J-S07029-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAVIER GOMEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 936 MDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 31, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0005496-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MAY 16, 2024

Javier Gomez appeals from the order denying his first timely petition 

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–

9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts as follows:

On September 22, 2017, Lancaster City Police Officers 

observed a Town & Country Minivan weaving down East Orange 

Street in Lancaster City, Pennsylvania, nearly striking the vehicles 

parked alongside the road. Officers followed the van and initiated 

a traffic stop when the vehicle failed to use a turn signal as 

required by law. [Gomez] was driving the van—which was owned 

by and registered to him—and was accompanied by two 

passengers, Annie Roth and Andrew Lundgren.

During the stop, Officers at the scene observed [Gomez], 

Ms. Roth, and Mr. Lundgren exhibit odd, non-compliant behaviors. 

All three occupants refused to roll down their windows more than 

a quarter or half inch and were reaching around in the vehicle, 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Gomez] refused to provide his license and registration, and 

[Gomez] was observed reaching toward the pocket side door and 

center console areas of the vehicle. Further, Officers observed 

Mr. Lundgren scratching his arms and kicking a bag inside the 

vehicle and noticed Ms. Roth using animated hand expressions

including flailing her arms and moving her hands on her breast 

area. 

Because of the occupants’ behavior, Officers decided to 

break one of the van’s windows to gain entry into the vehicle. 

After [Gomez], Ms. Roth, and Mr. Lundgren were removed, 

Officers searched the van. In the van’s center console, 

underneath [Gomez’s] registration and insurance information, 

Officers found a Charter Arms .38 caliber revolver, heroin[], and 

cocaine. [Gomez’s] DNA was later discovered on the revolver.

Officers found a “stow and go” compartment on the floor of 

the vehicle directly behind the driver’s seat that contained a 

locked safe and a backpack. The key to the safe was found on the 

key ring that was still inserted in the ignition of [Gomez’s] van. 

When Officers used the key to open the safe, they discovered bags 

of heroin and cocaine and a Ruger 9-millimeter handgun. 

[Gomez’s] DNA was discovered on the handgun. The backpack 

found in the compartment contained various drugs and 

paraphernalia[.] A casino rewards card with [Gomez’s] name was 

also found inside the backpack. Officers later discovered that both 

firearms removed from the van had been reported stolen.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/9/23, at 1-3 (citations to record omitted).

After his arrest, Gomez was charged with multiple drug, firearm and 

related offenses. On August 6, 2018, a jury trial began regarding only the 

two counts of firearm violations. Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted 

Gomez on both counts. Gomez elected to proceed with a bench trial on the 

remaining counts. Thereafter, a two-day non-jury trial commenced and, on 

October 16, 2018, the trial court convicted him on all remaining counts. On 

October 25, 2018, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 12 

1⁄2 to 25 years of imprisonment. Gomez filed a timely post-sentence motion, 
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which the trial court denied. Gomez appealed. On December 19, 2019, this 

Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and, on July 21, 2020, our Supreme 

Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. 

Gomez, 224 A.3d 1095 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 236 A.3d 1053 (Pa. 

2020).

Gomez filed a timely pro se appeal on September 27, 2021, and the 

PCRA court appointed counsel.1 After several extensions, PCRA counsel filed 

an amended petition on May 25, 2022. The Commonwealth filed an answer. 

On September 1, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its 

intent to dismiss the amended petition without a hearing.2 PCRA counsel filed 

a response on Gomez’s behalf. The PCRA court then scheduled an evidentiary 

hearing, which was held on February 27, 2023. Trial counsel was the only 

witness to testify. Following this hearing, the parties filed briefs supporting 

their respective positions. By order entered May 31, 2023, the PCRA court 

denied Gomez’s amended petition. This appeal followed. Both Gomez and 

the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Gomez raises the following issue on appeal:

I. Did the PCRA court err when it held [Gomez’s] trial counsel 

was [not] ineffective when he failed to use a third party’s 

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1 Because the trial judge retired in January of 2022, the matter was reassigned 

to another judge. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/9/23, at 4 n.6.

2 Gomez filed a pro se appeal from the Rule 907 notice, which this Court 

quashed on November 28, 2022.
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prior convictions to support [Gomez’s] third-party-guilt trial 

theory?

Gomez’s Brief at 4.

This Court’s standard of review for an order denying a PCRA petition 

calls for us to “determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence and free of legal error. The PCRA court’s factual findings will 

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified 

record.” Commonwealth v. Webb, 236 A.3d 1170, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191–92 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

Gomez’s issue raises a claim regarding trial counsel’s alleged 

ineffectiveness. To obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that 

counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that counsel's ineffectiveness so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could 

have taken place. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 

2009). “Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to be constitutionally 

adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient 

showing by the petitioner.” Id. 

The tripartite test we apply is well-settled, and each prong of the test 

has been explained as follows:

The burden is on the [petitioner] to prove all three of the 

following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) that counsel has no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of 

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. 
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We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where 

the factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief. 

Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal 

determination. 

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable 

basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel 

would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not 

chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. 

Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they 

effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight 

analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he 

may have taken. 

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted; formatting altered).

In support of his ineffectiveness claim, Gomez argues that he proved 

trial counsel “had powerful evidence that another person, the rear-seat 

passenger, possessed the drugs police found under his feet.” Gomez’s Brief 

at 11. Specifically, he claims Mr. Lundgren had three prior convictions for 

dealing drugs. Gomez concedes that trial counsel’s theory at trial was that 

the drugs were possessed by Mr. Lundgren or Ms. Roth, and asserts evidence 

of these convictions was admissible to support this theory. According to 

Gomez, “there is no reasonable basis for a defense attorney’s failure to use 

all evidence available to him to support his trial theory.” Gomez’s Brief at 11. 

Thus, Gomez contends that trial counsel’s failure to use this evidence 

prejudiced him.
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Regarding evidence of third-party guilt in criminal cases, this Court has 

reiterated that a defendant “has the right to ‘present evidence that someone 

else committed the crime of which he is accused.’” Commonwealth v. 

Herring, 271 A.3d 911, 918 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Yale, 249 A.3d 1001, 1014 (Pa. 2021). Stated differently, another person’s 

convictions for similar criminal activity are admissible to support a defendant’s 

third-party guilt argument.

Importantly, evidence of third-party guilt is not subject to Pa.R.E. 

404(b)’s prohibition regarding “propensity” evidence. Id. at 919-920 (citing 

Yale, at 1015-1022). Instead, the admissibility of prior convictions used to 

support a third-party guilty theory is governed by the general rules of 

evidence:

[u]ltimately, the question is whether the evidence supports an 

inference that the defendant did not commit the crime and 

someone else did. The more detailed the similarity, the more 

likely a finding of relevance. But a lesser level of detail combined 

with other circumstances attendant to the crime charged and the 

third person’s relationship to it are also pertinent considerations. 

So too are the temporal factors relative to the third person’s bad 

acts and the crime charged.

Herring, 271 A.3d at 920 (quoting Yale, 249 A.3d at 1024).

Here, the PCRA court concluded that Gomez’s ineffectiveness claim 

failed because he could not establish prejudice. The court explained:

Instantly, assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Lundgren’s prior 

convictions were admissible and that [trial counsel’s] decision not 

to introduce the evidence lacked a reasonable basis, [Gomez] 

cannot show that he was prejudiced by the error. Even if Mr. 

Lundgren’s convictions were admitted and the jury and the [trial 
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court] believed that Mr. Lundgren was, in fact, a drug dealer, it 

would not change the fact evidence against [Gomez] on each 

charge was overwhelming. Simply put, Mr. Lundgren’s status as 

a drug dealer would not have changed that the evidence 

sufficiently demonstrated that [Gomez] himself possessed the 

guns and drugs recovered from his van.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/9/23, at 7-8.

The PCRA court further noted that, because the contraband was not 

found on Gomez’s person, to support both the drug and firearm offenses the 

Commonwealth was required to establish that Gomez had “actual, 

constructive, or joint constructive possession of the contraband.” Id. at 8 

(citing Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa. Super. 2014).

The PCRA court then concluded that the Commonwealth 

“overwhelmingly” satisfied its burden:

[Here, t]he controlled substances and paraphernalia were 

found in a van that was owned and registered to [Gomez]. Some 

of the substances were found in the van’s center console 

underneath [Gomez’s] vehicle registration and insurance 

information. Other substances and other paraphernalia were 

found inside a backpack and in a locked safe located in a “stow 

and go” compartment on the floor of the van directly behind 

[Gomez’s] seat. The backpack where drugs and paraphernalia 

were found contained a casino card with [Gomez’s] name on it 

and the safe where other substances were located was opened by 

a key on [Gomez’s] own key ring. Thus, even if evidence of Mr. 

Lundgren’s past [drug] conviction had been introduced, the 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth unquestionably 

established that [Gomez] participated in the drug related activity 

and connected [Gomez] to the specific areas where the drugs 

were found.

***

[Moreover], there was “substantial evidence” that [Gomez] 

knowingly exercised power over the guns found in his van. The 

.38 caliber revolver was found in the center console of [Gomez’s] 
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van underneath his vehicle registration and insurance information. 

Importantly [Gomez’s] DNA was found on the revolver. Officers 

located the Ruger 9-millimeter handgun in a locked safe in the 

“stow and go” compartment found on the floor of the vehicle 

directly behind the seat where [Gomez] had been sitting. The 

locked safe was opened using a key that Officers found on the key 

ring that was inserted in [Gomez’s] van. [Gomez’s] DNA was also 

found on the Ruger handgun. The DNA evidence recovered from 

the weapons demonstrated that [Gomez] had physical possession 

of the guns, thus exerting actual control over the weapon(s). 

Further, the locations in which the firearms were found suggested 

that [Gomez] had the ability to exercise a conscious dominion over 

the weapons and the intent to do so. Again, to the extent that 

Mr. Lundgren’s prior [drug] convictions had any relevance to the 

gun charges that [Gomez] faced, the admission of these 

convictions would not have altered the outcome of [Gomez’s] 

trials. The Commonwealth presented extensive evidence showing 

that [Gomez] possessed the at-issue weapons.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/9/23, at 8-10 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted).

Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions. As

summarized above, at both trials in this matter, the Commonwealth clearly 

established a nexus between Gomez and the drugs and firearms found in his 

van. Additionally, all of Mr. Lundgren’s drug convictions occurred over five 

years prior to Gomez’s trial. Herring, supra; compare Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 779 A.2d 1195, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2001)(reversing for a new trial 

when driver of vehicle in which defendant passenger and drugs were found

had not only a prior drug conviction, but also had pending drug charges at the 

time of defendant’s trial).

Thus, Gomez has failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s failure to admit evidence of Mr. Lundgren’s prior drug 
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convictions, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Sandusky, supra. As he cannot establish that he was prejudiced by trial 

counsel’s omission, Gomez’s ineffectiveness claim fails. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/16/2024