NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GLENN ANTHONY SCHMITZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0443 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2020-001846-001

The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eric Knobloch

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jennifer Roach

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 10-27-2022
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass

joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Glenn Schmitz appeals his convictions and 

sentences for multiple sex crimes against five minors. For the following 

reasons, we affirm as modified to correct some technical portions of the 

sentencing order the parties agree should be corrected.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Between 1999 and 2004, Schmitz lived with his wife and their

three children—two sons and a younger daughter. Friends and 

acquaintances of the Schmitz children often visited the Schmitz house

during that time. Schmitz and his wife separated in 2006 and divorced in 

2007, when their children were approximately 15 to 19 years old.

¶3 In 2018, Dawn,

1 who had grown up in the area, reported to 

law enforcement that Schmitz had touched her inappropriately at the 

Schmitz home years before. After police interviewed Dawn, they contacted

other women who had frequented the Schmitz house around the same time

frame—including Yaria and Sarah, who had been close friends with 

Schmitz’s daughter, and Caroline, a close friend of Schmitz’s older son.

Another woman, Claire, contacted the police about Schmitz after seeing a 

news report on his arrest.

¶4 The State charged Schmitz with 25 counts of sexual conduct 

with a minor, sexual abuse, and molestation of a child committed on 

various dates ranging between May 1999 through August 2004. Eight 

counts pertained to Dawn, four to Yaria, four to Caroline, six to Sarah, and 

three to Claire. All five of those victims, as well as Schmitz’s three children 

and ex-wife, testified at his trial. A sixth victim, Stacey, was not a subject 

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the victims’ privacy. See generally

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(f).
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

3

of charged conduct but testified at trial under Arizona Rule of Evidence 

(“Rule”) 404(b) and (c).

¶5 Dawn and Claire testified that Schmitz inserted his fingers 

into their vaginas and touched their breasts under the guise of throwing the 

girls into the pool or playing water games. Caroline and Sarah testified that 

Schmitz touched their breasts and vaginas by the pool and inside the 

Schmitz home. Yaria testified that Schmitz touched her breasts and vagina 

while she was riding in his truck. Stacey, the Rule 404 witness, testified that 

Schmitz grabbed her breasts while tossing her into a lake during an outing 

in 2002. That incident was reported to law enforcement at the time, but no 

charges were filed.

¶6 After the State presented its case at trial, it moved to amend 

the indictment by altering the offense date for one count and dismissing 

three others. The court granted the motion, which led to the dismissal of 

three counts pertaining to Dawn. The jury found Schmitz guilty of four 

counts of sexual conduct with a minor, thirteen counts of sexual abuse, 

three counts of child molestation, and one count of contributing to the 

delinquency of a minor (a lesser-included offense). The jury found Schmitz 

not guilty of one sexual abuse charge. The superior court sentenced him to 

consecutive terms totaling two life sentences plus 129.5 years’ 

imprisonment.

¶7 We have jurisdiction over Schmitz’s appeal under Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Prior Consistent Statements

¶8 Schmitz argues the superior court improperly admitted prior 

consistent statements in violation of the rule against hearsay. Although we 

generally review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, Schmitz did 

not object to this testimony, meaning he must establish the admission was 

fundamental, prejudicial error. State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 334, ¶ 38 (2008); 

State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 138, ¶ 1 (2018).

¶9 Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted are generally inadmissible under the rule against hearsay. 

Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. But Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a declarantwitness’s prior out-of-court statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant 

testifies and is subject to cross-examination about [the] prior statement,” the 
STATE v. SCHMITZ

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statement “is consistent with the declarant’s testimony,” and the statement 

is offered “(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant 

recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive 

in so testifying; or (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness 

when attacked on another ground.” The Arizona Supreme Court has found 

that a statement is admissible under subsection (i) only if the witness 

“make[s] the prior consistent statement before the existence of facts that 

indicate a bias arises.” State v. Martin, 135 Ariz. 552, 554 (1983).

¶10 The essence of Schmitz’s defense at trial was that, after the 

victims heard rumors or accusations about him sexually assaulting others, 

the victims recharacterized, in their own minds, his innocent or accidental

conduct as intentionally sinister acts. Schmitz suggested that his children

came to believe the victims’ accounts of abuse over time because they 

resented his poor treatment of them after he and their mother divorced. 

Schmitz now contends that the admission of certain prior statements by his 

daughter violated Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) because the superior court did not 

first determine, on its own motion, that she made the statements before 

developing a bias against Schmitz. See id. at 555.

¶11 The first challenged statement—which was to the effect of

“dad molested all my friends”—was repeated, in different variations, by 

multiple witnesses. Schmitz’s older son testified that, when he was in his 

mid-20s and his sister was approximately 18 to 20 years old, she “start[ed]

to just kind of flippantly talk about how my dad touched all of her friends.” 

The older son recalled that his sister specifically mentioned Yaria and Sarah

but also “just kind of worked with the general sense of he touched all my 

friends.” Based on his sister’s statements, Schmitz’s older son asked

Caroline—who had been his best friend since childhood—whether Schmitz 

had done anything to her. The older son testified that Caroline confirmed 

Schmitz had done so, without providing details. Caroline also testified 

about that same conversation with Schmitz’s older son—who was the first 

person to whom she disclosed Schmitz’s conduct. She testified that he 

asked about Schmitz because “at that point [his sister] . . . had talked to 

[him] before about like, you know, some of my friends they say that, you 

know, dad touched them inappropriately, or dad molested them, and that 

wasn’t something that [the older son] wanted to believe.”

¶12 Schmitz’s daughter also testified about making a similar 

statement to a detective investigating the case. On cross-examination, 

defense counsel asked the daughter whether she told the detective that 

Schmitz “probably molested all [her] friends while they were teenagers.” 

The daughter answered, “Yes.” The State referred to that testimony on 
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

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redirect, and the daughter confirmed that when the detective asked her if 

she knew why he was contacting her, she told him it was “probably [her] 

creepy dad that molested all [her] friends.”2

¶13 Schmitz also challenges testimony by Yaria. She stated that at 

some point after Schmitz molested her, she “got a call from [his daughter] 

saying that [Sarah] and [another girl around the same age] might know 

something about Mr. Schmitz touching people.” Yaria contacted the other 

girls, and they decided to call Schmitz’s wife. But Yaria said when she was

making that call, her mother came in and Yaria explained to her mother that

the other girls were planning to tell Schmitz’s wife “that Mr. Schmitz had 

been touching us, and [Yaria’s] mother took over the call from there.” Yaria 

testified that her mother did not proceed with the call or otherwise do 

anything in response to Yaria’s disclosure about Schmitz.

¶14 Although the State and Schmitz exchange arguments over 

whether the challenged testimony was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), 

most of the statements appear to fall outside the rule against hearsay 

entirely because they were not offered “to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted in the statement.” Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). Caroline and Schmitz’s 

older son each testified about the daughter’s prior statement not to prove 

that Schmitz molested all his daughter’s friends but to provide context for 

the older son’s conversation with Caroline about Schmitz’s prior acts 

against her. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 170 Ariz. 301, 306 (App. 1991) 

(“Words offered to prove the effect on the hearer are admissible when they 

are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at issue.” (citation 

omitted)). Similarly, Yaria’s testimony was offered not to prove that 

Schmitz molested other girls, but to explain what Yaria knew and told 

others about Schmitz’s conduct at the time.

¶15 Nonetheless, even if we assume the statements attributed to 

Schmitz’s daughter were “prior consistent statements” subject to Rule 801, 

we reject Schmitz’s claims of reversible error because he does not establish

prejudice—which requires him to show that a reasonable jury could have 

2 Because Schmitz’s daughter’s statement to the detective was first 

elicited by the defense on cross-examination, Schmitz waived any challenge 

to the same statement being elicited on redirect. See State v. Maggard, 104 

Ariz. 462, 465 (1969) (observing that inadmissible testimony is invited error 

when elicited by defense counsel); cf. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 

1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that the defendant waived an objection 

to hearsay evidence where he opened the door by being the first to offer the 

evidence).
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

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reached a different verdict if the statements had been excluded. Escalante, 

245 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 30. First, none of the statements operated as a 

replacement for, or supplement to, the victims’ trial testimony about 

Schmitz’s conduct. Second, Schmitz’s daughter was thoroughly crossexamined and admitted she (1) did not witness any of the charged acts, (2)

recalled only one instance during her childhood of a victim telling her that 

Schmitz touched her inappropriately, and (3) had a strained relationship 

with Schmitz. Any error in admitting the statements, even if fundamental,

did not prejudice Schmitz on this record. See State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 

144, ¶ 66 (2000) (concluding that any error in admitting a prior consistent 

statement was harmless where the statement was cumulative of other 

evidence and the declarant “was subjected to thorough crossexamination”), abrogation on other grounds recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 

813 F.3d 798, 815 (9th Cir. 2015).

II. Comments on Witness Credibility

¶16 Schmitz next contends that three witnesses made statements 

during the State’s examination that impermissibly vouched for witness 

credibility. Again, because Schmitz did not object at trial, he must establish 

that the statements’ admission was fundamental, prejudicial error. See

Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 138, ¶ 1.

¶17 Schmitz first challenges Caroline’s statements that referred to

Stacey, the State’s Rule 404 witness who had reported inappropriate 

conduct by Schmitz in 2002. Caroline was Stacey’s friend and testified that 

she heard about Stacey’s accusation when it happened from Schmitz’s older

son. Caroline testified that Schmitz’s older son defended his father at the 

time and that Caroline, too, went along with the story that Stacey had made 

up the accusation even though “I think at that time I knew she wasn’t lying 

because it had been happening to me.” Caroline elaborated that the 

incident brought out “a lot of mixed emotions” and conflicting motivations

that led her to go “along with the narrative that I knew wasn’t true.” She 

added, “It’s like I knew [Stacey] was telling the truth, [but] I didn’t want to 

lose my stability.” When the incident with Stacey was raised again on 

redirect, Caroline testified that hearing about Stacey’s accusation “was that 

first moment that I couldn’t—I couldn’t excuse what [Schmitz] was doing 

anymore. . . . I couldn’t from that point on continue convincing myself that 

it was just an accident . . . .”

¶18 Schmitz also challenges Claire’s statements. The State elicited 

evidence that Claire had been convicted of a felony several years earlier and 

had told a presentence report writer that she was sexually abused by a 
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

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family friend when she was 11 years old. When the State asked whether 

she told the report writer “the truth,” Claire answered, “Yes.”

¶19 Finally, Schmitz challenges his daughter’s statement. On 

redirect, the State referred to the daughter being cross-examined about not 

remembering certain things from years back. The State asked the daughter 

whether the fact that she did not recall seeing certain victims, such as Dawn 

and Claire, at the house meant they were never there. The daughter 

responded by saying she could not remember, she was “not saying that [the 

victim] wasn’t there at all.” She added, “Oh, I guarantee you, if they’re 

saying it happened, it happened.”

¶20 A witness may not testify about another witness’s 

truthfulness. Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 335, ¶ 39. “Determining veracity and 

credibility lies within the province of the jury, and opinions about witness 

credibility are ‘nothing more than advice to jurors on how to decide the 

case.’” Id. (quoting State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 383 (1986)).

¶21 Even so, Schmitz does not establish fundamental, prejudicial

error. First, he shows no error as to Claire’s statement because her 

testimony commented on her own truthfulness—not that of another 

witness. Cf. United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(observing that counsel may ask “a witness to remark on the truthfulness 

of her own testimony [without invading the province of the jury] because 

the witness’s reaction and response are proper fodder for the jury’s 

credibility determinations”). Nor does Schmitz show reversible error as to

Caroline’s statements. Caroline’s testimony was not offered to bolster or 

comment on the truthfulness of Stacey’s testimony, but to explain how 

hearing about Stacey’s accusation affected Caroline’s own conduct and 

interpretation of Schmitz’s behavior toward her. Cf. State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 

56, 63, ¶ 26 (1998) (determining that a witness’s opinion about another’s

truthfulness is admissible if the opinion is not intended to comment on the 

other’s credibility, is rationally based on the witness’s perception, and 

could help the jury understand the witness’s testimony or determine a fact 

in issue).

¶22 Even if the statement by Schmitz’s daughter crossed the line 

by commenting on other witnesses’ truthfulness, Schmitz fails to establish 

that the challenged statement—or those of Claire and Caroline for that 

matter—prejudiced him. In determining whether a reasonable jury could 

have reached a different verdict without the challenged testimony, we 

“examine the entire record, including the parties’ theories and arguments 

as well as the trial evidence.” Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 31 (citations 
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

8

omitted). Here, the challenged statements were largely immaterial because 

Schmitz’s defense was not that the victims were lying but that they suffered 

from “a mistaken but genuine belief that something [inappropriate] 

happened.” In addition, after the court sustained a defense objection to 

testimony by Schmitz’s older son about his belief in the victims’ accounts, 

the court also instructed the jury that “we do not have witnesses testify as 

to the credibility or vouch for other witnesses,” such testimony is “not 

appropriate,” and jurors should not give it “any consideration.” The court 

also instructed the jurors that it was up to them to decide “what testimony 

to accept and what to reject.” We presume that jurors complied with these 

instructions. See State v. Martinez, 230 Ariz. 382, 385, ¶ 14 (App. 2012).

III. Jury Finding of Victim’s Age

¶23 Dawn testified that Schmitz digitally penetrated her in the 

summer of her seventh or eighth grade year—when she would have been 

13 or 14 years old. The superior court sentenced Schmitz to 20 years’ 

imprisonment for that offense (Count One)—the presumptive term for 

sexual conduct with a minor when the victim is 13 or 14 years old. See

A.R.S. § 13-604.01(C) (1999-2000). Schmitz now argues he must be 

resentenced as though Dawn were 15 or older because the jury did not 

make a specific finding of her age when it rendered the verdict. Because 

Schmitz did not object at the time of sentencing, he must establish

fundamental, prejudicial error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 563, ¶ 1

(2005).

¶24 Schmitz’s claim fails because the jury implicitly found Dawn 

to be under 15 at the time of the offense when it found him guilty and no 

“reasonable jury” could have found otherwise on this record. See id. at 569, 

¶¶ 27–28. The jury found Schmitz guilty of five charges pertaining to 

Dawn—the single count of sexual conduct with a minor and four counts of 

sexual abuse. The indictment alleged that all five offenses took place when 

Dawn was “a minor under fifteen years of age.” Dawn testified that all the 

conduct occurred during the same period, the court instructed the jury that 

the sexual abuse counts required the State to prove Dawn was under 15, 

and the verdicts for those four counts specified that the offenses occurred 

in Dawn’s “7th grade summer” and “8th grade summer.” Considering the 

indictment, trial evidence, instructions, and verdicts in this case, the jury 

verdict on Count One implicitly encompassed a finding that Dawn was 

under 15 when Schmitz committed the crime. Cf. State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 

534, 559–60, ¶ 74 (2003) (“[T]he age of the victim can be implicit in the 

verdict, if the jury simultaneously convicts the defendant of an offense that 
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

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includes the age of the [] victim as an element of the crime.”). No reasonable 

jury could have found Dawn to be 15 or older on this record.

IV. Errors in Sentencing Order

¶25 Schmitz asks this court to correct three alleged errors in the 

sentencing order: (1) the offense date for Count One; (2) that he waived the 

right to be present at some future restitution hearings, and (3) not 

specifying that his “life” sentences are release-eligible after 35 years. The 

State agreed with Schmitz’s argument.

¶26 We can correct clerical and similar errors in sentencing orders 

on appeal. See State v. Vandever, 211 Ariz. 206, 210, ¶ 16 (App. 2005),

disapproved on other grounds by State v. Aragon ex rel. Pima Cnty., 252 Ariz. 

525, 531, ¶ 20 (2022). We address each alleged error in turn.

¶27 First, the original indictment specified that Count One 

occurred “on or between May 1, 1999 and August 31, 1999”—which is the 

same date range provided in the sentencing order. During trial, however, 

the superior court amended the indictment by extending the date range on 

Count One to August 31, 2000. We agree with Schmitz and modify the 

sentencing order to show that the offense date for his conviction on Count 

One runs from May 1, 1999, to August 31, 2000.

¶28 Second, when Schmitz was sentenced, he expressly requested 

to be present at any future restitution hearing. Accordingly, the sentencing 

order is modified to reflect that he did not waive his presence as to any 

counts.

¶29 Third, the jury found that Schmitz committed two counts of 

sexual conduct with a minor against Claire when she was 12 years old or 

younger. Based on that age finding and the underlying facts of the offense, 

A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A) (2000) required the superior court to sentence Schmitz

to two terms of “life imprisonment” with no “eligib[ility] for suspension of 

sentence, probation, pardon or release from confinement on any basis 

except as specifically authorized by section 31-233, subsection A or B until 

the person has served thirty-five years or the sentence is commuted.” At 

the sentencing hearing, the court orally imposed “life in prison” for each 

conviction, and the sentencing order described each sentence as a “term of 

life” without reference to the applicable sentencing statute or any possible 

release after he serves thirty-five years. Thus, we modify the sentencing

order to reflect that each of Schmitz’s life sentences is pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 13-604.01(A) (2000).
STATE v. SCHMITZ

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶30 We modify the sentencing order as set forth above and

otherwise affirm Schmitz’s convictions and sentences.