1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

YUEH-LAN WANG, by and through her attorney-in-fact, Winston Wen-Young Wong, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 10-1743 (JEB) NEW MIGHTY U.S. TRUST, et al. , Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION This case begins in a Taiwanese rags-to-riches tale. Yung-Chin g (Y.C.) Wang was born in 1917 into a tea-farming fam ily so poor that he could not aff ord to attend high school. By his death in 2008, he was his country’s second wealthiest person — a plastics tycoon worth an estimated $6.8 billion. But, as is often true on both sid es of the Pacific: more money, more problems. Y.C. died without a known will, and his heirs — belonging to three “Famil ies” — have since been locked in an international struggle for his assets. This case is one chapter of that saga. Winston WenYoung Wong, Y.C.’s son from hi s Second Family, filed this suit in 2010 in the name of Plaintiff Yueh-Lan Wang, Y.C.’s wife fro m his First Family. Operating un der a power-of-attorney from Yueh-Lan, who was herself child less, Winston brought her claims seeking assets held by Defendants as part of her marital share under Taiwanese law. Y ueh-Lan has since died, and the Executors of her estate now seek to take over and revise the Co mplaint. As the Court ultimately concludes that this is permissibl e and that some of Defendants’ objections to the contrary should be reserved for later briefing, it will grant the Executors’ Mo tion to do so.2 I. Background Because the core question at this stage is whether the Executor s’ proposed Second Amended Complaint could survive a motion to dismiss, the Court draws its facts from that pleading and accepts them as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see In re Interbank Funding Corp. Securities Litigation, 629 F.3d 213, 21 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The Court does not, however, “accept as true a legal conclusion couched a s a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl . Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A teen bride, Yueh-Lan was married to Y.C. for 72 years — about the average life expectancy of a newborn toda y. See ECF No. 37-3 (Proposed Seco nd Amended Complaint), ¶ 1. (As many individuals in this case share the same last name, the Court refers to them by their first names for sake of convenience a nd not as a mark of disrespect.) Over the course of their long union, Y.C. founded several compani es, most notably the FormosaPlastics Group, which is “one of Taiwan’s biggest and most pr ofitable manufac turing conglomer ates with annual sales of over $60 billion and operations in fiv e countries.” Id., ¶ 17. The se ventures made him the second wealthiest person in Taiwan by 2006 w ith a conservative estimat ed net worth of around $6.8 billion. Id., ¶ 18. Two years later, in 2008, Y.C. die d in New Jersey without a kno wn will. Id., ¶ 16. Because he had distributed his ri ches around the world, his est ate in Taiwan eventually identified less than $2 billion in a ssets for disbursement to his heirs. Id., ¶ 18. Complicating matters further still, duri ng his long marriage to Y ueh-Lan (his “FirstFamily”), Y.C. created other families by fathering children with two other women — Wang Yang Chiao and Pao Chu (P.C.) Lee. Id., ¶ 26. While he and Y ueh-Lan had no offspring, his r elationship with Wang Yang3 Chiao resulted in the birth of f ive children known as the “Seco nd Family,” and his relationship with P.C. Lee produced another f our known as the “Third Family. ” Id. Perhaps not surprisingly given s uch fecundity, Y.C.’s intestate death has spawned a good deal of international litigati on among his three families, this action being one example. It was first filed on October 14, 2010, by Dr. Winston Wen-Young Wong, a member of the Second Family and Y.C.’s eldest son, w ho asserted that he was acting t hrough a valid power-of-attorney in bringing the suit on Yueh-La n’s behalf. See ECF No. 1 (Comp laint). Yueh-Lan’s claims sought property allegedly trans ferred by Y.C. to Defendants dur ing the five years prior to his death on the ground that Taiwanese law would entitle her to rec over these assets as part of her 50% spousal share upon his pass ing. Wang ex rel. Wong v. New M ighty U.S. Trust (Wang I), 841 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200 (D.D.C. 2012). Defendants are a trust formed under the laws of the District of Columbia — New Mi ghty U.S. Trust — as well as its t rustee, Clearbridge, LLC, and a beneficiary of the trust, Ne w Mighty Foundation. See SAC, ¶¶ 1 9-21. (Both the Foundation and Clearbridge, it should be noted, a re linked to children of the Third Family. See ECF No. 38-29 (Declaration of Susan Wang), ¶ 1; ECF No. 38-30 (Declaration of William Wong), ¶ 5.) Defendants moved to dismiss these claims on numerous grounds, a nd this Court granted that entreaty. Wang I, 841 F . Supp. 2d at 208; see Wang ex rel . Wong v. New Mighty U.S. Trust (Wang II), 843 F.3d 487, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016). While recognizi ng the question was “close” and one of first impression, it held that a traditional trust like New Mighty assumed the citizenship of all of its beneficiaries for th e purposes of diversity jurisdic tion and, accordingly, diversity was lacking in this case. Wang I, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 203. Plaintiff appealed this ruli ng, but Yueh-Lan died shortly there after. Wang II, 843 F.3d at at 489. The D.C. Circuit thus had t o hold the case in abeyance for years while the Taiwanese4 courts determined who should act as the executors of her will b ecause Yueh-Lan had named Winston as her sole heir but fa iled to appoint a n executor. Id .; see SAC, ¶ 14. Eventually, ChenTeh Shu, Dong-Xung Dai, and Robert S hi were chosen by the court s, and the three men moved to substitute themselves as Yueh- Lan’s personal representatives under the appropriate Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure while the case was still pending at the D.C. Circuit. Wang II, 843 F.3d at at 489. Before ruling on that motion, though, the D.C. Circuit again sta yed the case after the Supreme Court granted certio rari in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016), which addressed the appropriate citizenship te st for a real-est ate trust. Wang, 843 F.3d at 489 n.6. Based on the decision in Americold, the D.C. Circuit eventuallyreversed this Court’s dismissal of Yueh-Lan’s complain t after holding that the citize nship of a traditional trust like New Mighty Trust depends only on the trustee’s citizenship, notthe beneficiaries’ , as this Court had ruled. Id. at 489-96. As a result, diversity was not lack ing. Id. The Circuit, at the same time, also granted the Executors’ substitution motion “without prejudice to the defendants’ ability to renew in district cour t those arguments they ha[d] p ressed before” it about Winston’s potentially defective POA and the consequences flowing therefro m. Id. at 496. Now back in this Court, Plainti ff Executors filed the current M otion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint and for Other Relief. See ECF No. 37. Defendants have opposed, contending that the proposed new Complaint remains defective fo r myriad reasons. The matter is now ripe.
II. Legal Standard A plaintiff may amend her compla int once as a matter of course within 21 days of serving it or within 21 days of the f iling of a responsive pleading. S ee Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).5 Otherwise, she must seek consen t from the defendant or leave fr om the court. The latter permission “should [be] freely g ive[n] . . . when justice so re quires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In deciding whether to grant leave to file an amended complaint, c ourts may consider “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeate d failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, un due prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 37 1 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In this Circuit, “it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend u nless there is sufficient reason.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “ The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff’s motion to file an amended comp laint should be denied.” Clayton v. District of Columbia, 999 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (D.D.C. 2013)

. It is clear, however, that amendment should not be permitted if it would be futile. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (noting “futility of amendment” is permissible reason to deny Rule 15(a) motion). In other words, if th e new causes of action would sti ll be deficient notwithstanding the proposed amendment, courts need not grant leave. Interbank Fun ding, 629 F.3d at 218 (“[A] district court may properly deny a m otion to amend if the amend ed pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss.”); James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 108 5, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Courts may deny a motion to am end a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.”).
III. Analysis Defendants oppose Plaintiff Executors’ Second Amended Complaint on a congeries of grounds that primarily fall under the rubric of either futilityor bad faith. The C ourt addresses the futility-related arguments first and then turns to the much eas ier question of whether the Executors have demonstrated a ny bad faith in seeking amendment here. It next considers6 whether the SAC, having survived these arguments, relates back to the date of the filing of the original Complaint or is instead barred by statutes of limitati ons. Finally, the Court takes up Defendants’ more focused arguments that New Mighty Foundation ( a beneficiary of the trust) and New Mighty Trust should be dismissed from any surviving act ion for reasons particular to them.
A. Futility Most of Defendants’ objections to the SAC are in essence futili ty arguments. In other words, they contend that the ple ading “would not survive a moti on to dismiss,” and thus leave to file should not be granted. Interbank Funding, 629 F.3d at 218 . They advance four such arguments, which the Court weighs in turn: 1) this action was alegal nullity from its inception because Winston’s Power of Attorney was defective; 2) required persons are absent from the suit and cannot be joined; 3) this is n ot the proper forum for this litigation; and 4) the SAC fails to state a claim. The Court rejects the first three and concludes that the last should be at least partially reserved for later briefing. Ratification by Executors Defendants loose most of their arrows on a single target: the P ower of Attorney that Winston used to initiate this ac tion on Yueh-Lan’s behalf back in 2010. According to them, the POA did not authorize him to commence a legal action in her nam e because the mandate had facial defects, it lacked an expr ess authorization to bring sui t in her name, and Yueh-Lan became incompetent prior to this action’s filing. See Opp. at 12-13. Defendants claim that the Court, as a result, lacks jurisdiction to h ear a case that was a legal nu llity since its inception. Id. at 14-15. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot expand this Court’s jurisdiction, moreover, Defendants further contend that this Court cannot swap in the E xecutors under those Rules to7 cure that defect now. Id. The C ourt disagrees. Any alleged p roblem with Winston’s POA did not present an insurmountabl e jurisdictional hurdle. At the outset of its analysis, t he Court sets aside two issues. First, it need not rule on the lengthy affidavits on Taiwanese l aw that each party submits abo ut the POA’s scope and validity. It instead assumes for purposes of this Motion that Defendants are correct that the POA was ineffective. Second, the Court doe s not rehash whether, if the case survives, the Executors are Yueh-Lan’s proper substitutes under Federal Rule of Civil Proce dure 25. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) (“If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, t he court may order substitution of the proper party.”). The D.C. C ircuit has already found that the Executors would be the parties in a proper action under the appe llate version of this rule. T hat ship has rightly sailed. The Circuit nevertheless expr essly reserved the nub of the part ies’ dispute on this score for this Court’s consider ation on remand. Wang II, 843 F.3d at 496. That question asks: If Winston’s POA was ineffective , was this suit a legal nullity fr om its inception, which Plaintiff Executors’ substitution could not revive and thus should be dis missed? Id. The Court now concludes that it was not. Federal courts have l ong been reluctant to allow a party to be trapped int o forfeiting a potentially legit imate claim based on the sort of honest defect or incidental mistak e that Defendants seek to exp loit here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), in fact, was amended in 1966 to r eflect this m odern trend toward leniency when an honest and reasonable mistake as to the personal representat ive has been made at the outset of a case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 advisory committee notes on 196 6 amendment (mentioning “action may be filed in the name of John Doe (a fictitious pers on), as personal representative” of another, “in the hope that at alater time . . . the real name of the real personal representative” is substituted); see also Fed. R . Civ. P. 9(a)(1)(B) (setting plea ding requirements for “a party’s8 authority to sue or be sued in arepresentative capacity”). Th is is especially true where, as in this action, the proper party in inter est — Yueh-Lan and her Executo rs — seeks to cure such an innocent defect by later ratifyi ng the action and where the mis take caused no prejudice to Defendants. See, e.g., Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 325 F.2d 613, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (rejecting argument that suit improperly brought in name of ins ured, rather than real party in interest — the insurance company — was a legal nullity and allo wing substitution as well as relation back to avoid running of statute of limitations). Thi s is the wisest and most appropriate outcome in a case such as this one. Contrary to Defendants’ conten tion, there is no jurisdictional obstacle to this course of action. The matter of a person’s capacity or authority to sue on behalf of someone else who indisputably has standing to bri ng the asserted claims does not raise a jurisdictional problem at all. See Davis v. Lifetime Capital, Inc., 560 F. App'x 477, 47 8 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Generally, capacity is considered an affirm ative defense, not a jurisdicti onal issue.”); see also 5A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al. , Federal Practice & Pr ocedure § 1294 (3d ed. 2014) (treating “specific denial as t o a party’s capacity, authority, or legal existence required by Rule 9(a)” as “an affirmative defense”). A recent case out of the Fifth Circuit illustrates why. In Rid eau v. Keller Independent School District, 819 F.3d 155 (5t h Cir. 2016), parents of a sev erely disabled child successfully sued, as their son’s next frie nd, the school district where he had suffered abuse. Four days after the verdict, the district brought additional arguments “relatin g to whether the Rideaus had Article III ‘standing’” to bring the suit on their child’s behalf. Id. at 159-60. In considering these claims on appeal, the Circuit first reje cted the school district’s “at tempt[] to shoehorn a ll of its post-trial arguments into the doctrine of constitutional standing” because the question of who could9 properly sue on the child’s behalf was merely one of “capacity. ” Id. at 161. Instead, “[i]t recognized that the question of who could pursue those damages on [another’s] behalf is a capacity problem, not a standing p roblem.” Id. (emphases added ). While it ultimately agreed that the Rideaus lacked capacity to bring the child’s claims un der Texas estates law, it concluded that the district court had abus ed its discretion by not allowi ng the child’s trustee (the legal guardian of his assets ) to ratify the su it under Rule 17(a). I d. Other courts have likewise dis tinguished authority-to-sue issu es from questions of jurisdictional standing. See , e.g., Esposito v. United States. , 368 F.3d 1271, 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that case should be dismissed as “nul lity” and forfe ited due to running of statute of limitations simply because suit was mistakenly br ought in name of decedent who lacked “capacity to sue”); De Saracho v. Custom Food Mach., Inc ., 206 F.3d 874, 878 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Even if defendants ar e correct that [a corporation ] lacked authorization to sue, this court does not lack subject matte r jurisdiction in the sense th at it would if plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III of the Constitution.”); cf. CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1187-90 (9th Cir. 2016) (rej ecting notion that CFPB director’s lack of authority to br ing suit given his improper r ecess appointment deprived him of standing to initiate suit). To the extent, moreover, that othe r courts to confront such issues have spoken in terms of standing, they ha ve indicated that issues of capacity and authority are a prudential, rather than constitutional, aspect of that doctrine . See, e.g., Zanowick v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 850 F.3d 1090, 1096 n.11 (9th Cir. 2017) (not ing defendants could waive “prudential standing” issues of wife’s failure to “file a succe ssor-in-interest declaration”); Brown v. Keller, 274 F.2d 779, 780 (6th Cir . 1960) (“This is not stri ctly a question of j urisdiction, but lack of capacity on the part of t he plaintiffs to sue is a bar to the action.”). As a result, they are10 subject to the same principles of waiver or cure that govern other such procedural defects. See 5A Wright & Miller, § 1295. There is similarly no jurisdicti onal wall to scale here. Just as in Rideau, it is undisputed that the named plaintiff — i.e. , Yueh-Lan — had standing to bring he r spousal-related claims. After all, “economic harm” is the “bread-and-butter injury for private-law causes of action in which constitutional standing is rarely an issue.” Rideau, 819 F.3d at 163. Defendants do not even bother to argue otherwise . They instead hope to muddy the waters of this standing analysis, as did the school district in R ideau, by focusing on whether Wi nston had his own standing to bring claims. As the Fifth Circu it explained, however, that is a matter of capacity to bring suit on Yueh-Lan’s behalf, not one of standing to do so. Winston, a fter all, is not a party. This Court will not turn that legal issue i nto a matter of jurisdictional proportions when it could at best be one of prudential standing. Cf. U nited States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) (collecting recent cases “repeatedly” holding “high bar” exists to establish procedural rules as jurisdictional); Montes v. Jan itorial Partners, Inc, 859 F.3d 1 079, 1083-84 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding individual’s procedural failure t o opt in to collectiv e action was non-jurisdictional). Defendants, moreover, point t o no case holding that a defective power-of-attorney creates an incurable jurisdictional pr oblem when the plaintiff, who ind isputably did have standing, later ratified the action. Rather, e ven where a case has been brough t in the name of a corporate debtor without proper authorization, fed eral bankruptcy courts routine ly deny efforts by these debtors to dismiss such suits where the person with proper authorization h as later taken actions to ratify it. See, e.g., Hager v. Gibson, 108 F.3d 35, 40 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[ T]he unauthorized filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy [ o]n behalf of a corporation m ight be ratified in appropriate circumstances by ensuing conduc t of persons with power to have authorized it originally.”).11 Instead, they often force those plaintiffs to prosecute the act ion, despite such ini tial defects. Id. If Defendants were correct that courts lacked jurisdiction over these cases or the ability to revive them, this common federal-court practice could not stand. Defendants, rather, rely on cases readily distingu ishable from the scenario presented by this case. See, e.g., Opp. at 16 (citing Zurich Ins. Co. v. Lo gitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding named plainti ff who “had no standing to bri ng th[e] action” also lacked “standing to make a motion to subs titute the real party in inte rest”)). For example, they cite Meredith v. Ionian Trade r, 279 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1960), to establish that “[a] suit initiated without authority from the party named as plaintiff is a nullit y and any judgment obtained in such a suit is void.” Opp. at 13. But that case made no menti on of standing at all and involved an insurance underwriter’s brin ging the claim, without the insured’s permission or later ratification, in the name of the insured. See id. (also incorr ectly citing Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomm s., 790 F.3d 411, 423 (2d Cir. 2015), w hich declined to “resolve” the alleged “standing deficiency”). More critically, the D.C. Circuiteschewed Ionian Trader’s over ly rigid approach three years later in Link Aviat ion, 325 F.2d at 615 (adopting Tenth C ircuit’s approach to substitution under Federal Rules of Civil Proc edure). That holding is still binding law in this Circuit. See Empire Lofts Condo. Ass’n v. A.C.&R . Foam Insulators, LLC, No. 15-792, 2016 WL 81222, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2016) (citing Li nk Aviation favorably). Thr ee years after Link Aviation, Rule 17(a)(3), too, was amended to ref lect this modern lenient appro ach. See 6A Wright & Miller § 1555; see also 5A Wright & M iller § 1295 (“Although there is a nexus between capacity, authority, or legal existence and subject matter jurisdiction i n some contexts, that is not always the case as some early cases ha d suggested. In the majority of cases the party status issue is not12 significant.”) (footnote omitted) . Even the Second Circuit, infact, has been reluctant to transform substitution issues into standing ones. See Cortland t St., 790 F.3d at 423; id. at 425-27 (Sack, J., concurring) (approving of Link Aviation’s pragmatic approach). Put simply, the Court finds no support for Defendants’ c ontention that any of the iss ues they identify with Winston’s POA caused this case to be a l egal nullity, which defect could not later be cured. Assured, then, of its jurisdicti on, this Court is also satisfie d that Plaintiff Executors should now be allowed to ratify this action. Under Rule 17(a)( 3), a court “may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute i n the name of the real party i n interest until, a fter an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed f or the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” This Rule “re flects the general policy of th e drafters of the fed eral rules that the choice of a party at the plead ing stage ought not have to be ma de at the risk of a final dismissal of the action should it later a ppear that there had been an err or.” 6A Wright & Miller, § 1555. Ratification by the correct part y is thus justified where neces sary “as the result of an understandable mistake.” Wieburg v. GTE Sw. Inc., 272 F.3d 302 , 308 (5th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Classic exa mples include situations where complex legal issues hinder the identification of the correct pe rson with the capacity to sue o r there exists a mistaken “belief, not wholly unfounded” about a party’s competency at the commencemen t of the suit. See Magallon v. Livingston, 453 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding distr ict court abused its discretion in refusing substitution where Consul General of Mexico had believ ed named plaintiff was incompetent); Rideau, 819 F.3d a t 166 (finding district court a bused its discretion by not allowing trustee to r atify where determini ng the “property party to sue is difficult” and when there had been a “good-faith, nonfri volous mistake of law”).13 This case falls squarely within these exemplars. Both parties provide lengthy affidavits by prominent Taiwanese law experts opining on the validity or i nvalidity of Winston’s POA. See ECF No. 38-25 (Declaration of Yeong-Chin Su); ECF No. 39-1 (Declaration of Tsung-Fu Chen). This Court, after revie wing these, would be hard presse d to choose a clear winner in that debate. Likewise, there was no court ruling that Yueh-Lan was incompetent in 2010 when this case was brought or that Winston’s POA was thus no longer valid

. Allowing ratification by her Executors now that the statute of limitations has run on these claims, as a result, amply serve s “Rule 17(a)(3)’s intended pur pose: the avoid[ance of] forfeiture and injustice when an understand able mistake has been made.” R ideau, 819 F.3d at 165-66 (quoting 6A Wright & Miller, § 1555). The Court further finds no evidence that Winston’s reasonable mistake as to the scope of the POA — assuming one wa s even made — was not an honest one. See Scheuffler v. Gen. Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261, 1270 (10th Cir. 1997) (permitting joinder when failure to include real parties in interest “was t he result of a mistake as to the legal effectiveness of documents”); Link Aviation, 325 F.2d at 615 (r ejecting reading of Rule 17(a) that is “highly technical without meaningful purpose”). Nor do es it find any reason to believe that Defendants are prejudiced by this swapping in of the Execu tors, as the essential nature of the claims and their posture remain unchanged. Adv. Magnetics, Inc . v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F. 3d 11, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (indi cating prejudice to defendants should be considered). The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ effort to vitiate the filing of the SAC on the ground that the original suit was a legal nullity.
Joinder Defendants next contend that subs tituting the Executors is not enough; instead, they believe, the SAC cannot survive because Rule 19 requires more a ctors to be added to this14 litigation. To recap, the present parties are Plaintiff Execut ors and Defendants New Mighty Foundation, New Mighty Trust, and Clearbridge. See SAC, ¶ 22. Executors are domiciled in Taiwan for diversity purpos es, see Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957) (noting, if plaintiff dies during suit, div ersity is measured by her citize nship), and Defendants are completely diverse from Plainti ff as they are either D.C., Dela ware, or Virginia citizens. See SAC, ¶ 22. The purported absent ees, by contrast, are: (1) P.C. Lee (Y.C.’s Third Family partner) and (2) the Grantors of New Mi ghty Trust, which are three Briti sh Virgin Islands companies. See Opp. at 30, 36. Because joining these parties would purportedly “destroy[] diversity” jurisdiction, Defendants ask tha t the Court wield its discretio n and dismiss the case as lacking necessary and indispen sable parties. Id. Before separately considering w hether the absence of P.C. Lee o r the Grantors warrants this drastic remedy, the Court first sets out the relevant requ ired-joinder principles.

a. Dismissal under Rules 12(b)(7) & 19 Rule 12(b)(7) provides that a com plaint may be dismissed for “f ailure to join a party under Rule 19.” Courts are genera lly reluctant to grant Rule 1 2(b)(7) motions, and “dismissal is warranted only when the defect i s serious.” 5C Wright & Miller , § 1359. While “the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true,” it “may also consi der matters outside the pleadings” in ruling on such a motion. Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Wash., 30 6 F.R.D. 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2014); see Direct Supply, Inc. v. Specialty Hosps. of Am., LLC, 878 F. Sup p. 2d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2012). Rule 19, in turn, “establishes a tw o-step procedure for determi ning whether an action must be dismissed because of the absence of a party needed for a just adjudication.” Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt , 117 F.3d 1489, 1495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1 997); see Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (labe ling Rule 19(a) and (b) as15 “necessary” and “indispensable” prongs); see also W. Md. Ry. Co . v. Harbor Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 960, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J .) (framing inquiry, altern atively, as three questions). First, Rule 19(a)(1) makes join der of absent parties “necessary ” if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an inter est relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the a ction in the person’s absence m ay: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party s ubject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise in consistent obligations because of the interest. As Defendants do not contend that “complete relief” is impossib le, the focus is on whether P.C. Lee’s or the Grantors’ interes ts might be impaired in their abs ence or whether an existing party might endure a substantial ris k of inconsistent obligations. S ee Opp. at 30-36. Second, the Court examines whether those absent parties are “in dispensable.” This inquiry begins by asking if the necessary but absent party cann ot in fact be added — for instance, if joinder would destroy dive rsity. See, e.g., Provident Trade smens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 108 (1968). If joinder of a necessary party is impossible, then “the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, th e action should proceed among the existing parties or shoul d be dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). In other words, the Court can continue without the absentees o r dismiss the case as a whole a s lacking the necessary-andindispensable parties. In wei ghing these options, the Court co nsiders, inter alia : (1) the extent to which a jud gment rendered in the person’s ab sence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prej udice could be lessened or avoi ded by: (A) protective provisions in the judgm ent; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures;16 (3) whether a judgment rendere d in the person’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff woul d have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. Id. “The decision whe ther to dismiss ( i.e. , the decision whether the person missing is ‘indispensable’) must be based on f actors varying with the diff erent cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselv es, and some subject to balancing against opposing interes ts.” Provident Tradesmens Ba nk, 390 U.S. at 118-19. b. P.C. Lee Defendants first argue that the absence of P.C. Lee, the Third Family matriarch, requires dismissal. See Opp. at 31. Some further exposition is helpful here. Despite the SAC’s allegations that Yueh-Lan was Y .C.’s sole legal spouse, see SAC , ¶¶ 25-27, Defendants contend that the High Court of Taiwan i n 2015 confirmed that P.C. Lee w as a lawful wife under Taiwanese law. See ECF No. 38-4 ( Declaration of Pao Chu Lee), Exh. A (Civil Judgment of High Court of Taiwan) at 2 (“Pao -chu LEE is hereby confirmed to be the living spouse of YungChing Wang.”). Because this acti on “seek[s] to recover the pro perty purportedly transferred to Defendants from the Marital Est ate,” SAC, ¶ 2, Defendants asser t that P.C. Lee, too, is entitled to her marital share. Her joinde r, however — presumably as a plai ntiff (although Defendants do not so specify) — would allegedly be impossible as she was a du al American-Taiwanese citizen domiciled in Taiwan when the c ase commenced, rendering her “sta teless” for diversity purposes and unable to bring suit here. S ee Opp. at 34; see also Core V CT Plc v. Hensley, 59 F. Supp. 3d 123, 125 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding “statel ess” person “cannot sue or be sued in federal court on the basis of diversity”). As she is nonetheless necessary, Defenda nts ask the Court t o find that she is indispensable and thus dismiss the case instead.17 The Court finds no reason to do so. Even if P.C. Lee is a lawf ul wife under Taiwanese law, dismissal does not necessarily follow. First, looking at the two Rule 19(a)(1)(B) prongs, Defendants h ave not carried their burden to show that P.C. Lee’s shar e of the marital estate is i n jeopardy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). Courts do not alw ays require all heirs to part icipate in actions to recover estate property. In Jim é nez v. Rodr í guez-Pag á n, 597 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2010), for instance, the First Circuit considered whether absent non-diverse heirs needed to b e added in a contract action to recover moneys owed to the decedent’s estate. The Circuit expl ained that the absentees would be unnecessary where local Puerto Rican law held that “an indiv idual participant in a community of property does not impair other participants’ interests merel y by asserting common legal rights to the property while the other participants are absent.” Id. at 26 (collecting cases). Where an absent heir holds her own interes t, too, another heir’s suit wo uld be “something of a free shot for the non-diverse heirs.” Id. (“Success inures to their benefit while failure is costless.”). It may very well be the case that the E xecutors’ victory or loss would not result in P.C. Lee’s forfeiting her own right to those sums. See, e.g., Sadler v. Sadler, 167 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1948) (“That one or more [heirs] may have a trustdeclared in his or their favor as well as in favor of persons not parties does not make the absent persons indispensable or even necessary parties.”). Critically, Defendants present no argument that Taiwanese marit al-property rights or causes of action are arranged in s uch a way that Yueh-Lan’s los s would affect P.C. Lee’s own legal interests in the marital estate. See, e.g., Morrison v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 415 F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1969) (requi ring joinder becau se Louisiana l aw “permits only a single lumpsum damage award” that “would de prive the absent children of a share in the recovery”). They also do not claim that Yueh-Lan’s losing in a suit to vindicate her spousal rights would somehow18 prevent P.C. Lee from bringing he r own case later to seek her o wn marital share. In the event the Executors win, moreover, both sides agree that “litigation in T aiwan over P.C. Lee’s spousal rights would follow if [Plainti ffs] are awarded a judgment now ‘for return of all of the property’ in P.C. Lee’s absence.” Opp. a t 32 (quoting Mot. at 25-26). I n other words, if Yueh-Lan’s Executors were to recover in this suit, Defendants acknowledge that P.C. Lee could seek her share of the marital prop erty in another forum. The Court also dispenses with D efendants’ fear that a judgment favorable to Plaintiffs might be based on the faulty “premis e that Yueh-Lan is the sole spouse entitled t o the entire spousal share,” a holding that w ould “‘conflict[]’” with P.C. L ee’s marital rights. See Opp. at 32 (emphases added) (quoting Wac h v. Byrne, Goldenberg & Hamilton, PLLC, 910 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169 (D.D.C. 2012)); see id. (“[T]he Executors likely would cite any ruling on the basis that Yueh-Lan was the sole wife f avorably in the future . . . .”). Assuming that the Court had the power to resolve Taiwanese marita l rights definitively, the chances that its holding would inadvertently sweep so broadly as to extinguish P.C. Lee’s spou sal rights are extremely remote. As a practical matter, P.C. Lee has long been well aware of the litigation and is ably represented by the same counsel as Defendants, who no doubt also have an in terest in appropria tely cabining the Court’s ultimate holding and preventing the entirety of the alleged marital property from falling into Plaintiff Executo rs’ hands. See ECF No. 10-2, Exh . B; Shu v. Wang, No. 10-5302, 2016 WL 6080199 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2016) ( listing counsel); see a lso Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding joinder unn ecessary where absentee was “aware of the litigation”); Ris hell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Mem’l Med. Ctr., 94 F.3d 1407, 1411-12 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding tha t “[i]f, as a practical ma tter, the interests of the absent parties will be adequately repre sented, their interests will no t be impaired”).19 Second, Defendants also present li ttle reason to believe that t hey will be subject to duplicative or inconsistent ob ligations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 9(a)(1)(B)(ii). The question here is whether P.C. Lee would later create a “substantial risk” that D efendants incur multiple liabilities. W. Md. Ry., 910 F.2d at 963. As men tioned, however, despite kn owing about this action for over six years, P.C. Lee has made no attempt to intervene — ind eed, Defendants presently only claim that the case should be dismissed, not that she actually seeks to participate. See ECF No. 10-2, Exh. B; Lee Decl., ¶ 8 (mentioning only that she is “prep ared, should this Court decide not to dismiss this case,” to vindi cate her rights i n Taiwan); see also Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Nor can the [ defendant] legitimately bem oan the threat of inconsistent obligations since it never atte mpted to foreclose that possibil ity by seeking to join [ the absentees] in the . . . litigation.”). She hers elf “question[s] that any of the alleged marital property that is the subject of this action is actual ly marital property that is sub ject under Taiwan law to a claim on behalf of Yueh-Lan.” Lee Decl., ¶ 23; see 7 Wright & Miller, § 1610 (holding that “court’s [diversity] jurisdiction also ca n be preserved” if absentee “di sclaims any interest in the subject matter of the action”). Never mind the conflicts-of-interest and Taiwanese statute-of-limitations issues that might abound if P.C. L ee were actually to sue these Defendants. See Opp. at 33 (acknowledging that Plaintiffs r aise timeliness questions). “I n order to qualify as a necessary party under Rule 19(a), the possi bility of being subject to mul tiple or inconsistent obligations must be real, and not a mere po ssibility.” FDIC v. Bank of N.Y ., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting TRT Telecomm. Corp. v. W. Union Tel. Co., No. 87 -2760, 1988 WL 19259, at *2 (D.D.C. 1988)). Here, t he risk is speculative. Even passing Rule 19(a), the Rul e 19(b) factors also do not cou nsel dismissal. In considering those factors, the Court assumes that P.C. Lee is i ndeed necessary and that she20 should still be treated as a “stateless” American-Taiwanese nat ional domiciled in Taiwan (despite her relinqui shing her American c itizenship in 2013). See Lee Decl., ¶ 25. It also bears in mind that Rule 19(b) “calls f or practically-oriented conside ration of the competing interests at stake.” Cloverleaf Standardbr ed Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Nat’l Ba nk of Wash., 699 F.2d 1274, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The factors again may be summari zed as prejudice, remedy, adequ acy, and the effects of dismissal. The first “overlaps considerably with the Rule 19(a ) analysis,” which points to little or no prejudice to P.C. Lee or e xisting parties. Capitol Med. Ctr., LLC v. Amerigroup Md., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194 n.9 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Gardiner v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 145 F.3d 635, 641 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1998)). As to whether t he remedy could accommodate P.C. Lee’s spousal interest, Pla intiffs suggest that the judgme nt here could set aside “all or a portion of the award” based on the result of “any proceedings i n Taiwan.” Mot. at 26; see Major v. Shaver, 6 F.R.D. 207, 208-09 ( D.D.C. 1946) (commenting, in c ase with absent heirs, that judgment could convey only a “one -fifth interest” in property). The adequacy consideration — whether dismissal would help avoid multiple litigation and sett le the dispute as a whole — is a toss-up, as it appears practicallyinevitable that a billion-do llar, multinational intestacy dispute over the New Mighty Trust appara tus among three putative wives would spawn multiple lawsuits, whether this Court keeps the case alive or not. See Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 870 (2008). Finally, as discussed in Section III .A.1, supra , dismissal would leave Yueh-Lan’s estate without legal recourse, as the limitations pe riod has since run, and the Court does not see how subjecting an othe rwise timely suit to that fa te would be equitable. Because P.C. Lee is neither nece ssary nor indispensable, the Co urt rejects Defendants’ effort to obtain dismissa l based on her absence.21 c. Grantors The final extras Defendants wi sh to add to this cast are the Gr antors (or, settlors) of New Mighty Trust. See Opp. at 35. Those Grantors originally held numerous assets — principally, shares of two of Y.C.’s compan ies — before transferring them in to New Mighty Trust. See SAC, ¶¶ 46-50. Because the Grantor s are British Virgin Islands citizens, adding these entities as defendants would defeat diversit y (between them and the Executo rs, as both are foreign citizens) and lead to dismissal. See Opp. at 36. It is not clear, fir st, why prior owners of the disputed assets are required parties. Whereas P.C. Lee claimed a spousal interes t in the marital estate, Defe ndants fail to explain what live interest the Grantors maintai n in property that is no longer th eirs. See Sax v. Sax, 294 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding absent tr ust settlor not required when his “position would not be changed nor his interest altere d” by suit); Brownell v. Fid. Un ion Trust Co., 119 F. Supp. 755, 758 (D.N.J. 1954) (similar); see al so Rawlings v. Nat’l Molasse s Co., 394 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding, in patent contex t, that prior owner that h ad relinquished its rights was not necessary); E-Z Bowz, L.L.C . v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., No. 00-8670, 2003 WL 22064257, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) (finding unnecessary a party who “n o longer has any interest”). Absent the Grantors’ stake in N ew Mighty Trust, Defendants simi larly cannot show how their participation would create inc onsistent legal obligations. See E-Z Bowz, 2003 WL 22064257, at *4 (holding that disintereste d party would no longer have “righ t to sue”). Even if the Grantors were n ecessary, the Court would not dismis s the suit. First, Defendants do not explain why the Court would not add the Grant ors as additional plaintiffs as opposed to defendants — thus pr eserving diversity by keeping fo reign citizens on the same side of the controversy. See Fed. R. C iv. P. 19(a)(2) (“A person wh o refuses to join as a plaintiff may22 be made either a defendant or , in a proper case, an involuntaryplaintiff.”). Indeed, the Executors assert that the Grantors might assert some cause of action agai nst Defendants to recover “the same [assets]” that Plaintiffs now seek. See Opp. at 36 (quoti ng Wach, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 172). Second, given the Grantors’ rathe r distant relationship with th is action, it is difficult to envision how any of the Rule 19(b) factors favor dismissal, especially i f there is no prejudice at all and if the Grantors do not threaten future litigation. The Court thus finds that Defenda nts’ Rule 19 objections do notrender the filing of the SAC a futile endeavor. Forum non Conveniens Defendants next ask this Court to exercise its “sound discretio n” to dismiss the case because this forum is inconvenient to the litigation. See Opp. at 37-43. After considering their reasons on this score, however, the Court finds them currently wanting. Defendants’ primary argument in favor of dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds relies on the fact that Clearbridge, a D.C. limited-liability c orporation, has delegated its trustee duties to Trust Managers who ar e located in Taiwan. Id. at 37. Because Winston and Plaintiff Executors are also Taiwanese residents, Defendants contend that the island is plainly an adequate alternative forum for the litigation. Id. at 38. They further point out that a similar action brought in New Jersey by Plaintiffs was already dismissed on FNC ground s, and private and public factors counsel in favor of litigating this dispute in Taiwan b ecause the case revolves around the application of Taiwanese spousal law and most of the evidence i s located there. Id. at 38-40. Defendants, however, overlook a key variable in asking for an F NC dismissal. “Courts apply a two-step test to determine whether a case may be dismis sed under the forum non
conveniens doctrine when the only alternative forum is in a foreign count ry.” Fireman’s Fund23 Ins. Co. v. Thyssen Min. Const. of Canada, Ltd., 703 F.3d 488, 495 (10th Cir. 2012). The Court here need look only to the first s tep, at which it must verify that there is “an a dequate alternative forum in which the defendant i s amenable to pro cess.” Id. (quo ting Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 605 (10th Cir. 1998)). If there is not, the forum non conveniens doctrine is inapplicable. Id. Here, Defenda nts effectively concede that t hey are not amenable to process in Taiwan, but agree in affidavits t o submit themselves to its jur isdiction anyway. See Opp. at 38. At least on that Taiwanese pers onal-jurisdiction issue, such a concession is sufficient to overcome any problems. But Defendants have not carrie d their burden to prove that an a lternative forum is actually, not just theo retically, availabl e. Fireman’s Fund, 7 03 F.3d at 495-96 (establishing defendants bear this burden). I n their Reply, Plaintiff Execut ors contend that the statute of limitations has now run on their c laims. See Reply at 10, 17. Defendants fail to adequately respond to this potential problem by f ully waiving their right to a limitations defense in Taiwan. See ECF No. 42 (Sur-Reply) at 8-9. In fact, they implicitly ar gue, as discussed more fully below, that the statute of limitations has indeed run on many o f Plaintiff Executors’ claims, see Opp. at 19, and generally agree in t heir declarations to waive in Taiwan any new defenses that they could not have asserted he re. See Susan Wang Decl., ¶ 2; William Wong, ¶ 8; ECF No. 38- 31 (Declaration of Donald D. Koz usko), ¶ 12. As far as this Co urt can tell, they still remain intent on claiming in Taiwan that the limitations period has si nce run while this case was being litigated. See Susan Wang Decl., ¶ 2; William Wong, ¶ 8; Kozus ko Decl., ¶ 12. The Court remains unsure of the scope of t heir willingness to waive such defenses based on the vague reservations in their current affidavits.24 This alone dooms their forum non conveniens argument for now. See Fireman’s Fund, 703 F.3d at 496 (rejecting effort by Def endants to ask for FNC dismissal while also arguing statute of limitations had run) ; Carijano v. Occidental Petrole um Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The danger that the s tatute of limitations might s erve to bar an action is one of the primary reasons for the limita tion on the court’s discretion wi th respect to the application of the doctrine offorum non conveniens .”) (quoting Paper Operations C onsultants Int’l, Ltd. v. S.S. Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1975)); Chang v . Baxter Healthcare Corp., 599 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f the plaintiff’s suit w ould be time-barred in the alternative forum, his remedy there is inadequate[,] . . . . an d in such a case dismissal on grounds offorum non conveniens should be denied unless the defendant agrees to waive the stat ute of limitations in that forum . . . .”); C ompania Naviera Joanna SA v. Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster NV, 569 F.3d 189, 202 (4t h Cir. 2009) (“[I]f the st atute of limitations has expired in the alternative forum, the forum is not available, and the moti on to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens would not be appropriate.”); Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indu s., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 159 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Kontoul as v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1984) (same). The Court will therefore deny a dismissal of this case on FNC g rounds at this point. It is not clear that the Taiwanese c ourts would permit this litigatio n to proceed there, nor is it plain that Defendants would not assert t hat the course of this case h as given rise to new limitations defenses. See Stromberg v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 256 Fed. Appx . 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding district court did not abuse its discre tion in finding Mexico an adequate forum because “[a]ppellees agreed to accept se rvice in Mexico and waived any statute of limitations defenses”).25 If Defendants will waive, they can renew their request for an F NC dismissal in a future motion that fully articulates such a position.
Failure to State a Claim Defendants’ final futility argum ent is that the SAC should not be filed because it fails to state a claim. In this regard , too, Defendants overreach at th is stage in the litigation. Their arguments either come up short or are more properly reserved fo r future briefing. Their first quarrel with the well-drafted, 35-page SAC is that it allegedly does not meet the standard for information-a nd-belief pleading or contains fa tally implausible allegations. Defendants point in particular to the SAC’s assertion that Yueh -Lan was the “sole lawful spouse” of Y.C. who was “shorted” in her marital property upon his death, that Y.C. held a beneficial ownership of the shar es eventually transferred to Ne w Mighty Trust, and that Y.C. did so to reduce Yueh-Lan’s alleged spousal share. See Opp. at 24. In addition, they take issue with the SAC’s statement that the val ue of Y.C.’s estate was greater than that reflected in the amount that was paid to Yueh-Lan as h er spousal share. Id. at 25. This sort of factual nitpicking, though, is misplaced in an opp osition to a motion to amend, and probably even in a future motion to dismiss. Whethe r or not Plaintiff Executors’ contentions are eventually borne out by the evidence, they are not facially implausible by any stretch of the imagination, nor are they unsupported — as Defen dants contend — by appropriate factual allegations in the SAC . All that is required for a cla im to be facially plausible is that the SAC provide “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the mi sconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 678. On this score, even Defendants re cognize that at least one Taiw anese court arguably appears to have held it accurate that Yueh-Lan was indeed the s ole “legal” spouse. See Opp. at26 24. Even had it not, the fact that P.C. Lee might also be a sp ouse would not make implausible Yueh-Lan’s claim to her fair s pousal portion from Defendants’ c offers; at most, it would merely reduce her remedy as she would ha ve to share her recovery with any other wives. The SAC’s factual rendition in this regard i s thus plausible. Likewise, the SAC adequately supports its allegation that the amount Yueh-Lan received in the Taiwanese p robate matter was not in line with the estimation of Y.C.’s wealth prior to his death by poin ting to a credible 2006 publication on his net worth. See SAC, ¶ 18. In short, none of these factual averments is unsupported or implausible, and, even if they wer e, their absence alone would not be fatal to the SAC. This sort of largely factual di spute, once again, is not someth ing appropriately resolved in response to a motion seeking leave to amend a complaint. S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. E. Harlem Pilot Block Bldg. 1 Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 608 F.2d 28, 42 (2d Ci r. 1979) (refusing to reach factual dispute allegedly supported by conclusive documentationin considering motion to amend and noting defendants suffered little prejudice from waiting un til summary judgment to present their evidence). Rather, if De fendants truly believe the SAC c an be so impeached, they may devote more effort to pinning dow n the details of the reasons w hy in a later motion. The Court, however, sees little potential benefit in doing so itself now. A similar fate befalls Defendants’ next set of sal vos, which fo cuses on the elements of the various Taiwanese legal claims asserted in the SAC, arguing tha t each count fails to assert some required element to state a claim. See Opp. at 26-28. For ins tance, they argue that one count is defective because the Taiwanese l aw at issue provides relief on ly against the disposing spouse, rather than third parties like Defendants. Id. at 26. They po int, in support, to a lengthy expert declaration provided by a Taiwan ese law professor. Id. Not su rprisingly, Plaintiff Executors’ similarly credentialed expert on Taiwanese law urges that quite the opposite is true in his own27 declaration. See Reply at 5. N either party, however, supports these conclusions in their briefing. This sort of difficult legal di spute is simply not ripe for res olution based on such passing reference in an opposition to a motion to amend; yet again, it is better reserved for more comprehensive and refined brie fing in a future motion. See 6 Wright & Miller, § 1487 (“If a proposed amendment is not clear ly futile, then denial of leave to amend is improper.”) (collecting cases). Finally, the Court has some diff iculty following many of Defend ants’ other objections that fall under this heading. A n illustrative example is the c ontention that Count Two fails to support a plausible inference that Y.C. transferred this marita l property with the s pecific intent to reduce Yueh-Lan’s spousal share because the SAC only alleges th at Y.C. “directed,” “caused” and/or “permitted” transfers that were intended to reduce Yueh- Lan’s share. See Opp. at 26. If Defendant does decide to pursue dism issal in the future, such c avils will require further explication to prevail. Because the remaining attacks on the SAC’s D.C.-law counts are dependent on the problematic arguments above, the C ourt concludes that Defendant s have not shown that the SAC is so infirm that fili ng is not warranted.
B. Bad Faith Defendants next shift gears and argue that leave to amend shoul d be denied because Plaintiff Executors are proceeding in bad faith. See Opp. at 2 1-23 (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). As evidence of this, Defe ndants first point to the SAC’s continued assertion of claims against New Mighty Trust, which they say contradicts the Execut ors’ argument before the D.C. Circuit on appeal that the Trus t could not sue or be sued. Id. They also contend that the Executors are both misrepresenting the D.C. Circuit’s decision in this case by misconstruing the28 substitution motion as effectiv e on remand and making allegatio ns contrary to those put forth in the First Amended Complaint . The Court does not concur. As to Defendants’ first two ar guments, the Court agrees with Pl aintiff Executors that the SAC does nothing more than resta te the D.C. Circuit’s language that New Mighty Trust is a “nominal” party to this litigation. See Wang, 843 F.3d at 496; SAC, ¶ 22 (“Defendant New Mighty U.S. Trust is a nominal pa rty whose citizenship depends on the citizenshi p of its trustee, Defendant Clearbridge.”). To the extent that the Trust should now be dismissed as a result, that is a separate legal issue. Th e Executors are not acting in bad faith simply by following the language used in the D.C. Circu it’s own opinion, even if the sc ope of that wording or holding contradicts the full extent of the arguments pressed by Plainti ffs on appeal. Likewise, the SAC’s notation that the same opinion granted their substitution motio n is accurate, as this Court explained supra in section III.A.1. Even if it we re not, it certainly was at l east an arguable stance to take and thus not evidence of bad faith. Last, but not least, the Court finds no reasoned basis to concl ude that the SAC’s refined theories of its claims are improper. Although Plaintiff’s Firs t Amended Complaint indicated that the financial transfers to Def endants had been made without Y.C .’s knowledge, discovery in a separate action in Bermuda has si nce uncovered evidence that Y. C. may in fact have been aware of the shares being placed in the Trust prior to his death. Se e ECF No. 39-2 (Declaration by Daniel Weinberger), ¶¶ 46-61. N ot only that, but Defendant Cle arbridge is well aware that its client and a member of its Boa rd, Susan Wang, attested to his k nowledge in a sworn affidavit based on her personal conversat ions with her father. Id., ¶ 46 ; Wang Decl., ¶ 2. Defendants thus appear to do the same thing they accuse Plaintiff Executors of — namely, seeking to say one thing in one forum, while alleg ing the opposite in another. Se e, e.g., Opp. at 25 (asserting no29 basis for “rote recitation” in S AC that Y.C. knew of the transf er). The Court will not reward such behavior on Defendants’ part . Rather, Plaintiff Executors are free to pursue their own refined theory of Yueh-Lan’s orig inal claims, irrespective of t he theories that Winston might choose to pursue in his own litigation in another forum. One last point bears mentioni ng here. The new version of the f acts added to the SAC about Y.C.’s knowledge of the tra nsfers is an understandable re vision at this point in the litigation. Indeed, these are jus t the sort of r ecently discov ered facts that courts allow plaintiffs to add to an amended complaint. C ompare Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Co rp., 3 F.3d 137, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding of bad faith perm issible where relevant fac ts were within plaintiffs’ knowledge from outset of litiga tion), with Harrison v. Rubin, 1 74 F.3d 249, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding “a plaintiff is not bound by the legal theory on which he or she originally relied”) (citation omitted); see also H ourani v. Mirtchev, 282 F.R.D. 27 8, 279 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding no bad faith imputed where plainti ffs simply revise theory of clai ms). The Executors, moreover, moved swiftly to make these cha nges at the earliest possible op portunity, and the Court sees no prejudice to Defendants in l etting Plaintiffs now proceed on th eir improved knowledge of the evidence. After all, the relevan t facts were clearly well know n to Defendants, if not Plaintiffs, from the start. As a result, the Court will deny D efendants’ objections to the SAC to the extent that they rely on allegations of bad faith.
C. Relation Back under Rule 15(c) Having determined that the SAC sh ould be filed over the objecti ons raised by Defendants, one final issue fl agged by both parties must also b e resolved: whether that pleading should now relate back to the fili ng date of the original Compl aint. See Hartley v. Wilfert, 93130 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The appropriate posture fo r the Court to address [a] relation-back question is in conne ction with a motion to amend the complaint.”). While Rule 15(a) governs an amendment to a pl eading, Rule 15(c) controls w hether such “an amendment to a pleading relates back to the da te of the original pleading.” In fact, because the statute of limitations on Plaintiff Executors’ claims has “long since pass ed,” Mot. at 26, there would be little point in allowing this case to proceed if the SAC does n ot relate back to that first timely pleading. The Court easily concludes that relation back to the filing of the original Complaint on October 14, 2010, is appropria te here. “Rule 15(c) . . . gover ns when an amended pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a timely filed original pleading and is thus itself timely even though it was filed outside an applicable statute of limitations.” Kr upski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). Both sides agr ee that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) p rovides that, when “the amendment changes the party or t he naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted,” relation back is appropriate only if: 1) “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or o ccurrence set out — or attempt ed to be set out — in the original pleading”; and 2) “the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be pr ejudiced in defending on the merit s; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have be en brought against it, but f or a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” The careful reader will notice that this Rule does not quite fit this case. While Rule 15(c) does not expressly mention what is required when substitu tions are made to plaintiffs, rather than defendants, the Advi sory Committee Notes to its Ame ndment in 1966 states: The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not expressly treated in revised Ru le 15(c) since the problem is31 generally easier. Again the chief consideration of policy is that of the statute of limitations, and the attitude taken in revised R ule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs. Some federal courts thus apply the same factors to amendments s ubstituting plaintiffs as this rule prescribes for defendants, aski ng whether “‘the defendant knew or should have known that it would be called on to defend against claims asserted by the new ly-added plaintiff,’ unless ‘the defendant would be unfairly preju diced in maintaining a defense against the newly-added plaintiff.’” Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1132 (11th Cir. 2004)) ( considering previously numbered version of Rule 15(c)). Other courts, by contrast, craft their own similar rule “based on considerations of notice and prejud ice to determine whether an amendment regarding plaintiffs relates back.” Cliff, 363 F.3d at 1131. This slight difference matte rs not for this case. As should b e obvious, relation back under either standard is unlikely to be denied in a situation such as the one presented here — i.e. , where Executors merely step into the shoes of a deceased Plaintiff un der Rule 25 and then must ratify the action under Rule 17 because of some potential defect with the initial surrogate’s capacity to sue. The Court, in fact, is skep tical that these facts even ra ise concerns with the relation-back principle set out in Rule 15(c)(1 )(B) — instead of the more gen eral one provided by Rule 15(c)(1)(A), which looks only at the consiste ncy in the claims — because the Executors step wholly into the shoes of Yueh-Lan. Out of an abundance of caution, how ever, the Court will engage in a full analysis. As to the first consideration, the SAC asserts almost exactly the sam e causes of action found in the original Complaint. All of its c laims arise out of the same co nduct that has been at the heart of this litigation from the start — namely, whether transfers of Y .C.’s assets made to Defendants in32 the five years prior to his death denied Yueh-Lan her forced sp ousal share under Taiwanese law. See ECF No. 38-2 (Red-Line Compa rison of original Complaint and SAC). Defendants also knew of these claims from the out set, and Yueh-Lan’s Executors step into precisely the same shoes that she once wore. Defe ndants thus never had any right of “repose” from these claims inasmuch as they have been defendi ng against them this whole ti me. Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 917-18 (D.C. C ir. 1997) (explaining right of repose arises where defendant did not know it would nee d to defend against claims). Likewise, Defendants suffer no prejudice from the small refineme nts in the SAC, as they will c ontinue to maintain the same defenses that they have assert ed all along to these claims. No discovery, in fact, has even taken place yet in this litigat ion, and any alteration in the factual theories from the origin al Complaint seem largely due t o evidence Defendants turned over in similar litigation elsewhere. Plaintiff Executors’ nee d to revise their factual rendition to reflect this newly revealed evi dence, then, should hardly come as surprise to Defendants, who had such information in their posse ssion this whole time. If a nything, they got a head start on what would surely have been a nece ssary amendment to the First Amended Complaint after discovery in this case divulged those same facts. The Court thus readily concludes that the SAC relates back to the filing of the original Complaint in 2010.
D. Dismissal of New Mighty F oundation & New Mighty Trust Having disposed of the major ar guments asserted by Defendants a gainst the SAC, a few stragglers remain. Defendants fi rst provide two brief reasons that New Mighty Foundation (the beneficiary) should be dismissed — viz. , because it was not properly served and because the SAC fails to state a claim agains t it. Defendants then contend that New Mighty Trust should also33 be dismissed from the suit under th e principle of judicial esto ppel. The Court rejects each of these contentions in turn.
1. New Mighty Foundation’s Service of Process Defendants’ first position is thatone member of their ranks, N ew Mighty Foundation, was improperly served and thus s hould be dismissed from the act ion. See Opp. at 43. In response to such a motion, “[t]he party on whose behalf service is made has the burden of establishing its valid ity when challenged; to do so, he must de monstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requireme nts of the relevant portions of Rule 4 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and any other applicable prov ision of law.” L ight v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see Fed. R. Civ. P . 12(b)(5). “A signed return of service,” however, “constitutes prima facie eviden ce of valid service, which can b e overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.” Roland v. Branch Banking & Tr. Corp., 14 9 F. Supp. 3d 61, 65 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Gates v. Syria n Arab Republic, 646 F. Supp. 2d 7 9, 85-86 (D.D.C. 2009)); see Pollard v. District of Columbia, 285 F.R.D. 125, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying rebuttable presumption where defendants ch allenged that person served was authorized agent); Philippe v. Wallace, 714 F. Supp. 2d 219, 221 (D. Mass. 2010) (similar). D efendants, at least at this juncture, have not supplied such evidence. Rule 4(h) provides, in part, that a plaintiff may serve a corpo ration by “following state law for serving a summons i n an action brought in courts of gen eral jurisdicti on in the state where the district court is loca ted or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (incorporated by refer ence in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A)). Dis trict law states, in turn: In an action against a foreign corporation doing business in th e District, process may be served on the agent of the corporation or person conducting its business, or, when he is absent and can not be f ound, by leaving a copy at the principal place of business in the Distri ct, or, where34 there is no such place of business, by leaving a copy at the pl ace of business or residence of the agent in the District, and that se rvice is effectual to bring the cor poration before the court. D.C. Code § 13-334(a); see Gonzal ez v. Internacional De Elevado res, S.A., 891 A.2d 227, 233 (D.C. 2006) (construing § 13-334 as re lating to bot h “service o f process” and “personal jurisdiction”). There is no dis pute here that the Foundation i s a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business lo cated in Washington, D.C. See We inberger Decl., Exh. K (NMF Certificate of Incorporation) ; id., Exh. L (NMF Form 990-PF). Defendants allege, however, that the process server did not nail down the right person. The Executors, however, ha ve at least made out a prima facie case that the individual served — John C. Wannen — was a“person conducting [New Mighty Foundation’s] business.” Mot. at 27. Defendants New Mi ghty Foundation, New Mighty Trust , and Clearbridge all share the same address (down to the office-suite number) in Washingto n. See ECF No. 3 (Affidavits of Service) at 4, 6, 8. On Febru ary 9, 2011, Plaintiffs’ proce ss server headed over to that office and left copies of the Summons and Complaint with Wannen, who appears to be the registered agent of Clearbridge, which act s as trustee for the Trust. Id. at 8. At that time, Wannen also accepted service on behalf of the Foundation. Id. at 4. Plain tiffs then filed affidavits describing these efforts. See Roland, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 65. Defendants do not offer enough evidence to convince the Court that this service was faulty. They only submit a declara tion that states that Wannenwas not a “registered agent,” “officer,” or “managing or genera l agent” of the Foundation, or an agent otherwise “authorized to receive service of process on behalf of NMF.” ECF No. 38-13 (Declaration of Stephen K. Vetter), ¶ 5. Nowhere, however, doe s the declaration actually pin down his role — that is, Defendants are silent as to his actual affiliation with the Fou ndation and whether he conducts any of its business. Rather, from what the Court can tell, Wannen and the Foundation do not occupy35 entirely separate spheres. T he Foundation’s tax forms bear his signature as the preparer, while his tax-preparation company share s the same exact address as De fendants. See NMF Form 990- PF at 13; see also Kozusko Decl., ¶ 4 (mentioning also that Wan nen holds a 50% interest in Clearbridge). Absent evidence that clarifies Wannen’s relationship with New M ighty Foundation, the Court will not require Plaintiffs to engage in a further “cat-and-mouse game” with Defendants’ various entities and their agen ts. Ali v. Mid-Atl. Settlement Servs., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2006). Their bid to dism iss based on service-of-proces s concerns thus founders.
2. Statement of Claim Against New Mighty Foundation Defendants next point out that th e SAC’s only allegations again st the Foundation are that it received “gratuitous distributions” of cash from the Trust that were “authorized and/or directed” by Clearbridge. S ee Opp. at 44 (citing SAC, ¶ 57). Yet this is not accurate. The reference to the Foundation in the SAC incorporates the allegat ions made throughout the pleading that these transfers w ere done at the direction of Y.C . in the five years prior to his death to deny Yueh-Lan her fair mar ital share. See SAC, ¶ 57. To the extent that Defendants also mean to challenge the pleadi ng under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, as indicate d through a single supportive cit ation in their pl eading, the Court finds their contention wanting. S ee Opp. at 44-45 (citing Toum azou v. Turkish Rep. of N. Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2014)). Rule 8 prevents p laintiffs from “lumping all the defendants together in each cla im and providing no factual basi s to distinguish t heir conduct.” Toumazou, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2014). But, as should b e clear, the detailed SAC breaks out the individual Defendants w here appropriate in order to spe cify the conduct each is accused of committing in denying Yueh-Lan her fair marital share. Inde ed, the very part of the pleading36 Defendants point to in support of their Rule 8 argument, as exp lained above, represents just such an effort to tease out a distinc tion, while still incorporating by reference other more general allegations lodged against all Defendants. The Court will, accordingly, deny D efendants’ effort to dismiss the Foundation from the action as this point.
3. Judicial Estoppel In their final shot, Defendants posit that the SAC’s counts aga inst the Trust should be dismissed based on representations that Plaintiff Executors mad e before the D.C. Circuit about the Trust’s status as a “nominal party” to this litigation. Se e Opp. at 45. As previously explained, though, the Executors have merely rest ated in the SAC that the Trust is a nominal party to this suit. This is consistent with what they argued on appeal on the jurisdictional questi on and with what the Ci rcuit adopted in it s opinion on that issue. Wang, 843 F.3d at 496 (“To the extent New Mighty itself is a named party to the lawsuit, it is only a nominal one.”) (citing Nava rro Savings Ass’ n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 4 58, 461 (1980) (“[A] federal court must disregard nominal or f ormal parties and rest jurisdi ction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controvers y.”)). The Executors are not pre vented from a course of action that complies with the Circuit’s hol ding on this score. Nothing in that opinion, moreover, explicitly indicates that the Trust must now be dismissed as a result. An d, because Defendants had filed a petitition for writ of certoriari at the Supreme Court that cha llenged that Circuit decision when the SAC was proposed, the Court finds compelling the Executors’ explanation that they had wished to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of that d iversity-jurisdiction dispute, which hinged on the citizenship of the pending parties. See We inberger Decl., ¶ 11.37 The Court, in short, finds no indi cation that Plaintiff Executo rs are trying to get away with the “improper use of judici al machinery” in this case. Se e Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (describing purpose of judicial estop pel). Judicial estoppel, moreover, “is an equitable doctrine invoke d by a court at i ts discretion. ” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). The Court declines to call upon it here. If Defendants nevertheless wish t o pursue the dismissal of the Trust based on the legal implications of the Circuit’s decision, they are free to do so in a future motion. The Court reserves judgment on that question for now.
IV. Conclusion For the reasons explained above, t he Court concludes that no ba rriers exist to the filing of Plaintiff Executors’ Second Ame nded Complaint. The Court thus grants their Mo tion in full. A contemporaneous Order so sta ting, and amending the caption of t he case, shall issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: August 15, 2017