NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0739n.06 F iled: October 5, 2006 No. 05-1425 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
LON NI E M c KISSI C , Petitioner-Appellant , v. THOM AS B IR KETT, Wa r de n, Respondent-

Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: DA UG HTREY , C OLE, and G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. R. G UY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Petitioner-Appellant L onnie McKiss i c appeals the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of his pe tit ion

fo r ha be a s c or pu s re lie f un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 54 . M c Ki ssi c
wa s c on vic te d in

Mic hig an s tate c ou rt of var iou s d ru g -r e late d c ha

rg e s, and he c ha lle ng e s h is
c on vic tio n o n f

our g ro un ds : (1 ) he wa s immun e fr om pr os e c uti on be c a us e of a Mic hig an im mun ity st atu te and

an e arl ie r p le a

a g re e me nt w ithfe de ra l pr os e c uto rs re g ard ingthe dr ug -r e late d c on du c t; (2) the State w aited five y ear s t o p ro s ecute him, violating his rig ht to be fre e of pr ejudicial pre

ind ic tme nt d e l a

y ; ( 3 ) t h e S t a t e e n g a g e d

i n p r o s e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t by int ro du c ingse ve ra l w itn e sse s’ plea a g ree ments into evidence ; and (4) g iven hi s fe d er al plea a g ree ment, his conviction violates double-jeopa

rdy principles. F o r t h e reasons that follow, we AF F IRM the district court’s or der dismiss ing Mc Kissic’s petition for habe as cor pus relief
.No. 05-1425

Mc Kis sic v . B irk

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- 2 -

I. BACKG ROUND In F e b r u ar y 1 9 9 4 , M c K i s s i c w a s i n d i c t e d i nf e d e r a l c o u rto ndr

u g - t r a f f i c k i n g an d

m o n e ylaunder ing c harg es. I n J une 1994, McKissic re ache d a plea ag ree ment with the fede ral prose cutor. Th e a g re e me nt c a lle d fo r Mc Ki ssi c to ple a d g uil ty to the mon e y -l a un de ri ng c ha

rg e and coo perate with law-en fo rce ment ag encie s in their investigation of past crimes. This coope ration re quired McKissic to g ive t ruthful answers t o all investigators’ questions and provide truthful testimony at g ra nd jur ie s and tr ia ls. I n re tur

n f or Mc Ki ssi c ’s c oo pe ra

tio n, the fe de ra l pr os e c uto r a g re e d to dis mis s the oth e r p e nd ingc ha

rg e s a g a ins t Mc Ki ssi c , n ot t o b ri ng a dd iti on a l cha rg e s ag a ins t hi m re late d to t h e u n d e r l yi n g dr

u g t r a f f i c k i n g , an d

t o m a k e c e rt a i ns e n t e n c i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s i nh i s f a v o r . In Aug ust 1994, McKissic pleade d g uilty to the m oney -launde ring char g e and, a fter the prosec utor’s
rec ommendation of a dow nwar d depar ture, wa s sentence d to nine y ear s in feder al prison. On Fe bruar

y 29, 1995, in acc ordanc e with his plea a g ree ment, McKissic testified at Thomas Patrick’s g rand-

jury proce eding s in Mic higa

n state court. McKissic’s testimony implicated Patrick
and him se lf in t he sa les of lar ge amo un ts o f c oc a ine . In N ov e mbe r 1 99 5, ho we ve r, Mc Ki ssi c testified at Patrick’ s preliminary examination that Patr ic k w a s n ot i nv olv e d in any dr ugsa le s. McKissic then off

ere d simil ar te stimony

at Patrick’s trial. The fe dera l prosecutor deeme d Mc Ki ssi c ’s c on tr a dic tor

y te sti mony a fa ilure to co op e rate un de r t he fe de ra l pl e a

a g re e me nt, and , in J anuar y 1996, the prosec utor moved to withdraw the downwar d depar ture in McKissic’s sentence
. I nAp ri l 1 9 9 8 , t h e S t at e c h ar gedM cK i s s i c i ns t at e c o u rt w i t h p er j u ry an d v ar i o u s dru gtr a ff ic kin g of fe ns e s r e late d to the same c on du c t unde rl ying the e arl ie r fe de ra l cha rg e s ag a ins t hi m.No. 05-1425

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The State broug ht the perjury charg e in a se parate proc eeding , and it is not a subject of 1 McKissic’s ha

beas pe tition or appeal to this Court. - 3 - T h e s t at e d ru g-t raf

ficking c h a

rg es involved deliver

y , possession, and conspira cy to deliver more than 650 g rams of c ocaine . Following a benc h trial on the drugchar g es, McKissic wa s convicted of eac h 1

c ha r g e . O n N o v e mb e r 9 , 1 9 9 9 , M c K i s s i c w a s s e n t e n c e d a s a f o u r - t i m e h a

b i tu a l o f f e n de r t o
consec utive prison terms on ea ch cha rg e, for a total term of 70 to 110 y ear s. McKissic th e na

p p e a le d to th e M ic h ig anCo u rt o f A p p e a ls , w h ic h a f

f ir me d h is c o n v ic ti on
and se nte nc e . Th e Mic hig an Supr e me Court de nie d his ap pli c a tio n f or le a ve to a

pp e a l. M c Ki ssi c filed a petition in the di strict court for habea s corpus r elief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ra ising va riations of the c la ims he br ou g ht i n s tate c ourt . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sm is sed McK iss ic ’s pe tit ion wi th prejudice and dec lined to issue a ce rtificate of appe alability
. T h i s C o u rt then g rante d McKissic a
c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity on the fo ur iss ue s h e ra ise s in

thi s a pp e a l. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Standard of

Review Th e An tit e rr or ism

and Ef fe c tiv e De a th Pen a lty Ac t of 199 6, Pub . L . N o. 04 -3 21 , 1 10 Stat. 1214 (“A E DP A” ), ap plies to all habea s petitions filed after the ef fec tive date of

the ac t, April 24, 19 96
. B e c a

us e Mc Ki ssi c fi le d his pe tit ion a ft e r the e ff e c tiv e date , AE DPA ’s pr ov isi on s g ov e rn thi s Court’s revie w of his claims. Se e Gi llard v . M itc he ll , 445 F.3d 883, 889 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Under AE DP A , a p e t i t i o n f

o r a w r i t o f h a

b e a s c o r p u s s h a l l n o t b e g r an t e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o a ny c la im adjudicate d on the m erits i n state-c ourt proce eding s unless the adjudication of t he claim (1) re sulted in a dec ision that was contra ry to, or involved an u n re as o n ab l e application of, clea rly establishedNo. 05-1425

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- 4 - fede ral lawas dete rmined by the United S tates S upreme Court; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on a

n unrea sonable de termination of the f acts in light of the evidenc e pre sented in the statecourt proc eeding . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). A s tate c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o f a ha be a s p eti ti on er’ s c la im i s “ c on tr ary to” c le arl y established fe dera l law if (1) the state c ourt arr ives at a conclusion opposi te t o that rea ched by the Sup r e m e C o u rto na

qu e s t i o no f

l aw , o r ( 2 ) t h e s t a t e c o u rtc o n f

r o n t s f a c t s t h a tar e ma te ri a lly indisti ng uishable fr om releva nt Supreme Court prec edent and arr ives at a diff ere nt result. W

illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state-c ourt dec ision is an “unrea sonable a pplication” of clea rly established law if

it (1) cor rec tly identifies the leg al rule f rom a Supreme Court case but
unrea sonably

applies that rule to the fac ts of the particula r case , or (2) either unr easona bly extends
or unre a so na

bly re fu se s to e xten d a

le g a l pr inc ipl e fr om S up re me Court pr e c e de nt t o a

ne w c on te xt. Id . at 407. This Court rev i ew s t h e state cour t’s fac tual finding s with ex treme de fer ence . “A f eder al court is to apply

a pre sumption of corre ctness to state c ourt finding s of fa ct for ha beas co rpus purposes unless c lear

and convinc ing e v i dence is offer ed to re but this presumption.” Johnson v. Luoma , 4 2 5 F. 3 d

3 1 8 , 3 2 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Mc Ad oo v . E lo , 365 F.3d 487, 493- 94 (6th Cir. 2004)). B . Mc Ki s s i c’ s Cl a i ms 1. I mmunit

y McKissic ar g ues that he ha d immunit y from the State’s prosec ution of the drugtransac tions he te sti fi e d to in P a tr ic k’s le g a l pr oc e e din g s and that hi s c on vic tio n th e re fo re vio late s h isNo. 05-1425

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- 5 - c on sti tut io nal ri ght t o b e free f rom com pel led sel f-i ncri mi nat io n. McK is si c ass ert s t hat hi s i mm un ity ari s e s f r o m t w o s o u r c e s : ( a ) a

M ic h ig ans tatute , M ic h
. Co mp . L aw s § 7 5 0
. 1 5 7 ( 1 9 3 1 ) , w h ich provides for

transac tional immuni ty

under c erta in conditions; and (b) his plea a g re e me nt w ith feder al prosec utors. These a

re a ddresse d in turn. (a) Mi c hig

an Tra ns ac tio na l-

Im mu nit ySta tute The Michig an transac tional-immunit y clause in e ffe ct when McKissic testified at Patrick’ s g ra nd -j ur y pr oc e e din g in 1 99 9 p ro vid e d in re le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: No per son shall b e excused fr om attending and testifying . . . upon a ny inv e st igatio n, pr oc e e din g or tr ia l, f or a vio latio n o f a

ny of the pr ov isi on s o f t

his chapte r [reg ardingcriminal conspira ci es ], . . . for the rea son that the testimony
. . . require d of him may

tend to deg rade o r i n cr iminate him; but no person shall be prosec u t ed or subjected to any penalty . . . on acc ount of any

. . . matter . . . c on c e rn ing[that] wh ic h h e may so te sti fy
. . . , and no te sti mony

so g ive n . . . sh a ll be re c e ive d a g a ins t hi m upo n an y c ri min a l in ve sti g a tio n, pr oc e e din g or tr ia l[;] provided, [t] hat no per son so te stify ing sha ll be exempt from fede ral prose cution and p u n i s h m en tfo r p er

j u ry co m m i t t edi ns o t es t i fy i n g. Mich. Comp. L aw s § 7 5 0
. 1 5 7, amende d by 1999 PA No. 251 (1999). In other wor ds, under the statute, a pe rson may

not refuse to testify i n a p ro ce ed i n g related to a cr iminal conspiracy by invoki n g h i s o r h er rig ht ag ainst self incrimination; at the same time, that person ca nnot be pr os e c ute d f

or c ri me s ( e xce pt f

or pe rj ur y ) r e late d to the te sti mon

y he or sh e pr ov ide s. Th e statut e thus provides for transac tional immunit y (which preclude s prosec ution for any event to which the p er s o n t estifies) a

nd not simpl y

use immunity

(which pr eclude s only

the use of the person’ s statements in a prose cution ag ainst the person)
. See, e.g., United States v. Fitch , 964 F.2d 571, 575- 76 (6 th C ir . 1 99 2) (“ Tr ans a c tio na l im mun ity is f ull immun ity

fr om pr os e c uti on

fo r a ny of fe ns e to which the testimony

rela tes,” a nd it “prohibits the gover

nment from prose cuting the def endant at anyNo. 05-1425

Mc Kis sic v . B irk

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Th e re le va

nt s e c tio n o f t

he a me nd e d v e rs ion

of the statut e pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: 2 A per son shall not be excused from
. . . testifying . . . befor e a c ourt . . . upon an investig ation, proce eding , or trial for a violation of this chapter on the g round that the testimony or evidence may tend t o deg rade or incriminate the person. Tr uthful testimony
. . . compe lled

under this sec tion and any information der ived direc tly or - 6 - tim e wi th r e sp e c t to inc ri min a tin g matte rs that th e wi tne ss d isc los e d. ” ) ( c itatio ns om i tt e d )
. Mc Ki ssi c
argue s th a t hi s te sti mony

a t Patr ic k’ s g ra

nd -j ur y pr oc e e din g s f

a lls un de r t

his statut e and

e nti tle d h im to transac tional immuni ty , thus precludingprosec ution for cr ime s r e la ti n g to th e d r u g - r e la te d conduct to which he testified. T he Michig an Court of Appe als reje cted this a rg ument, concludingthat the statute did not apply

for two r easons. First, the Michig an cour

t expl ained that the statute provides immunity when the te stimony at i ssue i s “re quired” of the pe rson. Pe op le v . M c Kis sic ( McKissic I

), No. 224965, 2002 WL408930,
a t *1 (M ic h. Ct. App. Mar
. 15 , 20 02 ). B e c a us e Mc Ki ssi c te sti fi e d b e fo re Pa tr ic k’ s g ra nd jur y in
acc ordanc e with his fede ral plea ag ree ment, which he voluntarily enter ed into, the cour

t concluded that his testimony

was not require d: “ Voluntary cooper ation in acc ordanc e with the ter ms of a plea ag ree ment is not re quired testimony .” Id. (c i t i n g United States v. Camp , 72 F.3d 759, 761 ( 9th Cir. 1995)). McKissic objec ts to thi s holding on two g rou n d s . First, base d on an ame ndment to the statute, he c ontends that he is entitled to immunity even if his te stimony was not c ompulsory . The statute was signific antly amende d in 1999 to pr ovide use immunit y instead o f t ra n sactional i mmunity . The amended ve rsion ref err ed to the applica

ble testimony

as “r equire d,” but also as “compe lled.” McKissic ar g ues that bec ause the wo rd “c o mpelled” did not appe ar in the e arlier

2No. 05-1425

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indirectly from that truthful testimony
. . . shall not be used ag ainst the witness in a criminal ca se, except for

impeachm en t p u rp oses or in a pr osecution for perjury or oth e rw ise fa ili ngto t e sti fy
. . . a s required
. Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.157 (1999) (empha sis added). We think there is no differ ence betwee n “compe lled” and “ require d” in this c ontext
. I f the 3 le g isl a tur e int e nd e d “ c omp e lle d” te sti mony to m e an s ome thi ngoth e r t ha n “ re qu ir e d” te sti mony , it likely woul d

n o t h a v e c o n ti nu e d

to u s e th e w o r d

“ r e qu ir e d ” ( in

a d d it io nto “ c o mp e ll e d ” ) w h en descr ibing the testimony in the amende d version. See Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.157 (1999) , su pra n.2. Moreove r, the amendment did not amount to sim ply repla cing one wor d for a

nother (in whic h case the differ ence might be me aning ful); rather, the a mendment amounted to a sig nificant ove rhaul of the statutory

text (to repe al transa ctional immunity and provide use immunity ). - 7 - (a pp lic a ble ) v e rs ion , te sti mony

ne e d n ot b e “ c omp e lle d” fo r i mmunit y to a pp ly . T hu s, he su g g e sts , the testimony

he off ere d in acc ordanc e with his plea a g ree ment

— ev en i f t h at t estimony was not compelled — e ntitled him to immunity
. Even assuming there is a diffe renc e betwe en “r equire d” and “compe lled” tes t i m o n y , howeve r, McKissic doe s not dispute that the applicable ve rsion of the 3 statute provides immunity wher e the testimony

is “requir ed,” a

nd he offe rs no basis to sugg est the Michig an cour

t’s deter mination that his t estimony was not “r equire d” wa s contrar y to, or an
unrea sonable a

pplication of, United Stat es S upreme Court prec edent. His a rgument is theref

ore wi tho ut m e ri t. Se c on d, Mc Ki ssi c argue s th a t e ve n if the statut e a pp lie s to “ re qu ir e d” te sti mony , h e is s til l entitled to i m m u n i t y b ecause his testimony was not voluntary , but “re quired” by his feder al plea
a g re e me nt. Ye t Mc Ki ssi c a c kn ow le dg e s that he vo lun tari ly e nte re d int o the a g re e me nt, and he fa ils to offer any authority that testimony

offe red in acc ordanc e with a voluntar y plea a g ree ment (as
o p p o s ed to, for example, testimony offe red in re sponse to a cour t order) is “requir ed” w ithin theNo. 05-1425

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- 8 - meaningof the statute. We ag ree with the district c ourt that the Michig an court’s c onclusion was not contrar

y to, or an unre asonable application of, U nited States Supreme Court pre cede nt. McKissic fur

ther a rg ues that the s ta

te p r o s e c utor

compelled Mc Kissic’s testimony by making the following statement to him bef ore he testified at Patrick’ s g rand- jury proce eding : “With respect to the testimony that y ou g ive befor e this g rand jury , nothing y ou say in that te stimony will be used
a g a ins t y ou

un le ss w e fi nd a t some futur e tim e that y ou have lie d be fo re thi s g ra nd jur y .” B ut t his state me nt m e re ly

re ite rate d th a t Mc Ki ssi c wa s a bo ut t o te sti fy

in a c c or da

nc e wi th h is v olu nta ry fe de ral pl ea agreem ent . I mm edi ate ly befo re m aki ng th is st ate men t, th e pro secu to r sta te d to Mc Ki ssi c that he was at Patrick’s g rand- jury proce eding s “as part of a plea ag ree ment wi t h t h e f ederal authorities to testify

befor e this g rand jury ,” and Mc Kissic indicated that was pre cisely the ca se. (

Id. at 24, 26.) The prosecutor’ s statement does not chang e that McK issic voluntarily enter ed into the
a g re e me nt. Th is a

rgume nt i s th e re fo re a lso wi tho ut m e ri t. Th e Mic hig an c ourt ’s se c on d re a so n for no t a pp lyingthe statut e wa s Mc Ki ssi c ’s fa ilure to inv ok e his r i g h ta g a i n s ts e l f

- i n c r i m i n a t i o nb e f

o r e t h e g r an d

j u r y , a s h e w a s r e qu i r e d

t o d o t o a v a il himself of the statute. See M cKissic I , 2 00 2 WL 40 89 30 , at *2 (“ [P]er so ns are no t e nti tle d to statutory transac tional immuni ty

unless t h ey ra i se their c onstitut ional privileg e ag ainst selfi n cr i m i n at i o n o r o b

j ec t t o an s we ri n g qu es t i o n s h av i n g t h e t en d en cy t o i n cr i m i n at e. ”) (c i t i n g Pe op le v. Parsons , 371 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)). In light of our deter mination that McKissic’s testimony wa s n o t “re quired” and ther efor e does not re ceive the protec tions of the transac tional-immunit y

statute, we ne ed not re ach the question whether McKissic nee ded to invoke his right a g ainst self-incr imination and whether he fa iled to do so.No. 05-1425

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- 9 - (b) Fede ral Plea Agreem ent M c K is s ic a ls o ar g u e s th a t th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s statement to him at Patrick’s g rand- jury proce eding “ac ted as an immunity ag ree ment.” B eca

use this statement amounted to the prose cutor
mere ly reiter ating that the forthc oming testimony was in ac corda n ce wi th the plea a g ree ment, we understand Mc Kissic to be arguing that, in a ddition to violating the Mic higa n statute, his prosecution vio late s h is f

e de ra l pl e a

a g re e me nt. Du e proces s re qu ir e s th e g ov e rnme nt t o a dh e re to t he te rm s o f a

ny immun ity

a g re e me nt i t makes. United States v. Fitch , 9 6 4 F. 2 d 5 7 1 , 5 7 6 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Pe lletier , 898 F.2d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 1990)). I f t he re is a br e a c h o f t

he immun ity

a g re e me nt, wh ic h is a kin to a contr act, the a

vailab l e re m ed i es are those spec ified in the contra ct. Id
. ( c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d )
. We must first deter

mine whether McKissic mater ially brea ched the ag ree ment; if he did, we must then deter mine the re medies ava ilable to the g overnme nt. I n Fitch , thi s Court a ff

ir me d the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g tha t th e de fe nd ant d id n ot m a te ri a lly brea ch his plea a g ree ment. The de fenda nt ag ree d to provide truthful information t o the g overnme nt in e xch ang e fo r i mmunit

y , but the n mad e c on tr a dic tor y state me nts to autho ri tie s tha t mi nim ize d h is own involvement in criminal ac tivity
. Id. at 575. The defe ndant, however, assisted the g overnme nt in secur ing indictments ag ainst other individuals. Id. Thus , thi s Court he ld t hat th e de fe nd ant d id not materially

brea ch the a g ree ment beca use “the g overnme nt rec eived the benef it of its barg ain.” Id. The Seventh Circuit illust rate d the limits of Fitch in United States v. Re ed , 2 72 F .3 d 9 50 (7 th Cir. 2001). J ust as in Fitch , the def endant in R eed provided fa lse information to the g overnme ntNo. 05-1425

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- 10 - afte r enter ing into an immunity ag ree ment. See id. at 954. The Ree d court ex plained, howe ver, that “[u] nlike the instant case , the g overnme nt in Fitch was a ble to use other information provided by the defe ndant to further

the investig ation.” Id. a t 955. “ B y c on tr a st, ” the c ourt c on tin ue d, “ no t on ly

did Reed see k to minim ize his o wn wr o n g doing, but he also attempted to ave rt the g overnme nt’s suspicions f

rom [another def

endant].” Id. I n this way , the cour t expl ained, “ Reed’s violation thus de n ie d th e g o v e r

n me n t t h e v e r y b e n e f it th a t t h e a g r e e me n t w a s in te n d e d to s e c u r e —

inf ormation that would aid in the identification and prosec ution of other [drug ] t raf ficke rs.” Id. J ust like the defendant’s false stateme nts in Ree d , McKissic’s c ontradictory testimony

about Patrick wa s a mater ial b re ac h o f the plea a g ree ment. Unlike Fitch , in wh ic h th e de fe nd ant — notwithstanding his falsehoods — still “supplied t he gover nment with enoug h information to allow it to s ec u re a m u l t i co u n ti n d i ct m en taga i n s tnu m er o u s i n d i v i d u al s ” a n d “a l s o as s i s t edt h e gover

nment i n v ar i o u s other wa

y s,” Fitch , 964 F.2d at 575, McKissic, like the def endant in Ree d , p r o v ided information that would only hinder the pr osecution of other individuals. Having det erm i n edt h at M cK i s s i c m at er i al l y b re ac h edt h e a gre em en t , we turn to what re medy i s available to the g overnme nt. This Court in Fitch e xp la in e d th a t e v e n if th e r e w e re amateria l brea ch of the immunit y

ag ree ment, the g overnme nt would be “limited to those remedie s specifie d in the ag ree ment.” Id. a t 575. No tin g that a lth ou g h “ the re is c a se law that su g g e sts that an im mun ity
a g re e me nt i s v oid

up on the de fe nd ant’ s brea ch, ” we e xpla ine d th a t “ the c ourt s h a ve so he ld o nly wher e the a g ree ment expli citly provided that a

ny falsehood would void the ag ree ment . . . or whe re the ag ree ment was silent as to re medies.” Id. a t 57 6 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . B e c a us e the immun ity ag ree ment in Fitch “did not provide that it would be ‘null and void’ in the event [the defe ndant] li ed,No. 05-1425

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- 11 - nor wa s it sil ent as to the consequenc es t o [t he defenda nt] of telling a lie,” a

nd instead provided that the def endant c ould be prosec uted for pe rjury only , the g overnm en t was bound by that provision. Id. McKissic’s plea

ag ree ment, on the other hand, expressly provided that it “shall be c onsidered null and void” if McKissic brea ched and the g overnme nt e lected to te rminate the ag ree ment. The State there fore had author ity to prosecute him for the underly ing offe nses. Cf. Ree d , 272 F.3d at 955 (immunity

ag ree ment, “unlike the one in Fitch , expressly provided for

its nullification in the eve nt of a br eac h,” so prose cution for unde rlying c rimes was pr oper)
. 2. Pre-Indictment Delay M c K i s s i c n e x tar g u e s t h a th i s c o n v i c t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d

u e t o p r e - i n d i c t m e n td e l ay. McKissic asse rts that althoug h he wa s not char g ed with state crimes until April 1998, the St ate kne w
a bo ut his inv olv e me nt in t

he c oc a ine -d istri bu tio n n e tw or k a s e arl y a s 1 99 4. I n p art ic ula

r, Mc Ki ssi c argu e s th a t h e w a s u n a

b le to mo u n t a

na li b i d e f

e n s e b e c a u s e h e “ w a s s tu c k

w it h f a d in g me mo ries of both state and de fense witnesses.” A s uc c e ssf

ul D ue Pr oc e ss c la im f

or pr e -i nd ic tme nt de lay re qu ir e s that a pe tit ion e r e sta

bli sh (1 ) p re jud ic e to his ri g ht to a fa ir tr ia l, and (2 ) t hat th e g ov e rnme nt i nte nti on a lly c a us e d th e de lay

to g ain a tactica l advantag e. United States v. W right , 3 4 3 F. 3 d

8 4 9 , 8 5 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g United Sta te s v . B ro wn , 667 F.2d 566, 567 ( 6th Cir. 1982)). The Michig anCo u rt o f

A p p e a ls r e

je c te d M c K is s ic ’ s c la im , h o ld in g th a t t h e p r e ju d ic e resulting from pre -indictment delay must be actua l and substantial and that the a lleg ed imperf ections of a w itness’s memory

are g ener ally insufficient to establish ac tual and substantial pre judice. Mc Kis sic I , 200 2 W L 4 0 8 9 3 0 , at *3. The district c ourt ag ree d, concludingthat the state c ourt’sNo. 05-1425

Mc Kis sic v . B irk

e tt

- 12 - deter mination that McKissic’s “vague alleg ations of pre judice we re insuff

icient to war

rant re versa l was not contra

ry to or an unrea sonable a pplication of Supreme Court pr ece dent.” McKissic II , slip. op. at 15. We a g re e wi th the dis tr ic t c ourt
. Al tho ugh Mc Ki ssi c ind ic a te s that the c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m
ne c e ssi tate d an a lib i of

fe ns e , h e do e s n ot a

rgue that he wo uld

have be e n a

ble to b ri ngan a lib i de fe ns e if ind ic te d e arl ie r, de sc ri be the c on te nt of that alib i off e ns e , or e xpla in h owthe de lay pr e ve nte d h im fr om b ri ng ingthat de fe ns e . H e argue s o nly that th e de lay

re su lte d in th e lo ss of witn e sse s’ memories. That conc lusory argument is insufficient for show ing pr ejudice. See Paynev. Re es , 738 F.2d 118, 121 ( 6th Cir. 1984). Moreove r, eve n if he ha d establi shed pre judice, McK issic has not shown that the dela

y was a n intentional act by

the g overnme nt to ga in a tactica l advantag e. 3. Prosecutoria l Misconduct McKissic next a rgu es that the state e ng ag ed in misconduct by introducing the plea
a g re e me nts of

his c o- de fe nd ants int o e vid e nc e . A c c or din g to M c Ki ssi c , th e pr os e c uto r i mpr op e rl y
so ug ht a dmi ssi on

of the ple a a g re e me nts a s evi de nc e that th e of fe ns e s o c c ur

re d a nd that Mc Ki ssi c “must theref

ore be g uilty

as we ll.” The State re sponds that this argument is proce durally defa ulted beca use McKissic’ s trial attorney aff irmat i v el y s t at ed at trial that he had no objec tion to the admission of the plea a g ree ments. F or no nc omp lia

nc e wi th a

state pr oc e dure to s e rv e a s a bar to h a be a s r e vie w, the state proce dure must satisfy

the standar ds set forth in Ma up in v . S mi th , 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986). Sm ith v . O hio De

p’ t of Re ha b. & Cor

rs. , __ F.3d __, No. 04-4280, 2006 U.S. A pp. L EXI S 22843, at *9 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006). First, there m ust be a state pr ocedur e in place that the petitioner fa iledNo. 05-1425

Mc Kis sic v . B irk

e tt

- 13 - to follow. Id. Second, the sta t e co urt must have ac tually denied c onsideration of the petitioner’s claim on the g round of the state proce dural de fault. Id. Third, the state pr ocedur al rule must be a n “ade quate a

nd independe nt state g round” to pre clude habea s revie w. Id. To be “ a de qu a te ,” a state proce dural r u l e m u s t b e “firmly established and r egularly followed.” Id. at * 1 0 (q u o t i n g Ford v. Ge or gia , 498 U.S. 411, 423-33 (1991)). An “independent” state proce dural rule is one not relying
on fede ral law. Id. (c i t i n g Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991))
. I f these three fac tors
are satis fi e d ( thu s im

po sin g the pr oc e dura l ba

r) , the pe tit ion e r c an ov e rc ome the pr oc e dura l de fa ult by either “ demonstrating cause for the pr ocedur al def ault and ac tual prejudice as a re s u l t o f t he alleg ed viol ation of federa l law, or demonstrating that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundame ntal miscarr iag e of justice.” Id. (q u o t i n g Coleman , 501 U.S. at 750). The thre e Ma up in standards f or proc edura l defa

ult are satisfied here
. First, McKissic does
no t di sp ut e tha

t hi s atto rn e y ’s a ff

ir mativ e a g re e me nt t o th e int ro du c tio n o f t

he ple a a g re e me nts constituted waiver of appe llate re view of this issue under Michig an law. See M

cKissic I , 2 0 0 2 WL 4 0 8 9 3 0 , at * 2 (c i t i n g People v . Carter , 612 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Mich. 2000)) . Second, the Michig an Court of Appea ls, the last state cou rt to addre ss this i ssue, denied this cla im on that procedur al g round. See id. Th ir d, thi s p roce dura l r ule is a n a de qu a te and

ind e pe nd e nt s tate g ro un d. I t is independe nt be cause it does not rely on fede ral law . I t is adequate beca use it is firmly

established and reg ularly followed by Michig an cour

ts. See id. at 150 (“ [C ]ounsel ex pressly approve d the trial
c ourt ’s re sp on se and

su bs e qu e nt i ns tr

uc tio n. Th is c on sti tut e s a

wa ive r t hat e x tin gu ish es any

err or.”) ; People v . Riley , 636 N. W.2 d 5 14 , 5 18 (M ic h. 20 01 ) ( “ B e c a us e de fe nd ant w a ive d, a s o pp os e d to fo rf e ite d, his ri g hts un de r the ru le , the re is no ‘e rr or ’ t o r e vie w. ” ); Pe op le v . Ta te , 624 N.W.2d 524,No. 05-1425

Mc Kis sic v . B irk

e tt

- 14 - 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (sa me); Pe op le v . B ro wn , No. 222151, 2001 WL1657240, at *1 (Mich. Ct. Ap p. De c . 18 , 20 01 ) ( same ); People v . Bridgewater , No. 212889, 2001 W L664724, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May

18, 2001) (same). M cK i s s i c d o es n o tco n t en d h e c an s h o w c au s e a n d p re j u d i ce fo r t h e d ef

au l t
. An d al t h o u gh he argue s th a t th e de fa

ult wi ll r e su lt i n a

fu nd a me nta l mi sc arr ia g e of jus tic e , that wou ld o c c ur on ly if McKissic could show he was “ac tually innocent.” Lun dg

re n v. Mi tc he ll , 4 40 F .3 d 7 54 , 7 64 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Murray v . Carrier , 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). H e fa ils to do so. W e ther efor e ag ree with the district court that this claim is procedur ally defa ulted. 4. Double Jeopardy F ina lly , M c Ki ssi c argue s th a t hi s c on vic tio n vio late s do ub le -j e op ard y pr inc ipl e s b e c a

us e his convictions in state and fe dera l court ar ose out of the same transa ctions. The Double Jeopardy Clause “ p r o te c ts a

d e f e n d an t i na

c r im in a l p r o c e e d in g a g a in s t m u lt ip le p u n is h me n ts o r

r e p e ated prosec utions for the same of fense .” Un ite d S

tates v . D ini tz , 424 U.S. 600, 605 (1976). Th e Mic hig an Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls h e ld t

hat Mc Ki ssi c ’s state -c ourt c on vic tio ns did

no t vi olate the Double Jeopardy Clause beca use his f eder al drug -traf

fickingchar g es we re dismissed under the plea a g ree ment, and “[

j] eopar dy does not attach to char g es di smissed as par t of a plea ag ree ment.” McKissic I

, 2002 WL 408930, at *3 (citation om itted). McKissic pl eade d g uilty to only the fe dera l char g e of mone y launder ing. The Michig an court explained that ple ading to this charg e “r aises no double jeopar dy

issues with respec t to defe ndant’s state court indictment f or deliver y , possession, and conspira cy

to deliver c ocaine .” Id.No. 05-1425

Mc Kis sic v . B irk

e tt

- 15 - Th e dis tr ict c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t th is c on c lus ion wa s n ot c on tr ary

to, or an unr e a so na

ble application of, Supre me Court prec edent. McKissic II , slip op. at 17 (“ [J ]eopardy does not attac h, and the c onstitut ional prohibition can have no application, until a defe ndant is put to trial before the t ri er o f f ac t s , wh et h er

t h e t ri er b e aj u ry o r aj u d ge. ” ) (q u o t i n g United States v. Toaz , 5 9 F e d
. A p p x. 94, 100 (6th Cir. 2003)). We ag ree with the district court; McKissic has be en prose cuted only once fo r t he c on vic tio ns he a

pp e a ls h e re . T his c la im i s th e re fo re wi tho ut m e ri t.

III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the order of the district court dismiss ing Mc Kissic’s petition for a wr it of habea s corpus.