J-S50015-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: L.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.S., BIRTH MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 527 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order April 9, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at 

No(s): CP-02-AP-0000008-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2018

C.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 9, 2018 orphans’ court order 

that involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her son, L.S.

1 We affirm.

The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) has 

an extensive history with this family, beginning with L.S.’s September 2014

birth, when Mother tested positive for cocaine, opiates, Subutex, and 

benzodiazepines. L.S. was immediately removed from Mother and placed into 

foster care. The juvenile court adjudicated him dependent on September 26, 

2014; however, he was returned to Mother on March 10, 2015, approximately

six months later. CYF closed the case on July 14, 2015. 

____________________________________________

1

 By separate order entered on the same date, the orphans’ court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of the biological father, T.P. (“Father”), who did 

not appeal. 
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Thereafter, on October 20, 2016, CYF resumed contact with the family 

when police took L.S. into protective custody after Mother left him 

unsupervised at home at 1:30 a.m. The juvenile court removed L.S. from 

Mother’s care and placed him in his current pre-adoptive foster home. As a 

result of the incident, Mother pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child 

(“EWOC”), and was sentenced to two years probation with conditions to 

complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment, if necessary, and to 

enroll and complete a parenting class. The Commonwealth withdrew a 

concomitantly filed charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. 

The juvenile court adjudicated L.S. dependent a second time on 

November 17, 2016. The ensuing family service plan (“FSP”) that CYF 

developed for Mother included the primary objectives to: (1) complete a drug 

and alcohol evaluation; (2) submit random urine screens; (3) attend a 

parenting program; (4) participate in mental health treatment; (5) maintain 

supervised visitation with L.S.; and (6) acquire appropriate housing. In 

addition, the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in a dual diagnosis 

program in order to address her substance abuse and mental health problems. 

Shortly after the adjudication hearing, Mother was arrested for 

possession of a controlled substance after the police recovered a bag of heroin, 

a Suboxone strip, and a used crack pipe from her home. She was convicted 

of one count of possession and the remaining charges were withdrawn. The 

trial court imposed twelve months probation. 
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On January 9, 2018, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights to L.S. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). The 

orphans’ court appointed counsel for Mother. Cynthia Moore, Esquire, the

attorney appointed as the guardian ad litem during the dependency 

proceedings, reprised that role and served as L.S.’s legal counsel.

2 During the 

termination of parental rights hearing, CYF presented testimony from Malika 

Mason, the CYF caseworker assigned to the family, and Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., 

the court-appointed psychologist who performed an individual evaluation of 

Mother and interactional evaluations of Mother with L.S., and L.S. with his 

foster parents. Significantly, Dr. Rosenblum diagnosed Mother with an opioid 

disorder, stimulant disorder with cocaine dependency, unspecified depressive 

disorder, unspecified post-traumatic stress disorder, and antisocial personality 

____________________________________________

2 Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested 

involuntary termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel who 

discerns and advocates for the child’s legal interests, which our Supreme Court 

has defined as a child’s preferred outcome. In re T.S., __ A.3d __, 2018 WL 

4001825 at * 1 (Pa. 2018) (citing In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 

174 (Pa. 2017)). The T.S. Court confirmed that a guardian ad litem who is 

an attorney may act as legal counsel pursuant to § 2313(a) as long as the 

dual roles do not create a conflict between the child’s legal and best interests. 

As it relates to minors that are incapable of expressing their preferred 

outcome, the High Court explained, “if the preferred outcome of the child is 

incapable of ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal, 

there can be no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best 

interests; as such, the mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act that 

counsel be appointed ‘to represent the child,’ 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), is satisfied 

where the court has appointed an attorney-guardian ad litem who represents 

the child’s best interests during such proceedings.” Id. at *10. Instantly, we 

discern no conflict in Attorney Moore’s representation of the legal interests 

and best interests of her three-year-old client. 
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traits. Attorney Moore called to the stand Gail Redman, the foster care 

coordinator who supervised several of Mother’s visitations with L.S. Mother

testified on her own behalf. Following the close of evidence, the orphans’

court entered its order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

L.S. pursuant to § 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

Mother raises the following issues for our review.

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and 

(8)?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear 

and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of L.S. pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s brief at 6. 

In matters involving the involuntary termination of parental 

rights, our standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. [at] 827. 
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We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). As we previously explained, “[t]he 

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is 

likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Thus, “if competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we 

will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination 

followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 
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weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the 

orphans’ court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b),

to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Instantly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s 

decision to terminate parental under § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as 

follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 
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medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).

We first examine the orphans’ court’s termination of Mother’s parental 

rights under §2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be 

met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and 

(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)).

Further, this Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. In re A.L.D., supra at 337. A parent’s vow to cooperate, 

after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability 

of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.
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Mother argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion and/or erred 

as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate her

parental rights. Mother’s brief at 14. She contends that the evidence clearly 

established that she demonstrated substantial compliance with her FSP goals. 

Id. Mother’s position highlights her participation in parenting programs, and 

her attendance in dual mental health and drug and alcohol treatment. 

Likewise, she emphasizes her compliance with directives to maintain a 

regimen of medication, obtain additional mental health therapy for past 

trauma, and acquire appropriate housing. Finally, Mother contends that she 

visited L.S. consistently. Id. 

In addition, Mother disputes Dr. Rosenblum’s expert finding that she 

presents physical and emotional risks to L.S. Id. at 15. She stresses that,

despite Dr. Rosenblum’s report that she behaved inappropriately during her 

visits with L.S. in the past, Dr. Rosenblum did not directly observe any 

irritability or agitation. Id. at 15. Moreover, Mother claims that, while Dr. 

Rosenblum’s testimony discussed her mental health diagnosis and prognosis, 

it did not address the effect of those findings on her ability to care for L.S. Id.

at 19. She further argues that Dr. Rosenblum relied upon extensive collateral 

information to develop his opinion, including a letter purportedly written by 

Mother’s adult daughter, which he neglected to verify as authentic. Id. at 19-

20. The missive that Mother challenges described her as selfish and unable 

to take ownership or show remorse for what she caused her daughter to 
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endure as a child. Id. at 38-39. Dr. Rosenblum stated that he did not rely 

on the letter provided by Mother’s daughter, but found it constituted relevant 

collateral information. Id. at 49. 

Finally, Mother challenges the veracity of the evidence that CYF 

presented to demonstrate her mental instability and danger to L.S. She 

asserts that no nexus exists between the agency’s contentions and her 

parenting ability. Id. at 20. In sum, Mother contends that since the record 

demonstrates that she remedied her parental incapacity related to her ability 

to care for L.S. and complied with her FSP goals, the orphans’ court erred in 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2). Id. at 20-21. For 

the following reasons, we reject Mother’s core assertion that clear and 

convincing evidence did not support the orphans’ court’s finding that 

termination was warranted under the facts of this case. 

In finding that CYF adduced clear and convincing evidence to establish 

the statutory grounds to terminate parental rights pursuant to §2511(a)(2), 

the orphans’ court reasoned, in pertinent part, as follows:

At the time of the termination proceeding, [L.S.] was 

approximately three (3) years and seven (7) months old. In the 

sum total of his forty-three (43) month life, he has been removed

from Mother twice and he has been adjudicated dependent twice, 

all for the same concerns[:] Mother’s drug and alcohol use[;] the 

interplay with her mental health concerns[;] and her ability to 

appropriately parent him and meet his needs. [L.S.] has spent a 

total of twenty-three (23) months of his life in foster care as a 

result of Mother’s chronic issues. The facts unequivocally

establish that Mother was clearly unwilling or unable to even make 

reasonable progress in order to remedy the conditions that led to 

his second removal and second adjudication, and as such, she has 
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rendered herself unable to assume a role where she is able to 

provide essential parental care for [L.S.].

. . . .

Mother has regrettably not remedied the conditions that led 

to L.S.’s removal. Most importantly, Mother has not addressed 

the core issues preventing reunification and this [c]ourt finds it 

unsettling that Mother does not seem to grasp the impact that her 

lifestyle and continued choices has had on her ability to remedy 

the conditions that led to the removal. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/18, 8-10 (citations omitted).

The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s decision. During the 

termination hearing, Ms. Mason, the CYF caseworker assigned to this case in 

late September of 2017, testified about the agency’s extensive involvement 

with the family since 2014, when L.S. was first removed from Mother as an 

infant and adjudicated dependent. N.T., 10/31/17, at 5. She continued that, 

following his reunification with Mother, L.S. was removed again on October 

20, 2016, because Mother left him alone at home at 1:30 a.m. Id. at 6. He

was adjudicated dependent a second time on November 17, 2016. Id. at 7. 

As it relates to Mother’s compliance with the present FSP goals, Ms. 

Mason testified that Mother secured housing in late December of 2017,

currently attends drug and alcohol treatment, and is compliant with her 

treatment program. Id. at 8-9. Ms. Mason confirmed that Mother also 

participates in mental health therapy. Id. at 11-12. 

Despite those successes, however, Mother was unable to address her 

substance abuse. Since October of 2016, Mother has either failed or refused 
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to submit fifteen of twenty urine screens. Id. at 10. Similarly, Mother’s 

attitude toward improving her parenting skills was equally lax. Ms. Mason 

stated that Mother failed to satisfy the program requirements for a parenting 

class and, therefore, she did not receive a certificate of completion. Id. at 11, 

22-23. She confirmed that Mother’s inability to provide appropriate and safe

parental supervision remains the agency’s chief concern. Id. at 14. 

Dr. Rosenblum raised similar worries during his testimony regarding his 

evaluation of Mother on February 26, 2018. Id. at 33. Specifically, he was 

troubled by Mother’s eighteen-to-twenty-year history of substance abuse. Id. 

He was also troubled by Mother’s chronic use of opioids, including the 

utilization of a Suboxone maintenance program for the last eight years. Id.

at 33-34. In addition, Dr. Rosenblum noted that Mother’s drug use cultivated

“a concerning history of criminal activity.” Id. at 34. Ultimately, Dr. 

Rosenblum concluded that Mother had difficulty regulating her moods and 

emotions, refused to accept responsibility for her actions, and blamed others

for her problems. Id. He noted that there are a number of reports about 

Mother’s erratic behavior. Id. at 35. Examples of Mother’s combative nature

include an incident during a supervised visitation with L.S. and an outburst 

during the court-ordered psychological evaluation.3 As it relates to the latter 

episode, Mother became agitated during her first psychological assessment, 

____________________________________________

3 Likewise, the foster parents complained that Mother made telephone calls 

and text messages to them at inappropriate hours of the night. Id. at 75-76. 
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stormed out of the office, and refused to cooperate with the testing. Id. at 

36. While Mother returned on another day to complete the psychological 

evaluation, she remains oblivious of her inimical demeanor. Indeed, she

denies any problems with anger management, impulse control, or interacting

with others. Id. at 37. Likewise, Dr. Rosenblum confirmed that Mother does 

not see herself as displaying irritability or poor judgment. Instead, she is 

preoccupied with what she perceives as her positive attributes, such as being 

resolute, which Dr. Rosenblum characterized as an overly optimistic and 

unrealistic assessment of current functioning. Id. 

Importantly, the record sustains the orphans’ court’s determination that 

Mother’s parenting deficiencies impede L.S.’s development. Dr. Rosenblum 

opined that Mother loves L.S., enjoys spending time with him, and tries to be 

accommodating. Id. 40. However, L.S. requires consistency, discipline, 

structure, and a parent who will respond calmly to his outbursts. Id. at 43. 

Essentially, he reasoned that Mother’s parenting skills are inadequate to 

address L.S.’s behavioral problems, aggression, impulse control, and history 

of severe tantrums. Id. at 43, 51. In this vein, he highlighted that Mother 

lacked an understanding of L.S.’s developmental functioning. Id. 51. In sum,

Dr. Rosenblum concluded that, while Mother is attempting to stabilize her life 

by obtaining housing and attending drug and alcohol treatment, she is not

making any significant changes to her behavior, and most importantly, she 

does not demonstrate an ability to provide L.S. with the stability, attention,
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and emotional support that he requires at this stage of his development. Id.

at 43-44. In fact, Mother did not recognize her son’s behavioral problems and 

repeatedly stated that L.S. did not require the therapy that CYF obtained for 

him. 

Finally, we review the testimony presented by Ms. Redman, the foster 

care coordinator who supervised the majority of Mother’s visitations with L.S. 

since March 2017. Id. at 74. She reported Mother as attending fifty-four of 

seventy-eight visitations since December 2016. Over that period, Mother 

arrived late several times and was often argumentative. Id. at 76-77. 

Similarly, some of Mother’s visits with L.S. were terminated early because 

Mother appeared intoxicated—stumbling, falling asleep on her feet, and

unable to focus. Id. at 76. Even when she was attentive, Mother 

demonstrated poor parenting skills during a couple of the visitations by 

engaging in discussions in the presence of L.S. about the termination 

proceedings and then becoming enraged and argumentative when the 

caseworker reprimanded her for the improper conduct. Id. at 76-77, 81. 

The foregoing testimony belies Mother’s assertion that she made diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of parental responsibilities. 

At the time of the evidentiary hearing, then three-and-one-half-year-old L.S. 

had been removed from Mother’s care and adjudicated dependent on two 

separate occasions. He has been in foster placement due to the second 

adjudication since approximately October of 2016, when he was two years 
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old. Over that period, Mother consistently neglected her parental obligations. 

She did not complete parenting classes, submit random urine screens, or 

behave appropriately during the supervised visitations. She also admitted 

during the hearing that she has not seen her trauma counselor for two months. 

Significantly, Dr. Rosenblum testified that Mother’s unresolved issues with 

past trauma and her inadequate parenting skills combined to impair her ability

to care for L.S., provide the child with needed emotional support and stability, 

and address his behavioral problems. 

Accordingly, insofar as Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect, or refusal to perform her parental duties has caused L.S. to 

be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his

physical or mental well-being, we find the competent evidence in the certified

record supports the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., supra

at 826-27. 

Having found that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights under § 2511(a)(2), we next determine 

whether termination was proper under § 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has 

stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 
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(Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re T.S.M., supra at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 

324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

Mother contends that the orphans’ court erred in finding that CYF 

presented clear and convincing evidence that involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would best meet the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of L.S. Mother’s brief at 21. She argues that 

CYF relied heavily on Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony, utilizing a comparative 

assessment between L.S.’s relationships with Mother and foster parents, 

respectively. Id. at 22. Mother contends that it is undisputed that she loves 

L.S., and wishes to remain a part of his life, and points out that Dr. Rosenblum 

opined that L.S. would benefit from future contact with Mother. Id. at 23. 

She further submits that she has a meaningful bond with L.S. and that the 

deprivation of that bond and their love for each other is unnecessary. Id. 

Thus, she maintains that CYF did not meet its burden of proof under

§ 2511(b). Id.
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In contrast to Mother’s assertions, the orphans’ court found clear and 

convincing evidence that severing the parent-child bond would not cause 

extreme harm to L.S. Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/18, at 14. The orphans’ court 

noted Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony that L.S. is well on his way to establishing a 

secure identity in his current foster home, and considers his foster parents, 

rather than Mother, as his “mom” and “dad.” Id. at 13. The orphans’ court 

determined that the evidence established that the termination of parental 

rights would provide L.S. with much needed stability and permanence that he 

requires at this stage of his development. Id. In sum, the orphans’ court 

concluded that the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of L.S. would best be served by terminating Mother’s parental rights. Id. 

The certified record sustains the orphans’ court’s analysis. At the 

termination hearing, Dr. Rosenblum noted that L.S. had been at his foster 

home for about fourteen months and refers to his foster parents as “mom”

and “dad,” and views their son as his “brother.” N.T., 10/31/17, at 41. The 

two boys share a close bond. Id. at 41-42. L.S. is developing a secure identity 

within the family, which he considers his own. Id. at 43. In addition, Dr. 

Rosenblum stressed that, unlike Mother, foster parents are very attentive, 

nurturing, and understanding of L.S.’s behavioral problems. Id. at 42. They 

are consistent with discipline, strive to help L.S. express his emotions, and aid 

him in developing self-soothing skills, abilities that have proven difficult for 

him to master. Id. Dr. Rosenblum testified that L.S. was affectionate, 
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animated, and content with foster parents. He developed an attachment to 

the foster family who cultivates a stability that is essential for him to subdue 

his aggressive behavior. Id. at 42-43. 

Ultimately, Dr. Rosenblum concluded that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights in anticipation of adoption would serve L.S.’s developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare. Id. Furthermore, he reasoned that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would not cause significant 

psychological harm to L.S. because Mother is not able to provide the stability, 

emotional support, and proper discipline that L.S. needs to develop and 

overcome his behavioral problems. Id. at 44. As it relates to the remnants 

of the parent-child relationship, Dr. Rosenblum explained that, although it is 

generally beneficial for a child to maintain contact with a biological parent, 

continued contact between Mother and L.S. would be detrimental due to

Mother’s antagonistic relationship with foster parents and her inability to 

control her destructive impulses. Id.

In light of the foregoing evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion or 

legal error in the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. The orphans’ court considered the nature and extent of the bond L.S.

shares with Mother, and determined that severing that bond would not be 

detrimental. The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s determination. 

While Mother professes to love L.S., a parent’s own feelings of love and 

affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In 
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re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010). As we previously stated, a 

child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will 

summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. 

As we find that the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s 

conclusion that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence in favor of 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.S. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(2) and (b), we do not disturb it.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/2018