H.R. 4435—FY15 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BILL

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES

SUMMARY OF BILL LANGUAGE............................................ 1

BILL LANGUAGE..................................................................... 10

DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE ........................................ 47

SUMMARY OF BILL LANGUAGE

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Table Of Contents

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE E—DEFENSE-WIDE, JOINT, AND MULTISERVICE MATTERS

Section 1XX—Additional Oversight Requirements for the Undersea Mobility 

Acquisition Program of the United States Special Operations Command

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND 

EVALUATION

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 2XX—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Airborne Reconnaissance 

Systems 

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 2XX—Modification to Cost-sharing Requirement for Pilot Program to 

include Technology Protection Features during Research and Development of 

Certain Defense Systems

Section 2XX—Revision to the Service Requirement under the Science, 

Mathematics, and Research for Transformation Defense Education Program

TITLE VIII—ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION 

MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—AMENDMENTS TO GENERAL CONTRACTING AUTHORITIES,

PROCEDURES, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 8XX—Extension of Contract Authority for Advanced Component 

Development or Prototype Units

TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE D—COUNTERTERRORISM

Section 10XX—Extension of Authority to Make Rewards for Combating 

Terrorism

SUBTITLE F—STUDIES AND REPORTS

Section 10XX—Protection of Defense Mission-Critical Infrastructure from 

Electromagnetic Pulse and High-Powered Microwave Systems

SUBTITLE G—OTHER MATTERS

Section 10XX—Pilot Program for the Human Terrain System

Section 10XX—Certification and Limitation on Availability of Funds for 

Aviation Foreign Internal Defense Program

Section 10XX—Reduction in Costs to Report Critical Changes to Major 

Automated Information System Programs

2
Section 10XX—Modification of Department of Defense Authority for 

Humanitarian Demining Assistance and Stockpiled Conventional Munitions 

Assistance Programs

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING

Section 12XX—Extension of Authority for Support of Special Operations to 

Combat Terrorism

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 12XX—One-Year Extension of Authorization for Non-Conventional 

Assisted Recovery Capabilities

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND 

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Section 16XX—Assessment and Limitation on Availability of Funds for 

Intelligence Activities and Programs of United States Special Operations 

Command and Special Operations Forces

Section 16XX—Annual Briefing on the Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Requirements of the Combatant Commands

Section 16XX—One-Year Extension of Report on Imagery Intelligence and 

Geospatial Information Support Provided to Regional Organizations and 

Security Alliances

Section 16XX—Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Executive Agent

SUBTITLE C—CYBERSPACE-RELATED MATTERS

Section 16XX—Executive Agency for Cyber Test and Training Ranges

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE E—DEFENSE-WIDE, JOINT, AND MULTISERVICE MATTERS

Section 1XX—Additional Oversight Requirements for the Undersea Mobility 

Acquisition Program of the United States Special Operations Command

This section would modify the current oversight requirements for the 

undersea mobility acquisition program of U.S. Special Operations Command, and 

require the Secretary of the Navy to review a transition plan for the undersea 

mobility capabilities developed by the Commander, U.S. Special Operations 

3
Command. This section would also repeal section 144 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81). 

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION 

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 2XX—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Airborne Reconnaissance 

Systems 

This section would limit the obligation or expenditure of funds to not more 

than 25 percent for the imaging and targeting support of airborne reconnaissance 

systems, until the Secretary of the Air Force delivers a report to the congressional 

defense committees and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 

The elements of the report would include a detailed plan regarding using such funds 

for fiscal year 2015, and a strategic plan for the funding of advanced airborne 

reconnaissance technologies supporting manned and unmanned systems. 

The committee notes that the Air Force did not provide substantive 

information for the proposed use of these funds, aside from the general area of 

imaging and targeting support.

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 2XX—Modification to Cost-sharing Requirement for Pilot Program to 

include Technology Protection Features during Research and Development of 

Certain Defense Systems

This section would amend Section 243(b) of the Ike Skelton National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383) by striking “at 

least one half of the cost of such activities” and inserting “an appropriate share of 

the cost of such activities, as determined by the Secretary”. 

Section 2XX—Revision to the Service Requirement under the Science, Mathematics, 

and Research for Transformation Defense Education Program

This section would amend subparagraph (B) of section 2192a(c)(1) of title 

10, United States Code, by modifying the service obligation requirement to also 

include employment with a public or private sector entity or organization outside 

the Department of Defense if the Secretary of Defense determines that employment 

of the person with such entity or organization for the purpose of such obligated 

service would provide a benefit to the Department of Defense. 

4
TITLE VIII—ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION 

MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—AMENDMENTS TO GENERAL CONTRACTING AUTHORITIES, PROCEDURES,

AND LIMITATIONS

Section 8XX—Extension of Contract Authority for Advanced Component 

Development or Prototype Units

This section would extend existing statutory authority under subsection 

(b)(4) of section 819 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 

(Public Law 111-84; 10 U.S.C. 2302 note) until September 30, 2019. This authority 

provides the Department of Defense a “bridge” between the science and technology 

portion of a contract awarded under the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s Broad 

Agency Announcement authority, and the award of a contract under a new 

acquisition for advanced component development or production.

TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE D—COUNTERTERRORISM

Section 10XX—Extension of Authority to Make Rewards for Combating Terrorism

This section would extend the authority through fiscal year 2015 for the 

Secretary of Defense to offer and make rewards to a person providing information or 

nonlethal assistance to U.S. Government personnel or Government personnel of 

allied forces participating in a combined operation with U.S. Armed Forces 

conducted outside the United States against international terrorism or providing 

such information or assistance that is beneficial to force protection associated with 

such an operation.

SUBTITLE F—STUDIES AND REPORTS

Section 10XX—Protection of Defense Mission-Critical Infrastructure from 

Electromagnetic Pulse and High-Powered Microwave Systems

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a certification 

to the congressional defense committees that defense mission-critical infrastructure 

requiring electromagnetic pulse protection that receives power supply from 

commercial or other non-military sources, is protected from the adverse effects of 

5
man-made or naturally occurring electromagnetic pulse and high-powered 

microwave weapons. 

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense is dependent on 

commercial power to supply most of its needs and understands that such 

commercial power could be susceptible to disruption or degradation from 

electromagnetic pulse or high-powered microwave events. The committee believes 

that much of the Department's defense mission-critical infrastructure includes 

planning and mitigation measures against such threats, but remains concerned that 

some critical capabilities may not have been included in previous reviews. The 

committee intends to determine if there is reason for further concern, but recognizes 

that remediation activities will have to be resourced by other organizations outside 

of the Department of Defense. 

SUBTITLE G—OTHER MATTERS

Section 10XX—Pilot Program for the Human Terrain System

This section would require the Secretary of the Army to conduct a pilot 

program to utilize Human Terrain System assets in the U.S. Pacific Command area 

of responsibility to support Phase 0 shaping operations and to support the theater 

security cooperation plans of the geographic combatant commander.

Section 10XX—Certification and Limitation on Availability of Funds for Aviation 

Foreign Internal Defense Program

This section would prohibit U.S. Special Operations Command from 

obligating any funds available for fiscal year 2015 for the Aviation Foreign Internal 

Defense Program until the Secretary of Defense provides a certification to the 

congressional defense committees that validates program requirements.

Section 10XX—Reduction in Costs to Report Critical Changes to Major Automated 

Information System Programs

This section would give Department of Defense milestone decision 

authorities responsible for major automated information system programs or major 

information technology investments the option of submitting a notification to the 

congressional defense committees, either a critical change report when required, or 

a streamlined notification when the official concludes that the critical change 

occurred due to an extension of the program and there is minimal developmental 

risk.

Section 10XX—Modification of Department of Defense Authority for Humanitarian 

Demining Assistance and Stockpiled Conventional Munitions Assistance Programs

6
This section would modify the reporting requirements and definitions 

contained in section 407 of title 10, United States Code, regarding humanitarian 

demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance. The 

committee is also concerned that the Department of Defense Humanitarian Mine 

Action (HMA) program have sufficient resources for HMA and conventional 

munitions assistance programs. 

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS 

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING

Section 12XX—Extension of Authority for Support of Special Operations to Combat 

Terrorism

This section would extend through 2017 the authority for support of special 

operations to combat terrorism pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as 

amended most recently by section 1203(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81). Further discussion of this provision is 

contained in the classified annex to this report. 

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 12XX—One-Year Extension of Authorization for Non-Conventional Assisted 

Recovery Capabilities

This section would extend by 1 year the authority for non-conventional 

assisted recovery capabilities pursuant to subsection (h) of section 943 of the 

Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public 

Law 110-417), as amended most recently by section 1203(c) of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81). 

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND 

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Section 16XX—Assessment and Limitation on Availability of Funds for Intelligence 

Activities and Programs of United States Special Operations Command and Special 

Operations Forces

7
This section would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and the Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, to submit an assessment to the appropriate congressional 

committees on the intelligence activities and programs of the U.S. Special 

Operations Forces and U.S. Special Operations Command. This section would also 

limit 50 percent of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise 

made available for fiscal year 2015 of U.S. Special Operations Command Major 

Force Program-11 procurement, defense-wide, and research, development, testing, 

and evaluation, defense-wide, until such assessment is received. Further discussion 

of this provision is contained in the classified annex to this report. 

Section 16XX—Annual Briefing on the Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Requirements of the Combatant Commands

This section would direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees and the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 

Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance requirements, by specific intelligence capability type, of each of the 

combatant commands; for the year preceding the year in which the briefing is 

provided, the satisfaction rate of each of the combatant commands with the 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements, by specific intelligence 

capability type, of such combatant command; and a risk analysis identifying the 

critical gaps and shortfalls in such requirements in relation to such satisfaction 

rate.

Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence would be 

required to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees and the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 

the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on short-term, mid-term, and 

long-term strategies to address the critical intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance requirements of the combatant commands. The briefings should 

address the role of government and commercial systems, and the methods to 

meeting the requirements of the combatant commands.

These briefings would be due with the budget submission each year, from 

fiscal year 2016-20.

Section 16XX—One-Year Extension of Report on Imagery Intelligence and 

Geospatial Information Support Provided to Regional Organizations and Security 

Alliances

This section would extend the existing reporting requirement by 1 year, 

regarding sharing of imagery intelligence and geospatial information to regional 

organizations and security alliances. 

8
Section 16XX—Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Executive Agent

This section would establish an executive agent for the Tactical 

Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program. The executive agent shall 

report directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and shall be 

responsible for working with the combatant commands, military services, and 

intelligence community to develop methods to increase warfighter effectiveness 

through the exploitation of national capabilities and to promote cross-domain 

integration of such capabilities into military operations, training, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. 

This section would also require the TENCAP executive agent to provide an 

annual briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House 

of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for the 

fiscal years 2016-20 on the investments, activities, challenges, and opportunities in 

carrying out the TENCAP program.

SUBTITLE C—CYBERSPACE-RELATED MATTERS

Section 16XX—Executive Agency for Cyber Test and Training Ranges

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to establish an 

executive agent to coordinate and oversee the management of the various cyber test 

and training ranges being developed and deployed by the Department of Defense.

The committee is aware that a number of cyber ranges currently exist, but 

the Department's Test and Evaluation Strategic Plan has identified a number of 

capability gaps that need to be addressed in order to provide sufficient and 

adequate cyber test and training. Though there has been significant growth of cyber 

personnel to fulfill critical defensive and offensive missions for the Department, the 

capacity for training in a realistic environment has not kept pace. The committee is 

concerned that those challenges have not been addressed and that the Department 

is unable to come to resolution on how best to provide adequate management and 

support for such capabilities. The committee believes that designation of an 

executive agent for cyber test and training ranges will be an important step in 

managing the current range resources, as well as provide discipline to prevent 

rampant proliferation of duplicative capabilities. 

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BILL LANGUAGE

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1 SEC. 1ll. øLog 53920¿ ADDITIONAL OVERSIGHT REQUIRE2 MENTS FOR THE UNDERSEA MOBILITY AC3 QUISITION PROGRAM OF THE UNITED 

4 STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND. 

5 (a) LIMITATION ON MILESTONE B DECISION.—The 

6 Commander of the United States Special Operations Com7 mand may not make any Milestone B acquisition decisions 

8 with respect to a covered element unless—

9 (1) the Commander has submitted to the con10 gressional defense committees the transition plan 

11 under subsection (b)(2); 

12 (2) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi13 tion, Technology, and Logistics has submitted to 

14 such committees the certification under subsection 

15 (c)(1); and 

16 (3) the Secretary of the Navy has completed the 

17 review under subsection (d)(1). 

18 (b) TRANSITION PLAN.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commander shall de20 velop a transition plan for undersea mobility capa21 bilities that includes the following: 

22 (A) A description of the current capabili23 ties provided by covered elements as of the date 

24 of the plan. 


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1 (B) An identification and description of 

2 the requirements of the Commander for future 

3 undersea mobility platforms. 

4 (C) An identification of resources nec5 essary to fulfill the requirements identified in 

6 subparagraph (B). 

7 (D) A description of the technology readi8 ness levels of any covered element currently 

9 under development as of the date of the plan. 

10 (E) An identification of any potential gaps 

11 or projected shortfall in capability, along with 

12 steps to mitigate any such gap or shortfall. 

13 (F) Any other matters the Commander de14 termines appropriate. 

15 (2) SUBMISSION.—The Commander shall sub16 mit to the congressional defense committees the 

17 transition plan under paragraph (1). 

18 (c) CERTIFICATION.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided by para20 graph (2), the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac21 quisition, Technology, and Logistics shall certify an 

22 acquisition strategy for covered elements developed 

23 by the Commander if such strategy—


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1 (A) is based on reasonable cost and sched2 ule estimates to execute the product develop3 ment and production plan; 

4 (B) the technology in the program has 

5 been demonstrated in a relevant environment; 

6 and 

7 (C) the program complies with all relevant 

8 policies, regulations, and directives of the Sec9 retary of Defense. 

10 (2) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense may 

11 waive the certification requirement in paragraph (1) 

12 if the Secretary—

13 (A) determines that such certification is 

14 not in the interests of the United States; and 

15 (B) notifies the congressional defense com16 mittees of such determination, including jus17 tifications for making the waiver. 

18 (d) REVIEW.—The Secretary of the Navy shall—

19 (1) review the transition plan under subsection 

20 (b)(1) and the acquisition strategy described in sub21 section (c)(1); and 

22 (2) ensure that the development of require23 ments for the Navy and the acquisition plans of the 

24 Navy take into account such transition plan and ac25 quisition strategy. 


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1 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

2 (1) The term ‘‘covered element’’ means any of 

3 the following elements of the undersea mobility ac4 quisition program of the United States Special Oper5 ations Command: 

6 (A) The dry combat submersible-light pro7 gram. 

8 (B) The dry combat submersible-medium 

9 program. 

10 (C) The next-generation submarine shelter 

11 program. 

12 (D) Any new dry combat submersible de13 veloped under the undersea mobility acquisition 

14 program of the United States Special Oper15 ations Command after the date of the enact16 ment of this Act. 

17 (2) The term ‘‘Milestone B approval’’ has the 

18 meaning given that term in section 2366(e) of title 

19 10, United States Code. 

20 (f) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Section 144 of the Na21 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

22 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1325) is repealed.


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1 SEC. 2ll. øLog 53759¿ LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF 

2 FUNDS FOR AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE 

3 SYSTEMS. 

4 (a) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be ap5 propriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fis6 cal year 2015 for research, development, test, and evalua7 tion, Air Force, for imaging and targeting support of air8 borne reconnaissance systems, not more than 25 percent 

9 may be obligated or expended until the date on which the 

10 Secretary of the Air Force submits to the appropriate con11 gressional committees—

12 (1) a detailed plan regarding using such funds 

13 for such purpose during fiscal year 2015; and 

14 (2) a strategic plan for the funding of advanced 

15 airborne reconnaissance technologies supporting 

16 manned and unmanned systems. 

17 (b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

18 DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con19 gressional committees’’ means—

20 (1) the congressional defense committees; and 

21 (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel22 ligence of the House of Representatives and the Se23 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.


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1 SEC. 2ll. øLog 53650¿ MODIFICATION TO COST-SHARING 

2 REQUIREMENT FOR PILOT PROGRAM TO IN3 CLUDE TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION FEA4 TURES DURING RESEARCH AND DEVELOP5 MENT OF CERTAIN DEFENSE SYSTEMS. 

6 Section 243(b) of the Ike Skelton National Defense 

7 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (10 U.S.C. 2358 

8 note) is amended in the matter following paragraph (2) 

9 by striking ‘‘ at least one-half of the cost of such activi10 ties’’ and inserting ‘‘an appropriate share of the cost of 

11 such activities, as determined by the Secretary’’.


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1 SEC. 2ll. øLog 53651¿ REVISION TO THE SERVICE RE2 QUIREMENT UNDER THE SCIENCE, MATHE3 MATICS, AND RESEARCH FOR TRANS4 FORMATION DEFENSE EDUCATION PRO5 GRAM. 

6 Subparagraph (B) of section 2192a(c)(1) of title 10, 

7 United States Code, is amended to read as follows: 

8 ‘‘(B) in the case of a person not an employee 

9 of the Department of Defense, the person shall enter 

10 into a written agreement to accept and continue em11 ployment for the period of obligated service deter12 mined under paragraph (2)—

13 ‘‘(i) with the Department of Defense; or 

14 ‘‘(ii) with a public or private entity or or15 ganization outside the Department if the Sec16 retary of Defense determines that employment 

17 of the person with such entity or organization 

18 for the purpose of such obligated service would 

19 provide a benefit to the Department.’’.


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1 SEC. 8ll [Log 53717]. EXTENSION OF CONTRACT AUTHOR2 ITY FOR ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOP3 MENT OR PROTOTYPE UNITS. 

4 (a) EXTENSION OF TERMINATION.—Subsection 

5 (b)(4) of section 819 of the National Defense Authoriza6 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 10 

7 U.S.C. 2302 note) is amended by striking ‘‘September 30, 

8 2014’’ and inserting ‘‘September 30, 2019’’. 

9 (b) EXTENSION OF REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Sub10 section (c) of such section is amended by striking ‘‘March 

11 1, 2013’’ and inserting ‘‘ March 1, 2018’’.


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1 SEC. 10ll[Log53200]. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO MAKE 

2 REWARDS FOR COMBATING TERRORISM. 

3 Section 127b(c)(3)(C) of title 10, United States 

4 Code, is amended by striking ‘‘September 30, 2014’’ and 

5 inserting ‘‘September 30, 2015’’.


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1 SEC. 10ll[Log 53868]. PROTECTION OF DEFENSE MISSION2 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM ELEC3 TROMAGNETIC PULSE AND HIGH-POWERED 

4 MICROWAVE SYSTEMS. 

5 (a) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 

6 June 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 

7 the congressional defense committees certification that de8 fense mission-critical infrastructure requiring electro9 magnetic pulse protection that receives power supply from 

10 commercial or other non-military sources is protected from 

11 the adverse effects of man-made or naturally occurring 

12 electromagnetic pulse and high-powered microwave weap13 ons. 

14 (b) FORM OF SUBMISSION.—The certification re15 quired by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified 

16 form. 

17 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

18 (1) The term ‘‘defense mission-critical infra19 structure’’ means Department of Defense infrastruc20 ture of defense critical systems essential to project, 

21 support, and sustain the Armed Forces and military 

22 operations worldwide. 


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1 (2) The term ‘‘defense critical system’’ means a 

2 primary mission system or an auxiliary or sup3 porting system—

4 (A) the operational effectiveness and oper5 ational suitability of which are essential to the 

6 successful mission completion or to aggregate 

7 residual combat capability; and 

8 (B) the failure of which would likely result 

9 in the failure to complete a mission.


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1 SEC. 10ll[Log 53164]. PILOT PROGRAM FOR THE HUMAN 

2 TERRAIN SYSTEM. 

3 (a) PILOT PROGRAM REQUIRED.—The Secretary of 

4 the Army shall carry out a pilot program under which the 

5 Secretary uses the Human Terrain System assets in the 

6 Pacific Command area of responsibility to support phase 

7 0 shaping operations and the theater security cooperation 

8 plans of the Commander of the Pacific Command. 

9 (b) LIMITATION.—Not more than 12 full-time equiva10 lent personnel, or 12 full-time equivalent personnel for 

11 reach back support, may be deployed into the Pacific com12 mand area of responsibility to support the pilot program 

13 required by subsection (a). The limitation under the pre14 ceding sentence shall not apply to training or support 

15 functions required to prepare personnel for participation 

16 in the pilot program. 

17 (c) REPORTS.—

18 (1) BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days after 

19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

20 of the Army shall provide to the congressional de21 fense committees a briefing on the plan of the Sec22 retary to carry out the program required by sub23 section (a), including the milestones, metrics, 

24 deliverables, and resources needed to execute such a 


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1 pilot program. In establishing the metrics for the 

2 pilot program, the Secretary shall include the ability 

3 to measure the value of the program in comparison 

4 to other analytic tools and techniques. 

5 (2) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than one year 

6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec7 retary of the Army shall submit to the congressional 

8 defense committees a report on the status of the 

9 pilot program. Such report shall include the inde10 pendent analysis and recommendations of the Com11 mander of the Pacific Command regarding the effec12 tiveness of the program and how it could be im13 proved. 

14 (3) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than December 

15 1, 2016, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to 

16 the congressional defense committees a final report 

17 on the pilot program. Such report shall include an 

18 analysis of the comparative value of human terrain 

19 information relative to other analytic tools and tech20 niques, recommendations regarding expanding the 

21 program to include other combatant commands, and 

22 any improvements to the program and necessary re23 sources that would enable such an expansion. 


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1 (d) TERMINATION.—The authority to carry out a 

2 pilot program under this section shall terminate on Sep3 tember 30, 2016.


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1 SEC. 10ll[Log 53479]. CERTIFICATION AND LIMITATION ON 

2 AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR AVIATION FOR3 EIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAM. 

4 (a) CERTIFICATION.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec7 retary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 

8 defense committees a certification regarding the 

9 aviation foreign internal defense program that in10 cludes each of the following: 

11 (A) An overall description of the program, 

12 included validated requirements from each of 

13 the geographic combatant commands and the 

14 Joint Staff, and statutory authorities used to 

15 support fixed and rotary wing aviation foreign 

16 internal defense programs within the Depart17 ment of Defense. 

18 (B) Program goals, proposed metrics of 

19 performance success, and anticipated procure20 ment and operation and maintenance costs 

21 across the Future Years Defense Program. 

22 (C) A comprehensive strategy outlining 

23 and justifying contributing commands and units 

24 for program execution, including the use of Air 


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1 Force, Special Operations Command, Reserve, 

2 and National Guard forces and components. 

3 (D) The results of any analysis of alter4 natives and efficiencies reviews for any con5 tracts awarded to support the aviation foreign 

6 internal defense program. 

7 (E) Any other items the Secretary of De8 fense determines appropriate. 

9 (2) FORM.—The certification required under 

10 paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 

11 form, but may include a classified annex. 

12 (b) LIMITATIONS.—

13 (1) LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF FUNDS.—

14 None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 

15 this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 

16 2015 may be obligated or expended to support the 

17 aviation foreign internal defense program, or to re18 tire, transfer, or divest any asset of such program, 

19 until the date that is 45 days after the date on 

20 which the Secretary of Defense provides to the con21 gressional defense committees the certification re22 quired under subsection (a). 

23 (2) LIMITATION ON DISPOSITION OF AIR24 CRAFT.—No aircraft that, as of the date of the en25 actment of this Act, is part of the aviation foreign 


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1 internal defense program may be transferred into or 

2 maintained in a status that is considered excess to 

3 the requirements of the possessing command and 

4 awaiting disposition instructions.


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[KG] 

1 SEC. 10ll[Log 53204]. REDUCTION IN COSTS TO REPORT 

2 CRITICAL CHANGES TO MAJOR AUTOMATED 

3 INFORMATION SYSTEM PROGRAMS. 

4 (a) EXTENSION OF A PROGRAM DEFINED.—Section 

5 2445a of title 10, United States Code, is amended adding 

6 at the end the following new subsection: 

7 ‘‘(g) EXTENSION OF A PROGRAM.—In this chapter, 

8 the term ‘extension of a program’ means, with respect to 

9 a major automated information system program or other 

10 major information technology investment program, the 

11 further deployment or planned deployment to additional 

12 users of the system which has already been found oper13 ationally effective and suitable by an independent test 

14 agency or the Director of Operational Test and Evalua15 tion, beyond the scope planned in the original estimate or 

16 information originally submitted on the program.’’. 

17 (b) REPORTS ON CRITICAL CHANGES IN MAIS PRO18 GRAMS.—Subsection (d) of section 2445c of such title is 

19 amended—

20 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘paragraph 

21 (2)’’ and inserting ‘‘paragraph (3)’’; 

22 (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as para23 graph (3); and 


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1 (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the fol2 lowing new paragraph (2): 

3 ‘‘(2) NOTIFICATION WHEN VARIANCE DUE TO

4 EXTENSION OF PROGRAM.—If the milestone decision 

5 authority for a program who, following receipt of a 

6 quarterly report described in paragraph (1) and 

7 making a determination described in paragraph (3), 

8 also determines that the circumstances resulting in 

9 the determination described in paragraph (3) are 

10 primarily due to an extension of a program, the offi11 cial may, in lieu of carrying out an evaluation and 

12 submitting a report in accordance with paragraph 

13 (1), submit to the congressional defense committees, 

14 within 45 days after receiving the quarterly report, 

15 a notification that the official has made such deter16 minations and a certification that such determina17 tions involve minimal developmental risk. If such a 

18 notification is submitted, the limitation in subsection 

19 (g)(1) does not apply with respect to that determina20 tion under paragraph (3).’’. 

21 (c) CONFORMING CROSS-REFERENCE AMEND22 MENT.—Subsection (g)(1) of such section is amended by 

23 striking ‘‘subsection (d)(2)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection 

24 (d)(3)’’. 


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1 (d) TOTAL ACQUISITION COST INFORMATION.—Title 

2 10, United States Code, is further amended—

3 (1) in section 2445b(b)(3), by striking ‘‘devel4 opment costs’’ and inserting ‘‘total acquisition 

5 costs’’; and 

6 (2) in section 2445c—

7 (A) in subparagraph (B) of subsection 

8 (c)(2), by striking ‘‘program development cost’’ 

9 and inserting ‘‘total acquisition cost’’; and 

10 (B) in subparagraph (C) of subsection 

11 (d)(3) (as redesignated by subsection (b)(2)), 

12 by striking ‘‘program development cost’’ and in13 serting ‘‘total acquisition cost’’. 

14 (e) CLARIFICATION OF CROSS-REFERENCE.—Section 

15 2445c(g)(2) of such title is amended by striking ‘‘in com16 pliance with the requirements of subsection (d)(2)’’ and 

17 inserting ‘‘under subsection (d)(1)(B)’’.


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[PV] 

1 SEC. 10ll[Log 53826]. MODIFICATION OF DEPARTMENT OF 

2 DEFENSE AUTHORITY FOR HUMANITARIAN 

3 DEMINING ASSISTANCE AND STOCKPILED 

4 CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS ASSISTANCE 

5 PROGRAMS. 

6 (a) INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ABOUT INSUFFI7 CIENT FUNDING IN ANNUAL REPORT.—Subsection (d)(3) 

8 of section 407 of title 10, United States Code, is amended 

9 by inserting ‘‘or insufficient funding’’ after ‘‘such activi10 ties’’; 

11 (b) DEFINITION OF STOCKPILED CONVENTIONAL

12 MUNITIONS ASSISTANCE.—Subsection (e)(2) of such sec13 tion is amended—

14 (1) by striking ‘‘and includes’’ and inserting the 

15 following: ‘‘small arms, and light weapons, including 

16 man-portable air-defense systems. Such term in17 cludes’’; and 

18 (2) by inserting before the period at the end the 

19 following: ‘‘, small arms, and light weapons, includ20 ing man-portable air-defense systems’’.


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[PV] 

1 SEC. l øLOG 53193¿. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR SUP2 PORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO COMBAT 

3 TERRORISM. 

4 Section 1208(h) of the Ronald W. Reagan National 

5 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public 

6 Law 108–375; 118 Stat. 2086), as most recently amended 

7 by section 1203(c) of the National Defense Authorization 

8 Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 

9 1621), is further amended by striking ‘‘2015’’ and insert10 ing ‘‘2017’’. 

◊


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[PV] 

1 SEC. l øLog 53908¿. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZA2 TION FOR NON-CONVENTIONAL ASSISTED RE3 COVERY CAPABILITIES. 

4 (a) EXTENSION.—Subsection (h) of section 943 of 

5 the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act 

6 for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417; 122 Stat. 

7 4579), as most recently amended by section 1241 of the 

8 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 

9 (Public Law 113–66; 127 Stat. 920), is further amended 

10 by striking ‘‘2015’’ and inserting ‘‘2016’’. 

11 (b) CROSS-REFERENCE AMENDMENT.—Subsection 

12 (f) of such section is amended by striking ‘‘413b(e)’’ and 

13 inserting ‘‘3093(e)’’.


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[PV] 

1 SEC. 16ll [Log 53199]. ASSESSMENT AND LIMITATION ON 

2 AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR INTELLIGENCE 

3 ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS OF UNITED 

4 STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

5 AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES. 

6 (a) ASSESSMENT.—

7 (1) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Defense, 

8 acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for 

9 Intelligence, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

10 Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and 

11 the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

12 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con13 gress an assessment of the intelligence activities and 

14 programs of United States Special Operations Com15 mand and special operations forces. 

16 (2) INCLUSIONS.—The assessment under para17 graph (1) shall include each of the following ele18 ments: 

19 (A) An overall strategy defining such intel20 ligence activities and programs, including defi21 nitions of intelligence activities and programs 

22 unique to special operations. 

23 (B) A validated strategy and roadmap of 

24 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 


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1 programs and requirements for special oper2 ations across the future years defense program. 

3 (C) A comprehensive description of current 

4 and anticipated future Joint Staff validated re5 quirements for the intelligence activities and 

6 programs of each geographic combatant com7 mander within the respective geographic area of 

8 such covered combatant commander to be ful9 filled by special operations forces, including 

10 those that can only be addressed by special op11 erations forces, programs, or capabilities. 

12 (D) Validated present and planned United 

13 States Special Operations Command force 

14 structure requirements to meet current and an15 ticipated special operations intelligence activi16 ties and programs of geographic combatant 

17 commanders. 

18 (E) A comprehensive review and assess19 ment of statutory authorities, and Department 

20 and interagency policies, including limitations, 

21 for special operations forces intelligence activi22 ties and programs. 

23 (F) An independent, comprehensive cost 

24 estimate of special operations intelligence activi25 ties and programs by the Director of Cost AsVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:46 Apr 23, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\PKBAYER\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\7.0\GEN\C\LOG531~1.XM

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1 sessment and Program Evaluation of the De2 partment of Defense, including an estimate of 

3 the costs of the period of the current future 

4 years defense program, including a description 

5 of all rules and assumptions used to develop the 

6 cost estimates. 

7 (G) A copy of any memoranda of under8 standing or memoranda of agreement between 

9 the Department of Defense and other depart10 ments or agencies of the United States Govern11 ment, or between components of the Depart12 ment of Defense that are required to implement 

13 objectives of special operations intelligence ac14 tivities and programs. 

15 (H) Any other matters the Secretary con16 siders appropriate. 

17 (3) FORM.—The assessment required under 

18 paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 

19 form, but may include a classified annex. 

20 (b) LIMITATIONS.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), 

22 not more than 50 percent of the funds authorized to 

23 be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made avail24 able for fiscal year 2015 for procurement, Defense25 wide, or research, development, test, and evaluation, 


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1 Defense-wide, for the major force program 11 of the 

2 United States Special Operations Command may be 

3 obligated until the assessment required under sub4 section (a) is submitted. 

5 (2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not 

6 apply with respect to funds authorized to be appro7 priated for Overseas Contingency Operations under 

8 title XV. 

9 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

10 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON11 GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of con12 gress’’ means the congressional defense committees, 

13 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 

14 the House of Representatives, and the Select Com15 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate. 

16 (2) FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM.—The 

17 term ‘‘future years defense program’’ means the fu18 ture years defense program under section 221 of 

19 title 10, United States Code. 

20 (3) GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDER.—

21 The term ‘‘geographic combatant commander’’ 

22 means a commander of a combatant command (as 

23 defined in section 161(c) of title 10, United States 

24 Code) with a geographic area of responsibility.


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[SK] 

1 SEC. ll[Log 53213]. ANNUAL BRIEFING ON THE INTEL2 LIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAIS3 SANCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMBATANT 

4 COMMANDS.. 

5 At the same time that the President’s budget is sub6 mitted pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 

7 States Code, for each of fiscal years 2016 through 2020—

8 (1) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

9 shall provide to the congressional defense commit10 tees, the Permanent Select Committee on Intel11 ligence of the House of Representatives, and the Se12 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a brief13 ing on—

14 (A) the intelligence, surveillance, and re15 connaissance requirements, by specific intel16 ligence capability type, of each of the combatant 

17 commands; 

18 (B) for the year preceding the year in 

19 which the briefing is provided, the satisfaction 

20 rate of each of the combatant commands with 

21 the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais22 sance requirements, by specific intelligence ca23 pability type, of such combatant command; and 


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1 (C) a risk analysis identifying the critical 

2 gaps and shortfalls in such requirements in re3 lation to such satisfaction rate; and 

4 (2) the Under Secretary of Defense for Intel5 ligence shall provide to the congressional defense 

6 committees, the Permanent Select Committee on In7 telligence of the House of Representatives, and the 

8 Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a 

9 briefing on short-term, mid-term, and long-term 

10 strategies to address the critical intelligence, surveil11 lance and reconnaissance requirements of the com12 batant commands.


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[Discussion Draft] 

1 SEC. ll[Log 53214]. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF REPORT ON 

2 IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE AND GEOSPATIAL 

3 INFORMATION SUPPORT PROVIDED TO RE4 GIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY AL5 LIANCES. 

6 Section 921(c)(1) of the National Defense Authoriza7 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239; 126 

8 Stat. 1878) is amended by striking ‘‘2014 and 2015’’ and 

9 inserting ‘‘2014 through 2016’’.


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[Discussion Draft] 

[SK] 

1 SEC. ll[Log 53215]. TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF NA2 TIONAL CAPABILITIES EXECUTIVE AGENT. 

3 Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States 

4 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

5 section: 

6 ‘‘§ 430. TENCAP executive agent 

7 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—There is in the Department of 

8 Defense a Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities 

9 Executive Agent who shall be appointed by the Under Sec10 retary of Defense for Intelligence. The Executive Agent 

11 shall report directly to the Under Secretary of Defense 

12 for Intelligence. The Executive Agent shall be responsible 

13 for working with the combatant commands, military serv14 ices, and the intelligence community to develop methods 

15 to increase warfighter effectiveness through the exploi16 tation of national capabilities and to promote cross-do17 main integration of such capabilities into military oper18 ations, training, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais19 sance activities. 

20 ‘‘(b) ANNUAL BRIEFING.—At the same time as the 

21 budget materials are submitted to Congress in connection 

22 with the submission of the budget for each of fiscal years 

23 2016 through 2020, pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, 

24 the Executive Agent, in coordination with the commanders 


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[Discussion Draft] 

[SK] 

1 of the combatant commands, the Secretaries of the mili2 tary departments, and the heads of the Department of De3 fense intelligence agencies and offices, shall provide to the 

4 Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee 

5 on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 

6 Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel7 ligence of the House of Representatives a briefing on the 

8 investments, activities, challenges, and opportunities of 

9 the Executive Agent in carrying out the responsibilities 

10 under paragraph (1). The briefings shall be coordinated 

11 with each of the armed services, the Defense Intelligence 

12 Agency, the National Security Agency, the National 

13 Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Recon14 naissance office.’’.


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[KG] 

1 SEC. 16ll [Log 53586]. EXECUTIVE AGENCY FOR CYBER 

2 TEST AND TRAINING RANGES. 

3 (a) EXECUTIVE AGENT.—Not later than 120 days 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

5 of Defense shall designate a senior official of the Depart6 ment of Defense to act as the executive agent for cyber 

7 and information technology test and training ranges. 

8 (b) ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORI9 TIES.—

10 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than one year 

11 after the enactment of this Act, and in accordance 

12 with Directive 5101.1, the Secretary of Defense shall 

13 prescribe the roles, responsibilities, and authorities 

14 of the executive agent designated under subsection 

15 (a). 

16 (2) SPECIFICATION.—The roles and responsibil17 ities of the executive agent designated under sub18 section (a) shall include each of the following: 

19 (A) Developing and maintaining a com20 prehensive list of cyber and information tech21 nology ranges, test facilities, test beds, and 

22 other means of testing, training, and developing 

23 software, personnel, and tools for accommo24 dating the mission of the Department. 


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[KG] 

1 (B) Serving as a single entity to organize 

2 and manage designated cyber and information 

3 technology test ranges, including—

4 (i) establishing the priorities for cyber 

5 and information technology ranges to meet 

6 Department objectives; 

7 (ii) enforcing standards to meet re8 quirements specified by the United States 

9 Cyber Command, the training community, 

10 and the research, development, testing, and 

11 evaluation community; 

12 (iii) identifying and offering guidance 

13 on the opportunities for integration 

14 amongst the designated cyber and informa15 tion technology ranges regarding test, 

16 training, and development functions; 

17 (iv) finding opportunities for cost re18 duction, integration, and coordination im19 provements for the appropriate cyber and 

20 information technology ranges; 

21 (v) adding or consolidating cyber and 

22 information technology ranges in the fu23 ture to better meet the evolving needs of 

24 the cyber strategy and resource require25 ments of the Department; and 


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[KG] 

1 (vi) coordinating with interagency and 

2 industry partners on cyber and information 

3 technology range issues. 

4 (C) Defining a cyber range architecture 

5 that—

6 (i) may add or consolidate cyber and 

7 information technology ranges in the fu8 ture to better meet the evolving needs of 

9 the cyber strategy and resource require10 ments of the Department; 

11 (ii) coordinates with interagency and 

12 industry partners on cyber and information 

13 technology range issues; 

14 (iii) allows for integrated closed loop 

15 testing in a secure environment of cyber 

16 and electronic warfare capabilities; 

17 (iv) supports science and technology 

18 development, experimentation, testing and 

19 training; and 

20 (v) provides for interconnection with 

21 other existing cyber ranges and other ki22 netic range facilities in a distributed man23 ner. 

24 (D) Certifying all cyber range investments 

25 of the Department of Defense. 


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4

[KG] 

1 (E) Performing such other roles and re2 sponsibilities as the Secretary of Defense con3 siders appropriate. 

4 (c) SUPPORT WITHIN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—

5 In accordance with Directive 5101.1, the Secretary of De6 fense shall ensure that the military departments, Defense 

7 Agencies, and other components of the Department of De8 fense provide the executive agent designated under sub9 section (a) with the appropriate support and resources 

10 needed to perform the roles, responsibilities, and authori11 ties of the executive agent. 

12 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

13 (1) The term ‘‘designated cyber and informa14 tion technology range’’ includes the National Cyber 

15 Range, the Joint Information Operations Range, the 

16 Defense Information Assurance Range, and the C4 

17 Assessments Division of J6 of the Joint Staff. 

18 (2) The term ‘‘Directive 5101.1’’ means De19 partment of Directive 5101.1, or any successor di20 rective relating to the responsibilities of an executive 

21 agent of the Department of Defense. 

22 (3) The term ‘‘executive agent’’ has the mean23 ing given the term ‘‘DoD Executive Agent’’ in Direc24 tive 5101.1.


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DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE

47
Table Of Contents

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Personal dosimetry for protection in Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear 

and Explosive environments

OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Items of Special Interest

Beyond line of sight command and control for intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance systems

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND 

EVALUATION

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

High Performance Computing Modernization program

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY

Items of Special Interest

Navy reimbursable work for other Federal agencies

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE-WIDE

Items of Special Interest

Analysis of Alternatives for Undersea Clandestine Insertion of Special 

Operations Forces

Biosecurity in Department of Defense research facilities

Chemical Biological Defense Program threat priorities

Coordination of efforts for advanced manufacturing of medical 

countermeasures

Development of innovative detection and threat identification technologies

Field-programmable gate arrays for defense

Guidance on utilizing non-profit research institutes

Health of the research and development enterprise

Internet access on Kwajalein Atoll

Military service coordination and transition efforts for the chemical biological 

defense program

Special Operations developmental efforts for Tactical Assault Light Operator 

Suit

Technologies to improve spectrum efficiency

TITLE VIII—ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION 

MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Comptroller General Review of Department of Defense Trusted Foundry and 

Supply Chain Risk Management Programs

48
Independent Assessment of Department of Defense Cloud Computing 

Acquisition and Brokerage Policies

TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

OTHER MATTERS

Assessment of Counterfeit Detection Efforts

Comptroller General Review of Department of Defense Antiterrorism and 

Force Protection Efforts

Coordination of Efforts to Track and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

Economic Warfare Policy

Information Management Systems for Response Forces

Inventory of Counter Threat Finance Programs and Capabilities

Military Auxiliary Radio System

Review of Military Standard to Protect Systems Against Electromagnetic 

Pulse

Spectrum Operations Centers

Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Non-Lethal Weapons for Contingency Operations

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND 

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Air Force Cyber

Air Force Distributed Common Ground/Surface System

Comptroller General Assessment of U.S. Cyber Command

Comptroller General Assessment on Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance

Comptroller General Evaluation on Department of Defense Efforts to Protect 

Information and Systems from Insider Threats

Defense Intelligence Priorities

Geospatial Intelligence for Disadvantaged Users

Inspector General Review of the Activities Supporting the Joint Information 

Environment

Investments for Joint Information Environment Activities

Military Intelligence Program and Defense Input to the National Intelligence 

Program

Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination

Space-Based Reconnaissance

Targeting Enterprise

U.S. Transportation Command Joint Intelligence and Operations Center

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

49
TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Personal dosimetry for protection in Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and 

Explosive environments

The committee remains concerned about the increasing proliferation of 

Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, and believes that maintaining adequate modern protective equipment 

is of critical importance for the safety of U.S. forces in CBRNE environments. The 

committee notes that in regard to radiological hazards, accurate dosimetry is 

critical to the forecast of type, severity, and expected time of onset of symptoms, 

information needed to predict a person’s fitness for duty, and the provision of 

combat readiness information. The committee notes that the Department of the 

Army last validated a requirement for Individual Personal Dosimeters in 1975. 

However, the nuclear and radiological threat environment facing the Joint Force 

has changed dramatically over the past four decades and dosimeter technology has 

also improved. The committee is aware of efforts within the Department of Defense 

to develop a Joint Personal Dosimeter (JPD) and validate an updated requirement 

for the JPD. The committee understands that the JPD is expected to enter 

miestone C late in fiscal year 2015. The committee is concerned, however, that 

procuring JPDs to replace legacy Army systems will not begin until 2020, at the 

earliest. In addition, the committee notes that the Army currently has nearly 8,500 

legacy systems programmed for replacement. 

Therefore, the committee encourages the Army to begin JPD procurement 

to replace legacy Army systems as soon after the milestone C decision as the 

availability of funds will allow. Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of 

Defense to provide a briefing to the committee by September 1, 2014, on the status 

of the JPD program and the efforts to validate an updated dosimetry requirement 

for the JPD. The briefing should include any recommendations that the Secretary 

has to begin procurement of JPDs earlier than 2020. 

OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Items of Special Interest

Beyond line of sight command and control for intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance systems

The committee is encouraged by the advances in distribution of full motion 

video and the bridging of disparate radio wave forms for enhanced interoperability 

50
as part of the Joint Aerial Layered Network. The committee recognizes that the 

fielding of beyond line of sight command and control and associated tactical pods in 

support of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance will provide valuable 

capabilities in response to stated urgent combatant commander requirements. 

Yet, the committee is concerned that a joint capability, called Tactical 

Airborne Communications Pod (TACPod) was developed using Air Force Quick 

Reaction Capability funding and processes, but is not being used across the military 

services. Rather than deploying the capability to meet combatant commander 

validated requirements, TACPod is instead being stored indefinitely. Separately, 

the committee is concerned that the Air Force is procuring an entirely different 

capability to meet essentially the same requirements that TACPod was originally 

developed to fulfill.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in 

coordination with the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to provide a briefing to the committee by 

November 1, 2014, on the existing and planned activities in support of beyond line 

of sight command and control for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

systems.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION 

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

High Performance Computing Modernization program

The committee is aware that the Army Corps of Engineers serves as 

executive agent for the Department of Defense High Performance Computing 

Modernization (HPCM) program, a responsibility that devolved from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense in fiscal year 2012. The purpose of this program is to apply 

supercomputing resources to solve Department of Defense problems in research, 

development, test, and evaluation, and acquisition engineering. To meet this 

mission, the HPCM program must maintain state-of-the-art supercomputing 

resource centers, as well as software engineering talent to maintain modern and 

secure software applications for the user community.

The committee is also aware that the HPCM program has been operating at 

a level not currently supported by the level of funding requested in the President's 

request. The committee is concerned that the shortfall has only been mitigated by 

the repeated intervention of Congress to get the program to a sustainable level. The 

committee believes that the Department should conduct a thorough assessment of 

the program to ensure future budget requests are sufficient to right-size the budget 

to the needed infrastructure and support capabilities.

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Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in coordination 

with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, to review the 

HPCM program, and to submit a report on the findings to the congressional defense 

committees not later than September 30, 2014. The review should examine the 

following:

(1) Identify the capabilities that will be lost and the impact on Department 

if the HPCMP is funded at the budget request for fiscal year 2015 level throughout 

the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP);

(2) Identify the resources reduced, including manpower, in order to operate 

at the budget request for fiscal year 2015 level throughout the FYDP; and

(3) A strategy for closing the gap between the budget requests and the fiscal 

year 2012 HPCMP funding level throughout the FYDP.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY

Items of Special Interest

Navy reimbursable work for other Federal agencies

The committee is aware that the Chief of Naval Operations recently issued 

guidance to Navy working capital funded entities, including the science and 

technology laboratories and test and evaluation centers, to cease conducting 

reimbursable work for other Federal agencies. The committee is concerned that 

such a moratorium ignores how working capital funded entities operate and the 

value that outside, reimbursable work can have on reducing the overall rate 

structure for entities like the naval warfare centers. The committee also believes 

that such a move could be detrimental to the overall efficiency of the Federal 

research and test enterprise by forcing other Federal partners to rely on contractors 

to provide these services, or to build additional, redundant scientific and test 

capabilities. For example, the Department of Homeland Security works very closely 

with the naval warfare centers to provide science, technology, test and evaluation 

capabilities for its programs, and without that support, the Department of 

Homeland Security would have to devote a larger percentage of its research, 

development, test, and evaluation budget to providing those services itself.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination 

with the Chief of Naval Operations, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on 

Armed Services by March 1, 2015, on the rationale for the decision to cease 

reimbursable work for Federal agencies outside of the Navy, and an analysis of the 

policy impacts of this decision, including the ability to facilitate interagency work 

and fully utilize existing infrastructure. The briefing should also examine the 

anticipated effect on Navy working capital fund rates if the policy is enforced, as 

well as the impact if the policy is rescinded. Finally, the briefing should examine 

the impact on each naval warfare center, and the role of the warfare center's 

commanding officers in making decisions related to reimbursable work.

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RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE-WIDE

Items of Special Interest

Analysis of Alternatives for Undersea Clandestine Insertion of Special Operations 

Forces

The committee is aware of a recently completed Analysis of Alternatives 

(AOA) for Undersea Clandestine Insertion of Special Operations Forces and that the 

review provides alternatives for continued operational capability as well as future 

growth for Navy Sea, Air, Land undersea insertion capabilities. The committee 

understands that this AOA included representatives from U.S. Special Operations 

Command, the Department of the Navy (Program Executive Officer, Submarines), 

and the Joint Staff and was coordinated by a study director from the RAND 

Corporation, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center. The 

committee understands that the final publication of the AOA was to be made 

available to the congressional defense committees in March 2014. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a copy 

of the Analysis of Alternatives report in its entirety and a briefing on the report to 

the congressional defense committees by July 1, 2014. The report and briefing 

should be presented to the committees in unclassified and classified formats as 

determined by the Secretary of Defense. 

Biosecurity in Department of Defense research facilities

The committee is concerned about the potential threat posed to the United 

States by biological weapons. The threat of a biological attack may come from a 

number of sources, including state, non-state and even lone actors, as was believed 

to be the case in the 2001 Anthrax attacks. The Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities held a hearing on October 11, 2013, that 

examined the state of U.S. efforts for biodefense. During that hearing, the panel of 

independent expert witnesses was critical of the biosafety and biosecurity 

procedures in medical research facilities, identifying a lapse of proper screening and 

consistent procedures as a potential risk with respect to lone actor threats. While 

the committee notes that the biological agents stored in medical research facilities 

are not the only source of weaponizable materials, the committee believes the 

Department of Defense should take all precautions possible to mitigate the risk of 

bioterrorism. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a 

briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives not 

later than September 30, 2014, on biosecurity procedures within Department of 

Defense biological research facilities which handle or store Category A, B, or C 

priority pathogens. The briefing should include a discussion of personnel screening 

procedures, security procedures, and the means for training personnel on safety and 

53
security procedures. The briefing should also highlight any inconsistencies or 

variability in procedures across the facilities.

Chemical Biological Defense Program threat priorities

The committee is aware of significant efforts within the Chemical Biological 

Defense Program (CBDP) to develop medical countermeasures to protect U.S. troops 

from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The committee 

notes that the development of a drug or vaccine to treat or protect against a given 

threat in many cases will take up to a decade from the time of conception through 

the Food and Drug Administration approval process to be available for use. 

However, the committee recognizes that the CBRN threat space is constantly 

evolving in terms of the type and severity of threats U.S. troops are likely to 

encounter at any point in time. The committee is concerned about the mismatch in 

these timescales, and therefore directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs to brief the House Committee 

on Armed Services by September 30, 2014, on the approved process for establishing 

and validating the priorities for the threats for medical countermeasures research 

and development. The briefing should include a list of the current threats, and the 

frequency with which the priority list is updated.

Coordination of efforts for advanced manufacturing of medical countermeasures

The committee is aware of multiple efforts in biological defense within 

several Government departments and agencies, in particular in the area of medical 

countermeasures (MCM). The Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) within 

the Department of Defense has begun construction on an advanced manufacturing 

center for MCM in order to address the unique needs of the Department of Defense 

for medical countermeasures. However, the committee is also aware that the 

Department of Health and Human Services has also made significant investments 

in constructing its own centers for advanced manufacturing. In general, these 

centers will be focused on addressing the requirements of the Department of Health 

and Human Services for MCM.

In testimony before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities on October 11, 2013, the principal investigator for the Texas A&M 

Center for Innovation in Advanced Development and Manufacturing, one of the 

Department of Health and Human Services centers, testified that those centers 

were fully capable of meeting all Department of Defense requirements for MCM 

advanced manufacturing. This has raised questions regarding the need for the 

Department of Defense to fund what appears to be a duplicative effort. The 

committee notes that while there are differences in the capabilities between the 

Department of Defense and Department of Health and Human Services centers, 

there is also a significant amount of overlap.

The committee is aware that coordination on research and development of 

MCM is performed through the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 

54
Enterprise (PHEMCE), in which the Department of Defense is an active 

participant. These coordination efforts are laudable. However, the committee is 

aware that the PHEMCE is not directly managing the advanced manufacturing 

process and will instead rely on a separate governance board. In light of these facts, 

the committee is concerned that, although the Department of Defense center for 

advanced manufacturing is already designed and construction has begun, the 

ability to coordinate with and leverage the efforts of other Government agencies for 

advanced manufacturing does not yet appear to be fully established, and therefore, 

the possibility of inefficiency and unnecessary redundancy within the Department 

of Defense is still significant.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs to provide a briefing to the 

congressional defense committees by October 30, 2014, on the status of the 

coordination process for the advanced manufacturing of medical countermeasures 

between the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human 

Services. This briefing should include the following:

(1) Details of the Department of Defense's role on the governance board 

which oversees the advanced manufacturing process, including frequency of 

meetings, level of interaction, etc. 

(2) The degree to which the Department of Defense is able to utilize the 

Department of Health and Human Services advanced manufacturing centers, 

including a discussion of time and cost savings.

(3) Any application of best practices, lessons learned, etc. from past 

coordination efforts with the PHEMCE with respect to the current coordination 

efforts for advanced manufacturing.

(4) Any obstacles to the coordination process, including any issues which 

may prohibit or impede the Department of Defense's ability to utilize the 

Department of Health and Human Services advanced manufacturing centers.

Development of innovative detection and threat identification technologies

The committee remains concerned about credible threats posed by state and 

non-state actors in their attempts to acquire and weaponize chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) for use against the United States and its allies. The committee 

is aware that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) continues to develop 

and field technologies that reduce, counter, and eliminate the threat of CBRNE 

WMD. The committee is also aware that as part of these efforts, DTRA continues to 

invest in small lightweight, person-portable detection equipment to detect CBRNE 

materials. The committee recognizes the importance of this equipment as enabling 

a wide range of operations within CBRNE environments, and therefore encourages 

DTRA to continue the development, demonstration and deployment of innovative 

and emerging detection and threat identification technologies that are useful across 

the widest-spectrum of CBRNE threats. In addition, the committee directs the 

55
Director of DTRA to brief the House Committee on Armed Services by December 31, 

2014, on their efforts to advance and make operational a light-weight, personportable CBRNE detection and analysis device.

Field-programmable gate arrays for defense

The committee recognizes the importance of utilizing field-programmable 

gated arrays (FPGAs) for defense application in order to allow for greater flexibility 

in the processing power of some defense applications. The committee is aware, 

though, that such capability can also introduce vulnerabilities into defense systems, 

and the Department of Defense is challenged to find means to mitigate those 

potential vulnerabilities and ensure a high level of trust for this class of 

microcircuits. Further, the committee notes that the prevalence of foreign FPGA 

providers makes trusted sourcing for these microcircuits an additional security 

challenge that the Department must address.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct an analysis of the Department’s 

strategy for utilizing FPGAs and to provide a briefing to the House Committee on 

Armed Services by March 1, 2015 on the results of the analysis. The briefing should 

address the following issues:

(1) How FPGAs fit into both Department’s microelectronics strategy, 

especially with regard to their use in both new and legacy systems;

(2) How trust and security vulnerability can be mitigated by the Trusted 

Defense Systems strategy;

(3) Any special budgeting, manpower, manufacturing or acquisition issues 

that may need to be addressed by the use and integration of FPGAs; and

(4) Recommendations for how to increase utilization of FPGAs, and if 

necessary, production capacity.

Guidance on utilizing non-profit research institutes

The committee recognizes that independent, non-profit research 

institutions provide value to the research and development portfolios of the 

Department of Defense. The committee believes that non-profit research 

institutions have unique capabilities, experience, and infrastructure that are well 

suited to technology maturation, risk reduction, and transition to programs of 

record. 

As noted in the committee report (H. Rept. 113-102) accompanying the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee is aware 

the Department is examining ways to better utilize the unique capabilities and 

expertise of non-profit research institutions, especially in the area of transitioning 

innovation to commercialization. Furthermore, the committee understands that the 

Department has been evaluating how to better utilize the special authorities within 

the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations in order to better leverage the 

capabilities of the non-profit research community. The committee is concerned that 

56
the Department has not clearly articulated that policy to the broader research and 

acquisition community to inform them of how they might best leverage those 

capabilities, and the special contracting authorities that might be used.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to issue updated 

policy guidance related to the use of non-profit research institutions that clarifies 

their role in the research ecosystem, as well as the special provisions within the 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations that support their use. Additionally, the 

committee directs the Secretary to submit the updated policy guidance to the 

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives by 

March 1, 2015.

Health of the research and development enterprise

 The committee remains concerned about the long-term health of the 

Department of Defense research and development enterprise. There are currently 

67 Department laboratories across 22 states, 10 federally funded research and 

development centers (FFRDCs), and 13 university affiliated research centers, as 

well as a workforce of 60,000 employees, of which approximately 36,400 are degreed 

scientists and engineers. The committee recognizes the pivotal role these facilities 

and people play in maintaining the technological edge of the Department of Defense 

and providing the necessary tools for the warfighter. The committee is concerned 

that the declining state of much of the Department of Defense lab infrastructure, 

especially compared to academic, industrial, and international counterparts, can 

also serve to dispel many of the technology workforce that the Department would 

most like to attract.

The committee is determined to ensure that Department research and 

development capabilities remain robust in order to assure a vibrant and agile 

research and development enterprise. The committee is concerned that declining 

budgets and increasing threats are placing pressures on the Department that may 

lead it to make short-term decisions with long-term ramifications. The committee is 

unsure if the Department is striking the appropriate balance between near- and 

long-term objectives, which may negatively affect the overall health of the research 

and development enterprise. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to task the 

Defense Science Board to conduct an assessment of the organization, missions, 

authorities, and health of the defense research and development enterprise, and to 

submit a report on the findings of the assessment to the congressional defense 

committees by September 30, 2015. The assessment should include the following:

(1) How well do the defense laboratories respond to the needs of the 

Department?

(2) What mechanisms exist to refurbish and recapitalize Department of 

Defense labs, and how do those mechanisms compare with other Government, 

academic, international and industrial counterparts?

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(3) How well does the Department attract, recruit, retain, and train its 

workforce to remain technically current and flexible to respond to emerging 

national requirements?

(4) Does the appropriate balance exist in each service between service 

control and laboratory director discretion so as to maximize laboratory mission 

effectiveness?

Internet access on Kwajalein Atoll

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense maintains a 

significant presence on Kwajalein Atoll, including contractors and families, to 

support Department of Defense activities there. Further, the committee 

understands that data access for those families is limited to low-bandwidth phone 

modems, which can negatively impact the welfare of personnel and their families 

stationed at a remote location, where electronic communications are useful in 

maintaining personal and family relationships. 

Furthermore, the committee notes that the Defense Information Systems 

Agency (DISA) maintains high-bandwidth network connections to the Atoll, which 

were designed with additional capacity to allow for future expansions. The 

committee is also aware of instances in the past when DISA has provided additional 

networking capacity for morale, welfare and recreation applications through base 

exchanges. The committee believes that DISA could provide such capacity to 

families on the Atoll with minimal effort and cost. Therefore, the committee directs 

the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency to submit a plan to the 

Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by March 15, 2015, 

on providing internet access to families on Kwajalein Atoll. 

Military service coordination and transition efforts for the chemical biological 

defense program

The Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has the primary 

responsibility to develop technologies to protect U.S. troops from the threats posed 

by Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD). The committee believes that frequent open 

communication between the CBDP and the military services is critical during all 

phases of the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) process for 

developing these technologies. Such communication is necessary to ensure not only 

that the warfighter requirements are being properly addressed in the early 

planning phases of the RDT&E process, but that the technology is transitioned to 

the military services on an adequate timescale to ensure the safety and protection of 

U.S. troops. Therefore, the committee encourages the CBDP to continue to improve 

its communication with the military services during all phases of the RDT&E 

process. 

In addition, the committee remains concerned about the level of protection 

currently available to U.S. troops who are at risk of being exposed to CBRNE WMD, 

58
in particular with regards to mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear. The 

committee is concerned that in many cases the equipment available to the military 

units may be outdated or inadequate to address current requirements. Therefore, 

the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs to provide a briefing to the House Committee on 

Armed Services by November 30, 2014, on the coordination between the military 

services and the CBDP. The briefing should include details on the process by which 

the CBDP solicits and incorporates input from the military services into its 

planning and prioritization of RDT&E efforts, as well as the current plans and 

efforts to transition the resultant technology, including MOPP gear for CBRNE 

environments to the military services.

Special Operations developmental efforts for Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit

The budget request included $10.0 million in PE 1160402BB, Special 

Operations Technology Development, and $7.5 million in PE 1160402BB, Special 

Operations Special Technology, to support ongoing developmental efforts for the 

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Tactical Assault Light Operator 

Suit (TALOS), designed to improve operator survivability in direct action or kinetic 

environments. 

The committee notes that more than $4.5 million of fiscal year 2013 and 

fiscal year 2014 Major Force Program-11 funding has been put towards TALOS 

efforts thus far. The committee also notes that despite aggressive marketing efforts 

by USSOCOM, TALOS is not a program of record, but rather "an overarching 

vision" that provides "a coordinating focus for many of USSOCOM's science and 

technology efforts spanning multiple capability areas." The committee understands 

that present efforts are being used to survey current technologies and to better 

inform future requirements documents, and that USSOCOM intends to deliver a 

fully functional prototype assault suit by August 2018. 

The committee is concerned that these requirements are not being properly 

coordinated with related or complementary efforts at the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Systems 

Command. While USSOCOM is the proper authority to define Special Operations 

Forces peculiar requirements, it may not be the appropriate entity to lead such 

developmental technology efforts, like TALOS. While the committee understands 

that Natick Soldier Systems Command is currently developing and partially 

funding one of the two Generation I prototypes for USSOCOM, the committee is 

concerned that USSOCOM is also funding outside private sector research, and that 

overall efforts lack proper coordination and oversight, systems integration and 

collaboration, and prototype evaluation.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the 

congressional defense committees by August 1, 2014, on the TALOS project and 

similar efforts to include: (1) the overall TALOS requirement for U.S. Special 

Operations Forces, including requirements validation; (2) a list of funded activities 

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for fiscal years 2013-14, as well as planned activities for fiscal year 2015 and 

beyond, including efforts through DARPA, Natick Soldier Systems Command, the 

other military services, the Rapid Innovation Fund, and industry; (3) coordination 

efforts undertaken with USSOCOM, DARPA, Natick Soldier Systems Command 

and other similar ongoing research and development activities; (4) project timelines 

including the development of prototypes and anticipated funding; (5) any other 

developmental efforts underway that could satisfy USSOCOM TALOS-like 

requirements, and (6) any other items the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. 

Technologies to improve spectrum efficiency

The committee is aware that spectrum is a vital national security resource 

which must be actively managed to ensure effective and efficient use that balances 

competing demands between the military services, other Federal agencies and the 

private sector. In the committee report accompanying the Duncan Hunter National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (H. Rept. 110-652), the committee 

noted its concern over the availability of spectrum for defense applications and the 

increasing scarcity imposed by additional spectrum auctions and competition with 

commercial wireless providers. For this reason, the committee is pleased that the 

Department of Defense has recently issued an Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 

to provide more strategic guidance to shape the future of the Department's 

spectrum operations. As noted in the new strategy, "[the Department of Defense] 

must act now to ensure access to the congested and contested electromagnetic 

environment of the future. Specifically, the Department must adapt how it acquires 

and uses spectrum resources. Our approach must include acquiring more efficient, 

flexible, and adaptable systems while developing more agile and opportunistic 

spectrum operations to ensure that our forces can complete their missions."

 The committee is also aware that this strategy is the first step in a longer 

process to develop a roadmap and action plan to inform future actions and 

resourcing. In addition, the committee believes that the Department needs to 

identify opportunities where it should focus research and development efforts to 

address any technological gaps, or where additional testing for commercial 

technologies may be needed to integrate into defense systems. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief Information Officer of the 

Department of Defense to brief the House Committee on Armed Services by 

January 15, 2015, on the status of the associated Spectrum Roadmap and Action 

Plan, as well as a science and technology roadmap for technologies that are needed 

to improve spectrum efficiency.

TITLE VIII—ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION 

MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

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Comptroller General Review of Department of Defense Trusted Foundry and Supply 

Chain Risk Management Programs

The committee recognizes that trusted components, both hardware and 

software, are vital to ensure the security and integrity of defense systems. To that 

end, the Department of Defense established a Trusted Foundry program to ensure a 

dedicated supply of trusted microelectronics for highly sensitive defense 

applications, as well as a trusted supplier program to provide less advanced 

microelectronics that still require a high degree of trust. The committee also notes 

that section 254 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417) required the Department to develop a 

Trusted Defense Systems Strategy to ensure that those capabilities were aligned 

with the policy framework needed to enforce the use of those capabilities.

After 10 years of this capability and policy framework, the committee 

believes that it is important to review the Trusted Foundry program, the Trusted 

Suppliers certification program, and other supply chain risk management to 

determine their effectiveness and understand if updates or changes are necessary. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to 

review and submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 

the House of Representatives not later than February 1, 2015, on the Department's 

program related to trusted foundry, trusted suppliers, and other supply chain risk 

management activities to ensure that the program strategy, contracting vehicles, 

and execution are fully supported by clear policy guidance from the Department, 

that such guidance is being followed, and to make any recommendations for needed 

improvement. 

Independent Assessment of Department of Defense Cloud Computing Acquisition 

and Brokerage Policies

The committee is aware that there are significant cloud computing 

resources in the commercial sector that have resulted in reduced data center 

infrastructure and support personnel, leading to cost savings and efficiency for 

users of these services. The committee acknowledged that reality, as evidenced by 

the language in section 2867 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) that called for a strategy for transitioning to cloud 

computing, including the utilization of cloud computing services generally available 

within the private sector. 

The committee believes that the Department of Defense could benefit from 

that trend, but is concerned that the guidance for leveraging commercial cloud 

services is being developed too slowly. The committee believes that an outside 

review of the Department's guidance and planning for cloud computing capabilities, 

including both in-house and private sector, would be valuable. Therefore, the 

committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent assessment of 

the Department's policies and guidance for cloud computing capabilities and provide 

a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 

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Representatives by September 30, 2015. This assessment should include the 

following:

(1) Whether industry and government best practices are embodied in 

Department of Defense policies and guidance;

(2) Whether cloud brokerage procedures are clearly articulated, commonly 

understood by service providers, and unbiased with respect to the use of in-house 

government-provided cloud services;

(3) Whether security protocols for commercial cloud products and services 

are clearly articulated; 

(4) Whether guidance exists for integration of commercial cloud capabilities 

into the architectural plans for the Joint Information Environment; and

(5) Whether the ongoing commercial cloud pilots are being evaluated for 

cost, performance, and security against standardized, consistent, and objective 

measures of effectiveness that are adequately aligned with current guidance. 

TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

OTHER MATTERS

Assessment of Counterfeit Detection Efforts

The committee recognizes the challenges posed to the Department of 

Defense in identifying and mitigating the presence of counterfeit parts in its supply 

chain. Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

(Public Law 112-81) was an important step in establishing policy, guidance, and 

compliance reporting to move the Department forward in addressing the detection 

and mitigation of counterfeit parts, including microelectronics. The committee 

believes that it is important to take stock of the actions that have been taken to 

date and to evaluate their effectiveness. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to provide a briefing to the House Committee 

on Armed Services by December 1, 2014, assessing the approaches currently taken 

to mitigate counterfeit parts in the supply system. The briefing should include the 

following:

(1) A cost benefit assessment of current compliance and technology 

measures for mitigating counterfeit parts, including microelectronics, in the supply 

chain, and requirements for deoxyribonucleic acid authentication marking. This 

assessment should include costs associated with program implementation and the 

scope of components that are being addressed by these measures;

(2) An assessment of the costs and benefits of expanding these measures to 

additional classes of technology, which have been deemed at high risk for 

counterfeiting;

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(3) An analysis of the quantity of alerts and problem advisories reporting 

counterfeit electronic parts in the Government Industry Data Exchange Program 

since January 2011 that were a result of the use of the measures described in item 

(1) above; and

(4) A description and analysis of the Department of Defense's efforts to 

collaborate and coordinate with the defense industrial base on the development of 

standards associated with the prevention, detection, and responses to the threat of 

counterfeit electronic parts in the military supply system.

Comptroller General Review of Department of Defense Antiterrorism and Force 

Protection Efforts

The committee recognizes that there have been an increasing number of 

insider attacks on U.S. military bases in recent years. In November of 2009, 13 

people were killed and 43 others wounded when a soldier opened fire at Fort Hood, 

Texas. The committee notes that following this shooting at Fort Hood, the 

Secretary of Defense established the Department of Defense Independent Review 

Related to Fort Hood. The review board presented its findings and 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in January 2010. In completing its 

review, the review board limited the depth of its study in certain areas, including 

force protection roles and responsibilities and threat assessment programs, based 

on the Secretary of Defense’s stated intent to have the military departments 

conduct in-depth follow-on reviews. However, the committee is concerned that more 

incidents have occurred since this incident, including a shooting at the Washington 

Navy Yard in September of 2013, as well as a second shooting at Fort Hood in April 

of 2014. 

The committee recognizes that insider attacks, such as these, pose a 

different challenge to Department of Defense's traditional antiterrorism and force 

protection efforts that address external threats. Therefore, the committee directs 

the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a comprehensive review of 

the inside-the-wire, antiterrorism and force protection efforts of the Department of 

Defense, and submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 

30, 2015. The review should address the following areas:

(1) The extent to which the Department of Defense has implemented the 

recommendations identified in the Department’s Independent Review Related to 

Fort Hood; 

(2) The status of the follow-on studies to be completed by the military 

departments and to what extent have any recommendations from these studies 

been implemented; 

(3) Additional actions taken by individual installations, and the extent to 

which these efforts have been shared with other installations; and

(4) The extent to which the Department’s current antiterrorism and force 

protection policies, guidance, and standards address insider threats.

Coordination of Efforts to Track and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

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The committee remains concerned about the threats posed by weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) to the safety and security of the United States. Efforts to 

track and counter WMDs exist within a significant number of Federal agencies. 

The committee recognizes that counter-WMD missions outside of U.S. borders 

reside within the purview of the Department of Defense. However within U.S. 

borders, these missions fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland 

Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

The committee notes that as outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, the combating WMD strategy of the Department of Defense is to eliminate 

WMD threats prior to entering the United States; however, the committee 

recognizes that this may not always be possible. The committee is concerned about 

the eventuality wherein a WMD device crosses these jurisdictional boundaries, in 

particular, in regards to the coordination efforts between the Department of 

Defense and local, state, and Federal authorities. The committee believes that in 

the case of such an occurrence, the cooperation between the Department of Defense 

and other Government agencies should be absolute in order to guarantee the 

elimination of WMD threats. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of 

Defense to brief the House Committee on Armed Services by September 1, 2014, on 

the coordination efforts between the Department of Defense, the intelligence 

community, and local, state, and Federal authorities for tracking and combating 

weapons of mass destruction entering the United States. The briefing should 

include details on the authority structures in place within the Department of 

Defense to facilitate the coordination efforts, as well as examples of how these 

structures would operate in a realistic threat scenario.

Economic Warfare Policy

The committee continues to be concerned by the possibility of adversaries 

utilizing economic warfare as a means to undermine U.S. military advantages. As 

noted in the committee report (H. Rept 112-78) accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, "[t]he committee is concerned that our 

adversaries understand this dependency, and are developing means to attack our 

military strength by attacking our economy."

In making those observations, the committee noted the findings of a 2009 

report from the Irregular Warfare Support Program titled “Economic Warfare: 

Risks and Responses,” which offered some plausible scenarios about how economic 

warfare might be used against the United States. That report also made a number 

of recommendations which have yet to be given serious attention by the Department 

of Defense or the national security establishment, including:

(1) Recognize that protecting the American economy and industrial 

capability is a top defense priority that should be properly funded and supported; 

(2) Thoroughly research the hypothesis of economic warfare described from 

an economic defense perspective; and

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(3) Create a specialized threat finance unit to develop and implement 

appropriate countermeasures to emerging economic warfare threats.

Since that report was released, the committee has become increasingly 

aware of the potentialities that cyber-enabled technologies add to these economic 

and financial threats. For example, the large-scale theft of intellectual property in 

sectors of strategic importance to the United States poses a direct challenge to U.S. 

technological superiority, but also a long-term economic pressure as we are forced to 

develop countermeasures against our own stolen defense technologies and 

potentially lose market advantage in some non-military technology sectors. The 

presence of large swaths of the financial sector without an adequate monitoring 

framework that could be exploited by terrorist or nation-state, such as dark trading 

pools, credit default swaps, sovereign wealth funds, naked short selling, or 

algorithmic trading, may be a significant blind spot for the United States.

Given the pervasive nature of these threats, and the apparent lack of clear 

policy guidance or organization to address these issues, the committee directs the 

Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the Committee on Armed Services of the 

House of Representatives by August 1, 2015, on the Department’s assessment of 

these activities. The report should include:

(1) Articulation of what sorts of activities amount to economic warfare upon 

the United States;

(2) Clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of 

Defense in providing indications and warning of, or protection against, acts of 

economic warfare;

(3) The current status of authorities and command structure related to 

economic warfare; and

(4) Recommendations for improving the Department's capabilities, 

authorities, or command structure, as well as improving its coordination and 

support for interagency partners in dealing with economic warfare threats.

Information Management Systems for Response Forces

The committee is aware that the National Guard Bureau Weapons of Mass 

Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) currently field a system called the 

CST Information Management System, to provide a common operating picture, 

promote information-sharing and real-time collaboration in an emergency situation, 

and support the CST mission of assisting and advising first responders and 

facilitating communications with other Federal resources. The committee is also 

aware that in the National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Response Enterprise, there are also other capabilities such as the Unified 

Command Suite and the Joint Incident Command Suite. Because each of these tools 

support different echelons of command with different but related capabilities, it is 

vital that there be a comprehensive strategy for how to rationalize the current suite 

of tools, and move forward with a common, interoperable, enterprise information 

management solution.

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Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a 

briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by January 15, 2015, on a 

comprehensive strategy for developing and fielding an information management 

architecture for the Department's CBRN Response Enterprise. This strategy should 

define the information architecture needs for the CBRN Response Enterprise as 

well as its plans to achieve enterprise-wide data interoperability for all operating 

elements within the Response Enterprise.

Inventory of Counter Threat Finance Programs and Capabilities

The committee recognizes that illicit financial networks are critical 

enablers to destabilizing networks and transnational criminal organizations, 

including terrorist, narco-traffickers, human smugglers, proliferators and actors 

seeking to avoid sanctions. The Department of Defense invested heavily in the 

Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to create counter threat 

finance capabilities to detect and combat such illicit activity. With the draw-down in 

Afghanistan and the pivot to Asia, the committee is concerned that the Department 

might begin to divest itself of such counter threat finance capabilities in favor of 

traditional military capabilities. However, the committee believes such capabilities 

will continue to be of value to combat threats to our national security, including 

state actors avoiding sanctions or maintain black market economic activities. The 

committee also believes such capabilities can be useful in supporting surveillance 

and indications and warning for national economic threats, such as attempts to 

perpetrate economic warfare or sabotage. Therefore, the committee directs the 

Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the 

Senate and the House of Representatives by February 15, 2015, on an inventory 

and sustainment plan for Department of Defense counter-threat finance programs 

and capabilities.

Military Auxiliary Radio System

The committee continues to support the Military Auxiliary Radio System 

(MARS), a Department of Defense-sponsored auxiliary organization of volunteer 

amateur radio operators who provide contingency communications support to the 

Department of Defense and U.S. Government operations. In addition to providing 

an important back-up to conventional communications that is potentially vulnerable 

to disruption or degradation, MARS can play a vital role in helping to ensure 

continuity of Government and continuity of operations in the event of a natural or 

man-made disaster. Given these advantages of MARS, the committee is concerned 

by the Department’s lack of action in fully utilizing this capability. In the 

committee report (H. Rept. 112-479) accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the committee encouraged the Department 

to clarify and maintain policy oversight of MARS within the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and to update Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 4650.02 

entitled “Mars Auxiliary Radio System (MARS)” with respect to the 

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disestablishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks 

and Information Integration. The committee notes, however, that these actions 

have not yet occurred.

The committee is aware of efforts to revise and update DODI 4650.02, 

which establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for MARS. However, the 

revision is not yet complete. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of 

Defense to ensure that any rewrite of the DODI 4650.02 effectively integrates 

MARS into the Department of Defense’s emergency communications plan; 

consolidates MARS operations through appointment of an individual MARS 

manager to ensure standardization of operating policies and procedures among the 

three MARS branches within the Army, Air Force, and Navy-Marine Corps; and 

directs the service secretaries and geographic combatant commanders to integrate 

MARS more fully into their operational planning and activities. In addition, the 

committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the Committee on Armed 

Services of the House of Representatives by August 30, 2014, on the status of the 

revision of DODI 4650.02.

Review of Military Standard to Protect Systems Against Electromagnetic Pulse

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense maintains a 

military standard for protection of ground-based systems and facilities performing 

critical and time-urgent command, control, communications, computer, and 

intelligence missions from high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP). This 

military standard, known as MIL-STD 800-125-1 and -2, details the performance, 

acceptance test, and verification test requirements for identified systems, as well as 

HEMP-unique acceptance and verification test techniques.

The committee is concerned that in the nearly 16 years since this standard 

was last updated, technology may have progressed in ways that have out-paced the 

ability of the standard to ensure protection of designated systems. For example, on 

the offensive side, the capability exists now to buy commercial-off-the-shelf, nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generators to provide EMP effects without the 

need for nuclear devices. On the defensive side, the higher reliance on commercial 

information technology hardware, and the interconnection of such systems, results 

in a more complex interaction between specific systems that must be characterized 

to understand the propagation of EMP effects.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a 

review of MIL-STD 800-125-1 and -2 to determine if the standards are in need of 

updating based on the current and future projected threats, and whether the 

Department needs to revise the frequency for revisiting testing against these 

standards to ensure changes or updates to systems and facilities have not opened 

up new vulnerabilities. Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary to provide 

a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives by 

June 1, 2015, on the results of this review. 

Spectrum Operations Centers

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The committee is aware that U.S. Strategic Command operates the Joint 

Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. An 

important aspect of the JEWC is its role in connecting electronic warfare (EW) 

resources to the warfighter, and the committee believes that the JEWC provides 

critical operational EW support to the combatant commands, including combat 

operations support, opposing force EW during operational training exercises, Joint 

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization EW reprogramming, joint capabilities 

technology demonstration support and modeling analysis and simulation. 

The committee believes that the capabilities of the JEWC could be 

enhanced by having connections with sister organizations within each of the 

military services to act as spectrum coordination centers that would coordinate 

service-specific resources and needs into the planning and operations of the 

individual service training, exercises, and operations. Therefore, the committee 

directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military 

departments, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by 

June 1, 2015, that describes the use case for such spectrum operations centers, as 

well as a business-case analysis for designating or developing organizations to act in 

such a role. The briefing should examine the relative costs and benefits of 

leveraging existing organizations, as well as how such an organization could 

support full-scope electromagnetic operations, including EW, spectrum 

management, and cyberspace operations.

Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination

The committee is aware that as a result of direction received in the 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) established 

the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) in 2012 with the 

purpose of planning, training for, and executing command and control functions 

during weapons of mass destruction (WMD) elimination missions. However, the 

committee believes that the planning and training mission of the SJFHQ-E appears 

to have significant overlap with the STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCCWMD), which performs a similar function for the larger mission space of combating 

WMD. The committee is also aware that prior to the formation of the SJFHQ-E, the 

command and control functions for elimination missions were performed through 

the establishment of a Joint Task Force for Elimination (JTF-E), which was only 

established if and when it was deemed necessary based on the scope of the 

elimination mission. In addition, the committee notes that in its formation, the 

SJFHQ-E assumed the tasks, missions, and operations of the Joint Elimination 

Coordination Element (JECE) which previously functioned as the core of any JTF-E 

upon its formation. 

The committee believes that combating and eliminating WMD is of the 

utmost importance for national security. However, the committee also believes that 

in the current austere fiscal climate, the additional cost and bureaucracy associated 

with a standing headquarters must provide necessary, differentiable capability. 

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Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the House 

Committee on Armed Services by September 30, 2014, on the added benefit of the 

SJFHQ-E. The briefing should discuss unique value added by the formation of a 

standing headquarters, and compare the current capabilities and associated costs of 

the SJFHQ-E with those capabilities that existed previously among the SCC-WMD 

and the existing JECE.

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Non-Lethal Weapons for Contingency Operations

The committee reaffirms its longstanding support for the accelerated 

development, fielding, and deployment of non-lethal technologies. Non-lethal 

systems are useful for both force application and force protection missions. The 

committee notes that their employment is consistent with U.S. military strategy 

and helps minimize damage to property and inadvertent civilian casualties in the 

kinds of operational contingencies, including irregular warfare and humanitarian 

crises, in which U.S. forces are likely to be engaged. Their use provides commanders 

with additional decision time and space before resorting to lethal force, helps 

mitigate the negative consequences of unintended non-combatant injuries and 

fatalities, and enhances the overall prospects of mission success.

The committee understands that, as a result of budget pressures, the 

Department of Defense is proposing significant cuts to the Department's NonLethal Weapons program over the next 5 years. This includes a roughly one-third 

reduction in fiscal year 2015 for overall Department of Defense non-lethal 

investments and more than a 40 percent reduction in the Future Years Defense 

Plan compared to the previous 5-year estimate. The committee is also concerned 

that significant cuts to service procurements are also planned, further exacerbating 

cuts to the joint program.

The committee believes that such reductions may have unintended or 

unforeseen impacts on contingency planning related to humanitarian relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, and peacekeeping. If current contingency plans 

are predicated on the availability of such non-lethal systems, the Department of 

Defense may be forced into relying solely on lethal force to deal with these emerging 

requirements. Accordingly, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by 

February 1, 2015, on the impact of funding reductions for non-lethal systems on 

current contingency operations planning supporting humanitarian relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, and peacekeeping. This briefing should examine 

current contingency planning to determine if the level of investment estimated 

across the Future Years Defense Program in the joint and service programs is 

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sufficient to support those plans, and a possible course of action to mitigate any 

shortfall.

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Air Force Cyber

The committee notes that the fiscal year 2015 budget request is generally 

characterized by reductions in most mission areas except cyber. This trend is true 

across all the military services, including the Air Force. However, the committee 

believes that for the Air Force, it is particularly difficult to understand the breadth 

and depth of investment and focus in cyber given the dispersion of cyber manpower 

across multiple program areas and operating environments. 

The committee is concerned that disaggregating the cyber workforce across 

multiple expenditure centers and projects in such a manner not only makes 

understanding the entirety of the cyber investment more difficult, it generates 

greater risk for suboptimizing the cyber workforce, increased unintentional 

redundancy in tasking, and challenges in managing operational roles and 

responsibilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in 

coordination with the Director of the National Security Agency, to provide a report 

to the congressional defense committees, the Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on 

Intelligence of the Senate by February 16, 2015, that captures the aggregate Air 

Force investment in cyber, laying out where the various elements of Air Force cyber 

are nested, and how those elements are integrated within the overall Air Force and 

Department of Defense cyber enterprises. The report should focus both on the 

current laydown of personnel as well as the envisioned end-state manning 

construct. It should also include a discussion on how the Air Force has constructed 

the various operational chains of command within the service and between the

service elements and United States Cyber Command.

Air Force Distributed Common Ground/Surface System

The Air Force Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS-AF) is a 

family of existing and planned systems providing multi-intelligence tasking, 

processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities at the Joint Task Force 

level and below. The committee notes that the fiscal year 2015 request for DCGSAF totaled $782.4 million dollars and included over 7,600 personnel. Resident in 

the Processing and Exploitation expenditure center, DCGS-AF has traditionally 

been viewed in that functional context.

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The committee is concerned that through the course of supporting combat 

operations over the past 12 years, DCGS-AF has begun to evolve beyond the 

intelligence processing and exploitation functions to include single-intelligence and 

even multi-intelligence source analysis. The committee believes this presents an 

important opportunity for the Air Force to clarify the operational role of the DCGSAF enterprise, taking every measure to ensure full coordination between enterprise 

elements and complete deconfliction of functions, tasking, and mission 

responsibilities where possible.

The committee is specifically concerned that initiatives like the DCGS-AF 

Analysis and Reporting Team (DART) System risk stepping beyond the appropriate 

functional boundaries for the system, unduly broadening the mission, and 

distracting the operational focus. However, the committee believes that the future 

Analysis and Targeting Wing must take full advantage of technical advances 

accomplished within the DCGS-AF as part of Air Force efforts to clarify and cement 

appropriate mission assignments across the intelligence enterprise.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a 

report to the congressional defense and intelligence committees by June 1, 2015, 

that describes the future of DCGS analytic and processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination responsibilities. The report should describe which intelligence 

functions, such as processing, exploitation, and analysis, should reside at the 

service intelligence centers, the Joint Intelligence and Operations Centers, and at 

DCGS-AF nodes. The report should outline a proposed Plan of Action and 

Milestone to execute the transformation to the stated end state, including 

anticipated costs and manpower requirements across the enterprise and a plan for 

satisfying those requirements.

Comptroller General Assessment of U.S. Cyber Command

The committee notes that according to the Secretary of Defense, cyberspace 

is the new terrain for warfare where adversaries seek to do harm to the Nation, the 

economy, and its citizens. Adversaries, such as nations, insiders, terrorists, 

criminal groups, hackers, and other individuals and organizations, use an array of 

cyber tactics that could threaten our nation’s security. The unique nature of cyberbased attacks can vastly enhance their reach and impact. To address these threats, 

the Department of Defense established U.S. Cyber Command as a sub-unified 

command under U.S. Strategic Command. 

In 2010 and 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported 

that the Department’s and U.S. Cyber Command’s efforts could benefit from 

additional detail and clarity and that they had not fully defined long-term mission 

requirements and desired capabilities to guide the military services’ efforts to 

recruit, train, and provide forces with appropriate skill sets. In 2014, GAO also 

reported on the Department’s planning efforts to maintain continuity of operations 

in a degraded cyber environment. 

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U.S. Cyber Command achieved full operational capability in October 2010, 

and is currently responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, 

and conducting activities to direct the operations and defense of specified 

Department of Defense information networks, and to prepare to conduct full 

spectrum military cyberspace operations, when directed, to enable actions in all 

domains and ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace while denying 

the same to our adversaries. As U.S. Cyber Command continues to develop and 

grow, it is essential that it does so as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to 

submit a report to the congressional defense committees by March 31, 2015, on the 

organization, missions, and authorities of U.S. Cyber Command and its operational 

relationship with the geographic combatant commands. This report should include a 

review of the existing organizational structure of the U.S. Cyber Command, 

including the extent to which:

(1) The Department has clearly defined U.S. Cyber Command's mission, 

responsibilities, and authorities;

(2) U.S. Cyber Command's organization, personnel, and structure support 

cyberspace operations and leverage relationships with the combatant commands, 

military services, and defense while minimizing potential overlap or duplication of 

effort; 

(3) U.S. Cyber Command coordinates and supports the operations and 

activities of the geographic combatant commands, including identifying the 

offensive and defensive cyber rules of engagement for U.S. Cyber Command and 

geographic combatant commands and conducting assessments to identify needed 

cyber capabilities; and

(4) Effective coordination mechanisms have been established between U.S. 

Cyber Command and other Federal agencies that have a role in cyberspace 

operations. 

Comptroller General Assessment on Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance

Airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems 

provide critical insight to the warfighter across the spectrum of operations from 

combat to peacetime. Commanders of the combatant commands recognize the 

advantages that ISR provides, and therefore have significant demand and 

requirements for the use of these platforms in their areas of operation. The military 

departments must balance the warfighter requirements and overall investments to 

meet a broader defense strategy. Addressing the appropriate level of ISR capacity 

and capability appears to be a significant and recurring challenge for the 

Department of Defense.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United 

States to assess the processes by which the Department determines its airborne 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance investments and balances capability 

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and capacity in order to meet commanders of the combatant commands' critical ISR 

requirements. The Comptroller General should provide a report to the 

congressional defense and intelligence committees by February 1, 2015. The report 

should address the extent to which the Department of Defense has the necessary:

(1) Risk and resource management structures in place to validate, 

prioritize, and address airborne ISR collection requirements of the commanders of 

the combatant commands; 

(2) Airborne ISR capabilities to meet current intelligence requirements of 

the commanders of the combatant commands; 

(3) Airborne ISR investment strategy, including the appropriate capability 

and capacity of platforms and sensors relative to current and anticipated 

intelligence requirements of the commanders of the combatant commands; and 

(4) Any related matters the Comptroller General finds appropriate.

Comptroller General Evaluation on Department of Defense Efforts to Protect 

Information and Systems from Insider Threats

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense has implemented a 

number of measures, both technical and administrative, to try to mitigate the 

threat from privileged insiders. That process began with the unauthorized 

disclosures from Bradley Manning, but clearly gaps continue to exist that have been 

exploited by Edward Snowden. The committee remains concerned that the 

Department's efforts have not been comprehensive enough or implemented swiftly 

enough to get ahead of the problem. The committee is also concerned that the 

Department does not have an adequate baseline or rigorous metrics to assess the 

effectiveness or performance of the measures that are in place.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United 

States to submit a report to the congressional defense committees by January 15, 

2015, evaluating the Department's efforts at protecting against insider threats. This 

report should address the following issues:

(1) To what extent has the Department assessed and mitigated for the 

threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences that insiders pose to Department of 

Defense information and systems the Department uses?

(2) To what extent has the Department developed and implemented an 

insider threat detection and prevention program consistent with guidance and 

standards developed by the Insider Threat Task Force?

(3) To what extent have lessons learned from prior insider threat incidents 

been incorporated into the Department’s insider threat detection and prevention 

program?

(4) Has the Department reached out to other Federal agencies, foreign 

governments, or the private sector to identify best practices and lessons learned 

with regard to insider threats; and to what extent have those best practices and 

lessons learned been incorporated into the Department’s insider threat detection 

and prevention program?

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 (5) How well has the Department been performing on the assessments, both 

self-assessments and external assessments, called for in Executive Order 13587; 

and to what extent has the Department developed corrective action plans to address 

the findings in a timely manner?

(6) What additional areas need to be addressed, either by technical systems 

or additional policies?

Defense Intelligence Priorities

As part of both the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community 

(IC), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is dually tasked with providing 

intelligence collection, analysis, and support specifically responsive to the 

Department of Defense as well as national requirements established through the 

National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). The committee believes that 

both roles are critical, but can be difficult to balance. The committee also 

understands that measuring satisfaction of NIPF requirements may be easier than 

measuring the satisfaction of Department-specific requirements. In part, the 

committee believes this is due to difficulties with identifying Department-specific 

requirements in a holistic manner. 

Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 

(Public Law 113-66) requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a written policy 

governing the internal coordination and prioritization of intelligence priorities of 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, 

and the military departments to improve identification of the intelligence needs of 

the Department of Defense. Given this new policy, the committee directs the 

Director, DIA, to provide an assessment to the congressional defense and 

intelligence committees by October 1, 2014, of the following: 

(1) A specific description of how the new policy is being implemented in 

terms of driving and focusing DIA intelligence efforts to support the Department; 

(2) How efforts to incorporate the new policy are being balanced with DIA's 

responsibilities pursuant to the NIPF; 

(3) The extent to which any other Department of Defense or IC policies or 

guidance impact DIA's implementation of the new policy; and

(4) Any recommendations to further improve the Department's 

identification of its specific requirements and DIA's ability to respond to such 

requirements. 

Geospatial Intelligence for Disadvantaged Users

The committee is aware of the stated National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency (NGA) strategic goal to provide online, on-demand access to geospatialintelligence knowledge. However, in contrast to online products, the committee 

notes the importance of NGA's continued support to combat forces operating in 

disconnected, intermittent, and limited bandwidth operational environments. 

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While current programs are addressing this requirement, a strategic plan for this 

area has yet to be developed.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency, in coordination with the Department of Defense Chief 

Information Officer, to jointly provide a briefing to House Committee on Armed 

Services by December 1, 2014, on a joint plan to address the relevant combat forces 

requirements to efficiently and cost-effectively access national geospatialintelligence data in disconnected, intermittent, and/or limited bandwidth 

environments. 

 

Inspector General Review of the Activities Supporting the Joint Information 

Environment

The committee has been monitoring progress on the Department of 

Defense's Joint Information Environment (JIE) for several years. The committee is 

aware that the Department does not consider JIE to be a program of record, but is a 

coordinating framework for other programs of record in the Department. The 

committee is concerned that without a strong architectural foundation, many 

acquisition decisions are being made by the military services and Department of 

Defense agencies without sufficient planning and rigor to ensure that there is 

transparency and competition in the process. The committee is aware of at least one 

instance in which the Air Force, despite a court ruling, failed to adhere to necessary 

contracting and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements. The committee 

believes that the current process for contracting components of the JIE lends itself 

to an over-reliance on sole-source or brand-names contracts, or other decisions made 

for expediency over competition. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Inspector General of the Department 

of Defense to review Department of Defense noncompetitive information technology 

contracts to determine whether they were properly justified as sole source, and to 

provide a briefing on the results of the review to the Committee on Armed Services 

of the House of Representatives by March 1, 2015. The review should look at a 

sample of noncompetitive information technology contracts in fiscal years 2013-14, 

and review of these contracts should determine whether the Department is overly 

reliant on sole-source, brand-name or other contract types that bypass competition 

requirements. 

Investments for Joint Information Environment Activities

As noted elsewhere in this report, the committee has been monitoring 

progress on the Department of Defense's Joint Information Environment (JIE) for 

several years. The committee is aware JIE is an ambitious initiative to consolidate 

its information infrastructure, but is considered a coordinating framework for other 

programs of record in the Department and not a program of record itself. However, 

the committee recognizes that many existing acquisition programs influence, or are 

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influenced by, the architectural framework being developed by the Department of 

Defense, in close coordination with each of the military services and defense 

agencies. 

The committee is concerned, however, that the Department cannot readily 

indicate which programs are affected by the standards and processes being 

developed for JIE. The committee believes that JIE cannot be effective if the 

Department does not understand the span of all programs falling under the rubric 

of JIE, which will effect resourcing, development, manpower, testing, and 

evaluation. Therefore, the committee directs the Chief Information Officer of the 

Department of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed 

Services by March 1, 2015, that identifies all of the major funded activities within 

each of the military services and defense agencies that currently contribute to JIE, 

as well as the funding across the Future Years Defense Program, and an integrated 

master schedule with major milestones for all of the indicated programs.

Military Intelligence Program and Defense Input to the National Intelligence 

Program

In addition to describing responsibilities with regard to the Military 

Intelligence Program, section 3038 of title 50, United States Code, describes the 

Secretary of Defense's responsibilities regarding the National Intelligence Program. 

Section 3038 requires the Secretary of Defense to "ensure that the budgets of the 

elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense are 

adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, 

including the needs of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders 

of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such elements are performing 

government-wide functions, the needs of other departments and agencies." Further, 

section 3038 requires the Secretary of Defense to "ensure that the elements of the 

intelligence community within the Department of Defense are responsive and 

timely with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces." The 

Secretary also has specific statutory authorities relating to individual elements of 

the intelligence community that are part of the Department of Defense.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence (USDI) is largely responsible for fulfilling these statutory 

responsibilities on behalf of the Secretary and plays a critical role in ensuring that 

the intelligence needs of the warfighter are addressed. Specifically, the USDI has 

taken the lead role in establishing the new policy required by section 922 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66) to 

govern the internal coordination and prioritization of intelligence priorities of the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and 

the military departments to improve identification of the intelligence needs of the 

Department of Defense. 

Thus, the committee directs the USDI to provide a report to the 

congressional defense committees and the congressional intelligence committees by 

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October 1, 2014, that contains a detailed description of how the new policy 

regarding Department of Defense intelligence priorities has been integrated into 

resourcing deliberations and planning for the Military Intelligence Program, and 

how the new policy has been integrated into USDI's representation of the 

Department of Defense in resourcing deliberations and planning for the National 

Intelligence Program.

Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination

The committee recognizes that advances in the understanding and 

application of Object Based Production and Activity Based Intelligence (ABI) have 

exposed the imperative need for making every ounce of collected and processed 

intelligence readily accessible to the all-source analyst community in formats that 

are consistent, shareable, and searchable. The committee is concerned that the 

military services have been largely absent or excluded from those discussions and 

working groups. As the services have a significant personnel investment in 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination (PED), it is of critical importance that they remain abreast of 

technical advances in shared intelligence and analytic processes. To obtain the 

maximum possible value from nascent ABI analytic methodologies, the committee 

believes that every PED process must deliver accurately tagged and accessible or 

shareable content.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence to submit a report to the congressional defense and the congressional 

intelligence committees by May 1, 2015, on a proposed way ahead for transforming 

the existing Department of Defense PED enterprise. The report should look across 

all PED organizations in the enterprise and focus on today’s single source products 

developed in largely single intelligence discipline environments. The report should 

include a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) laying out specific actions to be 

taken, by each intelligence disciple and each collector, to evolve or enhance today’s 

PED processes and outputs to a condition that directly facilitates ABI analysis. In 

building the POA&M, the report should prioritize collection sources, identifying 

those that can be tackled simultaneously, and highlighting any obstacles that 

prevent the required PED maturation.

Space-Based Reconnaissance

The committee believes that the Operationally Responsive Space-1 (ORS-1) 

satellite has provided significant intelligence value to the U.S. Central Command 

and the Army's 513th Military Intelligence Brigade. When referring to this 

capability, the 513th stated "the ability to provide timely geospatial-intelligence 

(GEOINT) response to a real world mission during execution cannot be matched." 

U.S. Central Command provided similar feedback on the operational flexibility 

provided by this space reconnaissance asset to support urgent, short-notice 

requirements. 

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The committee is aware that ORS-1 is currently operating well beyond its 

design life, and there is no follow-on program planned. The committee would like to 

understand the requirements of the commanders of the combatant commands for 

use of space reconnaissance assets. Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a report to the congressional defense and the 

congressional intelligence committees by January 15, 2015, on the feedback from 

each of the commanders of the combatant commands on the utility of space-based 

reconnaissance capabilities to meet their priority intelligence requirements and 

their current ability to utilize and control space-based reconnaissance to meet those 

requirements. 

Targeting Enterprise

The committee recognizes the importance of geospatial intelligence 

(GEOINT) support to military operations. The National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency (NGA) defines GEOINT as the exploitation and analysis of imagery and 

geospatial information that describes, assesses and visually depicts physical 

features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. An important aspect 

of GEOINT operations is the target material provided to support the common 

operational picture, mission planning, precision coordinate generation, and other 

analytical products. The committee believes that the targeting mission is of critical 

importance, and the current threat environment will create challenges and 

necessitate the need for further review of the methods to accomplish this mission. 

 Therefore, the committee directs that the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, in coordination with the Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency, to provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 

Representatives and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 

of Representatives by May 1, 2015, on the state of the targeting enterprise. The 

briefing should include: an assessment of the current GEOINT targeting 

capabilities; identification of targeteer training as well as the current and projected 

number of targeteers across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, including NGA; 

and an analysis of opportunities for improvement within the defense intelligence 

community.

U.S. Transportation Command Joint Intelligence and Operations Center

The U.S. Transportation Command Joint Intelligence and Operations 

Center (JIOC-TRANS) recently executed a highly successful proof of concept 

associated with a new organizational construct titled the Transportation 

Intelligence Center (TIC). While the committee supports the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff delegation of authority to the TIC to allow full exercise of appropriate 

intelligence coordination activities as demonstrated in the proof of concept, the 

committee requires additional information regarding why it is necessary to 

engender a new organizational construct to achieve the desired end state, 

particularly when manned with the same personnel as the existing JIOC. 

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 Therefore, the committee directs that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, in coordination with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide a 

report to the congressional defense and the congressional intelligence committees by 

February 16, 2015, detailing the authorities delegated to the TIC as part of the 

proof of concept and presenting an evaluation of any obstacles to delegating those 

same authorities directly to the Commander, JIOC-TRANS. The report should 

identify any opportunities to apply the same lessons and delegations across the 

other functional JIOCS (e.g. U.S. Strategic Command JIOC, U.S. Cyber Command 

JIOC, and U.S. Special Operations Command JIOC) to achieve improved 

operational intelligence efficiency and effectiveness. Finally, the report should 

explore the potential for such initiatives to allow more efficient utilization of JIOC 

or Intelligence Community manning. 

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