### 73995 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 237 / Tuesday, December 10, 2013 / Rules and Regulations

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type
certification basis for Cessna Model 680 Series airplanes.

System Security Protection for Aircraft Control Domain and Information
Services Domain From External Access

1. The applicant must ensure airplane electronic system security protection from access by unauthorized sources external to the airplane, including those possibly caused by maintenance activity.

2. The applicant must ensure that electronic system security threats are identified and assessed, and that effective electronic system security protection strategies are implemented to protect the airplane from all adverse impacts on safety, functionality, and
continued airworthiness.

3. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the operator to ensure that continued
airworthiness of the aircraft ismaintained, including all post-typecertification modifications that may have an impact on the approved electronic system security safeguards.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 4, 2013. Jeffrey E. Duven, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013–29378 Filed 12–9–13; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration**

**14 CFR Part 25**

**[Docket No. FAA–2013–1035; Special Conditions No. 25–507–SC]** 

**Special Conditions: Cessna Model 680 Series Airplanes; Aircraft Electronic**  **System Security Isolation or Protection**
**From Internal Access**

**AGENCY :**  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION :**  Final special condition; request
for comments.

**SUMMARY :**  These special conditions are
issued for the Cessna Model 680 series airplanes. These airplanes will have novel or unusual design features associated with connectivity of the passenger service computer systems to the airplane critical systems and data
networks. The network architecture is composed of several connected networks including the following:

1. Flight-Safety related control and navigation systems,

2. Operator business and administrative support, and

3. Passenger entertainment. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

**DATES :**  The effective date of these special conditions is December 10, 2013. We must receive your comments by January 24, 2014.

**ADDRESSES :**  Send comments identified by docket number FAA–XXXX–XXXX using any of the following methods:

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.

Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC

20590–0001.

Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays.

Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202–493–2251.

Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without change,

to http://www.regulations.gov/

, including any personal information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web site, anyone
can find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement can be
found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478),
as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot .gov/.

Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT :**  Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM– 111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone 425–227–1298;
facsimile 425–227–1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION :**  The FAA has determined that notice of, and opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions are impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with
no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon publication in
the Federal Register.

Comments Invited

We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.

We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for comments. We may change these special
conditions based on the comments we

receive.

Background

On September 21, 2010, Cessna applied for a change to Type Certificate No. T00012WI in the digital systems
architecture in the Cessna Model 680 series airplanes.

The Cessna Model 680 ‘‘New Sovereign’’ is a twin-engine pressurized executive jet airplane with standard seating provisions for 14 passenger/crew and allowance for baggage and optional equipment. This airplane will have a maximum takeoff weight of 30,775 pounds with a wingspan of 72.3 feet, a maximum operating altitude of 47,000 feet, and will have two aft-mounted Pratt & Whitney 306D engines.

The proposed Cessna Model 680
architecture is novel or unusual for executive jet airplanes by allowing connection to previously isolated data networks connected to systems that perform functions required for the safe operation of the airplane. This proposed data network and design integration may result in security vulnerabilities
from intentional or unintentional corruption of data and systems critical to the safety and maintenance of the


### 73996 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 237 / Tuesday, December 10, 2013 / Rules and Regulations

airplane. The existing regulations and guidance material did not anticipate this type of system architecture or electronic access to aircraft systems. Furthermore, regulations and current system safety assessment policy and techniques do not address potential security vulnerabilities, which could be caused by unauthorized access to aircraft data
buses and servers. The intent of these special conditions is to ensure that security, integrity, and availability of aircraft systems are not compromised by
certain wired or wireless electronic connections between airplane data busses and networks. A separate Cessna Model 680 project special condition addresses aircraft electronic system security protection from unauthorized
external access.

Type Certification Basis

Under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, Cessna
must show that the Model 45 series meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25–1 through 25–128.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the Model 45 series because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate
for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the proposed special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and proposed special conditions, the Cessna Model 680 series airplane must comply with
the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36 and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92–574, the ‘‘Noise
Control Act of 1972.’’

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under § 11.38,and they become part of the typecertification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

The Cessna Model 680 will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features.

The proposed architecture and network configuration may be used for, or interfaced with, a diverse set of functions, including: 1. Flight-safety related control, communication, and navigation systems (aircraft control domain);

2. Operator business and administrative support (operator information domain); and

3. Passenger information and entertainment systems (passenger entertainment domain).

In addition, the operating systems (OS) for current aircraft systems are usually and historically proprietary. Therefore, they are not as susceptible to corruption from worms, viruses, and other malicious actions as more widely used commercial operating systems, because access to the design details of these proprietary OS is limited to the system developer and aircraft integrator. Some systems installed on the Cessna Model 680 series airplanes will use operating systems that are widely used and commercially available from third party software suppliers. The security vulnerabilities of these operating systems may be more widely known than proprietary operating systems currently used by avionics
manufacturers.

Discussion

The integrated network configurations in the Cessna Model 680 series airplanes may allow increased connectivity with
external network sources and will have
more interconnected networks and systems, such as passenger
entertainment and information services than previous airplane models. This may allow the exploitation of network security vulnerabilities and increased risks potentially resulting in unsafe conditions for the airplanes and occupants. This potential exploitation of security vulnerabilities may result in intentional or unintentional destruction, disruption, degradation, or exploitation of data and systems critical to the safety and maintenance of the airplane.

Cessna Aircraft Company should develop instructions for the operators to maintain the built-in security safeguards after the airplane enters commercial
service. The instructions should address physical security, operational security, audit and monitoring of the effectiveness of security safeguards and key management procedures. A test plan should also be developed and implemented to insure that security requirements are met and there is no inadvertent or malicious change to any system, software or data.

The existing regulations and guidance material did not anticipate these types of system architectures. Furthermore, 14 CFR regulations and current system safety assessment policy and techniques do not address potential security vulnerabilities which could be exploited by unauthorized access to airplane
networks and servers.

Therefore, these special conditions are being issued to ensure that the security (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of airplane systems is not compromised by unauthorized
wired or wireless electronic connections between airplane systems and the passenger entertainment services.

For the reasons discussed above, these special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Cessna Model 680 series airplanes. Should Cessna apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as
well.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon publication in
the Federal Register. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment
described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,

44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the


### 73997 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 237 / Tuesday, December 10, 2013 / Rules and Regulations

Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type
certification basis for Cessna Model 680 series airplanes.

Isolation or Security Protection of the Aircraft Control Domain and the Information Services Domain From the Passenger Services Domain

1. The applicant must ensure that the design provides isolation from, or airplane electronic system security protection against, access by
unauthorized sources internal to the airplane. The design must prevent inadvertent and malicious changes to, and all adverse impacts upon, airplane equipment, systems, networks, or other assets required for safe flight and operations.

2. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the operator to ensure that continued
airworthiness of the aircraft ismaintained, including all post-typecertification modifications that may have an impact on the approved electronic system security safeguards.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 4, 2013. Jeffrey E. Duven, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013–29377 Filed 12–9–13; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration**

**14 CFR Part 39**

**[Docket No. FAA–2013–0023; Directorate Identifier 96–CE–072–AD; Amendment 39–**  **17688; AD 99–01–05 R1]**

**RIN 2120–AA64**

**Airworthiness Directives; Various Aircraft Equipped with Wing Lift Struts** 

**AGENCY :**  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION :**  Final rule.

**SUMMARY :**  We are revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99–01–05 for certain aircraft equipped with wing lift struts. AD 99–01–05 required repetitively inspecting the wing lift struts for corrosion; repetitively inspecting the wing lift strut forks for cracks; replacing any corroded wing lift strut; replacing any cracked wing lift strut fork; and repetitively replacing the wing lift strut forks at a specified time for certain airplanes. AD 99–01–05 also required incorporating a ‘‘NO STEP’’ placard on the wing lift strut. Since we issued AD 99–01–05, we were informed that paragraph (c) had been misinterpreted
and caused confusion. This AD clarifies the intent of the language in paragraph (c) of AD 99–01–05 and retains all other requirements of AD 99–01–05. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

**DATES :**  This AD is effective January 14,

2014.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in this AD as of February 8, 1999 (63 FR 72132, December 31, 1998).

**ADDRESSES :**  For service information identified in this AD, contact Piper Aircraft, Inc., Customer Services, 2926 Piper Drive, Vero Beach, Florida 32960; telephone: (772) 567–4361; Internet: www.piper.com. Copies of the instructions to the F. Atlee Dodge supplemental type certificate (STC) and information about the Jensen Aircraft STCs may be obtained from F. Atlee Dodge, Aircraft Services, LLC., 6672 Wes Way, Anchorage, Alaska 99518– 0409, Internet: www.fadodge.com. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (816) 329–

4148.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating it in Docket No. FAA– 2013–00023; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,

DC 20590.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT :**  For Piper Aircraft, Inc. airplanes, contact: Gregory ‘‘Keith’’ Noles, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College Park, Georgia 30337; phone: (404) 474–5551; fax: (404) 474– 5606; email: gregory.noles@faa.gov.

For FS 2000 Corp, FS 2001 Corp, FS 2002 Corporation, and FS 2003 Corporation airplanes, contact: Jeff Morfitt, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, Renton, Washington 98057; phone: (425) 917– 6405; fax: (245) 917–6590; email: jeff.morfitt@faa.gov.

For LAVIA ARGENTINA S.A. (LAVIASA) airplanes, contact: S.M. Nagarajan, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–4145; fax: (816) 329–4090; email: sarjapur.nagarajan@ faa.gov.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION :** 

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to revise AD 99–01–05, Amendment 39–10972 (63 FR 72132, December 31, 1998), (‘‘AD 99–01–05’’). AD 99–01–05 applied to the specified products. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on January 16, 2013 (78 FR 3356). The NPRM proposed to retain all requirements of AD 99–01–05 and clarify our intent of required actions if the seal on a sealed wing lift strut is ever improperly broken.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal and the FAA’s response to each comment.

Request to Combine This AD with
Another AD

Len J. Buckel stated that AD 99–26– 19, Amendment 39–11470 (64 FR 72524, December 28, 1999), (‘‘AD 99– 26–19’’), and AD 99–01–05 should be
combined into one AD.

The commenter stated that since AD 99–01–05 is being revised, it should also be revised to include Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Model J–2 airplanes, which are covered separately in AD 99–26–19, so that all affected Piper airplanes would
be covered in one AD.

We do not agree with the commenter. AD 99–01–05 is being revised only to clarify language about how to maintain a sealed wing lift strut assembly if the seal is ever improperly broken. This revision does not require any additional actions for the owners/operators. The same confusing and misleading language that prompted this revision is also included in AD 99–26–19, which
will also be revised. In order to avoid any further confusion, we believe that it
is in the best interest of the owners/ operators to maintain two separate ADs.

We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.