2015 UT App 296

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF C.O., A PERSON UNDER 

EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

J.O.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20150716-CA

Filed December 17, 2015

Third District Juvenile Court, West Jordan Department

The Honorable Elizabeth A. Lindsley

No. 1079339

Judith L.C. Ledkins, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., STEPHEN L. ROTH, and

JOHN A. PEARCE.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 J.O. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights in her daughter, C.O. Mother asserts that there was 

insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the juvenile 

court’s findings and conclusions. We affirm.

¶2 A juvenile court’s findings of fact will not be overturned 

unless they are clearly erroneous. In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, 

¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only 
In re C.O.

20150716-CA 2 2015 UT App 296

when, in light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is 

against the clear weight of the evidence. See id. In reviewing a 

juvenile court’s order, this court “will not disturb the juvenile 

court’s findings and conclusions unless the evidence clearly 

preponderates against the findings as made or the court has 

abused its discretion.” In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, ¶ 6, 991 

P.2d 1118. “When a foundation for the [juvenile] court’s decision 

exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a 

reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 

P.3d 435.

¶3 Mother first asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights. 

The juvenile court found multiple grounds for termination 

under Utah Code section 78A-6-507. A finding of any single 

ground is sufficient to support termination of parental rights. 

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) 

(providing that the juvenile court may terminate parental rights 

“if the court finds any one of the [enumerated]” grounds for 

termination).

¶4 The evidence established that Mother was unfit and that 

she had failed to remedy the circumstances that led to C.O.’s 

removal. See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(c), (d). Although C.O. had been 

removed due to domestic violence concerns, Mother had 

resumed her relationship with C.O.’s father, who was again 

living with Mother. He had relinquished his own parental rights 

and was prohibited from having contact with C.O. This court has 

held that maintaining a relationship with an abusive spouse 

jeopardizes a child’s safety. See In re T.M., 2006 UT App 435, 

¶ 20, 147 P.3d 529. Mother’s renewed relationship with C.O.’s

father indicates that she does not recognize the relationship as 

dangerous to herself and C.O. and shows that Mother is not 

capable of protecting C.O. See id. The evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that Mother failed to remedy the 

circumstances leading to C.O.’s removal. 
In re C.O.

20150716-CA 3 2015 UT App 296

¶5 Additionally, despite Mother’s efforts to improve her 

parenting, the evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding 

that she was unfit. Although Mother had progressed early in the 

case, she was unable to maintain a level of appropriate parenting 

and did not internalize the lessons and modeling provided to 

her. She did not recognize C.O.’s emotional and developmental 

needs. Mother’s mental health issues also had manifested again, 

leading to emotional disregulation and a possibility of harm to 

C.O. Overall, even though Mother had made efforts to address 

her parenting deficiencies, the evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s finding that she was unfit.

¶6 Mother also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to

support a finding that terminating her parental rights was in 

C.O.’s best interests. C.O. was very young when she was 

removed from Mother’s care and has spent most of her life with 

her foster family. She is integrated into the family, and her needs 

are being met. Thus, the juvenile court’s finding that it was in 

C.O.’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights so that 

C.O. could be adopted into her foster family and be given the 

permanency and stability that she needs is amply supported by 

the evidence. 

¶7 Mother also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the juvenile court’s finding that the Division of Child 

and Family Services (DCFS) made reasonable efforts to provide 

reunification services to Mother. DCFS provides reasonable 

services if it makes a fair and serious attempt to reunify a parent 

and child prior to seeking to terminate parental rights. In re A.C., 

2004 UT App 255, ¶ 14, 97 P.3d 706. A juvenile court is in the 

best position to evaluate “whether the services were properly 

tailored to remedy the specific problems” identified. Id. ¶ 12. 

Here, the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s

determination that DCFS provided reasonable services to 

Mother. In particular, DCFS tailored the services to the issues 

identified and to give Mother the best opportunity to succeed. 
In re C.O.

20150716-CA 4 2015 UT App 296

Classroom components were minimized, and Mother was 

provided more hands-on instruction and modeling, which gave 

her opportunities to observe and to practice parenting skills.

Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in determining that 

DCFS had provided reasonable reunification services to Mother.

¶8 Affirmed.