United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit _____________

No. 19-40425

consolidated with

No. 21-40543

_____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Julio Cesar Cardenas, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:12-CR-512-1 

______________________________

Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Defendant Julio Cesar Cardenas seeks a reduction of his sentence for 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” and because of an amendment to 

_____________________

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion 

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set 

forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 14, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied his request for a reduction in his sentence on both grounds. We AFFIRM.

I. Background

On May 31, 2013, a jury convicted Julio Cesar Cardenas of charges 

related to drug trafficking and conspiracy. For three of the counts under 

which the jury convicted Cardenas, the district courtsentenced him pursuant 

to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Because Cardenas had prior felony drug convictions under Texas law, Cardenas received mandatory life sentences for his 

convictions under these three counts. Cardenas was also convicted under six 

other counts. The district court sentenced Cardenas for these counts under

§ 841(b)(1)(B). Unlike the three § 841(b)(1)(A) counts, these six counts did 

not carry mandatory life sentences.

1

Cardenas moved for release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). In 

this motion, Cardenas contended that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranted a sentencing reduction because the First Step Act amended 

§ 841(b)(1)(A), reducing the mandatory term of imprisonment for a defendant with two prior serious drug felony convictions from life to 25 years.2 The 

district court denied this motion and Cardenas’s motion to reconsider.

Separately, the district court had previously issued an order stating 

that it was considering, on its own motion, a reduction of Cardenas’s sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court did so to 

_____________________

1 In total, Cardenas was convicted under sixteen counts. The seven other counts 

not mentioned in this paragraph are of no relevance to the disposition of this appeal.

2 Cardenas also argued he was entitled to release because “his chronic 

gastrointestinal disease, hypertension, cyst-tumor and chronic sinus problem place[d] him 

in the crossfire of Covid-19.” On appeal, Cardenas does not argue that COVID-19 is an 

additional reason for granting his motion for release for “extraordinary and compelling 

reasons.”

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evaluate whether Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines warranted a

reduction in Cardenas’s sentence . In his response and objection to the addendum to the pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR Response”), Cardenas argued that the district court should reduce his total sentence to 360 

months, even though he was serving three mandatory life sentences. The 

district court denied Cardenas’s request and his motion to reconsider the denial of his request.

II. Discussion

Cardenas challenges the district court’s denial of the motions for 

release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and pursuant to 

Amendment 782. We consider each of these challenges in turn.

A.

Cardenas brings three challenges to the district court’s denial of the 

motion for release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” “We review 

the ultimate decision to deny compassionate release for abuse of discretion.” 

United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023). “[A] court abuses 

its discretion if it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence.” Id. (alteration in original).

Cardenas first contends the district court erred in concluding that he 

failed to show “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that would warrant 

release. A “prisoner [may] move for a sentence reduction . . . when 

‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant.’” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).

Cardenas identifies two reasons he contends are “extraordinary and 

compelling.” First, he pointsto the First Step Act’s non-retroactive changes 

to § 841(b)(1)(A) which, according to Cardenas, would “reduce [his] 

sentencing enhancements from life imprisonment to a term of 25 years, if 

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sentenced today.” But this court has rejected that same argument twice. See 

United States v. Elam, No. 22-40373, 2023 WL 6518115, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 

2023) (per curiam); United States v. McMaryion, No. 21-50450, 2023 WL 

4118015, at *2 (5th Cir. June 22, 2023) (per curiam). In sum, “a prisoner 

may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a 

compassionate release motion, because such changes are neither 

extraordinary nor compelling.” McMaryion, 2023 WL 4118015, at *2.3

 

Given this court’s decisions in Elam and McMaryion, “we cannot say that the 

district court abused its discretion” in concluding that the First Step Act 

does not support Cardenas’s motion for release. Elam, 2023 WL 6518115, at 

*2.4

Second, Cardenas argues the Supreme Court’s decision Wooden v. 

United States, 595 U.S. 360, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022), created an 

“extraordinary and compelling” reason entitling him to the relief he 

requests. According to Cardenas, the Supreme Court’s holding in Wooden 

requires that his three earlier Texas state-law convictions be treated as “one 

criminal episode,” which would result in “a statutory enhancement of 15-

_____________________

3 Cardenas argues that the district court’s holding “that nonretroactive changes in 

law, alone, cannot serve as the basis for compassionate release . . . runs contrary to this 

Court’s holding in” United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2021). Not so. In 

Cooper, this court merely remanded to “the district court to consider, in the first instance, 

whether the nonretroactive sentencing changes to [the defendant’s] . . . convictions, either 

alone or in conjunction with any other applicable considerations, constitute extraordinary 

and compelling reasons for a reduction in sentence.” Id. at 289 (emphasis added). In so 

doing, this court “offer[ed] no views as to the merits of the [prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)] 

motion.” Id.

4 To the extent Cardenas argues recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 

support his request for release, he is incorrect. “[C]hanges to the Sentencing Guidelines 

can give rise to relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), not § 3582(c)(1).” McMaryion, 

2023 WL 4118015, at *2.

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years of imprisonment instead of life.”5 Not so. “[A] prisoner cannot use 

§ 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his sentence; such 

arguments can, and hence must, be raised under Chapter 153.” Escajeda, 

58 F.4th at 187 (emphasis in original). Because Cardenas’s “claims would 

have been cognizable under § 2255, they are not cognizable under 

§ 3582(c).” Id. at 188. As such, Wooden did not create an “extraordinary 

and compelling” reason entitling Cardenas to relief under § 3582(c).

Finally, Cardenas argues the district court failed to provide a sufficient 

explanation for its decision to deny the motion for release. A “district court 

is not required to be persuaded by every argument parties make, and it may, 

in its discretion, dismiss arguments that it does not find compelling without 

a detailed explanation. Nor is a district court required to articulate anything 

more than a brief statement of reasons.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 

481, 501, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). Thus, this court has “repeatedly held 

that perfunctory orders justify a discretionary decision to deny relief under 

§ 3582(c)(1).” Escajeda, 58 F.4th at 188.

The district court’s seven-page order denying the motion for release

and three-page order denying Cardenas’s motion to reconsider discuss the 

nonretroactive changes the First Step Act made to § 841(b)(1)(A). Only after 

considering those changes and the “circumstances [Cardenas] cites” did the 

district court decline to find “extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” 

Thus, the district court did not commit a procedural error by failing to 

adequately consider the motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1); see also Escajeda, 

_____________________

5 Cardenas appealed his sentence to this court. See United States v. Cardenas, 

606 F. App’x 246, 246 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). He argued, inter alia, that the district 

court erred by “treating his three related prior felony drug convictions as separate 

convictions instead of as a single conviction[.]” Id. This court concluded that the district 

court did not err in treating the convictions as separate because they “were committed 

sequentially, not simultaneously” and affirmed his sentence. Id. at 247.

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58 F.4th at 188 (holding the district court did not commit “procedural error 

by perfunctorily denying [defendant’s] motion in a one-page order”).

For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Cardenas’s request for release under § 3582(c)(1).

B.

Cardenas also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for 

a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 to the Sentencing 

Guidelines. “Amendment 782 reduced by two levels the Base Offense Level 

assigned a defendant by the Guidelines’ Drug Quantity Table in Section 

2D1.1.” United States v. Hernandez, 647 F. App’x 426, 427 (5th Cir. 2016)

(per curiam). Amendment 782’s two-level guideline reduction applies to

Cardenas’s six § 841(b)(1)(B) counts but does not apply to the three 

§ 841(b)(1)(A) counts, for which Cardenas received statutorily mandated life 

sentences. Nevertheless, Cardenas argued in his PSR Response that the 

district court could lower his total sentence to 360 months because of 

Amendment 782. In other words, rather than serve life in prison, Cardenas 

would “be out of jail when he would be 69 years of age” if the district court 

granted his request. The district court denied Cardenas’s request simply 

because he is “subject to a statutory minimum sentence of life 

imprisonment” and, therefore, “his sentence remains the same.”6

On appeal, Cardenas does not directly attack the district court’s 

conclusion and instead changes his argument. Cardenas now argues the 

district court erred by not finding him eligible for a sentencing reduction 

under Amendment 782 for “all his . . . convictions” for which he “was not

subject to a statutory life sentence.” (emphasis added). In other words, 

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6 The district court reached the same conclusion in denying Cardenas’s motion to 

reconsider.

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Cardenas no longer asks to be released after 360 months as he did in his PSR

Response; now, he simply asks for a reduction in his sentences for certain 

counts that do not carry a mandatory life sentence. But “[t]o preserve an 

issue for appeal, the objection below must fully apprise the trial judge of the 

grounds for the objection so that evidence can be taken and argument 

received on the issue.” United States v. Huerra, 884 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 

2018) (citation and quotations omitted). Because Cardenas failed to do that, 

the plain-error standard of review applies. See United States v. Duhon, 

541 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The plain-error standard of review 

applies when a party challenges a district court’s sentencing decision on 

grounds it did not present to the district court.”).

Plain-error review “involves four steps, or prongs.” Puckett v. United 

States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). “First, there must be 

an error or defect—some sort of [d]eviation from a legal rule—that has not 

been intentionally relinquished or abandoned[.]” Id. (alteration in original)

(citation and quotations omitted). “Second, the legal error must be clear or 

obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. “Third, the error 

must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary 

case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the district 

court proceedings.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). “Fourth and 

finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the 

discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only 

if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)

(citation and quotations omitted).

Cardenas’s argument fails under prongs three and four, given this 

court’s decision in Huerra. In that case, a prisoner was serving a mandatory 

life sentence concurrently with a shorter sentence. Huerra, 884 F.3d at 520. 

The prisoner argued the district court erred with respect to the shorter 

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sentence. See id. at 519–20. Under plain-error review, this court concluded 

“the sentencing error did not affect Huerra’s substantial rights” because the 

error affected the shorter sentence and did not impact the mandatory life 

sentence. Id. at 520. As such, the prisoner failed to satisfy the third prong. 

Id. For similar reasons, this court held the prisoner also failed to satisfy the 

fourth prong. See id. (“The fourth plain-error requirement is . . . absent” 

because the prisoner’s “concurrent life sentence for Count 12 means that he 

can show no meaningful benefit . . . from vacating this [shorter] sentence on 

Count 13.” (alteration in original) (citation and quotations omitted)).

Here, even if the district court reduced Cardenas’s sentences for his 

six § 841(b)(1)(B) counts, Cardenas would still be serving mandatory life

sentences for his three § 841(b)(1)(A) counts. Thus, the district court’s 

failure to reduce his § 841(b)(1)(B) sentences has no impact on the total 

amount of time Cardenas will spend in prison. Therefore, Cardenas’s

challenge to the district court’s denial of his request for a sentence reduction 

fails under plain-error review.7

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in denying 

Cardenas’s request for a reduction in his sentence.

AFFIRMED.

_____________________

7 Cardenas argues the district court erred by relying on the 2013 version of the 

Sentencing Guidelines when it should have relied on the 2018 version. But Cardenas fails 

to identify any material differences between the 2013 and 2018 versions, nor does he explain 

how these differences impacted his sentence. Cardenas has inadequately briefed this issue 

and, therefore, has waived it. See United States v. Barnes, 979 F.3d 283, 304 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(“It is well settled in this circuit that a defendant waives an issue if he fails to adequately 

brief it.” (citation and quotations omitted)); see also FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (“The 

appellant’s brief must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them[.]” 

(emphasis added)).

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