UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4321

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO DONTA KEITT,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-4461

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TREMAINE ANTWAUN BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle of 

North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief 

District Judge, Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:14-cr00285-WO-4, 1:14-cr-00285-CCE-1)

Submitted: March 30, 2016 Decided: April 25, 2016

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sue Genrich Berry, BOWEN & BERRY, PLLC, Lumberton, North 

Carolina; Raymond C. Tarlton, TARLTON LAW PLLC, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellants. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Graham Tod Green, Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant United

States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Antonio Donta Keitt and Tremaine Antwaun Brown pled guilty, 

pursuant to written plea agreements, to the following: (1) 

Keitt pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and 

distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine

base, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846 (Counts 1 and 16); 

(2) Brown pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base

and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Counts 1 and 21). 

Keitt was sentenced to 144 months on each count, to run 

concurrently. Brown was sentenced to a total term of 204 

months’ imprisonment. They appeal and have filed a joint brief. 

Keitt asserts that the district court plainly erred in applying 

a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a premises 

for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance, U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2D1.1(b)(12), and erred in 

applying the two-level firearm enhancement, id. § 2D1.1(b)(1). 

Brown argues that the factual basis was insufficient to support 

his guilty plea to the firearm offense.* Finding no error, we 

affirm. 

 *We note that, although Brown’s plea agreement contains an 

appellate waiver provision, the Government has not unequivocally 

asserted the waiver. Accordingly, we will not sua sponte apply 

(Continued)
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No. 15-4321. Keitt raises two issues regarding his 

sentence. His first claim—that the district court erroneously 

applied the two-level enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12)—is 

reviewed for plain error as he did not challenge the enhancement 

in the district court. To satisfy the plain error standard, 

Keitt must show (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that 

affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640-41 (4th 

Cir. 2013). Keitt cannot meet this standard.

The Guidelines provide that “[i]f the defendant maintained 

a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a 

controlled substance, increase [the sentence] by 2 levels.” 

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12). According to the Guidelines commentary, 

“[a]mong the factors the court should consider in determining 

whether the defendant maintained the premises are (A) whether 

the defendant held a possessory interest in (e.g., owned or 

rented) the premises and (B) the extent to which the defendant 

controlled access to, or activities at, the premises.” Id. § 

2D1.1 cmt. n.17. “Manufacturing or distributing a controlled 

 

the waiver. See United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th 

Cir. 2005).
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substance need not be the sole purpose for which the premises 

were maintained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or 

principal uses for the premises.” Id. 

Keitt does not dispute that the controlled purchases were 

made at his residence. Moreover, a search of the residence 

after the controlled purchases resulted in the seizure of 

fifteen ounces of cocaine base and $5600 in cash. There are 

also statements in the record from witnesses detailing drug 

activity at Keitt’s residence, including a statement that 

Keitt’s residence was a known “crack house.” On these facts, 

Keitt cannot establish that the application of the § 

2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement constituted plain error affecting his 

substantial rights.

Next, Keitt asserts that the district court improperly 

applied the two-level Guidelines enhancement for possession of a 

firearm. We review application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement 

for clear error. United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 630–31 

(4th Cir. 2010). In order for the enhancement to apply, “the 

Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the weapon was possessed in connection with drug activity that 

was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the 

offense of conviction.” Id. at 628–29 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[P]roof of constructive possession of the [firearm] 
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is sufficient, and the Government is entitled to rely on 

circumstantial evidence to carry its burden.” Id. If the 

Government carries its burden, “[t]he enhancement should be 

applied . . . unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon 

was connected with the offense.” USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A). The 

defendant bears the burden of establishing such a clear 

improbability. United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 189 (4th 

Cir. 2011). Keitt cannot make this showing. 

In addition to a co-conspirator’s testimony that he saw 

Keitt in possession of a firearm, other witnesses provided 

statements that there was widespread possession of firearms 

among members of the conspiracy. Thus, the district court did 

not clearly err in finding that possession of firearms by other 

conspirators was foreseeable to Keitt. See United States v. 

Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding firearm 

enhancement where possession by co-conspirators was reasonably 

foreseeable to defendant). 

No. 15-4461. Brown’s only claim on appeal is that the 

amended factual basis presented by the Government was 

insufficient to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 

for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense. Brown did not challenge the factual basis during his 

Rule 11 hearing, other than to note his disagreement with being 
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characterized as a leader or organizer of the conspiracy. 

Therefore, review is for plain error. United States v. 

Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 656–57 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Government was required to 

show that Brown knowingly and unlawfully possessed a firearm in 

furtherance of the specified drug trafficking crime. See United 

States v. Moore, 769 F.3d 264, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2014) 

(identifying elements and standard of review), cert. denied, 135 

S. Ct. 1463 (2015). In other words, “§ 924(c) requires the 

government to present evidence indicating that the possession of 

a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward a drug 

trafficking crime.” United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 

(4th Cir. 2002). 

The evidence presented in the amended factual basis was 

sufficient to establish the necessary elements to support 

Brown’s conviction on the § 924(c) count. The amended factual 

basis included statements from a witness that Brown “always had 

a gun” for protection in case “Somebody roll up on me it’s a 

done deal.” J.A. 147. In addition, the amended factual basis 

stated that “[c]ooperating witnesses indicate that during the 

conspiracy [Brown and other named conspirators] were in 

possession of firearms.” J.A. 144. The district court’s

reliance on these facts was not plainly erroneous.
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Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in 

the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED