Filed 3/2/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re JUSTIN O. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B287406

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK74972)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

V.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Emma Castro, Commissioner and Sherri Sobel, 

Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed.
2

Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

Dependency proceedings commenced in October 2008 with 

Shane (also referred to in the record as Shawn), mother’s oldest 

child. In 2011, maternal grandmother (Grandmother) adopted 

Shane. Grandmother also had custody of mother’s younger 

children David, Justin, and Liam, the subjects of the current 

appeal. 

In July 2017, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) accused Grandmother of 

physically abusing then four-year-old Justin and filed a 

supplemental Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 387 

petition. Evidence from a forensic examination was inconclusive; 

the nurse examiner was unable either to rule out accidental 

trauma or to conclude Grandmother physically abused Justin. 

The juvenile court denied Grandmother de facto parent 

status notwithstanding the undisputed facts that mother’s four 

children lived with her, and that Grandmother cared for them as 

a parent for an extended period of time. The juvenile court then 

refused to permit Grandmother to defend herself against the 

allegations of physical abuse. Her counsel was not permitted to 

admit evidence or argue on her behalf. Without hearing from 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
3

Grandmother or her counsel, the juvenile court sustained the 

allegation of physical abuse, and DCFS removed David, Justin, 

and Liam from Grandmother’s care. 

On appeal Grandmother challenges the juvenile court’s 

denial of her requests for de facto parent status, made prior to 

the sustained findings of abuse. Grandmother also challenges 

the order sustaining the section 387 petition. 

We conclude that the juvenile court erred in denying 

Grandmother de facto parent status. The court then compounded 

the error by refusing to allow Grandmother an opportunity to 

present evidence or argument at the purported “hearing” on the 

section 387 petition. We reject respondent’s argument that the 

appeal is moot. A decision in this appeal may affect 

Grandmother’s visitation with the Children, as well as her ability 

effectively to parent her adopted son, Shane, who remains in her 

custody. We reverse the juvenile court’s order sustaining the 

section 387 petition. 

BACKGROUND2

Grandmother, V.M., was a licensed foster parent from 1993

to 2011. Grandmother provided a foster home for mother 

beginning when mother was seven years old, and Grandmother 

subsequently adopted mother. At the time mother began living 

with Grandmother, mother suffered from attention deficit 

disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and bipolar 

depression. Grandmother taught elementary school for 30 years 

before retiring. 

2 Finding good cause, on our own motion, we take judicial 

notice of the juvenile court record in Los Angeles Superior Court 

case Nos. CK74972 and DK23938. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
4

This case concerns three of mother’s five children—Justin, 

David, and Liam (the Children). The juvenile court previously 

terminated mother’s parental rights to her oldest child Shane 

and, as noted, Grandmother adopted Shane in January 2011. 

Shane had been living with Grandmother since he was three 

months old, and Grandmother’s adoption home study was 

completed in December 2009. DCFS reported that Grandmother 

provided Shane with “a safe, stable, and loving environment.” 

Justin was born in April 2013. In April 2014, the juvenile 

court assumed jurisdiction over him. DCFS initially placed 

Justin with paternal relatives. In August 2015, the juvenile 

court denied Grandmother’s section 388 petition seeking an order 

placing Justin in her care. Prior to denying Grandmother’s 

petition, the juvenile court allowed Grandmother to testify at a 

hearing. In October 2015, DCFS reported that no paternal 

relative was able to care for Justin. That same month, DCFS 

placed Justin with Grandmother. Grandmother indicated that 

she was aware of, and willing to care for Justin’s motor and 

speech delays. She expressed an interest in adopting Justin, and 

DCFS described her as a prospective adoptive parent. 

David was born in July 2014, and when he was 

one month old, DCFS placed him in Grandmother’s care. In 

September 2014, the court assumed jurisdiction over David. 

In November 2015, DCFS reported that Grandmother was 

planning to adopt David. In April 2015, DCFS reported that 

David “remains well cared for in the home of ” Grandmother. 

“David was often smiling and appeared very attached to 

[Grandmother]. David is a healthy baby and is meeting his 

developmental milestones.” In October 2015, DCFS reported that 
5

Grandmother “has demonstrated that she has the ability to meet 

all of David’s needs, including medical care.” 

Liam was born in November 2015. In 2016, the 

juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over Liam. Three days after 

his birth, DCFS placed him in Grandmother’s care. 

DCFS described Shane, Justin, David, and Liam as “special 

needs children.” Justin was diagnosed with developmental delay 

and was a client of the Harbor Regional Center. Mother’s 

youngest child, T., was born during the dependency proceedings. 

In September 2017, T. lived with her father. 

1. DCFS files a supplemental petition with allegations 

solely against Grandmother 

On July 18, 2017, DCFS filed a supplemental petition. 

Section 387 provides in pertinent part: “An order changing or 

modifying a previous order by removing a child from the physical 

custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing 

placement in a foster home, or commitment to a private or county 

institution, shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a 

supplemental petition.” (§ 387, subd. (a).) At that time, Justin 

was four years old, David was three years old, and Liam was 

one year old. DCFS alleged Grandmother physically abused 

Justin “by striking the child’s arms with a ruler, inflicting bruises 

to the child’s arms.” (Bold omitted.) DCFS further alleged that 

Grandmother’s physical abuse of Justin placed David and Liam 

at risk of physical abuse. 

The juvenile court ordered Grandmother’s visits to be 

monitored. DCFS removed the Children from Grandmother’s 

home and placed Justin with a paternal cousin, David in the 

home of his paternal grandparents, and Liam in his father’s care. 
6

2. Grandmother requests de facto parent status for 

Justin, David, and Liam

On September 19, 2017, before the juvenile court 

adjudicated the supplemental petition, Grandmother requested 

de facto parent status over Justin and David. She indicated that 

“[o]ther than when they are attending school, virtually all of the 

children’s waking hours are spent with me.” Grandmother later 

requested de facto parent status over Liam. 

The juvenile court (Referee Sherri Sobel) denied 

Grandmother’s de facto parent request for Justin, David, and 

Liam. The juvenile court stated, “I don’t believe that she 

qualifies for de facto status. I will not grant that de facto status.” 

3. DCFS reports regarding the supplemental petition

DCFS reported that Grandmother attended weekly visits at 

the Children’s Institute to address behavior management and 

skill building. The goal of the weekly sessions was to assist 

Grandmother in coping with challenges of raising children with 

special needs. Grandmother had some difficulty “ ‘manag[ing] 

the [Children’s] intense behaviors.’ ” A family friend reported 

that after Justin was placed in Grandmother’s home, 

Grandmother experienced more difficulty because Justin “had 

more needs and requires more attention.” The family friend 

observed no signs that Grandmother abused the Children. 

Justin’s paternal relative (who cared for Justin before 

DCFS placed him in Grandmother’s custody), gave a social 

worker a photograph of Justin with bruises on his back and 

redness in his anal region. The photograph does not show 

bruises on Justin’s arms.
7

To determine the causes of the bruises on Justin’s back, a 

nurse conducted a forensic examination of Justin at USC Medical 

Center. The nurse concluded Justin was a “ ‘poor historian likely 

due to young age and hyperactivity.’ ” Justin told the nurse that 

“ ‘[s]he hit me with a ruler right here’ ” and pointed to his arm. A 

social worker concluded that Justin was referring to 

Grandmother. The forensic nurse observed redness on Justin’s 

“perianal region” and Justin put his index finger into his rectum. 

The nurse further observed: “ ‘Multiple non specific bruises at 

various stages of healing scattered on child’s back and all 

extremities. Child did not disclose history for bruises, unable to 

determine the cause at this time. Some bruises may be caused by 

accidental injury. Child was observed to be hyperactive and 

climbing furniture in the exam room. However, cannot rule out 

non-accidental trauma.’ ” The nurse also indicated: “Scabbed 

abrasion on right knee. Pattern resembles an injury resulting 

from skidding on a hard surface. However, no history was 

obtained today; cannot determine if mark was caused by trauma 

from accidental or non-accidental injury.” The nurse provided a 

medication for Justin’s diaper rash. 

DCFS interviewed Grandmother, who reported that Justin 

has a skin disorder called dermatographism and that Justin “falls 

on his back often, bumps into everything, hits and pinches 

himself, causing the marks. [Grandmother] reported that the 

marks on his back are due to him falling on his scooter, and the 

scooter falling on him.” Grandmother denied hitting Justin with 

a ruler, further stating that she did not own a ruler. 

DCFS confirmed that Justin had dermatographism, but 

reported that the condition does not cause him to bruise. A 

doctor explained: “[D]ermatographism is [a skin disorder that 
8

appears] red and looks like hives and correlates with something 

that was touching or rubbing against the skin. 

Dermatographism does not have the blue, green, yellow or brown 

coloring of bruising.” 

One week after DCFS removed Justin from Grandmother’s 

care, a social worker attempted to interview Justin and reported 

that he “was difficult to interview due to his young age and [his] 

trying to play and jump up on the beds.” Justin reported that he 

had “booboos on his back” because his cousin scratched his back. 

Justin also said that “the doctor punched the booboos on his 

back.” Justin showed the social worker a scab on his arm and the 

social worker observed no other bruises. 

Justin’s caregiver (no longer Grandmother) reported using 

rash cream because Justin had sensitive skin. Caregiver 

reported that “Justin’s behaviors are challenging and that he is 

hitting his teachers at preschool.” Caregiver stated that in 

September 2017, when Justin was placed in her care, he had 

no bruises on his back. 

4. Juvenile court proceeding

On September 25, 2017, Grandmother appeared in 

juvenile court to contest the allegations in the supplemental 

petition. Counsel appeared and sought to represent 

Grandmother. Counsel reported that he represented 

Grandmother in another case “arising out of the identical facts,” 

but that the two cases were not consolidated.3 The other case 

involved mother’s oldest child, Shane. Counsel sought de facto 

3 The juvenile court had previously denied DCFS’s motion 

to consolidate the two cases. Commissioner Emma Castro denied 

the motion to consolidate. 
9

status for Grandmother and to be appointed as her counsel in the 

case involving Justin as well. Minors’ counsel opposed granting 

Grandmother de facto parent status. DCFS “had no problem 

with [Grandmother’s] attorney being heard” but opposed “the de 

facto motion.” Because Grandmother’s alleged abuse was the 

subject of the section 387 hearing, she had “unclean hands” and 

therefore was not entitled to de facto parent status. 

The juvenile court (Referee Sherri Sobel) stated that 

Grandmother was not entitled to counsel. During the same 

colloquy, the juvenile court indicated that Grandmother was 

“entitled to be heard,” and could “present[ ] evidence to the court 

that she did not do any of the things of which she was accused.” 

A few minutes later, the juvenile court told counsel he could 

argue the case, but the court was “not allowing testimony.” 

Ultimately, the court indicated that counsel would not be 

appointed and denied Grandmother status as a de facto parent. 

The juvenile court refused to hear any evidence or argument 

before it decided whether to sustain the allegations in the 

supplemental petition. 

In piquant language,4 the court reasoned that because the 

matter was subject to a general placement order and was 

“relative to relative,” DCFS had discretion to move children from 

relative to relative and Grandmother had “no standing to argue.”

The juvenile court observed that it was “pushing the envelope 

just a bit to allow [counsel] to simply enter a denial on her behalf, 

which is appealable.” The court then invited Grandmother to 

4 “Let me tell you the way it works—The way it used to 

work when people actually went to law school, graduated, came 

here and knew what they were doing. I’m including you in one of 

those people who actually went to law school.” 
10

appeal to determine whether juvenile courts would “ ‘have to 

allow relatives to be heard.’ ” 

The juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition and 

“declare[d] these children dependents . . . .” The court stated: 

“Prior placement with the maternal grandmother, 

[Grandmother], is inappropriate for protection of the Children. 

There are some serious allegations of physical abuse.” The court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that it was not in the 

Children’s “best interests” to return them to Grandmother’s 

custody. The court ordered Grandmother’s visits to be monitored 

and permitted her only weekly one-hour visits. 

5. Appeal

Grandmother timely appealed from the orders denying her 

de facto parent status. Grandmother timely appealed from the 

order sustaining the section 387 petition. 

6. Grandmother’s request to change a court order

While the current appeal was pending, pursuant to 

section 3885, Grandmother requested the juvenile court change 

its court order sustaining the section 387 petition. As 

Grandmother emphasized in her request to change a court order, 

the juvenile court reached a conflicting conclusion in Shane’s 

5 Section 388, subdivision (a)(1) provides in pertinent part: 

“Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a 

dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of 

change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the 

same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child 

of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set 

aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the 

jurisdiction of the court.” 
11

case. In Shane’s case, the juvenile court struck the allegation of 

physical abuse against Grandmother but instead, sustained the 

following allegation: Grandmother “ ‘inappropriately supervised 

a child [Justin] that has special needs and a delicate medical 

condition that resulted [in] injury to the child. [Grandmother’s] 

inability to provide appropriate attention to the child (Justin) 

with special needs placed [Shane] at risk of physical harm.’ ” 

Although the juvenile court (Judge Anthony A. Trendacosta) 

assumed jurisdiction over Shane, it allowed him to remain in 

Grandmother’s custody. 

Grandmother requested unmonitored visitation of Justin 

and David. Grandmother argued among other things: “Every 

professional that [sic] interviewed Justin noted that he was

hyperactive and either climbing on furniture or running around. 

Every professional has noted that Justin is not articulate. 

However, DCFS wants the court to believe that abuse 

occurred because [of] one statement provided with no context.” 

Grandmother further argued that other circumstances explained 

the bruises on Justin’s body. 

The juvenile court (Commissioner Emma Castro) denied 

Grandmother’s request to change a court order. The court noted 

that with respect to Liam, it terminated jurisdiction and granted 

physical custody to Liam’s father. 

DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the 

juvenile court erred in denying Grandmother de facto parent 

status and in denying her a hearing prior to sustaining the 
12

allegations in the supplemental petition.6 As also discussed 

below, we reject respondent’s argument that Grandmother’s 

appeal is moot. 

A. The Juvenile Court Erred in Denying Grandmother 

De Facto Parent Status

“The concept of de facto parent has been judicially created 

to recognize limited rights in dependency cases for a person who 

has been found by the juvenile court to have assumed, on a 

day-to-day basis, the role of a parent, fulfilling the child’s 

physical and psychological needs. [Citations.] The decision to 

grant de facto parent status depends on an assessment of the 

particular individual and the facts of the case. [Citation.] The 

juvenile court applies the preponderance of the evidence standard 

in making its factual findings and we review those findings for an 

abuse of discretion.” (In re Leticia S. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 378, 

381; see In re Bryan D. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 141 [applying 

abuse of discretion standard of review to juvenile court’s decision 

denying de facto parent status]; In re Jacob E. (2004)

121 Cal.App.4th 909, 920 [same].) 

The factors courts generally consider for determining 

de facto parent status include “ ‘whether (1) the child is 

6 On appeal, Grandmother also argues that section 387 

does not apply to a supplemental petition to move children from 

one relative to other relatives as opposed to “placement in a foster 

home, or commitment to a private or county institution.” (§ 387, 

subd. (a).) Because we reverse the juvenile court’s sustaining of 

the supplemental petition and order denying Grandmother status 

as a de facto parent for the reasons set forth in our Discussion, 

we do not address Grandmother’s other arguments challenging 

those rulings. 
13

“psychologically bonded” to the adult; (2) the adult has assumed 

the role of a parent on a day-to-day basis for a substantial period 

of time; (3) the adult possesses information about the child 

unique from other participants in the process; (4) the adult has 

regularly attended juvenile court hearings; and (5) a future 

proceeding may result in an order permanently foreclosing 

any future contact [between the adult and the child.]’ ” (In re 

Bryan D., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 141.) “De facto parent 

status is ordinarily liberally granted on the theory that a court 

only benefits from having all relevant information on the best 

interests of the child.” (Ibid.) 

Here, the juvenile court made no factual findings and 

abused its discretion in denying Grandmother de facto parent 

status. In September 2017, when Grandmother requested 

de facto parent status, she had been involved with juvenile court 

proceedings for almost a decade, since 2008. Grandmother 

regularly appeared in court. The juvenile court told 

Grandmother: “[Y]ou have been in front of me multiple 

times . . . .” 

It is undisputed that Grandmother assumed a parental role 

over the Children. She demonstrated a strong commitment to 

them, seeking to adopt both David and Justin (in addition to 

Shane). Grandmother kept the siblings together and provided a 

home for all of them. She also attended classes to learn to care 

for special needs children. It is undisputed that Grandmother 

cared for the Children’s day-to-day needs. 

The record further suggests that the Children bonded with 

Grandmother. Apparently, Justin referred to her as “mom,” and 

she made sure all of David’s needs were met. Grandmother also 

had relevant information such as knowledge that Justin suffered 
14

from dermatographism, a condition a doctor later confirmed. 

Finally, the conclusion that future proceedings could affect 

Grandmother’s contact with the Children was inescapable 

because that is exactly what occurred: DCFS removed the 

Children from Grandmother’s care. 

The undisputed facts all militate in favor of de facto parent 

status. Respondent identifies no facts supporting the denial of 

de facto parent status. The juvenile court identified no factual 

basis for its conclusion that Grandmother was not entitled to 

de facto parent status. The juvenile court failed to consider the 

relevant criteria and identified no factual support for its 

conclusion that Grandmother did not qualify. In short, it abused 

its discretion in denying Grandmother de facto parent status. 

(See In re Ashley P. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 23, 27–30; 

In re Vincent C. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1359.) 

As previously noted, DCFS argued below (but not on 

appeal), that Grandmother’s “unclean hands” deprived her of 

de facto parent status at the section 387 hearing, albeit the very 

subject of that hearing was whether Grandmother had “unclean 

hands.” 

“Once there is an adjudication that a child is within the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court because a nonparental caretaker 

committed a substantial harm, such as sexual or other serious 

physical abuse, which is fundamentally at odds with ‘the role of 

parent,’ the perpetrator’s ‘protectible interest’ . . . is 

extinguished.” (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 78.) This

principle does not apply here because at the time Grandmother 

requested de facto parent status, there had been no adjudication 

that she committed physical abuse. (In re Jonique W. (1994) 

26 Cal.App.4th 685, 696–697.) 
15

The fact that DCFS alleged Grandmother committed 

physical abuse did not warrant excluding Grandmother from 

participating in a hearing in the section 387 petition. (In re 

Jonique W., supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.) The very purpose 

of that hearing was to determine if Grandmother actually 

inflicted physical abuse on Justin. (Ibid.) We also observe that 

not even the forensic examiner could determine whether Justin’s 

injuries were accidental or caused by physical abuse by 

Grandmother, or, according to Justin, his cousin or his doctor. 

The fact that the juvenile court struck nearly identical 

allegations of abuse against Grandmother in Shane’s case 

underscores why Grandmother should have been given an 

opportunity to defend the allegations against her at the 

section 387 hearing. 

B. The Juvenile Court Failed to Follow Mandatory 

Procedures to Adjudicate a Section 387 

Supplemental Petition

When DCFS files a section 387 supplemental petition, a 

hearing is mandatory. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(b).) 

California Rules of Court, rule 5.565 provides that at a hearing 

on a supplemental petition, the juvenile court must make two 

findings: “(A) The factual allegations are or are not true; and 

[¶] (B) The allegation that the previous disposition has not been 

effective is or is not true.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(e)(1).) 

As our sister court explained: “[I]f the relevant ‘parent, 

guardian, relative or friend’ denies the allegations of the 

supplemental petition, the court must conduct a contested 

hearing to resolve factual disputes and determine whether the 

allegations of the petition are true.” (In re Jonique W., supra, 

26 Cal.App.4th at p. 692.) A custodial relative has “standing to 
16

contest a supplemental petition in the hearing . . . where the 

relative’s conduct and the removal of the minor(s) from the 

relative’s physical custody are at issue.” (Id. at p. 693.) A 

de facto parent has rights in addition to a relative and may 

“participate as a full party to the contested hearing” concerning 

the de facto parent’s conduct. (Ibid.) “Although it is clear that de 

facto parents do not have all the substantive rights and 

preferences of legal parents or guardians, they have been 

afforded procedural rights in order to ‘assert and protect their 

own interest in the companionship, care, custody and 

management of the child’ [citation], and to ‘ensure that all 

legitimate views, evidence, and interests are considered’ by the 

juvenile court in dependency proceedings.” (Ibid.) 

Turning to this case, the juvenile court proceeding in which 

the court sustained the supplemental section 387 petition cannot 

be characterized as a contested hearing to resolve factual 

disputes. The juvenile court refused to allow Grandmother to 

present evidence or argument. Although her attorney attempted 

to represent her, the juvenile court eschewed his efforts, 

ultimately concluding Grandmother could present neither 

evidence nor argument. Grandmother had no opportunity to 

contest the allegations made against her. The petition “was not 

subjected to even the most minimal adversarial testing.” (In re 

Jonique W., supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 698.) 

On appeal, respondent does not counter the substance of 

Grandmother’s arguments that she was a de facto parent and 

should have been allowed to address the court in the section 387 

hearing. Instead, respondent argues that the juvenile court’s 

rulings were harmless essentially for the same reasons that it 

argues the appeal is moot. 
17

As set forth below in subsection C., we disagree that this 

appeal is moot. To recap, the evidence adduced—without any 

input from Grandmother—was far from compelling. The forensic 

examiner could not determine if Justin’s bruises were accidental 

or the product of physical abuse, let alone physical abuse by 

Grandmother as opposed to Justin’s doctor or cousin. The fact 

that nearly identical allegations against Grandmother of physical 

abuse of Justin were stricken in Shane’s case supports our 

conclusion that the juvenile court’s errors were not moot. 

C. The Appeal is Not Moot

Two and a half years have passed since the juvenile court 

sustained the petition finding Grandmother physically abused 

Justin. In the context of the current appeal, Grandmother 

does not seek the return of the Children to her custody.

Respondent argues that the appeal is therefore moot: “Nothing 

would be different now but for the alleged error.” We disagree 

because respondent ignores the potential, serious consequences of 

sustained findings of physical abuse. 

The sustained findings of physical abuse has ongoing 

consequences for Grandmother in that her visitation was severely 

restricted. The juvenile court limited her visitation with the 

Children to one hour a week with a monitor. The sustained 

finding could also affect her in the future. For example, in 

considering whether to place a child with a relative, the court is 

required to consider “[t]he good moral character of the relative 

and any other adult living in the home, including whether any 

individual residing in the home has a prior history of violent 

criminal acts or has been responsible for acts of child abuse or 

neglect.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(5).) Additionally, the sustained 

finding of physical abuse may affect her ability to parent Shane 
18

who remains in her care. DCFS’s assertions to the contrary, 

these are not speculative concerns. 

DISPOSITION

We reverse the juvenile court’s order sustaining the 

supplemental section 387 petition. We reverse the juvenile 

court’s order denying Grandmother de facto parent status over 

the Children. If the Los Angeles County Department of Children 

and Family Services files another section 387 supplemental 

petition containing allegations against Grandmother, 

Grandmother shall be allowed to appear at a contested hearing 

with court-appointed counsel and to present any relevant 

evidence. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.