COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and 

 Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

RAY LYNN KNOTT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0983-97-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 APRIL 21, 1998 

BONNIE LOU PAINTER (KNOTT) 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE COUNTY 

Joshua L. Robinson, Judge Designate 

 Arthur L. Goff (Robert O. Goff; Robert O. 

Goff, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Rodger L. Smith (Rodger L. Smith, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Ray Lynn Knott was found in contempt of court for failure to 

pay his former wife $5,000 as provided in their property 

settlement agreement. Knott appeals arguing that the provision 

was neither alimony nor child support and, therefore, could not 

be enforced by contempt. We find that the provision could be 

enforced by contempt and affirm the trial court. 

 The parties entered a property settlement agreement that the 

trial court affirmed, ratified, approved, and incorporated by 

reference into the final decree of divorce. The decree ordered 

the parties to comply with the terms of the agreement. The 

parties had no children, and the property settlement agreement 

waived spousal support but did provide that the husband would pay 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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$5,000 to the wife. Knott was to pay this amount in periodic 

payments of $150 per month. He was to begin the payments August 

20, 1993. At the time of the contempt hearing, April 1, 1997, he 

had made no payments. 

 Knott argues that the $5,000 obligation was a simple debt 

and neither child support nor spousal support. Thus, he argues, 

it cannot be enforced under Code § 20-109.1 by contempt. He 

contends it can only be enforced as a civil money judgment. We 

disagree. 

 Code § 20-109.1 provides in pertinent part: 

 Any court may affirm, ratify and incorporate 

by reference in its decree . . . of divorce 

. . . any valid agreement between the 

parties, . . ., concerning . . ., or 

establishing or imposing any other condition 

or consideration, monetary or nonmonetary. 

Where the court affirms, ratifies and 

incorporates by reference in its decree such 

agreement or provision thereof, it shall be 

deemed for all purposes to be a term of the 

decree, and enforceable in the same manner as 

any provision of such decree. 

(Emphasis added). 

 The purpose of the statute is to encourage the voluntary 

settlement of property, custody and support matters. To 

facilitate enforcement of the terms of an incorporated agreement, 

the court may use its contempt power. See Morris v. Morris, 216 

Va. 457, 219 S.E.2d 864 (1975). By using the provisions of Code 

§ 20-109.1, the parties invoked the same authority of the court 

to enforce its decrees that they would have invoked to enforce an 

equitable distribution decree pursuant to Code § 20-107.3. There 
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is no reason to allow a court to enforce its division of the 

marital estate by contempt but not allow it to enforce a similar 

division simply because the method used to resolve the dispute 

was negotiation rather than litigation. 

 Finding that the trial court had authority to enforce the 

provision of the property settlement agreement by its contempt 

power, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.