*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

OCT 14 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT NELSON ENTRUP,

Individually, a/k/a Robert E. Nelson

and d/b/a Vista, Vista Financial

Services, Vista General and Enco

Agency alter egos of Robert Nelson,

Entrup and JULIE DIANE ENTRUP,

Individually,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

STATE OF COLORADO,

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE

STATE OF COLORADO; GALE A.

NORTON, Attorney General; JACK

WYSOKY, Assistant Colorado

Attorney General; VICKY BARBER,

Investigator for the Colorado Attorney

General; BOULDER COUNTY

DISTRICT COURT, and Boulder

County District Court In Re Colorado

v. Robert Nelson Entrup, et al., case

no. 90-CV-1571-5,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1197

(D.C. No. 92-B-2328)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

1The district court previously granted summary judgment in favor of

defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel. This court reversed that

determination. Entrup v. Colorado, No. 93-1454, 30 F.3d 141, 1994 WL 396048

(10th Cir. July 29, 1994).

2Apart from the immunity problem, the first amended complaint fails to

state a claim for many other reasons, most of which were identified by the

magistrate judge. See I R. doc. 132.

- 2 -

Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.**

Plaintiffs appeal from the order on remand1 of the federal district court

dismissing this action with prejudice. The first amended complaint alleges a

variety of constitutional and statutory claims arising out of a state court

proceeding where Plaintiffs were fined, forfeited property in connection with their

loan business, and ordered to make restitution based upon violations of several

antifraud statutes. See I R. doc. 48. On appeal, Plaintiffs take issue with the

district court’s determination that this action is barred by the Defendants’

immunity.2

 See Aplts. Opening Br. at 3. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 and exercising plenary review, we affirm.

Claims brought in federal court for monetary relief against Defendants

State of Colorado, the Boulder County District Court, and the individual

Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
- 3 -

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415

U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974). Claims for monetary relief against the individual

defendants (in their individual capacities) affiliated with the attorney general’s

office are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity insofar as these claims deal

with the initiation and prosecution of the civil action against the Plaintiffs. See

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); Roberts v. Kling, 104 F.3d

316, 318-19 (10th Cir. 1997). To the extent that the individual Defendants acted

pursuant to facially valid court orders in seizing and inventorying the Plaintiffs’

business assets, see I R. doc. 4 at 10-11; doc. 48 at 6, they are protected by

absolute judicial immunity. See Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d

1285, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 1989). Claims for damages against judges in their

individual capacities would be barred by absolute judicial immunity. See Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978).

Having determined that the claims for monetary relief against the

Defendants are barred, we proceed to claims for injunctive relief. The injunctive

relief sought by the Plaintiffs is no less than review of a state court judgment,

something which a lower federal court is not empowered to do. See District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Facio v. Jones,

929 F.2d 541, 543-44 (10th Cir. 1991). Additionally, Plaintiffs lack standing to

seek prospective injunctive relief against prosecution of themselves and others. 
- 4 -

See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-07 (1983); O’Shea v.

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

Circuit Judge