H.R. 4435—FY15 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BILL

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC

FORCES

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DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE ........................................ 97

SUMMARY OF BILL LANGUAGE

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Table Of Contents

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND 

EVALUATION

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 2xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Weather Satellite FollowOn System

Section 2xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Space-Based Infrared 

Systems Space Data Exploitation

TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—FINANCIAL MATTERS

Section 10xx—Authority to Transfer Funds to the National Nuclear Security 

Administration to Sustain Nuclear Weapons Modernization and Naval 

Reactors

SUBTITLE G—OTHER MATTERS

Section 10xx—Sense of Congress on the Life and Achievements of Dr. James 

R. Schlesinger

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE C—MATTERS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Section 12xx—Limitation on Use of Funds With Respect to Certification of 

Certain Flights by the Russian Federation Under the Treaty on Open Skies

Section 12xx—Limitations on Providing Certain Missile Defense Information 

to the Russian Federation

Section 12xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds to Transfer Missile Defense 

Information to the Russian Federation

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 12xx—Prohibition on the Integration of Certain Missile Defense 

Systems 

Section 12xx—Sense of Congress on Modernization of Defense Capabilities of 

Poland

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND 

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—SPACE ACTIVITIES

Section 16xx—Department of Defense Space Security and Defense Program

Section 16xx—Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Notification

Section 16xx—Liquid Rocket Engine Development Program

SUBTITLE D—NUCLEAR FORCES

Section 16xx—Retention of Missile Silos

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Section 16xx—Preparation of Annual Budget Request Regarding Nuclear 

Weapons

Section 16xx—Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Secondary Requirement

Section 16xx—Independent Review of the Personnel Reliability Program of the 

Department of Defense and the Human Reliability Program of the 

Department of Energy

DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 

SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER 

AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY 

PROGRAMS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 31xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Office of the 

Administrator for Nuclear Security

Section 31xx—Production of Nuclear Warhead for Long-Range Standoff 

Weapon 

Section 31xx—Design and Use of Prototypes of Nuclear Weapons for 

Intelligence Purposes

Section 31xx—Authorized Personnel Levels of National Nuclear Security 

Administration

Section 31xx—Cost Containment for Uranium Capabilities Replacement 

Project

Section 31xx—Additional Limitation on Availability of Funds for Office of the 

Administrator for Nuclear Security

Section 31xx—Recovery of Costs Relating to Non-National Nuclear Security 

Administration Use of Certain Facilities

Section 31xx—Plutonium Pit Production Capacity

Section 31xx—Definition of Baseline and Threshold for Stockpile Life 

Extension Project

SUBTITLE C—PLANS AND REPORTS

Section 31xx—Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation by National Nuclear 

Security Administration

Section 31xx—Analysis and Report on W88 Alt 370 Program High Explosives 

Options

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 31xx—Pilot Program on Public-Private Partnerships

Section 31xx—Technical Corrections to National Nuclear Security 

Administration Act

Section 31xx—Technical Corrections to Atomic Energy Defense Act

TITLE XXXII—DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

Section 3201—Authorization

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Section 32xx—Inspector General of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

Section 32xx—Number of Employees of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION 

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 2xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Weather Satellite Follow-On 

System 

This section would direct the Secretary of the Air Force to place the last 

remaining satellite of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) on the 

launch manifest for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. 

Additionally, this section would direct the Secretary to establish an additional 

launch, for acquisition in fiscal year 2015, under the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle program using full and open competition among certified providers. The 

Secretary would have the flexibility to determine the appropriate satellite launch to 

be competed.

This section would also limit 75 percent of the funds authorized to be 

appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for the 

weather satellite follow-on system until the the Secretary submits to the 

congressional defense committees the plan to meet the meteorological and 

oceanographic collection requirements validated by the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council. The plan must include how the Secretary will launch and use 

existing assets of the DMSP; how the Secretary will use other sources of data, such 

as civil, commercial, and international partnerships, to meet such requirements; 

and an explanation of the relevant costs and schedule.

Section 2xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Space-Based Infrared Systems 

Space Data Exploitation

This section would limit obligation or expenditure of funds to not more than 

50 percent for the data exploitation under the Space-Based Infrared Systems 

(SBIRS) space modernization initiative, which funds modernization and evolution of 

technologies to meet the SBIRS mission, until the Secretary of the Air Force 

delivers a certification to the congressional defense committees. The Secretary 

would be required to certify that the limited funds available for this effort will be 

used in support of data exploitation of the current SBIRS program of record, 

including the scanning and staring sensor; or that the data from the current SBIRS 

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program of record, including the scanning and starring sensor, is being fully 

exploited and no further efforts are warranted.

The committee is concerned that the Air Force is not focusing on developing 

the capabilities to fully exploit the data from the existing SBIRS program. During 

the fiscal year 2014 budget request hearing for national security space activities, 

the Commander of Air Force Space Command was asked about SBIRS exploitation 

and responded that, ‘‘We have not even scratched the surface, I think, of the 

potential that’s there. We have another sensor that we haven’t fully exploited yet as 

part of that satellite. We’re doing a good job on the scanning sensor. The staring 

sensor, which has much better fidelity, we really haven’t fully wrung out yet, 

because we've been so focused on getting the scanning sensor calibrated and 

certified.’’ The committee supports the Commander of the Air Force Space 

Command's stated comments, and encourages the Air Force to focus on achieving 

full performance and exploitation of SBIRS.

TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—FINANCIAL MATTERS

Section 10xx—Authority to Transfer Funds to the National Nuclear Security 

Administration to Sustain Nuclear Weapons Modernization and Naval Reactors

This section would provide the Secretary of Defense the authority to 

transfer up to $150.0 million to the nuclear weapons and naval reactor programs of 

the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) if the amount authorized to 

be appropriated or otherwise made available for the weapons activities of the NNSA 

is less than $8.7 billion (the amount specified for fiscal year 2015 in the report 

required by section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 (Public Law 111-84)).

SUBTITLE G—OTHER MATTERS

Section 10xx—Sense of Congress on the Life and Achievements of Dr. James R. 

Schlesinger 

The section would express the sense of Congress on the life and 

achievements of Dr. James R. Schlesinger, who served the country as the Director, 

Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy. 

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

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SUBTITLE C—MATTERS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Section 12xx—Limitation on Use of Funds With Respect to Certification of Certain 

Flights by the Russian Federation Under the Treaty on Open Skies

This section would impose a limitation on the use of funds to permit the 

certification of a proposal by the Russian Federation to change any sensor package 

for a flight by Russia under the Open Skies Treaty unless: (1) the Secretary of 

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National 

Intelligence jointly certify to the appropriate congressional committees that such 

proposal will not enhance the capability or potential of the Russian Federation to 

gather intelligence that poses an unacceptable risk to the national security of the 

United States or is not designed to be collected under such treaty; and (2) the 

Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that Russia 

is no longer illegally occupying Ukrainian territory, the Russian Federation is 

respecting the sovereignty of all Ukrainian territory, and the Russian Federation is 

no longer violating the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and is in 

compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The President 

would be able to waive this section if he submits to the appropriate congressional 

committees a certification that it is in the national security interest of the United 

States to do so. The section would also require a 90 day notice-and-wait prior to the 

approval of a Russian proposal. 

The committee is committed to effective and complete compliance with the 

Treaty on Open Skies, provided such compliance is not allowed to become a threat 

to the national security of the United States. 

The committees notes its request for a briefing on the ongoing 

implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies, and that this briefing was postponed 

at the request of the Administration. The Committee looks forward to receiving this 

briefing and plans to continue close oversight of this issue.

Section 12xx—Limitations on Providing Certain Missile Defense Information to the 

Russian Federation

This section would extend the sunset date on certain measures relating to 

the provision or prohibition on the provision of U.S. missile defense information to 

the Russian Federation. This section would also add a new prohibition on the 

transfer of velocity at burnout information to Russia. 

Section 12xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds to Transfer Missile Defense 

Information to the Russian Federation

This section would limit the use of funds in a fiscal year to transfer missile 

defense information to the Russian Federation unless the President has submitted a 

report to the congressional defense committees by October 31st of such fiscal year 

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detailing discussions between the United States and Russia during the prior fiscal 

year. 

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 12xx—Prohibition on the Integration of Certain Missile Defense Systems

The section would continue the prohibition enacted in section 233 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66) 

regarding the use of Department of Defense funds to integrate the missile defense 

systems of the People's Republic of China into the missile defense systems of the 

United States.

Section 12xx—Sense of Congress on Modernization of Defense Capabilities of 

Poland

The provision would express the sense of Congress that the Polish defense 

modernization program is an important opportunity to strengthen the U.S.-Poland 

bilateral relationship. 

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND 

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—SPACE ACTIVITIES

Section 16xx—Department of Defense Space Security and Defense Program

This section would state the sense of Congress that critical U.S. space 

systems face a growing foreign threat, that both the People’s Republic of China and 

the Russian Federation are developing capabilities to disrupt the use of space by the 

United States during a conflict, and that a fully-developed, multi-faceted approach 

is needed to deter and defeat any adversary’s acts of aggression in outer space.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the 

congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act that assesses the ability of the Department of Defense to 

deter and defeat any adversary's act of aggression in outer space.

In addition, this section would direct the Secretary of Defense, acting 

through the Office of Net Assessment, to conduct a study and provide a report to the 

congressional defense committees not later than one year after the date of the 

enactment of this Act of potential alternate defense and deterrent strategies in 

response to the existing and projected counterspace capabilities of China and 

Russia. 

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Section 16xx—Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Notification

This section would state the sense of Congress that the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle (EELV) program provides a critical national security launch 

capability; the Air Force is working to maintain mission assurance and reduce costs 

of such program; the Air Force should continue the current block buy contract for 

such program; and, the Air Force should continue to provide opportunities for 

competition to certified launch providers. 

This section would also direct the Secretary of the Air Force to provide 

certain congressional committees with notification of each change to the EELV 

acquisition plan and schedule as compared to the plan and schedule included in the 

budget submitted by the President for fiscal year 2015. The notification would 

include an identification of the change, a national security rationale for the change, 

the impact of the change on the evolved expendable launch vehicle block buy 

contract, the impact of the change on the opportunities for competition for certified 

evolved expendable launch vehicle launch providers, and the costs of the change. 

The notification requirement would apply to fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017.

Section 16xx—Liquid Rocket Engine Development Program

This section would express the sense of Congress that the Secretary of 

Defense should develop a next-generation liquid rocket engine that is made in the 

United States, meets the requirements of the national security space community, is 

developed by not later than 2019, is developed using full and open competition, and 

is available for purchase by all space launch providers of the United States. 

This section would also direct the Secretary of Defense to develop a nextgeneration liquid rocket engine that enables the effective, efficient, and expedient 

transition from the use of non-allied space launch engines to a domestic alternative 

for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. Of the funds authorized to be 

appropriated by this Act, $220.0 million would be available for the Secretary of 

Defense to develop a next-generation liquid rocket engine. The Secretary would be 

required to coordinate with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration, to the extent practicable, to ensure that the rocket engine 

developed meets objectives that are common to both the national security space 

community and the civil space program of the United States. 

The Secretary, in coordination with the Administrator, would be directed to 

deliver a report with a plan to carry out the development of the rocket engine, 

including an analysis of the benefits of using public-private partnerships, the 

estimated development costs, and identification of the requirements of the program 

to develop such rocket engine. 

SUBTITLE D—NUCLEAR FORCES

Section 16xx—Retention of Missile Silos

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This section would express the sense of Congress that recent authorization 

and appropriations acts enacted by Congress and signed by the President have 

promulgated a national policy that it is in the national security interests of the 

United States to retain the maximum number of land-based strategic missile silos 

and their associated infrastructure to ensure that billions of dollars in prior 

taxpayer investments for such silos and infrastructure are not lost through 

precipitous actions which may be budget-driven, cyclical, and not in the long-term 

strategic interests of the United States. 

This section would also require the Secretary of Defense to preserve each 

intercontinental ballistic missile silo that contains a deployed missile as of the date 

of the enactment of this Act in, at minimum, a warm status that enables such silo to 

remain a fully functioning element of the interconnected and redundant command 

and control system of the missile field and be made fully operational with a 

deployed missile.

Section 16xx—Preparation of Annual Budget Request Regarding Nuclear Weapons

This section would amend section 179 of title 10, United States Code, and 

add a new requirement regarding annual transfers to the Department of Energy of 

Department of Defense budget authority. Prior to making such transfers, the 

Secretary of Defense must establish a memorandum of agreement with the 

Secretary of Energy as to how the funds will be obligated and expended within the 

Weapons Activities budget of the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA). The committee believes that these are Department of Defense funds and it 

must be assured as to how they will be used by the Department of Energy if the 

transfers are to continue. 

This section would also require the Secretary of Defense to provide an 

annual certification to the congressional defense committees that includes detailed 

assessments from the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command regarding the 

implementation by the NNSA of any agreements and decisions of the Council. 

Section 16xx—Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Secondary Requirement

This section would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 

the Secretary of Energy and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to assess 

the annual nuclear weapon secondary production requirement needed to sustain a 

safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent. The Secretary of Defense 

would be required to submit a report on this assessment to the congressional 

defense committees within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. This 

report would be in unclassified form, with a classified annex if necessary, and would 

be required to include an explanation of the rationale and assumptions that led to 

the current 50-to-80 per year secondary production requirement, including the 

factors considered in determining such requirement, and an analysis of whether 

there are any changes to the 50-to-80 per year secondary production requirement, 

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including the reasons for any such changes. The report would also be required to 

include a description of how the following is affected by or related to the secondary 

production requirement:

(1) The demands of stockpile modernization, including the schedule for life 

extension programs;

(2) The requirement for a responsive infrastructure, including the ability to 

hedge against technical failure and geopolitical risk; and

(3) The number of secondaries held in reserve or the inactive stockpile, and 

the likelihood such secondaries may be reused.

Finally, the report would be required to include a proposed timeframe for 

achieving the annual secondary production requirement.

Section 16xx—Independent Review of the Personnel Reliability Program of the 

Department of Defense and the Human Reliability Program of the Department of 

Energy

This section would require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

Energy to jointly seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and 

development center to conduct an independent review of the Personnel Reliability 

Program (PRP) of the Department of Defense and the Human Reliability Program 

(HRP) of the Department of Energy and submit the report of this independent 

review to the congressional defense committees by October 1, 2015. Such review 

would be required to examine the costs and benefits of each program; examples of 

successes and failures for each program; the reporting and administrative 

requirements of each program; the authorities and responsibilities of commanders 

and managers in each program; guidance for when certain positions must be 

included in each program; recommendations for making the programs more 

effective, more efficient, and, to the extent appropriate, more consistent across the 

departments; and such other matters as the Secretaries determine appropriate.

Reviewing the results of investigations initiated by the Department of 

Defense and the Department of Energy in the wake of security and personal 

integrity failures in their respective nuclear enterprises, the committee believes 

that the programs administered by each department to ensure the reliability and 

fitness of personnel for nuclear-related duties must be modernized to be more 

effective and more efficient. The Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) of the 

Department of Defense and the Human Reliability Program (HRP) of the 

Department of Energy are key programs for mitigating threats from insiders and 

for identifying and mitigating problems with nuclear workers before it affects their 

duties. Concerns about PRP and HRP have been raised in several studies over the 

past decade, but until recently little action has been taken. The committee 

commends the Air Force for its current review of its PRP and encourages its effort 

to take carefully considered actions to improve the program. The committee believes 

the entire nuclear enterprise would benefit from a broad-based, independent review 

of PRP and HRP. 

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The committee believes sustained attention at the senior-most levels is 

necessary to overcome the leadership and integrity problems revealed within the 

Air Force and the Navy nuclear enterprise in the past year. The committee notes 

that various reviews and investigations are ongoing and will continue close 

oversight of the recommended reforms and their implementation.

DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 

SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER 

AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY 

PROGRAMS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section 31xx—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Office of the Administrator 

for Nuclear Security

This section would limit the availability of funds authorized to be 

appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for the 

National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of the Administrator to 

not more than 75 percent until several statutorily required reports are submitted to 

certain congressional committees in 2015. These include:

(1) The report on stockpile assessments required under section 4205(f)(2) of 

the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2525(f)(2)); 

(2) The Secretary of Energy's portion of the report required by section 1043 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81); 

(3) The annual assessment required under section 3122 of Public Law 112-

81; and, 

(4) The detailed report on the stockpile stewardship, management, and 

infrastructure plan required by section 4203(b) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act 

(50 U.S.C. 2523(b)).

The committee notes that in past years, the NNSA has not submitted 

several key statutorily required reports in a timely fashion, or in certain cases, at 

all. The committee is pleased that section 3115 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66) appears to have 

provided NNSA the necessary incentive to submit these reports in a timely way in 

2014. The committee therefore recommends a similar section for inclusion in this 

Act to ensure timely submission is continued into 2015. The committee believes 

these reports are critical to effective congressional oversight of the safety, security, 

and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, NNSA programs, and the 

Administration's plans for the stockpile and enterprise. 

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Section 31xx—Production of Nuclear Warhead for Long-Range Standoff Weapon

This section would require the Secretary of Energy to deliver a first 

production unit for a nuclear warhead for the long-range standoff weapon not later 

than September 30, 2025. This section would also require the Secretary of Energy 

and the Secretary of Defense to jointly develop a plan to carry out this mandate and 

require the Secretaries to submit this plan to the congressional defense committees 

within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

Finally, this section would require the Secretary of Energy, should the 

Secretary determine at any time that a first production unit will not be delivered by 

September 30, 2025, to notify the congressional defense committees, the Secretary 

of Defense, and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command of such determination, 

including an explanation for why delivery will not occur by such date. If the 

Secretary of Energy makes such a notification, the Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command would be required to submit an assessment to the congressional defense 

committees regarding the effects of such delay on national security and nuclear

deterrence and assurance, as well as any mitigation options available.

The committee believes the proposed 3-year deferral of this cruise missile is 

contrary to the interests of national security. Therefore, the committee recommends 

this provision to ensure warhead production for this cruise missile is deferred only 

one year. 

Section 31xx—Design and Use of Prototypes of Nuclear Weapons for Intelligence 

Purposes

Section 3115 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 (Public Law 112-239) established the requirement to provide for the design 

and use of prototypes of nuclear weapons to further intelligence estimates with 

respect to foreign nuclear weapons activities. 

In the committee report (H. Rept. 112-479) accompanying the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the committee noted at the time 

that this requirement was consistent with the recommendations of the Bipartisan 

Congressional Commission of the Strategic Posture of the United States. The 

commission found that: "A particularly sensitive question is whether the 

laboratories should be permitted to do weapons design work in support of this 

intelligence mission. At issue is whether the United States should seek to improve 

its understanding of the feasibility of the weapons design efforts of others by 

replicating those designs in U.S. laboratories. In the commission's view, this is 

possible and this work should be permitted. At a time of rising concern about efforts 

by proliferators to develop and improve their nuclear weapons, and of nuclear 

terrorism, such work is indeed critical. Such work would not involve the design of 

new weapons with new military characteristics for deployment by the United 

States. It can and should be done in accordance with U.S. policies not to produce 

fissile materials and not to conduct nuclear explosive tests. It would be limited to 

assessing whether adversarial efforts in development of new nuclear weapons will 

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result in operational capabilities, and what technical, military, political, and other 

consequences might follow from the potential new capabilities. Working with 

partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a position to 

advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons activities bearing on the 

interests of the United States and its allies. In short, the commission recommends 

that the laboratories be allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess 

foreign nuclear weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis."

This section would update that requirement consistent with the direction of 

the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration that such 

activity implicates a broader set of Department of Energy equities than those 

resident in the Administrator of that agency. 

Section 31xx—Authorized Personnel Levels of National Nuclear Security 

Administration

This section would amend section 3241A of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2441a) to require that, by October 1, 2015, the total 

number of employees within the Office of the Administrator may not exceed 1,650.

With the fiscal year 2015 budget request, the Administration proposes 

changing the name of the "Office of the Administrator" account to "Federal Salaries 

and Expenses". This section would also clarify that, for the purposes of section 

3241A, these terms are considered the same. The committee expects the 

Administrator for Nuclear Security to follow past practice for counting the number 

of employees for the purposes of section 3241A.

Section 31xx—Cost Containment for Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project

This section would express the sense of Congress that regarding the 

Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project (UCRP):

(1) A series of statements and policy documents from the Administration 

have identified the UCRP as a critical nuclear modernization priority;

(2) The failure of the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear 

Security Administration to successfully and efficiently execute and oversee the 

UCRP undermines national security and jeopardizes the long-term credibility of the 

nuclear deterrent;

(3) The April 8, 2014, testimony of the Acting Administrator for Nuclear 

Security that "close to half" of the $1.2 billion taxpayers have spent on the design of 

such project has been wasted is a grievous misuse of limited taxpayer funds, and 

the appropriate officials of the Federal Government and contractors must be held 

accountable;

(4) The uranium capabilities and modern infrastructure that are to be 

provided by all three phases of the UCRP are critical to national security and 

Congress fully supports efforts to deliver all of these capabilities efficiently and 

expeditiously; 

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(5) Focused attention and robust leadership from the highest levels of the 

executive branch and Congress are required to ensure that the UCRP delivers such 

critical national security capabilities; and

(6) The Secretary and the Administrator must ensure that lines of 

responsibility, authority, and accountability for the UCRP are clear going forward.

This section would also amend section 3123 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239), as amended by section 

3126 of the National Defense Authorzation Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 

113–66) to clarify that the Secretary of Energy may adjust the statutory cost cap of 

$4.2 billion for Phase I of the UCRP if, by March 15, 2015, the Secretary of Energy 

submits to the congressional defense committees a detailed justification for such 

adjustment. This justification would be required to include: the amount of the 

adjustment and the proposed total cost of Phase I; a description of the changes that 

would be required to the UCRP if Phase I were restricted to a total cost of $4.2 

billion; a detailed description of accountability actions taken with respect to 

contractors and Federal employees; a description of the clear lines of responsibility, 

authority, and accountability for UCRP going forward; and a detailed description of 

the structural reforms planned or implemented by the Secretary of Energy to 

ensure Phase I is executed on time and on schedule. 

This section would also require the Secretary of Energy to certify to the 

congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense by March 1 of each 

year through 2025 that Phase I of the UCRP will meet the cost limitation of $4.2 

billion (as adjusted) and that the UCRP will enable uranium operations in building 

9212 of the Y-12 National Security Complex to cease by 2025 while uranium 

operations begin in a new facility constructed under the UCRP by 2025. If the 

Secretary of Energy does not make such a certification by March 1 in any year, the 

Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council would be required to submit a report to 

the congressional defense committees that identifies the resources of the 

Department of Energy that the chairman determines should be redirected to enable 

the Department of Energy to meet the cost and schedule targets.

Finally, this section would require the Secretary of Energy and the 

Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit a report to the congressional defense 

committees by March 1, 2015, on implementation of section 3123(e) of Public Law 

112-239, as amended. This report would be required to include a description of the 

program management, oversight, design, and other responsibilities for UCRP given 

to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) and the funding provided 

by the Secretary of Energy to NAVFAC to carry out these responsibilities. 

Section 31xx—Additional Limitation on Availability of Funds for Office of the 

Administrator for Nuclear Security

This section would limit the availability of funds, in addition to a limitation 

included elsewhere in this title, authorized to be appropriated by this Act or 

otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for the National Nuclear Security 

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Administration's (NNSA) Office of the Administrator to not more than 90 percent 

until the date on which the Administrator for Nuclear Security submits to the 

congressional defense committees a report on the efficiencies proposed by the 2012 

Joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense Study on Potential NNSA 

Management and Work Force Prioritization Efficiencies. The report would be 

required to include details on how the Administrator will carry out each efficiency 

measure proposed by the joint study during fiscal year 2015. 

This section would also require the Nuclear Weapons Council to submit a 

report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2015, on the efficiencies 

that the Council recommends the Administrator carry out during fiscal year 2016. 

The council would also be required to include in the report the council's assessment 

of the reports submitted by the Administrator and the Comptroller General of the 

United States pursuant to section 3123 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), as well as the council's assessment of each 

of the matters contained in subsection 3123(a)(2) of Public Law 112-81.

The committee notes that, in the fiscal year 2014 budget request, NNSA 

proposed to find $320.0 million in management and workforce prioritization 

efficiencies and use these savings to fund high priority nuclear modernization 

programs. These proposed efficiencies were based upon a joint study conducted by, 

and agreed to by, both the Department of Defense and NNSA. On May 9, 2013, the 

Acting Administrator for Nuclear Security testified before the Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces that, "if we were unable to realize all of the efficiencies that we 

have assumed in fiscal [year] 2014, 5-year budget, we definitely would have to...go 

back and rethink how we are going to execute the programs we have." In the 

committee report (H. Rept. 113-102) accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee expressed its concern that 

these efficiencies would not be achieved and major impacts to critical nuclear 

modernization programs would result. 

The most recent information provided to the committee by NNSA indicates 

that only $80.0 million of these efficiencies will actually be realized in fiscal year 

2014, while $240.0 million will not. The committee believes NNSA's inability or 

unwillingness to aggressively pursue savings through efficiencies it agreed to in 

2012 have directly contributed to forcing schedule slips in critical programs due to 

insufficient funding. Therefore, the committee recommends this section and expects 

NNSA and the Nuclear Weapons Council to aggressively seek efficiencies in fiscal 

year 2015 and fiscal year 2016 to ensure high priority defense programs stay on 

track.

Section 31xx—Recovery of Costs Relating to Non-National Nuclear Security 

Administration Use of Certain Facilities

This section would amend title 47 of the Atomic Energy Energy Defense Act 

(50 U.S.C. 2741) to require the Administrator for Nuclear Security to recover the 

full costs (in accordance with Department of Energy Order 522.1 or any successor 

15
order) of an experiment conducted at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or the Z-machine at Sandia National 

Laboratories for a user or entity that is not an element of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA). 

The budget request for fiscal year 2014 for the NNSA eliminated support 

for experiments by external, non-NNSA users at the NIF and the Z-machine. This 

decision was recommended by the Department of Defense's Office of Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to save costs and focus scarce NNSA 

resources on direct NNSA mission needs. The committee notes that NNSA 

rescinded this decision in August 2013, before it was ever implemented. The 

committee believes this reversal was premature and unjustified, and the committee 

recommends this provision to ensure the steps identified by CAPE to achieve cost 

savings and program focus are implemented. 

Section 31xx—Plutonium Pit Production Capacity

This section would make a series of findings related to the Administration's 

projections to achieve the required capacity to produce 50 to 80 plutonium pits by 

certain years. This section would also state the sense of Congress that: (1) the 

requirement to create a modern, responsive nuclear infrastructure that includes the 

capability and capacity to produce, at minimum, 50 to 80 pits per year, is a national 

security priority; (2) delaying creation of a modern, responsive nuclear 

infrastructure until the 2030s is an unacceptable risk to the nuclear deterrent and 

the national security of the United States; and (3) timelines for creating certain 

capacities for production of plutonium pits and other nuclear weapons components 

must be driven by the requirement to hedge against technical and geopolitical risk 

and not solely by the needs of life extension programs. 

This section would also add a new section to title 42 of the Atomic Energy 

Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) to require the Secretary of Energy to ensure that the 

nuclear security enterprise produces at least 30 war reserve pits during 2023, at 

least 50 war reserve pits during 2026, and, during a pilot period of at least 90 days 

during 2027, demonstrate the capability to produce war reserve pits at a rate 

sufficient to produce 80 pits per year. The Secretary of Energy would be required to 

certify to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense by 

March 1 of each year until 2027 that the programs and budget of the Department of 

Energy will meet these pit production milestones. If the Secretary of Energy is 

unable to make such a certification in any year, the Chairman of the Nuclear 

Weapons Council would be required to submit a plan to the congressional defense 

committees by May 1 of such year. This plan would be required to include 

identification of the resources of the Department of Energy that the chairman 

determines should be redirected to enable the nuclear security enterprise to meet 

the pit production milestones described by this section. 

The committee is concerned that, despite the President's policy to create a 

responsive nuclear infrastructure to enable nuclear stockpile reductions without 

16
undue risk, the Department of Energy continues to slip schedules and programs 

needed to achieve this critical national security goal. With the proposed deferral of 

the first interoperable warhead, the Department has concurrently proposed to defer 

plans to achieve the Secretary of Defense's revalidated requirement for a plutonium 

pit production capacity of 50 to 80 pits per year. As a key component of a responsive 

nuclear infrastructure, continued delay in achieving this pit production capacity is 

unacceptable. The committee believes that waiting over 15 years to achieve a 

responsive nuclear infrastructure is too great a risk to national security. 

Section 31xx—Definition of Baseline and Threshold for Stockpile Life Extension 

Project

This section would amend section 4713 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act 

(50 U.S.C. 2753) to clarify that the cost and schedule baseline of a nuclear stockpile 

life extension project established pursuant to such section shall be the cost and 

schedule contained in the weapon design and cost report required prior to the 

project entering into the development engineering phase. 

This section would also lower the threshold for congressional notification on 

costs per warhead exceeding the baseline from 200 percent to 150 percent. 

SUBTITLE C—PLANS AND REPORTS

Section 31xx—Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation by National Nuclear 

Security Administration

This section would amend section 3221(h) of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2411) to clarify that the term "Administration", with 

respect to any authority, duty, or responsibility provided by section 3211, does not 

include the Office of Naval Reactors.

Section 31xx—Analysis and Report on W88 Alt 370 Program High Explosives 

Options

This section would require the Secretary of the Navy, the Administrator for 

Nuclear Security, and the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council to submit a 

joint report to the congressional defense committees within 90 days after the date of 

the enactment of this Act on the W88 Alt 370 nuclear warhead program. The report 

would be required to contain analysis of the costs, benefits, risks, and feasibility of 

both including and not including a refresh of the conventional high explosives of the 

W88 warhead as part of the W88 Alt 370 program. 

The report would be required to include, for each option:

(1) Near-term and lifecycle cost estimates, including costs to both the Navy 

and the National Nuclear Security Administration; 

(2) Potential cost avoidance; 

17
(3) Operational effects to the Navy and to the capacity and throughput of 

the nuclear security enterprise of the National Nuclear Security Administration; 

(4) The expected longevity of the W88 warhead; 

(5) Near-term and long-term safety and security risks, as well as potential 

risk-mitigation measures; and 

(6) Any other matters the Secretary, the Administrator, or the Chairman 

considers appropriate.

The committee expects the Nuclear Weapons Council to arrive at a decision 

regarding whether or not to include a refresh of the conventional high explosives as 

part of the W88 Alt 370 program in time to inform the budget request for fiscal year 

2016. 

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 31xx—Pilot Program on Public-Private Partnerships

This section would require the Administrator for Nuclear Security to 

establish a pilot program under which the Administrator would seek to enter into at 

least two public-private partnerships to build modern, non-nuclear facilities for the 

nuclear security enterprise. The Administrator would be required to submit a plan 

to the congressional defense committees within 270 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act describing at least two projects the Administrator would seek 

to carry out under this pilot program.

Section 31xx—Technical Corrections to National Nuclear Security Administration 

Act

This section would make technical corrections to section 3220 (50 U.S.C. 

2410) and section 3236 (50 U.S.C. 2426) of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration Act. 

Section 31xx—Technical Corrections to Atomic Energy Defense Act

This section would make technical corrections to the Atomic Energy 

Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501).

TITLE XXXII—DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

Section 3201—Authorization

This section would authorize funds for the Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board for fiscal year 2015. 

18
Section 32xx—Inspector General of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

This section would amend section 322 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

U.S.C. 2286k(a)) to mandate that the Inspector General of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission shall serve as the Inspector General of the Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board, in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App).

Section 32xx—Number of Employees of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

This section would amend section 313(b)(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286b(b)(1)(A)) to limit the number of full-time employees of the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to 120. This section would specify that this 

limit would take effect on October 1, 2015. 

19
BILL LANGUAGE

20
[SK] 

1 SEC. 2ll. øLog 53290¿ LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF 

2 FUNDS FOR WEATHER SATELLITE FOLLOW3 ON SYSTEM. 

4 (a) MANIFEST.—The Secretary of the Air Force 

5 shall—

6 (1) place the last remaining satellite of the de7 fense meteorological satellite program on the launch 

8 manifest for the evolved expendable launch vehicle 

9 program; and 

10 (2) establish an additional launch, for acquisi11 tion during fiscal year 2015, under the evolved ex12 pendable launch vehicle program using full and open 

13 competition among certified providers. 

14 (b) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be ap15 propriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fis16 cal year 2015 for research, development, test, and evalua17 tion, Air Force, for the weather satellite follow-on system, 

18 not more than 25 percent may be obligated or expended 

19 until the date on which the Secretary of the Air Force 

20 submits to the congressional defense committees the plan 

21 under subsection (c). 

22 (c) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Secretary of the Air 

23 Force shall develop a plan to meet the meteorological and 

24 oceanographic collection requirements of the Joint ReVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:50 Apr 18, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\AJSCIA~1\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\7.0\GEN\C\LOG532~1.XM

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1 quirements Oversight Council. The plan shall include the 

2 following: 

3 (1) How the Secretary will launch and use ex4 isting assets of the defense meteorological satellite 

5 program. 

6 (2) How the Secretary will use other sources of 

7 data, such as civil, commercial, and international 

8 partnerships, to meet such requirements. 

9 (3) An explanation of the relevant costs and 

10 schedule.


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1 SEC. 2ll. øLog 53760¿ LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF 

2 FUNDS FOR SPACE-BASED INFRARED SYS3 TEMS SPACE DATA EXPLOITATION. 

4 Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this 

5 Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for 

6 research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force, for 

7 data exploitation under the space-based infrared systems, 

8 not more than 50 percent may be obligated or expended 

9 until the date on which the Secretary of the Air Force 

10 submits to the congressional defense committees certifi11 cation that—

12 (1) such funds will be used in support of data 

13 exploitation of the current space-based infrared sys14 tems program of record, including the scanning and 

15 staring sensor; or 

16 (2) the data from such program of record, in17 cluding such scanning and starring sensor, is being 

18 fully exploited and no further efforts are warranted.


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1 SEC. 10ll. øLog 53235¿ AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER FUNDS 

2 TO THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY AD3 MINISTRATION TO SUSTAIN NUCLEAR WEAP4 ONS MODERNIZATION AND NAVAL REAC5 TORS. 

6 (a) TRANSFER AUTHORIZED.—If the amount author7 ized to be appropriated for the weapons activities of the 

8 National Nuclear Security Administration under section 

9 3101 or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 is 

10 less than $8,700,000,000 (the amount projected to be re11 quired for such activities in fiscal year 2015 as specified 

12 in the report under section 1251 of the National Defense 

13 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-

14 84; 123 Stat. 2549)), the Secretary of Defense may trans15 fer, from amounts authorized to be appropriated for the 

16 Department of Defense for fiscal year 2015 pursuant to 

17 this Act, to the Secretary of Energy an amount, not to 

18 exceed $150,000,000, to be available only for naval reac19 tors or weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security 

20 Administration. 

21 (b) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—In the event of a trans22 fer under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall 

23 promptly notify Congress of the transfer, and shall include 


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2

1 in such notice the Department of Defense account or ac2 counts from which funds are transferred. 

3 (c) TRANSFER MECHANISM.—Any funds transferred 

4 under this section shall be transferred in accordance with 

5 established procedures for reprogramming under section 

6 1001 or successor provisions of law. 

7 (d) CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY.—The transfer 

8 authority provided under subsection (a) is in addition to 

9 any other transfer authority provided under this Act.


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1 SEC. 10l. [Log 53887]. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE LIFE 

2 AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF DR. JAMES R. 

3 SCHLESINGER. 

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find5 ings: 

6 (1) The Honorable Dr. James R. Schlesinger 

7 was born in New York, New York, on February 15, 

8 1929, graduated summa cum laude from Harvard 

9 College in 1950 where he was elected Phi Beta 

10 Kappa and awarded the Frederick Sheldon Travel 

11 Fellowship, and subsequently received from Harvard 

12 University his master’s degree in 1952 and doctoral 

13 degree in 1956. 

14 (2) Dr. Schlesinger married Rachel Line 

15 Mellinger in 1954 and had eight children with her 

16 before she passed away in 1995. 

17 (3) Dr. Schlesinger is survived by his children 

18 Cora Schlesinger, Charles Schlesinger, Ann Schles19 inger, William Schlesinger, Emily Schlesinger, 

20 Thomas Schlesinger, Clara Schlesinger, and James 

21 Schlesinger, Jr., and eleven grandchildren. 

22 (4) Dr. Schlesinger was a generous patron of 

23 the arts, including helping significantly to establish 


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1 the Rachel M. Schlesinger Concert Hall and Arts 

2 Center in Arlington, Virginia. 

3 (5) Dr. Schlesinger was a generous sponsor of 

4 higher education, serving on the International Coun5 cil at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, endowing 

6 the Julius Schlesinger Professorship of Operations 

7 Management at New York University’s Stern School 

8 of Business and the James R. Schlesinger Distin9 guished Professorship at the Miller Center of Public 

10 Affairs at the University of Virginia, and sponsoring 

11 an ongoing music scholarship at Harvard College in 

12 honor of his beloved wife. 

13 (6) Dr. Schlesinger was a distinguished states14 man-scholar of great integrity, intellect, and insight 

15 who dedicated his life to protecting the security of 

16 the United States and Western civilization and the 

17 liberty of all the people of the United States 

18 throughout his highly-decorated and distinguished 

19 career spanning seven decades—

20 (A) serving as a professor of economics at 

21 the University of Virginia from 1955 until 

22 1963; 

23 (B) authoring numerous important schol24 arly and policy-related publications, including 

25 The Political Economy of National Security: A 


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1 Study of the Economic Aspect of the Contem2 porary Power Struggle (1960), Defense Plan3 ning and Budgeting: The Issue of Centralized 

4 Control (1968), American Security and Energy 

5 Policy (1980), America at Century’s End 

6 (1989), and most recently, Minimum Deter7 rence: Examining the Evidence (2013); 

8 (C) serving at the RAND Corporation 

9 from 1963 until 1969, including as the director 

10 of strategic studies; 

11 (D) beginning service in the Federal Gov12 ernment in 1969, leading on defense matters as 

13 the assistant director and acting deputy direc14 tor of the United States Bureau of the Budget; 

15 (E) serving as a member and chairman of 

16 the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 

17 until 1973, working tirelessly to introduce ex18 tensive organization and management changes 

19 to strengthen the regulatory performance of the 

20 Commission; 

21 (F) serving as Director of Central Intel22 ligence in 1973, focusing on the agency’s adher23 ence to its legislative charter; and 


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1 (G) becoming the Secretary of Defense in 

2 1973 at age 44, a position Dr. Schlesinger held 

3 until 1975, during which time he—

4 (i) authored the ‘‘Schlesinger Doc5 trine’’ that instituted important reforms to 

6 strengthen the flexibility and credibility of 

7 the United States nuclear deterrent to pre8 vent war, assure United States allies, and 

9 protect the liberties all Americans enjoy; 

10 ensuring that the United States main11 tained ‘‘essential equivalence’’ with the So12 viet Union’s conventional military forces 

13 and surging nuclear capabilities; 

14 (ii) lead the successful development of 

15 the A-10 close-air support aircraft and the 

16 F-16 fighter; leading the Department of 

17 Defense with great skill and prescience 

18 during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in 

19 which he was key to the United States air20 lift that, according to Israeli Prime Min21 ister Golda Meir, ‘‘meant life for our peo22 ple’’; 

23 (iii) led the Department of Defense 

24 during the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, the closing 

25 phase of the Indochina conflict, and the 


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1 1975 Mayaguez incident in which his ac2 tions helped save the lives of captured 

3 Americans, 

4 (iv) consulted regularly with and was 

5 highly-regarded by the uniformed military; 

6 and working tenaciously to strengthen the 

7 morale of the military following the United 

8 States withdrawal from Vietnam and to 

9 stem the defense budget cuts in that chal10 lenging period. 

11 (7) In light of his realistic views of the Soviet 

12 Union’s power and intentions, Dr. Schlesinger was 

13 invited to China as a private citizen in 1975 at the 

14 personal request of Mao Zedong, Chairman of the 

15 Chinese Communist Party, and upon Mao’s death, 

16 was the only foreigner invited by the Chinese leader17 ship to lay a wreath at Mao’s bier. 

18 (8) In 1976, President-elect Jimmy Carter in19 vited Dr. Schlesinger to serve as his special advisor 

20 on energy during the difficult period of oil embar21 goes and fuel shortages to establish a national en22 ergy policy and create the charter for the Depart23 ment of Energy and subsequently to serve President 

24 Carter as the first Secretary of Energy, successfully 

25 initiating new conservation standards, gradual oil 


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1 and natural gas deregulation, and unifying the na2 tion’s approach to energy policy with national secu3 rity considerations. 

4 (9) Following his return to private life in 1979, 

5 Dr. Schlesinger continued serving tirelessly to the 

6 end of his life in a wide array of public service and 

7 civic positions, including as a member of President 

8 Ronald Reagan’s Commission on Strategic Forces, a 

9 member of Virginia Governor Charles Robb’s Com10 mission on Virginia’s Future, Chairman of the 

11 Board of Trustees for the Mitre Corporation, a 

12 member of the Defense Policy Board and co-chair of 

13 studies for the Defense Science Board, Chairman of 

14 the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, 

15 and Timing Board, a Director of Sandia Corpora16 tion, a Trustee of the Atlantic Council, Nixon Cen17 ter, and Henry M. Jackson Foundation, and an 

18 original member of the Secretary of State’s Inter19 national Security Advisory Board. 

20 (10) In the recent past, Dr. Schlesinger was ap21 pointed by President George W. Bush to the Home22 land Security Advisory Board, invited by Secretary 

23 Robert Gates to lead the ‘‘Schlesinger Task Force’’ 

24 to recommend measures to ensure the highest levels 

25 of competence and control of the Nation’s nuclear 


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1 forces, and invited by Congress to serve as the Vice 

2 Chairman of the Congressional Commission on the 

3 Strategic Posture of the United States to produce 

4 the 2009 study, entitled ‘‘America’s Strategic Pos5 ture’’, which served as the blueprint for the 2010 

6 Nuclear Posture Review of the Department of De7 fense. 

8 (11) In addition to Dr. Schlesinger’s earned 

9 doctorate from Harvard University, he was awarded 

10 13 honorary doctorates, and was the recipient of nu11 merous prestigious medals and awards, including 

12 inter alia, the National Security Medal presented by 

13 President Carter, the Defense Science Board’s Eu14 gene G. Fubini Award, the United States Army As15 sociation’s George Catlett Marshall Medal, the Air 

16 Force Association’s H. H. Arnold Award, the Navy 

17 League’s National Meritorious Citation, the Society 

18 of Experimental Test Pilots’ James H. Doolittle 

19 Award, the Military Order of World Wars’ Distin20 guished Service Medal, the Air Force Association’s 

21 Lifetime Achievement Award, and the Henry M. 

22 Jackson Foundation’s Henry M. Jackson Award for 

23 Distinguished Public Service. 

24 (12) Dr. Schlesinger’s monumental contribu25 tions to the security and liberty of the nation and 


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1 Western civilization, and to the betterment of his 

2 local community should serve as an example to all 

3 people of the United States. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

5 (1) has learned with profound sorrow and deep 

6 regret the announcement of the death of the Honor7 able Dr. James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of 

8 Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Cen9 tral Intelligence; 

10 (2) honors the legacy of Dr. Schlesinger’s com11 mitment to the liberty and security of this Nation 

12 and the Western community of nations, the better13 ment of his local community, and his loving family; 

14 (3) extends its deepest condolences and sym15 pathy to the family, friends, and colleagues of Dr. 

16 Schlesinger who have lost a beloved father, grand17 father, and thoughtful leader; 

18 (4) honors Dr. Schlesinger’s wisdom, discern19 ment, scholarship, and dedication to a life of public 

20 service that greatly benefitted his community, coun21 try, and Western civilization; 

22 (5) recognizes with great appreciation that 

23 while serving as public servant under Presidents 

24 Nixon, Ford, and Carter, Dr. Schlesinger contrib25 uted significantly, thoughtfully, and directly to the 


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1 betterment of United States policies and practices in 

2 the areas of national defense, energy, and intel3 ligence; 

4 (6) recognizes with great appreciation that after 

5 returning to private life, Dr. Schlesinger continued 

6 to serve the Nation selflessly until his passing 

7 through his numerous bipartisan contributions to 

8 the reasoned public discourse of issues and his lead9 ership on numerous high-level studies sponsored by 

10 the White House, the Department of Defense, the 

11 Department of State, and the United States Con12 gress; 

13 (7) recognizes with great appreciation Dr. 

14 Schlesinger’s exemplary life guided by his commit15 ment to the continuing security and liberty of the 

16 United States, and by his honor, duty, and devotion 

17 to country and family, scholarship, and personal 

18 moral integrity; and 

19 (8) expresses profound respect and admiration 

20 for Dr. Schlesinger and his exemplary legacy of com21 mitment to the people of the United States, mem22 bers of the Armed Forces, and all those who help 

23 safeguard the Nation.


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1 SEC. l øLog 53752¿. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS WITH 

2 RESPECT TO CERTIFICATION OF CERTAIN 

3 FLIGHTS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 

4 UNDER THE TREATY ON OPEN SKIES. 

5 (a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to 

6 be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used 

7 to authorize or permit a certification by the United States 

8 of a proposal by the Russian Federation to change any 

9 sensor package of an aircraft for a flight by the Russian 

10 Federation under the Open Skies Treaty, unless—

11 (1) the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of 

12 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Na13 tional Intelligence jointly certify to the appropriate 

14 congressional committees that such proposal will not 

15 enhance the capability or potential of the Russian 

16 Federation to gather intelligence that poses an unac17 ceptable risk to the national security of the United 

18 States or is not designed to be collected under such 

19 Treaty; and 

20 (2) the Secretary of State certifies to the appro21 priate congressional committees that—

22 (A) the armed forces of the Russian Fed23 eration are no longer illegally occupying 

24 Ukrainian territory; 


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1 (B) the Russian Federation is no longer 

2 violating the INF Treaty; and 

3 (C) the Russian Federation is in compli4 ance with the CFE Treaty and has lifted its 

5 suspension of Russian observance of its treaty 

6 obligations. 

7 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require8 ment of the Secretary of State to make a certification de9 scribed in subsection (a)(2) with respect to a proposal by 

10 the Russian Federation if the President determines that 

11 it is in the national security interests of the United States 

12 to do so and submits to the appropriate congressional 

13 committees a report that contains the reasons for such de14 termination. 

15 (c) NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENT.—The Presi16 dent may not authorize or permit a certification by the 

17 United States for which the certifications required by 

18 paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) are made until 

19 the expiration of a 90-day period beginning on the date 

20 on which the certification required by such paragraph (1) 

21 or the certification required by such paragraph (2) is sub22 mitted to the appropriate congressional committees, 

23 whichever occurs later. 

24 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means—

4 (A) the congressional defense committees; 

5 (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence 

6 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

7 Senate; and 

8 (C) the Permanent Select Committee on 

9 Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Af10 fairs of the House of Representatives. 

11 (2) CFE TREATY.—The term ‘‘CFE Treaty’’ 

12 means the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 

13 Europe, signed at Paris November 19, 1990, and 

14 entered into force July 17, 1992. 

15 (3) INF TREATY.—The term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ 

16 means the Treaty Between the United States of 

17 America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

18 on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 

19 Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the 

20 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 

21 signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and en22 tered into force June 1, 1988. 

23 (4) OPEN SKIES TREATY.—The term ‘‘Open 

24 Skies Treaty’’ means the Treaty on Open Skies, 


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[TM] 

1 done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into 

2 force January 1, 2002.


April 23, 2014 (11:13 a.m.)

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1 SEC. l [LOG 53258]. LIMITATIONS ON PROVIDING CERTAIN 

2 MISSILE DEFENSE INFORMATION TO THE 

3 RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1246(c) of the National 

5 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public 

6 Law 113–66; ø127 Stat. l¿) is amended—

7 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘2016’’ and 

8 inserting ‘‘2017’’; and 

9 (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ‘‘2014’’ 

10 the following: ‘‘or 2015’’. 

11 (b) LIMITATIONS ON PROVIDING OTHER INFORMA12 TION.—No funds authorized to be appropriated or other13 wise made available for each of fiscal years 2015 through 

14 2017 for the Department of Defense may be used to pro15 vide the Government of the Russian Federation or any 

16 Russian person with information relating to the velocity 

17 at burnout of United States missile defense interceptors 

18 or missile defense targets or related information.


March 17, 2014 (11:43 a.m.)

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[TM] 

1 SEC. l. øLOG 53294¿ LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF 

2 FUNDS TO TRANSFER MISSILE DEFENSE IN3 FORMATION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to 

5 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 

6 2015 or any subsequent fiscal year for the Department 

7 of Defense may be obligated or expended to transfer mis8 sile defense information to the Russian Federation unless, 

9 with respect to such fiscal year, the President submits to 

10 the congressional defense committees not later than Octo11 ber 31 of such fiscal year a report on discussions between 

12 the Russian Federation and the United States on missile 

13 defense matters during the immediately preceding fiscal 

14 year, including any discussions for cooperation between 

15 the two countries on missile defense matters. 

16 (b) FISCAL YEAR 2015 REPORT.—The report sub17 mitted pursuant to subsection (a) with respect to fiscal 

18 year 2015 shall, in addition to including the information 

19 described in subsection (a) with respect to fiscal year 

20 2014, include the information described in subsection (a) 

21 with respect to fiscal years 2007 through 2013.


March 20, 2014 (10:32 a.m.)

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[TAM] 

1 SEC. 2ll øLog 53751¿. PROHIBITION ON INTEGRATION OF 

2 CERTAIN MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS. 

3 None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 

4 this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 

5 for the Department of Defense or for United States con6 tributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may 

7 be obligated or expended to integrate missile defense sys8 tems of the People’s Republic of China into missile defense 

9 systems of the United States.


April 9, 2014 (3:53 p.m.)

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[TM] 

1 SEC. l. øLOG 53242¿ SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MODERNIZA2 TION OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF POLAND. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

4 (1) The efforts of Poland to modernize its de5 fense capabilities and restructure its armed forces 

6 have the potential not only to enhance the national 

7 security of Poland but also to strengthen the North 

8 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

9 (2) The main priority of Poland with respect to 

10 such efforts is to procure anti-aircraft and missile 

11 defense systems. 

12 (3) At a time when most NATO allies are cut13 ting defense spending, Poland has maintained a 

14 steady defense budget and is making significant in15 vestment in procurement of new defense systems. 

16 (4) The United States should recognize the ef17 forts of Poland to modernize its defense capabilities 

18 and restructure its armed forces and promote such 

19 efforts as a positive example for other NATO allies 

20 to follow. 

21 (5) The United States has enjoyed a close cul22 tural, economic, political, and military relationship 

23 with Poland for many years and the efforts of Po24 land to modernize its defense capabilities and reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\MASYNNES\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\7.0\GEN\C\LOG53242.X

March 18, 2014 (1:12 p.m.)

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[TM] 

1 structure its armed forces provide opportunities for 

2 the two countries to work together even more close3 ly. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con5 gress that—

6 (1) the President should seek to work with Po7 land to ensure that, as part of the efforts of Poland 

8 to modernize its defense capabilities and restructure 

9 its armed forces—

10 (A) Poland, to the maximum extent prac11 ticable, procures defense systems that are inter12 operable with NATO defense systems and will 

13 help fill critical NATO shortfalls; and 

14 (B) Poland, to the maximum extent prac15 ticable and to the extent not inconsistent with 

16 the provisions of subparagraph (A), procures 

17 United States defense systems that—

18 (i) will strengthen the bilateral, stra19 tegic partnership between the two coun20 tries; 

21 (ii) will provide Poland with proven 

22 defense systems capabilities; and 

23 (iii) promote deeper and closer bilat24 eral cooperation between the two countries; 

25 and 


March 18, 2014 (1:12 p.m.)

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[TM] 

1 (2) the United States stands ready to assist Po2 land to achieve its goals to modernize its defense ca3 pabilities and restructure its armed forces.


March 18, 2014 (1:12 p.m.)

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[SK] 

1 SEC. 16ll[Log 53397]. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE 

2 SECURITY AND DEFENSE PROGRAM. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the Sense of Con4 gress that—

5 (1) critical United States national security 

6 space systems are facing a serious growing foreign 

7 threat; 

8 (2) the People’s Republic of China and the Rus9 sian Federation are both developing capabilities to 

10 disrupt the use of space by the United States in a 

11 conflict, as recently outlined by the Director of Na12 tional Intelligence in testimony before Congress; and 

13 (3) a fully-developed multi-faceted space secu14 rity and defense program is needed to deter and de15 feat any adversaries’ acts of space aggression. 

16 (b) REPORT ON ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO

17 DETER AND DEFEAT ADVERSARY SPACE AGGRESSION.—

18 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

19 of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 

20 congressional defense committees a report containing an 

21 assessment of the ability of the Department of Defense 

22 to deter and defeat any act of space aggression by an ad23 versary. 


April 21, 2014 (10:21 a.m.)

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[SK] 

1 (c) STUDY ON ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE AND DETER2 RENCE STRATEGIES IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN

3 COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES.—

4 (1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of De5 fense, acting through the Office of Net Assessment, 

6 shall conduct a study of potential alternative defense 

7 and deterrent strategies in response to the existing 

8 and projected counterspace capabilities of China and 

9 Russia. Such study shall include an assessment of 

10 the congruence of such strategies with the current 

11 United States defense strategy and defense pro12 grams of record, and the associated implications of 

13 pursuing such strategies. 

14 (2) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

16 Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 

17 committees the results of the study required under 

18 paragraph (1).


April 21, 2014 (10:21 a.m.)

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[SK] 

1 SEC. 16ll [Log 53430]. EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VE2 HICLE NOTIFICATION. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that—

5 (1) the evolved expendable launch vehicle pro6 gram provides a critical national security launch ca7 pability; 

8 (2) the Air Force is working to maintain mis9 sion assurance and reduce costs of such program; 

10 (3) the Air Force should continue the current 

11 block buy contract for such program; and 

12 (4) the Air Force should continue to provide op13 portunities for competition to certified launch pro14 viders. 

15 (b) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of the Air Force 

16 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 

17 notice of each change to the evolved expendable launch 

18 vehicle acquisition plan and schedule from the plan and 

19 schedule included in the budget submitted by the Presi20 dent under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, 

21 for fiscal year 2015. Such notification shall include—

22 (1) an identification of the change; 

23 (2) a national security rational for the change; 


April 18, 2014 (11:44 a.m.)

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[SK] 

1 (3) the impact of the change on the evolved ex2 pendable launch vehicle block buy contract; 

3 (4) the impact of the change on the opportuni4 ties for competition for certified evolved expendable 

5 launch vehicle launch providers; and 

6 (5) the costs of the change. 

7 (c) APPLICABILITY.—The requirement under sub8 section (b) shall apply to fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 

9 2017. 

10 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—

11 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com12 mittees’’ means—

13 (1) the congressional defense committees; and 

14 (2) with respect to a change to the evolved ex15 pendable launch vehicle acquisition schedule for an 

16 intelligence-related launch, the Permanent Select 

17 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep18 resentatives and the Select Committee on Intel19 ligence of the Senate.


April 18, 2014 (11:44 a.m.)

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[SK] 

1 SEC. 2ll. øLog 53894¿ LIQUID ROCKET ENGINE DEVELOP2 MENT PROGRAM. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that the Secretary of Defense should develop a next5 generation liquid rocket engine that—

6 (1) is made in the United States; 

7 (2) meets the requirements of the national secu8 rity space community; 

9 (3) is developed by not later than 2019; 

10 (4) is developed using full and open competi11 tion; and 

12 (5) is available for purchase by all space launch 

13 providers of the United States. 

14 (b) DEVELOPMENT.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense 

16 shall develop a next-generation liquid rocket engine 

17 that enables the effective, efficient, and expedient 

18 transition from the use of non-allied space launch 

19 engines to a domestic alternative for the evolved ex20 pendable launch vehicle program. 

21 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of 

22 the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 

23 for fiscal year 2015 for research, development, test, 

24 and evaluation, Air Force, as specified in the fundVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Apr 24, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\AJSCIA~1\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\7.0\GEN\C\LOG538~1.XM

April 24, 2014 (2:12 p.m.)

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[SK] 

1 ing table in section 4201, $220,000,000 shall be 

2 available for the Secretary of Defense to develop a 

3 next-generation liquid rocket engine. 

4 (c) COORDINATION.— The Secretary shall coordinate 

5 with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and 

6 Space Administration, to the extent practicable, to ensure 

7 that the rocket engine developed under subsection (b) 

8 meets objectives that are common to both the national se9 curity space community and the space program of the 

10 United States. 

11 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

12 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordina13 tion with the Administrator, shall submit to the appro14 priate congressional committees a report that includes—

15 (1) a plan to carry out the development of the 

16 rocket engine under subsection (b), including an 

17 analysis of the benefits of using public-private part18 nerships; 

19 (2) the requirements of the program to develop 

20 such rocket engine; and 

21 (3) the estimated cost of such rocket engine. 

22 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE23 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres24 sional committees’’ means the following: 

25 (1) The congressional defense committees. 


April 24, 2014 (2:12 p.m.)

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[SK] 

1 (2) The Committee on Science, Space, and 

2 Technology of the House of Representatives and the 

3 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor4 tation of the Senate. 

5 (3) The Permanent Select Committee on Intel6 ligence of the House of Representatives and the Se7 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.


April 24, 2014 (2:12 p.m.)

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33

1 SEC. 16ll.øLog 53270¿ RETENTION OF MISSILE SILOS. 

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the Sense of Con3 gress that recent authorization and appropriations Acts 

4 passed by Congress and signed by the President have pro5 mulgated a national policy that it is in the national secu6 rity interests of the United States to retain the maximum 

7 number of land-based strategic missile silos and their as8 sociated infrastructure to ensure that billions of dollars 

9 in prior taxpayer investments for such silos and infra10 structure are not lost through precipitous actions which 

11 may be budget-driven, cyclical, and not in the long-term 

12 strategic interests of the United States. 

13 (b) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall 

14 preserve each intercontinental ballistic missile silo that 

15 contains a deployed missile as of the date of the enactment 

16 of this Act in, at minimum, a warm status that enables 

17 such silo to—

18 (1) remain a fully functioning element of the 

19 interconnected and redundant command and control 

20 system of the missile field; and 

21 (2) be made fully operational with a deployed 

22 missile.


April 25, 2014 (3:19 p.m.)

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[TAM] 

1 SEC. 16ll. øLog 53291¿ PREPARATION OF ANNUAL BUDGET 

2 REQUEST REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 

3 Section 179(f) of title 10, United States Code, is 

4 amended by adding at the end the following new para5 graphs: 

6 ‘‘(3)(A) With respect to the preparation of a budget 

7 for a fiscal year to be submitted by the President to Con8 gress under section 1105(a) of title 31, the Secretary of 

9 Defense may not agree to a proposed transfer of estimated 

10 nuclear budget request authority unless the Secretary of 

11 Defense submits to the congressional defense committees 

12 a certification described in subparagraph (B). 

13 ‘‘(B) A certification described in this subparagraph 

14 is a certification that includes the following: 

15 ‘‘(i) Certification that, during the fiscal year 

16 prior to the fiscal year covered by the budget for 

17 which the certification is submitted, the Secretary of 

18 Energy obligated or expended any amounts covered 

19 by a proposed transfer of estimated nuclear budget 

20 request authority made for such prior fiscal year in 

21 a manner consistent with a memorandum of agree22 ment that was developed by the Nuclear Weapons 

23 Council and entered into by the Secretary of Defense 

24 and the Secretary of Energy. 


April 22, 2014 (11:17 a.m.)

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2

[TAM] 

1 ‘‘(ii) A detailed assessment by the Nuclear 

2 Weapons Council regarding how the Administrator 

3 for Nuclear Security implemented any agreements 

4 and decisions of the Council made during such prior 

5 fiscal year. 

6 ‘‘(iii) An assessment from each of the Vice 

7 Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the Com8 mander of the United States Strategic Command re9 garding any effects to the military during such prior 

10 fiscal year that were caused by the delay or failure 

11 of the Administrator to implement any agreements 

12 or decisions described in clause (ii). 

13 ‘‘(4) The Secretary of Defense shall include with the 

14 defense budget materials for a fiscal year the memo15 randum of agreement described in paragraph (3)(B)(i) 

16 that covers such fiscal year. 

17 ‘‘(5)(A) Not later than 30 days after the President 

18 submits to Congress the budget for a fiscal year under 

19 section 1105(a) of title 31, the Commander of the United 

20 States Strategic Command shall submit to the Chairman 

21 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an assessment of—

22 ‘‘(i) whether such budget allows the Federal 

23 Government to meet the nuclear stockpile and stock24 pile stewardship program requirements during the 


April 22, 2014 (11:17 a.m.)

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3

[TAM] 

1 fiscal year covered by the budget and the four subse2 quent fiscal years; and 

3 ‘‘(ii) if the Commander determines that such 

4 budget does not allow the Federal Government to 

5 meet such requirements, a description of the steps 

6 being taken to meet such requirements. 

7 ‘‘(B) Not later than 30 days after the date on which 

8 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff receives the as9 sessment of the Commander of the United States Stra10 tegic Command under subparagraph (A), the Chairman 

11 shall submit to the congressional defense committees—

12 ‘‘(i) such assessment as it was submitted to the 

13 Chairman; and 

14 ‘‘(ii) any comments of the Chairman. 

15 ‘‘(6) In this subsection: 

16 ‘‘(A) The term ‘budget’ has the meaning given 

17 that term in section 231(f) of this title. 

18 ‘‘(B) The term ‘defense budget materials’ has 

19 the meaning given that term in section 231(f) of this 

20 title. 

21 ‘‘(C) The term ‘proposed transfer of estimated 

22 nuclear budget request authority’ means, in pre23 paring a budget, a request for the Secretary of De24 fense to transfer an estimated amount of the pro25 posed budget authority of the Secretary to the SecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:17 Apr 22, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\AJSCIA~1\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\7.0\GEN\C\LOG532~1.XM

April 22, 2014 (11:17 a.m.)

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4

[TAM] 

1 retary of Energy for purposes relating to nuclear 

2 weapons.’’.


April 22, 2014 (11:17 a.m.)

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[DTW] 

1 SEC. 16ll. øLog 53855¿ ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPON 

2 SECONDARY REQUIREMENT. 

3 (a) ASSESSMENT.—The Secretary of Defense, in co4 ordination with the Secretary of Energy and the Com5 mander of the United States Strategic Command, shall 

6 assess the annual secondary production requirement need7 ed to sustain a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear 

8 deterrent. 

9 (b) REPORT.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec12 retary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary 

13 of Energy and the Commander of the United States 

14 Strategic Command, shall submit to the congres15 sional defense committees a report regarding the as16 sessment conducted under subsection (a). 

17 (2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under 

18 paragraph (1) shall include the following: 

19 (A) An explanation of the rationale and as20 sumptions that led to the current 50 to 80 

21 secondaries per year production requirement, 

22 including the factors considered in determining 

23 such requirement. 


April 22, 2014 (11:49 a.m.)

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2

[DTW] 

1 (B) An analysis of whether there are any 

2 changes to such 50 to 80 secondaries per year 

3 production requirement, including the reasons 

4 for any such changes. 

5 (C) A description of how the secondary 

6 production requirement is affected by or related 

7 to—

8 (i) the demands of stockpile mod9 ernization, including the schedule for life 

10 extension programs; 

11 (ii) the requirement for a responsive 

12 infrastructure, including the ability to 

13 hedge against technical failure and geo14 political risk; and 

15 (iii) the number of secondaries held in 

16 reserve or the inactive stockpile, and the 

17 likelihood such secondaries may be reused. 

18 (E) The proposed time frame for achieving 

19 such 50 to 80 secondaries per year production 

20 requirement. 

21 (3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) 

22 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in23 clude a classified annex.


April 22, 2014 (11:49 a.m.)

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[DTW] 

1 SEC. 16ll. øLog 53467¿ INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 

2 PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM OF THE 

3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE HUMAN 

4 RELIABILITY PROGRAM OF THE DEPART5 MENT OF ENERGY. 

6 (a) REVIEW.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after 

8 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

9 of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly 

10 seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded 

11 research and development center to conduct an inde12 pendent review of the personnel reliability program 

13 of the Department of Defense and the human reli14 ability program of the Department of Energy. 

15 (2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The review under 

16 paragraph (1) shall include the following: 

17 (A) An examination of the costs and bene18 fits of each program described in paragraph 

19 (1). 

20 (B) Examples of successes and failures for 

21 each such program. 

22 (C) The reporting and administrative re23 quirements of each such program. 


April 21, 2014 (4:15 p.m.)

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[DTW] 

1 (D) The authorities and responsibilities of 

2 the commanders and managers of each such 

3 program. 

4 (E) Guidance for when certain positions 

5 must be included in each such program. 

6 (F) Recommendations with respect to mak7 ing each such program more effective, more ef8 ficient, and, to the extent appropriate, more 

9 consistent between the Departments. 

10 (G) Any other matters the Secretaries 

11 jointly determine appropriate. 

12 (b) REPORT.—Not later than October 1, 2015, the 

13 Secretaries shall jointly submit to the congressional de14 fense committees such review.


April 21, 2014 (4:15 p.m.)

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[DTW] 

1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53234¿ LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF 

2 FUNDS FOR OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 

3 FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY. 

4 (a) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be ap5 propriated for fiscal year 2015 by section 3101 and avail6 able for the Office of the Administrator as specified in the 

7 funding table in section 4701, or otherwise made available 

8 for that Office for that fiscal year, not more than 75 per9 cent may be obligated or expended until—

10 (1) the President transmits to Congress the 

11 matters required to be transmitted during 2015 

12 under section 4205(f)(2) of the Atomic Energy De13 fense Act (50 U.S.C. 2525(f)(2)); 

14 (2) the President transmits to the congressional 

15 defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Rela16 tions of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign 

17 Affairs of the House of Representatives the mat18 ters—

19 (A) required to be transmitted during 

20 2015 under section 1043 of the National De21 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

22 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1576); and 

23 (B) with respect to which the Secretary of 

24 Energy is responsible; 


March 24, 2014 (12:23 p.m.)

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[DTW] 

1 (3) the Secretary submits to the congressional 

2 defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Rela3 tions of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign 

4 Affairs of the House of Representatives the report 

5 required to be submitted during 2015 under section 

6 3122(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act 

7 for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 

8 1710); and 

9 (4) the Administrator for Nuclear Security sub10 mits to the congressional defense committees the de11 tailed report on the stockpile stewardship, manage12 ment, and infrastructure plan required to be sub13 mitted during 2015 under section 4203(b)(2) of the 

14 Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523(b)(2)). 

15 (b) OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR DEFINED.—In 

16 this section, the term ‘‘Office of the Administrator’’, with 

17 respect to accounts of the National Nuclear Security Ad18 ministration, includes any account from which funds are 

19 derived for ‘‘Federal Salaries and Expenses’’.


March 24, 2014 (12:23 p.m.)

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[DTW] 

1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53449¿ PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WAR2 HEAD FOR LONG-RANGE STANDOFF WEAPON. 

3 (a) FIRST PRODUCTION UNIT.—The Secretary of 

4 Energy shall deliver a first production unit for a nuclear 

5 warhead for the long-range standoff weapon by not later 

6 than September 30, 2025. 

7 (b) PLAN.—

8 (1) DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary of Energy 

9 and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly develop a 

10 plan to carry out subsection (a). 

11 (2) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 180 days 

12 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec13 retaries shall jointly submit to the congressional de14 fense committees the plan developed under para15 graph (1). 

16 (c) NOTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT.—

17 (1) NOTIFICATION.—If at any time the Sec18 retary of Energy determines that the Secretary will 

19 not deliver a first production unit for a nuclear war20 head for the long-range standoff weapon by not later 

21 than September 30, 2025, the Secretary shall notify 

22 the congressional defense committees, the Secretary 

23 of Defense, and the Commander of the United 

24 States Strategic Command of such determination, 


April 25, 2014 (2:58 p.m.)

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[DTW] 

1 including an explanation for why the delivery will be 

2 delayed. 

3 (2) ASSESSMENT.—If the Secretary of Energy 

4 makes a notification under paragraph (1), the Com5 mander of the United States Strategic Command 

6 shall submit to the congressional defense committees 

7 an assessment of the delay described in the notifica8 tion, including—

9 (A) the effects of such delay to national se10 curity and nuclear deterrence and assurance; 

11 and 

12 (B) any mitigation options available.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53244¿ DESIGN AND USE OF PROTOTYPES 

2 OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR INTELLIGENCE 

3 PURPOSES. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 4509 of 

5 the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2660) is 

6 amended to read as follows: 

7 ‘‘(a) PROTOTYPES.—(1) Not later than the date on 

8 which the President submits to Congress under section 

9 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the budget for fiscal 

10 year 2016, the directors of the national security labora11 tories shall jointly develop a multiyear plan to design and 

12 build prototypes of nuclear weapons to further intelligence 

13 estimates with respect to foreign nuclear weapons activi14 ties and capabilities. 

15 ‘‘(2) Not later than the date on which the President 

16 submits to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United 

17 States Code, the budget for an even-numbered fiscal year 

18 occurring after fiscal year 2017, the directors shall jointly 

19 develop an update to the plan developed under paragraph 

20 (1). 

21 ‘‘(3)(A) The directors shall jointly submit to the Sec22 retary of Energy the plan and each update developed 

23 under paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively. 


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1 ‘‘(B) Not later than 30 days after the date on which 

2 the directors submit the plan and each update under sub3 paragraph (A), the Secretary of Energy shall submit to 

4 the congressional defense committees such plan and each 

5 such update, without change. 

6 ‘‘(4)(A) The Secretary, in coordination with the di7 rectors of the nuclear weapons laboratories, shall carry out 

8 the plan developed under paragraph (1), including the up9 dates to the plan developed under paragraph (2). 

10 ‘‘(B) The Secretary may determine the manner in 

11 which the designing and building of prototypes of nuclear 

12 weapons is carried out under such plan. 

13 ‘‘(C) The Secretary shall promptly submit to the con14 gressional defense committees written notification of any 

15 changes the Secretary makes to such plan pursuant to 

16 subparagraph (B), including justifications for such 

17 changes.’’. 

18 (b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—Such section is further 

19 amended—

20 (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as sub21 section (c); and 

22 (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol23 lowing new subsection: 

24 ‘‘(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—(1) The directors shall 

25 ensure that the plan developed and updated under subVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:18 Apr 22, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\AJSCIA~1\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\7.0\GEN\C\LOG532~1.XM

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1 section (a) provides increased information upon which to 

2 base intelligence assessments and emphasizes the com3 petencies of the national security laboratories with respect 

4 to designing and building prototypes of nuclear weapons. 

5 ‘‘(2) To carry out paragraph (1), the plan developed 

6 and updated under subsection (a) shall include the fol7 lowing: 

8 ‘‘(A) Design and system engineering activities 

9 of full-scale engineering prototypes (using surrogate 

10 special nuclear materials), including weaponization 

11 features as required. 

12 ‘‘(B) Design, system engineering, and experi13 mental testing (using surrogate special nuclear ma14 terials) of above-ground experiment test hardware. 

15 ‘‘(C) Design and system engineering of scaled 

16 or subcomponent experimental test articles (using 

17 special nuclear materials) for conducting experi18 ments at the Nevada National Security Site.’’. 

19 (c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Subsection (c) of 

20 such section, as redesignated by subsection (b), is amend21 ed by striking ‘‘subsection (a), the Administrator’’ and in22 serting ‘‘this section, the Secretary’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53265¿ AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS 

2 OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINIS3 TRATION. 

4 (a) FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT PERSONNEL LEVELS.—

5 Subsection (a) of section 3241A of the National Nuclear 

6 Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2441a) is amend7 ed—

8 (1) in paragraph (1)—

9 (A) by striking ‘‘2014’’ and inserting 

10 ‘‘2015’’; and 

11 (B) by striking ‘‘1,825’’ and inserting 

12 ‘‘1,650’’; and 

13 (2) in paragraph (2)—

14 (A) by striking ‘‘2015’’ and inserting 

15 ‘‘2016’’; and 

16 (B) by striking ‘‘1,825’’ and inserting 

17 ‘‘1,650’’. 

18 (b) DEFINITION.—Such section is further amended 

19 by adding at the end the following new subsection: 

20 ‘‘(e) OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOY21 EES.—In this section, the term ‘Office of the Adminis22 trator’, with respect to the employees of the Administra23 tion, includes employees whose funding is derived from an 


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1 account of the Administration titled ‘Federal Salaries and 

2 Expenses’.’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53445¿ COST CONTAINMENT FOR URANIUM 

2 CAPABILITIES REPLACEMENT PROJECT. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that—

5 (1) the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, a 

6 February 2011 letter from the President to the Sen7 ate, and many other policy statements and docu8 ments have identified the Uranium Capabilities Re9 placement Project as a critical nuclear moderniza10 tion priority; 

11 (2) the failure of the Department of Energy 

12 and the National Nuclear Security Administration to 

13 successfully and efficiently execute and oversee the 

14 Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project under15 mines national security and jeopardizes the long16 term credibility of the nuclear deterrent 

17 (3) the April 8, 2014, testimony of the Acting 

18 Administrator for Nuclear Security that ‘‘close to 

19 half’’ of the $1,200,000,000 taxpayers have spent on 

20 the design of such project has been wasted is a 

21 grievous misuse of limited taxpayer funds, and the 

22 appropriate officials of the Federal Government and 

23 contractors must be held accountable; 


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1 (4) the uranium capabilities and modern infra2 structure that are to be provided by all three phases 

3 of the Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project 

4 are critical to national security and Congress fully 

5 supports efforts to deliver all of these capabilities ef6 ficiently and expeditiously; 

7 (5) focused attention and robust leadership 

8 from the highest levels of the executive branch and 

9 Congress are required to ensure that such project 

10 delivers such critical national security capabilities; 

11 and 

12 (6) the Secretary of Energy and the Adminis13 trator for Nuclear Security must ensure that lines of 

14 responsibility, authority, and accountability for such 

15 project are clear going forward. 

16 (b) COST AND OVERSIGHT OF PROJECT.—Section 

17 3123 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

18 Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239; 126 Stat. 2178), as 

19 amended by section 3126 of the National Defense Author20 ization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–66; 127 

21 Stat. 1063), is amended—

22 (1) by amending subsection (d) to read as fol23 lows: 

24 ‘‘(d) COST OF PHASE I.—


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1 ‘‘(1) LIMITATION.—The total cost of Phase I 

2 under subsection (a) of the project referred to in 

3 such subsection may not exceed $4,200,000,000. 

4 ‘‘(2) ADJUSTMENT.—If the Secretary deter5 mines the total cost of Phase I will exceed the 

6 amount set forth in paragraph (1), the Secretary 

7 may adjust such amount if, by not later than March 

8 1, 2015, the Secretary submits to the congressional 

9 defense committees a detailed justification for such 

10 adjustment, including—

11 ‘‘(A) the amount of the adjustment and 

12 the proposed total cost of Phase I; 

13 ‘‘(B) a detailed justification for such ad14 justment, including a description of the changes 

15 that would be required to the project referred 

16 to in subsection (a) if Phase I were to not ex17 ceed the total cost set forth in paragraph (1); 

18 ‘‘(C) a detailed description of the actions 

19 taken to hold appropriate contractors, employ20 ees of contractors, and employees of the Fed21 eral Government accountable for the repeated 

22 failures within the project; 

23 ‘‘(D) a description of the clear lines of re24 sponsibility, authority, and accountability for 

25 the project as the project continues, including 


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1 descriptions of the roles and responsibilities for 

2 each key Federal and contractor position; and 

3 ‘‘(E) a detailed description of the struc4 tural reforms planned or implemented by the 

5 Secretary to ensure Phase I is executed on time 

6 and on schedule. 

7 ‘‘(3) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 

8 March 1 of each year through 2025, the Secretary 

9 shall certify in writing to the congressional defense 

10 committees and the Secretary of Defense that Phase 

11 I under subsection (a) of the project referred to in 

12 such subsection will meet—

13 ‘‘(A) the total cost set forth in paragraph 

14 (1) (as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (2) if so 

15 adjusted); and 

16 ‘‘(B) a schedule that enables, by not later 

17 than 2025—

18 ‘‘(i) uranium operations in building 

19 9212 to cease; and 

20 ‘‘(ii) uranium operations in a new fa21 cility constructed under such project to 

22 begin. 

23 ‘‘(4) REPORT.—If the Secretary of Energy does 

24 not make a certification by March 1 of any year in 

25 which a certification is required under paragraph 


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1 (3), by not later than May 1 of such year, the Chair2 man of the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to 

3 the congressional defense committees a report that 

4 identifies the resources of the Department of Energy 

5 that the Chairman determines should be redirected 

6 to enable the Department of Energy to meet the 

7 total cost and schedule described in subparagraphs 

8 (A) and (B) of such paragraph.’’; 

9 (2) in subsection (e), by adding at the end the 

10 following new paragraph: 

11 ‘‘(3) REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2015, 

12 the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the 

13 Navy shall jointly submit to the congressional de14 fense committees a report detailing the implementa15 tion of paragraphs (1) and (2), including—

16 ‘‘(A) a description of the program manage17 ment, oversight, design, and other responsibil18 ities for the project referred to in subsection (a) 

19 that are provided to the Commander of the 

20 Naval Facilities Engineering Command pursu21 ant to paragraph (1); and 

22 ‘‘(B) a description of the funding used by 

23 the Secretary under paragraph (2) to carry out 

24 paragraph (1).’’; and 

25 (3) by striking subsections (g) and (h).


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53454¿ ADDITIONAL LIMITATION ON 

2 AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR OFFICE OF THE 

3 ADMINISTRATOR FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY. 

4 (a) LIMITATION.—In addition to the limitation in 

5 øsection 31ll¿, of the funds authorized to be appro6 priated for fiscal year 2015 by section 3101 and available 

7 for the Office of the Administrator as specified in the 

8 funding table in section 4701, or otherwise made available 

9 for that Office for that fiscal year, not more than 90 per10 cent may be obligated or expended until the date on which 

11 the Administrator for Nuclear Security submits to the 

12 congressional defense committees a report on the effi13 ciencies proposed by the study titled ‘‘2012 Joint DOE/

14 DoD Study on Potential NNSA Management and Work 

15 Force Prioritization Efficiencies’’ conducted jointly by the 

16 Administrator and the Director of Cost Assessment and 

17 Program Evaluation. Such report shall include details on 

18 how the Administrator will carry out during fiscal year 

19 2015 each efficiency measure proposed by such joint 

20 study. 

21 (b) REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2015, the Nu22 clear Weapons Council established by section 179 of title 

23 10, United States Code, shall submit to the congressional 

24 defense committees a report that includes the following: 


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1 (1) The efficiencies that the Council rec2 ommends the Administrator to carry out during fis3 cal year 2016. 

4 (2) An assessment by the Council of—

5 (A) the report submitted by the Adminis6 trator under subsection (a)(1) of section 3123 

7 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

8 Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 

9 Stat. 1711); 

10 (B) the report submitted by the Comp11 troller General of the United States under sub12 section (b) of such section; and 

13 (C) each of the matters described in sub14 paragraphs (A) through (E) of subsection 

15 (a)(2) of such section. 

16 (c) OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR DEFINED.—In 

17 this section, the term ‘‘Office of the Administrator’’, with 

18 respect to accounts of the National Nuclear Security Ad19 ministration, includes any account from which funds are 

20 derived for ‘‘Federal Salaries and Expenses’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53456¿ RECOVERY OF COSTS RELATING TO 

2 NON-NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMIN3 ISTRATION USE OF CERTAIN FACILITIES. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Title XLVII of the Atomic En5 ergy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2741 et seq.) is amended 

6 by adding at the end the following new section: 

7 ‘‘SEC. 4733. RECOVERY OF COSTS RELATING TO NON-AD8 MINISTRATION USE OF CERTAIN FACILITIES. 

9 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—With respect to an experiment 

10 conducted at a facility described in subsection (b) for a 

11 user or entity that is not an element of the Administra12 tion, the Administrator shall recover the full costs of the 

13 experiment in accordance with Department of Energy 

14 Order 522.1 or any successor to such order. 

15 ‘‘(b) FACILITY DESCRIBED.—A facility described in 

16 this subsection is any of the following: 

17 ‘‘(1) The National Ignition Facility at Law18 rence Livermore National Laboratory. 

19 ‘‘(2) The Z Machine at Sandia National Lab20 oratories.’’. 

21 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents 

22 at the beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after 

23 the item relating to section 4732 the following new item:


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‘‘Sec. 4733. Recovery of costs relating to non-Administration use of certain facilities.’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53726¿ PLUTONIUM PIT PRODUCTION CA2 PACITY. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

4 (1) In 2008, the Department of Defense and 

5 the Department of Energy, acting through the Nu6 clear Weapons Council established by section 179 of 

7 title 10, United States Code, agreed on a strategy 

8 to balance cost, risk, and stockpile needs and estab9 lished the requirement for the Department of En10 ergy to produce 50 to 80 plutonium pits per year. 

11 (2) In a memorandum of agreement dated May 

12 3, 2010, entered into by the Secretary of Defense 

13 and the Secretary of Energy, the Secretaries agreed 

14 that the Department of Energy would achieve a min15 imum pit production capacity of 50 to 80 pits per 

16 year by 2022. 

17 (3) The current plans of the Secretary of En18 ergy would achieve a pit production capacity of 50 

19 to 80 pits per year by 2031, resulting in a delay of 

20 nearly a decade as compared to the agreement de21 scribed in paragraph (2). 

22 (4) In a report dated January 14, 2014, that 

23 the Secretary of Defense submitted to Congress, the 

24 Secretary stated that ‘‘the Department of Defense 


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1 has revalidated its requirement for 50 – 80 pits per 

2 year based on the demands of stockpile moderniza3 tion, the commitments to a modern physical infra4 structure, and the ability to hedge against technical 

5 failure or geopolitical risk.’’. 

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con7 gress that—

8 (1) the requirement to create a modern, respon9 sive nuclear infrastructure that includes the capa10 bility and capacity to produce, at minimum, 50 to 

11 80 pits per year, is a national security priority; 

12 (2) delaying creation of a modern, responsive 

13 nuclear infrastructure until the 2030s is an unac14 ceptable risk to the nuclear deterrent and the na15 tional security of the United States; and 

16 (3) timelines for creating certain capacities for 

17 production of plutonium pits and other nuclear 

18 weapons components must be driven by the require19 ment to hedge against technical and geopolitical risk 

20 and not solely by the needs of life extension pro21 grams. 

22 (c) PIT PRODUCTION.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Title XLII of the Atomic 

24 Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521 et seq.) is 


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1 amended by inserting after the item relating to sec2 tion 4218 the following new section: 

3 ‘‘SEC. 4219. PLUTONIUM PIT PRODUCTION CAPACITY. 

4 ‘‘(a) REQUIREMENT.—Consistent with the require5 ments of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of En6 ergy shall ensure that the nuclear security enterprise—

7 ‘‘(1) during 2023, produces not less than 30 

8 war reserve plutonium pits; 

9 ‘‘(2) during 2026, produces not less than 50 

10 war reserve plutonium pits; and 

11 ‘‘(3) during a pilot period of not less than 90 

12 days during 2027, demonstrates the capability to 

13 produce war reserve plutonium pits at a rate suffi14 cient to produce 80 pits per year. 

15 ‘‘(b) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 

16 March 1, 2015, and each year thereafter through 2027, 

17 the Secretary shall certify to the congressional defense 

18 committees and the Secretary of Defense that the pro19 grams and budget of the Secretary will enable the nuclear 

20 security enterprise to meet the requirements under sub21 section (a). 

22 ‘‘(c) PLAN.—If the Secretary does not make a certifi23 cation by March 1 of any year in which a certification 

24 is required under subsection (b), by not later than May 

25 1 of such year, the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons 


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1 Council shall submit to the congressional defense commit2 tees a plan to enable the nuclear security enterprise to 

3 meet the requirements under subsection (b). Such plan 

4 shall include identification of the resources of the Depart5 ment of Energy that the Chairman determines should be 

6 redirected to support the plan to meet such require7 ments.’’. 

8 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con9 tents for the Atomic Energy Defense Act is amended 

10 by inserting after the item relating to section 4218 

11 the following new item:

‘‘Sec. 4219. Plutonium pit production capacity.’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53770¿ DEFINITION OF BASELINE AND 

2 THRESHOLD FOR STOCKPILE LIFE EXTEN3 SION PROJECT. 

4 Section 4713 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 

5 U.S.C. 2753) is amended—

6 (1) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by adding after the 

7 period the following new sentence: ‘‘In addition to 

8 the requirement under subparagraph (B), the cost 

9 and schedule baseline of a nuclear stockpile life ex10 tension project established under this subparagraph 

11 shall be the cost and schedule as determined by the 

12 weapon design and cost report required prior to the 

13 project entering into the development engineering 

14 phase.’’; and 

15 (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ‘‘200’’ and 

16 inserting ‘‘150’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53268¿ COST ESTIMATION AND PROGRAM 

2 EVALUATION BY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECU3 RITY ADMINISTRATION. 

4 Section 3221(h) of the National Nuclear Security Ad5 ministration Act (50 U.S.C. 2411) is amended by adding 

6 at the end the following new paragraph: 

7 ‘‘(3) ADMINISTRATION.—The term ‘Administration’, 

8 with respect to any authority, duty, or responsibility pro9 vided by this section, does not include the Office of Naval 

10 Reactors.’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53238¿ ANALYSIS AND REPORT ON W88 ALT 

2 370 PROGRAM HIGH EXPLOSIVES OPTIONS. 

3 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

5 of the Navy, the Administrator for Nuclear Security, and 

6 the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council shall joint7 ly submit to the congressional defense committees a report 

8 on the W88 Alt 370 program that contains analyses of 

9 the costs, benefits, risks, and feasibility of each of the fol10 lowing options: 

11 (1) Incorporating a refresh of the conventional 

12 high explosives of the W88 warhead as part of such 

13 program. 

14 (2) Not incorporating such a refresh as part of 

15 such program. 

16 (b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under sub17 section (a) shall include, for each option described in para18 graphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), an analysis of the 

19 following: 

20 (1) Near-term and lifecycle cost estimates, in21 cluding costs to both the Navy and the National Nu22 clear Security Administration. 

23 (2) Potential cost avoidance. 


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1 (3) Operational effects to the Navy and to the 

2 capacity and throughput of the nuclear security en3 terprise (as defined in section 4002 of the Atomic 

4 Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501) of the Na5 tional Nuclear Security Administration. 

6 (4) The expected longevity of the W88 warhead. 

7 (5) Near-term and long-term safety and secu8 rity risks and potential risk-mitigation measures. 

9 (6) Any other matters the Secretary, the Ad10 ministrator, or the Chairman considers appropriate.


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1 SEC. 31ll. øLog 53471¿ PILOT PROGRAM ON PUBLIC-PRI2 VATE PARTNERSHIPS. 

3 (a) PILOT PROGRAM.—The Administrator for Nu4 clear Security shall establish a pilot program under which 

5 the Administrator shall seek to enter into not less than 

6 two public-private partnerships to build modern, non-nu7 clear facilities for the nuclear security enterprise (as de8 fined in section 4002 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act 

9 (50 U.S.C. 2501). 

10 (b) PLAN.—Not later than 270 days after the date 

11 of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall sub12 mit to the congressional defense committees a plan de13 scribing not less than two projects to build modern, non14 nuclear facilities for the nuclear security enterprise that 

15 the Administrator will seek to carry out under subsection 

16 (a).


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1 SEC. 31ll øLog 53447¿. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO NA2 TIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRA3 TION ACT. 

4 (a) STATUS OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.—Section 

5 3220(c) of the National Nuclear Security Administration 

6 Act (50 U.S.C. 2410(c)) is amended—

7 (1) by inserting an em dash after ‘‘activities be8 tween’’; 

9 (2) by realigning paragraphs (1) and (2) so as 

10 to be indented two ems from the left margin; and 

11 (3) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘, and’’ and 

12 inserting ‘‘; and’’. 

13 (b) CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN PRO14 GRAMS.—Section 3236(a)(2)(B)(iv) of such Act (50 

15 U.S.C. 2426(a)(2)(B)) is amended—

16 (1) by inserting an em dash after ‘‘program 

17 for’’; 

18 (2) by realigning subclauses (I), (II), and (III) 

19 so as to be indented four ems from the left margin; 

20 and 

21 (3) in subclause (I), by striking ‘‘year,’’ and in22 serting ‘‘year;’’ and 

23 (4) in subclause (II), by striking ‘‘, and’’ and 

24 inserting ‘‘; and’’.


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1 SEC. 31ll øLog 53446¿. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO 

2 ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACT. 

3 (a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 4002(3) of the Atomic 

4 Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501(3)) is amended by 

5 striking ‘‘Executive Order No. 12333 of December 4, 

6 1981 (50 U.S.C. 401 note), Executive Order No. 12958 

7 of April 17, 1995 (50 U.S.C. 435 note),’’ and inserting 

8 ‘‘Executive Order No. 12333 of December 4, 1981 (50 

9 U.S.C. 3001 note), Executive Order No. 12958 of April 

10 17, 1995 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note), Executive Order No. 

11 13526 of December 29, 2009 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note),’’. 

12 (b) MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.—Section 4102(b)(3) 

13 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2512(b)(3)) is amended—

14 (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), 

15 by striking ‘‘for improving the’’; 

16 (2) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘for im17 proving the’’ before ‘‘governance’’; and 

18 (3) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘relating 

19 to’’ before ‘‘any other’’. 

20 (c) STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP.—Section 

21 4203(d)(4)(A)(i) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2523(d)(4)(A)(i)) 

22 is amended by striking ‘‘50 U.S.C. 404a’’ and inserting 

23 ‘‘50 U.S.C. 3043’’. 


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1 (d) REPORTS ON STOCKPILE.—Section 4205(b)(2) of 

2 such Act (50 U.S.C. 2525(b)(2)) is amended by striking 

3 ‘‘commander’’ and inserting ‘‘Commander’’. 

4 (e) ADVICE ON RELIABILITY OF STOCKPILE.—Sec5 tion 4218 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2538) is amended—

6 (1) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘commander’’ 

7 and inserting ‘‘Commander’’; and 

8 (2) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ‘‘represent9 atives’’ and inserting ‘‘a representative’’. 

10 (f) DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN PLUTONIUM.—Section 

11 4306 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2566) is amended—

12 (1) in subsection (b)(6)(C), by striking ‘‘para13 graph (A)’’ and inserting ‘‘subparagraph (A)’’; 

14 (2) in subsection (c)(2), by striking ‘‘2002’’ and 

15 inserting ‘‘2002,’’; and 

16 (3) in subsection (d)(3), by inserting ‘‘of En17 ergy’’ after ‘‘Department’’. 

18 (g) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS IN RELATION TO

19 F-CANYON FACILITY.—Section 4454 of such Act (50 

20 U.S.C. 2638) is amended in paragraphs (1) and (2) by 

21 inserting ‘‘of’’ after ‘‘assessment’’. 

22 (h) INSPECTIONS OF CERTAIN FACILITIES.—Section 

23 4501(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2651(a)) is amended by 

24 striking ‘‘nuclear weapons facility’’ and inserting ‘‘naVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:35 Apr 09, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\AJSCIA~1\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\7.0\GEN\C\LOG534~1.XM

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1 tional security laboratory or nuclear weapons production 

2 facility’’. 

3 (i) NOTICE RELATING TO CERTAIN FAILURES.—Sec4 tion 4505 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2656) is amended—

5 (1) in subsection (b), by striking the subsection 

6 heading and inserting the following: ‘‘SIGNIFICANT

7 ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

8 LOSSES’’; and 

9 (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ‘‘50 U.S.C. 

10 413’’ and inserting ‘‘50 U.S.C. 3091’’. 

11 (j) REVIEW OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS BEFORE DE12 CLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.—Section 4521(b) of such 

13 Act (50 U.S.C. 2671(b)) is amended by striking ‘‘Execu14 tive Order 12958’’ and inserting ‘‘Executive Order No. 

15 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note)’’. 

16 (k) PROTECTION AGAINST RELEASE OF RESTRICTED

17 DATA.—Section 4522 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2672) is 

18 amended—

19 (1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘Executive 

20 Order No. 12958 (50 U.S.C. 435 note)’’ and insert21 ing ‘‘Executive Order No. 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 

22 note)’’; 

23 (2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ‘‘Executive 

24 Order No. 12958’’ and inserting ‘‘Executive Order 

25 No. 13526’’; 


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[DTW] 

1 (3) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ‘‘Executive 

2 Order No. 12958’’ and inserting ‘‘Executive Order 

3 No. 13526’’. 

4 (l) IDENTIFICATION OF DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVI5 TIES IN BUDGET MATERIALS.—Section 4525(a) of such 

6 Act (50 U.S.C. 2675(a)) is amended by striking ‘‘Execu7 tive Order No. 12958 (50 U.S.C. 435 note)’’ and inserting 

8 ‘‘Executive Order No. 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note)’’. 

9 (m) WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING PLAN.—Section 

10 4604(f)(3) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2704(f)(3)) is amended 

11 by striking ‘‘Nevada and’’ and inserting ‘‘Nevada, and’’. 

12 (n) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Section 4709(b) of 

13 such Act (50 U.S.C. 2749(b)) is amended by striking 

14 ‘‘athorization’’ and inserting ‘‘authorization’’. 

15 (o) TRANSFER OF DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL

16 CLEANUP FUNDS.—Section 4710(b)(3)(B) of such Act 

17 (50 U.S.C. 2750(b)(3)(B)) is amended by striking ‘‘man18 agement’’ and inserting ‘‘cleanup’’. 

19 (p) RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PAY CER20 TAIN PENALTIES.—Section 4722 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 

21 2762) is amended—

22 (1) by inserting an em dash after ‘‘Department 

23 of Energy if’’; 

24 (2) by realigning paragraphs (1) and (2) so as 

25 to be indented two ems from the left margin; and 


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1 (3) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘, or’’ and in2 serting ‘‘; or’’. 

3 (q) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BY CERTAIN FA4 CILITIES.—Section 4832(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 

5 2812(a)) is amended by striking ‘‘for Nuclear Security’’. 

6 (r) REPORT ON HANFORD TANK SAFETY.—Section 

7 4441 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2621) is amended by striking 

8 subsection (d). 

9 (s) CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIPS.—Sec10 tion 4813(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 2794(a)) is amended 

11 by striking ‘‘that atomic energy defense activities research 

12 on, and development of, any dual-use critical technology’’ 

13 and inserting ‘‘that research on and development of dual14 use critical technology carried out through atomic energy 

15 defense activities’’. 

16 (t) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

17 such Act is amended by striking the item relating to sec18 tion 4710 and inserting the following:

‘‘Sec. 4710. Transfer of defense environmental cleanup funds.’’.


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1 SEC. 3201. øLog 53700¿ AUTHORIZATION. 

2 There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 

3 year 2015, $30,150,000 for the operation of the Defense 

4 Nuclear Facilities Safety Board under chapter 21 of the 

5 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286 et seq.).


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[DTW] 

1 SEC. 32ll. øLog 53233¿ INSPECTOR GENERAL OF DEFENSE 

2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD. 

3 Subsection (a) of section 322 of the Atomic Energy 

4 Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286k(a)) is amended to read as 

5 follows: 

6 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Inspector General of the 

7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall serve as the Inspec8 tor General of the Board, in accordance with the Inspector 

9 General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).’’.


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1 SEC. 32ll. øLog 53466¿ NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES OF DE2 FENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 313(b)(1)(A) of the 

4 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286b(b)(1)(A)) 

5 is amended by striking ‘‘150 full-time employees’’ and in6 serting ‘‘120 full-time employees’’. 

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

8 subsection (a) shall take effect on October 1, 2015.


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DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE

97
Table Of Contents

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND 

EVALUATION

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE

Items of Special Interest

Nuclear command and control for enduring tanker aircraft

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Additional Reporting on the Transfer of International Traffic in Arms 

Regulations Controlled Missile Defense Technology to the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration

Foreign Military Sales of U.S. Air and Missile Defense Systems and 

Interoperability with Friendly and Allied States

Oversight of United States-Russian Federation Missile Defense Cooperation 

Discussions

Report on Countering Violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty

Report on Foreign Ballistic Missile Defense Programs

Report on the Proliferation Activities of Karl Lee and the Support of the 

Chinese Government

Report on Updated Independent Cost Estimate of the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach

Republic of China Radar Interoperability

Updated Report on Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Developments

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND 

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Additional Homeland Missile Defense Interceptor Site

Briefing and Report on the Implementation of the Secretary of Defense's Plans 

for Cruise Missile Defense of the United States

Comptroller General Review of Nuclear Weapons Council

Conventional Prompt Strike Capability Research, Development, and 

Acquisition

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Review of Missile Defense Agency 

Tests and Targets Efficiencies

Directed Energy for Missile Defense

E4-B and Assessments on Nuclear Command and Control

Fielding of Global Positioning System Military Code

Global Positioning System Replenishment

High Capacity Satellite Communications

Kestrel Eye Joint Capability Technology Demonstration

98
Long Range Discriminating Radar for Homeland Missile Defense

Missile Defense Applications for Electro Magnetic Rail Gun Technology

Mobile User Objective System

Nuclear Detonation Detection System

Report and Plan for Minuteman III Sustainment

Report on Reliability, Modernization and Refurbishment of the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense Segment

Report on Strategic Submarine Command and Control in the People's Republic 

of China

Requirement for Plan For Use of Highly Accelerated Life Testing and Highly 

Accelerated Stress Screening

Responses to Foreign Hypersonic Weapons Threats

Revision to the Integrated Master Test Plan

Standard Missile 3 Block IB

University Affiliated Research Centers for the Missile Defense Agency

DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 

SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER 

AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY 

PROGRAMS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Weapons Activities

Implementation of Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and 

Testing

DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE

Items of Special Interest

Nuclear command and control for enduring tanker aircraft

As the Air Force recapitalizes its tanker fleet, the committee believes it is 

important that nuclear command and control requirements for tankers be 

revalidated and a long-term plan be developed to fulfill any unmet requirements. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 

consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command, to review, and if appropriate update, the requirements contained in 

99
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6811.01C related to 

nuclear command, control, and communications for tanker aircraft. The committee 

further directs the Chairman to submit a report to the congressional defense 

committees by April 1, 2015, on the results of this review. 

Additionally, in the event that, subsequent to the Chairman's update, there 

are any unmet requirements contained in the updated 6811.01C for enduring 

tanker aircraft, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a 

plan to the congressional defense committees by November 1, 2015, to ensure that 

enduring tanker aircraft meet all requirements contained in CJCSI 6811.01C, as 

updated, related to nuclear command, control, and communications. The plan 

should include a schedule for updating all enduring tanker aircraft to meet any 

unmet requirements as well as associated costs and program details for such a plan.

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Additional Reporting on the Transfer of International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

Controlled Missile Defense Technology to the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

In the committee report (H. Rept. 113-102) accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee directed the 

Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), to provide a briefing to 

the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation of the Senate, and the Committee on Science, Space and Technology 

of the House of Representatives, not later than August 1, 2013, that responds to 

certain questions concerning reports of the illegal transfer of Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) developed technology. 

The committee is troubled that the stated agencies have thus far been 

unable to respond to those questions. Therefore, the committee directs the 

Inspector General of the Department of Defense to investigate whether MDA 

technology was transferred to NASA other than by the Department's policies and 

procedures for the protection of classified and International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) 

controlled technology; whether classified technology was involved; whether it was 

retransferred beyond the control of the U.S. Government and, if so, whether any 

damage to the security of the United States resulted by that transfer; and who had 

access to that technology, including foreign nationals. The Inspector General is 

further directed to provide a preliminary report to the House Committee on Armed 

Services and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of 

Representatives not later than November 31, 2014. In the event a final report is 

not complete by November 31, 2014, the Inspector General should brief the initial 

findings to the House Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Science, 

100
Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives. The committee expects 

NASA to provide unfettered access to MDA technology and related documents, 

personnel, and any other matters requested by the Inspector General of the 

Department of Defense. The Inspector General should immediately report to the 

committees any non-compliance or impairment with this direction. 

In the event the Inspector General finds that such transfer(s) did occur, the 

committee directs the Inspector General to review the Department's compliance 

with its transfer policy and procedures department-wide and to provide an interim 

report to the House Committee on Armed Services on its plan to undertake this 

review not later than November 1, 2015.

Foreign Military Sales of U.S. Air and Missile Defense Systems and Interoperability 

with Friendly and Allied States

The committee believes that international cooperation in air and missile 

defense will continue to grow as the threat grows in sophistication and numbers, 

and as defense budgets for the U.S. and friendly and allied states continue to 

decline. Further, the committee believes that through interoperability, the United 

States and its allies can realize the benefits of force multiplication and economies of 

scale. 

Conversely, the committee is concerned that the Department of Defense, 

the Department of State, and related U.S. Government agencies are not 

appropriately postured to fully promote the benefits of interoperable air and missile 

defense capabilities between the United States and friendly and allied countries. 

The committee is aware that, in many cases, policies related to data sharing and 

protection of sensitive and classified information are unclear. The committee is 

aware of examples where undeveloped policies and incomplete processes related to 

coproduction have stymied foreign military sales of these capabilities. Likewise, the 

committee has seen examples in which foreign states better position their 

indigenous capabilities in tenders and competitions, when superior U.S. capabilities 

have been offered but lack the clear support of the U.S. Government, across the 

Federal Government. 

The committee believes that the multiplicity of agencies involved in these 

matters (specifically the Department of Defense (including the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency; the Defense Technology Security Administration; the Missile 

Defense Agency; the military services; the Tri-Service Committee; the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy; and others), the Department of State, the 

Department of Commerce, and others) does not provide the focus and efficiency 

required to fully take advantage of the opportunities available to the United States 

by the interest of friendly and allied states in U.S. air and missile defense 

technology. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

to evaluate and provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by 

December 1, 2014, on the current structure for foreign military sales of air and 

101
missile defense technology to friendly and allied states, associated obstacles or 

barriers, and recommend steps to improve the structure to make it more nimble, 

responsive, and to better position U.S. military technology in foreign tenders and 

competitions. 

The committee further directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 

consultation with the geographic combatant commanders and the Commander, U.S. 

Strategic Command, to conduct an analysis and provide a briefing to the House 

Committee on Armed Services by January 1, 2015, on the potential, in specific 

examples and recommendations, for foreign military sales of U.S. air and missile 

defenses to friendly and allied states to enhance interoperability and data sharing 

to better share the operational burden of defending against regional missile threats. 

Lastly, the committee directs the Director, Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by 

November 15, 2014, on the intent of the United States, through the Department of 

Defense, to sell defense articles, equipment, and services related to U.S. air and 

missile defense technology under consideration and the potential for economies of 

scale. 

Oversight of United States-Russian Federation Missile Defense Cooperation 

Discussions

In the committee report (H. Rept. 113-102) accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee directed the 

Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Director, Missile Defense Agency 

to brief certain congressional committees on (1) missile defense discussions between 

the United States and the Russian Federation; (2) the use of missile defense 

declassification authority by Director, Missile Defense Agency; and (3) the 

declassification of certain missile defense information.

The committee directs that this information provided to the congressional 

committees pursuant to H. Rpt. 113-102 be updated by the Secretary of Defense, in 

coordination with the Director, Missile Defense Agency and the Secretary of State, 

and be reported to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

Representatives not later than August 1, 2014. 

Additionally, at the March 25, 2014, House Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces hearing on the President’s fiscal year 2015 

budget request for missile defense, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy stated, “[w]ith regard to talks with Russia on 

transparency and cooperation, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in violation of 

international law led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogues, 

including [Department of Defense] civilians, and we have subsequently not 

continued to engage Russia on the topic of missile defense.” 

102
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to notify the House 

Committee on Armed Services not later than one week after the Department of 

Defense resumes any missile defense discussion with the Russian Federation.

 

Report on Countering Violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On March 5, 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

and Missile Defense Policy testified before the Senate Committee on Armed 

Services that, "[w]e are concerned about Russian activity that appears to be 

inconsistent with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We've raised the 

issue with Russia. They provided an answer that was not satisfactory to us, and we 

will, we told them that the issue is not closed, and we will continue to raise this." 

The committee shares this concern regarding Russian behavior that is "inconsistent 

with" or in violation or circumvention of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty.

Additionally, the Commander, U.S. European Command, and Supreme 

Allied Commander Europe, stated on April 2, 2014, that, “A weapon capability that 

violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European land mass is 

absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with...I would not judge how the alliance 

will choose to react, but I would say they will have to consider what to do about 

it...It can’t go unanswered.”

The committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 

consultation with the Commander, U.S. European Command, the Commander, U.S. 

Central Command, and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, to provide a report 

to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not 

later than September 1, 2014, detailing the following:

(1) A list of any military capabilities (beyond those indicated by the 

September 2013 report by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Report on 

Conventional Prompt Global Strike Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Between the United States of America 

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”) the United States would develop or 

deploy to satisfy military requirements but for United States compliance with and 

adherence to the INF Treaty;

(2) The capability of the Aegis Ashore systems scheduled to be deployed to 

Romania and the Republic of Poland to detect Russian military systems that are 

inconsistent with or in circumvention of the INF treaty, and the appropriate types 

of interceptor missiles, including interceptor missiles other than the Standard 

Missile-3, that would be capable of defending allies and U.S. deployed forces from 

such Russian military systems that could be deployed at such Aegis Ashore sites, as 

well as a detailed explanation of any hardware and software changes required to 

those sites in order to provide a cruise-missile defense capability, and the costs of 

those changes;

103
(3) The defensive capability of the Aegis Ashore system, currently situated 

on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, if redeployed to one of the following 

locations: Japan, the Baltic Region of Europe, or the South Caucuses of Europe; 

(4) Options to increase the long-term, long-duration deployment of U.S. 

Aegis destroyers and cruisers, configured with the Aegis ballistic missile defense 

system, in the North Sea, Black Sea, Baltic Sea, White Sea, and other locations that 

provide an enhanced defense of the United States, deployed forces, and allies within 

range of the aforementioned Russian military systems, and costs of those options;

(5) Options to provide for the forward-deployment, on a non-temporary 

basis, for U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or PATRIOT units at potential 

locations in Eastern Europe, the South Caucuses of Europe, or in allied states in 

East Asia, and the costs of those options;

(6) Options to increase the deployment of U.S. Dual Capable Aircraft in 

states within range of the aforementioned Russian military systems, and the costs 

of those options; 

(7) Potential locations in Eastern Europe or the South Caucuses of Europe, 

or in allied states in East Asia, for U.S. Weapons Storage and Security System 

weapons vaults that would reduce response time and increase proximity to potential 

threats, and the costs of constructing the vaults at those sites; and

(8) The potential sensor coverage of potential threats to allies and U.S. 

deployed forces if the United States deployed the Ground-based Radar Prototype 

presently located on Kwajalein Atoll at optimal locations in the Baltic States, the 

South Caucuses, Eastern Europe, or in allied states in East Asia, as well as the 

potential sensor coverage of additional forward-deployed Army-Navy/Transportable 

Radar Surveillance units at those locations, and the costs of deploying such sensors.

Report on Foreign Ballistic Missile Defense Programs

The committee notes the long-term utility of the annual reports on military 

power of states including the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of 

Iran. Drawing on these examples, as an initial step, the committee is interested in 

better understanding the consequences of the increasing reliance on missile 

defenses by states around the globe. 

For example, the committee was informed by the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in his response to its direction in the committee report (H. Rept. 113-

102) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 

that: "Russia’s objective with its ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities is to 

ensure defense of critical political and military targets in the Moscow area from a 

ballistic missile attack, either by the United States or any other nation with nuclear 

or conventional ballistic or cruise missile capabilities. China desires a BMD 

capability to protect its mainland and strategic forces. At present, China’s existing 

long-range surface to air missile inventory offers a limited capability against shortrange ballistic missiles. China is proceeding with research and development toward 

a missile defense umbrella consisting of intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudes 

104
(>80km), as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles 

within the upper atmosphere."

The committee is also aware that the Republic of India is undertaking tests 

of its anti-ballistic missile defense system as part of its efforts to develop and deploy 

a ballistic missile defense shield. The committee is further aware of extensive U.S. 

missile defense cooperation involving the State of Israel, the Republic of Korea, 

Japan, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and many others. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 

in cooperation with the Director, Missile and Space Intelligence Center and the 

Director, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, to provide an unclassified 

report to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations 

of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

Representatives not later than November 15, 2014, that includes the following:

(1) A detailed description of ballistic missile defense programs of each state 

that possesses such a program, including role and capability of outer space in their 

system architecture, either through indigenous development or procurement from 

another state;

(2) The missile defense employment policy of that country, including any 

views on the reason such state has its missile defense system and any limitations on 

its use as a defense system, as well as any technical or doctrinal indications that a 

state’s ballistic missile defense programs are intended to defend that state from 

U.S. ballistic missiles; 

(3) Intent to, and established programs to, modernize such systems and 

relative budget as compared to national defense budget; and

(4) Indication that a state will abandon its ballistic missile defense program 

if the U.S. provides that state guarantees of any sort that U.S. ballistic missile 

defense programs are unrelated to that state’s offensive forces. 

Report on the Proliferation Activities of Karl Lee and the Support of the Chinese 

Government 

The committee is aware that the United States has repeatedly invoked 

sanctions on Karl Lee, a national of the People's Republic of China, for his 

proliferation to the Islamic Republic of Iran of components related to its illegal 

ballistic missile program in violation of United States statutes (for example, the 

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act) and numerous Executive orders. 

The committee is also aware that despite a criminal indictment in the 

United States for these activities, and numerous and repeated invocations of United 

States sanctions against him, China has made little apparent effort to respond to 

Karl Lee's activities. The committee believes it would be a benefit to the bilateral 

relationship between the two nations if China took efforts to arrest Karl Lee to stop 

permanently his illegal proliferation. 

105
The committee directs the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to submit 

a report to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign 

Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

Representatives, not later than August 31, 2014, providing the following: ongoing 

proliferation activities involving Karl Lee or his front companies, and relationships 

between Karl Lee and officials of the Chinese government, including bribes or 

protection payments to ensure that his activities go unchallenged by the 

government. The report should be in unclassified form, with a classified annex if 

necessary. 

Report on Updated Independent Cost Estimate of the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense provided the 

October 2012 Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) Independent Cost 

Estimate (ICE) for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) on February 

25, 2014. The committee is aware of both the total acquisition and lifecycle cost as 

well as the statement of the Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics that there have been numerous requirement content changes to the EPAA 

since it was completed, including mission requirements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation to update his October 2012 ICE and submit it directly to the 

congressional defense committees not later than November 15, 2014. 

Republic of China Radar Interoperability

The committee is aware that the Republic of China (Taiwan) possesses a 

large and highly capable Early Warning Radar. The committee believes that, based 

on its geographical location, this radar could be a benefit to United States and allied 

missile defense objectives. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to 

provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than October 1, 

2014, detailing his views on any benefits, and associated costs and security 

requirements, of integrating such radar with other United States missile defense 

and sensor systems to improve U.S. regional missile defense capabilities. The 

committee directs this report to be provided in unclassified form, with a classified 

annex if necessary. 

Separately, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy may provide an 

additional report detailing his views on the benefits and costs of such cooperation. 

Updated Report on Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Developments

In the committee report (H. Rept. 113-102) accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee directed the 

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Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to "provide unclassified semi-annual reports, 

with a classified annex if necessary, detailing the status of the development and 

deployment by the Russian Federation of nuclear weapons and associated delivery 

systems not subject to strategic arms control treaties. Such reports shall include 

status of deployment, numbers of deployed systems, expected employment doctrine, 

and status of training in the employment of such systems by the military forces of 

the Russian Federation."

The committee has received one such report and found it to be less 

responsive to its direction than it hoped. Therefore, the committee directs the 

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to submit a report to the House Committee on 

Armed Services not later than October 1, 2014, that includes the following:

(1) The status of the development and deployment by the Russian 

Federation of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems not subject to 

strategic arms control treaties; 

(2) The numbers of such deployed and non-deployed systems; 

(3) The expected employment doctrine; and

(4) The status of training in the employment of such systems by Russian 

military forces.

TITLE XVI—STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND 

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Additional Homeland Missile Defense Interceptor Site

The committee notes that section 239 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66) provided for certain 

briefings on the development of an additional homeland defense interceptor site and 

section 4201 of that Act provided $20.0 million for planning activities related to 

such site. 

The committee is also aware that on February 26, 2014, Commander, U.S. 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) testified that: 

“[T]he third site, if you built it, would give us better weapons access, it'd 

give us increased inventory and increased battle space with regards to a threat 

coming from the direction of the Middle East. So those are just facts. And that's 

what it would give to the combatant commander—and that's me—the one that's 

accountable for the defense of the homeland from the ICBM threats ... [Iran has] not 

stopped aspirational goals towards ICBM technologies. They have successfully put a 

missile—space vehicle into orbit, and that demonstrates the types of technologies 

that you need to develop an ICBM ... I think it was very prudent to direct us—or the 

Missile Defense Agency—to do a site selection.”

The committee acknowledges the assessment of the Commander of 

NORTHCOM and therefore directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in 

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coordination with the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, to provide the House 

Committee on Armed Services briefings not less than every 90 days through the end 

of fiscal year 2015, and starting not later than September 15, 2014, on the following:

(1) Progress updating the cost estimates provided to the committee in 

March 2012 for the additional homeland missile defense site; 

(2) Progress updating the Facility Requirement Documents, such as those 

developed for the ground-based interceptor site at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and 

the planned site in the Republic of Poland, also known as the Third Site, and 

other planning and designing processes related to the construction of an additional 

homeland missile defense interceptor site; and 

(3) Any additional matters they deem useful.

Furthermore, the committee directs the Director, MDA, in coordination 

with the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, not later than September 15, 2014, to 

provide the congressional defense committees a written and unclassified assessment 

of which of the potential sites for a homeland missile defense site under 

consideration offers the best site for the defense of the homeland from 

intercontinental ballistic missiles from Iran and whether such site is different than 

the site determined by the Commander in his 2007/2008 homeland missile defense 

study (the 2007-2008 U.S. NORTHCOM Ground-based Interceptor Study).

Briefing and Report on the Implementation of the Secretary of Defense's Plans for 

Cruise Missile Defense of the United States

The committee shares the concerns of the Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command, who testified on February 26, 2014, about the rising threat of cruise 

missile attack on the United States homeland and commends the Department of 

Defense for beginning to address this threat in an affordable manner. The 

Commander testified that:

"[W]e've been directed by the Secretary to ensure that we are also looking 

at how to provide effective defense against cruise missiles in a way that outpaces 

any threats, to include Russians ... and that's a three-phased approach that's been 

approved by the Pentagon. And it starts with getting the national capital region 

right. And right now, we're going through a test phase where two things have been 

added or are being added to the national capital region -- the stateside affordable 

radar, in conjunction with a joint elevated net sensor, the JLENS balloons. And 

what they're trying to accomplish is integrating that into an overall defensive plan 

that allows us to see, detect, track, warn and in the future hopefully engage cruise 

missiles that could pose a threat to the national capital region. Then the issue will 

be if the cruise missile threat continues to evolve, how do we then take and export 

that capability where we think we might need it to defend other strategically or 

critical infrastructure locations in the United States and Canada."

The committee supported the Secretary of Defense's plan in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66). However, the 

committee is concerned that the Secretary's plan is in danger of not being executed 

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in only its second year of implementation. The committee is aware that the Joint 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization had been responsible for 

implementation and funding for the initial capability in fiscal year 2014, but that 

responsibility is shifting to a military service in fiscal year 2015. The committee is 

aware that at least two of the key programs in the Secretary's plan are not funded 

by the responsible military service in the first year of its responsibility for doing so.

However, to more fully understand the impacts of the fiscal year 2015 

budget request, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 

consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Commander, U.S. 

Northern Command, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed 

Services not later than June 30, 2014, explaining the impacts on the Secretary's 

cruise missile defense plan of the potential delays included in the fiscal year 2015 

budget request and how the Chairman believes these potential delays can be 

avoided, including through reprogramming actions if necessary. 

 The committee directs the Chairman, in consultation with the Commander, 

U.S. Northern Command, and such other persons or agencies he deems expedient, 

to submit to the congressional defense committees a report not later than February 

1, 2015, that includes the following: an identification of the longer term coordination 

challenges within the Department of Defense and the federal government 

concerning other government radar assets that could be useful to this mission and a 

plan to ensure their availability; an identification of any air space challenges that 

may be present at a more advantageous geographic location for defense of the 

national capital region and a plan to address them; views of, and recommendations 

from, the North American Air Domain Awareness Surveillance (NAADAS) Analysis 

of Alternatives (AoA); and a recommendation for the designation of a responsible 

Departmental authority to coordinate planning for the cruise missile defense 

mission and acquisition of related military capabilities. 

Comptroller General Review of Nuclear Weapons Council

The role of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) established by the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (Public Law 99-661) has 

evolved with time and national needs. Today, the NWC's primary responsibilities 

focus on coordination and joint decisionmaking between the Department of Defense 

and the Department of Energy with respect to U.S. nuclear weapon policies, 

programs, schedules, and budgets. 

Over the past several years, the NWC has considered and approved a series 

of actions, programs, and plans for the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons program 

that have shortly thereafter been thwarted by Department of Energy resource 

constraints and differing priorities. This tension has been exacerbated by 

Department of Energy's increasing reliance on annual budget authority transfers 

from Department of Defense (totaling over $1.0 billion each year) to accomplish its 

nuclear modernization mission. Recent defense authorization bills have sought to 

provide the NWC greater insight into Department of Energy's National Nuclear 

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Security Administration budget and budgeting process, but coordination and 

transparency problems remain apparent. 

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to 

submit a report to the congressional defense committees by April 1, 2015, 

containing an assessment of the Nuclear Weapons Council's role, responsibilities, 

and effectiveness in coordinating Department of Defense and Department of Energy 

policies, programs, schedules, and budgets for developing, sustaining, and 

modernizing nuclear delivery systems, nuclear weapons, and their supporting 

infrastructure. The Comptroller General should assess: (1) the authorities and 

responsibilities of the NWC; (2) the decisionmaking processes and procedures of the 

NWC and its subordinate committees; and (3) the ability of the NWC to implement, 

oversee, and ensure its decisions are successfully executed. The Comptroller 

General's report should include recommendations to the Department of Defense and 

Department of Energy, or matters for congressional consideration, as appropriate, 

to improve the effectiveness of the NWC.

Conventional Prompt Strike Capability Research, Development, and Acquisition

The committee is aware that in testimony before it on April 2, 2014, the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command stated: 

"Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) capability offers the opportunity to 

rapidly engage high-value targets without resorting to nuclear options. CPS could 

provide precision and responsiveness in Anti-Access Area Denial environments 

while simultaneously minimizing unintended military, political, environmental, 

economic, or cultural consequences. I support continuing research and development 

of these important capabilities."

The committee agrees. The committee recognizes the success of the Army’s 

Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) test conducted on November 17, 2011, though 

it notes the failures of the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle tests. The committee is 

also aware of the planned flight test 2 of the AHW technology development system 

that will demonstrate operationally suitable ranges and performance as well as 

additional technologies needed to support continued development of this capability. 

The committee is aware that following flight test 2, the Department of 

Defense plans to examine the feasibility of deploying a hypersonic prompt strike 

weapon on a submarine platform. The committee believes it is prudent to 

undertake these efforts but is concerned about the budget sufficiency to do so. The 

committee is also concerned that with the budget request for fiscal year 2015, and 

the Future Years Defense Program, there is not sufficient funding requested and 

planned for the transition of this technology to a military service for a full-scale 

development and acquisition program when the technology has reached appropriate 

maturity. 

The committee notes that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the 

Administration planned to deploy these capabilities, "while not negatively affecting 

the stability of our nuclear relationships with Russia or China." The committee 

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agrees with this policy. The committee also notes that it directed the Secretary of 

Defense to provide a report on any policy considerations concerning any potential 

ambiguity problems regarding the launch of a conventionally armed missile from 

submarine platforms and any potential verification measures that may be pursued 

in the Joint Explanatory Statement (Committee Print No. 2) accompanying the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. The committee has not 

yet received this directed report and is interested in a detailed understanding of 

how the Department plans to evaluate and resolve these potential problems. 

The committee is also concerned that there does not appear to be an Army 

development program in the Department's plans, notwithstanding the fact that the 

only success the United States has seen with these technologies is the Army's AHW 

demonstrator. The committee believes it is prudent to consider whether a third 

flight test of the AHW could contribute to the Department's understanding of the 

feasibility of an Army development path. 

The committee therefore directs the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in coordination with the Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later 

than February 1, 2015, that includes the following: a detailed plan for the future of 

CPS, including an estimated timeline for completion of current research and 

development activities and associated projected cost; a determination about which 

additional strategic infrastructure technologies and enabling capabilities may be 

required to support CPS; opportunities for inter-service collaboration in 

development of common technology; opportunities and efforts to transition 

technologies developed under this program to current and future weapons systems; 

a date by which CPS programs will be transitioned to military services for full 

development and acquisition; an assessment of the utility of a third AHW flight 

test; and, an updated assessment of threat for which the military requirement for 

this capability was validated.

 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Review of Missile Defense Agency Tests 

and Targets Efficiencies

The committee is aware that the budget request for fiscal year 2015 and the 

Future Years Defense Program contains significant and meaningful efficiencies in 

the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) ballistic missile tests and targets program. The 

committee commends the efforts of the Director, MDA to achieve these hundreds of 

millions of dollars in savings by the measures proposed and believes these funds can 

and should be reinvested into important modernization programs for the ballistic 

missile defense system. 

To support the Director, MDA, the committee directs the Director, Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), in coordination with the Director, 

MDA, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later 

than October 31, 2014, detailing the views of the Director, CAPE on the likelihood 

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that the proposed efficiencies in MDA's test and targets programs can be realized 

and the Director's views as to whether there are opportunities to achieve further 

efficiencies in fiscal year 2015 and the Future Years Defense Program.

Directed Energy for Missile Defense

The committee is concerned with the fiscal year 2015 budget request for 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) directed energy. The committee is also concerned 

that MDA has chosen to focus the limited funds included in the budget request for 

directed energy on two technologies, which may not in fact be the most promising 

technologies for multiple aspects of the missile defense mission. While the 

committee supports the MDA's focus on directed energy applications for the missile 

defense sensing mission, it does not believe it is appropriate to focus only on those 

applications. 

The committee is aware of the progress being made by the U.S. Army and 

the U.S. Navy with testing, including field testing, of directed energy systems to 

destroy threats. The committee is also aware of cutting-edge work being done 

elsewhere in the Department of Defense. The committee notes that MDA pursued 

development of a megawatt class laser and had a successful test against a ballistic 

missile threat, though the program experienced technical challenges and delays. 

MDA has largely abandoned near-term development of its non-sensing directed 

energy efforts. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in cooperation with the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Director, Missile Defense Agency, 

to provide a roadmap to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than 

January 15, 2015, covering the development and deployment of missile defense 

technologies dealing with the destruction of threat ballistic missiles. 

E4-B and Assessments on Nuclear Command and Control

In a January 2014 report to Congress required by the committee's report 

(H. Rept. 113-102) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2014, the Air Force described the history and way ahead for sustainment of 

the E4-B fleet. The report described several abortive attempts to initiate a 

replacement program for the aging E4-B fleet, as well as the increasingly difficult 

and costly efforts to sustain and recapitalize E4-B systems. Plans for replacement of 

the E4-B have been delayed largely because of uncertainty in future concepts of 

operations (CONOPs) for nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 

National Military Command System (NMCS) airborne fleets. The January 2014 

report describes several efforts underway, and scheduled for completion by latesummer 2014, that are examining and defining NC3 requirements, architectures, 

and CONOPs. The committee believes these efforts must be completed expeditiously 

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to inform critical decisions regarding the nation's NC3 system, including potential 

replacement of the E4-B system. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to submit to the congressional defense committees by November 15, 2014, the 

reports resulting from the ongoing capabilities-based assessment of the nuclear 

command and control system and the mission area analysis of the NC3 NMCS 

airborne fleet.

Fielding of Global Positioning System Military Code

The committee fully supports investments to the Global Positioning System 

(GPS) to maintain U.S. military preeminence in positioning, navigation, and timing. 

In particular, the Department of Defense is working to field the military code (Mcode), which is a capability designed to provide improved resistance to existing and 

emerging threats, to include jamming. 

In the committee report (H. Rept. 113-102) accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee noted its concern 

that the current schedule for GPS III spacecraft, Next Generation Operational 

Control System, and the user equipment is not aligned. The committee believes 

that this is still a valid concern. The committee also notes the requirements stated 

in section 913 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2011 (Public Law 111-383) requiring the Department to purchase M-code capable 

user equipment during the fiscal years after fiscal year 2017. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United 

States to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by March 15, 

2015, on the progress the Department is making in deploying an M-code capability. 

This assessment should include current and planned investments; whether key 

milestones are being met; the projected ability to the meet the requirements in 

section 913 of Public Law 111-383; and an identification of the challenges that GPS 

faces and possible recommendations on how to make the program more successful 

in delivering M-code capabilities. 

Global Positioning System Replenishment

The committee is aware of the Air Force's most recent plan to delay the 

procurement and launch of Global Positioning System (GPS) III constellation 

satellites. While the committee is aware that the Air Force may have made some 

technical changes to enable better power management of on-orbit satellites, this 

does not affect the overall constellation fragility as characterized by factors such as 

satellite age and technical state of internal redundancy or lack thereof. The 

committee is concerned with the revised Air Force plan and has not seen any 

detailed analysis to support the significant changes to the schedule.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a 

report to the congressional defense committees, by November 1, 2014, on the Global 

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Positioning System satellite constellation and replenishment plan. The GPS plan 

should address the following:

(1) Current satellite and launch vehicle acquisition schedule;

(2) Cost advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a satellite and 

launch vehicle acquisition schedule as planned in the fiscal year 2014 President's 

budget, as compared to the current schedule;

(3) Age, design life, and technical state of all on-orbit assets;

(4) Calculated functional availability as identified with planned launches;

(5) Risk assessment of not meeting the required functional availability;

(6) Options to lower the risk assessment, to include faster replenishment of 

satellites;

(7) National security impact if the necessary capability is not provided; and

(8) Risks of further schedule delays to the planned satellite and launch 

schedule.

High Capacity Satellite Communications

The committee is aware of the growing satellite communications needs of 

the Department of Defense. According to the fiscal year 2013 report from the 

Defense Business Board (DBB) titled, "Taking Advantage of Opportunities for 

Commercial Satellite Communications Services," the DBB states, "as the demand 

for service increases in the future, the cost of communications satellite services 

purchased by Defense Information Systems Agency is projected to grow to $3B-$5B 

over the next 15 years." 

The committee believes that the use of modern technologies, such as high 

capacity communications satellites, may provide cost-effective bandwidth options to 

meet the Department's growing communications requirements. Therefore, the 

committee directs the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer to provide a 

briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than October 15, 

2014, on the potential use of modern technologies, such as high capacity 

communications satellites, to address the Department's requirements, and whether 

existing satellite communications acquisition processes and authorities are 

conducive to acquiring such technologies.

Kestrel Eye Joint Capability Technology Demonstration

The committee fully supports the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command program called Kestrel Eye. Kestrel Eye is a Joint Capability 

Technology Demonstration of a nanosatellite-class imagery satellite that is designed 

for tactical ground forces. The satellite will provide the warfighter, in the field, a 

capability to directly task and receive operational data from a space-based collection 

system. The imagery intelligence will support rapid situational awareness.

The committee is aware that this is a technology demonstration in 

development and has not launched into orbit yet. The committee encourages the 

Department of Defense to find a suitable space launch opportunity to enable the 

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Army to complete a military utility assessment to evaluate the operational value of 

this capability.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide a briefing to the House Committee 

on Armed Services, within 180 days of initial operating capability, on the military 

utility assessment of Kestrel Eye.

Long Range Discriminating Radar for Homeland Missile Defense

Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 

(Public Law 113-66), directed the Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to deploy 

a long-range discriminating radar (LRDR) against long-range ballistic missile 

threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and authorized $30.0 

million for that purpose. 

In the budget request for fiscal year 2015, $79.5 million was also requested 

for this purpose. As the MDA's fiscal year 2015 budget overview states, "the new 

LRDR is a mid-course tracking radar that will provide persistent sensor coverage 

and improve discrimination capabilities against threats to the homeland from the 

Pacific theater. This new radar also will give the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar 

more geographic deployment flexibility for contingency and test use." 

The committee recalls that section 235 of Public Law 113-66 also requires a 

plan be developed for such contingency deployment, including on the East Coast of 

the United States against the potential long-range ballistic missile threat from the 

Islamic Republic of Iran. The committee looks forward to receiving this report in 

June 2014. 

The committee supports the LRDR approach and intends to provide careful 

oversight over the technology and site selection processes for what the Future Years 

Defense Program indicates will be a nearly $1.0 billion program. 

The committee is aware that the National Academy of Sciences report, 

"Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and 

Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other 

Alternatives," recommended one potential sensor architecture. The committee also 

recalls that in a study conducted by the Director, Missile Defense Agency in 

response to the committee report (H. Rept. 112-479) accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, it was clear that employing current 

technology, like the ground-based radar-prototype, could be highly affordable and 

effective. The committee expects the Director to consider these and other options. 

The committee is also concerned that this necessary, $1 billion investment 

will be borne entirely by the Missile Defense Agency when, it is likely that the 

missile defense mission will consume very little of the LRDR's actual operational 

employment. The committee understands that missile defense will, by necessity, be 

the priority mission; however, it is expected that space situational awareness and 

other applications will likely be the primary operating mode. 

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Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency, in 

coordination with the Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command and any other 

appropriate United States government agency, to provide a report to the 

congressional defense committees and the congressional intelligence committees 

prior to setting the requirements for the LRDR, and not later than January 1, 2015, 

detailing how those requirements will be optimized to perform missions including 

missile defense sensor coverage, space situational awareness, and other missions of 

interest to the United States. The committee believes that there is also the 

opportunity for cost-sharing of the costs of such radar design and operation and 

expects the report coordinated by the Director among these agencies will include an 

assessment of that opportunity. The committee is aware that the U.S. Air Force is 

making significant investments in space situational awareness and believes there 

exists the opportunity in this nascent MDA acquisition effort to realize significant 

efficiencies for the American taxpayer. 

The committee further directs the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to 

provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than January 31, 

2015, detailing the requirement for space situational awareness coverage and how 

the LRDR fits into that coverage requirement and may enable a change in current 

plans to take advantage of this added capability. 

Missile Defense Applications for Electro Magnetic Rail Gun Technology

The committee applauds the work of the Navy and the Strategic 

Capabilities Office (SCO) to develop an electro-magnetic rail gun that could be 

capable of use as a more affordable air and missile defense option. The committee is 

mindful that a significant body of work and technology maturation remains to be 

completed before a thorough evaluation of this technology's suitability for air and 

missile defense is possible. 

The committee is concerned that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has 

been largely relegated to a minor, supporting role in the evaluation of rail gun 

technology thus far. The committee is aware that MDA has been granted 

significant exemptions from Department of Defense acquisition processes precisely 

to empower the agency to provide for the rapid development and fielding of cutting 

edge technology to defend the United States, its allies, and deployed forces from 

threat ballistic missiles. This exemption for MDA was reaffirmed in the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review of 2010. The committee notes the value of cutting-edge and 

nimble development and acquisition to satisfy air and missile defense requirements, 

as well as the operational requirements of the combatant commanders, and it hopes 

MDA is still capable of such development and acquisition efforts. 

The committee is also aware of the assumption of technical authority over 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense by MDA; and the committee believes this is a 

powerful opportunity to synergize efforts across the Department of Defense. 

The committee has been briefed by SCO and MDA on the path ahead for 

evaluating rail gun technology for the air and missile defense mission, and believes 

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that rigorous testing is vital to that evaluation. The committee is concerned that 

the current test schedule creates the potential for progress to stall in fiscal year 

2016 if SCO funding ends for this test program and MDA has not had sufficient test 

data to evaluate the technology for development as part of the ballistic missile 

defense system and inclusion in the budget request for fiscal year 2016. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency, in 

coordination with the Director, Strategic Capabilities Office, to provide a report to 

the congressional defense committees not later than November 15, 2014, that 

details the following:

(1) An agreed upon series of test events to determine the suitability of this 

technology for transfer to MDA for further development activity, including test exit 

criteria that should be met to warrant its transition; 

(2) Funding required in fiscal year 2016 and future years to undertake that 

test activity (beyond those funds already provided by SCO); 

(3) Opportunities to use existing MDA test events and assets to evaluate 

features of a rail gun system; and

(4) Opportunities to leverage other military service development and test 

activities to ensure the most cost-effective commitment of SCO, MDA, and other 

Department of Defense resources. 

Mobile User Objective System

The committee supports the Department of the Navy's Mobile User 

Objective System (MUOS) space program. The committee is aware that MUOS will 

provide a critical communication capability for the warfighter by enabling greater 

mobility, higher data rates, and improved operational availability. Of the eventual 

five satellite constellation, there are currently two MUOS satellites on orbit which 

were launched in November 2012 and July 2013.

The committee is aware that MUOS has two payloads, one to continue the 

legacy narrowband communications capability and another with a modern 

adaptation of Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) cellular 

technology. The committee is concerned that the modern WCMDA payload, which 

represents the primary purpose of developing a MUOS system, is unavailable for 

use by the warfighter. 

The committee is aware that the current Navy schedule projects the MUOS 

space and ground system to be operational in the first quarter of fiscal year 2015, 

but the user terminals will not be available until 21 months later. The committee is 

disappointed with this lack of synchronization in delivery of capability to the 

warfighter. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in 

coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by 

December 1, 2014, on a plan to accelerate the fielding of the user terminals in 

support of the MUOS program.

Nuclear Detonation Detection System

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The committee is aware of the joint Department of Defense and 

Department of Energy nuclear detonation (NUDET) detection system. The NUDET 

detection system is designed to detect, locate, and report on nuclear detonations in 

the Earth’s atmosphere or near space in near real time. The program is designed to 

support treaty monitoring, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and 

nuclear force management. The committee is aware that the funding for this 

program is split between the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, 

which can cause challenges in program execution and coordination. The committee 

notes the importance of meeting NUDET detection system requirements as part of 

its plans for its space architecture, understanding the multitude of requirements 

that exist on the space architecture and the declining budget. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 

with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State, to provide a briefing to the 

House Committee on Armed Services by January 15, 2015, on the NUDET detection 

system. The briefing should include identification of the requirements, a strategic 

plan to address those requirements, and the cost and schedule of the associated 

activities.

Report and Plan for Minuteman III Sustainment

From 2001-09, the Air Force conducted a Propulsion Replacement Program 

to remanufacture solid rocket motors for the Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile system. This high-production rate program extended the life of 601 

solid rocket motors an additional 20-25 years. In 2017, ongoing surveillance efforts 

will enable the Air Force to determine the expected service life of these 

remanufactured rocket motors; the first of which will likely age out between 2020-

25. Concurrently, existing Minuteman III guidance electronics are expected to age 

out in the mid-2020s. 

The committee notes that the Air Force is expected to finish its analysis of 

alternatives (AOA) for the follow-on to the Minuteman III in July 2014. Regardless 

of the outcome of this analysis, the Air Force plans to sustain and operate the 

Minuteman III system to 2030. The committee believes a significant gap and 

misalignment exists between the Air Force's stated intention to sustain Minuteman 

III to 2030 and the programs required to do so. Therefore, the committee directs the 

Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to the congressional defense 

committees by February 1, 2015, containing the Air Force's plan and programs to 

sustain the Minuteman III system to 2030 or beyond. Such report and plan should: 

(1) be informed by the pending AOA; (2) assess the feasibility, costs, and benefits of 

initiating a low-rate production program for solid rocket motors, including 

identification of preparatory actions should current rocket motors begin aging out in 

2020; and (3) to the extent practicable, align guidance replacement, propulsion 

replacement, and other efforts to minimize flight testing expenses.

Report on Reliability, Modernization and Refurbishment of the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense Segment

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The committee recognizes the shift in the Administration’s missile defense 

policy to a priority on homeland defense as evidenced by the March 2013 Secretary 

of Defense announcement, made in response to an escalating intercontinental 

ballistic missile threat, to increase the ground-based interceptor (GBI) fleet by 

nearly fifty percent by 2017. The committee supports this position; however, there 

is concern that the Administration has not made a commensurate shift in funding 

for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to address long-standing 

issues that have manifested themselves in flight test failures, degraded reliability, 

escalating obsolescence, and erosion of margin of capability over the threat. The 

committee notes that the GMD system is approximately 10 years old and was 

originally designed for a 20-year service life. The committee supports efforts to 

close the gap between what it believes is needed as necessary investment in the 

GMD system and the proposed funding levels contained in the budget request. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to 

provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than November 

1, 2014, that evaluates the necessary resources to maintain the GMD system in 

future years to achieve no less than standard industry practices for strategically 

important peer systems (such as Minuteman, Trident D5, Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense, and Aegis Standard Missile-3) for fleet upgrades, reliability 

confidence, obsolescence mitigation, and service-life assurance of capabilities 

against a threat that is growing in quantities and sophistication. The report should 

include, but not be limited to:

(1) Action plans, schedule, and by-year budget required to improve overall 

GBI fleet reliability and incorporate lessons learned from all ground and flight test 

failures into the existing fleet and in-process assets;

(2) Action plans, schedule, asset line-of-balance allocations, and by-year 

budget required to conduct a robust systems engineering approach for GBI ground 

testing to ensure confidence in system reliability, capability, and long-term 

sustainment. This should include robust GBI integration testing, Stockpile 

Reliability, Aging and Surveillance, Highly Accelerated Life Testing, and Highly 

Accelerated Stress Screening;

(3) Action plans, schedule, and by-year budget required to modernize and 

improve the GMD Ground System to ensure its sustainability for the operational 

life. Areas addressed should include technology refresh of obsolete components and 

technologies, modernized electronics architectures to eliminate single point failures 

and improve reliability, replacement of Ada software with a modern supportable 

and sustainable language, and fully incorporate the improved capabilities planned 

in the Enhanced Kill Vehicle Re-design and the Long Range Discrimination Radar; 

(4) By-year procurement budget requirements for various lot-buys for the 

additional 14 GBIs that the Secretary of Defense announced in March 2013, and 

include the associated long-lead procurement budget requirements and timeline to 

support, and impacts on the industrial base.

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Report on Strategic Submarine Command and Control in the People's Republic of 

China

In its report on "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2013," the Department of Defense highlighted the ballistic 

missile submarine program in the People's Republic of China, stating that China's 

Navy "places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force. China 

continues the production of JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 

(SSBN). Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094) are currently operational, and up to five 

may enter service before China proceeds to its next generation SSBN (Type 096) 

over the next decade." In testimony before the committee on March 5, 2014, the 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command stated that, "China’s advance in submarine 

capabilities is significant. They possess a large and increasingly capable submarine 

force. China continues the production of ballistic missile submarines. The platform 

will carry a new missile with an estimated range of more than 4,000 nautical miles. 

This will give the [sic] China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, probably 

before the end of 2014."

The committee is concerned that China's imminent deployment of an 

operational sea-based strategic deterrent is a major new step in China's nuclear 

weapon program. This step further increases the opacity of China's already opaque 

nuclear forces. Of particular concern, deployment of nuclear-armed SSBNs requires 

China to develop and implement new command, control, and communications 

paradigms to ensure positive control of the nuclear warheads by China's senior 

leaders. To better understand this new Chinese capability and its implications, the 

committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional 

defense committees by November 1, 2014, on the strategic and regional implications 

of China's sea-based nuclear deterrent force; China's command, control, and 

communications system for such force; the implications for the U.S. and its allies of 

the emergence of a Chinese sea-based nuclear force; the contribution of China's seabased deterrent to China's overall nuclear doctrine and employment strategy, 

including survivable second-strike capabilities; and, U.S. and partner nation 

mitigation or response plans. 

Requirement for Plan For Use of Highly Accelerated Life Testing and Highly 

Accelerated Stress Screening

On March 4, 2014, the committee received a report from the Director, 

Missile Defense Agency in response to the committee report (H. Rept. 113-102) 

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 

concerning highly accelerated life testing and highly accelerated stress screening 

(HALT/HASS) testing of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems and Components. The 

committee believes this report was a useful review of the potential benefits and 

limitations of employing this rigorous review system in addition to current Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA) systems. The committee agrees with the Director's belief 

that HALT/HASS testing could be useful in certain future MDA efforts. 

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Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to 

submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 

Representatives in concurrence with the fiscal year 2016 budget submission a plan 

to employ HALT/HASS testing, as appropriate, in appropriate future MDA 

programs. The committee believes these efforts should be supervised in part by 

MDA and should be competitively awarded through full and open competition. 

Responses to Foreign Hypersonic Weapons Threats

The committee is concerned that the People's Republic of China and other 

competitor nations pose an increasing challenge to the United States’ technology 

edge in such emerging areas as hypersonic weapons. On January 9, China 

successfully conducted the first flight test of a hypersonic glide vehicle. The 

Russian Federation is also known to be pursuing research and development of 

hypersonic capabilities. In testimony before the committee on January 28, 2014, 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, stated 

that, "[o]n hypersonics, this is a good example of an area of technology that is going 

to move forward whether we invest in it or not...China is doing work in this area.”

At the same time, the committee is unaware of any significant efforts to 

prepare defenses against hypersonic weapons. Therefore, the committee directs the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in 

consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit a report to 

the congressional defense committees by December 31, 2014, that evaluates 

emerging hypersonic threats to the United States, its allies, and its deployed forces, 

and explains how the Department of Defense intends to develop and deploy a 

defensive capability to counter this emerging threat. 

Revision to the Integrated Master Test Plan

The committee believes that the reliability and warfighter confidence in the 

Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment, also called the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) segment, could be enhanced through more frequent flight 

and intercept testing. 

According to the "Plan to Increase the Rate of Ground-Based Midcourse 

Defense Flight Tests" submitted to the congressional defense committees in October 

2013 in accordance with the requirements of section 231 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239), an increase in test 

cadence to three test events every 2 years will "require an increase in test resources 

and personnel." The committee believes such resources could increase warfighter 

confidence and the reliability of the nation's operationally deployed homeland 

missile defense capability if this test cadence is feasible and efficient. 

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA), in coordination with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to 

provide a report to the congressional defense committees following the FTG-06b 

intercept test, if successful, on the benefits and risks of revising the Integrated 

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Master Test Plan presently in force and future submissions of the plan, to achieve 

GMD tests at a frequency of not less than every nine months. The committee also 

directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to include in the budget request for 

fiscal year 2016 an illustration of the funding required, if appropriate, to meet this 

enhanced GMD test cadence. 

Standard Missile 3 Block IB

The committee is concerned by the reduction in funding for the Standard 

Missile 3 (SM-3) program in fiscal year 2015 and across the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP). After demonstrating success in five of five intercepts in 2013 and 

with a Full Rate Production decision planned for fall 2014, the Department now has 

reduced programmed quantities each year to fewer than were funded in fiscal year 

2014 in Low Rate Initial Production. The committee believes such a reduction 

injects inefficiency into the production line and that inefficiency may unnecessarily 

increase the per unit cost of these interceptors. 

At the same time, the committee is not aware of any diminishment in 

requirements by the combatant commanders for these interceptors. The committee 

supports the funding requested in the budget submission for Advanced Procurement 

to support long-lead time requirements for these missiles. The committee also 

supports the likely request in the fiscal year 2016 budget request for multi-year 

procurement authority for these missile interceptors. The committee believes that a 

successful negotiation between the Missile Defense Agency and its contractors could 

drive down the per unit cost of these interceptors and increase the available 

quantities to the warfighter. 

The committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to provide a 

briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than October 1, 2014, 

on the sufficiency of current and programmed inventory of SM-3 missiles to meet 

combatant commander requirements, the number of Requests for Forces received 

from combatant commanders in 2012-13 for SM-3 interceptors, and the shortfall in 

interceptors in each year of the FYDP. 

University Affiliated Research Centers for the Missile Defense Agency

The committee believes the missile defense mission is crucial to the 

protection of the homeland as well as allies and deployed forces, especially as the 

enemy threat increases in size and complexity. Yet, both internal and external 

evaluations and assessments have indicated that the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) needs to make significant technical advancements to create Ballistic Missile 

Defense System performance that is more reliable and affordable. 

The committee is aware that many agencies, including defense agencies, 

have found that University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC) have been useful 

for their core research and development capabilities.

 Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to 

provide a briefing to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House 

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Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2014, on whether 

expanding use of UARCs is appropriate and useful to the Missile Defense Agency, 

and if so, in what specific mission or technological areas, the prospective costs of 

such cooperation (including the safeguarding of unclassified technical information 

and classified information), and a plan for relevant universities to undertake a pilot 

UARC partnership, including identification of requirements for qualification to 

participate, and the completion by MDA of a public survey of university capabilities 

before entering into any UARC agreement.

DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 

SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER 

AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY 

PROGRAMS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Weapons Activities

Implementation of Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing

Section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2014 (Public Law 113-66) required the Administrator for Nuclear Security to 

establish a Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing 

(CSTART). In the wake of the security breach at the Y-12 National Security 

Complex in July 2012, the CSTART was established to provide the Administrator, 

the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, and the management and operating 

contractors of the nuclear security enterprise a wide-range of objective expertise on 

security technologies, systems, analysis, testing, and response forces. 

To better understand the Administrator's plan for the CSTART, the 

committee directs the Administrator to provide a briefing to the House Committee 

on Armed Services by September 30, 2014, on the Administrator's implementation 

plan for the CSTART. Such plan should be developed in consultation with the 

Department of Energy's Departmental Security Committee and should discuss the 

roles, missions, functions, responsibilities, and personnel assigned to the CSTART, 

as well as actions to be taken to implement the CSTART and timelines for such 

actions.

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