### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 595 -CV

M ag dal e na R odr igu e z Wo lk , A ppe lla nt

v. RobertE. Wolk , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 05- 0069 65 , HO NORAB LE LORA J. LIVI NGSTON , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
This i s an appe al from a

defa ult judgment g ranting a fina l divorce de cre e. In four issues, appellant Mag dalena Rodrigue z W olk contends that (i) she meets the requ i re m en t s of a restric ted appe al; (ii) there is no evidence in the rec ord t o s u p port the trial cour t’s setting of

the amount of child support; (iii) there is no e vidence in the rec ord to support the trial cour t’s division of the marital estate ; and (iv) ther e is no evidenc e to support the trial c ourt’s asse ssment of attorney ’s fee s and cour

t co s t s . Fo r t h e reasons that follow, we aff irm the dec ree in part, and r ever se and
re mand a s to the iss ue s r a ise d b y a pp e lla nt.

P ROCEDURAL AND F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND On Oc tob e r 2 0, 20 05 , a

pp e lle e Rob e rt

Wolk fi led fo r d ivo rc e fr om a pp e lla nt. Appella n t d i d n o t an s wer or otherw ise appe ar. Abrief he aring was he ld on April 5, 2006. The2

rec ord shows that Mr. Wolk w as the only witness to testify . He testified that he and a ppellant have a ninetee n-y ear -old child with Down sy ndrome, that a

ppellant has a lway s been the primary car etake r for the c hild, and that appellant ha d taken c are of the child for many y ear s. He pre sented e vidence of his income and a sked t he court to awa rd appellant child support in the amount of $632 per month. Mr . Wo lk t e sti fie d th a t he ha d p a id at le a st $ 70 0 to $1 ,5 00 pe r m on th f or the la st f if te e n y e a rs in
mor tg a g e pa y me nts fo r the ho me wh e re a pp e lla nt an d th e ir

c hil d r e sid e a nd

a sk e d th e c ourt

no t to g rant retroa ctive child support. Mr. Wolk also testified that he paid $408 p er m o n t h t o p rovide health insuranc e for

the child. Wit h reg ard to the division of proper ty , Mr. Wolk testified that he wa s asking the trial court to aw ard e ach of

the par ties “any and all per sonal eff

ects in their possession” a nd “any cash, ba nk a c c ounts , r e tir e me nt a c c ounts in t he ir po sse ssi on

. . . in the ir na

me ” ; to r e qu ir e e a c h p a rt

y “ to keep a nd p a y a n y a n d a ll d e b ts in th e ir n a me ” ; a n d to d iv e s t M r . Wo lk o f h is in te r e s t in the
co m m u n i t y

h o m es t ea d

an d aw ar d i t t o ap p el l an t wi t h ap p el l an t b ei n g re s p o n s i b l e fo r “t h e m o rt gage and all other

matters re lating to the pr operty .” He testified to the location and le g al desc ription of the c omm

un ity ho me ste a d a

nd state d th a t it

wa s the on ly real es ta te that he a nd a pp e lla nt b oth
owne d , b u t h e did not provide testimony on the prope rty ’s value or the outstanding debt on the proper ty
. The trial court signe d a defa ult divorc e decr ee g ranting the re lief soug ht on the same da y as the he aring. The decr ee spe cified that eac h party was re sponsible for his or her own attorne y ’s fee s, expenses and costs, and that court costs wer e to be borne by the par ty that incurre d them. On Oc tob e r 4 , 2 00 6, a

pp e lla nt f ile d a no tic e of a pp e a l.3 AN AL YSI S I n he r fi rs t iss ue , a

pp e lla nt a rgue s that sh e is e nti tle d to a re str ic te d a

pp e a l. Apa

rt y filing a restric ted appe al must demonstrate he filed the a pp ea l wi t h in six months of the date the judgme nt was re ndere d; he was a party to the suit; he did not participate at the he aring that resulted in the judgme nt complained of or file any post-judgme nt motions or appe als; and er ror is appa

rent
on the fa c e of the re c or d. Te x. R. A pp . P. 26 .1 (c ), 30 ; Alexande r v. Lynda’s Boutique , 134 S.W .3d 84 5, 84 8 ( Te x. 20 04 ). Th e “ fa c e of the re c or d” c on sis ts o f a ll the paper s o n f ile in t he a pp e a l, including the repor

ter’s r ecor d. Vazquez v. Vazque z , ___ S.W .3d ___, No. 14-05-01257- CV, 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 4713, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 14th Dist.] J une 19, 2 0 0 7 , no pet.); se e als o Norman Commc’ns v . Texas Eastman Co. , 955 S.W .2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997).

Mr. Wolk concede s that appellant ha s es tablished the first thre e re quirements of a
r e s t r i c t e d a p p e a l a n d t h a to n l y t h e f o u rt h r e qu i r e m e n t , e r

r o r o n t h e f a c e o f t h e r e c o r d , i s a ti s s u e . In her se cond, third and f

ourth issues, appellant a

rg ues that err or is appar ent on the fa ce of the re cord
a s to the tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio ns re g a rd ing the div isi on of the mari ta l e state , th e a mou nt o f c hil d support, and the allocation of attorney ’s fe es and c ourt costs. As to the trial cour t’s deter minations on these issues, we ag ree that err or is appar ent on the fa ce of the re cord.
Stan dard of Revie w

“I n a suit for divorc e, the pe tition m ay not be t ak en as confessed if the responde nt does not file an a

nswer.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.701 ( West 2 0 0 6 ). W h en a respondent in a divorce case fails to answe r, the pe titioner must still prese nt proof to support the material alleg ationsB e c a us e we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t have su ff

ic ie nt inf or ma tio n to e xer c ise its 1 discretion in the division of the marital e state, the a ssessment of ch i l d s u pport, or the a war d of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, we on ly

a dd re ss t he fi rs t in qu ir

y a s to e a c h is su e a

pp e lla nt r a ise s. 4 in the petition. Vazquez , 20 07 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 47 13 , at *5 -6 ; see also Barry v . Barry, 193 S.W .3d 72, 75 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Be cause appellant f ailed to answe r or a

ppear , Mr. Wolk was require d to present pr oof at trial to support the mate rial alleg ations in his petiti on.

Mo st a pp e a la ble iss ue s in fa mil y law ca se s ar e su bje c t to e va luatio n und e r t he a bu se of dis c re tio n s tan dard, in c lud ingthe div isi on of pr op e rt y a nd the a sse ssm e nt o f c hil d s up po rt
. Sandone v. M

iller-Sandone , 11 6 S.W. 3d 20 4, 20 5 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 20 03 , no pet.) . T he tes t for a buse of discr etion is whether the cou rt acte d without refe renc e to any g uiding pr inciples and rule s. Id . at 206. A def ault judgme nt of divorce als o i s subject to an evide ntiary attack on appea l. Vazquez , 2 0 0 7 Tex. App. L EXI S 4713, at *6. When sufficienc y revie w over laps the abuse of discretion standa

rd, the i n q u i ry o n appeal is two-fold: did the trial court have suff icient inf or ma tio n u po n w hic h to e xer c ise its dis c re tio n a nd did the tr ia l c ourt

e rr in i ts a pp lic a tio n o f i ts discretion. Sandone , 116 S.W .3d at 206. Evidentiary sufficie ncy revie w comes into play as to the first question. Id
. 1

Di v ision o

f M ar ita l Es tat

e I n her third issue, a

ppellant contends that the trial court e rred i n i t s division of the

mari ta l e state . T he tr ia l c ourt a wa rd e d t he com munity

ho me ste a d to a

pp e lla nt, bu t or de re d h e r t o pa y the “ ba lanc e du e , inc lud ing pr inc ipa l, int e re st, ta x, a nd ins ur a nc e e sc ro w, on the pr omi sso ry no te executed by

[Mr. W olk and appellant] on the [homestead].” The trial c ourt also awa rded a ll personal5

e ff e cts , cash, ba

nk a c c ounts a nd

re tir e me nt a c c ounts to t

he pa rt y in p os se ssi on

a nd or de re d b oth parties to pay

“any and all debt” in his or her name. The Te x as F amily

Code p rovi des that “[i] n a dec ree of divorce or annulment, the
c ourt sh a ll or de r a div isi on of the e state of the pa rt ie s in a ma

nn e r t hat th e c ourt

de e ms j us t and

ri g ht, having due reg ard for the rig hts of eac h party and any children of the marria g e.” Tex
. Fa m . Code Ann. § 7
. 0 0 1 ( We s t 2 0 0 6 )
. Co u rts h a v e b r o a d d is c r e ti o n in s u it s f o r d iv o r c e w h e n d iv iding the proper ty ; but the divisi on must be “just and rig ht.” Sandone , 116 S.W .3d at 207. This case is simi lar to O’Neal v. O ’Neal , 69 S.W .3d 347 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.), a lso a restric ted appe al o f a d ef au lt divorce judg ment. I n O’Neal , the petitioner wa s the only witness at t he hearingand provide d scant testimony
. Id. at 348-50. The trial court divided the
c omm un ity pr op e rt y , in c ludi ng rea l pr op e rt y , c a sh , b a nk

a c c ounts , r e tir e me nt a c c ounts , I RA
acc ounts, s t o ck s , b o nds and sec urities betwee n the par ties, without evidence of the va lue of the proper ty
. Id. at 348-50. The court of appeals concluded that the trial c ourt had a bused its discretion in the division of the estate ba sed on lac k of evide nce. Id. at 350.

The El Paso cour

t of appea ls r eac hed the same conclusion in another case involving
a restric ted appea l of a defa ult divorc e dec ree . Sandone , 116 S.W .3d at 205. The court reve rsed the trial court’ s division of p ro p er t y beca use there was no e vidence of the va lue of the a ssets or the amount of t he liabilities. Id. at 207-08. Stating that “[w] ithout the ability to determine the siz e of the c omm un ity pie , w e c a n ma

ke no de te rm inatio n th a t th e sli c e s awa rd e d to e a c h s po us e we re jus t
a nd ri g ht, ” the c ourt

he ld “ a div isi on of c omm un ity pr op e rt y c a nn ot b e up he ld w he re the re c or d is absolutely devoid of any testimony conce rning the value of the prope rty divided by

the cour t.” Id.6

a t 20 5, 20 7- 08 ; see also W ilson v. W ilson , 132 S.W .3d 533, 538 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [ 1 s t Di s t .] 2004, no pet.) (r ever sing pr operty division due to the “dearth of evidence identify ing, de scribing , and valuing the community

estate” ). Simi larly , this recor d lacks e vidence identify ing, de scribing , and v alui ng the community

estate. A lthough Mr. Wolk testified as to the location and legal d es cr i ption of the community

homestead, a

nd stated that he had made mortg ag e pay ments on the home of at least $700 to $ 1, 50 0 p e r m on th f

or fi ft e e n y e a rs , n o o the r e vid e nc e wa s pr e se nte d a s to t he va lue of

the pr op e rt

y or the outstanding debt on the prope rty
. L ikewise, no evidenc e wa s prese nted to identify , descr ibe, or value the other a ssets and liabilities divided in the decre e. I nstead, Mr. Wolk merely asked tha t the court allow each party to “kee p any cash, bank acc ounts, retire ment acc ounts in their possession

. . . in the ir name” and that “ea ch party be able to ke ep and pay any and all debts i n t h ei r n ame.” Acc ording ly , we c onclude err or is a ppare nt on the fac e of the rec ord and that the trial cour t abused its discretion in the division of the marital es t at e b as ed on the lac k of evide nce. See Sandone , 116 S.W .3d at 208. We sustain appellant’s third issue.
Amount o

f C hild Supp ort I n her se cond issue, appel lant contends the tria l court er red in its deter

mination of the amount of child support. The trial court a pplied the child support g uidelines, based upon evidenc e of Mr . Wolk’ s i n come, and awa rded a ppellant $632 per

month in child support. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.13 0 (W es t 2 0 0 2 ). Beca use we have r emande d the division of the community

estate to the tria l court, we also rema nd the deter

minat ion of child support as such a n
awa rd may be “materially

influence d” by

the p roperty

division, and we should not substit ute our7

discretion for

that of the trial c ourt. See V azquez , 2 00 7 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 47 13 , a t *1 2; se e als o W ilson , 132 S.W .3d at 539.

The Te x as F amily

Code also specifie s four factors that a court “shall deter mine and g ive sp e c ia l c on sid e ratio n to ” wh e n set tin g the a mou nt of c hil d sup po rt fo r a d isa ble d c hil d a ft e r h is eig hteenth birthday . Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.306 ( West 2002). The fa ctors ar e: ( 1 ) a n y e xi s t i n g o r f

u tu r e n e e d s o f t h e a d

u l t c h i l d d i r e c t l y

re la te d to the a du lt child’s mental or phy sical disability and the substantial ca

re a nd persona l su pe rv isi on dir e c tly re qu ir e d b y

or re la te d to that di sa

bil ity ; (2 ) wh e the r t

he pa re nt p a y s f

or or wi ll pa

y fo r the c a re or

su pe rv isi on of the a du lt child or provides or will provide substantial car e or pe rsonal super vision of the adult child; (3) the financ ial resour ces available to both pare nts fo r t h e s u p p o rt , ca re , and supervision of the a dult child; and (4) any

other financ ial resour ces or other re source s or prog rams available for the support, car e, and supe rvision of the adult child.
Id. T h o u g h e v i d e n c e w a s p r e s e n t e d t h a t t h e c h i l d h a s D o w n s yn dr o m e , t h a ta p p e l l a n th a s a l w a ys been the primary

car etake r, and tha t s h e has been takingcar e of the child for y ear s, there w as no evidenc e showing the child’s cur rent or f uture medic al nee ds relating to his d i s ab ility , the substantial car e and supe rvision require d rela ting to the c hild’s disabilit y , whether appellant pay s or will pay for the c are or supervision of t he child or wil l provide subst antial care, or financ ial or other
resour ces or

prog rams available for the s upport and care of t he child. We conclude that on the fa ce of the re cord, the trial court did not have suffic i en t i n fo rm ation “to deter mine and g ive spec ial consideration” to the statutorily require d fac tors. Se e id .; see also Sandone , 1 1 6 S. W. 3 d a t 2 0 8
. We sustain appellant’s se cond issue.8

Atto rne y ’s fe es a nd c ourt c os ts I n her f ourth issue, appe llant contend s the trial cour t erre d in its assessment of attorney ’s fe es and c ourt costs. T h e trial c ourt order ed in the divorc e dec ree that eac h party was responsible for

his or her ow n attorney ’s fe es, expenses and c osts, an d t h at co u rt costs wer e to be borne by the par ty that incurre d the costs. A court may apportion attorney ’s fe es in a divorc e ac tion as par t of a just an d rig ht divisi on of the prope rty
. Sandone , 116 S.W .3d at 208. Mr. Wolk, howeve r, did not prese nt any evidenc e of incurre d attorney ’s fees. Be cause we have re verse d and
rema nded the division of the marital estate, and beca use no evidenc e was prese nted on the amount of incurr ed attorne y ’s fe es, we sustain appellant’s fourth issue and remand t he assessment of fe es and costs for f urther c onsideration by

the trial court in connec tion with the ot her r emande d issues. See Ba rry , 193 S.W .3d at 76.
CO NC LU SION

We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt

de c re e in p a rt , a

nd hav in g s us ta ine d a

pp e lla nt’ s is su e s,
re ve rs e a nd

re mand fo r a ne w tri a l on

the iss ue s r a ise d b y

a pp e lla nt.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med in part; Rever sed and Rema nded in par

t Filed: September

12, 2007