IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-0124

Filed March 9, 2016

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C.,

Minor Child,

A.C., Father,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Mark F. Schlenker, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for 

appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

M. Kathryn Miller of the Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des 

Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2

DOYLE, Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, C.C.1 

He concedes the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the elements 

necessary to satisfy the grounds upon which his rights were terminated. Instead, 

he argues the juvenile court failed to consider the best interests of the child and 

erred in finding that the exceptions to termination found in Iowa Code section 

232.116(3) (2015) did not apply. Acknowledging that because of his present 

incarceration, he cannot presently take custody of the child, he asks the court for 

additional time so that when he has completed his treatment program, he can 

take custody of the child. We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings 

de novo. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014).

The three-step statutory framework governing the termination of parental 

rights is well established and need not be repeated here. See In re P.L., 778 

N.W.2d 33, 40-41 (Iowa 2010). Upon our de novo review, we find the juvenile 

court issued a thorough and well-reasoned ruling terminating the father’s parental 

rights, and we adopt its findings of fact and conclusions of law as our own.

The father has a long history of substance abuse and incarceration. He 

has made numerous attempts at drug counseling and therapy, which has 

included both in-patient and outpatient treatment. He was counseled for heroin 

and opiate addiction at the Iowa Residential Treatment Center. He then started 

using methamphetamine, trading one addiction for another.

C.C. was born in March 2014, and the father was released from prison for 

the second time shortly thereafter in July 2014. He started using

 

1 The mother’s parental rights were also terminated. She has withdrawn her appeal.
3

methamphetamine with the mother on a regular basis in August 2014, including 

times when C.C. was in their home. Due to the mother’s jail sentence, the child 

was removed from his mother’s care in January 2015 and was placed in the care 

of relatives. The father was not deemed suitable for placement because he 

tested positive for methamphetamine.

The father continued using until his arrest in June 2015. In November 

2015, the father was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling eight years’ 

incarceration, but he was granted probation for two years and sentenced to a 

residential treatment facility for maximum benefits. He was incarcerated at the 

time of the December 2015 hearing and awaiting placement into the twelvemonth inpatient-treatment program, during which time he could not have custody 

of the child. At the time of the December 2015 termination hearing, C.C. was 

less than two years old.

As we have stated numerous times, children are not equipped with pause 

buttons. “The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents 

experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 

609, 613 (Iowa 1987). While the law requires a “full measure of patience with 

troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience 

has been built into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 

489, 494 (Iowa 2000). Our supreme court has explained that “the legislature, in 

cases meeting the conditions of [the Iowa Code], has made a categorical 

determination that the needs of a child are promoted by termination of parental 

rights.” In re M.W., 458 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990) (discussing then Iowa 

Code section 232.116(1)(e)). Consequently, “[t]ime is a critical element,” and 
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parents simply “cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time 

periods for reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in 

parenting.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495. At some point, as is the case here, the 

rights and needs of the child must rise above the rights and needs of the parent. 

See In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). The public policy of 

the state having been legislatively set, we are obligated to heed the statutory 

time periods for reunification.

In its ruling, the juvenile court noted the father had almost a year to 

resolve the issues that caused the child to be removed and had made no 

progress, even when facing the potential prospect of termination of his parental 

rights. After our de novo review of the record, we agree with the court’s finding 

that there is insufficient evidence to merit granting the father any additional time 

for resolution of the matters that gave rise to the case. We likewise concur with 

the juvenile court’s conclusion that the child should not and does not have to wait 

to see if his father can kick his drug habit after another year of counseling. Even 

the father agreed that C.C. should not have to wait until at least December 2016 

to know where he is going to stay. All the father could say was, “I think it’s the 

best thing for him to be with his mother and father.” We conclude any additional 

time in limbo would not be in the child’s best interests.

For the same reasons, we agree with the juvenile court that terminating 

the father’s parental rights would be less detrimental to the child than the harm 

that would be caused by continuing the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(c) (permitting the juvenile court to eschew termination of parental 

rights if it finds there is clear and convincing evidence the termination would be 
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detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship). 

Though the record discloses a bond between the father and the child, the 

juvenile court’s assessment is spot on—the long range prospects of the child 

“growing up healthy and nurtured with these parents are minimal at best.” The 

child would be required to continue in foster care or relative placement while

awaiting for the father to resolve his longstanding substance-abuse issues—the 

issues which precipitated the juvenile court proceedings. After reviewing all the 

evidence, we agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the child’s best 

interests and that none of the mitigating factors in section 232.116(3) apply to 

overcome that determination.

Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s 

parental rights.

AFFIRMED.