In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-1662

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

COREY SEARCY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 10-CR-33—Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Chief Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 9, 2011—DECIDED DECEMBER 30, 2011

Before CUDAHY, POSNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. This is a case about a

search warrant based on an affidavit containing information provided by a confidential informant. Although the confidential informant could have provided

additional information regarding any past interactions with the defendant or regarding the model of

firearm the defendant illegally possessed, we believe

the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause. For this reason we affirm.
2 No. 11-1662

On July 1, 2009, Officer Andrew Matson of the Greater

Racine Gang Task Force applied for a search warrant

to search the home of defendant Corey D. Searcy. His

supporting affidavit was based primarily on information provided by a confidential informant. The affidavit stated, in relevant part, that the confidential informant contacted Officer Matson and informed him

that he observed Searcy with a firearm in the residence

located at 2220 Harriet Street, Racine, Wisconsin within

the past 72 hours. The informant further stated that Searcy

lives at that address with other family members and

that the residence was shot at in the past two weeks

by gang members due to an ongoing gang feud.

Officer Matson’s affidavit stated that he considered

the informant reliable because the informant had

provided information in the past six months that

resulted in the arrest of three different individuals.

The affidavit also stated that Officer Matson was able

to partially corroborate the informant’s statements.

Racine Police Department records showed that Searcy’s

primary address was 2220 Harriet Street. The utilities

for that address were listed under Lenna Gardner, a family

member of Searcy. Officer Matson’s check of Searcy’s

criminal history confirmed that Searcy had a felony

conviction (Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Deliver).

Moreover, Officer Matson knew from his experience on

the Greater Racine Gang Task Force that Searcy was an

active member of the Vice Lords street gang, which,

he stated, is known for illegal activities, including

weapons-related offenses and illegal drug trafficking. 
No. 11-1662 3

Based on this affidavit, a state court judge authorized

a search warrant for Searcy’s residence. Execution of

the warrant recovered two firearms. On February 23, 2010,

a grand jury indicted Searcy with one count of felon

in possession of a firearm. 

On March 16, 2010, Searcy filed a pre-trial motion

to suppress evidence. He contended that the search

warrant did not establish probable cause because

the informant’s statements lacked sufficient detail and

independent corroboration. The magistrate judge concluded that the totality of the circumstances supported

the finding of probable cause, and that, in any event,

the evidence survived under the good faith exception.

On the defendant’s objection to the magistrate’s recommendation, the district court adopted the magistrate’s

recommendation and denied the defendant’s motion

to suppress. The defendant then entered into a plea

agreement with the government, reserving his right

to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 

I.

On appeal, Searcy renews his argument that the search

warrant executed at his home was not supported by

probable cause. On this question, we review the district court's decision de novo, but give “great deference”

to the conclusion of the judge who initially issued

the warrant. United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 485

(7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. McIntire, 516 F.3d

576, 578 (7th Cir. 2008)). “When an affidavit is the

only evidence presented to a judge in support of a
4 No. 11-1662

search warrant, the validity of the warrant rests solely on

the strength of the affidavit.” United States v. Peck, 317

F.3d 754, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2003). Probable cause is established when, based on the totality of the circumstances,

the affidavit sets forth sufficient evidence to induce

a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search

will uncover evidence of a crime. See Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 

Where probable cause is based on information

supplied by an informant, we employ a totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry encompassing several factors:

first, the degree to which the informant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand observation; second,

the detail and specificity of the information provided

by the informant; third, the interval between the date of

the events and a police officer's application for the

search warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law

enforcement corroborated the informant's statements.

Garcia, 528 F.3d at 485-86. No one factor is determinative and a “deficiency in one factor may be compensated

for by a strong showing in another or by some other

indication of reliability.” Peck, 317 F.3d at 756 (citing

United States v. Brack, 188 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 1999)).

In the present case, we conclude that, based on the

totality of circumstances, Officer Matson’s affidavit

provided sufficiently reliable information to support

the issuance of a search warrant. We therefore affirm

the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to

suppress. Though we agree with the defendant that

the informant’s credibility is of prime importance here,
No. 11-1662 5

an analysis of the totality-of-the-circumstances factors

shows why the information contained in the affidavit

was sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable

cause.

First, the key information provided by the informant—that he or she observed Searcy with a gun in

his home—was obtained through firsthand observation.

This information was also transmitted within a relatively

short period of time—72 hours—before the application for the search warrant and certainly was not stale.

Moreover, the information furnished by the informant

was largely corroborated by law enforcement. Officer

Matson, by checking the police records, which listed

that location as his primary address, verified that Searcy

in fact resided at 2220 Harriet Street. Officer Matson

also confirmed that the utilities serving that location were in the name of Lenna Gardner, whom

Officer Matson knew to be a member of Searcy’s family.

Lastly, the informant’s statement that Searcy’s home

was shot at by a rival gang was consistent with Officer’s

Matson’s understanding that Searcy was an active member of the Vice Lords gang, which is often involved

in weapons-related incidents. 

Searcy focuses on the affidavit’s lack of detail

about the physical location and circumstances of the

informant’s observations. Though we agree that the

affidavit was lacking in specificity, this shortcoming, on

balance, is not sufficient to overturn a finding of probable

cause. Facts indicating how the informant came to be

inside Searcy’s home or where exactly in the home he saw
6 No. 11-1662

Searcy with the gun would have been helpful, but they

are by no means required to establish probable cause. See

Garcia, 528 F.3d at 486. Rather, given the fact that the

informant’s previous dealings with the police led to

three arrests in the past six months, and, as the

magistrate judge in the current case noted, because the

informant faced criminal prosecution for furnishing

false information to police, the informant’s information

was sufficiently reliable to compensate for its lack of

detail. See United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 871 (7th

Cir. 2002) (“[A] magistrate in the exercise of sound judgment is entitled to give greater weight to a tip from

a known informant, who can be held responsible

should he be found to have given misleading information to police officers, and thus has an incentive to

provide truthful information to the detectives.”).

Searcy relies on three cases—United States v. Peck, 317

F.3d 754, United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, and United

States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2009)—that he

argues compel a different result. They do not. In each of

those cases, the affidavit’s lack of specificity was compounded by other indicia of unreliability not present

here. In Bell and Peck, for instance, the contraband in

question consisted of drugs that are easily mistaken

for other, legal substances. The same is not true of firearms. Further, the amount and frequency of distribution

of the drugs were important in Bell and Peck because

those facts were elements of the offense for which

probable cause was being established. If a magistrate is

to reasonably conclude that the items being sought are

associated with a crime (i.e., possession with intent to
No. 11-1662 7

Of course, the suspect must also be a convicted felon, but that 1

element was clearly satisfied by Matson’s check of Searcy’s

criminal history

Searcy contends that the informant is not reliable because his 2

previous provision of information to police did not result

in successful convictions. The fact that the informant’s

furnished information led to arrests rather than convictions,

while potentially relevant, is not dispositive in this case. See

Garcia, 528 F.3d at 486; cf. Koerth, 312 F.3d at 867.

distribute), specific information had to be adduced

relating to the elements of that crime. Here, the mere

possession of a firearm is all that is required to

establish the commission of the offense.1

Moreover, the lack of specificity in Koerth, Peck, and Bell

took on increased significance because the informants in those cases had no history of providing

reliable information to police. Such history is important

in determining whether, or the extent to which, an informant’s information is colored by a bias against a defendant. In Searcy’s case, the informant had recently

provided information to police about three different

individuals, all leading to arrests. The informant’s 2

pattern of reporting information to police with respect to

other individuals indicates that the informant is not

targeting Searcy. We are therefore less concerned than

we were in Bell about whether the informant “is a rival

drug dealer, an angry customer, or had some beef with

[the defendant].” Bell, 585 F.3d at 1050. As the magistrate

judge below noted, “[It] is one thing to sic the authorities

onto a person against whom you might have a personal grudge. It is an entirely different matter to give
8 No. 11-1662

the authorities information to support the arrests of three

separate individuals.” Def’s Br. at A. 23; see also Garcia,

528 F.3d at 486.

On balance, a reasonable fact finder could conclude

that the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to establish

probable cause. The informant provided fresh information that he observed firsthand and which law enforcement adequately corroborated. The informant’s history

of providing reliable information to the police compensates for any absence of detail in the affidavit. We

therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

II.

Even if we were to assume that probable cause was

lacking, the evidence here would still survive under

the good faith exception principle of United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). It is well settled that under

Leon, the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a

search warrant that is later declared invalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant relied in

good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable

cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-24. An officer’s decision to

obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence that he or she

was acting in good faith. United States v. Otero, 495 F.3d

393, 398 (7th Cir. 2007). A defendant can rebut the presumption of good faith only by showing (1) that the

issuing judge abandoned his or her detached and

neutral role, (2) the officers were dishonest or reckless in

preparing the affidavit, or (3) the warrant was so lacking
No. 11-1662 9

in probable cause as to render the officer’s belief in its

existence entirely unreasonable. Id.

Additionally, police officers are “charged with a knowledge of well-established legal principles,” Koerth, 312

F.3d at 869 (quoting United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d

991, 995 (7th Cir. 1987)), and the corresponding “responsibility to learn and follow applicable legal precedent.”

United States v. Mykytiuk, 402 F.3d 773, 777-78 (7th

Cir. 2005). Thus, the evidence is admissible unless

(1) courts have clearly held that a materially similar

affidavit previously failed to establish probable cause

under facts that were indistinguishable from those presented in the case at hand, or (2) the affidavit is so

plainly deficient that any reasonably well-trained

officer “would have known that his affidavit failed

to establish probable cause and that he should not

have applied for the warrant.” Koerth, 312 F.3d at

869 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986)).

Because Officer Matson obtained a search warrant,

the defendant shoulders the burden of satisfying one of

the Leon exceptions. The defendant cannot meet this

burden. The defendant contends that in Bell, Peck, and

Koerth—all three of which found the exception applicable—there were facts supporting the exception that do

not exist here. We disagree. 

In Bell, this Court noted the police officers’ ability to

corroborate the informant’s information; here Officer

Matson was able to corroborate Searcy’s home address,

conviction, gang affiliation, and motive for possessing a

firearm. In Koerth, the informant was not unknown
10 No. 11-1662

and faced potential criminal charges for furnishing

false information to law enforcement. The same is

true here. Finally, in Peck, the officer’s good faith

was evidenced by the fact that he required the

informant to appear before the magistrate. Here, on the

other hand, the informant’s history of providing reliable

information was sufficient to demonstrate at least a

modicum of credibility and reliability. 

But, the primary bases of applying the Leon exception

in Bell (corroboration), Koerth (incentive to provide true

information) and Peck (ensuring reliability) are all

present here. Therefore, as we did in those cases, we

find that the investigator preparing the affidavit did

not act unreasonably in relying upon the informant’s information to obtain a search warrant. 

Additionally, we note that Searcy has failed to provide

us with any cases holding that an affidavit materially

similar to Officer Matson’s would fail to meet the test of

establishing probable cause (much less satisfy the Leon

test) based upon information from a named informant.

In fact, we agree with the magistrate that these facts

are eerily similar to those in United States v. Garcia, 528

F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2008). In that case, the informant—who

had previously provided information leading to the

arrest of at least three individuals—personally observed

contraband in the defendant’s home that he believed

to be cocaine because of his past experience with the

substance. Garcia, 528 F.3d at 486. The information led

to the execution of a search warrant within 72 hours.

Id. Given these factual similarities, it is entirely rea-
No. 11-1662 11

sonable, if not inescapable, for a law enforcement official

to believe that the warrant in the present case was

based upon probable cause. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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