J-S17003-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MARVIN PRICE,

Appellant No. 3175 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 10, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0503251-2004

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 17, 2019

Appellant, Marvin Price, appeals pro se from the post-conviction court’s 

order dismissing his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the procedural and factual history of this 

case as follows:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant matter involves the killing of Troy Jones on 

November 7, 2003. [Appellant] was tried for that murder before 

this [c]ourt and a jury between January 15, 2008[,] and January 

18, 2008. On January 18, 2008, the jury found [Appellant] guilty 

of first-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime. 

This [c]ourt thereafter sentenced [Appellant] to life imprisonment 

and a concurrent sentence of two and a half to five years’ 

incarceration for the possession of an instrument of crime charge. 

[Appellant] filed a timely appeal from the judgment of 

sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the Commonwealth’s evidence 

— consisting of dying declarations and excited utterances — was 
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insufficient to sustain a conviction and that this [c]ourt abused its 

discretion in admitting testimony of Philadelphia Police Officer 

Dawn Benton regarding the victim’s dying declaration. The 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a memorandum and order 

on December 21, 2009, affirming the judgment of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Price, [990 A.2d 52] (Pa. Super. 2009). The 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allocatur on June 22, 2010. 

Commonwealth v. Price, 997 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 2010).[1]

***

FACTUAL HISTORY

On November 7, 2003, Troy Jones was gunned down outside 

of his parents’ house ... in Philadelphia. At about 10:00 p.m., that 

night, Troy Jones went to his parents’ home to visit his nephew, 

who was recuperating from a serious automobile accident. He 

stayed for about an hour. At about 11:00 p.m., Troy Jones walked 

out of his parents’ house into an ambush of bullets. He was shot 

four times. The shooter sped off.

Darnell Gantt, Troy Jones’[s] nephew, rushed outside the 

house. Troy Jones collapsed into his arms and said, “Marvin shot 

me.” Seconds later, Dorothy and Richard Jones ran onto their 

front porch. As they entered the chaos, Troy Jones said, “Mom, 

I’m shot ...[.] Marvin, Marvin Price shot me.”

Dorothy Jones called 9-1-1. Philadelphia Police and 

Emergency Medical Technicians arrived shortly thereafter. Officer 

Dawn Benton arrived at the scene and positioned herself behind 

Richard Jones, who was kneeling over his severely injured son. 

She overheard Troy Jones say, “Marvin shot me.” However, the 

____________________________________________

1 After our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal, 

he did not seek review with the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, his judgment of 

sentence became final on September 20, 2010, when the time for filing a 

petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court expired. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating that a judgment of sentence becomes final at 

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the 

review); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (providing that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari

seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to 

discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed 

with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary 

review”). 
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Commonwealth was unaware of this until January 17, 2008, the 

last day of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.

The notes of testimony from January 17, 2008, show that 

before the jury entered the courtroom that morning, both counsel 

for [Appellant] and the Commonwealth met with this [c]ourt in 

chambers. During this conference, the prosecutor informed this 

[c]ourt that just moments earlier, Officer Benton provided her 

with new evidence. Officer Benton told the prosecutor that[,] 

while she was at the Jones[es’] front porch on November 7, 2003, 

she heard Troy Jones say, “Marv shot me.” Defense counsel 

objected to the admissibility of this evidence. This [c]ourt 

overruled the objection, stating that the witness “was subject to 

your cross-examination.”

After the parties, judge, and jury returned to the courtroom, 

the Commonwealth called Officer Benton to the stand. Under 

oath, she testified that she was standing on the front porch as 

officers tended to Troy Jones[’s] injuries. Troy Jones “was alert, 

his eyes were open ... and he was talking.” She then testified that 

she heard Troy Jones say, “Marvin shot me.”

[Appellant’s] trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined 

Officer Benton, asking questions such as: “... are you telling us 

that you didn’t bring up to anybody in preparation for going to 

court in this case that you heard Troy Jones say the word 

‘Marvin’”; “... isn’t that an important point, isn’t that something 

you would bring up to somebody if that’s what you heard?”; and[,]

“Did you ever prepare a document memorializing in any way, 

shape, or form that you heard Troy Jones say the word ‘Marvin’?” 

In her responses to these questions, Officer Benton testified 

that[,] according to her recollection, she informed the 

Commonwealth about this statement throughout trial 

preparations, including preparations occurring in November 2007.

After the Commonwealth rested, defense counsel moved for 

a mistrial, arguing that when the prosecutor interviewed Officer 

Benton in November 2007, she obtained discoverable material 

that she failed to pass to [Appellant]. The prosecutor defended 

her position, arguing that “although [Officer Benton] thinks a 

couple years ago she told me, whether she did or not, I can’t 

remember her telling me....” This [c]ourt denied the motion, 

reasoning:
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I do think you were effective in cross-examination ... and 

having observed your effective cross-examination, if you 

would like to call anybody, and quite frankly, I think last 

minute witnesses cut against the Commonwealth, but you 

have a right to call whoever you want at this point, but the 

motion for mistrial is denied.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 11/14/2018, at 1-2, 3-5 (internal citations and 

footnote omitted; some brackets added). 

On July 24, 2018, Appellant filed pro se his third PCRA petition. Therein, 

he alleged that he found newly-discovered evidence in the form of a June 7, 

2018 news article, which led to him discovering Detective Thomas Augustine’s 

“being cited for [his] role in a wrongful conviction civil suit stemming from his 

misconduct in [another] criminal matter....” PCRA Petition, 7/24/2018, at 3

(unnumbered). Appellant avers that Detective Augustine prepared false police 

reports in his case, and “[w]ithout the false reports, there would not have 

been direct evidence linking [Appellant] to the crime, so that the prosecutor 

would not have had cause to prosecute [Appellant].” Id. at 6. 

On September 4, 2018, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice 

of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition, indicating that the issue raised 

therein was without merit. Subsequently, on September 13, 2018, Appellant 

filed pro se an amended PCRA petition, in which he added that he uncovered 

another newly-discovered fact, explaining that Officer Dawn Benton was not 

listed in original discovery materials and that Officer Benton was signed into 
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the Criminal Justice Center on the four days of Appellant’s trial as Officer Dawn 

Kennedy. See Amended PCRA Petition, 9/13/2018, at 5-6.2 

On October 10, 2018, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing 

Appellant’s petition. On October 16, 2018, Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal. The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and he did not do so. 

On November 14, 2018, the PCRA court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion, 

stating that it “denied relief with respect to [Appellant’s] newly[-]discovered 

evidence claims because [Appellant] failed to establish that the information 

he included in his PCRA petitions would result in a different verdict.” PCO at 

7. 

Presently, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

Claim I. Whether the PCRA [court] erred in dismissing 

[Appellant’s] petition as untimely[?]

Claim II. Whether the PCRA [court] erred in not following the 

ruling in [Commonwealth] v. Burton[, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 

2017)]?

Claim III. Whether [Appellant] qualifies for the exception to the 

PCRA...?

Appellant’s Brief at 4, 6, 11.3 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant did not conventionally number the pages of his amended petition 

so we disregard his pagination. 

3

In his brief, Appellant does not include a Statement of Questions Involved 

section in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 2116. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (setting 

forth requirements for the Statement of Questions Involved section). 

Nevertheless, he divides his Argument section into three parts, so we rely on 

the headings of those parts to determine the issues Appellant wishes to raise. 
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Initially, we note that our standard of review regarding an order denying 

post-conviction relief is whether the findings of the court are “supported by 

the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 

1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted). Even though the PCRA court 

neglected to address the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, we must begin 

there because “[t]he PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. ... 

Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the 

substantive claims.” Id. (citations omitted). Further, our Supreme Court has 

observed that, “even where the PCRA court does not address the applicability 

of the PCRA timing mandate, this Court will consider the issue sua sponte, as 

it is a threshold question implicating our subject matter jurisdiction and ability 

to grant the requested relief.” Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 

475-76 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). 

With respect to timeliness, the PCRA provides, in pertinent part, the 

following: 

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges 

and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with 

the presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 

States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, at the time Appellant filed his 

petition, Section 9545(b)(2) required that any petition attempting to invoke 

one of these exceptions “be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could 

have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).4 

In this case, as stated above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became 

final on September 20, 2010. Therefore, his present petition, filed in July of 

2018, is clearly untimely, and Appellant must meet one of the exceptions to 

the timeliness requirement set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), supra. 

First, in his petition, Appellant alleged that “a recent article from [the] 

June 7, 2018[] Daily Newspaper[] led to an inquiry of the actual case matter

resulting in the discovery of Detective Thomas Augustine[’s] being cited for

[his] role in a wrongful conviction civil suit stemming from his misconduct in 

[another] criminal matter....” PCRA Petition at 3. He claims that “[Detective] 

Augustine and others uniformly provided ... prosecutors with false, misleading, 

and incomplete information in order to obtain approval for [Appellant’s] arrest 

and prosecution.” Id. at 4. Appellant says that, at trial, he “did not attack 

____________________________________________

4 A recent amendment to Section 9545(b)(2), which became effective on 

December 24, 2018, changed the language to require that a petition “be filed 

within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(2).
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[Detective] Augustine’s prior conduct because he had no basis to challenge 

his credibility. Thus, the evidence may be used to attack the veracity of 

[Detective] Augustine’s warrant, reports[,] and the evidence surrounding 

[Appellant’s] arrest.” Id. at 5.5 

Appellant argues that this claim meets the governmental interference 

exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(i), and the newly discovered fact 

exception pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See PCRA Petition at 1; 

Amended Petition at 2. We reject this argument because — although 

Appellant attaches to his petition and brief various news articles regarding 

wrongful convictions that occurred in Philadelphia — none of them mentions

Detective Thomas Augustine.6, 7 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(D) (“The defendant 

shall attach to the petition any affidavits, records, documents, or other 

evidence which show the facts stated in support of the grounds for relief, or 

____________________________________________

5 Appellant reiterates these claims in his amended petition. See Amended 

Petition at 10-14. 

6 Appellant does not point us to where exactly Detective Augustine is 

referenced, and our own review does not uncover where he is mentioned. 

Further, Appellant attaches no other documents connecting Detective 

Augustine to a ‘wrongful conviction civil suit.’ 

7 Appellant seems to restyle his argument on appeal, focusing less on alleged 

misconduct by Detective Augustine, and instead averring that a slew of others 

in the Philadelphia Police Department and the District Attorney’s Office

engaged in misconduct with respect to his case. See Appellant’s Brief at 4 

(“For the first time on appeal, [Appellant] alleges police and prosecution 

corruption.”). We do not address this argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the 

first time on appeal.”). 
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the petition shall state why they are not attached.”) (emphasis added). Thus, 

Appellant has failed to plead and prove facts to meet either timeliness 

exception for this claim. 

In his second claim, from what we can decipher, Appellant asserts that 

Officer Dawn Benton was not listed in any original discovery materials, and 

she did not sign into the Criminal Justice Center under this name during 

Appellant’s trial in January of 2008, but instead signed in under the name of 

Officer Dawn Kennedy. See Amended Petition at 5-7. Appellant contends 

that Officer Benton “was present daily at trial proceeding[s in] which she had 

no immediate relation to, nor was she listed as a Commonwealth witness, until 

a last minute surprise moment[,] tilting [the] scale in favor of the 

prosecution.” Id. at 6. See also Appellant’s Brief at 11 (discussing new 

evidence such as “[c]ourt [h]ouse [l]og-in/[s]ign-in [s]heet reflecting Officer 

Benton (a.k.a. Kennelly [sic]) [was] present in [the] courtroom of [the] 

accused daily before taking [the] stand on [the] last day of trial....”). Further, 

because Officer Benton did not sign in under that name, Appellant states that 

he could not cross-examine her effectively. See Amended Petition at 7. In 

support of this claim, Appellant attaches to his amended petition an August 6, 

2018 response to a Right to Know request he made, which provided that: “P/O 

Dawn Kennedy #2741 now P/O Dawn Benton was signed into the Criminal 

Justice Center on January 15, 2008 (Rm 505) & January 16, 17, 18, 2008 (Rm 

602).” See Right to Know Response, dated 8/6/2018, attached to Amended 

Petition. Thus, Appellant insists that this claim meets the governmental 
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interference exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(i), and the newly discovered 

fact exception pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Amended Petition at 

2; Appellant’s Brief at 5, 8-9, 11. 

Again, we reject Appellant’s argument. To invoke timeliness exceptions 

under either Section 9545(b)(1)(i) or Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), Appellant must 

show why, with the exercise of due diligence, he did not uncover these facts 

about Officer Benton earlier. See Commonwealth v. Fennell, 180 A.3d 778, 

782 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“The timeliness exception set forth in Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts 

upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier 

by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence demands that the petitioner 

take reasonable steps to protect his own interests.”) (citation omitted); 

Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344, 349 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[E]ven if 

[the a]ppellant’s claim possessed substantive merit, he fails to offer a 

reasonable explanation why, with the exercise of due diligence, he did not 

ascertain this alleged interference of government officials earlier and seek 

redress.”) (citation omitted). At trial, Officer Benton testified that, at the time 

of the incident, she was not going by the last name of Benton, but rather 

Kennedy. N.T. Trial, 1/17/2008, at 32. Additionally, the Commonwealth 

called “Officer Dawn Kennedy Benton” to testify. N.T. Trial, 1/16/2008, at 

102. Appellant, therefore, has been aware that she has gone by these 

different last names since at least the time of trial. By exercising due 

diligence, Appellant could have investigated earlier whether she was 
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mentioned in discovery, or had signed in to the courthouse on the days of 

trial. Consequently, this claim fails to satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(i) and 

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order 

dismissing Appellant’s petition.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/19