IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-60652

 

J. RANDOLPH LIPSCOMB, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly situated;

MAYOR, CITY OF COLUMBUS; CITY COUNCIL OF

THE CITY OF COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI, as the

statutorily designated successors in office

to the Trustees of Franklin Academy,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

THE COLUMBUS MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL

DISTRICT, Dr. Reuben E. Dilworth,

Superintendent; ET AL.,

Defendants,

THE COLUMBUS MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL

DISTRICT, Dr. Reuben E. Dilworth,

Superintendent; ET AL.,

Defendant-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Eric Clark,

Secretary of State; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT;

ERIC CLARK, Secretary of State,

Defendants-Appellees

 

Appeals from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Mississippi

 

June 23, 1998

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff J. Randolph Lipscomb initiated this class action in

federal district court, seeking a declaration as to the validity of
2

certain leases of Mississippi sixteenth section land. In light of

the state law issues involved in the case, the district court

abstained from decision. We conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in declining to exercise its proper

jurisdiction.

I.

In 1816, the United States purchased for $130,000 from the

Chickasaw Nation title to land that now comprises parts of northern

Alabama and Mississippi. In 1817, following a pattern that had

been in place since before the ratification of the U.S.

Constitution, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268-69 (1986),

Congress authorized the survey and sale of all these lands, except

for “section No. 16, in each township, which shall be reserved for

the support of schools therein.” Land Sales Act of March 3, 1817,

3 Stat. 375. Parts of the present-day town of Columbus,

Mississippi, fall within these sixteenth section lands.

Responding to the Congressional direction, Mississippi

included in its 1817 Constitution a provision mandating that

sixteenth section lands were never to be sold and that all funds

acquired by the state through the rental or lease of such lands

were to be set aside “for the use of schools.” See Miss. Const. of

1817, art. 6, § 20. In 1821, the Mississippi legislature

authorized the incorporation of the town of Columbus, which was

located at an important crossing of the Tombigbee River. Intending
3

to promote the development of Columbus, the legislature also

established the Franklin Academy, the first public school in

Mississippi. The legislature authorized the president and trustees

of the Academy to lease certain lots in the Columbus sixteenth

section “for the term of ninety-nine years, reserving an annual

rent therefor.” See 1821 Miss. Laws Ch. XLVI, p. 73-74. The

initial annual rent was to be determined by public auction. In

1830, concerned about the problem of lessees forfeiting their

leases, the legislature amended the 1821 statute and ordered the

insertion of the phrase “renewable forever” in all past and future

Columbus sixteenth section leases. See Act of December 13, 1830,

1830 Miss. Laws 14th Sess. Ch. II, pp. 9-10.

In 1890, Mississippi adopted a new constitution, parts of

which are still in force today. The 1890 Constitution placed a new

condition on all sixteenth section lands in the state, directing

that “[l]and belonging to, or under control of the state, shall

never be donated, directly or indirectly, to private corporations

or individuals.” Miss. Const. of 1890, art. IV, § 95. Moreover,

the 1890 Constitution limited the duration of leases of sixteenth

section lands to twenty-five years. See id. art. VIII, § 211. In

1913, fears arose among the Columbus leaseholders that the

constitution’s twenty-five year leasing limit might invalidate

their pre-existing leases. Mindful of the Contracts Clause of the

United States Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No State

shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of

contracts . . . .”), the Mississippi legislature in 1914 responded
 

1Previous Mississippi cases had questioned the validity of

sixteenth section leases under the 1890 Constitution, but none went

as far as Hill in striking down those instruments. See, e.g., Keys

v. Carter, 318 So. 2d 862 (Miss. 1975).

4

to the Columbus lessees’ concerns by passing a law authorizing the

renewal of the Columbus leases in 1920 at their original terms.

See 1914 Miss. Laws Ch. 462. The leases were so renewed.

In 1989, however, the Columbus leaseholders again became

concerned following a Mississippi Supreme Court decision. In Hill

v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1989), the court held that a

ninety-nine year lease of a plot of sixteenth section land for the

sum of $7.50 was voidable under the non-donation principle of § 95

of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution.1 As the court acknowledged,

its decision had the effect of invalidating hundreds of sixteenth

section leases across the state. See id. at 12. Notably, however,

the case did not explicitly address leases with “renewable forever”

clauses.

In 1988, after surveying Mississippi’s case law, counsel for

the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Jackson,

Mississippi, determined that the 1890 Constitution rendered

leaseholds of sixteenth section land in Columbus “virtually

uninsurable.” In 1990, responding to Hill and unhappy with the

revenues generated by the Columbus leases, the president of the

Columbus School Board announced that the Columbus sixteenth section

leases were invalid and would have to be renegotiated. Various

leaseholders responded by filing suit in Chancery Court in Lowndes

County, Mississippi, seeking a confirmation of title. On January
 

2Lipscomb holds two Columbus leases, the first originally

granted in 1839 and the second in 1843. The rentals for his leases

are $.11/year and $.93/year.

5

16, 1992, however, the suit was voluntarily dismissed, to permit

the filing of this complaint in federal court.

A few days later, on January 24, 1992, Randolph Lipscomb2

filed a putative class action in the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi against the Columbus

School District, the Mississippi Secretary of State (who is

statutorily authorized to administer sixteenth section lands), and

HUD. His suit sought a declaration that the Columbus leases were

valid and that the lessees possessed the right to renew the leases

in 2019 at their original terms. On July 31, 1992, recognizing

that at least 1,473 lessees had similar interests in Lipscomb’s

suit, the district court certified a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23. Lipscomb moved for summary judgment, and the Secretary of

State moved 1) to decertify the class and 2) for the district court

to abstain.

From February 1993 until July 1996, the district court held

the case under advisement. On July 23, 1996, the court granted the

Secretary of State’s motion to abstain, citing Railroad Comm’n v.

Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319

U.S. 315 (1943). The court reasoned that the case required an indepth examination of Mississippi statutes and constitutional

provisions, a task it felt was best left to the Mississippi courts.

The court also noted in passing that the plaintiffs’ case likely
6

did not state a valid federal claim under the Contracts Clause.

This timely appeal followed.

II.

We review a district court’s decision to abstain for an abuse

of discretion. See Allen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 948

F.2d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1006 (1992).

In practice, however, our scrutiny is stricter. Because an

exercise of abstention must occur within the specific limits of a

particular abstention doctrine, “decisions to abstain are reviewed

under a standard narrower than that applicable to decisions such as

evidentiary rulings.” American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dent, 982 F.2d

917, 922 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993).

A.

One of the two bases for abstention relied upon by the

district court was Burford abstention. As the Supreme Court has

defined the Burford doctrine:

Where timely and adequate state court review is available, a

federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with

the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies:

(1) when there are “difficult questions of state law bearing

on policy problems of substantial public import whose

importance transcends the result in the case then at bar;” or

(2) where the “exercise of federal review of the question in

a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state

efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a

matter of substantial public concern.”
7

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.

350, 361 (1989) (citations omitted). Other than citing Burford in

conjunction with Pullman, the district court made little effort to

apply the Burford doctrine.

The district court erred in invoking Burford abstention. As

we have stressed, Burford abstention requires the existence of a

state administrative proceeding to which the federal court could

defer. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir.

1994). This federal lawsuit interferes with no state

administrative scheme. The Secretary of State argues that his

office has supervisory and regulatory authority over sixteenth

section lands. Yet the Secretary of State has not identified any

administrative process by which the validity of sixteenth section

leases is adjudicated. This lawsuit simply asks for a declaration

of the lessees’ rights, relief that in no way would interfere with

Mississippi’s system of regulating sixteenth section lands. Cf.

St. Paul Ins., 39 F.3d at 589 (rejecting Burford abstention where

lawsuit did not seek to interfere with state regulatory process,

but simply asked for an interpretation of a settlement agreement in

light of a state statute). Accordingly, Burford abstention is

inappropriate here. See American Bank & Trust Co., 982 F.2d at 922

n.6 (noting that district courts abuse their discretion when their

abstention decisions exceed the bounds of narrow abstention

doctrines).

B.
8

The other abstention rationale cited by the district court was

the Pullman doctrine. As the Supreme Court has explained Pullman,

“federal courts should abstain from decision when difficult and

unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a

substantial federal constitutional question can be decided. By

abstaining in such cases, federal courts will avoid both

unnecessary adjudication of federal questions and ‘needless

friction with state policies . . . .’” Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.

Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984) (quoting Pullman, 312 U.S. at

500). Pullman abstention depends first and foremost upon an

ambiguity in state law. See Baran v. Port of Beaumont Navigation

Dist., 57 F.3d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1995). Pullman does not command

district courts to abstain simply to permit state review of an

unambiguous statute that has previously never been interpreted by

a state court. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 469

(1987). Moreover, the mere presence of an ambiguity in state law

and a likelihood of avoiding a constitutional adjudication does not

automatically compel Pullman abstention. Rather, before

abstaining, “[a] district court must carefully assess the totality

of circumstances presented by a particular case. This requires a

broad inquiry which should include consideration of the rights at

stake and the costs of delay pending state court adjudication.”

Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 697 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.

dismissed, 459 U.S. 1012 (1982).

Here, the district court abstained under Pullman after

determining that a potential conflict between the 1914 Mississippi
 

3Apparently, lessees in Columbus petitioned the Mississippi

legislature in 1913 to pass the statute in order to remove a cloud

over their title created by the 1890 Constitution. The Columbus

City Attorney, E.T. Sykes, wrote a brief to the legislature

requesting the enactment of the statute. The brief strongly stated

that the 1890 Constitution could not impair the vested rights of

the lessees to renew their leases forever, but it requested the

legislation anyway “as a matter of security” to silence various

“Doubting Thomases” who had questioned the leases.

9

statute and the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 was a substantial

question of state law that might moot the federal constitutional

issue. This was error.

The district court’s Pullman rationale for abstention

essentially ignored the bite of Lipscomb’s argument. Lipscomb

contends that prior to 1890, lessees in Columbus obtained pursuant

to statutory authorization ninety-nine year leases on Columbus

property that were renewable at their original terms forever.

Lipscomb argues that the School District cannot employ the 1890

Constitution’s prohibition against the donation of public lands to

invalidate the Columbus leases, because doing so would impair the

obligations of a contract in violation of the federal Contracts

Clause. As Lipscomb asserts, the 1914 legislation, which confirmed

that the leases could be renewed in 1920 at their original terms,

is irrelevant to his argument. If the lessees enjoyed before 1890

a contractual right to renew their leases in perpetuity, they did

not need a statute in 1914 to restate that right for them. Cf.

Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 568, 575-76 (1883)(noting

that a law recognizing an existing, binding obligation of the state

is not retroactive). In a sense, therefore, the 1914 legislation

was wholly unnecessary.3
 

4The district court also relied on our opinion in Frazier v.

Lowndes County, Miss. Bd. of Educ., 710 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir.

1983) to support its argument that the legal threats from the

School District here did not implicate the Contracts Clause.

Although the applicability of Frazier may speak to the merits of

this case, to the extent that the district court relied on Frazier

in its decision to abstain, it erred. In Frazier, we rejected the

claim that a school district’s threatened cancellation of sixteenth

section leases violated the Contracts Clause. We only found the

Contracts Clause inapplicable, however, because the legal authority

upon which the school district relied in challenging the leases

predated those leases. See id. at 1099 (“[T]he Lowndes County

Board of Education claims a right based on a new interpretation of

preexisting authority . . . to terminate the leases.”). Here, on

the other hand, the school district allegedly challenges the

Columbus leases under the authority of the Mississippi Constitution

of 1890, which postdated them -- a potential Contracts Clause

violation.

10

The district court, however, focused solely on the legality of

the 1914 statute in deciding to abstain under Pullman. The court

reasoned that since the leases were apparently renewed under the

authority of the 1914 statute, it would take a Mississippi court to

determine whether the 1914 statute conflicted with the 1890

Constitution. Pullman abstention is appropriate only when there

exists an ambiguous issue of state law, the resolution of which by

a state court might help a federal court to avoid a constitutional

decision. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 236. Here, settling

the Mississippi constitutionality of the 1914 statute would not

help to resolve the federal constitutional claims of the class, for

those claims are premised on a conflict between the 1890

Mississippi Constitution and the pre-existing leases.4

Perhaps acknowledging the irrelevance of the 1914 statute, the

Secretary of State advances an alternate basis for finding that

this litigation implicates unsettled questions of state law. The
11

Secretary of State argues that the 1830 statute granting the

trustees of Franklin Academy the right to issue renewable-forever

leases was later repealed by statutes in 1830 and 1833. Lipscomb’s

own leases, along with many others that purportedly contain the

renewable-forever terms, were crafted after 1830. Thus, argues the

Secretary of State, there is an unsettled question of state law

regarding the legality of the renewable-forever terms in the

Columbus leases, which requires adjudication in the first instance

in a Mississippi court.

The statute authorizing the Columbus trustees to issue

renewable-forever leases was enacted on December 13, 1830, and

reads, in pertinent part:

[T]he Trustees of said Franklin Academy be, and they are

hereby authorized to lay off and lease lots, not to consist of

more than ten acres each, for the same time, and in like

manner, and on like condition with those in the present plan

of the town of Columbus, throughout the section; and that said

Trustees be, and are hereby authorized to make out all leases

for the lots of said section, for ninety nine years, dating

from the first leasing of lots in said town of Columbus,

renewable forever. Providing, always, that the payment of

leases on said lots be made annually in advance, as before;

and that all leases heretofore made of lots, by the said

Trustees, be renewable at the expiration of the time for which

these were leases, in like manner as above, provided for, in

cases of lots to be leased hereafter.

Act of December 13, 1830, 1830 Miss. Laws 14th Sess. Ch. II, pp. 9-

10. The Secretary of State notes, however, that three days later

the Mississippi legislature passed a new law. This statute, dated

December 16, 1830, directed the trustees of schools in a variety of

counties, including Lowndes (the county containing Columbus), to

lease sixteenth section lands for fixed ninety-nine year terms,

whenever a “majority of the heads of families in any township”
 

5The December 16 statute reads, in pertinent part:

Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the state of Mississippi, in General

Assembly convened, That hereafter whenever a majority of the

heads of families in any township in the counties of Madison,

Jefferson, Claiborne, Monroe, and Lowndes, shall deem it

expedient, and shall in writing, direct the trustees for

schools in said township to lease for the term of ninety-nine

years, the sixteenth section, or other lands reserved in lieu

thereof, it shall be their duty to do so on their giving

thirty days notice in the nearest newspaper and at three of

the most public places in said county of the time and place of

leasing the same.

. . . .

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That said land shall

be offered for lease in lots of not more than a quarter of a

section, not less than an eighth of a section . . . .

. . . .

Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That all acts and

parts of acts coming with the meaning and purview of this act

be, and the same are hereby repealed.

Act of December 16, 1830, 1830 Miss. Laws 14th Sess. Ch. II, pp.

330-31.

 

6The 1833 statute reads, in pertinent part:

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state

of Mississippi, That whenever a majority of the resident heads

of families, (minors excepted,) in each township, or

fractional township, containing section No. 16. or such

section as may be reserved for the use of schools in lieu

12

requested them to do so. Act of December 16, 1830, 1830 Miss. Laws

14th Sess. Ch. II, pp. 330-31. The December 16 statute also

contained a repealing clause providing that “all acts and parts of

acts coming within the meaning and purview of this act be, and the

same are hereby repealed.” Id.

5 Furthermore, in 1833, the

Mississippi legislature passed another sixteenth section statute,

with substantially the same provisions as the December 16, 1830

statute. See Act of February 27, 1833, 1833 Miss. Laws pp. 452-

54.6 Like the second 1830 act, the 1833 statute contained a clause
thereof, within this state, shall request the same, it shall

be the duty of the trustees now in office, or who may

hereafter be in office, to lease the said section of their

respective townships to the highest bidder, for the term of

ninety-nine years, . . . Provided, that said trustees may

divide and lease such section in lots of not less than eighty

acres, if they should deem the same most advantageous . . . .

. . . .

Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That this act shall

not be construed as to affect any prior disposition, which may

have been made of any of the sections of any township within

this state; and that all acts and parts of acts contravening

the provisions of this act be and the same are hereby

repealed.

Act of February 27, 1833, 1833 Miss. Laws pp. 452-54.

13

dictating that “all acts and parts of acts contravening the

provisions of this act be and the same are hereby repealed.” Id.

The Secretary of State contends that there is a substantial

question whether the second 1830 statute and the 1833 statute both

repealed the first 1830 statute, which permitted renewable-forever

leases. Accordingly, argues the Secretary of State, the federal

constitutional question regarding the conflict between the 1890

Constitution and the pre-existing Columbus leases is preceded by a

state law question concerning the authority of the school trustees

to enter into renewable-forever leases before 1890. If the

trustees lacked such authority, contends the Secretary of State,

the federal constitutional question would be mooted, thereby

justifying Pullman abstention.

We disagree, for we find that the statutory scheme involved

here is not so ambiguous as to require Pullman abstention. See

City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 469 (requiring ambiguity in statutory

scheme before abstention is to be exercised). The Secretary of
14

State faces an uphill struggle in establishing the requisite statelaw ambiguity, for the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1898 confirmed

that the Columbus leases were properly made renewable forever. In

Street v. City of Columbus, 23 So. 773 (Miss. 1898), Columbus

leaseholders challenged the authority of Columbus to tax the

capital value of their leases, a value which had arisen because the

locked-in rents did not reflect the true value of the leaseholds.

In holding that Columbus could so tax the leases, the court

repeatedly acknowledged that the Columbus leases were renewable

forever. See id. at 773 (“These leases, as we learn from the

briefs of counsel, the leases themselves, and the act of the

legislature under which they were made, are renewable forever, at

the option of the lessees.”); id. at 774 (repeatedly noting that a

statute made the leases renewable forever). Although the precise

question of the renewability of the Columbus leases was not before

the Street Court, the opinion’s affirmation of the leases’

perpetual terms was not dicta, for acknowledging that the leases

were so renewable was necessary to establish the extent of their

capital value.

The Street opinion made no mention of the two statutes cited

by the Secretary of State, in all likelihood because no party

thought them relevant to the Columbus leases. Indeed, no

Mississippi authority has ever suggested that the two statutes

affect the renewable-forever nature of the Columbus leases. Cf.

City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 469 (noting that simple fact that

statute has not previously been construed does not supply requisite
15

ambiguity to justify abstention). On the contrary, an 1848

official compilation of the Mississippi Code lists all statutes

governing the Columbus sixteenth section land, but does not refer

to the two laws cited by the Secretary of State. See A.

Hutchinson, Code of Mississippi 246 (1848).

Although the Street opinion alone removes most doubt about the

validity of the perpetual terms in the Columbus leases, we are

confident that even if the Street Court had confronted the

Secretary of State’s two statutes, it would have found them

inapplicable to Columbus. By their terms, the December 16, 1830

and February 27, 1833 statutes did not dissipate any pre-existing

leases nor were they self-executing. Rather, the two statutes

provided that the trustees of school districts in Lowndes county

were to lease sixteenth section lands for ninety-nine year terms

only when the majority of households in a community requested them

to do so. There is no evidence to suggest that the households in

Columbus ever voluntarily invoked those statutes. Indeed, it would

have been absurd for them to have done so. Both the December 16,

1830 and February 27, 1833 statutes mandated a minimum lot size of

eighty acres. The eighty-acre minimum indicates that the

legislature was contemplating rural lots. By 1830, however, the

Columbus sixteenth section was urban. In accordance with its urban

nature, the December 13, 1830 statute that specifically empowered

the Columbus school trustees to authorize renewable-forever leases

permitted lots of no more than ten acres each. The Mississippi

legislature in enacting the general December 16, 1830 statute could
16

not possibly have intended to repeal its more specific December 13,

1830 law, passed just three days earlier. If the December 16, 1830

statute was a mandatory, overriding provision, it would have

allowed only eight lots on the 640-acre Columbus sixteenth section,

thereby depopulating the city of Columbus. The Secretary of State

perhaps should be commended for his creativity, if not his

nineteenth-century legal research, but the two statutes he has

located have failed to create a substantial ambiguity in state law.

Finally, the Secretary of State contends that the December 13,

1830 statute authorizing renewable forever Columbus leases 1) was

invalid under the 1817 Mississippi Constitution, which prohibited

the “sale” of sixteenth section land, and 2) violated the trust

under which Mississippi held the land. While a renewable-forever

lease may in practical effect resemble a “sale,” the United States

Supreme Court has acknowledged that in legal effect such

instruments are leases. See Bosley v. Wyatt, 55 U.S. (14 How.)

390, 396 (1852); see also Street, 23 So. 773 (construing the

Columbus leases as “leases”). The contention that the leasing of

this sixteenth section land violated the trust for the benefit of

schoolchildren under which Mississippi held the land is also easily

dispatched. As we have previously stated with respect to

indistinguishable Choctaw sixteenth section land in Mississippi,

the trust under which Mississippi operated at best created an

honorary, not a mandatory, obligation on the part of the state to

administer the lands for the benefit of schoolchildren. See

Madison County Bd. of Educ. v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 939 F.2d
17

292, 303-05 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S.

168 (1914) (permitting title to similar sixteenth section lands in

Alabama to pass by adverse possession, because trust obligations

were merely honorary in nature). Moreover, it is doubtful that the

leasing of the Columbus sixteenth section land even violated the

honorary trust. The legislature apparently authorized the

renewable-forever terms in the leases to prevent lessees from

forfeiting, an action that itself would deprive the schools of

funds. The renewable-forever terms encouraged the development of

the city of Columbus, an event at least indirectly beneficial to

the schools. See Madison County, 939 F.2d at 306-07 (reasoning

that the development of railroads generally benefitted education in

Mississippi, even if the railroad companies received sixteenth

section right-of-ways for free).

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that some uncertainty

exists in these unconstrued nineteenth century statutes, the

presence of a minute degree of ambiguity does not in and of itself

demand Pullman abstention. Cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,

375 (1964) (“The abstention doctrine is not an automatic rule

applied whenever a federal court is faced with a doubtful issue of

state law; it rather involves a discretionary exercise of a court’s

equity powers.”). Instead, in determining whether abstention is

appropriate in any particular case, we must consider the totality

of circumstances. See Duncan, 657 F.2d at 697. Lipscomb cites

several factors that cut against abstention. First, assuming that

the class was properly certified, sending this case back to state
18

court would be inefficient, as Mississippi law does not permit

class action litigation. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 23, Comment (“Class

action practice is not being introduced into Mississippi trial

courts at this time.”). Accordingly, were we to uphold federal

abstention, Lipscomb would either have to litigate this case

individually or join the other 1,400 Columbus lessees to his state

lawsuit. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau

Federation, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1993) (approving of

use of federal declaratory judgment actions to avoid multiplicity

of state lawsuits). Second, the exercise of federal jurisdiction

in this case would not substantially intrude upon Mississippi’s

state interests. Even though there are numerous Columbus lessees,

the Columbus leases, with their renewable-forever terms, are

apparently unique among the sixteenth section leases in

Mississippi. As such, even if we were to resolve a minor ambiguity

in Mississippi law, our decision would have no far reaching

preclusive effects in the state. Cf. Colorado River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)

(“Abstention is also appropriate where there have been presented

difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of

substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in

the case at bar.”).

The district court’s stated reasons for abstention were

erroneous. Moreover, despite the Secretary of State’s suggestions,

the legality of the Columbus leases under pre-1890 law is not so

ambiguous as to require deference to a state court pursuant to
 

7Lipscomb points us to certain exceptional cases in which our

court has addressed the merits of a claim after finding that the

district court below erred in abstaining. See, e.g., Snap-on Tools

Corp. v. Mason, 18 F.3d 1261, 1267 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994). Assuming

that we have the power to grant summary judgment in favor of the

class, as Lipscomb requests, we decline to do so, given the

complexities that remain in this case.

19

Pullman. Even assuming that some minor degree of state-law

ambiguity exists with respect to the leases, other factors in this

case argue in favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction.

III.

The Secretary of State has advanced a variety of other

arguments against our granting of relief to the class. He notes

that the price terms of Lipscomb’s own leases have changed

throughout the years, perhaps suggesting that Lipscomb’s leases

were not renewals but were in fact new leases. The Secretary of

State also argues that tax sales appear in the chain of title of a

number of the Columbus leases, thereby terminating those leasehold

interests. Neither of these contentions, however, identifies an

ambiguity in state law sufficient to justify abstention. Rather,

the Secretary of State suggests complications that the district

court will have to surmount in ruling on the merits of this case

and/or fashioning class relief.7

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in

declining to exercise its proper jurisdiction. This litigation

does not implicate any issue of state law that is so ambiguous as

to justify abstention. Similarly, certification to the Mississippi
20

Supreme Court would be inappropriate here: “[A]bsent genuinely

unsettled matters of state law, we are reluctant to certify.”

Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir.

1997).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.