IMPORTANT NOTICE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” 

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS 

OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE 

CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER 

CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, 

UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, 

RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR 

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED 

OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE 

BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR 

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN 

UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A 

COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG 

WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO 

THE ACTION. 
RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0482-MR

ROBERT K. COLLINS APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM MENIFEE CIRCUIT COURT

V. HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE 

NO. 17-CR-00015-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Robert Collins appeals to this Court and challenges the Menifee Circuit 

Court’s decision to deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to charges of 

murder; first-degree rape, victim under 12; and first-degree sodomy, victim 

under 12. For the reasons expressed herein, we decline to reverse, and we 

affirm the circuit court. 

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

In July 2021, Collins, while being represented by private counsel, 

entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth in which he agreed to 

plead guilty to murder; first-degree rape, victim under 12; and first-degree 

sodomy, victim under 12. In return, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend 

a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years for 

the capital murder charge, as well as 50-year sentences on each of the 
2

remaining two charges. The practical effect of the agreement would be that 

Collins would escape sentencing recommendations of death or life without the 

possibility of parole. Collins formally entered his Alford plea on July 15, 2021. 

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

Prior to sentencing, Collins made a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea, as he claimed it had not been entered freely, knowingly, or voluntarily.1

The trial court subsequently appointed an attorney from the Department of 

Public Advocacy to represent Collins. By and through his new counsel, Collins 

filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that he was “ill and 

not fully informed by defense counsel as to the evidence against him, his 

possible defenses at trial, and the true nature of the sentence that the 

Commonwealth was recommending.” Accordingly, the trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing on Collins’s motion to withdraw his plea. At the hearing, 

Collins’s former counsel, Clyde Simmons and Tom Balinski, each testified to 

the circumstances underlying Collins’s guilty plea. Collins declined to testify on 

his own behalf. 

Ultimately, the trial court denied Collins’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea after making a finding that there was “uncontroverted evidence in this 

1 While the Menifee Circuit Court’s order denying Collins’s motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea references a prior pro se motion to withdraw that plea, that pro se

motion does not appear in the record before this Court. At what was scheduled to be 

Collins’s sentencing hearing on September 23, 2021, the trial court stated on the 

record that Collins had filed multiple pro se “writings” to relieve his current counsel 

and to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court did not sentence Collins on that day. 
3

case that the plea was voluntary without Defendant’s testimony.” (emphasis 

added). The trial court then sentenced Collins in accordance with his plea deal. 

Collins now appeals to this Court as a matter of right, KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b), 

and argues that the trial court erred in determining that he entered his guilty 

plea voluntarily. In the alternative, Collins argues that the trial court 

nonetheless abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw a 

voluntary plea. Finally, Collins urges this Court to provide guidance to trial 

courts regarding the proper exercise of their discretion to grant motions to 

withdraw voluntary guilty pleas. 

We will develop further facts as necessary. 

II. ANALYSIS

Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.10 provides that, “[a]t any 

time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but 

mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” “A motion to 

withdraw a plea of guilty under RCr 8.10 is generally addressed to the sound 

discretion of the court; however, where it is alleged that the plea was entered 

involuntarily the defendant is entitled to a hearing on the motion.” Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 229 S.W.3d 49, 51 (Ky. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing 

Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 566 (Ky. 2006)). Because a plea 

of guilty “constitutes a waiver of several fundamental constitutional rights” due 

process requires that a valid plea “must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” 

Haight v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Ky. 1988) (citing Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)). 
4

Accordingly, if a trial court faced with an RCr 8.10 motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea determines that the defendant’s plea was entered involuntarily, “the 

motion to withdraw it must be granted.” Williams, 229 S.W.3d at 51 (citing 

Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004)). Such a 

requirement obviously undercuts the discretion entrusted to the trial court in 

ruling on an RCr 8.10 motion. In fact, “[o]ur case law is clear that the 

discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea exists only after a 

determination has been made that the plea was voluntary.” Rodriguez v. 

Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002).

“In determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary . . . the trial court 

considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea[.]” Porter 

v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 382, 385 (Ky. 2011). “The trial court is in the 

best position to determine if there was any ‘reluctance, misunderstanding, 

involuntariness, or incompetence to plead guilty[.]’” Id. at 386 (quoting Bronk v. 

Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Ky. 2001)). Because the trial court’s 

inquiry into the circumstances underlying the entrance of a guilty plea is a 

probe into the facts, this Court reviews the trial court’s voluntariness 

determination for clear error. Id. at 386. A trial court’s decision is not clearly 

erroneous when supported by substantial evidence. Id. Where a defendant 

alleges that a deficiency in the assistance of his counsel rendered his guilty 

plea invalid, the trial court must also “juxtapose the presumption of 

voluntariness inherent in a proper plea colloquy with a Strickland v. 
5

Washington inquiry into the performance of counsel[.]” Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 

486 (footnote omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

As previously stated, if the trial court determines that the defendant’s 

guilty plea was entered voluntarily, the court retains its discretion to either 

grant or deny a motion to withdraw the plea. Williams, 229 S.W.3d at 51. “At 

its heart, a motion to withdraw a voluntarily entered guilty plea is an appeal to 

the discretion of the trial court.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 626, 

630 (Ky. 2015). Accordingly, this Court reviews a trial court’s decision to deny 

a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Edmonds, 189 

S.W.3d at 570. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision was 

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” 

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

Here, after holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial court 

found that Collins had entered his guilty plea voluntarily. This Court concludes 

that the trial court’s voluntariness determination was supported by substantial 

evidence, and therefore not clearly erroneous. Porter, 394 S.W.3d at 386. 

The record reveals that prior to the entrance of Collins’s guilty plea, the 

trial court conducted a thorough plea colloquy to ascertain whether Collins was 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his plea. When prompted by 

the trial court, Collins testified that he had the ability to read and write; had 

never suffered from any mental impairments; was not currently impaired by 

illness, alcohol, or drugs; that he understood the nature and consequences of 

the charges against him, as well as the facts supporting those charges; that he 
6

was, in fact, guilty2 of those charges; that he had consulted with his attorneys 

before entering his guilty plea; that he had enough time to properly consult 

with his attorneys before entering his plea; that he had no complaints about 

the effectiveness of his attorneys in this case; that someone had read to him 

the contents of his motion to enter a guilty plea and he understood that 

motion; that he understood he had certain constitutional rights like the right to 

a trial by jury, right to counsel, right to confront witnesses against him, and 

that he had a privilege against self-incrimination; that he understood he was 

waiving those rights by pleading guilty; and that he was pleading guilty to his 

offenses willingly, freely and voluntarily.

In his later motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Collins argued to the trial 

court that he was “ill” on the day he entered his guilty plea. At the trial court’s 

evidentiary hearing, Collins’s former counsel, Clyde Simmons, testified that at 

some point preceding the entrance of his plea Collins did tell him he had 

contracted the COVID-19 virus, but that “Mr. Collins wasn’t sick on the day of 

the plea.” Simmons further testified that Collins never indicated to anyone the 

morning of the plea that he was sick. When asked whether Collins was sick on 

the morning of his plea, Collins’s former counsel, Tom Balinski, testified that 

Collins “looked a little tired, that was all.” 

Collins also argued to the trial court that he was not fully apprised of the 

evidence that the Commonwealth was prepared to offer against him. Simmons 

2 As previously stated, Collins entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina 

v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
7

testified that due to the nature of Collins’s charged offenses, a protective order 

prohibited him from sharing copies of every piece of evidence with Collins. 

Simmons testified, however, that he did tell Collins about the evidence he had 

obtained in discovery. 

Collins further argued to the trial court that “he felt pressured by 

counsel to enter the plea, and did not do so voluntarily.” Simmons testified that 

he and Collins had been discussing the possibility of entering a plea agreement 

for two years prior to Collins’s eventual plea. Simmons testified that, “This plea 

had been talked about. This plea had been all but prayed for for months and 

months and months. Mr. Collins was aware of what it meant.” Simmons 

testified that Collins was initially unwilling to enter a guilty plea in exchange 

for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Simmons testified that 

the Commonwealth subsequently offered Collins a recommended sentence of 

life without the possibility of parole for 25 years “two to three weeks” before 

Collins eventually entered his guilty plea. Simmons testified that after he 

received this most recent offer, Collins indicated that he was willing to accept 

such an offer. Simmons then testified that the Commonwealth arranged for 

Simmons to be transported to Bath County to formally enter his plea on July 

15, 2021. Simmons testified that “a couple of days, or a day” before Collins was 

scheduled to enter his plea, Collins indicated that he had changed his mind 

and would not enter a plea. Simmons testified that he contacted Collins’s 

grandmother and explained the situation to her. Simmons testified that, at that 

time, it was his impression “that we had this one shot in Bath County that 
8

morning to enter the plea or it was all off the table” but he doubted that he had 

communicated that impression to Collins. Balinski testified that Collins’s trial 

had already been scheduled for September of the same year, and that both 

attorneys were preparing for trial. Balinski testified that he could not say 

whether he had the impression that the Commonwealth’s latest plea offer 

would expire soon. Simmons testified that, despite Collins’s recent indication 

that he did not want to plead guilty, he had been transported to Bath County 

where both attorneys met with him the morning of July 15. Simmons and 

Balinski each testified that their meeting with Collins lasted less than an hour, 

and Simmons testified that Collins spent 15 minutes of that meeting on the 

phone speaking with his grandmother. Simmons testified that after Collins 

spoke to his grandmother, he indicated to his attorneys that he was ready to 

plead guilty in exchange for the Commonwealth’s sentencing recommendation 

of life without the possibility of parole for 25 years. Balinski testified that he 

did not recall that Collins ever said he was unwilling to go forward with his plea 

the morning of July 15. 

Collins also argues to this Court that he was not fully informed of the 

true nature of the sentence he would receive as a result of his plea. When 

asked at the evidentiary hearing whether he had informed Collins that he 

would be required to register as a sex offender as a consequence of his plea, 

Simmons testified that, “I think so. I can’t swear to it, but I think so. That is 

part and parcel.” Balinski testified that he did not recall whether the attorneys 

ever informed Collins of this consequence. Simmons also testified that the 
9

attorneys made it clear to Collins that a sentence of life without the possibility 

of parole for 25 years did not mean he would automatically be paroled, only 

that he would be “eligible” to appear before the Parole Board. Balinski also 

testified to the same. 

Again, Collins declined to testify on his own behalf at the trial court’s 

evidentiary hearing, so the testimony of his former counsel was unrebutted. 

After hearing the above testimony from Simmons and Balinski, the trial 

court determined that there was “uncontroverted evidence in this case that the 

plea was voluntary[.]” The trial court also analyzed Collins’s claim under the 

ineffective assistance of counsel standard announced in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “[T]o succeed in a standard claim of 

ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must show (1) deficient representation 

by counsel and (2) resulting prejudice to the defense.” Commonwealth v. Tigue, 

459 S.W.3d 372, 384 (Ky. 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “This ‘test 

applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.’” 

Id. at 391 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). “[I]n order to satisfy 

the “prejudice” requirement [of the Strickland test], the defendant must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 

U.S. at 59. Perhaps put more simply, the defendant “must allege facts that, if 

proven, would support a conclusion that the decision to reject the plea bargain 

and go to trial would have been rational[.]” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 548 
10

S.W.3d 881, 894 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 

237 (Ky. 2012)). 

This Court finds it unnecessary to parse each of Collins’s broad, 

conclusory claims to determine whether he has properly alleged or proven 

deficient performance on the part of his counsel, because it is abundantly clear 

that Collins has failed to prove he suffered any real prejudice as a result. Prior 

to entering his guilty plea, Collins faced the possibility that, if his case 

proceeded to trial and he was proven to be guilty, the Commonwealth would 

recommend he receive the death penalty. At no point during the trial court’s 

evidentiary hearing did Collins testify or assert that but for his counsel’s 

alleged deficiencies he would have declined the Commonwealth’s plea 

agreement and taken his chances at trial. Nor did defense counsel elicit any 

testimony from Simmons or Balinski that would have proven the same. Rather, 

Simmons testified that it was his opinion that, if this case proceeded to trial, a 

potential jury would have a hard time believing Collins’s alternative perpetrator 

defense and that the evidence the Commonwealth was prepared to offer against 

Collins was likely to inflame a jury. Simmons also testified that the 

Commonwealth had a “massive amount of evidence” at its disposal to convict 

Collins. Simmons testified he conveyed these opinions to Collins. After hearing 

this testimony, the trial court ultimately concluded that there was a 

“substantial effort to reach a [sic] good a result as possible in light of the facts . 

. . . The death penalty was avoided . . . .” Given the magnitude of the charges 

and penalties Collins faced, the opinion of his counsel as to the likelihood of 
11

his success at trial, the lack of any contradictory testimony from Collins, and 

the fact that his plea agreement reflected a recommended sentence of life 

without the possibility of parole for 25 years, this Court cannot say that Collins 

has offered any facts that would “support a conclusion that the decision to 

reject the plea bargain and go to trial [and face the potential of the death 

penalty] would have been rational[.]” Id. 

Our review of the record, including the testimony discussed above, 

convinces this Court that the trial court did not commit clear error in making 

its voluntariness determination, as it was clearly supported by substantial 

evidence. Porter, 394 S.W.3d at 386. 

Collins finally argues to this Court that despite the trial court’s 

conclusions as to the voluntariness of his plea, the trial court nonetheless 

abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Collins 

argues that because RCr 8.10 entrusts trial courts with the discretion to grant 

or deny a motion to withdraw even a voluntary plea, the trial court’s failure to 

further articulate another basis (aside from voluntariness) for the denial of his 

motion constitutes error. Collins further urges this Court to provide guidance 

to trial courts regarding the proper exercise of their discretion to grant or deny 

motions to withdraw voluntary guilty pleas. This Court has no problem 

concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this instance. We 

have previously declined to pronounce a standard restraining our trial courts’ 

discretion in ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that was voluntarily 

entered, Williams, 229 S.W.3d at 53, and we decline to do so again today. We 
12

see no reason why the trial court’s determination, supported by substantial 

evidence, that the defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary cannot be reason 

enough to deny a motion to withdraw that plea. Accordingly, we affirm the 

Menifee Circuit Court. 

III. CONCLUSION

This Court affirms the judgment of the Menifee Circuit Court because we 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins’s motion 

to withdraw his voluntarily entered guilty plea. 

All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell, 

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Robert Chung-Hua Yang

Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman 

Attorney General of Kentucky 

Matthew Robert Krygiel

Assistant Attorney General