IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF: V.B., A MINOR,
V.B., Appellant,
vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Resnondent. No. 65637 

# FILED
JUN 1 7 2016

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is an appeal from an order certifying a child for criminal proceedings as an adult. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; William 0. Voy, Judge.

First, appellant V.B. contends that the juvenile court erred by determining that prosecutive merit supported the count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. V.B. argues that because the matter was transferred from the district court back to the juvenile court, it is clear that the State failed to demonstrate prosecutive merit. We disagree.

"To say that there is prosecutive merit is to say that there is probable cause to believe that the subject minor committed the charged
crime." In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 437, 664 P.2d 947, 953 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by In re William S., 122 Nev. 432, 132 P.3d 1015 (2006); see also Sheriff v. Hodes, 96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d 178, 180 (1980) ("The finding of probable cause may be based on slight, even marginal evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this matter, a preliminary hearing was held wherein one victim testified that V.B. broke

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OF NP/ADA a bottle, stood approximately a foot away, pointed the fragmented part of

the bottle at the two victims, and told them to empty out their pockets before four or five different individuals beat the testifying victim and emptied his pockets, taking his wallet and car keys. We conclude the juvenile court did not err by determining that there was prosecutive merit to support the count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. Cf. Sheriff v. Provenza, 97 Nev. 346, 347, 630 P.2d 265, 265 (1981) (holding that the district court's ruling regarding probable cause will not be overturned absent substantial error).

Second, V.B. contends that the juvenile court erred by certifying him because he demonstrated substance abuse or emotional problems which could have been treated through the juvenile system. See NIBS 62B.390(3)(b). However, NRS 62B.390(3)(b) provides that a juvenile may rebut the presumptive certification outlined in NRS 62B.390(2), 1 and

'NIBS 62B.390(2) provides [T]he juvenile court shall certify a child for proper criminal proceedings as an adult to any court that would have jurisdiction to try the offense if committed by an adult, if the child: (a) Is charged with: (1) A sexual assault involving the use or threatened use of force or violence against the victim; or (2) An offense or attempted offense involving the use or threatened use of a firearm; and (b) Was 16 years of age or older at the time the child allegedly committed the offense.

2
(0) 1947Asuch presumptive certification is not at issue here. Therefore, this claim

lacks merit. Third, V.B. contends that the factors outlined in Seven Minors were not met and therefore certification was not warranted. See Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952 (outlining a three-category decisional matrix that should be considered when determining whether to transfer a juvenile to adult court: "first, nature and seriousness of the charged offense or offenses; second, persistency and seriousness of past adjudicated or admitted criminal offenses; and third, what we will refer to as the subjective factors, namely, such personal factors as age, maturity, character, personality and family relationships and controls"). The juvenile court noted that V.B. was a principal actor in a very serious offense and that V.B. had a history of persistent adjudications. The juvenile court went on to consider subjective factors, such as V.B.'s age, his psychological report, his substance abuse, and his amenability to treatment in the juvenile court. The juvenile court concluded that "Nased upon everything before [it], the State ha[d] met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that public safety warrants transfer to the adult system." Therefore, the juvenile court considered all three categories of the decisional matrix outlined in Seven Minors.

To the extent V.B. argues that his record in the juvenile system or the instant crime has not shown him to be among the worst offenders and therefore certification was not warranted, the juvenile court has "broad discretion in making discretionary certification decisions in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Seven Minors," In re Eric AL., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36 (2007) (internal quotation marks

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### eomitted), and we discern no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in

granting the State's certification petition, 

### see 

### id. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36-37.

Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the juvenile court AFFIRMED.



### J. Douglas

\.) J. Gibbons

cc: Hon. William 0. Voy, District Judge, Family Court Division Lizzie R. Hatcher Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

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