IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2022 ND 13

In the Matter of the Estate of Skip Beach, a/k/a Skip Tracy Beach, Deceased

Monte Beach and Dell T. Beach,

Co-Personal Representatives, Petitioners and Appellees

v.

Tracy Burris, Trudy Dunn, Tina Lantz, 

Terrel Beach, Murril Beach, Respondents

and

Clark Beach, Respondent and Appellant

No. 20210077

Appeal from the District Court of Golden Valley County, Southwest Judicial 

District, the Honorable Rhonda R. Ehlis, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.

Ronald S. Efta, Wibaux, MT, for petitioners and appellees.

Aaron W. Roseland, Hettinger, ND, for respondent and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JANUARY 6, 2022 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Estate of Beach

No. 20210077

VandeWalle, Justice.

[¶1] Clark Beach appealed from a district court order denying his petition for 

formal probate of a holographic will. Clark Beach argues the district court 

erred in finding the material portions of the holographic will were not in the 

testator’s handwriting. We affirm the order denying the petition for formal 

probate.

I

[¶2] Clark Beach is the brother of Skip Beach (“decedent”) who died on July 

8, 2020 at 59 years old. The decedent was domiciled in Golden Valley County, 

North Dakota. He was survived by seven siblings and one daughter.

[¶3] In July 2020, the estate of the decedent was submitted to informal 

probate and co-personal representatives were appointed. In September 2020, 

Clark Beach filed a petition for formal probate of a holographic will. The 

purported holographic will reads:

My Last Will and Testament

Skip Beach

I leave to Clark Beach

Everything I own

P.S. Bury me in Carlyle

4-8-04

[¶4] In November 2020, a hearing on the petition was held. At the hearing, 

Clark Beach presented testimony from seven witnesses. Many of them testified 

that the signature and all portions of the document were in the decedent’s 

handwriting. The purported holographic will was marked as exhibit 1. In 

admitting the exhibit:

Mr. Roseland: At this time, Your Honor, we seek to admit what’s 

been previously marked as Exhibit 1 for the purposes of not 

proving it as a will, but just as a piece of evidence on its own.

. . .
2

The Court: Any objection?

Mr. Efta: No.

The Court: All right. Exhibit 1 is received.

[¶5] The district court requested the parties submit written closing 

arguments on the issue. The court entered its order denying the petition for 

formal probate of the holographic will. The court found the signature “Skip 

Beach” on the proposed holographic will was the decedent’s signature based on 

the evidence. The court held the clause “Everything I own” was a material 

portion and was not in the decedent’s handwriting. The court reasoned that 

the clause appeared to have been written in different ink, was lighter in 

appearance, and was slanted different than the rest of the document.

Additionally, the court found the clause was smaller in text and was written 

in only printed letters while other portions of the document use a mix of cursive 

and printed letters. The court stated the testimony given by Clark Beach, his 

siblings, and others did not change the court’s finding and stated “[n]one of 

these individuals are handwriting experts, and none of them ever saw this 

purported will before Skip’s death.” The court was not convinced that the 

material clause “Everything I own” was in the decedent’s handwriting and held 

that Clark Beach failed to meet his burden of proof that a material portion of 

the document was in the testator’s handwriting as required by law.

II

[¶6] Clark Beach argues the district court erred in denying his petition for 

formal probate of the holographic will. He contends the district court erred in 

finding the material portions of the holographic will were not in the testator’s 

handwriting.

[¶7] The standard of review of findings of fact in probate proceedings is clear:

We review factual findings in a probate proceeding under the 

clearly erroneous standard of review in N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). A 

finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous 

view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, after 

reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm 

conviction a mistake has been made. Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1), 
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in an action tried on the facts without a jury, the court must find 

the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. A 

district court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law 

that are sufficient to enable an appellate court to understand the 

factual determinations made by the district court and the basis for 

its conclusions of law.

Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, ¶ 20, 863 N.W.2d 215 (quoting Estate of 

Wicklund, 2012 ND 29, ¶ 22, 812 N.W.2d 359) (quotation marks omitted).

“Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), we do not reweigh conflicting evidence, and we give 

deference to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses.” Estate of Blikre, 2019 ND 257, ¶ 22, 934 N.W.2d 867 (citing Estate 

of Clemetson, 2012 ND 28, ¶ 11, 812 N.W.2d 388).

[¶8] “Proponents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof 

of due execution in all cases[.]” N.D.C.C. § 30.1-15-07. “To be ‘duly executed,’ a 

will must comply with the statutory requirements for execution.” Estate of 

Wagner, 551 N.W.2d 292, 295 (N.D. 1996). The requirements for execution are 

found in N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-02. A holographic will is valid if “the signature and 

material portions of the document are in the testator’s handwriting.” N.D.C.C.

§ 30.1-08-02(2). Material portions of a holographic will express donative and

testamentary intent. Estate of Krueger, 529 N.W.2d 151, 154 (N.D. 1995). 

“Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters with respect to 

which they have the initial burden of proof.” N.D.C.C. § 30.1-15-07.

[¶9] Clark Beach contends the district court erred in finding the material 

portions of the holographic will were not in the decedent’s handwriting. He 

argues the court cannot arbitrarily create a new steeper evidentiary standard 

by requiring a handwriting expert because the handwriting in this case was 

properly authenticated under N.D.R.Ev. 901.

[¶10] To authenticate evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 901(a), the proponent must 

produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the 

proponent claims it is. Rule 901(a), N.D.R.Ev., treats authentication as a 

matter of conditional relevance to be decided under N.D.R.Ev. 104(b). R & D 

Amusement Corp. v. Christianson, 392 N.W.2d 385, 386 (N.D. 1986). If the 
4

court decides sufficient proof has been introduced to allow a finding the 

document is authentic, Rule 901(a) is satisfied and the question of weight is for 

the trier of fact. Id. Here, the district court judge was also the trier of fact.

[¶11] The purported holographic will was admitted “for the purposes of not 

proving it as a will, but just as a piece of evidence on its own.” Clark Beach 

misinterprets Rule 901 as if it requires a finding from the evidence. He argues 

that the witnesses testified that all the writing on the purported holographic 

will was the genuine, true, and authentic handwriting of the decedent and that 

once that fact was established, the requirements of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-02 were 

met. He argues no contradictory testimony was offered by the personal 

representatives or their witnesses. However, “[t]estimony may be 

uncontradicted, but not credible.” Clemetson, 2012 ND 28, ¶ 19. “A trier of fact 

need not accept undisputed testimony.” Id. Clark Beach not only had the initial 

burden of proof to show due execution of the purported holographic will, but he 

also had the burden of persuasion under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-15-07.

[¶12] The district court in this case properly weighed the competing testimony 

and evidence and, on the record, has support for its findings. The court found 

that the clause “Everything I own” was a material portion and reasoned that 

without this clause, the document does not express a donative and 

testamentary intent. Additionally, the court held the clause was not in the 

decedent’s handwriting. The court reasoned that the clause appeared to have 

been written in different ink, was lighter in appearance, and was slanted 

different than the rest of the document. The court found the clause was smaller 

in text and was written in only printed letters while other portions of the 

document use a mix of cursive and printed letters. The court stated the 

testimony given by Clark Beach, his siblings, and others did not change the 

court’s finding and stated “[n]one of these individuals are handwriting experts, 

and none of them ever saw this purported will before Skip’s death.” The 

weakness of the witness testimony goes to credibility, not admissibility as 

Clark Beach argues. The court was not convinced based on the evidence and 

testimony that the material clause “Everything I own” was in the decedent’s 

handwriting. The court held that Clark Beach failed to meet his burden of proof 
5

that the material portions of the purported holographic will were in the 

testator’s handwriting as required by law.

[¶13] We conclude the district court did not clearly err in finding that the 

material portions of the purported holographic will were not in the testator’s

handwriting. The court’s finding was not induced by an erroneous view of the 

law, nor are we left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been 

made.

III

[¶14] The order denying the petition for formal probate is affirmed.

[¶15] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte