Filed 6/17/22 In re Angela R. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Angela R. et al., Persons 

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

___________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Demi R. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B312951

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP05694A–B)

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
2

William H. Hook, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Demi R. 

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant Richard R.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy 

County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳

Demi R. (mother) and Richard R. (father) appeal from 

orders of the juvenile court terminating parental rights to their 

twin children, Angela and Richard, Jr. The parents contend the 

juvenile court erred by finding that the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) adequately 

investigated the children’s possible Indian ancestry, as required 

by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) 

and related state statutes. We find no error, and thus we will 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Detention, adjudication, and disposition.

Angela and Richard were born in August 2019. Both 

children tested positive for amphetamines and heroin at birth 

and experienced symptoms of withdrawal thereafter. Mother 

reported being homeless and using drugs daily during her 

pregnancy. Father disclosed a prior gang affiliation and an 

extensive criminal history related to drug use.

Two days after the children’s birth, mother discharged 

herself from the hospital against medical advice. Neither mother 

nor father left an address or any contact information other than 

cell phone numbers. A children’s social worker (CSW) tried to 
3

contact both parents the following day, but the parents had their 

phones turned off and did not return the phone calls.

DCFS obtained an expedited removal order for the children 

when they were three days old. Upon their release from the 

hospital, the infants were placed with foster parents who 

continued to care for them throughout these proceedings and are 

the prospective adoptive parents.

DCFS filed a dependency petition in September 2019. The 

petition alleged that mother’s use of illicit drugs while pregnant 

with the children and the parents’ substance abuse placed the 

children at serious risk of physical harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 300, subd. (b)).1 On January 31, 2020, the juvenile court 

sustained the allegations of the petition, ordered the children 

removed from mother and father, and ordered reunification 

services for both parents.

In July 2020, DCFS reported that it had had only periodic 

contact with the parents. Contact had been difficult because the 

parents’ telephone number had changed at least four times over 

the preceding ten months and the parents did not have 

permanent housing. Mother periodically called the CSW to 

report that she was participating in programs, but she was never 

able to provide contact information for the programs and did not 

respond to the CSW’s attempts to follow up. The parents 

routinely failed to show up for scheduled visits with the children, 

and neither parent ever appeared for a drug test.

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 

the Welfare and Institutions Code.
4

DCFS reported in June 2021 that the parents had last 

visited the children in November 2020 and last called the foster 

parents in April 2021.

B. ICWA inquiry.

1. Inquiry as to father.

A CSW interviewed father in late August 2019, when the 

children were two days old. Father said he was the oldest of four 

children and that his father had died when he was six years old. 

The CSW asked whether father had any family with whom the 

children could be placed, and father provided the names of his 

mother and stepfather, whom he said lived in Arizona. Father 

did not have his parents’ contact information, but he said he 

would ask them to call the CSW. They did not do so. Father also 

said he had two daughters with his former wife but he did not 

have an address or phone number for them.

On August 30, 2019, DCFS filed an ICWA-010 form, signed 

by the CSW under penalty of perjury, stating he had interviewed 

father in person, and father “denied any known Indian ancestry.”

Father, but not mother, appeared at the September 5, 2019 

detention hearing. Prior to the hearing, father filed and signed 

an ICWA-020 form in which he said, “I have no Indian ancestry 

as far as I know.” The court asked father whether his statement 

denying Indian ancestry was correct, and father said it was. The 

court then asked whether father knew if mother had Indian 

ancestry; father did not. Based on father’s response, the court 

found that ICWA did not apply, but said it would revisit the issue 

once mother was arraigned. 

The CSW interviewed father again in October 2019. Father 

said he was close to his mother, grandmother, and three living 
5

siblings, but he was able to provide contact information for only 

his grandmother (the children’s paternal great-grandmother). 

When the CSW attempted to call the paternal greatgrandmother, however, the number was inoperable. The CSW 

said he would inform the court if he was able to obtain any 

additional contact information.

The CSW tried to contact father on January 23, 2020, but 

father did not respond. The CSW had only sporadic contact with 

father thereafter.

2. Inquiry as to mother.

Mother refused to speak to the CSW while she was in the 

hospital and then discharged herself on August 29, 2019, when 

the children were two days old. The CSW tried to contact mother 

several times in October 2019, but mother’s number no longer 

was in service. In late October 2019, DCFS reported that 

mother’s whereabouts were unknown. On October 28, 2019, 

mother left a message for the CSW providing her new phone 

number, but the CSW was not able to reach mother at that 

number.

Mother appeared in court for the first time on December 11, 

2019. Prior to the hearing, mother signed an ICWA-020 form 

stating that she might have Indian ancestry through a Cheyenne 

tribe. Mother did not check the boxes on the form indicating that 

she or the children “[are] or may be . . . member[s], or eligible for 

membership in, a federally recognized tribe,” or that “[o]ne or 

more of [her] parents, grandparents, or other lineal ancestors is 

or was a member of a federally recognized tribe.” 

At the December 11, 2019 hearing, the court asked mother 

whether she or any member of her family was a member of a 

Cheyenne tribe. Mother said she did not know, but she believed 
6

she had Cheyenne ancestry through her father’s grandmother 

(the maternal great-great-grandmother). Mother did not know 

the great-great-grandmother’s name or whether she was still 

alive. Mother said her father’s name was Jerry Ruiz and he lived 

in Los Angeles “last I heard.” However, mother was not in touch 

with her father and did not know his phone number, address, or 

date of birth. The court then asked whether there were any other 

relatives who might have information about her family’s 

ancestry, and mother said there were not. The court asked 

mother to try to get contact information for any relatives who 

might know about her family’s Indian ancestry and to provide the 

information to her attorney. The court also directed DCFS to 

follow up with mother.

The CSW texted mother on January 7, 2020 to ask if she 

was available to talk, but mother did not respond. On 

January 13, 2020, the CSW “called, left voicemail messages and 

texted [mother] to inquire more about the ICWA claim.” Mother 

did not call back, but she sent a brief text stating that she had 

Cheyenne ancestry through her father. She did not give any 

more information.

On January 16, 2020, DCFS sent partially completed ICWA 

notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Secretary of the Interior, 

and federally recognized Cheyenne tribes. The notices indicated 

the parents’ names, addresses, birth dates, and birth places, but 

did not provide any information about the grandparents or greatgrandparents.

At the January 31, 2020 adjudication hearing, DCFS’s 

counsel noted that ICWA notices had been sent and asked the 
7

court to set a progress date in March or April. A hearing was set 

for April 1, 2020.2

In June 2020, mother asked the CSW whether the children 

could be placed with a member of her extended family. The CSW 

texted mother asking for names and birth dates of family 

members; mother did not respond.

Subsequently, DCFS reported that it had received signed 

return receipts from the noticed tribes, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

and Secretary of the Interior, and had received a letter from the 

Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe stating that the children were not 

enrolled members of the tribe.

C. Six-month review, ICWA finding, termination of 

parental rights.

Neither parent appeared at the six-month review hearing 

on February 8, 2021. The juvenile court found no substantial 

probability that the children would be returned to the parents in 

the next six months, terminated reunification services, and set a 

hearing to terminate parental rights pursuant to section 366.26.

Both parents were present at the June 7, 2021 permanency 

planning hearing. The juvenile court inquired whether there was 

any new information relevant to ICWA; none was provided. The 

court found that ICWA did not apply to the proceeding and 

terminated parental rights.

Both parents timely appealed from the order terminating 

parental rights.

2 Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the hearing did not go 

forward in April 2020 as scheduled. It ultimately was 

consolidated with the six-month review hearing and continued to 

February 8, 2021.
8

DISCUSSION

I. Relevant law.

A. ICWA.

ICWA was enacted “ ‘to protect the best interests of Indian 

children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 

and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards 

for the removal of Indian children from their families and the 

placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will 

reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In 

re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8 (Isaiah W.); see 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1902.) An “Indian child” is “any unmarried person who is under 

age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or 

(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 

biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1903(4); see also § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definition 

of “Indian child”].) 

“[T]he burden of coming forward with information to 

determine whether an Indian child may be involved . . . in a 

dependency proceeding does not rest entirely—or even 

primarily—on the child and his or her family.” (In re Michael V.

(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 233.) Rather, “[j]uvenile courts and 

child protective agencies have ‘an affirmative and continuing 

duty to inquire’ whether a dependent child is or may be an Indian 

child.” (Ibid.; see also Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 9–11; 

§ 224.2, subd. (a).)

This affirmative duty to inquire has several elements. The 

statute provides that if a child is removed from his or her parents 

and placed in the custody of a county welfare department, the 

department has a duty to inquire whether a child is an Indian 
9

child. Such inquiry “includes, but is not limited to, asking the 

child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family 

members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party 

reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, 

an Indian child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The court also must 

make an ICWA inquiry when the parents first appear in court: 

The court “shall ask each participant present in the hearing 

whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the

child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (c)), and must require 

each party to complete California Judicial Council Form ICWA020, Parental Notification of Indian Status (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.481(a)(2)(C)).

If the court or social worker has “reason to believe that an 

Indian child is involved in a proceeding,” the court or social 

worker must “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian 

status of the child” by, among other things, interviewing the 

parents and extended family members, and contacting the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, State Department of Social Services, 

and any tribe that may reasonably be expected to have 

information about the child’s membership, citizenship status, or 

eligibility. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2), italics added.) There is “reason 

to believe” a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child 

whenever the court or social worker “has information suggesting 

that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or 

may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(1).)

If the agency’s inquiry creates a “reason to know” that an 

Indian child is involved, notice of the proceedings must be 

provided to the parent, legal guardian, or Indian custodian and 

the child’s tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (f).) There is “reason to know” a 
10

child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory criteria is 

met—e.g., if the court is advised that the child “is an Indian 

child,” the child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, the 

child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or either parent or 

the child possess an identification card indicating membership or 

citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (d).) Thereafter, 

the court shall confirm that the agency used due diligence to 

identify and work with all of the tribes of which there is reason to 

know the child may be a member, or eligible for membership, to 

verify whether the child is in fact a member or whether a 

biological parent is a member and the child is eligible for 

membership. (§ 224.2, subd. (g).) A determination by an Indian 

tribe that a child is or is not a member of, or eligible for 

membership in, that tribe “shall be conclusive.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (h).)

If the juvenile court finds that “proper and adequate 

further inquiry and due diligence as required in this section have 

been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child 

is an Indian child,” the court may make a finding that ICWA does 

not apply to the proceedings, “subject to reversal based on 

sufficiency of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

B. Standard of review.

Where, as here, the juvenile court finds that ICWA does not 

apply, “ ‘ “[t]he finding implies that . . . social workers and the 

court did not know or have a reason to know the children were 

Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled their duty of 

inquiry.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885 [(Austin 

J.)]; see In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1050 [(D.S.)]

[“[t]he juvenile court may . . . make a finding that ICWA does not

apply because the Agency’s further inquiry and due diligence was 
11

‘proper and adequate’ but no ‘reason to know’ whether the child is 

an Indian child was discovered”].)’ (In re J.S. (2021) 

62 Cal.App.5th 678, 688.) ‘ “[W]e review the juvenile court’s 

ICWA findings under the substantial evidence test, which 

requires us to determine if reasonable, credible evidence of solid 

value supports the court’s order. [Citations.] We must uphold 

the court’s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all 

conflicts in favor of affirmance.” ’ (In re D.F. (2020) 

55 Cal.App.5th 558, 565.)” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 

388, 401.) “ ‘Thus, we do not consider whether there is evidence 

from which the dependency court could have drawn a different 

conclusion but whether there is substantial evidence to support 

the conclusion that the court did draw.’ (In re Noe F. (2013) 

213 Cal.App.4th 358, 366.)” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 

767, 774.)

II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

finding that ICWA did not apply.

Mother and father urge that the juvenile court erred in 

finding ICWA did not apply because DCFS did not contact 

extended family members to inquire about possible Indian 

ancestry. We disagree.

A. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s ICWA finding as to father.

It is undisputed that father completed and signed an 

ICWA-020 form in which he said he had “no Indian ancestry as 

far as I know.” It also is undisputed that father told DCFS in 

August 2019 that he did not have Indian ancestry, and he 

confirmed this statement on the record during his first court 
12

appearance on September 5, 2019. Nonetheless, the parents 

contend that DCFS had a duty to investigate father’s possible 

Indian ancestry by interviewing all identified members of father’s 

extended family, including father’s mother, grandmother, and 

siblings, and that the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA did 

not apply without requiring DCFS to undertake such an inquiry. 

There is a split among the Courts of Appeal as to a child 

welfare agency’s duty to investigate a child’s possible Indian 

ancestry where a parent denies such ancestry. Some Courts of 

Appeal have adopted the approach the parents advocate,

concluding that even where a parent denies any Indian ancestry, 

section 224.2, subdivision (b) requires DCFS to inquire of a child’s 

extended family members regarding his or her possible Indian 

ancestry. (See, e.g., In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421

[although mother reported she had no Indian ancestry, the 

juvenile court erred by concluding DCFS had conducted an 

adequate ICWA inquiry because it failed to inquire of the 

maternal grandmother, maternal aunts, and a maternal uncle 

about the child’s possible Indian ancestry]; In re A.C. (2022) 

75 Cal.App.5th 1009 [although parents denied Indian ancestry, 

DCFS erred by failing to ask members of parents’ extended 

family about the child’s possible Indian ancestry]; In re H.V.

(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433 [although mother denied Indian 

ancestry, DCFS had a duty to inquire of the maternal greatgrandmother and maternal great-grandfather].) Other courts 

have reached a contrary conclusion, holding that a parent’s 

unequivocal denial of Indian ancestry may constitute substantial 

evidence to support a juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not 

apply. (See, e.g., In re Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 483, 

486–488, 490–491 [juvenile court and agency made adequate 
13

ICWA inquiry where mother’s counsel, in mother’s presence, 

denied that mother had Indian ancestry]; In re Austin J., supra, 

47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 887–888 [no duty to make further inquiry 

regarding children’s possible Indian ancestry through father 

where father’s in-court statement and his parental notification of 

Indian status declaration indicated that he and his children had

no Indian ancestry]; In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 323

[no need for further inquiry if no one has offered information that 

would give the court or agency reason to believe that a child 

might be an Indian child]; In re H.V., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 433 

(dis. opn. of Baker, J.) [mother’s and father’s denials of Indian 

ancestry were substantial evidence to support juvenile court’s 

finding that ICWA did not apply].)

We need not resolve this issue here because even were 

DCFS required to inquire further regarding father’s possible 

Indian ancestry, substantial evidence supported the juvenile 

court’s finding that that duty was satisfied in this case. While 

the case was pending in the juvenile court, father was given 

multiple opportunities to provide contact information for 

extended family members, but he never did so. When he was 

first interviewed by DCFS in late August 2019, father provided 

the names of his mother and stepfather, whom he said lived in 

Arizona, but could not provide any contact information for them. 

Father said he would ask them to call DCFS; they never did. 

Father also could not provide an address or phone number for his 

ex-wife or two older children.

The CSW again asked father about his extended family in 

October 2019. Father identified his mother, grandmother, and

ex-wife, but was able to provide a phone number for only his 

grandmother. The phone number he provided was not in service, 
14

however. And, although father said he had three living siblings, 

he did not provide DCFS with their contact information.3 In 

short, the record does not identify any member of father’s 

extended family for whom DCFS had contact information but did 

not attempt to reach. 

Although father did not provide the CSW with contact 

information for any member of his extended family, he suggests 

that DCFS should have made efforts to “locate, contact, [and] 

interview” his parents, grandparents, and siblings because he 

provided their names and, in the case of his mother and 

stepfather, the state where they lived.4 Father cites no authority 

for the proposition that DCFS’s duty of inquiry includes 

attempting to obtain contact information for family members for 

whom it has only first and last names, and the case law is to the 

contrary. (See, e.g., In re A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 323

[although information provided by mother triggered a duty of 

further inquiry, agency’s failure to interview maternal relatives 

was reasonable where mother could not provide information 

about maternal relatives and no maternal relative appeared at 

3 Father suggests on appeal that DCFS did not do enough to 

locate members of his extended family because the CSW 

“apparently did not ask Father for his parents’ address in 

Arizona” and “apparently [did] not ask Father for his siblings’ 

addresses or other contact information.” The record does not 

support this inference.

4 Moreover, even were we to agree that DCFS has a duty to 

attempt to locate extended family members for whom parents do 

not provide contact information, we cannot imagine that such an 

attempt would have been fruitful here, where father’s parents 

have extraordinarily common names and father could say only 

that they lived somewhere in Arizona. 
15

any hearing or participated in the matter]; In re K.M. (2009) 

172 Cal.App.4th 115, 119 [where child protective agency 

“attempted on several occasions to elicit further information from 

the child’s family, but was unsuccessful due to the family’s 

hostility” toward the agency, the agency “did all that can or 

should be reasonably expected of it to meet its obligation to the 

child, to the family, to the tribes and to the court.].) 

In the present case, father did not provide valid contact 

information for a single member of his extended family––and 

because no extended family member ever appeared in the action, 

we are not certain what more DCFS could have done to 

investigate father’s possible Indian ancestry. We therefore 

conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that DCFS conducted a “proper and adequate further 

inquiry” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)) as to father’s family. 

B. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile 

court’s finding as to mother.

The parents also contend that DCFS did not conduct an 

adequate inquiry into mother’s claimed Cheyenne heritage 

because the record contains no evidence that DCFS attempted to 

contact mother’s father (the maternal grandfather). Again, we 

disagree.

Mother told the court at the disposition hearing that she 

might have Cheyenne ancestry through her father’s grandmother 

(the children’s maternal great-great-grandmother), whose name 

she did not know. Mother said her father, Jerry Ruiz, was the 

only member of her family who might have more information 

about her family’s ancestry, but she did not have contact 

information for him. The court directed mother to try to get more 

information about her father’s whereabouts and to give that 
16

information to her attorney, but mother never did so. And, 

although DCFS tried repeatedly to contact mother through phone 

and text, mother did not return the phone calls and did not 

provide any additional information by text.

Notwithstanding mother’s inability to provide DCFS with 

information about her extended family members, the parents 

contend the juvenile court should have required DCFS to attempt 

to contact her father or great-grandmother. We do not agree: As 

we have said, the statute requires DCFS to make a reasonable 

inquiry into the family’s ancestry, but it does not require the 

agency to attempt to speak to extended family members for whom 

the parents have not provided contact information.5 In any 

event, it is not clear what more DCFS could have done to attempt 

to contact mother’s father or great-grandmother: Lacking a 

phone number or address for either, and without any additional 

family members with whom to follow up, DCFS had, as a 

practical matter, done all it could do to investigate mother’s 

possible Indian ancestry. We therefore conclude that substantial 

evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that DCFS 

conducted an “proper and adequate further inquiry” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (i)(2)) as to mother’s family. 

The parents further contend that the notices DCFS mailed 

to the tribes were inadequate because they did not provide 

complete information (names, current and former address, birth 

and death dates, birth places, and tribal enrollment information) 

for the children’s direct lineal ancestors. Not so. ICWA notice is 

5 As with father’s parents, it is difficult to imagine that 

DCFS would have been able to locate mother’s father in 

Los Angeles even had it tried to do so because his name is so 

common.
17

required only if after initial and further inquiries there is “reason 

to know” that an Indian child is involved in the proceeding. 

(§ 224.2, subd. (f), italics added.) As we have described, there is 

“reason to know” a child is an Indian child if any one of six 

statutory criteria is met—e.g., if the court is advised that the 

child is a member or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe,

the child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or 

has been a ward of a tribal court, or either parent or the child 

possesses an identification card indicating membership or 

citizenship in an Indian tribe. (Id., subd. (d).) Here, none of 

these statutory criteria was met, and thus ICWA notice was not 

required. Any insufficiencies in the notices sent, therefore, were 

legally irrelevant.
18

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

I concur:

KIM, J.

*

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
LAVIN, J., Dissenting: 

D.R. (mother) and R.R. (father) appeal from the juvenile 

court’s orders terminating their parental rights to their infant 

children, A.R. and R.R. The parents argue the Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with 

the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) 

and related state laws implementing ICWA (Welf. & Inst. Code,1

§ 224 et seq.).

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not 

apply. In my view, the Department failed to conduct an adequate 

initial inquiry under ICWA as to both parents. Accordingly, I 

would conditionally affirm the orders terminating mother’s and 

father’s parental rights and remand the matter for the limited 

purpose of requiring the Department to comply with ICWA. I 

therefore respectfully dissent.

BACKGROUND

1. Proceedings Leading to the Termination of Parental 

Rights

In September 2019, shortly after A.R. and R.R. were born, 

the Department filed a dependency petition because the children 

tested positive for amphetamine and heroin at birth. The petition 

alleged mother’s use of illicit drugs while pregnant with the 

children and the parents’ issues with substance abuse placed the 

children at serious risk of suffering physical harm (§ 300, subd. 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
2

(b); b-1 through b4 allegations). After the detention hearing, the 

juvenile court found father was A.R.’s and R.R.’s presumed 

parent.

In January 2020, the court sustained all the petition’s 

allegations, declared the children dependents of the court, and 

removed them from mother’s and father’s custody. The court 

awarded the parents reunification services.

In February 2021, the court found mother and father were 

not in compliance with their case plans, terminated their 

reunification services, and scheduled a selection and 

implementation hearing under section 366.26. 

In June 2021, the court held the selection and 

implementation hearing. The court found A.R. and R.R. were 

adoptable, terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights, and 

designated the children’s foster parents as their prospective 

adoptive parents.

Mother and father appealed from the orders terminating 

their parental rights.

2. ICWA Investigation

Shortly after the children were born in August 2019, the 

Department interviewed father. Father has four siblings: two 

brothers and two sisters. His father died when he was six years 

old, and one of his sisters recently passed away. Father provided 

the Department with the names of the children’s paternal 

grandmother and paternal step-grandfather, who lived in 

Arizona. Father didn’t have the paternal grandparents’ contact 

information, but he told the Department he would try to obtain it.

Father also stated he was on parole and provided the 

Department with two possible telephone numbers for his parole 

officer. The Department called one of those numbers on October 
3

11, 2019 and left a voicemail message with return contact 

information. Although the Department had not received a return 

phone call from a parole officer as of October 18, 2019, there is no 

indication in the record that the Department made any further 

attempt to contact father’s parole officer.

Father told the Department in August 2019 that he had 

two other children, Angel Marie, born in 2001 or 2002, and 

Michelle Victoria, born in 2003, and provided the Department 

with the dates and months of their births. Father also stated that 

their mother, Victoria R., “had full custody of the girls through 

divorce Court” and provided the Department with Victoria R.’s 

date, month, and year of birth. Father could visit the girls every 

other weekend but had not seen them since prior to his last 

arrest about one year ago. Although father did not have a contact 

number or address for the girls and Victoria R., he stated the 

family was residing in Hemet, California. In addition, the 

Department had prior contact information for this family since it 

investigated, and closed, a 2002 allegation of emotional abuse 

and general neglect involving father, Victoria R., Angel Marie, 

and two stepchildren. 

In early September 2019, father filed an ICWA-020 form on 

which he checked a box stating, “I have no Indian ancestry as far 

as I know.”

Father, but not mother, appeared at the detention hearing. 

Father told the court that he didn’t know if his or mother’s 

families had any Indian ancestry. The court found it didn’t have 

reason to know A.R. and R.R. were Indian children and ordered 

the parents to keep the Department, their attorneys, and the 

court aware “of any new information relating to possible ICWA 

status.” 
4

In October 2019, the Department interviewed father again. 

Father was on good terms with his siblings, his mother, and his 

grandmother. He provided a phone number for his grandmother, 

but the number didn’t work when the Department tried to 

contact her. Father didn’t provide contact information for any of 

his other relatives. 

In December 2019, mother submitted an ICWA-020 form, 

stating she may have Indian ancestry through the Cheyenne 

tribe. At her first court appearance that same day, mother told 

the court that she has Cheyenne ancestry through her father’s 

side of the family. When the court asked mother if she knew 

whether anyone in her family was a member of the tribe, mother 

replied, “I don’t. It’s on my father’s side. I believe his 

grandmother was.” Mother didn’t know if her father’s 

grandmother was still alive because she no longer spoke to her 

father. Mother didn’t have her father’s contact information, but 

she provided his name and stated she believed he and his 

grandmother, if still alive, lived in Los Angeles. Mother told the 

court she would try to obtain her father’s date of birth and 

contact information. The court instructed mother to contact her 

relatives and ordered the Department to investigate mother’s 

claim of Indian ancestry. 

In mid-January 2020, the Department sent notices to the 

“Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma,” the “Cheyenne 

River Sioux Tribe,” and the “Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of 

Oklahoma.” The notices included: (1) each child’s name and date 

of birth; (2) mother’s name, contact information, and date and 

place of birth and a statement that mother claimed ancestry from 

the noticed tribes; and (3) father’s name, contact information, and 

date and place of birth. The notices did not include names or any 
5

other information for any of the family’s extended relatives, 

listing their identification as “unknown.” The court found the 

Department’s notices were proper. 

The Department received return receipts from the tribes, 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of State. The 

Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe responded to the Department’s 

notices. The tribe’s enrollment specialist conducted an enrollment 

check and found that mother, father, and both children were not 

enrolled in the tribe. 

In late January 2020, the Department reported it had 

called mother, left her voicemails, and texted her asking for more 

information about her claim of Cheyenne ancestry. Mother never 

returned the Department’s calls, but she responded through text 

message that she has Cheyenne ancestry through her father. She 

didn’t provide any other information. Nothing in the record 

indicates the Department otherwise tried to locate or contact 

mother’s father or her father’s grandmother.

In its selection and implementation report filed in May 

2021, the Department didn’t provide any new information about 

its investigation into the family’s ICWA status. The Department 

urged the court to make ICWA findings before deciding on a 

permanent plan for the children. 

At the June 7, 2021 selection and implementation hearing, 

the court found ICWA did not apply to the children’s proceedings. 

During that hearing, mother and father requested that A.R. and 

R.R. be placed with father’s ex-wife—Victoria R.— and mother’s 

counsel told the court that he has “the information for the court if 

the court does need that information.”
6

DISCUSSION

To effectuate ICWA, state law imposes on the Department 

and the juvenile court an affirmative and continuing duty to 

inquire whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be 

an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re Michael V. (2016) 3 

Cal.App.5th 225, 233.) The duty to inquire “begins with initial 

contact [citation] and obligates the juvenile court and child 

protective agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals 

whether the child may be an Indian child.” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 

Cal.App.5th 275, 290, citing § 224.2, subd. (a).) “[T]he burden of 

coming forward with information to determine whether an Indian 

child may be involved and [the extent of] ICWA notice required in 

a dependency proceeding does not rest entirely—or even 

primarily—on the child and his or her family.” (Michael V., at p. 

233.) 

Under its “duty of initial inquiry,” the Department must 

“make meaningful efforts to locate and interview ... ‘extended 

family members’ ” when it takes a child into temporary custody. 

(In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552–553 (Y.W.).) To that 

end, the Department must ask “the child, parents, legal 

guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others 

who have an interest in the child,” and the reporting party 

whether the child is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. 

(b).) Extended family members include adults who are the child’s 

stepparents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, 

nieces, nephews, and first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); 

§ 224.1, subd. (c).) The court is also required, at the first 

appearance of each party, to “ask each participant present in the 

hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to know 

that the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.25, subd. (c).) To meet its 
7

obligations under ICWA, the Department “must on an ongoing 

basis include in its filings a detailed description of all inquiries, 

and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information 

received pertaining to the child’s Indian status.” (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)

The court may find ICWA doesn’t apply to a child’s 

proceeding if it finds the Department’s duty of inquiry has been 

satisfied and there is no reason to know that child is an Indian 

child. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.481(b)(3)(A).) We review the court’s ICWA findings for 

substantial evidence. (In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 

404.) As I will explain, the Department failed to satisfy its duty of 

inquiry as to both parents. 

As to mother, the Department concedes “it had a duty of 

inquiry to interview the maternal grandfather and any other 

available extended maternal relatives given that mother claimed 

she had possible Cheyenne ancestry and then identified the 

maternal grandfather and his grandmother at court on December 

11, 2019.” The Department also acknowledges that although it 

“made some effort at following up with mother the following 

month to inquire about her ICWA claim, the record is silent on 

whether the agency made any additional efforts thereafter to 

speak with her extended relatives.”

The Department’s inquiry into mother’s claim of Cheyenne 

ancestry was inadequate. The Department was aware that 

mother claimed Cheyenne ancestry through her father’s side of 

the family. Although mother didn’t have contact information for 

her father or personal information for her father’s grandmother, 

she provided her father’s name and the city where she believed 

he and his grandmother, if still alive, lived (Los Angeles). 
8

Nothing in the record indicates the Department tried to locate or 

contact mother’s father, or to identify, contact, or locate her 

father’s grandmother, after mother identified them as relatives 

who potentially had information pertaining to her claim of 

Cheyenne ancestry. As the petitioning agency, it was incumbent 

upon the Department “to make a meaningful effort to locate and 

interview extended family members” to investigate mother’s 

claim that she has Cheyenne ancestry stemming from her 

father’s side of the family. (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 

709 (K.R.).) The Department failed to satisfy that duty in this 

case.

The Department also didn’t satisfy its duty of inquiry as to 

father. While father denied knowing of any Indian ancestry in his 

family, that didn’t relieve the Department of its duty to try to 

locate and contact the children’s extended paternal relatives. As 

several courts have observed, parents often “may not know their 

possible relationship with or connection to an Indian tribe.” 

(Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 554; see, e.g., In re S.R. (2021) 

64 Cal.App.5th 303, 314 [“parents apparently had no idea of their 

family’s connection to the Yaqui tribe of Arizona, even though the 

children’s great-grandmother was a member”]; In re Elizabeth 

M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 787 [“Oral transmission of relevant 

information from generation to generation and the vagaries of 

translating from Indian languages to English combine to create 

the very real possibility that a parent’s identification of the 

family’s tribal affiliation is not accurate.”]; In re Breanna S.

(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 650 [“ ‘parents may be unsure or 

unknowledgeable of their own status as a member of a tribe’ ”], 

disapproved on other grounds by In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

614, 637, fn. 6.) Accordingly, “ICWA and state law place the duty 
9

[to inquire] with the child protective agency in the first instance, 

not the child or his or her parent, to determine whether 

additional information exists that may link a child with Indian 

ancestry to a federally recognized tribe.” (Elizabeth M., at p. 787.) 

Thus, “[n]othing in section 224.2, subdivision (b), relieves the 

Department of its broad duty to seek ... information [about a 

family’s ancestry] from ‘all relevant’ individuals ... simply 

because a parent states on the ICWA-020 form ... ‘I have no 

Indian ancestry as far as I know.’ ” (Y.W., at p. 554, citation 

omitted.) 

Here, father provided the Department with the names of 

several of his family members, including his mother, his stepfather, and his grandmother, and he told the Department he still 

has good relationships with his surviving siblings. While father 

gave the Department an inactive phone number for his 

grandmother, nothing in the record shows the Department 

followed up with father to find a working phone number for her 

or otherwise made any effort to locate and contact her or any of 

father’s other relatives. 

In addition, the Department should have followed up on 

obvious leads and sources to obtain contact information for 

father’s extended family members, including his two eldest 

daughters. For example, it should have attempted to interview 

father’s ex-wife, Victoria R. Indeed, the Department had prior 

contact information for this family since it investigated a 

previous abuse and neglect allegation involving father, Victoria 

R., and Angel Marie. Father also stated that his eldest daughters 

and Victoria R. lived in Hemet, and father and Victoria R. had 

been involved in family court litigation. To the extent the 

Department could not locate Victoria R. from public sources of 
10

information or its own records, mother’s counsel appeared ready 

and able to provide the court with that information at the June 7, 

2021 hearing. And although the Department had not received a 

return phone call from father’s parole officer—another potential 

source of information concerning father’s family—as of October 

18, 2019, there is no indication that the Department made any 

further attempt to contact the officer.

In sum, the Department failed to comply with its duty “to 

make a meaningful effort to locate and interview extended family 

members to obtain whatever information they may have” as to 

A.R.’s and R.R.’s possible Indian status. (K.R., supra, 20 

Cal.App.5th at p. 709.) And where, as here, a child protective 

agency has not complied with its inquiry duty, I would not defer 

to the juvenile court’s ICWA finding. Under section 224.2, 

subdivision (i)(2), an ICWA finding is entitled to substantial 

evidence review only if the juvenile court first ensures that 

“proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as 

required [by the statute] have been conducted and there is no 

reason to know whether the child is an Indian child.” (See In re 

N.G. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 482–485 [rejecting agency’s 

argument that substantial evidence supported court’s ICWA 

findings and remanding matter for ICWA compliance because the 

agency did not document what efforts, if any, it made to ask 

extended family members about the child’s possible Indian 

ancestry]; K.R., at p. 709 [“the court has a responsibility to 

ascertain that the agency has conducted an adequate 

investigation and cannot simply sign off on the notices as legally 

adequate without doing so”].) 

For these reasons, I would conditionally affirm the court’s 

orders terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights and 
11

remand for full compliance with the inquiry provisions of ICWA 

and related California law.

LAVIN, J.