Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1512-CR-2174 | July 29, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael Frischkorn

Frischkorn Law LLC

Fortville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andrius Brooks,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A05-1512-CR-2174

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Mark Dudley, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C06-1211-FA-2135

Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues

[1] The trial court revoked Andrius Brooks’s probation and ordered him to serve 

the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. Brooks appeals, raising two 

issues which we consolidate and restate as one: whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in admitting hearsay evidence during the probation revocation 

proceedings. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the 

hearsay was sufficiently reliable, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 5, 2013, Brooks entered a plea of guilty to robbery as a Class B 

felony and battery as a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement which 

capped his possible sentence at ten years, the trial court sentenced Brooks on 

January 14, 2014, to ten years in the Department of Correction, with six years 

suspended to probation. 

[3] On October 19, 2015, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging 

Brooks violated the conditions of his probation by: a) committing new criminal 

offenses, b) failing to keep probation informed of his address, and c) associating 

with a convicted felon. At the probation revocation hearing, Brooks testified 

under oath that he failed to keep the probation department advised of his 

current address, thus admitting the second alleged probation violation. As to 

the remaining allegations, the State presented the testimony of Detectives Chris 

Frazier and Norman Rayford of the Anderson Police Department. In October 
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2015, Detectives Frazier and Rayford investigated a report of a kidnapping for 

which Brooks was ultimately charged with kidnapping, burglary, criminal 

confinement, and attempted robbery. Brooks objected to Detective Frazier’s 

testimony about the incident itself as inadmissible hearsay because the victim

did not testify. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the detective

to testify. Detective Frazier testified he interviewed the victim at the scene 

where she had been released. The victim was unable to identify her kidnappers 

because they were wearing masks when they took her at gunpoint from her 

home and placed her in the trunk of a car. However, she was able to generally 

identify the car in which she was taken and to specifically identify certain items 

in the trunk. Based on this and other information provided by the victim, 

detectives detained Brooks and his brother shortly thereafter in a car similar to 

the one the victim had described. The trunk contained the specific items the 

victim had identified. Detective Rayford testified he interviewed Brooks, who 

indicated he was at a job interview during the time the kidnapping was 

occurring. However, Detective Rayford’s follow-up interview with the 

purported interviewer revealed no such job interview had taken place. In 

addition, the detectives interviewed two other individuals who Brooks claimed 

to have been with during part of the time the kidnapping was occurring. Both 

individuals denied being with Brooks at the stated times.

[4] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Brooks had violated his 

probation:
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The issue [of the new offenses] boils down to . . . more or less a 

legal argument sir, and it’s can I take notice of what the officer 

said as it relates to their investigation or as [defense counsel] says 

is it unreliable hearsay and I should ignore all of what they have 

said relating to their investigation. . . . [The State] I think has 

the, the better argument here. This is a probation violation 

hearing. There are lessened standards of proof, preponderance of 

the evidence. There is [sic] also lessened standards of evidentiary 

hurdles. We counted in that it needs to be reliable hearsay. . . . 

[I]f we had a trial, Detective Frazier can’t just tell me well this is 

what the victim said. However that’s not the setting, that’s not 

what the case law tells us. Case law says this is not supposed to 

be a full blown trial, this is supposed to be a, basically a summary 

of the evidence as it relates to the, the alleged violations. . . . 

[T]he case law is that the witnesses that do this for a living, that 

follow procedures, we, we the Court can account for or say that

that testimony is a more reliable form of hearsay than from other 

individuals. . . . [W]hat I’ve heard from the witness stand as well 

as the file, because I’m allowed to take notice of my file which 

includes the probable cause affidavit, is that a kidnapping 

occurred on October 12th and that the victim was unable to 

visually see who the abductor’s [sic] were but . . . told the 

investigating officers that the people involved had Scream masks, 

that those were eventually retrieved by the Anderson Police 

Department as part of their investigation, that you were arrested 

in a white vehicle, with your brother, that the victim identified 

peculiar objects that were in the trunk of the vehicle that she was 

kept in and that the vehicle you were stopped in had those 

peculiar objects in the truck. This doesn’t prove your guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, don’t get me wrong, that certainly 

does not do that, but the Court does find that by a preponderance 

of the evidence the State has established that a kidnapping 

occurred, that there is a, as well as confinement. I didn’t hear 

any evidence as to the robbery element. And I don’t, in the end 

it’s not going to make a whole lot of difference to me as to 

sanctions but so the record is clear, the State did not establish by 

a preponderance of the evidence the robbery elements . . . but 
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clearly there was the kidnapping and the confinement. You 

admitted as to Paragraph 3b. Your counsel is going to call that a 

technical violation. I agree with it. It’s not, on the scale of 

things, a major violation, it’s a minor violation, but there is that 

admission. As to 3c your counsel actually has the better 

argument there. I can assume that you know about your 

brother’s criminal history. . . . My guess is you are aware of that 

but as an evidentiary point of fact for here, no one said that you 

were aware of your brother’s felony conviction. So as far as 3c 

the State’s failed to meet its preponderance of the evidence as to 

3c. So again, for the Court, for the record, the Court does find 

the State’s met it’s [sic] burden of proof as to 3a regarding the 

kidnapping and the confinement, as to 3b admitted, and 3c the 

State failed in their burden of proof.

Transcript at 55-58. The trial court ordered Brooks to execute the entire six 

years previously suspended from his sentence. Brooks now appeals the trial 

court’s revocation of his probation.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[5] A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged 

violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 

1267 (Ind. 2014); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). We review a trial court’s 

decision to admit or exclude evidence in a probation revocation proceeding for 

an abuse of discretion. Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.
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II. Hearsay Evidence

[6] The Indiana Rules of Evidence do not generally apply in probation revocation 

proceedings. Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2). However, due process principles 

applicable in probation revocation proceedings include the right of the 

probationer to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, Ind. Code § 35-

38-2-3(f), albeit said right is narrower and more flexible than in a criminal trial, 

Figures, 920 N.E.2d at 271. Therefore, the general rule against hearsay is 

inapplicable in a probation revocation proceeding and hearsay may be admitted 

without violating the probationer’s right to confrontation if the trial court finds 

the hearsay is “substantially trustworthy.” Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 442 

(Ind. 2007). Where the State shows the hearsay evidence bears “substantial 

guarantees of trustworthiness,” it need not also show good cause for not 

producing live testimony. Id. at 441. The trial court should explain on the 

record why the hearsay is reliable and why that is substantial enough to 

comprise good cause for dispensing with live witnesses. Id. at 442.

[7] Brooks contends the trial court’s admission of Detective Frazier’s testimony 

and consideration of the probable cause affidavit in lieu of testimony from his 

alleged victim violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against 

him. See Tr. at 17 (defense counsel objecting, “[T]he problem with this 

approach Judge is it allows the State to get in allegedly everything the victim 

said to the police and then when I go to ask a question and his response will be 

[‘]I don’t know, I wasn’t there.[’]”). He asserts the detectives were simply 
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“relaying information that had been gathered as a result of . . . interviews with 

witnesses . . . .” Brief of Appellant at 12-13.

[8] In Whatley v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), we held that a 

probable cause affidavit prepared and signed by the officer listed as the affiant 

bore sufficient indicia of reliability to be introduced into evidence at a probation 

revocation hearing. The probable cause affidavit revealed the officer found 

cocaine in a drawer in a locked bedroom. The drawer also contained 

documents with the probationer’s name on them. When the probationer was 

found in possession of a key to the bedroom, he admitted the cocaine was his. 

Brooks contends this case is unlike Whatley because the officer in Whatley

personally observed evidence of the crime, whereas here, the detectives did not 

witness the crime themselves. 

[9] In Whatley, the probable cause affidavit was the only evidence introduced to 

support the allegations that the probationer had violated his probation. 

Therefore, the firsthand knowledge of the affiant about evidence of a crime was 

an important consideration in determining the reliability of the affidavit. Here, 

the detectives were present at the hearing and testified about their investigation, 

which included interviewing the victim to ascertain what had happened. But 

Detective Frazier testified that during the ensuing investigation, he and other 

investigators uncovered evidence corroborating the victim’s hearsay statements. 

Therefore, the hearsay statements in both the probable cause affidavit and 

Detective Frazier’s testimony had sufficient indicia of reliability to be 

considered substantially trustworthy. 
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Conclusion

[10] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting reliable hearsay into 

evidence during the probation revocation hearing. We affirm the trial court’s 

decision to revoke Brooks’s probation upon finding the State had proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he had committed new crimes in violation 

of the conditions of his probation.

[11] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.