UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4906

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

WAYNE VINSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:06-cr-01170-CMC-1) 

Submitted: July 29, 2009 Decided: August 13, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Nicole N. Mace, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney, Robert C. 

Jendron, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Wayne Vinson pled guilty to being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2), (e) (2006). The district court found that Vinson had 

at least three prior felonies under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act (“ACCA”), § 924(e), and sentenced him to 210 months in 

prison.* Vinson now appeals, raising several issues related to 

his predicate offenses under § 924(e). On appeal, he also 

claims that one of his prior convictions for possession with 

intent to distribute was obtained in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, and also that the district court 

should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea. After 

reviewing Vinson’s claims, we affirm his conviction and deny his 

motion to file a supplemental, pro se brief. 

 We deal first with Vinson’s claim that his two prior 

convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine do 

not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. An offense 

under state law is a “serious drug offense” if it “involv[es] 

manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to 

manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in 

 *

 Vinson’s sentencing range under the federal Sentencing 

Guidelines was 235 months to 293 months. At sentencing, the 

district court granted Vinson a variance, although not as large 

as he had sought. 

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section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)), 

for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is 

prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 

 Pursuant to Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 

(1990), the court uses a “categorical approach” to determine 

whether a prior conviction serves as a predicate conviction 

under § 924(e). United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 188 

(4th Cir. 2001). Under this approach, the court will “look [ ] 

only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not 

to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Id.

(quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). 

 Vinson claims that because the South Carolina statute 

under which he was convicted also criminalizes the purchase of 

drugs, the district court needs to look beyond the statute to 

evaluate Vinson’s conduct. We disagree. Vinson actually 

pleaded guilty to an offense that is enumerated in 

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Therefore, as the Government points out, it 

is not necessary for the district court to examine additional 

material regarding the conviction. We also note that Vinson’s 

reliance on United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 

1998), and Brandon is misplaced. Hernandez involved a defendant 

whose prior judgments were ambiguous about whether his drug 

crimes involved the purchase or sale of drugs, while Brandon

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involved a defendant who pled guilty to a possession offense. 

See 145 F.3d at 1440; 247 F.3d at 189. 

 Vinson also argues that one of his convictions for 

possession with intent to distribute should be overturned 

because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel. We reject this argument. Because Vinson did 

not raise this claim in the district court, we review it for 

plain error. See United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 440-41 

(4th Cir. 1993). To be plain, an error must be “clear” or 

“obvious.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993). 

Vinson’s sole basis for his claim that he was unrepresented is a 

line in his presentence investigation report stating that for 

his February 1989 conviction, “[a]ttorney representation is 

unknown.” However, the report also notes that at the time of 

the conviction, South Carolina law required either that counsel 

be provided or that the defendant make a voluntary and 

intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Mere ambiguity in 

the presentence investigation report does not evidence a clear 

or obvious error, and so Vinson’s argument fails. 

Since we find that Vinson’s two prior convictions for 

possession with intent to distribute and his prior aggravated 

assault conviction qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA, 

we need not reach the merits of his other ACCA claims. 

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5 

 Vinson’s final claim is that he should have been 

permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. In this case, Vinson has 

not met his burden in showing that the district court erred by 

not allowing him to withdraw his plea. See United States v. 

Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (listing factors for 

the district court to consider in deciding whether to allow a 

defendant to withdraw his guilty plea). The district court 

conducted a thorough plea colloquy, informing Vinson of the 

potential penalties he was facing and ensuring Vinson’s plea was 

knowing and voluntary. Further, we are particularly skeptical 

of Vinson’s claim because Vinson did not raise the issue until 

about a year after he entered the plea, after he was arrested on 

another charge. 

 Vinson has also moved this court to allow him to file 

a pro se brief. Since Vinson is represented by counsel, we deny 

his motion. 

 For the reasons above, we affirm Vinson’s conviction 

and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED