J-S72001-17

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.N.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.W., MOTHER

No. 1263 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered March 20, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 

CP-51-AP-0000058-2017

CP-51-DP-0000884-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.N.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.W., MOTHER

No. 1267 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered March 20, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 

CP-51-AP-0000059-2017

CP-51-DP-0000838-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUSMANNO and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2018

C.W. (Mother) appeals from the March 20, 2017 orders that granted 

the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS)

to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to K.N.B. (born in February of 

2006) and K.N.W. (born in September of 2012) (collectively Children).

1

 

Additionally, the goals for Children were changed to adoption. We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Mother’s appeals were consolidated by this Court sua sponte by order 

dated May 9, 2017. 
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In its opinion, the trial court set forth the factual and procedural 

history of this case, as follows:

On September 25, 2012, the Department of Human Services 

(DHS) received a General report which stated that K.N.B. and 

K.N.W's mother tested positive for marijuana and cocaine at

K.N.[W.]’s birth [i]n September [of] 2012. The report stated 

Mother admitted using marijuana regularly during her pregnancy 

but denied cocaine use. K.N.[W.] was born three weeks 

premature at 36 weeks gestation and weighed four pounds and 

ten ounces. The report stated in early September 2012, Mother 

was admitted to the hospital suffering from preterm labor; 

Mother tested positive for marijuana at that time. Mother was 

referred to Chances drug and alcohol treatment program and did 

not follow through with the drug and alcohol treatment. The 

report stated K.N.B. was being cared for by [C]hildren’s Maternal 

... Grandmother while Mother was hospitalized. Mother and 

K.N.B. and K.N.W resided with Grandmother. Mother agreed to 

accept Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) 

services and was referred for community-base[d] prevention 

services with Health Federation implementing voluntary services. 

On April 1, 2015, DHS received a General Protective Services 

(GPS) report which alleged that the Philadelphia Police 

responded to a disturbance complaint at Mother’s residence. 

Mother was observed to be unresponsive and under the influence 

of heroin. The report alleged [] it took Philadelphia Police seven 

minutes to revive Mother to a conscious state. K.N.W was in 

Mother’s care. The report alleged Mother resided in [a] rooming 

house and there were two additional adults in the room who 

were under the influence of narcotics. The report indicated the 

room was unkempt. K.N.W. was clothed in only a diaper and 

was without adult supervision. The report further alleged once 

Mother regained consciousness, she was observed by 

Philadelphia Police picking up K.N.W. by his hair [and] 

attempting to flee the room. The report was determined to be 

valid. 

On April 1, 2015, DHS received a supplemental report which 

alleged Mother escaped the rooming house and took K.N.W. to 

Maternal Grandmother’s home. Police located K.N.W. at 

Maternal [G]randmother’s home and transported both to DHS. 
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DHS spoke with Maternal Grandmother, who stated she was 

willing and able to care for K.N.W. and did not believe Mother 

was capable of caring for K.N.W. The report alleged K.N.B. had 

been in her care for three years. DHS discussed kinship services 

with Maternal Grandmother. 

On April 1, 2015, DHS completed a home evaluation of 

Grandmother’s home and found the home to be compliant for 

K.N.B. and K.N.W. DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody

(OPC) for K.N.W. and placed him with Grandmother.

At the Shelter Care hearing for K.N.W. held on April 3, 2015, the 

[c]ourt lifted the OPC and ordered the temporary commitment of 

custody of K.N.W. to DHS to stand. 

On April 6, 201[5], DHS filed an urgent petition for K.N.B. 

Mother had a history of drug use and lacked stable and 

appropriate housing. 

On April 13, 2015, the [c]ourt deferred adjudication, ordered the 

temporary commitment to DHS to stand as to K.N.W., ordered 

Mother was not permitted to visit K.N.W. and K.N.B. in the home 

of Maternal Grandmother. The [c]ourt further ordered Mother to 

the Clinical Evaluation [Unit] (CEU) for a drug screen, 

assessment and monitoring with dual diagnosis. 

At the Adjudicatory Hearing held on April 20, 2015, the [c]ourt 

discharged the temporary commitment on K.N.W. The [c]ourt 

adjudicated K.N.B. and K.N.W. dependent and committed 

[C]hildren to DHS. The [c]ourt further ordered DHS to refer 

Mother for a GED program, re-referred Mother to CEU for a drug 

and alcohol screen, assessment with dual diagnosis, [and] 

monitoring. Mother was ordered to sign releases, to comply with 

all services and recommendations. Mother was also courtordered ... to continue treatment at Best Behavioral Health. 

On May 26, 2015, an initial Single Case Plan (SCP) was created. 

The objectives for Mother were to achieve recovery from drug[s]

and alcohol, to continue at NHS three times a week for individual

and group therapy, to continue at Best Behavioral Health for 

individual therapy once a week, to provide stable housing, to 

attend the Achiev[]ing Reunification Center (ARC) and comply 

with the program, to maintain the relationship with [C]hildren, to 
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continue supervised visits at the agency twice a month, to 

achieve age appropriate development and skills and to continue 

with ChildLink services twice a week in the home for speech 

therapy. 

On July 13, 2015, the [c]ourt referred Mother to CEU for an 

assessment and a drug screen with three random drug screens 

prior to the next court date.

On September 1, 2015, a revised SCP was created. The 

objectives for Mother were to achieve recovery from drug[s] and 

alcohol; to continue at NHS three times a week for individual and 

group therapy; to continue at Best Behav[ioral] Health for 

individual therapy once a week; to maintain a relationship with 

[C]hildren; to continue supervised visits at the agency twice a 

month; to achieve age-appropriate development and skills[;]

and to continue with Childlink services twice a week in the home 

for speech therapy. 

On October 6, 2015, it was reported that on September 22, 2015 

Mother tested positive at NHS for marijuana. The Court referred 

Mother to CEU for a full drug and alcohol screen and three

randoms prior to the next court date. 

On February, 26, 2016, a revised SCP was created. The 

objectives [were] for Mother to achieve recovery from drug and 

alcohol[;], to continue at NHS three times a week for individual 

and group therapy; to maintain a relationship with her children;

to continue with unsupervised liberal visits; to provide stable 

housing[;] to stabilize her mental health and to continue 

individual therapy once a week at Best Behavioral Health. 

On March 22, 2016, the [c]ourt referred Mother to CEU for [a] 

drug screen and monitoring to include three random drug 

screens prior to the next court date, and ordered that visitation 

with Mother was modified to supervised visits. 

On June 23, 2016, it was reported that there had been no 

compliance with the permanency plan by Mother. The [c]ourt 

ordered Mother to have supervised visits at DHS only, [and]

ordered Mother [to] confirm visits 24 hours in advance. The 

[c]ourt further ordered Mother was not permitted unauthorized

contact with K.N.B. and K.N.W. Mother was re-referred to CEU 
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for drug and alcohol screens, assessments, dual diagnosis 

monitoring, and three random drug screens. 

On November 17, 2016, it was reported there had been minimal 

compliance with the permanency plan by Mother. The [c]ourt 

ordered Mother to call and confirm her visits 24 hours in 

advance. The [c]ourt referred Mother to CEU for monitoring, 

dual diagnosis and three random drug screens. 

The matter was the listed on a regular basis before judges of the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court DivisionJuvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42

Pa.C.S.[] § 6351, and evaluated for the purpose of reviewing the 

permanency plan of [Children]. 

In subsequent hearings, the Dependency Review Orders reflect 

the [c]ourt’s review and disposition as a result of evidence 

presented, primarily with the goal of finalizing the permanency 

plan. 

On March 20, 2017, during the Termination of Parental Rights 

Hearing for Mother, the [c]ourt found by clear and convincing 

evidence that Mother’s parental rights [to] K.N.B. and K.N.W.[] 

should be terminated pursuant to the Juvenile Act. Furthermore, 

the [c]ourt held it was in the best interest of [C]hildren that the 

goal be changed to Adoption.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 8/16/17, at 1-3. 

In its opinion, the trial court also discussed the basis for its decision to 

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and to change the goal to adoption. It 

sets forth facts gleaned from the documentation and testimony presented at 

the March 20, 2017 hearing and suggests that this Court should affirm its 

decision. 

In Mother’s brief, she raises the following issues for our review:
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1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2), 

2511(a)(5), and 2511(a)(8)?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that termination of 

[M]other’s parental rights best served the [Children’s] 

developmental, physical and emotional needs under 23 

Pa.C.S. Section 2511(b)?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in changing the [C]hildren’s goal to 

adoption?

Mother’s brief at vi. 

We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the 

following standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree 

must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to 

involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord 

the hearing judge’s decision the same deference that we would 

give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive 

review of the record in order to determine whether the trial 

court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve 
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conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 

2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will 

affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 

With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts 

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 
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emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

As noted above, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). In order to affirm, we 

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of section 

2511(a), as well as section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). Mother’s brief provides argument regarding all four 

subsections of section (a). We have chosen to address and analyze the 

court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under section 

2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

***
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(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

In In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2010), this Court provided 

direction relating to what considerations need to be addressed when 

reviewing a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights under various 

subsections of 2511(a). Specifically, relating to subsection (a)(1), the Z.P.

Court stated:

A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) 

where the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties for at 

least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition. 

In re C.S., [761 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2000)]. The court 

should consider the entire background of the case and not 

simply:

mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent facing termination 

of his ... parental rights, to determine if the evidence, 

in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal 

denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (citing In re D.J.S.,

737 A.2d 283 (Pa. Super. 1999)).
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In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (emphasis in original). 

Relating to Mother’s argument addressing subsection (a)(1), her brief 

simply provides a recitation of the law and then she claims the following:

In this case, [M]other had consistently visited with the 

[C]hildren. Mother was active in mental health treatment, and 

she had attended drug and alcohol treatment until it interfered 

with her work times. Mother was employed full time and had 

housing. In addition, [M]other’s drug screens were negative. 

Mother’s brief at 4. 

In discussing the facts relating to section 2511(a)(1), the trial court 

stated:

In the instant matter, the social worker testified the case 

became known to the agency due to a visit to Mother’s home by 

Philadelphia Police. The social worker testified Mother was found 

unconscious by the Philadelphia Police. K.N.W. was found by the 

Philadelphia Police walking around unattended. 

Social worker testified Mother was offered and failed to be 

consistent with drug and alcohol treatment and mental health 

treatment. Social worker testified Mother failed to attend Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (CEU) for random drug screens as per court 

order. Mother admitted in her testimony, she failed to comply 

with the court ordered drug screens at CEU. Mother had not 

participated in drug screens in over a year. Furthermore, social 

worker testified Mother’s last screen tested positive high for 

alcohol. Mother testified she refused to take prescribed 

medication for depression. 

. . . 

In the present matter, during the twenty three months (23) 

K.N.B. and K.N.W. have been in DHS care, testimony of social 

worker stated Mother’s Single Case Plan objectives remained the 

same due to lack of progress. Furthermore, social worker 

testified Mother failed to provide verification of completion or 

progress in any kind of drug, alcohol or mental health treatment. 

However, Mother participated in visits only missing a few visits. 
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TCO at 4, 5 (citations to the notes of testimony omitted). Essentially, the 

trial court found that Mother failed to complete most of the objectives during 

the two-year period, in particular, those dealing with her drug, alcohol and 

mental health problems, although she did comply with the visitation 

objective. Notably, the court found the social worker credible, but that 

Mother’s testimony lacked credibility.

Likewise, with regard to Mother’s second issue, relating to subsection 

2511(b), Mother sets forth the applicable law, but merely relies on the fact 

that she complied with the visitation schedule with Children and that those 

visits “were appropriate.” Mother’s brief at 7. However, the court found 

that Children were “dependent on and bonded with their foster parent[;]” 

that Children’s “basic needs were being met by their foster parent[;]” and 

that Children “would suffer no irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were 

terminated.” TCO at 6. 

Our thorough review of the record reveals that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in ordering the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

The record supports the court’s findings and conclusion that Mother’s refusal 

or failure to perform parental duties occurred for a period of at least six 

months (in fact, for at least 23 months) prior to the filing of the petition. 

Moreover, the evidence shows that Children have bonded with foster parent, 

who satisfies their needs, and “is the focal point of stability and permanency 

for Children.” Id. at 6. Additionally, we note that a child’s life “simply 
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cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d. 726, 732 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right 

to the custody and rearing of [his or her] child is converted, upon the failure 

to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper 

parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 856. Since Mother has not 

convinced us otherwise, we conclude that she is not entitled to any relief. 

Lastly, we address Mother’s third issue concerning the goal change to 

adoption for Children. The trial court determined that based on the record a 

goal change to adoption was in Children’s best interests. Mother again set 

forth the law relating to a goal change and then simply argues that:

Mother was complying with her FSP objectives. Moreover, 

[M]other had always visited with the [C]hildren throughout the 

life of this case. The [C]hildren looked to [M]other for comfort, 

security, love and support. It is in these [C]hildren’s best 

interest to be with their [M]other, and the goal should not have 

been changed to adoption. 

Mother’s brief at 8. 

This Court’s standard of review involving a goal change for a 

dependent child is as follows: 

In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement 

goal ... to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. 

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). To hold that 

the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine its 

judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the court 

disregarded the law, or that its action was “a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. (quoting In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 
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967, 973 (Pa. Super. 2004)). While this Court is bound by the 

facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court’s 

inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a “responsibility 

to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry 

and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal 

principles to that record.” In re A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). Therefore, our scope of review is broad. Id.

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), when considering a 

petition for goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile court is to 

consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) 

the extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility 

of the current placement goal for the children; and (5) a likely date by which 

the goal for the child might be achieved. In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 977. The 

best interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide 

the trial court. Id. at 978 

Our review of the record in this case and the statutory directives 

governing a goal change support the conclusion that reunification of Children 

with Mother is not a realistic goal. Mother is primarily seeking to have this 

Court reweigh the evidence in a light more favorable to her. However, it is 

beyond our purview to disturb the credibility determinations of the trial court 

when the testimony relied upon is supported in the record. The trial court 

was free to conclude that Mother was unlikely to remedy the issues in the 
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near future; thus, the permanency needs of Children dictate changing their 

goal to adoption. We are compelled to conclude that the trial court did not 

err in ordering the change of goal to adoption. 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2018