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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3068 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3068

             To support stability across the Taiwan Strait.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 26, 2021

  Mr. Markey (for himself and Mr. Sullivan) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
             To support stability across the Taiwan Strait.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Actions Supporting Security 
by Undertaking Regular Engagements Act'' or the ``Taiwan ASSURE Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
        2018 (Public Law 115-409), the United States has grown its 
        strategic partnership with Taiwan's vibrant democracy of 
        23,000,000 people.
            (2) Section 2(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 
        3301(b)) declares that it is the policy of the United States--
                    (A) ``to preserve and promote extensive, close, and 
                friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations 
                between the people of the United States and the people 
                on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland 
                and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area''; 
                and
                    (B) ``to declare that peace and stability in the 
                [Western Pacific] area are in the political, security, 
                and economic interests of the United States, and are 
                matters of international concern''.
            (3) In recent years, the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China (PRC) has intensified its efforts to 
        diplomatically isolate and intimidate Taiwan through--
                    (A) punitive economic measures;
                    (B) increased military provocations; and
                    (C) exertions of malign influence to undermine 
                democracy in Taiwan.
            (4) To ensure the durability of the United States policy 
        under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 115-409), it is 
        necessary--
                    (A) to reinforce--
                            (i) Taiwan's international participation;
                            (ii) Taiwan's global economic integration; 
                        and
                            (iii) the credibility of Taiwan's military 
                        deterrent; and
                    (B) to simultaneously take measures to reduce the 
                risk of miscalculation among the PRC, the United 
                States, and Taiwan.
            (5) Taiwan's meaningful participation in international 
        organizations in which statehood is not a requirement benefits 
        the global community, as evidenced by the fact that Taiwan was 
        the first to inform the World Health Organization of cases of 
        atypical pneumonia reported in Wuhan, China, on December 31, 
        2019.
            (6) Despite the COVID-19 pandemic creating an opportunity 
        for the Government of the PRC to launch a disinformation 
        campaign aimed at sowing internal social division and 
        undermining confidence in the response of Taiwanese 
        authorities, Taiwan has been overwhelmingly successful in 
        controlling the pandemic.
            (7) The Global Cooperation and Training Framework, a United 
        States-Taiwan-Japan platform for Taiwan to share its expertise 
        with the world, has sponsored nearly 30 workshops since 2015 to 
        share Taiwan's knowledge on issues such as addressing COVID-19 
        misinformation, disaster relief, women's empowerment, and good 
        governance.
            (8) Section 2(b)(2) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 
        3301(b)(2)) states it is the policy of the United States ``to 
        declare that peace and stability in the [Western Pacific] area 
        are in the political, security, and economic interests of the 
        United States, and are matters of international concern''.
            (9) The PRC's recent military activities around Taiwan, 
        including conducting 10 transits and military exercises near 
        Taiwan since January 2021 and 380 sorties into Taiwan's Air 
        Defense Identification Zone in 2020 (the greatest number since 
        1996), have destabilized Northeast Asia.
            (10) Increased air and sea activity in and around the 
        Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea by the PRC, Taiwan, the 
        United States, and Japan increase the likelihood of accidents 
        that may--
                    (A) escalate tensions around Taiwan; and
                    (B) undermine the stability across the Taiwan 
                Strait and regional peace in the Northeast Asia.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) United States engagement with Taiwan should focus on 
        actions, activities, and programs that mutually benefit the 
        United States and Taiwan;
            (2) the United States should prioritize--
                    (A) people-to-people exchanges;
                    (B) bilateral and multilateral economic 
                cooperation; and
                    (C) assisting Taiwan's efforts to participate in 
                international institutions;
            (3) the United States should pursue new engagement 
        initiatives with Taiwan, such as--
                    (A) enhancing cooperation on science and 
                technology;
                    (B) joint infrastructure development in third 
                countries;
                    (C) renewable energy and environmental 
                sustainability development; and
                    (D) investment screening coordination;
            (4) the United States should expand its financial support 
        for the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, and 
        encourage like-minded countries to co-sponsor workshops, to 
        showcase Taiwan's capacity to contribute to solving global 
        challenges in the face of the Government of the PRC's campaign 
        to isolate Taiwan in the international community;
            (5) to advance the goals of the April 2021 Department of 
        State guidance expanding unofficial United States-Taiwan 
        contacts, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan should aim to 
        host Global Cooperation and Training Framework workshops timed 
        to coincide with plenaries and other meetings of international 
        organizations in which Taiwan is unable to participate;
            (6) the United States should support efforts to engage 
        regional counterparts in Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues on the 
        stability across the Taiwan Strait, which are important for 
        increasing strategic awareness amongst all parties and the 
        avoidance of conflict;
            (7) United States arms sales to Taiwan should support 
        Taiwan's asymmetric defense capabilities, as outlined in 
        Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept, and improve Taiwan's military 
        deterrent;
            (8) bilateral confidence-building measures and crisis 
        stability dialogues between the United States and the PRC are 
        important mechanisms for maintaining deterrence and stability 
        across the Taiwan Strait and should be prioritized; and
            (9) the United States and the PRC should prioritize the use 
        of a fully operational military crisis hotline to provide a 
        mechanism for the leadership of the two countries to 
        communicate directly in order to quickly resolve 
        misunderstandings that could lead to military escalation.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) China; prc.--The terms ``China'' and ``PRC'' mean the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (3) Taiwan authorities.--The term ``Taiwan authorities'' 
        means officials of the Government of Taiwan.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL COOPERATION AND 
              TRAINING FRAMEWORK.

    There are authorized to be appropriated for the Global Cooperation 
and Training Framework under the Economic Support Fund authorized under 
section 531 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346), 
$6,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2025, which may be 
expended for trainings and activities that increase Taiwan's economic 
and international integration.

SEC. 6. ENHANCING PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) National Guard Partnership Program.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of State and the appropriate 
        Taiwan authorities, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
        congressional committees regarding the feasibility and 
        advisability of establishing a National Guard partnership 
        program between United States National Guard forces and the 
        Armed Forces Reserve Command of Taiwan (referred to in this 
        section as ``Taiwan's Reserve Command'').
            (2) Objectives.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall examine how the establishment of a National Guard 
        partnership program would--
                    (A) advance Taiwan's Reserve Command's ability to 
                recruit, train, and equip its forces, including its 
                ability to require and provide regular individual and 
                collective training to all reserve forces;
                    (B) cultivate relationships among United States and 
                Taiwan reserve forces at the tactical, operational, and 
                strategic levels;
                    (C) enhance Taiwan's ability to respond to 
                humanitarian disasters; and
                    (D) strengthen Taiwan's ability to defend against 
                outside military aggression.
            (3) Contents.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a comprehensive assessment of the policy 
                opportunities and drawbacks associated with 
                establishing a National Guard partnership program;
                    (B) an assessment of any statutory or 
                administrative barriers to establishing such a program, 
                including a determination of the feasibility and 
                advisability of--
                            (i) modifying existing National Guard 
                        partnership authorities; or
                            (ii) establishing new authorities, as 
                        appropriate;
                    (C) an evaluation of the capacity of--
                            (i) United States National Guard forces to 
                        support such a program; and
                            (ii) Taiwan's Reserve Command forces to 
                        absorb such a program;
                    (D) a determination of the most appropriate 
                entities within the Department of Defense and Taiwan's 
                Reserve Command to lead such a program; and
                    (E) a determination of additional resources and 
                authorities that may be required to execute such a 
                program.
            (4) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex 
        if the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State 
        determine that the inclusion of a classified annex is 
        appropriate.
    (b) Taiwan's Asymmetric Defense Strategy.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a classified report, with an 
unclassified summary, assessing the implementation of Taiwan's 
asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities identified in 
Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept.

SEC. 7. SUPPORTING CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND STABILITY 
              DIALOGUES.

    (a) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit an 
unclassified report, with a classified annex, to the appropriate 
congressional committees that includes--
            (1) a description of all military-to-military dialogues and 
        confidence-building measures between the United States and the 
        PRC during the 10-year period ending on the date of the 
        enactment of this Act;
            (2) a description of all bilateral and multilateral 
        diplomatic engagements with the PRC in which cross-Strait 
        issues were discussed during such 10-year period, including 
        Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues;
            (3) a description of the efforts in the year preceding the 
        submission of the report to conduct engagements described in 
        paragraphs (1) and (2); and
            (4) a description of how and why the engagements described 
        in paragraphs (1) and (2) have changed in frequency or 
        substance during such 10-year period.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of State, and, as appropriate, the 
Department of Defense, no less than $2,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
years 2022 through 2025, which shall be used to support existing Track 
1.5 and Track 2 strategic dialogues facilitated by independent 
nonprofit organizations in which participants meet to discuss cross-
Strait stability issues.
                                 <all>
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