, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 

31576 (6th Cir.1994). In Hansen, the Sixth Circuit held the board’s policy limiting the 

overall length of public participation at a public meeting, the number of speakers, and 

the duration of their comments, and giving preference to speakers who had not spoken 

at a previous board meeting was a permissible content-neutral restriction on the time, 

manner, and place of the plaintiffs’ speech. Id. at *31. 

{¶23} Appellants do not dispute that the protection of the children in the board’s 

care and custody is a significant governmental interest. We note that the board is 

charged with the protection of children in its care. See R.C. 5153.16. Moreover, R.C. 

2744.01(C)(2)(o), the political subdivision immunity statute, expressly provides that the 

operation of a children’s agency is a governmental function. 

{¶24} However, appellants argue that if the board is truly interested in protecting 

the children, they should move the meetings to another facility where children are not 
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present. While R.C. 121.22 does not state where a public body must hold its public 

meetings, it has been held that the public body must use a public meeting place. Wyse 

v. Rupp, 6th Dist. No. F-94-19, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4008 (Sep. 15, 1995), *12. 

Appellants have failed to reference any authority that addresses the issue of what the 

public body must do if its general meeting place presents a risk to the security of its 

residents. Because R.C. 121.22 is silent on this issue, we must conclude that the 

legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the public body. Id. at *12-*13, citing 

State ex rel. Hunt v. Hildebrant, 93 Ohio St. 1, 11-12 (1915). Thus, the board has the 

discretion to determine where its public meetings will be held. It is not required to hold 

its meetings off-site because it also has an interest in ensuring the security of its 

children and confidential records. Instead, the board exercised its discretion to require 

members of the public wishing to enter its facility to sign in as a security measure. In 

upholding this policy, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. 

{¶25} Next, appellants do not dispute that the sign-in requirement is contentneutral. There is no evidence that this policy was aimed at certain groups or persons 

holding certain views. To the contrary, everyone seeking to enter the board’s facility is 

required to sign in. 

{¶26} Further, the board’s sign-in requirement is narrowly tailored to serve the 

board’s interest in protecting the children and the board’s confidential records. In light 

of the board’s significant interest in providing for the care and custody of the children, it 

is difficult to imagine a less intrusive requirement than simply requiring members of the 

public who wish to attend a board meeting to sign his or her name. As noted above, the 

board does not verify the signature or investigate the citizen. It merely requires him or 

her to sign his or her name. As long as the person identifies himself or herself, he or she 
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can enter the building, attend the board’s meetings, and express any views or opinions 

he or she chooses. 

{¶27} Appellants argue the board’s reason for the sign-in requirement, i.e., the 

security of its children and confidential records, is pretextual because the board does 

not check the signatures of those signing in. However, Mr. Kerosky testified it would not 

be feasible for the board to verify the signatures and run record checks on every person 

attending the board’s meetings. Appellants argue that because the board does not 

check the signatures, the board is not really interested in the attendees’ names, and 

that the real purpose of the sign-in requirement is to count the number of attendees. 

They argue this can better be accomplished by simply placing a counting machine at 

the door to count the number of people entering the building. However, just because 

the board cannot feasibly verify the accuracy of the names of all attendees or run 

criminal record checks on them does not mean the board does not have a legitimate 

interest in retaining records of the attendees. This is particularly true if they are involved 

in an incident requiring investigation. While appellants may not agree with the policy 

decisions made by the board to protect the children in its charge, the board has the 

discretion to make these choices. It is worth noting that the sign-in policy applies to 

anyone wishing to enter the board’s facility for any purpose, not only to attend a board 

meeting, further evidencing that the purpose of the board’s policy is to promote security, 

not to interfere with the public’s right to attend its meetings. 

{¶28} Appellants’ reliance on State ex rel. Randles v. Hill, 66 Ohio St.3d 32 

(1993) is misplaced because in that case the public body locked the door to the room in 

which the public meeting was taking place and actually excluded the public from a 
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meeting. In contrast, here, the board took no action to exclude members of the public 

from any public meeting. 

{¶29} Appellant argues that because the Public Records Law, R.C. 149.43, does 

not require a person requesting public records to disclose his identity, the board’s signin requirement violates the Sunshine Law. However, while the Public Records Law and 

the Sunshine Law are both aimed at promoting openness in government, they are 

separate and distinct in several respects. Three examples follow. First, while the Public 

Records Law provides that no public office may condition the availability of public 

records on disclosure of the requester’s identity, R.C. 149.43(B)(5), the Sunshine Law 

has no such provision. If the General Assembly wanted to include an anonymity 

requirement in the Sunshine Law, as it did in the Public Records Law, it could easily 

have done so. Second, as noted above, it is well settled that governmental agencies 

can place limitations on the time, place, and manner of access to their meetings, as 

long as the restrictions are content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant 

governmental interest. Third, public records requests can be made and responded to by 

the public agency via the mail, e-mail, or facsimile transmission, significantly reducing 

the likelihood of any disturbances. In contrast, the Sunshine Law contemplates the 

attendance of citizens at a public meeting. It is well known that discussion at such 

meetings can become heated, as often happens when the issues under discussion are 

controversial, increasing the likelihood of disruptive incidents. Thus, at public meetings, 

the need to provide security measures is greater than with a public records request. In 

light of the foregoing differences between the Public Records Law and the Sunshine 

Law, the anonymity requirement of the Public Records Law does not apply to the 

Sunshine Law. 
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{¶30} The record before us supports the finding that the board’s sign-in policy is 

content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve the board’s significant interest in providing 

for the security of the children in its care and custody who reside in the board’s facility. 

The record further supports the court’s finding that appellants failed to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the board’s sign-in policy violated their right to attend the 

board’s public meeting on October 18, 2011. The board’s sign-in policy does not deny 

access by the public to the board’s meetings. As the trial court noted, under this policy, 

citizens have the choice to either sign in and attend or not. 

{¶31} We therefore hold the trial court’s finding that the board’s sign-in policy 

does not violate R.C. 121.22 and that appellants were not entitled to an injunction was 

supported by competent, credible evidence. 

{¶32} For the reasons stated in this opinion, appellants’ assignment of error is 

overruled. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., concurs, 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion. 

_______________ 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion. 

{¶33} I dissent from the majority’s determination that the Trumbull County 

Children Services Board (TCCSB) did not violate R.C. 121.22, the Ohio Sunshine Law, 

by requiring those who wished to attend its public meetings to sign a sign-in sheet prior 

to being admitted. Since this sign-in requirement improperly creates a prohibition on an 
 12

individual’s right to attend a public meeting anonymously, the appellants’ request for an 

injunction should have been granted and the lower court’s judgment should be 

reversed. 

{¶34} Pursuant to R.C. 121.22(C), “[a]ll meetings of any public body are 

declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times.” It further states that the 

law must be “liberally construed,” and requires that official business and deliberations 

occur only in “open meetings,” unless an exception applies. R.C. 121.22(A). The 

emphasis of this law is to promote the accountability of public officials and prohibit 

secret deliberations on public issues. State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio 

St.3d 540, 544, 668 N.E.2d 903 (1996). See also Moraine v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. of 

Montgomery Cty., 67 Ohio St.2d 139, 145, 423 N.E.2d 184 (1981) (“the intent of the 

Sunshine Law [is] that deliberations concerning public issues be made public”). 

{¶35} Pursuant to this law, it is important that individuals are free to attend public 

meetings without restrictions that impede their access and essentially render the 

meetings closed to the public. It must be emphasized that R.C. 121.22 does not state 

that access to public meetings may be restricted by requirements for admission, such 

as giving one’s identity. As has been noted, “[t]he only defense available to the public 

body when public access is denied to a public meeting is that the meeting is statutorily 

excepted from the public meeting requirement,” which is not the case in the present 

matter. Specht v. Finnegan, 149 Ohio App.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-4660, 776 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 

35 (6th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Randles v. Hill, 66 Ohio St.3d 32, 35, 607 N.E.2d 458 

(1993). It cannot be presumed that restrictions are allowable when the purpose of the 

statute is for meetings to be “open.” Requiring individuals to sign in creates a situation 

in which the meeting is open to the public only if they are willing to reveal their identities. 
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{¶36} The United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 

anonymity, in the context of free speech. It has held that anonymity can be “assumed 

for the most constructive purposes,” and that “there are times and circumstances when 

States may not compel members of groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be 

publicly identified.” Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 

(1960). It was further explained that “identification and fear of reprisal might deter 

perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.” Id. In the present 

matter, similar anonymity concerns may be raised, in that individuals participating in a 

public meeting or observing the public discussion are compelled to identify themselves. 

This may bring fear of reprisals, which was testified to by appellant Paridon, who stated 

that she believed that TCCSB may retaliate based on her attendance at its meetings. 

{¶37} Because of these concerns, requirements such as the one utilized in the 

present matter can have a chilling effect on individuals who may wish to attend public 

meetings. Under the majority’s holding, R.C. 121.22’s requirements that meetings must 

be open and public can be vitiated, as various regulations and requirements are placed 

on meeting attendance. This is totally inapposite to the statutory requirement that the 

open meetings provision be “liberally construed.” 

{¶38} It is also useful to compare R.C. 121.22 to R.C. 149.43, the Public 

Records statute, to demonstrate the necessity of anonymity at a public meeting. In that 

statute, the Legislature stated that “no public office or person responsible for public 

records may limit or condition the availability of public records by requiring disclosure of 

the requester’s identity.” R.C. 149.43(B)(4). It is unclear why, under the majority’s 

interpretation of R.C. 121.22, an individual would be allowed to obtain records related to 

the activity of a public body and retain his or her anonymity, while an individual 
 14

attending a meeting would not be given the same right. Under this interpretation, an 

individual would be able to assert the right of anonymity to obtain the exact meeting 

minutes of a hearing which he could not attend anonymously. This, in effect, impedes 

individuals from exercising their right to attend public meetings and fails to comply with 

the requirement to construe R.C. 121.22 liberally. It is also noteworthy that the two 

statutes are closely related and are often considered together in determining the 

requirements for record keeping and providing information related to board meetings to 

the public. State ex rel. ACLU of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio 

St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 36 (“R.C. 121.22 and 149.43 are 

construed in pari materia for purposes of maintaining a record of the proceedings of 

public bodies and making minutes of those proceedings available to the public”).

{¶39} It is argued by the appellee and the majority that the sign-in requirement is 

permissible because it was necessary to protect the safety of the children residing at 

TCCSB’s facility where the meeting was held. There are multiple reasons, however, 

why creating such a restriction on freely attending public meetings at the board’s facility 

is both unnecessary and is not narrowly tailored. First, the board could have simply 

moved its meeting to a different facility, one that did not pose any risks to children. This 

would not be overly burdensome, as it would only require the board to hold its meeting 

at any available location that could be safely open to the public. As was noted by the 

majority, there is no requirement that a hearing be held at a specific location or where 

the public body normally conducts its business. Crist v. True, 39 Ohio App.2d 11, 13,

314 N.E.2d 186 (12th Dist.1973) (R.C. 121.22 is “silent on the subject of the times and 

places” of public meetings, except for the requirement that public meetings “must be 

conducted only in a public meeting place”). If the board’s purpose for adopting the sign-
 15

in requirement was to protect children, this would be a better solution, since it would 

allow the children to be safe and also would not impede on the open meeting 

requirement. 

{¶40} Second, the sign-in requirement fails to serve the asserted “significant 

governmental interest.” The testimony presented revealed that there was no 

requirement to sign in with an individual’s actual name and no verification of the identity 

of those attending occurred. It is unclear, then, what purpose is served by signing in or 

how it could serve any interest, including the protection of children. Therefore, this 

process is not only unduly restrictive of an individual’s right to attend a public meeting 

but also fails to serve any meaningful purpose1

. 

{¶41} Since the sign-in requirement used by TCCSB at its public meetings is in 

violation of R.C. 121.22’s requirement that a public body’s meetings be “open” to the 

public, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision and would reverse the decision 

of the trial court. 

 

1. To the extent it may be implied that someone attending the meeting sign in under a false name, such 

conduct has criminal connotations.