Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1709-CR-2192 | April 17, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Melissa J. Haley

Boonville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Osiel Marroquin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 17, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

87A01-1709-CR-2192

Appeal from the 

Warrick Superior Court 

The Honorable 

Robert R. Aylsworth, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

87D02-1612-F4-571

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] Osiel Marroquin (“Marroquin”) pleaded guilty in open court to one Level 4 

felony, three Level 5 felonies, one Level 6 felony, and a Class A misdemeanor. 
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All of those convictions arose from his drunken driving accident that killed 

fifteen-year-old S.R. and caused permanent brain damage to her eighteen-yearold friend, Megan Ripperdan (“Ripperdan”). The trial court entered judgment 

on only three of Marroquin’s convictions, noting that the other three were 

lesser-included offenses, and ordered Marroquin to serve an aggregate executed 

sentence of ten years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). 

Marroquin appeals, contending that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 17, 2016, Marroquin was heavily intoxicated as he drove his 

SUV westbound in the eastbound lanes of State Road 62 (“SR 62”), which was 

a four-lane highway. Meanwhile, Casie Mathies (“Mathies”) was driving 

eastbound in the right lane of State Road 62 when she saw Marroquin drive

past her in the opposite direction in the left lane, prompting her to call 911. 

Before officers could respond, Marroquin crashed into a car, which was driven 

by Whitney Winstead (“Winstead”) and carrying passengers S.R. and 

Ripperdan. 

[4] When law enforcement officers arrived on the scene, Winstead was coherent 

and able to speak, but did not remember the accident. Marroquin was similarly 

alert and able to respond. S.R., who was riding in the front seat of Winstead’s

car, was unresponsive and did not have a pulse. Ripperdan was lying across the 
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back seat of Winstead’s car. She was breathing, but was not coherent and 

began vomiting. Once extracted from the vehicles, emergency crews 

transported the four individuals to the hospital where S.R. was pronounced 

dead. Winstead’s injuries caused pain to her face, mouth, right elbow, and 

knee, while Ripperdan had serious internal bleeding and a large amount of 

swelling to her brain. A blood draw and resulting toxicology test revealed that 

Marroquin had a .232 blood alcohol content (“BAC”).

[5] Between December 20 and December 22, 2016, the State charged Marroquin

with the following six counts: Count 1, Level 5 felony reckless homicide of 

S.R.;

1 Count 2, Level 5 felony causing S.R.’s death when operating a motor 

vehicle with at least a .08 BAC;2 Count 3, Level 5 felony causing S.R.’s death 

when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated;3 Count 4, Level 6 felony 

causing Ripperdan serious bodily injury when operating a motor vehicle with at 

least a .08 BAC;4 Count 5, Class A misdemeanor endangering Mathies when 

operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated;

5 and Count 6, Level 4 felony 

causing S.R.’s death when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated with a 

prior operating while intoxicated conviction.6 On July 21, 2017, Marroquin 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5.

2

See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(1).

3

See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(3).

4

See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(1).

5

See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a), (b).

6

See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(3), (b)(1).
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pleaded guilty to all counts pursuant to an open plea agreement. The trial court 

accepted Marroquin’s guilty plea and entered judgment of conviction only as to 

Counts 4, 5, and 6, noting that Counts 1, 2, and 3 were lesser-included offenses 

of Count 6. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 54-55. 

[6] At an August 24, 2017 sentencing hearing, S.R.’s mother read a letter in which 

she related to the trial court the significance of S.R.’s life, the pain of losing S.R. 

when she was just fifteen years old, and the challenges of S.R.’s eighteen-yearold friend, Ripperdan, who “suffered a traumatic brain injury that will forever 

affect her life as well as those that love her.” Tr. Vol. II at 8. During the 

hearing, Marroquin admitted that, on the night in question, he knew he was 

drunk and called a friend to pick him up, but when that friend did not arrive,

Marroquin decided to drive himself home despite his highly intoxicated state. 

Id. at 13. The trial court found mitigating factors in Marroquin’s admission of 

guilt and relatively law-abiding life. Id. at 19. The trial court also took into 

consideration “the notice of the risk assessment prepared in the presentence 

investigation and report,” which placed Marroquin in “the LOW risk category 

to reoffend.” Id. at 19; Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 63-64. 

[7] The trial court, however, found those mitigating factors were outweighed by the

following aggravating factors:

[Marroquin] recently violated the conditions of any probation[;]

an active bench warrant exists from Florida for his arrest at this 

time[; and]. . . . Marroquin has been in the United States 

unlawfully since apparently he was nine years of age. Or for an 
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extended period of time. Obviously if he was not in this country, 

the incident would not have occurred on December 17, 2016. 

Tr. Vol. II at 18-19. Noting that no judgment of conviction was entered on 

Counts 1, 2 or 3, the trial sentenced Marroquin on the three remaining 

convictions. As to Count 6, Level 4 felony operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated causing death with a prior conviction, the trial court ordered 

Marroquin to serve ten years in the DOC. The trial court also sentenced 

Marroquin to serve one year each for his convictions on Count 5 (Class A 

misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated endangering a 

person) and Count 4 (Level 6 felony operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated causing serious bodily injury) and ordered those sentences to be 

served concurrent with Count 6 for an aggregate executed sentence of ten years. 

Marroquin now appeals his sentence. 

Discussion and Decision

[8] Marroquin asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and his character. “The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate 

review and revision of a trial court’s sentencing decision.” Robinson v. State, 91 

N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018). “This authority is implemented through Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, 

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the sentence is found to be 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Id. The principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the 

outliers. Id. (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). “The 
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burden is on the defendant to persuade the reviewing court that the sentence is 

inappropriate.” Id. 

[9] “Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment ‘should 

receive considerable deference.’” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2017) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222), trans. denied. Whether we 

regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on “our sense of the culpability of the 

defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad 

other facts that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. 

“The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather 

whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Sanders, 71 N.E.3d at 844.

[10] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Id. Here, Marroquin was 

sentenced on a Level 4 felony, a Level 6 felony, and a Class A misdemeanor, 

which reflected S.R.’s death, the serious and permanent brain injuries to 

Ripperdan, and the danger his driving posed to Mathies. The sentence for a 

Level 4 felony is a fixed term of between two years and twelve years, with the 

advisory sentence being six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. The sentence for a 

Level 6 felony is a fixed term of between six months and two and one-half 

years, with the advisory sentence being one year. The sentence for a Class A 

misdemeanor is a fixed term of not more than one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. 

Our court must also assess the trial court’s recognition or nonrecognition of 

aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the 
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sentence imposed was inappropriate. Sanders, 71 N.E.3d at 844. Here, the trial 

court found the aggravators were greater than the mitigators and sentenced 

Marroquin to an aggregate sentence of ten years, which was two years less than 

the maximum sentence for just the Level 4 felony.

[11] Marroquin argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense. Specifically, he contends that “[t]here was nothing in the record 

beyond the baseline elements which would merit moving the sentences off of 

the starting point for said charges[,] i.e. the advisory sentences.” Appellant’s Br. 

at 11. We disagree. On the night in question, Marroquin drank to the point 

where he had a .232 BAC, an amount that is almost three times the legal limit. 

Marroquin knew that he was too drunk to drive and called to get a ride, but

when his friend did not arrive, Marroquin decided to drive himself home

despite his highly intoxicated state. Tr. Vol. II at 13. Marroquin’s actions of 

driving that night not only killed a fifteen-year-old girl, but also caused her 

eighteen-year old friend to “suffer[] a traumatic brain injury that will forever 

affect her life as well as those that love her.” Id. at 8. We find the punishment 

for Marroquin’s convictions is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense.

[12] Marroquin’s argument that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character 

also fails. While the trial court noted that Marroquin had mostly led a lawabiding life during his time in the United States and that he was at a low risk to 

reoffend, the trial court also recognized that, at the time of the accident, 

Marroquin had recently violated the conditions of probation on a prior 
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conviction and that there was an active bench warrant from Florida for his 

arrest. Furthermore, the trial court noted that Marroquin had been in the 

United States unlawfully since he was nine years old and that the accident 

could not have occurred without his presence in this country. Based on the 

evidence before the trial court, we cannot say that an aggregate sentence of ten 

years as punishment for Marroquin’s crimes, which left a fifteen-year-old dead

and an eighteen-year-old with traumatic brain injury and endangered another 

driver, is inappropriate in light of Marroquin’s character. We conclude that the 

sentence imposed by the trial court is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 

7(B) and does not warrant appellate revision.

[13] Affirmed.

[14] Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.