AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Op inion Filed April 15, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01318-CR GARY DONALD ROGERS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F18-30789-J MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Par tida-Kipness, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Garcia Appellant was convicted of assaulting a police officer and the court assessed punishment, enhanced, at twenty years in prison. In a single is sue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for continuance because he needed the testimony of an expert who was crucial to his cas e. In a cross-issue, the State requests that we modify the judgment to reflect that there was no plea bargain. Finding no reversible error, we modify the judgment, a nd as modified, affirm.–2– I. B ACKGROUND Officer Elijah Fuller responded to a call about suspects breaki ng into vehicles and discovered appellant with his legs hanging out of a red Vol kswagen. He saw appellant open the glove compartment and wipe it down and grab a watch from the center console or g love compartment. Officer Fuller approached appellan t, asked him if he owned the car and where he lived, and requested that a ppellant roll down the window. Ap pellant claimed he could not comply because he did not have his keys. After knocki ng on the window to ask Officer Fuller a questi on, appellant opened the passenge r door and fled on foot. Officer Fuller pursued appellant and tackled him. Appellant pun ched the officer on his forearms and Officer Fuller punched him back to gain control. When Officer Fuller grabbe d appellant’s legs, a ppellant pulled one l eg free and kicked the officer on the head. Appellant a ttempted to take Officer Fuller ’s gun from its holster and said “Gimme your gun or I’mo kill you; give gimme your gun or I’mo shoot you.” Officer Fuller believed that appellant intended to kill him so he told appellant he could run. After attempting to take the officer’s gun one mo re time, appellant ran. Officer Fuller pursued him, and appellant was eventually appreh ended when a backup officer arrived.–3– Appellant testified at trial and admitted he was burglarizing a car when Officer Fuller approached him. He said that when the officer tackled hi m they both “tumbled” and “did a summersault.” According to appellant, Offi cer Fuller’s head injury resulted from the somers ault. He admitted that he threat ened to shoot the officer but denied kicking him or exchanging punc hes with him. After the State rested, defense counsel said she needed her exp ert witness to start her case and she would speak with the expert that evening . But the next day, counsel reported that she had not heard back from the expert. A fter appellant testified, defense counsel moved for a continuance based on the expert’s unavailability. The motion was denied. The trial court found appellant guilty. Appellant pleaded true to an enhancement and the c ourt sentenced him to twenty years in pris on. II. A NALYSIS Motion for Continuance Appellant’s sole issue argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for continuance based on the absenc e of his expert witness. As disc ussed below, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in denying appellant’s motion because appellant did not demonstrate the substance or material ity of the witness’s testimony or the exercise of d iligence in securing the witness’ s attendance. We review the denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse o f discretion, giving a wide degree of deference to the trial court. See Gallo v. State , 239 S.W.3d–4– 757, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also T EX
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. art. 29.06(6). An appellant claiming th e erroneous denial of a motio n for continuance must show that (i) the trial court erred in denying the motion for continuance, and (ii) such denial harmed him in some tangible way. Gonzales v. State , 304 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). If a defendant’s first motion for continuance is based on an ab sent witness, it is necessary to show (1) that the defendant has exercised dilig ence to procure the witness’s attendance; (2) that the witness is not absent by the procurement or consent of the defense; (3) that the motion is not made for delay; and (4) the facts expected to be proved by the witness. Harrison v. State , 187 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see T EX
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. art. 29.06. It must appear to the trial court that the facts are material. T EX
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. art 29.06(3). “Mere conclusions and general averments are not sufficient for the co urt to determine the materiality of the facts, and the motion for continuance must s how on its face the materiality of the absent testimony.” Harrison , 187 S.W.3d at 434. Subsequent motions for continuanc e must comply with article 29. 06 and must also state (1) that the testim ony cannot be procured from any o ther source known to the defendant, and (2) that the defendant has reasonable expect ation of procuring the same at the next term of the court. T EX
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. art. 29.07. The motion at issue here was defense counsel’s second motion fo r continuance. The motion stated only that the court had appointe d an expert to assist–5– the defense and “[the expert] is unavailable until Friday and D efendant cannot proceed without his testimony which is crucial to the defense.” This does not comport with the requirements of article 29.06(3) or 29.07. See T EX
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. art. 29.06(3) (motion shall state “the facts which are expected to be proved by the witness, and it mu st appear to the court that the y are material.”); T EX
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. art 29.07 (additional requirement s for subsequent motions). Likewise, defense counsel’s discussions with and arguments to t he court did not identify the substance of the expert’s testimony or establi sh its materiality. When counsel first informed the court that she needed the expert’s t estimony at trial, she admitted that there was no report, but said the expert was work ing on a PowerPoint. The judge expressed her understanding that the expert was going to testify about the audio for the body camera and “who said what.” Defense counsel replied that she had asked the expert to do something different that involved an analysis of shadows. Counsel described it as “a way to measure sound waves so you ca n tell the position of things from the audio and the video.” She was unable to elab orate but promised to get additional information wh en she spoke with the expert th at night. The next day, defense counsel reported that she had been unable to speak with her expert. When she argued he r written motion for continuance, the court specifically inquired about how the testimony was critical to t he defense. Counsel replied that the testimony was “to discredit the complaining wi tness . . . to throw doubt on his testimony . . . .”–6– The court confirmed counsel’s position that the expert, having never interviewed the complainant and who was not present at the scen e was “somehow going to cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant . . . even though [appellant] got on the stand and admitted to the basic elements of the offe nse that he’s charged with?” Counsel responded affirma tively and offered nothing furt her about how the expert’s testimony was critical to the defense. In addition, defense counsel did not demonstrate diligence to p rocure the witness’s attendance. Counsel sai d she contacted the expert abo ut the new theory as she was preparing for trial but offered nothing to establish di ligence in securing the expert’s presence at trial. Officer Fuller’s testimony established the elements of the offe nse and appellant admitted to the struggl e that resulted in the officer ’s injuries. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the continuan ce because expert testimony from an audiologist concerning “forensic shadows” was not crucial to resolving the case. Appellant’s first issue is overruled. Modification of the Judgment The State’s cross-point requests that we modify the judgment to reflect that there was no plea bargain. We are authorized to reform a judgme nt to make the record speak the truth when we have the necessary information t o do so. Bigley v.
State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex . Crim. App. 1993).–7– Here, the record supports the requested modification. We there fore sustain the State’s cross-point and modify the judgment accordingly.

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GARY DONALD ROGERS, Appellant
No. 05-19-01318-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F18-30789-J. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Justices Myers and Partida-Kipness participating. Based on the Court’s opinion o f this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED to reflect that there was no plea bargain. As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered April 15, 2021