## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02-15-00222-CV

ROSS MANDEL AND LEA MANDEL APPELLANTS
V. LEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF DENTON, CITY OF PLANO, AND CLAUSSNER HOLDINGS, LLC APPELLEES

------------ FROM THE 431ST DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 2013-70534-431

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### OPINION

---------- This is an appeal from a denial of a bill of review. 1 In one issue that contains several supporting arguments, appellants Ross Mand el and Lea Mandel contend that the trial court’s November2012 default judgment against them violated their right to due process and that the trial court therefore erred by

1 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f).2 granting the su mmary judgment motions filed in th e bill of review proceeding by appellees Lewisville Independent School District (Lewisville ISD), County of Denton (Denton County), City of Plano (Plano), and Claussner Holdings, LLC (Claussner). We affirm. Background Facts In a prior, restricted appe al that involved all of the same parties at issue here (other than Claussner), we affirmed th e trial court’s default judgment against appellants for delinquent ad valorem taxes on their Plano residence. 2 We set out the chronology of events be tween the parties as follows: On July 29, 2011, Lewisville IS D filed its original petition against the Mandels . . . for payment of delin quent 2010 property taxes on the Mandels’ home. Lea Mandel was served by personal service of process on August 5, 2011. Ross Mandel was served by personal service of process on Au gust 16, 2011. The Mandels did not answer. . . . While the case wa s pending, at some point in the following months, [a lienholder] paid the delinquent 2010 taxes. Lewisville ISD filed its first amen ded original petition on June 7, 2012, eliminating it s cause of action for 2010 taxes and alleging that the Mandels were delinquent on their 20 11 taxes. Lewisville ISD’s certificate of service append ed to its amended petition stated that it served the Mandels with a copy of the amended petition pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a. [3] The Mandels did

2 See Mandel v. Lewisville ISD , 445 S.W.3d 469, 485 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied).

3 The Mandels disputed in this bill of review proc eeding whether service of the amended petition under ru le 21a was accomplished. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a (stating that notices required to be serv ed, other than the citation, may be served in various ways, including in person, by ma il, or by e-mail). Ap pellees contend, in part, that Texas law did not require servic e of the amended pe tition under rule 21a.3 not answer. . . . On November 2, 2012, [Plano] in tervened. On November 13, 2012, [Denton Coun ty] intervened. [Plano] and [Denton County] each sought to re cover delinquent 2011 property taxes owed by the Mandels. On November 15, 2012, the ca se was called to trial. The Mandels did not appear. . . . On the same date, the trial court signed a final default judgment against the Mandels . . . for the amounts owed to Lewisville ISD, [Plano], and [Denton County] for the delinquent 2011 taxes, including penalties and interest until paid. The judgment also ordered forecl osure of the tax liens on the property, issuance of an order ofpublic sale of the property, payment to the taxing entities of the amounts owed from the proceeds, and issuance of a writ ofpossession to the purchaser of the property at the sale. On November 16, 2012, the D enton County District Clerk mailed a notice of the judgment to each of the Mandels, as well as a billing statement for the court cost s. On January 4, 2013, the Denton County District Clerk issued an order of sale for foreclosure of the tax liens and for court costs recovered in the default judgment. The Denton County Sher iff published notice of the sale and on March 13, 2013, mailed a copy of th e notice to the Mandels. The property was sold at a sheriff’ s sale on the Denton County Courthouse steps to Clau ssner on April 2, 2013. [4] In the restricted appeal, appellants ar gued that (1) the citation by which Ross was served with Lewisville ISD’s origi nal petition did not st rictly comply with certain rules of civil proced ure, (2) Lewisville ISD was re quired to serve them with a new citation when it f iled its amended petition be cause the amended petition asserted a new cause of action for a di fferent tax year, (3) Plano and Denton County were required to (and failed to) serv e appellants with ci tation when they intervened, and (4) they were denied due process because they did not receive

4 Mandel , 445 S.W.3d at 472–73.4 adequate notice of the order of sale of the property. 5 We rejected each of these arguments. 6 Before we issued our decision in the restricted appeal, appellants filed a petition for bill of review in the trial court, contending that the November 2012 default judgment is void. They argued t hat rule of civil procedure 21a required Lewisville ISD to serve its amended petition on them and that Lewisville ISD did not do so. They raised the same conten tion with respect to the intervention petitions filed by Plano a nd Denton County. Finally, they contended that the resulting sheriff’s sale of the home wa s improper because th e default judgment was taken without proper service and was therefore allegedly void. Appellees filed answers to the petiti on for bill of review. Appellants amended the petition; they again contended that their right to due process had been violated because they had not been served under rule 21a with Lewisville ISD’s amended petition or the interventi on petitions filed byPlano and Denton County. They cont ended that the November 2012 judgment was obtained in violation of their due process rights “b ecause they were not served with the pleadings upon which the defa ult judgment was based.” All parties sought summary judgment. Appellants argued that they were not served with Lewisville ISD’s amended petition or the other taxing entities’

5 Id. at 474–85.

6 See id. at 485.5 intervention petitions under rule 21a a nd that those petitions asserted a new cause of action and soughtmore onerous relief than Lewisville ISD’s original petition. Appellants contended, “Due process does not permit a default judgment on a claim never served on th e defendants. As such, this Court should . . . set aside the default judgment.” Appellants a ttached a declaration to their motion in which Ross stated that neit her he nor Lea received Lewisville ISD’s amended petition or the intervention petitions filed by Denton County and Plano. They also contended that Lewisville ISD had admitt ed that it had no t served the amended petition upon appellants. 7 They contended that when taxing entities are on notice that service has not been re ceived by a citizen, the entities have a due process obligation to take “additional steps to provide citizens notice before taking their property.” Finally, they ar gued that because they did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the taxing entities’ claims for the 2011 taxes, they were not required to prove traditional bill-of-reviewelements, including that they had a meritorious claim or defense. Claussner argued that appella nts’ claim seeking to void the sheriff’s sale of the property, which was conducted in acco rdance with the tria l court’s order of sale, was legally unsupported even if theyprevailed in setting aside the default

7 In a response to an interro gatory in discovery, Lewi sville ISD stated that it sent the amended petition to appellants by certified mail bu t that the certified mail was returned as unclaimed. Lewisville ISD admitted thatit knew that appellants had not received the amende d petition when Lewisville ISD sought the default judgment against them.6 judgment. Claussner conten ded that appellants’ onlyrecourse, if any, was “against the Taxing Authorities.” It argued, “Even if this Court were to set aside the Default Judgment (which it cannot and should not), this Court may not set aside the tax sale to Claussner.” Lewisville ISD asserted, among other ar guments, that appe llants were not entitled to a bill of review because they did not have a meritorious defense to the delinquency of the 2011 taxe s and because they were not legally entitled to receive a copy of Lewisville ISD’s amended petition. With respect to the latter argument, Lewisville ISD asserted t hat rule of civil procedure 117a 8 negated any need for service of the amended petition upon appellants under rule 21a. Lewisville ISD contended, “Pro perty owners have a legal duty to know whether or not the taxes assessed on their property have been paid and th is is especially true when suit has been filed to collectdelinquent taxes assessed on their property. This necessarily includes taxes becoming delinqu ent after a lawsuit has been filed.” Denton County adopted Lewisville ISD’ s summary judgment motion. The county also contended that it was not required to serve appellants with its intervention petition. The county argued that this co urt resolved that exact argument against appellants in the restricted appeal; thus, the county asserted that the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case precluded appellants’

8 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a.7 petition for bill of review. Plano adopte d Denton County’s and Lewisville ISD’s summary judgment motions and contended that the pr ocedures for se rvice in a tax suit created by rule 117a satisfied due process. The trial court granted the summary ju dgment motions filed by appellees and denied appellants’ motion. The court ordered that the “default judgment for [Lewisville ISD], [Denton Co unty], and [Plano] . . . ente red on Novemb er 15, 2012 is hereby SUSTAINED/AFFIRMED.” Appellants brough t this appeal. Rule 117a and Due Process In one issue that cont ains several supporting arguments, appellants contend that the November 2012 default judgment viol ated due process and that the trial court therefore erred by grantin g summary judgment for appellees and by denying appellants’ petition for bill of review. In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant establishe d that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the movantwas entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); see also Shackelford v. Cartercopters, LLC , No. 02-10-00414-CV, 2011 WL 3835638, at *2 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2011, no pet.) (m em. op.) (“The review of a grant of summary judgment on a petition for bill of review is the same standard of review as for grants of summary judgment in other types of cases.”). We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). A defendant who conclu sively negates at least one essential8 element of a cause ofaction is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 1180 (2011). When multiple part ies move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion while den ying another, we review the parties’ summary judgment evidence and de termine all questions presented. Little v. Delta Steel, Inc. , 409 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. A pp.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). A bill of review is an equi table proceeding brought bya party seeking to set aside a prior judgment that is no longer subject to ch allenge by a motion for new trial or appeal. Caldwell v. Barnes , 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998); see In re Child , No. 02-15-00118-CV, 20 16 WL 1403320, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 7, 2016, no pet. h.). It is brought as a separate su it from the case in which the challenged judgment was rendered. Morris v. O’Neal , 464 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The fundamental policy that finality mu st be accorded to judgments makes the grounds upon which a bill of review will be granted narrow. See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied , 541 U.S. 1030 (2004). Generally, to be entitled to relief, a bill ofreview petitioner must plead and prove three elements: (1) the peti tioner has a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action; (2) the peti tioner was prevented from making that defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, or because of official mistake; and (3) these acti ons were unmixed with any fault or negligence on the partof the petitioner. Child , 2016 WL 1403320, at *2. When a9 bill of review is premised on an alleged lack of service of process or notice, such as where the petitioner is seeking to set aside a def ault judgment, the petitioner is relieved of having to prove the first two elements. Morris , 464 S.W.3d at 805 n.1; see Mabon Ltd. v. Af ri-Carib Enters., Inc. , 369 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2012); Interaction, Inc. v. State , 17 S.W.3d 775, 778 (T ex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (“[W]hen a defendant does not rece ive notice of a lawsuit, the defendant is relieved of its burden to prove that frau d, accident, or wrongful act prevented it from making its defense.”). The connecting thread of appellants’ argu ments is their contention that rule 21a required Lewisville ISD to serve its amen ded petition on them and required Denton County and Plano to serve their interventi on pleadings on them. Appellants argue that because the amended petition an d intervention pleadings were not served, the default judgment viol ates their right to due process and is void. Appellees argue, in part, that rule 117a negated any need for the service of the amended petition or the intervention pe titions under rule 21a and that rule 117a complies with due process. Rule 21a states th at every “notice required by [the rules of civil procedure], and every pleading . . . required to be served under Rule 21, 9 other than the

9 Rule 21 states in part, Every pleading . . . must be filed with the clerk of the court in writing, must state the grounds therefor, must set forth the relief or order sought, and at the same time a true copy must be served on all other parties, and must be noted on the docket.10 citation to be served upon the filing of a cause of action[,] . . . may be served by delivering a copy to the part y to be served.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a(a) (emphasis added). Notices and pleadings cove red by rule 21a may be served electronically, in person, by mail, or by e-mail, amo ng other means. Id. ; see also In re E.A. , 287 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2009) (expla ining that the se rvice requirement and methods contained in ru le 21a generally apply to “all pleadings and court papers except the original petition”). Generally, when a defendant has been served with an original petition by citati on, the rules of civil procedure require the service of an amen ded petition, without citation , when the amen ded petition seeks a more onerous judgment 10 than prayed for in th e original pleading. E.A. , 287 S.W.3d at 3–5; Mandel , 445 S.W.3d at 478 (stating that “service under rule 21a suffices to satisfy the requirement of service of an amended petition asserting a new cause of action as well as one that seeks more onerous relief”); Garduza v. Castillo , No. 05-13-00377-CV, 2014 WL 2921650, at *2 (Tex. App.— Dallas June 25, 2014, no pe t.) (mem. op.) (“The issuance and service of citation is only required for an original petition. Thereafter neither issuance [nor] service of citation is required for subsequently amended petitions, just service pursuant Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(a).

10 The parties dispute whet her Lewisville ISD’s amen ded petition requested more onerous relief than its original pe tition. Appellants contend that the amended petition sought mo re onerous relief because it added a new cause of action for a different tax y ear (2011 instead of 2010) and alleged greater liability than the original petition. For the reason s stated below, we need not resolve that issue.11 to rule 21a of each amended petition that requests more onerous relief.” (citation omitted)). Failure to serve such an amended petition generally renders any default judgment granted on the amended petition void. See Pride v. Williams , No. 05-11-01189-CV, 2013 WL 3788627, at*2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 17, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Olive Tree Apartments v. Trevino , No. 04-09-00740-CV, 2010 WL 1817797, at *2 (T ex. App.—San Antonio May 5, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rule 117a applies to suits for collect ion of delinquent ad valorem taxes, like this case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11 7a (“In all suits for co llection of delinquent ad valorem taxes, the rules of civil proc edure governing issuance and service of citation shall control the issuance and servic e of citation therein, except as herein otherwise specially provided.”). Rule 117a explicitly relates to “citation” in tax suits but contains language that more generally applies to the notice of pleadings, including pleadings filed after th e original petition, required in such suits. See id. The rule provides that a cita tion in a tax suit must state that in addition to the taxes all in terest, penalties, and costs allowed by law up to and including the day of judgment are included in the suit ; and that all parties to the sui t, including plaintiff, defendants, and intervenors, shall take notice that claims for any taxes on said property becoming delinquent subsequent to the filing of the suit and up to the day of judgment, together with all interest, penalties, and costs allowed by law thereon, may, upon requests therefor, be recovered therein without further citation or notice to any parties thereto. Such citation need not be accompanied by a copy of plaintiff's petition and no such copyneed be served. Such citation shall also show the names of a ll taxing units which assess and collect taxes on said property not made parties to such suit, and shall contain, in substance, a recita tion that each party to such suit12 shall take notice of, and plead an d answer to, all claims and pleadings then on file or thereafter filed in said cause by all other parties therein, or who may in tervene therein and set up their respective tax claims against said property. After citation or notice has been given on behalf of any plai ntiff or intervenor taxing unit, the court shall have jurisdiction to he ar and determine the tax claims of all taxing units who are parties plai ntiff, intervenor or defendant at the time such process is issued and of all taxing units intervening after such process is issued, no t only for the taxes, interest, penalties, and costs which may be due on said pr operty at the time the suit is filed, but those becomin g delinquent ther eon at any time thereafter up to and including th e day of judgment, without the necessity of further citation or notice to any party to said suit ; and any taxing unit having a tax claim against said property may, by answer or intervention, set up and have determined its tax claim without the necessity of further cita tion or notice to any parties to such suit. Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(4) (emphasis added). The rule also provides a form for citation by personal serv ice in tax suits, and the form includes the following language: All parties to this suit, incl uding plaintiff, defendants, and intervenors, shall take notice that claims not only for any taxes which were delinquent on said property at the time this suit was filed but all taxes becoming delinquent thereon at any time thereafter up to the day of judgment , including all interest, pe nalties, and costs allowed by law thereon, may, upon request therefor, be recovered herein without further citation or notice to any parties herein , and all said parties shall take notice of and pl ead and answer to all claims and pleadings now on file and which may hereafter be filed in this cause by all other parties hereto, and byall of those taxing units above named, who may intervene herein and set up their respective tax claims against said property. Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(6). Lewisville ISD’s original petition , filed in July 2011, stated, All the parties of this suit, in cluding Plaintiff, Defendant(s) and lntervenor(s), shall take notice that claims for any and all taxes13 becoming delinquent on said property at any ti me subsequent to the filing of this suit, up to the da y of Judgment, ma y upon request therefore be recovered he rein without further Citation or Notice, and that such claims for such delinquen t taxes shall include all penalties, interest[,] and costs allowed by law. Similar language appeared on the ci tation that acco mpanied Lewisville ISD’s original petition. In accordance with rule 11 7a(6), the citation stated, All parties to this suit, including Plaint iff, Defendant(s), and Intervenors, shall take notice that claims not only for any taxes which were delinquent on said property at the time this suit was filed but all taxes becoming delinquent thereon atany time thereafter up to the day of judgment, including all inte rest, penalties, and costs allowed by law thereon, may upon reques t therefor, be recovered herein without further citation or notice to any parties here in, and all said parties shall take notice of and pl ead and answer to all claims and pleadings now on file an d which may hereafter be filed in this cause by all other parties hereto, and byall of those taxing units above named, who may intervene herein and set up their respective tax claims against said property. [11] See id. In resolving the restricted appeal, we relied on rule 117a to hold that Denton County and Plano were not requi red to serve appellants with citation when those entities filed their intervention petitions. See Mandel , 445 S.W.3d at 480–81; see also Stoker v. City of Fort Worth , No. 02-08-00103-CV, 2009 WL 2138951, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In a suit to collect delinquent ta xes due on property , any taxing unit having a tax claim

11 At the 2012 hearing in which the tria l court granted the default judgment, in response to an argument made by the lienholder, the court stated, “[I]t would seem to me that the parties were put on notice of the taxi ng [authorities’] intent to seek payment of past due taxes as well as future taxes if theyhappen to become due and owing prior to the time th at a judgment’s entered . . . .”14 against the property may inte rvene and have it s tax claim determ ined without the necessity of further citation or notice to any parties to the suit.”). We explained, “In essence, rule 117a(4) me ans that taxing units named in a citation as having claims for delinquent taxes on particular property, but no t parties to the tax suit, may later join the suit withou t further service of process or notice .” Mandel , 445 S.W.3d at 482 (emphasis added). We conc luded that as applied in this manner, rule 117a did not violate due process because the citation that appellants received provided them with sufficient notice that they were being sued by Le wisville ISD for delinquent ad valorem taxes on real property located at a specific address. By naming both the Ci ty and the County, which later intervened, the citation served with Lewisville ISD’s original petition gave the Mandels all t he notice to which they were entitled and gave them the opportunity to appear and defend the suit. Nothing in the record before us intimates that th ey were misled or placed at a disadvantage by the citation and pleadings. Id. However, we did not di rectly answer the question presented here, which is whether rule 21a, rather than rules relati ng to the service of citation, required service of the amended pleading or the intervention petitions upon appellants or whether, instead, rule 117a negated that requirement. 12

12 Instead, we appeared to assume, withou t explicitly deciding, that rule 21a applied and held that there was no error on the face of the record under rule 21a because Lewisville ISD’s amen ded petition recited that it was served by certified mail. Mandel , 445 S.W.3d at 479–80. In other words, we concluded that service under rule 21a was ad equate on the face of the reco rd in the restricted appeal, but we did not explicitly hold that se rvice was necessary when considering the effect of rule 117a. See id. Contrary to appellants’ argument on appeal, we cannot conclude that service of Lewisv ille ISD’s amended pe tition was legally15 We apply rules of civil procedure in accordance with their plain language. Simulis, L.L.C. v. G.E. Capital Corp. , 276 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Burrhus v. M&S Supply, Inc. , 933 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (“[R]ules t hat are specific and clear are given their plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would produce an absurd result or defeat the intent of the enacting body.”). The plain language of rule 117a signifies that in a suit for delinquent taxes, once a citation complying with the rule has been prop erly served, the party serving the citation along with intervening parties who do not serve citation may obtain a judgment for all taxes becoming delinquent before the rendition ofthe judgment “wit hout further . . . notice” to any defendant. Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(4). In other words, the rule contemplates that after a citation is se rved, the party serv ing the citation and other parties may plead new claims and seek more oner ous relief without further notice. See id. The rule expressly provides thatno copy of the plaintiff’s petition need be served and explicitly places the burden on a defendant to “take notice of, and plead and answer to, all cl aims and pleadings then on file or thereafter filed in said cause by all . . . parties therein .” Id. (emphasis added). The rule requires the citation to inform the defe ndant of this burden to respond to all pleadings on file at the time of the citation’s service or filed in the future, and the citations served on Ross and Le a in this case did so. Tex. R. Civ. P. 117a(6); necessary simply because Lewisville ISD attempted to serve the amended petition.16 see also Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33 .45 (West 2015) (stating that a party in a suit for tax delinquency must “t ake notice of and plead and answer to all claims and pleadings filed by other parties that have been joined or ha ve intervened, and each citation must so state”). Thus, the rules of civil procedure, which generally require the service of notice and pleadings, and rule 117a, whic h expressly negates the requirement of serving notice or pleadings in tax suits following the service of the citation, conflict. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(a), 21a(a), 117a (4). We conclude that rule 117a, which is the more specific ru le, prevails in tax suits to the extent of the conflict. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026(b) (West 2013); In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys. , 464 S.W.3d 686, 716 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (“[C]onflicts between general and specificprovisions favor the spec ific, and when the literal terms of the two provisions cannot both be true, th e terms of the specific provision ordinarily will prevail.”). For these reasons, under the preva iling language of rule 117a, we must reject appellants’ principal contention, wh ich is that rule 21a required Lewisville ISD to serve its amended petition on appella nts. We hold that no such service was required under the unambigu ous language of rule 117a. Appellants also argue, ho wever, that due process required service of the amended petition even if ru le 117a did not. They ar gue that rules of civil procedure cannot foreclose federal and st ate constitutional attacks by parties deprived of constitution ally adequate notice.17 Due process generally requires serv ice of an amended pleading seeking a more onerous judgment. See E.A. , 287 S.W.3d at 5–6. But the supreme court’s decision in Mexia Independent School Di strict v. City of Mexia leads us to conclude that the notice pr ovided by rule 117a is co nstitutionally adequate without the necessity of serv ice of amended or interven ing pleadings. 134 Tex. 95, 133 S.W.2d 118 (193 9). There, the supreme court examined the statute that preceded rule 117a. Id. at 96, 133 S.W.2d at 119; see Mandel , 445 S.W.3d at 481 (comparing rule 117a with the former statute). The factual background of the case involved an action by th e City of Mexia against a debtor, A.N. Pigford, for delinquent taxes. Mexia ISD , 134 Tex. at 98, 133 S.W. 2d at 120. Mexia ISD intervened and also sought a delinquen cy judgment against Pigford but did not serve Pigford with citation. Id. According to the former st atute (like rule 117a), the citation from the city’s original petition notified Pi gford that other taxing units had been made parties and th at Pigford should “take notice of, and plead and answer to, all claims and pleadings now on file and hereafter filed.” Id. The city contended that the former statute was unconstitutional, butthe supreme court disagreed, stating, The Act in question undertakes to require all parties to take notice of all subsequent pl eadings filed in the suit and it is contended by appellee that it is unconstitutiona l, because, if followed, it would deprive Pigford of hi s property without due process of law , in that it would permit an impleade d taxing unit to file a [cross-action] and recover judgment against Pigford fo r foreclosure of its lien without any citation to him thereon. The gene ral rule is that the legislature in its discretion may prescribe wh at notice shall be given to a defendant in a suit, subject to the condition that the notice18 prescribed must conform to the re quirement of due process of law. The requirement of due pr ocess of law is met ifthe notice prescribed affords the party a fair opportun ity to appear and defend his interests. The statute in question ap plies only to a pa rticular class of suits—that is, suits brought by taxing units to foreclose tax liens on property. The citation served on th e defendant must disclose to him the nature of the suit. He is c harged with knowledge of the law and therefore must know from the nature of the suit that there is a possibility of cross-action s by others. In other words, he is notified that an effort will be made to sell the particular piece of property for taxes and that all other defendants in the suit, as well as taxing units not parties thereto, wh o have an interest in the property have been invited to present their claims an d to participate in the sale. Section 4 of the Act requires that the citation contain a recitation calling his attention to the fact that he is [required] to take notice of all pleadings then on file and such as may thereafter be filed by any and all parties. It is a [well-recognized] rule that a defendant who has once entered his appearance in a caus e is charged with notice of all amendments thereafter filed, including pleas of intervention and cross-actions by other defend ants. If a defendant, merely because he has entered his appearance in an ordinary suit, can be required to take notice of all subsequent pl eadings, interventions and cross-actions by the public generally, we see no reason why in a particular class of su its a defendant, who ha s been served with citation that specifically warned hi m of the necessity of taking notice of subsequent pleadings, cannot be required to take notice of crossactions of a particular kind by a particular class of claimants. We think the notice required by the stat ute affords all defendants a fair opportunity to be hear d and therefore it does not violate the due process clause of our Constitution. Id. at 100–02, 133 S.W.2d at 121–22 (e mphasis added) (citations omitted). More recently, an intermediate court of appeals held that a citation complying with rule 117a comports with due process because such a citation gives a defendant notice of the claim for a tax deficiency and a fair opportunity to contest the claim. Conseco Fin. Servicing v. Klein ISD , 78 S.W.3d 666, 675–76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich , 15019 Tex. 398, 404, 241 S.W.2d 142, 146 (1951) (“The re quirement of du e process of law is met if the notice prescribed afford s the party a fair op portunity to appear and defend his interests.”), cert. denied , 342 U.S. 903 (1952). We conclude that the citations served on appellants satisfied due process, without the need of servic e of the amended or interv ening pleadings, because the citations notified appellants of the potential for future tax delinquencies sought by Lewisville ISD, Denton County, or Plano; instructed them to remain apprised of those potential claims; and gave them a fa ir opportunity to defend against the claims. See Mexia ISD , 134 Tex. at 100–02, 133 S.W.2d at 121–22; Conseco Fin. Servicing , 78 S.W.3d at 675–76. Although appellants contend that they were not “fairly put on notice that a judgment might re sult for another tax year without some kind of notice before the . . . default judgment,” 13 the citations provided them with this ex act notice, informing them that the taxing units were seeking taxes “delinquent on said property at the time this suit was filed [and] all taxes becoming delinquent thereon at any ti me thereafter up to the day of judgment . . . without furthercitation or notice.” An d as explained above, the citations received by appellants informed them that they were to take notice of all

13 Appellants rely, in part, on a letter they received informing them that the 2010 taxes had been paid. But that letter also info rmed appellants that the lawsuit remained pending and wo uld not be dismissed until “ all school taxes , court costs, and abstract fees [were] paid .” The letter stated, “Please be advised that the District may take judgment for any unpaid school ta xes, court costs[,] and abstract fees that remain unpaid without fu rther notice to you.”20 current and future pleadings. Nonetheles s, the record does not indicate that appellants appeared in the lawsuit prior to the date of the default judgment. In their argument concerning due pr ocess, appellants re ly on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Flowers , 547 U.S. 220, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006). There, the Court stated thatbefore a state may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, due pr ocess requires the state to provide the owner notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id. at 223, 126 S. Ct. at 1712. The Court held that such due process had not been provided to the owner because he first learned of the a llegation of a tax delinquency on the property after the property had been sold and because attempts to notify him by certified mail had been returned as unclaimed. Id. at 223–24, 239, 126 S. Ct. at 1712–13, 1721. This case is distinguishable from Jones because here, before the trial court’s judgment a nd before the sale of the pr operty, appellants received notice that suit had been filed for delinquen t taxes and that reco very in the suit could include any taxes that were de linquent on the day of the judgment. See Mandel , 445 S.W.3d at 483 (distinguishing Jones on the ground that the sale “of the Mandels’ home in this case was . . . with the prot ections afforded by service of citation on the Mandels, providing notice and an opportunity to appear in court for a meaningful hearing before the final judgment ordering sale of their home for payment of the de linquent taxes”). For all of these reasons, we hold that under rule 117a, appellants were not entitled to service under rule 21a (or otherwise) ofLewisville ISD’s amended21 petition or the other entities’ intervention pleadings, and we also hold that the provisions within rule 117a do not viol ate due process facially or as applied. 14
We conclude that the trial court did noterr by granting summary judgment for appellees 15 and by denying appellant s’ petition for bill of review. We overrule appellants’ sole issue. Conclusion Having overruled appellants’ only issu e, we affirm the trial court’s final summary judgment denying appellant s’ petition for bill of review. /s/ Terrie Livingston TERRIE LIVINGSTON CHIEF JUSTICE PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and GABRIEL, JJ. DELIVERED: June 30, 2016

14 In light of these related holdings, we conclude that we need not address other arguments, which co ncern issues such as wh ether setting aside the judgment would require setting aside the sale of the pr operty, whether appellants’ bill of review could be defe ated by certain defenses raised by ap pellees, or whether the trial court erre d by excluding certain summary judgment evidence. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals mu st hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin , 449 S.W.3d 665, 677 n.19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied).

15 Appellants argued that Claussner had no standing to move for summary judgment because “no claims were asserted agains t it.” We disagree because appellants explicitly sued Claus sner and asked the trial co urt to void the deed to Claussner. See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato , 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005) (explaining that the “issue of stan ding focuses on wh ether a party has a sufficient relationship with th e lawsuit so as to have a ‘justiciabl e interest’ in its outcome”).