IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50345

MAURICE A. MOSES, SR.,

 Petitioner-Appellee Cross-Appellant

v.

LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

 Respondent-Appellee Cross-Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:13-CV-280

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Maurice A. Moses, Sr. has applied for federal habeas corpus relief, 

claiming he was denied his right to self-representation, as defined in Faretta 

v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and his right to effective assistance of 

appellate counsel, see Blanton v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 243 (5th Cir. 

2008). The district court denied Moses’s self-representation claim as 

 * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 7, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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procedurally barred, but granted relief on the claim that appellate counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a Faretta claim. The parties 

filed cross-appeals. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s holding in part, as Moses’s Faretta claim is procedurally barred for 

purposes of federal habeas review, and REVERSE in part because the state 

habeas court’s denial of Moses’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States.

I

Moses was charged with capital murder and opted to go to trial. After 

the jury was selected, but before its members were sworn, Moses’s attorney 

informed the trial judge that Moses wished to proceed pro se. The trial judge 

admonished Moses about the dangers of self-representation, particularly in a 

capital case, and expressed grave concerns about Moses’s ability to represent 

himself given his eleventh-grade education. Moses reasserted his desire to 

represent himself, to which the court responded that although he was “not 

making a judgment at [that] point,” he was not convinced Moses was capable 

of representing himself. After additional back-and-forth on the question, the 

colloquy concluded:

THE COURT: [. . .] [F]rankly, given your education or lack thereof, 

I am not confident—you have not convinced me at this point that 

you’re competent to represent yourself. So having said that, let’s 

all sleep on it, take a break and talk to you tomorrow morning at 

nine o’clock.

THE DEFENDANT: So the comments that you have are 

irrelevant, sir?

THE COURT: That’s it for now.

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Despite the trial judge’s suggestion that the parties “sleep on it,” neither the 

judge, Moses, Moses’s counsel, nor the prosecution brought up Moses’s stated 

desire to represent himself again. Moses was represented at trial by counsel.

The jury found him guilty of capital murder and Moses was sentenced to life 

in prison.

Moses’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He did not raise a 

Faretta claim on appeal. Moses filed a state habeas corpus petition arguing, 

inter alia, that he had been improperly denied his right to self-representation 

and to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The trial-level state habeas 

court concluded that Moses’s Faretta claim was barred under state procedural 

rules because Moses had failed to raise it on appeal. The court considered the 

merits of Moses’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim and 

concluded that appellate counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to challenge the denial of Moses’s right to proceed pro se. The court 

concluded that because the claim was not clearly stronger than those appellate 

counsel raised, counsel was not ineffective for failing to brief the Faretta claim. 

The court found that the trial judge had discretion to deny Moses’s request 

because it had been made untimely—after voir dire had taken place. The court 

held in the alternative that Moses had waived his right to self-representation 

by failing to reassert it and by proceeding to trial with counsel, as the trial 

judge merely discouraged Moses from representing himself without explicitly 

denying the request. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA)

denied Moses’s state habeas petition without written order on the findings of 

the lower court.

Moses subsequently filed a federal habeas petition. The district court 

denied Moses’s Faretta claim as procedurally defaulted, but granted habeas 

relief on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. The district court 

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determined that the state habeas court made “an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the record” when it concluded that the trial court could 

have reasonably found that Moses waived his right to self-representation when 

he failed to reassert it. The district court also concluded that there was no 

support in the law for the state habeas court’s holding that Moses’s request 

was untimely because it was made after voir dire. Furthermore, the district 

court noted that an affidavit submitted by Moses’s appellate attorney revealed

she was unaware Moses had requested to represent himself, thereby indicating 

she had failed to familiarize herself with the record. The district court held 

that “the state habeas court’s implicit determination that counsel’s total failure 

to familiarize herself with the record in this case was not deficient was an 

unreasonable application of the Strickland standard to the facts in this case.” 

Accordingly, the district court concluded there was a substantial likelihood a 

Faretta claim would have succeeded on direct appeal and granted Moses 

habeas relief on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

II

In a habeas corpus appeal, this court reviews a district court’s findings 

of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Martinez v. Johnson, 

255 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir. 2001). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Moses can obtain federal habeas relief only if his 

adjudication in state court “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” Robertson v. Cain, 

324 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). “[A] 

habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . 

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could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether 

it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories 

are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). “AEDPA thus imposes a highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that 

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766, 773 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Federal 

courts reviewing habeas applications premised on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), are 

“doubly” deferential: “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable[;] [t]he question is whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.

III

The TCCA denied habeas review of Moses’s self-representation claim 

because Moses failed to raise this claim on direct appeal. A federal habeas 

court has no power to review a state court’s decision not to address a prisoner’s 

federal claims if the state court made that decision on the basis of independent 

and adequate state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 729-30 (1991). This court has specifically held that the Texas requirement 

“that a petitioner must raise a claim on direct appeal before it can be raised on 

state habeas . . . is an adequate state ground capable of barring federal habeas

review.” Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 827 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court thus did not err in 

holding that procedural default bars federal habeas review of Moses’s 

underlying Faretta claim.

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By virtue of Moses’s procedural default, this court cannot review the 

merits of his Faretta claim unless Moses can demonstrate cause for the default 

and actual prejudice due to the alleged violation of federal law. See Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 750. When afforded liberal construction, Moses’s briefs on appeal 

include an argument that his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim 

supplies the cause and prejudice required to overcome the procedural default. 

See, e.g., Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The filings 

of a federal habeas petitioner who is proceeding pro se are entitled to the 

benefit of liberal construction.”). However, “[w]e have repeatedly held that a 

contention not raised by a habeas petitioner in the district court cannot be 

considered for the first time on appeal from that court’s denial of habeas relief.” 

Johnson v. Puckett, 176 F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. 

Puckett, 930 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1991)). Nor will we generally consider an 

argument raised for the first time in a certificate of appealability (COA)

application to the district court. Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 695 (5th 

Cir. 2003); cf. Coleman v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2006)

(refusing to consider argument which was raised for the first time in a postjudgment motion in the district court). Moses did not argue cause and 

prejudice in support of his § 2254 application, raising this argument for the 

first time in the district court in support of his motion for a COA. Because 

Moses failed to properly raise this argument below, we will not consider it on 

appeal. 

IV

The district court granted habeas relief on Moses’s ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel claim after concluding that the state habeas court made 

unreasonable findings of fact and unreasonably applied Strickland to those 

facts. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, an 

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applicant must show (1) “counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness’” and (2) “but for his counsel’s deficient 

performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Blanton, 543 F.3d at 235 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694). The TCCA held that Moses was unable to 

satisfy either Strickland prong because his Faretta claim was not clearly 

stronger than the issues appellate counsel raised on appeal and there was no 

reasonable probability Moses would have prevailed had his attorney urged 

such a claim. The TCCA offered two alternative reasons for its conclusion: (1) 

Moses had not timely asserted his right to self-representation; and (2) Moses 

had waived the right by proceeding to trial with his appointed counsel. 

The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to selfrepresentation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. “[T]he denial of the right to selfrepresentation constitutes a structural error that is not subject to harmless 

error review and instead requires automatic reversal.” Batchelor v. Cain, 682 

F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 

n.8 (1984)). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that “the right of

self-representation is not absolute,” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171

(2008), and has noted with approval that “most courts require [a defendant to 

elect self-representation] in a timely manner.” Martinez v. Court of Appeal of 

Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (footnote omitted). The 

Court explained, “the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and 

efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as 

his own lawyer.” Id. The Court has not, however, made clear at what point a 

request for self-representation becomes sufficiently untimely that a trial judge 

could deny the request without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment. See

Miller v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 897, 903 n.5 (5th Cir. 2013). Thus, no Supreme Court 

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case contradicts the state habeas court’s holding that Moses did not timely 

request permission to proceed pro se. Accordingly, the decision was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court. See § 2254(d)(1); Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 

546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005). The district court’s error in holding otherwise is 

underscored by circuit court decisions.

Moses relies heavily on Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 

1977), for the proposition that a request for self-representation is untimely only 

if made after a jury has already been sworn. Chapman does in fact state: “If 

there is to be a Rubicon beyond which the defendant has lost his unqualified 

right to defend pro se, it makes far better sense to locate it at the beginning of 

defendant’s trial, when the jury is empaneled and sworn . . . .” Id. at 894. 

Moses first voiced his desire to proceed pro se after the jury was selected but 

before it was sworn. The issue in Chapman, however, was whether a demand 

for self-representation was untimely when made after defense counsel had 

declared himself “ready for trial” but before the jury had been empaneled. Id.

at 887. This court held the demand timely, but did not have occasion to 

consider whether the same would have been true had the demand been made 

between the empaneling and the swearing of the jury. See id. In fact, 

Chapman’s explicit holding was “that a demand for self-representation must 

be honored as timely if made before the jury is selected, absent an affirmative 

showing that it was a tactic to secure delay.” Id. Under Chapman, Moses’s 

demand for self-representation was not plainly timely because it was made

after the jury was selected. See id. In any event, Chapman does not 

definitively establish this circuit’s position, much less the Supreme Court’s 

position, on whether a request for pro se defense made after the jury has been 

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selected is timely beyond fairminded disagreement. See Harrington, 562 U.S. 

at 102.

Furthermore, this court has previously held that federal habeas relief 

was not appropriate where a state habeas court had determined a defendant’s 

request to proceed pro se to be untimely because the request had been made 

“only a few hours before jury selection.” Miller, 714 F.3d at 903 n.5 (emphasis 

added). Here, Moses demanded to present his own defense only after the jury 

had been selected. Miller supports the state habeas court’s position that the 

district court had discretion to deny Moses’s request to proceed pro se because 

the request was made after the jury had been selected. See id. Other circuits

have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., Hill v. Curtin, 792 F.3d 670, 674, 

679 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (refusing to grant habeas relief on Faretta claim 

because defendant requested self-representation on the first day of trial, before 

jurors had been empaneled); United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (“In cases involving jury trials, we have held that a request is timely 

if made before the jury is selected or before the jury is empaneled, unless it is 

made for the purpose of delay.”); United States v. Young, 287 F.3d 1352, 1354-

55 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant’s request to proceed pro se was 

untimely when made after the jury was empaneled but before it was sworn). 

At the very least, the law on this point is not clearly established, and the

district court therefore erred when it held the state habeas court unreasonably 

applied clearly established federal law.1

 1 The TCCA alternatively held that Moses’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to present a Faretta claim because Moses had waived his right to proceed pro se. 

Because we find that the timeliness ground was a sufficient basis for denying Moses’s claim, 

we need not address the TCCA’s alternative holding.

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V

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the denial of habeas corpus 

relief on Moses’s Faretta claim, and REVERSE the district court’s grant of 

habeas corpus relief on Moses’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

claim.

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