IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10176 

Summary Calendar

 

ARNOLD BELL; PATRICK JAMES REEDOM; DONALD WILLIS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

CITY OF FORT WORTH ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees,

----------------------------

DONALD WILLIS, Petitioner's middle initial is "D",

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF FORT WORTH, TX.,

 Defendant-Appellee,

-----------------------------

PATRICK JAMES REEDOM Et Al.,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

CITY OF FORT WORTH CDC COMMITTEE Et Al.

 Defendants-Appellees,

-----------------------------

DONALD WILLIS, and all black agencies applicants for CDBG

grants with the Fort Worth and HUD, both past and present,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT; SHIRLEY

LEWIS; CARLOS RENTIA; CITY OF FORT WORTH; KATIE WORSHAM;

MELODEE HUMBERT; JERRY JENSEN; CARLOS MELENDEZ,

 Defendants-Appellees.
No. 96-10176

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* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:95-CV-004-A

- - - - - - - - - -

July 26, 1996

Before JOHNSON, GARWOOD and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Arnold Bell, Patrick James Reedom, and Donald Willis named

the City of Fort Worth and several of its employees as defendants

in a civil suit alleging discrimination against black applicant

in the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) process. On

February 26, 1996, the district court entered a final judgment

dismissing “all plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants except

for plaintiffs’ claims against the city for damages, court

supervision of the City of Fort Worth CDBG grant process, and

immediate financing of the Oakland Incubation Project for $5

million dollars, for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 5309 and Title

VI.” 

Appellants argue that the district court judge erred by

failing to recuse himself because he granted the defendants’

motion to amend the scheduling order in the case without allowing

the appellant 20 days to respond. Other than making general and

conclusional allegations of bias, the appellants have produced

nothing that would cause a reasonable man to doubt the district

court's impartiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); Levitt v. Univ. of
No. 96-10176

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Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir.)(citations

omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 984 (1988). The district court

did not abuse its discretion by refusing to recuse himself from

this case. United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1165 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985). 

On appeal, Bell, Reedom, and Willis do not specifically

challenge any of the district court’s conclusions that supported

the grant of summary judgment. Rather, the appellants focus

their argument on whether the district court erred in granting

summary judgment after amending the scheduling order without

allowing twenty days for the appellants to respond. This court

ordinarily defers to the district court in the management of its

own docket. See Union City Barge Line v. Union Carbide Corp.,

823 F.2d. 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1987)(district court has broad

discretion to control its own docket). The appellants have not

shown that the district court abused its discretion in amending

the scheduling order.

This appeal is without arguable merit and thus frivolous. 

See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. All

outstanding motions are DENIED.

Bell, Reedom, and Willis are hereby cautioned that any

additional frivolous appeals filed by them or on their behalf

will be met with sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Bell, Reedom,

and Willis should review all pending appeals to ensure they are

not frivolous.

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS DENIED; SANCTIONS WARNING.