J-S05011-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN THOMAS PARKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 490 WDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 8, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0000275-2014, 

CP-02-CR-0006793-2013, CP-02-CR-0009422-2013, 

CP-02-CR-0009423-2013, CP-02-CR-0010886-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2018

Appellant, John Thomas Parker, appeals from the order entered on 

March 8, 2017, dismissing his petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546. We affirm.

On January 22, 2015, Appellant pleaded guilty but mentally ill “to 

more than a dozen criminal offenses, including three counts of defiant 

trespass, three counts of intimidation of witnesses or victims, two counts of 

terroristic threats, and one count of harassment.” Commonwealth v. 

Parker, 159 A.3d 33 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-2

(internal capitalization omitted).

During the guilty plea hearing, Appellant admitted to the following:

At [docket number] 201306793, [Appellant was] charged . . 

. with defiant trespass. . . .
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[A]t that case[,] the Commonwealth would have called

Sergeant Bandik, as well as Detective Topolnak, [] victim 

[S.P.,] and [S.P.’s] niece[, M.S.].

Testimony would have been that officers were called on May 

2, 2013, to [S.P.’s apartment in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania]. 

. . . They were reported that [Appellant] was seen entering 

[the apartment] by an anonymous caller. They responded 

to that location.

When they got there, they were met by [M.S.]. She 

indicated that she was the niece of the owner, [S.P.]. The 

officers told her that through an anonymous caller 

[Appellant] was seen going into that residence.

It should be noted [that] on September 2, 2012, [Appellant] 

was arrested for defiant trespass at that location, was told 

not to be on [the apartment] property or to go to that 

specific location.

The witness, [M.S.], gave them permission to go in and 

search the property. And the officers found [Appellant] 

hiding in a closet underneath some clothing and took him 

into custody.

And that would be the sum and substance of that case.

. . .

So at [docket number] 201309422, [Appellant was] charged 

[with criminal trespass, defiant trespass, and criminal

mischief]. . . .

The Commonwealth would again call Sergeant Bandik, again 

victim [S.P.], as well as witness [M.S.], and witnesses from 

[the apartment] management.

The testimony would have been on or about May 27, 2013, 

officers were called for a burglary report. The victim [S.P.]

indicated that [Appellant,] her estranged husband[,] broke 

into her apartment. . . . She indicated she was at her 

mother's apartment.
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When she and her niece went over to [S.P.’s] apartment[], 

she said when [M.S.] entered the front door she noticed 

that the rear door was open. The rear door had been 

secured with screws by maintenance earlier in the day

because the door had been broken and she indicated 

[Appellant] must have removed the screws secured by the 

door.

[M.S.] indicated that she found some of her clothes had 

been cut up and destroyed and that her damaged clothes

were worth somewhere in the neighborhood of $100.

They did not see [Appellant] at that time, but they found 

notes handwritten by him all over the apartment. The notes 

were not in the apartment when they left earlier, but the 

notes were there when they returned and were in 

[Appellant’s] handwriting and they recognized his 

handwriting. The notes were to their children. [Appellant] 

had been also given notice that he was not to be on the 

property because he was banned from the property as 

previously stated. That would be the sum and substance of 

the Commonwealth's case.

. . .

[At docket number] 201309423, [Appellant was] . . . 

charged with [criminal trespass, defiant trespass, and 

criminal mischief]. . . .

Had the Commonwealth proceeded at that case we would 

have called Lieutenant Savage, as well as victim [S.P.] and 

witness [M.S.]. The testimony would have been on May 

27th, both [S.P.] and [M.S.] were in their residence . . . 

when they heard a loud noise in the back.

They saw that someone was trying to get into the 

apartment. They saw it was [Appellant] who again was 

known not to be on the property. He was a defiant

trespasser to the [] premise. He was trying to push the 

door open until [M.S.] yelled for [S.P.] to get security.

[Appellant] took off out of the property and both girls ran to 

the security booth where they waited for responding 

officers. [Appellant] was at the residence and left behind 
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his wristwatch and cell phone outside of the apartment 

where he was trying to get in. [S.P.] identified these items 

as belonging to [Appellant].

When the officers cleared the residence two hours later, 

they went back into the apartment. The back door of the 

apartment had been damaged and the back door was not 

able to be used.

It should be noted that this case actually happened first in 

time before the previous cases that I read the summary to, 

which is why the door had to be screwed shut on the 

previous case.

[M.S.] heard someone inside and heard the click of a 

switchblade-like device. She indicated that [Appellant] was 

inside the home again. She discovered he had cut up her 

tennis shoes which were valued at approximately $50. They 

had to call security in order for the door to be fixed.

The police tried to get in touch with [Appellant]. He made 

contact with the police and indicated something about them 

having a cell phone, but the officer never mentioned to him 

about leaving behind a cell phone. And he made up a story 

to the officer about giving his cell phone to a different

individual who left it behind.

. . .

At [docket number] 201310886, [the Commonwealth 

charged Appellant with two counts of intimidation of a

witness or victim and two counts of terroristic threats]. . . .

Had the Commonwealth proceeded at that case, we would 

have called Lieutenant Savage again from West Mifflin, as 

well as victim [S.P.], victim [M.S.], victim [B.D.], and victim 

[B.A.].

Testimony would have been that on or about July 18th 

Lieutenant Savage received a complaint from [S.P.] and her 

mother [B.D.] concerning some threats made by [Appellant]

against them. It should be noted that from [B.D.], they 

learned of these threats through a mutual friend, [B.A.].
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[B.A.] received a letter in the mail from [Appellant]. He 

indicated in his letter references of his arrest and vowed to 

wage revenge for those responsible for putting him in jail.

He specifically named [S.P.], [B.D.], [M.S.], as well as 

[B.A.]. The letter was dated July 14th and was received on 

July 16th.

He indicated as soon as he gets released from jail, he was 

going to murder [S.A.], [M.S.], and [B.D.]. He wrote that 

[B.A.] needs to tell [S.P.] about the threats and he's not 

bluffing. He rambled on about the harm he's going to do 

and she can try to get a PFA, but it will be useless because 

he'll shoot her in the head.

He made references about [S.P.] being a rat for testifying 

against him. He also referenced that he knows where

everyone lives and his shooters will execute them with no 

mercy at all. They all took the threats very seriously and

were concerned for their personal safety.

The officer got copies of the letters she received and [B.A.]

was also concerned for her safety as well as the safety of 

her family. That would be the sum and substance of the

Commonwealth.

. . .

Finally at [docket number] 201400275, [the Commonwealth 

charged Appellant with intimidation of a witness or victim

and harassment]. . . .

Had the Commonwealth proceeded, we would have called 

Officer Savage again and victim [B.D.] who would have 

testified on December 11, 2013 that Officer Savage was 

contacted again by [B.D] concerning an intimidation letter 

she received from [Appellant]. The letter was in her mail 

that day. There was writing on the back of the envelope as 

well as the note inside. It was harassing in nature and had 

several phrases that the victims felt were threatening in 

nature. He wrote that he wishes death on her daughter and 

tells her she's about to croak soon. Written RIP on it. He 

warned her to be extra safe and that anything is possible,

again referencing the letters RIP. He wrote that her life is 
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very short. He threatened to murder [B.D.], as well as 

others, from jail in which the charges were brought forth. 

He indicated he is unable and fears that he may do her, 

[B.D.], and her family harm, if released. She found the 

letter to be both intimidating and harassing.

He had been warned many times by Magistrate Olasz not to 

have any contact with the witnesses in the case. So based 

on that, the officer filed charges and that would be the sum 

and substance of the Commonwealth's case.

N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 1/22/15, at 53-54, 55-57, 57-60, 60-62, 63-64.

On January 22, 2015, Appellant pleaded guilty but mentally ill to the 

charges. That day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate 

term of 10-years-and-three-months to 30 years in prison for his convictions.

We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on October 3, 2016. 

Commonwealth v. Parker, 159 A.3d 33 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished 

memorandum) at 1-9.

On November 2, 2016, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition 

and the PCRA court later appointed counsel to represent Appellant in the 

proceedings. Counsel then filed an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s 

behalf. The petition raised two claims for relief: 1) “trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate the contents and 

source of exculpatory evidence provided by [Appellant]” and 2) “[Appellant] 

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and/or a new trial based upon after 

discovered evidence that is exculpatory in nature.” Appellant’s Amended 

PCRA Petition, 1/4/17, at 7 and 9. 
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As to the first claim, Appellant alleged that he provided his trial 

counsel with “letters that could be deemed exculpatory or for use at trial to 

impeach the credibility of the witness/victims in his proceedings.” Id. at 8. 

Appellant’s written petition did not summarize the letters, identify the 

alleged authors, or specify how the letters could be deemed exculpatory. 

Nevertheless, he attached two letters to his PCRA petition. One of the 

letters contains nothing that could remotely be considered exculpatory. The 

second of the letters was postmarked December 5, 2013, signed by a person 

named S.P. (presumably, the same S.P. who is Appellant’s estranged wife 

and one of the victims in this case), and addressed to Appellant. Within the 

letter, S.P. allegedly wrote: 

p.s.s. whenever I get calls on you should call when S.R. 

gets home from school so you can talk 2 your kids and thats 

it. There is no need 2 talk 2 me . . . the courts dont no I 

lied about them charges on you anywa fuck you

Letter, attached as “Exhibit 1” to Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, at 2.1

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1 No evidentiary hearing occurred in this case and this Court is (obviously) 

not equipped to make findings of fact. Nevertheless, we note that the words 

“the courts dont no I lied about them charges on you anywa” appear to be 

from a different handwriting source than the remainder of S.P.’s letter. See

Letter, attached as “Exhibit 1” to Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, at 1-2. 

Indeed, a superficial review certainly makes it appear as though Appellant 

wrote the words “the courts dont no I lied about them charges on you 

anywa.” Compare id. with “Inmate’s Request to Staff Member,” 7/22/13, 

at 1.
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Appellant claimed that his “[t]rial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance . . . by failing to properly investigate [the] exculpatory evidence.” 

Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 1/4/17, at 9. 

With respect to Appellant’s second claim, Appellant alleged that he is 

“entitled to an evidentiary hearing and/or a new trial based upon after 

discovered evidence that is exculpatory in nature.” Id. Appellant explained 

the basis of his claim in the following manner:

[Appellant] contends that he has two additional witnesses 

that would testify that in fact the victim/witnesses in his 

above listed cases were fabricating the incident as 

retaliation or retribution on [Appellant]. The two witnesses, 

one being [Appellant’s] mother, who would indicate to the 

court that the victim/witness was “bragging about setting 

up” [Appellant] with a fake letter. The second witness 

would provide exculpatory evidence in that the letter 

provided as evidence against [Appellant] was actually

penned by someone other than [Appellant] and used 

against him as “payback.” These additional witnesses would 

provide more than impeachment evidence as their 

testimony goes to the heart of the matter surrounding 

[Appellant’s] cases. 

Id. at 11.

However, Appellant did not identify the alleged “second witness” and 

Appellant did not include a “signed certification” from his mother, “stating 

her name, address, date of birth and substance of testimony.” See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1).

On February 8, 2017, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice 

that it intended to dismiss the petition in 20 days, without holding a hearing. 

PCRA Court Notice, 2/8/17, at 1; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The PCRA 
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court finally dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on March 8, 2017 and 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. PCRA Court Order, 3/8/17, at 1. 

Appellant raises two claims on appeal:

[1.] Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Appellant’s PCRA] 

petition without a hearing because trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate the 

contents and source of known exculpatory evidence 

provided by [Appellant]?

[2.] Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Appellant’s PCRA] 

petition without a hearing because [Appellant] is entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing and/or a new trial based upon after 

discovered evidence that is exculpatory in nature and which 

[Appellant’s] prior counsel failed to raise?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred when it dismissed his PCRA 

petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Appellant first claims that 

he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate the “contents and source of known 

exculpatory evidence provided by” Appellant. Id. This claim fails.

To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated 

circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily 

enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffectiveness of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 
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process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

Counsel is, however, presumed to be effective and “the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v. 

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden, 

Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the 

particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not 

have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his 

interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is 

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged 

proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). As this Court 

has explained:

A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if 

accurate, could establish cause for relief. See 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005) 

(“if a petitioner raises allegations, which, even if accepted 

as true, do not establish the underlying claim . . . , he or 

she will have failed to establish the arguable merit prong 

related to the claim”). Whether the facts rise to the level of 

arguable merit is a legal determination.

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable 

basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent 

counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the 

alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater 

potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be 

considered reasonable if they effectuated his client's 

interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in 

comparing trial counsel's actions with other efforts he may 

have taken. 

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding 
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would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

internal quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of 

the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.

“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea 

process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 

136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002). Yet, where the ineffectiveness of counsel is 

claimed in connection with the entry of a guilty plea, a petitioner may only 

obtain relief where “counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest 

injustice, for example, by facilitating [the] entry of an unknowing, 

involuntary, or unintelligent plea.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 

526, 530 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). As we have explained:

once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is 

presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the 

burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, 

where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea 

colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident 

that the defendant understood the nature of the charges 

against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established.

Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 791 (Pa. Super. 1999) (internal 

quotations, citations, and corrections omitted), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. Super. 1994). “To prove prejudice, [an] 

appellant must prove he would not have [pleaded] guilty and would have 
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achieved a better outcome at trial.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 

795 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Moreover,

With regard to the voluntariness of a plea, a guilty plea 

colloquy must “affirmatively demonstrate the defendant 

understood what the plea connoted and its consequences.” 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Super. 

1998). Once the defendant has entered a guilty plea, “it is 

presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the 

burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.” 

Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. 

Super. 2008). Competence to plead guilty requires a 

finding that the defendant comprehends the crime for which 

he stands accused, is able to cooperate with his counsel in 

forming a rational defense, and has a rational and factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him. 

Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. 

2007).

Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013). “A 

defendant is bound by the statements which he makes during his plea 

colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 502 (Pa. Super. 1998) 

(internal citation omitted). “A defendant may not assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled guilty.” 

Id.

With respect to a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate, we note:

The failure to investigate presents an issue of arguable 

merit where the record demonstrates that counsel did not 

perform an investigation. It can be unreasonable per se to 

conduct no investigation into known witnesses. Importantly, 

a petitioner still must demonstrate prejudice. To 

demonstrate prejudice where the allegation is the failure to 
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interview a witness, the petitioner must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that the testimony the witness would 

have provided would have led to a different outcome at 

trial.

In this respect, a failure to investigate and interview a 

witness claim overlaps with declining to call a witness since 

the petitioner must prove: (i) the witness existed; (ii) the 

witness was available to testify; (iii) counsel knew of, or 

should have known of, the existence of the witness; (iv) the 

witness was willing to testify; and (v) the absence of the 

testimony was so prejudicial as to have denied the 

defendant a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 638–639 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Finally, a PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on his petition. Specifically, a PCRA petition may be dismissed 

without a hearing if the PCRA court “is satisfied from [its review of the 

petition] that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact and 

that the [petitioner] is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no 

purpose would be served by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). 

However, when the PCRA petition raises material issues of fact, the PCRA 

court “shall order a hearing.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2). Thus, “[t]o obtain 

reversal of a PCRA court's decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, 

an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if 

resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court 

otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” Commonwealth v. 
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Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted).

On appeal, Appellant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

“failing to investigate” the “exculpatory evidence” that he provided to 

counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Neither within Appellant’s brief to this 

Court nor in his PCRA petition does Appellant: summarize the letters, 

identify the alleged authors, specify how the letters could be deemed 

exculpatory, or explain what counsel could have done to further 

“investigate” the letters or the authors of the letters. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 16-17; Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 1/4/17, at 8-9. 

Indeed, from this Court’s review, there is only one phrase in the letters 

that could possibly be deemed “exculpatory”: when S.P. (allegedly) wrote 

“the courts dont no I lied about them charges on you anywa fuck you.” 

Letter, attached as “Exhibit 1” to Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, at 2. 

However, Appellant admits that he provided his trial counsel with this letter

– and Appellant does not explain to this Court what counsel could or should 

have done to further investigate this statement or S.P. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 16-17. Further, and fatally to Appellant’s claim, Appellant did not plead in 

his PCRA petition (and Appellant does not argue on appeal) that, if counsel 

would have further investigated S.P.’s alleged statement, he would not have

pleaded guilty. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-17; Appellant’s Amended PCRA 

Petition, 1/4/17, at 8-9. Therefore, Appellant cannot, as a matter of law, 
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prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Fears, 86 A.3d at 807

(“[for a petitioner t]o prove [that he was] prejudice[d by counsel’s 

ineffective assistance in connection with the entry of a guilty plea, the 

petitioner] must prove he would not have [pleaded] guilty and would have 

achieved a better outcome at trial”) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Appellant’s first claim on appeal thus fails.

Second, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his 

petition because “he has two additional witnesses that would testify that [] 

the victim/witnesses in his above listed cases were fabricating the incident 

as retaliation or retribution on [] Appellant.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

According to Appellant, the testimony of the “two additional witnesses” 

constitutes after discovered evidence, which entitles him to a new trial. Id. 

This claim fails.

The PCRA provides an avenue for relief for individuals who are able to 

plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence “[t]he unavailability at 

the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become 

available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been 

introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). “To establish such a claim, a 

petitioner must prove that (1) the evidence has been discovered after trial 

and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable 

diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely 

to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.” 
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Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 228 (Pa. 2016) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

The PCRA court ably explained why Appellant’s claim fails:

Appellant asserted in his PCRA petition that he had two 

witnesses, one being his mother and another witness who is 

not identified, who would testify that his estranged wife 

fabricated the incidents to retaliate against Appellant. 

Appellant did not provide any such witness statements with 

his PCRA [petition], did not specify when the witness 

allegedly became aware of the alleged fabrications[,] or 

which incident or incidents were supposedly fabricated. 

Appellant [thus] fails the first prong, as he [] failed to 

establish that the evidence could not have been obtained 

prior to January 22, 2015 by the exercise of due diligence. . 

. . 

Further[,] Appellant’s PCRA petition failed to comply with 42 

[Pa.C.S.A.] § 9545(d), which requires a signed certification 

as to each proposed witness including the witness’s name 

and the substance of that witness’s testimony as well as any 

documents material to that witness’s testimony. 42 

[Pa.C.S.A.] § 9545(d). The same provision states that 

“[f]ailure to substantially comply with the requirements of 

this paragraph shall render the proposed witness’s

testimony inadmissible.” Id. [The PCRA] court deemed the 

witness’s testimony inadmissible and correctly dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/4/17, at 5 (some internal capitalization omitted).

We agree with the PCRA court’s cogent analysis and conclude that 

Appellant’s second claim on appeal fails.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/27/2018