Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer A. Joas

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

James D. Boyer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the ParentChild Relationship of: T.M., 

M.M., E.M., Jn.M., and Js.M. 

(Minor Children), 

T.M., Jr. (Father),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

November 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

40A01-1604-JT-866

Appeal from the Jennings Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jon W. Webster, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

40C01-1511-JT-28, 40C01-1511-

JT-29, 40C01-1511-JT-30,

40C01-1511-JT-31, and 

40C01-1511-JT-32,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 2 of 13

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] T.M., Jr. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights 

over his minor children T.M., M.M., E.M., Jn.M., and Js.M. (collectively “the 

Children”). Father raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the 

State presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of his parental 

rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and W.M. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) have five children 

together, namely, T.M., born July 25, 2007; M.M., born June 6, 2008; E.M., 

born June 26, 2009; and twins Jn.M., and Js.M., born May 18, 2010.

1

 On 

September 19, 2013, someone with the Jennings County Sheriff’s Department 

contacted the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to report that 

Father and Mother had been found “passed out” in their vehicle, which was 

parked in the front yard of their residence, while a child2 was strapped in a car 

seat in the back seat. Tr. at 38. In response to that report, DCS Assessor 

Deborah Satterfield drove to the residence to assess the situation. Father and 

Mother were awake, but “very lethargic,” and they were inside the house by the 

 

1

 Mother’s parental rights to the children were also terminated, but she does not participate in this appeal.

2

 The transcript identifies the child as “D.M.,” but the parents do not have a child named D.M. The trial 

court’s findings state that Jn.M. was in the car at the time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 3 of 13

time Satterfield got there. Satterfield “provided them with paperwork” and 

“discussed the allegations,” and, after forty-five minutes of trying, Satterfield 

obtained drug screens from them. Id. at 39. Father tested positive for 

Oxycodone and Tramadol, and Mother tested positive for Diazepam, 

Nordiazepam, and Oxycodone. The Parents did not have prescriptions for any 

of those drugs. Satterfield removed the Children from the Parents’ care.

[3] On September 23, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were Children

in Need of Services (“CHINS”). In particular, DCS alleged that the Parents 

were “found in their car intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness,” with a 

child in the car; the Parents “had been ‘passed out’ for approximately 25 

minutes before they were able to be awakened”; when they woke up, Mother 

“had what appeared to be a white powder around her nostrils and was 

extremely lethargic,” and Father was “drooling and incapable of conversation”; 

and the Parents were unable to care for the child in the car. Petitioner’s Ex. 1B. 

In addition, DCS noted that the Parents

have a long history with DCS, they have had 8 substantiations 

and 2 previous cases in the last 4 years. Both parents have severe 

mental health issues and have a history of abusing their 

prescribed medications. At the time of removal all the children 

were extremely dirty. [Jn.M.] had open sores on her head from 

lice infestation and numerous insect bites on her arms and legs. 

[Js.M.] had 2 black eyes and red marks on his upper forehead.

Id. During the initial hearing on those petitions, the Parents denied the 

allegations. Following a factfinding hearing, the trial court adjudicated the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 4 of 13

Children to be CHINS and the court ordered the Parents to comply with an 

Order of Participation, which included: contacting the family case manager 

(“FCM”) every week; submitting to random drug screens; completing any 

assessments and/or programs recommended by the FCM, including a 

substance abuse assessment; maintaining safe, stable, and clean housing; and 

engaging in a home-based counseling program. The Parents’ compliance with 

that dispositional order was inconsistent.

[4] On November 30, 2015, DCS filed petitions to terminate the Parents’ parental 

rights to the Children. Following a hearing, the trial court granted those

petitions. In support of its order, the trial court entered the following findings 

and conclusions:

8. On or about September 19, 2013, children and parents, 

[T.M.], Jr., (hereinafter Father) and [W.M.] (hereinafter 

Mother), became involved with DCS when DCS investigated a 

report that the children were being neglected by their parents. 

(Petitioner’s Exhibit’s 1-B through 1-D, 1-F). More specifically, 

the facts are that Father and Mother had been found intoxicated 

to the point of unconsciousness while child [Jn.M.], was in the 

vehicle with them. Father and Mother have a long history with 

DCS that includes nine substantiations and two previous cases in 

the last several years. The parents needed assistance in 

effectively and appropriately parenting the children. (Petitioner’s 

Exhibit 1-F).

* * *

14. After the Dispositional Decree of June l3, 2014, the children 

were returned to the parents’ care and custody for a trial home 

visit from February 3, 2014[,] until May 6, 2014.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 5 of 13

15. The children were removed from the parents’ home on May 

6, 2014[,] due to an altercation between Mother and Father, and 

due to Father’s mental state.

16. Since that time, the children have not been returned to the 

parents’ care and custody.

* * *

18. During the supervised visits Father was very harsh with the 

children and did not show any affection to the children. Father’s 

only interaction with the children during supervised visits was to 

discipline them.

19. From October of 2013 to May of 2014 the Mother and 

Father were fairly consistent in participating in services. Father 

and Mother maintained contact with the Department of Child 

Services, enrolled in programs through Centerstone, and 

completed their substance abuse assessments. Mother and 

Father frequently tested positive for their prescription 

medications, and at times the medication levels were above their 

level of therapeutic need.

20. Because Father and Mother had begun to demonstrate some 

parental improvement, Father and Mother had been permitted a 

trial-home-visit with the children starting on February 3, 2014.

21. However, on May 6, 2014, DCS removed the children from 

the trial-home-visit due an altercation between Mother and 

Father in front of the children, and due to Father’s mental state.

22. On or about May 12, 2014, the Court granted the change of 

placement and terminated the trial home visit. The children were 

placed in foster care. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1-E).

23. Father was arrested for the events that took place while the 

children were on the trial home visit, and [he was] charged with 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 6 of 13

Domestic Battery Committed in the Presence of a Child Less 

Than 16, a Class D Felony. Father was incarcerated until 

November 19, 2014. Father was convicted of said charge on 

May 7, 2015. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 5-A, 5-B, and 1-I).

24. Father had been previously convicted in 2013 of two (2) 

counts of Neglect of a Dependent, both Class A Misdemeanors. 

(Petitioner’s Exhibit 4-A-C).

* * *

28. A periodic case review was held on December 10, 2014. . . . 

Father had not participated in services due to his incarceration. 

While additional services were not required for Mother and 

Father at that time, the parents were required to immediately 

begin participating in the services that had been previously 

ordered. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1-I).

29. After the periodic case review in December, Father 

completed a substance abuse assessment. After the assessment it 

was recommended that Father participate in individual therapy, 

home based case work, recovery coach, and psychiatric services.

30. Father did not participate in individual therapy, home based 

case work, or psychiatric services. Father had sporadic and 

inconsistent participation with his recovery coach.

* * *

33. Mother and Father did not consistently keep in contact with 

the Family Case Manager, Elisha Tempest.

34. Both Father and Mother receive Social Security Disability, 

but it is not enough to support their five children.

35. Father and Mother do not have stable housing, and [they]

are currently homeless.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 7 of 13

36. Father and Mother continued to test positive for prescription 

pain medication, such as oxycodone. In some instances, their 

positive results were much higher than the therapeutic level. 

(Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 & 3).

37. Father tested positive for methamphetamine as recently as 

October of 2015.

38. A periodic case review was held on March 11, 2015, to 

address Father, Mother, and children’s progress. Mother and 

Father had not complied with the case plan at that time. The 

Court found . . . that Father was not in compliance with the case 

plan because he had been incarcerated for most of the reporting 

period and was unable to participate in services. The Court also 

found that Father had not yet started services since his release on 

November 19, 2014. The parents had been participating in 

supervised visitations with the children, but they were ceased due 

to the visits causing the children’s behavioral issues to escalate. 

(Petitioner’s Exhibit 1-J).

39. A permanency hearing was held on September 2, 2015, to 

address the children’s permanency plan. The Court found . . . 

that Father was not in compliance with the case plan due to his 

sporadic participation with his recovery coach. Father also 

refused to participate in individual counseling and home based

services. Both Mother and Father refused to meet with a carecoordinator from Centerstone. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1-L).

40. Father has failed to address both his substance abuse and 

mental health issues. Father did not financially support the 

children throughout the case. Father did not call to inquire about 

the well-being of his children. Father did not write any letters to 

the children, send the children any cards, or leave any messages 

with DCS for the children throughout the case. Father has not

visited with the children since March of 2015.

* * *
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 8 of 13

42. Child, [T.M.], III, receives therapy for his behavioral issues. 

[Child T.M.] has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD) from the physical abuse he received from 

Father. [Child T.M.’s] PTSD also stems from witnessing his 

parents fighting. [Child T.M.] currently has power struggles with 

adults and lacks an ability to show emotion. [Child T.M.] needs 

structure and stability. [Child T.M.] still needs, and will continue 

to need, therapy to address his ongoing behavioral issues. Lynn 

Pittman, the child’s therapist, opined that [child T.M.] needs a 

structured and stable home environment.

43. [Child M.M.] receives therapy for her behavioral issues. 

[Child M.M.] has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder from the physical, verbal, and emotional abuse she 

received from parents. [Child M.M.] still struggles with verbal 

and physical aggression against others. [Child M.M.] still needs, 

and will continue to need, therapy to address her ongoing 

behavioral issues. Michelle Striegel, the child’s therapist, 

believes that [child M.M.] needs a stable home environment.

44. [Child E.M.] receives therapy for his behavioral issues. 

[Child E.M.] has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder. Andrea Donnells, the child’s former therapist, opined 

that the child regressed while he was on the trial home visit with 

his parents. After the trial home visit, [child E.M.] was 

physically aggressive, and it took him some time after visits 

ended with parents to stabilize his behaviors.

45. Family Case Manager, Elisha Tempest, believes that 

adoption is in the children’s best interests. The Guardian Ad 

Litem Debra J. Peetz also echoed that adoption and termination 

of parental rights is in the children’s best interests. The Guardian 

Ad Litem also filed a written report with the Court on February 

19, 2016, which is made a part hereof by reference, and which 

expresses the same sentiment as her testimony.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 9 of 13

46. DCS’s plan for the children is that they be adopted; this plan 

is satisfactory for the children’s care and treatment.

Appellant’s App. at 44, 46-50. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We begin our review of this appeal by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional 

right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe 

Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), 

trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the 

parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a 

termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re K.S.), 750 

N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child 

relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is 

threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be 

terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental 

rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or 

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[6] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 10 of 13

reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

* * *

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental 

rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-

14-2).

[7] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of 

Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial 

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s 

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 

Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 11 of 13

[8] Here, in terminating the Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 

2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, 

second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. 

“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[9] Father’s challenge on appeal is very narrow. Father concedes that the evidence is 

sufficient to support the trial court’s findings underlying its conclusions that 

Father will not remedy the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal 

and that the continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to the 

well-being of the Children. Father only challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to show that termination is in the best interests of the Children and 

that there is a satisfactory plan for the Children. We address each of those 

contentions in turn.

Best Interests

[10] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a 

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. 

Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 12 of 13

supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a 

finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best 

interests.” Castro v. State Ofc. of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an 

important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the 

testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s 

best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224 (emphasis added).

[11] Father contends that, because DCS cannot show that the Children will be 

placed together in one home, DCS cannot show that termination of his parental 

rights is in the Children’s best interests. In particular, Father maintains that the 

evidence shows that “it was imperative that all five (5) children remain in 

contact with one another” and that the “likelihood is slim to none that all five 

(5) children would be adopted together.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. But Father’s 

contentions amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will 

not do. 

[12] As the trial court found, Elisha Tempest, the FCM, testified that adoption is in 

the children’s best interests. The Guardian Ad Litem Debra Peetz also testified 

that adoption and termination of parental rights is in the children’s best 

interests. The totality of the evidence, including Father’s historical inability to 

provide a safe and stable home and his refusal to take advantage of the 

resources DCS provided him during the CHINS proceedings, supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the 

Children’s best interests.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A01-1604-JT-866| November 28, 2016 Page 13 of 13

Satisfactory Plan

[13] In order for the trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship, the trial 

court must find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child. A.P. v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 

268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. This plan does not need to be detailed, 

so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be 

going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. Id.

[14] The undisputed evidence shows that DCS plans to place the Children for 

adoption. The trial court’s conclusion on this issue is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. While keeping the Children together as a family unit 

would be ideal, it is not required to terminate Father’s parental rights. The trial 

court did not err when it terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children.

[15] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.