UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MAURICE SABBA SCOTT, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF KANSAS; DEREK 

SCHMIDT, Attorney General of the State 

of Kansas, 

 Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 16-3037 

(D.C. No. 5:15-CV-03270-SAC-DJW) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYINY A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

After a Kansas state-court jury convicted Maurice Sabba Scott of possession of 

methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia, he was sentenced to 20 

months’ imprisonment. He appealed his conviction to the Kansas Court of Appeals, see 

State v. Scott, 356 P.3d 436 (Kan. 2015), but did not seek review with the Kansas 

Supreme Court. He then filed a pro se application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas alleging prosecutorial misconduct, the 

denial of a fair trial, a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and cumulative error. He indicated in his application that he did not file a 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

May 24, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

petition for review in the Kansas Supreme Court because his appellate attorney failed to 

do so, in violation of Kansas ethical rules.

The magistrate judge ordered Mr. Scott to show cause why his application should 

not be denied for failure to exhaust state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the applicant “must give the state courts one full 

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the 

State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 

(1999). This includes seeking discretionary review by the state’s highest court. See id. at 

845–846. 

Mr. Scott responded that he had satisfied the exhaustion requirement by presenting 

his claims to the Kansas Court of Appeals and also argued that his procedural default 

could be overcome because he had shown a miscarriage of justice. The district court 

denied his application and dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Mr. Scott now seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) from this court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(1)(A) (requiring COA to appeal denial of § 2254 relief). We deny 

the application for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 

“A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching 

the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner 

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a 
3 

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the 

district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not 

conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner 

should be allowed to proceed further.” Id. 

In his brief to this court, Mr. Scott reiterates his substantive claims and asserts that 

his procedural default should be excused because his appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek review with the Kansas Supreme Court. This argument fails on two 

grounds. 

First, Mr. Scott did not raise the ineffectiveness claim in response to the district 

court’s order to show cause. We could refuse to consider the argument on that ground 

alone. See Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2005) (issue not raised in 

district court in § 2254 proceeding is waived). 

Second, although “counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing properly to preserve the 

claim for review in state court will suffice” as cause to excuse procedural default, 

“principles of comity and federalism that underlie our longstanding exhaustion doctrine . 

. . . require [an ineffective-counsel claim], like others, to be first raised in state court.” 

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451–52 (2000). But Mr. Scott has failed to raise in 

Kansas court his claim of ineffective appellate counsel. Nor has he argued that there was 

cause for his failure or that he could still raise the issue in state court. Therefore, the 
4 

ineffectiveness claim is procedurally barred. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 

(1996). 

We conclude that the district court’s ruling would not be debatable by reasonable 

jurists. We DENY the application for a COA and DISMISS the appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge