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******************************************************MARGARET ROBINSON v. DONALD J. ROBINSON (AC 38222)
DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Pellegrino, Js.
Submitted on briefs November 18, 2016—officially released April 25, 2017 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of NewLondon at Norwich, Goodrow, J. [dissolution judgment]; Carbonneau, J. [motion for modification of

child support and custody].)
Donald J. Robinson, self-represented, the appellant (defendant), filed a brief.Opinion BEACH, J. The defendant, Donald J. Robinson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his postjudgment motion to modify his child support obligation to the plaintiff, Margaret Robinson. The defendant claims that the court erroneously denied his motion for modification because (1) its calculation of presumptive child supportwas erroneous; (2) it erroneously found shared physical custody; and (3) there was
no justification for ordering an upward deviation from the presumptive amount of child support provided for in the guidelines. We do not agree and affirm thejudgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following relevant facts and proceduralhistory. ThepartiesweremarriedinSeptember, 1993. There are four minor children issue of the marriage. The parties were divorced on February 3, 2014. The divorce was uncontested andthe court incorporated by reference the parties’ separation agreement initsjudgment ofdissolution. That agreementprovided that the parties were to share joint legal custody of their minor children, whose primary residence was to be with the plaintiff, while the defendant was to enjoy ‘‘liberal and unrestricted parental access.’’ It also provided that the defendant was to pay the plaintiff $400 per week in child support for the first year subsequent to the dissolution, $300 per week in the second year, and $200 per week in the third year.1 The agreement provided as wellthatthe defendantwas to payperiodic alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $1000 per week.2
On June 18, 2015, the self-represented defendant3 moved for a downward modification of child support and a modification in the formal custody status, such that the primary residence ofthe three minor children, who were then actually living with him, be changed to reflect that reality.4 Following a hearing, the court deniedthe defendant’s motion formodification ofchild support. The court did orderthattheprimaryresidence ofthree ofthe four then minor children be changed so thatitwouldbewiththe defendant, butfound, nonetheless, that there was a shared physical custody arrangement. The court found that the presumptive amount of child support according to the guidelines was $221 per week, but that an upward deviation to $300 per week, the same amount called for in the agreement and the dissolution judgment, was justified in the circumstances. This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court erred in its calculation of presumptive child support, because, in its application ofthe child support guidelines, itneither reduced the defendant’s income by the amount of alimony he paid nor increased the plaintiff’s income by acorresponding amount. We disagree.
The defendant contends that § 46b-215a-1 (11) (B) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies is specific as to the items excluded from the definition of ‘‘gross income,’’ and because that list does not include alimony as an exclusion, it must be included in the income attributed to the plaintiff.5 He further argues that the list in § 46b-215a (11) (A) oftwenty-two items includedas ‘‘grossincome’’ isnonexhaustive; therefore, the fact that alimony is not included in that list is not dispositive. The amount of alimony, then, should have been added to the plaintiff’s income and subtracted fromthe defendant’sincomeforthepurpose ofcomputing the proportionate shares ofchild supportto be paid by either party under the guidelines, according to the defendant’s reasoning. ‘‘Our review of the court’s interpretation of

. . . § 46b–215a–1 (11)

. . . ofthe Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies is plenary.’’ Lusa v. Grunberg, 101 Conn. App. 739, 761, 923 A.2d 795 (2007). Section 46b215a-1 (11) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies defines gross income as ‘‘the average weekly earned and unearned income from all sources before deductions

. . . .’’ That section includes a nonexhaustive list of twenty-two inclusions. In that list of inclusions is: ‘‘alimony being paid by an individual who is not aparty to the support determination.’’ (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11) (A) (xix). The specific wording ofthis inclusion makes clearthat only alimony received from anonpartyto the support determination is included in gross income. See Felician Sisters ofSt. Francis of Connecticut, Inc

. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 850–51, 937A.2d 39, 48 (2008) (‘‘the tenet ofstatutory construction referred to as expressio unius est exclusio alterius

. . . may be translated as the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.

. . . [W]here express exceptions are made, the legal presumption is that the legislature did not intend to save other cases from the operation of the statute.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); see also Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 751, 865 A.2d 428 (2005) (agency regulations construed in accordance with accepted rules of statutory construction). Because the defendant is a party to the action, his alimony payments to the plaintiff are not included as income to her. Further, alimony paid is not listed as an exclusion serving to reduce the defendant’s income for the purpose of determining child support payments. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a1 (11) (B). We conclude that the court properly applied the guidelines to find that the presumptive amount of child support to be paid by the defendant was $221 per week.6
II
The defendant next claims that the court erred infindingasharedphysicalcustodyarrangement. Wenote atthe outsetthatthisappealpresentsadegree ofanalytical murkiness. The defendant’s motion for modificationwas, byitsterms, grounded onthe propositionthat there had been a substantial change of circumstances because of the change of residence of three of the children. The court, whichdidnotwriteaformalmemorandum ofdecision but, rather, announced its decision
on the record and issued brief written orders, appears to have reasoned that there had been a change of circumstances, butthat the change did not equitably compel a departure fromthe prioragreement inthe amount of child support to be paid. The court further based its ultimate decision on a finding that the child support guidelines provided for apresumptive payment of$221 per week, and an upward deviation to $300 per week
was justified, at least in part, by a finding of shared physical custody and the inability of the plaintiff to provide appropriately unless she received the greater amount. In this context, the self-represented defendant quite understandably chose to address the court’s reasoninginhis statementofissues onappeal andformost ofhis argument. The equitable considerations underlying decisions whether to deviate from the guidelines
are consistent with the more general considerations underlying motions to modify, and indeed overlap in the unusual circumstances of this appeal.
We address, then, the defendant’sclaimthatthe court erred in denying his motion for modification, andjustifying an upward deviation from the guidelines, by finding shared physical custody,7 despite having found that three children primarily resided with the defendant. The standards to be applied in reviewing such orders
are well established. ‘‘An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.

. . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.

. . . Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding motions formodification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pite v. Pite, 135 Conn. App. 819, 824, 43A.3d229, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 901, 52 A.3d 728 (2012). ‘‘[T]o the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whetherthose findings were clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elm City Cheese Co

. v. Federico, 251 Conn. 59, 68, 752 A.2d 1037 (1999). ‘‘General Statutes § 46b–86 governs the modification of a child support order after the date of a dissolution judgment.

. . . Section 46b–86 (a) permits the court to modify child support orders in two alternative cir-cumstances. Pursuant to this statute, a court may not modify a child support order unless there is first either (1) a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party or (2) a showing that the final order for child support substantially deviates from the child support guidelines

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich, 156 Conn. App. 628, 638, 115 A.3d 39, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 921, 118 A.3d 63 (2015).8
‘‘When presented with a motion to modify child support orders on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, a court must first determine whether there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties.

. . . Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and

. . . make an order for modification.

. . . A party moving for amodification ofa child support order must clearly and definitely establish the occurrence ofa substantial change in circumstances ofeitherparty that makes the continuation of the prior order unfair and improper.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 639. ‘‘[I]n considering a motion to modify or terminate an alimony or support order pursuant to § 46b–86, the court is limited to a comparison between the current conditions and the last court order. To obtain a modification, themovingpartymustdemonstratethatcircumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modification of the existing order.

. . . The power ofthe trial court to modify the existing order does not, however, include the power to retry issues already decided

. . . or to allowthepartiestouse amotionto modifyas anappeal.

. . . [The court’s] inquiry is necessarily confined to a comparisonbetweenthe currentconditionsandthelast court order. To permit the trial court to reconsider all evidence dating from before the original divorce proceedings, in determining the adjustment of [support], would be, in effect, to undermine the policy behind the well established rule oflimiting proofofthe substantial change of circumstances to events occurring subsequent to the latest [support] order— the avoidance of relitigating matters already settled.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosier v. Rosier, 103 Conn. App. 338, 344–45, 928A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 932, 934 A.2d 247 (2007).
Asdiscussedpreviouslyinthisopinion, thedefendant alleged in his motion for modification that there had been a substantial change of circumstances because three of the four children had moved in with him. The court found that the children had in fact moved, sothat circumstances had changed, to that extent. Butthe court found that the change did not compel a lowering ofthe amount ofchild support to be paid by the defendant, atleastpartlybecausethereeffectivelywasshared physical custody.9
The court’s finding of shared physical custody was not clearly erroneous. The court noted that there was
no setparenting schedule, and thatthe children ‘‘pretty much come and go as they please.’’ The court alluded to the guidelines: ‘‘[S]hared physical custody means a situation in which the physical residence ofthe child— children is shared by the parents in a manner that
ensures that the children have substantially equal time andcontactwithbothparentsandexactlyequalsharing of physical care and control of the children is not requiredforafinding ofsharedphysical custody.’’10The plaintiff’s testimony supported this finding: she explained that the children ‘‘sleep at [the defendant’s] house, but they’re at my house constantly

. . . .’’ She explained that ‘‘there’s no schedule,’’ ‘‘we never know when you’re gonna have kids or not.

. . . [T]he kids
are at any age where if

. . . they’re happy here, things
are going well, fine, but the minute someone tells you to do the dishes, you run to the other person’s house.’’ The court explained: ‘‘we’re not dealing with children. We’re dealingwithyoung adults, andit sounds like they
move fairly freely between your households

. . . .’’ The court concluded that ‘‘what’s really needed here is for both households to be able to receive the children until they graduate from high school.’’ The court did not abuse its discretion in finding shared physical custody.
III
The final question is whether, having found the presumptive amount of child support and shared physical custody, the court abused its discretion in deviating upward from the presumptive amount. Stated from the perspective ofthe motion for modification, the issue is whether, in light of the change of circumstance, i.e., the change in primary residence, the court abused its discretion in not decreasing the amount of child support. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.
As discussed previously, a party seeking a modification must show that the continuation ofthe prior order would be unfair or inequitable. Budrawich v. Budrawich, supra, 156 Conn. App. 639; Rosierv. Rosier, supra, 103 Conn. App. 338. Similarly, a court may deviate from the presumptive amount ofchild care ifthe procedures outlined in § 46b-215a-5c of the regulations are followed. Notably, an agreement may provide a sufficient basisforadeviationwhentheagreementcitesdeviation criteria; the presumptive amount also ‘‘maybe rebutted by a specific finding on the record that such amount would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-5c (a).The regulations also provide for ‘‘special circumstances,’’ which include the best interests of the child and ‘‘other equitable factors.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 46b-215a-5c (b) (6) (D) and (E).
Thecourtfoundthatitwouldbeinequitabletomodify the existing child support orders; it stated: ‘‘If I undo what was done previously, even though the circumstances may have changed in terms of primary residence, itwouldbe unfairand inequitable to, in essence, elevate one household and diminish the other household. So, the orders will remain—the order that I’ve been asked to modify will remain exactly where it is right now

. . . .’’ The court essentially found that, under the circumstances in which the parties shared custody of the children, and both households needed to be maintained in a manner capable of receiving the children, it would be unfair and inequitable to modify the amount ofchild support specified in the separation agreement, despite the fact that the amount was higher thanthepresumptiveamountcontemplatedbythe child support guidelines. The court expressed the concern that if it ‘‘were to lower the child support

. . . there would [not] be sufficientremainingfundsforthereceiving parent to meet the basic needs ofthe children after that deviation.’’ See Amodio v. Amodio, 56 Conn. App. 459, 467, 743 A.2d 1135 (purpose of guidelines is to
ensure that parent responsible for child support does not pay less than amount dictated by guidelines), cert. granted on other grounds, 253 Conn. 910, 754 A.2d 160 (2000) (appeal withdrawn September 27, 2000). Under these circumstances we do not conclude that the court abused its discretion in denyingthe defendant’s motion for modification.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 During year two, three of the children, who are triplets, would turn eighteen and during year three, the youngest child would turn eighteen.

2 Therewereprovisionsfortheterminationofalimonythatarenotrelevant to this opinion.

3 Bothpartieswere self-represented atthe hearing onthe motionformodification.

4 This was the defendant’s second motion formodification. The defendant previously had filed a motion for modification on March 20, 2015, which

was substantially similar to the second motion.

5 Although, accordingto the defendant, the lack ofspecific exclusionfrom income lends support to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s income should have been increased by the amount ofalimony received, we note that there similarly is no express deduction from income for alimony paid

. 6 We note that there is no inherent unfairness in not adjusting the respective incomes to reflect alimony orders. In general, if child support orders

are calculatedfirst, anyaward ofalimonycanthenbe made withthe support orders in mind. In this case, of course, the prior orders were entered by agreement.
7Aclose reading ofthe court’s reasoningleaves some doubt asto whether

a precisefinding of shared physical custody mattered in the resolution of the case. The court discussed shared physical custody in the context ofthe need for the plaintiff to provide for the children, regardless of where they formally resided. The deviation was also predicated on that equitable concern, especially in light of the prior agreement to pay $300 per week.

8 As previously noted, both potential rationales for modifying the defen-dant’s child support obligations are addressed in this opinion.

9 Section46b-215a-1 (23) ofthe Regulations ofConnecticut StateAgencies defines ‘‘[s]hared physical custody’’ as ‘‘a situation in which the physical residence of the child is shared by the parents in a manner that ensures the child has substantially equal time and contact with both parents. An exactlyequal sharing ofphysical care and control ofthe childis notrequired for a finding of shared physical custody.’’ The defendantbrought his motion formodificationbased on a substantial change in circumstances, and did not base the motion for modification on
a claim that the final order substantially deviated from the child support guidelines. Thecourt’sfindingofanarrangementinwhichtheparentsequally share custody is relevant to whether the circumstances have substantially changed under § 46b-86 so as to warrant a modification of the current support order.

10 See footnote 9 of this opinion.