The Honor able Joseph M. Hood, Senior United States District J udg e for the Easter n District * of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0750n.06 F iled: October 19, 2007 Nos. 06-6050 and 06-6051 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , P laintif f-App ellee,
v. HAROLD EUGENE WILSON, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES DI STRIC T CO UR T F OR THE EA STERN DI S TR IC T O F TE NNESSEE, K NO XV ILLE DI VI SION

Before: CLAY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges, and HOOD, Chief District Judge. * JULIA SMITH GIB B O NS , Ci rc u it Judge . This appea l arises out of the a rre st of defe ndant-a

ppellant Har old E ug ene Wil son for possession of cra ck coc aine with intent to distribute. The district cour

t denied Wilson’s pretrial motion to suppress the evidenc e ag ainst him, and a jury later c onvicted Wilson of one count of possession with intent to distribut e cr ack c ocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). I n addition to sentencingWil son to 120 months i mprisonment on the possession count, the district court de termined that Wilson had viol ated the terms of his probation, imposed in a previous c ase, and sentenc ed Wilson t o an additional ter m of thirty -seve n months. For the re asons below, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t .2 I. The unde rlying f

acts, a s set forth at Wilson’s suppression hear ing, a re a s follows. On J uly 27, 2004, Robert Nea se, a na rcotics a g ent employ ed with the F ifth J udicial DrugTask F orce i nBl o un tC o un ty , arra n gedan un d er co v er dru g p urc h as e f

ro mR o b ertAn d

re S m i thth ro u gh J ason Ne wton, a conf

idential informant. Ne ase, a ccompa nied by a fe llow ag ent, Marty

Widener, followed Ne wton to a Pilot gas station. Upon ar riving at the station, the ag ents observe d, among other thing s, Smi th’s vehicle, a red pic kup truck, pa

rked be side Wil son’s g ray Buic k. As the office rs watc hed, Smith walked betwe en the two ve hicles, which w ere both parke d, front-f irst, on th e s i d e o f t h e P i l o ts t at i o nan d ap p ro x i m at el y

th re e o r f o ur f ee taw ay fr o mea ch o th er . Al th o u gh Smit h was not spea

king to Wilson at the time the office rs ar rived, Ne ase te stified that Smit h was sta nd ingc los e e no ug h a

nd in a po sit ion fr om whic h h e c ou ld h ave e ng a g e d Wil so n in
conver sation. Nea se exited his car a nd went betwe en Smith and Wi lson’s vehicles, whe re he observe d Smit h’s wife seate d in the driver’ s seat of Smith’s truck and Wilson seated in the driver’ s seat of his ca

r. As Ne ase a

pproac hed, Smith, who was standing betwee n the truck a nd the B uick, g ree ted Nea se by name, c alling out “ Hey , Offic er N ease .” Ac cordingto Nease ’s testimony , afte r Smith acknowledg ed him, Wil son rea cted: “A s Iapproa ched him, I noticed Mr. Wil son . . . turn. He’ s at the steer ing wheel, he turns and appe ars to be hidingsomething or stu ff ingso me thi ng , w hic h, in p oli c e wo rk , w e c a ll a fu rt ive mov e me nt. ” Duri ngc ro ssexamination, Nease c laimed that he sa w Wils on’s left a

rm “a ppear to be putting somethingawa y or hiding something.” Nea se, en r oute to place Smit h under a rre st, told W ilson to pl ace his hands3

wher e they

could be se en and a lerted Widener that Wil son was “stuff

ing some thing.” Nea se had no further dealing s with W ilson at that tim e. Widener, at Ne ase’ s urg ing, a pproac hed Wilson’s car. He rec og nized W ilson from an
e arl ie r n arc oti c s inve sti g atio n invo lvi ngWils on . Wid e ne r a sk e d Wil so n to ste p o ut o f h is vehicle, a nd Wil son complied. Upon Wilson’s ex it, W idener conducte d “a lig ht pat-down of [W ilson’s] pockets” to make sure that Wil son had no we apons. Widener f ound no wea

pons but testified at Wilson’s suppression hearingthat he obser ved, protrudingfrom the c enter console of Wil son’s vehicle , the top of a c ellophane ba g g y . Followinghis pat down of Wilson, W idener “immediately” we nt into the vehicle console “to re trieve what [he] believe[d] to be nar cotics.” Wide ne r t e sti fi e d th at he c on c lud e d th a t th e ba g g y c on ta ine d n arc oti c s b a se d u po n h is “experienc e, tra ining a

nd ever y thing” and explained that the bag g y ’s appe ara nce w as “c onsistent with the packa g ing of

narc otics and, as a

cellophane bag g y , had a knot in the top.” Widener further repr esente d that he knew Smit h to be a use r and Wilson to be a seller of illega l narc otics. Finally , Widener cla imed that based on N ease ’s war ning c oncer

ning Wilson’s movement, he wa s afr aid there might be a

wea pon in Wi lson’s car . In Wil son’s ce nter c onsole, Widener discove red wh a t w a s late r d e te rm ine d to be 17 .7 g ra ms o f c oc a ine ba se . Wil so n w a s p la c e d und e r a rr e st, and, duringthe cour se of a more thorough subsequent sea rch inc ident to arre st, the office rs discovere d a Copenha g en snuff can c ontaining a

smaller amount of pow der c ocaine
. Wide ne r t e sti fi e d th at f

oll ow ingWils on ’s arr e st b ut b e fo re the of fi c e rs e ng a g e d h im i n any “in-de pth conver sation,” the off icer s advised Wilson of his rights verba lly . Wil son did not “say either w ay” whe ther he wished to waive his rights, but Widener a ssured Wilson that he4

could “pick a

nd choose” the questions he wa nted to answe r, and a

conver sation commence d. Wil son expl ained to the of fice rs that he wa s “in a bind” be cause he wa s on probation and a ny
arr est would prompt the re vocation of his probation. He then off ere d to secure two kilos of
coca ine for the office rs if they helped him avoid prison. The office rs place d Wil son in custody
. Wils on wa s su bs e qu e ntl y

c ha rg e d w ithon e c ount o f p os se ssi on wi th i nte nt t o d ist

ri bute more than f

ive g rams of c rac k coca ine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Wilson filed a motion to suppress the evide nce a g ainst him on the gr ound that Widener’s sea rch of his vehicle wa s not supported by

rea sonable suspicion and w as there fore in violation of his Fourth Amendment rig hts. On Fe bruar

y 8, 2006, a United States Mag istrate Judge he ld a hea ringon Wil son’s mot ion . F oll ow ingthe he ari ng , Wil so n f ile d a su pp le me nta l mo tio n s e e kin g to s up pr e ss h is state me nts fo llo wi nghis arr e st o n th e g ro un d th a t Wid e ne r n e g le c te d to pr ov ide him wi th a fu ll
re c itatio n o f h is Miranda ri g hts
. The mag istrate judg e issued a written order rec ommending the denial of Wilson’s motion. In the orde r, the mag istrate judg e rule d that the ag ents had re asonable suspicion of wrong ful
a c tiv ity on Wils on ’s pa

rt and lawf ull y c on du c te d a

pat do wn of Wils on ’s pe rs on

c on sis te nt w ith Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Wilson’s claim conce rningthe sea rch of his vehicle wa s simil arly reje cted on the ground that the off icer s were justified in conducting a prote ctive sea rch of Wils on ’s ve hic le fo llo wi nghis Terry stop. Finally , the mag istrate judg e conc luded that Wils on ’s c la im that th e po lic e fa ile d to a dv ise him fu lly of his Miranda ri g hts wa s w ith out me ri t,
cre diting Widener’ s testimony that he fully

articulated Wils on’s rig hts to him befor e eng ag ing him in questioni ng . The district cour t overrule d Wil son’s objections to the mag istrate judg e’sTh e g o v e r n m e n t h a d p r e v i o u s l y f

i l e d n o t i c e o f i t s i n t e n t i o n t o s e e k an e n h an c e d pe na lty 1 based upon Wilson’s previous drugconviction, as re quired unde r 21 U.S.C. § 851. 5 repor t and re commendation and a dopted the mag istrate’s r eport in its entirety . Followinga twoday trial, a jury

found Wilson guilty

of the c harg e ag ainst him. W ilson’s moti ons for a judgme nt of ac quittal were denied. At the time of his conviction in this matter, Wil son was ser ving a five-year term of probation for

a 2003 convic tion from the United States District Court for the Western District of Te xas f or c on sp ir a c y

to p os se ss w ithint e nt t o d ist ri bute c oc a ine . Upo n Wil so n’ s c onvic tio n in the Easter n District of Tenne ssee, the g overnme nt filed a pe tition s eekingto have Wilson’s probation re voked and a

sentenc e of imprisonment imposed for his 2003 c onviction. At sentenc ing, the district court sentenc ed Wilson t o the statutory mandatory

minimum of 12 0 mo nth s im

pr iso nme nt a

nd an e ig ht- y e ar t e rm

of su pe rv ise d r e le a se fo r h is p os se ssi on wi th intent to dist ribute convic tion. In addition, the court re voked Wilson’s probation for his 2003 1 conviction and se ntence d him to thi rty -seve n months im prisonment and four y ear s supervised rele ase f or that ea rlier of fense . Wil son filed timely notices of a

ppeal f rom the judg ment of the district court, includingthe re vocation of his probation. II. A. An a pp e llate c ourt

re vie wi nga

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of

a mot ion to s up pr e ss c on du c ts a de novo revie w of the district c ourt’s leg al conc lusions and examines any fac tual finding s for clea r er ror. Un ite d S

tates v . D illar

d , 438 F.3d 675, 680 ( 6th Cir. 2006).6

Wil son argues on appe al that the ag ents had insuffic ient cause to justi fy the inspection of his vehicle followingthe Terry pat do wn c on du c te d b y

Wide ne r a

nd that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld have suppr essed the e vidence secur ed as a result of the a g ent’s unlawf ul activities. The F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citiz ens fr om
unre a so na

ble se arc he s at th e ha

nd s o f t he g ov e rnme nt, U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . IV, and , a s a

re su lt,
any g ov e rnme nta l inva sio n o f t ho se are a s o rd ina

ri ly pr ote c te d b y

the sc op e of

the F ourt h Amendment must be re asonable
. Pennsylv ania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) ( “The touchstone of our

analy sis under the F ourth Amendment is alwa y s ‘the re asonable ness in all the
c i r c u m s t an c e s o f

th e p art i c u l ar

g o v e r n m e n t a l i n v a s i o no f

a c i t i z e n ’ s p e r s o n a l s e c ur i ty . ’ ” )
. In Te rry v . O hio , the cour

t deemed r easona

ble the use of

brief inve stigatory

pat downs to ensure the absenc e of da

ng erous we apons on individuals suspected of criminal ac tivity . 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1 96 8) . A n o ff

ic e r m ay e ng a g e in s uc h a

sto p a nd ins pe c tio n in

the a bs e nc e of pr ob a ble c a us e so long a s the offic er ha s “re asonable suspicion to believe that cr iminal activity may be af oot.” Un ite d S tates v . A rv izu , 5 34 U. S. 2 66 , 2 73 (2 00 2) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T hat is , he must be able to point to “specific a nd articula

ble fa cts which, take n toge ther with rational infere nces f

rom those fa cts,” wa

rra nt the intrusion occasione d on the individual’s person. Te rry , 392 U.S. at 21. When assessingwhether a police of

fice r had r easona

ble suspicion, a re viewing court must look at the totality of the c ircumstance s surroundinga g iven sea rch. Arv izu , 5 34 U. S.
a t 27 3; United States v. J

acob , 3 77 F .3 d 5 73 , 5 77 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) . Wil so n d oe s n ot d ir e c tly challeng e Widener’ s rig ht to conduct a Terry pat down but ar g ues on appe al that Widener lac ked the nec essar

y cause to inspect the interior of his vehicle.7

In Michigan v. Long , 4 63 U. S. 1 03 2 ( 19 83 ), the Sup re me Court e xten de d it s h old ingin Terry to permit the inspection of a vehicle oc cupied by

a per son who has bee n lawfully detained for a Te rry

sto p. Th e Court

ru le d: [T]he se arc h o f t

he pa sse ng e r c omp artme nt o f a n a uto mob ile , li mit e d to tho se are as in which a

wea pon may be plac ed or hidde n, is permissible if the police of fi c e r p os se sse s a

re a so na ble be lie f b a se d o n “ sp e c if ic and art ic ula ble fa c ts wh ic h, take n to g e the r w iththe ratio na l in fe re nc e s f ro m th e se fa c ts, re a so na

bly war rant” the offic ers in believingthat the suspect is dang erous a nd the suspect may g a in i mme diate c on tr ol o f w e a po ns . Long , 463 U.S. at 1049. Wil son argues that bec ause Widener ’s pat down did not re veal the prese nce of

wea pons, the offic er w as not empowe red to c onduct a f urther se arc h of Wilson’s car. In other wor ds, under Wilson’s view, an off icer undertaking a

sear ch of a

vehicle’ s interior pursuant to a Terry stop must pos sess an a dditional measure of rea sonable suspicion bef ore proce edingto inspect the ca r. Long fore closes this argument, howeve r. Unde r the re asoningof the Court’s holding in Long , w he n a po lic e of fi c e r c omp e ls t

he e xit of an in div idu a l f

ro m a vehicle in or der to c onduct a Terry fr isk —b a se d u

po n h is b e lie f t

hat th e ind ivi du a l is po te nti a lly dang erous—that of

fice r re mains vulnerable to the possibili ty that the individual, if not arre sted, will be fre e to re trieve a

ny wea pons within his car. See id. at 1051-52. Unde r Long , the vehicle’ s inspection is intended to ensure that an individual subject to a pre liminary de te rm inatio n b y

the po lic e that he may

be arm e d a

nd da ng e ro us do e s n ot r e tur

n to his ve hic le and obtain a w eapon to ha rm either the office r or other s in the vicinity . Be cause the sea rch of a vehicle subse quent to a Terry stop is based upon this init ial deter mination, there is no nee d for a further finding of dang erousne ss to support the inspection.8

Thus, Widener’s sea

rch of Wil son’s ca

r followinga Terry pat down wa s rea sonable. The totality of the c ircumstance s supported the a g ents’ belief that Wil son might be a

rmed a nd dang erous a

nd justified Wi dener ’s dec ision to pat W ilson down for we apons, a pr oposition t hat Wils on do e s n ot c ha lle ng e . A ft e r p e rf or min g a lawf ul Te rry frisk, Widener wa s empower ed under Long to chec k the interior of Wil son’s vehicle for we apons. The unde rlying policy of protec ting police office rs that animates the Long decision applies e qually here . Had the of

fice rs elec ted to rele ase Wilson and allowed him ac cess to his vehicle without checkingthe interior f or
we a po ns , Wil so n w ou ld h ave be e n in a po sit ion to s e c ur e a

we a po n s e c re te d in

his ve hic le . T his
w a s a p art i c u l ar l y s e r i o u s c o n c e r no nth e s e f

a c t s w h e r e th e a g e n t s d i d

n o ti m m e d i a t e l y p artw ays with Wi lson and rema ined at the g as station, on foot, to arr est Smit h. Upon discover ing na

rcotics in the c onsole of Wilson’s vehicle duringthe cour se of a permissible vehicle inspection under Long , Wid e ne r w a s f re e to s e ize that mate ri a l. “ I f, wh ile conductinga leg itimate Te rry sear ch of the interior of the automobile, the offic er should, as he re, discover c ontraba

nd other than w eapons, he clea rly cannot be require d to ignor e the c ontraba nd, and the F ourth Amendment doe s not require its suppression in such circumstanc es.” Long , 453 U.S. at 1050. B. Wils on arg ue s th at th e of

fi c e rs pla c inghim

un de r a rr e st f a ile d to inf

or m hi m f ull y of his F i f thA m e n dm e n tr i g h t s a s r e qu i r e d b y Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966), a nd the district court should have suppressed his stateme nts following his ar rest. In its order
rec ommending the denial of Wilson’s motion t o suppress, the mag istrate judg e ac cepte d Ag ent9

Widener’s a ccount of

the eve nts surrounding Wil son’s arr est and re jected Wilson’s claim that Ag ent Widener infor

med Wils on only

of his rig ht to “pick and c hoose” the questions he wished to a ns we r. Th is c on c lus ion , e mbr a c e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt , is a

fa c tua l de te rm inatio n th a t is
reve rsible upon a showingthat it is clearly err oneous. United States v. J ohnson , 488 F.3d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 2007). A district cour t clear ly err s when its decision lea ves “the revie wing court . . . with the definite a

nd firm conviction that a mistake has bee n made.” Un ite d S tates v . B ro wn , 44 9 F .3 d 7 41 , 7 44 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) . “ Th e e vid e nc e mus t be re vie we d in the lig ht m os t li ke ly

to support the district court’s de cision.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). Wil son rea ds Wi dener ’s testimony to be an a dmission t hat the only information he pr ov ide d Wil so n w a s th at he ha d th e ri g ht t o c ho os e amon g the qu e sti on s p os e d to him . T his is a str a ine d r e a din g of

Wide ne r’ s te sti mony , w hic h a c tua lly su g g e sts that Wid e ne r’ s a dv ic e to Wil son followed his rec itation of the Miranda war nings. I n any event, to the e x tent that Widener’s testimony

is ambiguous, the district c ourt’s selec tion of one re asonable interpre tation is not errone ous. An de rso n v . Ci ty of B esse me r Ci ty

, N. C. , 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“ Where there are two permissible views of the evidenc e, the f actf inder’s c hoice be tween the m cannot be
c le arl y e rr on e ou s. ” ). In li g ht o f Wi de ne r’ s unc on te ste d te sti mony c on c e rn ingthe e ve nts surroundingWil son’s arr est, it was not clea r er ror f or the district cour

t to conclude that Widener fu lly inf or me d Wil so n o f h is Miranda rig hts. C. Wils on arg ue s th at th e g ov e rnme nt f a ile d at tr ia l to pr e se nt s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e of

his commission of the crime with which he was c harg ed. An individual adva ncinga suff

iciency of10

the evidenc e cla im following his conviction “be ars a very heavy burden.” United States v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 589 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). An
a pp e llate c ourt

c on sid e ri ngsu c h a

c la im mus t e va luate “ the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to the prosec ution and g ive[] the prosec ution the benef it of all rea sonable infe renc es fr om the testimony .” Id. (citation omitted). Us ingthi s d e fe re nti a l le ns , a re vie wi ngc ourt

may no t r e ve rs e if “a ny rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a
rea sonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). Wil son’s sufficie ncy

of the e vidence claim is essentially a cha lleng e to the cr edibility of the witnesses off

ere d by the g overnme nt. He conte nds that Smi th, Nease , and Widener w ere
unre lia ble wi tne sse s w ho se te sti mony c ou ld n ot f

or m th e ba sis fo r h is c onvic tio n. Smit h, by his
o wn ad m i s s i o n , h ada n u mb er o f p ri o r c o n v i ct i o n s fo r ara n ge o f o ff en s es , i n cl u d i n g s h o p l i ft i n g,
secur ing pr escr iption medication by fra ud, forg ery , and possession of illeg al drug s. Moreove r, he
a c kn ow le dg e d s e rv inga s a pa id i nf or mant i n o the r i nv e sti g a tio ns c oo rd inate d b y the F if th J udicial Task F orce . As to the testimony of the lawenfor ceme nt office rs, Wils on argues that the initial arrest re port prepa

red by Widener wa s not consistent with his t estimony at the suppre ssion he ari ng . Sp e c if

ic a lly , th e re po rt

state d th a t “ a g e nts ob se rv e d a larg e c e llo ph ane ba g g ie containingcra ck coc aine inside the c enter console of Wilson’s vehicle.” At the suppression hear ing, how ever , Widener cla rified that, whe n he initially observe d the ce llophane bag g y , he
w a s un a b l e t o a s c e rt a i nw h atth e b a g c o n t a i n e d
. W h e na s k e d t o e x p l a i nth i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y, counsel for

the g overnme nt repre sented that a fter br ingingNea se and Widener toge ther, he utiliz ed their “ collective me mories” to dete rmine pre cisely what happe ned.11

Wils on c onte nd s th at th e g ov e rnme nt’ s w itn e sse s w e re su ff ic ie ntl y inc re dib le to m ake his
c onvic tio n unr e lia

ble . B e c a us e an a pp e a ls c ourt

mus t r e so lve any

c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns in favor of the jury ’s ver dict, Un ite d S tates v . P au le tte , 457 F.3d 601, 606 ( 6th Cir. 2006), Wi lson cannot pr evail on his claim. In fac t, our court ha s expl ained that c redibility issues are not proper g rounds for suf

ficienc y of the e vidence challeng es. United States v. Burns , 298 F.3d 523, 535 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) (n oti ngthat su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e c ha lle ng e s “ are no pla c e fo r a rgume nts reg ardinga g overnme nt witness’s lack of cre dibilit y ”) ( internal quotation marks a nd alterations omi tte d) . A ll o f t

he g ov e rn me nt’ s w itn e sse s w e re su bje c t to c ro ss e xami natio n b y de fe ns e counsel at trial, and it is not the role of an a ppellate c ourt to“judg e the c redibility of witnesses or substitut e [its] judgme nt for that of the jury .” United States v. King , 272 F.3d 366, 370 ( 6th Cir. 20 01 ). B e c a

us e Wils on

me re ly c ha lle ng e s th e ve ra c ity

of the g ov e rnme nt w itn e sse s’ a c c ounts , his c la im i s n ot a

c og niza ble su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e c ha lle ng e and la c ks me ri t. D. A district court’s de cision to revoke a term of pr obation is reviewe d for a n abuse of discretion. United States v. Bujak, 3 47 F .3 d 6 07 , 6 09 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) . Wil so n c on te nd s th a t, i n the eve nt that the panel a cce pts his Fourth Amendment c laim and his claim conc erningthe sufficie ncy

of the e vidence , the district court’s r evocation of his probation in his earlier c ase ma y
no t st and . Wil so n’ s argume nt o n th is i ssu e fa ils be c a us e it i s p re mis e d e nti re ly up on his F ourt h Amendment and suf

ficienc y of the e vidence claims, which we have r ejec ted.

III
. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt .