NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEREMY JOHN BRAULICK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF 

AMERICA; JENNIE DIDIER, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

MIKE BATISTA; CONNIE WINNER; 

SARAH PHIPPS; DOUGLAS FENDER, 

Warden; ACEL THACKER; HEATHER 

SAND; KYLE NASREEN; CHRISTOPHER 

ROST; JOSEPH BERDECIA; JOSEPH 

BERDECIA; MARTHA DOBBINSODEGARD; WILLIAM PEARSON; 

STEPHEN GLEIM; TRISTAN KOHUT; 

PAUL REES; LANCE GRIFFIN; BRIAN 

ROBINSON; REGINALD MICHAEL; 

LORAINE WODNIK; CINDY HINER; 

SANDY JACKE; MICHAEL FLETCHER, 

Defendants.

No. 20-35278 

D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00122-JTJ 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAR 16 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

John T. Johnston, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2022

Portland, Oregon

Before: GRABER, BEA, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Jeremy Braulick, appearing pro se, brought a First Amendment retaliation 

claim against Nurse Jennie Didier which he lost at a jury trial, and a Monell claim 

against Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) which he lost at summary 

judgment. Represented by pro bono counsel, Braulick appeals on three grounds: (1) 

the district court erred when it denied his motion for appointment of counsel, (2) the 

district court erred when it instructed him not to object during closing arguments at 

trial, and (3) the district court erred when it granted summary judgment. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. Appointment of Counsel 

We review a district court’s refusal to appoint counsel in a civil case for abuse 

of discretion. Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014). The district court 

may appoint counsel only upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” Palmer

v. Valdez, 560 F.3d. 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). Exceptional circumstances do not exist 

if the pro se litigant is able to “articulate his claims . . . in light of the complexity of 

the legal issues involved.” Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 

954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
3 

concluded that Braulick was able to articulate his claims, relying on the quality of 

his detailed pleadings and the simplicity of his case.

2. The Closing Argument Instruction 

A trial court’s decision to limit objections during closing arguments is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Patel, 762 F.2d 784, 794-95 (9th 

Cir. 1985). It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to instruct Braulick that 

he was not permitted to object at all during closing arguments because 

contemporaneous objections are the method by which litigants preserve error for 

appeal. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2009). But the error was 

harmless, as the argument to which Braulick claims he would have objected was a 

short, isolated comment he refuted on rebuttal. 

3. The Monell Claim 

To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a 

policy of deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Miranda v. 

City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir. 2005). Braulick pointed to three 

unrelated occurrences over the course of his three-year incarceration during which 

he missed doses of his thyroid medication. But these “isolated or sporadic” incidents 

do not amount to a policy of deliberate indifference. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 

918 (9th Cir. 1996). Reviewing de novo, Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 

967 (9th Cir. 2021), summary judgment was proper. 
4 

AFFIRMED.