```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3131 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3131

     To accelerate deployment by Taiwan of the asymmetric defense 
capabilities required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion of 
   Taiwan by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            November 2, 2021

  Mr. Hawley introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To accelerate deployment by Taiwan of the asymmetric defense 
capabilities required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion of 
   Taiwan by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Arm Taiwan Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Department of Defense has warned that the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China may conclude that 
        it can successfully invade and seize control of Taiwan in the 
        latter half of the 2020s.
            (2) In October 2021, the Minister of National Defense of 
        Taiwan, Chiu Kuo-cheng, echoed these warnings when he stated 
        that the People's Republic of China--
                    (A) ``is capable now'' of invading Taiwan; and
                    (B) will have ``lowered the costs and losses'' 
                associated with invading Taiwan ``to a minimum'' after 
                2025.
            (3) If the People's Republic of China were to invade and 
        seize control of Taiwan, it would deal a severe blow to United 
        States interests by--
                    (A) destroying one of the world's leading 
                democracies;
                    (B) casting doubt on the ability and resolve of the 
                United States to uphold its security commitments;
                    (C) incentivizing other countries in the Indo-
                Pacific region to bandwagon with the People's Republic 
                of China; and
                    (D) facilitating the formation of a regional order 
                dominated by the People's Republic of China in which 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China may--
                            (i) regulate or otherwise limit the ability 
                        of individuals in the United States to trade in 
                        the Indo-Pacific region, which would have dire 
                        effects on the livelihoods and freedoms of such 
                        individuals; and
                            (ii) use the Indo-Pacific region as a 
                        secure base from which to project military 
                        power into other regions, including the Western 
                        Hemisphere.
            (4) Taiwan's proximity to the People's Republic of China, 
        coupled with investments by the People's Republic of China in 
        capabilities designed to delay intervention by the United 
        States Armed Forces in support of Taiwan, means that Taiwan may 
        be forced to delay, degrade, and deny an invasion by the 
        People's Republic of China with limited support from the United 
        States Armed Forces for the initial days, weeks, or months of 
        such an invasion.
            (5) If Taiwan is unable to delay, degrade, and deny an 
        invasion by the People's Republic of China with limited support 
        from the United States Armed Forces, especially in the initial 
        period of war, then the People's Republic of China may conclude 
        that it is, or may actually be, capable of--
                    (A) invading and seizing control of Taiwan before 
                the United States or any other partner country of 
                Taiwan is able to respond effectively, thereby 
                achieving a fait accompli; and
                    (B) potentially rendering any attempt by the United 
                States or any other partner country of Taiwan to 
                reverse territorial gains by the People's Republic of 
                China prohibitively difficult, costly, or both.
            (6) To defend itself effectively, especially in the initial 
        period of war, it is imperative that Taiwan accelerate 
        deployment of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense 
        capabilities, including mobile coastal and air defenses, naval 
        mines, missile boats, man-portable anti-armor weapons, civil 
        defense forces, and their enablers.
            (7) The deployment of such asymmetric defense capabilities 
        by Taiwan would not only improve the ability of Taiwan to 
        defend itself, but also reduce operational risk to members of 
        the United States Armed Forces under a Taiwan contingency.
            (8) The President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen, has--
                    (A) vowed to bolster the national defense of Taiwan 
                and demonstrate Taiwan's determination to defend itself 
                so as to ensure that Taiwan will not be forced to take 
                the path that the People's Republic of China has laid 
                out for Taiwan; and
                    (B) advocated the deployment of asymmetric defense 
                capabilities.
            (9) The Government of Taiwan has begun taking steps to 
        improve Taiwan's defenses, including by increasing Taiwan's 
        defense budget and through Taiwan's new proposed special 
        defense budget, but far more is needed, and quickly, to ensure 
        that Taiwan is able to maintain a sufficient self-defense 
        capability.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the threat of an invasion of Taiwan by the People's 
        Republic of China is increasing rapidly and expected to reach 
        especially dangerous levels by the latter half of the 2020s;
            (2) the United States has a strong interest in preventing 
        the People's Republic of China from invading and seizing 
        control of Taiwan, especially by ensuring that Taiwan is able 
        to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
            (3) the United States should establish a security 
        assistance initiative so as to accelerate, to the greatest 
        extent possible, Taiwan's deployment of cost-effective and 
        resilient asymmetric defense capabilities;
            (4) the United States should provide such assistance on the 
        condition that Taiwan--
                    (A) matches investments by the United States in its 
                asymmetric defense capabilities;
                    (B) increases its defense spending to a level 
                commensurate with the threat it faces;
                    (C) prioritizes acquiring cost-effective and 
                resilient asymmetric defense capabilities as rapidly as 
                possible, including from foreign suppliers, if 
                necessary; and
                    (D) demonstrates progress on defense reforms 
                required to maximize the effectiveness of its 
                asymmetric defenses, with special regard to Taiwan's 
                reserve forces; and
            (5) in the course of executing such a security assistance 
        initiative, the United States should--
                    (A) seek to co-produce or co-develop cost-effective 
                and resilient asymmetric defense capabilities with 
                suppliers in Taiwan, including by providing incentives 
                to that effect, so long as those suppliers can produce 
                such capabilities at a reasonable cost, in the 
                quantities required, as rapidly, and to the same 
                quality and technical standards as suppliers in the 
                United States or other countries; and
                    (B) encourage other countries, particularly United 
                States allies and partners, to sell, lease, or 
                otherwise provide appropriate asymmetric defense 
                capabilities to Taiwan so as to facilitate Taiwan's 
                rapid deployment of the asymmetric defense capabilities 
                required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion 
                by the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. TAIWAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish an 
initiative, to be known as the ``Taiwan Security Assistance 
Initiative'' (referred to in this Act as the ``Initiative''), to 
accelerate Taiwan's deployment of asymmetric defense capabilities 
required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion by the People's 
Republic of China.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $3,000,000,000 for the Department of Defense for each of 
fiscal years 2023 through 2027 to provide assistance to the Government 
of Taiwan under this section.
    (c) Authority To Provide Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
        with the Secretary of State, shall use the funds authorized to 
        be appropriated under subsection (b) to provide assistance to 
        the Government of Taiwan for the purpose described in 
        subsection (d).
    (d) Purpose.--The purpose of the Initiative is to provide 
assistance, including equipment, training, and other support, to the 
Government of Taiwan so as to accelerate Taiwan's deployment of 
asymmetric defense capabilities required to achieve, with limited 
support from the United States Armed Forces for the initial days, 
weeks, or months after the initiation of an invasion by the People's 
Republic of China of Taiwan, the following objectives:
            (1) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's 
        Liberation Army forces to enter or transit the Taiwan Strait 
        and adjoining seas.
            (2) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's 
        Liberation Army forces to secure a lodgment on Taiwan and 
        expand or otherwise use that lodgment to seize control of a 
        population center or other key territory in Taiwan.
            (3) To prevent the People's Republic of China from 
        decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or 
        rendering ineffective the Government of Taiwan.
    (e) Asymmetric Defense Capabilities.--In this section, the term 
``asymmetric defense capabilities'' includes, in such quantities as the 
Secretary of Defense determines to be necessary to achieve the purpose 
specified in subsection (d), the following:
            (1) Mobile, ground-based coastal defense cruise missiles 
        and launchers.
            (2) Mobile, ground-based short-range and medium-range air 
        defense systems.
            (3) Smart, self-propelled naval mines and coastal 
        minelaying platforms.
            (4) Missile boats and fast-attack craft equipped with anti-
        ship and anti-landing craft missiles.
            (5) Unmanned aerial and other mobile, resilient 
        surveillance systems to support coastal and air defense 
        operations.
            (6) Equipment to support target location, tracking, 
        identification, and targeting, especially at the local level, 
        in communications degraded or denied environments.
            (7) Man-portable anti-armor weapons, mortars, and small 
        arms for ground combat operations.
            (8) Equipment and technical assistance for the purpose of 
        developing civil defense forces, composed of civilian 
        volunteers and militia.
            (9) Training and equipment, including appropriate war 
        reserves, required for Taiwan forces to independently maintain, 
        sustain, and employ capabilities described in paragraphs (1) 
        through (8).
            (10) Concept development for coastal defense, air defense, 
        decentralized command and control, civil defense, logistics, 
        planning, and other critical military functions, with an 
        emphasis on operations in a communications degraded or denied 
        environment.
            (11) Any other capability the Secretary of Defense 
        considers appropriate for the purpose described in subsection 
        (d).
    (f) Availability of Funds.--
            (1) Plan.--Not later than December 1, 2022, and annually 
        thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
        of Congress a plan for using funds authorized to be 
        appropriated under subsection (b) for the purpose specified in 
        subsection (d).
            (2) Initial certification.--Amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated under subsection (b) for fiscal year 2023 may not 
        be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary 
        of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 
        certifies that the Government of Taiwan has committed--
                    (A) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric 
                defense capabilities in fiscal year 2023;
                    (B) to spending not less than three percent of 
                Taiwan's national gross domestic product on defense on 
                an annual basis by the end of fiscal year 2027, 
                including expenditures under the normal defense budget 
                and any supplemental or special defense budgets of 
                Taiwan;
                    (C) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as 
                rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the 
                United States or other countries, if the Secretary of 
                Defense determines that such suppliers will be able to 
                provide such capabilities at a reasonable cost, in 
                sufficient quantities, of sufficient quality and 
                technical standards, and more rapidly than suppliers in 
                Taiwan; and
                    (D) to undertaking the defense reforms required to 
                maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense 
                against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, 
                including by improving organization, mobilization, and 
                training of the reserve forces and other military 
                personnel of Taiwan.
            (3) Subsequent certifications.--Amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated under subsection (b) for each of fiscal years 
        2024, 2025, 2026, and 2027 may not be obligated or expended 
        until the date on which the Secretary of Defense, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of State, certifies that the 
        Government of Taiwan has committed--
                    (A) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric 
                defense capabilities in the applicable fiscal year and 
                upheld its commitment to spend an equivalent amount as 
                the United States in the preceding fiscal year on 
                asymmetric defense capabilities to be deployed by 
                Taiwan;
                    (B) to spending not less than three percent of 
                Taiwan's national gross domestic product on defense on 
                an annual basis by the end of fiscal year 2027, 
                including expenditures under the normal defense budget 
                and any supplemental or special defense budgets of 
                Taiwan, and demonstrated progress toward that spending 
                target in the preceding fiscal year;
                    (C) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as 
                rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the 
                United States or other countries, if the Secretary of 
                Defense determines that such suppliers will be able to 
                provide such capabilities at reasonable cost, in 
                sufficient quantities, of sufficient quality and 
                technical standards, and more rapidly than suppliers in 
                Taiwan, and upheld its commitment to acquire asymmetric 
                defense capabilities as rapidly as possible in the 
                preceding fiscal year; and
                    (D) to undertaking the defense reforms required to 
                maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense 
                against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, 
                including by improving the organization, mobilization, 
                and training of the reserve forces and other military 
                personnel of Taiwan, and demonstrated progress on such 
                reforms in the preceding fiscal year.
            (4) Notification to congress.--Not later than 30 days after 
        making a certification under paragraph (2) or (3), the 
        Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees 
        of Congress a notice and explanation of such certification.
            (5) Remaining funds.--
                    (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), 
                amounts appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to the 
                authorization of appropriations under subsection (b) 
                that are not obligated and expended during that fiscal 
                year shall be added to the amount that may be used for 
                the Initiative in the subsequent fiscal year.
                    (B) Rescission.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
                the authorization of appropriation under subsection (b) 
                that remain unobligated by the end of fiscal year 2027 
                shall be rescinded and deposited into the general fund 
                of the Treasury.
    (g) Defense Articles and Services From United States Inventory and 
Other Sources.--
            (1) In general.--In addition to assistance provided 
        pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of State, may make available to 
        the Government of Taiwan, in such quantities as the Secretary 
        of Defense considers appropriate for the purpose described in 
        subsection (d), the following:
                    (A) Weapons and other defense articles from the 
                United States inventory and other sources.
                    (B) Excess defense articles from the United States 
                inventory.
                    (C) Defense services.
            (2) Replacement.--Amounts for the replacement of any item 
        provided to the Government of Taiwan under paragraph (1)(A) may 
        be made available from the amount authorized to be appropriated 
        under subsection (b).
    (h) Termination of Authority.--Assistance may not be provided under 
this section after September 30, 2027.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) historically, the Government of Taiwan has prioritized 
        the acquisition of conventional weapons that would be of 
        limited utility in deterring or defeating an invasion by the 
        People's Republic of China at the expense of the timely 
        acquisition of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense 
        capabilities;
            (2) the United States Government has often shared 
        responsibility for the misguided prioritization of defense 
        acquisitions described in paragraph (1) by approving sales of 
        conventional weapons to Taiwan, despite knowledge that such 
        sales would do little to enhance, and may even undermine, the 
        ability of Taiwan to deter or defeat an invasion by the 
        People's Republic of China;
            (3) the misguided prioritization of defense acquisitions 
        described in paragraph (1) has not only undermined the ability 
        of Taiwan to deter or defeat an invasion by the People's 
        Republic of China, but has also placed at greater risk of death 
        or injury members of the United States Armed Forces who may 
        come under attack or be asked to come to the aid of Taiwan to 
        repel such an invasion; and
            (4) any future sales, leases, or other provision of 
        conventional weaponry to Taiwan by the United States should be 
        conditioned on meaningful progress by the Government of Taiwan 
        on the acquisition of appropriate asymmetric defense 
        capabilities.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--For each of fiscal years 2023 through 
2027, the United States Government shall not sell, lease, or otherwise 
provide military capabilities to Taiwan other than asymmetric defense 
capabilities described in subsection (e) of section 3 until the earlier 
of--
            (1) the date on which the Secretary of Defense has 
        submitted a notification under subsection (f)(4) of that 
        section for the fiscal year in which the Government of Taiwan 
        has requested the sale, lease, or other provision of military 
        capabilities other than such asymmetric defense capabilities; 
        or
            (2) the date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to 
        the appropriate committees of Congress that the sale, lease, or 
        other provision to Taiwan of military capabilities other than 
        such asymmetric defense capabilities--
                    (A) is necessary to enhance the ability of Taiwan 
                to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion by the 
                People's Republic of China; or
                    (B) will not slow, delay, limit, or otherwise 
                detract from or undermine the ability of Taiwan to 
                deploy such asymmetric defense capabilities.

SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
                                 <all>
```