United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 15-2781

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Sarah K. Brooks; Michelle R. Bullock; Zoea A. Warnick; Francis Livingood; Paul

G. Wolf; Jason Fett

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

Kris L. Olds

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

v.

City of Des Moines, Iowa; Gatso USA, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

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 Submitted: November 17, 2016

 Filed: December 1, 2016

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Before LOKEN, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Six drivers sued the City of Des Moines and Gatso USA, Inc., arguing that the

Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates federal and state law. The
district court dismissed the drivers’ claims. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291, this court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands.

I. 

In 2011, the City, by ordinance, authorized an ATE system. Des Moines, Iowa

Mun. Code § 114-243. The City contracted with Gatso to install and operate the

system. When a vehicle speeds or runs a red light, an ATE camera takes an image. 

Gatso then mails a Notice of Violation to the vehicle owner. The driverssued in Iowa

state court, arguing that the ATE systemviolatestheir right to procedural due process,

their fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code §§ 602.6101 and 364.22, and causes

unjust enrichment for the City and Gatso. They removed the case to federal court

and moved to dismiss.

The district court dismissed the drivers for failure to state a claim. On appeal,

the drivers contend that the district court erred by failing to address their standing and

by dismissing their complaint. 

II. 

The district court “passesthe question whether plaintiffs here have standing to

bring the claims.” To the contrary: “Lack of the jurisdiction of the subject matter of

litigation cannot be waived by the parties or ignored by the court.” Hunter v.

Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 2004). “The appellate court must satisfy

itself not only of its own jurisdiction but also that of the district court.” Id. at 476-77. 

Where a plaintiff lacks standing, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Young

America Corp. v. Affiliated Comput. Servs., Inc., 424 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2005). 

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show 1) an injury in fact, 2)

a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and

3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v.

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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The party invoking federal

jurisdiction has the burden to establish these elements. Id. 

All drivers received a Notice of Violation, which is sufficient injury in fact. 

See Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006-07

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff had standing to challenge a statute because

the state had given no indication that the law would not be enforced and the plaintiff

“faced a reasonable risk that it would be subject to civil penalties for violation of the

statute”); Horne v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d

on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (“A monetary penalty is an actual, concrete

and particularized injury-in-fact.”). The drivers’ alleged injury is directly traceable

to the City and Gatso. If the court awards damages, their claims are redressed. See

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174

(2000). The drivers have standing.

III.

 

The drivers argue that district court should not have relied on Hughes v. City

of Cedar Rapids, 112 F. Supp. 3d 817 (N.D. Iowa 2015), because the facts here are

materially different. While the drivers correctly note that the Cedar Rapids’

ordinance is different, any difference is immaterial. Both Cedar Rapids and Des

Moines offer access to the district court (before or after an optional administrative

proceeding). Based on this court’s holding, the other differences that the drivers

allege are irrelevant.

IV.

The drivers argue that the process established under the ordinance is preempted

by Iowa Code §§ 602.6101, 364.22(4), and 364.22(6). “A local ordinance is not

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inconsistent with state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law.” Goodell v.

Humboldt Cty., 575 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1998) (emphasis in original). 

Section 602.6101 establishes the jurisdiction of the Iowa District Court as

“exclusive, general, and original jurisdiction of all actions . . . except in cases where

exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is conferred upon some other court, tribunal, or

administrative body.” Article III of the Iowa Constitution provides home rule power,

authorizing a municipality to determine local affairs and government so long as the

municipality does not act inconsistently with state law. Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A. 

Further, section 364.22(2) states: “A city by ordinance may provide that a violation

of an ordinance is a municipal infraction.” 

Here, the home rule power and section 364.22(2) allow the City to create

municipal infractions, and section 602.6101 allows for concurrent jurisdiction. The

administrative body has concurrent jurisdiction with the Iowa District Court over

ATE infractions. See State v. Stueve, 150 N.W.2d 597, 602 (Iowa 1967) (explaining

that concurrent jurisdiction is “jurisdiction exercised by different courts, at the same

time, over the same subject-matter, and within the same territory, and wherein

litigants may, in the first instance, resort to either court indifferently”). Since

concurrent jurisdiction for municipal infractions is not irreconcilable with Iowa state

law, the drivers fail to state a claim for a violation of section 602.6101.

Section 364.22(4) says, “An officer authorized by a city to enforce a city code

or regulation may issue a civil citation to a person who commits a municipal

infraction.” The drivers argue that the ordinance violates this provision because it

improperly delegates power to Gatso. Based on Section V of this court’s decision in

Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. 15-2703 (8th Cir. 2016), this claim is dismissed. 

 

Section 364.22(6)states, “Inmunicipal infraction proceedings, the matter shall

be tried before a magistrate, a district associate judge, or a district judge in the same

manner as a small claim.” The drivers believe that the administrative proceeding is

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irreconcilable with section 364.22(6)’s instruction that municipal infraction

proceedings “shall be tried” in a district court. The City and Gatso argue that the

Iowa Supreme Court has already rejected similar claims in City of Sioux City v.

Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 340-54 (Iowa 2015).

The drivers mistakenly believe that the administrative hearing is required; it is

optional. Notice of Violation, Gatso Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1A. (“[Y]ou may request

a civil infraction (lawsuit) in lieu of an administrative hearing.”). An optional

administrative hearing—itself appealable de novo to the district court—is not

irreconcilable with section 364.22(6). 

V.

The drivers argue that the ATE system violates their federal rights to due

process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities. These claims are dismissed

for the reasons stated in Section III.B and Part IV of the Hughes opinion. 

The drivers allege that the City's violation of IDOT rules states claims under

the Iowa Constitution. Based on Section IV.C of Hughes, these claims should be

dismissed without prejudice. 

The drivers believe the City and Gatso have been unjustly enriched. Based on

Part V of Hughes, the drivers have not stated an unjust enrichment claim. 

 

 

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The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The drivers’ state law

claims based on IDOT standards are remanded for dismissal without prejudice. The

judgment is otherwise affirmed, and the case remanded. 

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