Present: All the Justices 

SAINT PAUL HOLMES 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 981428 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

April 16, 1999 

JOHN DOE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY 

Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge 

In this appeal, we consider whether, in a jury trial of an 

automobile accident liability claim, the trial court properly 

permitted the introduction of expert testimony concerning the 

relationship between tire tread depth and hydroplaning. 

On July 29, 1996, pursuant to the uninsured motorist 

provisions of his insurance policy and Code § 38.2-2206, Saint 

Paul Holmes filed a “John Doe” action seeking damages for 

injuries he sustained in an automobile accident on September 1, 

1995. In his motion for judgment, Holmes alleged that as a 

result of the negligence of John Doe, the unknown driver of a 

tractor-trailer truck, Holmes lost control of his vehicle, which 

then left the highway and collided with a tree. Holmes sought 

$450,000 in damages. 

Government Employees Insurance Company, Holmes’s automobile 

liability insurance carrier, defended the action in the name of 

John Doe. In the grounds of defense, Doe denied liability and 

asserted that the accident was the result of Holmes’s own 

negligence. It was Doe’s contention that Holmes had been 
operating his vehicle too fast for the highway and weather 

conditions, causing it to hydroplane. 

During a jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury on 

the requirements for finding a “John Doe” motorist liable and on 

the effect of contributory negligence. The jury returned its 

verdict for Doe. We awarded Holmes this appeal. 

Upon familiar principles, we relate the essential facts 

concerning the accident in the light most favorable to Doe, the 

prevailing party in the trial court. Immediately prior to the 

accident, Holmes was operating his 1993 Ford Mustang, a rearwheel drive vehicle, in the right-hand lane of Interstate 85 

behind a tractor-trailer truck. Because Holmes did not want to 

follow the truck, he drove his vehicle into the left-hand lane. 

The truck then exhibited a left turn signal and also pulled into 

the left lane in front of Holmes’s vehicle. There was no 

contact between the vehicles. Holmes applied his brakes and his 

vehicle “started shaking and started sliding to the right.” It 

then began “rotating around,” went off the right side of the 

highway, and ultimately collided with a tree. 

At the point of the accident, the highway was straight and 

level. A heavy rain was falling and there was standing water on 

the roadway. The posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour, and 

Holmes had been operating his vehicle at that speed. Holmes was 

unable to identify the driver or owner of the truck. 

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Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that all four tires 

on Holmes’s vehicle had at least the statutory minimum tire 

tread depth of 2/32nd of an inch. Code § 46.2-1043. At the 

time of the accident, the two front tires had treads 9/32nd of 

an inch in depth, the left rear tire had a tread 3/32nd of an 

inch in depth, and the right rear tire had a tread 2/32nd of an 

inch in depth. 

Relevant to the issue presented in this appeal, Thomas O. 

Lee qualified as an expert to testify on the conditions under 

which there can be a loss of highway traction resulting from a 

loss of contact between an automobile tire and a wet road 

surface, commonly known as hydroplaning. In a pre-trial 

hearing, the trial court ruled that because Lee had no specific 

knowledge of the road conditions at the time and place of 

Holmes’s accident, Lee’s testimony would be limited to “the 

principles of hydroplaning.” Prior to permitting Lee to 

testify, the trial court reiterated that Lee would not be 

permitted “to particularize this accident.” 

At one point in his testimony, Lee stated that a tire with 

a tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth “is illegal in this state.” 

Responding to Holmes’s objection, the trial court stated that 

“[t]he jury has already been told that [2/32nd of an inch is a 

legal tire tread depth in Virginia]. I think what Mr. Lee meant 

to say was that if it’s less than 2/32.” Lee agreed with the 

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trial court that he had misspoken, apologized, and corrected his 

testimony. Holmes’s counsel responded, “Perhaps. That’s fine.” 

Lee then testified that a tire with a tread of the minimum 

legal depth was “not safe on wet surfaces” and that a tire that 

has a tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth “should be removed.” 

Holmes again objected that this was contrary to the stipulation 

of legal minimum tire tread depth. The trial court responded 

that “the jury understands that 2/32’s of an inch is legal in 

Virginia.” Holmes’s counsel responded, “Absolutely.” 

The balance of Lee’s testimony was devoted to describing 

the physical circumstances of speed, condition of an 

automobile’s tires, road surface conditions, and weather 

conditions under which a vehicle might hydroplane. More 

specifically, Lee explained that a tire is supposed to channel 

road water through circumferential voids between the ribs of the 

tire so that water can get through the tire treads when the 

tread is in motion going down the pavement. He further 

explained that “when the vehicle is moving down the [wetted] 

pavement, it builds up a wedge of water in front of the tire” 

and “[i]f the water is sufficient enough, it will lift the tire 

off the pavement and provide an insulation between the tire and 

the pavement. . . . [W]hen that totality takes place, that’s 

called hydroplaning; in other words, skiing on water.” Lee 

further explained that where the tread depth of a tire is low 

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“it would not permit the water to get through as easily and 

would thus reduce the hydroplaning speed of the tire.” 

Lee testified that hydroplaning results from a combination 

of factors including the depth of the water, the speed of the 

vehicle, the depth of the tire treads, and the type of road 

surface. He further testified that for a rear-wheel drive 

vehicle, the tread depth of the rear tires was the essential 

factor and that when “tread depth . . . of those tires is down 

towards the minimum, the hydroplaning speed dramatically drops 

. . . [I]t can drop as much as 10 miles an hour.” 

During Lee’s testimony, Holmes asserted numerous 

objections, contending that Lee was testifying to matters within 

the common knowledge of the jury or that Lee was, without 

adequate foundation, offering speculative opinions on the 

ultimate question of fact. 

On appeal, Holmes first contends that the trial court erred 

in permitting Lee to testify that a tire tread 2/32nd of an inch 

in depth was not legal in Virginia. The record amply 

demonstrates, however, that Lee corrected his misstatement and 

that the jury was properly instructed on several occasions on 

that issue. Accordingly, there is no merit to this contention. 

Holmes further contends that Lee’s testimony that a tire 

tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth was unsafe for use on a wet 

road surface and that tires with the minimum tread depth should 

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be removed from a vehicle was inadmissible because these 

contentions were contrary to the provisions of Code § 46.2-1043. 

We disagree. 

Subsequent to the initial misstatement of the law, which 

Lee corrected, none of Lee’s statements expressed an opinion 

that a tire tread 2/32nd of an inch in depth was “illegal,” but, 

rather, that it was “unsafe.” Code § 46.2-1043, although a 

safety-related statute, reflects a policy decision of the 

legislature in establishing the minimum tire tread depth for the 

operation of motor vehicles in this Commonwealth. The statute 

does not purport to address the specific safety concerns for 

operating a vehicle with minimum depth treads under the 

circumstances of this case. Lee, however, was qualified to 

offer an opinion on tire safety, his area of expertise. 

Holmes further contends that Lee’s testimony was 

speculative because Lee had no specific knowledge of the road 

and weather conditions at the time of the accident. However, a 

careful review of the record reveals that, in accord with the 

trial court’s limitation on his testimony, Lee testified only 

about hypothetical tire, road, and weather conditions in order 

to explain “the principles of hydroplaning.” Lee never opined 

what the conditions at the time and place of the accident were, 

nor did he offer an opinion as to the cause of Holmes’s 

accident. Rather, Lee’s testimony was limited to explaining the 

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general relationship of hydroplaning to wet road conditions, 

tire tread depth, and speed. Accordingly, there is no basis for 

Holmes’s contention that this testimony was improperly 

speculative. 

Finally, Holmes contends that Lee’s testimony was 

irrelevant because the jurors could, from their common 

experience, draw their own conclusions about the effect of the 

road conditions on Holmes’s ability to control his vehicle. We 

disagree. While it is certainly true that the danger of 

hydroplaning is a matter of common experience, knowledge of the 

scientific cause of hydroplaning is not. Determining the 

conditions under which a vehicle will hydroplane requires an 

understanding of multiple variables that are not within the 

common knowledge of the average citizen. See, e.g., Bush v. 

State of Louisiana, 395 So. 2d 916, 919 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 

Expert testimony is admissible where the jury “is 

confronted with issues that require scientific or specialized 

knowledge or experience in order to be properly understood, and 

which cannot be determined intelligently merely from the 

deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary 

knowledge, common sense, and practical experience gained in the 

ordinary affairs of life.” Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 

716, 726, 250 S.E.2d 749, 755-56 (1979)(citation omitted); see

also Neblett v. Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 339-40, 150 S.E.2d 115, 118 

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(1966). Here, the jury heard evidence from other witnesses 

concerning the weather, road, and traffic conditions and 

Holmes’s speed of travel. Lee’s expert testimony was 

appropriate to aid the jury in putting this factual evidence 

into an appropriate context from which the jury could draw its 

own conclusions. Code § 8.01-401.3(A); see also Lawson v. John 

Doe, 239 Va. 477, 482-83, 391 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1990). 

Accordingly, Lee’s testimony was not irrelevant and was an 

appropriate topic of expert testimony in this case. 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 

court sustaining the jury’s verdict for Doe. 

Affirmed. 

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