IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR K

ENT COUNTY

UCHEAMAKA MBA, : : C.A. No: K14A-06-008 RBY Appellant, : : v. : : BAYHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER, : INC., : : Appellee. :

Submitted: Novembe r 3, 2014 Decided : Dece mber 5, 2 014 Upon Con sideration of Appellan t’s Appeal from the Une mployment Insurance A

ppeal Board AFFIRMED
ORDER
Ucheamaka MBA, Pro se

. E. Chaney

Hall, Esquire, Greenburg Trauri g, LLP , Wilm

ington, De laware , and Pro Hac Vice Johnin e P. Barnes, Esqu ire, Washingt on, DC for Appel lee. Paige J. Schm

ittinger, Esquire, Deputy Att orn ey General, D epartment of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Unemployment Insuran ce Appeal Boar d.

Young, J.Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

2 SUMMARY Ucheam aka Mba (“Ap pel lan t”) app eal s fr om a decision of the Unemploy

ment Insurance Appeal B oard (“ the Board”), deny

ing her appl ication fo r unem ployment insurance compensation. A ppellant filed a claim

for benef

its in Janua

ry 2014 , following a prolonged

absence f

rom her position a

t Bay health Medical Center, Inc. (“Appellee”). The hear

t of this app eal is cont

rolled by 19 Del. C

ode § 3 314(2), providingthat em

ployee s who volunta

rily q uit their j obs without

good cause s hall be disqualified from

receiving unemploym

ent benefits. The resolution of this matter rest s upon whether

the Board

prop erly foun d that Appe llant’s indefinite leave, and subsequent

filing for unemp loyment insura

nce, fit the scena rio contem

plated by the statute. This Cour

t is to reverse the r

uli ng of t he Board o nly if the opinion w as not based in subst antial evi dence, o r was the result of legal err

or. Finding neither to be the case, the Court AFFIRMS the decisi on of the Bo ard.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE Appellant began working for Appellee on April 9, 2010, as a Nu rsing Assistant /Unit Secret ary. By he r own re quest, A ppellant sw itched to par t-t ime status, starting on July 18, 2010. On October 24, 2010, Appellant, again of her own acco rd, asked for an add

itional re duction in hour s, switc hing to what i s kn own as “relief” status. Citing her husband’s travel schedule, Appel lant took advan tage o f Appe llee’s policy of allowing employees to take a s ix mont h, unpaid le ave of

absence, wherein the emplo yee’ s position is he ld open for her. A lte rnatively , the em ployee is able to reapply as an int ern al h ire w hen read y. Appellant was granted such leave on March 6, 2013.Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

3 Duringthis tim e, Appe llee wa s in regular contact w ith Appell ant, discussing,

amo ng other things, Appellant’s expected time fra me for returning to work. A ppellan t initially stated she would be re turning in September or October. Ha ving not heard from Appellan

t, Appel lee’s r

epresent ative, D ebbie Hin es (“ Hine s”) , contacted Appellant in October 2013. By email dated October 2 0, 201 3, Appellant informed Hines that she would n ot be able t o return to work until December, as her mother had recently passed aw ay. Hines re sponded that Appe llant would be placed on “adm inistrativ e separati on,” as th e six m onths hadnow expired, but that she was free to reapply at any tim

e. Although there is some discord between the parties a s to the exactmeaning of App ellan t’s reply ema il dated Oc tober 23, 2013, it ca n at least be said Ap pella nt acknowl edged the se paration, promi sing to be in t ouch once th e funeral arran geme nts were compl eted. O n October

28, 2013, A

ppellant received a letter from Appellee , me moria

lizing the adminis trative separati on. This l etter did n ot, however, menti on the possibi lity of re-appli cation. Fol lowing this exchange, it is undisp uted that Appellant never attempted reinstate ment with Appell ee. Upon the com pletion of t

he funeral arrange ments for her m other, A ppellant applied for unem

ployment insura

nc e benefitsin January

2014. Thi s claim

was denie d, and Appellant appealed. On March 4, 2014, the Appeals Refere e determined that Appellant was, indeed, eligible for unemploy ment benefits. The Refere e based her decision on 19 Del. C

ode § 3314(2), holding that Appellant had not been discharged for just cau se, and th

us, cou ld rightfully receive the insurance paym ents. Appellee appealedthis decisi on to the Boa rd, whic h reverse d the ruling of the Appeals Referee. This time, the Board

applied 19 Del. Code § 3314(1), finding that Appellant hadUcheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

1 29 Del. C . §10142( d); Avon Prods. v. Lamparski , 203 A.2d 559, 560 (Del. 1972).

2 Olney v. Cooch , 425 A .2d 61 0, 614 (Del. Super . Ct. 1981) (citi ng Consolo v. Fed. Mar

. Comm’n , 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).

3 Id. (quot ing Cross v. Calfano , 475 F.Supp. 896, 898 (M.D. Fla. 1979)).

4 Delaware Transit Corp. v. Roane , 2011 WL 3793450, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011) (quot ing Straley v. Advanced Staffing, Inc., 2009 WL 1228572, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009)).

5 Lehman Br

others Ban k v. State

Bank Comm issioner, 937 A.2d 95, 102 (Del. 2007).

6 Anchor M

otor Freig

ht v. Ciaba ttoni, 716 A.2d 154, 156 (Del. 1998).

4 voluntarily

left Appellee’s em

ploy, lacking good cause. The Board den i ed Appellant ’s benefits. STANDARD OF REVIEW For administrative boar d appea ls, this Co urt is lim ited to rev iewing w

hether the Board ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence and free

from legal er rors. 1 Subst antial evidence is that whi ch “a reasonab le mind might

accept a s adequate

to support a conclusi on.” 2 It is “more than a scintill a, but les s than prepon deranceof the evidence.” 3 An abuse o f discret ion will be

found if the board “ acts arbi trarily or capricio usl y...ex ceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recogniz ed rules of law or pr

actice so as to pr oduce inju stice.” 4 Where an ag encyh as interpr

eted and a

pplied a sta

tute, the court’ s review

is de novo

. 5 In the absence of an err

or of law , lack of

substantial

evidence or abuse of

discretio n, the Court wil l not disturb the decisi on of the boa rd. 6Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

7 State ex rel. Dep’t of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. , 297 A.2d 412, 414 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (“[t]his Court does, however, review questions of law. The specific question raised by this appea

l, i.e. whether the undisputed factual situation amounted to....a voluntary quitting of a job without good cause, is a question of law subject to review ”).

8 19 Del. C. § 3314(1).

9 See Gsell v. Unclaimed Freight , 1995 WL 339026, at *1, n. 2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 3, 1995) (w here ap pellant w as pro se “[t]he Cour t has atte mpted to charact

erize [App ellant’s ] position as recognizable legal arg ument”). 5 DISCUSSION Appellan t as ks this Court to reverse the holding of the Board, denying her claim for unemploym

ent insurance. In contemplating Appellant’s request, this Court is limit ed in its review of

the Board’s decision to examining whether the Board based its findings on substantial evidence, and whether any legal error was comm itt ed. Specificto the case at bar, the C ou rt is furt her asked, soundly within its r eviewing aut hor ity, to rule upon

a question o f law: di d the Appe llant, as a matt er of law , leave her position voluntarily and without good cause? 7 The fac tual scena

rio prese nted by

the instant

matt er, is go v erned by

19 Del. Code § 33 1 4(1), which provides in relevant part: “[a] n individual shall be disqualified for benefits. ...[ f]or

the week in which [the individual] left work voluntaril

y wit hout good cause att ributable to such work...” 8 Summ arizing Appellant’s argument, it is her position th at she di d not voluntarily leave her job with Appellee, but instead was discharge d. 9 The def

inition of “

voluntarily

” leaving wo rk has bee n specific ally distinguished from being discharge d: “ [t]he p hrase volun tarily quitting means leav ingUcheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

10 Id., at *3 (internal quotations omitted). 6 on one’s own motion, as o pposed t o being d ischarged .” 10 As such, Appellant ar gues, she sh ould not be di squalifi ed from receiving unemployment benefit s. Appellee counters that Appellant did, in fact, leave of her own accord , and further that she lacked th e “good cause” mandat ed by the cont rolling statute. Th e determination of whether App ellant left of her own free wi ll or wa s terminated

by App ellee re sts upon wha t Appella

nt und ersto od regarding her emplo ym ent

st atu s. T he B oar d, i n ma k ing its rulin g that Appe llant with drew fr om work voluntaril

y, relied on a s eries of comm unic a tions betw een Appel lant and Appellee. Both parties a

ppear to be

in agreem

ent that on o r about Ma

rch 6, 2010 , Appellant temporarily

made hersel f una vailable t o Appelle e. The understand ing betweenthe partie s, at tha t point, w as that Appellant w ould retur n to the act

ive duty pool in a fe w mo nths tim e. The Board re viewed a n email chain be tween A ppellant and Hines in whi ch Appellan t requeste d additi onal time off. Alth ough sensitive to Appel lant ’s fam ily em

ergency , Hines inform ed Appell ant that, given the am ount of ti me she had alr

eady been absent, s he would now be placed

on an “ admin istrative separatio n.” Hines further instructed that Appellant should “reapply,” w hen she was available to work ag ain. App ellee al so mail ed a lette r to Appellan t, form alizing the separatio n. The meaning of the “ administrative separation,” and, m ore on point, what Appellant understood this to mean, is the focal point of the dispute. Th e Board, in reviewing the com

munic ati ons be tween the parties, determ

ined Appel lant comprehended

that she was not being discharged. Since she did not retu rn to work

–Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

11 See e.g., Sandefur v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 1993 WL 389217 at

* 4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1993) (“an employ ee does have an obligation to inform an employ er of resolvable problems and to make a good faith ef fort to resolve them before simply leaving”); Thompson v

. Christiana

Care Heal

th Sys. , 25 A.3d 7 78, 785 (D el. 2011)(an empl oye e “must bring th e proble

m to the att

ention of someone i

n authori ty to make the necessa ry adjustmen

ts, describe the problems in sufficient detail to allow for resolution, and to give the employer enough time to correct the problem”).

12 Johnson v. Chrysler Corp. , 213 A.3d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).

13 Behr v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. , 1995 WL 109026 at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1995). 7 even aft er being to ld she could reapply at any time– but instea d filed for unempl oym ent

insurance , the Boa

rd c onclud ed Ap pel lan t le ft h er jo b vo lun tari ly. Appel lant ’s position, meanwhile, was that the adm inistrat ive separati on was a discharge. She claims that she did not make f urther contact with Appellee, as sh e believed herself to be ineligible fo r work. T he Board also did not find any “ good cause” for Appellan t’s volunt ary withdrawal. As pe r the Board, i f, as Appel lant contends, she truly believed her sel f ineligible for reinstatement, it was her responsibil ity

to seek out Appellee to find a resolution, before simply leaving w ork. 11 In reviewi

ng the Boar

d’s dec ision, theCourt is to avoid behaving as a “tr

ier of fact with authority to weigh the evidence, determ ine quest ions of cre dibility , and make its own factual finding s and conc lusions .” 12 In the present matter, the Boar d made the fact ual deter minat ion that, a t the tim e Appella

nt applied f

or unem ployment insurance, she was a

ware a nd understood

that Appellee

had not disc harged her

by its

comm unications. To the ext ent this fin ding was base d in “subst antial evi dence,” this Court is to take this conclusion at face value. 13 Moreover, substantial evidence is thatUcheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

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C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

14 Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedore s , 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).

15 See e.g. Appellee ’s Answe ring B rief at 4

(citing Appellan t’s Octob er 23, 20 13 email to Hines: “ I understand that you will have to file the separation...I will keep in touch with you when I get bac k” ) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in the original).

16 Gsell , 1995 WL 339026 at *2.

17 Sandefur , 1993 WL 389217 at *2.

18 Gsell , 1995 WL 339026 at *3. 8 which a “reasonab le mind might accept as adequat e to supp ort a concl usion.” 14 The Board, with r egard to App ellan t’s understand ing of her e mploy

ment s tatus
on “adm inistrative separation,” centered its finding upon the written exchanges betweenthe parti es . The Board engaged in a weighing of credibility between Appel lant ’s interpre tation of th e writings, and that of Appellee’s. A reasonable trier of fact coul d, ba sed upon th e language used by Appellan

t, deter mine t hat she comprehended

that the a dminis trative separati on did not permanently terminate her relations hip with Appellee. 15 As such, this Court finds that the Board’s decision was firmly rooted in substantial evidence. “Whether this fact ual situati on amo unted to a vol u ntar y quitting of the j ob without cause is a qu estion o f law subject t o review by this Court.” 16 Although factual findings are acce pted, wh e re supporte d by subst antial evi dence, a Court m ust next inquire whether

the Board ap plied the la

w corre ctly t o these fa cts. 17 Specifi c to the matter athand, in

order to affirm the Board’ s opinion, the Court must conclude that Appel lant ’s understand

ing of her c ontinued abi lity to reapply , and her subsequent failure to do so, constitute a “co nscious int ention to le ave or ter minat e the employment.” 18Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

19 1995 WL 339026 at *1.

20 Id. , at *3.

21 Id. ; see also Behr , 1995 WL 109026 at

*1 (holdin

g that e mploy ee volunt arily abandoned his employment whe re he failed to report when he said he would, f ailed to contact the employer for

several weeks...”). 9 In exam ining the fa cts of this case, th e Court fi nds it instru ctive to review the Gsell v. Unc laimed F

reight

. 19 In holding that the evidenceand factu al findings of the Board did not “subst antiate a

conscious in

tention to le ave or

terminate employment,” the Gsell cou rt w as mo ved by “t he absence of evidenc e that [A

ppellant] failed to reporton a date set by the employer or agreed t o by the partie s... ” 20 The Gsell employer did not comm unicate to the Appe llant-em ployee adequate ly, t

he me ans for her reins tatem ent. The

Appellee here, by contrast, clearly

stated tha

t Appella ntwas free to ret urn to wor k. M ore ov er, sh e wa s b ein g “se par ate d” o nl y un ti l th at t ime when she was wil ling or able

to be reins tated. T

he decision

to reapply, appears to have been leftentirely

to Appellant’s whim. The Board determined, base d upon the substantial evidence before it, that Appellant’s status was known and unambiguous to her. Her failure to reach out to her employer was, therefore, correctly interpreted by the Board as a “conscious intentio n to leave o r terminate the emplo yment.” 21 The Board als o reasoned that Appe llant’s vo luntary withdraw al from emplo ym ent

was wit hout “g ood cause. ” Pursuan t to 19 Del. C

ode § 3314(1), where

an emplo yee l e aves volunta rily, there m

ust be good ca

use in orde r to qualif

y for

u nempl oym ent

benefits. Go od cause is understo od to mean “such caus e as wo ul d justify one in voluntar

ily le aving the ranks of theemplo yed an d joining the ranks o fUcheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

.

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

22 Sandefur , 1993 WL 389217 at *4.

23 White v. Security Link

, 658 A.2d. 619, 622 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994).

24 See e.g., Sandefur, 1993 WL 389217 at

*4 (“an e mploy ee does have an o

bligation to inform an employer

of resolvable problems and to make a good fa ith effort to resolve them before simply leaving ”); Thompson , 25 A.3d at 785(an employe e “must bring the problem to the attention of someone in authority

to make th e neces sary

adjustmen

ts, descr ibe the pr oblems in sufficient detail to allow for resolution, and to give the employ er enough time to correct the problem”).

25 White , 658 A.2d. At 622. 10 the unemployed.” 22 This cause must further be “fo r reasons connected with employment.” 23 In com ing to this co nclusion, t

he Board f

ocused on the

requirem ent that “ good cause” arises onl

y aft er an ef

fort is m ade by the em ployee , to resol

ve the ma tter motiva ting her withd

rawal. 24 The Board stressed the many instances in which Appellee indicated

that Appe llant should b e in touch. Even if s he were unc lear abou t her status during the “ admin istrative separati on,” the o nus was on her to clarif y the situation. The Court is satisfied with the Board ’ s interpre tation of th e governing statute, and its appl ication to t he facts at hand. Failing

an attempt at clarification, as courts have inter

preted the statute to require, Appellan t’s volunt ary quitting was not justified by good cause. The Court under stands Appellan t to suggest t

hat the “ good

cause” f or her le ave from work was the death of her mother. As an initial m

atter, the Court

recognizes that the “good cause” must b e “for reasons con nected with employment.” 25 Al though tragic, bere a veme nt does not f all under t

his definition. It is necessar ily, somet hing outsideof Appellan t’s em ployment. In a

n attem pt to bolster

her argum

ent, Appellan

tUcheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc

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C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY December 5, 2014, 2014

26 19 Del. C. § 3314(2).

27 The Appellee, in its Answering Brief, a dditionally raised the arg

ument that Appellant should be d

enied une mploy ment comp ensation , as a re sult of ha ving be en discha

rged f or just cause, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2). As this Court affirms the Board’s ruling under 19 Del. C. § 3314(1), this Court does not address the § 3314(2) argument. 11 cites to 19 Del. Code § 3314(2), which pro vides in re levant par t: “[a ]n indiv idual, who is discharged from work because the individual is providing care for that individual’ s...pa

rent with a ve rified il lness or dis ability , will not be conside red to have been disch arged from work for g ood cause ...” 26 Appellan t certainly to ok t ime off as a resu lt of a par

ent, but th e Court does not read the statute to c over the organizing of funeral arrangements. The statute is plainly inapplicable. T he Board’s rulin g was supp orted by subs tantial ev idence. Addi tionall y, i n findi ng that Appellant

voluntaril

y lef t Appelle e’s em

ploy w ithout good ca

use, the Board comm itted no errors of law. Hence, the Board did not abuse it s discreti on. The decision is AFFIRMED

. 27 CONCLUSION For the f oregoing re asons, the

decision of

the Board

is AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED

. /s/ Rober t B. Youn g J.
RBY /l mc oc: Prothonotary cc: Counsel Ucheamaka Mba, Pro se Opinion Di stribution File