97-215

 No. 97-215

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

THOMAS C. RICHARDS,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Cascade,

 The Honorable Kenneth R. Neill, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Bethany F. Schendel, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;

 Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General;

 Helena, Montana

 Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: October 2, 1997

 Decided: November 4, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Thomas C. Richards appeals from that portion of a sentence and judgment entered

by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, restricting his access to 

Cascade

County, and from a subsequent order of the court mandating that he pay restitution 

in the

amount of $10,438.05 for counseling costs incurred by one of his victims. We vacate 

the court's order that Richards pay $10,438.05 in restitution, and hold we lack

jurisdiction to review Richards' original sentence. 

 We rephrase the issues presented on appeal as follows: 

 1. Did the District Court err in ordering that Richards pay restitution in the

amount of $10,438.05 for counseling costs incurred by one of his victims?

 2. Did the District Court err in restricting Richards from entering Cascade

County as a condition of his suspended sentence?

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 By way of an information filed May 25, 1994, the State charged Richards with two

counts of felony criminal endangerment to which he subsequently pled not guilty. On

November 9, 1994, the State amended its information to charge Richards with one count

of felony assault and one count of misdemeanor assault, in violation of õ 45-5-201,

MCA. Richards entered a plea of not guilty to each count at his November 21, 1994,

arraignment. On February 10, 1995, Richards entered into a plea agreement with the

State, and on April 10, 1995, he pled guilty to both counts contained in the amended 

information.

 On May 9, 1995, District Court Judge Robert Goff sentenced Richards to five

years in the Montana State Prison with all time suspended on the count of felony 

assault. 

With respect to the count of misdemeanor assault, Judge Goff sentenced Richards to 

six

months in the Cascade County Jail, suspending all but the 225 days already served. 

Judge Goff gave Richards credit for the 225 days already served, and ordered the

sentences to run consecutively. 

 The court imposed a number of conditions upon Richards' suspended sentence,

among which were the following: 

 1. Defendant shall be restricted from entering Cascade County,

 Montana. [Condition #9]

 2. Defendant shall pay restitution to the Crime Victim's Compensation

 Unit in the amount of $4,174.46. [Condition #13]

 3. The Defendant shall pay for any future counseling costs of Timi

 Gilbreath and/or Amanda Gilbreath. [Condition #15]

 On August 26, 1996, the State filed a motion asking that the court order 

Richards

to pay $10,438.05 in restitution. The amount requested represented the balance due 

on

a bill from Deaconess Medical Center for inpatient psychiatric treatment received by 

Timi

Gilbreath in October 1994. On January 23, 1997, following a hearing on the State's

motion, the court ordered that Richards pay restitution in the amount of $10,438.05, 

less

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any amounts previously reimbursed by worker's compensation insurance by reason of a

prior industrial injury to which portions of the bill may have related. On January 

31,

1997, the court issued a supplemental order in which it directed that Richards remit 

his

restitution payments to the Clerk of the District Court who was, in turn, to forward 

them

to Deaconess Medical Center. 

 On February 10, 1997, Richards filed his notice of appeal from the court's

January 23, 1997, restitution order and from its January 31, 1997, supplemental 

order. 

Richards additionally seeks, in effect, to appeal from that portion of the District 

Court's

May 9, 1995, sentencing order which restricted Richards from entering Cascade 

County. 

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err in ordering that Richards pay restitution for 

counseling

costs, in the amount of $10,438.05, incurred by one of his victims?

 We review the imposition of a sentence "for legality only." State v. Graves

(1995), 272 Mont. 451, 463, 901 P.2d 549, 557. We have held that "[t]he standard of

review on sentence legality is whether the district court abused its discretion. 

Graves,

250 Mont. at 463, 901 P.2d at 557.

 On appeal, Richards presents three separate arguments in support of his 

contention

that the District Court erred in ordering him to pay $10,438.05 in restitution. 

Richards

first argues that, in ordering he make additional restitution, the court erroneously

modified an otherwise valid sentence. Richards next argues the court erred in 

imposing

the $10,438.05 of restitution because that amount did not reflect pecuniary loss 

suffered

by the victim. Finally, Richards contends the court erred in ordering him to pay

restitution to Deaconess Medical Center because it failed to consider his financial

resources and future ability to pay. 

 As noted, Richards first argues the District Court erred in ordering him to pay

$10,438.05 in restitution on the basis that, having imposed a valid sentence by way 

of its

May 9, 1995, order, the court lacked jurisdiction to subsequently modify that 

sentence. 

Indeed, this Court has recognized that "[o]nce a valid sentence has been pronounced, 

the

court imposing that sentence has no jurisdiction to modify it, except as provided by

statute." State v. Fertterer (1993), 260 Mont. 397, 400, 860 P.2d 151, 154. 

Pursuant

to õ 46-18-117, MCA, a court may modify or "correct an erroneous sentence or

disposition at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner 

within

120 days after the sentence is imposed or after remand from an appellate court." 

 The State, in fact, agrees that, pursuant to Montana law, once a district court

pronounces a valid sentence and judgment, it has no jurisdiction to modify that 

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sentence

except as provided by law. The State does argue, however, that in ordering Richards 

to

pay restitution to Deaconess Medical Center, the District Court was not modifying the

previously imposed sentence, but rather, was adhering to the original intent of the

sentencing court which was that Richards make full restitution to his victims. 

 In support of its argument that the court's January 23, 1997, order regarding

restitution did not constitute a modification of Richards' sentence, the State 

points to that

portion of the presentence investigation report in which Richards stated that: "More 

than

anything else, I wish to make amend[s] for what I've done, pay or make restitution, 

and

rebuild my life on its present course." The State additionally points to that 

portion of

Richards' testimony at the January 17, 1997, hearing in which he acknowledged that, 

at

the time of the original sentencing, he had agreed to pay all restitution in this 

case. 

Accordingly, the State argues it was the intent of both the sentencing court and 

Richards

himself that he pay all restitution in this case. 

 The fact remains, however, that the court's May 9, 1995, sentencing order

provided only that Richards "pay restitution to the Crime Victim's Compensation Unit

in the amount of $4,174.46" and that he "pay for any future counseling costs of Timi

Gilbreath and/or Amanda Gilbreath." The $10,438.05 bill from Deaconess Medical

Center represented charges incurred during an inpatient stay by Timi Gilbreath in the

hospital's psychiatric ward in October 1994. Thus, because the bill was for medical 

care

provided more than six months prior to the court's May 9, 1995, sentencing order, it

clearly did not represent "future counseling costs." The court's original 

sentencing order

did not direct payment of the $10,438.05 medical bill, and did not order Richards to 

pay

past, as well as future, counseling costs. Thus, by subsequently ordering Richards 

to pay

that $10,438.05, the court in effect modified its original sentence in this case. 

 Although the State argues it did not learn of the $10,438.05 bill from Deaconess

Medical Center until after the court originally sentenced Richards and was thus 

unable

to submit the bill to the court, that omission does not authorize the court to 

modify its

sentence. The sentence imposed by the court on May 9, 1995, was neither erroneous 

nor

imposed in an illegal manner, as contemplated by õ 46-18-117, MCA, and the court was

thus without jurisdiction to modify it. Accordingly, we hold that, in ordering 

Richards

to pay $10,438.05 in restitution, the District Court erroneously modified its 

original

sentence in this case. We thus vacate the District Court's January 23, 1997 and 

January

31, 1997, orders requiring that Richards pay $10,438.05 in restitution.

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 Having so held, we need not address Richards' additional arguments that the

$10,438.05 of ordered restitution did not reflect pecuniary loss suffered by the 

victim,

and that, in ordering the restitution, the court erroneously failed to consider 

Richards'

financial resources and future ability to pay.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err in restricting Richards from entering Cascade County

as a condition of his suspended sentence?

 On appeal, Richards argues the court erred in imposing, as a condition of his 

May

9, 1995, suspended sentence, that he "be restricted from entering Cascade County,

Montana." In response, the State argues this Court is without jurisdiction to 

address the

merits of Richards' claim on this issue due to his failure to file a timely notice 

of appeal

from the May 1995 sentence and judgment. Although Richards does not dispute his

failure to file a timely notice of appeal in 1995, he argues that when the court 

modified

that sentence in January 1997 it thereby reimposed the original sentence's remaining

conditions. Therefore, Richards argues, his appeal from the January 1997 reimposed

sentence is timely. 

 Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' respective arguments, we

conclude we are without jurisdiction to consider Richards' claim that the lower court

erred in restricting his access to Cascade County. Rule 5(b), M.R.App.P., requires 

that,

"[i]n criminal cases an appeal from a judgment must be taken within 60 days." Here,

Richards first filed a notice of appeal on February 10, 1997, more than one and onehalf

years after the imposition of his May 9, 1995, sentence. Although Richards argues 

the

District Court reimposed the original conditions of his suspended sentence in 

January of

1997, in effect creating a new sentence from which he may now appeal, we disagree.

 Neither the District Court's January 22, 1997, order nor its January 31, 1997,

order directs reimposition of the remaining conditions present in the original May 

9,

1995, sentence and judgment. Rather, the two January 1997 orders exclusively address

the issue of restitution. In ordering additional restitution, the court did not 

impose a new

sentence upon Richards, or even reimpose the previous sentence which remained valid. 

Instead, it simply added a modification to the original May 9, 1995, sentence and

judgment. As Richards failed to timely file a notice of appeal from that May 1995

sentence, he is precluded from now contesting that portion of the sentence which 

ordered

he be restricted from entering Cascade County.

 Having held we lack jurisdiction to address this issue, we need not consider the

State's argument that Richards failed to first raise the issue in district court, 

thereby

precluding its consideration by this Court. 

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

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We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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