Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1601-CR-124 | February 21, 2017 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Bryan M. Truitt

Bertig & Associates, LLC

Valparaiso, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lazaro Miranda, a/k/a Randall 

Izquierdo,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 21, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

64A03-1601-CR-124

Appeal from the 

Porter Superior Court

The Honorable 

Mary R. Harper, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D05-1405-FC-4132

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Lazaro Miranda, a/k/a Randall Izquierdo (“Defendant”) was convicted after a 

jury trial of forgery1 as a Class C felony, was found to be a habitual offender2

after a bench trial, and was sentenced to an aggregate fourteen-year sentence. 

He appeals and raises the following issue for our review: whether the State 

presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Class C felony 

forgery.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At approximately 11:15 a.m. on May 7, 2014, Sergeant Alfred Villareal 

(“Sergeant Villareal”) and Sergeant Michael Stewart (“Sergeant Stewart”) of the 

Lake County Police Department’s Drug Task Force Interdiction Unit (“the 

Interdiction Unit”) were patrolling I-94, which leads to Michigan. The 

Interdiction Unit is involved in detecting criminal activity that occurs through 

the interstate highways, which includes the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and

cash. On May 7, Sergeant Villareal and Sergeant Stewart were each in an 

unmarked police vehicle; Sergeant Villareal was parked in the median of the 

interstate, observing traffic, and Sergeant Stewart was driving on the interstate, 

monitoring vehicles. 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b). We note that, effective July 1, 2014, a new version of this criminal statute was 

enacted. Because Defendant committed his crime prior to July 1, 2014, we will apply the statute in effect at 

the time he committed his crime.

2

See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8. 
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[4] Sergeant Stewart was driving behind a group of vehicles as the vehicles 

approached Sergeant Villareal’s parked car. As the vehicles passed Sergeant 

Villareal, all of the vehicles except for one “did [the] typical reaction,” which 

was to slow down to about 70 miles per hour, remain in their lanes, and keep 

driving past the police vehicle. Tr. at 128. One vehicle, however, slammed on 

its brakes, dropped its speed to about sixty to sixty-five miles per hour, and 

swerved over into the right lane without signaling its lane change. This drew 

Sergeant Stewart’s attention because he considered it to be a “really unusual 

overcompensated action.” Id. Sergeant Stewart continued to follow the vehicle 

for a period of time.

[5] Sergeant Stewart pulled up next to the vehicle and saw two individuals inside, 

who were both exhibiting “unusual” body language. Id. at 131. The driver was 

sitting very forward and very rigidly, was staring straight ahead, and had a 

“death grip” on the steering wheel. Id. The passenger, later identified as 

Defendant, was staring straight ahead and was also “very rigid” and “very 

stiff.” Id. at 132. Sergeant Stewart thought the occupants of the vehicle 

“appeared . . . very nervous.” Id. At that time, Sergeant Stewart slowed his car 

to pull behind the vehicle and activated his lights to initiate a traffic stop. 

[6] After the vehicle had pulled over onto the shoulder of the highway, Sergeant 

Stewart approached the driver’s side and observed that the driver was very 

“frantic,” “shuffling around looking for documents.” Id. at 133. Defendant 

was sitting still, staring straight ahead without blinking, refusing to make eye 

contact with the officer, and gripping a backpack tightly in his lap, which 
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Sergeant Stewart thought was further unusual behavior. The driver gave 

Sergeant Stewart his identification and registration, and Sergeant Stewart had 

the driver step out of the vehicle to come back to his police car to speak with 

him. 

[7] While back in the police car, Sergeant Stewart ran the driver’s information 

through his computer and asked the driver where he was headed. The driver 

responded that they were going to Grand Rapids, Michigan to visit a girl. 

When Sergeant Stewart inquired of the driver as to the name of the passenger, 

the driver stated that he was a friend he had known for about a year, but did not 

know his name. Id. at 136. Sergeant Stewart found this to be “pretty unusual 

and pretty suspicious,” so he exited his car and walked to the passenger side to 

speak with Defendant. Id. 

[8] Sergeant Stewart asked Defendant for his identification, what his name was, his 

date of birth, and where he was traveling. Id. at 137-38. Defendant told the 

officer that he did not have his identification, but informed Sergeant Stewart

that his name was Lazaro Miranda and gave a date of birth. Although 

Defendant provided Sergeant Stewart with this information, it seemed to the 

officer that Defendant was “trying to think of something, like he was trying to 

make up a name and a date of birth.” Id. at 137. In response to the question of

where he and driver were traveling, Defendant told Sergeant Stewart that they 

were going to Grand Rapids for “some type of business.” Id. at 138. During 

this conversation, Defendant “kept staring straight ahead,” was acting very 
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“standoffish,” “nervous,” and “evasive,” and was still clutching his backpack 

with a “death grip.” Id. at 142-43. 

[9] Because of their conflicting stories, Sergeant Stewart then went back to speak 

with the driver again to try to clear up the stories, but the driver stated they 

were not headed to Michigan for any type of business. Id. at 139-40. This led 

Sergeant Stewart to believe that the driver and Defendant were lying about 

where they were traveling. The driver continued to act nervous even though 

Sergeant Stewart told him he was not going to write him a ticket. Sergeant 

Stewart asked the driver for consent to search his vehicle, and the driver 

consented. The officer had the driver remain in the patrol car and went back to 

ask Defendant to exit the vehicle and sit inside the patrol car during the search.

[10] Defendant stepped out of the vehicle still clutching his backpack, and Sergeant 

Stewart asked him if he had anything illegal in it; Defendant said that he did 

not. Id. at 146. Sergeant Stewart then asked for consent to search the 

backpack, and Defendant gave his consent. Sergeant Stewart asked Defendant 

to leave the backpack in the vehicle, and Defendant agreed and went to sit in 

the patrol car. Meanwhile, Sergeant Villareal arrived on the scene and assisted 

Sergeant Stewart in his search of the vehicle. While the officers searched the 

vehicle and the backpack, the driver and Defendant watched from the patrol car 

and spoke to each other in Spanish, which was recorded on the camera inside 

of Sergeant Stewart’s car. When the officers started to search the backpack, 

Defendant said to the driver, “are they searching my bag?” Id. at 103. 
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[11] In their search of the backpack, the officers found two white envelopes 

containing what looked to be United States currency, all in fifty-dollar bills. 

Inside one of the envelopes, the bills were separated into four or five sections 

with white “divider” papers, which the officers found odd because they had 

never seen money packaged that way during their careers. Id. at 112, 152. 

When the officers touched the currency, they noticed that the “feel” of the 

money did not seem normal and that the bills were “too crisp.” Id. at 79, 81, 

108. The bills did not have a visible hologram, multiple bills had the same 

serial number, the printing was blurry and “not accurate,” the color of the bills 

seemed off, and the security strip “stood out a little bit too much.” Id. at 79-81, 

114, 174. The officers found forty-eight bills, totaling $2,400, which they 

believed to be, and was later determined to be, counterfeit money. 

[12] Also inside of the backpack, the officers found handwritten directions to Grand 

Rapids, Michigan, a pre-paid “burner-type” phone, and two wallets. Id. at 

152,156, 159-60. One wallet contained $1,900 in legitimate United States 

currency and a photograph of a woman and a man, who looked like Defendant, 

but no identification. Id. at 107, 152. The officers also found thirteen small 

pieces of paper inside the backpack that contained descriptions of electronics

equipment, a price for the items, an address, and a phone number with a Grand 

Rapids area code. When the officers looked into the trunk of the vehicle, they 

found two “big empty . . . shipping-type boxes,” but no suitcases, clothing, 

briefcases, or computers that might have indicated an overnight business trip to 

support the story given by Defendant. Id. at 166. 
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[13] The officers placed the driver and Defendant under arrest. When they arrived 

at the Lake County Jail, Defendant could not be processed because he would 

not provide his date of birth, address, or any other identifying information. 

Defendant had to be identified by running his fingerprints through the NCIC 

database. Through the search, the police learned Defendant’s name was 

Randall Izquierdo and not Lazaro Miranda. 

[14] On May 12, 2014, the State charged Defendant with Class C felony forgery. 

The State amended the charging information on May 19 to add Randall 

Izquierdo as an alternate name for Defendant and to add a charge of Class D 

felony identity deception. On October 1, 2015, the State filed its notice of 

habitual offender enhancement. A jury trial was held, and after the State rested 

its case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the identity deception 

charge, which the trial court granted and dismissed the charge. The jury later 

found Defendant guilty of Class C felony forgery. Defendant waived his right 

to a jury trial on the habitual offender enhancement, and after a bench trial, the 

trial court found Defendant to be a habitual offender. At sentencing, the trial 

court sentenced Defendant to six years for the forgery conviction, enhanced by 

eight years for the habitual offender finding, resulting in an aggregate sentence 

of fourteen years. Defendant now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] The deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. When 

we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we do not 

reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Boggs v. State,
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928 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences that can be 

drawn from this evidence. Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 75 (Ind. Ct. App.

2014), trans. denied. We also consider conflicting evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013), trans. denied. We will not disturb the jury’s verdict if there is 

substantial evidence of probative value to support it. Fuentes, 10 N.E.3d at 75. 

We will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind.

2012). As the reviewing court, we respect “the jury’s exclusive province to 

weigh conflicting evidence.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). 

[16] Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support 

his conviction for Class C felony forgery. Specifically, he contends that the 

evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that he had the intent to 

defraud. Defendant asserts that there was no evidence that he had knowledge 

that he possessed counterfeit money and claims that the counterfeit bills were 

not so obviously fake as to alert an ordinary person and give him knowledge 

that they were not legitimate currency. He further alleges that the evidence that 

he acted nervously was because he was an illegal immigrant and had a warrant 

out for his arrest in Florida. 

[17] Defendant’s charging information read in pertinent part:

[O]n or about 7th day of May, 2014, in the County of Porter, 

State of Indiana, [Defendant], with the intent to defraud, makes, 
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utters or possesses a written instrument, numerous counterfeit 

United States Currency fifty dollar bills, in such a manner that 

they purport to have been made by another person; at another 

time; with different provisions; or by authority of one who did 

not give authority . . . .

Appellant’s App. at 97. In order to convict Defendant of forgery as a Class C 

felony, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he, with 

the intent to defraud, made, uttered, or possessed a written instrument in such a 

manner that it purported to have been made by another person, at another time, 

with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give authority. 

Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b). 

[18] Defendant only argues that insufficient evidence was presented to prove the 

intent to defraud element of his conviction. “Proof of intent to defraud requires 

a showing the defendant demonstrated ‘intent to deceive and thereby work a 

reliance and injury.’” Bocanegra v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wendling v. State, 465 N.E.2d 169, 170 

(Ind. 1984)), trans. denied. Actual injury is not required; potential injury is 

enough. Id. “Intent to defraud may be proven by circumstantial evidence 

which will often include the general conduct of the defendant when presenting 

the instrument for acceptance.” Miller v. State, 693 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1998) (citing Wendling, 465 N.E.2d at 170). Because intent is a mental 

state, the fact-finder often must look to the reasonable inferences based upon an 

examination of the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether there is a 

showing or inference of the requisite criminal intent. Brown v. State, 64 N.E.3d 
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1219, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2010)). In making this determination, the fact-finder looks to the 

person’s conduct and the natural consequences therefrom. Id. Further, a 

defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of a written instrument is not a separate 

element of the crime of forgery, but such knowledge may be relevant to show a 

defendant’s intent to defraud. Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009), trans. denied. 

[19] In the present case, the evidence most favorable to the verdict showed that

Defendant was found in possession of forty-eight counterfeit fifty-dollar bills, 

totaling $2,400. When the car that Defendant was a passenger in was pulled 

over, Defendant sat in the front seat staring straight ahead, was “very rigid” and 

“very stiff,” refused to make eye contact with the officer, was gripping a 

backpack tightly in his lap, and “appeared . . . very nervous.” Tr. at 132-133. 

This behavior, coupled with the fact that Defendant and driver told conflicting 

stories about where they were traveling, caused Sergeant Stewart to believe that 

Defendant was being evasive and lying to him. Throughout Sergeant Stewart’s

conversation with Defendant, Defendant continued to avoid eye contact and 

tightly grip his backpack. Defendant’s behavior of avoiding eye contact with 

Sergeant Stewart, clutching the backpack, and lying to the officer created a 

reasonable inference that Defendant was hiding something and knew that the 

backpack contained counterfeit money. 

[20] Further, Defendant continued to act evasively and lie to Sergeant Stewart as the 

conversation progressed. When the officer asked Defendant for identification, 
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Defendant told Sergeant Stewart that he did not have any identification, and 

instead, hesitated in giving his name and date of birth, which both later turned 

out to be false. Defendant never told the officers his real name; his true identity 

was eventually learned through his fingerprints after arrest. When Sergeant 

Stewart searched Defendant’s backpack, he discovered the large quantity of 

counterfeit bills inside. Defendant did not just have a few counterfeit bills in his 

backpack; there were forty-eight bills, totaling $2,400. Additionally, the “feel” 

of the money did not seem normal, the bills were “too crisp,” the bills did not 

have a visible hologram, multiple bills had the same serial number, the printing 

was blurry and “not accurate,” the color of the bills seemed off, and the security 

strip on the bills “stood out a little bit too much.” Id. at 79-81, 108, 114, 174. 

Given the quantity and quality of the bills found inside the backpack, it was 

reasonable for the jury to infer that Defendant knew the money was counterfeit. 

[21] Further evidence found in Defendant’s backpack also added to the inference 

that he knew that the money was counterfeit and that he had the intent to 

defraud. The counterfeit bills were unusually stored in a white envelope, 

separated in small bundles by white “divider” papers. Id. at 152. Sergeant 

Villareal testified that he had never seen money stored in that manner. Id. at 

112. The officers also found inside the backpack handwritten directions to 

Grand Rapids, a “burner-type” phone, tr. at 159, two wallets that contained no 

identifying information, and thirteen white slips of paper that contained 

descriptions of electronics equipment, a price for the items, an address, and a 

phone number with a Grand Rapids area code. Based on this evidence, it could 
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be reasonably inferred that Defendant intended to use the counterfeit money to 

purchase electronic equipment in Grand Rapids and defraud the sellers of the 

equipment who lived in another state, which would make it harder to locate 

him. We, therefore, conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented from 

which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant possessed the counterfeit 

money with the intent to defraud. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are 

merely requests for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. 

Boggs, 928 N.E.2d at 864. The State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Defendant’s conviction for Class C felony forgery.

[22] Affirmed.

[23] Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.