FILED 

DECEMBER 1, 2016 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent, 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER JOHN BLAIR, 

Appellant. 

RA WNE LEE CLINGER 

Defendant. 

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No. 33911-4-111 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

KORSMO, J. - Christopher Blair challenges the use of two prior convictions in 

calculating his offender score, arguing that they are facially invalid. We disagree with 

that argument and affirm. 

FACTS 

Mr. Blair was charged with taking a motor vehicle (TMV) resulting from the theft 

of a truck from a dealership lot in 2011. He entered into a drug court program, but 

absconded from treatment, was terminated from the program, and then was convicted of 

the TMV charge at a stipulated bench trial after he was recaptured in 2015. The matter 

then proceeded to sentencing. 

Although the parties agreed in writing that defendant's prior convictions existed 

and counted in the offender score calculation, the defense made inconsistent arguments 
No. 33911-4-III 

State v. Blair 

concerning the offender score. The defense did agree that the prior offenses counted at 

least 7 points, and also agreed with the State's calculation that the offender score was 9. 1 

The defense, nonetheless, argued that two prior 2011 TMV convictions, which all parties 

agreed were to be treated as same criminal conduct with each other and an accompanying 

second degree burglary conviction, were facially invalid because the stolen vehicles had 

been snowmobiles. On that basis, the defense sought an exceptional sentence that would 

fall within the range for an offender score of7 (17-22 months). The defense did not ask 

the court to find that the offender score actually was 7 or argue that the range of 17-22 

months applied to this sentencing. 

The court declined to impose an exceptional sentence. It also declined to address 

the facial validity argument, concluding that the defense was asking it to not just look at 

the prior TMV plea documents, but to make a legal determination that one of the 

elements of those offenses was missing. However, the court did accede to the joint 

request of the parties that a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) be imposed and 

ordered a DOSA sentence of 25 months. 

Mr. Blair then appealed to this court. 

1 The difference between the two calculations turned on whether the 2011 TMV 

convictions were valid or not. Because prior TMV convictions count as three points 

when sentencing a current TMV conviction, one of the TMV counts would add three 

points to the offender score, while the burglary count would add only one point. 

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No. 33911-4-111 

State v. Blair 

ANALYSIS 

The sole issue presented by this appeal is a contention that the two prior 2011 

TMV convictions for stealing snowmobiles were facially invalid, requiring that Mr. Blair 

be resentenced with an offender score of 7. We agree with the trial court that those 

convictions were not, on their face, invalid. 

This case sits in an extremely peculiar procedural posture. Mr. Blair agreed with 

and did not directly challenge the offender score calculation, but instead sought an 

exceptional sentence based on an alleged error in calculating the offender score. A trial 

court's denial of an exceptional sentence cannot be challenged on appeal unless the trial 

court failed to follow a mandatory process. State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 712, 854 P.2d 

1042 (1993). Viewed as an unsuccessful exceptional sentence request, Mr. Blair's appeal 

would necessarily fail. Similarly, his counsel expressly argued the two offenses were 

facially invalid, acknowledged that would result in an offender score of 7 with a range of 

17-22 months, but did not ask for sentencing within that range for that reason, even 

though that is the request he is making now. In light of the strictures of RAP 2.5, which 

acknowledges that arguments not presented to the trial court generally will not be 

considered on appeal, it is arguable that the defense has waived this argument. Against 

that stricture is the common law "sentencing error" exception to RAP 2.5(a) recognized 

in State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), and State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 

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No. 33911-4-III 

State v. Blair 

472, 973 P.2d 452 (1999). While the contours of that exception are rather vague, it might 

apply to this circumstance. 

In light of the fact that the defendant made the specific argument to the trial court 

that he makes here, albeit in the form of requesting an exceptional sentence, we conclude 

that we can consider the argument in this appeal. Nonetheless, we conclude that his 

claim does not establish facial invalidity. 

The seminal case upholding the Sentencing Reform Act and its use of prior 

convictions to establish sentencing ranges is State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 713 P.2d 

719, 718 P .2d 796 ( 1986). The Ammons court expressly declared that the State had no 

affirmative burden of proving that prior convictions were constitutionally valid. Id. at 

187. "However, a prior conviction which has been previously determined to have been 

unconstitutionally obtained or which is constitutionally invalid on its face may not be 

considered." Id. at 187-188. The court then elaborated on the meaning of"invalid on its 

face" by addressing challenges presented by the defendants. 2 One defendant challenged a 

prior guilty plea by arguing that the plea statement form suffered from various 

deficiencies. The court determined that the validity of the issues could not be made from 

the face of the guilty plea form. Id. at 189 .. Another defendant challenged jury 

2 The court has also had to determine the meaning of a judgment "valid on its 

face" in the context of interpreting RCW 10.73.090(1). E.g., In re Pers. Restraint of 

Stoudmire, 141 Wn.2d 342, 353-354, 5 P.3d 1240 (2000). 

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No. 33911-4-III 

State v. Blair 

instructions used in a prior trial. The court again declared that the claim "cannot be 

determined facially" because it would require the trial court "to go behind the verdict and 

sentence and judgment to make such a determination." Id. 

Ammons indicates that documents associated with a guilty plea can be considered 

in determining facial validity. Although Mr. Blair has submitted the information filed 

against him in the 2011 TMV cases, he has not provided a plea statement form, so we do 

not know what facts were established in that proceeding. Assuming, however, that the 

guilty plea was to the offense as charged in that information and that Mr. Blair was 

convicted of TMV for taking two snowmobiles, he still has not established that those 

convictions are invalid on their face. 

As the trial court observed, whether the TMV statute applies to snowmobiles 

would require more than a simple look at the judgment and sentence and associated 

documents. It would require construing a statute; no prior case law has been cited to us 

suggesting that the statute does or does not apply to snowmobiles. 3 The prior conviction 

does not, "on its face," display constitutional infirmity. Determining whether the 

3 A recent decision from this court holds that the TMV statute does not apply to 

riding lawn mowers, even though they fall within the definition of "motor vehicle" used 

in this state. State v. Barnes, No. 33811-8-III (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2016), 

http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/338118_pub.pdf. We do not opine whether or 

not a snowmobile would be similarly treated since the issue is not actually presented in 

this action. 

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No. 33911-4-III 

State v. Blair 

conviction is constitutionally invalid would require a more significant "elaboration" than 

permitted by Ammons. 

Appellant did not establish that his two prior TMV convictions were invalid on 

their face. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

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