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STATE OF VERMONT 

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT 

Town of Georgia, { 

 Plaintiff { 

 { 

 v. { Docket No. 105-6-10 Vtec 

 { 

Ronald King and Laurie King, { 

 Defendants { 

Decision and Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

The Town of Georgia (“Town”) has brought an enforcement action against 

Ronald King and Laurie King (“Defendants”) for allegedly violating the Town of Georgia 

Zoning Regulations (“Regulations”) by developing a second dwelling on their property 

without a zoning permit. The Town has moved for partial summary judgment, asking 

the Court to find that the terms of the violation discussed in the September 23, 2009 

Notice of Violation (“NOV”) that the Town of Georgia Zoning Administrator (“ZA”) 

issued to Defendants are final and cannot be challenged in this proceeding. 

Defendant Ronald King has submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Town’s 

motion, and the Town has replied, but Defendant Laurie King has not filed a response. 

In this proceeding, the Town is represented by Amanda S. Lafferty, Esq. with 

John H. Klesch and David W. Rugh serving as co-counsel. Defendant Ronald King is 

represented by Daniel P. O’Rourke, Esq., and Defendant Laurie King is selfrepresented. 

Factual Background 

For the sole purpose of putting the pending motion in context, we recite the 

following facts which we understand to be undisputed unless otherwise noted: 

1. Defendants own a 10.03 acre lot located at 857 Sodom Road in the 

Agricultural/Rural Residential Zoning District (or, AR-1 District) of the Town of 

Georgia, Vermont. 

2. In August 2007, Defendants sought approval from the ZA to place a mobile 

trailer on their property. At that time, Defendants’ property was already developed 

with one single-family dwelling. 
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3. The ZA informed Defendants that, in order to add the new dwelling to their 

property, they would need to obtain a subdivision permit from the Town to create a 

separate lot for their trailer. 

4. At some point following this conversation, Defendants placed a mobile trailer on 

their property and Defendant Ronald King’s mother began living in it.1 At that time, 

Defendants had not completed the process of receiving a zoning permit for the 

development. 

5. On September 23, 2009, the ZA issued a Notice of Violation (“NOV”) to 

Defendants based on the existence of the trailer on their property. Included in the 

NOV is a statement that Defendants violated the Regulations by commencing land 

development without a subdivision permit or a building permit. The NOV also 

indicates that the “cure for this violation is to remove the second residential dwelling 

unit,” and provides an explanation of Defendants’ appeal rights. (See Mot. for Partial 

Summ. J., Exhibit A, filed Mar. 25, 2011.) 

6. The parties dispute when Defendant Ronald King became aware that a NOV had 

been issued to him. The Town alleges that it mailed the NOV to Defendants by both 

certified mail and first class mail, and that Defendants received the certified mailing 

on October 9, 2009.2 Defendant Ronald King claims to have had no notice of the NOV 

until sometime in October, 2009.3

7. Defendants did not appeal the issuance of the NOV. 

8. On June 20, 2010, the Town instituted the present enforcement action against 

Defendants based on the violation alleged in the NOV. 

9. Subsequent to the Town’s issuance of the NOV, Defendants applied for 

permission to use the mobile trailer now on their property as an accessory dwelling. 

Defendants thereafter received a certificate of occupancy for the trailer. 

Discussion 

 Pending before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the 

Town requesting that the Court determine that Defendants cannot now challenge the 

 

1 While Defendant Ronald King admits that his mother moved into the trailer after he received a state 

wastewater permit for a septic system for the trailer, he does not indicate the date of this event. 

2 The Town has submitted a return receipt which includes Defendant Laurie King’s signature and a delivery 

date of October 9, 2009. 

3 While Defendant Ronald King makes this assertion in his general narrative of the actions he has taken in 

regards to the development on his property, he does not incorporate this assertion into any of the arguments 

he makes in opposition to the Town’s motion for partial summary judgment. 
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zoning violation discussed in the September 23, 2009 NOV that the ZA issued to them. 

The asserted zoning violation consists of the development by Defendants, without a 

zoning permit, of a second dwelling on their property. 

The Town argues that Defendants did not appeal the NOV and that, therefore, it 

is final and binding. Defendant Laurie King does not oppose the Town’s motion. 

Defendant Ronald King does not refute that he failed to appeal the NOV. However, he 

argues that he is not bound by it for three principal reasons: 1) the Town’s NOV did 

not comply with the requirements for a notice of violation found in 24 V.S.A. § 4451(a); 

2) it is a disputed fact whether he violated the Regulations; and 3) the Town 

incorrectly advised him that he should seek a subdivision permit and not an accessory 

dwelling permit and should be estopped from enforcing its Regulations. 

I. Summary judgment standard 

 As we address the pending motion, we note that summary judgment is only 

appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, . . . show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3); see V.R.E.C.P. 3. In our examination of the facts, we 

give the non-moving party (here, Defendants) the benefit of all reasonable doubts and 

inferences, and accept as true all assertions made in opposition “so long as they are 

supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” Robertson v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 

2004 VT 15, ¶ 15, 176 Vt. 356 (citations omitted). 

II. Statutory requirements for a notice of violation 

Section 4451(a) of Chapter 117 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated requires that 

a municipality give an individual or entity that the municipality believes is in violation 

of its zoning ordinance, a notice of the violation and time to “cure” it before the 

municipality institutes an enforcement action. 24 V.S.A. § 4451(a). The notice should 

be sent by certified mail and must indicate both that there is a violation and that the 

“alleged offender” has the opportunity to cure the violation. Id. 

The Town has submitted a copy of its September 23, 2009 NOV with its motion 

for summary judgment and asserts that this NOV is sufficient to trigger the finality 

provisions discussed in more detail below. The Town’s NOV includes a recitation of 

the sections of the Regulations that the Town alleges Defendants violated, a 

description of Defendants’ actions that violated these Regulations, a statement that 
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Defendants have time to cure the violation, a statement that such a cure would be “to 

remove the second residential dwelling unit,” and a description of Defendants’ right to 

appeal in regard to the NOV. (See Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Exhibit A, filed Mar. 25, 

2011.) 

Defendant Ronald King argues that the Town’s NOV is deficient because the 

cure the Town describes is removal of the trailer. He asserts that the Town should 

have indicated that he could also cure the violation by pursuing a subdivision or 

accessory dwelling permit, and that this deficiency raises a genuine issue of material 

fact that prevents summary judgment in the Town’s favor. 

Mr. King is misinformed about what constitutes the “cure” of a violation. A 

party who submits a permit application for a development that was originally 

completed without a permit, but for which a permit was required, does not 

retroactively “cure” the violation through that application. Even if the party were to 

eventually gain approval for the necessary zoning permit or permits, he or she would 

still have violated the applicable zoning ordinance from the time the non-permitted 

development began to the time he or she received the necessary permits. 

Consequently, we cannot agree with Defendant Ronald King that he has raised a 

triable issue of fact. 

III. Finality of the NOV 

Individuals or entities who qualify as interested persons with regard to the 

decisions of municipal administrative officers, such as the recipients of a notice of 

violation, have a statutorily provided right to appeal that decision. See 24 V.S.A. 

§ 4465(a). Such an appeal must be initiated by filing a notice of appeal with the 

appropriate municipal panel within 15 days of the decision to be appealed. Id. If 

persons with the right to appeal an officer’s decision fail to do so, they and all other 

“interested persons affected shall be bound by that decision.” Id. § 4472(d). In other 

words, an appeal of an officer’s decision to the appropriate municipal panel within 15 

days of that decision is the “exclusive statutory remedy for persons aggrieved by local 

zoning decisions.” Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 356 (1992); see 24 

V.S.A. § 4472(a). 

Here, the Town argues that the terms of the NOV, including the violation 

described therein, are binding on Defendants because they did not appeal that 

decision. Defendants do not contest the Town’s assertion that they failed to appeal 
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the September 23, 2009 NOV the Town issued to them. Instead, Defendant Ronald 

King argues that there is a “genuine question” as to whether he violated the 

Regulations which creates a disputed fact barring summary judgment on the question 

of whether the violation exists. (See Def. Ronald King’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial 

Summ. J. 6, filed June 6, 2011.) 

We do not accept Mr. King’s interpretation of the applicable law. An argument 

going to whether there was a violation could have been raised in an appeal of the NOV 

itself, but cannot now be raised in this enforcement action brought by the Town. 

Because Defendants did not appeal the Town’s September 23, 2009 NOV issued to 

them, under the provisions of § 4472, that decision is now final and cannot be 

contested. Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge Mr. King 

raises. 

We conclude that Defendant Ronald King has failed to raise a disputed material 

fact regarding the finality of the NOV, and its terms are binding on Defendants. 

IV. Equitable estoppel 

Defendant Ronald King’s final argument is that partial summary judgment for 

the Town is not warranted because the doctrine of equitable estoppel should bar the 

Town from pursuing this enforcement action against Defendants. Specifically, Mr. 

King argues that the Town incorrectly advised him that he should seek a subdivision 

permit rather than an accessory dwelling permit, and that he relied on that advice to 

his financial determent during his pursuit of a subdivision permit. 

We would normally begin our analysis of Mr. King’s equitable estoppel claim by 

reviewing the legal standard for that doctrine. However, we need not do so here 

because Mr. King’s argument does not, in fact, support his legal challenge based upon 

equitable estoppel. The operative action here is not the advice the ZA gave to Mr. 

King, nor its decision to prosecute Defendants, but rather their decision to place a 

trailer on their property without first obtaining some sort of zoning approval. Even if 

the Town’s advice to Defendants can be classified as incomplete or misleading, it falls 

far short of the transgressions that would give rise to an equitable estoppel claim. Mr. 

King does not allege that the ZA advised Defendants to place a trailer on their property 

without first obtaining some sort of zoning approval; Mr. King chose to not follow 

through on what the ZA advised him to do. Rather, he chose to improve his property 
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without any zoning approval. Thus, his argument does not support the application of 

equitable estoppel to this enforcement action. 

We conclude that Defendant Ronald King’s argument concerning the 

application of equitable estoppel neither prevents us from granting partial summary 

judgment in favor of the Town here (on the question of whether the terms of the NOV 

are binding on Defendants) nor bars this enforcement action in its entirety. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons detailed above, we GRANT the Town’s motion for partial 

summary judgment. That is, we find that the terms of the zoning violation presented 

in the September 23, 2009 NOV the ZA issued to Defendants are final and binding on 

Defendants. The issues that remain in this action—the appropriate remedies and 

fines, if any—will be determined at the upcoming merits hearing which is scheduled 

for August 30, 2011 at the Franklin County Courthouse in St. Albans, VT. Parties are 

directed to prepare for that hearing. 

 Done at Rutland, Vermont this 25th day of August, 2011. 

 

Thomas S. Durkin 

Environmental Judge