NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MATTHEW CSIZMADIA, 

Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, 

Respondent,

NATIONAL PEO/THE MINT,

Respondent Employer,

LUMBERMEN’S UNDERWRITING ALLIANCE, 

Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 15-0059

Special Action - Industrial Commission

ICA Claim No. 20123-180238

Carrier Claim No. AZ-354323

The Honorable Robert F. Retzer, Administrative Law Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Matthew Csizmadia, Hamilton, NJ

Petitioner
2

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Jason M. Porter

Counsel for Respondent

CopperPoint Mutual Insurance Company, Phoenix 

By Mark A. Kendall

Counsel for Respondents Employer/Carrier

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of 

Arizona (ICA) award. For the following reasons, we affirm the award of 

the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Petitioner employee Matthew Csizmadia (Csizmadia) injured 

his left knee on September 22, 2012, while employed as a door host at a 

night club. Csizmadia was assigned to work at an outdoor patio and

observe any signs of unrest by the club patrons from a two and a half feet 

high concrete platform. During an attempt to step up onto the platform, 

Csizmadia “twisted and torqued” his left knee, but continued working for 

the remainder of his shift. Csizmadia sought medical attention two or three 

days later, but moved to New Jersey approximately five or six days after 

his injury, without requesting permission from the ICA.

¶3 The Employer’s insurance carrier accepted Csizmadia’s claim 

for benefits in February 2013, but determined no benefits were due. On 

August 30, 2013, Csizmadia filed a request to leave Arizona and the ICA 

approved it retroactively to that date. The ICA terminated temporary 

compensation and active medical treatment as of April 13, 2014, concluding 

the injury resulted in no permanent disability. 

¶4 In June 2015, after formal hearings were held, the ICA

awarded Csizmadia “medical, surgical and hospital benefits from 

September 22, 2012, through April 13, 2014, minus the time period 
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3

September 22, 2012[,] through August 30, 2013, when his benefits were 

suspended [due to the unapproved absence].” The ALJ concluded, 

however, that no total temporary or temporary partial compensation 

benefits were owed. The ALJ affirmed the award upon review. We have 

jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21.A.2 

and 23-951.A (West 2016),1 and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special 

Actions 10.

DISCUSSION

¶5 We defer to the ALJ’s factual findings but review questions of 

law de novo. Lane v. Indus. Comm’n, 218 Ariz. 44, 47, ¶ 9 (App. 2008). We 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the award. 

Lovitch v. Indus. Comm’n, 202 Ariz. 102, 105, ¶ 16 (App. 2002). We will affirm 

as long as the award is supported by reasonable evidence. Delgado v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 183 Ariz. 129, 131 (App. 1994).

¶6 Csizmadia argues he is entitled to full compensation for all of 

his medical treatment, and to other benefits, including treatment obtained

during his unapproved absence from Arizona, because his treatment has

not concluded and he suffered from additional injuries and infirmities 

stemming from the industrial injury.2 We construe Csizmadia’s opening 

brief as contending that the ALJ erred in (1) adopting the opinion of one 

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred.

2 The Respondents argue that Csizmadia’s opening brief fails to 

clearly identify or discuss any specific legal grounds or arguments for 

vacating the ALJ’s decision. Furthermore, Respondents assert that the 

opening brief fails to include citations to the record. This lack of reference 

to legal authority and the record could be considered abandonment and 

waiver of his claim. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (requiring appellant’s brief to 

contain arguments with “citations of legal authorities and appropriate 

references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies”); State 

v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure to argue a claim usually 

constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”). However, in our 

discretion, we decide this appeal on its merits based on our own review of 

the record. See Adams v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 

1984) (recognizing that courts prefer to decide each case upon its merits 

rather than dismissing on procedural grounds).
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Decision of the Court

4

medical expert over another in terminating the benefits and (2) suspending 

the benefits during the unapproved absence from Arizona.

I. Benefits Termination

¶7 The ICA “is not required to continue benefits beyond the 

period of temporary disability absent a showing of permanent disability 

related to the industrial incident.” Ortega v. Indus. Comm’n, 121 Ariz. 554,

556–57 (App. 1979). Csizmadia has the burden to prove his physical 

condition was causally related to his industrial injury and that he was not 

yet medically stationary. See Lawler v. Indus. Comm’n, 24 Ariz. App. 282, 284 

(App. 1975). 

¶8 In assessing Csizmadia’s medical condition, the ALJ relied on 

evidence presented by medical experts. See W. Bonded Prods. v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 132 Ariz. 526, 528 (App. 1982) (holding that expert medical opinion 

is required to demonstrate a causal relationship between the industrial 

injury and claimant’s condition where the causal relationship is not readily 

apparent to a layperson). When expert medical evidence conflicts, the ALJ 

is the sole judge of witness credibility and is to resolve all conflicts in the 

evidence and draw warranted inferences from it. See Malinski v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 103 Ariz. 213, 217 (1968). 

¶9 Two medical experts testified and presented differing 

opinions. Csizmadia’s expert witness and treating physician, Scott 

Greenberg, M.D., is licensed to practice in New Jersey and is board certified 

in family practice; he also practices in the specialty of regenerative nonsurgical orthopedics. Dr. Greenberg opined that as of July 2014, Csizmadia 

had reached his “maximum medical improvement,” but noted significant

looseness (laxity) of both knees. Dr. Greenberg explained Csizmadia had 

reached his maximum medical improvement as of July 2014, because 

“unfortunately, I could not do much more for him at that time.” Dr. 

Greenberg further stated that he could not say whether the injury was 

permanent, but it was long lasting, Csizmadia’s response to treatment was 

very slow, and based on the last time he saw him, Csizmadia was “still 

somewhat unfit for ambulatory work.” 

¶10 The ICA’s expert witness, Thomas Carter, M.D., is licensed to 

practice in Arizona and is board certified in orthopedic surgery. Dr. Carter 

examined Csizmadia in February 2014. He concluded that Csizmadia

lacked a clear cut etiology of his symptoms and that Csizmadia was “not in 

need of supportive care or modification of work activities specifically as it 

relates to the industrial event.” Dr. Carter also concluded Csizmadia
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“[h]ypothetically . . . may have some very mild chondromalacia that would 

be softening of the joint, but there is no evidence of a chondral defect on 

MRI scans.” Dr. Carter further found no “objective basis for [Csizmadia’s]

pain as it relates to the industrial injury” and concluded (1) the injury 

resulted in no permanent impairment to the left knee and (2) there would 

be no benefit from additional medical treatment. 

¶11 Because Dr. Carter personally examined Csizmadia and 

reviewed Csizmadia’s medical history prior to forming his opinions, it was 

not unreasonable for the ALJ to adopt Dr. Carter’s opinions “as being most 

probably correct and well founded.” Also, the ALJ did not err in accepting

Dr. Carter’s opinion that “there is no medical evidence that [Csizmadia] 

was unable to do his regular work as a result of his September 22, 2012[,]

industrial injury from August 30, 2013[,] to April 13, 2014.” See Ortega v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 121 Ariz. 554, 557 (App. 1979) (“[I]t is the hearing officer’s 

obligation to resolve conflicting medical evidence, and his resolution will 

not be disturbed unless it is wholly unreasonable.”).

II. Benefits Suspension during the Unapproved Absence from 

Arizona

¶12 Additionally, Csizmadia seems to argue that the ALJ 

incorrectly suspended the medical benefits between September 22, 2012,

and August 30, 2013, when Csizmadia resided in New Jersey without the 

ICA’s approval.

¶13 According to A.R.S. § 23-1071.A, “[n]o employee may leave 

the state of Arizona for a period exceeding two weeks while the necessity 

of having medical treatment continues, without the written approval of the 

commission.” Such employee otherwise “forfeit[s] [his] right to 

compensation[,] . . . right to reimbursement for [his] medical expenses, and 

any aggravation of [his] disability.” Id. Arizona courts have declined to 

create exceptions to this statute. Waxler v. Indus. Comm’n, 116 Ariz. 213, 215 

(App. 1977).

¶14 Csizmadia testified that he moved out of Arizona five or six

days after his injury without permission of the ICA. Once Csizmadia filed 

a request to leave Arizona on August 30, 2013, the ICA approved it 

retroactively to the date of request. However, the statute does not allow 

retroactive application of the request to the date of departure. See Cont’l 

Cas. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 113 Ariz. 116, 118 (1976). Csizmadia’s benefits 

were, thus, properly suspended during the unapproved period.
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CONCLUSION

¶15 Because the evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s award 

and decision upon review, we affirm.