NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICK MUNOZ,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; JANINA MEISSNER

FRISK, D.O., Defendants

- Appellees. No. 19

- 17292
D.C. No. 1:16

- cv - 01103

- LJO

- JLT

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Lawrence J. O'Neill, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 18, 2020 San Francisco, California Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SCHROEDER and BERZON, Circuit Judges. Plaintiff Rick Munoz appeals the district cou rt’s grant of summary judgment
to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and Dr. Meissner

- Frisk , D.O. (collectively, “ D efendants”) , on his Americans with

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

JAN 7 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim. We reverse and remand.
1. The district court erred when it applied an expressly superseded legal standard to conclude that Munoz did not have a qualifying disability within the meaning of the ADA. The relevant statutory provision defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that s ubstantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). I n the ADA Amendment s Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) , Congress added rules of construction for courts to apply in resolving questions of disab ility

. These rules provide, inter alia , that the

“ definition of disability

. . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter ,” id. § 12102(4)(A), and that an “ impair ment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability ,” id. § 12102(4)(C). Additionally, Congress specifically

“ reject [ ed ] the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in T oyota Motor
M anufacturing , Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams , 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms ‘substantially’ and ‘major’ in the definition of disability under the ADA ‘need to be interpreted strictly [.] ’ ” Pub. L. No. 110

– 325 , § 2(b)( 4 ) , 122 Stat

. 3553 , 3554 (2008) ; see Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist. , 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2009)

. In concluding that Munoz was not disabled, the district court relied on3

Toyota Motor ’s interpretation of “substantially” as meaning “considerable” or “to a large degree.” Toyota Motor , 534 U.S. at 196

. Applying that interpretation, t he district court held that Munoz had not provided sufficient evidence that he was substantially limited in th e major life activity of climbing. The court reasoned that Munoz had only shown that he had difficulties climbing to an upper bunk, not that he had trouble “climbing stairs or anything” else. The district court concluded that “difficulty climbing to an upp er bunk qualifies as an impairment , but it does not qualify as a substantial limitation on [Munoz’s] major life activity of climbing.” The district court thus erred in relying on the superseded Toyota Motor standard and ignoring the ADAAA’s liberal rules of construction. We remand for the district court to apply the proper standard to the question of whether Munoz has a qualifying disability. See Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc. , 908 F.3d 428, 434

– 35 (9th Cir. 2018)

. 2. We decline Defendants ’ invitation to affirm the grant of summary judgment on grounds not reached by the district court. First, Defendants are not entitled to s ummary judgment on the question of whether they discriminated against Munoz “by reason of his disability.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap , 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 20 0 1). Although Defendants are correct that claims of “inadequate treatment for disability ” are not cognizable under the ADA , Simmons v. Navajo C

nty. , 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 ( 9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds4

by Castro v. Cnty. of L.A. , 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) , Munoz does not argue he was denied adequate treatment for his knee injuries , only that he was denied an accommodation for his disability. “ [D]isability ac commodations under the [ADA] . . . include basic necessities of life for disabled prisoners and parolees, such as . . . accessible beds .” Armstrong v. Brown , 732 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2013 ) (emphasis added). Dr. Meissner

- Frisk’s denial of a disability accommodation was not an unreviewable medical determination simply because she invoked her medical judgment in concluding Munoz was not disabled

. Cf. Simmons , 609 F.3d at 1022 (citing Bryant v. Madigan , 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 199 6) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”)). The record shows that all disability accommodations are verified by a doctor at Valley State Prison. To accept Defendants’ position that the involvement of a doctor removes all prison

accom modations decisions from the ADA’s reach would undermine the Supreme Court’s recognition that Title II of the ADA applies to prisons. See Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey , 524 U.S. 206 , 209

– 10 (1998). Defendants are therefore not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether they discriminated against Munoz by reason of his disability.
3. Defendants are likewise not entitled to summary judgment as to whether they exhibit ed deliberate indifference

. “ W hen the plaintiff has alerted the5

public ent ity to his need for accommodation ,” the public entity has a “well settled” duty to “undertake a fact

- specific investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation .” Duvall , 260 F.3d at 1139. This duty requires the public entity “ to gather sufficient information from the [disabled individual] and qualified experts as needed to determine what accommodations are necessary.” Id. (quoting Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. , 192 F.3d 807, 818 ( 9th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original)

. The evidence presented by Munoz creates a triable issue of fact as to whether Dr. Meissner

- Frisk conducted an adequate “fact

- specific” inquiry into Munoz’s disability. Id. Dr . Meissner

- Frisk never examined Munoz’s knees before rescinding his chrono , nor did she conduct a patient interview

. She testified that a medical doctor would wa nt to conduct a physical exam before deciding whether to grant or rescind a low

- bunk chrono. She also testified that she relied on medical records to make her decision , which were the same records that prior physicians used to grant Munoz’s chrono

. The medical records were filled with many references to serious knee injuries, prior knee surgeries, and knee pain. The medical records reflected X

- rays that described Munoz’s knees as “normal,” yet Dr. Meissner

- Frisk and Munoz’s expert, Dr. Bruce Ellison , both opined that X

- rays
were not certain to reveal the type of knee injuries of which Munoz complained. Because the question whether Dr. Meissner

- Frisk conducted an adequate inquiry6

turns on disputed material facts , Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to that issue

. REVERSED AND REMANDED .