J-A15028-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MADELINE S. CRUZ

v.

JERMEY CRUZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 198 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 12, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County,

Civil Division at No(s): Docket No. 1874 of 2013.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: September 2, 2022

Jeremy Cruz appeals from the order denying his petition to void his 

divorce decree. Upon review, we affirm. 

Cruz and Madeline S. Cruz (now Morales) were married on October 10, 

2011, in Erie Pennsylvania. On April 5, 2013, Morales filed for divorce. On 

April 17, 2013, Cruz accepted service of the divorce complaint, which 

designated the venue for the action as the Court of Common Pleas of Potter 

County. Subsequently, on July 19, 2013, the parties executed an affidavit of 

consent and waiver of notice of Morales’ intention to request entry of a divorce 

decree, which was notarized. The parties were divorced on August 8, 2013.

More than eight years later, on October 8, 2021, Cruz filed a petition to 

void the divorce decree. He claimed that Morales coerced him into signing the 

divorce documents. According to Cruz, he did not read the documents before 
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he signed them and some of the information was false. Cruz further claimed 

that he did not want to be divorced and did not realize he could have exercised 

certain rights before the divorce was granted. 

Following a hearing, the trial court denied Cruz’s petition. Cruz filed this 

timely appeal. Cruz and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.

Cruz raises the following issues on appeal:

-The trial court erred in denying Cruz’s petition because the 

divorce court improperly granted Morales’ request for a divorce 

decree without confirming her physical address and failed to 

comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

-The trial court erred in denying Cruz's petition when it stated that 

Cruz requested the court to open or vacate the decree based on 

Cruz's confusion of the process and that the fact that some of the 

allegations in the affidavit and waiver were not accurate.

-The trial court erred in denying Cruz's petition by accepting the 

testimony of Morales that Cruz voluntarily participated with the 

divorce process with full knowledge of the ramifications.

-The trial court erred in denying Cruz's petition because it violated 

Cruz’s constitutional right to have a fair trial of which Cruz was 

deprived.

See Cruz’ Brief at 1.

Cruz challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to vacate the 

divorce decree on several grounds. In reviewing this matter, we are mindful 

of our standard of review. “A trial court's exercise or refusal to exercise its 

authority to open, vacate, or strike a divorce decree is reviewable on appeal 

for an abuse of discretion.” Bardine v. Bardine, 194 A.3d 150, 152 (Pa. 
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Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error 

of judgment but is found where the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by the evidence or the record.” Fischer v.

UPMC Northwest, 34 A.3d 115, 120 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

A petition to open or vacate a divorce decree is governed by 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332, which provides: 

A motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment may be made 

only within the period limited by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (relating to 

modification of orders) and not thereafter. The motion may lie 

where it is alleged that the decree was procured by intrinsic fraud 

or that there is new evidence relating to the cause of action which 

will sustain the attack upon its validity. A motion to vacate a 

decree or strike a judgment alleged to be void because of extrinsic 

fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or a fatal defect 

apparent upon the face of the record must be made within five 

years after entry of the final decree. Intrinsic fraud relates to a 

matter adjudicated by the judgment, including perjury and false 

testimony, whereas extrinsic fraud relates to matters collateral to 

the judgment which have the consequence of precluding a fair 

hearing or presentation of one side of the case.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332 (emphasis added). This section sets forth clear and 

definitive time constraints and evidentiary requirements regarding a court's 

authority to open or vacate a divorce decree. The purpose of section 3332 is 

“to codify the extraordinary circumstances which will outweigh the interests 

of the parties and the court in finality, and to delimit the time periods which 

within such circumstances must be established.” Bardine, 194 A.3d at 153 

(citing Anderson v. Anderson, 544 A.2d 501, 505 (Pa. Super. 1988)). 
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Here, the trial court denied Cruz’s petition. Although the trial court 

considered the merits of Cruz’s claims and found them to be meritless, the 

trial court ultimately concluded that Cruz’s claims were untimely. This basis,

alone, was sufficient to deny Cruz’s petition. Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at

3-5. We agree.

Upon review, we observe that Cruz sought to void the divorce decree. 

We therefore construe this as a request to vacate the decree. “For a motion 

to vacate, the [motion] must be filed within five years of the divorce decree 

where the attack is based on extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the 

subject matter or a fatal defect apparent upon the face of the 

record.” Bardine, 194 A.3d at 153 (citing Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, 

502 A.2d 185, 188 (Pa. Super. 1985)).

Indisputably, Cruz filed his petition more than eight years after the 

divorce decree was entered, well beyond the five-year time limit of section 

3332. Cruz’s petition was clearly untimely. As such, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Cruz’s petition, and we need not reach the 

merits of Cruz’s claims.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/2/2022