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IN CLfERI<S OFFICE 

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DATE MAR 2 0 2014 

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This opinion was filed for r 

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

W.G. CLARK. CONSTRUCTION CO., a ) 

Washington corporation, ) No. 88080-8 

) 

Respondent, ) EnBanc 

) 

v. ) 

) 

PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL ) 

COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, a Local ) 

Union; CARPENTERS HEALTH & ) 

SECURITY TRUST OF WESTERN ) 

WASHINGTON; CARPENTERS ) 

RETIREMENT TRUST; CARPENTERS- ) 

EMPLOYERS VACATION TRUST; ) 

CARPENTERS-EMPLOYERS ) 

APPRENTICESHIP & TRAINING TRUST; ) 

and PARAMOUNT SCAFFOLD, INC., ) 

a Washington corporation, ) 

) 

Appellants. ) Filed MAR 2 0 2014 

) 

OWENS, J. -- The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

(ERISA) is a set of federal laws that regulates pension and welfare plans. To provide 

national uniformity in plan administration, ERISA preempts most state laws that 

"relate to" employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). At issue in this case is 
WG. ClarkConstr. Co. v. Pac. Nw. Reg'! Council ofCarpenters 

No. 88080-8 

whether ERISA preempts claims made under two Washington state laws designed to 

ensure that workers on public projects are paid for their work: chapters 39.08 and 

60.28 RCW. When we previously addressed this issue in 1994 and 2000, we held that 

ERISA preempted such claims. Puget Sound Elec. Workers Health & Welfare Trust 

Fundv. Merit Co., 123 Wn.2d 565, 870 P.2d 960 (1994); Int'l Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 

Local Union No. 46 v. Trig Elec. Constr. Co., 142 Wn.2d 431, 13 P.3d 622 (2000). 

Since then, however, courts across the country (including federal courts here in 

the Ninth Circuit) have analyzed the United States Supreme Court's developing 

ERISA preemption jurisprudence and come to a consensus that these types of state 

law claims are not preempted by ERISA because they have only a tenuous connection 

to ERISA plans. See, e.g., S. Cal. IBEW-NECA Trust Funds v. Standard Indus. Elec. 

Co., 247 F.3d 920, 925-27 (9th Cir. 2001). As a result of this conflict between our 

rule and the rule followed by federal courts, the outcome of this type of case in 

Washington is entirely dependent on whether the lawsuit is filed in federal or state 

court. This has led to blatant forum shopping and created inconsistent and unjust 

results for parties in Washington, as lamented by both the superior court judge in this 

case and the federal district court judge in the parallel federal case. In light of the 

national shift in ERISA preemption jurisprudence and the persuasive reasoning 

underlying that shift, we now join courts across the country and hold that this type of 

state law is not preempted by ERISA. 

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FACTS 

The basic facts of this case are largely undisputed. In 2010, the University of 

Washington contracted with W.G. Clark Construction Co. for a student housing 

construction project. W.G. Clark subcontracted certain scaffolding work on the 

project to Paramount Scaffold, Inc. Paramount entered into a collective bargaining 

agreement with the Pacific Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters (Union) to 

provide laborers for the scaffolding work. As is common in this type of labor 

agreement, Paramount agreed to compensate the laborers for their work in two ways: 

by paying wages and by making contributions to certain trusts that provide benefits to 

the laborers, their dependents, and their beneficiaries (collectively the Trusts ). 1 

In June 2012, the Trusts and the Union reported that Paramount had failed to 

make $64,905.48 in required payments to the Trusts for work performed by the Union 

laborers. Later records indicate that Paramount was insolvent. The Trusts and the 

Union issued a notice of claim on lien on the student housing project pursuant to 

chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW (statutes designed to ensure that workers on public 

works projects are paid for their work, as discussed in more detail below). The lien 

was served on Paramount, W.G. Clark, the University of Washington, and the 

insurance company that issued the performance bond on the project. 

1 The trusts in this case are the Carpenters Health & Security Trust of Western 

Washington, the Carpenters Retirement Trust, the Carpenters-Employers Vacation Trust, 

and the Carpenters-Employers Apprenticeship & Training Trust. 

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W.O. Clark filed for declaratory judgment in King County Superior Court, 

requesting that the lien be released. W.O. Clark moved for summary judgment, 

arguing that ERISA preempted any claims the Trusts might have under chapters 39.08 

and 60.28 RCW. Shortly thereafter, the Trusts filed a separate action in the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking foreclosure on 

the lien and monetary damages. 

The King County Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to W.O. 

Clark, ruling that our state precedent is clear that such state law claims are preempted 

by ERISA. The judge acknowledged that the outcome would have been different in 

federal court and lamented, "Ultimately, this is going to have to get resolved one way 

or another .... [F]rom my perspective, it's broken." Clerk's Papers at 465. 

In light of the judge's decision in the King County Superior Court case, United 

States District Court Judge Ricardo Martinez ruled that he had no choice but to 

dismiss the federal case. Nonetheless, he pointed out the serious consequences of the 

existing conflict between the state and federal courts on this issue: 

The situation is unfortunate, because diverging results in state and 

federal court inevitably perpetuate the practice of forum shopping. As in 

the present case, Defendants acknowledge they filed a "preemptive 

declaratory judgment action" (Dkt. # 22, p. 5) in Superior Court in order 

to receive a favorable ruling. Such action constitutes blatant forum 

shopping, which is highly discouraged. 

Br. of the Appellant Carpenters Trusts, Ex. 1, at 7-8. 

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The Trusts appealed the King County Superior Court ruling to this court and 

we granted direct review. 

ISSUE 

Should we adopt the reasoning of the federal courts and hold that under current 

United States Supreme Court precedent, ERISA does not preempt the Trusts' chapters 

39.08 and 60.28 RCW claims? 

ANALYSIS 

ERISA is a set of federal laws that regulates pension and welfare plans. Merit, 

123 Wn.2d at 568. Congress passed ERISA in 1974 with two goals in mind: "to 

protect plan participants and beneficiaries from abuses and mismanagement in the 

administration of employee pension and benefit plans" and "to protect plan 

administrators from the 'burden that would be imposed by a patchwork scheme of 

regulation."' Haw. Laborers' Trust Funds v. Maui Prince Hotel, 81 Haw. 487,493, 

918 P.2d 1143 (1996) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11-12, 

107 S. Ct. 2211, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987)). The second goal was addressed through 

ERISA's preemption clause, which provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all 

State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" 

covered under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 

At issue in this case is whether ERISA preempts claims made under two 

Washington state laws: chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW. Under chapter 39.08 RCW, a 

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general contractor on a public works project must execute and deliver a bond to the 

public agency. RCW 39.08.010(1)(a). The bond ensures that "all laborers, 

mechanics, and subcontractors and material suppliers" on the project are paid for their 

work. RCW 39.080.010(1)(a)(ii). Such individuals have a right of action against the 

bond if they are not paid for their work. RCW 39.08.010(1)(b). Chapter 60.28 RCW 

also provides protections for workers on public improvement contracts. It requires the 

public agency to retain a percentage of the money earned by the general contractor for 

the protection and payment of claims under the contract. RCW 60.28.011(1)(a). Any 

person performing labor or furnishing supplies under the public improvement contract 

has lien rights against the retained percentage. RCW 60.28.011(2). Notably, both 

statutes apply generally to any laborer, supplier, or subcontractor on a project, and 

neither makes any reference to ERISA plans. 

As described above, the workers on this project did not receive the 

compensation they were owed in the form of payments to the Trusts that provide the 

workers with various health and retirement benefits, but the superior court ruled that 

under this court's precedent in Merit and Trig Electric, the Trusts' claims under 

chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW are preempted by ERISA. The Trusts appeal that 

ruling, arguing that chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW are not preempted by ERISA 

under current federal jurisprudence and that Washington courts should adopt the 

reasoning of the federal courts. We agree. First, we agree with the reasoning of the 

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federal courts, which have concluded that current United States Supreme Court case 

law requires that we begin our ERISA preemption analysis with a presumption that 

state law is not preempted, and that laws of general applicability with only "a tenuous, 

remote, or peripheral connection with ERISA plans" are not preempted. See Standard 

Indus., 247 F.3d at 927 (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. ofTrade, 

506 U.S. 125, 130 n.l, 113 S. Ct. 580, 121 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1992)). Second, we 

recognize the need to address the current conflict between state and federal courts in 

Washington, which has resulted in blatant forum shopping and created inconsistent 

and unjust results for parties in Washington. 

I. We Agree with the National Consensus That These State Laws Are Not 

Preempted by ERISA under Current United States Supreme Court Case 

Law 

ERISA preemption is a matter of federal law. Mackey v. Lanier Collection 

Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988). 

On matters of federal law, we are bound by the decisions of the United States 

Supreme Court. Home Ins. Co. ofN.Y v. N. Pac. Ry., 18 Wn.2d 798, 808, 140 P.2d 

507 (1943). Decisions of the federal circuit courts are "entitled to great weight" but 

are not binding. I d. In Merit, we cited four federal circuit court opinions to support 

our interpretation of United States Supreme Court case law on ERISA preemption. 

See Merit, 123 Wn.2d at 572. But two of these cases were later expressly overruled, 

and the other two involved statutes that-unlike those at issue here-expressly 

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referred to benefit trust funds. See Standard Indus., 247 F.3d at 929 (expressly 

overruling two of the cases cited in Merit); Merit, 123 Wn.2d at 572-73 (describing 

the statutes considered in two of the federal circuit cases as expressly referring to 

ERISA plans); Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. US. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 

136, 142 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing the reasoning of the earlier First Circuit case as 

relying on the fact that the statute "'expressly single[d] out ERISA plans for special 

treatment"' (alteration in original) (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 

13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991))). Therefore, it is appropriate for us to consider current federal 

circuit court case law on ERISA preemption in our analysis. 

Courts throughout the country-both state and federal-have reached a 

consensus that under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in New York State 

Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 

645, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1995), ERISA does not preempt state lien 

statutes that are generally designed to ensure that workers are paid for their work and 

do not specifically target benefit trust funds. See generally Forsberg v. Bovis Lend 

Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146, ~ 32 n.19, 184 P.3d 610 (reviewing the history ofthis 

issue and noting that although prior to Travelers, many courts had concluded that this 

type of claim was preempted by ERISA, "[t]he only post-Travelers case we have 

found that holds ERISA preempts a mechanics' lien statute of general application is 

[Trig Electric]."); Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Nicholas & Assocs., Inc., 2011 IL 

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App (2d) 100125, ~~ 32-45, 956 N.E.2d 609,353 Ill. Dec. 747 (noting that Trig 

Electric now represents the "minority view" on this issue and citing no other courts 

that currently adhere to its approach), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 2380 (2012). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Standard Industrial is 

representative of these cases, and we find its reasoning persuasive. The court started 

with the presumption laid out by the United States Supreme Court '"that Congress did 

not intend ERISA to preempt areas of "traditional state regulation" that are quite 

remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly concerned."' Standard Indus., 

247 F.3d at 928-29 (quoting Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 

201 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2000)). The court then turned to the test laid out by the 

United States Supreme Court: a state law "'relates to"' ERISA-and is thus 

preempted-if it has a '"connection with'" or a "'reference to'" ERISA plans. !d. at 

925 (quoting Geweke Ford v. St. Joseph's Omni Preferred Care Inc., 130 F.3d 1355, 

1358 (9th Cir. 1997)). "A statute has an impermissible 'reference to' an employee 

benefit plan if it acts immediately and exclusively upon the plans or if the plans are 

essential to the law's operation." !d. (quoting Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147, 

121 S. Ct. 1322, 149 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2001)). A statute has a '"connection with"' 

ERISA if it "'implicates an area of core ERISA concern' and jeopardizes national 

uniformity in plan administration." !d. (quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147). 

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Applying this rule to a state law that required public works projects to issue 

payment bonds to ensure workers are paid for their labor, the court concluded that the 

law had neither a "'connection with"' nor a '"reference to"' ERISA plans. Id. at 925-

26 (quoting Geweke Ford, 130 F.3d at 1358). The court reasoned that such laws do 

not require the establishment of a separate plan or impose any reporting, disclosure, 

funding, or vesting requirements for ERISA plans. ld. at 925. The court also pointed 

out that the statute functions irrespective of any ERISA plans. !d. at 926. It is simply 

a general law that ensures workers receive payment for their work on public projects 

and has no special applicability to ERISA plans. Ultimately, the court concluded that 

"the effect of this state regulated relationship on ERISA' s domain is too tenuous to 

precipitate preemption under ERISA." ld. at 927. As described above, courts across 

the country have come to the same conclusion. 

This reasoning is sound and we now adopt it. These statutes are in place to 

ensure that workers on public projects are paid for their work. They apply generally 

to all workers on public projects, regardless of the type of work they perform or how 

they are paid. The laws have nothing to do with regulating how pension plans operate 

and thus do not encroach on ERISA' s territory. 

11. These State Claims Are outside ERISA 's Scope and Thus Are Not 

Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms 

Generally, state statutes that provide plans and participants with alternative 

mechanisms for enforcing ERISA obligations are preempted. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 

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McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990) (explaining 

that Congress intended for Section 502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), to provide 

the "exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA"). W.G. Clark argues that 

chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW provide such alternative enforcement mechanisms, but 

this same argument has been raised across the country and rejected time after time 

because such statutes are not a mechanism for enforcing ERISA obligations. See, e.g., 

Bellemead Dev. Corp. v. NJ. State Council of Carpenters Benefit Funds, 11 F. Supp. 

2d 500, 517 (D.N.J. 1998); Maui Prince Hotel, 81 Haw. at 499-500; Plumber's Local 

458 Holiday Vacation Fund v. Howard Immel, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 233, 238-39,445 

N.W.2d 43 (1989). In rejecting this alternative mechanism argument, courts have 

relied on the Mackey case, where the United States Supreme Court ruled that ERISA 

did not preempt garnishment of ERISA plan benefits, just as it does not preempt "runof-the mill state-law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts 

committed by an ERISA plan." 486 U.S. at 833. If plans are subject to such run-ofthe-mill state-law claims, they should also be able to file such claims themselves. See 

Howard Immel, 151 Wis. 2d at 238-39. This is just such a general state law claim that 

allows the trust fund to recover amounts owed to it, just like any other worker on a 

public project. 

More fundamentally, the argument that these statutes are alternative 

enforcement mechanisms fails because state lien claims that apply to third parties are 

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outside the scope of ERISA and thus not preempted. See Bellemead, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 

517. ERISA regulates the responsibilities of employers and those administering 

pension plans with the goal of"protect[ing] plan participants and beneficiaries from 

abuses and mismanagement in the administration of employee pension and benefit 

plans." Maui Prince Hotel, 81 Haw. at 493. Here, W.G. Clark is not an employer or 

plan administrator and thus is not subject to ERISA obligations. W.G. Clark contends 

that since it has no obligations under ERISA, state law cannot impose any similar 

obligations. But the state laws at issue do not assign any ERISA-like obligations to 

W.G. Clark. The state law has nothing to do with the administration or management 

of a pension plan. It simply provides a mechanism to ensure that all workers on 

public projects are paid the amounts they are owed. Ensuring workers are paid for 

their work does not fall within the scope of ERISA. 

Because we hold that ERISA does not preempt the Trusts' claims, we do not 

reach their argument that to hold otherwise would violate their due process and equal 

protection rights. 

III. Stare Decisis 

Finally, we take this opportunity to clarify how we apply the doctrine of stare 

decisis when the United States Supreme Court provides additional guidance or 

clarifies the proper analytical approach for a federal issue. Generally, under stare 

decisis, we will not overturn prior precedent unless there has been "a clear showing 

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that an established rule is incorrect and hannful." In re Rights to Waters of Stranger 

Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970). However, this court must have the 

flexibility to consider emerging United States Supreme Court case law when 

considering earlier decisions on federal issues. As the First Circuit thoughtfully 

remarked when considering this issue, 

stare decisis is neither a straightjacket nor an immutable rule; it leaves 

room for courts to balance their respect for precedent against insights 

gleaned from new developments, and to make informed judgments as to 

whether earlier decisions retain preclusive force. 

US. Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d at 142. The court observed that there are '"relatively 

rare'" occasions when a court should eschew prior precedent in deference to 

intervening authority. Id. at 141 (quoting Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 

588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995)). We agree. The doctrine of stare decisis should not keep 

this court from fully considering all United States Supreme Court guidance on federal 

issues, even when the newer cases have not directly overruled or superseded prior 

cases. See id. at 141-42. 

Thus, we can reconsider our precedent not only when it is has been shown to be 

incorrect and harmful but also when the legal underpinnings of our precedent have 

changed or disappeared altogether. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521, 

115 S. Ct. 231 0, 13 2 L. Ed. 2d 444 ( 199 5) (declaring that stare decisis may yield 

when a precedent's "underpinnings [have been] eroded[] by subsequent decisions of 

[the] Court"); Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55, 112 S. 

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Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 67 4 (1992) (observing that review of a precedent might be 

justified when "related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old 

rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine"). 

CONCLUSION 

Merit was a reasonable interpretation of United States Supreme Court 

precedent in 1994, but the United States Supreme Court has since narrowed its ERISA 

preemption doctrine. Since the last time we considered the rule in Trig Electric, other 

jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have consistently held that 

these types of state claims are not preempted by ERISA. Not only is their reasoning 

persuasive, but the existing split encourages litigants to engage in blatant and harmful 

forum shopping. We take this opportunity to update our approach to ERISA 

preemption in light of these developments. We reverse the trial court's summary 

judgment ruling and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

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WE CONCUR: 

15