alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Marafine v. Campolongo

*Carl A. Belin, Jr.,*for plaintiffs and additional defendants.

*Bell, Silberblatt & Swocrpe,*for defendants.

May 24, 1977

REILLY, P. *].,*

The above action in trespass arose out of an automobile accident on November 12, 1974. The action was commenced by summons on November 10, 1976, two days before the statute of limitations expired and the summons was not served on defendants until November 15, 1976, three days after the statute of limitations expired. Defendants issued a rule on plaintiff to file a complaint on March 23, 1977, and the complaint was filed and served on defendants on April 1, 1977. An answer and counterclaim was filed to the complaint on April 20, 1977, which is, *736of course, more than two years after the date of the accident. This matter is now before the court upon plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, in view of the fact that it was not filed within two years of the date of the accident. This court is of the opinion that said motion for summary judgment must be dismissed.

While it is true that actions for personal injury must be commenced within two years from the date the injury is sufferred, it is quite possible that one who suffers such injury may choose not to pursue his claim unless forced to do so by being sued himself for other injuries sustained in the acci-. dent. The reasons for choosing not to pursue one’s claim are many and varied, among which, the obvious is the time and expense involved, especially if the claim is relatively insignificant. However, choosing not to pursue one’s own claim by initially commencing an action against another should not bar the raising of that action as a counterclaim should the other party proceed to attempt to recover damages that he sustained, and this should be true even though the statute of limitations has passed unless the period has expired through negligence or other dilatory inaction on the part of defendant.

In this case, plaintiff chose to wait until two days before the statute of limitations expired before even filing his summons in trespass. Even then, no complaint was filed until a rule on behalf of the defendant was issued, directing the filing of said complaint within twenty (20) days allowable. Thereafter, the answer and counterclaim was filed. This court agrees with the language of the Court in Armstrong V. Logsdon, 469 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1971), in which the court stated (quoting from Azada v. *737Carson, 252 F. Supp. 988 (1966), as follows: “ ’Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose — they are designed to bar stale claims. Where, as in this case, the counterclaim arises from the same incident as the complaint, the counterclaim is no more stale than the complaint. Simple justice dictates that if the plaintiffs are given an opportunity to present a claim for relief based upon a particular automobile collision, the defendant should not be prevented from doing so by a mere technicality.’ ”

Wherefore, the court enters the following

ORDER

Now, May 24, 1977, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim filed by the defendant is refused.
```

[Federal Register: February 22, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 34)]
[Notices]               
[Page 7570]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr22fe10-33]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Army; Corps of Engineers

 
Extension of the Public Comment Period for the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Moffat Collection System 
Project, City and County of Denver, Adams County, Boulder County, 
Jefferson County, and Grand County, CO

AGENCY: Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, DoD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Omaha District is 
announcing a 16-day extension of the public comment period for the 
Moffat Collection System Project (Moffat Project) Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (Draft EIS). The originally announced comment period 
ends on March 1, 2010, but has been extended until March 17, 2010. The 
original Notice of Availability of the Draft EIS was published in the 
Federal Register on Friday, October 30, 2009 (74 FR 56186) and included 
an initial 90-day comment period (October 30, 2009 to January 27, 
2010). A second Notice of Availability announcing an extension of 32 
days (January 27, 2010 to March 1, 2010) was issued on December 18, 
2009 (74 FR 67180).

DATES: Comments on the Draft EIS should be postmarked no later than 
March 17, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the Draft EIS should be sent to the 
attention of: Scott Franklin, Moffat EIS Project Manager, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, Omaha District--Denver Regulatory Office, 9307 
South Wadsworth Boulevard, Littleton, CO 80128; via Fax at 303-979-
0602; or via e-mail at moffat.eis@usace.army.mil.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: None.

Timothy T. Carey,
Chief, Denver Regulatory Office.
[FR Doc. 2010-3338 Filed 2-19-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3720-58-P
```
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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-1529

___________________________

Willie Earl Moore

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: December 2, 2016

Filed: December 7, 2016 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Willie Earl Moore appeals the order of the district court1

 affirming the

Commissioner’s determination that he is not entitled to supplemental security income,

after his hearing before an administrative law judge. Upon review, we are satisfied

that the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. See

Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 1997). The judgment of the district

court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

1

The Honorable David D. Noce, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

-2-
#### Keown v. Patten.

*Landlord and tenant*— Distraint—Jurisdiction, *J. P.*— Act *of March 20, 1810*— Certiorari.

1. In a proceeding before a justice of the peace by a tenant under the Act of March 20, 1810, § 20, 5 Sm. Laws, 161, 170, to establish a set-off against rent after a distress, the justice has no jurisdiction to enter any judgment, or to issue any process to enforce his decision. In such a case the justice simply notes his determination, but enters no judgment.

2. Where, in such a case, the justice enters judgment and issues execution, a *certiorari*will not be quashed because it was not sued out within twenty days after judgment, as the judgment was void for want of jurisdiction.

NOTE. — See Hilke *v.*Eisenkeis, 104 Pa. 514, and Fowler *v.*Eddy, 43 Legal Intell. 17.

*Certiorari to*justice of the peace. C. P. Butler Co., June T., 1921, No. 50.

*E. H. Negley,*for plaintiff; no appearance for defendant.

July 15, 1921.

Reibek, P. J.,

The plaintiff below was indebted to the defendant for rent amounting to $24, for which sum the defendant distrained the goods of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon instituted proceedings before the justice of the peace under the provisions of the 20th section of the Act of March 20, 1810, 5 Sm. Laws, 161, 170, alleging that the defendant was indebted to him, and asking that he be allowed a set-off against the rent thus owed. The justice, after hearing the proofs and argument of counsel, on Oct. 25, 1920, entered judgment as follows: “No rent due on lease. Costs to be paid by defendant, Mary Keown, she to put new pump in the well.” On May 4, 1921, execution issued.

Under the provisions of said act of assembly, the justice is without power to enter any judgment, nor does it authorize him to issue any process to enforce his decision. See Thomas *v.*Pyle, 2 Pa. C. C. Reps. 258, where the question is fully discussed and cases cited.

It follows, therefore, that the justice was without jurisdiction. It is contended by defendant in error that the writ of *certiorari*must be quashed, for the reason that it was not sued out within twenty days after judgment, but *[it was sued out]*within twenty days after the execution to enforce the payment of costs, and, in our opinion, was lawful, as the judgment of the justice was void for want of jurisdiction to enter it: Pantall *v.*Dickey, 123 Pa. 431; Edwards *v.*Jeremy, 2 Kulp, 489; Edwards *v.*Fonk, 6 Dist. R. 505.

And now, July 15, 1921, specifications of error sustained and judgment set aside, at costs of defendant in error.

From James E. Marshall, Butler, Pa.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

TROY TAQUELL ALVIN,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 436 MAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 6th day of December, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### Herron *v.*Duquesne Borough

(No. 2).

October 7, 1907:

Opinion by

Beaver, J.,

The facts in this case are similar to those in No. 172 of April Term, 1907, between the same parties, in which an opinion has this day been filed, ante, p. 231. The cases were tried together and two separate’ verdicts rendered. The cases were also argued here together, the assignments of error being the same.

For the reasons stated in the previous case, the judgment in this one is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-2266

JOSEPH CRUSSIAH,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GOVERNOR LAWRENCE HOGAN; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. 

Paula Xinis, District Judge. (8:21-cv-02418-PX)

Submitted: January 20, 2022 Decided: January 24, 2022

Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph Crussiah, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 21-2266 Doc: 6 Filed: 01/24/2022 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Crussiah appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil complaint as 

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 21-2266 Doc: 6 Filed: 01/24/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-7556
ERIC MARADIAGA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DARREN WILSON, Highway Patrolman; DAVID THOMLEY, Captain and Highway Patrolman, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge. (4:05-cv-2836-PMD) Submitted: February 21, 2008 Decided: April 7, 2008 Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eric Maradiaga, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Jonathan Bridgmon, Ruskin C. Foster, Hanna Stokes Green, MCCUTCHEN, BLANTON, JOHNSON & BARNETTE, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina; Donna Seegars Givens, WOODS & GIVENS, LLP, Lexington, South Carolina; Harry H. Stokes, Jr., MCANGUS, GOUDELOCK & COURIE, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Eric Maradiaga appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, granting summary judgment to the Defendants, and denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Maradiaga v. Wilson , No. 4:05-cv2836-PMD (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2007). We also deny the motion to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNITED STATES


SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Washington, D.C. 20549





FORM 8-K





CURRENT REPORT


PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE  SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934





Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported) July 29, 2013











DENNY’S CORPORATION


(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)





Delaware0-1805113-3487402(State or other jurisdiction ofCommission File No.(I.R.S. EmployerIncorporation or organizationIdentification No.)





203 East Main Street


Spartanburg, South Carolina 29319-0001


(Address of principal executive offices)


(Zip Code)





(864) 597-8000


(Registrant’s telephone number, including area code)





Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligations of the registrant under any of the following provisions:





[    ]  Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)





[    ]  Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)





[    ]  Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))





[    ]  Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))














---










Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition





On July 29, 2013, Denny's Corporation issued a press release announcing financial results for the second quarter ended June 26, 2013. A copy of the press release is attached as Exhibit 99.1 hereto and incorporated herein by reference.





Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits





(d) Exhibits





Exhibit 99.1 -- Press release issued by Denny's Corporation on July 29, 2013.








---




SIGNATURES





Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.











Denny's CorporationDate: July 29, 2013/s/  F. Mark WolfingerF. Mark WolfingerExecutive Vice President,Chief Administrative Officer andChief Financial Officer
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2953 

To prohibit the Internal Revenue Service from requiring financial institutions 

to report on the financial transactions of their customers. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 7, 2021 

Mr. TUBERVILLE (for himself, Mr. SCOTT of Florida, and Mr. BRAUN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Internal Revenue Service from requiring financial institutions to report on the financial transactions of their customers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Financial 

5 Privacy Act of 2021’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2953 IS

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 

2 FROM REQUIRING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 

3 TO REPORT ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 

4 OF CUSTOMERS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the In6 ternal Revenue Service shall not be permitted to create 

7 or implement any new financial account information re8 porting program that— 

9 (1) was not in effect as of October 1, 2021, and 

10 (2) would require financial institutions to report 

11 data on financial accounts in an information return 

12 listing balances, transactions, transfers, or inflows or 

13 outflows of any kind. 

14 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this Act shall 

16 preempt, limit, or supersede, or be construed to pre17 empt, limit, or supersede, any provision of, or re18 quirement under, the Bank Secrecy Act or any regu19 lations promulgated under such Act. 

20 (2) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this sub21 section, the term ‘‘Bank Secrecy Act’’ means— 

22 (A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit In23 surance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b), 

24 (B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91– 

25 508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.), and 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 2953 IS

1 (C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, 

2 United States Code. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with the annual report of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc. on
Form 20-F for the year ended March 31, 2013 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of
Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

I, Koichi Miyata, President and Representative Director of Sumitomo Mitsui
Financial Group, Inc., certify that, to the best of my knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries.

Date:
July 23, 2013



|                  |  |                                      
|----------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|/s/ Koichi Miyata
|Name:             |  | Koichi Miyata                        
|Title:            |  | President and Representative Director
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ex parte Matthew Leachman

Appellate case number: 01-16-00787-CR

Trial court case number: 1522187

Trial court: 248th District Court of Harris County

On September 28, 2016, appellant, Matthew Leachman, proceeding pro se and 

incarcerated, filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s judgment, signed that 

day, denying his pre-trial habeas application, which is based on double jeopardy.

On October 14, 2016, appellant filed a pro se motion to allow briefing in this 

Court. On October 24, 2016, the district clerk filed a letter in this Court stating that both 

the sealed clerk’s record and the supplemental clerk’s record were mailed to appellant, 

but it left unchecked the line for the reporter’s record of the writ hearing.

On December 2, 2016, appellant filed a pro se letter in this Court, enclosing a 

November 30, 2016 letter to the district clerk. Appellant stated that while he had 

received the clerk’s record and first and second supplemental clerk’s records, the district 

clerk had failed to file his third supplemental clerk’s record and also had failed to mail 

him the reporter’s record. On December 6, 2016, the third supplemental clerk’s record 

was filed in this Court, in compliance with appellant’s request. Accordingly, after 

reviewing all the records, the Court determines that it does not desire briefing and, thus, 

DENIES appellant’s motion to allow briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31.1.

However, because it appears that the district clerk has yet to mail the reporter’s 

record and this new supplemental clerk’s record to appellant, the Court ORDERS the 

district clerk, no later than 10 days from the date of this order, to mail a copy of the third 

supplemental clerk’s record and the reporter’s record to appellant, and to certify to this 

Court, within 15 days of the date of this order, the date upon which delivery is made.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura Carter Higley

  Acting individually 

Date: December 8, 2016
[Crim. No. 167.

Fourth Appellate District.

June 18, 1934.]

#### THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANK E. BOWDEN, Appellant.

*319N. Lindsay South for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and Frank Richards, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

BARNARD, P. J.

The appellant was charged in two counts of an indictment with separate violations of the Corporate Securities Act. After a trial he was convicted on both counts and judgment was pronounced imposing a fine of $100 on each count, with the provision that if the fine was not paid he should be imprisoned in the county jail of Tulare County one day for each $2 of the fine remaining unpaid.. On the day judgment was pronounced oral notice of appeal was given.  The record discloses that the appellant did not file within five days after giving notice of appeal, or at all, any statement-of the grounds of the appeal or the points upon which the appellant relied, as required by section 7 of Rule II of the rules governing this court, and no application was filed designating what portion of the reporter’s notes it would be necessary to have in order to present the points relied upon.

The respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the required application and statement were not filed within the time specified in the rule.

It has frequently been held that an appeal should be dismissed in the absence of any substantial attempt to comply with the requirements referred to *(People*v. *Pierce,*89 Cal. App. 290 [264 Pac. 519]; *People*v. *Davis,*103 Cal. App. 318 [284 Pac. 516]; *People*v. *Riga,*104 Cal. App. 477 [285 Pac. 1069]; *People*v. *Schroeder,*112 Cal. App. 550 [297 Pac. 105]; *People*v. *Rutledge,*114 Cal. App. 728 [300 Pac. 828]; *People*v. *Vincent,*116 Cal. App. 211 [2 Pac. (2d) 460]).

The motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

Marks, J., and Haines, J., *pro tem.,*concurred.
C it y of Westm in ste r 

Department of 

Publi c Wo rks 

a nd Utiliti es 

48 00 West 92nd Ave nu e 

Westminste r, Co lo rado 

8003 1 

3 03-658 -24 00 

FAX 30 3-706-3 927 

WESTMINSTER 

March 8, 20l6 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Section 333 Exemption Application 

VIA Electronic Submission 

To Whom It May Concem: 

The City ofWestminster, Colorado (the "City"), would like to apply for an 

exemption to the Federal Aviation Administration under Section 333 of the FAA 

Modemization and Refmm Action of 2012 (Public Law 112-95) to allow operation of its 

unmanned drone, a single Dn Phantom 2 Vision+ UAV, or the like, for non-commercial 

purposes. 

As such, the City is submitting the attached 333 Exemption Application. In 

addition, the City has also submitted a parallel application related to acquisition of a 

COA (submitted to the FAA Emerging Technologies Team). A copy ofthis initial 

application letter is also enclosed. 

Finally, in keeping with the City's commitment to following FAA guidelines 

associated with operation of a UA V as part of the City's infrastructure operations and 

maintenance program, a copy of the City's Small UAS Certificate of Registration (UAS 

Ce1iificate Number F A3 9RA TXKP) is also enclosed. 

Any subsequent questions or comments may be directed to Robert Krugmire, 

Water Resources Engineer, City of Westminster, 4800 West 92nd Avenue, Westminster, 

Colorado, 80031 . Thank you for the oppmiunity to submit this paperwork for review. 

re, 

Printed 0 11 recycled paper 

-ugmire 

Water i eer