IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF: V.B., A MINOR, 

V.B., 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Resnondent. 

No. 65637 

FILED 

JUN 1 7 2016 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from an order certifying a child for criminal 

proceedings as an adult. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court 

Division, Clark County; William 0. Voy, Judge. 

First, appellant V.B. contends that the juvenile court erred by 

determining that prosecutive merit supported the count of robbery with 

the use of a deadly weapon. V.B. argues that because the matter was 

transferred from the district court back to the juvenile court, it is clear 

that the State failed to demonstrate prosecutive merit. We disagree. 

"To say that there is prosecutive merit is to say that there is 

probable cause to believe that the subject minor committed the charged 

crime." In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 437, 664 P.2d 947, 953 (1983), 

disapproved of on other grounds by In re William S., 122 Nev. 432, 132 

P.3d 1015 (2006); see also Sheriff v. Hodes, 96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d 178, 

180 (1980) ("The finding of probable cause may be based on slight, even 

marginal evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this matter, a 

preliminary hearing was held wherein one victim testified that V.B. broke 

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a bottle, stood approximately a foot away, pointed the fragmented part of 

the bottle at the two victims, and told them to empty out their pockets 

before four or five different individuals beat the testifying victim and 

emptied his pockets, taking his wallet and car keys. We conclude the 

juvenile court did not err by determining that there was prosecutive merit 

to support the count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. Cf. 

Sheriff v. Provenza, 97 Nev. 346, 347, 630 P.2d 265, 265 (1981) (holding 

that the district court's ruling regarding probable cause will not be 

overturned absent substantial error). 

Second, V.B. contends that the juvenile court erred by 

certifying him because he demonstrated substance abuse or emotional 

problems which could have been treated through the juvenile system. See 

NIBS 62B.390(3)(b). However, NRS 62B.390(3)(b) provides that a juvenile 

may rebut the presumptive certification outlined in NRS 62B.390(2), 1and 

'NIBS 62B.390(2) provides 

[T]he juvenile court shall certify a child for proper 

criminal proceedings as an adult to any court that 

would have jurisdiction to try the offense if 

committed by an adult, if the child: 

(a) Is charged with: 

(1) A sexual assault involving the use 

or threatened use of force or violence 

against the victim; or 

(2) An offense or attempted offense 

involving the use or threatened use of 

a firearm; and 

(b) Was 16 years of age or older at the time 

the child allegedly committed the offense. 

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such presumptive certification is not at issue here. Therefore, this claim 

lacks merit. 

Third, V.B. contends that the factors outlined in Seven Minors 

were not met and therefore certification was not warranted. See Seven 

Minors, 99 Nev. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952 (outlining a three-category 

decisional matrix that should be considered when determining whether to 

transfer a juvenile to adult court: "first, nature and seriousness of the 

charged offense or offenses; second, persistency and seriousness of past 

adjudicated or admitted criminal offenses; and third, what we will refer to 

as the subjective factors, namely, such personal factors as age, maturity, 

character, personality and family relationships and controls"). The 

juvenile court noted that V.B. was a principal actor in a very serious 

offense and that V.B. had a history of persistent adjudications. The 

juvenile court went on to consider subjective factors, such as V.B.'s age, 

his psychological report, his substance abuse, and his amenability to 

treatment in the juvenile court. The juvenile court concluded that "Nased 

upon everything before [it], the State ha[d] met its burden by clear and 

convincing evidence that public safety warrants transfer to the adult 

system." Therefore, the juvenile court considered all three categories of 

the decisional matrix outlined in Seven Minors. 

To the extent V.B. argues that his record in the juvenile 

system or the instant crime has not shown him to be among the worst 

offenders and therefore certification was not warranted, the juvenile court 

has "broad discretion in making discretionary certification decisions in 

accordance with the guidelines set forth in Seven Minors," In re Eric AL., 

123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36 (2007) (internal quotation marks 

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omitted), and we discern no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in 

granting the State's certification petition, see id. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36-37. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the juvenile court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Douglas 

\.) J. 

Gibbons 

cc: Hon. William 0. Voy, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Lizzie R. Hatcher 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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