NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FERNANDO GUERRERO-GUERRERO, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-72392 

Agency No. A091-641-202 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of an

Immigration Judge

Submitted June 8, 2022**

Anchorage, Alaska

Before: HURWITZ, BRESS, and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Fernando Guerrero-Guerrero, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a 

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) affirming an asylum officer’s determination 

that Guerrero did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. 

Reviewing for substantial evidence, see Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 10 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

(9th Cir. 2018), we deny the petition. 

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Guerrero did not

establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c), 

(g) (2011) (amended 2020). 

a. A petitioner “may establish a well-founded fear of future persecution in 

two ways: by proving past persecution, or by demonstrating that he has a 

subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.” 

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)

(cleaned up); see Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 809 n.4. Guerrero never contended that he 

was persecuted in the past and he failed to show that anyone in Mexico would want 

to harm him in the future.

b. The bulk of Guerrero’s briefing is directed at the IJ’s determination that he 

had not shown that he could not reasonably relocate within Mexico. A petitioner 

who fails to establish past persecution, or that he faces future persecution by the

government or a government-sponsored actor, has the burden of establishing that it 

would be unreasonable for him to relocate. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3)(i) (2000). In 

evaluating the reasonableness of relocation, an IJ considers several factors including 

“social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial 

ties.” Id. § 208.16(b)(3) (2000). Guerrero has failed to establish that the IJ refused 

to consider all relevant evidence, including Guerrero’s health, in making his 
3 

determination. See Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 814 (explaining that an IJ is not required 

to “address all of the evidence and claims specifically” in reviewing reasonable fear 

determinations). The IJ’s statement, “I also wonder if they’re going to be able to 

send him back in his medical condition but that’s beside the point,” does not indicate 

that he believed Guerrero’s health was irrelevant to the relocation issue. And 

substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Guerrero failed to establish 

that he could not relocate. Guerrero never testified, nor argued, that he could not 

reasonably relocate because of his health and when asked whether he could relocate, 

he said he did not know. 

2. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Guerrero 

did not establish a reasonable possibility of torture if returned to Mexico. See 8 

C.F.R. § 208.31(c), (g) (2011) (amended 2020). Guerrero did not claim past torture 

or establish that anyone would target him if he were removed to Mexico, see Dhital 

v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008), and the IJ reasonably found 

that relocation was possible, see Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, ---F.4th---, 2022 

WL 1196787, at *7 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2022) (explaining that the agency must consider 

“the possibility of relocation—without regard for the reasonableness of relocation” 

in the Convention Against Torture analysis). 

PETITION DENIED.