SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

MARTIN CENTENO, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

B. QUEEN VICTORIA, LLC; AND 

ABSOLUTE COLLECTION SERVICE, 

INC., 

Respondents. 

No. 67915 

FILED 

JAN 2 7 2016 

TRACIE K. UNDEMAN 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

EY 

DEPUTY CLERK 

ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND 

This is a pro se appeal from a district court summary 

judgment in a real property action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Kenneth C. Cory, Judge. 

Having considered the record and the parties' arguments, we 

conclude that summary judgment was improper. As a threshold matter, 

we conclude that appellant has standing to allege that respondent 

Absolute Collection Service did not mail the notices required under NRS 

Chapter 116. Generally speaking, a quitclaim deed "is sufficient to convey 

whatever interest the grantor had in the property at the time the 

conveyance was made," Brophy Min,. Co. v. Brophy & Dale Gold & Silver 

Min. Co., 15 Nev. 101, 107 (1880), which, in this case, includes Victoria 

Family Trust's (VFT) right to contest whether Absolute Collection mailed 

the notices in compliance with NRS Chapter 116. CI 23 Am. Jur. 2d 

Deeds § 277 (2013) ("[C]ourts agree that a quitclaim deed, unless a 

contrary intent appears, passes all the right, title, and interest which the 

grantor has at the time of making the deed, which is capable of being 

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transferred by deed."). While we recognize that the deed in this case did 

not convey 100 percent of VFT's interest in the subject property, 

respondents have not explained why this distinction would warrant 

deviating from the aforementioned general rule. Accordingly, we conclude 

that appellant has standing to challenge whether Absolute Collection 

mailed the notices in compliance with NRS Chapter 116. Cf. Arguello v. 

Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 368, 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011) 

(observing that the issue of standing "overlaps with" the inquiry into 

whether a party is a real party in interest under NRCP 17(a) and that "[a] 

real party in interest is one who possesses the right to enforce the claim 

and has a significant interest in the litigation" (quotation omitted)). 

Additionally, we conclude that summary judgment was 

improper, as a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Absolute 

Collection mailed the notices in compliance with NRS Chapter 116. See 

Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) 

(reviewing a summary judgment de novo and recognizing that summary 

judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and other evidence on file, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate 

that no genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute). In 

particular, based on the current record, the affidavits of non-receipt 

from VFT's co-trustee and from VFT's tenant were sufficient to create a 

question of fact as to whether Absolute Collection mailed the notices in 

compliance with NRS Chapter 116. See Liberty Mat. Ins. Co. v. 

Caterpillar Tractor Co., 353 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1984) ("Proof that an 

addressee did not receive a piece of mail is competent evidence that it was 

not mailed."); Pizitz v. Ryan, 403 So. 2d 222, 223 (Ala. 1981) (same); 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

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, C.J. 

Parraguirre 

J. 

Cherry 

Jensen v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 296 P.2d 434, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) 

(same). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order. 1 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Kenneth C. Cory, District Judge 

Martin Centeno 

Charles L. Geisendorf, Ltd. 

Hafter Law 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

'In rendering this disposition, we have not considered respondents' 

arguments that were not made in district court, including the argument 

regarding NRS 116.31166. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 

623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). To the extent that respondents made an 

argument regarding NRS 163.110 in district court, the record before us is 

insufficiently developed to determine whether such an argument may 

have had merit. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A