UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STEVEN JERMAINE HARRIS SR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00705 (UNA) 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., 

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se pleading entitled 

“judicial review according to Administrative Procedure Act,” ECF No. 2, which the court will 

construe as a civil complaint. Upon review, and for the reasons explained below, the court will 

dismiss the case without prejudice. 

At the outset, the court notes that plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, ECF No. 2, is not captioned for this court, in contravention of Federal Rule 10(a) and 

D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(g), and will therefore be denied. 

 Plaintiff is an Oklahoma state prisoner who is a member of the Cherokee Nation. He sues 

the United States Departments of Justice and Department of the Interior and alleges that an

Oklahoma state court was “without criminal jurisdiction” to prosecute, convict, and sentence him, 

in violation of several federal laws and treaties. More specifically, because his alleged crimes 

occurred on a reservation, he contends that they were subject only to federal prosecution. He seeks 

to vacate his “illegal detention” by and through this court’s “review pursuant to the Administrative 

Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq) of [defendants’] failure to investigate and, if necessary, 
prosecute Oklahoma state officials for illegal detention of [plaintiff] and other[s] similarly situated 

in state custody, and require said agencies to conduct and investigation as to whether Oklahoma 

officials are violating federal law.” Plaintiff faces hurdles that he cannot overcome. 

First, plaintiff should properly pursue these claims by filing a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254 authorizes federal courts to “entertain an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before obtaining review, a plaintiff must first exhaust his 

available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Such a petition may proceed only “in the 

district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district 

[where] the State court was held which convicted and sentenced [petitioner][,] and each of such 

district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 

And if the petition is a second or successive one, the plaintiff first must “move in the appropriate 

court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(A). Consequently, plaintiff must pursue relief in the United States District Court for 

the District of Oklahoma or in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 

Second, because plaintiff may pursue relief by and through a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, there can be no of action under the APA to challenge the legality of his conviction or 

detention “because that Act is limited to review of agency action ‘for which there is no other 

adequate remedy.’” Vetcher v. Sessions, 316 F. Supp. 3d 70, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that 

plaintiff may not bring claim under APA when habeas remedy was available) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 

704; citing Stern v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 601 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (D.D.C. 2009)). 

Third, and similarly, the court notes that plaintiff passingly references the federal 
mandamus act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, but mandamus is proper only if “(1) the plaintiff has a clear right 

to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy 

available to plaintiff.” Council of and for the Blind of Delaware County Valley v. Regan, 709 F.2d 

1521, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc). As discussed, plaintiff has an available remedy in habeas. 

See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (“Challenges to the validity of 

any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus [.]”) 

(citation omitted)); Morales v. Jones, 417 Fed. App’x 746, 749 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Absence of 

jurisdiction in the convicting court is indeed a basis for federal habeas corpus relief cognizable 

under the due process clause.”). And where “habeas is an available and potentially efficacious 

remedy, it is clear beyond reasonable dispute that mandamus will not appropriately lie.” 

Chatman–Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

Fourth, plaintiff cites, without explanation, to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, “but 

there is no debate that the only court with authority to grant the writ is the court that issued the 

underlying judgment or order that will be affected by granting the writ.” Aka v. Holder, No. 09 

1526, 2009 WL 2496712, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2009) (citing United States v. Salgado, 692 F. 

Supp. 1265, 1269 n.3 (E.D. Wash. 1988) (“The authorities are unanimous that only the court 

rendering judgment has the power to issue an extraordinary writ. Thus, § 1651 does not create 

jurisdiction, but merely allows a court to exercise continuing jurisdiction in aid of, or in 

supervising, its own judgments.”); Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. Federal 

Communications Commission, 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The All Writs Act is not an 

independent grant of jurisdiction to a court; it merely permits a court to issue writs in aid of 

jurisdiction acquired to grant some other form of relief.”)). Thus, plaintiff has no recourse in this 

District to circuitously challenge his prosecution, conviction, or incarceration, under the All Writs 
Act. 

Fifth, plaintiff recites 25 U.S.C. § 2802, which provides the Secretary of the Interior 

responsibility in “providing, or for assisting in the provision of, law enforcement services in Indian 

country[,]” see id. § 2802(a), including a specific list of those law enforcement and public safety

responsibilities, see id. § 280(b) et seq. While these responsibilities certainly exist, there is no 

indication that this statute provides an individual any private right of action, and moreover, this 

provision does not, in any way, foreclose plaintiff’s ability to pursue his claims through a writ of 

habeas corpus. 

Sixth, plaintiff may not initiate criminal proceedings by filing a complaint with this court

because the court has no authority to compel the government to initiate a criminal investigation or 

to prosecute a criminal case. See Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Cox v. Sec'y of Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) 

(citing cases). The decision of whether or not to prosecute, and for what offense, rests with the 

prosecution. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). “[I]n American 

jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 

nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Sargeant 

v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234–35 

(D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966); Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 

227 (4th Cir. 1988); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2012). Nor may plaintiff 

compel a criminal investigation by any law enforcement agency by filing a complaint. See Otero 

v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also Jafree v. 

Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). “[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, 

whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's 
absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 

 Finally, to the extent that plaintiff attempts to bring this action on behalf of those “similarly 

situated,” he may not do so, because a pro se litigant can represent only himself in federal court. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their 

own cases personally or by counsel . . . ”); Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984) (individual “not a member of the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not 

qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel for others”) (citation and footnote omitted); see 

also U.S. ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2003), 

aff'd sub nom. Rockefeller ex rel. U.S. v. Washington TRU Solutions LLC, No. 03–7120, 2004 WL 

180264 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2004) (“[A] class member cannot represent the class without counsel, 

because a class action suit affects the rights of the other members of the class”) (citing Oxendine 

v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)). 

For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order 

accompanies this memorandum opinion. 

Date: April 17, 2023 

Tanya S. Chutkan

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge