IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

MURLAND W. SEARIGHT and 

VIRGINIA SEARIGHT, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

-vsMICHAEL CIMINO, 

..= . Defendant and Respondent. ,- ; 

APPEAL FROK: ~istrict Court of the Eleventh Judicial District;: L-' 

In and for the County of Flathead, 

The Honorable Leif Erickson, Judge presiding.' 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 62 

For Appellant: 

Murland W. Searight, ~olumbia Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

James C. Bartlett; Hash, 0'~rien & Bartlett, 

Kalispell, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on ~riefs: June 8, 1989 

Decided: July 19, 1989 

- -I- 

/ Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The Searights appeal from an order of the District Court 

for the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, denying 

their motion to vacate judgment and imposing sanctions 

against the defendant, Mr. Cimino. We affirm the District 

Court's denial of the motion, and further assess damages 

against the appellants pursuant to Rule 32, M. R.App. P., for 

the filing of an appeal without substantial or reasonable 

grounds. 

The Searights present several issues for our review but 

we find it necessary only to address the issue of whether the 

District Court properly denied appellants' motion to vacate 

judgment and impose sanctions. Because we answer this question affirmatively, we will not discuss the remaining issues 

raised by appellants. 

This case has a lengthy history. The Searights initiated a cause of action against Mr. Cimino in 1981, seeking to 

enforce the terms of a contract for deed requiring Mr. Cimino 

to pay half the cost of an airstrip constructed on the 

Searights' land. On May 14, 1985, judgment was entered in 

favor of the Searights, and on appeal this Court affirmed. 

Searight v. Cimino (1986), 718 P.2d 652, 43 St.Rep. 810. 

Mr. Cimino then sought to enforce the terms of the 

contract for deed granting him the right to use the airstrip. 

In July of 1986, he filed a motion to cause appellants to 

execute an airport easement pursuant to Rule 70, M.R.Civ.P., 

which provides in relevant part: 

If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents 

or to perform any other specific act and the party 

fails to comply within the time specified, the 

court may direct the act to be done at the cost of 

the disobedient party by some other person 
appointed by the court and the act when so done has 

like effect as if done by the party. 

The Searights resisted defendant's motion, arguing that 

the previous judgment entered did not contain any reference 

to an easement which could be enforced by invoking Rule 70, 

M. R.Civ. P. The Searights acknowledged defendant's right to 

use the airstrip as set forth in the contract for deed, but 

argued that the granting of an easement was not contemplated 

either by the contract or by the District Court's judgment so 

that defendant's motion should be dismissed. The Searights 

also requested sanctions against Mr. Cimino under Rule 11, 

M.R.Civ.P. 

The District Court held a hearing on the motion to cause 

the execution of the easement, and ruled that a written 

easement needed to be prepared and recorded. Following a 

later hearing on the Searights' motion for sanctions, the 

District Court found that an easement had been prepared and 

recorded by the Searights' attorney. The court further found 

that the motion for sanctions "appears to be harassment on 

Mr. Searight's part." The court denied sanctions against Mr. 

Cimino, and on its own motion, imposed sanctions against the 

Searights of $100. 

The Searights then filed a motion to alter or amend the 

judgment, arguing that Rule 70, M.R.Civ.P., was inappropriate 

to enforce a judgment granting an easement which never existed. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that: 

The thrust of Plaintiffs' argument is to 

relitigate the issue of easement. Since plaintiffs 

have already signed and recorded the easement the 

point is moot. 

On appeal, this Court refused to disturb the actions of 

the parties in putting the easement on record. Searight v. 
Cimino (Mont. 1988), 748 P.2d 948, 45 St.Rep. 46. This 

conclusion was reached based upon the absence of a record of 

the hearing on Mr. Cimino's motion to require execution of an 

easement, and the absence of proof of whether an order was 

issued or whether the parties were simply told to work it 

out. This Court also affirmed the levying of sanctions 

against the Searights, but refused to award damages for a 

frivolous appeal under Rule 32, M.R.App.P. 748 P.2d at 952. 

On March 10, 1989, after appointing himself as counsel, 

Mr. Searight filed a motion to vacate judgment and impose 

sanctions in the District Court. The motion requested that 

the court, pursuant to its authority under Rule 12 (h) (3) , 

M.R.Civ.P., and Rule 60(b)(4), M.R.Civ.P., vacate all orders, 

decrees, and judgments entered in the action arising from Mr. 

Cimino's motion to cause appellants to execute an airport 

easement. Mr. Searight contended that the District Court 

lost subject matter jurisdiction of the case after entry and 

satisfaction of its final judgment in the first action and 

had no power to order the granting of an easement. Mr. 

Searight also requested that sanctions be imposed against Mr. 

Cimino pursuant to Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P. The District Court 

summarily denied the motion. It is from this denial that the 

Searights appeal. 

I 

Did the District Court properly deny appellants' motion 

to vacate judgment and impose sanctions? 

Appellants contend that the District Court was without 

subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine the easement issue because final judgment had been rendered in the 

prior decision and that judgment included no reference to an 

easement which could have been enforced under Rule 70, 

M.R.Civ.P. 
Appellants argue that all orders and judgments rendered 

as to the easement issue must be vacated, citing Crawford v. 

Pierse (1919), 56 Mont. 371, 375-76, 185 P. 315, 317-18: 

It is elementary that when the judgment-roll upon 

its face shows that the court was without jurisdiction to render the particular judgment, its pronouncement is in fact no judgment. It cannot be 

enforced. No right can be derived from it. All 

proceedings founded upon it are invalid and ineffective for any purpose. . . . An affirmance of 

such a judgment on appeal cannot make it valid. 

(citations omitted). 

In response, Mr. Cimino argues that appellants are 

merely attempting to relitigate the easement issue, and that 

because they have already had the opportunity to raise a 

jurisdictional challenge, the doctrine of res judicata applies to preclude further litigation of this matter, citing 

Wellman v. Wellman (1982), 198 Mont. 42, 643 P.2d 573: 

Once there has been full opportunity to present an 

issue for judicial decision- in a given proceeding, 

including those issues that pertain - to - a court's 

jurisdiction, the determination of the court in 

that proceeding must be accorded finality as to all 

issues raised or which fairlv could have been 

raised, else judgments might bg attacked piecemeal 

and without end. (~m~hasis supplied) . 

643 P.2d at 575, citing Royal Coachman Color Guard v. Marine 

Trading (Me. 1979), 398 A.2d 382, 384. 

Contrary to appellants' contentions that Wellman is 

distinguishable we conclude that it controls. In Wellman, 

appellants attempted to attack a judgment rendered ten years 

prior to the appeal, contending that the District Court 

exceeded its jurisdiction by granting more relief than was 

sought in the pleadings. In affirming the lower court's 

dismissal, this Court said: 
Plaintiffs had a full opportunity to litigate the 

voidness issue in 1971 when they first moved to set 

aside the default judgment. They failed to do so. 

The doctrine of res judicata is founded upon the 

generally recognized public policy that there must 

be some end to litigation. The end for the plaintiffs in this case occurred more than ten years ago 

when they failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction 

and the District Court denied their first motion to 

set aside the default judgment. 

In the present case, appellants had the same opportunity 

to raise the voidness issue when Mr. Cimino first filed his 

motion to cause execution of an airport easement. They did 

in fact object to the District Court's ability to enforce an 

easement under Rule 70, M.R.Civ.P., in their motion to alter 

or amend the judgment following disposition of the easement 

issue. They further raised the specific issue of lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction in their Petition for Rehearing 

after this Court's opinion in the matter. Because the substance of appellants' challenge to the District Court's 

actions has remained the same, it is apparent they are merely 

attempting to relitigate issues which have already been 

decided by invoking different labels by which to contest the 

proceedings, one of which is subject matter jurisdiction. We 

will not allow appellants' characterization of their claim to 

hinder application of the doctrine of res judicata, and the 

prevention of protracted litigation. 

Furthermore, the District Court's handling of the easement issue was compelled by the actions of the appellants 

themselves. While it is not clear from the record whether 

the District Court ordered an easement be granted or told the 

parties to "work it out," the District Court's findings 

indicate that appellants were uncooperative and that Mr. 

Cimino's attorney was left with three alternatives: 
(a) to do nothing and have this matter continue indefinitely without resolution; 

(b) to breach the Code of Professional Responsibility and communicate directly with Mr. 

Searight; or 

(c) to seek relief through the Court. 

The District Court found that Mr. Cimino's attorney chose the 

only alternative that was reasonably available to him, namely, to file a motion asking the court to compel an easement 

be drawn and recorded. 

Even if the relief sought by Mr. Cimino was beyond the 

scope of the original pleadings in the first proceeding, we 

hold that a jurisdictional challenge to the court's actions 

will nevertheless be barred by the doctrine of res judicata 

under this Court's holding in Wellman. We affirm the District Court's order denying appellants' motion to vacate and 

impose sanctions. Because we conclude that this appeal is 

taken without substantial or reasonable grounds and that 

appellants are merely attempting to relitigate the easement 

issue, we impose damages in the amount of $500 pursuant to 

Rule 32, M.R.App.P. 

Affirmed.