∗ The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above.

23-6035-cr 

United States v. Dixon

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO 

A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS 

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S 

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH 

THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 22nd day of May, two thousand twenty-four. 

Present: 

 REENA RAGGI, 

 EUNICE C. LEE, 

 BETH ROBINSON,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. No. 23-6035-cr

DAMISE DIXON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

∗

_____________________________________ 

For Appellee: Thomas R. Sutcliffe, Emmet 

O’Hanlon, Assistant United 

States Attorneys for Carla B.

Freedman, United States

Attorney for the Northern 
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District of New York, 

Syracuse, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant: James P. Egan, 

 Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Syracuse, NY. 

Appeal from a January 11, 2023 judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of New York (D’Agostino, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Damise Dixon appeals from the district court’s judgment of 

revocation of supervised release, which sentenced Dixon to a term of 15 months’ imprisonment 

followed by 24 months’ supervised release.1

 At the revocation hearing, the district court imposed 

several special conditions as terms of Dixon’s supervised release. One condition requires 

Dixon’s participation in mental health treatment. Dixon now challenges this condition, arguing 

that the district court erred because the record did not clearly support the imposition of a mental 

health treatment condition. We disagree.

During the revocation hearing, the district court informed Dixon that he: 

[M]ust participate in a mental health program, which may include medical, 

psychological, or psychiatric evaluation and outpatient treatment as 

recommend[ed] by the treatment provider based upon [his] risk and needs. 

[Dixon] may also be required to participate in inpatient treatment upon 

recommendation of the treatment provider and upon approval of the Court. 

1 Dixon was originally convicted for distributing cocaine base and heroin, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) as well as 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), for which he was 

sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment and four years of supervised release in 2020. He was 

released to supervision in February 2022. The probation office filed a petition to revoke Dixon’s 

supervision on November 16, 2022. 
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App’x at 126–27. Thus, the challenged condition requires Dixon to undergo mental health 

treatment if his treatment provider recommends it. Dixon did not object to this condition before 

the district court.

“Generally, we review conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. When the 

defendant does not object to the conditions, however, we review only for plain error.” United

States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To show plain error, a 

defendant must show that “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious . . .; (3) the error 

affected the defendant’s substantial rights . . .; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Bastian, 770 F.3d 212, 

219-20 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010)). At times, 

we have applied “a ‘relaxed’ form of plain error review in those rare cases in which the defendant 

lacked sufficient prior notice that a particular condition of supervised release might be 

imposed.” United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2015). Even under a relaxed plain 

error standard of review, we conclude that the district court did not err in imposing Dixon’s 

challenged special condition of supervised release. 

District courts possess broad discretion in imposing conditions of supervised 

release. United States v. Gill, 523 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). However, such 

conditions must involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to 

implement the statutory purposes of sentencing,” be “consistent with pertinent Sentencing 

Commission policy statements,” id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123-24 

(2d Cir. 2008)), and be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 

(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D),” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). Furthermore, sentencing courts are “required 
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to make an individualized assessment when determining whether to impose a special condition of 

supervised release, and to state on the record the reason for imposing it.” United States v. Betts, 

886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018). 

Dixon argues that the information relating to his mental health on which the district court 

relied, including his “self-reported situational feelings of depression and anxiety,” was both 

insufficient to justify the condition and “stale,” given that it was based on the presentence report 

prepared several years earlier for his underlying conviction. Appellant’s Br. at 6. We disagree. 

First, the district court made clear at the revocation hearing that it was relying not only on 

the prior presentence report but also Dixon’s recent conduct. The court explained that all the 

special conditions it was imposing were “necessary and justified . . . based upon the nature of the 

instant offense as well as the history and characteristics of the defendant as outlined in detail in 

the presentence report, based on his conduct while in the community during his first term of 

supervised release, and to promote rehabilitation.” App’x at 125. With regard to Dixon’s 

conduct while on supervised release for his underlying drug conviction, the court highlighted his 

repeated selling of marijuana, as well as the fact that the court had previously “tried to get him on 

the right track simply by modifying his supervision,” but his conduct continued. App’x at 124. 

The court found this conduct to be “very troubling” and “very, very concerning” because Dixon 

“knew he was on supervision,” yet “his conduct didn’t stop.” Id.; see United States v. 

Quarterman, 739 F. App’x 60, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (affirming mental health 

treatment condition where record showed defendant’s history of substance abuse and difficulties 

“adjusting to supervised release”). 
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Second, the district court further justified its imposition of the mental health treatment

condition by properly relying upon the presentence report in Dixon’s underlying case, which 

included Dixon’s prior “self-reported concerns with depression.” App’x at 127. Dixon had told 

the probation office that he was “feeling depressed and having anxiety over his current legal 

situation,” and shared that he believed that he may have participated in some form of counseling 

as a child. Presentence Investigation Report ¶ 47. The district court concluded that these 

statements also justified a condition of mental health treatment to “further assess this issue and to 

secure any necessary resources that may aid [his] rehabilitation.” App’x at 127. These 

disclosures, coupled with Dixon’s conduct while on supervision, were sufficient under a plainerror, or even a relaxed plain-error, analysis for the district court to reasonably conclude that Dixon

might need psychological treatment, thus justifying the imposition of a special condition of mental 

health treatment. See United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 

(holding that a district court is permitted to “require as a special condition of [supervised release] 

that a defendant participate in a mental health program ‘[i]f the court has reason to believe that the 

defendant is in need of psychological or psychiatric treatment’” (quoting U.S.S.G. 

§ 5B1.3(d)(5))). 

Finally, we note that Dixon has the option of seeking modification of the mental health 

treatment condition before the district court at a later time as circumstances warrant. See United 

States v. Belfon, No. 21-1444, 2023 WL 2342688, at *2 n.5 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2023) (summary order) 

(upholding mental health treatment condition and noting that the defendant could “move the 

district court to ‘modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release’ by removing the 

mental-health-treatment condition” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2))). 
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For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court