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Filed 1/14/16 In re William M. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re WILLIAM M

. , a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. WILLIAM M

. , Defendant and Appellant. A145191
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. J40937)

Defendant William M. appeals orders of the juvenile court continuing him a s a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code , § 602), remov ing him from parental custody, and placing him in a residential treatment facility , with standard probation conditions.
William’s appointed appellate counsel initially filed an opening brief which summarize d the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raise d no issues, and ask ed that this court independently review the record. ( People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Thereafter,
this court requested additional briefing on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s finding that William had co mmitted a robbery

. Having considered supplemental briefing by both William’s appointed counsel and the Attorney General, we find no error
in the record and therefore shall affirm the orders.2 Factual and Procedural History On January 8, 2015, the Solano C ounty District Attorney’ s Office filed a juvenile wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), charging William with a violation of Penal Code section 211, second degree robbery. The following evidence was pr esented at the jurisdictional hearing: On January 6, 2015, at around 11:00 p

. m

. , the 19

- year

- old victim was walking home when a black SUV
with a cracked wi ndshield pulled up next to her. There were three m ales in the car, two in
the front seats and one in the back. William, who was driving the car, asked if they could use the victim’s cell phone because their car had broke n down. The victim entered the password to her phone and passed it to the front passenger. When the front passenger grabbed the phone from the victim, the passenger in the back seat pulled out a silver gun and pointed it at her. The car then instantly drove off, “like they had planned it.” The victim used a friends’ phone to call 911. T he vi ctim identified William as the driver of the car after he was arrested and again at the hearing. A recently deleted file on her phone contained videos of the three people who took her phone with the firearm that had been used in the robbery, including foot age inside an SUV with a cracked
windshield. During closing arguments, trial counsel argued that the facts of the case did not support a robbery conviction, but rather demonstrated a completed theft followed by brandishing of a weapon. The court rejecte d defense counsel’s argument and sustained the petition. The minor was continued as a ward of the court and placed at a residential treatment facility . As terms of probation the court ordered that William not possess any deadly or dangerous weapons, ammun itions or firearms and that he be subject to a search
clause. William timely filed a notice of appeal.
Discussion “Robbery is defined as ‘the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and a gainst his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.’ [Citation.] Robbery is larceny with the aggravating circumstances that ‘the property is taken from the person or presence of another

. . . ’ and ‘is3

accomplished by the use of force or by putting the victim in fear of injury.’ [Citation.] In California, ‘[t]he crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety.’ [Citation.] It thus is robbery when the property was peacefully acquired, but force or fear was used to carry it away.” ( People v. Anderson (2011) 5 1 Cal. 4th 989, 994.) In this case, substantial evidence establishes that the phone was acquired by theft by trick or de vice. ( People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 417 [“The crime of
thef t by trick or device requires: 1) obtaining possession of property of an other by some trick or device; 2) intent by the wrongdoer to convert it to his own use and to permanently deprive the owner thereof; and 3) transfer of possession but not title to the wrongdoer.”] .) Theft by trick is a crime of larceny that satisfies the “felonious taking” element of robbery and includes an asportation element . ( People v. Williams (201 3) 57
Cal. 4th 776, 783

- 784; People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 256; People v. Whitmer (2014) 230 Cal.App. 4th 906, 923

. ) Contrary to William’s suggestion, the re is substantial evidence to support the finding that fear was used to accomplish the asportation element
of the robbery. The re cord established that the rear passenger brandished a gun immediately after the phone was grabbed from the victim and the victim testified that she
was scared when she saw the gun . It is reasonable to infer that the fear caused by the brandishing of the gu n was sufficient to stop the victim from attempting to retrieve her phone before the car drove away. In Williams
, cited in this court’s request for further briefing, the Supreme Court held that the offense of theft by false pretenses can not fulfill the “felonious taking” requirement of robbery , in part because, unlike the offense of larceny, theft by false pretenses does not require asportation . ( People v. Williams
, supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 787 [“The crime of theft by false pretenses ends at the moment title to the property is acquired, and thus cannot become robbery by the defendant’ s later use of force or
fear .”] .) The facts in that case indicated that the defendant had committed only theft by false pretenses and the court therefore reversed his robbery convictions. In the present case, the victim was tricked into voluntarily surrendering her phone; however, as4

Williams also points out, “theft by false pretenses involves the consensual transfer of possession as well as title of property .” ( I d. at p. 788 ; italics omitted and added .) The victim here voluntarily transferred possession of her cell phone to the occupants of William’s car, but she clearly did no t transfer title to the phone. Therefore, the crime was robbery rather than theft by fal se pretenses, so that asportation was an element of the offense and, as indicated above, there is substantial evidence of the use of fear to effect the asportation of the stolen property. William was adequately represented by counsel throughout the procee dings. Given
that William’s juvenile record includes numerous prior criminal offenses
, we see no error in the court’s disposition. Disposition The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.

_________________________ Pollak, J.

W e concur:

_________________________ McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________ Jenkins, J.