Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2736 | June 10, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT W.J.

Michael B. Troemel

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT M.R.

Jennifer L. Schrontz

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Frances H. Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of W.J.J (Minor Child)

and

W.J. and M.R. (Parents),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

June 10, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-2736

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Nancy L. 

Gettinger, Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D03-1908-JT-120
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2736 | June 10, 2020 Page 2 of 8

Bradford, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] M.R. (“Mother”) and W.J. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the 

biological parents of W.J.J. (“Child”). Prior to Child’s birth, Parents’ parental 

rights to another child were terminated. Since his birth, Child has twice been 

adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). During the second 

set of CHINS proceedings, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

requested that the juvenile court find that it was no longer required to make 

reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family pursuant to Indiana Code 

section 31-34-21-5.6(b) (“the No Reasonable Efforts Statute”). Following a 

hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS’s motion. DCS subsequently filed a 

petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. Parents appeal the 

juvenile court’s order granting DCS’s petition. In challenging the termination 

of their parental rights to Child, Parents contend that the No Reasonable Efforts 

Statute is unconstitutional. Because we conclude otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the biological parents of Child, who was born on October 26, 2017. 

Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS at birth after his cord tissue tested 

positive for morphine. The case was successfully closed with reunification with 

Mother on June 4, 2018. 
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[3] On March 21, 2019, DCS received a report alleging that Child was a victim of 

neglect due to substance abuse by Mother. On April 1, 2019, Mother was 

observed to be under the influence while acting as Child’s sole caregiver. 

Mother submitted to a drug screen which “returned positive for 

methamphetamine and fentanyl.” Ex. Vol. I, p. 26. On April 4, 2019, DCS 

removed Child from Mother’s care. At the time, Mother “appeared to be under 

the influence of substances as evidenced by the following: hand tremors, 

excessive nervousness, sweating, difficulty keeping eyes open, and she could 

not follow a clear timeline.” Ex. Vol. I, p. 26. 

[4] A few days later, DCS filed a second petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. 

In this petition, DCS indicated that Mother was the sole caregiver of Child 

because Father was incarcerated.1 Mother “admitted to being an addict, and 

indicated [that] she [did] not want to participate in a residential or outpatient 

treatment program[] for her substance[-]abuse issues.” Ex. Vol. I, p. 26. DCS 

also outlined Mother’s history of substance-abuse issues and neglect, stating as 

follows: 

p. Mother was a perpetrator of neglect on 01/22/10 due to

caregiver impairment with use of marijuana for 2 reports, other 

minors were the Victims; an out-of-home CHINS was filed and

opened, and the case was successfully closed with reunification 

on 07/09/10.

1

 The record reveals that Father was incarcerated for the entirety of the underlying CHINS and termination 

proceedings, with the possible exception of a few days. His current release date is scheduled for May 18, 

2022. See https://www.in.gov/apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs?previous_page=1&detail=163009 (last visited 

May 28, 2020). 
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q. Mother was a perpetrator of neglect on 11/22/13 due to

caregiver impairment with use of marijuana and cocaine, another 

minor was the Victim; an out-of-home CHINS was filed and

opened and ended with reunification with [the child’s] father in 

that case. 

r. Mother was a perpetrator of neglect on 12/02/14 due to

caregiver impairment with use of marijuana and cocaine, other 

minors were the victims; an out[-]of[-]home CHINS was filed 

and opened and the case was closed with TPR and adoption.

Ex. Vol. I, p. 26. The juvenile court subsequently adjudged the Child to be a 

CHINS.

[5] On June 13, 2019, DCS filed a motion in which it requested that the juvenile 

court “issue an order finding that [DCS] is not required to make reasonable 

efforts to preserve and reunify the family” pursuant to the No Reasonable 

Efforts Statute. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 19. Parents objected to DCS’s 

motion. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS’s motion. 

Child’s permanency plan was subsequently changed to adoption. 

[6] On August 7, 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to 

Child. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 16, 

2019, after which it took the matter under advisement. On October 24, 2019, 

the juvenile court entered an order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision
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[7] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their child. Bester v. 

Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although 

parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the 

termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their 

parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), 

trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be 

subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental 

rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is 

threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly 

harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently 

impaired before terminating the parent–child relationship. Id.

[8] In appealing from the termination of their parental rights to Child, Parents do 

not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

order.2 Instead, they challenge the constitutionality of the No Reasonable 

Efforts Statute.

Whether a statute is constitutional on its face is a question of law. 

When the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we 

review the matter de novo. Further, legislation under 

constitutional attack is clothed in a presumption of 

2

 Parents challenge only one of the juvenile court’s finding, that being that Father was offered services while 

incarcerated. Parents, however, do not challenge any of the juvenile court’s other findings or conclusions 

and, as such, we accept the juvenile court’s findings as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 

1992) (providing that unchallenged findings of the trial court must be accepted as correct).
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constitutionality. The challenger has the burden to rebut this 

presumption. All reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of 

an act’s constitutionality. When a statute can be so construed to 

support its constitutionality, we must adopt such a construction.

G.B. v. Dearborn Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2001) (internal citations omitted). The No Reasonable Efforts Statute 

provides in relevant part, 

Reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child’s parent, 

guardian, or custodian or preserve a child’s family ... are not 

required if the court finds any of the following:

****

(4) The parental rights of a parent with respect to a biological or 

adoptive sibling of a child who is a child in need of services have 

been involuntarily terminated by a court under:

(A) IC 31-35-2 (involuntary termination involving a 

delinquent child or a child in need of services)[.]

Indiana Code § 31-34-21-5.6(b).

[9] Parents challenge the constitutionality of the No Reasonable Efforts Statute on 

due process grounds. “Federal and state substantive due process analysis is 

identical.” G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1031. “In setting forth a claim for a violation of 

substantive due process, a party must show either that the law infringes upon a 

fundamental right or liberties deeply rooted in our nation’s history or that the 

law does not bear a substantial relation to permissible state objectives.” Id. In 

concluding that the No Reasonable Efforts Statute did not violate a parent’s due 

process rights, we stated the following: 
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We have previously found that a parent’s fundamental right to 

raise his or her child without undue interference from the state is 

not unlimited because the state has a compelling interest in 

protecting the welfare of children. When parents neglect, abuse, 

or abandon their children, the state has the authority under its 

parens patriae power to intervene. This statute serves that 

compelling interest.

Further, the challenged statute is not more intrusive than 

necessary to protect the welfare of children. Specifically, the 

statute is narrowly tailored to include only those parents who 

have had at least one chance to reunify with a different child 

through the aid of governmental resources and have failed to do 

so....

Because Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.6 serves a compelling 

state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, it does 

not violate substantive due process under the Indiana and United 

States Constitutions.

Id. at 1032 (internal citations omitted). We reached the same conclusion in 

Matter of S.G. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 67 N.E.3d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2017).

[10] Parents “concede[] that the [No Reasonable Efforts Statute] has been upheld 

several times” but “urge this court to review the constitutionality of this statute 

through the eyes and perspective of the child.” Appellants’ Br. p. 8. In support, 

Parents assert that Child had a due process right to be raised by his biological 

parents. Parents cite to no authority for this proposition, and our research has 

uncovered none. Parents merely argue that Child “should have been given the 

opportunity for his parents to succeed, despite their past failings in the prior 
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involuntary TPR” and for Child, “there has been a rush to judgment.” 

Appellants’ Br. p. 13. 

[11] To the contrary, we agree with DCS that “[f]ar from rushing to judgment, DCS 

has spent years working with Parents and their children.” Appellee’s Br. p. 25. 

Parents have not demonstrated an ability to remedy the reoccurring issues that 

have led to the removal of multiple children from their care. The Indiana 

Supreme Court, noting a child’s interest in and need for permanency, has held 

that “children have an interest in terminating parental rights that prevent 

adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous 

relationships.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). “A parent’s 

historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent’s 

current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental 

rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family 

& Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Parents have 

demonstrated both a historical and current inability to provide a safe and 

suitable living environment for Child. As such, considering the applicability of 

the No Reasonable Efforts Statute from Child’s perspective would warrant the 

same result.

[12] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.