SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

Jeffrey J Clark Kent County Courthouse

Judge 38 The Green

 Dover, DE 19901

 302-735-2111

March 28, 2017

John C. Cordrey, Esq. Charles R. Owens

Reed Smith, LLP 50 Madeline Drive

1201 Market Street, Suite 1500 Brunswick, ME 04011-7173

Wilmington, DE 19801

Deborah D. Statler

123 Blue Beach Road

Dover, DE 19904

RE: JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Charles R. Owens 

& Deborah D. Statler

C.A. No. K14L-04-001 JJC

Submitted: March 12, 2017

Decided: March 28, 2017

Dear Mr. Cordrey and Ms. Statler:

This letter addresses a motion filed by Plaintiff JP Morgan Chase Bank 

National Association (hereinafter “JP Morgan”) seeking summary judgment 

against Defendants Charles R. Owens and Deborah D. Statler. JP Morgan filed a 

mortgage foreclosure action in this matter on April 1, 2014, seeking a judgment in 

rem against them. In the Complaint, JP Morgan included a demand pursuant to 10 

Del.C. § 3901, requiring the Defendants to answer allegations in the Complaint by 

affidavit. To date, Defendant Charles Owens has not filed an Answer or responded 
2

in any way. Defendant Deborah Statler (hereinafter “Ms. Statler”) answered the 

Complaint but did not do so with an accompanying affidavit describing her 

defenses. 

JP Morgan alleges various grounds for summary judgment including that the 

defendants did not comply with the requirements of 10 Del.C. § 3901.1 Ms. Statler 

opposes the motion on several grounds and claims that she has made fifteen 

monthly payments on the mortgage since 2008, and that JP Morgan and its 

predecessor in interest have failed to mediate the matter in good faith. She does 

not, however, allege that she complied with the requirements of 10 Del.C. § 3901 

for raising and supporting her defenses by affidavit. 

A review of the record reveals that Ms. Statler filed an affidavit on May 19, 

2016, more than two years after the complaint was filed. In that affidavit, rather 

than identifying the nature and character of her defenses or their factual basis, she 

merely attested to her “[i]ntention to defend and contest the above cited case.”

Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of JP Morgan in this case

since there are no genuine issues of material fact and JP Morgan is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.2 Namely, 10 Del. C. § 3901 provides in relevant part, 

that in matters including scire facias mortgage actions, 

the plaintiff may specifically require the defendant or defendants to 

answer any or all allegations in the complaint by an affidavit setting 

forth the specific nature and character of any defense and the factual 

basis therefor . . . . If . . . the defendant or defendants [fail] to respond 

to the designated allegations by affidavit filed with the answer or 

answers, the designated allegations will be deemed admitted, and 

default judgment may be entered thereron . . . .

 

1

See Coppedge v. U.S. Bank Ass’n, 35 A.3d 418, 2011 WL 6393197, at *2 (Del. Dec. 19, 2011) (Table)

(recognizing that absent a defendant alleging coherent defenses when required to do pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3901, 

summary judgment is appropriately granted on behalf of the plaintiff).

2

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
3

Here, JP Morgan, by specific notation on the face of the Complaint, 

demanded that its allegations be answered by affidavit. Defendant Charles Owens 

has not responded in any manner. Ms. Statler has (1) not answered by affidavit as 

required, or (2) separately raised a valid defense to this action. JP Morgan’s 

allegations are deemed admitted by virtue of her non-compliance with the 

aforementioned statute. As a result, no genuine issue of material fact remains. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriately entered on behalf of JP Morgan

against Ms. Statler and Mr. Owens. Furthermore, to the extent Ms. Statler has an 

outstanding attempted appeal of the Commissioner’s decision denying her motion 

to amend her answer to include counterclaims, it is denied as untimely.3

JP Morgan is entitled to judgment in rem in this matter in the amount of 

$228,722.87, together with interest accruing at the legal rate and costs. Final 

judgment in rem is hereby entered in that amount. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/Jeffrey J Clark 

 Judge

 

3

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 132(a)(3)(ii)(providing ten days to appeal a Commissioner’s Order by filing written objections 

to the Order).