NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MARIA S., FELICIANO R., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, N.J., A.J., C.J., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0105

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD527290

The Honorable Janice K. Crawford, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen, P.C., Phoenix

By Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen

Counsel for Appellants

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Ashlee N. Hoffmann

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 9-28-2017
MARIA S., FELICIANO R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Maria S. and Feliciano R. (collectively “Grandparents”)

appeal from the superior court’s denial of their motion to intervene and 

motion to change physical custody. Because Grandparents have not shown 

the superior court abused its discretion, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Grandparents are the maternal grandparents of N.J., born in 

2003, A.J., born in 2005, C.J., born in 2009, and D.S., born in 19981

(collectively the “Children”). The Children’s mother, Benita S. (“Mother”),

suffers from severe mental-health issues and cognitive disabilities that 

prevent her from caring for the Children. Additionally, the Children all 

have special needs of their own.

¶3 Because of Mother’s own disabilities, she and the Children 

lived with Grandparents. When Grandparents took an extended trip to 

Mexico in late 2013, leaving the Children in Mother’s care, the Department 

of Child Safety (“DCS”) filed a dependency petition, alleging the Children 

were dependent as to Mother because she was unable to safely care for them 

or herself. Once removed from Mother’s care, the Children were placed in 

foster homes licensed by the Division of Developmental Disabilities 

(“DDD”) and began to receive specialized services.

¶4 After the superior court found the Children dependent as to 

Mother in August 2014, DCS attempted to reunify the Children with 

Mother, providing her with an array of reunification services. In March 

2015, DCS completed its first home study for Grandparents but a potential 

return of the Children was denied because Mother continued to live in the 

home and exhibited violent tendencies. Additionally, Grandparents were 

 

1 D.S. turned eighteen in December 2016 and is not a party to this 

appeal.
MARIA S., FELICIANO R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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reportedly unable to understand safety risks and the Children’s special 

needs. DCS unsuccessfully attempted to place the Children with other 

relatives.

¶5 Following a petition to sever the parental relationship and an 

evidentiary hearing, the superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

in May 2016 and the Children’s fathers’ rights in August 2016.2 This Court 

dismissed Mother’s appeal on July 8, 2016, pursuant to Arizona Rule of 

Procedure for the Juvenile Court 106(G)(1).

¶6 On August 17, 2016–three months after Mother’s parental 

rights had been terminated–Grandparents filed a motion to intervene under 

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 24(a) and/or (b).3 That same day, 

Grandparents also filed a motion to change physical custody and visitation,

requesting the Children be placed with them. Grandparents’ motions

asserted they could address the Children’s disabilities because they had 

addressed Mother’s similar disabilities. Grandparents sought to intervene 

in order to gain standing in the case so they could advocate for the Children 

and be considered as a permanent placement.

¶7 DCS and the Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) objected 

to Grandparents’ motions, based on lack of standing and the best interests 

of the Children. They pointed out that, during the course of the case, DCS

had performed a home study and on-site inspection of Grandparents’

home, had continually assessed Grandparents for placement, and although 

Grandparents discussed finding an alternate living arrangement for 

Mother, Grandparents took no action to remedy the problems DCS had 

identified. Further, DCS and the GAL argued that Grandparents were 

consistently unable to understand or deal with the Children’s disabilities 

and medical needs, and unable to interact or otherwise effectively control 

the Children.

¶8 Following a November 11, 2016 oral argument on 

Grandparents’ motion to intervene, the superior court set an evidentiary

hearing. Just prior to the evidentiary hearing, DCS performed a home 

 

2 The fathers of N.J., C.J., and A.J. are believed to reside in Mexico, 

have had no contact with the Children, and are not parties to this appeal.

3 Grandparents appeal the denial of the motion to intervene under

Rule 24(b), and we therefore do not consider Rule 24(a) on appeal.
MARIA S., FELICIANO R. v. DCS, et al.

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study for Grandparents, and it was denied because Mother was still 

residing in the home.

¶9 After taking the matter under advisement, the superior court 

denied Grandparents’ motions to intervene and for change of physical 

custody, finding that allowing Grandparents to intervene would be 

contrary to the Children’s best interests. In fact, the court voiced its “very 

serious concerns as to whether permitting intervention would provide the 

Grandparents with information that would be contrary to the [C]hildren’s 

best interest[s].” This timely appeal followed.

¶10 The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Grandparents sought permission to intervene pursuant to 

Rule 24(b), which provides that the court may, upon timely motion, permit 

intervention by one who “has a conditional right to intervene under a 

statute” or who “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 

common question of law or fact.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). Rule 24 “is 

remedial and should be liberally construed with the view of assisting 

parties in obtaining justice and protecting their rights . . . .” Mitchell v. City 

of Nogales, 83 Ariz. 328, 333 (1958).

¶12 Grandparents were not parties to the Children’s dependency 

and severance proceedings, however, that is not to say they lacked an 

interest in the proceedings. “Grandparents are among those people eligible 

to become guardian of a child found to be dependent” and, as such, a child’s 

grandparents “should be allowed to intervene in the dependency process 

unless a specific showing is made that the best interest of the child would 

not be served thereby.” Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68, 73 (1986); see also Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 8-514(B).

¶13 We review the superior court’s denial of Grandparents’

motion to intervene for an abuse of discretion. See Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 

Ariz. 361, 364, ¶ 9 (App. 2007).
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¶14 Bechtel outlined several relevant factors which the court 

should consider prior to determining whether a grandparent should be 

allowed to intervene in a dependency matter. 150 Ariz. at 72.

4

¶15 On appeal, Grandparents argue the court failed to properly 

apply the Bechtel factors for intervention and cite Chon-Lopez for the 

proposition that the superior court inappropriately analyzed placement 

issues instead of grounds for granting intervention. In concluding that

Grandparents’ intervention was not in the best interests of the Children, the

court cited the occasion in 2013 in which Grandparents, who were the 

primary caregivers of the Children, left the Children with Mother knowing, 

or having reason to know, that Mother was not an appropriate caregiver 

due to her mental capabilities. Although Grandparents underwent a home 

study in hopes of becoming a suitable placement for the Children, Mother, 

who is dependent on Grandparents, was still residing in the home. On that 

basis, DCS and the Children’s GAL opposed Grandparents’ request to serve 

as placement. The court further concluded “[i]ntervention is likely to result

in prolonging the case.”

¶16 The court was aware DCS had assessed Grandparents as a 

potential placement and offered Grandparents opportunities to visit with 

the Children in their home with Mother. During those visits, Grandparents 

 

4 Those factors are:

[T]he nature and extent of the intervenors’

interest, their standing to raise relevant legal 

issues, the legal position they seek to advance, 

and its probable relation to the merits of the 

case. The court may also consider whether 

changes have occurred in the litigation so that 

intervention that was once denied should be 

reexamined, whether the intervenors’ interests 

are adequately represented by other parties, 

whether intervention will prolong or unduly 

delay the litigation, and whether parties seeking 

intervention will significantly contribute to full 

development of the underlying factual issues in 

the suit and to the just and equitable 

adjudication of the legal questions presented.

Id.
MARIA S., FELICIANO R. v. DCS, et al.

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were unable to appropriately manage the Children, and the Children 

exhibited negative behaviors during and after the visits. The court heard 

testimony that DCS moved the visits to DCS offices but the Children’s 

behaviors remained unchanged, as did Grandparents’ response. The DCS 

case manager and DDD supervisor testified that the grandmother failed to 

implement any skills she had been taught to manage the Children’s 

behaviors and that instead, did not engage with the Children. In fact, the 

record shows that by March 2016, visitation with the grandmother was 

terminated because she did not follow DCS guidelines and caused the 

Children to become even more disruptive. In the presence of the 

grandmother, the Children’s behavior was frequently uncontrollable and 

violent, and over an extended period of time, attempts to educate the 

grandmother did not improve the Children’s behaviors. When visitation 

stopped, the Children’s behavior improved for the first time.

¶17 This case is dissimilar to Bechtel where the court found a

“paucity” of a record and “no indication at all as to why the [Grandparent’s]

motion was denied.” 150 Ariz. at 72. Here, the court did not “summarily” 

deny intervention, but rather made an “individualized determination” 

based on the best interests as required by Bechtel. See William Z. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 192 Ariz. 385, 389, ¶ 21 (App. 1998) (a summary denial of 

intervention is an abuse of discretion).

¶18 Grandparents argue their interests with regard to visitation 

and placement were not represented by any party to the case but, in fact, 

Mother’s counsel, the GAL, and one child’s attorney did do so throughout 

the dependency case. The superior court found Grandparents did not 

advance a legal position or offer any relevant legal issues not already 

presented by a party in the case, notwithstanding the fact that the GAL 

could not, in the Children’s best interests, represent Grandparents’ 

interests. Further, the court found that to allow the intervention would 

prolong the case.

¶19 Given the extensive record, including the Children’s 

interactions with Grandparents, the Children’s extensive history and 

continuing need for specialized care, and the need for permanency, 

Grandparents have not shown the superior court abused its discretion in 

denying their motion to intervene.

¶20 We address only the superior court’s denial of Grandparents’ 

motion to intervene. Grandparents were not permitted to intervene and 

were not otherwise parties pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for the 

Juvenile Court 37(A), and therefore had no right to file a motion to change 
MARIA S., FELICIANO R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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physical custody and similarly now lack standing to challenge the superior

court’s denial of said motion.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm the superior court’s rulings.