1 NOT D E S I GNATED FOR P UB LICAT I ON

N o

. 1 20, 643

IN THE C OURT OF APPEALS OF THE S TA T E OF KAN S AS

S TATE OF K ANSAS

, Appel l ee

,

v.

D ANNY W. Q UEE N

, Appel l ant

.

MEMO RA NDUM OP INION

Ap p eal from Do u glas District C o urt; P E G G Y C. K IT T E L

, judge. Opini o n filed J u l y 2

, 2 0 2 0

.

Co n victio n s reversed, sen t ences va c ate d

, a n d ca s e dis m is s e d

.

Peter Maharr

y

, o f Kansas Ap p ellate Defen d er Offic e

, for ap p ellan t

.

Kate Du n can B u tle r

, assis t ant district attorne y

, Ch a rl e s E. Bra n so n

, d istrict attorne y

, and Derek

Sc h mid t

, att o r ney g eneral, f o r appellee.

Before A T CHES O N

, P

. J

. , W ARNER

, J., and W AL K E R

, S.J.

P ER C UR I A M : We a re to d ay o b l i gated to r e verse the convic t io n s of D anny W.

Q u e e n for s e con d

- d e g r ee mur d er a nd t wo ot h e r violent f e l o n i e s beca u se the D o ugl a s

Co u nty Di s tr i ct Co u rt fa i l e d to beg i n h is jury t ri a l wi t hin the t i me l imi t s the Kans a s

Legisl a ture has e s t ablis h ed. As a r e s ult of t his viola t i o n of Q u e e n's spe e d y

- tr i al rights

under K.S

. A. 2019 S upp. 22

- 3402, t he char g es must be dismi s s e d, and Q u e e n cannot be

re t ri e d. T h at is the l e g i s l a t ively mandated r e me d y.2

T h e r e c o r d on a

p p e a l s hows t he d i s t ri c t co u rt mis c a l c u l a t ed the 1 50

- day s pe e dy

tr i al deadline, s o Queen's jury tr i al had b e e n s c he d ul e d to b e gin 3 days too l a t e . The

m o r ning t h e t ri a l was t o st a rt, Queen's l awyer moved to dismi s s the c a s e un d er K.S.A.

2019 S upp. 22

- 3402(a). T h e p r osecutor o bjec t ed. The dist r ict court held s ever a l he a rings

before d e nyi n g the m oti o n and p roce e ding with the ju r y trial. The district court concluded

an except i on permi t t i ng a 3 0

- d a y co n t i nu a nce t o ac c omm o date oth e r t ri a l s ap p l i ed and, in

any e ve n t, Q u e e n's l a w y er a c qu i e s c e d to the o riginal tr i al s e t t ing o utside the 1 5 0

- day

peri o d. The re c ord and the l aw s u p port neit h er p u r p ort e d b a s is for de n ying Q u e en's

m o t i on to d i smi s s. No o ther exc e p t io n s to the s t a t ut o ry s p e e d y

- trial re q uirement a p ply.

On a p p e a l, Q u e e n ren e ws t he c l aim that his s t a tutory ri g ht to a speedy tr i al was

vi o l a t e d and also argu e s er r ors during the ju r y tr i al t a in t ed the ve r dict s . Be c au s e we m u st

reve r se the convic t io n s for t he spe e dy t r i a l viola t io n , we do not c o n s ider the a s sert e d trial

er r ors.

F ACTU A L AND P ROCED U RAL B ACK G ROUND

Giv e n how we must d e c i de Q u e e n's appeal, we ne c e s s a rily fo c us on t he spee d y

trial chronology and the relevant discussions in the district court. Altho u gh t he f a c t s

about t he charg e d cr i mes as p o rt r ayed in the evidence p r e s ented to t he jury are

disturb i ng

— l i ke m o st c i rcums t ances inv o lv i ng vi o l e nt death s

— t h ey h a ve no dir e ct l e gal

bear i ng on the spee d y

- tr i al issue. We offer an o verview for s o m e c ont e xt.

As part of an e xte n d e d and a l c o hol

- fuel e d b ir t h d a y ce l eb r a t ion o n J u ne 23, 2 017,

Q u e e n w ound up at D

- Dubs, a bar i n E u d ora, s h o rt l y before mi d night. Q u e e n de c ided a

fem a le bar t en d er was n o t a t t e n di n g t o h is d r ink r e que s t qui c kly e n ough a n d u n l e a shed a

pr o f a ne t i rade. Bo Ho p son, a m em ber of bar's s e c urity c r ew, a long w i th s e veral other men

es c orted Q ueen o u t s i d e. T h e g r oup b e gan s c u ff l in g

. Q ueen pull e d out a pis t ol and s h o t

Hopson t w i c e . He then a t t e m p t e d to s h o o t a n o ther man, b ut the pi s tol mi s fi r ed. Hear i ng3

the s h o t s

, a n o t

her bar patr o n approach e d the ar e a, and Q ueen p o i nted the pis t ol at h im.

T h e gun ag a in mis f

ired. Several patr o ns then swa r med Q u e e n and beat him i n to

u n c ons c iou s nes s . Law e nf o rc e m e nt offi c ers arrived s h ortly af t er Q u e en h a d b e e n s u bdued

and a r re s t e d h im. Ho p son, w h o had been s hot i n the che s t, was tr a n sported t o an ar e a

ho s pita l . He died the n ext day.

On J une 2 6, 201 7

, t he Do u glas C o unty Dis t ri c t At t or n ey's off i ce cha r g e d Queen

with prem e ditat e d fir s t

- death m urder for t he f a t a l s h o oti n g of Hopson and t w o counts of

a t t e m p t e d fir s t

- de g ree mu r der for t rying t o s h o o t t he ot h e r two m e n o utside the bar. The

dist r i c t c o u rt s e t a $1 mil l ion bond for Q ue e n. He was u na b le to post the b o nd and

rem a ined i n ja i l f

rom the t i me of his a r re s t t h rou g h the wee k

- l o ng jury t r i a l i n July 2 0 1 8

.

T h e j u r y convict e d Que e n o f i nte n t i o n al s e c o n d

- de g ree m u r der for t he death of Hops o n,

o n e c ount of a t t e m

p t e d se c o n d

- d e gree m u r d e r, and o ne count of a t t e m p t e d vol u ntary

mansl a ugh t er. T h e di s tr i ct court l a t e r s entenc e d Queen t o a c o n t r olling te r m of 226

months in p r i s on with p o s t re l e a se supervisi o n for 36 mo n t hs.

With that o verview, w e now e x a mine in deta i l how the speed y

- tr i al violat i on

u n f ol d e d af t er Q u e e n had been c h a rged.

T h e dist r i c t court held a pr e l i minary hear i ng on Oct o ber 24, 2017, and bou n d

Q u e e n over on all thr e e c harges. At the c lose of the he a rin g , the c ourt inst r ucted the

l a w y ers to "st a rt thin k i ng a bout a v a i l a ble t ri a l dat e s and if the r e's any d i s cus s i o n about

how m uch t ime mi g ht be need e d." The pr o s e cutor s a id she needed t o check with

witnes s es a n d fami l y mem b ers a bout their avai l abil i ty and a s k e d

, " S o we're looki n g

probab l y at Febr u a r y, Mar c h?" The c ourt responde d , " Y e s ."

Q u e e n's a r ra i g n m e nt took place o n e we e k la t er, on Oct o ber 3 1, 2017. Q ueen

pleaded not g u i l ty t o all cha r ges. Under K.S

. A. 2019 S upp. 22

- 3402(a ) , a def e n d a nt's

ar r a i g n m e nt s t a rts the speedy t r i a l t ime. T h e St a te then h as 1 5 0 da y s to bri n g a def e ndant4

bei n g h e l d i n ja i l t o tr i a l. T h e dist r i c t c o u rt discus s ed s c he d ul i ng t he t r i a l with the

l a w y er s . The pr o s e cut o r vo l u n t e e r ed that "the week of M ar c h 1 9 t h is the s pring break,

b o t h for K U a n d for L a wrence p u blic s c h o o l s

, " and n o t e d that s he g e nera l ly a v oi d e d

th o se dat e s " b e c ause of the diff i culty with witnes s e s ." The following excha n ge t hen

occurred:

"THE COU R T: S p eedy tr i al wo u ld r u n April 3 0 th?

"[THE STATE]: Yeah.

"THE COU R T: S p ri n g break again is w h en?

"[THE STATE]: March 1 9th, which is a M o n d ay.

"THE COU R T: Co u nsel, will y ou check your availa b ility f o r April 2 n d that wee k [?]

"[THE STATE]: T h at's fi n e with t h e State.

"[DE F ENSE COUNSEL]: M o n d ay, Ap r il 2 n d ? T h at wor k s for d efense, Yo u r H o n o r.

"THE COU R T: Okay."

T h e c o u rt s c heduled t h e trial for a full we e k begi n ning M ond a y, A p r il 2, 201 8

.

T h at was t h e f

ir s t tri a l s e t t ing in t he c a s e

. T h e c o u rt a n d the part i es t h en w o r ked

bac k ward f

rom that d a te, s c he d uling a s t a t us confer e nce for Ma r ch 1 6 , a m oti o ns hear i ng

for Feb r uary 23, a nd a J a n u ary 31 deadline f or f i l i ng any pret r i a l motions.

A p ril 2, 201 8

, was the 153rd day after Q u e e n's ar r a i g n men t . As we have s a i d, that

m o r ning Q ueen m ov e d to d i s mi s s the c harg e s u n der K

. S. A

. 2 2

- 3 4 0 2 (a) bec a u s e his

s t a t ut o ry s p e e d y

- trial r i ght had been v i olate d . T h e s t a t uto r y langu a ge govern i ng that right

s t a t es in part:

"If any p ers o n charged with a crime and h eld in jail s olely by reason t h ereof sh a ll

n o t b e broug h t to trial wit h i n 150 da y s after such p erson's arraig n me n t o n t he c h arge,

such p erson shall b e entitled to b e discharged fr o m further liability t o be tried for the

crime charg e d

. " K.S.A. 2019 Sup p

. 22

- 3 4 0 2 (a).5

Consi s t e nt with this s t a t ut o ry man d a t e, Q u e en s i m p ly a s s er t ed the c a se must be dismi s s e d

b e c ause the tr i al was set t o st a rt t hree da y s p a st the deadline a nd no except i ons ap p l i ed t o

alter t h at t i me calc u l a t i o n

.

T h e dist r i c t court rele a s e d the p otenti a l j ur o rs and h e l d an init i al hea r ing o n

Q u e e n's mo t io n . The S t a t e a rg u ed that a l though m ore t han 1 50 d a ys had pas s ed s i nce

Q u e e n's a r ra i g n m e n t , there were s ever a l r e a s o ns w hy t h e t ri a l co u l d p r oceed. In

p art i cula r , t h e St a te a r g u ed that K.S.A. 2 0 19 Su p p. 2 2

- 3402(e) ( 4) a l l o w ed t he court to

extend t he s t a t ut o ry s p e e d y

- tr i al deadline by 30 da y s "b e c a use of t he court's c a l e n d ar."

T h is p r ovi s io n , oft e n ca l l e d the c r owde d

- docket except i o n

, a l l ows for a o ne

- t i me, 30

- day

extens i on o f t he spe e dy

- tr i al deadline w h e n

, " because of other c a s es pendi n g for t r i a l, the

co u rt does n o t ha v e s u f

fi c i e nt t i m e t o com m e nce t he t r i a l of the c a se within the [150

- d a y

t i mefr a me]." K.S

. A. 2 019 Su p p. 22

- 3 4 0 2 (e ) ( 4 ) ; see St a te v. E d w ard s , 291 K a n. 532, 54 3

,

243 P

. 3d 6 83 ( 2010) (referring to the subsection as the " ' crowded docket' p rovisi o ns" of

the s pee d y tr i al sta t ut e ).

After r e viewi n g the t r ansc r ipt f rom the a r ra i gnment, t he pr o s e cu t or a c kno w l e dged

that neither s i de had req u e s t e d or re c e i ved a co n t i n u a nce of t he or i gi n al t r i a l date. B u t the

pr o s e cu t or reiterated the St a t e 's p o s i t i on that the cro w d e d

- docket e x c e ption a ppl i ed. T h e

Sta t e a l so a rg u e d that Que e n

, t hrough his l awyer, a c q u i e s c ed to the April 2 tri a l a nd

waived his r ig h t t o a spee d y tr i al by c o n s e nting t o that d a te, co n t i nuing to f i le moti o ns,

and part i c i pa t ing i n p r e t ri a l he a ri n gs wi t hout ra i s i ng the speed y

- trial q u e s t i on.

The dist r i c t co u rt ulti m a t e l y de n i e d Q ueen's m o t i on. T he dist r i c t c o urt

acknowl e dged its err o r at a r raignment in s t a t ing that A p r il 30 was the spee d y

- trial

deadline

— an e r ror the Sta t e i mmediat e ly r a t i fi e d. B u t t he dist r i c t c o u rt a l so faul t ed

Q u e e n's l a w y er for not corr e c t ing the er r or:6

"[W ] hen t h e co u rt mentioned A p ril 3 0 th as a speedy t r ial time, n either side c o rrected the

co u rt. Both c o u nsel h ave a d uty of candor t o wards the tri b u n al and sh o uld n o t a l low t h e

tri b u n al to be m isled by false statem e nts of law o r fact. A n d us u ally that can d or i s when

an o ther attorn e y m a y b e m i srepre s enti n g som e thing or m a y b e a clie n t is misr e pr es enti n g

somethi n g. B u t an ad v oca t e d o es have a d u ty t o disc l ose adverse a uth o rity. Here, n either

side c o rrected t h e co u rt."

T h e dist r i c t co u rt a l so concl u d e d the c r owded

- d o c ket e x c eption al l owed it to

extend Q ueen's s peedy

- tr i al per i od b y 30 day s . The dist r i c t co u rt a c knowl e dged it "d i d

n o t m a ke a re c ord w hile s e t t ing this t r i a l that t h e c ourt's calendar w a s ful l ." Nev e rthe l e s s,

the dist r i c t co u rt f

o und that " it wa s , which is why we w e nt out as far as we did "

— that i s

,

"it [ was] im

p l i c i t t hat t his c o u rt's c a l e n d ar w as ful l ." At the s a me t i me, the dist r i c t co u rt

offer e d that if it had " kno w n . . . we were g o i n g outs i de t h e 150 d a ys

, " it " w o u l d ha v e

moved ca s es to f

i t i t in."

We n ow tu r n to our discus s ion of the c ontrol l ing l e gal i s s ue a n d expl a in why

Q u e e n's s t a tutory s peedy t r i a l r igh t s were vi o l a t e d.

D I S CUS S ION

K.S.A. 2019 S upp. 22

- 3402(a) man d a t es that a de f en d a nt held in jail on c r imin a l

charges " b e brought t o tr i al within 150 da y s af t er such person's a r ra i g n m e n t ." O t herwis e

,

the def e nd a nt "shall be ent i t l ed to be dis c harg e d from f urther l i a bilit y " f

or the c harg e d

offense s . K.S.A. 2019 Su p p. 22

- 3402(a ) ; see St a te v. Br o w n l e e

, 3 02 Kan. 4 9 1, 503, 354

P.3d 5 25 ( 2 015). T he S t a te bears t h e l egal o b l igat i on t o ensure a de f en d a nt is brought t o

tr i al within this s t a tutory d e a dline, a nd a def e ndant ne e d not t ake a ny af f irm a t i ve a c t i on

to ensure t h e s e speedy

- trial ri g hts are honor e d. St a te v. Dupr e e , 304 K a n. 43, 49, 371

P.3d 8 62 ( 2 016).7

T h e s t a tute pro v ides v a rious exce p t i o n s that t o ll this deadline. If the def e n d ant

reques t s and r e c e ives a c o n t i nuan c e of t he t r ial dat e

, t hat time does n ot count t o ward the

15 0

- day s p e e d y

- tr i al per i o d . L i kewise, a delay a t tr i b u t a b l e t o the "fault of the d ef e n d an t "

d o es n o t c ount. K

. S.A. 2019 Su p p. 22

- 3 4 0 2 ( a). A n d a d i ff e rent deadline m a y ap p l y if a

defe n da n t f

a i ls to a p p e a r a t t he t r i al or any pret r i a l he a ri n g (re q uir i ng a be n c h warrant) or

is found in c ompet e nt to s t and t r i a l, or if mat e r i a l e vi d en c e i s u n avai l able and m a y b e

re a sona b l y p ro c ured. S ee K.S.A. 2019 S upp. 2 2

- 3402(d )

, ( e) ( 1 )

- (3). E v e r yone agre e s

none of t hose exc e ptio n s ap p l i es h er e

.

Rel e va n t h ere, t he s t at ute a l so permits "[n] o t m o re th a n o ne c o n t i n u ance of not

m o re th a n 3 0 da y s " if, " b e c ause of other c a s es pe n d i ng for t ri a l, the c o urt d oes not ha v e

suff i c i ent t i me t o commence the tr i al of the c a s e wi t hin the [ s t a tutory spee d y

- trial

peri o d]." K .S.A. 2 019 Su p p. 22

- 3402(e) ( 4). T h is is the "crowd e d docket" e xcepti o n. The

cro w de d

- docket ra t i o nale c a nnot be appli e d re t roac t ively to l e gally jus t ify a trial delay.

Rathe r

, i t must be ba s ed on f i ndin g s m a de by t he dis t ri c t c o u rt befo r e t he expi r a t ion of

the s pee d y

- tr i al per i o d

. St a te v. Craw

f or d

, 4 6 Kan. A pp. 2d 401, 408, 262 P.3d 10 7 0

(20 1 1); s ee a l so St a te v. Cox

, 2 1 5 Kan. 8 0 3, 805, 528 P

. 2d 1 226 ( 197 4 ) (exc e p t io n s to the

speedy

- trial statute m u st be found within t he statutory sp e ed y

- tr i al per i o d ). F or this

re a son, good pra c t i ce c a l l s for the d i s tr i ct court t o identify on t he r e cord t he c r owd e d

d o c ket e x c eption i n cont i nui n g a t ri a l da t e a nd to e xpl a in at l e a st br i ef l y the oth e r m a t t ers

t a ki n g prec e de n ce o n t he c a l e n d a r . Otherwis e , the r e c ord must sup p ort "an i m p l i c it

dete r minat i on t

hat a n ea r l i er t ri a l d a t e was u n avai l able" f o r t he except i on to a

p p l y. See

Edw a r d s

, 2 91 Kan. at 542 (c i t i ng St a te v. Rodri g uez

- Gar c i a , 27 K a n. A p p

. 2d 439, 4 4 1 , 8

P.3d 3 [ 1999]).

A dist r i c t co u rt's rul i ng i n v o l ving a defend a n t 's speed y

- trial ri g hts often involves

fa c tual and l e gal di s p u t e s . For example, w hether a defe n da n t a c q uies c ed to a delay is a

fa c tual q u e s t io n ; we uphold a dist r i c t c o u rt's fa c tual findin g s w hen t hey a r e s upp o rt e d by

substant i al co m

petent e vi d ence. S t

ate v . Vaugh n

, 2 88 K an. 1 4 0

, 143, 200 P.3d 4468

(20 0 9). B u t ap p e l l a te courts g i ve no def e rence to a dist r ict court's inte r pret a t i on of K.S

. A.

22

- 3402. 2 88 Kan. at 143. A nd w hether a t r i a l s e t t ing v i olat e d a def e n d a nt's s tatut o ry

right to a spee d y tr i al is a q u e s t i on of l a w we r e view de novo. 288 Kan. at 143.

Que e n's a r ra i g n m e nt o c curr e d on Oct o ber 3 1

, 20 1 7

. T he part i es agr e e t hat t he co u rt

s c heduled Q uee n 's tr i al to be g in on A p r i l 2, 20 1 8

— the 153 r d day af t er his ar r a i g n m e n t

.

T h e pa r t i es a l so agree that bec a use Que e n was held i n j a il thro u ghout his case, t h e 15 0

-

d a y spe e d y

- tr i al per i od in K.S

. A. 2 019 Supp. 2 2

- 3402(a) gover n s. Th u s, u n l e ss an

e xcepti o n appl i ed, t he S t a te had u n t il Ma r ch 30, 2018, t o br i ng Q ueen to t r i a l. If n o t, the

s t a tute requir e d the case t o be dismi s s e d with p r e j u d i c e. The dist r i c t c o urt fou n d two

exc e ptio n s broug h t the April 2 date with i n the s pee d y

- tr i al per i o d : ( 1) T he c r o w d e d

d o c ket e x c eption al l owed an a ddi t io n al 3 0 days to bri n g Q u e e n t o tr i a l

, plac i ng the A pril

2 se t t i ng w i thin this 3 0

- day grace per i od. A n d (2) Q ue e n h a d ac q uies c ed to the April 2

tr i al when his counsel indica t ed at the ar r a i gnment that d a te was ava i l a ble wi t h o ut

n o t i fy i ng t h e c o u rt that it was bey o nd the s t a t ut o r y spee d y

- tr i al per i o d

.

On a p p e a l, the Sta t e a c knowl e dges that the di s tr i ct co u rt did n o t m a ke an e x plic i t

cro w de d

- docket fi n di n g bef o re A p ril 2. That i s , t h e dist r i c t co u rt did n o t i nd i c a te when i t

s c he d ul e d Q u e e n's t r i al that it p i cked that d a te bec a use i t did n ot "have s uffi c i e nt t i me t o

comm e nce t he t r i a l of the c a s e " within the 15 0

- d a y spe e d y

- tr i al per i o d . See K

. S.A. 2 0 19

Su p p. 22

- 3402(e)(4). Inst e ad, t he Sta t e a rg u es that the dist r i c t co u rt ex p l a in e d at the

hear i ng on Que e n's mo t ion to dismi s s that its impli c it reason for s c heduli n g the t r i a l on

that date was i t s ca s el oa d

. T h e a r gument is u n p er s uasive b o t h fa c tual l y and l e g a l l y.

The Sta t e a rg u es t h e d i s t ri c t co u rt's crow d e d

- d o c ket f ind i ng is cons i s t ent wi t h our

o p i nions i n St a te v. D e a n

, 42 Kan. App. 2 d 3 2 , 208 P

. 3d 343 (2 0 0 9 ), and Rodri g uez

G a r c i a

, 27 Kan. A pp. 2d at 4 4 1 . We disagr e e. Both Dean a nd Rod r ig u e z

- G a r c i a involv e d

impli c it f i n d i n gs that the cro w ded

- d o c ket e x c eption a p p l i e d. B u t i n e a ch c a s e , t h e r e c ord

c l e a rly demo n s t ra t ed t h at the dist r i ct court's reason for c h o o s i ng the chal l en g e d tr i al9

dat e

— at the t i me t hat d a t e was s e l e c t e d

— w a s the c o u rt's s ched u l e d c a s e load. T h e re c o r d

here n o t only f

a i l s to i m plic i t l y sup p ort a c r owded docket, it r e ad i ly shows j u st the

oppos i t e

.

In Dean , a series of c o nti n ua n c e s by t he Sta t e a nd the c ourt delayed the

defe n da n t's t r i a l u n t i l the e l eventh hour of the s peed y

- trial t i mef r am e . The re c o r d

e s t a blished the pr e s i ding j u d g e had a l re a dy s che d uled a nother c a se on t he l a st day

rem a ini n g in the spee d y

- trial perio d

. See 42 Kan. A pp. 2d at 35

- 36. Bas e d o n t hese fa c t s

,

the di s tr i ct co ur t f

o u nd

— a n d this c o u rt af

f irm e d

— t hat t he l a st contin u ance m ade a t t he

end of the s pee d y

- tr i al peri o d and s ched u l i ng the t ri a l within the ne x t 30 da y s satisfied

the c rowd e d

- docket e x c e ptio n

. 42 Kan. A pp. 2d at 36, 3 8.

Simil a rly, i n R o drig u e z

- G a r c i a

, t he district c ourt e x plained w h e n sche d uli n g the

defe n da n t's t r i a l da t e that there w ere no avai l able tr i al s e t t in g s unt i l a ft e r t he expira t ion of

the s t a tutory spee d y

- tr i al deadline. On a p peal, this co u rt s t a t ed it c o uld n o t "ignore the

clear a n d reasonable i m p l i c a t io n s f r om the d i s t ri c t co u rt's s t a t ement" a n d conc l u d e d the

cro w de d

- docket exc e pti o n ef f e c t ively ext e nded the de f en d a nt's s peed y

- tr i al deadline by

30 da y s. 2 7 Kan. A p p

. 2d at 4 41.

In c o ntra s t, the r e cord in this c a se d o es n ot s u g g e s t that Q u e e n's t r i al was

s c he d ul e d for A pril 2 due t o the c o urt's tr i al sc h e d ule a nd c a s e load. At t he c l ose o f t he

prel i minary hea r in g

, f

or example, the pr o s e c u tor obs e rved that t his t ri a l wo u ld need to be

s c he d ul e d for "probab l y . . . Februa r y, Mar ch "

— t i mes w i t hin the s t a t ut o ry s peed y

- trial

peri o d

— a n d the dist r i c t co u rt agr e ed. T he dist r i c t co u rt said noth i ng t o indi c a t e its

c a s e load wou l d prec l ude a t r i a l e i ther month. T h e dist r ict court's s tated p u r pose was to

ha v e t he l a w y ers l o ok at the i r c a l e n d ars in a d va n ce of t he a r ra i g n m ent, so they would

come well prepar e d t o agree on a tr i al dat e

. I de n t i fy i ng Feb r uary a nd Mar c h as a ge n er a l

t i mef r ame f or the t ri a l would ha v e made n o sense if the dist r i c t c o u rt's d o cket had a l re a dy

rendered t

hose months u n re a l i s t i c

. W h e n the l a w y ers and the di s tr i ct co u rt d i d s c hedule10

the t ri a l a t t he a r ra i gnment a we e k la t e r

, t he pr o s e cu t or o b s e rv e d th a t she w o u l d like t o

av o i d the w e e k o f spring b re a k (a l so in Mar c h) to a v o i d conf l i c ts with wi t nes s e s

. The

dist r i c t co u rt ne v er sugge s t e d the conce r n was unwarr a n t ed because i t s d o cket would not

permit a t rial until the beg i n n i ng of A pril.

Rather, the re c ord s h ows the dist r i c t co u rt sc h e d uled the t r i a l for April 2 beca u se

the c o u rt i n corr e c t ly b e l i eved

— a nd t he p r osecutor inc o rr e c t ly con f irm e d

— th a t t he

speedy

- tr i al deadline w as April 30, n o t M a rch 3 0

. I t i s u n c l e ar w h e t h e r t he r e a s on for t his

er r or was a misc a l c ulati o n of the 1 5 0

- day t im ef r ame or a m i s t aken b e l i ef that a d if f er e nt

l i mit a t i o n s peri o d (such as the 18 0

- d a y timefr a me for d e fend a nts r elea s ed on bond under

K.S.A. 2019 S upp. 22

- 3402[b]) a ppl i ed. Reg a rdle s s, the dist r i c t co u rt did n ot s c hedule

the t ri a l outside the 150

- d a y time f rame d u e t o i t s o v er c row d e d dock e t. I t did so because it

er r o n e o usly bel i eved t h at the A p ril 2 trial date was within the speed y

- trial period u n der

K.S.A. 2019 S upp. 22

- 3402. T he dist r i c t co u rt's a t t empt to re t roac t ively just i fy that

deci s ion th r ough the cro w de d

- docket except i on c a nnot be supported in the r e c or d . See

Edw a r d s

, 2 91 Kan. at 542; C o x

, 2 15 Kan. at 805.

As a ma t t e r of s t a tutory cons t ruct i o n

, we d oubt a dist r i c t court c an inv o ke the

cro w de d

- docket exc e pti o n in K

. S.A. 2 0 19 Su p p. 2 2

- 3 402(e) t o in i t i a l ly s e t a tr i al date up

to 30 d a ys past what would ot h e rwi s e be the s peed y

- tr i al deadline. T h at is what the

dist r i c t c o u rt ef

f e c t ively t r i e d to do here. T he exc e pti o n spec i fi c a l ly r e fe r s to a o n e

- t i me

co n t i n u a n c e of up t o 30 d a ys. The t e rm "co n t in u a nce" c o m m o n l y m e a ns a cha n ge in a

fixed date to a l a t e r date

— not a n o r iginal s e t ti n g. See B l a c k's Law D i c t i o n ary 400 ( 1 1 t h

ed. 2 019) (in c ont e xt of proce d ur e , "cont i n u a nce" def i ned as "[t]he adj o urnment or

p o s t pone m ent of a t r ial or other p roce e ding to a future d a t e" ) ; cf. S t ate v

. Diaz , 44 Kan.

App. 2 d 8 7 0, 877, 241 P.3d 1 018 (20 1 0) ("a c o n t i nu a nce me a ns that a new tr i a l da t e i s

s e t"). We have n o re a son t o infer the legis l a t ure i m p uted some i di o s y n cr a t i c m e ani n g to

the wo r d in K.S.A. 2 0 19 Su p p. 2 2

- 3 4 0 2 (e ) . See Midw e st Cra n e & Riggi n g, L LC v.11

Kansas C o r

p o rat i on Comm '

n

, 3 06 Kan. 845, 850, 397 P.3d 1205 (20 1 7) ("c o m m on

w o r ds" in s t a tute sho u l d b e gi v e n their " o r din a ry meani n g " ).

T h e s pe e d y

- tr i al s t a t u t e, t he n , gen e ra l ly r e q u ir e s an init i a l t ri a l se t t i n g with i n the

designa t ed t i me per i od of 1 50 or 180 da ys , d e pendi n g on the def e nd a nt's c usto d i al s t a tus.

T h e dist r i c t court may then ad j us t

— i.e., c o ntinu e

— that s e t t ing to a c c o m m oda t e a def e nse

request for more t i me t o p r e pare, a dete r minat i on of a de f en d a nt's c o m peten c y, or a

cro w ded docket. But a dist r i c t c o u rt c a n n ot i n i t i a l l y sche d ule a t r i a l f o r a n i n

- c u s t ody

defe n da n t m o re th a n 1 50 da y s after the ar r ai g nm e nt because of a cro w ded docket.

T h e dist r i c t court a l s o found that Que e n a c qui e s c ed to s c heduli n g the t r i a l o u t s ide

the s pee d y

- tr i al per i o d

— ther e by waivi n g his s t a tutory rig h t

— w hen his l a w y er in d i c a t ed

his a vail a bili t y for an April 2 tr i al and fa i l e d to corr e ct the dist r i c t c o u rt's spee d y

- trial

mis c a l culatio n . To s h o w acquie s c ence in the s peed y

- trial context, the State m u st prove

"'more than me r e pa s si v e a c c epta n c e '" b y t he defe n da n t. Brownle e , 302 K a n. at 507

(quoti n g Vau g h n

, 288 Kan. at 14 5 ). Inst e ad, t he Sta t e "'must p r odu c e s o m e e vi d ence of

agre e ment to t he delay by t he def e n d a nt or defense couns e l. T h e r e c ord m u st s upport a

co n c l us i on that the def

e n d a nt e x pres s ly or impli e dly a greed to the d e l a y.'" Brownle e

, 3 02

Kan. at 5 07 (quot i ng Vau g h n

, 288 Kan. at 14 5 ). Defense couns e l's actions and

a c q u i e s c e n ce a r e a t tributable to t h e de f en d a nt for pu r pos e s of the def e n d a nt's s t a t ut o ry

speedy

- trial ri g hts. See St a te v. Bl o o m

, 273 K a n. 291, 310, 44 P

. 3d 3 05 ( 2002).

W h e n sch e d u l i ng t

he t r i a l a t Quee n 's ar r a i gnment, t he d i s t ri c t co u rt a s ked the

pr o s e cu t or w h e t

her t he spee dy

- tr i al deadline ex p ir e d April 3 0

. T he p r osecutor

(e r ro n e o usly) agr e ed; t he dist r i c t c o u rt did n ot a s k Q u e e n or his l a wye r

, a nd nei t her of

them vol u n t e e red a d d i t io n al in f ormation. The dist r i c t c o urt t hen a d dres s ed b o t h p ar t i e s

and a s k e d about the i r a vailabili t y the week of A p ril 2. The pr o s e cut o r i n d i c a t ed that was

"fine for t he Sta t e"; Queen's l a wyer s t ated that da t e "works for the defens e ."12

T h e Sta t e co n t e n d s th a t Queen " a c t i vely agre e d to a date o u t s ide t he speed y

- trial

deadlin e " w h i l e "let [ t i n g ] t he dist r i c t c o u rt c o n t i n u e t o o p er a te o n its [e r ro n e o us spe e d y

trial c a lculation] unt i l t he mo r ning of t r i a l." Q u e e n re s p o n d s that " m er e ly s t a t i n g that a

pro p osed tr i al date 'wor k s for the defens e ' is n o t a c q uies c ence" a n d that t he defend a nt has

no obl i gation t o noti f

y the St a te of a p o s s ible speedy

- tr i al probl e m. Ra t her, i t i s the Sta t e's

exclus i ve duty to e nsu r e a de f en d a nt is brought t o tr i al c o nsi s t e nt w i t h K. S .A. 2019 S upp.

22

- 3402. K ansas Su p r eme Court pr e c e de n t s upports Qu e en's p o s i t i o n

.

St a te v. Adam s

, 2 83 K an. 3 6 5

, 36 7

- 68, 1 53 P .3d 512 (2 0 0 7 ), pres e nted an

analog o us s e t of c ir c u m s t ance s . There, the defe n da n t's tr i al was init i a l ly s e t w i t hin the

s t a t ut o ry s p e e d y

- tr i al per i o d

, b ut it was conti n ued s ever a l t i mes for reasons o utside the

defe n da n t's control. At the hear i ng on the fin a l c o n t i nua n ce, t he district co u rt sug g e s t e d

—

and defen s e c ounsel i n d i c a t ed t h at he was avai l able for

— a trial da te outside the statutory

speedy

- tr i al per i o d

. On t he tr i al d a t e , Adams m o ved t o di s miss the c a s e as a vi o l a t i on of

his s t a tutory ri g ht to a speedy tr i a l

.

T h e Kansas Supreme C o u rt f o und t he tr i al violat e d A d a m s' speed y

- trial r ig h t

under K.S

. A. 2 006 S u p p

. 2 2

- 3402. A nd t he court r e

j e c t ed the St a t e 's argume n t that

defense c o u n s e l's agr e ement t o the eventual tr i al date equated t o a c q u i e s c ence or waiver:

"T h e State d id n ot request an earlier set t ing, and Ada m s' defen s e c o u nsel d id not o bject to

starting t h e trial o n Au g ust 1 8, 2 0 04. Although Adams' defense co u nsel ac c epted t h e

Au g ust 1 8

, 20 0 4, trial sett i n g

, h is ac c eptance is neit he r an acq u iesce n ce to a co n ti n ua n ce

n o r t h e eq u i v a lent of a wa i ver of Ada m s ' statutory right to a s p eedy trial. The S tate, n ot

Adams, w as r esponsi b le for ensuri n g th a t A d a m s w as tried b efore t h e statut o ry speedy trial

d eadli n e ex p ired

. " 283 K a n. at 3 7 0

.

Apply i ng Adam s ' re a soning her e

, defense c o u n s e l's s t a t ement t hat he was ava i l a ble

for a tr i al o n April 2 does n o t e qua t e t o Q u e e n ac q uies c i ng t o a c o n t in u a nce or waivi n g

his s peed y

- trial ri g ht. I nde e d, no cont i nu a nces were requested by any party or by the13

co u rt be f o r e t he A p ril 2 tr i al date. See Bloo m , 273 K a n. at 3 1 0 ( "A defe n da n t may wa i ve

the s t a tutory ri g ht to spe e dy t r i a l b y r e q u e s t i ng or a c qui e s c ing in t he grant of a

co n t i nu a nce."). And t h ough the c o urt i n d i c a t ed that Q ueen was n ot "pr e j u diced" by the

delay f r om M a rch 3 0 to April 2, a de f en d a nt ' s s t a t ut o ry right to a s p e e dy t r i a l un d er

K.S.A. 2019 S upp. 22

- 3402 d oes not r e quire a sho w i ng t he defe n d a nt was ot h e rwi s e

harmed by a delay. S e e Ada m s

, 2 83 Kan. at 370.

T h e s t a tute u n a m

b i guous l y d ir e c t s that a pe r son who is n ot b r ought t o tr i al within

the r eq u ir e d spee d y

- tr i al per i od " shall be e ntit l ed to be dis c harg e d from fur t her l i a bili t y to

be t r i e d for the c rime cha r g e d." K

. S.A. 2 0 19 Su p p. 2 2

- 3402(a ) . The rem e dy is strong

medic i ne, s ince it u n d o es any c o nvi c t i on o btained in a tr i al imperm i s s ibly held after the

s t a t ut o ry d e adline a nd pre c lu d es a ny f urther p rose c uti o n o f t he def e n d a nt on t hose

charge s . See St a te v. Taylor , 299 Kan. 5, 8, 319 P.3d 1 2 56 ( 2014); Adam s , 283 Kan. at

36 6

. T he obv i o u s a l t e rnat i ve r e medy of dism i s s ing the c h arges without prej u dice,

permit t ing t

he defe n d a nt to be pro s e c uted an e w, wou l d give the St a te l i t t le incentive to

press for c o m

plianc e

. A spee d y

- tr i al violat i on then w o u l d impose n o more than a

b u re a ucra t ic hit c h in the p r osecut i on of the d ef e n d ant, s i m

p l y requi r ing the Sta t e t o d ra f t

and f i le a new charg i ng ins t rum e nt.

Finally, t he dis t ri c t c o u rt fo u nd Q u e en's a t t or n ey h a d an a ff i rma t ive obl i gation t o

corr e ct the dist r i c t c o u rt's mi s t a k e

— and in f a i l ing to c or r e c t t he e r ror, h e surr e n d er e d h is

c l i e nt's r ig h t t o a s peedy t r i a l . T h e c o u rt v e ntur e d that "[b]oth c o uns e l "

— that i s

, t he

pr o s e cu t or and the de f

ense a t torn e y

— " h a ve a d u ty of c a ndor t o wards t he t r ibunal and

should n o t a l low the t r ibunal to be mi s l e d b y fa l se sta t e ments of l a w or fa c t." T h is

s t a t ement mis c o n s t r u es the Kans a s R u l e s of Profes s io n a l Con d uct (K R PC) in c o m i ng t o

an unt e n a ble c o n c l usi o n that is inconsis t ent w i t h Ka n s a s l a w.

KRPC 3.3 governs an a t torney's e t hical d u ty of c a ndor t o the c o urt and states i n

re l evant p a rt that l a w y ers may n o t "knowi n g l y" make " f a l se sta t e m ent[ s ] o f fact or law"14

(or f a il to c o rr e ct their prev i o u s m a t er i al fa l se s t a t ements); f a i l to d i s c l ose c o n t r olling

l e gal a ut h o r i t y d ir e c t ly adverse to their c l i e nt s ' p o s i t i ons; or off e r f a l se evidence. KRPC

3. 3 (a) ( 2 020 K a n. S. C t. R. 353). Comm e nt 2 to that R u l e e x p l a ins t hat a l though a l a w y er

"must n o t a l l ow the tr i bunal t o b e mis l ed by f a l se sta t e m ents of l a w or fa c t or e vi d e nce

that the l awyer k nows t o b e fa l s e ," an a t torney " in an a dver s ary pr o c e e di n g is n ot

required t o p re s ent a n impart i al exp o s i t i on of the l aw or to v ouch for the eviden c e

submi t t e d." KRPC 3

. 3, Comment 2 (2020 K a n. S. Ct. R. 354). A part from dis c losi n g

co n t r olling l e gal a ut h o r i t y, the R u l e i m p oses no a f fi r mat i ve d u t y on l a w y ers in a d v er s ary

pr o c e ed i n g s to advise or info r m a co u rt in t h e f ir s t insta n c e . But w hen l aw ye r s do a d vise

or info r m the c ourt, they m u st a c t i n g o o d fa i th and ref r a in from knowi n gly m a king f a l s e

fa c tual or l e gal r epre s enta t io n s. And if they l e arn t hey or the i r c l i e nts have m ade f a l se

repr e s e ntati o ns, t h e y have a du t y to corre c t t he r e pres e ntat i on or oth e rwi s e "t a ke

re a sona b le rem e dial mea s ures

. " KR P C 3. 3 (a ) (3). (T h e ot h er "rea s onable mea s ures" may

come in t o pl a y w h e n a c l i e nt dire c t l y makes f a l se f a c tual repr e s e ntat i o n s to the co u rt in

an a f fidavit or in t e s t i mon y .)

R u le 3

. 3 , a c or n er s t o ne of the i ntegrity of t he ju d i c i a l pr o c e s s , w o uld prohibit an

a t torney fr o m af

f irm a ti v e l y misl e a d i n g a di s tr i ct co u rt by know i ngly st a t i ng a wrong

s t a t ut o ry s p e e d y

- tr i al wi n dow a p pli e s. See K R PC 3.3 ( a) ( 1 ) . B u t rem a ini n g si l ent wh e n

the St a te erro n e o u s l y agrees with the di s tr i ct c o urt that t h e s peed y

- tr i al per i od e x pir e s

A p ril 3 0 is n o t t he s am e a s k n owing l y m a king a fa l se s ta t e ment o f l a w or fa c t. T h is is

part i cula r ly t r ue in l i ght of Kansa s ' longs t an d i ng re c o g nit i on that a d ef e n d ant h a s "no

o b l i gation t o take a ff

i rma t ive a c t io n " to pr o t e c t his or her speedy

- t ri a l r ig h t. St

a te v.

Siev e r s , 299 K a n. 305, 30 7

- 0 8

, 3 23 P

. 3d 170 (20 1 4). T h e dis t ri c t c o u rt's mi s statement of

a de f ense l a w y er ' s duty of c a ndor would und e rcut the e ntir e ly proper fu n c t i o ning of the

ad v er s ar i al process in a c r iminal cas e

.

The o b l i gation to bring a c a se to t r i a l wi t hin the s t a t ut o ry s peed y

- tr i al per i od rests

sole l y with the St a t e . 2 9 9 Kan. at 307. A defend a nt ne e d n ot t a ke a n y aff i rma t ive s t e ps to15

pr o t e ct that r i g h t. 299 Kan. at 3 07

- 0 8 . It was the St a t e 's r e s ponsibil i ty to a c cura t e l y

dete r mine Q u e e n's speedy

- tr i al deadline and e nsure the tr i al was h e ld b efore t h at dat e

.

Q u e e n's l a w y er h a d no duty t o al e rt the di s trict co u rt to the l oomi n g spee d y tr i al

vi o l a t i on. T he c o nsequenc e s of t h e fa i lure to corr e ct the dist r i c t co u rt's e r ror must be

a t tr i b u t e d to the Sta t e a lo n e. The dist r i c t c o u rt er r ed when i t denied Queen's m oti o n to

dismi s s on s t a t ut o ry s p e e d y

- tr i al grounds.

The Sta t e fai l ed to bring Q u e e n to tr i al within 1 50 d a ys of his ar r a i gnment. As a

re s ult, K.S.A. 2019 S upp. 22

- 3402(a) dir e c t s that this case m u st be dismis s ed. Ba s ed on

that s t a t ut o ry ma n dat e , we reve r se Queen's c onvict i ons, v a c a t e his s e ntence s

, a nd dismi s s

the c harges aga i nst him with prejudic e . In l i g h t of this dis p osit i o n

, we ne e d not a d d re s s

Q u e e n's oth e r c o n t e nt i o n s on a ppe a l.

Co n vict i ons rever s ed, s e ntences vac a t e d, and c a s e di s m i s s e d

.