#### *Kinloch*& *Phillips*vs. *Jacob Meyer, administrator of Luder Meyer, and Mauris Meyer.*

1. Petition filed agaifast tfie administrator of ah intestate, for an account of bis estate, and for a statement of the ainóunt to which a brother of the deceased would be entitled, who, before the intestate’s death, had left thé State indebted to the petitioners, for the purpose of making the Same liable for their demand. It was Stated in the petition, and admitted in the answer} that the party absent left no attorney, nor property of any description what* fever. But it was further stated, that the intestate left *eL*considerable personal, and some real, estate, to a distributive share of which the absent debtor ivas entitled, and admitted by the administrator that he did ieavfe personal festate, subject to distribution between the absent debtor, himself} and others} but no real estate whatever;

2. Plea to the jurisdiction, that petitioners had plain afad adequate remedy fat law, and were not entitled to the aid of this cortrt; but as the debtor was ■Without the jurisdiction of the law courts, and had left no property on which an attachment Could Operate, the plea was not sustained.

3. The case of *Kennédy vs¡‘ Simirions,*(decided in 1837) ifa which thfe bill was filed to charge the wife’s separate estate with the payment of a bond entered into by her before coverture} the husband being charged to be insolvent) to be distinguished from this} as in that case, there was a per*son primarily liable, who could have been made a party at law.

4. Complainants having stated, that intestate died seized of real estate, it Was insisted for defendant, that this made a case for the law Court. This might have been good cause for demurrer) but as defendant denied that hfe did die so seized, the deficit in the petition was thus removed, and made a case for the jurisdiction of this court:

5. None but the administrator and absent party being made defendants, it was urged that the other distributees ought to have been so made- — but *held*unnecessary;

6. A distributive share of an intestate’s personal estate, in the hatids of an administrator, cannot be levied on by an attachment for the debt of one of the distributees. *Vide Young*vs¡ *Youngs*2 Hill Rep. 425, and 3 Hill, 12. But a bill may be entertained in this court, to subject the funds of an absent debtor, not the subject of attachment at law, to the payment of his debts. *Vide Btnoden*vs. *Schatzell,*1 Bail. Eq. Rep. 360.

*■Befóte*Johnson, Cli. *at Charleston, February*Term, 1843.

Johnson, CÍl The complainants state in their petition, that defendant, Mauris Meyer, became indebted to thém in *428the sum of $325, on account, and that he suddenly and clandestinely migrated from the State, to parts unknown to them, and that he did not leave behind him any attorney, or property of any'kind or description whatever, out of which their demand could be satisfied. That since his departure, his brother, the intestate, Luder Meyer, died intestate, leaving a considerable personal, and some real, estate, to a distributive share of which the said Mauris will be entitled; and that administration has been granted to the defendant, Jacob Meyer. The prayer is, that defendant, Jacob Meyer, may account for the estate of his intestate, and state the amount to which Mauris Meyer is entitled, and that he may be decreed to pay complainants so much of it as will satisfy their demand.

Mauris Meyer has not answered. Defendant, Jacob Meyer, in his answer, admits that Mauris Meyer left the State in 1839, for Bremen, in Germany, where he still resides, and that he left no attorney, or property of any kind or description whatever. He admits the death and intestacy of Luder Meyer, in 1841, and states that he was not, at. the time of his death, seized or possessed of any real estate whatever, as far as he knows or believes, and he believes that the personal estate, after paying all demands, will leave a balance of about $1100, which is distributable between his mother and his brother, John H., the said Mauris, and himself. He denies all knowledge of Complainants’s demand, and prays strict proof. He insists, by way of plea to the jurisdiction of the court, that complainants have a plain and adequate remedy at law, or at least, were bound to establish their claim and exhaust their remedy at law, before they could come here for relief.

The case has been argued, on the objection to the jurisdiction of the court, founded on the universally acknowledged principle, that this court will not entertain any cause, when the complainant has, as it is usually expressed, a plain and adequate remedy at law. The very foundation of social order would be broken up, if the law did not furnish a remedy for every wrong done, or right withheld; hence the courts of chancery have assumed jurisdiction in all cases in which the courts of law, on ac*429count of their peculiar organization, or the defects of their mode of proceeding, are incompetent to supply suitable relief. The defendant, Mauris Meyer, was without the jurisdiction of the law court, and none of its process could reach his person, and the only remedy known in that court, is the process of attachment against his goods and effects. Now, the complainants state in their petition, and the defendant admits in his answer, that Mauris Meyer did not leave in this State, property of any kind or description whatever, so that there was nothing on which an attachment could operate. If it had issued, the sheriff must have returned that there was nothing on which it could be levied, and there must have been an end of the remedy at law. The only purpose which such a proceeding could have answered, would have been to show that there was nothing on which to levy, and I should reasonably conclude that the defendant would not require other proof of that fact, than his own admission on oath. The case of *Kennedy*vs. Simons, decided in 1837, is relied on, as showing the necessity of proceeding first at law; but I am not able to see any analogy between the cases. That was a bill to charge the wife’s separate estate with the payment of a bond entered into by her, before coverture, the husband being charged to be insolvent; and the court held that the complainant was bound first to sue the husband, and exhaust his remedy at law against him, before he could come here for relief. In that case, there was a person primarily liable, who could have been made a party at law — not so here.

It is conceded, that if Mauris Meyer inherited real estate from his brother, it would have been subject to an attachment at law. And it is insisted for the defendant, that the complainants, by stating that Luder Meyer did die seized of real estate, made a case of which the law court had jurisdiction, and were not, therefore, entitled to come here. That would undoubtedly have been a good cause of demurrer. But the defendant, in his answer, denies that he did die seized of any real estate, and has, himself, supplied the deficit in the petition, so that, looking through all the pleadings, it makes a case in which the court has jurisdiction. If the plea was allowed, the court might, in *430its discretion, allow the complainant to amend, by striking out that statement, or if the petition was dismissed, the complainant might file a new petition omitting it, the eileet of which would be, to state precisely the case now made by the pleadings, and admitted by the defendant.

It is said also, that the other distributees of the estate of Luder Meyer, ought to have been made parties, but I cannot see the necessity for it. The complainant cannot be supposed to know that the defendant has not already paid them their distributive shares, or that they desire any account from him ; all that complainants are interested in is, to ascertain the amount to which Mauris Meyer is entitled, and to do that, there is no necessity for making any other parties.

The case of *Young*vs. *Young¡*2 Hill’s Ch. Rep. 425, and 3 Hill, 12, establish very clearly, that the distributive share of an intestate’s personal estate, in the hands of an administrator, cannot be levied on by an attachment, for the debt of one of the distributees; and in *Bolton*vs. *iSchátzell,*i Bailey’s Eq. Rep. 360, a bill was entertained to subject funds of an absent debtor, which were not the subject of attachment at law, to the payment of his debts.

It is, therefore, ordered and decreed, that the defendant, Jacob Meyer, do account before one of the Masters of this Court, for the estate of his intestate, and that he, (the Master) do ascertain and report, to what amount Mauris Meyer is entitled,

The defendants appealed from this decree, on the fob lowing grounds.

1. That the complainants had a plain and adequate remedy at law, or, at least, had not exhausted their reme-* dy at law, and their demand being purely a legal one, this court has no jurisdiction of the case,

2. That the complainants have no right to call the ad-* ministrator of an estate, to which they are strangers, to an account; nor, although they may be creditors of one of the distributees, have they any specific claim or lien on his distributive share.

3. That the other distributees of the intestate should have been made parties defendant to the suit.

*4314. That the defendant, Mauris Meyer, has never been regularly made a party to the suit.

*Yeadon &*Macbeth, for the appeal,

---, contra.

*Curia, per*Johnson, Ch.

The court concur in the decree of the circuit court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Dunkin and Harper, Chancellors, concurred,

Johnston, Ch,, absent from indisposition.