United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-30416

Jonathan Michael Ruiz, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Louisiana State; John Bel Edwards, Governor, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:18-CV-11664

Before Clement, Haynes, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jonathan Michael Ruiz, a currently incarcerated person in the 

Louisiana prison system, filed a civil rights complaint against the State of 

Louisiana, Governor John Bel Edwards, and an unidentified John Doe

defendant, complaining that changes to the state’s sex offender registration 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 28, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 19-30416 Document: 00515917542 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/28/2021
No. 19-30416

2

laws are being applied to him retroactively in violation of his constitutional 

rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who

ultimately determined that the named defendants are entitled to state 

sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended that 

the district court dismiss sua sponte the constitutional claims against them 

with prejudice as frivolous, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted, and for seeking monetary relief against immune parties. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). Ruiz objected to the magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation, asserting that he had learned the names of the 

individual officers and asking that he be permitted to amend his complaint to 

name them as additional defendants. The district court overruled Ruiz’s 

objections and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations in full, 

dismissing all of Ruiz’s § 1983 claims with prejudice. 

Ruiz timely appealed, challenging both the dismissal of his claims and 

the denial of leave to amend his complaint. We review the dismissal de novo, 

Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 2018), and the denial of leave 

to amend for abuse of discretion, Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 53, 57 (5th 

Cir. 1991). 

The district court properly dismissed Ruiz’s claims against the named 

defendants. Ruiz raises no issue with the dismissal of his claims against the 

State of Louisiana or against the John Doe defendant. Nor does he dispute 

that Governor Edwards was sued in his official capacity and is entitled to state 

sovereign immunity. See Bryant v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., 781 

F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that sovereign immunity generally 

shields state officials sued in their official capacity); Wallace v. Edwards, No. 

93-3651, 1994 WL 399144, at *1 (5th Cir. July 21, 1994) (per curiam) 

(concluding that the Governor of Louisiana was shielded by sovereign 

Case: 19-30416 Document: 00515917542 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/28/2021
No. 19-30416

3

immunity). Instead, he contends that his claims are not barred by state 

sovereign immunity because he seeks injunctive relief against Governor 

Edwards, who, Ruiz claims, has a sufficient connection to enforcement of the 

challenged laws. This contention is without merit. Ruiz has not 

demonstrated that Governor Edwards has an adequate connection to 

enforcement of the sex offender registration laws beyond having the general 

duty to see that Louisiana’s laws are implemented. See Tex. Democratic Party 

v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 400–01 (5th Cir.) (explaining that such a “general

duty” is not enough to invoke the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign 

immunity (quotation omitted)), application to vacate denied, 140 S. Ct. 2015 

(2020) (mem.). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed as to the dismissal of

the named defendants.

But before dismissing a pro se litigant’s complaint for failure to state 

a claim, a district court ordinarily must provide an opportunity to amend the 

complaint to remedy any deficiencies. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 

(5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). In his objections to the magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation, Ruiz requested leave to amend his complaint to 

assert claims against former governors and other state and local officials who

he claims are responsible for enforcing the state’s sex offender registration

laws. That request was implicitly denied by the district court when it adopted 

the report and recommendation in full. See Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 

1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a district court may implicitly deny 

a motion by entering a final judgment).

Certainly, adding some of those officials—the former governors—

would be futile for the same reasons previously discussed with respect to 

Governor Edwards; the district court need not permit their addition. See Tex.

Democratic Party, 961 F.3d at 400–01; Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 211 

(5th Cir. 2016) (noting that a district court need not grant a futile motion to 

amend). But the district court should have permitted Ruiz to amend his

Case: 19-30416 Document: 00515917542 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/28/2021
No. 19-30416

4

complaint to assert claims against the other identified officials, or at a 

minimum, addressed in the first instance why those officials were not 

appropriate defendants. See Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 

2016) (explaining that a district court may dismiss a complaint with prejudice 

sua sponte only if “the plaintiff has alleged his best case”); Eason v. Thaler, 

14 F.3d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the district court abused its 

discretion in failing to provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend 

where the deficiencies in his complaint could have been remedied by “further 

factual development and specificity”). We therefore vacate the judgment in 

part and remand for further proceedings. We neither express nor intimate 

any opinion with respect to the merits of Ruiz’s claims or with respect to 

whether the proposed defendants are immune from suit; the district court 

may resolve those matters in the first instance, as appropriate. 

We therefore AFFIRM in part and VACATE and REMAND in 

part.

Case: 19-30416 Document: 00515917542 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/28/2021