J-S68015-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

HELEN L. GEORGE, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

PETER MELTZER, ESQUIRE, MICHAEL 

EMERICK, ESQUIRE, VERNON 

LITZINGER, JUBELIRER, CAROTHERS 

KRIER, & HALPERN LAW FIRM,

Appellees No. 422 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County

Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015 GN 1800

BEFORE: SHOGAN, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 5, 2016

Appellant Helen George, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial 

court’s order dismissing her amended complaint pursuant to Pennsylvania 

Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1. Upon review, we find Appellant’s claims 

devoid of merit and affirm the order dismissing this action and barring 

Appellant from further attempts to re-litigate issues previously resolved in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County. 

On August 10, 2015, Appellant filed an amended complaint against her 

former attorney, Michael Emerick (“Emerick”), an attorney who previously 

represented Equity One Mortgage, Peter Meltzer (“Meltzer”), an adjoining 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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landowner, Vernon Litzinger (“Litzinger”), and the law firm representing 

Litzinger, Jubelirer, Carothers, Krier, and Halpern (the “Law Firm”) for, inter 

alia, a violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 

Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. §§ 201-1, fraud, concealment of fraud, 

and altered sheriff’s deed. The underlying controversy originated in 

February of 2002 when Appellant obtained a $362,369.00 mortgage from 

Equity One Mortgage Company that encumbered certain parcels of 

Appellant’s real property. 

The trial court cogently described the litigation spawned from this 

initial transaction, as follows: 

[Appellant] obtained a mortgage loan from Equity One 

Mortgage Company (“Equity One”) in the amount of 

$362,369.00 in February 2002. Pl. Amended Compl., Ex. A. 

Plaintiff discovered that the mortgage was over–encumbered and 

retained [Emerick] to release two parcels of land from the 

mortgage. Id. at ¶ 7. A Complaint in Equity, Docket No. 2003 

GN 465, was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 

on January 24, 2003. This initial action is the basis for the 

instant action before the Court. During the initial action, a 

Partial Release of “Parcel A and Parcel B” from [Appellant’s] 

property was negotiated between [Emerick] and [Meltzer], which 

left “Parcel C” as the encumbered property. Id. at ¶ 7. The 

Partial Release was recorded on September 24, 2003, and the 

initial action was discontinued with prejudice. Id., Ex. B.

[Appellant] subsequently defaulted on the mortgage loan; 

as a result, Chase Manhattan Bank, as assignee of the Equity 

One [M]ortgage, filed a Mortgage Foreclosure action against 

[Appellant] in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 

seeking to foreclose on Parcel C. Pl. Amended Compl. at ¶ 8. 

Arthur Cohen, Esq., now deceased, represented [Appellant] 

during the proceedings. The Hon. Thomas G. Peoples, Jr., 

presided over a non-jury trial and awarded judgment for Chase 

Manhattan Bank against [Appellant]. Opinion and Order, June 5, 
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2005, Docket No. 2004 GN 1743. [Appellant] filed an appeal 

with the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal on 

December 22, 2005, “because Appellant’s filings violate[d] the 

rules of appellate procedure to such an extent that [the court 

could not] conduct appellate review.” Helen George v. Equity 

One Inc., 2147 WDA 2006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).[1]

[Appellant], through Attorney Cohen, brought an action 

against Equity One filed February 12, 2004, repeating the initial 

action’s allegations that Equity One incorrectly over-encumbered 

[Appellant’s] property. Opinion and Order, May 10, 2006, 

Docket No. 2004 GN 731. [Appellant] also alleged violations of 

the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law of 

Pennsylvania and defamation by Equity One. Id. The Hon. 

Hiram A. Carpenter III held that [Appellant’s] action was barred 

by res judicata and granted Equity One’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment on May 10, 2006. Id. [Appellant] filed an appeal with 

the Superior Court, which quashed her appeal on August 24, 

2007.

On December 1, 2006, [Appellant] filed a Praecipe for Lis 

Pendens pro se against Equity One. Docket No. 2006 GN 6443. 

Judge Carpenter struck the Lis Pendens against the property on 

February 13, 2007.

[Appellant] then commenced a Legal Malpractice action pro 

se against [Emerick] by filing a Praecipe for a Writ of Summons 

on September 28, 2007. [Appellant] filed a Complaint on 

May 27, 2008, and an Amended Complaint on July 9, 2008. In 

____________________________________________

1

 The trial court erroneously described the appellate disposition of the 

mortgage foreclosure action. The docket entries attendant to 2004 GN 1743 

actually reveal that this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal as no issues had 

been preserved for appellate review due to Appellant’s failure to file posttrial motions. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. George, 1285 WDA 2005 

(Pa. Super. filed October 6, 2005) (review of appeal from 2004 GN 1743). 

Appellant’s appeal from the trial court’s order in Case No. 2004 GN 731, 

reinstating a summary judgment award to Equity One, was quashed because 

“Appellant’s indecipherable documents fail[ed] to present any discernable 

issues and are so defective that we are completely unable to conduct 

appellate review.” George v. Equity One, Inc., 2147 WDA 2006 (Pa. 

Super. filed July 9, 2007) (unpublished memorandum at 1). 
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the Amended Complaint, [Appellant] alleged that [Emerick] 

incorrectly identified the property originally intended to be 

encumbered by the mortgage with Equity One and therefore the 

Partial Release concerned incorrect properties. Amended Compl. 

in Legal Malpractice at ¶¶ 11-15, 31-34. The Hon. Charles C. 

Brown, specially presiding, granted [Emerick’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment on May 26, 2010, stating that [Appellant’s] 

claim was time barred by the two (2) year statute of limitations 

and [Appellant] failed to present an expert to establish a 

deviation from the standard of care. Order, June 4, 2007, 

Docket No. 2007 GN 5397. [Appellant] filed an appeal with the 

Superior Court, which affirmed Judge Brown’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Opinion on April 12, 2011. George, H. v Emerick, M., 1071 WDA 

2010, (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).

[Appellant] commenced a suit pro se against the Blair 

County Tax Claim Bureau and the Blair County Tax Assessment 

Bureau by filing a Praecipe for a Writ of Summons on March 15, 

2012. A Complaint was filed on March 30, 2012 and an 

Amended Complaint claiming “Negligent Misappropriation of 

Taxes; Illegal Tax Foreclosure on [Appellant’s] Home; Parcel B., 

and Damages Thereof” was filed September 17, 2012. Pl. 

Amended Tax Compl., p. 1. Judge Brown granted Defendants’ 

Preliminary Objections in the nature of a Demurrer on December 

2, 2013, because [Appellant] failed to follow proper procedure in 

filing her suit. Opinion and Order, Dec. 2, 2013, Docket No. 

2012 GN 904.

[Appellant] commenced a Quiet Title action pro se against 

[Litzinger], the purchaser of the property foreclosed on by Chase 

Manhattan Bank and subsequently sold at a Sheriff’s Sale 

(“Parcel C”) on May 9, 2014, by filing a Complaint. [Litzinger] 

filed an Answer to [Appellant’s] Complaint with New Matter and 

Counterclaim on June 16, 2014. On July 24, 2014, [Litzinger] 

filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings raising the issue of 

res judicata. The Hon. Wade A. Kagarise granted [Litzinger’s] 

Motion and dismissed the Quiet Title action with prejudice. 

Order, Sept. 4, 2014, Docket No. 2014 GN 1349. [Appellant] 

filed an appeal to the Superior Court on October 8, 2014. In his

Pa.R.A.P. 1925[a] Opinion, Judge Kagarise stated:

This Court’s review of the allegations in 

[Appellant’s] present action lead this court to the 

conclusion that [Appellant] seeks a ruling from this 
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Court concerning the property lines for this subject 

property. She specifically indicates in her request for 

relief that she “respectfully requests the clarification 

of her property ownership.” The Court is constrained 

to find that on numerous occasions her property 

ownership in the subject property has already been 

clarified. This Court sees no new issues in the 

present matter that have not been previously 

addressed.

1925[a] Opinion, Nov. 21, 2014, Docket No. 2014 GN 1349. 

(emphasis added)[.]

The Superior Court quashed [Appellant’s] appeal on 

March 31, 2015. On October 26, 2015, Judge Kagarise ordered 

[Appellant] to pay counsel for [Litzinger] five hundred dollars 

($500.00) within six (6) months as a sanction for “frivolous, 

meritless, and...bad faith” litigation filed by [Appellant]. Order, 

Oct. 26, 2010, Docket No. 2014 GN 1349. Judge Kagarise 

deferred any consideration of further sanctions pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 until the conclusion of the instant action before 

the Court. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/16, at 2–7.

As noted, Appellant’s instant lawsuit alleges that all Appellees engaged 

in deceptive business practices under the UTPCPL. She additionally claims 

that attorneys Emerick and Meltzer: 1) forged or fraudulently tampered with 

legal documents; 2) altered legal documents; 3) concealed legal documents; 

4) breached a contract; 5) committed perjury; 6) knowingly submitted to 

the trial court an altered description of the subject property with incorrect 

boundary lines; 7) testified that the submitted maps were correct; 8) 

“spoken under oath that ‘whatever Parcel C is on the submitted map of 

Parcel C is what the Mortgage Company has to accept’” and, 8) “influenced 

the Court by the altered subdivision.” Amended Complaint, 8/10/15, at ¶ 
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46. The allegations against Litzinger and the Law Firm are muddled but 

appear to assert that these parties colluded in preparing a forged deed to 

the subject property. Id. at ¶¶ 64–72. 

On August 28, 2015, Emerick filed preliminary objections to the 

amended complaint and a separate motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

233.1.2 On August 31, 2015, Litzinger and the Law Firm filed their 

preliminary objections, incorporating a motion to dismiss under Rule 233.1. 

Meltzer did not file a responsive pleading.3 On January 20, 2016, the trial 

court conducted oral argument on Appellees’ preliminary objections and 

motions to dismiss and Appellant’s responses thereto. Subsequently, the 

trial court granted the motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 233.1 and 

dismissed the claims against Emerick, Litzinger, and the Law Firm, with 

____________________________________________

2

 Rule 233.1(a)(1) provides that “[u]pon the commencement of any action 

filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file 

a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the pro se plaintiff is 

alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior 

action against the same or related defendants.” Rule 233.1(c) further 

instructs that “[u]pon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the 

court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation 

against the same or related defendants raising the same or related claims 

without leave of court.” Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a), (c).

3

 The certified docket reveals that Meltzer was not served with original 

process in the manner required by Pa.R.C.P. 402. Instead, it appears 

Appellant attempted to serve Meltzer by certified mail; however, the trial 

“[c]ourt did not authorize service through the mail.” Trial Court Opinion, 

2/22/16, at 7. Meltzer has not participated in this litigation in any fashion. 

In her brief, Appellant admits that she served Meltzer by certified mail, but 

does not offer any argument that this method of service was permissible 

under Pa.R.C.P. 403, allowing for service by mail in certain circumstances.
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prejudice. The trial court’s order further barred Appellant “from pursuing 

additional pro se litigation against the same or related defendants raising the 

same or related claims without leave of court.” Order, 2/22/16, at 15. 

On March 7, 2016, Appellant filed a pleading captioned: “Res Judicta 

Judgment on the Merits Breach of Contract Fraud and Perjury Altered Sherrif 

Deed Fraudulent Concealment.” The trial court treated the filing as a motion 

for reconsideration and denied it on March 21, 2016. Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal. 

At this juncture, we would ordinarily identify the issues Appellant 

requests that we review; however, the significant deficiencies in Appellant’s 

brief, discussed infra, severely hamper identification of the questions 

involved. That being said, within the morass of Appellant’s appellate 

submission, we have discerned only one issue related to the trial court’s 

dismissal of this action pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 223.1, stated by Appellant as 

follows: “With all the prima face [sic] evidence submitted by [Appellant], 

why would the Court dismiss fraud by Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 and 233.1(c)?” 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

Prior to our consideration of the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must 

address two preliminary matters. First, on August 11, 2016, Appellant filed 

with this Court a document titled “Additional Discovery of Clear and 

Convincing Evidence” which we construe as a motion to supplement the 
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record on appeal.4 The proposed evidence consists of certain documents 

that Appellant recently received from a former attorney. Motion, 8/11/16, at 

3–8. Appellant avers that these documents are relevant to the instant 

proceeding and claims that she “has been told by Superior Court to submit 

the newly discovered evidence to the Blair County Prothonotary for 

admission and submission to forward new discovery to Superior Court.” Id.

at 2. However, the certified docket from the trial court does not 

demonstrate that this new evidence was submitted to the Blair County 

Prothonotary. Similarly, there is no entry on the appellate docket reflecting 

any communication from this Court concerning supplementing the record. 

In any event, we cannot consider Appellant’s alleged newly discovered 

evidence. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1921, “[t]he 

original papers and exhibits filed in the lower court, paper copies of legal 

papers filed with the prothonotary by means of electronic filing, the 

transcript of proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket entries 

prepared by the clerk of the lower court” constitute the appellate record. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1921. An appellate court may consider only the facts which have 

been duly certified in the record on appeal. In re Fielder, 132 A.3d 1010, 

1027 n.15 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Young, 317 A.2d 

258, 264 (Pa. 1974)). A party to an appeal cannot therefore file a 

____________________________________________

4

 Appellant’s motion was deferred for disposition at the same time as the 

merits of the appeal and is now ripe for resolution.
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supplemental record containing documents that were not included in the 

record certified from the trial court and were not part of the evidence 

considered by the trial court in making its decision. Possessky v. Diem, 

655 A.2d 1004, 1011 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1995). Thus, Appellant’s motion to 

supplement the record on appeal is denied. 

Second, we are compelled to address whether Appellant’s appeal is 

waived because of numerous defects in her appellate brief. Appellant’s 

arguments are barely decipherable and completely unsupported by legal 

citation; thus, it would be well within our province to dismiss this appeal 

based upon Appellant’s failure to file a brief in conformity with the rules of 

appellate procedure. We decline to do so, however, because the trial court 

adeptly clarified why dismissal under Rule 233.1 was necessary in this 

matter, and we deem it essential that Appellant understand that she may no 

longer clutter the trial court dockets with frivolous and repeated litigation 

without leave of court.

As the trial court explained:

Rule 233.1 does not require the highly technical 

prerequisites of res judicata or collateral estoppel to allow the 

trial court to conclude that a pro se litigant’s claims are 

adequately related to those addressed in prior litigation. Gray v. 

Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 838 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Nor does it 

require an identity of parties or the capacities in which they sued 

or were sued. Id. Rather it requires a rational relationship 

evident in the claims made and in the defendant’s relationships 

with one another to inform the trial court’s conclusion that the 

bar the Rule announces is justly applied. Id. 

* * * 
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated “certain 

litigants are abusing the legal system by repeatedly filing new 

litigation raising the same claims against the same defendant 

even though the claims have been previously adjudicated either 

through settlement or through court proceedings. New Rule 

233.1 provides relief to a defendant who has been subjected to 

this type of repetitive litigation.” Pa.R.C.P. 233.1, Explanatory 

Comment—2010.

In the instant action before the Court, [Appellant] admits 

“a litany of lawsuits were presented in hopes of correcting the 

error” that [Appellant] perceives to have resulted from the 

mortgaging of her property and the subsequent actions arising 

from it. Pl. Amended Compl. at ¶ 27. Furthermore, [Appellant] 

admits “a stigma follows [Appellant] in the Court as a person 

wanting to repeat lawsuits when they were all adjudicated as res 

judicta.” Id. [Appellant] is correct in her admissions. 

[Appellant] has repeatedly brought lawsuits litigating the same 

facts, parties, and legal questions, which have been resolved in 

prior proceedings before the Court of Common Pleas of Blair 

County. Multiple judges have dismissed [Appellant’s] previous 

attempts at re-litigating these same facts and legal questions 

before the Court. The Superior Court has repeatedly affirmed 

the Courts[’] decisions and quashed Appellant’s appeals. This 

Court declines to allow [Appellant] to continue with such 

frivolous and vexatious litigation.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/16, at 11–12. 

After careful review of the record in this case and the briefs of the 

parties, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s well-reasoned 

decision to dismiss Appellant’s lawsuit under Rule 233.1. See Coulter v. 

Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014) (a trial court’s decision to 

grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 233.1 is reviewed for an abuse of that 

court’s discretion). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing 

Appellant’s claims with prejudice and barring Appellant from pursuing pro se
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litigation against the same or related parties raising the same or related 

claims without leave of court.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2016