IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, :

 : ID No. 1208001982

 : In and for Kent County

 : 

v. :

 :

GERALD A. LANDRY, :

 :

 Defendant. :

 :

ORDER

On this 8

th

day of December, 2016, having reviewed the filings of Defendant

Gerald Landry (hereinafter “Landry”), it appears that:

1 . Landry moves for post-conviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal

Rule 61 seeking to set aside a conviction resulting from a guilty plea to four drugrelated charges. Landry also seeks appointment of counsel to represent him for

purposes of his post-conviction motion.

2. Landry pled guilty to the charges at issue on September 25, 2013. Thereafter,

Landry moved to correct his sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a)

on January 29, 2015, arguing that his sentencing on multiple drug related offenses

violated his right against double jeopardy. When the SuperiorCourt denied the motion

for correction ofsentence, Landry appealed the denial to the Delaware Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed this Court’s denial ofthe motion and ordered the Superior

Court to merge his sentences for Aggravated Possession Tier 5 and Drug Dealing Tier

4, with direction that Landry be sentenced to eight unsuspended years at Level V to

match the parties original plea agreement. On March 4, 2016, the Superior Court

accordingly modified Landry’s sentence to reflect the direction of the Supreme Court
on remand.

3. The instant motion is controlled by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2),

since Landry seeks to set aside his conviction based on a guilty plea. The 2014 version

of the Rule applies, and it provides in relevant part, that the Court 

may appoint counsel . . . if the judge determines that: . . . (ii) the motion

sets forth a substantial claim that the movant received ineffective

assistance of counsel in relation to the plea of guilty . . . and (iv)

specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.

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4. Here, Landry’s motion meets neither of the above-mentioned criteria for

appointment of counsel. Namely, other than the portion of his post-conviction motion

addressing the double-jeopardy issue, which is now moot after his direct appeal, he

makes only vague, unsubstantiated allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel

during pre-trial motion practice and pre-trial discovery. He alleges nothing of

substance that could lead the Court to find that his guilty plea was not knowing or

voluntary. Rather, he expresses dissatisfaction with the outcome of pre-trial matters

involving his counsel. Furthermore, nothing in his filings lead the Court to conclude

that there are specific exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of

counsel.

5. Finally, “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion of post conviction relief and

the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the

judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal . . ..”

2 The Court, after reviewing

Landry’s motion and the record, concludes that on the motion’s face, it does not

substantiate any basis for relief.

1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(effective June 4, 2014) (emphasis added).

2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).

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WHEREFORE, Defendant’s Motionsfor Appointment ofCounsel and for PostConviction Relief are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Jeffrey J Clark 

 Judge

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