[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14297

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DERONG WANG, 

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A205-038-417

____________________

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Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Derong Wang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of 

the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 

affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for 

cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(“INA”). Wang argues that the IJ did not sufficiently consider the 

evidence he submitted to show that his children would suffer 

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship (“EEUH”), that the IJ 

erred by finding he had a possible alternative means of obtaining 

status in the United States, and that the BIA failed to give reasoned 

consideration to his claim of hardship. Because we lack jurisdiction 

over some of Wang’s arguments and the rest lack merit, we dismiss 

Wang’s petition for review in part and deny it in part. 

I. Background 

Wang entered the United States without inspection on 

September 15, 1999. In 2012, the Department of Homeland 

Security (“DHS”) served Wang with a notice to appear, charging 

him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), “as an alien 

present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” 

Wang conceded the charge of removability and applied for 

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming that 

his removal would result in EEUH to his children, who are United 

States citizens. 

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At a hearing on Wang’s application for cancellation of 

removal, Wang testified that he moved to New York after entering 

the United States in 1999. He lived in New York until 2015, when 

he moved to Georgia for his then-girlfriend Xia You. The two had 

met in 2007, and Wang explained that Xia moved to New York for 

a brief period in 2008 but moved back to Georgia later that year. 

From 2008 to 2015, Wang lived in New York while Xia lived in 

Georgia, although they would reunite for visits. During that time, 

Xia worked part-time at a Chinese restaurant. Xia purchased the 

restaurant in 2012. After Wang moved to Georgia, he married Xia 

three years later. Wang testified that he has one biological 

daughter, who was born in May 2008, and one adopted daughter, 

who was born in January 2005.1 Both of Wang’s daughters were 

born in New York, and they are both United States citizens. 

Now, Wang and Xia operate the restaurant together and are 

the restaurant’s only employees. Wang works as the cook and is 

“mainly responsible for the kitchen in the back,” and Xia receives

phone calls in the front and takes care of the children. Their 

combined monthly income is about $2,500, and their monthly 

household expenses are around $2,400 to $2,600. At the time of the 

1 Xia is the mother of both of Wang’s daughters. Wang’s adopted daughter 

was born to Xia in 2005 while Xia was in a prior relationship. When Wang 

and Xia lived apart from 2008 to 2015, the children lived in Georgia with Xia. 

Xia cared for the children and worked part-time, and Wang’s primary role was 

to make money to support the family. 

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hearing, Xia had A-5 status and was applying for permanent 

residence in the United States, but the application process was very 

slow.2 Xia’s parents and three siblings all live in the United States, 

and they all have green cards except for her sister. 

Wang testified that if he were forced to return to China, the 

restaurant would close and Xia, whose English is limited, would 

have to find other restaurant work. And as the children’s caretaker,

Xia could work only part-time, which would not be enough “to 

support the children and the house payment.” As for Wang, he 

would make only $200 to $300 per month in China with his limited 

education and skills, which would not be enough to support the 

children. Wang explained that the children primarily speak English 

with minimal Mandarin, that China would bar the children from 

attending public school because they were United States citizens, 

and that the family could not afford private school. The family

would also have to pay for private medical care for the children if 

they went to China with Wang. Wang testified that Xia’s parents 

were granted political asylum in the United States, which might 

impact the family if they return to China. 

Xia testified next and gave testimony consistent with 

Wang’s. She added that she could not run the restaurant by herself 

because she helped in the front of the restaurant and was not able 

to run the kitchen. She could not afford to hire an employee to 

2 Xia’s A-5 status refers to her status as an asylee: Xia’s father was granted 

asylum, and Xia was granted derivative asylee status through her father. 

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help. She testified that she did “not have sufficient education and 

skill” to find another job and explained that if she had to work full 

time, she would not be able to take care of their children. She did

not know when she would be eligible for permanent residence, but 

she had to reapply for her A-5 card each year.

The IJ asked counsel when Xia’s visa would be current so 

she could be eligible to become a permanent resident. DHS 

informed the IJ that Xia had filed an I-485 application for 

adjustment of status, which was denied in 2005, and filed another 

I-485 in 2007, but it was unknown whether that second application 

had been adjudicated. 

The IJ issued an oral decision denying Wang’s application 

for cancellation of removal. Although the IJ found that Wang and 

Xia were “credible witnesses” and that Wang met three of the four 

requirements for cancellation, the IJ ultimately found that Wang 

failed to meet “his burden to show [EEUH] to his two qualifying 

relative children for two primary reasons.” First, the IJ found that 

neither Wang nor Xia had provided “sufficient evidence to show 

that [Xia] is ineligible to adjust her status, whereby [Wang] would 

be also eligible to adjust his status by an alternative means.” The IJ 

explained that “the BIA has long-found that if a Respondent has an 

alternative means of adjusting his status in the United States, it 

diminishes any hardship to his qualifying relatives.” Consequently, 

because Wang failed to provide concrete evidence that Xia “would 

be ineligible to adjust her status . . . , Wang ha[d] thus failed to show 

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that the hardship to his qualifying relatives would rise to the level 

of exceptional and extremely unusual.” 

Second, the IJ found that, even if Xia were not eligible to 

adjust her status to become a permanent resident, Wang still failed 

to meet his burden of showing EEUH to his children. Specifically, 

the IJ found that if Wang’s children remained in the United States 

after Wang’s departure, they would “suffer the same hardship 

commonly seen in these types of cases,” rather than EEUH. The IJ 

noted that Xia had owned and operated the restaurant for several 

years while Wang lived out of state, and despite the testimony that 

they could not afford to hire an employee, there was no testimony 

indicating that family members would not be able to help Xia run 

the restaurant in Wang’s absence and no evidence “to verify that 

the restaurant [would] be inoperable” without Wang. But even if 

the restaurant closed, the IJ found that Xia had transferable skills, 

no physical or mental impediments to working full-time, and 

family in the United States who had helped her in the past with the 

restaurant and her children. Moreover, the IJ stated that the 

evidence showed that education and healthcare for the children 

would only be more expensive in China—not unavailable—and 

that Wang and Xia’s testimony about diminished economic 

prospects did not rise to the level of EEUH.

Wang appealed to the BIA, challenging the determination 

that he failed to demonstrate EEUH and that Xia’s A-5 status 

constituted an available alternative means of adjusting his status

that diminished Wang’s hardship claim. Wang argued that he 

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demonstrated EEUH through testimony that, if he were removed 

and his family stayed in the United States, Xia would have to close 

the restaurant because she could not operate it alone; that Xia 

would not be able to find suitable employment to provide for two 

children and pay for the family’s living and home expenses; and 

that Wang’s two teenage daughters were emotionally dependent 

on him and would suffer emotional hardship if he left the United 

States. Wang also argued that, if the whole family returned to 

China, they would have to pay for private medical care and private 

school for the children, which they could not afford, and that the 

children were familiar only with the United States. Additionally, 

Wang argued that the IJ erred in finding that Xia’s status 

constituted an available alternative means for Wang to adjust his 

status, which diminished his hardship claim, because even if Xia 

adjusted her status to become a permanent resident, it would not 

improve Wang’s ability to obtain legal status. 

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Wang’s 

appeal. The BIA acknowledged Wang’s arguments that the IJ erred 

by finding (1) that Wang had not established the requisite EEUH 

based on financial difficulty (including not being able to operate 

their restaurant), emotional hardship, and hardship to the children 

if they went to China and (2) that Xia’s status created an alternative 

means of immigration and diminished Wang’s hardship claim. As 

to the latter argument, the BIA explained that the IJ did not find 

that Xia’s status would directly result in immigration benefits for 

Wang, but instead merely “noted the possibility that” Xia could 

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become a permanent resident and file a visa petition on Wang’s 

behalf, which would provide Wang an “alternative means of 

obtaining” legal status. The BIA then noted that the IJ had 

alternatively found that, even if Wang could not obtain status 

through his wife, he had not established EEUH to his children. 

The BIA concluded that, “[u]pon de novo review, [Wang

did] not qualify for cancellation of removal because he did not 

show that his removal would result in [EEUH] to his [children].” 

The BIA recognized that Wang’s family would experience hardship 

if Wang were removed but concluded that the hardship did not rise 

to the level of EEUH. The BIA ruled that the IJ properly considered 

the evidence of hardship, including the children’s health, ages, and 

lack of special educational needs; economic and financial issues; 

and family separation. “In this case, when all factors are considered 

in the aggregate,” the BIA explained, “[Wang] did not establish the 

requisite hardship.” Accordingly, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision 

and dismissed Wang’s appeal. 

Wang timely appealed. 

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

The INA provides that the Attorney General may cancel the 

removal of an alien who meets the four statutory requirements

enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).3 The last of the four 

3 In full, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) provides: 

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criteria—and the one at issue in this case—requires an alien to

establish “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a 

citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). 

When the BIA issues a decision regarding the cancellation of 

removal, “we review only that decision, except to the extent that 

the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision.” Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 735 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2013); Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[w]here 

the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review the decisions of 

The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to 

the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 

residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the 

United States if the alien—

(A) has been physically present in the United States for 

a continuous period of not less than 10 years 

immediately preceding the date of such application;

(B) has been a person of good moral character during 

such period;

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 

1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title, subject 

to paragraph (5); and

(D) establishes that removal would result in 

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the 

alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the 

United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence.

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both the BIA and the IJ to the extent of the agreement” and where 

“the BIA [does] not expressly adopt the IJ’s decision or rely on its 

reasoning, we . . . review only the BIA decision”). We do not 

consider issues or findings from the IJ that were not reached by the 

BIA. See Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403. Moreover, we review 

jurisdictional questions, constitutional claims, and questions and 

conclusions of law de novo, and we review factual determinations 

under the substantial evidence test. Id.; Rivas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

765 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Under the INA’s discretionary decision bar, we lack 

jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of”

cancellation of removal, except to the extent that a petitioner raises 

a constitutional claim or question of law. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); see Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 

(2022) (holding that “[f]ederal courts lack jurisdiction to review 

facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under . . . the 

. . . provisions enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),” one of which is 

cancellation of removal). “[A] party may not dress up a claim with 

legal or constitutional clothing to invoke our jurisdiction.” Mutua 

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 22 F.4th 963, 968 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation 

omitted). Thus, “[a]n argument couched as a legal question that 

essentially challenges the agency’s weighing of evidence is a 

garden-variety abuse of discretion argument that does not state a 

legal or constitutional claim.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Nevertheless, we have jurisdiction to determine whether

the BIA gave reasoned consideration to an alien’s claim because 

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that raises a question of law. Perez-Guerrero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

717 F.3d 1224, 1231 (11th Cir. 2013); Farah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 

F.4th 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2021). “A reasoned-consideration 

examination does not look to whether the agency’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence.” Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 

F.3d 792, 803 (11th Cir. 2016). “Rather, it looks to see whether the 

agency has ‘consider[ed] the issues raised and announce[ed] its 

decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive 

that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.’” Id. (quoting

Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 1356, 1364 (11th Cir. 2011)). The 

BIA must consider, but need not discuss, all the evidence submitted 

to it. Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2019). 

III. Discussion 

On appeal, Wang argues that (1) the IJ failed to correctly 

analyze the cumulative effect of the hardship factors on Wang’s 

children; (2) the IJ erred by finding that Wang had an alternative 

means of adjusting his status in the United States; and (3) the BIA 

failed to provide reasoned consideration of Wang’s claim. We 

deny Wang’s petition because we either lack jurisdiction to 

consider his arguments or because his enumeration of error lacks

merit.

First, Wang argues that the IJ did not provide an “adequate 

analysis of the cumulative effect of [the hardship] factors on [his] 

daughters.” But because the BIA issued a decision regarding the 

cancellation of removal in this case, “we review only [the BIA’s]

decision, except to the extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s 

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decision.” Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1308. Here, the BIA engaged in 

a de novo review of whether Wang met the EEUH requirement 

and did not expressly adopt the IJ’s analysis. Accordingly, Wang’s 

argument that the IJ did not properly analyze the hardship factors 

is not properly before us.4 See Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403; Malu v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Second, Wang’s argument that the IJ erred by finding that 

Wang’s hardship claim was diminished because he had a possible 

alternative means to obtaining status in the United States fails for 

the same reason. Wang again challenges the decision of the IJ—

not the BIA. Because the BIA never expressly adopted or relied on 

the IJ’s alternative-means finding, that finding is not properly 

before us for review.5 See Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403 (reviewing 

4 Additionally, to the extent Wang argues that the IJ applied the wrong legal 

standard, we lack jurisdiction to consider his claim because he failed to raise it 

before the BIA. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 

(11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that, “absent a cognizable excuse or exception, we 

lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the BIA” 

(quotation omitted)). And to the extent Wang challenges the IJ’s or the BIA’s 

weighing of the hardship factors, we lack jurisdiction over such claims.

Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining 

that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s EEUH determinations); FloresAlonso v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 36 F.4th 1095, 1099–100 (11th Cir. 2022). 

5 As a reminder, although the BIA summarized the IJ’s findings—including the 

IJ’s alternative finding that Xia may provide Wang with an alternative pathway 

to status—the BIA conducted a de novo review and concluded that Wang 

failed to demonstrate EEUH without relying on any alternative-means 

finding. 

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“only the BIA decision” where the “BIA did not expressly adopt the 

IJ’s decision or rely on its reasoning”). 

Third, Wang’s argument that the BIA failed to provide 

reasoned consideration of his claim lacks merit. Unlike his other 

two enumerations of error, Wang’s third argument is properly 

before us because he contends that the BIA did not reasonably 

consider his claim—which is a question of law that we can review. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Perez-Guerrero, 717 F.3d at 1231. We 

have explained that “the [BIA] does not need to do much” to 

reasonably consider a petitioner’s claim. Ali, 931 F.3d at 1333. “We 

just need to be left with the conviction that the [BIA] has heard and 

thought about the case and not merely reacted.” Id. (quotation 

omitted) (alterations adopted); Farah, 12 F.4th at 1327 (“To 

determine whether the [BIA] gave reasoned consideration to a 

petition, we inquire only whether the [BIA] considered the issues 

raised and announced its decision in terms sufficient to enable a 

reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not 

merely reacted.” (quotation omitted)). We have held that the BIA’s 

analysis was sufficient to show reasoned consideration when it 

listed the basic facts of the case, referred to relevant statutory and 

regulatory authority, and accepted several grounds on which the IJ 

denied the petitioner’s request for relief. Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2018). On the other 

hand, the BIA fails to give reasoned consideration to a claim when 

it “misstates the contents of the record, fails to adequately explain 

its rejection of logical conclusions, or provides justifications for its 

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decision which are unreasonable and which do not respond to any 

arguments in the record.” Id. at 874 (quotation omitted). 

Here, Wang argues that the BIA did not reasonably consider 

his claim because “the BIA’s conclusion as to whether [Wang’s 

children] would suffer the requisite hardship consisted of two short 

and conclusory paragraphs.” We disagree and conclude that the 

BIA’s discussion was sufficient to show that the BIA heard and 

thought about Wang’s arguments and the evidence in his case. 

The BIA acknowledged Wang’s arguments about various hardship 

factors, explicitly noting his arguments about being unable to 

operate the restaurant, financial difficulties, and the emotional 

hardship that the children would suffer if they accompanied Wang

to China. It then cited the applicable statutory and regulatory 

authority and relevant BIA decisions and concluded that Wang’s 

asserted hardship factors, when considered in the aggregate, did 

not meet the EEUH standard. In other words, the BIA’s discussion 

showed that the BIA gave reasoned consideration to Wang’s claim. 

See Bing Quan Lin, 881 F.3d at 874–75. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss in part Wang’s 

petition because Wang’s first two arguments are not properly 

before us, and we deny in part Wang’s petition because the BIA 

gave reasoned consideration to Wang’s claim. 

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART.

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