IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jessica Carpenter :

:

v. : No. 190 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: October 14, 2016

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Motor Vehicles, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: December 2, 2016

The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles 

(PennDOT) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna 

County (trial court) sustaining the statutory appeal filed by Jessica Carpenter from 

a three-month suspension of her vehicle registration. Because the trial court erred 

in sustaining Carpenter’s appeal on grounds of equity, we reverse.

On September 18, 2015, GEICO Indemnity Company (GEICO) 

cancelled an insurance policy on Carpenter’s Jeep Station Wagon and reported the 

termination of coverage to PennDOT. In a letter dated September 29, 2015, 

PennDOT informed Carpenter that it had received notice of the policy’s 

cancellation and requested updated information regarding the status of her 

insurance. Reproduced Record at 24a (R.R. __). Thereafter, by notice mailed 

November 15, 2015, PennDOT advised Carpenter that, as a consequence of her 

failure to maintain financial responsibility, the registration of her vehicle would be 
2

suspended for three months, effective December 20, 2015, pursuant to Section 

1786(d) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d). PennDOT also advised 

Carpenter that in lieu of serving the three-month suspension, she could pay a civil 

penalty in the amount of $500, along with a restoration fee in the amount of $88

pursuant to Section 1786(d)(1.1) of the Vehicle Code. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(1.1).

1

 

Carpenter filed a statutory appeal, and the trial court held a hearing. 

At the hearing, PennDOT presented certified documents showing that 

the insurance on Carpenter’s vehicle had been canceled on September 18, 2015. 

Carpenter conceded that her insurance had lapsed and testified that she obtained 

new insurance “34 days after ... the lapse of insurance .... It was an honest 

mistake.” N.T., 1/20/2016, at 4; R.R. 16a. Carpenter explained that she was a 

single mother with two children and a full time job. She lacked the funds to cover

the fine and could not be without a vehicle for three months. Further, she had 

shown proof of her new insurance to PennDOT. PennDOT responded that the 

effective date of the new insurance policy was October 23, 2015, five days beyond 

the 31-day statutory grace period.2 In response to PennDOT, the trial court stated 

 

1

It states:

In lieu of serving a registration suspension imposed under this section, an owner 

or registrant may pay to the department a civil penalty of $500, the restoration fee 

prescribed under section 1960 and furnish proof of financial responsibility in a 

manner determined by the department. An owner or registrant may exercise this 

option no more than once in a 12-month period.

75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(1.1). 

2

Section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code provides an exception to the registration suspension: 

This subsection shall not apply in the following circumstances: 

(i) the owner or registrant proves to the satisfaction of the 

department that the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was 

for a period of less than 31 days and that the owner or registrant 

(Footnote continued on the next page . . .)
3

that “we are going to give [Carpenter] the benefit of the doubt under these 

circumstances.” R.R. at 17a. 

On January 22, 2016, the trial court issued an order sustaining 

Carpenter’s appeal and directing reinstatement of her registration. After receiving 

notice of PennDOT’s appeal, the trial court issued an opinion stating that although

Carpenter conceded that she obtained insurance five days 

beyond the statutory requirement ..., [she] made every effort to 

maintain insurance on her vehicle once she realized her 

insurance lapsed. She maintained insurance prior to her 

November 25, 2015 appeal and prior to the January 20, 2016 

hearing. 

Trial Court opinion at 3; R.R. 34a (internal citation omitted). The trial court found 

that PennDOT failed to prove that Carpenter drove her vehicle during the five-day 

period of lapse. The trial court further found that, being a single mother with two 

children, Carpenter “lack[ed] the financial resources to pay PennDOT’s fines or 

maintain her full-time employment and family obligations without her vehicle 

registration.” Id. PennDOT now appeals to this Court.3

On appeal, PennDOT argues that the trial court erred in sustaining 

Carpenter’s appeal because the court misconstrued the burden of proof, 

 

(continued . . .)

did not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle during the 

period of lapse in financial responsibility.

75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i). 

3 Our review determines whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence 

and whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Greenfield v. 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 67 A.3d 198, 200 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013). 
4

misinterpreted the relevant Vehicle Code exception and cited equitable reasons in 

reaching its holding.

4

 We are forced to agree. 

Section 1786(a) of the Vehicle Code provides that “[e]very motor 

vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title which is operated or 

currently registered shall be covered by financial responsibility.” 75 Pa. C.S. 

§1786(a). Section 1786(d) further provides that “[t]he Department of 

Transportation shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three 

months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured as 

required by this chapter....” 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(1). This subsection does not 

apply when the owner or registrant proves “to the satisfaction of the department 

that the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 

days and that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit the operation of the 

vehicle during the period of lapse in financial responsibility.” 75 Pa. C.S. 

§1786(d)(2)(i). If the duration of the lapse in financial responsibility is not less 

than 31 days, however, a three-month vehicle registration suspension “must be 

imposed even when financial responsibility has been secured either prior to the 

expiration or the imposition of the suspension.” Greenfield v. Department of 

Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 67 A.3d 198, 201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)

(quoting Pray v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 708 

A.2d 1315, 1317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)). 

The Department has the initial burden of showing that a registrant’s 

vehicle is registered or is a type that is required to be registered, and that the 

 

4 By order dated October 7, 2016, Carpenter was precluded from filing a brief in this matter after 

failing to comply with this Court’s September 6, 2016, order directing her to do so within 14 

days.
5

Department received notice that the registrant’s financial responsibility coverage 

was terminated. Deklinski v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor 

Vehicles, 938 A.2d 1191, 1194 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3). The 

Department makes its prima facie case by certifying its receipt of documentation

or an electronic transmission from an insurance company stating that a registrant’s 

financial responsibility coverage was terminated. Deklinski, 938 A.2d at 1194 

(citing 75 Pa. C.S. §1377(b)(2)). Once the Department satisfies its burden of 

proof, a presumption arises that the vehicle lacked the requisite financial 

responsibility. The burden then shifts to the registrant to overcome the 

presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence that the vehicle was

insured. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3)(ii). 

Here, PennDOT established its prima facie case that Carpenter’s 

financial responsibility coverage lapsed. PennDOT provided a certified notice 

showing that GEICO cancelled Carpenter’s insurance policy on September 18, 

2015. The burden then shifted to Carpenter to overcome the presumption of lack 

of financial responsibility by clear and convincing evidence. Carpenter did not 

produce any evidence that her vehicle was insured at all times; rather, she 

conceded that she did not secure her new insurance until 34 days after GEICO’s 

termination, which is beyond the 31-day statutory grace period. Therefore, the 

three-month registration suspension was mandatory. The fact that Carpenter later 

secured financial responsibility coverage is irrelevant. As discussed, the 

suspension must be imposed even when financial responsibility has been secured 

prior to the imposition of the suspension. Greenfield, 67 A.3d at 201. 

In sustaining Carpenter’s appeal, the trial court found that PennDOT

failed to prove that Carpenter drove her vehicle during the period of lapse. This 
6

was error. The statute does not impose such a burden on PennDOT. Rather, under 

Section 1786(d)(2)(i), it is the owner or registrant who bears the burden to show 

that (1) the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was less than 31 days and (2) 

the owner or registrant did not operate the vehicle during the period of lapse in 

financial responsibility. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i). Here, Carpenter did not 

secure her new insurance within the 31-day grace period. Therefore, Section 

1786(d)(2)(i) does not apply. 

Despite Carpenter’s acknowledgement that she violated the statute, 

the trial court also considered the equities and her hardship when it sustained her 

appeal. The statutory scheme, however, does not allow the trial court to resort to 

such consideration. The Vehicle Code expressly limits the trial court’s discretion:

The court’s scope of review in an appeal from a vehicle 

registration suspension shall be limited to determining whether:

(i) The vehicle is registered or of a type that is 

required to be registered under this title; and 

(ii) There has been either notice to the department 

of a lapse, termination or cancelation in the 

financial responsibility coverage as required by 

law for that vehicle or that the owner, registrant or 

driver was requested to provide proof of financial 

responsibility to the department, a police officer or 

another driver and failed to do so.

75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3) (emphasis added). Further, this Court has repeatedly held 

that a trial court lacks discretion to sustain an appeal of a vehicle registration 

suspension under Section 1786 based on hardship or other equitable factors. As 

this Court observed in Greenfield: 
7

While we acknowledge that strict application of the mandatory 

registration suspension provisions of section 1786 will 

inevitably create hardship, it is now well-settled that courts 

have no discretion to decide such matters based on equitable 

considerations. Instead, our decisions, like those of the courts 

of common pleas, “must be founded on firm jurisprudence.”

Greenfield, 67 A.3d at 202 (quoting Banks v. Department of Transportation, 

Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)). Because the 

statute must be strictly construed, the trial court could not consider Carpenter’s 

“good faith efforts” at compliance or her financial hardships. Trial Court opinion 

at 3; R.R. 34a. 

When insurance on a vehicle has lapsed for 31 days, the consequence 

is a three-month suspension or payment of a civil penalty of $500. 75 Pa. C.S. 

§1786(d)(1.1). The legislature has not given the judiciary the discretion to waive 

this consequence where it would be unduly harsh.5 Accordingly, we are 

constrained to reverse the trial court’s order and reinstate Carpenter’s three-month 

registration suspension.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

 

5 By contrast, PennDOT has prosecutorial discretion not to pursue every violation of the Vehicle 

Code.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jessica Carpenter :

:

v. : No. 190 C.D. 2016

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Motor Vehicles, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 2nd day of December, 2016, it is hereby ORDERED 

that the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, dated 

January 22, 2016, in the above-captioned case is hereby REVERSED. 

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge