Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1512-CR-2051 | December 5, 2016 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be

regarded as precedent or cited before any

court except for the purpose of establishing

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Robert Summerfield

CGS Law Group

Indianapolis,Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis,Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jason Eugene Shaw,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 5, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1512-CR-2051

Appeal from the Madison Circuit

Court

The Honorable Thomas Newman,

Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C03-1402-FB-335

Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue

[1] Jason Shaw pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery, Class B felonies,

and the trial court sentenced him to ten years executed in the Indiana

Department of Correction. On appeal, Shaw raises the sole issue of whether

the trial court abused its discretion in failing to enter a sentencing statement.

Concluding Shaw waived his right to appeal his sentence, we dismiss his

appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 19, 2014, Shaw and an accomplice broke into the home of Leroy

Smith. Shaw was armed with a rifle, and the pair attempted to rob Smith and

his friend. Thereafter, Smith and his friend thwarted the robbery by attacking

Shaw and his accomplice, causing them to flee. Law enforcement later

apprehended Shaw and the State charged him with two counts of armed

robbery, both Class B felonies.

[3] On January 26, 2015, Shaw and the State entered into a written plea agreement

pursuant to which Shaw agreed to plead guilty to two counts of armed robbery

in exchange for a cap of ten years on any portion of the sentence ordered

executed by the trial court. In addition, the plea agreement provided,

[Shaw] hereby waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed

by the Court, including the right to seek appellate review of the

sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B), so long as the Court

sentences [Shaw] within the terms of this plea agreement. It is
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further agreed that the sentence recommended and/or imposed is

the appropriate sentence to be served pursuant to this agreement.

Appellant’s Appendix at 50. At the plea hearing, the trial court advised Shaw

of the various rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and Shaw offered a

factual basis for his offense. The trial court accepted Shaw’s plea, entered

judgment of conviction, and sentenced Shaw to twenty years on each count,

with ten of those years suspended to probation. The trial court ordered the

sentences to run concurrently, making Shaw’s total executed sentence ten years.

[4] In November of 2015, Shaw petitioned the trial court to file a belated appeal.

The trial court granted his petition and on December 2, 2015, Shaw filed his

Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court, Court of

Appeals, and Tax Court. The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss

Shaw’s appeal arguing, pursuant to his plea agreement, Shaw waived his right

to appeal his sentence. This issue was presented to the motions panel of this

Court, and on August 29, 2016, the motions panel denied the State’s motion to

dismiss and ordered the State to file its appellee’s brief.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Shaw argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing

statement. The State cross-appeals and asks us to reconsider the motions

panel’s decision denying its motion to dismiss Shaw’s appeal. In Miller v. Hague

Ins. Agency, 871 N.E.2d 406, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), this court stated,
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[e]ven though our motions panel has already ruled on this issue,

[the appellee] is not precluded from presenting its arguments to

us. Smith v. Deem, 834 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005),

trans. denied. “It is well established that we may reconsider a

ruling by the motions panel.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Young, 852

N.E.2d 8, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. While we are

reluctant to overrule orders decided by the motions panel, this

court has inherent authority to reconsider any decision while an

appeal remains in fieri. See Davis v. State, 771 N.E.2d 647, 649 n. 5

(Ind. 2002); State v. Moore, 796 N.E.2d 764, 766 (Ind. Ct. App.

2003), trans. denied.

[6] We agree with the State this appeal should be dismissed. Generally, “[w]here .

. . a defendant pleads guilty to what has been characterized as an ‘open plea’

the freedom and latitude of the trial court to impose a particular sentence is

readily apparent.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 (Ind. 2006)

(footnote omitted). Moreover, even where a plea agreement sets forth a

sentencing cap, the trial court still must exercise discretion in determining the

sentence. Id. As a result, in either case, the defendant is “entitled to contest the

merits of a trial court’s sentencing discretion.” Id. at 1078-79 (citation omitted);

cf. Sholes v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 2008) (a plea agreement for a

fixed sentence precludes a defendant from challenging his resulting sentence by

direct appeal). However, a provision waiving the right to appellate review as

part of a written plea agreement is enforceable “as long as the record clearly

demonstrates that it was made knowingly and voluntarily.” Creech v. State, 887

N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008) (quoting United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668

(7th Cir. 1999)). Acceptance of a plea agreement containing a waiver
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provision is sufficient to indicate that, in the trial court’s view, the defendant

knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver. Id. at 77.

[7] Shaw’s plea agreement provides,

[Shaw] shall plead guilty as charged with a cap of ten (10) years

on any part of the sentence ordered executed by the court.

* * *

[Shaw] hereby waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed

by the Court, including the right to seek appellate review of the

sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B), so long as the Court

sentences [Shaw] within the terms of this plea agreement. It is

further agreed that the sentence recommended and/or imposed is

the appropriate sentence to be served pursuant to this agreement.

Appellant’s App. at 49-50. Shaw’s plea agreement specifically provides he

waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the trial court, provided the

trial court sentences him within the terms of the plea agreement. The trial court

sentenced Shaw to ten years executed on both counts of armed robbery, with

the sentences to run concurrently. Therefore, Shaw will serve a total of ten years

executed in the Department of Correction, precisely the amount of 

executed time allowed by the plea agreement. Because the trial court sentenced

Shaw within the terms of his plea agreement, Shaw has waived his right to

appeal his sentence.

Conclusion
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[8] Shaw waived his right to appeal his sentence, and his appeal is therefore

dismissed.

[9] Dismissed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.