COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-15-00222-CV 

ROSS MANDEL AND LEA MANDEL APPELLANTS

V. 

LEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF 

DENTON, CITY OF PLANO, AND 

CLAUSSNER HOLDINGS, LLC 

 APPELLEES

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FROM THE 431ST DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 2013-70534-431 

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OPINION 

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This is an appeal from a denial of a bill of review.1 In one issue that 

contains several supporting arguments, appellants Ross Mandel and Lea Mandel 

contend that the trial court’s November 2012 default judgment against them 

violated their right to due process and that the trial court therefore erred by 

 1See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f). 
2 

granting the summary judgment motions filed in the bill of review proceeding by 

appellees Lewisville Independent School District (Lewisville ISD), County of 

Denton (Denton County), City of Plano (Plano), and Claussner Holdings, LLC 

(Claussner). We affirm. 

Background Facts 

In a prior, restricted appeal that involved all of the same parties at issue 

here (other than Claussner), we affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against 

appellants for delinquent ad valorem taxes on their Plano residence.2 We set out 

the chronology of events between the parties as follows: 

 On July 29, 2011, Lewisville ISD filed its original petition 

against the Mandels . . . for payment of delinquent 2010 property 

taxes on the Mandels’ home. Lea Mandel was served by personal 

service of process on August 5, 2011. Ross Mandel was served by 

personal service of process on August 16, 2011. The Mandels did 

not answer. . . . While the case was pending, at some point in the 

following months, [a lienholder] paid the delinquent 2010 taxes. 

 Lewisville ISD filed its first amended original petition on June 

7, 2012, eliminating its cause of action for 2010 taxes and alleging 

that the Mandels were delinquent on their 2011 taxes. Lewisville 

ISD’s certificate of service appended to its amended petition stated 

that it served the Mandels with a copy of the amended petition 

pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a.[3] The Mandels did 

 2See Mandel v. Lewisville ISD, 445 S.W.3d 469, 485 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2014, pet. denied). 

3The Mandels disputed in this bill of review proceeding whether service of 

the amended petition under rule 21a was accomplished. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a 

(stating that notices required to be served, other than the citation, may be served 

in various ways, including in person, by mail, or by e-mail). Appellees contend, in 

part, that Texas law did not require service of the amended petition under rule 

21a. 
3 

not answer. . . . On November 2, 2012, [Plano] intervened. On 

November 13, 2012, [Denton County] intervened. [Plano] and 

[Denton County] each sought to recover delinquent 2011 property 

taxes owed by the Mandels. 

 On November 15, 2012, the case was called to trial. The 

Mandels did not appear. . . . On the same date, the trial court 

signed a final default judgment against the Mandels . . . for the 

amounts owed to Lewisville ISD, [Plano], and [Denton County] for 

the delinquent 2011 taxes, including penalties and interest until paid. 

The judgment also ordered foreclosure of the tax liens on the 

property, issuance of an order of public sale of the property, 

payment to the taxing entities of the amounts owed from the 

proceeds, and issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser of 

the property at the sale. 

 On November 16, 2012, the Denton County District Clerk 

mailed a notice of the judgment to each of the Mandels, as well as a 

billing statement for the court costs. On January 4, 2013, the 

Denton County District Clerk issued an order of sale for foreclosure 

of the tax liens and for court costs recovered in the default judgment. 

The Denton County Sheriff published notice of the sale and on 

March 13, 2013, mailed a copy of the notice to the Mandels. The 

property was sold at a sheriff’s sale on the Denton County 

Courthouse steps to Claussner on April 2, 2013.[4]

In the restricted appeal, appellants argued that (1) the citation by which 

Ross was served with Lewisville ISD’s original petition did not strictly comply with 

certain rules of civil procedure, (2) Lewisville ISD was required to serve them with 

a new citation when it filed its amended petition because the amended petition 

asserted a new cause of action for a different tax year, (3) Plano and Denton 

County were required to (and failed to) serve appellants with citation when they 

intervened, and (4) they were denied due process because they did not receive 

 4Mandel, 445 S.W.3d at 472–73. 
4 

adequate notice of the order of sale of the property.5 We rejected each of these 

arguments.6

Before we issued our decision in the restricted appeal, appellants filed a 

petition for bill of review in the trial court, contending that the November 2012 

default judgment is void. They argued that rule of civil procedure 21a required 

Lewisville ISD to serve its amended petition on them and that Lewisville ISD did 

not do so. They raised the same contention with respect to the intervention 

petitions filed by Plano and Denton County. Finally, they contended that the 

resulting sheriff’s sale of the home was improper because the default judgment 

was taken without proper service and was therefore allegedly void. 

Appellees filed answers to the petition for bill of review. Appellants 

amended the petition; they again contended that their right to due process had 

been violated because they had not been served under rule 21a with Lewisville 

ISD’s amended petition or the intervention petitions filed by Plano and Denton 

County. They contended that the November 2012 judgment was obtained in 

violation of their due process rights “because they were not served with the 

pleadings upon which the default judgment was based.” 

All parties sought summary judgment. Appellants argued that they were 

not served with Lewisville ISD’s amended petition or the other taxing entities’ 

 5Id. at 474–85. 

6See id. at 485. 
5 

intervention petitions under rule 21a and that those petitions asserted a new 

cause of action and sought more onerous relief than Lewisville ISD’s original 

petition. Appellants contended, “Due process does not permit a default judgment 

on a claim never served on the defendants. As such, this Court should . . . set 

aside the default judgment.” Appellants attached a declaration to their motion in 

which Ross stated that neither he nor Lea received Lewisville ISD’s amended 

petition or the intervention petitions filed by Denton County and Plano. They also 

contended that Lewisville ISD had admitted that it had not served the amended 

petition upon appellants.7 They contended that when taxing entities are on notice 

that service has not been received by a citizen, the entities have a due process 

obligation to take “additional steps to provide citizens notice before taking their 

property.” Finally, they argued that because they did not receive constitutionally 

adequate notice of the taxing entities’ claims for the 2011 taxes, they were not 

required to prove traditional bill-of-review elements, including that they had a 

meritorious claim or defense. 

Claussner argued that appellants’ claim seeking to void the sheriff’s sale of 

the property, which was conducted in accordance with the trial court’s order of 

sale, was legally unsupported even if they prevailed in setting aside the default 

 7In a response to an interrogatory in discovery, Lewisville ISD stated that it 

sent the amended petition to appellants by certified mail but that the certified mail 

was returned as unclaimed. Lewisville ISD admitted that it knew that appellants 

had not received the amended petition when Lewisville ISD sought the default 

judgment against them. 
6 

judgment. Claussner contended that appellants’ only recourse, if any, was 

“against the Taxing Authorities.” It argued, “Even if this Court were to set aside 

the Default Judgment (which it cannot and should not), this Court may not set 

aside the tax sale to Claussner.” 

Lewisville ISD asserted, among other arguments, that appellants were not 

entitled to a bill of review because they did not have a meritorious defense to the 

delinquency of the 2011 taxes and because they were not legally entitled to 

receive a copy of Lewisville ISD’s amended petition. With respect to the latter 

argument, Lewisville ISD asserted that rule of civil procedure 117a8 negated any 

need for service of the amended petition upon appellants under rule 21a. 

Lewisville ISD contended, “Property owners have a legal duty to know whether or 

not the taxes assessed on their property have been paid and this is especially 

true when suit has been filed to collect delinquent taxes assessed on their 

property. This necessarily includes taxes becoming delinquent after a lawsuit 

has been filed.” 

Denton County adopted Lewisville ISD’s summary judgment motion. The 

county also contended that it was not required to serve appellants with its 

intervention petition. The county argued that this court resolved that exact 

argument against appellants in the restricted appeal; thus, the county asserted 

that the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case precluded appellants’ 

 8See Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a. 
7 

petition for bill of review. Plano adopted Denton County’s and Lewisville ISD’s 

summary judgment motions and contended that the procedures for service in a 

tax suit created by rule 117a satisfied due process. 

The trial court granted the summary judgment motions filed by appellees 

and denied appellants’ motion. The court ordered that the “default judgment for 

[Lewisville ISD], [Denton County], and [Plano] . . . entered on November 15, 2012 

is hereby SUSTAINED/AFFIRMED.” Appellants brought this appeal. 

Rule 117a and Due Process 

In one issue that contains several supporting arguments, appellants 

contend that the November 2012 default judgment violated due process and that 

the trial court therefore erred by granting summary judgment for appellees and by 

denying appellants’ petition for bill of review. In a summary judgment case, the 

issue on appeal is whether the movant established that no genuine issue of 

material fact existed and that the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. 

Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); see also Shackelford v. 

Cartercopters, LLC, No. 02-10-00414-CV, 2011 WL 3835638, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The review of a grant of 

summary judgment on a petition for bill of review is the same standard of review 

as for grants of summary judgment in other types of cases.”). We review a 

summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 

862 (Tex. 2010). A defendant who conclusively negates at least one essential 
8 

element of a cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Frost 

Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010), cert. denied, 562 

U.S. 1180 (2011). When multiple parties move for summary judgment and the 

trial court grants one motion while denying another, we review the parties’ 

summary judgment evidence and determine all questions presented. Little v. 

Delta Steel, Inc., 409 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). 

A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set 

aside a prior judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new 

trial or appeal. Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998); see In re 

Child, No. 02-15-00118-CV, 2016 WL 1403320, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

Apr. 7, 2016, no pet. h.). It is brought as a separate suit from the case in which 

the challenged judgment was rendered. Morris v. O’Neal, 464 S.W.3d 801, 805 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). 

The fundamental policy that finality must be accorded to judgments makes 

the grounds upon which a bill of review will be granted narrow. See King Ranch, 

Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 

(2004). Generally, to be entitled to relief, a bill of review petitioner must plead 

and prove three elements: (1) the petitioner has a meritorious defense to the 

underlying cause of action; (2) the petitioner was prevented from making that 

defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, or because 

of official mistake; and (3) these actions were unmixed with any fault or 

negligence on the part of the petitioner. Child, 2016 WL 1403320, at *2. When a 
9 

bill of review is premised on an alleged lack of service of process or notice, such 

as where the petitioner is seeking to set aside a default judgment, the petitioner 

is relieved of having to prove the first two elements. Morris, 464 S.W.3d at 805 

n.1; see Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2012);

Interaction, Inc. v. State, 17 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. 

denied) (“[W]hen a defendant does not receive notice of a lawsuit, the defendant 

is relieved of its burden to prove that fraud, accident, or wrongful act prevented it 

from making its defense.”). 

The connecting thread of appellants’ arguments is their contention that rule 

21a required Lewisville ISD to serve its amended petition on them and required 

Denton County and Plano to serve their intervention pleadings on them. 

Appellants argue that because the amended petition and intervention pleadings 

were not served, the default judgment violates their right to due process and is 

void. Appellees argue, in part, that rule 117a negated any need for the service of 

the amended petition or the intervention petitions under rule 21a and that rule 

117a complies with due process. 

Rule 21a states that every “notice required by [the rules of civil procedure], 

and every pleading . . . required to be served under Rule 21,9 other than the 

 9Rule 21 states in part, 

Every pleading . . . must be filed with the clerk of the court in writing, 

must state the grounds therefor, must set forth the relief or order 

sought, and at the same time a true copy must be served on all other 

parties, and must be noted on the docket. 
10 

citation to be served upon the filing of a cause of action[,] . . . may be served by 

delivering a copy to the party to be served.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a(a) (emphasis 

added). Notices and pleadings covered by rule 21a may be served 

electronically, in person, by mail, or by e-mail, among other means. Id.; see also 

In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2009) (explaining that the service requirement 

and methods contained in rule 21a generally apply to “all pleadings and court 

papers except the original petition”). Generally, when a defendant has been 

served with an original petition by citation, the rules of civil procedure require the 

service of an amended petition, without citation, when the amended petition 

seeks a more onerous judgment10 than prayed for in the original pleading. E.A., 

287 S.W.3d at 3–5; Mandel, 445 S.W.3d at 478 (stating that “service under rule 

21a suffices to satisfy the requirement of service of an amended petition 

asserting a new cause of action as well as one that seeks more onerous relief”); 

Garduza v. Castillo, No. 05-13-00377-CV, 2014 WL 2921650, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas June 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The issuance and service of citation 

is only required for an original petition. Thereafter neither issuance [nor] service 

of citation is required for subsequently amended petitions, just service pursuant 

 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(a). 

10The parties dispute whether Lewisville ISD’s amended petition requested 

more onerous relief than its original petition. Appellants contend that the 

amended petition sought more onerous relief because it added a new cause of 

action for a different tax year (2011 instead of 2010) and alleged greater liability 

than the original petition. For the reasons stated below, we need not resolve that 

issue. 
11 

to rule 21a of each amended petition that requests more onerous relief.” (citation 

omitted)). Failure to serve such an amended petition generally renders any 

default judgment granted on the amended petition void. See Pride v. Williams, 

No. 05-11-01189-CV, 2013 WL 3788627, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 17, 2013, 

no pet.) (mem. op.); Olive Tree Apartments v. Trevino, No. 04-09-00740-CV, 

2010 WL 1817797, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 5, 2010, no pet.) (mem. 

op.). 

Rule 117a applies to suits for collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes, 

like this case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a (“In all suits for collection of delinquent 

ad valorem taxes, the rules of civil procedure governing issuance and service of 

citation shall control the issuance and service of citation therein, except as herein 

otherwise specially provided.”). Rule 117a explicitly relates to “citation” in tax 

suits but contains language that more generally applies to the notice of 

pleadings, including pleadings filed after the original petition, required in such 

suits. See id. The rule provides that a citation in a tax suit must state 

that in addition to the taxes all interest, penalties, and costs allowed 

by law up to and including the day of judgment are included in the 

suit; and that all parties to the suit, including plaintiff, defendants, 

and intervenors, shall take notice that claims for any taxes on said 

property becoming delinquent subsequent to the filing of the suit and 

up to the day of judgment, together with all interest, penalties, and 

costs allowed by law thereon, may, upon requests therefor, be 

recovered therein without further citation or notice to any parties 

thereto. Such citation need not be accompanied by a copy of 

plaintiff's petition and no such copy need be served. Such citation 

shall also show the names of all taxing units which assess and 

collect taxes on said property not made parties to such suit, and 

shall contain, in substance, a recitation that each party to such suit 
12 

shall take notice of, and plead and answer to, all claims and 

pleadings then on file or thereafter filed in said cause by all other 

parties therein, or who may intervene therein and set up their 

respective tax claims against said property. After citation or notice 

has been given on behalf of any plaintiff or intervenor taxing unit, the 

court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the tax claims of 

all taxing units who are parties plaintiff, intervenor or defendant at 

the time such process is issued and of all taxing units intervening 

after such process is issued, not only for the taxes, interest, 

penalties, and costs which may be due on said property at the time 

the suit is filed, but those becoming delinquent thereon at any time 

thereafter up to and including the day of judgment, without the 

necessity of further citation or notice to any party to said suit; and 

any taxing unit having a tax claim against said property may, by 

answer or intervention, set up and have determined its tax claim 

without the necessity of further citation or notice to any parties to 

such suit.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(4) (emphasis added). The rule also provides a form for 

citation by personal service in tax suits, and the form includes the following 

language: 

 All parties to this suit, including plaintiff, defendants, and 

intervenors, shall take notice that claims not only for any taxes which 

were delinquent on said property at the time this suit was filed but all 

taxes becoming delinquent thereon at any time thereafter up to the 

day of judgment, including all interest, penalties, and costs allowed 

by law thereon, may, upon request therefor, be recovered herein 

without further citation or notice to any parties herein, and all said 

parties shall take notice of and plead and answer to all claims and 

pleadings now on file and which may hereafter be filed in this cause

by all other parties hereto, and by all of those taxing units above 

named, who may intervene herein and set up their respective tax 

claims against said property. 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(6). 

Lewisville ISD’s original petition, filed in July 2011, stated, 

 All the parties of this suit, including Plaintiff, Defendant(s) and 

lntervenor(s), shall take notice that claims for any and all taxes 
13 

becoming delinquent on said property at any time subsequent to the 

filing of this suit, up to the day of Judgment, may upon request 

therefore be recovered herein without further Citation or Notice, and 

that such claims for such delinquent taxes shall include all penalties, 

interest[,] and costs allowed by law. 

 Similar language appeared on the citation that accompanied Lewisville 

ISD’s original petition. In accordance with rule 117a(6), the citation stated, 

 All parties to this suit, including Plaintiff, Defendant(s), and 

Intervenors, shall take notice that claims not only for any taxes which 

were delinquent on said property at the time this suit was filed but all 

taxes becoming delinquent thereon at any time thereafter up to the 

day of judgment, including all interest, penalties, and costs allowed 

by law thereon, may upon request therefor, be recovered herein 

without further citation or notice to any parties herein, and all said 

parties shall take notice of and plead and answer to all claims and 

pleadings now on file and which may hereafter be filed in this cause 

by all other parties hereto, and by all of those taxing units above 

named, who may intervene herein and set up their respective tax 

claims against said property.[11]

See id. 

 In resolving the restricted appeal, we relied on rule 117a to hold that 

Denton County and Plano were not required to serve appellants with citation 

when those entities filed their intervention petitions. See Mandel, 445 S.W.3d at 

480–81; see also Stoker v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-08-00103-CV, 2009 WL 

2138951, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In a 

suit to collect delinquent taxes due on property, any taxing unit having a tax claim 

 11At the 2012 hearing in which the trial court granted the default judgment, 

in response to an argument made by the lienholder, the court stated, “[I]t would 

seem to me that the parties were put on notice of the taxing [authorities’] intent to 

seek payment of past due taxes as well as future taxes if they happen to become 

due and owing prior to the time that a judgment’s entered . . . .” 
14 

against the property may intervene and have its tax claim determined without the 

necessity of further citation or notice to any parties to the suit.”). We explained, 

“In essence, rule 117a(4) means that taxing units named in a citation as having 

claims for delinquent taxes on particular property, but not parties to the tax suit, 

may later join the suit without further service of process or notice.” Mandel, 445 

S.W.3d at 482 (emphasis added). We concluded that as applied in this manner, 

rule 117a did not violate due process because the citation that appellants 

received provided them with 

sufficient notice that they were being sued by Lewisville ISD for 

delinquent ad valorem taxes on real property located at a specific 

address. By naming both the City and the County, which later 

intervened, the citation served with Lewisville ISD’s original petition 

gave the Mandels all the notice to which they were entitled and gave 

them the opportunity to appear and defend the suit. Nothing in the 

record before us intimates that they were misled or placed at a 

disadvantage by the citation and pleadings. 

Id. However, we did not directly answer the question presented here, which is 

whether rule 21a, rather than rules relating to the service of citation, required 

service of the amended pleading or the intervention petitions upon appellants or 

whether, instead, rule 117a negated that requirement.12 

 12Instead, we appeared to assume, without explicitly deciding, that rule 21a 

applied and held that there was no error on the face of the record under rule 21a 

because Lewisville ISD’s amended petition recited that it was served by certified 

mail. Mandel, 445 S.W.3d at 479–80. In other words, we concluded that service 

under rule 21a was adequate on the face of the record in the restricted appeal, 

but we did not explicitly hold that service was necessary when considering the 

effect of rule 117a. See id. Contrary to appellants’ argument on appeal, we 

cannot conclude that service of Lewisville ISD’s amended petition was legally 
15 

 We apply rules of civil procedure in accordance with their plain language. 

Simulis, L.L.C. v. G.E. Capital Corp., 276 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Burrhus v. M&S Supply, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 635, 640 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (“[R]ules that are specific and clear 

are given their plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would produce an 

absurd result or defeat the intent of the enacting body.”). The plain language of 

rule 117a signifies that in a suit for delinquent taxes, once a citation complying 

with the rule has been properly served, the party serving the citation along with 

intervening parties who do not serve citation may obtain a judgment for all taxes 

becoming delinquent before the rendition of the judgment “without further . . . 

notice” to any defendant. Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(4). In other words, the rule 

contemplates that after a citation is served, the party serving the citation and 

other parties may plead new claims and seek more onerous relief without further 

notice. See id. The rule expressly provides that no copy of the plaintiff’s petition 

need be served and explicitly places the burden on a defendant to “take notice 

of, and plead and answer to, all claims and pleadings then on file or thereafter 

filed in said cause by all . . . parties therein.” Id. (emphasis added). The rule 

requires the citation to inform the defendant of this burden to respond to all 

pleadings on file at the time of the citation’s service or filed in the future, and the 

citations served on Ross and Lea in this case did so. Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(6); 

 

necessary simply because Lewisville ISD attempted to serve the amended 

petition. 
16 

see also Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.45 (West 2015) (stating that a party in a suit 

for tax delinquency must “take notice of and plead and answer to all claims and 

pleadings filed by other parties that have been joined or have intervened, and 

each citation must so state”). 

 Thus, the rules of civil procedure, which generally require the service of 

notice and pleadings, and rule 117a, which expressly negates the requirement of 

serving notice or pleadings in tax suits following the service of the citation, 

conflict. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(a), 21a(a), 117a(4). We conclude that rule 117a, 

which is the more specific rule, prevails in tax suits to the extent of the conflict. 

See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026(b) (West 2013); In re Mem’l Hermann 

Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 716 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (“[C]onflicts 

between general and specific provisions favor the specific, and when the literal 

terms of the two provisions cannot both be true, the terms of the specific 

provision ordinarily will prevail.”). 

 For these reasons, under the prevailing language of rule 117a, we must 

reject appellants’ principal contention, which is that rule 21a required Lewisville 

ISD to serve its amended petition on appellants. We hold that no such service 

was required under the unambiguous language of rule 117a. 

 Appellants also argue, however, that due process required service of the 

amended petition even if rule 117a did not. They argue that rules of civil 

procedure cannot foreclose federal and state constitutional attacks by parties 

deprived of constitutionally adequate notice. 
17 

 Due process generally requires service of an amended pleading seeking a 

more onerous judgment. See E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 5–6. But the supreme court’s 

decision in Mexia Independent School District v. City of Mexia leads us to 

conclude that the notice provided by rule 117a is constitutionally adequate 

without the necessity of service of amended or intervening pleadings. 134 Tex. 

95, 133 S.W.2d 118 (1939). There, the supreme court examined the statute that 

preceded rule 117a. Id. at 96, 133 S.W.2d at 119; see Mandel, 445 S.W.3d at 

481 (comparing rule 117a with the former statute). The factual background of the 

case involved an action by the City of Mexia against a debtor, A.N. Pigford, for 

delinquent taxes. Mexia ISD, 134 Tex. at 98, 133 S.W.2d at 120. Mexia ISD 

intervened and also sought a delinquency judgment against Pigford but did not 

serve Pigford with citation. Id. According to the former statute (like rule 117a), 

the citation from the city’s original petition notified Pigford that other taxing units 

had been made parties and that Pigford should “take notice of, and plead and 

answer to, all claims and pleadings now on file and hereafter filed.” Id. The city 

contended that the former statute was unconstitutional, but the supreme court 

disagreed, stating, 

 The Act in question undertakes to require all parties to take 

notice of all subsequent pleadings filed in the suit and it is contended 

by appellee that it is unconstitutional, because, if followed, it would 

deprive Pigford of his property without due process of law, in that it 

would permit an impleaded taxing unit to file a [cross-action] and 

recover judgment against Pigford for foreclosure of its lien without 

any citation to him thereon. The general rule is that the legislature in 

its discretion may prescribe what notice shall be given to a 

defendant in a suit, subject to the condition that the notice 
18 

prescribed must conform to the requirement of due process of law. 

The requirement of due process of law is met if the notice prescribed 

affords the party a fair opportunity to appear and defend his 

interests. The statute in question applies only to a particular class of 

suits—that is, suits brought by taxing units to foreclose tax liens on 

property. The citation served on the defendant must disclose to him 

the nature of the suit. He is charged with knowledge of the law and 

therefore must know from the nature of the suit that there is a 

possibility of cross-actions by others. In other words, he is notified 

that an effort will be made to sell the particular piece of property for 

taxes and that all other defendants in the suit, as well as taxing units 

not parties thereto, who have an interest in the property have been 

invited to present their claims and to participate in the sale. 

Section 4 of the Act requires that the citation contain a recitation 

calling his attention to the fact that he is [required] to take notice of 

all pleadings then on file and such as may thereafter be filed by any 

and all parties. It is a [well-recognized] rule that a defendant who 

has once entered his appearance in a cause is charged with notice 

of all amendments thereafter filed, including pleas of intervention 

and cross-actions by other defendants. If a defendant, merely 

because he has entered his appearance in an ordinary suit, can be 

required to take notice of all subsequent pleadings, interventions 

and cross-actions by the public generally, we see no reason why in a 

particular class of suits a defendant, who has been served with 

citation that specifically warned him of the necessity of taking notice 

of subsequent pleadings, cannot be required to take notice of crossactions of a particular kind by a particular class of claimants. We 

think the notice required by the statute affords all defendants a fair 

opportunity to be heard and therefore it does not violate the due 

process clause of our Constitution.

Id. at 100–02, 133 S.W.2d at 121–22 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

 More recently, an intermediate court of appeals held that a citation 

complying with rule 117a comports with due process because such a citation 

gives a defendant notice of the claim for a tax deficiency and a fair opportunity to 

contest the claim. Conseco Fin. Servicing v. Klein ISD, 78 S.W.3d 666, 675–76 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 150 
19 

Tex. 398, 404, 241 S.W.2d 142, 146 (1951) (“The requirement of due process of 

law is met if the notice prescribed affords the party a fair opportunity to appear 

and defend his interests.”), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 903 (1952). 

 We conclude that the citations served on appellants satisfied due process, 

without the need of service of the amended or intervening pleadings, because 

the citations notified appellants of the potential for future tax delinquencies 

sought by Lewisville ISD, Denton County, or Plano; instructed them to remain 

apprised of those potential claims; and gave them a fair opportunity to defend 

against the claims. See Mexia ISD, 134 Tex. at 100–02, 133 S.W.2d at 121–22; 

Conseco Fin. Servicing, 78 S.W.3d at 675–76. Although appellants contend that 

they were not “fairly put on notice that a judgment might result for another tax 

year without some kind of notice before the . . . default judgment,”13 the citations 

provided them with this exact notice, informing them that the taxing units were 

seeking taxes “delinquent on said property at the time this suit was filed [and] all 

taxes becoming delinquent thereon at any time thereafter up to the day of 

judgment . . . without further citation or notice.” And as explained above, the 

citations received by appellants informed them that they were to take notice of all 

 13Appellants rely, in part, on a letter they received informing them that the 

2010 taxes had been paid. But that letter also informed appellants that the 

lawsuit remained pending and would not be dismissed until “all school taxes, 

court costs, and abstract fees [were] paid.” The letter stated, “Please be advised 

that the District may take judgment for any unpaid school taxes, court costs[,] 

and abstract fees that remain unpaid without further notice to you.” 
20 

current and future pleadings. Nonetheless, the record does not indicate that 

appellants appeared in the lawsuit prior to the date of the default judgment. 

 In their argument concerning due process, appellants rely on the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006). 

There, the Court stated that before a state may take property and sell it for 

unpaid taxes, due process requires the state to provide the owner notice and 

opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id. at 223, 126 S. 

Ct. at 1712. The Court held that such due process had not been provided to the 

owner because he first learned of the allegation of a tax delinquency on the 

property after the property had been sold and because attempts to notify him by 

certified mail had been returned as unclaimed. Id. at 223–24, 239, 126 S. Ct. at 

1712–13, 1721. This case is distinguishable from Jones because here, before 

the trial court’s judgment and before the sale of the property, appellants received 

notice that suit had been filed for delinquent taxes and that recovery in the suit 

could include any taxes that were delinquent on the day of the judgment. See 

Mandel, 445 S.W.3d at 483 (distinguishing Jones on the ground that the sale “of 

the Mandels’ home in this case was . . . with the protections afforded by service 

of citation on the Mandels, providing notice and an opportunity to appear in court 

for a meaningful hearing before the final judgment ordering sale of their home for 

payment of the delinquent taxes”). 

 For all of these reasons, we hold that under rule 117a, appellants were not 

entitled to service under rule 21a (or otherwise) of Lewisville ISD’s amended 
21 

petition or the other entities’ intervention pleadings, and we also hold that the 

provisions within rule 117a do not violate due process facially or as applied.14 

We conclude that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for 

appellees15 and by denying appellants’ petition for bill of review. We overrule 

appellants’ sole issue. 

Conclusion 

 Having overruled appellants’ only issue, we affirm the trial court’s final 

summary judgment denying appellants’ petition for bill of review. 

/s/ Terrie Livingston 

TERRIE LIVINGSTON 

CHIEF JUSTICE 

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and GABRIEL, JJ. 

DELIVERED: June 30, 2016 

 14In light of these related holdings, we conclude that we need not address 

other arguments, which concern issues such as whether setting aside the 

judgment would require setting aside the sale of the property, whether appellants’ 

bill of review could be defeated by certain defenses raised by appellees, or 

whether the trial court erred by excluding certain summary judgment evidence. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written 

opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and 

necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin, 449 

S.W.3d 665, 677 n.19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). 

15Appellants argued that Claussner had no standing to move for summary 

judgment because “no claims were asserted against it.” We disagree because 

appellants explicitly sued Claussner and asked the trial court to void the deed to 

Claussner. See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 

2005) (explaining that the “issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a 

sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a ‘justiciable interest’ in its 

outcome”).