## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Rice , 2011 IL App (1st) 103753

Appellate Court Caption In re MARRI AG E OF MADONN A RI CE, Petitioner-Appellee
, and DANI ELRI CE, Respondent-Appe llant.

District & N o. First District, Six th Division Docke t No. 1-10-3753

Opinion filed Rehea ringdenied Modified opinion filed Dec ember 9, 2011
J anuar y 18, 2012
J anuar y 20, 2012

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) On appea l from a trial court’s postjudgment order s i n dissoluti on proce eding s, the trial court’s modification of responde nt’s child support obligation by setting a lump-sum obl i gat ion rende red inapplicable the reduc tion provision of the parties’ marital settlement ag ree ment reduc ing responde nt’s obligation by 2 4 % as each child beca me emancipated and his support obligation was set at $700 per month until his y oung est child

was emanc ipated and mandatory interest acc rued on his delinquent child
suppo rt beg inning on April 23, 1991, the most rec ent date in which an

arr ear ag e wa s calc ulated by the cour t.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 82-D-9896; the Hon. David Ha rac z, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Nichole M. Capra ro , o f Stewart & Caprar o, of Oak Park, and Daniel J

. Rice, of F orest Park, f

or appe llant.

Marie I . Murphy , of De s Plaines, for appe llee.

Panel PRESID I N G JU ST I CE R. GORDON delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Gar cia a

nd L ampkin concur

red in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 T h i s ca s e co n cer ns the amount of past-due child support that is owed by responde n t Daniel Rice to his former wife, petitioner Madonna Rice. The parties divorce d in 1982 and
enter ed into a marital settlement ag ree ment conce rning the amount of child support Daniel would be require d to pay , which was incorporated into the judgme nt for dissoluti on of marria g e; the ag ree ment included a provision that as eac h of the couple’ s four minor children

emanc ipated, the support o b l i gat ion would decr ease by “one quarte r” (the reduc tion
p rovision). In 1990, the postjudgment court enter ed an order for “tempora ry support , ” modifying the amount of child support Daniel was to pay , and the order did not mention the reduc tion provision. By 2009, all four of the parties’ children wer e emanc ipated, and Daniel

was in arr ear s ap p roxi mately $40,000, including interest that beg an acc ruing in 2006. Howeve r, at Madonna’ s reque s t, the interest calc ulation was chang ed to ref lect interest

acc ruing beg inning in 1991, resulting in a revise d ar re ar ag e amount of approximately $80,000. Daniel filed a petition for clar ification of his child support obligations and the

arr ear ag e amount. The trial court found that the reduc tion provi s i o n d i d not control the
amount of child support owed and that the larg er interest calc ulation was corr ect. The court denied Daniel’ s motion to rec onsider and Daniel appea ls, arg uing th at : (1 ) t he 1990 court order modifying Daniel’ s child support obligation had no eff ect on the reduc tion provision, (2) the reduc tion provision was not ag ainst public policy and that argument should be barr ed by l a ch es , (3 ) the 1990 court order was within the guidelines of the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act (the Marr iag e Act) (750 I L CS 5/101 et seq. (West 2008)), and (4) the I llinois Depa

rtment of Hea lthcare and Family Service s cannot assess interest for sums owed prior to J anuar

y 1, 2000, since that is within the discretion of the trial court. We aff irm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 The parties wer e marrie d in 1972 and four children wer e born during the course of their marria g e. On May 24, 1982, Madonna filed a petition for dissoluti on of marria g e. At the time of the filing of the petition, Madonna was a housewife and Daniel was an attorney in private
prac tice as a

solo attorney . Madonna r equeste d custody of the pa rties’ c hildren.

-2-¶ 4 On Marc h 31, 1983, the trial court enter ed a judgm en t fo r d i s s o l u t ion of marriag e.

Incorpor ated into the judgme nt was a marital settlement agree ment (the ag ree ment) enter ed into by the parties. Article I I I of the ag ree ment conce rned the support of the parties’ children. I t stated that “the Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of 42% of his net income as and for child support with a minimum of $312.50 per month per child” and further stated that the support pay

ments wer e based on Daniel’ s repr esente d “g ross rec eipts of $86,000 in 1982.” Article I I I also contained the reduc tion provision, which provided: “Hu s b a n d’s obligation for support shall be reduce d by o n e- fo u rth as each child attains the age of 18, dies, marrie s or become s emanicipated [ sic ], whichever e vent occ urs ea rlier.” ¶ 5 On Marc h 31, 1983, the same day as the entry of the judgme n t fo r d i s s o l u t i o n o f marria g e, the court also enter ed a family sup p o rt memorandum of judgme nt. In that document, Daniel’ s net income was listed as $30,000 per year and his support pay ments wer e to be made payable to the cler k of the court at $1,250 per month. Additionally
, the memorandum of judgme nt listed prospec tive dates of termination of support for eac h child, and stated that “as children cea se to be elig ible for support, support pay ments to c lerk shall be reduc ed as follows,” followed by a list indicating that the support paym en t s wo u l d decr ease by

one quar ter a s eac h child cea sed to be e ligible f or support. ¶ 6 In 1984, the l eg islature amended sec tion 505 of the Marr iag e Ac t to add guidelines for calc ulating child support. See I ll. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, ¶ 505. In 1988, the leg is l ature amende d section 510 of the Marr iag e Act to allow those who rec eived child support pursuant to an order enter ed befor e the eff ective date of the support guidelines and whose supp ort pay ments wer e below those in th e gu i d elines one opportunity to petition the court for a modification of the support order to incre ase the amount of chi l d support to the amount specifie d under the g uidelines. See I ll. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, ¶ 510 (as amended by Pub. Act 85-1001 ( eff

. J uly 1, 1988)). ¶ 7 On September 18, 1989, the State, on Madonna’ s behalf
, filed a petition for rule to show

cause for Daniel’ s fa i l ure to pay child support and for modification of the child support amount pursuant to the amendment in the statute. The petition claimed that Daniel was in

arr ear s in the amount of $9,505 and also reque sted incre ased support in confor mity with the
guidelines of sec tion 505 of the Marr iag e Ac t (I ll. Rev. St at. 1987, ch. 40, ¶ 505). ¶ 8 On Marc h 27, 1990, the parties came befor e the court on the issue of deter mining cur

rent support and arr ear s. The trial court enter ed an ag ree d “orde r for s up p o rt ” and “judg ment order for arr ear ag es.” The order stated that “Respondent is self employ ed[,] income v[a] ries” and found that Daniel was in arr ear s $20,662. The court further order ed Daniel to pay $2,000
per month, $1,250 for curr ent support and $750 to be applied to the arr ear s until it was paid i n fu l l; the order stated that “[u] npaid arr ear s bear interest.” The order also stated t h at “[c]urrent support is based upon guidelines (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1985 Ch. 40 Par. 505).” The court continued the matter to J une 19, 1990, noting that “Respondent is to rema in curr ent–if Respondent is not curre nt by 6-19-90 c ontempt hear ing w ill procee d.” ¶ 9 On J une 19, 1990, the partie s aga i n ca m e b ef o re t h e court on the matter of “c hild support.” The court order ed Daniel to make his J une pay ment within the next seven day s and

co n t i n u ed the m atter to October 16, 1990, for pay ment status. The order also stated t hat i f

-3 -Daniel was not curr ent on the next court date, a contempt hear ing would occur

. On October

16, 1990, the trial court found that Daniel was $23,412 in arr ear s and enter ed an order for a body attachme nt, noting t h at t h e matter was befor e it “on the return of a Rule to Show Cause” ag ainst Daniel and that Daniel had been order ed to appea r on the rule but had failed to appea r. ¶ 10 On October 23, 1990, the trial court held a hear ing on Daniel’ s motion to vacate the body attachme nt and also considere d the matter of “child support and[/] or arr ear age

. ” T h e trial
court enter ed two order s, one vacating the body attachme nt or der and one for “tempora ry [1 ] support and arr ear s.” The court found that Daniel was $21,312 in arrea rs an d enter ed a judgme nt a g ainst Daniel and in Ma donna’s favor in that a mount. The court order ed Daniel to pa y $750 per month, $700 of which was for curr ent support and $50 for arr ear s until the

arr ear ag e was paid. The matter was continued to April 23, 1991, “to rec onsider [t he] arr ear s”
pay ment. ¶ 11 On April 23, 1991, the c ourt order ed Daniel to “make pa y ment of $3,000.00 within 21 day s toward the arr ear ag e of $23,812 as of 4/30/91.” Over the next two y ear s, the case was continued a number of times, with Daniel periodica lly being order ed to make pay ments on his curre nt and past-due s upport. The c ourt remove d the matter f rom its call on November 16, 1993. ¶ 12 On Dec ember 3, 1993, Daniel filed a pro se petition to reduc e child support. The pe tition claimed that under the marital settlement agree ment, support pay ments wer e to be reduc ed by 25% as e ach c hild reac hed the a g e of 18; the pe tition further st ated that one of Daniel’s children had rea ched the ag e of 18 and g radua ted from high school. The petition claimed that Daniel ha d been c urre nt in his pay ments of $700 per month, a s require d in the October 23, 1990, court order
, as well as an additional $50 per month paid by agree ment with the State’s At t o rn ey ’s office. Daniel reque sted that the court reduc e the amount of current support h e

was require d to pay by $175, which repr esente d the 25% reduc tion, and apply that $175 per month toward the arr ear ag e; in short, the total amount he was to pay would rema in the same, but the funds would be allocate d differ ently

. The rec ord does not contain a dispositi on of this
pro se petition. 2 ¶ 13 The next document in the rec ord is an order to withhold income for child support, dated April 27, 2001, and sent to “D anile Rice.” The orde r st ated that $200 per month was to be

T he ord er was cal le d an ord er for te m por ar y sup por t even tho ugh the re was no sub seq uen t 1 ord er m odi fying the amount of chi ld sup por t. See 750 I LCS 5/5 01( d)( 3) (W est 2008 ) (a te m por ar y ord er “t er m ina te s when the fi nal j udgm ent is ent er ed” ). T he re cor d al so doe s not ind ic at e tha t ei the r par ty fi le d a pet it ion to m odi fy the sup por t amount ot h e r tha n the pet it ion tha t was fi le d on Sept ember 18, 1989

. I n his re ply bri ef
, Dan i e l c la ims tha t he fi le d a pet it ion for m odi fi cat ion on Oct obe r 23, 1990
, and tha t the ord er was is sue d af te r a “ f u l l h e a r ing” hel d on the same day. However, the pet it ion is not con ta ine d in t he r eco rd on a ppe al andMa donn a’ s bri ef cl ai m s that no pet it ion orm oti on wa s e ver fi le d.

Ma donn a’ s bri ef st at es tha t no ord er was ever ent er ed dis pos ing of the pet it ion and Dani el ’s 2

re ply br ie f s ta te s t hat he never re que st ed a hea ri ng on th e pe ti ti on.

-4 -deducte d from Daniel’ s income; $50 of the amount was desig nated for past-due support, and

$150 was a llocated to delinquenc y totaling $21,175. 3 ¶ 14 On J an u ar y 2 9
, 2 0 1 0
, Daniel filed a petition to clar ify child support obligations and deter mine arr ear ag e. Daniel claimed that, pursuant to the marital settlement ag ree ment and the October 23, 1990, order modifying th e am ount of child support pay ments, he was require d to pay $700 per month until eac h of his children turned 18. He claimed that his first chil d t u rn ed 18 on November 23, 1993, at which time his monthly support obligation was reduc ed to $525 per month. His second child turned 18 on November 3, 1995, at which time Daniel’ s monthly support obliga tion was reduc ed to $393.75. Daniel’ s third child turned 18

on October 31, 1997, at which time his monthly support obligation was reduc ed to $295.91
per month. His y oung est child turned 18 on September 20, 1999. Thus, Daniel claimed that as of Oc tober 1, 1999, he no longe r had a ny curr ent support obligations. ¶ 15 Daniel claimed that on April 18, 2007, the I llinois Depa rtment of Hea lthcare and F amily Service s (I DHF S) sent an order t o wi t h h o l d income for child support in which Daniel’ s monthly obligation for arr ear ag es was l i s t ed at $140 per month until the total arr ear ag e amount of $7,987 plus interest wa s p ai d in full. Daniel further claimed that on August 5, 2009, I DHF S sent him corr espondenc e indicating that he had a total arr ear ag e of $80,262.71

as of April 30, 2009, and he disputed the amount of arr ear ag e and the amount due and owing for c hild support. ¶ 16 Daniel claimed that the state’s Child Support Pro g ram tender ed him a support calc ulation workshee t, in which it did not take into acc ount the automatic reduc tion in support. Thus, Daniel reque sted that the child support and arr ear ag e amounts be clar ified in an order which took into account the mar ital settlement ag ree ment and Oc tober 23, 1990, orde r. ¶ 17 The corr espondenc e Daniel discussed in his petition wa s a letter dated August 5, 2009, from I DHF S to him wher e it stated that as of April 30, 2009, the amount of past-due support was $38,104

. 2 5
, i n cludi ng $9,327.25 in interest; M adonna disag ree d with the t otal figure, stating that she thought it should be more. When revie wing the support calc ulation, the coordinator informed Madonna that the arr ear ag e amount includ ed interest calc ulated beg inning J anuar

y 1, 2006. The letter

indicated that “ [i ]t has been the [ I DHF S Division of Child Support Enforc ement’s (DCSE)] prac tice to charg e interest beg innin g Ja nuary 1, 2006, unless a calc ulation will be used in Circuit Court or at the reque st of a custodial pare nt.” Madonna reque sted that interest be char g ed beg inning May 1, 1987, or April 23, 1991, which

was the date that the circ uit court found that Daniel owed $23,812. The letter indicated that “[a ] s a result of Madonna Rice’s reque st and the fac t that this matter may be litigated in Ci rcuit Court, DCSE will be utiliz ing the calc ulation[ ] which calc ulated interest beg inning[ ] April 23, 1 991.” The total amount of Daniel’s past-due support was thus $80,262.17 as of

Wh il e the ord er doe s not spe ci fy the dif fe re nce bet ween pas t- due sup por t and del inq uen cy, 3 the I nco m e Wit hhol din g for Supp ort Act def ine s deli nque ncy as “an y paym ent *** unde r an orde r for sup por t whic h bec om es due and re m ai ns unpa id af te r ent ry of the ord er for sup por t.” 750 I LCS 28/ 15( c) (W est 2008 ). T hus
, the “pa st

- due ” sup por t was tha t sup por t owed pri or to the ent ry of the Oct obe r 2 3, 19 90, o rde r o f s uppo rt , whi le th e “ del inq uen cy” ac cr uedaf te r t he e ntr y of t he o rde r.

-5 -April 30, 2009.

¶ 18 On September 3, 2010, the trial court issued a written order conce rning Daniel’ s petition for clar ification. The court revie wed the terms of the judgme nt for dissoluti on of marria g e, including that pursuant to article I I I of the marital sett l ement ag ree ment, Daniel “wa s g rossing $86,000 per y ear at the time.” The court found that Daniel’ s child support obligation

was modi fi ed o n Oc t ober 23, 1990, and that at no time afte r that order did Daniel file a motion to modify the child support figure, including upon the emanc ipation of any of his children. The court found that Daniel’ s child support obligation continued to acc rue at $700
per month from October 1990 throug h September 20, 1999. The court also found that at no time did Daniel ever rema in curr ent in his child support obligations and that, pursuant to the May 5, 2009, support calc ulation workshee t prepa red by the State of I llinois Child Support Prog ram, Da

niel owed $80,262.17 in bac k child support and statutory interest. ¶ 19 The court reje cted Daniel’ s contention t h at h i s chil d support obligation should have automatically been reduc ed 25% as eac h child beca me emanc ipated. The court noted that if that was the case , then support for Daniel’ s y oung est child would have been $175 per month for approximately the last two months of the child’s minority

. The court found that “[c]learly
, this level of child support would be a downwar d deviation from the statutory guidelines” and “[n] o finding of g ood cause was ever made by a court for such a deviation as require d by 750 I L CS 5/505(a)( 2).” The court further found that the October 23, 1990
, o rd er of support modified the rele vant portions of article I I I of the marital settlement agree ment, including the reduc tion provision. ¶ 20 Additionally
, the court found that implementation of the reduct i o n p ro v i s i o n of the marital settlement ag ree ment “is counter to public policy and is not enfor cea ble.” The court found that if Daniel wanted that provision to be applied, “he had an obligation to reque st the Court to modify the curr ent support order
, and if nece ssary , to make the express finding for allowing a deviation from the statute. [Daniel] never did this.” The court held that the October 23, 1990, order of support rema ined in eff ect until the emanc ipation of the y oung est child on September 20, 1999, and that the support calc ulation works h eet of May 5, 2009, “appe ars to be corr ect throug h that date,” wi t h s tatutory interest continuing to acc rue. Acc ording ly
, the court denied Daniel’ s reque st to apply the marital settlement ag ree ment to

rec alculate the arr ear ag e and order ed an acc ount adjustment revie w to update the interest and total amounts Daniel owe d. ¶ 21 On September 14, 2010, Daniel filed a motion to rec onsider the trial court’s Septe mber 3, 2010, ruling

. Daniel claimed that the ruling “is based upon two finding s that neither party direc tly addre ssed or considere d,” namely
, the finding that the October 23, 1990, order “wa s not a guideline order,” and the finding that the child support reduc tion provision was void

as b ei n g against public policy

. On Dec ember 15, 2010, the trial court denied Daniel’ s 4 motion to rec onsider and found no just rea son to delay enfor ceme nt or appea l. On the same day , Daniel f

iled a notice of

appea l.

T he ord er is not dat ed, but the re cor d indi cat es tha t it was ent er ed on Dece m ber 15, 2010

. 4

-6 -¶ 22 ANALYSI S

¶ 23 On appea l, Daniel argues: (1) the October 23, 1990, court order modifying Daniel’ s child support obligation had no eff ect on the reduc tion provision, (2) the reduc tion provision was not ag ainst public policy and the public policy argument should be barr ed by laches
, (3) the October 23, 1990, court order was within the guidelines of the Marriag e Act, and (4) the I DHF S cannot assess interest for sums owed prior to J anuar y 1, 2000, since that is within the discretion of the trial court.

¶ 24 I . Validity of Reduction Provision ¶ 25 The circ uit cou rt fo u n d that the reduc tion provision did not apply to Daniel’ s support obligation and g ave three rea sons for its conclusion: (1) the October 23, 1990, order modified the rele vant support provisions of the marital set t l ement ag ree ment; (2) if the reduc tion
p rovi sion was applicable
, the amount of support would have been below the guideli n es imposed by the Marr iag e Act; and (3) the i m p lementation of the reduc tion provision was ag ainst public policy beca use it permitted modif

i ca t i o n o f the support obligation without
court intervention. Da n iel argues that none of the three rationale s applies. First, he argues that the provision rema ined in eff ect despite the court’s October 23, 1990, order modifying his child support obligation. Second, he argues that the reduc tion provision was not ag ainst public policy and that, if the issue had been raised by Madonna instead of by the trial court

sua sponte , the ar gu m en t s hould have been barr ed by laches

. Finally
, he argues that the October 23, 1990, court orde r wa s within the guide lines of the Mar riag e Ac t. We note that

we owe no defe renc e to the trial court’s i nterpre tation of t he October 23, 1990, order, a s it involves no fac tual finding s but is a purely leg al question, much like the interpre tation of a statute or contra ct. See Stojkovich v. Monadnock Building
, 281 I ll. App. 3d 733, 742 (1996) (“When an issue is decide d as a matter of law, revie w of a trial court’s decision on the matter is ge nera lly de novo .”).

¶ 26 A. Effect of 1990 Order on Re duction Provision ¶ 27 First, we consider whether the trial court’s 1990 order for “tempora ry” support aff

ecte d the reduc tion provision. In the case at bar, the trial court order ed Daniel to pay $700 per month for his support obliga tions but made no mention of the marital settlement ag ree ment or t he reduction provision. Daniel argues t hat t he 1990 order only modified t h e amount of support and had no eff

ect on the reduc tion pr ovision, whic h continued to a pply

. We do not find Danie l’s argument persua sive. ¶ 28 Da n i el ’s i n i tial support obligation, set forth in the agree ment incorpora ted i n t o t h e judgme nt f

or dissoluti on of marria g e, provided that “the Husband shall pay to the Wife the

sum of 42% of his net income as and for child support with a minimum of $312.50 per month per child” and further stated that “Husba nd’s obligation for support shall be reduc ed by one-f ourth as eac h child attains the ag e of 18, dies, marrie s or become s emanicipated [ sic ], whicheve r event occur s ear lier.” T h u s , t h e terms of the ag ree ment allocate d the support obligation per child and provided a provision for reduc tion of the awa rd as the children wer e

emanc ipated that cor

responde d to the support allocate d to eac h child.

-7 -¶ 29 Howeve r, the child support obligation was modifie d t wi ce , an d the modified support

order s also modified the provisions of the marital settlement ag ree ment conce rning Daniel’ s support obligations. See 750 I L CS 5/502(f) (West 2008) (“[T]erms of an ag ree ment set forth in the judgme nt are automatically modified by modification of the judgme nt.”); see also 750 I L CS 5/ 502(b) ( West 2008); Blisset v. Blisset , 123 I ll. 2d 161, 167 (1988) ( the cour t is not bound by ag ree ments provi d i n g fo r the s upport, custody
, and vis itation of children). After the 1984 amendme n t to the M arr iag e Act imposed child support guidelines, the t rial court
enter ed a support order pursuant to Madonna’ s petition setting Daniel’ s obligation as $1,250
per month for support. This order made no ment i o n o f al l o cating the support amount per child and stated that it was pursuant to the guidelines. The order also did not re fe r to the parties’ marital settlement agree ment. Simi larly , the cour t’s subsequent “te mporary” orde r

on October 23, 1990, set Daniel’ s child support obliga tion as $700 per month fo r curr ent support. L ike the ear lier order
, it did not allocate this amount among the parties’ children or make a ny mention of the marital se ttlement ag ree ment. ¶ 30 Daniel argu es t h at t h e fa ct t h at t he trial court’s order was silent with reg ard to the reduc tion provision means that the provision rema ins in eff ect. We disag ree

. Daniel’ s argument relies on us finding that t h e October 23, 1990, order solely modified the dollar
amount of his support obligation. Howeve r, examining that order
, and the Marc h 27, 1990, order prec eding it, demonstrates that the trial court made more extensive modifications to the support obligation. First, as no t ed, the modifications make no mention of the reduc tion provision or t he marital settlement ag ree ment at all. Moreove r, t h e modi fications chang ed the char acte r of the obligation f rom pay ments that wer e allocate d among the children to a n unallocate d lu m p -s um support obligation. Thus, since the support order s made sever al important modifications to Daniel’ s support obliga tion, we cannot find that the trial court’s silence on the reduc tion provision means that the provision rema ined in eff ect. Indeed, g iven the l aw concer

ning reduc tion of support pay ments in the case of an unallocated lum p-sum support obligation, we find that the opposite result follows and the provision was no longe r applicable

. ¶ 31 In the case of an unallocate d lump-sum support obliga tion, a party may not unilaterally reduc e the amount o f s up p o rt paid and must petition the court for any modifications. In Finley v. Finley
, 81 I ll. 2d 317, 329 (1980), the I l l i n o is Supreme Court held that “the unilatera l pro rata reduc tion of lump-sum periodic support pay ments for the benef

it of more than one child upon the emanc ipation of a child is imper missibl e” both unde r the Marr iag e Act and u n d er t h e common law. The court noted that a support order involves the consideration of a number of fac tors, including the noncustodial pare nt’s ability to pay , so the amount awa

rded may not acc urate ly provide for the needs of the children. Finley
, 81 I ll. 2d at 328. Thus, as the children become emanc ipated and are no longe r entitled to suppor t, “the orig inal awa

rd may m o re ac curately come to ref lect the needs of the rema ining children.” Finley
, 81 I ll. 2d at 328. The court also stated that permitting one pare nt to equally divide the support among the children would be “in dere liction of the leg islative guidelines”
set forth in the Marriag e Act and would infring e upon the court’s power to modify an awa rd of support. Finley
, 81 I ll. 2d at 328-29. The court rea soned that “[i] t is the function o f the
court to deter

mine whether there should be a p r o r ata reduc tion in lump-sum periodic

-8 -support pay ments when one of seve ral c hildren is emanc ipated, or whether other equitable considerations require that the reduc tion be a lower amount, or in fac t whether there should be any reduc tion in the pay ments.” Finley
, 81 I ll. 2d at 329. Thus, the court held that such

a reduc tion i s i m p er m i s sible and that the pare nt should petition the court to reduc e the support obligation in li g ht of cha ng ed cir cumstance s. Finley , 81 I ll. 2d at 329. ¶ 32 Daniel argues that Finley does not apply becau s e h e wa s n ot attempting to make a unilatera l pro rata reduc tion but was mere ly applying the provision ag ree d to by the parties in their marital settlement ag ree ment. We do not find this argument persua sive. As noted, the support order s enter ed by the trial court m o d i fi ed Daniel’ s support obligations, including those provisions in the marital settlement agre ement conce rning child support. Daniel provides us no authority for the proposition that a reduc tion provision rema ins in eff ect when the trial cour

t chang es the c hara cter of the support obligation a nd is silent on the reduction provision’s continued ef

fec t. ¶ 33 Fur

thermore , we f

ind Daniel’s r eliance on In re Marriage of Sweders , 296 I ll. App. 3d 919 (1998), to be misplaced

. I n S w eders
, the parties enter ed into a marital settlement
ag ree ment, incorpora

ted into the judgme nt for dissoluti on o f m ar riag e, that included a provision requiring the husband to pay child support until eac h child’s emanc ipation, which

was define d as “ ‘[t] he child’s rea ching majority or completing his education, whicheve r is later but not beyond ag e 22.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Sweders
, 296 I ll. App. 3d at 920. The husband’s support obliga tion wa s subsequently

modified, and the suppor t order stated that “ ‘all other terms of the J udg ment for Dissolution of Marr iag e shall rema in in full forc e and eff ect.’ ” Sweders
, 296 I l l

. Ap p. 3d at 921. The husband was later awa rded custody of the parties’ y oung est child, and the trial court order ed th e wi fe t o pay child support to the husband until the child rea ched ag e 22. Sweders
, 296 I ll. App. 3d at 921. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s order
, finding that the ag ree ment enter ed into by the parties define d the ag e at whic h the child bec ame e mancipate d. Sweders , 296 I ll. App. 3d at 922. ¶ 34 Daniel analog izes his s i t u at i on to that in Sweders
, arguing that in both case s, the trial
court was o b l igated to follow the terms of the marital settlement ag ree ment. Howeve r, in Sweders
, the trial court expressly noted in its order t h at t he terms of the ag ree ment would

rema in in eff

ect despite the m odification of support. See Sweders
, 296 I ll. App. 3d at 921. By contra st, in the case at bar, the trial court was silent on the issue of the agree ment. Thus, we do not find Sweders applicable to the situation at bar. ¶ 35 In t h e agr ee ment, as not ed, there was an allocation of t he support obligation per c hild, with eac h child being allocate d an equal share of the obligation, which corr esponded to the 25% re duction as ea ch child re ache d the ag e of majority

. Howeve r, afte r the modifications of the support obligation, there was no longe r an allocation of support but solely a lump-sum support obligation. I t does not follow that the same pro rata reduc tion was ag ree d to by the parties in the absenc e of an allocation of the support obligation. I f Daniel wished to r educe h i s child support obligation, whether by 25% or by any other amount, he was required t o petition the court, at which point the trial court would deter mine whether Daniel was entitled

-9 -to a reduc tion in his support obligation. Since he did not do so, the October 23, 1990, order 5

rema ined in eff

ect. Acc ording ly
, we aff irm the trial court’s finding that the reduc tion provision did not apply and that Daniel’ s support obligation was based on a pay ment of $700 per month until his y oung est child was e mancipate d.

¶ 36 B. Other Argume nts ¶ 37 Since we have found that the reduc tion provision did not apply to the October 23, 1990, order of support, there is no need for us to consider whether ap p l i ca tion of the provision violated public policy or comports with the Marr iag e Act child support guidelines. There is also no need for us to consider whether the public policy argument should have been barr ed by laches
, since we aff

i rm t h e trial court’s decision not on the basis of its public policy
argument but for the rea son that the support order s modified the marital settlem e nt a gr e e ment and the r eduction provision no long er a pplied.

¶ 38 I I . Intere st Calculation ¶ 39 Daniel a lso a

rgues that the I DHF S improperly assessed inter est beg inning on Apr il 23, 1991, and argues that interest on any arr ear ag e should h av e b ee n imposed beg inning on J anuar y 1, 2000. Daniel ag ree s that he was require d to pay interest beg inning on J anuar y 1, 2000, so his argument solely focuse s on the time betwee n April 23, 1991, and J anuar y 1, 6 2000. ¶ 40 Daniel a

rgues that intere st on child support prior to J anuar y 1, 2000, was discr etionary and that, based on “ equitable pr inciples,” intere st should only acc rue in his case beg inning

on J anuar y 1, 2000. We ag ree with Madonna that this issue has been resolved by the I llinois Supreme Court, which held that interest on delinquent child support pay ment s b ec ame mandatory in 1987 in its rec ent d ec i s i o n i n Illinois Departme nt of Healthcare & Family Servic es ex

rel. W iszowat y v. W iszowat y , 239 I ll. 2d 483 (2011). ¶ 41 In W

iszowat y , the court found that interest beca me mandatory u

pon passag e of Public Act 85-2 (ef fec ti v e May 1, 1987), which amende d the Marr iag e Act. In the public act, the leg islature adde d the followingprovision to the Marria g e Ac t:

T he re cor d ind ic at es tha t Dani el fi le d a pet it ion for m odi fi cat ion of his sup por t obl igati on 5 af t e r h i s f i r st chi ld bec ame emancip at ed. However, the re is no dis pos it ion of tha t pet it ion in the

re cor d an d Dan ie l’ s br ie f i ndi cat es tha t h e ne ver so ught he ar ing on t he p et it ion

. Beginni ng on J anu ar y 1, 2000
, sec ti on 505( b) of the Ma rr ia ge Act was amended to pro vide 6 tha t “[ a] sup por t obl igati on, or any por ti on of a sup por t obl igati on, whic h bec om es due and re m ai ns unpa id for 30 days or m ore sha ll acc rue int er est at the ra te of 9% perann um .” 7 50 I LCS 5/ 505( b) (W est 2000 ). T he cur re nt la nguage of sec ti on 505( b) pro vides tha t “[ a] sup por t obl igati on, or any por ti on of a sup por t obl igati on, whic h bec om es due and re m ai ns unpa id as of the end of eac h m ont h,

exc lud ing the chi ld sup por t tha t was due for tha t m ont h to the ext ent tha t it was not pai d in tha t

m ont h, shal l accr ue s imple i nte re st as se t f ort h i n Secti on 12- 109 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure .” 750 I LCS 5/ 505( b) (W est200 8).

-1 0 -“Any new or exis ting support order enter ed by the co u rt u n d er this Section shall be deeme d to be a series of judgme nts ag ainst the person obligated to pay support there under, eac h such j udg ment to be in the amoun t o f each pay ment or i nstallment of support and eac h such judgme nt to be deeme d enter ed as of the date of the corr esponding
pay m en t or installment become s due under the terms of the support order

. Eac h such judgme nt shall have the full forc e, eff ect and attributes of any other ju d gm en t o f this State, including the ability to be enf orce d.” I ll. Rev. St at. 1987, ch. 40, ¶ 505(c)

. ¶ 42 At the same time, the leg islature also amende d sections 12-109 and 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, ¶¶ 12-109, 2-1303). Section 12-109 provided:
“Inte rest on judgme nts. Every judgme nt except those arising by operation of l aw from child support order s shall bear i n tere st there on as provided in Section 2-1303. Every judgme nt arising by operat i o n o f l aw from a child support order shall bear interest as provided in Sect i o n 2-1303 commencing 30 day s from the eff ective date of eac h judgme nt.” I ll. Rev. St at. 1987, ch. 110, ¶ 12-109. Section 2-1303 provided that “[j] udg ments rec overe d in any court shall draw interest at the
rate of 9% per annum from the date of the judgme nt until satisfied.” I ll. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, ¶ 2-1303. ¶ 43 The W

iszowat y court noted that the languag e in the amendments included the use of the word “shall,” which was g ener ally used to indicate a mandator y r e q u irement. W

iszowat y , 239 I ll. 2d at 487. Acc ording ly
, the court held that “under the plain and ordinary languag e of the fore g oing statutory amendments, past-due child support pay ments beg an to bear mandatory interest on May

1, 1987.” W

iszowat y , 239 I ll. 2d at 487-88. ¶ 44 Following the I llinois Supreme Court’s decision in W iszowat y , we ag ree with the circ uit
court and find that mandatory interest acc rued on Daniel’ s deli n quent child support beg inning on April 23, 1991, the most rec ent date in which arr ear ag e was calc ulated by the
court.

¶ 45 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 46 We find that the s upport order s enter ed by the t rial court in 1990 modified the par ties’ marital settl ement agr eeme nt and th at the agr eeme nt’s reduc tion provision was not part of the modified support obligation. We further find that the circ ui t court properly assessed interest on Da

niel’s delinquent support pay ments beg inning on Apr il 23, 1991.

¶ 47 Affir

med.

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