II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2912 

To strengthen United States oversight of the Biological Weapons Convention 

and to advance non-proliferation objectives related to biological weapons, 

dual-use technologies, and life sciences research, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2021 

Mr. RISCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To strengthen United States oversight of the Biological 

Weapons Convention and to advance non-proliferation 

objectives related to biological weapons, dual-use technologies, and life sciences research, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Biological Weapons 

5 Policy Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

5 and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

6 Senate; and 

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

8 the Committee on Appropriations Armed Serv9 ices of the House of Representatives. 

10 (2) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.—The 

11 term ‘‘Biological Weapons Convention’’ means the 

12 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

13 Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and 

14 Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at 

15 Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972. 

16 (3) LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH.—The term ‘‘life 

17 sciences research’’— 

18 (A) means research that pertains to living 

19 organisms, including microbes, human beings, 

20 animals, and plants, and their products, includ21 ing all disciplines and methodologies of biology 

22 such as aerobiology, agricultural science, plant 

23 science, animal science, bioinformatics, 

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1 gineering of living systems, and all applications 

2 of the biological sciences; and 

3 (B) is meant to encompass the diverse ap4 proaches for understanding life at the level of 

5 ecosystems, organisms, organs, tissues, cells, 

6 and molecules. 

7 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress makes the following findings: 

9 (1) According to the Department of State, 

10 ‘‘promoting global health security is a core tenant of 

11 the U.S. biodefense strategy because infectious dis12 ease threats, whether naturally occurring, deliberate, 

13 or accidental, have the potential to spread globally 

14 and affect the American people and interests’’. 

15 (2) Several countries around the world have 

16 known or suspected chemical and biological weapons 

17 capability or are undertaking research that poses 

18 concerns about such nations’ compliance with the 

19 Biological Weapons Convention, as documented by 

20 the United States Department of State and the 

21 United Nations. 

22 (3) With respect to the Russian Federation, the 

23 Department of State, in its 2021 report on Adher24 ence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Non25 proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and 


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1 Commitments, assessed that ‘‘the Russian Federa2 tion (Russia) maintains an offensive BW [biological 

3 weapons] program and is in violation of its obliga4 tion under Articles I and II of the BWC [Biological 

5 Weapons Convention]’’. 

6 (4) With respect to the People’s Republic of 

7 China, the Department of State, also in its 2021 re8 port on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms 

9 Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agree10 ments and Commitments, assessed that it ‘‘engaged 

11 in activities with dual-use applications, which raise 

12 concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of 

13 the BWC. In addition, the United States does not 

14 have sufficient information to determine whether 

15 China eliminated its assessed historical biological 

16 warfare (BW) program, as required under Article II 

17 of the Convention.’’ 

18 (5) The People’s Republic of China’s engage19 ment in biological research that presents dual use 

20 concerns, its professed prioritization of biotechnology 

21 and synthetic biology in relevant national strategies, 

22 and evidence that emerged in the midst of the 

23 COVID–19 pandemic of collaboration between osten24 sibly civilian research laboratories in the People’s 

25 Republic of China and the People’s Liberation 


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1 Army, has highlighted the imperative of the United 

2 States to monitor closely and conduct diligent over3 sight of biological research collaboration with the 

4 People’s Republic of China. 

5 (6) Another consideration in the imperative for 

6 closer oversight is the People’s Republic of China’s 

7 prioritization of military-civil fusion, which system8 atically harnesses all civil and commercial research 

9 and technology for potential weapons use. 

10 (7) A potential bioweapons attack or accidental 

11 leak of biological research, especially biological re12 search that could be militarized, would have dev13 astating human health, economic, and geopolitical 

14 consequences. While the origins of COVID–19 re15 main under investigation, the current pandemic 

16 serves as a sobering example of vulnerability and 

17 could inspire malign actors. 

18 (8) The Department of State, particularly the 

19 Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

20 International Security, is responsible for ‘‘developing 

21 measures to prevent misuse of advances in the life 

22 sciences’’ (1 FAM 457.3). These challenges require 

23 that the Department of State have the lead role in 

24 preventing the proliferation of bioweapons and in 

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1 gate the potential risk of a deliberate or accidental 

2 bioweapons event. 

3 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

4 It shall be the policy of the United States to— 

5 (1) conduct rigorous oversight of public health 

6 research and innovation that could be weaponized or 

7 serve a dual-use function, and incorporate national 

8 security and nonproliferation considerations and 

9 country-specific conditions into decisions regarding 

10 international biological, bacteriological, virological, 

11 and other relevant research collaboration; 

12 (2) ensure that United States Government sup13 port for public health research and other actions are 

14 not inadvertently contributing to the proliferation of 

15 biological weapons and dual use technologies in the 

16 search for solutions to pressing global health chal17 lenges; and 

18 (3) declassify, to the maximum extent possible, 

19 all intelligence relevant to the People’s Republic of 

20 China’s (PRC) compliance or lack of compliance 

21 with its obligations under the Biological Weapons 

22 Convention (BWC), and other national security con23 cerns regarding PRC life sciences research that falls 

24 outside the scope of the BWC. 


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1 SEC. 5. AMENDMENTS TO SECRETARY OF STATE AUTHORI2 TIES. 

3 (a) RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OTHER STUD4 IES.—Section 301(a) of the Arms Control and Disar5 mament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571(a)) is amended by inserting 

6 ‘‘biological, virological,’’ after ‘‘bacteriological’’. 

7 (b) OVERSIGHT OF DUAL-USE RESEARCH.—Title III 

8 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 

9 2571 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 301 

10 (22 U.S.C. 2571) the following new section: 

11 ‘‘SEC. 301A. AUTHORITIES WITH RESPECT TO BIOLOGICAL 

12 DUAL-USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN. 

13 ‘‘(a) OVERSIGHT OF DUAL-USE RESEARCH.— 

14 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, 

15 working through Chiefs of Mission in each country 

16 listed in paragraph (2), as applicable, shall lead the 

17 conduct and completion of a Country Team Assess18 ment to evaluate and determine whether, for each 

19 discrete proposed research project or other collabora20 tion funded or otherwise supported by the United 

21 States Government that involves life sciences dual22 use research of concern, including research related 

23 to biological agents, toxins, and pathogens, aligns 

24 with the national interests of the United States. The 

25 Country Team Assessment shall be submitted to the 

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1 partment or agency sponsoring the proposed re2 search or collaboration. 

3 ‘‘(2) LIST OF COUNTRIES SPECIFIED.—The 

4 countries for which a Country Team Assessment, as 

5 described in paragraph (1), must be completed are 

6 as follows: 

7 ‘‘(A) The People’s Republic of China. 

8 ‘‘(B) The Russian Federation. 

9 ‘‘(C) The Islamic Republic of Iran. 

10 ‘‘(D) The Democratic People’s Republic of 

11 Korea. 

12 ‘‘(E) The Syrian Arab Republic. 

13 ‘‘(F) Any other country specified in the re14 port assessing compliance with the Biological 

15 Weapons Convention, as required by section 

16 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament 

17 Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant cal18 endar year. 

19 ‘‘(b) REPORT ON APPROVALS OF COLLABORATION.— 

20 Not later than September 30, 2022, and annually there21 after for a period of three years, the Secretary of State, 

22 in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal 

23 departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to 

24 the appropriate committees of Congress a report describ25 ing any research or collaboration described in subsection 


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1 (a) that was approved and the justification for such ap2 proval. 

3 ‘‘(c) REPORT ON EFFICACY OF COUNTRY TEAM AS4 SESSMENT.—Not later than September 30, 2025, the Sec5 retary of State, in coordination with the heads of other 

6 relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit 

7 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that 

8 includes the following elements: 

9 ‘‘(1) A summary of the work of the relevant 

10 country teams over the previous three years. 

11 ‘‘(2) An assessment of whether the country 

12 team assessment process described in subsection (a) 

13 is effective in advancing relevant national interests 

14 of the United States, and any associated rec15 ommendations. 

16 ‘‘(3) Any other key findings and recommenda17 tions, including for conducting oversight of and im18 proving interagency coordination on the review and 

19 monitoring of collaboration with other countries on 

20 life sciences research. 

21 ‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

22 ‘‘(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON23 GRESS.—the term ‘appropriate committees of Con24 gress’ means— 


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1 ‘‘(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

2 and the Committee on Health, Education, 

3 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; and 

4 ‘‘(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

5 and the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

6 of the House of Representatives. 

7 ‘‘(2) LIFE SCIENCES DUAL-USE RESEARCH OF

8 CONCERN DEFINED.—The term ‘life sciences dual9 use research of concern’ means life sciences research 

10 that can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowl11 edge, information, products, or technologies that 

12 could be directly misapplied to pose a significant 

13 threat with broad potential consequences to public 

14 health and safety, national security, or agricultural 

15 crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or 

16 materiel.’’. 

17 (c) ENHANCEMENTS TO THE ANNUAL COMPLIANCE

18 REPORT.—Section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disar19 mament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) is amended— 

20 (1) in paragraph (5)— 

21 (A) by inserting ‘‘or the conduct of life 

22 sciences research of dual-use concern (as de23 fined in section 301A),’’ before ‘‘including—’’; 

24 and 


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1 (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘; 

2 and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

3 (2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as para4 graph (7); and 

5 (3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the fol6 lowing new paragraph: 

7 ‘‘(6) a detailed assessment of the national secu8 rity and proliferation risk of life science research of 

9 dual-use concern conducted by the other nations in10 cluding— 

11 ‘‘(A) a review of major issues the Depart12 ment of State is prioritizing with respect to the 

13 misuse or potential misuse of life sciences re14 search; 

15 ‘‘(B) a description of all efforts by the De16 partment of State and other relevant depart17 ments and agencies to develop and promote 

18 measures to prevent misuse or proliferation of 

19 advances in the life sciences; 

20 ‘‘(C) an assessment of national level poli21 cies, research initiatives, or other relevant ef22 forts focused on increasing the pathogenicity, 

23 contagiousness, or transmissibility of viruses or 

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1 ticipated to involve enhanced potential pan2 demic pathogens of other nations, including— 

3 ‘‘(i) the People’s Republic of China; 

4 ‘‘(ii) the Russian Federation; 

5 ‘‘(iii) the Islamic Republic of Iran; 

6 ‘‘(iv) the Democratic People’s Repub7 lic of Korea; 

8 ‘‘(v) the Syrian Arab Republic; 

9 ‘‘(vi) any other nation identified in 

10 paragraphs (4) and (5); and 

11 ‘‘(vii) any terrorist group or malign 

12 non-state actor; 

13 ‘‘(D) an assessment of whether any of the 

14 activities described in subparagraph (C) con15 stitute violations of Biological Weapons Conven16 tion or pose related national security concerns; 

17 ‘‘(E) a description of collaboration between 

18 ostensibly civilian entities, including research 

19 laboratories, and military entities on life 

20 sciences research; 

21 ‘‘(F) a description of the confidence-build22 ing measures or other attempts by the countries 

23 described in subparagraph (C) to justify, clar24 ify, or explain the activities described in such 

25 subparagraph; 


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1 ‘‘(G) an assessment of risks to United 

2 States national security and proliferation risks 

3 presented by the initiatives described in sub4 paragraph (C); 

5 ‘‘(H) a description of all involvement by 

6 the Department of State to review United 

7 States Government funding or other support, 

8 including subgrants, for life sciences research in 

9 other countries that qualifies as dual-use re10 search of concern, including research related to 

11 biological agents, toxins, and pathogens; and 

12 ‘‘(I) a description of all participation in 

13 any other United States Government and inter14 national groups on biosecurity and dual-use re15 search;’’; 

16 (4) in paragraph (7), as redesignated by para17 graph (2) of this subsection, by striking the period 

18 at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

19 (5) by adding at the end the following new 

20 paragraph: 

21 ‘‘(8) a description of any obstacles or challenges 

22 to the ability of United States Government to ad23 dress the requirements specified in this section, in24 cluding a description of gaps in authorities, intelVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:05 Oct 14, 2021 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2912.IS S2912

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1 ligence collection and analysis, organizational re2 sponsibilities, and resources.’’. 

3 SEC. 6. REPORT ON UNITED STATES FUNDING FOR LIFE 

4 SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE PEOPLE’S RE5 PUBLIC OF CHINA. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall con8 duct a formal review, and produce a written report, of all 

9 United States Government grants or funding awarded in 

10 the past ten years for research collaboration with the Peo11 ple’s Republic of China related to life sciences, gain-of12 function, synthetic biology, biotechnology, or other re13 search areas that pose potential biological weapons pro14 liferation or dual-use concerns. 

15 (b) ELEMENTS.—The review required under sub16 section (a) shall analyze— 

17 (1) all such grants and funding requests that 

18 were awarded and a detailed project description, the 

19 awardee, the amount awarded, any resulting sub20 grants to entities under the jurisdiction of the Peo21 ple’s Republic of China, and the criteria met for 

22 granting approval of funding; 

23 (2) the exact procedures used to approve or 

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1 lic health preparedness and biomedical research, in2 cluding the Department of Health and Human Serv3 ices, and national security agencies, including the 

4 Department of State; 

5 (3) an assessment of any gaps in United States 

6 Government procedures and safeguards to prevent 

7 any such research intended for civilian purposes 

8 from being diverted for military research in the Peo9 ple’s Republic of China; 

10 (4) an assessment of how to best address any 

11 such gaps in procedures and safeguards, especially 

12 regarding greater interagency input from national 

13 security agencies, particularly the Department of 

14 State; 

15 (5) how the research conducted with the grants 

16 and funding requests listed pursuant to paragraph 

17 (1) may have contributed to the development of bio18 logical weapons in the People’s Republic of China; 

19 (6) how the United States Government’s under20 standing of the People’s Republic of China’s ‘‘mili21 tary-civil fusion’’ national strategy informed and im22 pacted funding decisions, and how it will inform fu23 ture funding decisions in research related to gain-of24 function, synthetic biology, biotechnology, or other 


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1 research areas that pose biological weapons pro2 liferation or dual-use concerns; 

3 (7) whether any United States Government 

4 funding, including subgrants, was used to support 

5 gain-of-function research in the People’s Republic of 

6 China during the United States moratorium on such 

7 research from 2014 to 2017; 

8 (8) steps taken the by United States Govern9 ment, if any, to apply additional scrutiny to United 

10 States Government funding, including subgrants, to 

11 support gain-of-function research in the People’s Re12 public of China after the United States Government 

13 lifted the moratorium on gain-of-function research in 

14 2017; and 

15 (9) any other relevant matter discovered during 

16 the course of the review. 

17 (c) REPORT SUBMISSION.—Within 15 days of the 

18 completion of the report required under subsection (a), the 

19 President shall submit the report to— 

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

21 Senate; 

22 (2) the Committee on Health, Education, 

23 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; 

24 (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

25 Senate; 


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1 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

2 House of Representatives; 

3 (5) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 

4 the House of Representatives; and 

5 (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

6 House of Representatives. 

7 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report shall be unclassi8 fied, but may include a classified annex. 

9 SEC. 7. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT 

10 ON OVERSIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE 

11 SCIENCES RESEARCH COLLABORATION. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General 

14 of the United States shall submit a report to the appro15 priate congressional committees on the following matters: 

16 (1) An audit of United States Government au17 thorities, policies, and processes governing coopera18 tion with other nations as relates to life sciences re19 search that could be weaponized or pose dual-use 

20 concerns, such as pathogens or toxins, synthetic biol21 ogy, and related emerging technologies, and the de22 gree to which these authorities, policies, and proc23 esses account for national security, proliferation, and 

24 country-specific considerations in decisions on 

25 whether to pursue such collaboration. 


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1 (2) An assessment of the degree of coordination 

2 between Federal departments and agencies respon3 sible for public health preparedness and the govern4 ance of biomedical research and Federal depart5 ments and agencies responsible for national security, 

6 especially the United States Department of State, to 

7 assess and account for security implications of co8 operation with other nations on life sciences re9 search. 

10 (b) ELEMENTS.—The review required under sub11 section (a) shall address the following elements: 

12 (1) The Federal department or agencies or 

13 other governmental entities that provide funding or 

14 other material support for life sciences research, es15 pecially biological research, with other nations. 

16 (2) The authorities, policies, and processes that 

17 currently exist for reviewing, approving, and moni18 toring grant funding or other material support for 

19 biological research with other nations, including a 

20 description of all the steps involved reviewing, ap21 proving, and monitoring such funding or other sup22 port. 

23 (3) Which Federal departments and agencies, 

24 including specific bureaus and offices, are involved 


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1 in the authorities, policies, and processes described 

2 in paragraph (2). 

3 (4) The circumstances under which Federal de4 partments and agencies apply enhanced review, mon5 itoring, and coordination to proposed collaboration, 

6 as well as an analysis of the extent to which and 

7 how national security, proliferation, or country-spe8 cific considerations, such as a nation’s adherence to 

9 the Biological Weapons Convention, are among the 

10 circumstances that trigger enhanced scrutiny of 

11 whether the United States Government should fund 

12 a particular research program. 

13 (5) The information required to be included in 

14 an application for United States Government fund15 ing of life sciences research to address potential na16 tional security, proliferation, or country-specific con17 cerns, and whether the information required varies 

18 across departments and agencies. 

19 (6) The extent to which Federal departments 

20 and agencies with national security responsibilities 

21 have visibility into the information described in 

22 paragraph (5) prior to an award being made, even 

23 if grantees are applying to funding from another 

24 Federal department or agency. 


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1 (7) The processes and timeline by which funds 

2 are issued to the awardee or awardees after a grant 

3 or other funding award is made, and to what extent 

4 these funds are monitored for national security im5 plications thereafter, including how Federal depart6 ments and agencies with national security respon7 sibilities are involved in monitoring such research 

8 after funds are awarded. 

9 (c) REPORT SUBMISSION.—Within 15 days of the 

10 completion of the report required under subsection (a), the 

11 President shall submit the report to— 

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

13 Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pen14 sions, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 

15 Senate; and 

16 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

17 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Com18 mittee on Armed Services of the House of Rep19 resentatives. 

20 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

21 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 

22 may include a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 8. PROHIBITION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TYPES 

2 OF LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH. 

3 No Federal funds may be obligated or expended for 

4 the purpose of conducting research that increases the 

5 pathogenicity, contagiousness, or transmissibility of vi6 ruses or bacteria, including any research anticipated to in7 volve enhanced potential pandemic pathogens, if such re8 search involves a foreign entity that is subject to the juris9 diction of any of the following countries: 

10 (1) The People’s Republic of China. 

11 (2) The Russian Federation. 

12 (3) The Islamic Republic of Iran. 

13 (4) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

14 (5) The Syrian Arab Republic. 

15 (6) Any other country specified in the report 

16 assessing compliance with the Biological Weapons 

17 Convention, as required by section 403(a) of the 

18 Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 

19 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year. 

20 SEC. 9. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS REVIEW CON21 FERENCE. 

22 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—In order to promote 

23 international peace, and security, it is the policy of the 

24 United States to pursue adherence to the Biological Weap25 ons Convention and accountability for violations thereof, 

26 including as described in subsections (b) and (c). 


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1 (b) ACTIVITIES IN ADVANCE OF THE NINTH REVIEW

2 CONFERENCE OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVEN3 TION.—Before the Ninth Review Conference of the 1972 

4 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro5 duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 

6 Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (in this sub7 section referred to as ‘‘the Conference’’), the President 

8 shall carry out the following activities: 

9 (1) Demand greater transparency from the 

10 Government of the People’s Republic of China re11 garding the dual-use applications of its life science 

12 research, which raise concerns regarding its compli13 ance with Article I of the Biological Weapons Con14 vention. 

15 (2) Engage with other governments, the private 

16 sector (including in relevant life sciences and tech17 nology fields), and other stakeholders, as appro18 priate, on United States concerns about the People’s 

19 Republic of China’s compliance with the Biological 

20 Weapons Convention, and the national security, pub21 lic health, and non-proliferation implications of these 

22 concerns. 

23 (3) Emphasize that the People’s Republic of 

24 China’s national strategy of ‘‘military-civil fusion’’ 

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1 forceability of the Biological Weapons Convention, 

2 which may not adequately capture the full range of 

3 dual-use biotechnologies being pursued by the Peo4 ple’s Republic of China. 

5 (c) SECURITY COUNCIL COMPLAINT.—If the ques6 tions and concerns raised in subsection (b) are not ade7 quately addressed, the President should consider lodging 

8 a complaint to the Security Council pursuant to Article 

9 VI of the Convention. 

10 SEC. 10. ANNUAL REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES AGENCY 

11 FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

13 date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 

14 seven years, the Administrator of the United States Inter15 national Development shall submit to the appropriate con16 gressional committees a report describing all engagements 

17 and funding, including subgrants, for life sciences research 

18 involving or related to the study of pathogens, viruses, and 

19 toxins provided to entities subject to the jurisdiction of 

20 countries listed in subsection (b), to include a national se21 curity justification for such engagements and funding. 

22 (b) LIST OF COUNTRIES SPECIFIED.—The countries 

23 to be covered by the report required in subsection (a) are 

24 as follows: 

25 (1) The People’s Republic of China. 


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1 (2) The Russian Federation. 

2 (3) The Islamic Republic of Iran. 

3 (4) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

4 (5) The Syrian Arab Republic. 

5 (6) Any other country specified in the report 

6 assessing compliance with the Biological Weapons 

7 Convention, as required by section 403(a) of the 

8 Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 

9 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year. 

10 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 

11 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 

12 a classified annex. 

13 SEC. 11. UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, PROGRAMS, AND 

14 FUNDS. 

15 (a) PROHIBITION.—The Permanent Representative 

16 of the United States to the United Nations, in coordina17 tion with the United States Representative to the World 

18 Health Assembly, shall use the voice, vote, and influence 

19 of the United States at the United Nations to bar rep20 resentatives from countries listed in subsection (b) from 

21 serving in leadership positions within any United Nations 

22 specialized agency, program, fund, or treaty organization 

23 with a nexus to global health (including animal health), 

24 biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, or 

25 food security and agricultural development. 


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1 (b) LIST OF COUNTRIES SPECIFIED.—The countries 

2 to be covered by the report required in subsection (a) are 

3 as follows: 

4 (1) The People’s Republic of China. 

5 (2) The Russian Federation. 

6 (3) The Islamic Republic of Iran. 

7 (4) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

8 (5) The Syrian Arab Republic. 

9 (6) Any other country specified in the report 

10 assessing compliance with the Biological Weapons 

11 Convention, as required by section 403(a) of the 

12 Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 

13 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year. 

Æ 


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