J-S56040-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHERI MAUFORT, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1332 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 28, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0000266-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: Filed: January 28, 2021

Sheri Maufort (Maufort) appeals a judgment of sentence entered by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court). Following a jury trial, 

Maufort was found guilty of two counts of institutional sexual assault of a 

minor (18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.2(a.2)(1)); one count of unlawful contact with a 

minor (18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1)); and one count of corruption of minors (18 

Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i)). She was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 

11.5 to 23 months, followed by three years of probation.

In this appeal, Maufort contends that the trial court reversibly erred in 

admitting into evidence a prior bad act which she claims was both irrelevant 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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and highly prejudicial with respect to the issues to be resolved by the jury. 

Finding no merit in this evidentiary claim, we affirm.

I.

The following summary of the evidence is taken from the trial court’s 

1925(a) opinion:

Sheri Maufort was a substitute teacher’s aide at the Unionville 

High School in Chester County, Pennsylvania in September of 

2016. . . . On September 16, 2016, [Maufort] had sexual 

interactions with two (2) students from Unionville High School. 

First, during a party after a high school football game, [Maufort] 

sent another person into the house where the party was being 

held to ask a hockey player, T.G., to come outside. T.G. was 18 

years old. They then went on a car ride where they kissed and 

she grabbed his genital area. After that, she dropped him back 

off at the party.

A few hours later, [Maufort] contacted B.M., age 17, by text 

wanting to pick him up at his house. She then drove him to the 

parking area of a closed restaurant, the Dilworthtown Inn, where 

they got out of the vehicle. She began kissing B.M. and eventually 

performed oral sex on him. After the contact between [Maufort] 

and B.M. occurred, [Maufort’s] husband appeared in the parking 

lot and insisted on driving B.M. home.

. . . .

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a Motion in limine to Admit 

Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, the 

Commonwealth wanted to introduce evidence concerning an 

incident [on May 14, 2016] in which B.M. was in a vehicle smoking 

marijuana with friends. [Maufort] was allegedly in the car 

smoking marijuana with them. The Commonwealth sought to 

introduce this additional contact between [Maufort] and B.M. to 

provide the jury with the complete context of the relationship 

between [Maufort] and B.M.

. . . .
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The court allowed this evidence in because it showed the growing 

relationship between [Maufort] and B.M. and it also showed the 

chain of events leading to this crime. . . . The court felt there was 

a need for this evidence to establish the relationship between 

these parties. [Maufort] progressed from interacting with them 

socially . . . doing things like drinking and smoking marijuana . . . 

to eventually approaching both these young men sexually.

1925(a) Opinion, 9/11/2018, at 1-3.

Maufort contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony that 

she smoked marijuana with B.M. several months before the charged incident 

because this prior bad act evidence was irrelevant as well as more prejudicial 

than probative, entitling her to a new trial.

Echoing the trial court, the Commonwealth responds that the evidence 

was relevant because it was part of a sequence of events leading up to the 

charged offenses and revealed how Maufort had manipulated the victims over

a period of time in order to carry those offenses out. As alternative grounds

for affirmance, the Commonwealth asserts that any error was harmless 

because it could not have reasonably affected the jury’s verdict.

II.

A.

“Evidence of distinct crimes [is] not admissible against a defendant 

being prosecuted for another crime solely to show his bad character and his 

propensity for committing criminal acts.” Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 

491, 497 (Pa. 1988); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, 

wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 
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show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character.”).

“However, evidence of other crimes . . . may be admissible in special 

circumstances where the evidence is relevant for some other legitimate 

purpose and not merely to prejudice the defendant by showing him to be a 

person of bad character.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Claypool, 495 A.2d 

176 (Pa. 1985)). The Rules of Evidence enumerate a non-exhaustive list of 

such purposes, including “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 

404(b)(2).1

Additionally, under the “res gestae” exception, a prior bad act may be 

admitted as part of the “history or natural development of the case.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 326 (Pa. Super. 2012). The 

exception is limited to bad acts “which are so clearly and inextricably mixed 

up with the history of the guilty act itself as to form part of one chain of 

relevant circumstances, and so could not be excluded on the presentation of 

the case before the jury without the evidence being rendered thereby 

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1 “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 

consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence may 

be excluded from trial if its admission would confuse or mislead the jury, waste 

judicial resources, or result in unfair prejudice to the defendant. See Pa.R.E. 

403.
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unintelligible.” Id. at 330; see also Commonwealth v. Knoble, 188 A.3d 

1199, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2018) (same).2

Prior bad act evidence is only admissible in a criminal case “if the 

probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). “‘Unfair prejudice’ supporting exclusion of relevant 

evidence means a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis or 

divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence 

impartially.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 151 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (citing Pa.R.E. 403).

B.

Preliminarily, we find that the res gestae exception does not apply in 

this case. Maufort smoked marijuana with B.M. months before the date of the 

alleged offenses. Prior bad acts become admissible as res gestae only “when 

the bad acts are part of the same transaction involving the charged crime.” 

Brown, 52 A.3d at 332. Clearly, Maufort’s drug use with B.M. was a separate 

episode from the criminal transactions that followed months later, making res 

gestae inapplicable. See id.; Commonwealth v. Green, 76 A.3d 575, 584 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (“[I]t is also clear that the gun-pointing incident was in no 

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2

If the “res gestae” exception applies, then the trial court must balance the 

probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect. See Brown, 

at 326; Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1191 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (balancing occurs after non-propensity purpose established under Rule 

404(b)).
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way part of the same transaction or sequence of events that constituted the 

crime for which Appellant was being tried.”).

C.

While res gestae did not justify the admission of the prior bad act 

evidence in this case, Maufort’s drug use with B.M. was admissible to prove 

her motive, intent and preparation to commit a crime for which she was 

charged. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). For example, the offense of unlawful contact 

with a minor includes the central element that the defendant “intentionally 

was in contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in” sexual offenses. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1). Criminal intent is an element that may be and 

usually must be proven circumstantially. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 

65 A.3d 939, 943 (Pa. Super. 2013) (intent element of a crime ordinarily must 

be proven through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the parties’ acts, 

conduct or attendant circumstances).

Here, it was undisputed that on September 16, 2016, Maufort picked up 

B.M. from a party and spent time alone with him in her vehicle. Maufort 

denied that she initiated sexual contact, much less that she ever planned to 

do so. The jury, therefore, had to resolve whether Maufort indeed had the 

requisite intent to engage in the alleged sexual conduct.

In this context, Maufort’s previous interactions with B.M. were relevant 

to show that she had sought to influence him into accepting her sexual 

advances. The fact that she smoked marijuana with B.M., in combination with 
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other admissible evidence,3tended to support the Commonwealth’s 

contention that Maufort’s drug use with B.M. was a means of grooming him to 

facilitate sexual offenses, making the evidence probative of her intent on the 

night in question. That is, the drug use was relevant to prove whether Maufort 

had intent to meet with B.M. for an illicit purpose, a necessary element of 

unlawful contact with a minor. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1).

Moreover, the probative value of the prior bad act was not outweighed 

by the potential of unfair prejudice. The comparative potential for prejudice 

was minor because the single instance of marijuana use was not in itself so 

offensive that it could have inflamed the passions of the jury or prevented it 

from viewing the evidence impartially.

The bad act was also somewhat cumulative of similar episodes that were

never disputed. There was unrebutted evidence at trial that Maufort had on 

multiple occasions imbibed alcohol in the company of minors, diminishing the 

prospect that the instance of marijuana use could have affected the jury’s 

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3 At trial, the evidence established that Maufort first met B.M. and T.G. at her 

own home during a party hosted by her teenage daughter on May 14, 2016. 

Video recordings at the party proved that Maufort had been drinking alcohol 

with students, and that she gave out her contact information to T.G. and 

others so that they could video chat with each other. Maufort encountered 

B.M. again months later at another student’s party, and after speaking with 

him for 30 minutes on the telephone later that night, she arranged to pick him 

up in her vehicle at about 11 p.m. B.M. testified that Maufort supplied him 

with alcohol before initiating sexual contact. The two were discovered by 

Maufort’s husband laying on a grassy area near a restaurant parking lot.
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impartiality. Any prejudicial impact would have been further offset by the trial 

court’s instructions on how that prior bad act evidence had to be weighed. 

Thus, the potential for prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the 

prior bad act.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that Maufort 

smoked marijuana with B.M. at a house party months before her alleged 

offenses took place because it was relevant and not unduly prejudicial.

4

D.

Even if the admission of the subject evidence was erroneous, it would 

not entitle Maufort to a new trial because there is no reasonable probability 

that such an error could have contributed to the verdict. See 

Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1062–63 (Pa. 2001). When it is 

shown that the resulting prejudice of an evidentiary error is de minimis, then 

the error is deemed harmless and no appellate relief is due. See id.

5

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4 The trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine regarding the admission of 

evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See

Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251 (Pa. Super. 2016). Such rulings 

are “not to be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of 

support to be clearly erroneous.” Id.

5 The improper admission of evidence may also be found harmless where the 

Commonwealth can establish that the evidence was cumulative or

substantially similar to admissible evidence, or the properly admitted evidence 

was so overwhelming that the verdict would have been inevitable. See

Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1062–63 (Pa. 2001).
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Maufort’s drug use with B.M. received relatively little attention at trial. 

B.M.’s testimony touched on the episode briefly in response to questioning, 

and the trial court specifically advised the jury that the evidence was relevant 

for the sole purpose of establishing the relationship between the parties. See

Trial Transcript, 11/28/2017, at pp. 11-12. The incident was hardly 

mentioned during the parties’ respective statements to the jury, and when the 

Commonwealth did so, it reiterated the trial court’s instructions. See Trial 

Transcript, 11/29/2017, at p. 14. Thus, any prejudice caused by the 

admission of the prior bad act evidence was de minimis.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/28/21