NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

NORMAN A. HARRIS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1747

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-0649, Judge Robert N. Davis.

______________________ 

Decided: November 4, 2016

______________________ 

NORMAN A. HARRIS, Greenville, IN, pro se.

ALBERT S. IAROSSI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

SCOTT D. AUSTIN; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, BRANDON A. JONAS, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 
2 HARRIS v. MCDONALD

Before LOURIE, PLAGER, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

This is the second appeal by this pro se veteran appellant, who has doggedly and effectively sought, inter alia, 

an earlier effective date for certain service-connected 

conditions. In the first appeal, the Board had held 

against the veteran on this issue, and the Veterans Court 

had upheld the Board decision in that regard. We vacated 

and remanded because the Veterans Court failed to apply 

the proper legal standard as expressed in a series of 

cases—namely, Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004); Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 

2004); and Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). See Harris v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 946, 947–49 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013). We explained that pro se filings must be read 

liberally and that the Department of Veterans Affairs had 

a duty to generously construe the evidence and resolve 

any ambiguities in the veteran’s favor. Id. at 948–49.

On remand the Board again held against the veteran. 

On appeal to the Veterans Court, this time the court 

reversed the Board’s decision with respect to an issue not 

now before us,1 set aside the remainder of the Board’s 

decision, and remanded.

The veteran again appeals here. The Government argues that because the Veterans Court remanded the 

matter, we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal as 

there is no final decision to be reviewed. The statute 

governing our jurisdiction, 38 U.S.C. § 7292, does not 

impose an explicit finality requirement. However, on 

prudential grounds, this court generally declines to re-

 

1 The Veterans Court reversed the Board’s determination regarding the appellate status of claims for 

diabetes mellitus and diabetic neuropathy.
HARRIS v. MCDONALD 3

view non-final Veterans Court decisions in which issues 

remain to be decided. See Hudgens v. McDonald, 823 

F.3d 630, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

There is an exception to the finality rule as applied by 

this court, when the Veterans Court in its opinion purports to decide a legal issue in the case in a manner that 

in effect is final. See, e.g., Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 

1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It is true that the Veterans 

Court in this case, after concluding a remand was in 

order, went on to discuss certain legal issues in the case 

by way of guidance to the Board when it next considers 

the case. It is understandable that the veteran was 

confused about the legal status of his case, and asked us 

to hear it on appeal. Nevertheless, as a result of the 

Veterans Court remand his search for his requested relief 

remains undecided; the additional discussion by that 

court of certain legal issues does not represent any final 

determination of the law applicable to his case, and all 

issues affecting the veteran’s rights in this matter remain 

to be finally determined.

For these reasons, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal 

at this juncture, and dismiss Mr. Harris’s current appeal.

DISMISSED

No costs.