FILED 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

MARY HEDMAN, ) No. 33318-3-III 

) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DR. W. DALE CRUM and ORAL ) 

SURGERY PLUS, a Washington ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

Corporation, d/b/a SURGERY PLUS ) 

SOUTH, W. Dale Crum, D.D.S. PS, d/b/a ) 

INLAND ORAL SURGERY, Dr. Cary ) 

Simonds, and Dr. Jeffrey Lockwood and ) 

Dr. Jeffrey Lockwood DDS FACP, INC., ) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.CJ. - Mary Hedman appeals the trial court's summary 

judgment dismissal of her medical negligence claims. She argues she produced expert 

medical testimony establishing that the defendants breached the standard of care and this 

breach proximately caused her injuries. She also argues the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied her CR 56(t) motion to continue the summary judgment 

hearing. We disagree and affirm the summary dismissal of her claims. 
No. 33318-3-III 

Hedman v. Crum 

FACTS 

Because the trial court dismissed this case on summary judgment, we present the 

facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Ms. Hedman, the 

nonmoving party. 

In October 2009, Ms. Hedman became a patient of Oral Surgery Plus, an oral 

surgery practice. Dr. Dale Crum and Dr. Cary Simonds were both shareholders of Oral 

Surgery Plus. Ms. Hedman was Dr. Crum's patient. Ms. Hedman told Dr. Crum she 

wanted to have her remaining lower teeth extracted. She then wanted upper and lower 

"' all on four'" bridges placed, which are full arch dental prostheses supported by four 

implants. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 281. 

On November 16, 2009, Dr. Crum installed four implants in Ms. Hedman's 

mouth. On November 24, he installed temporary dentures. 

The next day, Ms. Hedman called Oral Surgery Plus. Dr. Crum was on vacation 

and Dr. Simonds was covering. Dr. Simonds answered Ms. Hedman's call. Ms. Hedman 

said she was in pain and that her Oxycodone prescription Dr. Crum had given her had 

been stolen. Dr. Simonds called Dr. Crum and then agreed to hand deliver another 

prescription to Ms. Hedman that evening. Another doctor met her with the prescription. 

Dr. Simonds called Ms. Hedman the next day and asked if she was doing better. 

She said she was, and Dr. Simonds told her to call back if she had any other questions. 

Dr. Crum treated Ms. Hedman throughout December 2009. Ms. Hedman became 

dissatisfied with Dr. Crum's treatment and their relationship deteriorated. On January 8, 

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Hedman v. Crum 

2010, Dr. Crum dismissed Ms. Hedman from the practice. He agreed to see her for 

emergency services for the next 30 days. He told her to find a new oral surgeon as soon 

as possible. 

On January 25, Ms. Hedman and her son went to Oral Surgery Plus to see Dr. 

Simonds. She complained of"' gingival tissue trauma and pain.'" CP at 282. Dr. 

Simonds examined her and determined that the sites where Dr. Crum had operated were 

healthy with no gingivitis. Ms. Hedman requested pain medication. Dr. Simonds 

advised her to use hot and cold packs for pain relief. Dr. Simonds's only involvement in 

Ms. Hedman's care consisted of the two telephone calls and the office visit. Dr. Simonds 

did not perform any dental work on her. 

Ms. Hedman then sought a second opinion from Dr. Kenji Higuchi who, like Dr. 

Crum, is an oral surgeon. Dr. Higuchi referred Ms. Hedman to Dr. Jeffrey Lockwood, a 

prosthodontist, for a prosthodontic assessment. The purpose of the referral was to 

evaluate some concerns related to Dr. Crum's treatment. Dr. Lockwood treated Ms. 

Hedman from February 2010 to November 2011. Dr. Lockwood believed Ms. Hedman's 

dentures needed to be replaced and remade with additional implants. He then made a 

provisional denture. In December 2011, Dr. Lockwood determined it was inappropriate 

to continue further restorative treatment and sent Ms. Hedman a letter explaining this. 

In 2012, two different attorneys representing Ms. Hedman contacted Oral Surgery 

Plus. One requested Ms. Hedman's medical records, and the other alleged medical 

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No. 33318-3-III 

Hedman v. Crum 

negligence and requested prelitigation mediation under RCW 7.70.110. In June 2013, a 

third attorney contacted Dr. Crum and requested mediation. 

PROCEDURE 

On August 26, 2013, Ms. Hedman, through her third attorney, filed a complaint 

against Dr. Crum, Inland Oral Surgery, Dr. Simonds, Oral Surgery Plus, Dr. Lockwood, 

and Dr. Jeffrey Lockwood DDS FACP, Inc. She brought claims under the theories of 

medical negligence, breach of promise, lack of informed consent, and violation of the 

Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW. She also alleged Oral Surgery 

Plus was vicariously liable for Dr. Crum's and Dr. Simonds's negligence. 

In February 2014, Dr. Crum and Dr. Simonds moved for summary judgment, 

arguing that Ms. Hedman failed to support her claims with competent expert testimony. 

Dr. Lockwood later moved for summary judgment. On April 4, Ms. Hedman's third 

attorney filed a notice of intent to withdraw, declaring that his approach and Ms. 

Hedman's approach to the case had diverged to the point where it was suitable for her to 

obtain new counsel. The trial court continued the pending summary judgment motions to 

August 15, finding that this would be "sufficient to allow Ms. Hedman time to find 

replacement counsel." CP at 343. 

On August 8, a fourth attorney appeared on behalf of Ms. Hedman for the limited 

purpose of responding to the pending summary judgment motions. This attorney moved 

to stay in lieu of responding to defendants' motions for summary judgment or, 

alternatively, to continue the summary judgment proceedings pursuant to CR 56(f). The 

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Hedman v. Crum 

attorney declared that no discovery had taken place on Ms. Hedman's behalf and her 

previous attorney had not responded to defendants' motions for summary judgment. The 

trial court continued defendants' pending summary judgment hearing to October 29, and 

continued the trial date to April 6, 2015. Shortly after obtaining the continuance, the 

fourth attorney informed defendants that he was no longer representing Ms. Hedman. He 

told Ms. Hedman's son he could not afford to take the case. 

On October 17, a fifth attorney filed a declaration regarding his contact with Ms. 

Hedman and her son. He declared he could not respond to defendants' summary 

judgment motions by the deadline, but believed the case justified a good cause 

continuance to allow him to adequately prepare. Several days later, Ms. Hedman moved 

pro se to continue the summary judgment hearing so that the fifth attorney could 

represent her. 

Ms. Hedman also filed a pro se motion opposing defendants' motions for 

summary judgment. Ms. Hedman attached a declaration from Dr. Kirsten Robinson, one 

of her treating physicians, declaring that Ms. Hedman suffers from a chronic pain 

disorder proximately caused by Dr. Crum's dental care. She also attached a letter from 

Dr. Doug Brossoit. Dr. Brossoit stated he had been Ms. Hedman's dentist since January 

2012. He also stated Dr. Crum's treatment fell below the standard of care for an implant 

supported full mouth rehabilitation. 

Ms. Hedman also attached a letter Dr. Lockwood sent to the Washington Dental 

Quality Assurance Commission (DQAC) on July 24, 2010. Dr. Lockwood's letter stated: 

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No. 33318-3-III 

Hedman v. Crum 

In the case of Dr. Crum, who is a Board Certified Oral and Maxillofacial 

Surgeon, I believe he was operating outside of his specialty and outside of 

his area of competency when he assumed the role of the restorative dentist 

in this most challenging case. Due to his apparent lack of knowledge of 

basic prosthodontic principals [sic], he designed and created an implant 

restoration that is impossible to achieve that would satisfy the patient's 

desire to have fixed/screw retained dentures . 

. . . I will say that I am sure Dr. Crum is a fine oral surgeon, but he is not a 

restorative dentist and ethically should not be practicing outside of his 

specialty. His restorative treatment of Mrs. Hedman is, in my opinion, 

below the standard of care. 

CP at 85-86. 

On October 28, 2014, Ms. Hedman filed a declaration from Dr. Brossoit. Dr. 

Brossoit declared that he had treated Ms. Hedman. He declared that Dr. Crum, Dr. 

Simonds, and Dr. Lockwood had all breached the standard of care, and their breaches 

caused Ms. Hedman's injuries. 

On October 29, 2014, the trial court heard defendants' motions for summary 

judgment. The trial court dismissed Ms. Hedman' s CPA claims against all defendants, 

her breach of promise claims against all defendants, her corporate negligence claims, and 

her informed consent claim against Dr. Simonds. The court found that Dr. Brossoit's 

declaration raised a material issue of fact and declined to dismiss Ms. Hedman's medical 

negligence claims. The court reserved ruling on Ms. Hedman's lack of informed consent 

claims against Dr. Crum and Dr. Lockwood. 

On November 13, a sixth attorney appeared on behalf of Ms. Hedman. This 

attorney took Dr. Higuchi's deposition. In the deposition, Ms. Hedman's attorney read 

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No. 33318-3-III 

Hedman v. Crum 

Dr. Lockwood's July 24, 2010 letter to Dr. Higuchi. He asked Dr. Higuchi ifhe agreed 

with the portion in which Dr. Lockwood wrote that Dr. Crum was operating outside of 

his specialty and area of competency when he assumed the role of a restorative dentist. 

Dr. Higuchi responded that he did not know Dr. Crum's experience in prosthetic or 

restorative dentistry, and that if he had adequate training he could be qualified. Dr. 

Higuchi added that it would generally be unethical for an oral surgeon to do restorative 

procedures. 

Ms. Hedman's attorney then asked Dr. Higuchi ifhe agreed with the second part 

of Dr. Lockwood's letter, in which he wrote that Dr. Crum "designed and created an 

implant restoration that is impossible to achieve that would satisfy the patient's desire to 

have fixed/screw retained dentures." CP at 153. Dr. Higuchi responded: 

[I]n evaluating the surgery that was performed on the lower jaw, I think 

there was a surgical misdiagnosis of failure of reducing enough of the 

alveolar bone. 

There should have been more modification of the lower jaw so there 

would not have been the issues and concerns relative to the vertical 

dimension that we've talked about. 

CP at 153. Dr. Higuchi later testified that he did not intend to render standard of care 

opinions against Dr. Crum. 

Dr. David Bat's deposition was also taken. Dr. Bot testified that Ms. Hedman was 

diagnosed with depression and somatic symptom disorder with pain. Defense counsel 

asked Dr. Bot if he was able to opine regarding what degree of Ms. Hedman's depression 

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No. 33318-3-III 

Hedman v. Crum 

was caused by the dental treatment. Dr. Bot testified that "probably 66 to 75 percent 

would be associated with the dental issue." CP at 199. 

On January 7, 2015, defendants deposed Dr. Brossoit. In his deposition, Dr. 

Brossoit testified he had not fully reviewed Ms. Hedman's dental records at the time he 

signed his prior declarations. He also testified Ms. Hedman and her son wrote the bulk of 

the declarations and that he regretted signing the declarations without having fully 

reviewed Ms. Hedman's dental records. Contrary to his prior declaration, he testified Dr. 

Simonds and Dr. Lockwood did not violate the standard of care. He did not change his 

opinion that Dr. Crum's treatment fell below the standard of care and that this caused Ms. 

Hedman's injuries. He stated prosthesis was in his expertise. He later stated 

prosthodontics is a specialty that requires extra schooling, that he was a general dentist 

and did not have training in prosthodontics, and that he never held himself out to be a 

prosthodontist. 

Following Dr. Brossoit's deposition, all three defendants again moved for 

summary judgment. 

On January 28, Ms. Hedman 's sixth attorney filed a notice of intent to withdraw as 

Ms. Hedman's counsel. He moved to continue the April 6, 2015 trial date, arguing that 

Ms. Hedman needed a continuance so she could retain experts to review the medical and 

dental records and render opinions regarding the standard of care and proximate 

causation. He noted that "Dr. Brossoit' s testimony concerning standard of care still 

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No. 33318-3-III 

Hedman v. Crum 

stands with regard to summary judgment; however, it's [sic] tactical use at trial has been 

seriously eroded, if not vaporized, by his recent deposition." CP at 718. 

The sixth attorney also moved under CR 56(f) to continue the summary judgment 

hearing so Ms. Hedman could obtain the affidavits of expert witnesses. He attached 

numerous exhibits to this motion, including Dr. Higuchi's deposition testimony, Dr. 

Higuchi's second opinion consult note, Dr. Higuchi's curriculum vitae, and Dr. 

Lockwood's July 24, 2010 letter to DQAC. 

On February 13, a seventh attorney, Dayle Andersen, filed a notice of appearance 

on behalf of Ms. Hedman. Mr. Andersen submitted a declaration and attached numerous 

exhibits, including several sets of interrogatories and the deposition testimonies from Dr. 

Robinson, Dr. Bot, and Dr. Higuchi. Mr. Andersen also attached declarations from Dr. 

Will Chung and Dr. Edmond Truelove. The declarations of Dr. Chung and Dr. Truelove 

were nearly identical. They both declared: 

I have been retained as an expert in the matter of Hedman v. Oral Surgery 

Plus for purposes of evaluating and determining Ms. Hedman's injuries, 

and ... the relation of the injuries, if any, to the dental procedures 

conducted by the defendants. 

I will need time to review the complete records and images from Ms. 

Hedman's care. 

CP at 203-04, 205-06. The trial court considered attorney Andersen's declaration. 

At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court denied Ms. Hedman's CR 56(f) 

motion to continue defendants' summary judgment motions. The trial court granted 

summary judgment in favor of all defendants and dismissed Ms. Hedman's claims with 

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Hedman v. Crum 

prejudice. The trial court dismissed the case because it found Ms. Hedman could not 

demonstrate, by expert testimony, a breach of the applicable standard of care. The day 

after the trial court entered its orders, Mr. Andersen filed a notice of intent to withdraw. 

Ms. Hedman appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

A. INSUFFICIENT EXPERT TESTIMONY OF STANDARD OF CARE AND CAUSATION 

Ms. Hedman argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Dr. 

Crum on the grounds that she could not demonstrate, by expert testimony, a breach of the 

applicable standard of care. Ms. Hedman focuses her argument solely on Dr. Crum's 

alleged medical negligence. She does not argue the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment for Dr. Lockwood or Dr. Simonds. 

1. Standard of review 

This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo, engaging in the same 

inquiry as the trial court. Davies v. Holy Family Hosp., 144 Wn. App. 483,491, 183 P.3d 

283 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). A material fact is one the outcome 

of the litigation depends on, in whole or in part. Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wn. App. 499, 509, 

784 P.2d 554 (1990). This court views all facts and reasonable inferences from those 

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is 

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Hedman v. Crum 

appropriate only if reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion from all the 

evidence. Id. 

On a summary judgment, the trial court does not weigh evidence or assess witness 

credibility. Barker v. Advanced Silicon Materials, LLC, 131 Wn. App. 616,624, 128 

P.3d 633 (2006). This court also does not do so on appeal. Id. This court's "'job is to 

pass upon whether a burden of production has been met, not whether the evidence 

produced is persuasive. That is the jury's role, once a burden of production has been 

met.'" Id. (quoting Renz v. Spokane Eye Clinic, PS, 114 Wn. App. 611,623, 60 P.3d 106 

(2002)). 

A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that 

there is no issue of material fact. Id. The defendant can meet this burden "by pointing 

out that the plaintiff lacks competent medical evidence to make out a prima facie case of 

medical malpractice." Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn. App. 18, 22, 851 P .2d 689 

(1993). Once the defendant does this, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce an 

affidavit from a qualified expert witness that alleges specific facts establishing a cause of 

action. Id. at 25. 

Evidence submitted in opposition to summary judgment must be admissible. 

SentinelC3, Inc. v. Hunt, 181 Wn.2d 127,141,331 P.3d 40 (2014). "CR 56(e) requires 

that evidence offered in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment be 

in the form of sworn affidavits or declarations made under penalty of perjury." Young 

Sao Kim v. Choong-Hyun Lee, 174 Wn. App. 319,326,300 P.3d 431 (2013). Moreover, 

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No. 33318-3-III 

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"[ a ]ffidavits containing conclusory statements without adequate factual support are 

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Guile, 70 Wn. App. at 25. To 

survive summary judgment, "expert testimony must be based on facts in the case, not 

speculation or conjecture." Seybold v. Neu, 105 Wn. App. 666, 677, 19 P.3d 1068 

(2001). 

2. Ms. Hedman 's expert medical testimony 

"Expert testimony is required when an essential element in the case is best 

established by an opinion that is beyond the expertise of a layperson." Id. at 676. In a 

medical malpractice case, expert testimony is generally required to establish the standard 

of care and to prove causation. Id. Thus, "to defeat summary judgment in almost all 

medical negligence cases, the plaintiffs must produce competent medical expert 

testimony establishing that the injury was proximately caused by a failure to comply with 

the applicable standard of care." Id. The standard of care is "that degree of care, skill, 

and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that time in the 

profession or class to which he belongs, in the state of Washington, acting in the same or 

similar circumstances." RCW 7.70.040(1). 

"To testify that the defendant has breached the applicable standard of care, 'a 

physician must demonstrate that he or she has sufficient expertise in the relevant 

specialty.'" Davies, 144 Wn. App. at 494 (quoting Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 

Wn.2d 216,229, 770 P.2d 182 (1989)). "A physician with a medical degree will 

ordinarily be considered qualified to express an opinion with respect to any medical 

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No. 33318-3-III 

Hedman v. Crum 

question, including questions in areas in which the physician is not a specialist, so long as 

the physician has sufficient expertise to demonstrate familiarity with the medical 

procedure or problem at issue in the action." Id. 

1. Dr. Lockwood's letter is inadmissible 

Ms. Hedman's primary argument is that Dr. Lockwood's July 24, 2010 letter 

establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Crum's treatment fell below 

the standard of care. Dr. Crum argues this court cannot consider this letter because it is 

unswom and therefore inadmissible. 

An almost identical situation arose in Kim, 17 4 Wn. App. 319. In that case, 

Young Soo Kim visited Dr. Choong, who extracted a number of Mr. Kim's teeth and 

surgically replaced those teeth with implants. 1 Id. at 321. Mr. Kim later sought treatment 

from Dr. Kenny, who detected a number of problems with Dr. Choong's implants. Id. at 

322. Mr. Kim sued Dr. Choong for medical malpractice. Id. 

In opposition to Dr. Choong's summary judgment motion, Mr. Kim submitted his 

own declaration and two documents from Dr. Kenny. Id. at 325. The first was an 

unswom, unsigned exhibit in which Dr. Kenny stated, "' It was wrong diagnosis, 

treatment[,] planning[,] and execution."' Id. at 326 (alterations in original). The second 

document was a signed but unswom letter in which Dr. Kenny described Dr. Choong's 

work as deficient because he used an improper abutment selection and an inadequate 

1 Both dentists have the same last name, so their first names are used for clarity. 

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number of implants. Id. Mr. Kim argued that these documents were sufficient to create a 

genuine issue of material fact. Id. 

The Kim court disagreed. It held that Mr. Kim's argument failed because the 

evidence on which he relied was not in the proper form before the trial court. Id. The 

court noted CR 56(e)'s requirement that evidence opposing a summary judgment motion 

must be in the form of sworn affidavits or declarations made under penalty of perjury. Id. 

Because Dr. Kenny's statements were not in such form, the Kim court held that Mr. Kim 

could not rely on them to create a disputed issue of material fact. Id. at 327. 

Here, as in Kim, Ms. Hedman may not rely on Dr. Lockwood's 2010 letter to 

create a genuine issue of material fact because the letter was not in the form of a sworn 

affidavit or declaration made under penalty of perjury, as required by CR 56(e). Courts 

do not always require strict compliance with CR 56( e) due to the potentially extreme 

consequences of a summary judgment motion, particularly with respect to the nonmoving 

party. Id. at 326-27. "But we are aware of no case ... that excuses in whole the 

requirement that statements purporting to establish a necessary element of a claim or 

defense be in the form of sworn affidavits or declarations made under penalty of perjury." 

Id. at 327. 

Ms. Hedman argues at length that Dr. Lockwood, a prosthodontist, could give an 

expert opinion on the standard of care for Dr. Crum, an oral surgeon, because Dr. Crum 

performed restorative prosthodontic work. However, because Dr. Lockwood's letter is 

inadmissible, it is unnecessary for us to consider this argument. 

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11. None of the remaining declarations or depositions Ms. 

Hedman cites create a genuine issue of material fact 

Ms. Hedman cites her other declarations and depositions, arguing these establish a 

genuine factual dispute as to whether Dr. Crum fell below the standard of care. 

She first cites Dr. Higuchi's deposition testimony in which he opined that "there 

was a surgical misdiagnosis of failure of reducing enough of the alveolar bone." CP at 

201. However, Dr. Higuchi did not testify or go into detail regarding whether this 

surgical misdiagnosis was a breach of the applicable standard of care. In fact, he 

specifically testified that he did not intend to render standard of care opinions against Dr. 

Crum. 

Ms. Hedman also cites Dr. Chung's and Dr. Truelove's declarations that they had 

been retained for the purpose of evaluating and determining Ms. Hedman's injuries. But 

because Dr. Chung and Dr. Truelove had not yet evaluated Ms. Hedman, nor did they 

offer any substantive evidence about her injuries, these declarations do not help Ms. 

Hedman. 

Ms. Hedman also cites Dr. Bot's deposition testimony. While Dr. Bot testified 

that "probably 66 to 75 percent [ofMs. Hedman's depression issues] would be associated 

with the dental issue," Dr. Bot never specified which dental treatment was responsible. 

CP at 199. Nor did he discuss the applicable standard of dental care or how Dr. Crum 

breached it. 2 

2 One of Ms. Hedman's physicians, Dr. Robinson, filed a declaration in which she 

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111. Dr. Brossoit's declaration and deposition 

On appeal, Ms. Hedman does not argue that Dr. Brossoit's October 2014 

declaration or his subsequent deposition establish a genuine dispute of material fact. We 

therefore do not address this evidence on appeal. See RAP 12.l(a); Wash. Prof'/ Real 

Estate LLC v. Young, 163 Wn. App. 800, 818 n.3, 260 P .3d 991 (2011) (Court of Appeals 

will not decide a case on the basis of issues that are not set forth in the parties' briefs.). 

B. No ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING FOURTH CR 56(f) MOTION TO 

CONTINUE 

Ms. Hedman also argues the trial court erred by not continuing the summary 

judgment hearing so she could present evidence before the court in an admissible format. 

CR 56(f) allows a trial court to continue a summary judgment hearing. It provides that 

when a nonmoving party 

cannot present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, 

the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 

continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 

discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 

CR 56(f). The party seeking a continuance under CR 56(f) must provide a good reason 

for the delay. Durand v. HIMC Corp., 151 Wn. App. 818, 828, 214 P .3d 189 (2009). In 

addition, the party must provide an affidavit stating what evidence the party seeks and 

how it will raise an issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. Id. 

declared Ms. Hedman suffers from a chronic pain condition which was proximately 

caused by Dr. Crum's dental care. However, this declaration does not contain any 

evidence of or discussion about the standard of care or how Dr. Crum breached it. 

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A court may deny the motion if"( 1) the moving party does not offer a good reason 

for the delay in obtaining evidence; (2) the moving party does not state what evidence 

would be established through additional discovery; or (3) the evidence sought will not 

raise a genuine issue of fact." Coggle, 56 Wn. App. at 507. The trial court may deny a 

CR 56(f) motion for any one of these three reasons. Mossman v. Rowley, 154 Wn. App. 

735, 742, 229 P.3d 812 (2009). This court reviews a trial court's denial of a CR 56(f) 

continuance for an abuse of discretion. Durand, 151 Wn. App. at 828. 

Here, in moving for a continuance under CR 56(f), Ms. Hedman failed to state 

what evidence would be established through additional discovery. Although Dr. Chung 

and Dr. Truelove each declared that Ms. Hedman had retained them for purposes of 

evaluating her case, they did not say what their opinions would be. 

Ms. Hedman also argues that Dr. Lockwood's 2010 letter indicates she could 

obtain admissible evidence if given more time. But she never explains why she had not 

obtained such evidence in the years she had known about Dr. Lockwood's letter. 

Ms. Hedman relies on Coggle. In that case, plaintiff's counsel retired and 

substitute counsel appeared one week before the summary judgment hearing. Coggle, 56 

Wn. App. at 502. Plaintiff's new counsel then moved for a continuance under CR 56(f), 

which the trial court denied and granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 503. 

The Coggle court held this was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 509. 

Coggle is distinguishable. There, plaintiff's substitute counsel attached a 

declaration with his CR 56(f) motion that specified precisely what steps he and his client 

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were going to take, what filings they needed, and what the filings would accomplish. Id. 

at 502. Substitute counsel "identiflied] the evidence he sought and explain[ ed] that the 

declarations would rebut the defense expert testimony." Id. at 508. Here, Ms. Hedman 

relies on what she hopes to reveal through additional discovery, rather than identifying 

concrete evidence that would give rise to a genuine issue of fact. 

Moreover, in Coggle, the plaintiff had only one prior attorney and that attorney 

retired; yet, the trial court denied plaintiffs continuance request. Id. Here, Ms. Hedman 

had five prior attorneys before her sixth attorney filed her fourth request for a CR 56(f) 

continuance. The trial court also granted two of her earlier continuance requests. We 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Hedman's fourth 

CR 56(f) continuance request. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J. 

WE CONCUR: j 

Pennell, J. ' .... 

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