COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

NORMAN H. RAGLAND 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1036-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 FEBRUARY 18, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

James E. Kulp, Judge 

 John B. Boatwright, III (Boatwright & Linka, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Norman H. Ragland (appellant) appeals his conviction of a 

second or subsequent offense of operating a motor vehicle after 

having been declared an habitual offender in violation of Code 

§ 46.2-357. He contends that the trial court erred when it 

denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a stop of 

his car because the detaining police officer lacked a legally 

cognizable reason to stop him. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 In 1988, appellant was adjudged to be an habitual offender 

and his driver's license was revoked for a period of ten years. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Appellant was convicted of felony habitual offender in 1992. 

 At 2:30 a.m. on February 4, 1995, Officer Douglas Burton of 

the Henrico County Police Department was on patrol when he 

observed a vehicle with an anomalous tail light. Officer Burton 

noticed that the red plastic cover of this tail light was askew 

so that about an inch and a half of white light emanated from it. 

 The other tail light was completely covered by its red plastic 

cover and was functioning properly. Officer Burton initiated a 

traffic stop of the vehicle, during which he discovered that 

appellant was the driver. 

 Appellant was charged with a second or subsequent offense of 

operating a motor vehicle after having been declared an habitual 

offender in violation of Code § 46.2-357. At trial, the 

Commonwealth's evidence consisted of Officer Burton's testimony 

and proof of appellant's prior convictions. At the close of the 

Commonwealth's case, appellant moved to suppress the evidence 

obtained by Officer Burton during the stop of his car. The trial 

court denied appellant's motion, and a jury convicted appellant 

of a second or subsequent offense of operating a motor vehicle 

after having been declared an habitual offender. 

 II. 

THE BROKEN TAIL LIGHT 

 Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion to suppress because Officer Burton had no legal reason 

to stop his vehicle on February 4, 1995. Specifically, appellant 
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argues that Officer Burton could not stop his vehicle on the 

basis of his broken tail light because driving a vehicle with one 

broken tail light while the other tail light functions properly 

is not a violation of Virginia law. We disagree. 

 "Motor vehicles operating on the highways of this State are 

required to comply with the statutes relating to lighting 

equipment in effect at the time of their operation." Hall v. 

Hockaday, 206 Va. 792, 798, 146 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1966). We hold 

that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to 

suppress because Officer Burton's stop of appellant's car was 

based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant's 

automobile had defective equipment. Cf. Freeman v. Commonwealth, 

20 Va. App. 658, 660-61, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1995). Virginia 

law makes it unlawful for a person to drive a vehicle that has a 

defective tail light on the highways of the Commonwealth. Code 

§ 46.2-1003 states that: 

 it shall be unlawful for "any person to use

or have as equipment on a motor vehicle 

operated on a highway any device or equipment 

mentioned in § 46.2-1002 which is defective

or in unsafe condition. 

(Emphasis added). Included among the equipment mentioned in Code 

§ 46.2-1002 is ". . . any lighting device . . . for which 

approval is required by any provision of this chapter . . . ." 

Code § 46.2-1013 requires tail lights used on motor vehicles to 

be approved by the superintendent of the Department of State 

Police of the Commonwealth. Thus, under Code § 46.2-1003, it is 
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unlawful to drive a car that has a tail light in defective 

condition. 

 The record indicates that Officer Burton stopped appellant's 

car because of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant 

was driving a car with a defective tail light. "Defective" is 

commonly defined as "falling below an accepted standard in 

regularity and soundness of form or structure." Webster's Third 

New International Dictionary 591 (1981). The Virginia Code 

requires tail lights to be a "red light plainly visible in clear 

weather from a distance of 500 feet to the rear of such vehicle." 

 Code § 46.2-1013. Officer Burton observed that the red plastic 

covering of appellant's tail light was out of place so that it 

emanated both a red light and a white light that was plainly 

visible to him from a distance. Because Officer Burton saw that 

appellant's tail light deviated from the standard for tail lights 

set forth in Code § 46.2-1013, he had reason to conclude that 

appellant was driving a car with a defective tail light. 

 Appellant contends that Officer Burton had no legal 

justification to stop appellant because driving a car with one 

defective tail light and one functioning tail light is legal in 

Virginia. Specifically, appellant argues that Code § 46.2-1013 

must be read together with Code § 46.2-1003 and that a driver 

does not violate Code § 46.2-1003 if his car has at least one

tail light that functions in accordance with Code § 46.2-1013. 

We disagree because appellant's proposed reading of these two 
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code provisions fails to give full effect to the apparent intent 

of Code § 46.2-1003. "'In construing a statute the court should 

seek to discover the intention of the legislature as ascertained 

from the act itself when read in the light of other statutes 

relating to the same subject matter.' 'Two statutes which are 

closely interrelated must be read and construed together and 

effect given to all of their provisions.'" Tharpe v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 37, 43, 441 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1994) 

(citations omitted). Code § 46.2-1013 is codified among the 

provisions in Title 46.2 that set forth the minimum requirements 

for "lights and turn signals" with which all vehicles must 

comply. Code § 46.2-1003, on the other hand, is codified among 

the provisions regarding "vehicle and equipment safety." It does 

more than set a minimum standard; it regulates the maintenance of 

devices or equipment used on a vehicle. In particular, Code 

§ 46.2-1003 prohibits the use on a vehicle of any equipment 

mentioned in Code § 46.2-1002 that is either unsafe or defective, 

whether or not this equipment exceeds the minimum requirements 

set forth elsewhere in the Code. Thus, the apparent intent of 

Code § 46.2-1003 is to compel automobile owners to repair or 

replace any of their vehicle's equipment that falls into a 

defective or unsafe condition. Appellant's harmonization of Code 

§ 46.2-1003 with Code § 46.2-1013 has the effect of eviscerating 

the impact of Code § 46.2-1003 because it would create an entire 

class of equipment that may be legally used on a vehicle in an 
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unsafe or defective condition simply because the equipment is in 

excess of the Code's minimum requirements. We will not construe 

these two provisions to achieve such an unwarranted result. See

Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 

(1992). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the stop was lawful. 

 Therefore, we affirm the conviction of a second or subsequent 

offense of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared 

an habitual offender in violation of Code § 46.2-357. 

Affirmed.