J-S79016-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.B., A MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1182 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 24, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000319-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2016

E.B. (“Child”), through her child advocate/guardian ad litem, appeals 

from the order entered February 24, 2016, in the Philadelphia County Court 

of Common Pleas. This order, in part, vacated the appointment of the Court 

Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) and directed no contact with potential 

adoptive parents, the Ls, and that their home no longer be considered as a 

placement resource until further order of court.1 In addition, in vacating the 

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1 This order maintained Child’s placement in general foster care and 

the goal of reunification, and provided for visitation between Child and her 

sibling. In addition, the court instructed that the case not be transferred

from the Department of Human Services (“DHS’”) to the Department of 

Public Welfare (“DPW”), Child not to be taken out of the jurisdiction, the 

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) process be 

discontinued, and Adoptions from the Heart no longer be involved. DHS was 

further ordered to conduct a home evaluation of Child’s former kinship 

provider, C.G., within thirty days. Permanency Review Order, 2/24/16.
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CASA appointment, the court declined to allow the CASA to be called as a 

witness and denied admission of the CASA report. After review, we quash 

Child’s appeal.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history 

as follows:

[In October, 2014], [DHS] received a General Protective 

Services Report (“GPS”) alleging that when E.O. (“mother”) gave 

birth to E.B., E.B. tested positive for methadone and opiates; 

that E.B. had a high Neonatal Abstinence Scoring and had to be 

admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”) of a 

hospital. Further, it was alleged that mother was unaware that 

she was pregnant until August 2014 and had been using heroin 

throughout the summer. The report was substantiated.

On the aforementioned date, when DHS visited Einstein 

Medical Center Montgomery (“hospital”), where E.B. was born, 

DHS learned it would still be a few more weeks before E.B. could 

be discharged.

It was further reported to DHS that mother had been 

previously arrested on September 8, 2014, and was, at the time 

of the GPS report, incarcerated at the Montgomery County 

Correctional Facility (“correctional facility”) for violating the 

terms of her probation; that she was scheduled for release from 

that facility some time in November 2014; that upon her release, 

mother was to reside with M.B. (“father”), who was to provide 

for E.B. until mother’s release.

On October 25, 2014, mother was discharged [from] the 

hospital and transported back to the correctional facility.

Subsequently, on October 29, 2014, per a telephone 

conversation with the hospital staff, DHS learned that E.B. had 

been moved to NICU; that hospital staff had administered 

morphine to E.B. to alleviate the symptoms of her withdrawal; 

and that there was no anticipated date of discharge for E.B.

Subsequently, DHS learned that father was the perpetrator 

in a substantiated GPS report and that father had numerous 

arrests for driving under the influence.
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On October 29, 2014, DHS telephoned father to inform 

him that he would be unable to care for E.B. until DHS 

implemented the appropriate services in his home. Father 

agreed to accept services and provided DHS with the name of 

[C.G.], a paternal cousin, as a possible placement source for E.B.

On November 5, 2014, DHS learned that E.B. would be 

ready for discharge from the hospital the following week.

On November 6, 2014, DHS visited [C.G.]’s home and 

conducted a successful home assessment and obtained the 

appropriate clearances.

On November 16, 2014, E.B. was discharged from the 

hospital to [C.G.]’s care with a safety plan implemented by DHS.

On December 4, 2014, DHS implemented In-Home 

services through Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) and 

Catholic Social Services.

On December 11, 2014, a Family Support Conference was 

held where father disclosed that he had a history of taking pills; 

that he drank excessively; that he was currently attending 

meeting[s] to address his drinking problems; and that he did not 

believe his drinking would interfere with his ability to care for 

E.B.

On January 14, 2015, mother informed DHS via telephone 

that she was released from the correctional facility two days 

prior; that she was currently on probation; and that she was 

residing with father. At that time, DHS informed mother that 

she needed to complete parent training and drug and alcohol 

treatment.

Thereafter, on February 6, 2015, DHS filed a dependency 

petition on behalf of E.B., based on mother and father’s present 

inability to care for E.B.

On February 25, 2015, a pre-hearing conference was held 

and all parties agreed to adjudicate the child dependent based 

on present inability and that the commitment to DHS should 

stand.

Pursuant to the adjudication of E.B., a kinship care referral 

was made for [C.G.] and supervised, liberal visits were to be 

held at her home, supervised by her and observed by CUA once 

a month.
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The matter was then listed on a regular basis before 

judges of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas – Family Court 

Division- Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the 

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351, and evaluated for the purpose 

of reviewing the permanency plan for the child.

Thereafter, on September 16, 2015, a permanency review 

hearing was held before the Honorable Vincent L. Johnson. 

Judge Johnson ordered that [the Ls] be explored as a preadoptive resource for E.B., and counsel for mother and father to 

explore signing voluntary relinquishment forms with them.

On October 27, 2015, a Petition for Order to Transfer Legal 

Custody of Child From DHS to DPW Licensed Child Placement 

Agency, filed by parents, was heard before the Honorable 

Vincent L. Johnson.

On November 3, 2015, DHS filed its Answer to Parents’ 

Petition For Order To Transfer Legal Custody Of Child From DHS 

T[o] DPW-Licensed Child Placement Agency.

Subsequently, on November 4, 2015, a permanency 

review hearing was held before Judge Johnson who ordered that 

the [Ls] have supervised visits twice a month at the agency and 

that the [ICPC] be processed forthwith. 

Then, on December 16, 2015, a permanency review 

hearing was held before Judge Johnson who ordered that the 

ICPC be processed forthwith. Judge Johnson further ordered 

that New Jersey Department of Youth and Family Services 

complete a home visit for the [Ls]. It was further ordered that if 

the [Ls’] home was cleared and all parties were in agreement, 

E.B. would go on an extended visit to the [Ls’] home in New 

Jersey.[2]

On January 29, 2016, a permanency review hearing was 

held before the Honorable Lyris Younge who found that CUA had 

not made reasonable efforts to finalize E.B.’s permanency plan. 

Judge Younge ordered the removal of CUA from the case and 

that the extended visit with the [Ls] should be terminated; that 

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2 On December 24, 2015, the Honorable Joseph Fernandes signed an 

emergency order granting a 30-day extended visit with the Ls.
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E.B. should not be brought to New Jersey and there be no 

further visits with the [Ls] at this time. Judge Younge further 

ordered that the ICPC process could continue.[3]

On February 24, 2016, a contested permanency review 

hearing was held before Judge Younge who ordered that the 

ICPC be discontinued immediately; that the [Ls] have no further 

contact with E.B.; that Adoptions from the Heart, the adoption 

agency representing the [Ls], cease all involvement in this case; 

and the home of the [Ls] was to be no longer considered as a 

placement for E.B., until further order of the court.[4]

Corrected Opinion, 5/3/16, at 1-5 (unpaginated) (“1925(a) Op.”). 

On March 28, 2016, Child, through her child advocate/guardian ad 

litem, filed a notice of appeal,5along with a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Child raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the Juvenile Court err in refusing to permit the child 

through her child advocate/guardian ad litem, and Court 

Appointed Special Advocate to present evidence regarding her 

permanency plan and best interests, thereby denying her due 

process as well as failing to ascertain to the fullest extent 

possible the views of the child as required by, inter alia, 42 

[Pa.C.S. § 6351(e)(1)]?

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3 On February 5, 2016, DHS filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

court’s January 29, 2016 order. The trial court denied this motion without 

hearing by order dated February 5, 2016.

4 The trial court also removed the CASA from the case.

5 Thirty days from entry of the February 24, 2016 order was Friday, 

March 25, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal shall be filed within 

thirty days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken). 

However, as Friday, March 25, 2016, was Good Friday, and the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas was closed, Child filed this appeal on 

Monday, March 28, 2016. 
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2. Did the Juvenile Court err in vacating the Court Appointed 

Special Advocate (CASA)?

3. Did the Juvenile Court err in refusing to allow the February 

24, 2016 CASA report to be entered into the record despite 

the Court, on the record, having announced that she had read 

the report prior to the hearing?

4. Was it an abuse of judicial discretion for the lower Court, sua 

sponte, without regard for the permanency plan approved by 

her predecessor judge, and without permitting the Child 

Advocate/Guardian Ad Litem to present evidence or testimony 

on behalf of the child and the child’s needs to Order: the 

removal of CASA; that the child cease all contact with kinship 

and adoptive resources Mr. & Mrs. L.; that the ICPC process 

be discontinued; and that Mr. & Mrs. L. no longer be 

considered as a resource for Adoption until further order of 

the court?

5. Does the Superior Court have jurisdiction to hear this appeal?

Child’s Br. at 5-6.

Before proceeding to a review of the merits, we must determine 

whether we have jurisdiction. In particular, we must examine whether the 

order in question, the permanency review order of February 24, 2016, is an 

appealable order. Because “we lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order 

it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether the 

appeal is taken from an appealable order.’”6 Gunn v. Automobile Ins. Co. 

of Hartford, Connecticut, 971 A.2d 505, 508 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting 

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6 Child was the only party at the permanency review hearing who filed 

a brief with this Court. DHS submitted a letter stating that it “will not be 

filing a brief in this matter.”
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Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa.Super. 2000)). It is well-settled 

that, “[a]n appeal lies only from a final order, unless permitted by rule or 

statute.” Stewart v. Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 471 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Generally, a final order is one that disposes of all claims and all parties. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). See also In re H.S.W.C.-B & S.E.C.-B., 836 A.2d 908, 

911 (Pa. 2003) (With regard to dependency matters, “An order granting or 

denying a status change, as well as an order terminating or preserving 

parental rights, shall be deemed final when entered.”) (citation omitted).

Instantly, Child does not assert that the February 24, 2016 

permanency review order is a final order, as it does not grant or deny a goal 

change or terminate or preserve parental rights.7, 8 Rather, Child avers that 

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7 A review of the record reveals that a petition to terminate parental 

rights and for a goal change has not been filed.

8 While we recognize the expansion of those dependency orders which 

are deemed final, appealable orders under In re H.S.W.C.-B. & S.E.C.-B., 

we find the instant matter distinguishable. Not only did the trial court 

indicate that the order in question is not a final order, see 1925(a) Op. at 6 

(unpaginated), Child does not dispute that the order is not a final order. 

Moreover, the trial court also examined whether the order was collateral 

and/or the appeal was interlocutory as of right or by permission and 

concluded the appeal should be quashed. See 1925(a) Op. at 6-7 

(unpaginated). Further, upon review, in disputing the court’s actions with 

regard to the CASA, Child is essentially challenging the trial court’s actions 

with regard to potential adoptive parents, the Ls, who importantly are not 

parties to the matter. Critically, these actions, in particular, excluding the 

Ls’ home from consideration as a placement resource, were qualified by the 

court, see Permanency Review Order, 2/24/16, thus allowing the potential 

for consideration in the future. The court, however, in an effort to not 

circumvent the dependency process, explored the option of reunification and 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the order is appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 313(a) (providing that an appeal may be taken as of right from a 

collateral order of a lower court). “A collateral order is an order separable 

from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is 

too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if 

review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be 

irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). 

Child, through her child advocate/guardian ad litem, argues that the 

February 24, 2016 order meets the requirements of the collateral order 

doctrine. Child suggests that the removal of the CASA, which prohibited 

Child from presenting evidence, is separate from, and collateral to, the 

dependency itself. Child’s Br. at 34. Child further avers that the court 

impinged upon her right “to meaningfully participate” in the dependency 

hearing. Id. Lastly, Child posits that “this Constitutionally protected right 

would be lost if the lower court continued to deny the child advocate the 

opportunity to participate in the hearing.” Id. at 35.

Upon review, we conclude that that the trial court’s February 24, 2016 

order does not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine. While 

Child argues that the February 24, 2016 order is appealable because it 

infringed upon her right to present evidence, the right to participate and 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

further investigated Child’s former kinship provider, C.G. See 1925(a) Op. 

at 8-9 (unpaginated); Permanency Review Order, 2/24/16.
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present evidence during dependency proceedings is not separate from, or 

collateral to, those proceedings. In addition, Child’s right will not be lost if 

postponed until final judgment. Child can raise the instant claims upon the 

determination of a goal change/termination petition, if and when filed, or at 

the conclusion of the dependency matter.

Accordingly, the February 24, 2016 order is not a collateral order 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider 

Child’s claims, and the appeal must be quashed. 

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/7/2016