II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 3192 

To advance a policy to ensure peace and security across the Taiwan Strait. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 4, 2021 

Mr. RISCH (for himself, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. HAGERTY, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. RUBIO, 

and Mr. ROMNEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To advance a policy to ensure peace and security across 

the Taiwan Strait. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Taiwan Deterrence Act’’. 

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

7 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

TITLE I—DETERRENCE POLICY REGARDING TAIWAN 

Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Statement of policy. 


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TITLE II—BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN DEFENSE 

AND SECURITY 

Sec. 201. Report on capability development by Taiwan. 

Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations for Foreign Military Financing grant 

assistance to Taiwan. 

Sec. 203. Eligibility of Taiwan for Foreign Military Sales and export status 

under the Arms Export Control Act. 

Sec. 204. Report on advancing the defense of Taiwan. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com5 mittees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

7 the Senate; and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

9 the House of Representatives. 

10 (2) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The 

11 terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 

12 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. 

13 (3) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 

14 ‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 

15 TITLE I—DETERRENCE POLICY 

16 REGARDING TAIWAN 

17 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

18 Congress makes the following findings: 

19 (1) Taiwan is a model democracy in the Indo20 Pacific, with open and fair elections, strong marketVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:54 Nov 05, 2021 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3192.IS S3192

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1 led economic growth, and high levels of individual 

2 freedoms. 

3 (2) The United States and Taiwan share a ro4 bust unofficial relationship with close cooperation on 

5 a wide range of issues, including global health, eco6 nomic issues, military and defense, development, and 

7 people-to-people exchanges. 

8 (3) Taiwan is a key economic partner of the 

9 United States, serving as the 10th largest trading 

10 partner of the United States as of October 2021 and 

11 home to critical high-tech supply chains. 

12 (4) The People’s Republic of China has greatly 

13 increased its political, diplomatic, economic, and 

14 military coercion campaigns across the Taiwan 

15 Strait, especially since 2016. 

16 (5) The PRC seeks to annex Taiwan through 

17 whatever means may ultimately be required. The in18 sistence by the Chinese Communist Party that so19 called ‘‘reunification’’ is Taiwan’s only option makes 

20 that goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, 

21 President Xi stated that the PRC ‘‘make[s] no 

22 promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] 

23 the option of taking all necessary means’’. Taiwan’s 

24 embodiment of democratic values and economic lib25 eralism challenges President Xi’s goal of achieving 


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1 national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai2 wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island 

3 Chain and to project power into the Second Island 

4 Chain and beyond. 

5 (6) The People’s Liberation Army has exponen6 tially increased its military activity in the Taiwan 

7 Strait. As of October 2021, the Ministry of National 

8 Defense of Taiwan recorded that more than 600 

9 Chinese military sorties have flown into the Air De10 fense Identification Zone of Taiwan in 2021 alone. 

11 That is an increase of 50 percent compared to 2020. 

12 That same month, the PLA made its largest ever air 

13 incursion into the Air Defense Identification Zone of 

14 Taiwan, sending almost 150 planes in total over a 

15 number of days. 

16 (7) In response, on October 3, 2021, the De17 partment of State said it was ‘‘very concerned by the 

18 People’s Republic of China’s provocative military ac19 tivity near Taiwan, which is destabilizing, risks mis20 calculations, and undermines regional peace and sta21 bility’’ and urged Beijing to ‘‘cease its military, dip22 lomatic, and economic pressure and coercion against 

23 Taiwan’’. 

24 (8) The PRC has increased the frequency and 

25 scope of its exercises and operations targeting TaiVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:54 Nov 05, 2021 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3192.IS S3192

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1 wan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exer2 cises in the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights 

3 that encircle Taiwan, and flights across the unoffi4 cial median line in the Taiwan Strait. The destruc5 tion of Hong Kong’s autonomy by the Government 

6 of the PRC potentially accelerates the timeline of a 

7 Taiwan scenario and makes the defense of Taiwan 

8 an even more urgent priority. 

9 (9) In October 2021, the PRC adopted export 

10 controls on Chinese goods to Taiwan in an attempt 

11 to put more economic pressure on Taiwan. That fol12 lows an increase in PRC tactics to squeeze the econ13 omy of Taiwan, including banning certain exports 

14 and adopting the ‘‘31 measures’’ policy to induce 

15 brain drain on the island by providing government16 sponsored incentives for Taiwanese talent and busi17 nesses to move to the mainland. 

18 (10) The PRC launches massive cyber cam19 paigns against Taiwan. The Department of Cyber 

20 Security of Taiwan estimates that there are approxi21 mately 20,000,000 to 40,000,000 cyberattacks every 

22 month, most of which are suspected to be by the 

23 PRC. In July 2021, head of the Department of 

24 Cyber Security of Taiwan Chien Hung-wei told 

25 United States media that there was a ‘‘rather high 


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1 degree of confidence that many attacks originated 

2 from our neighbor [the PRC]’’ and warned that Tai3 wan’s ‘‘critical infrastructure, such as gas, water, 

4 and electricity are highly digitized, so [Taiwan] can 

5 easily fall victim’’. 

6 (11) The PRC continues to isolate Taiwan dip7 lomatically. The PRC has refused to allow Taiwan 

8 to attend annual summits of international organiza9 tions such as the International Civil Aviation Orga10 nization, the International Criminal Police Organiza11 tion (INTERPOL), and the World Health Organiza12 tion. 

13 (12) The PRC also uses its economic might to 

14 punish countries who seek closer ties with Taiwan. 

15 Most recently, in September 2021, the PRC denied 

16 Lithuania certain export licenses after Lithuania 

17 and Taiwan announced their intent to establish a 

18 Taiwan representative office in the city of Vilnius. 

19 (13) The PRC uses economic incentives such as 

20 massive investment promises to try to formalize rela21 tions with Taiwan’s remaining allies. Since 2016, 

22 seven countries—the Republic of Kiribati, the Sol23 omon Islands, the Dominican Republic, Burkina 

24 Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of 

25 Panama, and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome 


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1 and Principe—have shifted diplomatic recognition 

2 from Taipei to Beijing. 

3 (14) The PRC aims to use its growing military 

4 might in concert with other instruments of its na5 tional power to displace the United States in the 

6 Indo-Pacific and establish hegemony over the region. 

7 Achieving the annexation of Taiwan is a key step for 

8 the PRC to achieve those ambitions. 

9 (15) The defense of Taiwan is critical to— 

10 (A) retaining the credibility of the United 

11 States as a defender of the democratic values 

12 and free-market principles embodied by the peo13 ple and government of Taiwan; 

14 (B) limiting the ability of the PLA to 

15 project power beyond the First Island Chain, 

16 including to United States territory, such as 

17 Guam and Hawaii; 

18 (C) defending the territorial integrity of 

19 Japan; and 

20 (D) preventing the PLA from diverting 

21 military planning, resources, and personnel to 

22 broader military ambitions. 


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1 SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

2 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United 

3 States, in ensuring security in the Taiwan Strait, to pur4 sue the following objectives: 

5 (1) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific re6 mains favorable to the United States and its allies 

7 and partners. The United States and its allies and 

8 partners maintain unfettered access to the region 

9 and the PRC neither dominates the region nor co10 erces its neighbors, including Taiwan. 

11 (2) The allies and partners of the United 

12 States, including Taiwan— 

13 (A) maintain confidence in United States 

14 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa15 cific region; 

16 (B) can withstand and combat subversion 

17 and undue influence by the PRC; and 

18 (C) work with the United States to pro19 mote shared interests and values in the region. 

20 (3) The combined influence of the United 

21 States and its allies and partners is strong enough 

22 to demonstrate to the PRC that the risks of at23 tempts to annex Taiwan by coercion or force out24 weigh the potential benefits. 

25 (4) The United States deters the PRC from 

26 seeking military or other aggressive unilateral action 


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1 to change the status quo on Taiwan or in the Tai2 wan Strait. 

3 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, 

4 in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 

5 (1) to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as the 

6 most important political-military theater for United 

7 States foreign policy; 

8 (2) to prioritize resources for achieving United 

9 States political and military objectives in that most 

10 critical region; 

11 (3) to sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (22 

12 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances pro13 vided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 

14 as the foundations for United States-Taiwan rela15 tions; 

16 (4) to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the 

17 extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United 

18 States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support 

19 the development of capable, ready, and modern 

20 forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan; 

21 (5) to encourage and facilitate Taiwan’s accel22 erated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, 

23 which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan 

24 from invasion, including long-range precision fires, 

25 anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air 


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1 defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, con2 trol, communications, computers, intelligence, sur3 veillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and resilient 

4 command and control capabilities; 

5 (6) to increase the conduct of relevant and 

6 practical training and exercises with the defense 

7 forces of Taiwan, including, as appropriate, the Rim 

8 of the Pacific exercise, combined training at United 

9 States Army combat training centers and the United 

10 States Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 

11 United States Air Force Red Flag and Green Flag 

12 exercises, and bilateral naval exercises and training; 

13 (7) to use, in service of the policy described in 

14 paragraphs (5) and (6), existing tools such as for15 eign military sales and direct commercial sales, iden16 tify new tools, including foreign military financing 

17 for Taiwan under certain conditions, and explore 

18 greater industrial cooperation and co-production or 

19 co-development opportunities; 

20 (8) to prioritize the timely review of and re21 sponse to requests from Taiwan for defense articles 

22 and services within the United States acquisition 

23 system, and to ensure that such prioritization is the 

24 top priority of relevant Cabinet officials, including 

25 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense; 


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1 (9) to prioritize building the capacity of Taiwan 

2 to protect United States defense technology; 

3 (10) to design major defense capabilities for ex4 port; 

5 (11) to encourage Taiwan’s domestic production 

6 of certain defense capabilities; 

7 (12) to expand professional military education 

8 and technical training opportunities in the United 

9 States for military personnel of Taiwan; 

10 (13) to pursue a strategy of military engage11 ment with Taiwan that fully integrates exchanges at 

12 the strategic, policy, and functional levels; 

13 (14) to increase exchanges between senior de14 fense officials and general officers of the United 

15 States and Taiwan consistent with the Taiwan Trav16 el Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), espe17 cially for the purpose of enhancing cooperation on 

18 defense planning and improving the interoperability 

19 of the military forces of the United States and Tai20 wan; 

21 (15) to conduct exchanges with Taiwan specifi22 cally focused on improving the reserve force of Tai23 wan and to ensure the effectiveness of the All-Out 

24 Defense Mobilization Agency; 


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1 (16) to deter acts of aggression or coercion by 

2 the PRC against the interests of the United States 

3 and its allies, especially regarding Taiwan, by show4 ing PRC leaders that the United States can and is 

5 willing to deny them the ability to achieve their ob6 jectives, including by— 

7 (A) consistently demonstrating the political 

8 will of the United States to deepening existing 

9 treaty alliances and growing new partnerships 

10 as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra11 tegic advantage to the growing military capa12 bilities and reach of the PRC; 

13 (B) maintaining a system of forward-de14 ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the 

15 most visible sign of United States resolve and 

16 commitment to the region and as platforms to 

17 ensure United States operational readiness and 

18 advance interoperability with allies and part19 ners; 

20 (C) adopting a more dispersed force pos21 ture throughout the region, particularly the 

22 Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access 

23 for United States mobile and relocatable 

24 launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and 


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1 hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific 

2 region; 

3 (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike 

4 networks to United States and allied forces, in5 cluding ground-launched cruise missiles, under6 sea and naval capabilities, and integrated air 

7 and missile defense in the First Island Chain 

8 and the Second Island Chain, in order to im9 pose high risks on the PRC for operating in 

10 those zones and maximize the ability of the 

11 United States to operate; 

12 (E) strengthening extended deterrence to 

13 demonstrate that escalation against key United 

14 States interests would be costly, risky, and self15 defeating; and 

16 (F) collaborating with allies and partners 

17 to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar18 ing the burdens of mutual defense, including 

19 through the acquisition and fielding of advanced 

20 capabilities and training that will better enable 

21 them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; 

22 (17) to strengthen and deepen United States al23 liances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pa24 cific region, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi25 lateral cooperative initiatives that ensure peace and 


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1 stability in the Taiwan Strait, advance shared inter2 ests, and bolster partner countries’ confidence that 

3 the United States is and will remain a strong, com4 mitted, and constant partner; 

5 (18) to encourage and aid Taiwan to boost its 

6 own capabilities and resiliency to avoid and deter 

7 PRC military pressure in the Taiwan Strait; 

8 (19) to maintain United States access to the 

9 Western Pacific, including by— 

10 (A) increasing the qualitative advantage of 

11 United States forward-deployed forces in the 

12 Indo-Pacific region; 

13 (B) modernizing the United States military 

14 through investments in existing and new major 

15 platforms, emerging technologies, critical in-the16 ater force structure and enabling capabilities, 

17 operational concepts, and access agreements; 

18 and 

19 (C) operating and conducting exercises 

20 with allies and partners— 

21 (i) to prevent the PLA from gaining 

22 the ability to project power and establish 

23 contested zones within the First Island 

24 Chain and the Second Island Chain; 


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1 (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA 

2 to coerce its neighbors; and 

3 (iii) to maintain open sea and air 

4 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, 

5 the East China Sea, and the South China 

6 Sea; 

7 (20) to deter the PRC from— 

8 (A) coercing Taiwan, including by devel9 oping more combat-credible forces that are inte10 grated with Indo-Pacific allies and partners of 

11 the United States in contact, blunt, and surge 

12 layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of 

13 victory in the First Island Chain or Second Is14 land Chain and beyond, as called for in the 

15 2018 National Defense Strategy; 

16 (B) using gray-zone tactics below the level 

17 of armed conflict; or 

18 (C) initiating armed conflict; and 

19 (21) to convey to the PRC that, in the event 

20 that deterrence by denial fails, the United States, if 

21 necessary— 

22 (A) will impose prohibitive diplomatic, eco23 nomic, financial, reputational, and military 

24 costs on the PRC for its aggression; and 


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1 (B) will defend itself and its allies regard2 less of the point of origin of attacks against 

3 them. 

4 TITLE II—BOLSTERING UNITED 

5 STATES AND TAIWAN DE6 FENSE AND SECURITY 

7 SEC. 201. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT BY TAI8 WAN. 

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that— 

11 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and 

12 strengthen existing measures under the United 

13 States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide 

14 capabilities to Taiwan, prioritizing Taiwan in ac15 cordance with United States strategic imperatives; 

16 (2) the United States should design for export 

17 to Taiwan capabilities critical to maintaining a fa18 vorable military balance in the region, including 

19 long-range precision fires, air and missile defense 

20 systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise 

21 missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intel22 ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, 

23 and command and control systems; 

24 (3) the United States should pursue, to the 

25 maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology 


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1 security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems 

2 described in paragraph (2); and 

3 (4) the Secretary of State should— 

4 (A) urge Taiwan to invest in sufficient 

5 quantities of munitions to meet contingency re6 quirements and avoid the need for accessing 

7 United States stocks in wartime; and 

8 (B) cooperate with Taiwan to deliver such 

9 munitions, or when necessary, to increase the 

10 capacity of Taiwan to produce such munitions. 

11 (b) REPORT.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

13 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

14 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De15 fense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

16 committees a report that— 

17 (A) describes United States priorities for 

18 building more capable Taiwan security forces 

19 and organizations; and 

20 (B) identifies statutory, regulatory, or 

21 other obstacles to advancing such priorities. 

22 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

23 required by paragraph (1) shall— 

24 (A) provide a priority list of defense and 

25 military capabilities that Taiwan must possess 


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1 for the United States to be able to achieve its 

2 military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region; 

3 (B) identify, from the list referred to in 

4 subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 

5 provided, or can only be provided, by the 

6 United States; 

7 (C) identify— 

8 (i) actions required to prioritize 

9 United States Government resources and 

10 personnel to expedite fielding the capabili11 ties identified under subparagraph (B); 

12 and 

13 (ii) steps needed to fully account for 

14 and a plan to integrate all means of 

15 United States foreign military sales, direct 

16 commercial sales, security assistance, and 

17 all applicable authorities of the Depart18 ment of State and the Department of De19 fense; 

20 (D) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 

21 requirements for United States security assist22 ance for Taiwan, including resources and per23 sonnel limits, legislative and policy barriers, and 

24 factors related to specific partner countries; 


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1 (E) identify limitations on the ability of 

2 the United States to provide the capabilities de3 scribed in paragraph (A), including the capabili4 ties identified under subparagraph (B), because 

5 of existing United States treaty obligations or 

6 United States statutes, regulations, or other 

7 policies; 

8 (F) recommend changes to existing stat9 utes, regulations, or other policies that would 

10 reduce or eliminate limitations on providing 

11 critical capabilities to Taiwan; 

12 (G) identify requirements to streamline the 

13 International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

14 under subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, 

15 Code of Federal Regulations, that would enable 

16 more effective delivery of capabilities to Taiwan; 

17 (H) recommend improvements to the proc18 ess for developing requirements for Taiwan’s 

19 capabilities; and 

20 (I) recommend other statutory, regulatory, 

21 or policy changes that would improve delivery 

22 timelines. 

23 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

24 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

25 include a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FOR2 EIGN MILITARY FINANCING GRANT ASSIST3 ANCE TO TAIWAN. 

4 (a) TAIWAN SECURITY PROGRAMS.—In addition to 

5 amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated for For6 eign Military Financing, there is authorized to be appro7 priated to the Department of State for Taiwan Foreign 

8 Military Finance grant assistance programs 

9 $2,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2023 to 2032. 

10 (b) RESTRICTIONS ON TAIWAN FOREIGN MILITARY

11 FINANCING.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated 

12 under subsection (a) shall be available only if— 

13 (1) Taiwan commits to match spending on a 

14 dollar-for-dollar basis; and 

15 (2) the United States and Taiwan formally 

16 agree— 

17 (A) to conduct joint long-range planning 

18 for capability development; and 

19 (B) on the expenditure of such amounts. 

20 SEC. 203. ELIGIBILITY OF TAIWAN FOR FOREIGN MILITARY 

21 SALES AND EXPORT STATUS UNDER THE 

22 ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT. 

23 The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 

24 seq.) is amended— 

25 (1) in sections 3(d)(2)(B), 3(d)(3)(A)(i), 

26 (3)(d)(5), 21(e)(2)(A), 36(b)(1), 36(b)(2), 36(b)(6), 


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1 36(c)(2)(A), 36(d)(2)(A), 62(c)(1), and 63(a)(2), by 

2 inserting ‘‘Taiwan,’’ before ‘‘or New Zealand’’ each 

3 place it appears; 

4 (2) in section 3(b)(2), by inserting ‘‘the Govern5 ment of Taiwan,’’ before ‘‘or the Government of 

6 New Zealand’’; and 

7 (3) in sections 21(h)(1)(A) and 21(h)(2), by in8 serting ‘‘Taiwan,’’ before ‘‘or Israel’’ each place it 

9 appears. 

10 SEC. 204. REPORT ON ADVANCING THE DEFENSE OF TAI11 WAN. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

13 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

14 for a period of seven years, the Secretary of State and 

15 the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appro16 priate congressional committees a report on Taiwan’s en17 hancement of its self-defense capabilities. 

18 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re19 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 

20 (1) An assessment of the commitment of Tai21 wan to implementing the tenets of the Overall De22 fense Concept, and what steps Taiwan has and has 

23 not taken to implement those tenets. 


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1 (2) An assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to 

2 acquire and employ within its forces asymmetric ca3 pabilities, including— 

4 (A) long-range precision fires; 

5 (B) air and missile defense systems; 

6 (C) anti-ship cruise missiles; 

7 (D) land attack cruise missiles; 

8 (E) conventional hypersonic systems; 

9 (F) mining and countermining capabilities; 

10 (G) intelligence, surveillance, and recon11 naissance capabilities; 

12 (H) command and control systems; and 

13 (I) any other defense capabilities the Sec14 retary of State and the Secretary of Defense 

15 jointly determine are crucial to the defense of 

16 Taiwan. 

17 (3) An evaluation of the balance between con18 ventional and asymmetric capabilities in the defense 

19 force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report 

20 is submitted. 

21 (4) An assessment of steps by Taiwan to en22 hance the overall readiness of its defense forces, in23 cluding— 


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1 (A) the extent to which Taiwan is requir2 ing and providing regular training to such 

3 forces; 

4 (B) the extent to which such training is re5 alistic to the security environment Taiwan 

6 faces; and 

7 (C) the sufficiency of the financial and 

8 budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward 

9 readiness of such forces. 

10 (5) An assessment of steps by Taiwan to ensure 

11 that the Taiwan Reserve Command can recruit, 

12 train, and equip its forces. 

13 (6) An evaluation of— 

14 (A) the severity of manpower shortages in 

15 the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve 

16 forces; 

17 (B) the impact of such shortages in the 

18 event of a conflict scenario; and 

19 (C) Taiwan’s efforts to address such short20 ages. 

21 (7) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to boost 

22 its civilian defenses, including any informational 

23 campaigns to make aware the risks of Taiwan’s se24 curity environment to the population of Taiwan. 


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1 (8) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to se2 cure its critical infrastructure, including in transpor3 tation, telecommunications networks, and energy. 

4 (9) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to en5 hance its cybersecurity, including the security of ci6 vilian government and military networks. 

7 (10) An assessment of any significant gaps in 

8 any of the matters described in paragraphs (1) 

9 through (9) with respect to which the United States 

10 assesses that additional action is needed. 

11 (11) A description of cooperative efforts be12 tween the United States and Taiwan on the matters 

13 described in paragraphs (1) through (10). 

14 (12) A description of resistance within the Gov15 ernment of Taiwan to implementing the matters de16 scribed in paragraphs (1) through (9) or to United 

17 States support or engagement with regard to those 

18 matters. 

19 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 

20 shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an 

21 unclassified summary. 

Æ 


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