2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-2-2012

James Douris v. State of New Jersey

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1010

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Recommended Citation

"James Douris v. State of New Jersey" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 330.

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DLD-280 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1010

___________

JAMES GEORGE DOURIS,

Appellant

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02836)

District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

September 13, 2012

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 2, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

James George Douris appeals from an order or 
2

orders1

I.

of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey. Because no substantial 

question is presented by his appeal, we will summarily 

affirm the District Court’s orders.

Because the parties are familiar with the facts of 

the case, we will set forth only those facts necessary 

to understanding the appeal. Douris, who alleges a 

number of disabilities, filed a complaint against the 

State of New Jersey (“the State”) with claims stemming 

from an incident in which he was ticketed in May 2008 

for failure to wear a seat belt. Before the State 

answered, Douris filed a First Amended Complaint. In 

that complaint, Douris alleged that he was injured at 

the Hopewell Township Municipal Court and at the 

Lawrence Township Municipal Court when he tried to 

access those courts in order to contest his ticket. He 

alleged that the courts were not compliant with Title 

 1 See Section II, infra.
3

II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Douris’s complaint also 

alleged that the New Jersey Superior Court in Trenton 

was not ADA compliant, because the court papers were in 

small type. In paragraph 20 of the amended complaint, 

Douris alleged that he was denied access to viewing a 

criminal trial at the Superior Court of New Jersey in 

New Brunswick, in violation of the ADA. 

The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended

complaint, arguing that Douris could not relitigate the 

propriety of his seat-belt ticket, due to the RookerFeldman doctrine,2

 2 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal court review of 

“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

before the district court proceedings commenced and 

inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments”). At the time Douris filed his federal 

complaint, he had already contested his traffic ticket 

in municipal courts in New Jersey and lost, and had 

attempted to appeal the guilty finding in the Superior 

Court of New Jersey. We agree that the District Court 

could not entertain an appeal of the guilty finding.

and that Douris’s other claims should 
4

be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. 

R. Civ. P.”). After a hearing, the District Court 

agreed, and dismissed the amended complaint with 

prejudice, with the exception of the allegations in 

paragraph 20 of the complaint, which the District Court 

dismissed without prejudice, as the allegations were

unrelated to the remainder of the complaint. The Court 

explained in its ruling that Douris could bring the 

claims raised in paragraph 20 in a new complaint, if he 

desired.

About a week later, Douris filed a “Motion to the 

Court to File a Second Amended Complaint.” The motion 

argued that the District Court erred by dismissing his 

complaint without giving him an opportunity to file 

another amended complaint. Douris attached a proposed 

Second Amended Complaint. A magistrate judge denied the 

motion as moot, stating that the matter was closed and 

that Douris had not sought leave to reopen. Less than 
5

a week later, Douris filed a document titled, 

“Plaintiff’s Motion as the Court Allowed Plaintiff the 

Right to Amend the First Amended Complaint with no Time 

Limit to Amend.” The District Court then entered an 

order denying Douris’s motion to file a second amended 

complaint, and stated that any claims he would like to 

raise related to paragraph 20 of the complaint “must be 

filed as a new complaint, rather than an amended 

complaint, to initiate a new case under a separate 

docket number.” Douris appealed two days later.

II.

We construe Douris’s “Motion to the Court to File a 

Second Amended Complaint”3

 3 It is not clear that the Magistrate Judge had the 

authority to decide Douris’s post-decision motion to 

amend his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (B) 

(authorizing magistrate judge to hear and determine 

pretrial matters, and to conduct hearings and submit 

proposed findings of fact and recommendations for 

disposition in posttrial criminal matters); Colorado 

Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen Constr. 

Co., 879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989) (decisions in 

matters referred to magistrate judge under “additional 

duties” provision of § 636(b)(3) are not directly 

appealable to court of appeals). Because Douris’s 

and his “Motion as the Court 
6

Allowed Plaintiff the Right to Amend the First Amended 

Complaint with no Time Limit to Amend” as motions to 

reconsider the District Court’s November 7, 2011 order 

dismissing his complaint. Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 

201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (courts may consider postjudgment motions as motions filed pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)). As each motion was 

filed within 28 days of the November 7th order, the 

time to appeal that order began to run “from the entry 

of the order disposing of the last [of the two] 

motion[s].” Rule 4(a)(4)(A), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure (“Fed. R. App. P.”). We thus have 

jurisdiction to review the November 7th order, and the 

order denying Douris’s second motion to amend the 

complaint.4

 

motion to amend his complaint was ultimately heard by 

the District Court, we will review that final order.

 

4

 We note that Douris’s notice of appeal mentions 

only the December 28, 2011 order denying his last 

motion. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), an 

appellant must “designate the judgment, order, or part 

thereof being appealed.” Courts generally construe 
7

III.

We first turn to the November 7th order granting 

the State’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. 

Our review of a district court's order granting a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is 

plenary. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 

230 (3d Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

 

submissions from a pro se litigant liberally and hold 

them “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 

655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). However, Douris is 

an experienced litigator. See Douris v. Middletown 

Township, 293 F. App’x 130, 132-33 (2008) (district 

court did not err in denying in forma pauperis status 

based on Douris’s abusive filings). Nevertheless, in 

this instance, we will give Douris the benefit of 

liberal construction. Douris is cautioned that any 

future notices of appeal should conform to Rule 3. 

, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 

We may affirm a district court for any reason supported 
8

by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman

A.

, 637 F.3d 187, 191 

(3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

We agree that Douris’s claims against the New 

Jersey Superior Court failed to state a claim for 

relief under the ADA. In order to state a claim for 

relief under Title II of the ADA, “a plaintiff must 

allege: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a 

disability; (2) that he was either excluded from 

participation in or denied the benefits of some public 

entity's services, programs, or activities or was 

otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such 

exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by 

reason of his disability.” 

Claims Involving the New Jersey Superior Court

Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 

24, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Parker v. Universidad 

de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000)); 42 

U.S.C. § 12132. Douris’s complaint alleges facts that 

would establish that he is a qualified individual with 

a disability, but the complaint fails to plead factual 
9

matter that would allow the Court to infer that he was 

“excluded from participation” or “denied benefits” at 

the Superior Court because of his disabilities.

The amended complaint alleges that Douris appealed 

his seat-belt violation at “the State Superior Court in 

Trenton New Jersey at such time the access to the Court 

was not accessible to Douris in his wheelchair,” and 

that he was “unable to proceed with the appeal and the 

appeal died.” Amended complaint, dkt. #4-1, ¶5. The 

complaint does not explain why or when the court was 

inaccessible, but Douris explained at oral argument in 

the District Court that “there were some bird droppings 

that were bothersome to him, so he didn’t enter one 

day,” and that “there were issues with moving up and 

down to different floors; there’s elevators, but they 

may be mechanical and there may be a need for sheriff’s 

officers to help Mr. Douris.” Dist. Ct. Op., dkt. #68, 

at 5. Thus, it appears that Douris was not excluded 

from the courthouse; rather, he chose not to enter, and 
10

when he did enter, he was assisted when he needed to 

move between floors.

The amended complaint alleges that the New Jersey 

courts failed to provide him with legal counsel, but 

there is no requirement under the ADA that courts 

provide legal counsel for a person with disabilities. 

Whether counsel should have been provided is a matter 

that could have been litigated within the appeal from 

Douris’s conviction.

The amended complaint alleges that the “papers and 

legal case law” at the Superior Court in Trenton were 

not readable, presumably because the type was too 

small. It is not clear whether Douris sought any 

accommodations; e.g., by asking that specific legal 

provisions be enlarged. Further, Douris’s complaint 

concedes that when he had trouble reading court orders, 

the judge rewrote them in larger print so that he could 

see them. Amended complaint, dkt. #4-1, ¶19. Thus, 

Douris’s complaint does not show that he was excluded
11

from participation in the appeal because of the small 

type.

Douris’s amended complaint also alleged that he was 

unable to access the Superior Court in New Brunswick on 

an unknown date as a public viewer because there were 

“locked doors.” Douris does not allege factual matter 

that would allow the court to infer that he was 

excluded from the proceeding because of his disability. 

If the doors were locked, then nobody would have been

able to enter the court, disability or no disability.

B. Claims Involving New Jersey Municipal Courts

Along with its motion to dismiss, the State of New 

Jersey provided affidavits and certifications to 

support the motion with regard to claims involving the 

municipal courts. Douris also provided numerous 

exhibits in connection with his responses. “[B]ecause 

the District Court reviewed affidavits and other 

documents outside of the pleadings in evaluating [the 

State’s] motion to dismiss, we review the record 

 
12

pursuant to Rule 56 [of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure].” Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 570 (3d 

Cir. 2001); Rule 12(b)(6). We review a district 

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the 

same standard as the district court. Pichler v. UNITE

Summary judgment was appropriate here on the claims 

involving the municipal courts. The State of New 

Jersey, the only named defendant, provided affidavits 

noting that the Hopewell Township Municipal Court and 

the Lawrence County Municipal Court are under the 

control and authority of Hopewell Township and Lawrence 

Township, respectively, and not under the control of 

the State of New Jersey. 

, 

542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if the record reveals “no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

See also N.J. Stat. Ann. 

2B:12-15 (“Suitable courtrooms, chambers, offices, 

equipment and supplies for the municipal court, its 
13

administrator's office and its violations bureau shall 

be provided by the municipality or by a county that has 

established a central municipal court.”). Thus, 

Douris’s allegations that he was injured at those 

courts, and that those courts are not ADA-compliant, 

are not proper claims against the State of New Jersey.5

C.

Douris’s amended complaint also contained claims 

pursuant to the state’s law against discrimination. 

Because the District Court properly dismissed all of 

the federal claims, the Court did not abuse its 

discretion in dismissing the state-law claims as well. 

New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

 5 Claims under Title II of the ADA are subject to 

the statute of limitations for personal injury claims 

in the state in which they are raised. Disabled in 

Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 

2008). New Jersey has a two-year statute of 

limitations for personal injury claims. N.J. Stat. 

Ann. 2A:14-2. It thus appears that most, if not all, 

of Douris’s claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations. Because the statute of limitations is an 

affirmative defense, and because the State did not 

raise the issue in the District Court, we do not rely 

on the untimeliness of the claims as a basis for 

affirming the District Court’s dismissal.
14

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).6

IV.

In his post-dismissal motions to amend his 

complaint, Douris argues that the District Court should 

have given him an opportunity to amend his complaint 

before dismissing (the bulk of) his claims with

prejudice. We agree. “[I]f a complaint is subject to 

a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit 

a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be 

inequitable or futile.” Phillips

 6 We also affirm the District Court’s decision to 

deny injunctive relief. Douris apparently clarified at 

oral argument that he sought an injunction against 

officers issuing him tickets in the future for not 

wearing his seat belt. Whether Douris is required to 

wear a seat belt is a matter that was considered by the 

state courts when Douris contested his traffic 

violation, and we do not discern any violation of the 

ADA in New Jersey's enforcement of the seat belt laws. 

See N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:3-76.2g (providing exception to 

seat belt requirement if "driver or passenger possesses 

a written verification from a licensed physician that 

the driver or passenger is unable to wear a safety seat 

belt system for physical or medical reasons").

, 515 F.3d at 245-46 

(citation omitted). We need not remand for further 

proceedings, however, because Douris submitted his 
15

proposed amended complaint to the District Court, and 

his proposed amendment does not cure the defects that 

we have discussed above.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons given by 

the District Court, we will affirm the District Court’s 

judgment.