COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge McClanahan, Senior Judges Coleman and Annunziata

KAREN A. DELUCA MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1741-04-4 PER CURIAM MAY 10, 2005 DENIS KATCHMERIC

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY M. Langhorne Keith, Judge (Karen A. DeLuca, pro se , on briefs). (Michael A. Ward, on brief), for appellee.
Karen A. DeLuca (wife) appeals a decision of the trial court concerning equitable distribution and spousal support awards. Wife raises thirty-six issues on appeal. Denis Katchmeric (husband) raises three issues on appeal concerning the spousal support award to wife. Husband also requests an award of atto rney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conc lude that this appeal is without merit. Acco rdingly, we summarily affirm the decision. SeeRule 5A:27. 1 The parties married in 1984 an d separated in 2001. They had no children. Husband is in “relatively good” health, and wife contends she has had significant health problems for years. However, none of wife’s witnesses testified that she is di sabled or unable to wo rk. Wife also has a law degree and was once license d to practice in Pennsylvania and Virginia. Husband worked throughout the marriage an d supported the family. Wife worked as a paralegal for about one year

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Husband has filed two motions to dismiss. We deny those motions.- 2 - and worked at several other jobs, but had not worked outs ide of the home for th e last ten years of the marriage. The trial court found that hus band’s monetary contributions to the marriage were “far more substantial” than wife’s. It also found that wife’s effo rts in handling the fami ly finances, drafting correspondence, and conserving and investing th e marital income were more substantial than husband’s. The trial court found th at although husband’s activities outside the marriage resulted in negative non-monetary cont ributions, wife’s “inability or refusal to cope wi th her health problems” was also a negative contribution to the marriage. The tr ial court divided the ma rital assets equally, and it awarded wife $900 pe r month in spousal support. Wife appeals the equitable distribution and spousal support awards, and husband appeals the spousal support award. Wife raises thirty-six issues on appeal. The first twenty is sues are under the heading “With Respect to Findings of Fact” and the last sixtee n issues are under the he ading “With Respect to Procedural Issues.” Under the he ading “With Respect to Findings of Fact,” wife presents no legal authority in support of the arguments numbered 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14. Therefore, we will not consider these issues on appeal. Rule 5A:20(e). Similarly, under the heading “With Respect to Procedural Issues,” wife pres ents no legal authority in suppor t of arguments numbered 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16. We will not consider these issues on appeal. Id. Under the heading “With Respect to Findings of Fact,” wife presents no argument or authority for issues numbered 16, 17, and 19. “S tatements unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration. We will not search the record for errors in order to interpret appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a brief.” Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Accordingly, we will not address these issues on appeal.- 3 - Wife argues the trial court erred by not assigning a value to the personal property husband removed from the marita l residence in 2002 and by not at tributing a value to husband for that property when making the distribution of marital assets. Sh e also contends the trial court erred by assigning $10,000 worth of personal property to her. Husband testified at the hearing that the onl y furniture and furnishings he wanted were the items he removed from the residence in October 2002, with the exception of two souvenirs he wanted to obtain from the residence. Husband also submitted a Personal Information Schedule indicating that the parties had $10,000 worth of personal marital property. The trial court accepted husband’s valuation evidence and aw arded this personal property to wife. Wife submitted no evidence of the value of the parties’ personal property, and she provides no specific information in her brief as to the nature or va lue of the items she alleges husband removed from the marital residence in 2002. It is not this Cour t’s “function to comb through the record . . . in order to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [wife’s] claims.” Fitzgerald v. Bass , 6 Va. App. 38, 56 n.7, 366 S.E.2d 615, 625 n.7 (1988) ( en banc ). The “value of property is an issue of fact, not of law.” Howell v. Howell , 31 Va. App. 332, 340, 523 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2000). We will not distur b a trial court’s finding of the value of an asset unless the finding is plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Rowe v. Rowe , 24 Va. App. 123, 140, 480 S.E.2d 760, 768 (1997). Further, ab sent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a tria l court comes to an appellate court with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts. Yarborough v. Commonwealth , 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977). We cannot say the trial c ourt erred in accepting husband’s valuation of the personal property where wife presente d no evidence to dis pute this valuation. Wife asserts the trial court erred by using various dates to determine the value of the marital assets.- 4 - Code § 20-107.3(A) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The court shall determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue. Upon motion of either party made no less than 21 days before the evidentiary hearing the court ma y, for good cause shown, in order to attain the ends of justice, orde r that a different valuation date be used. Again, wife presented no evidence to disput e husband’s evidence conc erning the value of the marital assets, whereas husba nd presented numerous statements concerning the balances in the parties’ bank and investment accounts. Husband also testified as to changes in the value of the accounts since the date of the last statements. “In challenging the court’s decision on appeal, the party seeking reversal bears the burden to de monstrate error on the part of the trial court.” Barker v. Barker , 27 Va. App. 519, 535, 500 S.E.2d 240, 248 ( 1998). Moreover, wife did not make a motion after the evidentiary hearing reques ting that a different valu ation date be used. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in accepting husband’s valuation evidence. Wife argues the trial court erred by classify ing husband’s inheritance as his separate property. Husband presented evidence that he in herited money from his father’s estate and received two cash gifts from his father. Husb and testified that he put the money from the inheritance and gifts into two of his investment accounts, the Nuveen Muni A & B accounts and the Saratoga account, and he had not contributed any other funds to these accounts. Code § 20-107.3(A)(1) provides that “[ s]eparate property is . . . al l property acquired during the marriage by bequest, devise, descent, survivorship or gift from a source other than the other party . . . .” These circumstances allowed th e court to trace the hus band’s accounts contribution back to separate property. Acco rdingly, the trial court did not e rr in its classification of this property. Wife asserts the trial court erred by divi ding the marital assets 50/50 where husband’s conduct contributed to the depl etion of the marital assets.- 5 - “Fashioning an equitable dist ribution award lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be set aside unl ess it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Srinivasan v. Srinivasan , 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). Indeed, [u]nless it appears from the record that the [court] has abused [its] discretion, that [it] has not consid ered or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, or that th e evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying [its] re solution of the conflict in the equities, the [court’s] equitable distribution award will not be reversed on appeal. Smoot v. Smoot , 233 Va. 435, 443, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987) (superceded by statute on other grounds). “The trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be given to their testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.” Anderson v. Anderson , 29 Va. App. 673, 686, 514 S.E.2d 369, 376 (1999). The trial court accepted husband’s Personal Information Schedule as to the value and classification of the assets. Wi fe presented little, if any, eviden ce to dispute husband’s evidence concerning the marital and separate property of th e parties. Furthermor e, the trial court found that husband made more substantial monetary contribu tions to the marriage, while wife made more non-monetary contributions to the marriage. Although the trial court indicated husband’s activities outside the marriage “resulted in negative non-mone tary contributions,” it also found that wife’s “inability or refusal to cope with her health problems” contributed negatively to the marriage. In addition, the trial court stated in it s opinion letter that it c onsidered all the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.3(E) in rendering its decision. The fact ual predicates for the trial court’s decision are valid, and the court’s exercise of discretion is sound. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s equitable distribution award. Both parties challenge the tria l court’s spousal support award.- 6 - “In awarding spousal support, the [trial co urt] must consider th e relative needs and abilities of the parties. [The trial court] is gui ded by the . . . factors thatare set forth in Code § 20-107.1.” Joynes v. Payne , 36 Va. App. 401, 419, 551 S.E.2d 10, 19 (2001). Although its findings “must have some foundation ba sed on the evidence presented,” id. , “‘[w]hether and how much spousal support will be awarded is a matter of discretion for the trial court.’” Northcutt v. Northcutt , 39 Va. App. 192, 196, 571 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2002) (citation omitted). “‘In fixing the amount of the spousal support award, . . . the cour t’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. We will reverse the trial cour t only when its decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Moreno v. Moreno , 24 Va. App. 190, 194-95, 480 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1997) (citation omitted). The record reveals the trial court carefully considered all the evidence and the applicable statutory factors. The trial c ourt specifically stated that it accepted the testimony from Anthony Bird, a vocational rehabilitation c onsultant, concerning wife’s inco me capacity. Wife has a law degree, but is not currently license d to practice law. Bird testifie d that a conservative estimate of wife’s earnings as a paralegal is $40,000 per year . Wife presented evid ence of her physical limitations, which the trial court considered in making its ruling. However, none of wife’s witnesses testified wife is une mployable or unable to work. “[A] court may impute income to a pa rty who is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Imputation of income is based on the principle that a spouse should not be allowed to choose a low paying positi on that penalizes the other spouse . . . .” Calvert v. Calvert , 18 Va. App. 781, 784-85, 447 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1994) (citations omitted). Whether a person is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed is a factual determin ation. In evaluating a request to impute income, the trial court must “consider the [parties’] earning capacity, financial resour ces, education and training, ability to secure such educati on and training, and other factors relevant to the equities of the parents and the children.”- 7 - Blackburn v. Michael , 30 Va. App. 95, 102, 515 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1999) (citation omitted). “Imputation of income is within the trial [c ourt]’s discretion . . . .” Sargent v. Sargent , 20 Va. App. 694, 704, 460 S.E.2d 596, 601 (1995). Considering Bird’s testimony and wife’s ev idence of her physical limitations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imputing $20,000 in annual income to wife. Furthermore, while wife did not submit a monthly income and e xpense statement, the trial court referred to the current mortgage payment for the marital residence, wife’s tax returns, information contained in husband’s income and expense statement, and ev idence concerning the parties’ lifestyle while married in determining wife’s needs. In addition, it was within the trial court’s discretion not to make the award of a defined duration. See Code § 20-107.1(C). “‘[S]pousal support awards must be determined in light of contemporary ci rcumstances and . . . redetermined [if necessary] in light of new circumstances.’” Blank v. Blank , 10 Va. App. 1, 4, 389 S.E.2d 723, 724 (1990) (citation omitted). We conclude that the tria l court did not abuse its discretion in making the spousal support award. Wife contends the trial court erred by refu sing to admit into evidence “charts” she made showing her daily physical problems and a not arized document wife submitted to husband’s employer. “The admissibility of evidence is with in the broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the ab sence of an abuse of discretion.” Blain v. Commonwealth , 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988). Wife represented to the trial court that the “charts” sh owed dates the parties argued and the physiological effects wife asserted the arguments had on her. The “notarized docu ment” contained wife’s allegations concerning husband’s activities both within th eir relationship and outside of the marriage. In addition to being hearsay, the evidence was not relevant to the proceedings on equitable distribution and- 8 - spousal support. Accordingly, th e trial court did not abuse its di scretion in refusing to admit the evidence. Wife contends the trial court erred by not allowing husband to testify concerning certain discovery. The trial court sustai ned husband’s objection to wife’s questioning about some of his discovery responses concerning his expenses af ter the separation. Thes e questions concerned restaurants husband visited and whether he ow ned a lawn mower. This evidence was not relevant to the issues of spousal support and the distribution of the parties’ assets. Therefore, the trial court did not err in this ruling. Wife asserts the trial court erred by not addr essing her objections to the Commissioner’s report. However, wife’s brief fa ils to show where in the record she presented this argument to the trial court. See Rule 5A:20. The pages cited by wife in her opening brief do not contain her arguments to the court concerning th is issue. If the issue was raised before the trial court, we will not search the record for where the objection was made and argued. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 239. Husband requests attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal. Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, we hold that husband is entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs. See O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). Accordingly, we remand this case to th e trial court solely for a determination of those fees and costs. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed and remanded.