In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-1849

CRYSTAL LONGSTREET,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

and LAMARK CARTER, individually and

in his official capacity as Warden,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 2490--James B. Zagel, Judge.

Argued December 3, 2001--Decided January 14, 2002

 Before POSNER, EVANS, and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

 EVANS, Circuit Judge. Crystal

Longstreet, a correctional officer at the

Joliet/1 Correctional Center, sued her

employer, the Illinois Department of

Corrections, and Warden Lamark Carter,

alleging that she was sexually harassed

and retaliated against after complaining

about it. Longstreet’s complaint centered

on two distasteful workplace incidents

she encountered during a 30-day period in

1998. The district court granted summary

judgment for the defendants and

Longstreet appeals.

 The first incident occurred when

Longstreet reported for her morning shift

at Joliet’s Tower 2 to take over

fromRonald Bester, a correctional officer

whose shift was over. Bester, a crude

fellow who deserves absolutely no style

points, told Longstreet that he had been

trying to masturbate all night but that

he kept getting interrupted. He then

yelled at Longstreet and said she should

bring him a cup of water and soap. He

said this as he stood in the stairwell

masturbating in front of her. The next

day, Longstreet complained about the

incident to a prison chaplain, and a few

days later she prepared an incident
report. Warden Carter began an

investigation and placed Bester on a paid

leave pending the results of his

investigation. The Department of

Corrections (DOC) continued to

investigate the incident and, following a

hearing, suspended Bester. A month later,

it recommended that Bester be discharged

for cause. Apparently seeing the writing

on the wall, Bester resigned rather than

face a discharge hearing. All in all,

Bester was temporarily removed from

Joliet within days of Longstreet’s

complaint and permanently out of a job in

4 months.

 The second incident Longstreet complains

of occurred 30 days after the encounter

with Bester when another correctional

officer, Ronald Bills, allegedly rubbed

his penis across her buttocks. Longstreet

again prepared a report and informed

Warden Carter of the incident. The

incident was investigated and four

witnesses to the event, as identified by

Longstreet, were interviewed. It is

undisputed that none of the four

corroborated Longstreet’s version of the

event, and the investigator (Janet

Richmond acting at Warden Carter’s

request) concluded that the allegation of

sexual harassment could not be

substantiated. Bills, however, promised

the investigator that he would have no

further contact with Longstreet, a

promise which has been kept.

 It is, we think, difficult to determine

which of the two incidents Longstreet

complains about, if true, was worse. Both

were close to 9’s on a scale of 10. But

this is not a lawsuit against Bester

and/or Bills. It’s a Title VII claim

which seeks to hold an employer

financially responsible for the

irresponsibility of a co-worker. And in a

case involving sexual harassment by a coworker, an employer is only liable for

employment discrimination under Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e et seq., if it

negligently failed to take steps to

remedy the illegal harassment. Smith v.

Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999). 

 Given that standard and the facts

alleged in this case, one may be excused

for questioning just why Longstreet filed

her lawsuit. She cannot contend that

removing Bester from Joliet (in all

practical respects he was fired) was not
sufficient to remedy the harassment. She

can hardly contend that the isolated

incident with Bills--which by the way she

does not emphasize on appeal--could be

the basis of an actionable sexual

harassment claim against her employer

under Title VII as we have construed it.

The answer seems to be that her real

contention is that the DOC was negligent

not so much in its response to her

complaints but in not preventing the

harassment in the first place. She says

that both Bester and Bills harassed

others before her. The contention is that

if the DOC had taken reasonable steps in

connection with those prior incidents,

these unpleasant things would not have

happened to her.

 The facts of this case do not support

Longstreet’s theory. The prior incidents

on which she relies do not show that the

DOC was negligent in its previous

dealings with Bester. In one prior

incident Bester apparently offered

Sergeant Tracey Terry $100 to "suck his

dick" and $200 to have sex with him.

Terry complained to her captain and to

Samantha Franklin, the officer

responsible for harassment complaints.

Terry told Franklin she never wanted to

work with Bester again. Bester was

reassigned and Terry got her wish; she

never had to work with him again.

Franklin thought this resolved the

situation and, in fact, there is no

evidence that Terry was ever harassed

again. Longstreet contends that the

employer’s response was insufficient

because, even if Terry was satisfied with

the resolution of her case, the DOC had

an independent obligation to make a

further investigation and to make certain

that Bester clearly understood that his

reassignment was a result of his bad

behavior.

 The only other evidence of prior

incidents consists of vague hearsay

allegations that both Bester and Bills

harassed other women in some way, but, in

what is a fatal flaw, there is no

allegation that any of these incidents

were reported to a supervisor. We doubt

that these facts would support a claim by

any of the other women. We do not know,

of course, because those cases are not

before us. Longstreet uses these prior

incidents to imply that if the men had

been properly dealt with in the other
incidents, they would not have been

recidivists.

 We have recognized that deterrence is an

objective in imposing liability on

employers for the creation of a hostile

environment by a plaintiff’s co-workers.

An employer’s response to allegations of

harassment "must be reasonably calculated

to prevent further harassment under the

particular facts and circumstances of the

case at the time the allegations are

made." Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d

412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989); McKenzie v.

Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 92 F.3d 473

(7th Cir. 1996). What is a reasonable

response depends on the gravity of the

harassment. Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l

Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995). An

employer must take more care to protect

employees, depending on the seriousness

of the harassment. See Ellison v. Brady,

924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). In this

case, we must determine how far those

principles can be stretched.

 Here, the only prior incident with any

potential legal meat is the Terry/Bester

episode. The response to Terry’s

complaint solved her problem with Bester;

he never harassed her again. The proper

measure of the reasonableness of the

DOC’s response was dependent on the facts

and circumstances of that case. Short of

litigating Terry’s situation in

Longstreet’s case, there is little to be

said about it except that the DOC

response was not obviously unreasonable.

 It would push the role of deterrence too

far to say that a response which seemed

to be within the realm of reasonableness

in one situation can, if ultimately it

did not have the proper deterrent effect,

be the sole basis for liability in

another case even if the employer’s

response in the second case was clearly

sufficient. The DOC’s response to Terry’s

complaint was not patently unreasonable

and it solved her problem with Bester.

But it did not cure him of disgusting and

boorish behavior, as his interaction with

Longstreet shows. In response to

Longstreet’s complaint, however, Bester,

in effect, was discharged, which by

anyone’s measure has to be considered an

adequate response. But nevertheless,

Longstreet, in 20/20 hindsight, says that

she would not have had to suffer the

indignity imposed on her if the DOC had
taken different actions in regard to the

Terry complaint.

 Although Longstreet’s argument has

superficial appeal, we cannot conclude

that an employer is subject to what

amounts to strict liability for every

second incident of harassment committed

by an employee, especially when the first

incident was far less serious than the

second. Had Bester’s acts toward Terry

been more severe--and as a result he had

merely been reassigned to another duty

station--we would be faced with a

different situation. Or were there actual

nonhearsay complaints that he harassed

several other women, and that despite

complaints he had not been disciplined,

the situation would also be different.

But what we have here is, in effect, one

prior incident which may or may not rise

to the level of actionable harassment and

which was not ignored by the employer,

followed by a second incident which

resulted in the de facto discharge of the

harasser. To say that the employer must

be held liable in the second incident

would be to impose strict liability on an

employer any time an employee commits two

acts of harassment. It would be a twostrikes-and-you’re-out rule. To be safe

from liability, an employer would always

have to discharge a person accused of any

kind of harassment because no employer

can predict with certainty, any more than

any judge sentencing a criminal defendant

can predict with certainty, that an

offender will not offend again.

 Longstreet also contends that she was

retaliated against for complaining about

these incidents of harassment. She can

prevail on a retaliation claim if she can

show that she opposed an unlawful

employment practice under Title VII, that

she was the object of an adverse

employment action, and that the adverse

action was caused by her opposition to

the unlawful employment practice. Hamner

v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care

Center, Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.

2000).

 Longstreet says that it was retaliation

to move her from what had been a

permanent duty station in Tower 2 to a

new position in Tower 5. Contrary to

usual practice, which was to rotate

officers among duty stations, Longstreet

had been given a permanent duty station
because she was diagnosed with multiple

sclerosis soon after she began her

employment with the DOC, some 9 years

before her encounter with Bester. She

contends that the job requirements on

Tower 2 were easier for her to perform

than those on Tower 5. We note in passing

that a claim Longstreet brought under the

Americans with Disabilities Act was

dismissed based on the State’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity, pursuant to

University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531

U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001). Despite

the fact that there is no ADA claim, if

the transfer to Tower 5 was, in fact, an

adverse employment action taken because

of Longstreet’s opposition to sexual

harassment, the claim is actionable under

Title VII.

 That is a big "if." The evidence that

the Tower 5 duties were more onerous,

thus making the transfer an adverse

employment action, is way too thin. It

consists of Longstreet’s description in

her deposition of the difficulties she

had performing the duties. However, she

was apparently able to perform them

without much of a problem. She worked at

Tower 5 almost 2 years before she was

transferred back to Tower 2.

 Even were she to show that she suffered

an adverse employment action, in order to

prevail on her retaliation claim she must

also show a connection between the

transfer and her complaints of

harassment. Her only evidence of a

connection is the timing; the transfer

occurred 4 months after the second

complaint. This is insufficient. See

Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, 202 F.3d 913

(7th Cir. 2000).

 Similarly, other alleged adverse

employment actions do not carry the day.

For instance, she complains of negative

performance evaluations and being

required to substantiate that her

absences from work were illness-related.

These events did not result in tangible

job consequences and therefore are not

adverse employment actions actionable

under Title VII. See Oest v. Illinois

Dep’t of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605 (7th

Cir. 2001).

 The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTE

/1 Joliet is a legendary prison. The recent announcement that it will soon close (the victim of

the budget-cutter’s knife) deserves a moment of

silence. Sentimentalists, however, longing for a

good look at the old fortress, can always cue up

"The Blues Brothers" (Universal Studios, 1980)

video and see the prison’s magnificent medieval

facade and Joliet Jake’s long walk to freedom and

the waiting Bluesmobile attended to by his brother Elwood.