J-S59034-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

DAVID LENNITT, JR., 

 Appellant 

 

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: No. 914 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 7, 2014, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000690-1990 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS and STRASSBURGER*, JJ. 

JUDGMENT ORDER BY: STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 

David Lennitt, Jr., (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order entered 

January 7, 2014, dismissing his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1, 2

 

Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the 

date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to 

this time requirement: (1) interference by government officials 

in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and 

(3) an after-recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner 

 

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Appellant’s second collateral petition, filed in June 11, 1999, was entitled 

“Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Article I, Sect. 14 of the Pa. 

Const. and for PCRA relief pursuant to the PCRA Act. 42.Pa.C.S. 9542 et. 

seq. and consolidated Memorandum of law.” Despite its title, this Court 

affirmed the trial court’s determination that the document was a PCRA 

petition. Commonwealth v. Lennitt, 996 A.2d 547 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(unpublished memorandum). Appellant does not dispute that the filing that 

gave rise to the instant appeal is, in fact, a PCRA petition, nor does he 

contest the applicability of the PCRA with respect to this petition.
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alleges and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the 

petition will be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one 

of these exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the 

claims could have been presented. The timeliness requirements 

of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA 

court cannot hear untimely petitions. 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations and quotations omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

September 19, 1992, 60 days after the expiration of the time for seeking 

discretionary review with the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3); (former) U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 20.1. The instant petition, filed on 

August 23, 2012, is patently untimely. The PCRA court had no jurisdiction to 

entertain Appellant’s petition unless he pleaded and offered to prove one of 

the three statutory exceptions to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). 

Appellant failed to do so.3

 Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed his 

petition. 

 The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County dismissing 

Appellant’s petition filed under the PCRA is hereby AFFIRMED.

 

3

 Although not mentioned in his brief to this Court, in his PCRA petition, 

Appellant argued that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller

v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) qualifies as an after-recognized 

constitutional right exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements. We 

disagree. In Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013) cert. 

denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (U.S. 2014), our Supreme Court held that the 

constitutional right recognized in Miller does not apply retroactively. 

Moreover, the holding of Miller applied only to juvenile offenders. Id. at 

2469. Appellant was nearly 23 years old at the time he committed his 

crimes. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/10/2014