[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12948

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONALD CEDRIC HOWARD, JR., 

a.k.a. Ronald Cecil Howard,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00006-TFM-N-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12948

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Howard, Jr., appeals his sentence of 108 months’ 

imprisonment for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Howard argues that his sentence was 

procedurally and substantively1 unreasonable. He contends that

the court erroneously concluded that he possessed the ammunition 

in connection with another felony offense—namely, unlawful 

restraint—and as a result erred in applying the cross-reference in 

U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(c)2

, which resulted in a higher base offense level. 

1 While Howard did not object to the substantive reasonableness of his 

sentence below, he properly preserved his substantive reasonableness 

argument by asking for a lower sentence. Holguin-Hernandez v. United 

States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 767 (2020). 

2 The relevant portion of U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(c) states 

If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition 

cited in the offense of conviction in connection with the 

commission or attempted commission of another offense, or 

possessed or transferred a firearm or ammunition cited in the 

offense of conviction with knowledge or intent that it would 

be used or possessed in connection with another offense, 

apply—

(A) §2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) in 

respect to that other offense, if the resulting 

offense level is greater than that determined 

above

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21-12948 Opinion of the Court 3

However, because the district court gave a Keene3 statement that 

it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the 

cross-reference and because the sentence is substantively 

reasonable, we affirm.

I. Background 

A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Alabama 

returned a superseding indictment that charged Howard with 

unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition as a convicted 

felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Howard pleaded guilty 

without a written plea agreement to the unlawful possession of 

ammunition but did not admit to the possession of any firearms. 

A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation 

report (the “PSI”) in Howard’s case. Howard’s PSI indicated that, 

on February 11, 2020, Brandy Plummer accepted a ride from three 

people, including Howard, who sat in the back seat next to her and 

forced her to perform oral sex on him, after striking her on the head 

with a firearm and while holding another firearm between his legs. 

He struck her on the head again when she tried to fight back, and 

physically assaulted her when she asked to leave the car. Howard 

U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(c)(a). Because the defendant used ammunition in 

connection with the commission or attempted commission of another 

offense of unlawful restraint, the PSI cross referenced the guideline for 

the ammunition offense with U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a) which has a base 

offense level of 32. 

3 United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006). 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12948

admitted that Plummer performed oral sex on him but claimed 

that he paid her, and he denied physically assaulting her. Police 

found Plummer’s identification card in Howard’s pocket, her blood 

on his pants, .38 Special ammunition in his pocket, and two 

firearms in the car, one of which contained .38 Special ammunition. 

Pursuant to the applicable 2018 Sentencing Guidelines,

U.S.S.G. §§ 2A4.1(a) and 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), Howard’s base offense 

level was 32 because Howard used the ammunition in connection 

with the commission of another offense (unlawful restraint). After 

various enhancements and reductions, his total offense level was

found to be 37. His prior convictions resulted in four criminal 

history points and a criminal history category of III. Based on his 

total offense level of 37 and criminal history category of III, 

Howard’s guidelines range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. 

Because, however, the guidelines range exceeded the statutory 

maximum, his guideline range was adjusted to 120 months’ 

imprisonment to reflect the statutory maximum, pursuant to 

§ 5G1.1(b). 

Howard objected, in relevant part, to the guidelines 

calculation, denying that any other offense, including unlawful 

restraint, occurred. He argued that his base offense level should be 

14, pursuant to § 2K2.1, resulting in a lower guidelines range of 24 

to 30 months’ imprisonment. 

At the sentencing hearing, Howard reiterated his objection. 

The government presented four witnesses, including the victim

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21-12948 Opinion of the Court 5

Plummer, to prove that the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)

was applicable. 

The district court found the victim’s testimony and 

statements were credible based on the DNA evidence submitted. 

It also found that Howard possessed both the ammunition, to 

which he pled, and the firearms. It found that the firearms 

facilitated Howard’s commission of, “at a minimum,” Plummer’s 

sexual assault, which he found that Howard committed beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It noted that the fact that Howard pled guilty 

deserved consideration. It explained that the assault could have 

killed Plummer and, at a minimum, traumatized her and physically 

hurt her. Thus, the court confirmed that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c) 

applied for possession of ammunition in connection with another 

felony offense, adopted the PSI, and imposed a 108 months’ 

imprisonment below-guidelines sentence and 3 years’ supervised 

release. 

The court noted that, even if the cross reference did not 

apply, it would still “depart upwardly because he did commit a 

sexual assault . . . and did commit an assault, at a minimum, that in 

my opinion deserves the sentence . . . imposed.” Howard objected 

to the application of the cross reference for the reasons argued 

earlier. 

II. Standard of Review 

An appellate court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence 

for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-12948

The court first reviews a sentence for procedural error and then 

considers whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under 

the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 

566, 573 (11th Cir. 2010). This Court will not vacate a sentence 

based on an assertion of procedural error if the district court 

indicates it would have imposed the same sentence and if the 

resulting sentence is reasonable. United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 

1347, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2006).

III. Discussion 

On appeal, Howard argues that there was not sufficient 

evidence that his possession of ammunition was in connection with 

the commission or attempted commission of another offense, and 

therefore the cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2(c)(1)(A) 

was in error. He also argues separately that the sentence imposed 

was greater than necessary, violating 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 

A district court commits a procedural sentencing error by 

sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, failing to calculate or 

improperly calculating the guidelines range, failing to consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, or failing 

to explain the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. However, we

need not reach a Guidelines issue if it made no difference to the 

sentence imposed by the district court and the ultimate sentence 

was reasonable. United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1221 

(11th Cir. 2020) (citing Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349). If the district court 

states that its sentence would not have changed with a different 

Guidelines calculation, we assume there was an error, calculate the 

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21-12948 Opinion of the Court 7

guideline range without the error, and analyze whether the 

sentence would be substantively reasonable under that guideline 

range. Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349. If it is, then we will not address 

the disputed Guidelines issue because “it would make no sense to 

set aside this reasonable sentence and send the case back to the 

district court since it has already told us that it would impose 

exactly the same sentence, a sentence we would be compelled to 

affirm.” Id. at 1350.

A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a 

substantively unreasonable sentence only if it: (1) fails to consider 

relevant factors that were due significant weight; (2) gives 

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or 

(3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper 

factors. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th 

Cir. 2015). We “commit[] to the sound discretion of the district 

court the weight to be accorded to each § 3553(a) factor.”4 United 

4

The § 3553(a) factors include, 

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for 

the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant; and

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-12948

States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015). We will 

vacate a district court’s sentence as substantively unreasonable 

“only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the 

§ 3553(a) factors” as evidenced by a sentence “that is outside the 

range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” 

Goldman, 953 F.3d at 1222 (quotation omitted). 

Here, the district court gave a Keene statement, that it 

would impose the same sentence regardless of the cross-reference. 

Without the application of § 2K2.1(c), Howard’s guidelines range 

would have been 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. Therefore, we 

will consider the substantive reasonableness of the 108-month 

sentence, in light of the 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment range. See 

Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349. 

The district court properly weighed the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, § 3553(A)(1), the seriousness of the 

offense, § 3553(a)(2)(A), and the sentencing objectives of 

punishment such as deterrence and incapacitation, § 3553(a)(2)(B–

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 

or vocational training, medical care, or other 

correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available . . .

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 

similar conduct . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

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21-12948 Opinion of the Court 9

C). The court also considered Howard’s acceptance of 

responsibility and explained in detail why it believed the sentence 

imposed was necessary and appropriate in light of testimony 

presented at sentencing. We do “not presume that a sentence 

outside the guidelines is unreasonable and must give due deference 

to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, 

justify the extent of the variance.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 

1160, 1187 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Additionally, the 

sentence imposed is below the statutory maximum of 120 months’ 

imprisonment, another indication that the sentence is within the 

range of reasonable sentences. See Goldman, 953 F.3d at 1222. 

Any argument that the sentence was higher than sentences for 

similarly situated defendants, who pled guilty to possession of 

ammunition and did not have any violent prior convictions, is 

unavailing because that defendant would not be similarly situated, 

as the district court found that Howard committed a sexual assault 

that greatly traumatized the victim, and possessed two firearms, as 

well as the ammunition. We conclude that Howard’s 108-month 

sentence did not fall outside of reasonable sentences dictated by the 

facts of the case. Because his sentence is substantively reasonable, 

we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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