IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer Steel : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Company and The Greater :

Bustleton Civic League : 

: No. 1004 C.D. 2022

From Decision of City of Philadelphia : No. 1009 C.D. 2022

Zoning Board of Adjustment : 

:

Appeal of: Sandmeyer Steel :

Company :

In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer Steel :

Company and The Greater :

Bustleton Civic League :

: No. 1005 C.D. 2022

From Decision of City of Philadelphia : No. 1010 C.D. 2022

Zoning Board of Adjustment : Argued: April 9, 2024

:

Appeal of: The Greater Bustleton :

Civic League :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: June 20, 2024

In these consolidated appeals, Sandmeyer Steel Company (Sandmeyer) 

and The Greater Bustleton Civic League (GBCL) (together, Appellants or Objectors) 

appeal the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) 
2

denying Objectors’ appeals of the decisions of the City of Philadelphia (City) Zoning 

Board of Adjustment (ZBA) that affirmed the issuance of “by right” zoning permits 

by the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections (L&I) to Relteva LLC 

(Relteva or Owner), the owner, and United Parcel Service (UPS), the lessee, for the 

130-acre land parcel at 1 Red Lion Road and the contiguous 1-acre parcel at 10098 

Sandmeyer Lane (together, Property), located in the City’s I-2, Medium Industrial 

Zoning District.1 We affirm.

1 Section 14-403(1)(c)(.4) of the City’s Code provides:

The I-2, Medium Industrial [D]istrict is primarily intended to 

accommodate light industrial uses, moderate-impact uses, and 

employment activities such as manufacturing, distribution, 

processing, industrial parks, and other activities that may generate 

noise, odor, vibration, after hours activities, or traffic impacts well 

beyond the subject property lines.

City of Philadelphia, Pa. Code (Phila. Code or Code) §14-403(1)(c)(.4) (2020). In turn, Section 

14-601(10)(i) of the Code permits “Trucking and Transportation Terminals” as a subcategory of 

the permitted Industrial Uses Category, defined as: “Uses engaged in the dispatching and longterm or short-term storage of large vehicles. Minor repair and maintenance of vehicles stored on 

the premises is also included.” Id. §14-601(10)(i). Finally, Section 14-601(9)(b), (c), and (d) of 

the Code outlines the permitted uses of the Wholesale, Distribution, and Storage Use Category, 

stating:

This category includes uses that provide and distribute goods in 

large quantities, principally to retail sales, commercial services, or 

industrial establishments. Long-term and short-term storage of 

supplies, equipment, commercial goods, recyclable materials, and 

personal items is included. The wholesale, distribution, storage 

subcategories are:

* * *

(b) Moving and Storage Facilities.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

Relteva entered into an agreement with UPS for the lease of the 

Property for use as a warehouse, distribution, and trucking facility with accessory 

uses. On December 23, 2020, L&I issued Relteva by right Zoning Permit No. ZP2020-010545 (Development Permit) for the Red Lion parcel allowing:

[T]he complete demolition of all existing structures on 

[the] lot; for the erection of [a] one (1) story/partial two (2) 

story detached structure and for the erection of accessory 

structures [of the] size and location as shown in the 

application.

Uses engaged in the moving of household or office furniture, 

appliances, and equipment from one location to another, including 

the temporary storage of those same items. Typical uses include 

moving companies and self-service and mini-storage warehouses.

(c) Warehouse.

Uses that do not meet the definition of a moving and storage facility 

but that are engaged in long- term and short-term storage of goods, 

typically in containers such as boxes, barrels, or drums, within a 

completely enclosed building.

(d) Wholesale Sales and Distribution.

Uses engaged in the wholesale sales, bulk storage, and distribution 

of goods. Such uses may also include incidental retail sales. 

Wholesale showrooms are also included in this use subcategory.

Id. §14-601(9)(b), (c), and (d). Pursuant to Table 14-602-3 of the Code, both the Trucking and 

Transportation subcategory of the Industrial Use Category, and all of the subcategories of the 

Wholesale, Distribution, and Storage Use Category, are permitted uses of the Property.

However, under Section 14-514(1) of Code, the Property is also located in the FNE, Far 

Northeast Overlay District of the City. Phila. Code §14-514(1). Pursuant to Section 14-514(2)(a), 

“[c]ommercial vehicle repair and maintenance, commercial vehicle sales and rentals, vehicle 

fueling station, personal vehicle repair and maintenance, personal vehicle sales and rentals, and 

vehicle paint finishing shop uses are prohibited within all lots zoned I-1 or I-2” within the FNE. 

Id. §14-514(2)(a).
4

Reproduced Record (RR) at 1639a.

The Development Permit identified the approved uses for the Red Lion 

parcel as “Trucking and Transportation Terminals, Wholesale, Distribution, and 

Storage -- Warehouse,” and identified the following “Additional Use Details”:

For a warehouse, distribution, and trucking and 

transportation terminal with accessory offices and vehicle 

services and maintenance with accessory structures for 

employee access, maintenance and accessory vehicle 

fueling (providing gasoline, diesel, [compressed natural 

gas (CNG)] dispenser and CNG station) and wash station 

with 1,827 accessory parking spaces, (956 employee 

spaces, 737 trailer spaces, and 134 tractor spaces), 101 

bicycle spaces, and more than 25 loading spaces.

RR at 1640a.2

On December 30, 2020, L&I issued Zoning Permit No. ZP-2020-

000653 (Unity of Use Permit), recognizing a “unity of use” under which the Red 

Lion parcel and the Sandmeyer parcel would be treated as a single zoning lot.3 The 

permit described the “Approved Development” as:

2 On January 13, 2021, L&I amended the Development Permit to add a note to the 

“Additional Use Details,” stating: “[A]mended permit language as of 1/13/2021 per [the City 

Planning Commission’s (Commission)] Civic Design Review [(CDR)] Committee accessory retail 

sales and office use are proposed in the accessory structure and additional landscaping has been 

proposed.” RR at 1640a.

3 Section 14-203(169) of the Code defines “Lot” as: “A parcel of land consisting of a 

horizontal plane bounded by vertical planes that comprise its front, side, and rear lot lines, and that 

is intended or designed to be used, developed, or built upon as a unit.” Phila. Code §14-203(169). 

In turn, Section 14-203(170) defines “Lot Adjustment” as: “A subdivision that results in the 

creation of new lots that all have street frontage on an existing legally open street shown on the 

City Plan; or the relocation of existing lot lines, including the combination of existing lots into 

fewer or differently configured lots.” Phila. Code §14-203(170).

In addition, Section 14-203(328) of the Code defines “Subdivision” as:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

A division of any part, lot, or area of land by the owner or his or her 

agent into two or more lots, or changes in existing lot lines, for the 

purpose of conveyance, transfer, improvement, or sale with or 

without appurtenant roads, streets, lanes, driveways, and ways 

dedicated or intended to be dedicated to public use, or the use of 

purchasers or owners of lots fronting on them. The term subdivision 

includes re-subdivision and, as appropriate, shall refer to the process 

of subdividing land or to the land so subdivided.

Phila. Code §14-203(328). Moreover, Section 14-304(6)(b) and (c) provides:

(b) Procedure.

(.1) L&I shall not issue any zoning permits for a lot 

adjustment unless the lot adjustment, as shown on a 

plot plan, has been first reviewed and approved by 

the Commission.

(.2) No activity described in [Section] 14-304(6)(a) 

above shall occur, and no street, driveway, sanitary 

sewer, stormwater sewer, water main, public service, 

or other facilities in connection with the lot 

adjustment shall be constructed, maintained, opened, 

or dedicated for public use or for the common use of 

occupants of buildings abutting on them, and no 

record of lot shall be created, until a plot plan has 

been approved and compliance with the procedures 

of this [Section] 14-304(6) has been established.

(.3) The procedure for review and decision on a lot 

adjustment is:

(.a) The Commission shall review 

and approve, approve with 

conditions, or deny the plot plan 

using the criteria in [Section] 14-

304(6)(c) below. The Commission 

shall review and approve, approve 

with conditions, or deny the plot plan 

within 45 days of application 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

For the establishment of a unity of use to create one (1) lot 

for zoning purposes with restrictive covenants and 

agreements to be recorded by deed to bind current and 

future owners of the contiguous two (2) parcels (1 Red 

Lion Road [] and 10098 Sandmeyer Lane) to preserve the 

unity of use and the legality of the entire project that stems 

from the single zoning lot treatment prior to the issuance 

of [a] certificate of occupancy, [and] proof of [the] 

recordation of easements, agreements, and restrictive 

covenants must be supplied.

submission or the plot plan shall be 

deemed approved.

(.b) If it disapproves the plot plan, the 

Commission shall notify the 

applicant in writing of its action and 

the reasons for the decision within 

seven days after the decision.

(.c) The applicant must record deeds 

and the approved survey plan with the 

Department of Records. The deed or 

deeds must include the legal 

description of, and the proposed 

street address and tax account 

number assigned by the Office of 

Property Assessment for, each lot on 

the approved survey plan.

(c) Criteria for approval.

The Commission shall approve a lot adjustment if it finds that:

(.1) It is not a subdivision subject to [Section] 14-

304(7) (Subdivisions and Subdivision Plats); and

(.2) It complies with the lot dimension and street 

frontage requirements of this [Code].

Id. §14-304(6)(b) and (c). Finally, Section 14-304(7)(a) provides: “The procedures of this 

subsection apply to any subdivision (as defined in [Section] 14-203(328) (Subdivision)), except 

for a lot adjustment.” Id. §14-304(7)(a) (emphasis added).
7

RR at 1643a.

On January 21, 2021, Sandmeyer Steel and GBCL filed third-party 

appeals of L&I’s grant of the zoning permits with the ZBA. In its appeal, Sandmeyer 

claimed: (1) the proposed use improperly effectuates a subdivision; (2) the proposed 

use of the Sandmeyer Lane parcel as an accessory driveway use to the Red Lion 

parcel violates Section 14-604(1)(e) of the Code,4 which requires an accessory use 

to be located on the same lot as the principal use and structure; (3) the proposed 

vehicle maintenance and fueling uses on the Red Lion parcel are prohibited in the 

FNE Overlay District by Section 14-514(2)(a) of the Code; (4) the proposed 

accessory driveway use of the Sandmeyer Lane parcel exceeds that use’s limitations; 

and (5) the proposed use of the Red Lion parcel is not properly classified as an I-2 

use under the Code. 

In its appeal, GBCL claimed: (1) the plans submitted by Relteva upon 

which L&I based the zoning permits were “defective, [and] misleading, [and] 

misinterpret, and mischaracterize, [and] do not provide full or accurate information 

and provide false information,”

5 and the zoning permits “must be revoked as having 

been issued in error”; (2) the challenged permit “was not properly processed or 

issued by [L&I]”;

6

(3) the permit was not posted as required by Section 14-

4 Phila. Code §14-604(1)(e). Section 14-604(1)(e) states: “Accessory uses and structures 

must be located on the same lot as the principal use and structure, except as otherwise expressly 

stated.”

5 As noted by the ZBA in its decision, “[t]the allegedly defective, misleading, and 

inaccurate information was not identified” by GBCL. RR at 11a.

6 As noted by the ZBA in its decision: “Again, GBCL did not state the grounds for its broad 

allegation or identify how, specifically, L&I erred in processing the permit.” RR at 11a.
8

303(6)(f)(.3) of the Code;7(4) the proposed principal uses are not “Limited 

Industrial” or “General Industrial” uses as categorized8 and defined in Section 14-

601(10)(b) and (c) of the Code,9 but are “Intensive Industrial” uses as defined in 

7 Phila. Code §14-303(6)(f)(.3). Section 14-303(6)(f)(.3) states:

(.3) Posting of As of Right Permits by L&I.

No later than 5:00 p.m. of the next business day following the date 

of issuance of any as of right zoning permit, L&I shall:

(.a) post the zoning permit on its official website, in 

searchable format, by date of issuance, name of 

permit holder, address of permitted property, zip 

code, and council district; and

(.b) Send by email to all Registered Community 

Organizations [(RCOs)] and all councilmembers a 

notification of the zoning permit that includes the 

date of issuance, the name of the permit holder, and 

the address, zip code, and council district of the 

permitted property.

8 Section 14-602(2)(a) of the Code states:

For the purpose of this [Code], uses are classified into use categories 

and subcategories. These are described and defined in [Section 14-

601 of the Code, Phila. Code] §14-601 (Use Categories). Use 

categories and subcategories are identified in the first column of the 

use tables. In some cases, specific use types are listed in addition 

to the use subcategories.

Phila. Code §14-602(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the uses listed in the Code are not necessarily 

the exclusive list of the permitted uses in a zoning district.

9 Phila. Code §14-601(10)(b) and (c). Section 14-601(10)(b) of the Code describes 

“Limited Industrial” uses as:

Uses that process, fabricate, assemble, treat, or package finished 

parts or products without the use of explosive or petroleum 

materials. This subcategory does not include the assembly of large 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
9

Section 14-601(10)(d) of the Code;10 (5) whether characterized as principal or 

accessory, the proposed retail sales, commercial vehicle repair, and vehicle fueling 

uses are prohibited in the FNE Overlay District under Section 14-514(2)(a) of the 

Code; (6) the proposed accessory structures violate the requirements of Section 14-

303 of the Code; and (7) Relteva failed to comply with the notice requirements of 

equipment and machinery and has very limited external impacts in 

terms of noise, vibration, odor, hours of operation, and traffic.

Phila. Code §14-601(10)(b). In turn, Section 14-601(10)(c) describes “General Industrial” uses 

as:

Uses that process, fabricate, assemble, or treat materials for the 

production of large equipment and machines as well as industrial 

uses that because of their scale or method of operation regularly 

produce odors, dust, noise, vibration, truck traffic or other 

external impacts that are detectable beyond the property lines of 

the subject property.

Phila. Code §14-601(10)(c) (emphasis added). Contrary to GBCL’s assertion, the proposed uses 

on the Property clearly fall within the foregoing description of “General Industrial” uses.

10 Phila. Code §14-601(10)(d). Section 14-601(10)(d) describes “Intensive Industrial” uses 

as:

Industrial uses that regularly use hazardous chemicals or procedures 

or produce hazardous byproducts, including the following: 

manufacturing of acetylene, cement, lime, gypsum or plaster-ofparis, chlorine, corrosive acid or fertilizer, insecticides, 

disinfectants, poisons, explosives, paint, lacquer, varnish, petroleum 

products, coal products, plastic and synthetic resins, and radioactive 

materials. This subcategory also includes petrochemical tank farms, 

gasification plants, smelting, animal slaughtering, oil refining, 

asphalt and concrete plants, and tanneries. Intensive industrial uses 

have high potential for external impacts on the surrounding area in 

terms of noise, vibration, odor, hours of operation, and traffic.

Contrary to GBCL’s assertion, the proposed uses on the Property clearly do not fall within the 

foregoing description of “Intensive Industrial” uses.
10

the Code during the Commission’s CDR Committee review process thereby 

violating GBCL’s due process rights.

On April 23, 2021, GBCL’s attorney asked the ZBA to issue subpoenas 

compelling the appearance of: (1) Cheli Dahal, the L&I Plans Examiner who 

reviewed the applications for the challenged permits; (2) Richard Maggetti, the L&I 

supervisor of Dahal and other examiners involved in the review of the applications; 

(3) the City’s Deputy Commissioner of Transportation Richard Martinez; (4) FNE 

Overlay District Planner Greg Washington; and (5) the Commission’s Executive 

Director Eleanor Sharpe. On April 25, 2021, Leonard Reuter, Senior Attorney in 

the City’s Law Department, e-mailed the ZBA’s attorney and administrator, noting 

that GBCL had not yet submitted exhibits for the upcoming hearing and objecting 

to the requested subpoenas because “there is no relevance to their testimony and the 

proposed scope is onerous,” and “[t]he [C]ode interpretations that are contested in 

this matter are self-evident on the face of the permit plans and the permits that were 

issued.” RR at 12a.

Ultimately, on April 27, 2021, at the first hearing on Relteva’s 

application, the ZBA asked counsel for the parties to summarize their respective 

positions. In relevant part, Relteva’s attorney stated that Relteva is an affiliate of 

CVC Commercial Development Corporation, and that UPS is the tenant. RR at 89a. 

He stated that the history of the Property “has long been affiliated with industrial 

use[s],” “[a]nd it was the famous Budd Plant where they manufactured and serviced 

rail cars.” Id. at 90a. He also stated that a prior owner, Teva Pharmaceuticals, had 

“received similar permits by L&I for [a] transportation, warehouse, [and]

distribution center,” but, “[u]nfortunately, it never started construction on the 

building.” Id.
11

The ZBA then directed the City’s Senior Attorney to call Dahal, the 

L&I examiner who reviewed the application. Dahal testified that she worked for 

L&I as a Civil Engineer 2 for 13 years, and that she was the plans examiner for the 

project at issue. RR at 97a-98a, 102a-03a. She stated that the application, the revised 

application, and the supporting materials were submitted to the City through Eclipse, 

the City’s electronic filing system. Id. at 109a. She testified that she determined 

that the proposed warehouse, distribution, and trucking terminal principal uses were 

permitted by right on the Property, and that the proposed vehicle repair, 

maintenance, and fueling accessory uses were also permitted because they were 

“[n]ot for the public.” Id. at 106a-07a. She said that the plans were also Code 

compliant on all dimensional requirements such as setbacks. When GBCL’s 

attorney sought to cross-examine Dahal regarding any documents submitted or 

details provided by Relteva during the application process, the City’s Senior 

Attorney objected, stating that “[t]his entire line of questioning is utterly irrelevant” 

because Objectors took appeals from the Zoning Permits and “are claiming that the 

uses are not permitted” on the Property. Id. at 155a. He asserted: “It is a legal 

argument. The permit says what it says. What [Dahal] looked at at this point is 

essentially irrelevant.” Id. at 155a-56a. Due to time constraints, the hearing was 

ended before Dahal’s testimony was concluded and a second hearing was scheduled.

Based on the arguments made at the hearing, on May 17, 2021, the

ZBA’s counsel sent the parties a request for: (1) clarification from GBCL regarding 

the specific grounds upon which its appeal was based; (2) a list of all witnesses that 

they propose to present with an offer of proof as to the issues that each witness was 

expected to address and the relevance of their testimony; and (3) legal memoranda 

addressing the identified issues in the appeals.
12

On June 7, 2021, GBCL’s counsel identified 11 fact witnesses that 

GBCL proposed to present, including a traffic engineer; an architect and urban 

planner; an expert in the area of “economic development and economic impact;” the 

President of GBCL and 5 members of GBCL; the President of the Somerton Civic 

Association; Dahal; and Greg Waldman of the Commission. Sandmeyer Steel’s 

counsel identified two executives with the company who would present testimony. 

In a June 11, 2021 correspondence, GBCL objected to being required to submit 

clarifications as “overly and unduly burdensome,” and that it “created an unlevel 

playing field” by “tipping [its] hand” by providing the opposition “with a copy of 

[its] playbook.”

On September 14, 2021, Relteva’s counsel submitted a Motion to 

Exclude Irrelevant and/or Duplicative Evidence in which he challenged Objectors’ 

standing and argued, inter alia, that Objectors’ offers of proof were irrelevant to 

whether the plans that were submitted to L&I followed the proper procedure for the 

issuance of the Development Permit and the Unity of Use Permit. Both GBCL and 

Sandmeyer Steel submitted responses in opposition to the motion.

At the start of the ZBA’s second hearing, on October 12, 2021, its Chair 

stated that the ZBA had reviewed the submitted materials and made the following 

rulings: (1) Objectors’ request for subpoenas was denied; (2) the hearing would 

continue with GBCL’s cross-examination of Dahal; (3) following Dahal’s 

testimony, the ZBA would hear testimony from the L&I supervisor, whose 

testimony would be limited to confirming whether L&I properly issued the permits; 

(4) the ZBA would then hear limited testimony necessary to establish Objectors’ 

standing; and (5) thereafter no more testimony would be permitted. RR at 212a-14a. 

GBCL’s counsel then resumed his cross-examination of Dahal regarding the 
13

application process and the information submitted by Relteva. Dahal was then crossexamined by Sandmeyer Steel’s counsel, followed by questioning by the City’s 

Senior Attorney and Relteva’s counsel. Jais Skaria, an engineering service 

supervisor with L&I was then called to testify. When questioned by the Senior 

Attorney, Skaria confirmed that he had reviewed the application and he believed that 

the permits for the Property were properly issued. See RR at 338a-39a. Skaria was 

then subject to cross-examination by Objectors’ counsel, and the parties presented 

closing arguments.11

The following day, the ZBA unanimously voted to deny Objectors’ 

appeals. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed in support of that 

decision, the ZBA made the following relevant conclusions of law. 

With respect to the principal uses of the Property, the ZBA noted that 

the Development Permit identifies the approved principal use of the Property as 

“Trucking and Transportation Terminals; Wholesale Distribution, and Storage --

Warehouse.” It noted that the Property is in the I-2 Industrial Zoning District within 

the FNE Overlay and that “Trucking and Transportation Terminals” is a subcategory 

of the Code’s Industrial Use Category, defined in Section 14-601(10)(i) as “engaged 

in the dispatching and long-term or short-term storage of large vehicles,” and that 

“[m]inor repair and maintenance of vehicles stored on the premises is also included.” 

Warehouse use is a subcategory of the “Wholesale, Distribution, and Storage Use” 

11 GBCL’s counsel reasserted his objection to the ZBA’s preclusion of his witnesses’ 

testimony submitted as offers of proof. He also argued that the Development Permit is “clearly 

defective on its face,” and that the plans and information submitted by Relteva were incorrect, and 

that L&I should not have allowed the permit to be amended without submitting a new application 

and going through the entire review process again. See RR at 395a-402a. Sandmeyer Steel’s 

counsel spoke of the impact that the UPS facility would have on the surrounding properties in 

terms of the traffic, and the particular problems created by the accessory driveway on the 

Sandmeyer parcel. See id. at 402a-16a.
14

Category that is specifically permitted in the I-2 Zoning District. Section 14-601(9) 

of the Code permits “uses that provide and distribute goods in large quantities” and 

includes “[l]ong term and short term storage of supplies, equipment, [and] 

commercial goods....” In addition, “Warehouse” is one of the four subcategories of 

“Wholesale, Distribution, and Storage Use” Category in Section 14-601(9)(c) as 

“[u]ses that do not meet the definition of a moving and storage facility but that are 

engaged in long-term and short-term storage of goods....” The ZBA explained that 

Objectors “maintain that the proposed uses by virtue of their intensity and the likely 

impact of their operations [] are incompatible with the I-2 Industrial district [] and 

must instead be classified as I-3 Heavy Industrial uses, uses that would require a 

variance.” RR at 21a. However, ultimately, the ZBA concluded:

27. The plain language of the [Code] identifies the 

approved principal uses of the Propert[y] as permitted uses 

in the applicable I-2 Industrial Zoning classification. City 

Council was presumably aware of the district’s general 

description when it designated the uses as permitted. 

Therefore, as in the cases discussed above, the [Code’s]

allowance of the proposed uses by right establishes, as a 

matter of law, legislative acceptance that the uses are 

consistent with the I-2 zoning classification.

28. As noted above, a permitted use is a use “which is 

allowed absolutely and unconditionally.” Aldridge v 

Jackson Township, 983 A.2d 247, 253 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009). Significantly, the Legislature could have made 

approval of these uses dependent on the details and 

intensity of the individual proposals by designating them 

as conditionally permitted uses requiring a special 

exception. City Council, however, permitted the uses by 

right and the [ZBA], by law, “lacks the authority to modify 

or amend the terms of [the Code].” Sabatini v. Zoning 

Hearing Board, [230 A. 3d 514, 520 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)].

Also see Reihner v. City of Scranton Zoning Hearing 

Board, 176 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (“it is an 
15

abuse of discretion for a zoning hearing board to narrow 

the terms of an ordinance and further restrict the use of a 

property”).

RR at 22a. Accordingly, “[b]ased on the plain language of the Code, and applying 

the relevant rules of statutory construction,” the ZBA “conclude[d] L&I properly 

determined the approved principal uses are permitted by right.” Id. at 23a.

In addition, the ZBA noted that the Development Permit also lists a 

number of accessory uses, including “accessory offices, vehicle services and 

accessory vehicle fueling and wash stations,” and, “per [the Commission’s CDR] 

Committee, accessory retail sales and office use are proposed in the accessory 

structure.” RR at 23a. Objectors maintain that because the accessory vehicle 

maintenance, repair, wash, and fueling uses are prohibited as principal uses by the 

Code in the FNE Overlay District under Section 14-514(2), they are likewise 

prohibited by Section 14-604(1)(b), which provides that “unless otherwise expressly 

stated, accessory uses and structures are subject to the same regulations that apply 

to principal uses and structures.” Id. at 23a-24a (emphasis added). The ZBA noted 

that even accepting a broad reading, Section 14-601(8)(g)(c) defines “vehicle fueling 

station” as one that sells fuel at retail, and the fueling station on the Property would 

only service UPS vehicles as accessory to the permitted uses. In addition, Section 

14-601(10)(i) defines “Trucking and Transportation Terminals” as including the 

“minor repair and maintenance of vehicles stored on the premises....” Id. at 24a. 

Moreover, although Dahal’s testimony regarding the accessory retail sales was 

unclear, “if [L&I’s] intent was to include incidental retail sales as an approved 

accessory or incidental use, the use meets the Code criteria [in Sections 14-203(2) 

and 14-604(1)] for accessory uses and would be permitted.” Id.

Moreover, Sandmeyer Steel challenged the Unity of Use Permit on the 

basis that it “improperly effectuates a subdivision without Commission approval and 
16

without complying with the subdivision procedures in Section 14-304(7) of the 

Code. However, Section 14-203(328) defines “Subdivision” as “a division of any 

. . . lot or area of land by the owner or his or her agent into two or more lots or 

changes in existing lot lines.” Relteva’s Unity of Use Permit allows the two separate 

parcels to be treated as one lot as “Lot” is defined in Section 14-203(169) of the 

Code. Relying on Opinion No. 91-4 issued on January 26, 1991, by the Assistant 

City Solicitor to L&I’s Chief of Permit Issuance, see RR at 947a-49a, the ZBA 

determined that the application met all requirements for a unity of use. Opinion No. 

91-4 relies, in turn, on the Supreme Court opinions in Markey v. Zoning Board of 

Adjustment, 187 A.2d 175 (Pa. 1963), and Appeal of Fisher, 49 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1946),

approving of this interpretation of “Lot” under the Code. As a result, Relteva “was 

not required to formally consolidate the Propert[y], which remain[s] under separate 

deeds, as a condition of approval.” RR at 25a.

Next, Sandmeyer Steel argued that L&I erred in allowing the accessory 

driveway use for the Sandmeyer parcel because (1) Section 14-604 requires 

accessory uses and structures to be located on the same “lot” as the principal use and 

structure; and (2) the proposed use “exceeds the use limitations” of the Sandmeyer 

parcel because there is an incredible disparity between the allowed uses of the 

[Sandmeyer parcel] and the uses served by the driveway.” RR at 25a. First, Markey, 

Appeal of Fisher, and Opinion No. 91-4 support the determination that the two 

separate parcels in common ownership by Relteva are considered one “Lot”, so the 

driveway is located on the same zoning lot as the principal uses, as required by 

Section 14-604. Second, the case law cited by Sandmeyer Steel is inapposite 

because both parcels are herein zoned I-2 Industrial, while the lots involved therein 
17

were zoned for different types of uses. Thus, the “disparity” present in those cases 

is not present herein.

With respect to Objectors’ standing, the ZBA determined that “[t]here 

being no dispute that the Sandmeyer Steel’s properties are located in the immediate 

area and that a number of individual members of GBCL live in close proximity to 

the Proper[y], that both [Objectors] had standing to appeal.” RR at 27a.12

Finally, the ZBA “conclude[d] that the proposed testimony from expert 

witnesses and others intended to show the potential harmful effects of the proposed 

uses was properly excluded as not relevant.” RR at 28a. Specifically, the ZBA “was 

asked to decide if the proposed uses were, as L&I concluded, permitted by right” in 

the I-2 Zoning District, and the proposed evidence was irrelevant because 

“[e]vidence offered to establish that the uses’ impact would exceed that expected in 

an I-2 [Zoning] District . . . would not have made any ‘fact at issue more or less 

probable’” so it “was not relevant and was properly excluded.” Id. 

Nevertheless, Objectors contend that Section 14-303(14)(e) of the 

Code13 required the ZBA to permit any testimony from any witness called by a party. 

However, the ZBA determined that Section 14-303(14(e) “indicates only that a 

12 The ZBA’s decision regarding Objectors’ standing in this case must be contrasted with 

the disposition of the standing issue in Appeal of: The Greater Bustleton Civic League (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 629 C.D. 2023, filed June 4, 2024), argued seriately with the above-captioned 

consolidated appeals. In that case, GBCL appealed a trial court order quashing its appeal of L&I’s 

grant of a building permit for the same UPS project on the Property. 

13 Phila. Code §14-303(14)(e). Section 14-303(14)(e) states:

Any organization or member of the public who attends a public 

hearing before the [ZBA] shall be permitted to offer testimony 

individually regardless of whether the organization, individual or 

person on whose behalf they are offering testimony has standing to 

appeal the decision by the [ZBA] to the [trial court].
18

witness may not be prohibited from testifying based on standing,” and that “[i]t does 

not suggest that the [ZBA] cannot limit testimony to that which is relevant.” RR at 

28a. As a result, the ZBA “has ‘wide latitude in determining what evidence to admit 

as relevant,’” and “that its evidentiary rulings were proper and within its authority 

to make.” Id.

Furthermore:

73. Finally, addressing GBCL’s attorney’s suggestion that 

the [ZBA]’s requests for clarifications and offers of proof, 

“unfairly, unjustly, and improperly prejudice[d]” his client 

by requiring it to give the City and [Relteva] “what 

amounts to advance notice of a significant portion of 

[GBCL’s] case,” [the ZBA] note[d] that as the party with 

the burden of proof, and given the presumption that L&I 

acted properly,[14] giving other parties advance notice of its 

arguments and grounds for appeal is exactly what GBCL 

was obligated to do.

74. With regard to GBCL’s suggestion that the [ZBA’s] 

requests were “highly unusual” and “unduly

burdensome,” the [ZBA] note[d] that its requests were 

made as a means of narrowing the appeals to consideration 

of issues and evidence that was relevant. This in turn was 

due, in no small part, to the nature of GBCL’s 

submissions, which included an appeal that failed to 

identify the specific errors L&I allegedly made, the 

submission of thousands of pages of exhibits days before 

14 See, e.g., In re Appeal of Smith, 231 A.3d 59, 67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (“[W]e note that 

government actors are presumed to act legally. See Office of Governor v. Donahue, 59 A.3d 1165, 

1170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (stating, ‘[n]o rule of law requires this Court to presume that an agency 

will act in bad faith in complying with its statutory duties’), aff’d, [98 A.3d 1223 (Pa. 2014)]; 

Hughes v. Chaplin, [132 A.2d 200, 202 (Pa. 1957)] (stating presumption of regularity of acts of 

public officers exists until the contrary appears).”); U.S. National Bank Association v. United 

Hands Community Land Trust, 129 A.3d 627, 636 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“‘It is, as a general rule, 

presumed that a public official properly and regularly discharges his duties, or performs acts 

required by the law, in accordance with the law and the authority conferred on him, and that he 

will not do any act contrary to his official duty or omit to do anything which such duty may 

require.’”) (citation omitted)).
19

the initial hearing, and a request for subpoenas for 

witnesses whose testimony seemed unlikely to yield 

information relevant to the issues presented.

RR at 28a-29a. Accordingly, “[f]or all of the above-stated reasons, the [ZBA] 

conclude[d] [Objectors’] appeals were property denied.” Id. at 29a.

On November 11, 2021, Objectors filed timely appeals of the ZBA’s 

decision to the trial court, which were consolidated for disposition by that court on 

March 4, 2022. Following legal argument, but without taking additional evidence, 

the trial court issued an order denying Objectors’ consolidated appeals.15 Objectors 

then filed the instant timely consolidated appeals to this Court.16

On appeal, Sandmeyer claims: (1) the ZBA erred in granting the 

application to operate an accessory commercial vehicle maintenance use on the 

Property because Section 14-514(2)(a) of the Code prohibits such a use in the FNE, 

Far Northeast Overlay District; (2) the ZBA erred in approving the permits allowing 

Relteva to use the Sandmeyer Lane parcel as an accessory driveway for the Red Lion 

Road parcel; (3) the ZBA erred in approving the permits thereby subdividing the 

Property by eliminating the lot lines without approval by the Commission as 

required by Section 14-304 of the Code; and (4) the ZBA abused its discretion by 

15 On July 19, 2022, the trial court entered an order and memorandum opinion denying 

Objectors’ consolidated appeals. On July 22, 2022, Relteva filed a motion to correct the order, 

seeking the redaction of a paragraph on page 7 of the trial court’s memorandum opinion. On 

August 2, 2022, Sandmeyer Steel filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the trial court to vacate 

its order in its entirety and to reopen the issues raised therein. On August 9, 2022, Relteva filed 

an answer to the motion for reconsideration. On August 17, 2022, the trial court vacated its July 

19, 2022 order in the consolidated appeals. On August 18, 2022, the trial court entered the instant 

order and memorandum opinion denying Objectors’ consolidated appeals.

16 Where, as here, the parties presented no additional evidence in the trial court following 

the ZBA’s decision, “our review is limited to determining whether the ZBA committed an abuse 

of discretion or an error of law.” Society Hill Civic Association v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of 

Adjustment, 42 A.3d 1178, 1185 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
20

refusing to allow Sandmeyer Steel to present any witnesses and exhibits 

demonstrating the impropriety of the permits.

On appeal, GBCL claims: (1) the ZBA committed an error of law, 

abuse of discretion, and/or a capricious disregard of evidence by failing to allow 

GBCL to present evidence regarding the true intensity of the proposed use in 

violation of the Local Agency Law,17 the Code, case law, and basic precepts of due 

process: (2) the ZBA erred by deferring to L&I’s expertise in issuing the Zoning 

Permits; (3) the ZBA erred in determining that the Zoning Permits should not be 

revoked even though they violate the Code and an L&I employee admitted that they 

were issued in error; and (4) the trial court erred in determining that Relteva’s selfidentification of the use on the application does not constitute illegal flexible 

selective zoning.

18

17 2 Pa. C.S. §§751-754.

18 The Dissenting Opinion’s rationale to reverse the trial court’s order and remand the 

matter to the ZBA for further hearing is unavailing. Through the proposed expert testimony, 

Objectors sought to have the ZBA recognize a new “High-Cube Parcel Hub” intensive industrial 

use, a use that is not contained or defined in the Code; to have the ZBA designate Relteva’s 

proposed uses as constituting this “High-Cube Parcel Hub” use; and to then also have the ZBA 

determine that L&I erred because this proposed “High-Cube Parcel Hub” use is not a permitted 

use in the I-2, Medium Industrial Zoning District. However, it is inappropriate for Objectors to 

seek an amendment to the Code in the instant proceedings before the ZBA on their objections to 

the issuance of “by right” zoning permits by L&I to Relteva under the Code as it is currently 

written.

Indeed, as this Court has previously explained in a similar circumstance:

The second part of the [b]oard’s decision concerned the 

impact of the proposed use on the public welfare and safety. The 

inquiry of the [b]oard in this area was misplaced. All the [b]oard 

had before it was the question of whether a pizza shop and 

gameroom were permitted uses under the ordinance.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
21

However, after reviewing the record, Objectors’ briefs and oral 

argument, and the relevant case law, we conclude that the appellate issues have been 

ably resolved in the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of Judge Anne Marie B. 

Coyle. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order on the basis of her opinion in 

the matter of In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer Steel Company and The Greater Bustleton 

Civic League (C.P. Phila., November Term 2021 Nos. 00973, 00974, and 01073, 

filed August 18, 2022).

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

A permitted use, in technical zoning jargon refers to uses 

allowed absolutely and unconditionally. Kopelman v. The Zoning 

Hearing Board of New Kensington, [423 A.2d 761 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1980)]. Once compliance with the requirements of the [o]rdinance 

is established, no further inquiry is authorized. The uses permitted 

by the [o]rdinance were determined not to be detrimental to the 

public health, safety, or welfare by the [c]ity when it passed the 

[o]rdinance.

Laird v. City of McKeesport, 489 A.2d 942, 944 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (emphasis in original).

Likewise, in the instant proceedings on the issuance of the “by right” permits, it would 

have been inappropriate for the ZBA to consider Objectors’ testimony and evidence regarding the 

recognition of this new “High-Cube Parcel Hub” use and its classification as an intensive industrial 

use that is not permitted in the I-2, Medium Industrial Zoning District. Laird; see also Phila. Code 

§14-103(4)(a)(.1) (“[ZBA] may, after public notice and public hearing[,] . . . [h]ear and decide 

appeals in zoning matters where error is alleged in any order, requirement, decision, or 

determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this [Code] . . . .”); id. §14-

303(1)(a) (“Any person or entity . . . may request that the City Council enact an amendment of the 

text of this [Code] or the official zoning map, pursuant to §14-304(3) (Zoning Map and Text 

Amendments).”) (emphasis added); id. §14-304(3)(a) (“The zoning map and text amendment 

procedures of this subsection apply to ordinances for amendments to the text of this [Code] and 

to amendments to the official zoning map.”) (emphasis added).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer Steel :

Company and The Greater :

Bustleton Civic League :

: No. 1004 C.D. 2022

From Decision of City of Philadelphia : No. 1009 C.D. 2022

Zoning Board of Adjustment :

:

Appeal of: Sandmeyer Steel :

Company :

In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer Steel :

Company and The Greater :

Bustleton Civic League :

: No. 1005 C.D. 2022

From Decision of City of Philadelphia : No. 1010 C.D. 2022

Zoning Board of Adjustment :

:

Appeal of: The Greater Bustleton :

Civic League :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of June, 2024, the order of the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas dated August 18, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer Steel : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Company and The Greater : 

Bustleton Civic League : 

: 

From Decision of City of Philadelphia : No. 1004 C.D. 2022

Zoning Board of Adjustment : No. 1009 C.D. 2022

:

Appeal of: Sandmeyer Steel Company :

In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer Steel : 

Company and The Greater : 

Bustleton Civic League : 

:

From Decision of City of Philadelphia : No. 1005 C.D. 2022

Zoning Board of Adjustment : No. 1010 C.D. 2022

: Argued: April 9, 2024

Appeal of: The Greater Bustleton : 

Civic League :

 

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION 

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: June 20, 2024

Respectfully, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the City of

Philadelphia (City) Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) had authority to prevent 

Sandmeyer Steel Company (Sandmeyer) and the Greater Bustleton Civic League 
SW - 2

(GBCL) (together, Objectors) from presenting witness testimony and introducing 

evidence at the ZBA’s public hearing in this matter. See In re: Appeals of Sandmeyer 

Steel Co. and the Greater Bustleton Civic League, (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 1004, 1005, 

1009, and 1010 C.D. 2022, filed June 20, 2024), slip op. at 17-20 (Majority Opinion). 

Because I believe the ZBA must allow the parties and members of the public who 

attend the ZBA’s public hearings to testify and present evidence, I would vacate the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas’ (trial court) order and remand this 

matter to the trial court with instructions to vacate the ZBA’s decision and further 

remand this matter to the ZBA to properly conduct a public hearing as required by 

the City’s Zoning Code (Code).

1

Relevant to the ZBA’s refusal to permit Objectors to present testimony or 

evidence, Sandmeyer asserted in its appeal to the ZBA that “the classification of the 

proposed use as an ‘I-2’ use is not proper. Given the high-impact and intensive 

nature of the proposed use (including its dramatic traffic impact) the use is more 

properly classified as an ‘I-3’.” See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1037a, 1039a-40a. 

Similarly, GBCL asserted the zoning permit applications contained false 

information and were defective and misleading. Id. at 1600a. In addition, GBCL 

asserted “[t]he Department of Licenses and Inspections [(L&I’s)] interpretation as 

to the nature, scope and scale [of] the proposed, approved and permitted use . . . [of 

the property] . . . conflicts with the use regulations of the I-2 (Medium Industrial) 

zoning district . . . .” Id. at 1601a. Finally, GBCL asserted the proposed uses 

qualified as intensive industrial uses that are prohibited in the I-2 zoning district. Id. 

at 1602a-03a. 

1

 City of Philadelphia, Pa., Zoning Code (2012), as amended.
SW - 3

The ZBA held a public hearing on Objectors’ appeals on April 27, 2021. See 

R.R. at 73a. After hearing opening arguments, the ZBA permitted the City to present 

the testimony of Cheli Dahal (Dahal), the plans examiner at L&I who reviewed 

Relteva, LLC’s (Landowner) permit applications in this matter. Id. at 100a-03a. 

During counsel for GBCL’s cross-examinination of Dahal, the ZBA announced it 

had run out of time, would have to end the hearing, and would resume the hearing 

on a later date. Id. at 175a.

Rather than simply resuming the hearing and permitting the parties to continue 

presenting their evidence, however, the ZBA demanded Objectors submit written 

offers of proof for their witnesses. See R.R. at 16a-17a, 1446a-47a. Objectors 

repeatedly asserted the ZBA could not prohibit them from presenting witness 

testimony and evidence. See id. at 1436a-1490a. Nonetheless, Objectors complied

with the ZBA’s requests and provided offers of proof for their proposed presentation 

of evidence. Id. at 1483a-90a. Relevantly, Objectors asserted their engineer would 

testify:

- The proper and accurate classification and consideration of [United 

Parcel Services’ (UPS)] proposed facility as a High-Cube Parcel 

Hub, not a warehouse, distribution facility and/or trucking and 

transportation termina[l] for which UPS applied to the City of 

Philadelphia and was issued permits.

- Traffic associated with a High-Cube Parcel Hub and the high, 

intensive adverse impact thereof as compared to a warehouse, 

distribution facility and/or trucking and transportation termina[l]

and the limited, moderate impact thereof.

- Traffic and impact associated with I-2 type uses as compared to I-3 

type uses.

Id. at 1483a-84a. In addition, Objectors asserted their architect would testify:
SW - 4

- How warehousing, distribution and trucking and transportation 

terminals differ greatly from UPS’s proposed High-Cube Parcel 

Hubs, particularly in terms of intensity of use and their impact. 

Specifically, that the moderate impacts[] of the former bear little 

resemblance to the high adverse impact(s) of the large-scale 

automated High-Cube Parcel Hubs.

- UPS’s proposed High-Cube Parcel Hub at the Subject Premises 

is an I-3 use, not an I-2 use.

Id. at 1484a (emphasis added). Finally, Objectors asserted they (the President or 

Executive Vice President for Sandmeyer, and for GBCL, its President and five 

members who were either local residents or business owners) would tesify at the 

hearing. See id. at 1436a, 1486a-89a.

In response, Landowner “submitted a ‘Motion to Exclude Irrelevant and/or 

Duplicative Evidence’ [in] which [it] challenged [Objectors’] standing and argued 

that the issues presented and offers of proof made by [Objectors] ‘are not relevant to 

whether or not the plans examiner followed the proper procedure for issuance of the 

by right permits.’” R.R. at 17a. Objectors submitted responses in opposition to 

Landowner’s motion. 

When the ZBA resumed its hearing, the ZBA announced it would limit 

Objectors’ remaining cross-examination of Dahal to one-half of one hour. Id. at 

213a. The ZBA also announced it would permit the City’s second witness, an L&I 

supervisor, to “confirm[ L&I’s] position that the challenge[d] permits were . . .

properly issued.” Id. Finally, the ZBA announced it would “then hear testimony, 

limited testimony necessary to establish [Objectors’] standing. No other testimony 

will be permitted.” Id. (emphasis added). Objectors then renewed their objections 
SW - 5

to the ZBA’s decision to preclude them from presenting witness testimony and 

evidence.

2

 See id. at 18a, 226a-27a.

Section 14-103(4)(a) of the Code only permits the ZBA to hear and decide 

appeals in zoning matters “after public notice and public hearing.” Phila. Code § 

14-103(4)(a) (emphasis added). Section 14-303(14)(d) of the Code establishes that 

“[a]ll hearings [of the ZBA] shall be open to the public.” Phila. Code § 

14-303(14)(d) (emphasis added). The Code does not expressly define a “public 

hearing.” However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long held:

A “hearing” contemplates more than mere attendance by the public; it 

connotes a meeting which the public has the right to attend and the right 

to be heard. As stated in People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 97 N.E.2d 

908, 912 [(1951)]: “A ‘hearing’ contemplates the right to be present and 

to put forth one’s contentions by proof and argument (Black’s Law 

Dictionary, [3d ed.], p. 882, and cases cited).”

Appeal of Kurren, 208 A.2d 853, 856 (Pa. 1965) (footnote omitted). While the 

Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code3(MPC) does not govern zoning appeals 

in the City, Section 107 of the MPC defines a “public hearing” as “a formal meeting 

held pursuant to public notice by the governing body or planning agency, intended 

to inform and obtain public comment, prior to taking action in accordance with 

this act.” 53 P.S. § 10107 (emphasis added). Thus, the General Assembly codified 

the rights outlined in Appeal of Kurren for zoning hearings under the MPC. 

Similarly, the Code requires the ZBA to permit the public to testify and 

provide input. Section 14-303(14)(e) of the Code, provides:

2 Objectors also challenged the legality of the ZBA’s decision to prohibit them from presenting 

witness testimony or evidence before the trial court and this Court on appeal. 

3 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202.
SW - 6

Any organization or member of the public who attends a public 

hearing before the Zoning Board shall be permitted to offer 

testimony individually regardless of whether the organization, 

individual or person on whose behalf they are offering testimony has 

standing to appeal the decision by the Zoning Board to the Court of 

Common Pleas.

Phila. Code § 14-303(14)(e) (emphasis added). Section 14-201(4) of the Code 

provides that “shall” is mandatory. Phila. Code § 14-201(4). Additionally, Section 

14-303(j) of the Code provides that “attorneys representing applicants or objectors” 

“will be permitted to cross examine, present evidence, and request the issuance of 

subpoenas.” Phila. Code § 14-303(j) (emphasis added). Finally, Section 14-303(h) 

of the Code permits the ZBA to “determine the order of testimony” and “establish 

time limits on testimony in order to allow all interested parties to be heard and 

may, in its discretion, prevent duplicative testimony.” Phila. Code §

14-303(14)(h)(emphasis added). 

Therefore, the Code requires the ZBA to accept testimony from all interested 

parties who attend its public hearings and only permits the ZBA to establish time 

limits for testimony and prevent testimony that is duplicative. The Code does not 

allow the ZBA to prevent testimony it perceives as not relevant.

4

 This conforms

with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s explanation of the requirements for a public 

hearing. See generally Appeal of Kurren. This also conforms to the general purpose 

4 Even if the ZBA had the authority to prohibit testimony that was not relevant, Objectors were 

proposing to present relevant evidence. L&I issued the permits in this matter on the basis that

Landowner’s proposed uses of the property qualified as uses permitted by right in the I-2 district 

in which the property is located. As fully outlined above, however, Objectors’ witnesses would 

have testified that Landowner’s proposed uses of the property qualified as uses that were only 

permitted by right in the heavy industrial district (I-3). Thus, Objectors’ proposed testimony was 

directly relevant to whether L&I correctly issued permits by right in the I-2 district. See Pa.R.E. 

401 (“Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”).
SW - 7

and function of public hearings in zoning matters, which is to allow the parties and 

the public to present testimony and evidence for the ZBA’s consideration. 

Here, the ZBA prohibited Objectors from presenting witness testimony or 

evidence. This was a clear violation of the ZBA’s authority. Therefore, I believe 

we should vacate the trial court’s order and remand this matter to the trial court with 

instructions to vacate the ZBA’s order and further remand to the ZBA to conduct a 

public hearing in accordance with the Code’s requirements.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge
COPIES SENT PURSUANT TO Pa.R.C.P. 236(b) D. KELLY 10/25/2022