SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1494-15T1

SHARON MILLER GROMEK,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

VITOLD F. GROMEK,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

Argued May 22, 2018 – Decided June 5, 2018

Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FM-14-0006-10.

Vitold F. Gromek, appellant pro se. 

Respondent Sharon Miller Gromek has not filed 

a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Vitold F. Gromek appeals from an October 27, 2015 

order, which denied his motion for relief from a December 10, 2014 

order entered following a plenary hearing addressing alimony, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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child support, college contribution, and attorney's fees. We 

affirm.

We glean the following facts from the record. The parties 

were married in 1982. Two children were born of the marriage, 

both of whom are now emancipated. The parties divorced in 1999 

following a three-day trial. Defendant appealed from the trial 

judge's decision, and we remanded in part for the trial judge to 

address certain aspects of the alimony computation, equitable 

distribution, and counsel fees. Gromek v. Gromek, No. A-0480-99

(App. Div. Jan. 17, 2002); Gromek v. Gromek, No. A-6302-99 (App. 

Div. Jan. 17, 2002). 

The trial judge made findings on the remanded issues, and

defendant appealed. We affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded 

in part the trial judge's determination. Gromek v. Gromek, No. 

A-4825-03 (App. Div. Oct. 27, 2005). Pertinent to the present 

appeal, in our remand we: established the budget for plaintiff on 

which the trial judge was again directed to calculate alimony and 

child support; directed probation to credit defendant's account 

in the event the support recalculation on remand resulted in excess 

payment of support; addressed credits to defendant against 

equitable distribution of the parties' Nantucket residence; and 

awarded plaintiff counsel fees from defendant's share of equitable 

distribution of the residence. 
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These issues, which were remanded in 2005, were subject to a 

trial before a different judge who also adjudicated other postjudgment matters, including defendant's request to: terminate 

child support, terminate or reduce alimony, and reduce or eliminate 

his obligation to contribute to the children's college costs. 

Subsequent to our remand, the judge entered two preliminary orders 

dated November 4, 2011, adjudicating alimony, child support, and 

reimbursements from the Nantucket property. Defendant sought 

reconsideration, which the judge granted in part in an order dated 

February 2, 2012. 

The trial judge also entered a separate order on February 22, 

2013, addressing defendant's motion for reconsideration of the 

judge's rulings regarding child support and the dispute over 

probation's calculation of defendant's arrears. Defendant sought 

reconsideration of this order, which the judge denied on August 

14, 2013. The judge found defendant had advanced no legitimate 

basis to grant reconsideration. The judge also noted a plenary 

hearing had been scheduled to address the dispute. 

Eventually, a fourteen-day trial ensued, which resulted in 

the entry of a final order on December 10, 2014. The trial judge 

determined the parties' children were emancipated as of January 

1, 2012, and terminated defendant's child support obligation as 

of that date. The judge denied defendant's motion to terminate 
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alimony, but reduced his alimony obligation from $600 to $498 per 

week, effective June 1, 2012. The judge found defendant was 

responsible for fifty percent of the children's undergraduate 

college costs, and fifty percent of the payments plaintiff 

previously made for those costs. The judge awarded plaintiff 

$131,865.45 in counsel fees and costs. Defendant appealed from 

the December 10, 2014 order, but it was dismissed for failure to 

perfect the appeal. Gromek v. Gromek, No. A-3067-14 (App. Div. 

June 11, 2015). 

The parties' motion practice continued, resulting in the 

order now under appeal, which addressed forty-seven requests for 

relief. Plaintiff's motion largely sought enforcement of the 

December 10, 2014 order. Citing Rule 4:50-1, defendant's motion

argued the December 10, 2014 order was "so defective, so replete 

with errors, as it relates to child support, attorney fees, and 

college expenses that it should be voided and re-litigated." He 

also sought reconsideration of the emancipation date for one of 

the children, and the counsel fee award. Additionally, as part 

of his ongoing disputation of probation's arrears calculation, 

defendant sought to compel plaintiff to produce documentation for 

all funds she received or had held for her benefit outside of 

probation. A different judge heard the motions, and denied 
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defendant's requests, noting the relief defendant sought should 

have been addressed on appeal. This appeal followed.

I.

We begin with our standard of review. A trial court's 

findings "should not be disturbed unless '. . . they are so wholly 

insupportable as to result in a denial of justice[.]'" Rova Farms 

Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974) 

(quoting Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. 

Div.), aff'd o.b., 33 N.J. 78 (1960)). When the trial court's 

findings are "supported by adequate, substantial and credible 

evidence[,]" those findings should be upheld on appeal. Id. at 

484. 

"[O]ur appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge 

unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported 

by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." 

Fagliarone v. N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963); 

see also Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484. The function of this court 

is to determine whether there is "substantial evidence in support 

of the trial judge's findings and conclusions . . . ." Weiss v. 

I. Zapinsky, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 1961).
6 A-1494-15T1

II.

As we noted, defendant styled his motion as one for 

reconsideration, but cited Rule 4:50-1, and specifically argued 

the December 10, 2014 order was void and generally unjust. Thus, 

defendant's argument implicated Rule 4:50-1(d) and (f), which 

provide: 

On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms 

as are just, the court may relieve a party or 

the party's legal representative from a final 

judgment or order for the following reasons: 

. . . (d) the judgment or order is void; . . . 

or (f) any other reason justifying relief from 

the operation of the judgment or order. 

Generally, "[c]ourts should use Rule 4:50-1 sparingly, [and] in 

exceptional situations[.]" Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 

135 N.J. 274, 289 (1994). Relief under Rule 4:50-1 "is designed 

to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and 

judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should 

have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." 

Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cty. Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113, 120 

(1977) (citing Hodgson v. Applegate, 31 N.J. 29, 43 (1959)). 

Under Rule 4:50-1: "No categorization can be made of the 

situations which warrant redress under subsection (f). . . . [T]he 

very essence of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional 

situations. And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as 

expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice." DEG, LLC 
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v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 269-70 (2009) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 

(1966)).

On appeal, defendant again challenges the December 10, 2014

order. He claims the support calculation in it was erroneous 

because he experienced a changed circumstance after we remanded 

the matter. Specifically, on the remand we directed the trial 

judge use $127,465 as defendant's income, and he argues his income 

was actually $63,487, and claims the trial judge erred when he 

failed to use the lower income figure. 

Defendant argues the trial judge failed to calculate child 

support using the child support guidelines. He asserts the trial 

judge's deviation from the guidelines by eighty-eight dollars per 

week to meet plaintiff's needs was arbitrary and capricious. 

Defendant argues the trial judge incorrectly calculated taxes on 

defendant's income because he used estimated taxes rather than 

averaging his actual tax liability. He asserts the trial judge's

guidelines calculation incorrectly calculated the medical 

insurance premium, unreimbursed health care expenses, parenting 

time adjustment, and plaintiff's income.

Defendant claims the trial judge failed to recognize 

plaintiff's case information statements (CISs) were false and 
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contained erroneous expenses. Defendant asserts plaintiff failed 

to provide CISs for certain years.

Defendant argues the trial judge failed to acknowledge 

payments defendant made outside of probation. He claims probation 

failed to conduct a court ordered audit to account for the correct 

date on which his pendente lite support ended and his post-judgment 

support obligation began. Defendant argues he overpaid by $4800, 

which was not credited to his arrears. He asserts he provided 

probation with the proofs, but it refused to accept them, and the 

trial judge failed to compel it to do so. Defendant claims his 

share of the sales proceeds from the Nantucket home were not 

credited to his arrears. He argues probation failed to record the 

fact his support obligation was reduced as a result of a child's

emancipation and the reduction in his alimony obligation.

Defendant asserts the trial judge failed to account for and 

differentiate child support from college expenses, which resulted 

in defendant paying for certain expenses twice. He argues child 

support was not recalculated to account for the children's 

residence in college.

Defendant asserts plaintiff incurred invalid costs for 

college, which resulted in excessive borrowing, and he should not 

have to pay for those costs. He argues the trial judge failed to 

account for his ability to pay for college. Defendant claims the 
9 A-1494-15T1

trial judge erred by not considering defendant's argument he should 

be absolved of his obligation to contribute to college because he 

was not consulted in the process.

Defendant argues the trial judge erred by not permitting 

defendant to submit his claim for counsel fees. He asserts he was 

denied fees because he was self-represented. Defendant claims the 

trial judge failed to address defendant's application to modify 

or terminate alimony based on a prospective retirement pursuant 

to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j). 

Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive. The motion judge 

undertook a detailed review comparing the circumstances and 

evidence presented to him with the trial judge's decision, and the 

record before the trial judge. The motion judge concluded:

There was a motion for reconsideration, again, 

appeals taken. There was a vocational expert 

at some point who was retained, Dr. Stein, I 

know who posited an income range between 

[ninety thousand] and [one hundred and twenty 

thousand dollars.] The defendant had some 

concern that everybody was focused on the high 

end of Dr. Stein's number. And I note also 

that the [trial judge] did find that the 

defendant had sequestered funds in the name 

of his sister or otherwise, and I know that's 

a finding that the defendant disagree[s] with. 

But all of these issues, the alimony, the 

dates of emancipation, the level of college 

contribution, all of that was subject, or 

would have been subject to [a]ppellate review. 

It was subject to application for 

reconsideration. And you know, whether it's 
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filed five months later, six months later or 

seven months later, I really haven’t had 

information presented to me such that I could 

legitimately say in the interest of justice I 

have to do something, a travesty has occurred, 

this has to be changed. It can't be allowed 

to stand. Recognized and established law was 

ignored, or the law has changed, and the 

change gave retroactive application to those 

changes, none of those things have happened.

Our review of the record leads to the same conclusion. The 

trial judge addressed all of defendant's claims regarding alimony, 

college contribution and counsel fees, applying the facts to the 

relevant factors found in the statute, case law, and court rules. 

Therefore, as noted by the motion judge, defendant's remedy was 

to appeal the December 10, 2014 decision, rather than present 

arguments why he disagreed with the trial decision to the motion 

judge, and expect a different outcome pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. As 

the motion judge noted, Rule 4:50-1 addresses grounds for 

collateral relief from a final order, it does not act as a 

substitute for appeal. Defendant's disagreement with the December 

10, 2014 order neither demonstrated it was void pursuant to Rule

4:50-1(d) nor established grounds for extraordinary relief under 

Rule 4:50-1(f). For these reasons, the motion judge did not abuse 

his discretion by declining to re-visit the December 10, 2014 

order.
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Furthermore, although defendant is correct neither the 

December 10, 2014 nor the October 27, 2015 order addressed his 

claim for counsel fees as a self-represented litigant, the reason

is self-evident. The Supreme Court has held a self-represented 

litigant may not claim attorney's fees for the litigant's own 

efforts prosecuting a case. Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 260-64 

(2012). Therefore, neither judge erred by failing to award 

defendant counsel fees. 

Finally, we have reviewed the balance of defendant's 

arguments, including: the calculation of defendant's income and 

tax obligations; the trial judge's guidelines calculation; 

defendant's claims regarding plaintiff's CIS data; probation's 

calculation of arrears; and defendant's claim to a prospective 

retirement. The trial judge found these arguments lacked merit, 

and based on our review of the record we also find they lack 

sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written 

opinion. Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.