alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
While discussion at oral argument indicated that the fishing trip did not happen for reasons unrelated to 1

the trial, the trial court was still in recess.

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-76,036

HECTOR ROLANDO MEDINA, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM CASE F07-32923-S

FROM THE 282nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

DALLAS COUNTY

JOHNSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

Jury duty is not an easy thing, especially in a capital trial, but once undertaken, it needs to

be the highest priority for all jurors. This is a case in which the court encouraged jurors to set other

matters above the duties of a juror. The trial began on September 8. One juror wanted to go fishing,

so, on Wednesday, September 10, the court adjourned the capital trial until Monday, September 15,

losing two days of trial time. Over defense objection, the trial court then recessed the capital trial

1
2

on September 16 so that another juror could be present for the scheduled, induced birth of a

grandchild. When another juror fell and severely injured her arm, the trial court decided to wait for

a week for her to recover, something unlikely to occur with a severe bone injury. Although the

injury coincided with the induced birth, the decisions to twice delay proceedings severely prejudiced

appellant’s ability to present mitigating evidence. His witnesses came from outside Texas, even

from outside of the United States. His expert witness was present at the beginning of trial, but had

a scheduling conflict after the needless recesses extended the trial.

An alternate juror was available to replace the severely injured juror. An induced birth can

be rescheduled. Before there is a rush to accuse me of being too harsh, I repeat, jury duty is not an

easy thing, especially in a capital trial, but once undertaken, it needs to be the highest priority for all

jurors. The injured juror was not at fault, but there was an alternate juror available to complete her

service. It is reasonable to assume that the prospective grandparent knew of the impending induced

birth scheduled for September 16 before the trial began on September 8; he told the judge that he

would not be able to focus on the trial because of it. While being present at the induced birth was

greatly important to that one person, it is trivial when compared with a decision as to whether a man

will live or die. 

The injured juror should have been replaced at the time of her injury and the trial continued

without regard to scheduled, induced births. I would grant a new trial on punishment. Because the

Court does not do so, I dissent.

Filed: January 12, 2011

Do not publish
Tuesday, January 12, 2016

DJI F550 HEXACOPTER

Pre Flight Checklist

• Inspect UA to confirm all wiring is intact and connections are secure

• Check chassis for cracks or damage

• Check rotational direction of each propellor

• Check each propeller is secure

• Check voltage level of installed UA battery

• Check battery level indicator on transmitter

• Check voltage level of FPV battery

• Insure each setting on transmitter is in correct position

• Always turn on transmitter first before arming UA

• Walk around UA and perform a final visual inspection from all sides

• Place UA at launch point before connecting battery

• Activate FPV monitor to ensure GPS fix (at least 7 satellites displayed)

• Arm UA without advancing throttle to ensure all rotors are spinning normally 

and in correct direction before launching UA

1
**Exhibit 24.1**

 

**POWER OF ATTORNEY**

 

KNOW ALL MEN BYTHESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned hereby constitutes and appoints Robert E.Sulentic, Arlin E. Gaffner and J. Christopher Kirk and each of them, his trueand lawful attorneys-in-fact, with full power of substitution andresubstitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, to sign on hisbehalf, as a director or officer, or both, as the case may be, of Trammell CrowCompany, a Delaware corporation (the “Corporation”), the Corporation’s AnnualReport on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004, and to sign anyor all amendments to such Form 10-K, and to file the same, with all exhibitsthereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities andExchange Commission, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact, and each of themwith or without the others, full power and authority to do and perform each andevery act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about thepremises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do inperson, hereby ratifying and confirming all that each of said attorneys-in-factor their substitute or substitutes may lawfully do or cause to be done byvirtue hereof.

 

 
|   | /s/  DEREK R. MCCLAIN |   |
|--------|-----------------------|--------|
|   | Derek R. McClain      |   |

 

----
EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350 (ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002) In connection
with the periodic report of Dynegy Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the
period ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Bruce A. Williamson, Chairman
of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify as of the date hereof, solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63,
Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge: (1)
the Report
 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
 applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and(2)
the
 information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
 respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at
 the dates and for the periods indicated.  Date: July
 25, 2008
By:
/s/ BRUCE
 A. WILLIAMSONBruce A. WilliamsonChairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive
 Officer
EXHIBIT 23.1
                       Consent of Independent Accountants

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of
IMRglobal Corp. (formerly Information Management Resources, Inc.) on
Form S-8 (No. 33-24027) of our report dated February 13, 1998, except for
certain information in Note 13 for which the date is March 9, 1998, on our
audits of the consolidated financial statements of IMRglobal Corp. as of
December 31, 1997, and for the years ended December 31, 1997 and 1996, which
report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


Tampa, Florida
March 26, 1999
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Beales, Chafin and Senior Judge Bumgardner 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

CHELSEA NICOLE COSTON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1880-15-1 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 NOVEMBER 29, 2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

James Clayton Lewis, Judge 

 Annette Miller, Senior Trial Attorney (Office of the Public Defender, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. 

Herring, Attorney General; Susan Baumgartner, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Chelsea Nicole Coston appeals her conviction of petit larceny, third offense, Code 

§ 18.2-104. She admits she committed the current larceny but maintains a prior conviction could 

only enhance her punishment if it was pronounced before the current offense occurred. We 

conclude that the predicate offense must occur before the date of the present offense, but the 

conviction for the predicate offense need not predate the current offense. Accordingly, we affirm 

her conviction. 

When the defendant stole from WalMart on June 20, 2014, she had been convicted for 

uttering a bad check in 2013. Two days prior she also had committed a petit larceny, but she was 

not convicted of the offense until July 21, 2014. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
 - 2 - 

The theft from WalMart on June 20 was charged as petit larceny, third offense. The 

indictment stated the defendant had “previously been convicted on two or more other occasions 

within the Commonwealth . . . of larceny, or an offense deemed punishable as larceny . . . .” The 

defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment. The defendant contends the offense on 

June 18, 2014 could not be used to enhance her punishment because she was not convicted of 

that crime until after she committed the current offense. 

The question of statutory construction of Code § 18.2-104 has been resolved during the 

pendency of this appeal in Pitts v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (Nov. 8, 

2016). Accordingly, we affirm. 

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, STATEMENT OF INCOME, AND STATEMENT OF CASH FLOW AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          $1,509
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   32,410
<ALLOWANCES>                                       431
<INVENTORY>                                     25,582
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                62,202
<PP&E>                                          78,631
<DEPRECIATION>                                  35,157
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 113,852
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           14,354
<BONDS>                                         30,518
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           148
<OTHER-SE>                                      65,045
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   113,852
<SALES>                                         89,519
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                89,519
<CGS>                                           66,875
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   82,556
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 780
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,673
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,574
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,099
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,099
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .38
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .38


</TABLE>
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 20

- 00028

- CR

C HARLES S ALAS J R

. , Appellant

V

.

T HE S TATE OF T EXAS §

§

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 431st District Court

of Denton County ( F18

- 3564

- 431 )

October 29, 2020

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Lee G a briel

Justice Lee Gabriel
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2709 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2709

  To amend the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 to increase the 
fiscal year 2021 commitments to guarantee certain business loans of the 
                     Small Business Administration.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            August 10, 2021

 Mr. Cardin (for himself and Mr. Van Hollen) introduced the following 
   bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Small 
                     Business and Entrepreneurship

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 to increase the 
fiscal year 2021 commitments to guarantee certain business loans of the 
                     Small Business Administration.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Continuing Access to 504 Capital 
Act''.

SEC. 2. SBA BUSINESS LOANS.

    Title V of division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
(Public Law 116-260) is amended, under the heading ``(including 
transfer of funds)'' under the heading ``business loans program 
account'' under the heading ``Small Business Administration'', in the 
second proviso, by striking ``$7,500,000,000'' and inserting 
``$8,500,000,000''.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 21-0037

IN TI-IE MATTER OF:

FILED

JUN 1 5 2021

Bowen Greenwood

Cerk of Suprerne Court

State of Montane

A.D., ORDER

A Youth in Need of Care.

Counsel for the appellant mother of A.D. filed a motion and brief asking to be

allowed to withdraw from this appeal on grounds that counsel has been unable to find any

nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal, pursuant to § 46-8-103(2), MCA, and Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). The mother was granted time to file a

response, but no response was filed.

The Court has now independently examined the record pursuant to § 46-8-103(2),

MCA, and Anders. We conclude there are no arguments with potential legal merit that

could be raised in the mother's appeal in this case.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED.

The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this Order to all counsel of record and to

the appellant mother per onally.

DATED this 1 5 day of June, 2021.

Chief Justice

06/15/2021

Case Number: DA 21-0037
dri 

Justices
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 96-2733EA

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Jerry Dixon, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

_____________

 Submitted: March 11, 1997

 Filed: May 9, 1997

_____________

Before FAGG, HEANEY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Jerry Dixon pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine

base within one thousand feet of a playground, see 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), 860(a), 846, and using a firearm during a drug offense,

see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Dixon to

seventy-eight months on the drug offense and a consecutive sixty

months on the firearm offense. After the Supreme Court decided

Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995) (narrowing

definition of “using” firearm within meaning of § 924(c)), Dixon

filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his firearm sentence.

The Government agreed Dixon’s firearm sentence should be vacated in

light of Bailey, but argued the district court should enhance

Dixon’s drug sentence for his possession of a firearm, see U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1996). The district

court set aside Dixon’s firearm sentence, but held it lacked
-2-

jurisdiction to resentence Dixon on the unchallenged drug

conviction. The Government appeals. 

In a case presenting the same issue and decided the same day,

United States v. Harrison, No. 96-2544, slip op. at 3-4 (8th Cir.

May 9, 1997), we held 28 U.S.C. § 2255 gives district courts power

to enhance an unchallenged drug sentence for firearm possession

after vacating the defendant’s sentence for using a firearm in

violation of § 924(c). The § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement of the drug

sentence and the § 924(c) firearm conviction are interdependent.

See id. Thus, to correct a § 2255 petitioner’s sentence after a

successful attack on the § 924(c) firearm conviction, the district

court must revisit the drug term to consider the § 2D1.1(b)(1)

enhancement. See id. Resentencing in these circumstances does not

violate double jeopardy or due process. See id. at 4-5. 

We reverse and remand for the district court to consider

whether application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is appropriate

in Dixon’s case.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent in this case for the reasons set forth

in my dissent in the companion case, United States v. Harrison, No.

96-2544 (8th Cir. May 9, 1997).

A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EXHIBIT 21
 SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT
 Jurisdiction ofSubsidiary
    
    IncorporationMidway Interactive Inc.
    
    DelawareMidway Home Entertainment Inc.
    
    DelawareMidway Games West Inc. (formerly, Atari Games Corporation)
    
    CaliforniaMidway Games Sales Corporation
    
    BarbadosMidway Games (Europe) GmbH
    
    GermanyMidway Games Limited
    
    United KingdomMidway Amusement Games, LLC
    
    Delaware (LLC)Midway Sales Company, LLC
    
    Delaware (LLC)Midway Home Studios Inc.
    
    DelawareK. K. Midway Games
    
    JapanMidway Games Canada Corp.
    
    CanadaSurreal Software Inc.
    
    WashingtonMidway Studios  Austin Inc.
    
    TexasMidway Studios  Los Angeles Inc.
    
    CaliforniaMidway Games GmbH
    
    GermanyMidway Australia Holdings Pty Ltd
    
    AustraliaRatbag Holdings Pty Ltd
    
    AustraliaMidway Studios  Newcastle Limited
    
    United KingdomMidway Games SAS
    
    France
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          10,629
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,624
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,500
<INVENTORY>                                      5,182
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                38,531
<PP&E>                                         243,723
<DEPRECIATION>                                 113,282
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 176,746
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           27,214
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           181
<OTHER-SE>                                      92,837
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   176,746
<SALES>                                         19,936
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               124,638
<CGS>                                           12,350
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   59,473
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   404
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,182
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 16,807
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,536
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,271
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,271
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .84
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .84
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 13.1

                                  CERTIFICATION
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(SUBSECTIONS (a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES
                                      CODE)

         Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the
undersigned officer of The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland, a
corporation incorporated in Ireland (the "Company"), hereby certifies, to such
officer's knowledge, that:

         The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended March 31, 2003 (the
"Report") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

Dated: July 23, 2003                        /s/ MICHAEL D. SODEN
                                            ____________________________________
                                            Name: Michael D. Soden
                                            Title: Group Chief Executive Officer

         The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) as an exhibit to the
Report.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

October 21, 2014

N o. 04

- 14

- 00569

- CV

Burton KAHN

, Appellant

v.

HELVETIA ASSET RECOVERT, INC., Appellee

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013

- CI

- 18355 Honorable Michael E. Mery, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant Burton Kahn filed a notice of appeal on August 7, 2014, stating he “desires to appeal from the Order denying Defendants for New Trial on July 21, 2014.” An order denying a motion for new trial is not independently appealable. See In re Adams , 4 16 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2013, no pet.) (citing State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Berdan , 335 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2011, orig. proceeding ) ). Rather, an appeal may generally be taken only from a final judgment. See Lehmann v. H ar

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Accordingly, it appear ed we lack jurisdiction over this matter. We therefore ordered appellant to file a response showing cause why this court should not dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

On O ctober 20, 2014, appellant filed a satisfactory response establishing this court has jurisdiction over the appeal, advising he was appealing from the trial court’s June 11, 2014 final judgment and attaching a copy of same.

The clerk’s record was filed October 8, 2014, and the reporter’s record was filed October 20, 2014. Accordingly, we ORDER appellant to file his brief in this court on or before November 19, 2014.

We order the clerk of this court to serve cop ies of this order on appellant and all counsel.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 21st day of October, 2014

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DANIELLE NICOLE PACKER,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 533 MAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 5th day of December, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Packer 

acted with sufficient malice when she became involved in a fatal motor 

vehicle accident after she “huffed” Dust-Off to support her convictions for 

[t]hird [d]egree [m]urder and [a]ggravated [a]ssault?