IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 69

Kayla Jones, Petitioner 

 v.

Mark Rath, Respondent and Appellant

No. 20220239

Appeal from the District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Cherie L. Clark, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Kayla Jones, petitioner; no appearance.

Mark A. Rath, Bismarck, ND, self-represented, respondent and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

APRIL 13, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Jones v. Rath

No. 20220239

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Mark Rath appeals from a disorderly conduct restraining order directing 

him to have no contact with Kayla Jones for one year. Rath argues the court 

abused its discretion by not holding a hearing within fourteen days of issuing

the temporary restraining order. He argues the court abused its discretion by 

granting a restraining order even though Jones’s petition did not comply with 

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(3). He also argues the court abused its discretion by 

issuing the disorderly conduct restraining order without sufficient findings. We 

affirm. 

I

[¶2] In January 2013, Rath and Jones divorced. Together they have two 

children. On July 21, 2022, Jones filed a petition for a disorderly conduct 

restraining order after Rath sent numerous e-mails to Jones, her attorney, and 

her employer during a short period of time. A temporary restraining order was 

issued. On August 9, 2022, a hearing was held and the district court granted a 

disorderly conduct restraining order against Rath. Rath timely appealed. 

II

[¶3] Rath argues the district court abused its discretion by not holding a 

hearing within fourteen days of the temporary restraining order.

[¶4] Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(5)(c), the court may grant a disorderly 

conduct restraining order if the court sets a hearing within fourteen days of an 

issuance of a temporary restraining order. The hearing may be set later if there 

is good cause. Id.

[¶5] “This Court will not reverse a district court’s decision to grant a 

restraining order or to conduct a hearing absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Lehnerz v. Christopher, 2022 ND 122, ¶ 4, 975 N.W.2d 585. “The district court 

abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or 

unconscionable manner, when it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when 
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its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned 

determination.” Id. 

[¶6] Rath argues the hearing did not comply with the fourteen-day time 

restraint in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(5)(c). A temporary restraining order was 

issued on July 21, 2022. Fourteen days from July 21, 2022 was August 4, 2022. 

A hearing was set for August 4, 2022, but was continued when the case was 

reassigned to the Southeast Judicial District after all the South Central 

Judicial District judges were disqualified. The earliest date a judge from the 

Southeast Judicial District could hold the hearing was August 9, 2022. 

Following Rath’s objection, the district court found the disqualification and 

reassignment was good cause for the delay. The court’s finding was not 

unreasonable or unconscionable because there was legitimate scheduling delay 

after the reassignment. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by 

holding the hearing on August 9, 2022.

III

[¶7] Rath argues the district court abused its discretion by granting a 

disorderly conduct restraining order even though Jones’s petition did not 

comply with N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(3).

[¶8] Section 12.1-31.2-01(3), N.D.C.C., provides:

“A petition [for a disorderly conduct order] must allege facts 

sufficient to show the name of the alleged victim, the name of the 

individual engaging in the disorderly conduct, and that the 

individual engaged in disorderly conduct. An affidavit made under 

oath stating the specific facts and circumstances supporting the 

relief sought must accompany the petition.”

[¶9] A district court’s decision to grant a restraining order will not be reversed 

absent an abuse of discretion. Lehnerz, 2022 ND 122, ¶ 4.

[¶10] The petition required Jones to describe the events between her and Rath

to support why the district court should grant a restraining order against Rath. 

Instead of describing the events in the provided space of the petition, Jones 
3

wrote “See attached affidavit,” and attached a separate document to the 

petition. Rath argues the petition is invalid because Jones did not describe the 

events on the petition, but on a separate document which was not signed under 

oath. 

[¶11] The petition was signed by Jones under the statement “I declare, under 

penalty of perjury under the law of North Dakota, that everything I stated in 

this Petition for Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order is true and correct.” 

Jones also signed at the bottom of the separate document. The district court 

found the information on the separate page, which was referred to in the 

petition, was contained within the petition. The court therefore concluded the 

petition was valid under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(3).

[¶12] The district court’s finding that the separate factual statement was part 

of the petition was supported by the facts, and its conclusion was not 

unreasonable or unconscionable because Jones referenced the separate 

document within the petition. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion 

by granting the disorderly conduct restraining order based on Jones’s petition. 

IV

[¶13] Rath argues the district court abused its discretion in issuing the 

disorderly conduct restraining order without sufficient findings.

[¶14] “‘Disorderly conduct’ means intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or 

gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of 

another person.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(1). “The court may grant a 

restraining order if, after a hearing, it finds reasonable grounds to believe the 

respondent has engaged in disorderly conduct.” Lehnerz, 2022 ND 122, ¶ 6. 

“Reasonable grounds exist for issuing a restraining order when the facts and 

circumstances presented to the judge are sufficient to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution to believe that acts constituting disorderly conduct have 

been committed.” Id. This Court will not reverse a district court’s decision to 

grant a restraining order absent abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 4.
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[¶15] The district court’s factual findings for ordering a disorderly conduct

restraining order included that: Rath admitted he knew Jones did not want 

him to send her e-mails, Rath sent e-mails to Jones and her attorney 

referencing Jones’s throat getting slit and asserting Jones and her attorney 

were engaging in sexual acts, Rath sent an inappropriate e-mail to Jones’s 

employer and Rath sent 20 to 30 e-mails a day to Jones and her attorney.

[¶16] In Rekow v. Durheim, we reversed a one-year disorderly conduct 

restraining order after determining the district court did not specifically 

identify the defendant’s acts were intended to affect the safety, security, or 

privacy of another. 2022 ND 177, ¶ 8, 980 N.W.2d 917. Our decision in Rekow 

stressed the need for the district court to make sufficient findings on all the 

elements of proof, including addressing a respondent’s intent. Id. However, the 

facts in this case are significantly different than those in Rekow. In Rekow, the 

court granted the restraining order after finding Durheim came onto Rekow’s 

property, Rekow requested that she leave, an argument ensued, and Durheim

did not leave immediately.

[¶17] The order in Rekow did not provide us with an understanding of the 

district court’s basis for finding intent. Here, we understand the court’s

rationale for issuing the protective order. See Clarke v. Taylor, 2019 ND 251, ¶ 

11, 934 N.W.2d 414; Lindstaedt v. George, 2020 ND 262, ¶ 6, 952 N.W.2d 102; 

VND, LLC v. Leevers Foods, Inc., 2003 ND 198, ¶ 27, 672 N.W.2d 445 (affirmed 

protection orders where the district court’s findings lacked specificity, but this 

Court could understand the rationale for the decision to issue the order).

[¶18] The findings by the district court, while not using the word “intent,”

leave us with a clear understanding the court found Rath intended to adversely 

affect Jones’s safety, security, or her privacy with his conduct. Specifically, Rath 

was aware his e-mails were unwanted, he sent an inappropriately large volume 

of e-mails, and the e-mails contained threats to Jones’s safety and security (her 

throat would be slit) and her privacy (alleging she was engaged in sexual 

conduct with her attorney and contacting her employer). On these facts, the 

court did not abuse its discretion by granting the disorderly conduct 

restraining order.
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V

[¶19] The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding a hearing more 

than fourteen days after the temporary restraining order was issued. The court 

did not abuse its discretion by finding Jones’s petition complied with N.D.C.C. 

§ 12.1-31.2-01(3). The findings of the court, while lacking the word “intent,” are 

sufficient to understand the court’s rationale regarding Rath’s intent to 

adversely affect Jones’s safety, security, or privacy. We affirm.

[¶20] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Daniel Saleh El-Dweek, D.J. 

[¶21] The Honorable Daniel S. El-Dweek, D.J., sitting in place of Bahr, J., 

disqualified.