Filed 10/6/21 In re Ariana G. CA2/2

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re ARIANA G., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B310511

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP01801)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MANUEL G.,

Defendant and Appellant.
2

In re ARIANA G., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B311415

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP01801)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MELISSA H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.

William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant Manuel G.

Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Melissa H.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *

Manuel G. (father) and Melissa H. (mother) have filed 

separate, concurrent appeals challenging termination of their 

parental rights to their daughter Ariana G. (born September

2017). Because the facts and legal arguments overlap, we 
3

address the two appeals together in this single opinion. Both 

parents argue that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply 

the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental 

rights found in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).1 Neither father nor mother has shown 

that the juvenile court’s factual determinations lacked 

substantial evidence or that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in balancing the factors concerning detriment to the 

child. Therefore, we find no error and affirm the juvenile court’s 

order terminating parental rights.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Family

The family consists of father, mother and Ariana. The 

parents never married. Mother has a son (born July 2003), who 

resides with his maternal aunt through a family court legal 

guardianship. Mother voluntarily agreed to this arrangement 

because she was unable to obtain adequate housing.

Mother’s prior child welfare history with her older child 

included referrals from 2006 through 2017. The four referrals 

during this time alleged that mother physically abused, 

emotionally abused, or neglected her son. The referrals were 

either closed due to mother’s situation becoming stable or deemed 

inconclusive.

Mother and father both have criminal histories. Mother’s 

criminal history is extensive, including convictions for driving 

while her license was suspended, vandalism, and arrests for 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
4

infliction of corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant and violation 

of a protective order. Father’s criminal history includes a 2017 

arrest for battery on a spouse/ex-spouse. He also has arrests and 

convictions from 2007 to 2011 for driving while his license was 

suspended.

Referral and initial investigation in the present matter

On October 19, 2017, the Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral 

alleging that mother neglected one-month-old Ariana by smoking 

marijuana, drinking beer, and using her welfare money to buy 

marijuana and beer.

The investigating social worker obtained a call log from the 

referral address and noted that there were four calls made to law 

enforcement for domestic violence in December 2016.

Mother permitted the social worker to enter her home on 

October 24, 2017, for a face-to-face interview. Mother lived with 

maternal grandfather (MGF) in his studio apartment. Mother 

believed that father made the referral, stating that father told 

her via text message that he would be calling DCFS. Mother 

believed that father did this in retaliation because she left his 

home and would not return. Mother described father as 

“possessive” and “manipulative.” Mother admitted to prior 

domestic violence with father, and stated that she intended to 

obtain a permanent restraining order against him by the end of 

the week. Mother reported that father called DCFS with false 

reports because he was trying to obtain custody of their child and 

because she had ended their romantic relationship. Mother had a 

temporary restraining order against father, but admitted that 

they continued to contact each other in violation of the order.
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Mother agreed to and signed a safety plan that day. The 

safety plan provided that no one transporting or caring for 

Ariana would be under the influence of any substances, and the 

parents would comply with any existing court orders regarding 

domestic violence. The safety plan lasted for 30 days or until 

closure of the referral.

In a telephone conversation with the social worker on 

October 24, 2017, father expressed concern that mother was both 

exposing the child to marijuana smoke and was a violent 

individual. Father stated that there had not been any violence in 

the past month because mother was not allowing father to visit 

the child. The social worker informed father that DCFS was 

investigating the matter and both parents would be asked to test 

for drugs. Father agreed but admitted to smoking marijuana,

offering to provide his medical marijuana card.

At a subsequent in-person interview father denied smoking 

marijuana since Ariana was born. When asked about the 

parents’ incidence of domestic violence in May 2017, father stated 

that mother was to blame because she could not control her 

anger. As a result of the incident, father had enrolled in domestic 

violence classes and was on probation. Father said he had to call 

law enforcement on mother several times, that he had a 

restraining order against mother, but admitted that both parties 

violated the order. Father claimed they were trying to figure out 

their relationship now that they had a child. Father alleged that 

mother was not fit to take care of the child and signed the same 

safety plan that mother signed.

On October 27, 2017, mother sought a restraining order to 

protect both her and Ariana from father and for father to have no 

contact with the child. Two days later father called the social 
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worker and expressed concern regarding Ariana’s safety in 

mother’s care. Father admitted that he and mother continued to 

violate the restraining orders. Father added that he would 

rather have Ariana in foster care than with mother. 

Mother called the social worker on November 1, 2017, 

claiming father had violated the restraining order and came to 

her home that day. Mother did not allow father in the house and 

called law enforcement. Mother also informed the social worker 

that MGF wanted her to move due to the issues she had with 

father. The social worker determined that mother was open to 

going to a shelter and provided information for a shelter intake.

Section 300 petition and detention

On November 14, 2017, DCFS filed a section 300 petition 

on behalf of Ariana alleging that she was at risk of serious 

physical harm as a result of mother and father’s history of 

engaging in violent altercations in the child’s home and by

violating a criminal protective order. It was further alleged that 

father had a history of substance abuse, was a current abuser of 

marijuana and incapable of providing regular care for the child.

The juvenile court ordered Ariana detained from father and 

released to mother, with father having monitored visitation three 

times per week. The court ordered DCFS to provide the parents 

with appropriate referrals for weekly random drug testing, 

individual counseling, parenting, and a domestic violence 

program.

On December 18, 2017, DCFS filed a section 385 petition 

requesting that Ariana be detained from mother, following the 

events of December 13, 2017, at which time the parents engaged 

in domestic violence at father’s home while mother was under the 

influence of alcohol and marijuana. Law enforcement responded, 
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and mother was arrested for child endangerment and assault 

with a deadly weapon. Father requested an emergency protective 

order. Ariana was detained in foster care.

Mother was incarcerated for spousal abuse with pending 

court dates of December 18 and 19, 2017. Father admitted that 

he allowed mother and Ariana to live with him so the couple 

could work things out. Father was adamant that he and mother 

could resolve their problems even though he acknowledged that 

mother was violent and drunk at the time of the recent incident. 

Father thought it was the fault of DCFS for leaving the child 

with mother. If instead the child had been released to him, he 

would not have had to deal with mother in order to be with 

Ariana.

The juvenile court made detention findings and ordered 

Ariana detained from both parents. Monitored visits for mother 

three times weekly for three hours per visit were ordered, and 

father’s visits too remained monitored, three times per week for 

three hours per visit.

First amended petition, jurisdiction and disposition

On January 10, 2018, DCFS filed a first amended petition 

adding allegations surrounding the December 2017 incidence of 

domestic violence. The petition alleged that Ariana was exposed 

to violence in which mother punched, slapped, and kicked father 

multiple times while the child was attached to mother in a baby 

harness. Mother was arrested and was convicted of willful 

cruelty to a child on December 27, 2017. She was placed on four

years’ probation.

In later interviews mother admitted to vandalizing father’s 

car and striking him on December 13, 2017. The dependency 

investigator observed a videotape of the incident and noted that 
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mother hit father continuously to the point where he fell to the 

ground.

Father said mother was physically aggressive towards him 

and denied ever assaulting her. Father thought mother needed 

domestic violence and anger management counseling. DCFS 

observed that though a criminal protective order was in place 

since April 2017, both parents violated the order by continuing to 

see each other, culminating in the December 2017 incident in the 

presence of the child.

On January 25, 2018, mother signed a waiver of rights. 

The juvenile court adjudicated the first amended section 300 

petition, sustained the petition as amended by interlineation, 

declared Ariana a dependent of the court, and removed her from 

parental custody. The court ordered family reunification services 

with monitored visitation for the parents three times per week 

for three hours each visit. The parents were not to visit together. 

Father’s case plan required him to complete a 26-week domestic 

violence program, eight random or on-demand consecutive drug 

tests and a full drug rehabilitation program if any test was 

missed or positive, a parenting program, and individual 

counseling to address case issues. Mother was ordered to 

complete a 52-week domestic violence program, five random or 

on-demand consecutive drug tests, and individual counseling to 

address case issues.

First six-month reunification period (January through 

August 2018)

On April 11, 2018, father filed a modification petition 

requesting he be granted unmonitored visits and asking that 

DCFS terminate weekly drug testing. Since father had 

completed his 26-week domestic violence program, parenting 
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classes, and five drug tests, on April 26, 2018, the court granted 

father’s modification petition.

Mother also made progress having completed individual 

counseling, submitted to drug testing, enrolled in a 52-week 

domestic violence program and a parenting education program, 

as well as consistently visiting Ariana. Mother progressed from 

monitored to unmonitored day visits with Ariana.

Ariana had been placed with licensed foster parents M.A. 

and her husband. Ariana was thriving in her placement. She 

was well cared for and had formed a bond with her foster parents. 

Ariana was developing at an age appropriate level, was healthy 

and appropriately engaged with adults.

Despite the parents’ progress, DCFS remained concerned 

about returning Ariana to their care. DCFS noted that the 

parents continued to have a contentious relationship and to 

speak ill of each other. In addition, the parents had not yet had 

unmonitored overnight visits with Ariana, due to unresolved 

safety issues including mother obtaining appropriate sleeping 

accommodations, all adults in both homes being approved, and 

both homes being free from safety hazards.

August 2018 six-month review hearing and placement 

with father

On August 8, 2018, over DCFS’s objection, the juvenile 

court terminated the suitable placement order and released the 

child to father with family maintenance services and 

unannounced home visits by DCFS.

The court also ordered unmonitored visits for mother with 

the child, including overnight and enhancement services. The 

court set a progress hearing for November 7, 2018, and a section 

364 hearing on February 6, 2019.
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August to December 2018, home-of-father placement

During the last week of August 2018 the parents reported 

that father allowed mother to reside in his home for 

approximately one week so that mother could spend more time 

with Ariana. Father intended to seek amendment of the previous 

no-contact order to allow peaceful contact between the parents. 

DCFS held a child family team meeting with mother and father 

to address the importance of complying with the no-contact order. 

Father agreed to adhere to the no-contact order. In a separate 

meeting with mother in September 2018, mother also committed 

to complying with the court orders and working towards creating 

a safe home for Ariana.

The parents made more progress in their court-ordered 

programs. Father completed 36 group sessions of “Project

Fatherhood,” the 26-week domestic violence program and 

individual counseling to address case issues, as well as 22 

consecutive parenting classes. Mother completed 20 individual 

therapy sessions, 39 parenting classes, and 32 out of 52 weeks of 

domestic violence for aggressors.

Father provided the social worker with an updated 

restraining order dated October 30, 2018, from the superior court 

allowing peaceful contact between the parents.

On November 16, 2018, DCFS filed a section 388 petition 

asking the juvenile court to suspend unmonitored visitation for 

mother. The social worker learned that mother had gone to 

father’s home and attempted suicide by ingesting psychotropic 

medications in the presence of the sleeping child. This was the 

second time that mother violated the juvenile court’s no-contact 

order. Father called 911, and mother was admitted to the 

hospital.
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Father later admitted that he and mother were living 

together from early October 2018 through November 11, 2018, 

when their last physical altercation occurred.

On November 30, 2018, the juvenile court ordered 

monitored visitation for mother three times per week. 

December 2018 detention and removal from father’s 

custody

On December 12, 2018, DCFS detained Ariana from father 

into foster care. The child was returned to the same foster 

parents she had resided with previously.

On December 14, 2018, DCFS filed a section 342 petition on 

behalf of then 15-month-old Ariana alleging that she was at risk 

due to father’s failure to protect her by allowing mother to reside 

in father’s home with unlimited access to the child. The petition 

alleged that mother was suffering from mental and emotional 

problems, and father failed to protect the child.

DCFS also filed a section 387 petition alleging the parents 

had a history of physical altercations and had failed to comply 

with the juvenile court’s order that the parents have no contact 

with each other.

Father did not understand why the child had been detained 

from him since he no longer had a relationship with mother,

despite admitting that he and mother lived together from October

2018 through November 11, 2018.

DCFS opined that mother had not embraced or 

implemented any of the tools she learned from the domestic 

violence program or individual counseling to prevent her from 

getting into physical altercations with father.

On December 17, 2018, the juvenile court ordered the child 

detained in foster care under the supervision of DCFS.
12

DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report in advance of 

the January 31, 2019 hearing. Ariana remained in foster care 

with the same caregivers. They reported that she was healthy 

and appeared to have normal mental and emotional development 

for a child her age. Father and mother were participating in 

monitored visitation with Ariana in separate locations on 

separate days.

DCFS observed that Ariana had been detained from father 

on three different occasions: November 12, 2017, December 14, 

2017, and December 12, 2018. The latter two detentions were 

due to father allowing mother to reside in his home despite a 

restraining order and a no-contact order in both the criminal 

court and the juvenile court. On both occasions father stated that 

he wanted to work on his relationship with mother and believed 

that she had changed.

DCFS reported that father admitted to having failed to 

protect the child by allowing mother to be around her. Father 

expressed that he believed mother was “psychotic” and “suicidal” 

and therefore unable to take care of Ariana. Father did not want 

Ariana influenced by mother’s actions, stating that mother 

always “ha[d] to drink something.”

Mother denied that she ever tried to commit suicide, but 

had put all of her pills in her mouth because father tried to take 

them away from her. Mother reported that father and Ariana 

came to pick her up when she was released from the hospital on 

November 15, 2018. When reminded about the no-contact order, 

mother stated, “As long as he has my daughter, I’m going to be 

around because he says he can’t take care of her on his own.”

DCFS noted that the parents continued to contact each 

other in the presence of the child and were unable to understand 
13

the toxicity of their relationship or implement the skills of 

peaceful contact to avoid violence. DCFS took the position that 

the parents needed extra time in their court-ordered programs to 

learn the importance of implementing the skills learned from 

these programs before the child could be safely returned to their

care.

January 31, 2019 hearing on DCFS’s petitions

On January 31, 2019, the juvenile court granted DCFS’s 

section 388 petition and ordered mother’s visits to remain 

monitored. The parents pled no contest to the amended section 

387 petition. The juvenile court ordered Ariana removed from 

parental custody with family reunification services in place and 

monitored visitation three times per week. The parents were not 

to visit together. They were each ordered to complete several 

court-ordered programs. The court admonished the parents that 

they were to have no contact with each other.

May 2, 2019 progress report and hearing

Ariana had been in the home of M.A. and her husband from 

December 14, 2017, through August 8, 2018, when she was 

placed with father. When Ariana was detained from father on 

December 14, 2018, father asked if the same caregivers could 

again care for Ariana. M.A. and her husband were both 

employed, so Ariana spent time at daycare. The caregivers were 

attentive and ensured that Ariana was safe. DCFS requested 

that Ariana be allowed to go on vacation with the caregivers.

Father had completed nine domestic violence classes and 

10 individual counseling sessions. He remained consistent with 

his monitored visits and was attentive to Ariana during the 

visits. Father informed the social worker that he would not 

coparent with mother because she was unfit to parent the child.
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Mother completed a 52-week domestic violence program, 

parenting education, and individual therapy. Mother was 

consistently participating in twice-weekly monitored visits with 

Ariana. Mother displayed appropriate parenting skills. Ariana 

seemed comfortable in mother’s care and moved towards mother 

when she needed help.

At the May 2, 2019 progress hearing, the juvenile court 

ordered unmonitored visitation with Ariana for the parents and 

gave discretion to DCFS to allow overnight visits.

August 2019 status review

DCFS filed a report in anticipation of an August 2019 

status review hearing. Ariana remained in foster care with the 

same caregivers who were providing Ariana with all of her basic 

needs, including food, shelter, clothing, nurturing, medical care, 

and access to the parents for visitation.

Mother was living in transitional housing. While at the 

homeless shelter mother had enrolled in school to study 

phlebotomy and culinary skills. Mother consistently visited

Ariana every Friday.

Father was renting a room that was equipped with a crib 

for Ariana, a bathroom, and access to a kitchen. Father was 

working as a driver and could set his own hours.

DCFS held meetings with the parents in June 2019. 

Father continued to be critical of mother, stating “mother is not 

fit to be a parent, mother continues to choose drinking before her 

daughter, my daughter is not safe in mother’s care, mother 

doesn’t have anywhere to live with my daughter, I am a better 

parent because I have a place to stay and a job.” Father was 

defensive with the social workers regarding Ariana’s care. For 

example, when a social worker mentioned that Ariana was 
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returned from a visit with a wet diaper, father stated that the 

social worker was accusing him of not taking care of his baby. 

Father was animated, hitting the table with opened hands. 

When asked why he did not stop to get diapers, father deflected 

with threats to sue DCFS if he did not get his child back. 

Father’s defensive attitude also arose during a discussion of 

Ariana’s diet. During father’s monitored visits Ariana was 

drinking excessive amounts of juice and eating fruit at the same 

time and ended up with diarrhea before the end of the visit. 

When the social worker noted the issue, father stated, “You don’t 

tell me what to do with my baby” and “She’s only drinking juice.”

During her meetings, mother appeared passive and 

disconnected. She sat at the end of the table, faced away from 

the participants, did not engage until asked a question, and sat 

with her arms crossed and a flat facial expression. Mother 

seemed focused on blaming father and was provoked when 

hearing father speak about things mother has done, including 

drinking and attempting suicide. Mother did not express the 

positive things she was doing.

DCFS opined that neither parent took responsibility for 

their own actions, but instead continued to blame each other. 

The parents had developed a pattern of getting along for a few 

days, then going back to arguing and fighting. Then father was 

quick to share all that happened and argue that mother would 

not be a good parent. During the meetings DCFS social workers 

attempted to explain this to the parents and try to reach a 

resolution. After an hour and a half it was clear that the parents 

were not able to devise a safety plan or supply any ideas that 

would allow for the child to return to their care. Therefore, DCFS 

could not recommend that the child return to the parents’ care. 
16

Instead, DCFS recommended that the court terminate the 

parents’ reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.

DCFS’s section 388 petition and September 2019 18-month 

review and release to parents

On August 26, 2019, DCFS filed a section 388 petition 

asking the juvenile court to revert the parents’ visitation with 

Ariana to monitored, after it learned that the parents were 

visiting the child together in violation of the court’s order. The 

social worker had observed mother and Ariana walking up to 

father’s car. When the social worker addressed the issue with the 

parents, mother said father had just called her. Father denied 

that he was present for the purpose of visiting mother and 

Ariana. He said he just happened to be in the area where mother 

was visiting and called her. DCFS expressed concern that the 

parents were visiting the child together in violation of the court’s 

order. Mother also reported that she and father were engaged to 

be married.

Father informed DCFS that he and mother were attending 

couple’s counseling and were planning to be in a relationship 

together. Father questioned why DCFS would not allow the 

parents to visit the child together. Initially father denied that he 

and mother were engaged, but later admitted that they were. 

Father also denied that they were living together, but later 

admitted that they had moved in together on August 20, 2019, 

were getting along, and had no further issues.

DCFS expressed concern regarding the parents’ pattern of 

disobeying court orders and being dishonest with DCFS.

On September 23, 2019, the juvenile court denied DCFS’s 

section 388 petition and held the 18-month review hearing. The 

court found that the progress made by the parents had been 
17

substantial, that returning the child to the parents would not 

create a substantial risk to the child, and ordered her released to 

the parents with family maintenance services.

Family maintenance September 2019 through June 2020

In January 2020, the parents were cooperative and Ariana 

was adjusting well to living with them. The parents were 

participating in conjoint therapy but stopped participating after 

moving to San Bernardino. DCFS recommended that the case be 

transferred to San Bernardino County.

DCFS filed a report for the March 23, 2020 section 364 

hearing expressing continued concerns regarding the parents’ 

relationship. On February 10, 2020, father contacted the social 

worker because there had been an incident which prompted

father to contact the police. Father had observed mother 

jaywalking with Ariana while mother was drunk. Father asked 

mother to let him take Ariana, but mother refused. Father knew 

she was drunk and stated that mother had been arrested but was 

not presently in jail. Father did not then know mother’s

whereabouts. The social worker contacted mother who was 

staying at a motel because father would not let her back in the 

house. Father confirmed that mother had come back to the house 

but stated that he and his family did not allow her in. They 

informed her that she could not live there if she was going to be 

an alcoholic.

The social worker made an unannounced visit to the home. 

The paternal aunt stated that she had not seen mother drinking 

on the day of the incident and did not believe mother was drunk 

that day. The paternal aunt opined that mother and father were 

not good together. The social worker checked the local police 

station where it was determined that there had been no calls for 
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service at the parents’ address in the past year. The mother had 

been arrested due to an outstanding warrant but nothing related 

to the father’s claims.

On March 5, 2020, father informed the social worker that 

the family had temporarily moved to a motel in El Monte while 

they looked for affordable housing. Father stated that the reason 

they were moving was that the paternal aunt with whom they 

were residing no longer wanted mother in the home and raised

their rent.

On April 16, 2020, the juvenile court continued the section 

364 hearing due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

May 2020 removal from father

On May 29, 2020, the juvenile court granted an order 

removing Ariana from father’s custody, but denied removal from 

mother’s custody.

DCFS had received multiple messages from mother and 

father, each accusing the other of various things. On May 2, 

2020, father reported that mother was acting up in the car and 

almost hit him. Father reported that mother was an alcoholic 

and “is out of the picture, she doesn’t live here anymore.” Father 

reported that mother had called the police because mother 

wanted to take Ariana but father would not let the child go. The 

police officer who arrived would not allow mother to take the 

child because she was drunk and did not have a car seat. Father 

accused DCFS of failing to do anything about mother’s drinking 

problem. Father subsequently reported that he allowed mother 

to spend time with him and Ariana for Mother’s Day because 

mother promised not to drink, and he agreed to give her one more 

chance.
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Mother reported that father pushed her when she tried to 

say goodbye to Ariana on Mother’s Day and that father was lying

about her consuming alcohol.

June 2020 section 342 petition and removal from parents

On June 3, 2020, DCFS filed another section 342 petition 

on behalf of then two-year-old Ariana, alleging the child was at 

risk due to the parents’ history of engaging in violent 

altercations. The petition alleged that on May 11, 2020, mother 

grabbed Ariana’s arm while father held her, and father pushed 

mother. The petition further alleged that mother had a history of 

substance abuse and was a current user of alcohol, and father 

failed to protect the child from mother’s conduct.

On June 8, 2020, the juvenile court made detention 

findings and ordered Ariana into suitable placement under the 

supervision of DCFS, with monitored visitation for the parents.

On July 29, 2020, DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition 

report. Ariana had been placed in the same foster home where 

she had previously lived from December 2017 through August

2018, then again from December 2018 through September 2019. 

DCFS reported that Ariana appeared to have a proper bond with 

her foster mother, M.A. The child was too young to provide any 

meaningful statement.

Mother admitted to ongoing violence throughout her 

relationship with father and that she and father were engaged 

the last time the court released the child to them (September

2019). After mother ended the relationship with father in May

2020, father would not allow mother to see the child.

Father confirmed that the parents’ relationship was “on 

and off.” Father said he tended to resume a relationship with 

mother because she did not have a place to live, she promised to 
20

stop drinking alcohol, and he wanted to raise Ariana in an intact 

family. The last time they ended their relationship was May 1, 

2020, when mother called law enforcement on him. Father stated 

that DCFS was involved because mother could not control 

herself, was often under the influence of alcohol, and does not 

have a stable living environment. Father wanted Ariana 

released to him and mother stripped of her rights. Father 

continued to have monitored visits with Ariana, which were going 

well.

On July 29, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the section 

342 petition and removed Ariana from her parents. The child 

was ordered placed in suitable placement under the supervision 

of DCFS with monitored visits for the parents.

The court noted that despite the child’s young age, the 

parents were given two and a half years of family reunification 

services even though the law only entitled the parents to six 

months of reunification services. The court set a section 366.26 

hearing for November 24, 2020.

Permanency planning

In November 2020, DCFS reported that Ariana continued 

to live with the same foster family. She appeared to be 

comfortable and thriving in the home. Ariana had a good 

attachment to her caregivers, who were providing her with a 

loving, stable home. At her three-year-old well-child 

appointment, no concerns were noted, and she appeared to be 

developing appropriately. She attended daycare three to five 

days a week where she was able to follow instructions and 

interacted with the other children. There were no concerns 

regarding Ariana’s mental and emotional health, with the 

exception of her being in an agitated state postvisitation with her 
21

parents. Ariana’s caregivers were committed to providing her 

permanency through adoption.

The foster parents noted that visits between Ariana and 

her parents were difficult on the child. She appeared to be tired 

and emotionally drained after the monitored visits. She would be 

grumpy, fussy, and have difficulty going to bed. Ariana would 

hit, scratch, and bite her four year-old foster sibling. When she 

saw a marked police car, she would say, “[M]y daddy called the 

police on my mommy, and mommy was in handcuffs.” When she

observed arguments on television, she would say, “[T]hey fight 

like my mommy and daddy.” The foster parents believed Ariana 

was being negatively affected by the extensive visits with her 

parents, and she was not thriving in her educational growth and 

development. DCFS recommended that the parents’ monitored 

visits be reduced to weekly two-hour visits and that the matter be 

continued for six months for a review of the permanent plan 

hearing.

On November 24, 2020, the juvenile court continued the 

section 366.26 hearing to complete the adoption readiness. On 

January 8, 2021, Ariana’s foster parents were approved for 

adoption. 

Contested hearing

The contested section 366.26 permanency planning hearing 

was held on February 17 and 18, 2021. Mother and father 

appeared with counsel via Webex. Father’s counsel called 

father’s therapist, father, and the human services aide to testify.

Therapist

Father’s therapist had seen father since 2018, weekly 

during periods of high stress, every two weeks during periods of 

low stress, and every three weeks during periods of extremely low 
22

stress. Father and the therapist discussed his relationship with 

mother, father’s grief and pain over the loss of custody of his 

child, and the domestic violence issues. The therapist felt that 

father had been successful in using anger management tools to 

address the domestic violence issues.

The therapist had seen father interact with Ariana once 

about a year earlier when father brought Ariana to a therapy 

session. The child was comfortable with father. When asked 

whether it would be detrimental to sever the parental bond 

between father and Ariana, the therapist replied, “Of course, 

absolutely. It always i[s].” He added that to be raised in the 

home of a biological parent is always preferable for a child’s wellbeing and mental health. On cross-examination, the therapist 

agreed that it was also important for a child to reside in a home 

that was physically safe.

In answer to the court’s question when the parents last 

engaged in domestic violence, the therapist responded, “August of

2020.” The court observed that this was after father had been 

seeing the therapist for over two years.

Father

Father testified that he was in therapy to address why his 

child was taken from him, his issues with mother, and their 

domestic violence. Father learned that his relationship with 

mother was toxic and that he needed to set boundaries. Father 

was visiting with Ariana every Tuesday and Thursday.

Father testified that when he visited with Ariana, she ran 

to him and hugged him, calling him “daddy.” Ariana would tell 

father how much she loved him and that she wanted to go to 

home with him. Father stated that his inability to bring Ariana 

to his home was hurting her as much as it was hurting him. 
23

Father testified that he had been visiting regularly, and at the 

end of the visits, Ariana holds his leg and does not want to let go. 

Father would bring food, toys, and a tablet to the visits to play 

learning games. Father had pictures to share of himself and 

Ariana.

Human services aide

The human services aide testified that she monitored most 

of father’s visits with Ariana. Father was always prepared for 

the visits, on time, and had food and toys for Ariana. Ariana was

usually happy to see father, and they always greeted each other 

with hugs. Ariana would say, “Hi daddy” and “I love you daddy.” 

The monitored visits were positive. The human services aide 

testified that Ariana did not cry at the end of the visits, though 

there were times when she would hold on to him and tell him she 

did not want to go home. When father would leave the visits, 

Ariana would ask for whatever toy or type of food she wanted 

father to bring to the next visit. She would say, “‘Daddy, can you 

bring me my scooter next time?’ Things like that.”

Argument of counsel

DCFS argued that Ariana was adoptable, her foster 

parents’ home was approved for adoption, and DCFS did not 

believe there was any applicable exception to adoption. DCFS 

took the position that any benefit Ariana derived from her 

ongoing parental relationship with mother and father were 

outweighed by the benefit provided to her through adoption and 

permanence. Ariana’s counsel joined DCFS in requesting that 

the parental rights of both parents be terminated, noting that 

any parental benefit would not outweigh her need for 

permanence. Ariana’s counsel observed that while father’s visits 

with Ariana were positive, “that was more of a play/friendship 
24

relationship with the father as she was looking forward to toys 

and different play interaction with the father rather than a 

parental relationship.” Ariana’s counsel further noted that 

Ariana viewed the caretakers’ home as her real home.

Mother’s counsel requested that the court not terminate 

mother’s parental rights. She argued that mother had occupied a 

parental role in the child’s life, the two were bonded, and there 

had never been a lapse in visitation. Father’s counsel also argued 

that parental rights should not be terminated. Father’s counsel 

stated that father had proved that he maintained consistent and 

regular visits as well as showing that he occupied a parental role 

in Ariana’s life. Father’s counsel argued that the therapist’s 

testimony showed that “there’s a secured attachment that is 

essential to the health and development of Ariana’s personality 

structure.” Father requested the permanent plan be legal 

guardianship rather than adoption.

The court’s decision

The juvenile court found that clear and convincing evidence 

existed that Ariana was adoptable, and that any benefit accruing 

to the child from her relationship with her parents was 

outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit she would 

receive through the permanency of adoption, and that adoption 

was in the best interest of the child. The court found that no 

exception to adoption applied, and terminated the parental rights 

of both parents.

Father and mother separately appealed.
25

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable law and standard of review

If a court cannot safely return a dependent child to a 

parent’s custody within statutory time limits, the court must set 

a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. (In re 

Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) “[W]hen the 

court orders the section 366.26 hearing, reunification services 

have been terminated, and the assumption is that the problems 

that led to the court taking jurisdiction have not been resolved.” 

The goal is to select and implement a permanent plan for the 

child. (Ibid.) “To guide the court in selecting the most suitable 

permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of 

preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among 

them.” (Ibid.) When it is determined that a child is adoptable, 

the court “shall” terminate parental rights to allow for adoption. 

(Ibid.; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)

If the parent shows that termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental for at least one specifically enumerated 

reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and 

select another permanent plan. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 630-631.) One such exception exists where the juvenile court 

finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to 

the child and (1) the parents have maintained regular visitation 

and contact with the child; and (2) the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Thus, 

the parent must prove three elements in order to prevail under 

this exception: (1) regular visitation and contact; (2) a 

relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child 

such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, at p. 631.) In 
26

assessing whether termination would be detrimental to the child, 

“the trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the 

child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the 

child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632.) “By 

making this decision, the trial court determines whether 

terminating parental rights serves the child’s best interests.” 

(Ibid.)

A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the 

first two elements of this exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th

at p. 639.) “The determination that the parent has visited and 

maintained contact with the child ‘consistently,’ taking into 

account ‘the extent permitted by the court’s orders’ [citation] is 

essentially a factual determination. It’s likewise essentially a 

factual determination whether the relationship is such that the 

child would benefit from continuing it.” (Id. at pp. 639-640.) 

Under the substantial evidence standard, we do not reweigh the 

evidence. Instead, the juvenile court’s factual determinations 

should be upheld if “‘supported by substantial evidence, even 

though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the 

trial court might have reached a different result had it believed 

other evidence.’” (Id. at p. 640.)

The third element—whether termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to the child—is different. (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) The “ultimate decision—whether 

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child 

due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary 

and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) A court 

abuses its discretion “only when ‘“‘the trial court has exceeded 

the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, 

or patently absurd determination.’”’” (Id. at p. 641.)
27

II. Father’s appeal

Father appeals from the order terminating parental rights 

on the ground that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply 

the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of 

parental rights found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). 

We discuss each element father was required to prove below. We 

find that the evidence below supports the juvenile court’s 

decision, and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

termination of father’s parental rights would not be detrimental 

to the child.

A. Regular visitation and contact

Father showed regular visitation and contact during the 

pendency of this case. However, father’s visits with Ariana 

reverted back to monitored visits in July 2020 due to the parents’ 

inability to stop engaging in violence in the presence of the child.

Further, regular visitation with the child is only part of the 

test. Father was also required to show that the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship and that the termination 

of parental rights would be detrimental to Ariana. (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)

B. A benefit to the child from continuing the 

relationship

In determining whether the parent and child have a 

beneficial relationship such that parental rights should not be 

terminated, the juvenile court “must engage in a balancing test, 

juxtaposing the quality of the relationship and the detriment 

involved in terminating it against the potential benefit of an 

adoptive family.” (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 

424-425.)
28

“Interaction between natural parent and child will always 

confer some incidental benefit to the child.” (In re Autumn H. 

(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Frequent and loving contact is 

not sufficient to establish the benefit from continuing the 

relationship contemplated by the statute. (In re Beatrice M. 

(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418.) Instead, the parent must 

show that he or she “occupied a parental role” in relation to the 

child. (Id. at p. 1419.) The beneficial parental relationship exists 

only where the parent’s contact with the child has “‘developed a 

significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’” 

(Ibid.)

Substantial evidence in the record suggests that such a 

relationship did not exist between father and Ariana. The 

evidence showed that father and Ariana enjoyed fun, playful 

visits. Father would bring food, toys, and a tablet to play games 

with Ariana. When the visits ended, Ariana would ask father to 

bring certain toys or items of food the next time. This evidence 

suggested that Ariana looked to father as more of a playmate 

than a parental figure. The human services aide testified that 

Ariana did not cry at the end of the monitored visits. While the 

two had positive and loving interactions, the evidence does not 

suggest that Ariana looked to father to fulfill a parental role. 

Instead, there was evidence that Ariana looked to her prospective 

adoptive parents to fulfill the parental role in her life. Ariana 

was appropriately bonded to her prospective adoptive parents, 

who provided her with a loving, stable home, and acted as her 

primary caregivers.

Father cites In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530 

(Brandon C.), as a comparable case. In Brandon C., two boys 

were declared dependents of the court because they had been the 
29

victims of domestic violence. (Id. at p. 1532.) At the time of the 

section 366.26 permanency hearing, the mother objected to 

termination of her parental rights due to her close bond with the 

children. The mother testified that she had visited them every 

week for the past three years, except when she was out of state, 

and that the boys were happy and affectionate to her when she 

visited. Notably, the paternal grandmother agreed that it was 

not in the boys’ best interest to terminate their relationship with 

the mother and father because they had a good relationship that 

should continue. (Brandon C., at p. 1533.) The juvenile court 

found that it would be in the children’s best interests to maintain 

the relationship between the minors and the mother, and DCFS 

appealed. (Ibid.)

On appeal, the Brandon C. court gave proper deference to 

the juvenile court’s view of the evidence, noting “[t]he trial court 

obviously credited the testimony from both mother and 

grandmother that there was a close bond between mother and the 

boys, and that a continuation of contact would be beneficial to the 

children. DCFS did not present any evidence to the contrary.” 

(Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1537.) Here, in 

contrast, the juvenile court had to weigh conflicting evidence as 

to the strength and importance of Ariana’s bond with father. 

While father, and his therapist, testified that it would benefit 

Ariana to maintain the relationship with father, DCFS presented 

evidence of insufficient benefit to Ariana from the relationship. 

DCFS presented ample evidence that Ariana’s bond with her 

prospective adoptive parents was stronger and more significant 

in her life, that she was thriving in their care, and that she 

viewed father as more of a playmate than a parent. The juvenile 

court was entitled to credit DCFS’s evidence.
30

The evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination 

that father did not provide Ariana the type of significant, positive 

emotional attachment required for the section 366.26, subdivision 

(c)(1)(B)(i) exception to termination of parental rights.

C. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion 

in determining that termination of father’s 

parental rights would not be detrimental to the 

child

The final decision by the juvenile court involves a “delicate 

balancing” of the court’s factual determinations regarding the 

specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent and 

how a “prospective adoptive placement may offset and even 

counterbalance those harms.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at

p. 640.) In this matter, given the evidence that father’s current 

relationship with Ariana did not rise to the level of a significant, 

parental relationship, the court found that “any benefit accruing 

to the child from her relationship with the parents is outweighed 

by the physical and emotional benefit the child would receive 

through the permanency and stability of adoption, and that 

adoption is in the best interest of the child.”

The juvenile court had given father many chances in this 

case to gain permanent custody of Ariana. Father’s failure to 

obey the court’s orders that he and mother stay away from each 

other and refrain from engaging in domestic violence in the 

child’s presence caused Ariana to be detained multiple times. 

Ariana had returned several times to the home of her prospective 

adoptive parents, with whom she had appropriately bonded. 

They provided her with loving care and met all of her needs. In 

addition, there was evidence that Ariana’s visits with her parents 

were becoming detrimental to her development. She returned 
31

from recent visits grumpy, had trouble sleeping, and would 

assault her foster sibling. The juvenile court was entitled to 

credit the evidence that severing the parent-child relationship 

between Ariana and father would not be detrimental to Ariana. 

Although father’s therapist testified that he believed severing the 

parent-child relationship would be detrimental to Ariana, the 

court was not required to give weight to this evidence 

particularly since the therapist had not seen father and Ariana 

together in a year.

Ariana’s caretakers were prepared to give her a permanent, 

loving and stable home through adoption. “‘Adoption is the 

Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best 

chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible 

caretaker.’” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) The 

juvenile court appropriately used its discretion in determining 

that providing Ariana this full commitment outweighed the 

benefit that she would gain through maintaining her pleasant, 

positive relationship with father. The juvenile court did not 

exceed the limits of legal discretion by making this reasonable 

decision. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)

Father cites several cases in support of his position that his 

relationship with Ariana rose to the level required for application 

of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception to apply. 

First, father cites In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 (S.B.) 

where the father had been his daughter’s primary caregiver for 

the first three and a half years of her life until he was arrested on 

drug charges. At the 12-month review hearing, the court 

concluded that the father had complied with every aspect of his 

case plan, including maintaining sobriety. (Id. at p. 293.) In 

addition to maintaining regular, consistent and appropriate visits 
32

throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court found that the 

father had an “emotionally significant relationship” with his 

child. (Id. at p. 298.) The social worker noted that even after she 

was removed from his care, the father continued to “‘consistently 

put[] his daughter[’]s needs and safety before his own.’” (Ibid.) 

The S.B. court concluded, “The record here fully supports the 

conclusion [the father] continued the significant parent-child 

relationship despite the lack of day-to-day contact with S.B. after 

she was removed from his care.” (Id. at p. 299.) The court noted 

that the juvenile court “recognized that S.B. would benefit from 

continuing her relationship with [her father] and based its 

decision to terminate parental rights in part on the grandparents’ 

willingness to allow [the father] to continue to visit S.B.” (Id. at

p. 300.) The S.B. court did not believe the father should be 

deprived of his legal relationship with his child based on an 

unenforceable promise of future visitation by the child’s 

prospective adoptive parents. (Ibid.)

The present matter is distinguishable. Ariana did not 

consistently spend the first three years of her life with father. 

Instead, she was repeatedly removed from his custody and placed 

with the foster parents due to the parents’ inability to follow 

court orders and refrain from violence in the child’s presence. 

Further, the juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental rights 

was not based on an unenforceable promise that Ariana continue 

to be permitted to visit with father. On the contrary, father’s 

visits had recently been reduced due to the negative effects the 

visits were having on Ariana. Unlike the S.B. court, the juvenile 

court here did not acknowledge an emotionally significant 

relationship between father and Ariana. Instead, it implicitly 

concluded that the emotionally significant relationship for Ariana 
33

was the one that existed between Ariana and her prospective 

adoptive parents.

Father attempts to distinguish this matter from In re 

Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308 (Bailey J.). In Bailey J.,

the court found that a mother’s relationship with her child did 

not rise to the level of that which would support application of 

the beneficial relationship exception. The court noted that the 

child was detained when he was two days old and spent no part 

of his life in his mother’s custody. Thus, “[a]t best, mother’s 

supervised interactions with Bailey amounted to little more than 

play dates for him with a loving adult.” (Id. at p. 1316.) In 

contrast, father argues, he had custody of Ariana twice 

throughout these proceedings, providing Ariana day-to-day care 

for a total of one year of her life. And when she was not in his 

custody, father argues, he continued to develop his parental 

relationship with her through frequent visits.

While father had more time with custody of Ariana than 

the mother in Bailey J., the evidence before the juvenile court 

supported a finding that the relationship between father and 

Ariana did not benefit Ariana such that it outweighed the 

benefits of adoption. Like the caregivers in Bailey J., Ariana 

looked to her prospective adoptive parents as the ones who 

provided for her physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection 

and stimulation. (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316.) 

In addition, as in Bailey J., there is no basis to find that the 

juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that the 

relationship between father and Ariana did not provide a 

compelling reason to find that termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to Ariana. (Ibid.)
34

Finally, father relies on In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68 

(E.T.). In E.T., a mother’s twins were removed from her care at 

the age of four months due to mother’s mental health issues and 

drug addiction. After more than a year of reunification services, 

the children were returned to her care. However, over a year 

later, mother admitted to her social worker that she had relapsed 

and needed help and agreed to a safety plan placing the children 

in the home of their godparents. (Id. at p. 71.) Mother relapsed 

again during the proceedings despite her efforts to overcome her 

addiction. (Id. at p. 74.) By the time of the permanency hearing, 

the children had lived with their godparents for 24 months of 

their lives and had lived with mother for 22 months of their lives. 

The court determined that although the children were “‘very 

tied’” to mother, their relationship with mother was not 

substantial enough to outweigh the children’s need for stability 

with their godparents. (Id. at p. 75.) The E.T. court reversed, 

finding that severing the natural parent/child relationship would 

deprive the children of a substantial, positive emotional 

attachment such that they would be greatly harmed. (Id. at

p. 77.) The court noted, “the twins have a substantial and 

positive attachment to Mother such that terminating their 

familial relationship would cause them great harm.” (Ibid.) As 

in S.B., the E.T. court noted that although the juvenile court 

likely considered that the mother would still have contact with 

her children in the future due to her close relationship with the 

godparents, “‘the court cannot nevertheless terminate parental 

rights based upon an unenforceable expectation that the 

prospective adoptive parents will voluntarily permit future 

contact between the child and a biological parent, even if 

substantial evidence supports that expectation.’” (E.T., at p. 78.) 
35

Finally, the mother’s self-reporting of her relapses showed that 

she recognized when the children were in jeopardy and needed 

help. Thus, the mother showed insight into her parental 

responsibilities and was attentive to her children’s best interests. 

(Ibid.)

Father points out that like the mother in E.T., Ariana was 

tied to father and would get emotional when visits ended. 

However, there was conflicting evidence on this point. The 

human services aide testified that Ariana did not cry when the 

visits ended. In addition, she testified that Ariana requested 

things from father like food items and toys for him to bring to 

future visits, supporting the conclusion that she viewed him as 

more of a playmate. Finally, there was evidence that the visits 

were negatively affecting Ariana’s emotional state, as she would 

come home agitated and her behavior would deteriorate. Unlike 

E.T., there was no suggestion that the prospective adoptive 

parents had a close relationship with father that would cause 

father to be included in Ariana’s life in the future. These factual 

differences between the cases sufficiently distinguish them such 

that we are not persuaded that we should follow E.T. in this case.

Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s factual 

determination that father’s relationship with Ariana would not 

benefit Ariana to the extent required for application of the 

exception to termination of parental rights found in section 

366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile court did not abuse 

its discretion in finding that termination of father’s parental

rights would not be detrimental to the child.

III. Mother’s appeal

Like father, mother appeals from the order terminating 

parental rights on the ground that the juvenile court erred in 
36

declining to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception 

to termination of her parental rights found in section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We discuss each element mother was 

required to prove below. As in father’s appeal, we find that the 

evidence below supports the juvenile court’s decision, and the 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of 

mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to the child.

A. Regular visitation and contact

As in father’s appeal, the first element of the beneficial 

parental relationship exception is not at issue in mother’s appeal. 

DCFS does not dispute that mother maintained consistent 

visitation throughout the case to the extent that such visitation 

was permitted. However, as was the case with father, mother’s 

visits reverted from unmonitored to monitored in July 2020 given 

the parents’ inability to stop engaging in domestic violence in the 

child’s presence.

B. A benefit to the child from continuing the 

relationship

Mother’s burden of showing a sufficiently beneficial 

relationship with Ariana was the same as father’s. She was 

required to show more than frequent and loving contact. (In re 

Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) Instead, she was 

required to show that she occupied a parental role in Ariana’s 

life. (Id. at p. 1419.) Such a parental relationship exists only 

where the parent’s contact with the child has “‘developed a 

significant, positive, emotional attachment.’” (Ibid.) Substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision that this type of 

significant relationship did not exist between mother and Ariana 

at the time of termination of parental rights.
37

Like father, mother had pleasant, fun visits with Ariana. 

Ariana enjoyed the monitored visits, which took place twice 

weekly. However, mother presented no evidence that Ariana 

looked to her as a parental figure. In contrast, the evidence 

showed that Ariana looked to her foster caregivers as her 

parental figures. Each time that Ariana was redetained from her 

parents’ care, the prospective adoptive parents had recommitted 

to caring for her. Mother provided no evidence that the bond 

between mother and Ariana was a significant, emotional 

attachment that rose to the level of the beneficial parental 

relationship exception.

In addition, like father, mother had multiple opportunities 

to reunify with Ariana, only to have her detained again due to the 

parents’ violation of court orders requiring them to stay away 

from each other and refrain from domestic violence in her

presence. Unlike the parents in S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at

page 298 and E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at page 78, mother was 

not able to put Ariana’s needs first and stay away from father. 

This evidence weighed against a finding of a beneficial 

relationship.

Further, there was evidence that the visits with mother did 

not benefit Ariana. She would be upset, tired and emotionally 

drained after her visits with her parents, causing her to act out 

and have trouble sleeping. Ariana associated her parents with 

police activity and arguments that she would see on television.

Mother bore the burden of proof in this matter. She 

presented no evidence of a bonding study, nor did she present any 

evidence from a therapist or psychologist suggesting that 

Ariana’s bond with her was significant. In contrast, DCFS 

presented ample evidence that Ariana’s bond with her 
38

prospective adoptive parents was far stronger and more 

significant in her life than her relationship with mother. Ariana 

was thriving in their care. The juvenile court was entitled to 

credit DCFS’s evidence.

Under the circumstances, we find that the evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s determination that mother did not 

provide the type of significant, positive emotional attachment 

required for the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception 

to termination of parental rights.

C. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion 

in determining that termination of mother’s 

parental rights would not be detrimental to the 

child

The evidence in this matter supported the juvenile court’s 

finding that mother’s current relationship with Ariana did not 

rise to the level of a significant, parental relationship such that 

the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied. Given that 

finding, we cannot find that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in finding that “any benefit accruing to the child from 

her relationship with the parents is outweighed by the physical 

and emotional benefit the child would receive through the 

permanency and stability of adoption, and that adoption is in the 

best interest of the child.”

The evidence supporting the juvenile court’s reasonable 

exercise of its discretion on the detriment issue in this matter 

overlaps with its findings regarding the beneficial relationship. 

As set forth in detail above, Ariana was detained multiple times 

from her parents because they violated court orders and 

continued to engage in violence in Ariana’s presence even after 

participating in court-ordered programs. Ariana was continually 
39

placed back in the home of the same foster parents, who became 

her prospective adoptive parents. While the parents continued to 

visit with Ariana, the visits began to cause Ariana distress and 

began to interfere with her normal development. The visits were 

reduced accordingly. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that the prospective adoptive parents were the ones 

providing Ariana with her daily care, meeting all of her needs, 

and providing a stable and loving environment. The juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of 

mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to the child.

D. The juvenile court did not apply the wrong legal 

standard

Mother contends that the juvenile court applied an 

incorrect legal standard when it terminated parental rights. 

Mother argues that the juvenile court “erroneously combined two 

standards, part of the third component of the beneficial 

relationship test, and a best interests standard.”

We disagree that the juvenile court erred. The juvenile 

court specifically found that Ariana was adoptable, that any 

benefit to the child accruing from her relationship with the 

parents was outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit 

she would receive through the permanency and stability of 

adoption, and that no exceptions were applicable. As part of its 

ruling, the court noted that “adoption is in the best interest of the 

child.”

The juvenile court did not err in mentioning Ariana’s best 

interests. As set forth in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 

633, “In each case, then, the court acts in the child’s best interest 

in a specific way: it decides whether the harm of severing the 

relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a 
40

new family would confer.’” To balance the various factors is a 

“daunting prospect” for trial courts. (Id. at p. 635.) However, as 

the Caden C. court noted, the juvenile court must do its best to 

act in the child’s best interest throughout this difficult 

decisionmaking. The juvenile court did not err in noting that 

adoption was in Ariana’s best interest, and its reference to 

Ariana’s best interest does not undermine the careful weighing of 

evidence that the juvenile court appropriately undertook during 

the section 366.26 proceedings.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

________________________

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________ ________________________

LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J.