In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2430

Steven J. Chestnut, Kimberly M. Cunningham

and Bary L. Brown,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Officer Terry Hall, Individually as a

Sergeant for the Indianapolis Police

Department; Officer Ron Burgess,

Individually as an Officer for the

Indianapolis Police Department; and

Officer David Neal, Individually

as an Officer for the Indianapolis Police

Department; and the City of Indianapolis,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. IP00-0525--John D. Tinder, Judge.

Argued January 17, 2002--Decided April 1, 2002

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, Bauer and

Easterbrook, Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffsappellants filed suit against the

defendants-appellees, claiming

constitutional rights violations. The

case went to trial and a jury returned a

verdict in favor of the appellees and

against the appellants on all claims. On

appeal, the appellants argue that the

district court abused its discretion in

excluding evidence of a witness’s past

misconduct and in submitting flawed

instructions to the jury. For the

following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment

of the district court.

Background

 The appellants are supporters of the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a

union that orchestrated a strike and

established a picket line outside of the

Overnite Transportation Company’s

("Overnite") Indianapolis facility

toprotest claimed unfair labor practices
in late 1999. Wackenhut Corporation

("Wackenhut"), a private security firm,

was hired by Overnite to provide security

during the strike, which was by all

accounts riddled with clashes between the

union supporters and Overnite employees.

 One such incident occurred on the night

of December 17, 1999. At approximately

10:00 p.m., Paul Tutsie, a former police

officer employed as a supervisor by

Wackenhut, contacted Sergeant Terry Hall

of the Indianapolis Police Department.

Tutsie informed Hall that one of his

subordinates then working the Overnite

location reported that strikers were

vandalizing Overnite property. In

particular, Tutsie told Hall that one of

his subordinates reported that some

strikers were throwing down nails in

front of the main gate in an effort to

block non-striking truckers from entering

and exiting. In response to Tutsie’s

call, Hall called for backup and

proceeded to the Overnite facility.

 Upon arriving at Overnite, Hall,

followed by Officers David Neal and Ron

Burgess, approached the picket line.

Standing near Overnite’s front entrance

were all three appellants, Steven J.

Chestnut, Kimberly M. Cunningham and Bary

L. Brown, and a fourth individual, Bruce

Hamilton. What happened next is not

altogether clear. The appellants complain

that they were "seized, searched and

intimidated" by the appellees "without

probable cause, a warrant, the consent of

the individuals, or exigent

circumstances." Though the appellees

concede that they did not have a search

warrant when investigating the report of

vandalism at Overnite, they argue that no

unlawful search or seizure occurred

because (i) their actions were nothing

more than a protective pat-down for

weapons as a result of a lawful

investigatory stop; (ii) even if their

conduct amounted to a search, each of the

appellants voluntarily consented;/1 and

(iii) there existed probable cause that a

crime was being or had been committed,

and there existed exigent circumstances.

 After a three day jury trial and

verdict, the district court entered final

judgment in favor of the appellees on May

11, 2001. The appellants now seek

reversal, arguing that the district court

abused its discretion in excluding
evidence of a defense witness’s past

misconduct and in submitting flawed

instructions to the jury. We find these

arguments unavailing.

Discussion

 A. Excluded Evidence

 Prior to trial, the appellants and the

appellees filed several motions in

limine. At issue here is the appellees’

first motion in limine, which sought an

order excluding any evidence that witness

Paul Tutsie was involved in an incident

known as the "Meridian Street Police

Brawl" when he was employed by the

Indiana Police Department. In support of

their motion, the appellees argued that

any such evidence was irrelevant to the

appellants’ claims and its introduction

would be unduly prejudicial. The district

court granted the appellees’ motion,

finding Tutsie’s involvement in the

Meridian Street Police Brawl "clearly

irrelevant to any issue in this case." We

agree.

 The Federal Rules of Evidence define

"relevant evidence" as "evidence having

any tendency to make the existence of a

fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable

or less probable than it would be without

the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401 (emphasis

added). Evidence of Tutsie’s involvement

in the Meridian Street Police Brawl is of

no consequence to the determination of

this action, nor can such evidence

reasonably be said to have any tendency

making the existence of a fact that is of

consequence more or less probable.

Tutsie’s role on the night of December

17, 1999, was limited to relaying

information received from a subordinate

at Wackenhut that strikers were

vandalizing Overnite property. As the

district court noted, Tutsie was not even

present at the scene when the events

giving rise to this lawsuit occurred.

Evidence of past misconduct by a witness

whose narrow testimony has no bearing at

all on the ultimate determination of the

action is properly excluded under Rule

401. The district court in no way abused

its discretion in excluding evidence of

Tutsie’s past misconduct in this case.

 B. Jury Instructions
 The appellants also argue that the

district court committed reversible error

in submitting flawed instructions on

warrantless searches. Specifically, the

appellants claim that Final Instructions

20 and 23 set forth incorrect statements

of the law. With respect to Final

Instruction 20, the appellants concede

that they did not object to this

instruction on the record at trial as

required by Rule 51 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 ("At

the close of the evidence or at such

earlier time during the trial as the

court directs . . . [n]o party may assign

as error the giving or the failure to

give an instruction unless that party ob

jects thereto before the jury retires to

consider its verdict, stating distinctly

the matter objected to and the grounds of

the objection."). Failure to challenge a

jury instruction in a civil case results

in a waiver and precludes appellate

review. Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 644

(7th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Org. for Women,

Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 704 (7th

Cir. 2001) ("[In] a civil trial, not a

criminal trial, there is no equivalent of

’plain error’ review for a challenge that

is forfeited rather than waived.").

Notwithstanding, the appellants assert

that Final Instruction 20 is properly

subject to appellate review because they

objected to a similar instruction in the

appellees’ proposed jury instructions. We

are unpersuaded.

 Rule 51 requires not only that

objections to jury instructions be made

in a timely fashion and on the record,

but also with sufficient specificity to

apprise the district court of the legal

and factual bases for any perceived

defect. See, e.g., Knox v. State of

Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1332 (7th Cir.

1996) (denying appellate review to party

whose instruction objection was not

specific enough to alert trial court to

argument set forth on appeal); Maltby v.

Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 560 (7th Cir. 1994)

(Rule 51 requires a specific objection on

the record). The specificity requirement

facilitates one of the basic purposes of

Rule 51; to give district courts the

opportunity to amend erroneous jury

instructions, thereby avoiding the need

for further review and potential retrial.

See Haley, 86 F.3d at 644. Objecting to a

"similar" proposed instruction hardly
satisfies this requirement. To so hold

would be no different than allowing the

appellant to rely on a general objection,

which is insufficient under Rule 51. See

Knox, 93 F.3d at 1332; Maltby, 36 F.3d at

560; Haley, 86 F.3d at 644. Because the

appellants failed to satisfy the

requirements of Rule 51, any argument

regarding Final Instruction 20 is waived.

See Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake

Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 453 (7th Cir.

2001).

 The appellants’ objection to Final

Instruction 23 is likewise waived. In

arguing that Final Instruction 23

isproperly subject to appellate review

under Rule 51, the appellants again rely

on an objection to a proposed instruction

containing language similar to that in

Final Instruction 23. As discussed,

however, objections to similar

instructions are insufficient to satisfy

Rule 51’s requirements.

 Additionally, the appellants assert that

because they did object to Final

Instruction 23 during the jury

instruction conference, albeit on a

different basis than that for which they

now seek review, they should nonetheless

be able to argue a new error on appeal.

Not so. A party’s failure to object to

even that portion of a jury instruction

questioned on appeal results in a waiver

under Rule 51. See Gagan v. Am.

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966 (7th

Cir. 1996) (finding Rule 51 objection

waived where party conceded that he did

not object to that portion of the jury

instruction questioned on appeal); Susan

Wakeen Doll Co., 272 F.3d at 453 (party

waived any appellate argument regarding

clause to which no objection was made at

instruction conference); cf. Knox, 93

F.3d at 1334 ("We agree . . . that the

State’s trial objection was not specific

enough to alert the district court to the

more refined argument it is now making

[on appeal], and thus that the objection

did not meet the requirements of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 51."). The appellants have waived

their Rule 51 objection and Final

Instruction 23 is beyond the scope of

review.

 The appellants also assert that they

twice argued the substantive problems

they had with the law ultimately set

forth in Final Instruction 23 during the
presentation of evidence. The assertion

that these evidentiary arguments serve as

or excuse a formal Rule 51 objection does

not bar waiver in this case. A party may

be excused from complying with the

formalities of Rule 51 where: (1) the

party’s position has been previously made

clear to the court; and (2) further

objection would be unavailing and futile.

Carter v. Chicago Police Officers M.L.,

165 F.3d 1071, 1078 (7th Cir. 1998)

(citations omitted). Even if we were to

assume that the appellants’ arguments

regarding Final Instruction 23 were made

sufficiently clear to the district court

(which is questionable), the appellants

have made absolutely no showing that a

timely, specific and formal Rule 51

objection would have been unavailing and

futile. This is especially true where, as

here, the appellants were afforded and

failed to seize the opportunity to make a

specific, formal objection during the

instruction conference at trial.

 Lastly, the appellants filed a Statement

of Proceedings pursuant to Rule 10(c) of

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

in order to incorporate an objection they

made to proposed Instruction No. 23 at a

pre-trial conference into the record on

appeal. After the appellees filed a

Verified Response, the district court

entered an order settling the record that

acknowledges the appellants’ objection to

proposed Instruction No. 23 but questions

the applicability of Rule 10(c) to pretrial conferences. See Fed. R. App. P.

10(c) ("If the transcript of a hearing or

trial is unavailable, the appellant may

prepare a statement of the evidence or

proceedings . . . .") (emphasis added).

We need not address the applicability of

Rule 10(c) to such a proceeding, however,

because the appellants’ earlier comments

do not cure their failure to later record

a formal objection to Instruction No. 23

during the instruction conference. Rule

51 requires that specific objections be

made on the record "[a]t the close of the

evidence or at such earlier time during

the trial as the court reasonably

directs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (emphasis

added). In accordance with Rule 51, the

judge here afforded the appellants the

full opportunity to alert the court to

their objections so that any errors could

be corrected prior to deliberations. The

appellants chose not to voice their

objections to Instruction 23’s statement

of the law on warrantless searches when
reasonably directed to do so by the

court. The appellants ignored the

mandates of Rule 51 and in so doing,

waived any objection to Final Instruction

23.

Conclusion

 The judgment of the district court is

hereby AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTE

/1 In addition to consent, the appellees answered

the appellants’ allegations with several affirmative defenses: (1) good faith; (2) the appellants’ own negligence; (3) no action for damages

under the Indiana Constitution; (4) qualified

immunity; and (5) immunity from tort liability

under Indiana statute for the enforcement of a

law.