IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 17, 2016 Session

KATHY HUDSON v. WILLIAM T. HUDSON

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for McNairy County

No. 11DV126 Van McMahan, Judge

___________________________________

No. W2015-01519-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This is the second appeal of this case. In the first appeal, the Husband appealed the trial 

court’s valuation of the marital assets and its overall distribution of the marital estate. 

Appellant Husband now appeals the trial court’s adoption of Appellee Wife’s property 

survey dividing certain real property. Husband also appeals the trial court’s valuation of 

a tractor and attachments, which were awarded to Wife in the final decree of divorce. 

Because Wife’s survey does not comport with the division of real property as set out in 

the final decree of divorce, the trial court abused its discretion in adopting it. 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to the adoption of Wife’s survey. As to 

the value of the tractor, we conclude that the trial court’s valuation is within the range of 

values represented by the evidence and affirm this portion of the trial court’s order. 

Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court is 

Reversed in part, Affirmed in Part, and Remanded. 

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B. GOLDIN,

J., and DAVID R. FARMER, SP. J., joined.

Stuart Brian Breakstone, Memphis, Tennessee, and Leanne Thorne, Lexington, 

Tennessee for the appellant, William T. Hudson.

George D. Norton, Jr., Selmer, Tennessee, for the appellee, Kathy Hudson.

OPINION

I. Background

12/07/2016
- 2 -

This is the second appeal of this case, which began on November 8, 2012 when 

the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that Appellant William T. Hudson 

(“Husband”) appealed challenging the trial court’s valuation of the marital assets and its 

distribution of the marital estate. Hudson v. Hudson, No. W2013-00999-COA-R3-CV, 

2014 WL 2854257 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2014)(“Hudson I”). Finding no error in the 

trial court’s valuation of the marital property or the division of the marital estate, we 

affirmed the trial court’s final decree of divorce. Hudson I, 2014 WL 2854257 at *4 -*5. 

Mr. Hudson and Appellee Kathy Hudson (“Wife”) were married on November 18, 

2000. The parties were divorced by final decree entered on November 8, 2012. As is 

relevant to this appeal, in the final decree of divorce, the trial court divided 68 acres of 

marital property into three separate tracts, see discussion infra.

1

 The trial court awarded 

Wife the marital home with three acres. Wife’s mother occupied a mobile home that was 

located on the 68 acre tract. The trial court also awarded Wife “10 acres ... wherein the 

mobile [home] is located.” The court’s order specified that “the said ten acres shall be 

the 10 acres immediately surrounding said mobile home.” Additionally, the final decree 

of divorce grants Wife an easement for ingress and egress to the ten-acre tract of land 

immediately surrounding the mobile home. The trial court awarded Husband the 

remaining fifty-five acres. According to the order, the parties were each to pay one half 

of the cost to survey and divide the property as directed. Wife was also awarded a 

Kubota tractor with attachments (i.e. front end loader, bucket, and hay fork). 

Following the divorce, Husband allegedly attempted to collaborate with Wife to 

procure the ordered survey; however, Husband soon discovered that Wife had hired a 

surveyor unbeknownst to Husband. Wife’s survey severed a single contiguous 13-acre 

tract of land, the majority of which surrounded the marital home and contained the entire

road frontage.

On September 2, 2014, Husband filed a motion for contempt and for a new survey. 

On September 25, 2014, Wife filed an answer denying any contempt. Concurrent with 

her answer, Wife filed a cross-petition for contempt against Husband, wherein she 

asserted that Husband was in contempt of the divorce decree for failing to tender the 

tractor that was awarded to Wife. The cross-petitions for contempt were heard by the 

trial court on October 14, 2014. The trial court did not enter an order until April 23, 

2015, wherein it found that neither party was in contempt and denied Husband’s motion 

for new survey.

On April 23, 2015, Husband filed a motion for reconsideration and for findings of 

fact pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 52.02 and 60.02. In his motion, 

Husband requested that the trial court reconsider its prior adoption of Wife’s survey and 

 

1

In Hudson I, Wife did not challenge the trial court’s division of the 68 acre parcel of land into 

three separate tracts.
- 3 -

that it make findings of fact, which were absent from the April 23, 2015 order. Also on 

April 23, 2015, Wife filed a “motion” for civil and criminal contempt alleging that 

Husband had not yet relinquished the tractor and attachments. Wife requested that 

Husband be ordered to return the tractor and its attachments, or, in the alternative, that he 

be ordered pay the monetary value of the equipment as determined by the court. At the 

hearing on the parties’ motions, Husband tendered two surveys: Wife’s original survey 

and a second survey procured by Husband. Wife testified that the value of the tractor and 

its attachments was $40,000. Husband testified that the value of the tractor and its 

attachments was between $12,000 and $15,000. By order of July 2, 2015, the trial court 

again denied Wife’s motion for contempt, but ordered Husband to tender the tractor to 

Wife by May 15, 2015, or to pay her $26,000. By order of July 20, 2015, the trial court 

denied Husband’s motion to reconsider and held that Wife’s survey “comports with the 

[c]ourt’s ruling in the final decree of divorce. . . and shall be adopted.

2

” Husband 

appeals.

II. Issues

Appellant presents the following issues as stated in his brief:

1. Did the trial court err in denying Husband’s motion for contempt and 

for a new survey, and later the motion to alter or amend, when it 

determined that Wife’s survey comported with the judgment of 

divorce?

2. Did the trial court err in assigning a value of $26,000 to the Kubota 

tractor and implements?

III. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a Rule 60.02 motion for relief from a final 

judgment, Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn. 2003), and a motion to revise 

under Rule 52.02, under the abuse of discretion standard. Holladay v. Speed, 208 

S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)(citing Long Equip. Co. v. Keaton, 736 S.W.2d 

611, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)).

Abuse of discretion is found “‘only when the trial court applied incorrect legal 

standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that causes an injustice to the 

complaining party.’” State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 39 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. 

 

2 We note that the record does not reveal any pleadings wherein the parties’ ownership interest

was divested from one party to the other, nor did the record contain any quitclaim deeds describing such a 

transfer.
- 4 -

Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn. 2008)). The abuse of discretion standard does not 

permit an appellate court to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. 

Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012); see also Eldridge v. 

Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001); Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 479. Instead, “[u]nder 

the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's ruling ‘will be upheld so long as 

reasonable minds can disagree as to [the] propriety of the decision made.’” Eldridge, 42 

S.W.3d at 85 (quoting State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000)). 

We review the trial court's findings of fact de novo with a presumption of 

correctness, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); 

Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn. 2000). However, “[i]nterpretation of 

the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law, which we review de novo 

with no presumption of correctness.” Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis 

Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 

259, 261 (Tenn. 2009)). 

IV. Analysis

A. Competing Surveys

Husband argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for contempt and 

for a new survey. Husband’s argument is based on the premise that Wife’s survey does 

not comport with the final decree of divorce. 

The final decree of divorce states, in pertinent part, as follows:

The [Wife] is awarded most of the 701 Meeks Road property. This is the 

property wherein the marital home is located. This property contains two 

different tracts of property: 1) the marital home situated on three acres. 

This property is valued at $160,000.00; and 2) sixty-five acres.

[Wife] is awarded 10 acres of the subject 65 acres wherein the mobile is 

located, including the mobile home. [Husband] is awarded the remaining 

55 acre tract. Wife is awarded ingress and egress onto the 10 acre tract. 

The said 10 acres shall be the 10 acres immediately surrounding said 

mobile home. The parties are to each pay one-half of the cost to survey and 

divide the property as above directed, as may be necessary.

***

[Wife] is awarded all of the remaining property at the Meeks Road address, 

including the above mentioned ten acres and the three acres containing the 

marital home.
- 5 -

(emphases added).

The crux of Husband’s argument is that, in adopting Wife’s survey, the trial court 

failed to adhere to its original order regarding the division of the real property. In 

Hudson I, this Court affirmed the division of marital property outlined in the final decree 

of divorce. Accordingly, the trial court must apply the terms of the final decree of 

divorce in any post-divorce motions, such as the one giving rise to this appeal. In other 

words, the final decree of divorce constitutes the law of the case which the Tennessee 

Supreme Court has described as follows: 

a legal doctrine which generally prohibits reconsideration of issues that 

have already been decided in a prior appeal of the same case. 5 Am.Jur.2d 

Appellate Review § 605 (1995). In other words, under the law of the case 

doctrine, an appellate court's decision on an issue of law is binding in later 

trials and appeals of the same case if the facts on the second trial or appeal 

are substantially the same as the facts in the first trial or appeal. Life & 

Casualty Ins. Co. v. Jett, 175 Tenn. 295, 299, 133 S.W.2d 997, 998–99 

(1939); Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 939 S.W.2d 83, 90 

(Tenn.App.1996). 

***

[I]t is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based 

on the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and 

decided by a court of competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be 

revisited. Ladd, 939 S.W.2d at 90 (citing other cases). This rule promotes 

the finality and efficiency of the judicial process, avoids indefinite 

relitigation of the same issue, fosters consistent results in the same 

litigation, and assures the obedience of lower courts to the decisions of 

appellate courts. Ladd, 939 S.W.2d at 90; 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 

605 (1995); 1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[1] (2d 

ed.1995); 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 790 (1981).

Memphis Publ. Co. v. Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 

303, 306 (Tenn. 1998). 

We concede that as a general rule, the trial court is in the best position to interpret 

its own orders. Jackman v. Jackman, 373 S.W.3d 535, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).

Orders, like other written instruments, should be enforced according to their plain 

meaning. See Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 

578, 580 (Tenn. 1975). Thus, courts called upon to interpret orders should construe the 

language in the order in light of its usual, natural, and ordinary meaning. See Staubach 
- 6 -

Retail Servs.-Southeast, LLC v. H.G. Hill Realty Co., 160 S.W.3d 521, 526 (Tenn.

2005); Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 889-90 

(Tenn. 2002). If the language in an order is clear, then the literal meaning of the 

language in the order controls. See Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp. 

Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 359 (Tenn. 2008); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 195 S.W.3d 609, 

611 (Tenn. 2006); Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 342 (Tenn.

2005). 

From the plain and ordinary language used in the order it is clear that the trial 

court awarded Wife two separate tracts of land, a ten-acre tract and a three acre tract 

(containing the marital residence). Concerning the ten acre tract, the final decree of 

divorce specifies that Wife shall receive “the 10 acres immediately surrounding said 

mobile home.” Despite these clear mandates, Wife’s survey apportions a single 

contiguous 13-acre tract of land, the majority of which surrounds the marital home and 

contains the entire road frontage. This division of the 68-acre tract is not consistent with 

the trial court’s order that was affirmed on appeal. Furthermore, the final decree of 

divorce grants Wife an easement for ingress and egress to the ten-acre tract of land

immediately surrounding the mobile home. Had the trial court intended for Wife’s 

portion of the property to include all of the road frontage, there would have been no need 

for the easement for ingress and egress. In adopting Wife’s survey, the trial court fails to 

follow its own previous ruling. Not only does the trial court’s adoption of Wife’s survey 

negate its central ruling regarding the property division in the final decree of divorce, it 

also creates an illogical and unjust result, whereby Husband has no road frontage to his 

remaining 55-acre tract and he has no express easement for access to his acreage. 

Consequently, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion and we reverse the trial 

court’s order adopting Wife’s survey. Conversely, Husband’s survey grants Wife two 

separate and distinct tracts of land, each with road frontage for ingress and egress. Other 

than providing for an easement, which is unnecessary since both of Wife’s parcels have 

road frontage, Husband’s survey comports with the final decree of divorce. Therefore, 

we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to adopt the survey submitted by 

Husband. 

B. Valuation of the Tractor

Husband next argues that the trial court erred in valuing the tractor at $26,000 

when the actual value of the tractor is $12,000. The trial court's valuation of a marital 

asset is a question of fact and is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Watson v. 

Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)(citing Watters v. Watters, 959 

S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)); Woodward v. Woodward, 240 S.W.3d 825, 828 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220 at 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). 

In accordance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d), the trial court's 

valuation of marital property will be presumed to be correct unless the evidence 

preponderates otherwise. Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
- 7 -

1987). Decisions as to the value of the parties' assets are entitled to great weight on 

appeal and will not be second-guessed unless they are not supported by a preponderance 

of the evidence. Woodward, 240 S.W.3d at 828; Ray v. Ray, 916 S.W.2d 469, 470 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 

With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the record. At the hearing Wife testified 

that the tractor and front-end loader were purchased new over ten years earlier for 

$44,000. She argued that the tractor and the attachments had a current value of 

$40,000.00. Based on his prior dealings with purchasing and using tractors, Husband 

testified that the tractor and attachments were worth between $12,000 and $15,000. 

Given Wife’s admission at the hearing that she had never bought, sold or used a tractor, 

and her admission that she did not know how many hours were on the tractor, and had no 

independent proof of the value of the tractor and its attachments, Husband argues that her 

valuation was mere speculation and should be afforded no weight or credit. In 

Tennessee, a property owner is automatically deemed qualified to offer an opinion as to 

the value of his or her own property simply by virtue of owning it. State ex rel. Smith v. 

Livingston Limestone Co., 547 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tenn. 1977); Stinson v. Stinson, 161 

S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). However, a property owner's opinion regarding 

valuation cannot be given any weight where it is clear that the owner's testimony is 

founded on pure speculation. Sikora v. Vanderploeg, 212 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2006); see also Airline Constr., Inc. v. Barr, 807 S.W.2d 247, 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1990) (“There must be some evidence, apart from mere ownership, that this ‘value’ is a 

product of reasoned analysis.”).

Given the conflicting evidence regarding the valuation of the tractor and its 

attachments, we conclude that the trial court did not err in valuing these items at $26,000, 

which is “within the range of the values represented by all the relevant valuation 

evidence.” Woodward, 240 S.W.3d at 828 (citing Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 

589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)); Brock v. Brock, 941 S.W.2d 896, 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1996)); see also Wallace, 733 S.W.2d at 107 (“the trial court, in its discretion, is free to 

place a value on a marital asset that is within the range of the evidence submitted”); 

Ogles v. Ogles, No. M2013-02215-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 113336, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Jan. 7, 2015). Accordingly, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial 

court’s finding and we affirm the trial court’s order as to the valuation of the tractor and 

attachments. 

B. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order adopting Wife’s 

survey and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to adopt the survey 

submitted by Husband. The trial court’s order is affirmed in all other respects. The case 

is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this 

opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed equally against the parties, one-half to
- 8 -

Appellant William T. Hudson and his surety, and one-half to Appellee Kathy Hudson, for 

all of which execution may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________

KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE