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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

November 29, 2016 

v No. 327947 

Macomb Circuit Court 

PAUL A. LATORRE, LC No. 2014-002838-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MURRAY and BORRELLO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant was convicted by a jury of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (force or 

coercion) (CSC-IV), MCL 750.520e(1)(b). He was sentenced to five years’ probation for the 

CSC-IV conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 This appeal arises out of the victim’s claims that sometime in October, 2013, defendant 

approached her at work and pinched her nipple. She also testified that defendant had engaged in 

similar objectionable behavior in the months leading up to the October, 2013 incident and for 

several months thereafter. For example, he had grabbed at her breasts, crotch, and buttocks on 

other occasions, and made crude comments to her suggesting they should have sex. The victim 

indicated that she did not report any of defendant’s behavior to their employer, because the 

facility had a policy under which all people involved in a workplace dispute were suspended 

without pay until the matter could be investigated and resolved. However, another coworker 

advised their employer about the situation on March 25, 2014, after the victim complained to 

him that defendant had exposed his penis to her the day before. Pursuant to the workplace 

policy, the victim and defendant were both suspended as a result of the report. On March 27, 

2014, acting on the advice of her union representative, the victim filed a police report about the 

October, 2013 nipple-pinching incident. Thereafter, defendant was charged with, and eventually 

convicted of, CSC-IV. 

II. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES 
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 On appeal, defendant raises two evidentiary issues. First, defendant argues that the trial 

court erred by allowing testimony indicating that defendant engaged in similar, uncharged acts, 

including grabbing the victim’s crotch, smacking her buttocks, and exposing his penis to her. 

Defendant asserts that such evidence was inadmissible under MRE 404(b) because it constituted 

improper propensity evidence and the prosecutor failed to provide the required advanced notice 

of her intention to introduce other-acts evidence. In a related argument, defendant contends that 

he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the 

introduction of the other-acts evidence. For his second claim of error, defendant argues that the 

trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence, over defense counsel’s objection, that 

defendant told the victim he wanted to have sex with her 14-year-old daughter. According to 

defendant, the testimony about his comment lacked relevance and presented such a high risk of 

unfair prejudice that it should have been excluded, even if relevant. 

 To preserve a claim that evidence was improperly admitted at trial, the party challenging 

the evidence must object at the time of admission. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 508; 674 

NW2d 366 (2004). The party’s objection must be based on the same ground asserted on appeal. 

People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Defense counsel objected to 

various portions of the testimony concerning defendants other uncharged conduct, but his 

objections were not based on the inadmissibility of the evidence under MRE 404(b). Thus, 

defendant’s MRE 404(b) issue is not preserved for appeal. However, because defense counsel 

made a timely objection to the victim’s testimony regarding defendant’s comment about her 

daughter, that issue is properly preserved. To the extent that defendant’s first claim of error also 

alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, that issue is also unpreserved 

because defendant failed to request a new trial or Ginther1

 hearing in the trial court. People v 

Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). 

 When the issue has been properly preserved, this Court generally reviews a trial court’s 

decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 262; 

787 NW2d 126 (2010). “When the decision involves a preliminary question of law however, 

such as whether a rule of evidence precludes admission, we review the question de novo.” 

People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 614; 790 NW2d 607 (2010). Abuse of discretion exists if the 

trial court’s decision “is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v 

Orr, 275 Mich App 587, 588-589; 739 NW2d 385 (2007). There is generally no abuse of 

discretion when the trial court’s decision involves a close evidentiary question. Sabin (After 

Remand), 463 Mich at 67. But “[a] defendant pressing an unpreserved claim of error must show 

a plain error that affected substantial rights, and the reviewing court should reverse only when 

the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” People v Parker, 288 Mich App 500, 509; 795 NW2d 596 

(2010), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of fact and 

constitutional law. People v Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). 

 

1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
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Generally, the lower court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and its rulings on 

questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. Id. However, when the defendant’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not preserved at the trial court level, this Court’s 

review is limited to errors that are apparent from the record on appeal. People v Matuszak, 263 

Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). 

A. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE 

 The admissibility of evidence concerning a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

governed by MRE 404(b), which provides, in part: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 

of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the 

conduct at issue in the case. [MRE 404(b)(1).] 

The Michigan Supreme Court has observed that, by its plain terms, MRE 404(b) applies to 

evidence which presents a risk of an improper character-to-conduct inference only if the 

evidence introduces crimes, wrongs, or acts other than the “conduct at issue in the case,” i.e., the 

charged offense. People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 262-263; 869 NW2d 253 (2015). In other 

words, MRE 404(b) does not restrict the admissibility of evidence concerning acts that constitute 

part of the charged offense, directly evidence the requisite conduct, or contemporaneously 

facilitate the commission of the offense. Id. at 263. 

 Defendant was charged with one count of CSC-IV, arising from the victim’s allegation 

that he pinched her nipple in October, 2013. When charged pursuant to MCL 750.520e(1)(b), as 

defendant was here, “[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if he or 

she engages in sexual contact with another person and . . . [f]orce or coercion is used to 

accomplish the sexual contact.” MCL 750.520e(1)(b); see People v Green, 313 Mich App 526, 

538; 884 NW2d 838 (2015). The other-acts evidence in this case consisted of testimony that 

defendant touched the victim’s breasts, buttocks, and crotch on other occasions, and exposed his 

penis to her. These acts did not constitute part of the sexual contact that occurred in October, 

2013, directly evidence that contact, or otherwise facilitate defendant’s commission of the 

offense. As such, the evidence concerning defendant’s other acts fell squarely within the scope 

of MRE 404(b). See Jackson, 498 Mich at 262-263. 

 In determining the admissibility of other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b), a trial court 

should consider the following analytical framework, first set articulated in People v VanderVliet, 

444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended by 445 Mich 1205 (1994): 

 To admit evidence under MRE 404(b), the prosecutor must first establish 

that the evidence is logically relevant to a material fact in the case, as required by 

MRE 401 and MRE 402, and is not simply evidence of the defendant’s character 

or relevant to his propensity to act in conformance with his character. The 
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prosecution thus bears an initial burden to show that the proffered evidence is 

relevant to a proper purpose under the nonexclusive list in MRE 404(b)(1) or is 

otherwise probative of a fact other than the defendant’s character or criminal 

propensity. Evidence relevant to a noncharacter purpose is admissible under 

MRE 404(b) even if it also reflects on a defendant’s character. Evidence is 

inadmissible under this rule only if it is relevant solely to the defendant’s 

character or criminal propensity. . . . Any undue prejudice that arises because the 

evidence also unavoidably reflects the defendant’s character is then considered 

under the MRE 403 balancing test, which permits the court to exclude relevant 

evidence if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice. . . .” MRE 403. Finally, upon request, the trial court may 

provide a limiting instruction to the jury under MRE 105 to specify that the jury 

may consider the evidence only for proper, noncharacter purposes. [Jackson, 498 

Mich at 259-260, quoting Mardlin, 487 Mich at 615-616 (alterations in original).] 

 By eliciting testimony regarding defendant’s other acts without seeking the trial court’s 

preapproval and without objection from defendant, the prosecutor never identified a proper, 

nonpropensity purpose for the other-acts evidence in the trial court. On appeal, defendant 

contends that the other-acts evidence was admitted solely to paint him as “a deviant with a 

propensity for inappropriate sexual conduct.” On appeal, the prosecutor argues that the otheracts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing that defendant acted with a sexual 

purpose when he pinched the victim’s nipple. By definition, the contact that is criminalized 

under CSC-IV is intentional contact with intimate parts of the defendant’s or victim’s body, 

where that contact is done “for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification,” or “for a sexual 

purpose,” or “in a sexual manner.” MCL 750.520a(q). Thus, it was of critical importance that 

the prosecutor demonstrate defendant’s purpose. 

 The evidence presented at trial concerning the October, 2013 incident was limited. The 

victim’s explanation of the event did not go beyond the bare fact that defendant pinched her 

nipple extremely hard and, in response, she screamed at him. The occurrence was corroborated 

by James Gibson, but there was no evidence about defendant’s conduct that day that suggested 

defendant’s purpose in touching the victim. Though we are struggling to discern a nonsexual 

purpose for such contact, the evidence of defendant’s other sexually-charged behavior toward the 

victim certainly made it more probable that he acted with a sexual purpose or for his own sexual 

arousal or gratification when he pinched the victim’s nipple. Accordingly, the evidence was 

logically relevant for a legitimate, nonpropensity purpose, even if it had a secondary effect of 

casting defendant’s character in a negative light. 

 Under the VanderVliet analytical framework, logically relevant other-acts evidence is still 

subject to exclusion under MRE 403 if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” Jackson, 498 Mich at 259-260. As this Court has recognized 

before, all evidence offered against a party at trial is prejudicial, and only unfairly prejudicial 

evidence must be excluded. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 613-614; 709 NW2d 595 

(2005). Unfair prejudice refers to “the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the 

objecting party’s position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., 

the jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.” Id. at 614 (citation omitted). Nothing in the record 

suggests that the other-acts evidence interjected improper considerations in this matter. To the 
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extent that the testimony regarding defendant’s other acts could have presented a danger of 

unfair prejudice, that danger did not substantially outweigh the significant probative value of the 

evidence, given the lack of direct evidence concerning defendant’s purpose on the date in 

question. Moreover, the danger of unfair prejudice was alleviated by the court’s instructions to 

the jury, advising it of the limited purpose for which the evidence could be considered. 

 In sum, the other-acts evidence was admissible under MRE 404(b) because it was 

logically relevant for a nonpropensity purpose and its probative value was not substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, defendant also contends that the otheracts evidence should not have been admitted because the prosecutor failed to comply with the 

procedural notice requirements mandated by MRE 404(b)(2). It is uncontested that the 

prosecutor did not provide defendant with formal notice of her intention to admit other-acts 

evidence under MRE 404(b). This failure amounts to plain error because MRE 404(b)(2) 

“unambiguously requires notice to the defense at some time before the prosecutor introduces the 

prior bad acts evidence.” People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 453; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). 

Nevertheless, because this plain error was unpreserved in the trial court, defendant must also 

demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights, which “generally requires a showing of 

prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” People v 

Chelmicki, 305 Mich App 58, 69; 850 NW2d 612 (2014), quoting Carines, 460 Mich at 763. 

In Jackson, our Supreme Court found that even if the prosecution fails to make a motion 

under MRE 404(b)(2), the defendant must demonstrate that this error was “more probably than 

not...was outcome determinative.” Jackson, 498 Mich at 270 (citation omitted). As indicated 

above, our review of the record evidence leads us to conclude that the victim’s testimony was 

substantively admissible under MRE 404(b), notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to make a 

proper motion and the trial court’s failure to properly analyze it under that rule. And while it was 

error for the prosecution not to provide, and the trial court not to require, “reasonable notice” of 

the victim’s testimony under MRE 404(b)(2), the defendant has not demonstrated that this error 

“more probably than not . . . was outcome determinative.” Jackson, 498 Mich at 270. 

Accordingly, we find that the lack of proper pretrial notice did not result in the admission of 

substantively improper other-acts evidence. Thus, as our Supreme Court held in Jackson: 

“...although the defendant was not afforded his due ’opportunity to marshal arguments’ against 

its admission before it was introduced at trial, VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 89 n 51, he has not 

shown that any such arguments would have been availing, or would have affected the scope of 

testimony ultimately presented to the jury.” Jackson, 498 Mich at 270-271. As was the case in 

Jackson, while it can be argued here that the defendant suffered “unfair surprise” from the 

unexpected introduction of this testimony at trial, based on the protracted nature of this series of 

workplace incidents, defendant was admittedly aware of the victim’s general version of events 

before trial. Id. at 271. Therefore, we cannot glean from defendant’s arguments that defendant 

would have approached trial or presented his defense differently had he known in advance that 

the victim would be permitted to testify as she did. In line with our Supreme Court’s holding in 

Jackson, we therefore cannot conclude that “defendant suffered outcome-determinative prejudice 

from the prosecution’s failure to follow, and the trial court’s failure to apply, MRE 404(b)(2). 

See also, Hawkins, 245 Mich App at 455-456 (concluding the defendant was not entitled to relief 

due to the prosecutor’s failure to provide the notice required under MRE 404(b) because, inter 

alia, the lack of notice did not result in the prosecutor being ‘able to use irrelevant, inadmissible 
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prior bad acts evidence to secure [the defendant’s] conviction’ and the defendant ‘has never 

suggested how he would have reacted differently to th[e] evidence had the prosecutor given 

notice’”). Jackson, 498 Mich at 279-280. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on this 

issue. 

 Next, defendant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to the 404(b) evidence and 

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the defendant must show that: (1) counsel’s representation at the proceeding “fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, there 

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. People 

v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 670; 821 NW2d 288 (2012), citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 

668, 688-694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). 

Defense counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of other-acts evidence which the 

assistant prosecutor failed to properly notice by motion under MRE 404(b)(2) fell below a 

standard of reasonableness and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, given the 

admissibility of the other-acts evidence in this case, defendant has failed to establish that there is 

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different in the 

absence of defense counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Consequently for the reasons set 

forth above, defendant cannot demonstrate that “but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is 

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Vaughn, 491 Mich at 670. (Citation omitted). Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on 

this issue. 

B. RELEVANCE AND MRE 403 

 Next, defendant argues on appeal that a statement allegedly made by defendant about the 

victim’s daughter. According to the testimony of the victim, after seeing a picture of the victim’s 

underage daughter, defendant made a comment that he would like to have sex with the victim’s 

daughter. “Evidence is generally admissible if it is relevant.” MRE 402; Gipson, 287 Mich App 

at 262. The concept of relevance can be broken into two elements: materiality and probative 

value. McGhee, 268 Mich App at 610. “Materiality looks to the relation between the 

propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the evidence is 

offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial.” 

People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), quoting McCormick, Evidence 

(4th ed), § 185, p 773. “The probative force inquiry asks whether the proffered evidence tends to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Crawford, 458 Mich at 389-

390 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 On appeal, the prosecutor contends that defendant’s remark about the victim’s daughter 

was relevant because it tended to make it more probable that defendant had a sexual purpose 

when he pinched the victim’s nipple in October, 2013. As already noted above, whether 

defendant had a sexual purpose when he acted was of consequence to this action because he 

could only be convicted of CSC-IV if the contact “can reasonably be construed as being for the 

purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner . . . .” 
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MCL 750.520a(q). Thus, because defendant’s purpose was at issue, the evidence satisfies the 

materiality component of relevancy. 

 However, while defendant’s purpose may have been material to the action, it does not 

necessarily follow that his comment about the victim’s daughter had any tendency to make 

defendant’s sexual purpose more or less probable than it would have been without the evidence. 

Unlike the evidence concerning defendant’s other behavior toward the victim, defendant’s 

remark about a third-party minor did nothing to illustrate what his intentions toward the victim 

were, even if his comment was spoken to the victim and concerned her daughter. The timing of 

defendant’s alleged comment is also noteworthy: The victim testified that defendant’s remark 

was made sometime before he began harassing her. Even if we accepted the prosecutor’s 

contention that any sexual remark exemplified the tenor of defendant’s interaction with the 

victim on the day in question, defendant’s comment about her daughter would still lack probative 

value as to his purpose for actions that took place at least a year later. Having failed the 

probative value inquiry, the evidence concerning defendant’s remark about the victim’s daughter 

should have been excluded as irrelevant under MRE 402. 

 Defendant also maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled 

defense counsel’s objection to this line of inquiry because it was highly inflammatory and 

unfairly prejudicial. Pursuant to MRE 403, even if proposed evidence meets the test for 

relevancy, it may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. Gipson, 287 Mich App at 262. 

Assessing probative value against prejudicial effect requires a balancing of 

several factors, including the time required to present the evidence and the 

possibility of delay, whether the evidence is needlessly cumulative, how directly 

the evidence tends to prove the fact for which it is offered, how essential the fact 

sought to be proved is to the case, the potential for confusing or misleading the 

jury, and whether the fact can be proved in another manner without as many 

harmful collateral effects. [People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 751 NW2d 

408 (2008).] 

Evidence may be unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to interject immaterial considerations 

into the lawsuit, McGhee, 268 Mich App at 614, or if it is likely to be given undue or preemptive 

weight by the jury, Blackston, 481 Mich at 462. 

 Assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s comment about the victim’s daughter did have

some probative value relative to his purpose in pinching the victim’s nipple, we agree that the 

prejudicial effect of such evidence substantially outweighed its limited probative value. 

However, the improper admission of defendant’s comment does not warrant reversal unless 

“after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more probable 

than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Burns, 494 Mich 104; 110; 832 

NW2d 738 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The reviewing court must examine the 

nature of the error and assess its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted 

evidence.” People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 397; 666 NW2d 657 (2003) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). There was significant evidence apart from defendant’s comment about the 

victim’s daughter that supported his conviction in this matter. The victim testified that defendant 
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pinched her nipple in October, 2013, and recalled several other occasions on which defendant 

behaved in an inappropriate sexual manner toward her over the course of a year. One of the 

victim’s coworkers corroborated her allegation, noting that he saw defendant grab the victim’s 

breasts and buttocks in the fall of 2013. Though Soens, Hughes, and DeJesus did not recall ever 

seeing defendant touch the victim, the weight of their testimony was arguably diminished by the 

fact that Soens and Hughes were social friends of defendant, and DeJesus’s credibility was 

directly impeached by a rebuttal witness. Because of the substantial untainted evidence 

presented in this matter, it appears that the trial court’s error in admitting the testimony about 

defendant’s comment was harmless and does not warrant reversal. Accordingly, defendant is not 

entitled to relief on this issue. 

II. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR 

 Defendant also challenges his conviction on the basis of prosecutorial error. Specifically, 

defendant maintains that the assistant prosecutor infringed upon his due process right to a fair 

trial by denigrating defense counsel and describing the defense theory as moronic, ridiculous, 

and disgusting. According to defendant, the assistant prosecutor effectively implied that defense 

counsel was intentionally misleading the jury which, in turn, suggested that he did not believe 

defendant. 

To preserve a claim of prosecutorial error, the defendant must “timely and specifically 

object[], except when an objection could not have cured the error, or a failure to review the issue 

would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 234-235 (citation omitted). 

Here, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s characterization of his arguments as 

ridiculous, arguing that it amounted to improper denigration of counsel. However, the objection 

was not contemporaneously with the challenged rebuttal argument; the objection was not made 

until after the jury had received its instructions and begun its deliberations. Because the 

objection was not timely, this issue is not preserved for appeal. 

 This Court generally reviews claims of prosecutorial error de novo. People v Thomas, 

260 Mich App 450, 453; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). However, because defendant failed to preserve 

this claim of error, this Court’s review is limited to plain, or outcome-determinative, error. 

People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). In reviewing claims of 

prosecutorial error, this Court examines the record to assess the prosecutor’s remarks in context 

and in relation to the defendant’s arguments to determine if the defendant was denied a fair and 

impartial trial. Thomas, 260 Mich App at 453-454. “[O]therwise improper remarks by the 

prosecutor might not require reversal if they respond to issues raised by the defense.” Callon, 

256 Mich App at 330. The prosecutor is generally given great latitude in its arguments at trial, 

Unger, 278 Mich App at 236, and is not limited to use of the “blandest of all possible terms,” 

Aldrich, 246 Mich App at 112. However, the prosecutor must be careful to avoid denigrating or 

personally attacking defense counsel, for an argument of that nature “undermines the defendant’s 

presumption of innocence [and] impermissibly shifts the focus of the evidence itself to the 

defense counsel’s personality.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 236, quoting People v Wise, 134 Mich 

App 82, 101-102; 351 NW2d 255 (1984). 

 During his closing argument, defense counsel suggested that the victim’s testimony was 

not credible because she did not report defendant’s alleged harassment to their employer or the 
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police, even though she asserted that it was an ongoing torment for an entire year. Rather, 

defense counsel opined that the victim fabricated the harassment charges in order to get revenge 

against defendant when she was suspended from work for her involvement in a workplace 

dispute. Defense counsel further argued that this theory was emphasized by the victim’s failure 

to report defendant’s “threat” against her daughter. Expanding upon this point, defense counsel 

stated: 

And you know when I ask her, ma’am, do you love your daughter she says yeah. 

And would you do anything to protect her? What did she say? No. What? Why 

didn’t you go to the police when he said he wanted to [sic] the daughter? 

 What? There’s only one explanation for why it didn’t happen. Why 

didn’t she go to management? Why didn’t she go to the police? The only 

explanation is it didn’t happen. Because who in their right mind would say that 

this in fact did happen and then not go to management about it and say something, 

or not go to other friends and say something that [sic] turn around and tell him to 

knock it off, or go to the police and say this man has threatened to rape my 14 

year old daughter? 

Responding to this portion of defense counsel’s argument, the prosecutor began her rebuttal 

argument as follows: 

 (Inaudible) children (inaudible). Can’t pay her bills because you’re not 

getting paid. You’re suspended without pay, you can’t protect your kids. That’s 

just, it’s a moronic comment by somebody, it’s a ridiculous thing to say, it’s a 

disgusting thing to say. I would imagine in the setting in which these people work 

that is not something so outside the imagination that people (inaudible) crass and 

disgusting, and wrong, immoral. 

 On appeal, defendant contends that the words “moronic,” “ridiculous,” and “disgusting,” 

were employed by the prosecutor to describe defense counsel’s argument and, therefore, 

improperly denigrated the defense and suggested that defense counsel was attempting to mislead 

the jury. By contrast, the prosecutor maintains that the comment was not a reflection on defense 

counsel’s argument; rather, it merely asserted that defendant’s remark about the victim’s 

daughter was so ridiculous and moronic that it could not have been construed as a serious threat, 

such that there was no need to report the comment and suffer a resulting suspension and wage 

loss. 

 Reviewing the prosecutor’s remark in its full context, we believe that the prosecutor’s 

interpretation of the challenged remark is a reasonable one. While the argument was rather 

ambiguous, the language used did not directly refer to defense counsel or his theory of the 

case—instead, it appears that the prosecutor was merely responding to defense counsel’s theory 

about the victim’s delayed reporting. This conclusion is also consistent with the trial court’s 

first-hand view of the closing and rebuttal arguments. Rejecting defense counsel’s untimely 

objection, the trial court noted that it “observed the demeanor of the Prosecutor and the Defense 

Attorney . . . [and] did not see anything that reflected any personal animus or denigration.” The 
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trial court also found that “the argument was based upon the logic of the argument that was being 

put forth.” 

 “During closing argument, a prosecutor may argue all the facts in evidence and all 

reasonable inferences arising from them, as they relate to the prosecutor’s theory of the case.” 

People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 63; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). It appears that the prosecutor’s 

rebuttal in this case was properly rooted in evidence presented during the trial, namely, the 

testimony about the internal suspension policy that deterred the victim from reporting any 

workplace disputes. The victim also testified that she did not report defendant’s comment 

because she knew it was “not going to happen.” Thus, we do not believe that the prosecutor’s 

brief remark amounted to prosecutorial error or infringed upon defendant’s right to a fair and 

impartial trial. See People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996) 

(finding that the prosecutor’s description of the defendant as a moron, an idiot, and a coward, did 

not require reversal “given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and the isolated 

nature of the comments”). Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 For his final claim of error, defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to prove each element of CSC-IV beyond a reasonable doubt. For a sufficiency of 

the evidence claim, we review the record de novo. People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich 

App 127, 142; 854 NW2d 114 (2014). We “view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the elements 

of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 222. This 

Court must not interfere with the factfinder’s role of “determining the weight of the evidence or 

the credibility of witnesses.” People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). 

 When charged with CSC-IV pursuant to MCL 750.520e(1)(b), as defendant was here, 

“[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if he or she engages in sexual 

contact with another person and . . . [f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual contact.” 

MCL 750.520e(1)(b); Green, 313 Mich App at 538. The term “sexual contact” is defined as

the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional 

touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s 

intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being 

for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in 

a sexual manner for: 

(i) Revenge. 

(ii) To inflict humiliation. 

(iii) Out of anger. [MCL 750.520a(q).] 

In cases involving force, that element can be satisfied in several different ways, including when 

“the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical 
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violence.” MCL 750.520e(1)(b)(i); People v Premo, 213 Mich App 406, 409; 540 NW2d 715 

(1995). 

 The victim testified that defendant pinched her nipple sometime in October, 2013. 

Pursuant to MCL 750.520a(f), “the breast of a human being” is considered an intimate part. The 

victim’s testimony, if believed by the jury, the victim’s testimony constituted sufficient legal 

proof that defendant intentionally touched an intimate part of her body, or the clothing covering 

an intimate area. She further testified that defendant had contacted other intimate parts of her 

body on multiple occasions, including her crotch and buttocks. The victim also stated that 

defendant made a number of comments about his desire to have sex with her and, on one 

occasion, exposed his penis to her. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecutor, a reasonable jury could infer that defendant had a sexual purpose when he pinched 

the victim’s nipple and, therefore, conclude that defendant engaged in “sexual contact” with her 

on the day in question. Finally, though there was little evidence concerning defendant’s use of 

typical force or coercion, this Court has previously held that the act of pinching an intimate area 

satisfied the force requirement for CSC-IV because it “requires a person to exert strength or 

power on another person.” Premo, 213 Mich App at 409. Accordingly, the force element was 

evidenced by the victim’s testimony indicating that defendant pinched her nipple with so much 

strength that she felt as though it was bruised. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which a 

rational jury could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

 Defendant’s sufficiency claim rests primarily on his belief that the victim’s testimony 

was not credible and that a significant portion of the trial testimony was comprised of 

inadmissible evidence that implied he was prone to devious sexual behavior. We reject 

defendant’s claim of error, as both arguments are without merit. As already discussed above, the 

other-acts evidence was admissible under MRE 404(b), despite the prosecutor’s failure to 

comply with the procedural notice requirements set forth in that rule. And although the evidence 

concerning defendant’s comment about the victim’s daughter lacked relevance and should not 

have been admitted, the error does not appear to have been outcome-determinative, and 

sufficient evidence existed apart from that isolated comment to support defendant’s conviction. 

 With respect to defendant’s attack on the victim’s credibility, defendant’s argument 

ignores the fact that the jury is in the best position to determine witness credibility. People v 

Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 714; 873 NW2d 855 (2015). In recognition of this principle, we are 

bound to “draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury 

verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Moreover, although a 

victim’s testimony need not be corroborated in a CSC case, MCL 750.520h, the prosecutor 

offered evidence from other witnesses to support the victim’s allegations. Gibson testified that 

he saw defendant grab the victim’s breasts and nipples in the fall of 2013, and confirmed that 

defendant attempted to “grab her close to him,” on other occasions. Likewise, another coworker 

heard someone shout “get your hands off me, don’t touch me,” and discovered defendant and the 

victim in the neighboring aisle when she investigated the commotion. Viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecutor, there was sufficient evidence presented from which a 

rational jury could find that defendant was guilty of CSC-IV beyond a reasonable doubt. 
-12- 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello