Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 58A04-1602-CT-502 | November 30, 2016 Page 1 of 19

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Thomas J. Dall, Jr.

Law Offices of Blake R. Maislin, LLC

Cincinnati, Ohio

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

JOE’S CONSTRUCTION, LLC

AND JOE GETZ

Richard T. Mullineaux

Crystal G. Rowe

Jacob B. Vissing

Kightlinger & Gray, LLP

New Albany, Indiana

R. Patrick Magrath

Merritt K. Alcorn

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, 

LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

PROPERTY-OWNERS 

INSURANCE COMPANY

William J. Beggs

Jennifer L. Upton

Bunger & Robertson

Bloomington, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 58A04-1602-CT-502 | November 30, 2016 Page 2 of 19

Mark Vinup,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Joe’s Construction, LLC and Joe 

Getz,

Appellees-Defendants,

and

Property-Owners Insurance 

Company,

Appellee-Plaintiff,

v.

Joe’s Construction, LLC and Joe 

Getz,

Appellees-Defendants.

November 30, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

58A04-1602-CT-502

Appeal from the

Ohio Circuit Court

The Honorable

James D. Humphrey, Judge

The Honorable 

Kimberly A. Schmaltz, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

58C01-1404-CT-2

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] After Mark Vinup (“Vinup”) was injured on the job while working for Joe’s 

Construction, LLC and Joe Getz (together, “Joe’s Construction”), Vinup filed a 

lawsuit against Joe’s Construction seeking damages for his personal injuries. 

The commercial general liability insurer for Joe’s Construction, PropertyOwners Insurance Company (“Property-Owners”), filed a declaratory judgment 

action, seeking a declaration that, pursuant to a policy exclusion, it had no duty 

to defend and no duty to pay any judgment that might be rendered against Joe’s 

Construction or Joe Getz (“Getz”). The trial court consolidated the declaratory 
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judgment action with Vinup’s action, and, thereafter, Property-Owners and 

Joe’s Construction each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court 

granted both motions, and Vinup now appeals, raising several issues that we 

consolidate and restate as: Whether the trial court erred when it determined as 

a matter of law that Vinup was an employee of Joe’s Construction at the time 

he was injured.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Getz began operating Joe’s Construction in 1989 as a “d/b/a,” and in 2011, he 

converted it to a limited liability company. Appellant’s App. at 190. Getz 

generally worked by himself at Joe’s Construction and hired other laborers 

when he “need[ed] an extra hand or two” for projects. Id. Joe’s Construction 

did not issue W-2 or 1099 forms and, instead, paid workers in cash or by 

trading labor. Joe’s Construction did not carry worker’s compensation 

insurance. Id. In April 2012, Joe’s Construction was doing work on a project 

for the Aberdeen Pate Water Company (“Aberdeen Project”), installing water 

lines. At some point, Vinup was hired by Joe’s Construction,1 along with two 

 

1

Prior to being hired by Joe’s Construction, Vinup had borrowed money from Getz, and Getz agreed to 

allow Vinup to pay back the debt by having Vinup give some money back to Getz after each time that Joe’s 

Construction paid Vinup. 
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other men, Shane Adams (“Adams”) and Anthony McAlister (“McAlister”) to 

work on the Aberdeen Project. 

[4] For the Aberdeen Project, water pipes, measuring twenty feet in length and 

weighing in excess of 250 pounds, were loaded and transported on the bed of a 

trailer and bound together with a metal band. After the crew from Joe’s 

Construction dug a trench for the pipes, a truck would haul the trailer loaded 

with pipes to an area adjacent to the trench, and the metal bands were cut. The 

pipes were then individually rolled off the trailer, onto the ground, and into the 

trench. On April 3, 2012, while Vinup was working, a large pipe that had been 

cut loose on the trailer “took a bad hop” and started rolling down a hill. Id. at 

157. Vinup attempted to stop the pipe by using a spud bar, but the pipe hit 

Vinup and knocked the spud bar out of his hand. The pipe hit Vinup in the face

and head, resulting in injuries. 

[5] When Vinup contacted Joe’s Construction to pursue Worker’s Compensation 

benefits, an attorney representing Joe’s Construction sent Vinup a letter stating 

that Vinup was not eligible for benefits because he was an independent 

contractor. Id. at 207 (Ex. B to Getz deposition). Thereafter, Vinup filed a 

complaint for damages against Joe’s Construction. Property-Owners filed a 

declaratory judgment complaint, asking for a determination that, pursuant to a 

policy exclusion (1) the policy did not provide coverage for the potential 

liability of Joe’s Construction or Getz, (2) it had no duty to defend, and (3) it 

would not be liable for any judgment rendered in the future against Joe’s 

Construction or Getz related to Vinup’s injuries. The trial court consolidated 
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Vinup’s action with Property-Owners’s action, and, thereafter, PropertyOwners and Joe’s Construction each filed a motion for summary judgment, 

asserting that Vinup was an employee of Joe’s Construction at the time of the 

accident. 

[6] Property-Owners’s position was that the Commercial General Liability Policy 

issued to Joe’s Construction for the period from September 15, 2011 through 

September 15, 2012 (“the Policy) contained an “Employer’s Liability” 

exclusion clause that excluded coverage from bodily injury to employees of the 

insured arising out of and in the course of employment, and, thus, it was not 

liable for coverage for Vinup’s injuries. Id. at 94. Joe’s Construction’s position 

was that Vinup was an employee under Indiana law, and, therefore, his 

exclusive remedy was to pursue a claim for benefits under Indiana’s Worker’s 

Compensation Act. 

[7] Property-Owners designated evidence including certain pleadings and exhibits, 

the Policy at issue, and deposition excerpts from Vinup, Getz, McAlister, and 

Adams. Joe’s Construction also designated evidence that included deposition 

excerpts from Vinup, Getz, McAlister and Adams. The evidence was, to some 

degree, overlapping and reflected that Getz would hire people as he needed

them and that he was the person in charge of those workers. Getz solely 

determined the schedule, work hours, and breaks for all individuals that worked 

for Joe’s Construction, Getz provided the workers with tools and safety vests, 

and he determined the work to be done on each day. Vinup, McAlister, and 

Adams were all hired as “general laborers.” Id. at 194. Getz, and no one else,
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told the workers “what to do.” Id. at 156. Joe’s Construction designated 

evidence that Getz considered Vinup to be an employee of Joe’s Construction 

for the period of time that he was working on the Aberdeen Project and that 

Vinup considered Getz to be “the boss.” Id. at 156, 167, 194. The designated 

evidence showed that Getz paid Vinup $10 per hour, and they generally worked 

eight-hour days. Vinup expected that work on the Aberdeen Project would last 

several months, and he would work on it “until we got it done.” Id. at 154. 

Previously, Getz had loaned Vinup money in increments that totaled $363, and 

Vinup paid back Getz as he would get paid by Joe’s Construction. He had paid 

back about $50 when the accident occurred, which was only a few days into the 

job. The designated evidence reflected that the type of work that Joe’s 

Construction was doing on the Aberdeen Project was part of the usual and 

ordinary course of business for Joe’s Construction.

[8] Vinup opposed the summary judgment motions, arguing that, with regard to 

Property-Owners, Vinup did not qualify as an “employee” under the Policy

and, instead, was a “temporary employee” for whom coverage was available 

under the Policy. He also argued that the determination of one’s employment 

status is fact-sensitive and thus improper for determination by summary 

judgment. Vinup’s designations in opposition to the two summary judgment 

motions included, among other things, evidence that Vinup was a general 

laborer, who worked various odd jobs for various contractors in the course of a 

year and that Getz never considered Vinup to have been a full-time employee of 

Joe’s Construction. Id. at 152, 192. Vinup designated evidence that Joe’s 
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Construction paid its workers in cash or trade, never issued W-2 or 1099 forms 

to its workers, and payroll taxes were never withheld from Vinup’s earnings. 

Id. at 192. Vinup designated evidence that Getz expected that once Vinup’s 

debt to Getz was paid off, Vinup would no longer work for Getz. Id. at 194. 

With regard to Getz’s control of Vinup and the other workers, Vinup 

designated evidence that Getz did not train them or specifically instruct them 

on how to perform the assigned physical labor tasks. Id. at 214, 230.

[9] Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment, by separate 

orders, in favor of Property-Owners and Joe’s Construction, determining that 

no genuine issue of fact existed, that Vinup was an employee, and the alleged 

injuries arose out of in and in the course of Vinup’s employment. Id. at 23-26. 

Vinup now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[10] When reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply the same 

standard as the trial court: summary judgment is only appropriate when the 

designated evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 

56(C); Walker v. Martin, 887 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. 

On appeal, we consider all of the designated evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 130. The trial court’s 

order granting a motion for summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption 

of validity, and a party appealing from a summary judgment decision has the 
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burden of persuading the court that the grant or denial of summary judgment 

was erroneous. Id.

[11] The issue before us is whether the trial court erred when it determined, as a 

matter of law, that Vinup was an employee of Joe’s Construction at the time 

that he suffered injuries. As is relevant here, the consequences of that employee 

status are: (1) Vinup’s remedy is limited to that available under the Worker’s 

Compensation Act, and he cannot pursue a negligence action against Joe’s 

Construction;

2 and (2) pursuant to a policy provision excluding from coverage 

payment for injuries to an employee, Property-Owners owed no duty to defend 

and would not be liable for any judgment rendered against Joe’s Construction

or Getz. Vinup contends that genuine issues of material fact exist on the issue 

of whether he was an employee or, instead, was an independent contractor, 

and, therefore, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor 

of Joe’s Construction and in favor of Property-Owners. He asks that we reverse 

the summary judgment orders and remand the matter for trial.

A. Ten-Factor Analysis

[12] Whether one acts as an employee or an independent contractor generally is a 

question for the trier of fact. Mortg. Consultants, Inc. v. Mahaney, 655 N.E.2d 

493, 496 (Ind. 1995). “However, if the significant underlying facts are 

 

2

See Ind. Code § 22-3-2-6 (Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act is exclusive remedy available to employees 

for accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment). 
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undisputed, the court may properly determine a worker’s classification as a 

matter of law.” Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 131 (citing Moberly v. Day, 757 N.E.2d 

1007, 1009 (Ind. 2001)). An employee is one “‘employed to perform services in 

the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the 

performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control,’” 

whereas an independent contractor generally controls the method and details of 

the task and answers to the principal only as to the results. Id. (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(1) and citing Wishard Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Kerr, 846 N.E.2d 1083, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). 

[13] As Vinup correctly observes, our Supreme Court in Moberly set forth a nonexhaustive list of ten factors to be used in the analysis of determining whether 

one is an independent contractor or an employee:

(1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 

exercise over the details of the work;

(2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 

occupation or business;

(3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 

locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 

employer or by a specialist without supervision;

(4) the skill required in the particular occupation;

(5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 

instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 

doing the work;
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(6) the length of time for which the person is employed;

(7) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

(8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 

employer;

(9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 

relation of master and servant; and

(10) whether the principal is or is not in business.

757 N.E.2d at 1010 (applying analysis of Restatement (Second) of Agency §

220). All of the ten circumstances are considered in the analysis, and although 

no single factor is dispositive, “the ‘extent of control’ factor is the single most 

important factor in determining the relationship.” Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 131 

(citing Wishard Mem’l Hosp., 846 N.E.2d at 1090). On appeal, Vinup argues that 

six of the ten Moberly factors weigh in favor of independent contractor status 

and thus, genuine issues of material fact exist and make summary judgment in 

favor of Joe’s Construction and Property-Owners inappropriate. We address

each of Vinup’s six challenges in turn. 

[14] First, with regard to the extent of control that Getz exercised, Vinup argues that 

“[t]he mere fact that [Getz] was at the job site does not mean that he was 

exercising ‘control’ over the manner in which [Vinup] dug trenches” and that 

merely telling Vinup what needed to be done did not reflect control as is 

necessary for Vinup to be considered an employee. Appellant’s Br. at 19. Vinup 
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also notes that, although Getz may have directed Vinup to dig trenches, 

Vinup’s designated evidence shows that he was using a spud bar to stop pipes as 

they rolled off the truck, thus “Vinup had sufficient control . . . at the job site to 

do a different job than that which had been assigned by Getz.” Id. at 22. 

Accordingly, Vinup asserts, the “extent of control” factor weighs in favor of 

finding Vinup was an independent contractor. We disagree.

[15] Under the first factor, an employee-servant is one “employed to perform

services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct 

in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to 

control.” Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 131 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency

§ 220(1)). Conversely, an independent contractor generally controls the method 

and details of his task and is answerable to the principal as to results only. Id. 

Here, Getz solely determined and assigned what tasks were to be done by 

workers of Joe’s Construction. That is, Getz determined the location where the 

work was to be done, in this case, where on the Aberdeen Project they would be 

working. He determined the workers’ schedules, including work hours and 

breaks, and he had the power to remove anyone from his employment. Joe’s 

Construction provided the tools and equipment, including safety vests, and he 

determined when those were to be worn. Vinup did not use any of his own 

tools in the performance of his work for Joe’s Construction. Contrary to 

Vinup’s assertion, we find that the “control” factor weighs in favor of employee 

status.
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[16] Next, Vinup addresses the third Moberly factor, which concerns whether the 

kind of occupation consists of work usually done under the direction of an 

employer or by a specialist without supervision, and he asserts, “it is common 

for independent contractors to be hired on construction jobs” for the type of 

work he was doing on the Aberdeen Project, and, therefore, “this factor slants 

in favor of independent contractor” status. Appellant’s Br. at 25. Vinup’s 

singular statement that often independent contractors are hired for construction 

jobs does not demonstrate whether his particular occupation at Joe’s 

Construction was under the direction of an employer or by a specialist. 

Furthermore, evidence designated by Joe’s Construction, namely Getz’s 

deposition, indicates that the type of work that Vinup and his coworkers were 

doing on the Aberdeen Project was the type of work that, in that locality, was 

typically done under the direction and supervision of an employer. Appellant’s 

App. at 195. Thus, we find this factor weighs in favor of employee status.

[17] Vinup’s next argument concerns the fourth Moberly factor, addressing the skill 

required for the particular occupation. “Unskilled labor is usually performed by 

employees, while skilled labor is often performed by independent contractors.” 

Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 132 (citing Moberly, 757 N.E.2d at 1010). Vinup

contends that sometimes he was required to drive a dump truck, which requires

special skill and weighs in favor of independent contractor status. The 

designated evidence reveals, however, that Vinup was hired to, and did 

perform, general labor for Joe’s Construction that primarily consisted of digging 

trenches and laying water line pipe and sometimes driving a dump truck. 
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Indeed, Vinup acknowledges in his brief that “he was doing unskilled labor, 

which did not require any special instructions or supervision.” Appellant’s Br. at 

21-22. Getz testified that there were no special skills, training, certification, or 

licensing required for Vinup to perform his job. Appellant’s App. at 194. Vinup 

has failed to show that he was performing skilled labor while working for Joe’s 

Construction. 

[18] Next, Vinup addresses the sixth Moberly factor, which considers the length of 

employment, and argues that Getz did not intend a long-term employment 

relationship with Vinup and, rather, expected only that Vinup would work for 

Joe’s Construction until his debt was repaid to Getz. See Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 

133 (observing that a long-term relationship may indicate employee status, 

especially employment over a period of time with regular hours). With regard 

to the debt, there is little evidence about it, other than Vinup borrowed money 

in various sums from Getz that totaled approximately $363 and that, at the time 

of the accident, Vinup had repaid approximately $50; thus, most of it had yet to 

be repaid. Other designated evidence showed that Vinup had no other 

employment during the time that he worked for Joe’s Construction, he expected 

that his work on the Aberdeen Project – generally, eight hours per day – would 

last several months, and he had no plans to find additional work during this 

time. He anticipated that he would work on the Aberdeen Project “until we got 

it done.” Appellant’s App. at 154. We find these circumstances indicate 

employment over a period of time with regular hours and suggest an employee, 

as opposed to an independent contractor, relationship.
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[19] Vinup next addresses the seventh Moberly factor, concerning the method of 

payment, i.e., whether by the time or by the job. “Sporadic payments in lump 

sum amounts for each job performed, instead of payments by the hour or on a 

weekly basis are more typical of an independent contractor than an employee.” 

Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 133. Vinup argues that in his case this factor weighs in 

favor of independent contractor status because, although he was paid an hourly 

rate, he was paid sporadically “however or whenever” the workers desired to be 

paid. Appellant’s App. at 190. Although paid not at consistent intervals, Joe’s 

Construction paid Vinup an hourly wage of ten dollars per hour, and Vinup 

generally worked eight-hour days. Thus, he was still paid by the hour, and not 

according to completion of a job or project. On balance, the seventh factor 

reflects employee status. 

[20] Lastly, Vinup argues that, pursuant to the ninth Moberly factor, regarding 

whether the parties believed that they were creating an employer/employee 

relationship, the designated evidence demonstrates that Joe’s Construction 

intended Vinup’s status to be an independent contractor. Vinup relies on the 

June 2012 letter that then-counsel for Joe’s Construction sent to Vinup, telling 

Vinup that he was an independent contractor and not an employee of Joe’s

Construction.

3

 However, the relevant inquiry is what the parties believed, and 

 

3 We recognize that Joe’s Construction completely changed its position, initially telling Vinup in the June 

2012 letter that Worker’s Compensation benefits were not available to him, and later taking the position that 

his only remedy is to seek Worker’s Compensation benefits. Joe’s Construction indicates that the June 2012 

letter was an “incorrect assessment by prior counsel,” noting that it was given two months after the incident 

and before a full investigation had been conducted. Joe’s Construction Br. at 26 n.4. Although Joe’s 
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Joe’s Construction designated evidence that Getz considered Vinup to be an 

employee of Joe’s Construction during the Aberdeen Project, and Vinup

considered Getz to be “the boss” when he was working for Joe’s Construction.

Appellant’s App. at 156, 167, 194. We find that the designated evidence indicates 

that, at the time, Getz and Vinup believed that they had an employee/employer 

relationship.

[21] Although Vinup does not claim that the four remaining Moberly factors do not 

support an employee status, we nevertheless will address them, as all ten of the 

factors are to be considered in the analysis. Walker, 887 N.E.2d at 131. With 

regard to the second factor, pertaining to whether or not the one employed is 

engaged in a distinct occupation or business, there was no designated evidence 

that Vinup engaged in a distinct occupation during the time that he worked for 

Joe’s Construction. Indeed, the evidence was that Vinup worked solely for 

Joe’s Construction and had no plans to gain other employment during the time 

that he worked for Joe’s Construction. Appellant’s App. at 285. 

[22] The fifth factor examines whether the employer or the workman supplies the 

instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work. 

Under this factor, “it is particularly significant if an employer provides tools . . 

. and the same would presumably be true if the workman is the provider.” 

Moberly, 757 N.E.2d at 1012. Here, Joe’s Construction provided the tools and 

 

Construction urges that the letter “has no bearing on this appeal[,]” id., it was designated evidence and 

considered by the trial court during summary judgment proceedings.
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safety equipment; Vinup did not use any of his own tools while working for 

Joe’s Construction. Additionally, Vinup testified that he and the other workers 

would meet at Getz’s home, and Getz would transport them or provide the 

equipment for them to get to the job site. Appellant’s App. at 271, 283. Thus, the 

fifth factor weighs in favor of Vinup’s status as being an employee of Joe’s 

Construction. The eighth factor considers whether the relevant work is part of 

the regular business of the employer. Here, the designated evidence 

demonstrated that the type of work that Joe’s Construction provided on the 

Aberdeen Project was part of the usual and ordinary course of business for Joe’s 

Construction. Id. at 193. The tenth factor considers whether the principal is in 

business. Here, the designated evidence shows that Joe’s Construction is a 

construction business that began in 1989, first starting as a “d/b/a” and later 

converting to a limited liability company. Id. at 190.

[23] Upon review of the ten-factor analysis, we find that Vinup has failed to 

establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of whether 

Vinup’s status was that of an employee at the time that he was injured.4 

 

4 The Restatement of Employment Law Section 1.01, adopted in May 2014, addresses the distinction 

between an employee and an independent businessperson. Section 1.01, Conditions for Existence of 

Employment Relationship, states:

(a) Except as provided in §§ 1.02 and 1.03, an individual renders services as an employee of an 

employer if:

(1) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests of the employer;

(2) the employer consents to receive the individual’s services; and

(3) the employer controls the manner and means by which the individual renders services, 

or the employer otherwise effectively prevents the individual from rendering those services 

as an independent businessperson.
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Accordingly, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Joe’s Construction 

and Property-Owners was not erroneous.

B. Temporary Employee Inquiry

[24] On appeal and in opposing Property-Owner’s motion for summary judgment, 

Vinup also asserted that Property-Owners “was and remains obligated to 

provide coverage” because he does not fit within the Policy’s definition of an 

employee and, instead, was a “temporary worker” for whom coverage was not 

excluded. Appellant’s Br. at 19. The trial court disagreed and granted summary 

judgment to Property-Owners, finding that Vinup “was an employee of Joe’s 

Construction” at the time that he sustained injuries and that the Policy does not 

provide coverage. Appellant’s App. at 26. 

[25] On appeal, Vinup explains that the Policy provides that that the term 

“Employee” includes a “leased worker” but does not include a “temporary 

worker,” which the Policy defines as follows:

a person who is furnished to you to substitute for a permanent 

“employee” on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload 

conditions.

 

(b) An individual renders services as an independent businessperson and not as an employee when 

the individual in his or her own interest exercises entrepreneurial control over important business 

decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where 

to deploy equipment, and whether and when to provide service to other customers.

Restatement of Employment Law § 1.01 (2015).
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Id. at 109, 112. Vinup argues that the designated evidence reveals that he 

worked for Joe’s Construction intermittently, as opposed to being a permanent

full-time employee on payroll, and that Joe’s Construction hired him and other 

workers, on an as-needed basis. Joe’s Construction would pay such workers in 

cash or trade, taxes were not withheld, and Joe’s Construction did not issue W2 or 1099 forms. Getz testified that he expected Vinup “would have probably 

moved on down the road” after his debt was paid in full. Id. at 194. Vinup 

argues that these factors indicate that he was “temporary,” and thus the Policy 

does not exclude coverage for him, or that, at a minimum, genuine issues of 

material fact remain as to whether he was a temporary worker and not excluded 

from the Policy’s coverage. 

[26] Property-Owners maintain that Vinup was not a “temporary worker” as that 

term is defined in the Policy. Property-Owners emphasizes that a “temporary 

worker,” as defined in the Policy is someone who is “furnished to the insured to 

substitute for a permanent employee or to meet seasonal or short-term 

workload conditions.” Id. at 112 (emphasis added). Vinup was neither 

“furnished” to Joe’s Construction by some other party nor was he substituting 

for a permanent employee. Therefore, Property-Owners asserts, Vinup did not 

qualify under the Policy’s definition of “temporary worker.” We agree. Vinup 

testified that Getz asked for his help with the Aberdeen Project, and Getz 

testified likewise, stating that he offered the work to Vinup. Id. at 154, 193. 

Under the plain language of the Policy, Vinup was not a “temporary worker,” 
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and the trial court did not err when it granted Property-Owners’s motion for 

summary judgment.

[27] Affirmed.5

May, J., and Crone, J., concur.

 

5 We recognize that, after making its arguments regarding Vinup’s employment status, Joe’s Construction 

states, “Although the above arguments [regarding Vinup’s status as an employee] are dispositive and support 

an affirmance of the trial court’s summary judgment order, it is important to note that Getz [as the ownermember of Joe’s Construction, an Indiana limited liability company] is independently shielded from personal 

liability” for any injuries suffered by Vinup while working for Joe’s Construction. Joe’s Construction Appellee’s 

Br. at 31. Joe’s Construction also raised the matter in its motion for summary judgment and at the hearing. 

Appellant’s App. at 256-259; Tr. at 18-19. Vinup did not appear to address the matter either at the trial court 

level, or by reply brief. Appellant’s App. 299-307. However, as Joe’s Construction acknowledges on appeal, 

the dispositive issue is whether Vinup was or was not an employee, which determines whether Worker’s 

Compensation is Vinup’s exclusive remedy. We decline to reach the matter of Getz’s potential personal 

liability, as we find it is beyond the scope of the issue before us.