UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 98-4022

KASHMA PORTER, a/k/a Rick

Hampton,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-96-480, CR-97-456)

Submitted: February 16, 1999

Decided: March 15, 1999

Before WIDENER, ERVIN, and KING, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Parks N. Small, Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Kashma Porter pled guilty to ten counts of wire fraud pursuant to

a plea agreement. The district court sentenced Porter to serve sixtyfour months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised

release and to pay restitution in the amount of $552,518. Porter

appeals his convictions and sentence. Porter's attorney has filed a

brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

raising four issues but indicating that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Porter was informed of his right to file a pro

se supplemental brief, but he has not done so.

First, Porter's counsel raises the question of whether the district

court complied with the requirements outlined in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11

when taking Porter's pleas.* Following a de novo review of the entire

record, we conclude that the district court complied with all the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Porter's guilty pleas.

Second, counsel raises the propriety of the district court's decision

to increase Porter's offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 3C1.1 (1997) for obstruction of justice. Porter withdrew his

objection to the increase at sentencing. Thus, we review the court's

decision only for plain error. See United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d

512, 516 (4th Cir. 1997).

The enhancement was based on two parts of Porter's testimony. He

testified at a suppression hearing that he only consented to the search

because agents told him that they would put him in jail if he did not

consent. A Government agent testified at the same hearing that there

was no coercion and that Porter voluntarily consented to the search.

Further, Porter testified at his bond revocation hearing about his

knowledge of Lonnie Riley's fugitive status at the time he gave Riley,

a person indicted in the Tennessee case, a ride to an acquaintance's

_________________________________________________________________

*Porter actually had two Rule 11 hearings. At one, he pled guilty to

nine counts of wire fraud. At the second, he pled guilty to one count of

wire fraud in Tennessee under Fed. R. Crim. P. 20. The colloquy at each

hearing was substantially the same.

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house. Porter stated that he did not know that Riley was a fugitive.

Two co-defendants testified that they were with Porter in court before

the date of the ride when an IRS agent testified that Riley was a fugitive. The court found that Porter lied at both hearings and knowingly

harbored a fugitive. Given these facts, the district court did not commit plain error when it enhanced Porter's sentence for obstruction of

justice on the basis of perjury.

Third, Porter's counsel raises the issue of whether the district court

plainly erred by enhancing Porter's sentence under USSG § 3A1.1

because the offense involved "vulnerable victims." In his plea agreement, Porter acknowledged that the vulnerable victim enhancement

would apply. Further, at sentencing, Porter admitted that his fraudulent scheme specifically targeted the elderly. Thus, we easily find that

the district court properly applied the guidelines. See United States v.

Cron, 71 F.3d 312, 314 (8th Cir. 1995).

Finally, Porter's counsel challenges trial counsel's performance.

However, we do not review claims of ineffective assistance on direct

appeal unless the record conclusively demonstrates counsel's ineffectiveness, see United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th

Cir. 1991), which is not the case here. Therefore, any such claim must

be raised in a collateral attack.

In accordance with the requirements of Anders, we have examined

the entire record in this case and find no other meritorious issues for

appeal. Thus, we affirm Porter's convictions and sentence.

This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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