NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________ No. 15-3684

______________ DAVID JOHN KANAKIS, Appellant

v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

______________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. No. 2-14-cv-01011) District Judge: Hon. Gustave Diamond

______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 20, 2016

______________ Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. (Filed: May 23, 2016)

______________ OPINION *

______________ SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
John Kanakis appeals from the order of th e District Court affirming the decision of

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.2 the Administrative Law Judge (“ ALJ”) denying his a pplications for disability insurance benefits (“DIBs”) and supplemental social se curity income (“SSI”). For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm.
I Kanakis suffers from chronic back pain an d arthritis. He filed applications for DIBs and SSI in February 2013, alleging that pain, stiffness, and mobility problems have prevented him from working since November 7, 2012. 1 At a hearing before the ALJ in May 2014, Kanakis testified that his pain remains at “a four to a six,” on a scale of one to ten, so long as he stretches and takes medica tion, otherwise it “goes up” to “a nine or a ten.” R. 48. Kanakis also testified that he spends much of the day in bed and sometimes uses a cane to get around, although he is able to shower, dress himself, drive short distances, shop, and prep are his own meals. The ALJ also reviewed medical record s, including records from Dr. Lawrence Ferlan, Kanakis’s primary care physician, Dr. Clifford Vogan, a physician who examined Kanakis on behalf of the Social Security Administration, and Dr. Edward Reidy, an orthopedic specialist. Each recounted Kanakis’ s medical complaints as well as the results of their respective examinati ons, which included findings concerning his mobility, reflexes, strength, and range of motion. Based on Kanakis’s testimony and his medical records, the ALJ concluded that

1 Kanakis testified that he injured himself that day while helping a friend move boxes.3 Kanakis has several severe impairments, 2 including degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and chronic back pain. Observing that Kana kis is nonetheless able to “manage his personal needs,” R. 17, the ALJ found that Kanakis’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and lim iting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely credible,” R. 19. The ALJ also c onsidered the testimony of a Vocational Expert and found that although Kanakis must have the option to sit or stand at any job due to the pain and stiffness in his b ack, and can only o ccasionally be required to climb stairs, balance, stoop, or kneel, he retains the resi dual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, and is capable of performing several jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, including ticket check er and document preparation clerk. 3 Accordingly, the ALJ determin ed that Kanakis is not entitled to DIBs or SSI. The District Court affirmed. Kanakis appeals.
II 4 We exercise plenary review over the ALJ’ s determination of legal issues, Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011), and review his factual findings and final determination under the deferential “substantial evidence” st andard, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).

2 A “severe impairment” is “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [a claimant’s ] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 3 The ALJ found that Kanakis could perfo rm sedentary work but not “any past relevant work.” R. 21. Kanakis had work ed as a cook, construc tion worker, and truck driver. 4 The District Court had jurisdiction u nder 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).4 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evid ence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ruther ford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderanc e of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If, upon review of the record as a whole, Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431, we determine that the ALJ’s fi ndings are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings even if we would have decided th e inquiry differently, Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
III Kanakis argues first that the ALJ’s dete rmination that he retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work is not supported by s ubstantial evidence. We disagree. Though Kanakis’s pain, s tiffness, and mobility problems may be significant, the medical eviden ce supports the ALJ’s conclu sion that his symptoms are reasonably manageable and that he rema ins capable of performing physically undemanding work. For exampl e, Dr. Ferlan indicated that when he examined Kanakis in January 2013, Kanakis responded well to pain medication, was able to “bend[] over fairly well,” and exhibited “[n]o evidence of se vere pain or spasm.” R. 264. Following another examination a few months later, D r. Ferlan indicated that Kanakis’s back continued to improve, due in part to phys ical therapy, and that Kanakis was feeling “fine.” R. 294. Dr. Reidy, who examined Kanakis in January 2014, offered a similar assessment, describing his patie nt’s physical health as “decent overall” and his lumbar range as “pretty good.” R. 351, 353. These assessment s, together with Kanakis’s5 testimony that he is able to shower, dre ss himself, drive, go shopping, and perform routine household activities, as well as lif t between six and ten pounds, provided substantial evidence for the ALJ’s resi dual functional capacity determination. Kanakis claims that in assessing his residual functional capacity, the ALJ improperly discounted the me dical opinions of Dr. Ferlan, who later completed a disability form indicating that Kanakis’s ability to work is limited, and Dr. Vogan, who reached the same conclusion. While Kanakis is correct that the opinions of treating and examining physicians typically deserve si gnificant weight, see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(2), “the law is clear that [suc h] opinion[s] . . . do[] not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361 (int ernal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Rather, the ALJ, and “not treating or examining physicians . . . [,] must make the ultimate . . . [residual functional capacity] determinations,” id., taking in to consideration multiple fact ors, including the extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and supported by relevant evidence, see 20 C. F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)-(4). Here, the ALJ declined to credit Dr. Fe rlan’s opinion because it is “clearly inconsistent with his own treatment record s,” including his report, issued two months before he completed the disability form , indicating that Kanakis’s condition was improving and that Kanakis was feeling fine. R. 21. The ALJ declined to credit Dr. Vogan’s opinion because it was based primaril y on Kanakis’s “subjective assertions at the time of the examination” and was incons istent with Dr. Reidy’s assessment that Kanakis is in decent overall he alth. R. 21. The ALJ fully considered the opinions of Dr.6 Ferlan and Dr. Vogan, and ad equately explained why they are entitled to little weight. For this reason, and because the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Kanakis’s residual functional capacity is suppor ted by substantial evidence , we will not disturb it. We turn now to Kanakis’s argument re garding the testimony of the Vocational Expert. At the hearing, the ALJ asked th e Vocational Expert whether a hypothetical person of Kanakis’s age, education, an d past work experience who could only occasionally climb stairs, stoop or kneel, and required a “sit/s tand at will option,” R. 57, could perform any jobs in the national economy. The Vocational Expert indicated that there were several jobs that such a pers on could perform, including ticket checker and document preparation clerk. The ALJ then asked the Vocational Expert whether the hypothetical person could perform such jobs if the person also needed to miss more than one day of work per month and lie down for three hours each day. According to the Vocational Expert, these additional limitations “w ould eliminate all wo rk at all exertional levels.” R. 58. Kanakis claims that he has these add itional limitations and, to the extent the Vocational Expert testified that a person with such limitations would be unable to find work, the ALJ improperly ignored his testimony in concluding that there are jobs that Kanakis can perform. This argument is unavailing. An ALJ need not accept the testimony of a Vocational Expert unless it is based on a clai mant’s credibly established limitations. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554; see also Craigie v. Bowe n, 835 F.2d 56, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Inasmuch as the administrativ e law judge did not ha ve to accept [the claimant’s] testimony, he did not have to credit the [vocational expert’s] testimony that7 was predicated upon it.”). He re, substantial evidence suppor ts the ALJ’s decision not to credit Kanakis’s claims regarding the frequenc y of his need to miss work and lie down, particularly the reports of Dr. Ferlan and D r. Reidy indicating that Kanakis felt fine and was relatively healthy and Kana kis’s testimony about the tasks he regularly performs. Because the ALJ did not err in concluding th at the evidence did not support the assertion that Kanakis would need to miss more than one day of work per m onth and lie down for three hours each day, he did not err in di sregarding the testimony of the Vocational Expert related to a hypothetical pers on with such additional requirements. Finally, we conclude that the ALJ care fully reviewed the medical evidence and adequately explained, upon consideration of Kanakis’s testimony and the reports of multiple physicians, why Kanaki s’s statements regarding the intensity of his symptoms and physical limitations were not entirely credible. For example, the ALJ pointed out that Kanakis is able to manage his personal needs notwithstanding the alleged severity of his condition, and that both Dr. Ferlan and Dr. Reidy reported that Kanakis maintained a good range of motion, showed improvement with physical th erapy, and was in “decent overall” health. R. 19. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination, we will not dist urb it. See Schaudek, 181 F.3d at 433 (noting that an ALJ is permitted to reject a clai mant’s testimony as incredible, so long as the ALJ provides a basis for doing so supported by the record).
IV For the foregoing reasons, we will affi rm the order of the District Court.