# FILED

Au gust 15, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMIN AL APPEALS OF TENN ESSEE

AT NASHVILLE APRIL 1997 SESSION

KIM LA MAR WITT, * C.C.A. # 01C0 1-9606-CR- 00274 Appellant, * DAVIDSO N COUNTY VS. * Hon. J. Ra ndall W yatt, Jr., Judge STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Habeas Corpus) Appellee. *
For Appellant : For Appellee: Robert J. M endes Charles W. Burson 209 Tenth Avenue Sout h Attorney Gen eral & Repor ter Cummins Station, Suite 507 450 James Roberts on Parkway Nashvil le, TN 37203 Nashvil le, TN 37243 Kare n M. Ya cuzzo Assistant Attorney Gener al 450 James Roberts on Parkway Nashvil le, TN 37243 Katrin Novak Miller Assistant D istrict A

ttorney Gener

al 222 Second Avenue North Washington Square, Suite 50 0 Nashvil le, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILE D:_______________________

AFFIRMED

GARY R. WADE, JUDGE2 OPINION The petitioner, Kim La mar W itt, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for w rit of habeas corpus. In 1987, the p etitioner was convic ted of armed robbery and assault with the intent to comm it first degree murder; the trial court imposed two concurrent, R ange II sentences of life impris onment. The petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief o n two different grounds:

(1) the 1989 Sen tencing Refor m Act and its predecessors

violate t he Separation of Powers Clause of the Tennessee Consti tution; and (2) the 1989 Sen tencing Refor m Act and its pred eces sors vi olat e the dete rmin ate s ente ncin g law. A ft e r a n e v i d e n t i a ryh e a r i n g o n t h e i s s u e s , t h e t r i a l c o u rt d e n i e d t h e p e t i t i o n . We affirm.
The habeas corpus remedy in this state is li mited. The wr it may be granted only

where a pet itioner has e stablished l ack of jurisdi ction for the or der of confinement or that he is otherw ise entitled to immediate rel ease because of the expirati on of his sentence. See Ussery v. Avery , 432 S.W .2d 656 (Tenn. 196 8); State ex rel. W ade v. Norvell , 443 S.W.2d 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. 196 9). Habeas corpus reli ef is avail able in this state only when it appear s on the face of the judgment or th e record that the trial court was without j urisdicti on to convic t or sentence the defendant or that the sentence of imprisonment has otherwis e expired. Archer v . State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State , 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992).

This action does not allege t hat the Hamilton County cour t lacked jurisdict ion or that the petitioner's sentence has ex pired. Thus, the petitioner has failed to state a c laim for habeas corpus relief. See Monro e E. Da visv. J immy Harrison, Warden , No. 02C01-960 7-CC-00242, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p., at1 The peti ti oner chal lenges the " Tennessee Sentenci ng Reform Act .. . and i ts pr edecessor statu tes." W e lim it our dis cus sion to the 1 982 Act, th e Ac t und er w hich the p etitione r wa s se nten ced

. W e note, however, thatthe 1989 Act cont ains pr ovi sions t hat ar e simil ar t o the chal lenged port ions of the 1 982 Act. 3 Jackson, Jul y 2, 1997) ( holding thes e identical c hallenges to the 1989 Sentencing Act do not state a claim for habeas corpus reli ef).

Neverthel ess, we w ill address the merits of the a rguments. F irst, the petitioner argues the Senten cing Act 1 violates the Separation of Powers Clause of the Tennessee Consti tution, whi ch provid es as follows:

Sec. 1. Div ision of power s.--The powers of the Government shall be divided into three distinct departments: the Le gislative, Executive, and Judicial. Sec. 2. Limitat ion of powers .--No pers on or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in t he cases herei n directed or permitted. Tenn. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2.

The 1982 Sentencing Act requir es the trial judge to "deter mine the appropriate r

ange of sentence." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -210(a) (198 2 repl.). The range determi nation control s release el igibili ty. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 501(c) (1982 repl.). The pet itioner arg ues that because t he trial cour t had to determine the ran ge, the tri al court imper missibly "dictates to t he executive when an offender is first el igible for parole." He contends that the l egislati ve branch has delegated to the executive branch the exclusive power to calculate initial parole eligibil ity dates. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § § 4 0
- 2 8
- 1 0 1 t h r o u g h - 1 2 5 ( 1 9 8 2 r e p l

. )

. We must disagree.

Our supreme cour

t has held that "[t]heoreticall y, the leg islative power is the authori ty to make, or der, and repeal[ ;] the execut ive, that to administer and4 enforce[;] and the j udicial, that to interpret

and apply, l aws." Richardson v . Young , 125 S.W. 664, 668 (Tenn. 1910) (quot ed with appr oval in Underwood v . State , 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1975)). Our court has recently ackn owledged that the "authority to grant par

oles is not j udicial in nature but is a dministrativ e." Monroe E. Davis , slip op. at 3 (citin g Woods v. State , 169 S.W. 558 (Tenn. 1914)). Never thel ess, our su prem e cou rt ha s obs erved , "it is imp ossi ble t o pre serve perfectly thetheoretical lines of demarcati on between the [three] branches of government. " Underwood , 529 S.W .2d at 47. "There is necessa rily a certain amount of overlappi ng. The three dep artments are i nterdependent." Id.

In Davis , our court r

ejected an arg ument identical to that of the petitioner, r uling "that a trial cour

t's determinati on of sentencing r ange does not infringe upon t he powers of the executive branch." Sli p op. at 3. See also Steve L. Bryant v . State , No. 01C01-960 5-CR-00190, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p., at Nashvil le, April 24, 1997).

The petitioner nex

t argues that

the 1982 Act v iolates the dete rminate sentencing l aw. He as serts that the sentencing r anges alongwith release elig ibility percentages e stablish ind eterminate sentences in vi olation of Tenn. Code An n. § 40-35-211 (1982 repl.), which provides "[i]n fixing a sentence ..., the court shall impose a specific

sentence leng th for each offense. ... There shall be no indeterminate se ntences."

Parole does not terminate a pri soner's senten ce. See Howell v. State , 569 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tenn. 1978). While the prisoner is release d from confinement, the sentence continues and th e parolee "is still in the custody of the penal authoriti es of the State." Doyle v . Hampton , 340 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tenn.5 1960). Parole does not cause the sentence to ex pire or ter minate. Id. Thus, the possibi lity of pa role doe s not cau se a sent ence to be inde termin ate. Ran ge classificati ons and release eligibil ity deter minations do not c reate the possi bility of indeterminate se ntences. See also Steve L. Br yant , slip op. at 4 (rulingthat "[p]arole does not

cause a sentence to expire or terminate but is a conditi onal release from more r

estrictiv e confinement").
Accordingl y, the judg ment of the trial court is affirmed.

__________________________________ Gary R. W ade, Ju dge CONCUR:

_______________________________ David H. W elles, Ju dge

_______________________________ Curwood W itt, Jud ge