alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.20.1

                                AMENDMENT NO.  1
                                       TO
                               RESELLER AGREEMENT

           This Amendment No. 1 to Reseller Agreement ("Amendment No. 1") is
made and entered into as of this 2nd day of September, 1997 by and among
ORBCOMM USA, L.P. ("ORBCOMM USA") and Orbital Sciences Corporation ITS Group
("Reseller").

                                   WITNESSETH

           WHEREAS, ORBCOMM USA and Reseller previously entered into a Reseller
Agreement dated as of March 3, 1997 (the "Reseller Agreement"); and

           WHEREAS, ORBCOMM USA and Reseller desire to amend and modify certain
terms of the Reseller Agreement;

           NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

           SECTION 1 Terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the
meanings assigned thereto in the Reseller Agreement.

           SECTION 2 Exhibit A - Authorized Territory of the Reseller Agreement
shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

           The Reseller is granted the non-exclusive right to resell ORBCOMM
           Products and Services for Intelligent Transportation System
           monitoring, tracking and messaging applications to Federal, State
           and local Government and commercial accounts.  Excluded from this
           territory definition is the right to resell ORBCOMM Products and
           Services (a) for barge tracking and monitoring applications on the
           inland waters of the United States, and (b) to United States-based
           rail companies for the specific purposes of monitoring and/or
           tracking rail cars used exclusively for the transportation of
           automobiles and trucks, which rail cars are know as "Autorack
           Railcars".

           IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment No. 1
as of the day and year first above written.

                               ORBCOMM USA, L.P.

                                      By:
                                         -----------------------------
                                          Name: Robert F. Latham
                                          Title: President

                               ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION ITS GROUP

                                      By:
                                         ------------------------------
                                          Name: Joan Deoul
                                          Title: Contracts Manager, ITS Group
### STANDARD REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT CBI: No P-10-0224 Standard Review Draft 4/26/2010
ENGINEER: El-Zoobi/Avcin \ CLM PV (kg/yr): Import only
Revision Notes/Assessment Overview:
SUBMITTER:
USE:
OTHER USES:
MSDS : LABEL : No Gen Eqpt: Respirator : Health Effects: TLV/PEL : CRSS: (3/1/2010): Chemical Name: S-H2O: 1 g/L @ VP: 1.0E-6 torr @ MW: 0.0%<500 0.0%<1000 Physical State and Misc CRSS Info: Neat: Mfg: N K: Imported Proc/Form: End Use:

. Consumer Use : SAT (concerns): (3/2/2010):
Related Cases and Misc SAT Info:

Migration to groundwater: Other (please specify) PBT rating: P 3 B 1 T 2 Anion: P3B1T2 // Cation: P1B1T1 Health: 2, Drinking Water, Inhalation Eco: 1, No releases to WaterOCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE RATING: 2B
NOTES & KEY ASSUMPTIONS: Generated by the 06/07/2005 version of ChemSTEER.
POLLUTION PREVENTION CONSIDERATIONS: P2 Claims:
P2 REC:
EXPOSURE-BASED REVIEW: No (0 criteria met)P-10-0224

Use:
Number of Sites/Location: Basis: Process Description: 

## ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES ESTIMATE SUMMARY IRER Note: The daily releases listed for any source below may coincide with daily releases from the other sources to the same medium.

## OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES ESTIMATE SUMMARY Tot. # of workers exposed via assessed routes: Basis:

Inhalation:
FILED

October 1, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE 

 JANUARY 1997 SESSION

ROBERT F. TURNER, )

)

Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9603-CR-00098

 )

) Hamilton County

v. ) 

) Honorable Stephen M. Bevil, Judge 

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)

) 

Appellee. )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Robert F. Turner, Pro Se Charles W. Burson

# 167179 Attorney General of Tennessee

Turney Center Annex and

Route One Eugene J. Honea

Only, TN 37140 Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

William H. Cox

District Attorney General

600 Market Street, Suite 310

Chattanooga, TN 37402

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

Joseph M. Tipton

Judge
2

O P I N I O N

The petitioner, Robert F. Turner, appeals as of right from the Hamilton

County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his second post-conviction petition without a

hearing. He contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because the use of the

term “moral certainty” in the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at his trial allowed

the jury to convict him based on a lower standard of proof than is constitutionally

required. 

In 1983, the petitioner was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and

robbery and received a sentence of forty years and five to ten years, respectively. This

court affirmed his conviction. State v. Earl Allen Bailey and Robert Turner, [no number

in original], Hamilton County (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 1984). On January 10, 1996,

the petitioner filed the present petition, alleging that the reasonable doubt instruction

given at his trial is unconstitutional under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct.

328 (1990). The trial court dismissed the petition because it concluded that the jury

was properly instructed on the state’s burden of proof at the petitioner’s trial. We agree.

The following instruction was given at the petitioner’s trial:

Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an

investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after

such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty

of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may

arise from possibility, or an imaginary or captious doubt.

Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to

convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required

as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the

offense.

This is a correct statement of the burden of proof for criminal trials in Tennessee. See

Nichols v. State, 877 S.W.2d 722, 734 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Sexton, 917 S.W.2d 263, 266

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994). 
3

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

 

Joseph M. Tipton, Judge 

CONCUR:

 

Gary R. Wade, Judge 

 

William M. Barker, Judge
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6729

MARIO ALPHONSO HERRERA-UMANZOR,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

TOM SMITH, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:15-hc-02298-FL)

Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: December 2, 2016

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mario Alphonso Herrera-Umanzor, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Mario Alphonso Herrera-Umanzor pled guilty to causing 

premeditated death through use of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(j)(1), (2) (2012), and was sentenced in September 2013 in 

federal district court in New York to 264 months’ imprisonment. 

His conviction and sentence were summarily affirmed on appeal. 

United States v. Prado, 815 F.3d 93, 105 (2nd Cir. 2016).

In December 2015, Herrera-Umanzor filed the underlying 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition, alleging ineffective assistance 

of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition without 

prejudice, noting that Herrera-Umanzor must proceed under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), but it could not convert his § 2241 

petition to a § 2255 motion because it would be successive. 

Herrera-Umanzor appeals.

The district court properly found that, because HerreraUmanzor is challenging the legality of his detention, rather 

than the execution of his sentence, he must proceed under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th 

Cir. 1997). However, our review of the docket in HerreraUmanzor’s criminal proceedings reveals no prior § 2255 motion. 

Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and 

affirm the dismissal without prejudice of Herrera-Umanzor’s 

§ 2241 petition. Herrera-Umanzor may file a § 2255 motion in 
3

the court of conviction, mindful of the one-year limitations 

period. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15D0206. WILLIE A. SMITH, JR. v. THE STATE.

After pleading guilty to cocaine trafficking, Willie A. Smith, Jr. filed a motion

to set aside a void judgment and sentence. According to Smith, the State failed to

present a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea. The trial court dismissed the

motion on November 7, 2014, and Smith filed this application for discretionary

appeal on December 18, 2014. We lack jurisdiction.

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry

of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582 (420

SE2d 393) (1992). Because this application was filed 41 days after entry of the order

Smith seeks to appeal, it is untimely. We thus lack jurisdiction to consider the

application, which is hereby DISMISSED. See Hill, supra. 

Even if the application had been timely, it would have been subject to

dismissal. In Roberts v. State, the Supreme Court made clear that a motion seeking

to challenge an allegedly invalid or void judgment of conviction “is not one of the

established procedures for challenging the validity of a judgment in a criminal case.” 

Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532 (690 SE2d 150) (2010). Thus, Smith is not authorized

to collaterally attack his conviction in this manner. See id.; Matherlee v. State, 303

Ga. App. 765 (694 SE2d 665) (2010).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

01/13/2015

January 13, 2015
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-8484

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MARVIN HAROLD WITHERSPOON, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.Voorhees, District Judge. (5:04-cr-00005-RLV-DCK-1; 5:07-cv00021-RLV)

Submitted: January 15, 2009 Decided: January 26, 2009

Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marvin Harold Witherspoon, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Marvin Harold Witherspoon seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Witherspoon has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vapor Fuel Technologies, Inc. on Form
10-QSB/A for the period ending June 30, 2002, as filed with the  Securities  and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, C. Thomas Davis, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that, to
the best of my knowledge and belief:

         (1)      the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial  condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.



/s/ C. Thomas Davis
C. Thomas Davis
Chief Executive Officer
January 13, 2004



A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
has been  provided  to the  Company  and will be  retained  by the  Company  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 29, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50932

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KHALEEL NA’IM SHAKUR, also known as

Khaleel Shakur,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-02-CR-66-1

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and DEMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Khaleel Shakur challenges his guilty-plea conviction and

sentence for conspiring to make, utter, or possess a counterfeit

security of an organization. He asserts for the first time on

appeal that the factual basis was insufficient to establish that

he had agreed to join a conspiracy. He has not shown that the

district court committed plain error in accepting his guilty
No. 02-50932

-2-

plea, as Shakur’s admissions establish the elements of a

conspiracy. See United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529,

530 (5th Cir. 2000).

Shakur contends, also for the first time on appeal, that

during his rearraignment proceeding the district court violated

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 in three separate instances. He maintains

that the court did not explain the nature of the charge to him,

in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); did not adequately

explain the effect and operation of supervised release, pursuant

to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); and did not ask him whether his

willingness to plead guilty resulted from discussions between his

attorney and the Government, pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d). 

He has not established that these omissions constituted plain

error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043,

1046 (2002). 

Shakur maintains that the district court abused its

discretion in departing upward at sentencing to impose a sentence

of 60 months. The district court concluded that the upward

departure was warranted based upon the underrepresentation of

Shakur’s criminal history and the likelihood that he would commit

more crimes in the future. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. The

court’s explanation of its reasons for departure includes an

implicit explanation for the rejection of intermediate

categories. See United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 663 (5th

Cir. 1993)(en banc). The degree of the departure was reasonable. 
No. 02-50932

-3-

See United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 174-75 (5th Cir.

1995). The district court did not abuse its discretion in

departing upward. See United States v. McKenzie, 991 F.2d 203,

204 (5th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N NO. 03-15-00602- CV In re Rodney K idd ORI GINAL P ROCEEDI NG F ROM TRAVIS CO UNTY M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N The petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition is denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

__________________________________________ Cindy Olson Bour land, J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Goodwin, and B ourland Filed: Oc tober 1, 2015
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.3

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Pyramid Breweries Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jason W. Rees,
Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ JASON W. REES
Jason W. Rees
Controller and Chief Accounting Officer
March 31, 2005
“

.., 

## THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OP -*AS ClZAWm-ORD

c.MARTmiv Ausnlv. TEXAR 78711 .4lTORNEY CIBNERAL May 8, 1968

Hon. James E. Barlow Criminal District Attorney Bexar County SanAntonio, Texas 78204 Dear Mr. Barlow: Opinion NO. M-230 Re: Filing fees and appeal bonds in connection with appeals from justice court.

you have asked our opinion as towhether an appellant from the justice court must pay a filing fee to the county clerk under theprovisions of Section 1A(1)(a)ofArticle 3930(b), Vernon's Civil Statutes, in addition toproviding an appeal bond, inview of the provisions of Article 3930(b) and Rule 571, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule.571 provides, inpart, as follows: "Theparty appealing . . .shall . . . filewith the justice abond . . .conditioned that appellant shall prosecute his appeal to effect, and shall pay off and satisfy the judgment which may be rendered against him on appeal . . . When such bond has been filed with the justice, the appeal shall be held to be thereby perfected and all parties to said suit or to any suit so appealed shallmake their appearance at the next term of court towhich said case has been appealed. . . ." Article 3930(b) prescribes the fees that county clerks and clerks of county courts are authorized and required to collect, which include filing fees for each cause of action or docket in county civil courts.

We agree with your conclusion that no conflict exists between the provisions of Article 3930(b), providing for filing fees, and Rule 571, providing for filing of appeal bonds. The appeal bond requirement is forthe purpose of assuring payment of judgment and costs. The filing fee constitutes fees county clerks are authorized to collect for services rendered by them in the filing of various instruments.

InAttorney General's Opinion M-170 (19671,construing theprovisions of Article 3930(b), itwas stated that no' conflict exists between itsprovisions and theprovisions of -1124*Hon. James E. Barlow, page 2 (M-230)

Section 428 of Chapter X of theTexas Probate Code. See also Attorney General's Opinions ~-128 (19671,M-133 (19671,M-134 (1967),M-135 (1967),M-148 (1967),and M-168 (19671,concerning the effect of the enactment of House Bills 78 and 80 of the 60th Legislature, Regular Session, concerning fees of county and district clerks on existing laws.

Inview of the foregoing, you are advised thatwe agree with your opinion that there isno conflict between Rule 571 and Article 3930(b), Section 1A(1)(a),and that both an appeal bond and a filing fee are now required. SUMMARY There isno conflict between Rule 571, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and Article 3930(b), Section 1A(1)(a),Vernon's Civil Statutes, and both an appeal bond and a filing fee are now required.

Prepared by John Reeves Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Hawthorne Phillips, Chairman Kerns Taylor, Co-Chairman Fisher Tyler Charles F. Aycock Bob Flowers Jerry Roberts A. J. CARLJBBI,JR. Executive Assistant truly yours, m7~ C. MARTIN General of Texas

-1x.5-
Exhibit 13.1  Section 906 Certification  Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland, a chartered corporation incorporated under the laws of Ireland (Bank of Ireland), hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:  The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the twelve months ended December 31, 2012 (the Report) of The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland  fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Bank of Ireland.   Date: 27 March 2013/s/Richie BoucherName: Richie BoucherTitle: Group Chief Executive