* On November 30, 2016, the court forwarded a sealed copy of this Memorandum Opinion 

And Permanent Injunction to the parties to redact any confidential and/or privileged information 

from the public version and note any citation or editorial errors requiring correction. On December 

5, 2016, Verizon Deutschland GmbH submitted proposed redactions and indicated that counsel for 

the Government and Level 3 Communications, LLC did not oppose the redactions. The court has 

incorporated these proposed redactions, and corrected or clarified certain portions herein. 

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 16-829 

Filed: December 5, 2016*

****************************************

*

LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. *

*

THE UNITED STATES, *

*

Defendant, *

*

and *

*

VERIZON DEUTSCHLAND GMBH, *

*

Defendant-Intervenor. *

*

****************************************

Shelly Lynn Ewald, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar, & Fitzgerald, LLP, McLean, Virginia, Counsel for 

Plaintiff. 

Robert C. Bigler, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., Counsel 

for the Government.

Jonathan D. Shaffer, Smith Pachter McWhorter PLC, Tysons Corner, Virginia, Counsel for the

Defendant-Intervenor.

MEMORANDUM OPINION RESOLVING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON 

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD AND ISSUING PERMANENT INJUNCTION

BRADEN, Judge.

Administrative Procedures Act 

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706;

Bid Protest Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491;

Contract Award Procedures, 10 

U.S.C § 2305; 

Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement 

(“DFARS”) 252.239-7005,

252.239-7006;

Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(“FAR”) 14.405, 15.101-2, 

15.305(a), 15.306(a), 16.703, 

52.249-14;

Rules of the United States Court 

of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) 

11(b), 52.2, 54(d)(1).
2

This bid protest concerns the Defense Information Systems Agency’s decision to award a 

federal contract for construction and maintenance of a Structured, High Availability 

Telecommunications Circuit between Wiesbaden, Germany and Arifjan, Kuwait to Verizon 

Deutschland GmbH at a price of $38.6 million more than the bid of Level 3 Communications, 

LLC, the company that had been performing on the job for several years. Today, the court has 

entered an injunction to prohibit any further work from being performed under this contract, but 

also ordered the Defense Information Systems Agency (“DISA”) to provide its files in this matter 

to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for further investigation, particularly in 

light of the fact that lawyers from the Department of Justice and DISA informed the court, both in 

writing and at oral argument, that performance would not commence until December 1, 2016. In 

fact, performance began on June 29, 2016 and DISA "accepted" a completed telecommunications 

circuit on November 1, 2016—only a few days before the November 8, 2016 election. Although 

the court has authority to issue sanctions against the lawyers involved, the Inspector General has 

authority to ensure the integrity of the procurement process, and the Senate Armed Services 

Committee has oversight responsibility determine whether the American taxpayers are served by 

this type of procurement, albeit in support of our military requirements in the Middle East.

To facilitate review of this Memorandum Opinion, the court has provided the following 

outline: 

I. Factual Background.

II. Procedural History.

III. Discussion.

A. Jurisdiction.

B. Standing.

C. Standard Of Review.

D. The Parties’ Cross-Motions For Judgment On The Administrative Record. 

1. Level 3 Communications, LLC’s Argument. 

2. The Government’s Response. 

3. Verizon Deutschland GmbH’s Response.

4. The Court’s Resolution.

a. The Contracting Officer’s Decision Not To Seek A 

“Clarification” Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And An Abuse 

Of Discretion. 
3

b. The Contracting Officer’s Decision Regarding NALLA 

Accreditation Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And An Abuse Of 

Discretion. 

c. The Contracting Officer’s Decision Not To Seek Negotiations

With Offerors Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And An Abuse 

Of Discretion. 

E. Level 3 Communications, LLC Is Entitled To Injunctive Relief. 

IV. Conclusion. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

1

On August 28, 2015, the Defense Information Systems Agency (“DISA”) issued 

Solicitation HC1021-15-T-3033 (“the Solicitation”) seeking a STM 64, AU4 Structured, High 

Availability Telecommunications Circuit (“the circuit”) between Wiesbaden, Germany and 

Arifjan, Kuwait with an original service date of November 30, 2015. AR Tab 5, at 150. After 

amendments to the Solicitation, the service date was revised to May 2, 2016. AR Tab 7, at 271. 

The Solicitation requested offers for a fixed-price, indefinite-term delivery order for 

telecommunications installation, service, and maintenance, for an estimated service period of 60 

months, i.e., 5 years. AR Tab 5, at 156 (“All charges shall be understood to be firm fixed prices 

for the life of the contract.”); AR Tab 5, at 158 (“Contract for this telecommunication service shall 

be an indefinite term contract with an estimated contract period of 60 months.”). 

Pursuant to paragraph M(6) of the Solicitation, telecommunication providers (“TPs”) were 

requested to submit offers to install and maintain two circuit “paths:” a “protect path” that could 

traverse the bodies of water between Germany and Kuwait, and a “working path” that traversed

only dry land. AR Tab 5, at 153. Paragraph M(6) also instructed offerors that the protect path and 

the working path could not traverse or touch a list of nations, including Iran. AR Tab 5, at 153. 

Award of the contract was to be made to an offeror that submitted the lowest-priced, 

technically acceptable quote: “[q]uotes received in response to this Inquiry will be evaluated for 

technical sufficiency, ability to meet required service date, past performance, and total price.” AR 

Tab 5, at 157. Section A.1 of the Solicitation provided that: 

[a]fter the receipt of quotes, the government will first evaluate the lowest price 

quote. If the lowest price quote is determined to be technically acceptable and 

otherwise properly awardable, no further evaluations will be conducted, and award 

will be made. If, however, the lowest price quote is determined to be technically 

unacceptable and/or otherwise not properly awardable, the next lowest price quote 

 

1 The facts discussed herein were derived from the July 20, 2016 Administrative Record 

(“AR Tabs 1–31,” at 1–1253). 
4

will be evaluated until a quote is deemed technically acceptable and otherwise 

properly awardable.

AR Tab 5, at 150 (emphasis added). 

Level 3 Communications, LLC (“Level 3”) and Verizon Deutschland GmbH (“Verizon”),

and six other companies,2submitted offers by the October 28, 2015 submission deadline. AR Tab 

14, at 498; see also AR Tab 10, at 340 (Solicitation amendment changing submission deadline to 

October 28, 2015). 

Level 3 was the incumbent contractor and current provider of the existing

telecommunications circuit between Wiesbaden, Germany, and Arifjan, Kuwait. AR Tab 11, at 

392. Level 3 had provided this circuit for approximately two years. AR Tab 20, at 983. Level 3’s 

offer stated that the new circuit would follow the same working path, and did not traverse Iran. 

AR Tab 11, at 392 (“Level 3’s proposal utilizes a working path that is identical to the current [path] 

from Camp Arifjan to Wiesbaden.”); AR Tab 11, at 397 (“Working path does not touch or go 

through Iran[.]”). Level 3 also submitted the lowest price of $60,128,000 for installation and 60 

months of maintenance. AR Tab 15, at 504.

On November 19, 2015, DISA’s Technical Evaluation Team (“TET”) evaluated Level 3’s

proposal to determine technically acceptability. AR Tab 23A, at 1067 (Nov. 19, 2015 TET email 

with consolidated technical evaluation).3 On November 23, 2015, the Contract Specialist

responded to the TET’s evaluation: 

I can see that you determined [Level 3’s] proposed routing to be acceptable based on the 

maps/drawings/diagrams included in [Level 3’s] quote[.] [H]owever, I cannot find 

information . . . which documents how [Level 3’s] response to Standard Provision (SP) 39 

was determined to be acceptable. Remember, SP39 states the TP must submit with its 

quote submission a .kmz/.kml file (which [Level 3] failed to do). 

 

2 Of the eight offerors, only six complied with Standard Provision 8 of the Solicitation, 

requiring that only National Long Line Agencies (“NALLA”) accredited TPs could receive service 

orders under the proposed contract. AR Tab 15, at 501; AR Tab 5, at 156 (Standard Provision 8). 

The six companies that complied with NALLA included Verizon, Level 3, and four other 

companies. The three companies, other than Level 3, that submitted offers lower than Verizon are 

referred to herein as “Companies B, E, and F.” AR Tab 15, at 501. Documents in the 

Administrative Record refer to Verizon as “Company A” and Level 3 as “Company C.” AR Tab 

15, at 501. Another NALLA compliant company submitted an offer that was higher than 

Verizon’s, but this offer was not considered for award. AR Tab 15, at 504. 

3 The Administrative Record includes the November 19, 2016 e-mail but does not include 

the TET’s “Quote Evaluation Sheet” (“QES”). AR Tab 23A, at 1067. The July 12, 2016 

Complaint, as amended on September 29, 2016, alleges that the initial TET evaluation was 

favorable. Amend. Comp. at ¶ 22. 
5

AR Tab 20, at 913 (emphasis added). 

The Contract Specialist also raised two additional concerns: (1) Level 3’s offer did not 

expressly state that its subcontractor for the nation of Turkey was an accredited National Long 

Line Agencies (“NALLA”) subcontractor;

4

and (2) Level 3’s circuit route between Istanbul, 

Turkey, and Budapest, Hungary, was “completely UNCLEAR,” because of gaps in the diagram 

between Stara Zagora, Bulgaria, and Budapest, Hungary. AR Tab 20, at 913. The Contract 

Specialist requested that “[w]ith the above in mind, could [the TET] please have a look at the quote 

again, and advise.” AR Tab 20, at 914. 

That same day, a member of the TET also advised the Contract Specialist that: 

[t]here are gaps in the diagrams between Stara Zagora, Bulgaria, and Budapest, Hungary 

and Ivancice, Czech Republic. Please ask the offeror to provide the detailed routing 

.kmz/.kml file. The file should provide a more detailed routing between Bulgaria and 

Hungary as well as the routing between Hungary and Czech Republic. 

 

4 Standard Provision 8 of the Solicitation provided: 

One or more end points of this circuit terminate in NATO countries that have 

National Long Lines Agencies (NALLAs) and NALLA accredited 

Telecommunication Providers (TPs). As a member and signatory in North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. Department of Defense acquires its military 

telecommunication services in accordance with NATO requirements specified in 

Alliance Long Lines Activity (ALLA) handbook. Therefore, only TPs accredited 

by NALLAs of respective NATO countries will be eligible to receive any Order or 

Circuit Demand resulting from this Inquiry, for NATO country portions of this 

circuit. Additionally, only NALLA accredited TPs can be used as subcontractor TP 

in NATO countries. In NATO countries having no NALLA and/or NALLA 

accredited TP, quotes from TPs possessing authorization to provide communication 

services from appropriate national authority will be considered. Quotes shall 

identify portions of service that will be provided using TP’s own facilities as well 

as those that will be provided by subcontractor TPs, and shall identify all 

subcontractor TPs. Additionally, quotes shall provide evidence TP and all 

subcontractor TPs possess required NALLA accreditations or national authority 

authorizations for countries where this circuit terminates. Evidence of such 

NALLA accreditation and national authority authorizations for TP and all 

subcontractor TPs is a definitive responsibility criterion. 

ACCEPTABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDER (TP) RESPONSE: 

“UNDERSTAND,” and identify all portions of service provided by TP and all 

portions of the service provided by subcontractor TPs, plus provide evidence that 

TP and all subcontractor TPs possess required NALLA accreditations and national 

authority authorizations. 

AR Tab 5, at 156. 
6

AR Tab 20, at 912 (emphasis added). 

The Contracting Officer (“CO”), however, decided not to request that Level 3 provide 

detailed routing .kmz/.kml files or to request any clarification from Level 3, although Level 3 was 

currently maintaining the circuit that did not traverse Iran. AR Tab 20, at 574 (“The [CO] did not 

seek clarification, enter discussions, or engage in negotiations with any offerors at any time.”). 

Without the clarification requested by the TET member, the CO-issued Technical 

Evaluation Results stated that

[w]ith lack of information primarily resulting from the fact that [Level 3] failed to 

provide with its quote submission material explicitly requested in the RFQ (path 

documentation in the format of .kmz or .kml routing maps), the Government was 

not able to finalize evaluation of Level 3’s quote . . . unless the Government would 

have determined it necessary to conduct negotiations with offerors, which had 

enabled TPs to cure material omissions and/or submit a final revised quote . . . . As 

the determination of whether it is necessary to conduct negotiations with offerors 

in this full and open competition environment cannot be made unless all quotes 

received in response to the RFQ from TPs being eligible for award have been sent 

to and evaluated by the TET, the next lowest priced quote [was evaluated].” 

AR Tab 15, at 501–02. 

In short, the CO elected not to obtain clarifying information from Level 3, as requested by 

the TET member. Therefore, the TET proceeded to evaluate the next lowest priced offers and 

found the next three lowest priced offerors5 were “technically unacceptable.” AR Tab 15, at 502. 

And, in a “subsequent step,” the TET changed its prior decision finding Level 3’s offer “technically 

acceptable,” to finding the offer “technically unacceptable.” AR Tab 15, at 503. On November 

23, 2015,

6

the TET issued a Quotation Evaluation Sheet (“QES”) explaining why Level 3’s offer 

was deemed “technically unacceptable:”

 

5 These offerors were Companies B, E, and F. AR Tab 15, at 503. 

6 The court believes that the November 23, 2015 date of evaluation on the QES is incorrect, 

because the TET e-mails reflect that the TET members were still considering whether Level 3 was 

technically acceptable as of 3:52 pm on November 23, 2015. AR Tab 20, at 912. The concerns 

raised in the November 23, 2015 e-mails are also different from the grounds on which Level 3’s 

offer was found to be “technically unacceptable:” i.e., the Contract Specialist (“CS”) was 

concerned with the route between Turkey and Hungary, not whether the route came into contact 

with Iran. AR Tab 20, at 913. Moreover, on January 22, 2016, the CS e-mailed the CO and the 

TET member to inform that a QES had not been submitted for Level 3 as of that date. AR Tab 20, 

at 912. 
7

 First, Level 3’s working path “passes through Iran south of the Kanaquin PoP.7”

 Second, Level 3 did not provide a .kmz file as required in Standard Provision 39. 

 Third, Level 3’s quote identified a subcontractor—“NT”—for Turkey, but did not 

state whether the subcontractor was NALLA accredited, as required in Standard 

Provision 8. 

AR Tab 20, at 962. 

On February 8, 2016, Verizon’s offer was evaluated and determined to be “technically 

acceptable”. AR Tab 15, at 527. Verizon’s price, however, was $98,664,800.00, approximately 

$38.6 million more than Level 3’s offer. AR Tab 15, at 504. Nevertheless, on March 8, 2016, 

Verizon was awarded the contract and received a circuit demand requesting the provision of 

telecommunications circuit ALLA 660038, a 10GB circuit between Wiesbaden, Germany and 

Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. AR Tab 16B, at 532. 

On November 1, 2016, DISA accepted a completed telecommunications circuit from

Verizon and Verizon commenced performance of the contract, although the court was informed, 

in writing on August 23, 2016, and orally on September 15, 2016, that performance would not 

commence until December 1, 2016. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On March 14, 2016, after receiving notice of award, Level 3 filed a protest with the 

Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), arguing that (1) DISA’s determination that Level 

3’s offer was technically unacceptable was unreasonable, and (2) that Verizon’s offer took 

exception to mandatory Solicitation requirements. See Matter of: Level 3 Communications LLC, 

B-412854.1 (Comp. Gen.), 2016 WL 3568223 at *2. On June 21, 2016, the GAO denied Level 

3’s protest, finding that DISA’s determination was not unreasonable and finding that Level 3’s 

arguments concerning the award to Verizon “provide no basis on which to sustain the protest.” 

See id. at *7. 

On July 12, 2016, Level 3 filed a Complaint (“Compl.”) in the United States Court of 

Federal Claims. ECF No. 1. On that same day, Level 3 also filed: a Motion For Preliminary 

Injunction; a Memorandum In Support Of Motion For A Preliminary Injunction; a Motion For 

Protective Order; a Motion To Seal The Complaint And Memorandum In Support Of Motion For 

A Preliminary Injunction; a Notice Of Related Case(s) (stating that Level 3 was unaware of any 

related cases pending before the court); and a Rule 7.1 of the Rules of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims (“RCFC”) Disclosure Statement. ECF Nos. 5–6, 8–11. 

 

7 A “point of presence” (“PoP”) is the physical location where a long distance 

telecommunications carrier interfaces with the local network. See Glossary of Telecom Terms, 

VERIZON PARTNER SOLUTIONS, https://www22.verizon.com/wholesale/glossary/Glossary-ofTelecom-Terms-p.html. 
8

On July 13, 2016, Verizon filed an Unopposed Motion To Intervene that the court granted 

and also filed a RCFC 7.1 Disclosure Statement. ECF No. 12. That same day, the court also 

granted Level 3’s July 12, 2016 Motion For A Protective Order. ECF No. 14. On that same day, 

Level 3 filed, under seal, a Motion For Temporary Restraining Order and attached a Memorandum 

In Support of the motion. ECF No. 19. 

On July 14, 2016, the parties filed a Proposed Schedule. ECF No. 20. That same day, the 

court issued a Scheduling Order. ECF No. 21. 

On July 20, 2016, the Government filed, under seal, an Opposition To Level 3’s Motion 

For A Preliminary Injunction And Appendix. ECF No. 27. That same day, the Government also 

filed the Administrative Record, under seal. ECF No. 28. On July 22, 2016, Level 3 filed, under 

seal, a Brief In Reply To the Government’s Opposition To Plaintiff’s Motion For A Preliminary 

Injunction and attached the July 21, 2016 Declaration of John Shuttleworth, Senior Director of 

Sales Engineers for Level 3 and the July 21, 2016 Declaration of Robert A. Crinks, President of 

89Degree Networks, LLC (Level 3’s subcontractor). ECF No. 29. 

On August 1, 2016, the court convened a telephone status conference to discuss the status 

of the contract. On August 3, 2016, the court issued an order to schedule Oral Argument at the 

National Courts Building in Washington, D.C. at 2:30 p.m. EST on September 15, 2016. ECF No. 

32. 

On August 11, 2016, Level 3 filed, under seal, a Motion For Judgment On The 

Administrative Record And For Permanent Injunction and attached a Memorandum Of Law In 

Support of the motion (“Pl. Mem.”). ECF No. 35. 

On August 23, 2016, the Government filed, under seal, a Response To Plaintiff’s Motion 

For Judgment On The Administrative Record And Cross Motion For Judgment On The 

Administrative Record (“Gov’t Resp.”) and attached an Appendix. ECF No. 36. That same day, 

Verizon filed, under seal, a Response To Level 3’s Motion For Judgment On The Administrative 

Record And Cross Motion For Judgment On The Administrative Record (“D.I. Resp.”). ECF No. 

37. In the August 23, 2016 Response, the Government represented that Verizon would not begin 

performance until December 1, 2016. Gov’t Resp. at 25 (“In contrast to Level 3’s failure to put 

forward any claim of irreparable harm, the Government would be significantly harmed if the Court 

enters an injunction preventing Verizon from proceeding with preparation for its contract so that 

it can begin performance on December 1, 2016.” (emphasis added)). 

On August 29, 2016, Level 3 filed a Brief In Reply To The Government And Verizon’s 

Oppositions And Response To The Government And Verizon’s Cross Motions (“Pl. Reply”). ECF 

No. 38. 

On September 2, 2016, Verizon filed a Reply (“D.I. Reply”). On that same day, the 

Government also filed a Reply (“Gov’t Reply”). 

On September 15, 2016, the court convened an Oral Argument on the parties’ CrossMotions For Judgment On The Administrative Record. ECF No. 42 (“9/15/2016 TR”). During 

the Oral Argument, the court suggested that Level 3 file an Amended Complaint, since the July 

12, 2016 Complaint did not identify which statutes or regulations that DISA violated by granting 
9

an award to Verizon. 9/15/2016 TR at 6–7. In addition, the court asked the Government’s counsel 

about the status of the contract, and the Government represented that Verizon was preparing to 

perform on December 1, 2016: 

[THE COURT]: So tell me what’s happening right now. Verizon has the contract. 

What are they doing?

[THE GOVERNMENT]: No, I know, Your Honor. Verizon, right now, is preparing 

to perform on December 1st.

9/15/2016 TR at 40 (emphasis added). 

On September 29, 2016, Level 3 filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 43. 

On November 9, 2016, the court’s law clerk sent an e-mail to the parties to inquire whether 

Verizon still intended to commence performance on December 1, 2016. ECF No. 52. On 

November 10, 2016, the Government responded that: “Verizon was able to complete the circuit 

ahead of schedule and the Government accepted the circuit and began using the circuit on 

November 1, 2016.” ECF No. 52. 

On November 14, 2016, the court convened a hearing to confirm the current status of the 

contract. ECF No. 48 (“11/14/16 TR”). During the hearing the Government represented that DISA

had accepted a complete circuit from Verizon on November 1, 2016. 11/14/16 TR at 4. The 

Government confirmed that it failed to inform either the court or Level 3 that performance 

commenced prior to December 1, 2016. 11/14/16 TR at 9. 

In response, on that same day, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion And Temporary 

Restraining Order, prohibiting DISA from allowing Verizon to continue performing under the 

contract. See Level 3 Communications, LLC v. United States, No. 16-829, 2016 WL 6694969, at 

*3 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 14, 2016). 

On November 18, 2016, the Government filed a sealed status report to update the court 

about the work that Verizon performed to date and the amount that has been paid or is due to 

Verizon. ECF No. 50. In an attached declaration, the CO stated that Verizon began the 

“provisioning process to install the circuit per the contract,” on June 29, 2016, after GAO issued 

its ruling, and that Verizon completed work on the circuit on November 1, 2016. ECF No 50-1 at 

¶¶ 5–6. In addition, the CO stated that, under Verizon’s offer, the set up process carried a $ [...]

“non-recurring cost,” that would be billed to DISA. ECF No. 50-1 at ¶ 13. Since DISA accepted 

the circuit on November 1, 2016, the court was informed that Verizon apparently was also owed 

$ [...] for one month of service. ECF No 50-1 at ¶ 13. 

On November 21, 2016 the Government submitted an additional status report, confirming 

that contract “performance” commenced on June 29, 2016. ECF No. 51 at 7. 
10

III. DISCUSSION.

A. Jurisdiction.

Under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1995 (“ADRA”), the United States 

Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction: 

to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a 

Federal agency or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award of a contract 

or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a 

proposed procurement. 

28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

Count I of the September 29, 2016 Amended Complaint alleges that DISA violated 10 

U.S.C. § 2305(b)(1)8and FAR 15.305(a),

9

15.306(a),

10 and 15.101-2,11 in evaluating Level 3 and 

Verizon’s offers. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 100–108. Count II alleges that DISA’s decision to award 

the contract was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with 

law, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706.12 Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 109–116. 

B. Standing.

As a threshold matter, a plaintiff in a bid protest must establish standing by demonstrating 

that it is an “interested party,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). See Myers Investigative & Sec. 

Servs. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[S]tanding is a threshold 

jurisdictional issue.”). An “interested party’” is any actual or prospective offeror whose “direct 

economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by a failure to award the 

contract.” American Fed’n Of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001). In this case, Level 3 submitted a timely offer in response to the October 22, 2015 

Amended Solicitation. AR Tab 10, at 340 (Amendment to Solicitation setting the due date as 

October 28, 2015); AR Tab 12, at 341 (Level 3’s offer was submitted October 28, 2015). 

Necessarily, Level 3’s direct economic interest was affected by DISA’s decision to award the 

Contract to Verizon. Therefore, the September 29, 2016 Amended Complaint properly alleged

that Level 3 is an “interested party.”

In addition to alleging that the plaintiff is an interested party, the complaint in a bid protest

must also allege sufficient facts to show that the plaintiff has been prejudiced by the award to 

 

8 Relevant portions of 10 U.S.C. § 2305 are set forth in the attached Court Appendix. 

9 Relevant portions of FAR 15.305(a) are set forth in the attached Court Appendix. 

10 Relevant portions of FAR 15.306(a) are set forth in the attached Court Appendix. 

11 FAR 15.101-2 is set forth in the attached Court Appendix. 

12 5 U.S.C. § 706 is set forth in the attached Court Appendix. 
11

another bidder. See Information Technology & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 

1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In order to establish standing, [the plaintiff] must show that it 

is . . . an interested party, prejudiced by the award to [another bidder.]”). To establish prejudice, 

the complaint must allege that a “significant error” was made during the procurement process, and 

“there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award[,] but for that error.” 

Alfa Laval Separation, Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). But, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit has instructed that the test for prejudice “is more lenient than showing actual causation,” 

because the plaintiff need not “show[] that but for the errors [it] would have won the contract.”

Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Instead, 

the complaint must allege that the plaintiff has a “greater than insubstantial chance of securing the 

contract[,] if successful on the merits of the bid protestor,” i.e., a “substantial chance” of receiving 

award. See Information Technology & Applications Corp., 316 F.3d at 1319. 

In this case, Level 3 had a “substantial chance” of being awarded the contract, but for 

DISA’s arbitrary and capricious actions, and abuse of discretion, in evaluating Level 3’s offer. 

Specifically, under the terms of the October 22, 2015 Solicitation, the contract was to be awarded

to the “lowest price quote,” that also was determined to “be technically acceptable and otherwise 

properly awardable.” AR Tab 5, at 150. Level 3 submitted the lowest offer of $60,128,000. AR 

Tab 14, at 498. Level 3 did not receive award, however, because its offer was not deemed 

“technically acceptable.” AR Tab 15, at 582. The September 29, 2016 Complaint alleges that 

DISA violated 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(1), as well as Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 

15.305(a), 15.306(a), and 15.101-2 by unlawfully awarding the contract to Verizon, because Level 

3’s offer was the lowest price quote and was “technically acceptable.” Amend. Compl. at ¶¶100–

116. Under these circumstances, Level 3 established a “substantial chance” of receiving the 

contract under the Solicitation. For these reasons, the court has determined that Level 3 has 

established standing to seek an adjudication of this bid protest. 

C. Standard Of Review.

Pursuant to the Tucker Act, as amended by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 

Pub. L. No. 104-320 § 12, 110 Stat. 3870, 3874 (Oct. 19, 1996), Congress authorized the United 

States Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate bird protests under the standards set forth in the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (“In any 

action under this subsection, the courts shall review the agency’s decision pursuant to the standards 

set forth in section 706 of title 5.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (“The reviewing court 

shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 

be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]”); 

Banknote Corp. of Supp., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Among the 

various APA standards of review in section 706, the proper standard to be applied in bid protest 

cases is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A): a reviewing court shall set aside the agency action if it 

is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’”) 

(citations omitted).

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held, the court’s primary 

responsibility in a bid protest is to determine whether a federal agency violated a federal statute or 

regulation in the procurement process and whether any such violation was prejudicial. See Axiom 
12

Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “the disappointed 

bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations”) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

If no prejudicial violation of law or regulation is found, the court next is required to 

determine whether the agency decision evidences a rational basis. See Savantage Fin. Servs. 

Inc. v. United States, 595 F.3d. 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a court “must sustain an 

agency action unless the action does not evidence rational reasoning and consideration of relevant 

factors”) (quotations omitted); see also Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 

1071, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that to meet the burden of showing that a sole-source award 

lacks rational basis, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the agency’s decision to conduct a sole-source 

procurement process lacked a rational basis; (2) the agency’s sole-source requirements lacked a 

rational basis; or (3) based on the sole-source requirements, the selection of the sole-source 

awardee lacked a rational basis”). 

Finally, the court is required to ascertain whether the federal agency otherwise acted in an 

arbitrary and capricious manner with respect to the procurement at issue. See Banknote Corp., 365 

F.3d at 1350 (“[A] reviewing court shall set aside the agency action if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion.’”). In particular, the United States Supreme Court has held that a federal 

agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious, when the agency “entirely failed to consider an 

important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 

evidence before the agency, or [the decision] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 

D. The Parties’ Cross-Motions for Judgment On The Administrative Record. 

1. Level 3 Communications, LLC’s Argument. 

Level 3 seeks a permanent injunction barring DISA from proceeding with any further

performance of the contract, with any entity other than Level 3, or, alternatively, an order requiring 

DISA to reevaluate or re-solicit proposals. Pl. Mem. at 2. Level 3 submitted the lowest-priced, 

“technically acceptable” offer and the decision that Level 3’s offer was not “technically 

acceptable” was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. Pl. Mem. at 2. Furthermore, the 

decision to award the contract to Verizon was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law because 

Verizon’s offer was not “technically acceptable.” Pl. Mem. at 2. 

Level 3 argues that Verizon’s proposal was not “technically acceptable,” because Verizon 

took exception to material requirements of the Solicitation. Pl. Mem. at 20. To be eligible for an 

award, a bidder must meet all material requirements of solicitation; “[i]f a bidder attempts to 

impose conditions that would modify material requirements, the bid is not responsive and must be 

rejected.” Tel-Instrument Elec. Corp. v. U.S., 56 Fed. Cl. 174, 176 (2003), aff’d, 87 F. App’x 752 

(Fed. Cir. 2004). Verizon, however, sua sponte modified four material requirements: (1) Verizon 

required a 150 day lead time and therefore did not meet the required service date, a condition

precedent to award under Standard Provision 24 of the Solicitation and a mandatory requirement 

of Standard Provision 42; (2) Verizon conditioned compliance with the Solicitation’s Permit 

requirements, set forth in Standard Provision 27, by requiring that any delay in performance,

resulting from the time needed to obtain permits, “shall” be an excusable delay; (3) Verizon did 
13

not comply with the Solicitation’s requirement to submit a firm fixed-price quote, but instead

responded that Verizon should be able to renegotiate the contract price, in the event of new taxes 

or similar charges; and (4) Verizon conditioned the Solicitation’s Circuit Parameters 

Requirements, if there were unforeseeable events, such as a severed cable. Pl. Mem. at 21. 

First, with respect to the service date, Standard Provision 24 stated that an award would be 

made to the offeror “whose quote is determined to be the lowest priced, technically acceptable and 

meets the Government’s service date.” AR Tab 5, at 157 (emphasis added). Paragraph E of the 

Solicitation, and subsequent amendments, set the service date as May 2, 2016. AR Tab 7, at 269. 

Standard Provision 42 of the Solicitation also required all offerors to confirm their ability to meet 

the required service date. AR Tab 5, at 160. Verizon’s offer, however, stated that “lead time for 

this order is 150 calendar days. Verizon can provide the circuit by 02 May 2016 if the award is 

received by 04 December 2015.” AR Tab 12A, at 434. When DISA evaluated and awarded the 

contract to Verizon on March 8, 2016, DISA knew that Verizon could not meet the required service 

date, because of the 150 day lead time. Pl. Mem. at 22. In contrast, Level 3’s offer required a lead 

time of only “60 days from Award.” AR Tab 11A, at 392. Therefore, on March 8, 2016 when 

DISA awarded the contract to Verizon, DISA knew that Verizon could not meet the required May 

2, 2016 Service Date. Pl. Mem. at 22. Conversely, on November 19, 2015, when DISA evaluated 

Level 3’s proposal, DISA knew that Level 3 could meet the required May 2, 2016 service date. 

Pl. Mem at 22 (citing AR Tab 23A, at 1067 (e-mail showing that the initial technical evaluation of 

Level 3’s offer was completed on November 19, 2015)). 

Second, with respect to the permit requirements, Standard Provision 27 of the Solicitation 

stated that, “inability of [a bidder] to obtain any [required] approval or permit shall not be a valid 

basis for not meeting the service date or providing service.” AR Tab 5, at 158. 

In response, Verizon stated that: 

Verizon Understands/Will Comply with the understanding that Verizon may be 

delayed through no fault of its own in securing any permits necessary or this project. 

Should such delay result in a delay of performance, the parties will work together 

to resolve the issue. Upon Verizon’s reasonable request, the Government may agree 

to grant an extension of time as may be reasonably necessary for Verizon to obtain 

such permits. The delay in performance shall be excused until such permit is 

granted.

AR Tab 12A, at 437 (emphasis added). As such, Verizon’s response did not comply with Standard 

Provision 27 of the Solicitation.

Third, with respect to the firm-fixed price requirement, Standard Provision 4 stated that: 

“All charges quoted shall be understood to be firm fixed prices for all the life of the contract. Firm 

fixed price quotes must account for all applicable charges (e.g., charges from Subcontractors or 

other Contractors/TPs, taxes, surcharges, universal service fund, fees, etc.), and these charges may 

not be billed separately.” AR Tab 5, at 156. Verizon’s offer, however, did not comply with the 

Solicitation, because its offer was qualified: “[i]n the event a new tax or similar charge arises or 

becomes applicable during the term and has a material impact on circuit costs, such an event would 

be beyond Verizon’s control and Verizon will work with the Government to revise contract rates 
14

to address the change.” AR Tab 12A, at 434. In short, Verizon’s failure to provide a firm, fixedprice offer renders Verizon’s offer unresponsive. See U.S. Security Associates, Inc. v. United 

States, 124 Fed. Cl. 433, 437 (2015) (“The offer tendered by [the bid protestor] cannot be accepted 

by the government without the addition of new terms. In the context of a fixed price procurement, 

that makes the protestor’s bid non-responsive and deprives it of standing to challenge the award.”).

Fourth, with respect to the Parameter Requirements, Article (M)(9)(C) of the Solicitation 

required that, in the case of outage, the contractor “shall provide preplanned restoral of the circuit 

in the event of failure within eight (8) hours. Maximum time to repair shall be 8 hours.” AR Tab 

5, at 178. But, Verizon’s offer insisted on including a force majeure clause that provided that:

Verizon shall not be liable for loss or damage . . . if such failure or delay of performance 

is due to causes beyond Verizon’s reasonable control . . . including . . . cable cuts . . . . Any 

delay resulting therefrom shall extend performance accordingly or excuse performance by 

Verizon in whole or in part, as may be reasonable. 

AR Tab 12A, at 425. 

Not only is this force majeure clause “impermissibly broad,” but it is significantly different 

from the analogous FAR provision. Pl. Mem. at 26 (citing FAR 52.249-14 (providing a clause to 

be inserted governing excusable delays, stating that “the Contractor shall not be in default because 

of any failure to perform this contract under its terms if the failure arises from causes beyond the 

control and without the fault or negligence of the Contract”)). 

In addition, DISA’s decision that Level 3’s offer was not “technically acceptable” was 

arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, for the following reasons. 

First, Level 3’s working path did not traverse Iran. AR Tab 5, at 153 (“No part of the 

working path service shall go through or touch Iran[.]”). Level 3’s offer expressly stated that 

“[w]orking path does not touch or go through Iran[.]” AR Tab 11A, at 397. And, Level 3’s offer 

expressly stated that “Level 3’s offer utilizes a working path that is identical to the current STM16(6Q6j) [i.e., the circuit then currently in use] from Camp Arifjan to Weisbaden.” AR Tab 11A, 

at 392 (emphasis added). 

DISA’s determination that Level 3’s path traversed Iran, however, appears to have been 

based solely on a map that depicted the entire length of Level 3’s circuit path from Germany to 

Kuwait. Because the scale of the map and the thickness of the line showing the circuit path, the 

map appears as though the circuit path touches the Iranian border. AR Tab 17 at 548 (Mar. 14, 

2016 Decl. of John Shuttleworth, Level 3’s Senior Director of Sales Engineers, stating that “given 

the scale of these maps, the width of the black line on the map is much wider than the actual cable 

line and represents a distance between twenty-five (25) and fifty (50) miles, whereas the right-ofway for the actual circuit is approximately fifty (50) feet”). Therefore, DISA’s reliance on the 

map, without regard to the written statement in Level 3’s offer was arbitrary, capricious, and abuse 

of discretion. Pl. Mem. 28. 
15

Second, DISA also found Level 3’s offer to be “technically unacceptable,” because Level 

3 did not submit the electronic .kmz files showing its routing map. But Standard Provision 39 of 

the Solicitation only required that bidders provide “as-built drawings” of “[r]oute maps for each 

link or span,” and that “[t]his documentation must be provided in electronic format.” AR Tab 5, at 

159. Standard Provision 39 also provided that, “Acceptable formats are Microsoft Office 

(PowerPoint, Word, and Excel), Visio, AutoCAD, and AdobePDF.” AR Tab 5, at 160. 

In addition, Standard Provision 39, also required that: 

path documentation shall be submitted with the quote for the Government to 

complete the evaluation . . . . Format for path documentation must either be .kmz 

or .kml routing maps depicting the physical route for the terrestrial segments at a 

sufficient level of detail to identify each central office or switching stations, cable 

heads, cable stations and the approximate routing for undersea cable segments.

AR Tab 5, at 160. 

Therefore, Standard Provision 39 required only that an offeror prepare the route maps in a 

.kmz format, and submit those documents in a Adobe .pdf format. Pl. Mem. at 30 (emphasis 

added). Nothing in Standard Provision 39 required that only .kmz format routing maps must be 

used to determine whether the route, at issue, avoided Iran. Pl. Mem. at 30. Instead, Standard 

Provision 39 stated that the .kmz maps were to be used to identify “the physical route for the 

terrestrial segments at a sufficient level of detail to identify each central office or switching 

stations, cable heads, cable stations and the approximate routing for undersea cable segments of 

the lease.” AR Tab 5, at 160 (emphasis added). Therefore, DISA’s reliance only on the routing 

map provided by Level 3 (in .pdf format) to determine whether the circuit traversed Iran, was 

arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. 

In addition, DISA also found that Level 3’s offer was “technically unacceptable,” because 

Level 3 did not provide evidence that its Turkish subcontractors were NALLA accredited. But, 

Standard Provision 8 provided that:

One or more end points of this circuit terminate in NATO countries that have 

National Long Line Agencies (NALLAs) and NALLA accredited 

Telecommunication Providers (TPs) . . . quotes shall provide evidence TP and all 

other subcontractor TPs possess required NALLA accreditations . . . for countries 

where this circuit terminates. Evidence of such NALLA accreditation . . . is a 

definitive responsibility criterion. 

AR Tab 5, at 156 (emphasis added). 

Level 3’s proposed circuit terminated in Germany, a NATO member, and in Kuwait, a 

country that is not a NATO member. Pl. Mem. at 32. Therefore, Level 3 provided evidence of 

NALLA accreditation for Germany. Pl. Mem. at 32. Although Level 3’s circuit did pass through 

Turkey, a NATO country, Standard Provision 8 required only that the offeror provide NALLA 

accreditation for the countries where the circuit terminated. Pl. Mem. at 31 (emphasis added). 
16

Level 3 complied with this requirement. Pl. Mem. at 32. Furthermore, the CO engaged in disparate 

treatment with respect to this provision, because the CO found Verizon’s offer “technically

acceptable,” when Verizon also did not provide evidence of NALLA accreditation for its Turkish 

subcontractor. Pl. Mem. at 32. 

Level 3 also argued that it had a NALLA accredited subcontractor in Turkey. Pl. Reply 

at 13. Standard Provision 8 required offerors to list “all subcontractors.” AR Tab 5, at 156. Level 

3 listed “all” of its subcontractors because 89 Degrees was the only subcontractor used by Level 

3. Pl. Reply at 13. Level 3’s subcontractor 89 Degrees in turn subcontracted with another 

company: Turkish Telecom, A.C. (“Turkish Telecom”), the same NALLA accredited TP for 

Turkey identified in Verizon’s offer. Pl. Reply at 13. Although Level 3’s offer did not state that 

89 Degrees had sub-subcontracted with Turkish Telecom, there was no requirement under the 

Solicitation to list “second-tier subcontractors.” Pl. Reply at 13. 

2. The Government’s Response. 

The Government responds that, Level 3’s offer included “three fatal errors,” so that 

DISA’s decision, finding Level 3’s offer was not “technically acceptable,” was not irrational, 

arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to applicable law. Gov’t Resp. at 7, 10. First, the map submitted 

by Level 3, as shown below, evidences that the circuit path crossed over into the Iranian border. 

Gov’t Resp. at 1011. Specifically, the image, shown below, and the region within the red circle 

shows the working path (the black line) coming into contact with the Iranian border (the yellow 

line): 

Gov’t Resp. at 11; see also AR Tab 11, at 392. 
17

Second, the Solicitation’s Standard Provision 39 required that Level 3 to submit Google 

Earth files, either in .kmz or .kml format:

Path documentation shall be submitted with the quote for the Government to 

complete the evaluation and its accuracy confirmed by the supplier prior to being 

considered for an award. Format for path documentation must either be .kmz or 

.kml routing maps depicting the physical route for the terrestrial segments . . . .

AR Tab 5, at 159–160 (emphasis added). 

Level 3’s argument that offerors should prepare maps in .kmz format and then submit them 

in .pdf format is “completely untenable.” Gov’t Resp. at 13. Although Standard Provision 39 

required path documentation to be “submitted,” Standard Provision 39 did not use the word 

“prepare” in connection with the .kmz files. Gov’t Resp. at 13. 

Third, Level 3 also was required to identify a NALLA accredited subcontractor for its route 

through Turkey. Gov’t Resp. at 14. But, Level 3 cites only part of Standard Provision 8 that 

states that, “quotes shall provide evidence [of] NALLA accreditations . . . for countries where this 

circuit terminates.” AR Tab 5, at 156. Level 3 ignores additional language that provided: “only 

TPs accredited by NALLAs of respective NATO countries will be eligible to receive an Order or 

Circuit Demand resulting from this Inquiry, for NATO Country portions of this circuit.” AR Tab 

5, at 156. Read together, these two parts of Standard Provision 8 require offerors to provide 

evidence of NALLA accreditation for their subcontractors at the place where the circuit 

terminated, and also list or identify NALLA subcontractors in all other NATO countries where the 

circuit traversed. Gov’t Resp. at 15. Instead, Level 3 provided evidence of NALLA accreditation 

for itself and its German subcontractor, but failed to identify a NALLA accredited subcontractor 

for Turkey. Gov’t Resp. at 15. 

Although Verizon also failed to provide evidence of NALLA accreditation for its Turkish 

subcontractor, Verizon was only required to identify a NALLA subcontractor for Turkey. Gov’t 

Resp. at 15 (emphasis added).13 Therefore, DISA did not engage in disparate treatment with regard 

to Level 3’s offer. 

In response to the additional argument that Level 3 listed “all” of its subcontractors, as 

required by Standard Provision 8, the Government contends that “all” means “all,” and that Level 

3 was required to list not only its first-tier subcontractor, 89 Degrees, but also all secondary 

subcontractors. Gov’t Reply at 6. 

In addition, DISA properly evaluated Verizon’s offer and its decision to award the contract 

to Verizon was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Govt. Resp. at 6. First, none of the 

“so-called exceptions” identified by Level 3 were included in the circuit demand order issued by 

the Government after the award was made. Gov’t Resp. at 16. In fact, the exceptions included in 

 

13 Verizon’s offer names Turkish Telecom A.C. (“Turkish Telecom”) as its subcontractor 

for Turkey and Turkish Telecom is the only NALLA accredited subcontractor in Turkey. Gov’t 

Resp. at 15. 
18

Verizon’s offer simply restate terms included in Verizon’s basic ordering agreement with DISA,

14

and did not materially alter the rights and obligations of the parties. Gov’t Resp. at 18. But, even 

assuming arguendo that the exceptions differed from the rights and obligations incorporated in the 

basic agreement, they were “minor informalities or irregularities,” and, under section 14.405 of 

the FAR,

15 “can be corrected or waived without being prejudicial to other bidders.” Gov’t Resp. 

at 17 (citing FAR 14.405)). 

With respect to Level 3’s contention that Verizon could not meet the required service date, 

Verizon’s offer stated that it could provide the circuit by the May 2, 2016 service date, if the award 

was received by December 4, 2015. AR Tab 21B, at 1017. Level 3’s bid included similar language 

stating that Level 3 needed 60 days of lead time and could meet the May 2, 2016 service date only 

if award was received 60 days prior to May 2, 2016. AR Tab 11, at 345. 

 

14 FAR 16.703(a) provides: 

A basic ordering agreement is a written instrument of understanding, negotiated 

between an agency, contracting activity, or contracting office and a contractor that 

contains (1) terms and clauses applying to future contracts (orders) between the 

parties during its term, (2) a description, as specific as practicable, of supplies or 

services to be provided, and (3) methods for pricing, issuing, and delivering future 

orders under the basic ordering agreement. A basic ordering agreement is not a 

contract.

48 C.F.R. § 16.703(a). 

A basic ordering agreement incorporates clauses into the individual orders issued to 

successful bidders. FAR 16.703(a). Both Verizon and Level 3 entered into basic ordering 

agreements with DISA’s Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization (“DITCO”). 

AR Tab 1, at 1 (Verizon Basic Ordering Agreement); AR Tab 3, at 115 (Level 3 Communications 

Basic Ordering Agreement). Standard Provision 1 of the Solicitation required offerors to have 

entered into a basic ordering agreement with DITCO. AR Tab 5, at 155. 

15 FAR 14.405 provides: 

A minor informality or irregularity is one that is merely a matter of form and not of 

substance. It also pertains to some immaterial defect in a bid or variation of a bid 

from the exact requirements of the invitation that can be corrected or waived 

without being prejudicial to other bidders. The defect or variation is immaterial 

when the effect on price, quantity, quality, or delivery is negligible when contrasted 

with the total cost or scope of the supplies or services being acquired. The 

contracting officer either shall give the bidder an opportunity to cure any deficiency 

resulting from a minor informality or irregularity in a bid or waive the deficiency, 

whichever is to the advantage of the Government.

48 C.F.R. § 14.405 (emphasis added). 
19

With respect to Level 3’s contention that Verizon improperly took exception to the permit 

requirements, Verizon stated that it would comply with the requirement. AR Tab 21, at 1025 

(stating that Verizon “Understands/Will Comply” with Standard Provision 27’s permit 

requirement). In addition, Verizon clarified that “[u]pon Verizon’s reasonable request, the 

Government may agree to grant an extension of time as may be reasonably necessary to obtain 

such permits” and that “the delay in performance shall be excused until such permit is granted.” 

AR Tab 21, at 1025 (emphasis added). But, this was not a material exception to the Solicitation’s 

terms, because Verizon did not demand a right to an extension; it only allowed DISA the option 

of agreeing to allow a requested extension. Gov’t Resp. at 19.

With respect to Level 3’s contention that Verizon failed to provide a firm-fixed price as 

required by the Solicitation, Verizon’s bid stated that, “Verizon will work with the Government to 

revise contract rates,” if a new tax or similar charge arises that has a material impact on circuit 

costs. AR Tab 21, at 1022. This repeated the basic ordering agreement that incorporated Defense 

Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (“DFARS”) clauses 252.239-700516 and 252.239-

7006.17 

With respect to Level 3’s contention that Verizon took exception to the terms of the 

Solicitation by the insertion of the force majeure clause, that addition restated the excusable delay 

clause that is incorporated into the IQO process through the basic ordering agreement between 

DISA and Verizon. AR Tab 1, at 20 (basic ordering agreement providing that “[t]he Contractor 

 

16

 DFARS 252.239-7005(b)(1) provides that “[t]he Contractor shall furnish the services 

and facilities under this agreement/contract in accordance with . . . [a]ll applicable tariffs, rates, 

charges, rules, regulations, or requirements.” 48 C.F.R. § 252.239-7005(b)(1). 

17 DFARS 252.239-7006 provides: 

(a) The Contractor shall provide to the Contracting Officer —

(1) Upon request, a copy of the Contractor’s current existing tariffs 

(including changes);

(2) Before filing, any application to a Federal, State, or any other regulatory 

agency for new or changes to, rates, charges, services, or regulations 

relating to any tariff or any of the facilities or services to be furnished solely 

or primarily to the Government; and

(3) Upon request, a copy of all information, material, and data developed or 

prepared in support of or in connection with an application under paragraph 

(a)(2) of this clause.

(b) The Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer of any application that 

anyone other than the Contractor files with a governmental regulatory body which 

affects or will affect the rate or conditions of services under this agreement/contract. 

These requirements also apply to applications pending on the effective date of this 

agreement/contract.

48 C.F.R. § 252.239-7006. 
20

shall be liable for default unless nonperformance is caused by the occurrence beyond the 

reasonable control of the Contractor”). The “cable cuts” identified by Verizon in its force majeure 

clause would be an occurrence beyond Verizon’s reasonable control. AR Tab 1, at 20. 

Furthermore, Level 3’s basic ordering agreement incorporated FAR 52.212-4(f)18 by reference, an 

analogous provision that relieved Level 3 of responsibility for excusable delays. AR Tab 3, at 119 

(listing § 52.212-4 as one of the clauses incorporated by reference). 

3. Verizon Deutschland GmbH’s Response.

Verizon adds that Level 3’s protest fails to meaningfully address the applicable standard 

of review and instead seeks to have the United States Court of Federal Claims to sit as a super 

evaluation panel to select the awardee. D.I. Resp. at 1. “This is not the role of the [c]ourt or the 

bid protest process.” D.I. Resp. at 1. Instead, the court must review whether the agency complied 

with procurement laws and the Inquiry Quote Order terms. D.I. Resp. 1. 

Level 3 has a “heavy burden” to establish that DISA’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or 

contrary to law. D.I. Resp. at 2. Specifically, Level 3 must demonstrate that DISA’s actions lacked 

a “rational basis.” See Sys. Application & Techs., Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 687, 717 

(2011) (“[T]he court will not disturb the ratings assigned by the agency absent a showing that they 

have no rational basis.”). Level 3’s arguments, however, are tantamount to a “mere disagreement 

with the subjective judgment of the agency evaluators.” D.I. Resp. at 2. Therefore, Level 3’s 

protest should be denied. 

4. The Court’s Resolution. 

a. The Contracting Officer’s Decision Not To Seek A 

“Clarification” From Level 3 Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And 

An Abuse Of Discretion. 

Level 3’s September 29, 2016 Amended Complaint alleges that the CO violated FAR 

15.101-2 and 15.306(a), by failing to seek a “clarification” from Level 3 regarding the lack of a 

 

18 FAR 52.212-4(f) provides: 

Excusable delays. The Contractor shall be liable for default unless nonperformance 

is caused by an occurrence beyond the reasonable control of the Contractor and 

without its fault or negligence such as, acts of God or the public enemy, acts of the 

Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, 

quarantine restrictions, strikes, unusually severe weather, and delays of common 

carriers. The Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer in writing as soon as it 

is reasonably possible after the commencement of any excusable delay, setting forth 

the full particulars in connection therewith, shall remedy such occurrence with all 

reasonable dispatch, and shall promptly give written notice to the Contracting 

Officer of the cessation of such occurrence.

48 C.F.R. § 52.212-4. 
21

.kmz routing map, and determining that Level 3’s working path traversed Iran, although Level 3’s 

written statement was to the contrary. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 107, 115.19 

FAR 15.101-2 regulates the lowest price “technically acceptable” source selection process, 

i.e., the process used in this case. AR Tab 5, at 150 (“[T]he Government will first evaluate the 

lowest price quote. If the lowest price quote is determined to be technically acceptable and 

otherwise properly awardable, no further evaluation will be conducted, and award will be made.”). 

FAR 15.101-2(b)(4) provides that “exchanges [between the CO and the offeror] may occur,” 

pursuant to FAR 15.306. 

If the CO enters into “discussions,” i.e., “[n]egotiations . . . between the Government and 

offerors, that are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to revise its proposal . . . [that] 

take place after establishment of the competitive range,” they must be conducted with all the 

offerors within the competitive range. FAR 15.306(d). But, FAR 15.306(a)(1)-(2) allows the CO 

to seek a “clarification” from offerors, without initiation of “discussions.” In contrast, 

“clarifications” are defined as “limited exchanges, between the government and offerors that may 

occur when award without discussions is contemplated.” FAR 15.306(a)(1) (emphasis added).20 

“Clarifications” allow offerors “the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of proposals (e.g., the 

relevance of an offeror's past performance information and adverse past performance information 

to which the offeror has not previously had an opportunity to respond) or to resolve minor or 

clerical errors.” FAR 15.306(a)(2). 

FAR 15.306(a)(2) clearly differentiates “discussions” from “clarifications,” i.e.,

negotiations that lead to changes to the proposal. The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit has explained that it is “clear that discussions are more substantial communications 

than minor clarifications.” Information Tech. & App. Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1320 

 

19 Level 3 also argues that the Solicitation did not require them to submit .kmz files in the 

first place, and that Standard Provision 39 instead required them to prepare the route maps in 

.kmz format but then submit them in .pdf format. Pl. Mem. at 30. This argument, however, is 

contrary to Standard Provision 39, that provided: “path documentation shall be submitted with 

the quote for the Government to complete the evaluation” and that “[f]ormat for path 

documentation must be either .kmz or .kml routing maps.” AR Tab 5, at 160. 

20 The definition of “clarification” is the result of an amendment made to the FAR in 1997. 

See 62 FED. REG. 51,224 (Sept. 30, 1997); see also Information Tech. & App. Corp. v. United 

States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing the regulatory history of FAR 

15.306(a)(2) and holding that communications for the purpose of obtaining the past-performance 

history of subcontractors listed in offeror’s proposal were “clarifications”). This amendment was 

enacted to “[s]upport[ ] more open exchanges between the Government and industry, allowing 

industry to better understand the [Solicitation] and the Government to better understand industry 

proposals.” 62 FED. REG. 51,224 (Sept. 30, 1997). This is reflected in the new definition of 

“clarification:” “[w]e drafted the rule to allow as much free exchange of information between 

offerors and the Government as possible, while still permitting award without discussions and 

complying with applicable statutes.” Id. at 51, 228–29. 
22

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, “there is no requirement in the regulation 

that a clarification not be essential for evaluation of the proposal.” Id. at 1323 (emphasis added). 

In fact, “‘clarifications’ by [an] offeror could lead to an increase in [the offeror’s] past performance 

score or perhaps tilt the award in its favor.” Id. (quoting John S. Pachter et al., “The FAR Part 15 

Rewrite,” 98-05 Briefing Papers 1, 6 (1998)) (emphasis added). In other words, “clarifications”

are deemed information exchanges that do not alter the terms of the offer, but can be determinative 

in the evaluation process. 

In this case, an inquiry about the absence of .kmz files in Level 3’s offer would be a 

“clarification,” not a “discussion.” Submission of the .kmz files would not have varied the terms 

of Level 3’s offer, because the written offer expressly stated that Level 3’s proposed circuit would 

follow the same paths used in the current circuit maintained by Level 3 and that Level 3’s working 

path did not traverse Iran. AR Tab 11, at 392 (“Level 3’s proposal utilizes a working path that is

identical to the current [path] from Camp Arifjan to Wiesbaden.”), 397 (“Working path does not 

touch or go through Iran[.]”). Asking for submission of the .kmz file would allow the CO to 

confirm Level 3’s proposal. See 62 FED. REG. 51, 228 (Sept. 30, 1997). For this reason, a TET

Member recommended a “clarification,” by asking the Contracting Specialist to request a .kmz 

file from Level 3: 

There are gaps in the diagrams between Stara Zagora, Bulgaria, and Budapest, Hungary 

and Ivancice, Czech Republic. Please ask the offeror to provide the detailed routing 

.kmz/.kml file. The file should provide a more detailed routing between Bulgaria and 

Hungary as well as the routing between Hungary and Czech Republic. 

AR Tab 20, at 912 (emphasis added). 

Although FAR 15.036 is permissively worded,

21 the United States Court of Federal Claims 

has determined that a CO’s decision not to seek “clarifications” can constitute an abuse of 

discretion under certain circumstances. See BCPeabody Construction Services, Inc. v. United 

States, 112 Fed. Cl. 502, 512 (2013) (Lettow, J.). In BCPeabody, the United States Army Corps 

of Engineers issued a solicitation utilizing the “lowest price technically acceptable source selection 

process,” under FAR 15.101-2, i.e., the same evaluation process utilized by the Solicitation in this 

case. Id. at 505. The protestor submitted an offer deemed technically unacceptable, because the 

offer failed to include a “project information sheet” detailing the past performance of one of 

protestor’s subcontractors. Id. at 505–06. The protestor, however, also quoted a price that was 

more than $1,000,000 less than the price of the offer selected for award. Id. at 506. The court 

determined that the protestor’s failure to include the project information sheet was not a “major 

omission that made it impossible to fully evaluate [the] proposal,” but was a clerical error that 

could have been corrected by seeking a “clarification.” Id. at 512–13. The court concluded that 

“[g]iven [the protestor’s] significantly lower bid, the contractor officer had virtually overwhelming 

cause to [seek a “clarification”],” and that the failure to seek a “clarification” was a prejudicial 

abuse of discretion. Id. at 512 (emphasis added). 

 

21 “Clarifications are limited exchanges, between the Government and offerors that may 

occur when award without discussions is contemplated.” FAR 15.306 (emphasis added). 
23

Like the omission of the pricing information sheet in BCPeabody, the omission of the .kmz 

file in this case was an oversight that easily could have been corrected. It was not a major omission 

that made it impossible to fully evaluate Level 3’s proposal. Although Level 3’s low definition 

.pdf maps made it appear that Level 3’s working path touched Iran, the court notes that DISA 

approved of the working path when they awarded Level 3 the initial contract. AR Tab 20, at 826 

(“Level 3’s proposal utilizes a working path that is identical to the current STM-16 (6Q6J) from 

Camp Arifjan to Wiesbaden.”). That fact together with Level 3’s written representation that the 

path did not touch Iran and the proposed working path would follow the same path as the circuit 

currently provided by Level 3, evidence that the CO’s decision not to seek a “clarification” was 

arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. AR Tab 11, at 392, 397. 

In this case, as in BCPeabody, the CO had “virtually overwhelming cause” to seek 

clarification from Level 3, because of its “significantly lower” price. The price difference in 

BCPeabody was more than $1 million; in this case; the difference in this case is approximately 

$38.6 million. 

For these reasons, the court has determined that the CO’s decision not to seek a 

“clarification” regarding the .kmz routing map, in light of Level 3’s written statement was 

arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 

b. The Contracting Officer’s Decision Regarding NALLA 

Accreditation Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And An Abuse Of 

Discretion. 

The CO found that Level 3’s offer was “technically unacceptable,” because it did not 

provide a NALLA accredited subcontractor for the nation of Turkey, as required by Standard 

Provision 8 of the Solicitation. AR Tab 20, at 962 (“Straight line diagram on page 54 identifies 

subvendor NT in Turkey, but the proposal does not state that the NT is NALLA accredited s 

required in Standard Provision 8.”). 

Standard Provision 8 of the Solicitation provided: 

One or more end points of this circuit terminate in NATO countries that have 

National Long Lines Agencies (NALLAs) and NALLA accredited 

Telecommunication Providers (TPs). As a member and signatory in North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. Department of Defense acquires its military 

telecommunication services in accordance with NATO requirements specified in 

Alliance Long Lines Activity (ALLA) handbook. Therefore, only TPs accredited 

by NALLAs of respective NATO countries will be eligible to receive any Order or 

Circuit Demand resulting from this Inquiry, for NATO country portions of this 

circuit. Additionally, only NALLA accredited TPs can be used as subcontractor

TP in NATO countries. In NATO countries having no NALLA and/or NALLA 

accredited TP, quotes from TPs possessing authorization to provide communication 

services from appropriate national authority will be considered. Quotes shall 

identify portions of service that will be provided using TP's own facilities as well 

as those that will be provided by subcontractor TPs, and shall identify all 

subcontractor TPs. Additionally, quotes shall provide evidence TP and all 
24

subcontractor TPs possess required NALLA accreditations or national authority 

authorizations for countries where this circuit terminates. Evidence of such 

NALLA accreditation and national authority authorizations for TP and all 

subcontractor TPs is a definitive responsibility criterion. 

ACCEPTABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDER (TP) RESPONSE: 

“UNDERSTAND,” and identify all portions of service provided by TP and all 

portions of the service provided by subcontractor TPs, plus provide evidence that 

TP and all subcontractor TPs possess required NALLA accreditations and national 

authority authorizations. 

AR Tab 5, at 156.

The interpretation of a solicitation is a question of law. See NVT Techs., Inc. v. United 

States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The interpretation of a contract or solicitation is a 

question of law which we review de novo.”). Determining the ambiguity of a solicitation is 

likewise a question of law. Id. (citing Cmty. Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 

1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The court begins with the plain language of the solicitation. See Banknote 

Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And, the court must 

consider the solicitation as a whole and interpret it in a “manner that harmonizes and gives 

reasonable meaning to all of its provisions.” Id.

The plain language of Standard Provision 8 of the Solicitation requires an offeror to provide

evidence of NALLA accreditation for the offeror and all subcontractor TPs that would be working 

in NATO countries or, alternatively, provide national authority authorization where NALLA does 

not apply, i.e., in NATO countries that do not have NALLA accredited TPs. Standard Provision 

8 states that “only NALLA accredited TPs can be used as subcontractor TP in NATO countries,” 

and the text regarding “Acceptable Response” also states that an offeror is to “provide evidence 

that [the offeror] and all subcontractor TPs possess required NALLA accreditations and national 

security authorizations.” AR Tab 5, at 156 (emphasis added).

Level 3 provided evidence of NALLA accreditation by citing to a NALLA website listing 

Level 3 and Interoute Germany GmbH—the subcontractor Level 3 had selected for Germany—as 

NALLA accredited. AR Tab 20, at 837. But, Level 3 did not provide evidence that NT and 89

Degrees—the subcontractors it selected for Turkey—had NALLA accreditation. AR Tab 20, at 

830 (combined working path and protect path diagrams showing NT as the TP for Turkish portion 

of route); AR Tab 20, at 831 (working path diagram showing NT and 89 Degrees as subcontractors 

for Turkish portion of route). But, Verizon also failed to meet this requirement, since Verizon’s 

offer listed Turkish Telecom as its subcontractor for Turkey, but did not provide any evidence that 

Turkish Telecom was NALLA accredited, nor did Verizon’s offer state that Turkish Telecom was 

NALLA accredited.

22

 AR Tab 12A, at 422, 435 (providing Turkish Telecom as Verizon’s 

 

22 The CO and the administrative staff reviewed the NALLA interface and determined that 

Turkish Telecom was the only NALLA accredited TP for Turkey. AR Tab 20, at 568 (April 13, 

2016 Agency Report to GAO). But, this does not change the fact that Verizon failed to evidence 

NALLA accreditation with its offer. 
25

subcontractor TP for Turkey). Verizon also failed to include evidence of NALLA accreditation 

where the working path terminated. Verizon’s working path diagram shows that the terminating 

portions of the circuit in Germany are provided by Deutsche Telekom (“DT”). AR Tab 12A at 

422. Verizon’s answer to Standard Provision 8 includes the statement that “Verizon and Deutsche 

Telekom are NALLA accredited in Germany.” AR Tab 12A, at 435. But, this statement is not 

“evidence” of NALLA accreditation. 

Because both Verizon and Level 3 did not comply with Standard Provision 8, the CO

engaged in disparate treatment when Verizon was found to be “technically acceptable,” but Level 

3 was not. As such, the CO’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.

c. The Contracting Officer’s Decision Not To Conduct 

Negotiations With Offerors Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And 

An Abuse Of Discretion.

COs “are entitled to exercise discretion upon a broad range of issues confronting them in 

the procurement process.” Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 

F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, as a matter of law, if the CO’s decision reflects “rational 

reasoning and consideration of relevant factors,” the court is required to defer to the CO’s decision, 

even if it is one the court would have determined differently. See Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United 

States, 595 F.3d 1232, 1286 (“[W]e must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince 

rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors”) (internal quotations omitted); see 

also Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“If the court finds a 

reasonable basis for the agency's [procurement decision], the court should stay its hand even 

though it might, as an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion [.]”) Nevertheless, 

the court must be “enabled to perform reasonable review within the within the strictures of the 

APA.” In re Sang Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, an agency violates the APA when it

“entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 

decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [the decision] is so implausible 

that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor 

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (emphasis added). 

In this case, the CO failed to consider an “important aspect of the problem:” the fact that 

Level 3’s offer was approximately $38.6 million23 less than Verizon’s. Under these circumstances, 

the CO should have entered into negotiations with offerors, since Standard Provision 24 expressly 

reserves that right. AR Tab 5, at 158. 

Nominally, DISA was interested in getting the new telecommunication line up and running 

as soon as possible, but DISA revised the service date from November 30, 2015 to May 2, 2016.

But, DISA awarded the contract to Verizon with knowledge that Verizon could not meet the May 

2, 2016 service date, because of the required 150 day lead time. AR Tab 7, at 271 (amendment to 

 

23 Level 3 quoted a price of $60,128.000.00; Verizon quoted a price of $98,664,800.00. 

AR Tab 14, at 498. The difference between the two price quotes is $38,536,800. 
26

the required service date from November 30, 2016 to May 2, 2016); AR Tab 21B, at 1017 

(Verizon’s offer providing 150 days of lead time). Therefore, the essence of time was not a 

dispositive factor preventing negotiations to obtain the best value for the agency. 

During the hearing on the parties’ Cross-Motions For Judgment On The Administrative 

Record, the court asked why the Government did not seek any “clarification,” about the concerns 

raised between the map and Level 3’s written representations and past performance, in light of the 

$38.6 million difference between Level 3’s and Verizon’s offers: 

THE COURT: The Government awarded a contract to Verizon, which was $30 

million more than the people who had been doing the job --

[THE GOVERNMENT]: That’s correct.

THE COURT: -- based on the map. And no one bothered to think about picking up 

the phone and saying hmm, hmm -- as my grandson [Roark] would say -- I wonder 

if there’s a problem with the map? Or was something else going on?

9/15/16 TR at 25. 

In a recent article, Professor Ralph C. Nash described the CO’s decision in this case to 

award the contract to Verizon as “egregious,” and, in analyzing the GAO’s June 21, 2016 decision 

denying Level 3’s protest, observed that: 

We certainly agree with the GAO that it is an offeror’s responsibility to submit a 

perfect proposal or quotation and that it deserves to be punished for not doing so

. . . . However, we don’t agree that the Government should also be punished when 

this happens. This is especially true when the punishment costs the taxpayers 

multimillions of dollars. Our complaint here is with the Contracting Officer that 

concluded that there was no need for discussions with these two offerors . . . . Such 

a step would have taken a week or two but would have saved U.S. taxpayers 

millions of dollars. . . . Our current competitive negotiation process constitutes a 

critiquing of proposal language, not an endeavor to negotiate the best deal for the 

Government. If we were trying to make up a scenario to illustrate this point, we 

would have never come up with as clear an example as Level 3.

Vernon J. Edwards and Ralph C. Nash, “Our Competitive Process: It’s Expensive!,” 30 No. 9 Nash 

& Cibinic Rep. ¶ 48 (Sept. 2016). 

Under these circumstances, the court has determined that the CO’s decision not to enter 

into negotiations in light of the significant price disparity was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse 

of discretion. 

E. Level 3 Communications, LLC Is Entitled To Injunctive Relief. 

To determine if an injunction is warranted, the court must consider whether: “(1) the 

plaintiff has succeeded on the merits, (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the court 

withholds injunctive relief, (3) the balance of hardships to the respective parties favors the grant 
27

of injunctive relief, and (4) the public interest is served by a grant of injunctive relief.” Centech 

Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also FMC Corp. v. United 

States, 3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“No one factor, taken individually, is necessarily 

dispositive . . . . [T]he weakness of the showing regarding one factor may be overborne by the 

strength of others.”) (emphasis in original); see also RCFC 65(a).

With respect to success on the merits, Level 3 has met its burden of demonstrating that the 

CO’s technical evaluation and subsequent award decisions was contrary to law and/or was

arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 

With respect to irreparable harm, Level 3 has already suffered irreparable harm in the form 

of a lost opportunity to fairly compete for the contract. See PGBA, LLC v. United States, 57 Fed.

Cl. 655, 664 (2003) (“This court has acknowledged that a lost opportunity to compete may

constitute an irreparable harm[.]”). In addition, because the Government already owes Verizon 

$2,9540,400 for set up costs and the first month of performance, Level 3 has also been deprived 

of potential profits. See Hosp. Klean of Tex., Inc. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 618, 624 (2005) 

(“Here, absent injunctive relief, [the protester] will lose the opportunity to earn the profit it would 

have made under this contract.”). This injury also constitutes irreparable harm. See Furniture by 

Thurston v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 505, 520 (2012) (“The court has repeatedly held that the 

‘the lost potential profits’ from a government contract constitutes irreparable harm.”). 

With respect to the balance of the hardships, Verizon would suffer economic hardship if 

the contract award is rescinded, but Level 3 would suffer a greater hardship if it is awarded only 

bid preparation costs and is not given a chance to fully and fairly compete. The Government also 

argues that “more bandwidth is critically needed” to support DISA’s military activities in the 

Middle East, and that the Government would be harmed by the delay if DISA was required to 

reevaluate proposals. Gov’t Resp. at 25–26; Gov’t Reply at 15–16. But, the administrative record 

demonstrates that DISA has already allowed the service date to be extended from November 30, 

2015 to May 2, 2016, and that DISA awarded the contract to Verizon with knowledge that Verizon 

could not meet the May 2, 2016 service date due to its 150 day lead time. AR Tab 7, at 271 

(amendment to the required service date from November 30, 2015 to May 2, 2016); AR Tab 21B, 

at 1017 (Verizon’s offer providing 150 days of lead time). In other words, although the additional 

bandwidth provided under the contract is important to the Government, DISA’s past conduct 

indicates that timeliness is not a critical component of this procurement. 

With respect to the public interest, the court has determined that the public interest is best 

served when the Government complies with procurement statutes and the FAR, and when the 

contracting officer exercises discretion to obtain a best value for the agency. 

IV. CONCLUSION.

For reasons discussed herein, Level 3’s Motion For Judgment On The Administrative 

Record is granted. The Government’s and Verizon’s Motions For Judgment On The 

Administrative Record are denied. All other pending motions are dismissed as moot. 

The Defense Information Systems Agency is enjoined from allowing Verizon Deutschland 

GmbH to continue performance under the Circuit Demand IQO Contract, No. HC1021-16-M-
28

0012, or any other procurement contract or vehicle associated with this bid protest. This 

procurement is remanded to the Defense Information Systems Agency for six months to determine 

whether to issue a new Solicitation or otherwise correct the deficiencies identified herein. During 

that time, the Government will provide the court with a report on the status of the remand every 

90 days. See RCFC 52.2. 

Level 3 is awarded bid preparation costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2); see also RCFC 

54(d)(1). 

On or before January 3, 2017, the Government is advised to show cause why the 

Government’s written and oral representations to the court that performance of the contract with 

Verizon would not commence until December 1, 2016 does not violate RCFC 11(b). 

In addition, the court hereby orders the Defense Information Systems Agency promptly to 

provide all pleadings, the Administrative Record, and all Memorandum Opinion and Orders in this 

case to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for investigation into why the 

Contracting Officer awarded the contract at issue to Verizon at a price of $38.6 million more than 

the incumbent contractor and proceeded to commence performance contrary to written and oral 

representations to the court – and prior to the November 8, 2016 election.

In that regard, the court also intends to forward the public record in this case to the Senate 

Armed Services Committee for such oversight as it deems appropriate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Susan G. Braden

SUSAN G. BRADEN

Judge
i

COURT APPENDIX:

CERTAIN RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

5 U.S.C. § 706 provides:

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 

relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the 

meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be--

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 

statutory right;

(D) without observance of procedure required by law;

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557

of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 

statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo 

by the reviewing court.

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of 

it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

5 U.S.C. § 706. 

10 U.S.C. § 2305(b), in relevant part, provides that:

(b)(1) The head of an agency shall evaluate sealed bids and competitive proposals 

and make an award based solely on the factors specified in the solicitation.

* * *

(4)(A) The head of an agency shall evaluate competitive proposals in accordance 

with paragraph (1) and may award a contract—
ii

(i) after discussions with the offerors, provided that written or oral 

discussions have been conducted with all responsible offerors who submit 

proposals within the competitive range; or

(ii) based on the proposals received, without discussions with the offerors 

(other than discussions conducted for the purpose of minor clarification) 

provided that the solicitation included a statement that proposals are 

intended to be evaluated, and award made, without discussions, unless 

discussions are determined to be necessary.

10 U.S.C. § 2305(b). 

FAR 15.101-2, under the heading “Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Source Selection 

Process,” provides: 

(a) The lowest price technically acceptable source selection process is appropriate when 

best value is expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with 

the lowest evaluated price.

(b) When using the lowest price technically acceptable process, the following apply:

(1) The evaluation factors and significant subfactors that establish the requirements 

of acceptability shall be set forth in the solicitation. Solicitations shall specify that 

award will be made on the basis of the lowest evaluated price of proposals meeting 

or exceeding the acceptability standards for non-cost factors. If the contracting 

officer documents the file pursuant to 15.304(c)(3)(iii), past performance need not 

be an evaluation factor in lowest price technically acceptable source selections. If 

the contracting officer elects to consider past performance as an evaluation factor, 

it shall be evaluated in accordance with 15.305. However, the comparative 

assessment in 15.305(a)(2)(i) does not apply. If the contracting officer determines 

that a small business' past performance is not acceptable, the matter shall be referred 

to the Small Business Administration for a Certificate of Competency 

determination, in accordance with the procedures contained in subpart 19.6 and 15 

U.S.C. 637(b)(7)).

(2) Tradeoffs are not permitted.

(3) Proposals are evaluated for acceptability but not ranked using the non-cost/price 

factors.

(4) Exchanges may occur (see 15.306).

48 C.F.R. § 15.101-2
iii

FAR 15.305(a), under the heading “Proposal Evaluation,” provides: 

Proposal evaluation is an assessment of the proposal and the offeror's ability to 

perform the prospective contract successfully. An agency shall evaluate 

competitive proposals and then assess their relative qualities solely on the factors 

and subfactors specified in the solicitation. Evaluations may be conducted using 

any rating method or combination of methods, including color or adjectival ratings, 

numerical weights, and ordinal rankings. The relative strengths, deficiencies, 

significant weaknesses, and risks supporting proposal evaluation shall be 

documented in the contract file.

48 C.F.R. § 15.305(a).

FAR 15.306, under the heading “Exchanges With Offerors After Receipt Of Proposals,” provides: 

(a) Clarifications and award without discussions.

(1) Clarifications are limited exchanges, between the Government and offerors, 

that may occur when award without discussions is contemplated.

(2) If award will be made without conducting discussions, offerors may be given 

the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of proposals (e.g., the relevance of an 

offeror's past performance information and adverse past performance information 

to which the offeror has not previously had an opportunity to respond) or to 

resolve minor or clerical errors.

(3) Award may be made without discussions if the solicitation states that the 

Government intends to evaluate proposals and make award without discussions. If 

the solicitation contains such a notice and the Government determines it is 

necessary to conduct discussions, the rationale for doing so shall be documented 

in the contract file (see the provision at 52.215–1) (10 U.S.C. 2305(b)(4)(A)(ii) 

and 41 U.S.C. 3703(a)(2)).

(b) Communications with offerors before establishment of the competitive range. 

Communications are exchanges, between the Government and offerors, after receipt of 

proposals, leading to establishment of the competitive range. If a competitive range is to 

be established, these communications—

(1) Shall be limited to the offerors described in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) 

of this section and—
iv

(i) Shall be held with offerors whose past performance information is the 

determining factor preventing them from being placed within the 

competitive range. Such communications shall address adverse past 

performance information to which an offeror has not had a prior 

opportunity to respond; and

(ii) May only be held with those offerors (other than offerors under 

paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section) whose exclusion from, or inclusion in, 

the competitive range is uncertain;

(2) May be conducted to enhance Government understanding of proposals; allow 

reasonable interpretation of the proposal; or facilitate the Government's evaluation 

process. Such communications shall not be used to cure proposal deficiencies or 

material omissions, materially alter the technical or cost elements of the proposal, 

and/or otherwise revise the proposal. Such communications may be considered in 

rating proposals for the purpose of establishing the competitive range;

(3) Are for the purpose of addressing issues that must be explored to determine 

whether a proposal should be placed in the competitive range. Such 

communications shall not provide an opportunity for the offeror to revise its 

proposal, but may address—

(i) Ambiguities in the proposal or other concerns (e.g., perceived 

deficiencies, weaknesses, errors, omissions, or mistakes (see 14.407)); and

(ii) Information relating to relevant past performance; and

(4) Shall address adverse past performance information to which the offeror has 

not previously had an opportunity to comment.

(c) Competitive range.

(1) Agencies shall evaluate all proposals in accordance with 15.305(a), and, if 

discussions are to be conducted, establish the competitive range. Based on the 

ratings of each proposal against all evaluation criteria, the contracting officer shall 

establish a competitive range comprised of all of the most highly rated proposals, 

unless the range is further reduced for purposes of efficiency pursuant to 

paragraph (c)(2) of this section.

(2) After evaluating all proposals in accordance with 15.305(a) and paragraph 

(c)(1) of this section, the contracting officer may determine that the number of 

most highly rated proposals that might otherwise be included in the competitive 

range exceeds the number at which an efficient competition can be conducted. 

Provided the solicitation notifies offerors that the competitive range can be 
v

limited for purposes of efficiency (see 52.215–1(f)(4)), the contracting officer 

may limit the number of proposals in the competitive range to the greatest number 

that will permit an efficient competition among the most highly rated proposals 

(10 U.S.C. 2305(b)(4) and 41 U.S.C. 3703).

(3) If the contracting officer, after complying with paragraph (d)(3) of this 

section, decides that an offeror's proposal should no longer be included in the 

competitive range, the proposal shall be eliminated from consideration for award. 

Written notice of this decision shall be provided to unsuccessful offerors in 

accordance with 15.503.

(4) Offerors excluded or otherwise eliminated from the competitive range may 

request a debriefing (see 15.505 and 15.506).

(d) Exchanges with offerors after establishment of the competitive range. Negotiations 

are exchanges, in either a competitive or sole source environment, between the 

Government and offerors, that are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to 

revise its proposal. These negotiations may include bargaining. Bargaining includes 

persuasion, alteration of assumptions and positions, give-and-take, and may apply to 

price, schedule, technical requirements, type of contract, or other terms of a proposed 

contract. When negotiations are conducted in a competitive acquisition, they take place 

after establishment of the competitive range and are called discussions.

(1) Discussions are tailored to each offeror's proposal, and must be conducted by 

the contracting officer with each offeror within the competitive range.

(2) The primary objective of discussions is to maximize the Government's ability 

to obtain best value, based on the requirement and the evaluation factors set forth 

in the solicitation.

(3) At a minimum, the contracting officer must, subject to paragraphs (d)(5) and 

(e) of this section and 15.307(a), indicate to, or discuss with, each offeror still 

being considered for award, deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past 

performance information to which the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to 

respond. The contracting officer also is encouraged to discuss other aspects of the 

offeror's proposal that could, in the opinion of the contracting officer, be altered 

or explained to enhance materially the proposal's potential for award. However, 

the contracting officer is not required to discuss every area where the proposal 

could be improved. The scope and extent of discussions are a matter of 

contracting officer judgment.

(4) In discussing other aspects of the proposal, the Government may, in situations 

where the solicitation stated that evaluation credit would be given for technical 
vi

solutions exceeding any mandatory minimums, negotiate with offerors for 

increased performance beyond any mandatory minimums, and the Government 

may suggest to offerors that have exceeded any mandatory minimums (in ways 

that are not integral to the design), that their proposals would be more competitive 

if the excesses were removed and the offered price decreased.

(5) If, after discussions have begun, an offeror originally in the competitive range 

is no longer considered to be among the most highly rated offerors being 

considered for award, that offeror may be eliminated from the competitive range 

whether or not all material aspects of the proposal have been discussed, or 

whether or not the offeror has been afforded an opportunity to submit a proposal 

revision (see 15.307(a) and 15.503(a)(1)).

(e) Limits on exchanges. Government personnel involved in the acquisition shall not 

engage in conduct that—

(1) Favors one offeror over another;

(2) Reveals an offeror's technical solution, including unique technology, 

innovative and unique uses of commercial items, or any information that would 

compromise an offeror's intellectual property to another offeror;

(3) Reveals an offerors price without that offeror's permission. However, the 

contracting officer may inform an offeror that its price is considered by the 

Government to be too high, or too low, and reveal the results of the analysis 

supporting that conclusion. It is also permissible, at the Government's discretion, 

to indicate to all offerors the cost or price that the Government's price analysis, 

market research, and other reviews have identified as reasonable (41 U.S.C. 2102 

and 2107);

(4) Reveals the names of individuals providing reference information about an 

offeror's past performance; or

(5) Knowingly furnishes source selection information in violation of 3.104 and 41 

U.S.C. 2102 and 2107.

48 C.F.R. § 15.306.
vii

FAR 52.215-1(a), under the Heading “Instructions to Offerors- Competitive Acquisition,” 

provides: 

Discussions are negotiations that occur after establishment of the competitive range 

that may, at the Contracting Officer's discretion, result in the offeror being allowed 

to revise its proposal.

48 C.F.R. § 52.215-1(a).