NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

COLENE P., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.T., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0225

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 528750

The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
COLENE P. v. DCS, D.T.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Colene P. (Mother) appeals the superior court’s termination 

of her parental rights to her daughter DT. For the following reasons, we 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 After Mother left DT with relatives, DT was placed in 

temporary physical custody of the Arizona Department of Child Safety 

(DCS). Later, she was placed with a paternal cousin. In May 2015, DT’s 

Guardian ad Litem initiated dependency proceedings, alleging Mother

neglected DT as a result of her substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal

activity. Mother failed to appear for the dependency hearing and DT was 

adjudicated dependent. In April 2016, the court changed the case plan to 

severance and adoption and DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. DCS alleged Mother’s chronic abuse of dangerous drugs and DT’s

length of time in an out-of-home placement as grounds for severance.

¶3 At the severance hearing, Mother failed to appear without 

good cause. The hearing was held in abstentia and the court found Mother 

had a substance abuse problem that was likely to continue for a prolonged, 

indeterminate period and length of time in care as grounds for severance. 

The court also found severance was in DT’s best interest and terminated 

Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and the

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1 

and -2101.A (West 2016).1

 

1 We cite to the current version of applicable statutes absent any 

change material to this decision.
COLENE P. v. DCS, D.T.

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

¶4 A parent-child relationship may be terminated when a court 

finds at least one of the statutory grounds for severance and determines that 

severance is in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533.B; Mary Lou C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). We review a court’s 

severance determination for an abuse of discretion, adopting its findings of 

fact unless clearly erroneous. Id. A court’s decision “must be based on 

clear and convincing evidence [and] will be affirmed unless we must say as 

a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear 

and convincing.” Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 94, ¶ 7 

(App. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). We do not reweigh 

the evidence on appeal. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 

282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002).

I. Grounds for Severance

¶5 Under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.3, a parent’s rights can be terminated 

when the parent has a history of chronic drug abuse, resulting in an 

inability to discharge parental responsibilities. Severance on this basis is 

appropriate when the court also finds “there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate 

period.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 15 (App. 

2010). 

¶6 Mother argues the trial court erred in finding her unable to 

parent her child due to substance abuse, without making an independent 

finding the substance abuse endangered the child or hindered her ability to 

parent DT. According to Mother, failure to complete services offered to her 

by DCS does not prove that substance abuse rendered her unable to parent 

DT. 

A. History of Chronic Drug Abuse

¶7 At the severance hearing, DCS’s program specialist (the 

specialist) testified Mother had a history of methamphetamine abuse,

starting when she was a minor. At the time of severance, Mother was thirtyone years old. Moreover, Mother neither disputed this testimony, nor 

presented any evidence suggesting she does not have a history of chronic 

drug abuse. 

¶8 In August 2015, Mother completed a psychological 

evaluation. She was diagnosed with stimulant use disorder, amphetamine 
COLENE P. v. DCS, D.T.

Decision of the Court

4

type. The record supports the court’s conclusion that “Mother has a 

significant history of methamphetamine use.”

B. Inability to Discharge Parental Responsibilities

¶9 When determining whether a parent can discharge parental 

responsibilities, the court must consider how the substance abuse hinders 

the parent’s ability to effectively parent. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377-78, ¶ 

19. In making this finding, the court has flexibility to consider the 

circumstances of each case. Id. at 378, ¶ 20.

¶10 At the severance hearing, the specialist testified Mother was 

offered the following services: TASC drug testing; TERROS Family First 

drug treatment, which included counseling and psychiatric services;

supervised visitations; parent aide services; and therapeutic visitations.

However, Mother failed to fully participate in any services.

¶11 Mother did not complete the initial intake with TERROS.

Although Mother was referred to TERROS services at least three more 

times, she failed to participate on those occasions as well. Further, Mother 

was inconsistent with drug testing. Mother was closed out of supervised 

visitation and parent aid as a result of her failure to access offered services. 

¶12 The specialist opined Mother was “unable to discharge 

parental responsibilities due to a history of substance abuse.” The court 

found Mother “has not demonstrated that she can maintain sobriety in 

order to parent the child,” despite her recent month and a half long 

participation in therapeutic visitations. 

C. Reasonable Belief Chronic Substance Abuse Will Continue

¶13 Evidence sufficient to support a finding that Mother’s 

substance abuse will continue may include her history of use and failure to 

complete or engage in offered services. Id. at 378-79, ¶ 26. A parent’s failure 

to abstain from substances despite a pending severance is “evidence [the 

parent] has not overcome [her] dependence on drugs.” Id. at 379, ¶ 29. 

¶14 The specialist testified Mother failed to consistently 

participate in substance abuse testing and failed to participate in any drug 

treatment services. The specialist testified she believed Mother’s substance 

abuse will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period of time. 

¶15 Consequently, the court correctly concluded “there are 

reasonable grounds to believe that [Mother’s chronic drug use] will 
COLENE P. v. DCS, D.T.

Decision of the Court

5

continue for a prolonged indeterminate period,” and that DCS made 

“reasonable efforts and diligent efforts to provide [M]other with services 

for reunification and to address her substance abuse issues.” 

¶16 Because we accept the court’s findings of fact unless clearly 

erroneous, we find the court did not err in severing Mother’s rights to DT. 

See Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Act. No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 

576 (App. 1994). When clear and convincing evidence supports at least one 

of the grounds for severance, we need not address the other reasons for 

severance. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3. 

II. Best Interests Determination

¶17 After finding grounds for severance, the court considered 

DT’s best interests. Mother challenges the court’s finding, arguing the court 

failed to conclude that “not to sever would result in a lack of permanency 

and stability.”

¶18 In a best interests inquiry, the court determines by a 

preponderance of the evidence whether severance is in a child’s best

interest. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). The best 

interests can be shown by presenting evidence of “how the child would 

benefit from a severance.” Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19 (emphasis 

added) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Existence of an adoptive 

plan is sufficient evidence that termination would result in a benefit. Id. 

¶19 Contrary to Mother’s argument, the court sufficiently 

explained how DT would benefit from the severance. The court found an

adoption placement was available, and that severance would further the 

plan, therefore, the court did not need to find Mother was unable to provide 

stability for DT. 

¶20 Moreover, at the time of severance, DT’s placement with a 

relative was meeting her needs. DCS also identified a suitable placement 

willing to adopt DT, with whom DT already had established a relationship.

DT was otherwise adoptable, because she was very young, bright, and had 

no medical issues. 

¶21 Because substantial evidence in the record exists to support 

the court’s best interest finding, we find no error.
COLENE P. v. DCS, D.T.

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court’s severance of 

Mother’s rights to DT.