J-S01006-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JERMAINE JACKSON, :

:

Appellant : No. 1810 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 23, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-09-CR-0003598-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2016

Jermaine Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his convictions of murder of the second degree, robbery, 

criminal conspiracy (robbery), and criminal conspiracy (burglary). See 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b); 3701(a)(1)(i); 903(c). We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in 

its Opinion as follows:

On December 28, 2011, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer 

Douglas Slemmer [“Officer Slemmer”] of the Bristol Township 

Police Department responded to a call regarding a shooting at 17 

Crabtree Lane in Levittown. Officer Slemmer discovered the 

victim, Danny DeGennaro [“DeGennaro”], deceased and bleeding 

from the chest in the home’s entryway. Only [] DeGennaro and 

his roommate, James Meszaros [“Meszaros”], were home at the 

time. [] Meszaros testified at trial that he went downstairs to go 

to the bathroom, and when he returned, he saw [] DeGennaro 

walking towards him in the vestibule. [] DcGennaro said “here 

we go,” then his eyes rolled up in his head, he fell backwards, 

and [] Meszaros tried to catch him. [] Meszaros did not see 

what preceded the shooting. When [] DeGennaro fell to the 

ground, []Meszaros ran to seek help from his neighbor, Nick 
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Wilson [“Wilson”]. [] Wilson called 911, then tried to stuff tshirts into [] DeGennaro’s shotgun wound to stop the bleeding. 

Officer Slemmer testified that the shotgun wound was about two 

to three inches in diameter and that it was “bleeding profusely.”

Officer Slemmer saw no signs of forced entry. He observed 

[that] a large amount of blood was on the stairs, walls, and floor 

of vestibule. The kitchen area also had a great deal of blood. 

Detective Timothy Furhmann [“Detective Furhmann”], who also 

investigated the scene that night, found a bullet case, shotgun 

wadding, and plastic sheathing from a shotgun shell in the 

kitchen. Detective Furhmann discovered a bullet hole in a wall in 

the living room. Furthermore, tire tracks were located in the 

grass behind the house. Bullet holes were later found in the 

shirts [] DeGennaro was wearing and his chest had over eightysix shotgun pellets inside of it.

Dr. Erica Williams, a forensic pathologist, opined that [] 

DeGennaro’s death was a homicide caused by a shot fired from 

about a three foot range. She testified that the blast injured [] 

DeGennaro’s skin, ribs, pericardium, heart, right lung, 

diaphragm, and liver. [] DeGennaro lost a “significant” amount 

of blood and it was unlikely that he could have survived the 

shotgun wound.

Prior to the shooting, [] Wilson parked his Volkswagen [which 

was bearing a for sale sign and Wilson’s telephone number,] 

behind [] DeGennaro’s house[.] During the investigation[,] [] 

Wilson reported to Detective Gregory Beidler [“Detective 

Beidler”] that he [had] received a call at 9:30 on the evening of 

the shooting, regarding the vehicle [for sale], and he provided 

the detective with the incoming cell phone number .... Detective 

Beidler obtained the subscriber information from T[-]Mobile and 

determined that the number belonged to Dakita Boone[,] and 

the phone was used by her daughter, Tatyana Henderson 

(“Henderson”). The T[-]Mobile records also showed that [] 

Henderson was about 300 yards from [] DeGennaro’s house 

when she called [] Wilson on December 28, 2011. The records 

also revealed that a number belonging to Danasia Bakr [“Bakr”] 

sent several texts to [] Henderson on the night of the shooting, 

including a text at 5:39 p.m. that said “can we do that thing wit 

Jermaine.” [] Henderson texted [] Bakr the next day as well, 

saying “going outside to talk to Jermaine just in case.” [] 
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Henderson’s phone records also showed that she made many 

calls to a number belonging to [Jackson]. 

Records for [Jackson’s] phone number showed five calls to and 

from numbers belonging to Breon Powell [“Powell”] and Kazair 

Gist [“Gist”] just minutes after the shooting. The records for all 

five individuals showed that their phones were in the area of [] 

DeGennaro’s house at the time of the shooting and that they 

[had] exchanged multiple calls and text messages that evening. 

Significantly, immediately after the shooting[,] at approximately 

10:00 p.m., [] Bakr and [] Powell called [Jackson] multiple 

times.

On February 13, 2012, Superior Court Judge Paula Francisco Ott 

approved a hard wire for the cell phones belonging to [] Bakr, [] 

Henderson, and [Jackson]. ... [] Bakr gave an interview to the 

Bucks County Detectives in which she implicated herself, [] 

Henderson, [Jackson], [] Powell, and [] Gist in the killing of [] 

DeGennaro. On March 29, 2012, [Jackson] was arrested in 

connection with the murder of [] DeGennaro.

At trial, [] Bakr testified that she acted as the get-away driver. 

On the day of the shooting, she and [] Henderson agreed to help 

[Jackson] rob someone who owed him money for drugs. [] Bakr 

and [] Henderson met [Jackson], [] Powell, and [] Gist at a 

parking lot in Trenton[, New Jersey]. [] Powell placed a gym 

bag in Bakr’s trunk and instructed [] Bakr to follow the three 

men, who were [riding] in [] Powell’s car. The plan was for 

[Jackson] to go into the target’s house to get the money[,] and 

if the target did not cooperate, [] Powell was to go into the

house to hold the target at gunpoint. [] Bakr understood 

[Jackson] to be in charge of what they were going to do that 

night. 

... [Jackson] directed [] Bakr to pull up to [] DeGennaro’s house 

and [] Henderson to “call about the car,” [i.e., Wilson’s] 

Volkswagen that was parked behind [] DeGennaro’s house. As 

they sat in the car, [] Bakr could see two men inside [] 

DeGennaro’s house. [Jackson] wanted [] Henderson to call 

regarding the car so he could see if either of the men [inside of 

DeGennaro’s house] would answer. [] Henderson made the call 

at approximately 9:00 p.m. and was told she could test drive the 

car the next day. 
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After the phone call, the five drove around the neighborhood and 

stopped at another location. There, [Jackson] and [] Powell got 

out of the cars.... Both men were wearing gloves and had their 

faces covered. [Jackson] and [] Powell walked “around the 

corner” and [] Bakr could not see them anymore. [] Hendersen 

was on the phone with [Jackson] for about a minute after the 

two men disappeared. 

Five minutes later, [] Bakr heard a noise that sounded like a 

shotgun. Bakr began to drive away, but [] Powell and [] Gist 

then ran to [] Bakr’s vehicle and [] Powell pounded on her trunk, 

so she slowed her car down and let the two men into her car. [] 

Bakr noticed that [] Gist also had his face covered and was 

wearing gloves. According to [] Bakr, [] Powell and [] Gist 

seemed “jumpy.” [] Powell stated “I had to do it, son” and [] 

Gist said “I shot him too.” They instructed [] Bakr to drive away 

and she did. As they drove away, [] Powell was on the phone 

with [] Jackson. They met [Jackson] back at the parking lot in 

Trenton, where [] Powell got out of the car, removed a shotgun 

from his pants, and put it back in the gym bag that he placed in 

[] Bakr’s trunk. [Jackson] got into [] Bakr’s car, where he 

informed [] Bakr and [] Henderson that “it wasn’t meant to 

happen this way,” and he advised the two women not to say 

anything to anyone. [Jackson] then got into the other car with 

[] Powell and [] Gist and they all drove away. ...

At trial, [] Henderson testified that on December 27, 2011, 

[Jackson] asked her to get []Bakr’s car so that she could take 

him to Pennsylvania to “get money” from someone who owed 

him money. On December 28, 2011, [] Henderson sent [] Bakr 

a text message asking her if she was ready to go do “that thing 

with Jermaine.” ... [After approaching the home, Jackson] called 

[] Henderson and asked her to stay on the phone with him while 

they went inside. After about a minute, [] Henderson heard 

[Jackson] say “go ahead,” and about a minute later, she heard 

two gunshots. ...

[Jackson] was arraigned on June 22, 2012. On June 26, 2013, 

the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Joinder to [join Jackson’s] 

trial with the trial of [] Powell and [] Gist. On August 8, 2012, 

[Jackson] filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion and a Motion to Bar 

the Death Penalty as Unconstitutional. On September 7, 2012, 

the Commonwealth withdrew the death penalty. On April 25, 

2013, [Jackson’s] trial was severed from the trial of [] Powell 
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and [] Gist, and [Jackson’s] Motion to Suppress was denied. On 

May 20, 2013, after a jury trial, [Jackson] was found guilty of 

[the above-mentioned crimes]. On May 23, 2013, [Jackson] was 

sentenced to life imprisonment. On June 14, 2013, [Jackson] 

filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court[, and a courtordered Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) 

Concise Statement.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/15, at 1-7 (citations omitted).

Jackson raises the following questions for our review:

1. Did the lower court err by not sustaining objections and 

declaring a mistrial following objections to the prosecutor’s 

use, during closing argument, of PowerPoint slides 

manipulated to present unduly inflammatory images that 

were not in evidence?

2. Did the lower court err by not suppressing evidence of mobile 

phone usage obtained through the use of grand jury 

subpoenas that were issued without the affidavits required to 

show the necessity for the use of a grand jury subpoena to 

obtain the evidence sought? 

3. Did the lower court err by admitting unfairly inflammatory 

evidence of [Jackson’s] presence at a shooting range?

Brief for Appellant at 2.

In his first claim, Jackson contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his Motion for a Mistrial in light of the prosecutor’s use of PowerPoint slides 

during closing argument that displayed words and images that were never 

introduced into evidence, and which created a prejudicial atmosphere. Id. 

at 14, 21-22. Jackson takes issue with three specific PowerPoint slides: (1) 

a slide that includes the words “go ahead” in red typeface, which according 

to Jackson appeared to be written by a blood soaked finger; (2) a slide that 

includes the words “get money” in red typeface, which appeared to be 
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written by a blood soaked finger; and (3) a slide that includes a picture of a 

cell phone inside manacles. Id. at 14-15, 21. Jackson argues that the 

slides inflamed the passions of the jury and formed in their minds bias and 

hostility toward him such that they could not objectively render a fair 

verdict. Id. at 15-16, 17; see also id. at 21-22 (asserting that the slide 

including the manacles unnecessarily emphasized that Jackson was black, 

while the victim was white). Jackson also claims that the trial court’s 

cautionary instruction was inadequate to overcome this prejudice. Id. at 

22.1

Our standard of review with regard to the denial of a motion for 

mistrial is as follows: 

In criminal trials, declaration of a mistrial serves to eliminate the 

negative effect wrought upon a defendant when prejudicial 

elements are injected into the case or otherwise discovered at 

trial. By nullifying the tainted process of the former trial and 

allowing a new trial to convene, [a] declaration of a mistrial 

serves not only the defendant’s interest but, equally important, 

the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just 

judgments. Accordingly, the trial court is vested with discretion 

to grant a mistrial whenever the alleged prejudicial event may 

reasonably be said to deprive the defendant of a fair and 

impartial trial. In making its determination, the court must 

 

1 We conclude that Jackson preserved his claim regarding the PowerPoint 

slides by objecting to them following the completion of the prosecution’s 

closing argument. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 960 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (stating that a delay in objecting to conduct during closing 

arguments does not result in waiver so long as: “(1) there is no factual 

dispute over the content of the prosecutor’s argument (e.g., the argument 

was recorded and available for review at trial); and (2) counsel objects 

immediately after closing argument with sufficient specificity to give the 

court the opportunity to correct the prejudicial effect of the improper 

argument.”).
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discern whether misconduct or prejudicial error actually 

occurred, and if so, ... assess the degree of any resulting 

prejudice. Our review of the resulting order is constrained to 

determining whether the court abused its discretion. Judicial 

discretion requires action in conformity with the law on facts and 

circumstances before the trial court after hearing and 

consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, 

in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or 

exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason. The remedy 

of a mistrial is an extreme remedy required only when an 

incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to 

deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial tribunal.

Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

With specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in a 

closing statement, we must review the prosecutorial conduct to determine 

its prejudicial quality and the conduct cannot be viewed in isolation, but 

rather as a whole. Id. A prosecutor must have “reasonable” latitude and 

may engage in “oratorical flair” during closing arguments, where the 

statements are supported by the evidence and its reasonably derivative 

inferences. Commonwealth v. Hogentogler, 53 A.3d 866, 878 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). Parties are entitled to utilize visual aids during their closing 

arguments so long as the evidence and the inferences derived therefrom 

reasonably support the demonstrative aids. Commonwealth v. 

Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 837 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also 

Commonwealth v. Pelzer, 612 A.2d 407, 412 (Pa. 1992). In defining 

what constitutes impermissible conduct during closing argument, 
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Pennsylvania follows Section 5.8 of the American Bar Association (ABA) 

Standards, which states as follows:

(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue 

all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. The

prosecutor should not intentionally misstate the evidence 

or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.

(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal 

belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony 

or evidence or the guilt of the defendant. 

(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to 

appeal to the prejudices of the jury. 

(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would 

divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the 

evidence.

ABA Crim. Justice Stand. § 5.8 (3d ed. 1993); see also Judy, 978 A.2d at 

1020.

 Furthermore, “prosecutorial misconduct does not take place unless 

the unavoidable effect of the comments at issue was to prejudice the jurors 

by forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, 

thus impeding their ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a 

true verdict.” Judy, 978 A.2d at 1020; see also Commonwealth v. 

Fisher, 741 A.2d 1234, 1243 (Pa. 1999) (stating that even isolated 

references to evidence not of record will not necessarily be considered “so 

pervasive or deliberate so that the unavoidable effect thereof [is] to 

prejudice the jury to the point that they could not fairly weigh the evidence 

presented.”). Thus, “an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires us to 
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evaluate whether a defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Judy, 

978 A.2d at 1019. 

Here, during his closing argument, the prosecutor utilized a PowerPoint 

presentation. N.T., 5/20/13, at 101-05. Two slides showed the phrases 

“get money” and “go ahead” printed in red lettering. Id. at 102, 104-05. 

Defense counsel noted that the “get money” slide was shown to the jury for 

seventeen minutes and the “go ahead” slide was shown to the jury for four 

minutes. Id. at 102, 105. The prosecution also utilized another slide that 

depicted manacles with a cell phone inside.2 Id. at 103-04. Defense 

counsel objected to the use of these three slides following the completion of 

the prosecution’s closing argument, and sought a mistrial. Id. at 102-06. 

The trial court denied the Motion for a mistrial. Id. at 106. However, the 

trial court provided the following cautionary instruction to the jury:

The speeches given by the lawyers are not part of the 

evidence[,] and you should not consider them as such. 

However, in deciding the case, you should carefully consider the 

evidence in light of the various reasons and arguments which 

each lawyer presented. It is the right and duty of each lawyer to 

discuss the evidence in a manner which is most favorable to the 

side he represents. You should be guided by each lawyer’s 

arguments to the extent they’re supported by the evidence and 

insofar as they aid you in applying your own reason and common 

sense. However, you’re not required to accept the arguments of 

either lawyer. It is for you[,] and you alone[,] to decide the 

case based on the evidence as it was presented from the witness 

stand and the instructions I’m giving to you.

 

2 The record does not indicate how long the PowerPoint slide with the 

manacles was displayed to the jury.
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I would also mention that there were illustrations used during 

the course of the closing statements. These are not evidence. 

They are simply illustrations[,] and you should consider them as 

such. To the extent that any illustrations that were shown 

appeal to your emotions, you need to set them aside and decide 

this case based solely on the evidence you heard in the 

courtroom[,] and the law as I’ve given it to you.

Id. at 114-15.

Here, the Commonwealth points out that the term “go ahead” 

referenced the words Jackson spoke to his co-conspirators prior to the 

shooting, and the term “get money” referenced the purpose of entering the 

residence. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 22; see also N.T., 5/17/13, 

at 175, 188, 189-90, 198, 218; N.T., 5/16/13, at 125; N.T., 5/14/13, at 10. 

Further, the Commonwealth points out that the image of the manacles with 

a cell phone inside was “to impress upon the jury how the extensive use of 

cell phone records by law enforcement was what led the police to [uncover 

Jackson’s] and his co-conspirators’ role in the murder, leading to their arrest 

and proscecution.” Brief for the Commonwealth at 22. Jackson does not 

allege that any of the facts the prosecutor presented in the PowerPoint slides 

were not true, or exceeded the scope of the evidence presented. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 3/17/15, at 10. Our review discloses that the PowerPoint 

slides did not convey the prosecutor’s personal belief or opinion on Jackson’s 

credibility or guilt, did not appeal to the prejudices of the jury, and did not 

divert the jury from deciding the case on the evidence presented at trial. 

See Judy, 978 A.2d at 1020. Moreover, the trial court rejected Jackson’s 
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claim that the words “get money” and “go ahead” were written in blood. 

See N.T., 5/20/13, at 102, 104-05, 108 (wherein the trial court rejected 

defense counsel’s characterization of the red lettering to have been drawn in 

blood); see also Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 194 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that we will not disturb the trial court’s credibility 

determination). Nothing in Jackson’s speculative arguments demonstrates 

that the slides prejudiced the jury in rendering a verdict.3 In point of fact, 

Jackson has not pointed to any Pennsylvania authority that would suggest 

that the prosecution’s summation could not include dramatic allusions, such 

as those found in the PowerPoint slides, which were within reasonable 

bounds of the evidence supplied at trial.4 Thus, Jackson’s suggestion that 

the use of any PowerPoint slides during closing arguments is somehow 

suspect is specious. See Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d at 837; see also Pelzer, 

612 A.2d at 412.

Further, the trial court provided a cautionary instruction, which 

Jackson accepted at trial. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 

503-04 (Pa. 1995) (stating that if the trial court issues a cautionary or 

 

3 We note that in rendering its verdict, the jury found Jackson not guilty of 

various other charges. See N.T., 5/20/13, at 217-20.

4

Jackson points to various decisions in other jurisdictions to support his 

argument. Brief for Appellant at 19-24. While decisions from other 

jurisdictions may provide guidance to this Court, they are clearly not binding 

authority. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 8 A.3d 901, 904 n.3 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). Nevertheless, upon our review, the decisions cited by Jackson 

do not entitle him to relief based upon the facts of this case. 
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curative instruction, and no objection is subsequently raised, we presume 

that the jury followed the instruction and that the objecting party was 

satisfied with the instruction). Under these circumstances, the use of a 

PowerPoint presentation during closing argument to summarize facts and 

evidence produced at trial, combined with the cautionary instruction 

provided by the trial court, renders Jackson’s first argument without merit.

In his second claim, Jackson contends that the trial court erred in 

failing to suppress telephone records obtained by a grand jury subpoena. 

Brief for Appellant at 22, 27-28. Jackson argues that the Commonwealth 

failed to provide a “Schofield affidavit,” required by Robert Hawthorne, 

Inc. v. Cty. Investigating Grand Jury, 412 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1980), for each 

item of evidence sought from the subpoena. See Brief for Appellant at 23-

25, 27; see also id. at 27 (wherein Jackson argues that the Commonwealth 

could not cure its error by filing the affidavit after Jackson pointed out the 

error in a Motion to Suppress). Jackson asserts that the Commonwealth 

filed a single “Schofield affidavit,” even though it obtained multiple cell 

phone records. Id. at 23-24. Jackson further asserts that the 

Commonwealth did not establish an evidentiary nexus between the 

information sought and the investigation. Id. at 24. 

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only 
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the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court 

is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court's 

legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to 

plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).

Here, Jackson has not demonstrated, through any citation to case law, 

that a consequence of the failure to file a “Schofield affidavit” is the 

suppression of evidence in a criminal proceeding. Indeed, the purpose of 

the “Schofield affidavit” is to set forth the procedure, in the context of a civil 

action, for a contempt hearing where the government sought to enforce a 

grand jury subpoena, and the subpoenaed person refuses to comply. See 

Robert Hawthorne, Inc., 412 A.2d at 560-61. There were no enforcement 

proceedings on the phone records in this case and thus, the Commonwealth 

was under no obligation to file a “Schofield affidavit.” See Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/17/15, at 12 (noting that the phone records were obtained
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properly, given the broad powers of the grand jury).5 Accordingly, Jackson’s 

reliance on the alleged lack of a “Schofield affidavit,” in the context of his 

suppression motion, does not entitle him to relief. See, e.g., United 

States v. Oliva, 611 F.2d 23, 24-25 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that defendant’s 

motion to suppress the grand jury testimony based upon the lack of a 

Schofield affidavit was misplaced, as such affidavits deal with the procedure 

to enforce the subpoena).6

In his third claim, Jackson contends that the trial court improperly 

admitted evidence of his presence at a shooting range called “Ready, Aim, 

Fire” with two of his co-conspirators. Brief for Appellant at 28; see also id. 

(wherein Jackson claims that the evidence included images of him shooting a 

gun at the range, a “target used for firearm practice, digital images of 

[Jackson] and co-conspirators at the establishment, and a statement made 

by [Jackson] while at the establishment[.]”) (citations omitted). Jackson 

 

5

In any event, the trial court noted that the Commonwealth filed “Schofield 

affidavits” to show “that the information sought through the subpoenas was 

relevant to the murder investigation, the investigation was properly within 

its jurisdiction, and that the information was not being sought for another 

purpose.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/15, at 12; see also Robert 

Hawthorne, Inc., 412 A.2d at 560-61 (stating that under the Schofield 

procedure, “the Government [is] required to make some preliminary 

showing by affidavit that each item is at least relevant to an investigation 

being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is 

not sought primarily for another purpose.... [T]he Government’s supporting 

affidavit should be disclosed to the witness in the enforcement 

proceeding.”).

6 We note that holdings of federal circuit courts does not bind this Court, but 

may serve as persuasive authority in resolving analogous cases. 

Commonwealth v. Haskins, 60 A.3d 538, 548 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2012).
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argues that the “evidence tended only to blacken [his] character, portraying 

him as a person with an unusual interest in firearms[,] more likely than not 

to commit a violent act.” Id. at 29. Jackson asserts that the evidence was 

unfairly prejudicial, and that he is entitled to a new trial. Id.

Initially, in his Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement, Jackson raised the 

following claim: “The [trial c]ourt erred in admitting, over [Jackson’s] 

objection, evidence of his holding a gun at or around a firing range, as such 

evidence was not part of a common scheme nor otherwise relevant, and 

unfairly inflammatory and prejudicial.” Concise Statement, 11/4/13, at 2 

(unnumbered). Jackson did not raise any claims regarding the target used 

at the range, images of Jackson and his co-conspirators at the range, or 

statements made by Jackson in the Concise Statement. Thus, Jackson’s 

claims in this regard are waived on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lane, 

81 A.3d 974, 979 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that any issues not raised in a 

Rule 1925(b) concise statement are waived on appeal); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(3)(iv).

Furthermore, with regard to the Jackson’s claim that the trial court 

improperly admitted evidence of Jackson shooting a gun at the range, we 

note that, aside from a single sentence, Jackson has not developed this 

claim in his appellate brief. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.2d 

1231, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that “[t]he failure to develop an 

adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim 
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under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.”) (citation omitted). Jackson’s failure to develop a 

legal argument in support of his claim, and this Court’s reluctance to act as 

his appellate counsel, results in a waiver of his claim. See id.

7

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2016

 

7 Even if we addressed the claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in admitting this evidence. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 

736, 749 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that the admission of evidence is within 

the sound discretion of the trial court and cannot be reversed unless the 

court abused its discretion). Here, the Commonwealth presented the 

evidence showing Jackson holding a gun at the shooting range to impeach 

Jackson’s statement to the police that “he didn’t like guns, he didn’t own 

guns, and he never played with guns and he’s never fired a gun.” N.T., 

5/17/13, at 126-27. Jackson has not demonstrated that the images implied 

that he was unlawfully at the range or that he could not use or own a gun. 

Instead, Jackson merely speculates, without any support, that any mention 

of a shooting range evidences an attempt to blacken his character by 

showing he would commit a violent act. Thus, the relevant and probative 

value of the evidence outweighs any prejudicial impact that the jury became 

aware that Jackson was seen with a gun. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 752 

(stating that courts are not “required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all 

unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant 

to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development 

of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.”).