J-S63008-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

KENYATTA WILLIAMS, :

:

Appellant : No. 1091 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 25, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-1004231-1991

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 04, 2015

Kenyatta Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the order of court 

dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”). We affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

histories as follows: 

On August 21, 1992, [Williams] was found 

guilty by a jury ... of [f]irst [d]egree [murder], 

[r]obbery, [a]ggravated [a]ssault [], [c]riminal 

[c]onspiracy, and [p]ossessing [i]nstruments of 

[c]rime. He was sentenced to life without the 

possibility of parole. [Williams] appealed, and the 

Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on 

August 26, 1994. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied his petition for allowance of appeal on 

January 18, 1995.

On December 24, 1996, [Williams] filed a pro 

se PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed, and a “no 

merit” letter pursuant to Finley/Tuner [sic] was 
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filed. After review, the [PCRA court] dismissed his 

first PCRA petition. [Williams] filed an appeal to the 

Superior Court, but his appeal was dismissed on 

February 17, 1999 for failure to file a brief. 

On May 21, 2012, [Williams] filed the instant 

PCRA petition, his second. After conducting an 

extensive and exhaustive review of these filings, the 

record and applicable case law, this Court found that 

[Williams’] petition for post[-]conviction collateral 

relief was untimely filed. Therefore, this Court did 

not have jurisdiction to consider [Williams’] PCRA 

petition and it was dismissed. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 1-2 (footnote omitted). 

This appeal follows, in which Williams presents two issues for our 

review, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and PCRA counsel. Williams’ 

Brief at 21, 34.1 Before we can consider these claims, we first must 

determine whether the underlying PCRA petition was timely filed. It is well 

established that “[t]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the 

PCRA petition was not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 

A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa. 2007). The PCRA provides in relevant part as 

follows: 

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a 

second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within 

one year of the date the judgment becomes final, 

unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves 

that:

 

1 Contrary to our Rules of Appellate Procedure, Williams, who is represented 

by counsel in this appeal, has failed to include a statement of questions 

involved in his appellate brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). 
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with 

the presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 

States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively. 

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in 

paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the 

date the claim could have been presented.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). 

Williams’ judgment of sentence became final on or about April 18, 

1995, which marked the end of the period in which he had to seek review by 

the United States Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Dehart, 730 

A.2d 991, 993 (Pa. Super 1999) (holding that judgment became final when 

period for filing petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 

Court lapsed). To be considered timely, therefore, Williams had to file any 

PCRA petitions on or before April 18, 1996, unless he could establish an 

exception contained in § 9545(b)(1). 

Before us now are Williams’ second PCRA petition, filed May 18, 2012, 

and the four amendments thereto that he filed between August 23, 2012 

and February 1, 2014. These filings are blatantly untimely, and so Williams 
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was required to establish one of the exceptions to the time bar for the PCRA 

court to consider the claims raised therein. 

In his second PCRA petition, Williams made numerous allegations of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. He acknowledged the untimeliness of his 

petition but attempted to establish the § 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception based 

upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, __ 

U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). This Court has previously decided that the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez affects federal habeas 

corpus law only and has no impact on how we interpret and apply the 

PCRA’s time-bar. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (“While Martinez represents a significant development in 

federal habeas corpus law, it is of no moment with respect to the way 

Pennsylvania courts apply the plain language of the time bar set forth in 

section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA.”). Accordingly, reliance on Martinez will 

not establish an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. 

In his first and second amendments, Williams argued that the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 

S.Ct. 2455 (2012), created a newly-recognized constitutional right, thereby 

establishing an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. There is no merit to this 

claim. As we have succinctly summarized, “[i]n Miller, the Supreme Court 

of the United States recognized a constitutional right for juveniles under the 

age of eighteen, holding that ‘mandatory life without parole for those under 
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the age of [eighteen] at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 

Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the holding of 

Miller does not apply retroactively. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 

A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. 2013). Furthermore, even if Miller could be applied 

retroactively, Williams would not be entitled to relief. Williams had already 

turned eighteen at the time he committed the crimes underlying his 

sentence. Supplemental Addendum to PCRA Petition, 8/24/12, at 3. This 

Court has conclusively established that Miller does not create a newly 

recognized constitutional right in individuals that were over the age of 

eighteen at the time they committed their offenses. Cintora, 69 A.3d at 

764. 

Next, Williams raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

unlawful detainment, and the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over him 

because of an illegal arrest. With regard to the ineffectiveness claims, 

Williams acknowledged that such claims “[are] not considered to be fall [sic] 

within any of the three exceptions to the time bar.” Third Supplemental 

Addendum to Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 8/28/13, at 2 n.2. To the 

extent that Williams attempted, again, to raise Martinez as the exception to 

the time bar for these claims, his attempt fails for the reasons discussed 

above. William does not attempt to establish a time bar exception for the 
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remaining claims. “The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden 

of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.” 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 591, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012). Because 

Williams failed in this regard, the PCRA court could not entertain these 

claims. 

In his last amendment, Williams alleged two bases for relief: that the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction over him due to a defective criminal complaint 

and that he was unlawfully incarcerated because the trial court did not 

reduce his judgment of sentence to writing. Fourth Supplemental Addendum 

to Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief and Post Conviction Relief, 2/10/14, at 

3-7. 

As noted by the PCRA court, the first of these claims is cognizable 

under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(viii) (providing that a claim 

that a proceeding occurred before a tribunal without jurisdiction must be 

raised under the PCRA). Williams’ claim is that the because the criminal 

complaint does not bear the seal of any issuing authority, the trial lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over his proceedings. Fourth Supplemental 

Addendum to Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief and Post Conviction Relief, 

2/10/14, at 3-4. At no point in making this claim, however, does Williams 

allege or establish an exception to the time bar. 

Williams also alleged that he was unlawfully detained because he was 

incarcerated without a “[w]ritten [j]udgment of [s]entence [o]rder.” Id. at 
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7. We agree with the PCRA court that this claim is not cognizable under the 

PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).2 Therefore, it was proper for the 

 

2 This statute provides that to be entitled to relief under the PCRA, a 

petitioner must establish 

that the conviction or sentence resulted from one or 

more of the following:

(i) A violation of the Constitution of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the 

United States which, in the circumstances of the 

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place.

(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined 

the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.

(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the 

circumstances make it likely that the inducement 

caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the 

petitioner is innocent.

(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials 

of the petitioner's right of appeal where a 

meritorious appealable issue existed and was 

properly preserved in the trial court.

(v) Deleted.

(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of 

exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become 

available and would have changed the outcome of 

the trial if it had been introduced.

(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the 

lawful maximum.
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PCRA court to treat this as a habeas corpus claim. See Commonwealth v. 

West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1044 (Pa. 2007) (holding claim that does not 

implicate truth determining process or implicate the legality of the sentence 

imposed falls outside of the PCRA and is properly addressed as petition for 

writ of habeas corpus.). 

As this is not a PCRA claim, it is not subject to the PCRA’s jurisdictional 

time bar. However, Williams does not challenge the PCRA court’s denial of 

this claim on appeal. See Williams’ Brief at 21-43. As such, it is not before 

us to review. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/4/2015

 

(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).