[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11267

Non-Argument Calendar

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RYAN WALKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-62713-RKA

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11267

Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ryan Walker appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”) on his interference and retaliation claims arising under the Family Medical 

Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. On appeal, Walker 

argues that: (1) the district court erred when it granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment on his FMLA interference claim because he established a prima facie case of FMLA interference; and 

(2) the district court erred when it granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment on his FMLA retaliation claim because he established that UPS’s proffered reason for terminating him was pretext, 

and there was a close temporal proximity between his request for 

FMLA leave and his termination. After careful review, we affirm.

I.

We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, “viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). Summary 

judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact, 

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

However, a claim or argument that has not been briefed before us is considered abandoned, and we will not address its merits. 

See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th 

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21-11267 Opinion of the Court 3

Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 

(11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that issues not raised in an initial 

brief are deemed forfeited and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances). An appellant also abandons a claim when 

he fails to devote a discrete section of his argument to that claim, 

like when he makes a passing reference to a district court holding 

without advancing any arguments or citing any authority to establish that the finding was in error. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. 

Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). “To obtain reversal of a 

district court judgment that is based on multiple, independent 

grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground 

for the judgment against him is incorrect.” Id. at 680. If he “fails 

to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the 

district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned 

any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is 

due to be affirmed.” Id. Further, arguments that are “raised for 

the first time in a reply brief are not properly before a reviewing 

court.” Herring v. Sec., Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). 

II.

First, we are unpersuaded by Walker’s argument that the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment to UPS on his 

FMLA interference claim. Under the FMLA, an eligible employee 

is entitled to take up to 12 weeks of “leave during any 12-month 

period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the 

employee unable to perform the functions of the position.” 29 

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U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added). A “serious health condition” means “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental 

condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or 

residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a 

health care provider.” Id. § 2611(11); see also 29 C.F.R. 

§ 825.113(a). 

The FMLA creates two types of claims -- interference claims 

and retaliation claims. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)–(2); O’Connor v. 

PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2000). 

To establish a prima facie FMLA interference claim, an employee 

must show, inter alia, that he was entitled to a benefit under the 

FMLA that was denied. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Drago v. Jenne, 

453 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006). Whether the employer intended to deny the benefit is irrelevant. Krutzig v. Pulte Home 

Corp., 602 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010). For an employer to be 

held liable for FMLA interference, the request for leave must have 

been the proximate cause of the termination. Schaaf v. Smithkline 

Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2010). 

“Once an employee gives sufficient notice to [his] employer 

that potentially FMLA-qualifying leave is needed, the employer 

must then ascertain whether the employee’s absence actually qualifies for FMLA protection.” Cruz v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 

428 F.3d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2005). Absent unusual circumstances, an employee must also comply with an employer’s “usual 

and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting 

leave.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302(d), 825.303(c). An employer may 

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require an employee to support his leave through a certification 

issued by his health care provider if the employee is “unable to perform one or more of the essential functions of the employee’s position.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a). The medical certification must include, in relevant part: 

(1) The name, address, telephone number, and fax 

number of the health care provider and type of medical practice/specialization; 

(2) The approximate date on which the serious health 

condition commenced, and its probable duration; 

(3) A statement or description of appropriate medical 

facts regarding the patient’s health condition for 

which FMLA leave is requested. The medical facts 

must be sufficient to support the need for leave. Such 

medical facts may include information on symptoms,

diagnosis, hospitalization, doctor visits, whether 

medication has been prescribed, any referrals for evaluation or treatment (physical therapy, for example), 

or any other regimen of continuing treatment; 

(4) If the employee is the patient, information sufficient to establish that the employee cannot perform 

the essential functions of the employee’s job as well 

as the nature of any other work restrictions, and the 

likely duration of such inability . . . . 

Id. § 825.306(a). If the employee does not provide a complete and 

sufficient certification or any certification, the “employer may deny 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11267

the taking of FMLA leave, in accordance with § 825.313.” Id. § 

825.305(c), (d). The employee bears the responsibility to furnish a 

complete and sufficient certification, or to provide his healthcare 

provider with the necessary authorization so that his health care 

provider can “release a complete and sufficient certification to the 

employer to support the employee’s FMLA request.” Id.

§ 825.305(d). Importantly, if “the employee never produces the 

certification, the leave is not FMLA leave.” Id. § 825.313(b). 

On appeal, Walker is not entitled to relief as to his FMLA 

interference claim because he has not sufficiently challenged each 

of the district court’s independent grounds for granting summary 

judgment on this claim. The district court concluded that summary judgment was warranted because: (1) Walker did not submit 

the required certification documentation to UPS or its third-party 

benefits administrator (Aetna Life Insurance Company); and (2) 

even if he had submitted the appropriate FMLA certifications, he 

still failed to show prejudice. In determining that Walker had not 

submitted proper FMLA documentation, the district court explained that the one-page document he offered from Holy Cross 

Orthopedic Institute “did not list a date of onset, did not include 

any information about the nature of his illness, and noted only that 

Walker could not perform heavy lifting, carrying, pushing, [or] 

pulling until December 6, 2016,” which was insufficient. It also explained that the submissions from physician assistant Jamie Rubin 

and Dr. Alan Gregg failed to state “(1) that Walker could not work; 

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21-11267 Opinion of the Court 7

(2) the date on which Walker became incapacitated; or (3) the date 

on which Walker could return to work,” and were thus insufficient. 

Notably, Walker’s initial brief does not address these deficiencies raised by the district court, nor does it otherwise properly 

challenge the court’s finding that his documentation failed to satisfy the FMLA’s certification requirements. Accordingly, we affirm 

the dismissal of his FLMA interference claim on that ground, without reaching the remaining arguments made by the parties as to 

this claim. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.

III.

We also are unconvinced by Walker’s argument that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to UPS on his 

FMLA retaliation claim. Absent direct evidence of the defendant’s 

intent, courts evaluate FMLA retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas1 burden-shifting framework. Schaaf, 602 F.3d at 1243. 

To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, the plaintiff 

must show that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected conduct; 

(2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected conduct. Id. 

When an employee requests time off or provides notice to 

his employer of his need to take time off for a serious health condition, he engages in statutorily protected activity under the FMLA. 

Cruz, 428 F.3d at 1383–84. If an employee cannot show he has a 

1 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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“serious health condition,” his action of requesting time off for that

condition is not an FMLA-protected activity. See Cash v. Smith, 

231 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that, when an employee did not provide her employer with certification that her 

medical condition met the statutory standard, the medical leave 

she took for that condition “was not under the auspices of the 

FMLA”). 

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, 

the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 

1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009). If the employer proffers legitimate, 

non-retaliatory reasons for a materially adverse action, the burden 

shifts back to the employee to demonstrate, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that the employer’s reasons are pretextual. Furcron 

v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2016). 

Here, the district court did not err when it granted summary 

judgment to UPS on Walker’s FMLA retaliation claim. Among 

other things, the district court found as a matter of law that Walker 

did not establish that he engaged in statutorily protected activity --

the first prima facie element of FMLA retaliation -- because he did 

not establish that he had a “serious health condition.” See Cash, 

231 F.3d at 1307. On appeal, however, Walker has not challenged 

the district court’s determination that he had not engaged in an 

FMLA-protected activity, so he has abandoned the issue before us. 

Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330. Accordingly, we affirm on that 

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basis and need not consider arguments concerning UPS’s proffered 

reason for firing him or whether it was pretext.2

AFFIRMED.3 

2 To the extent Walker seeks to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on his “employer-notice” claim, he fails to address 

the district court’s finding that he had not plead an employer-notice claim in 

his complaint, rendering the claim untimely when he later raised it in his summary judgment filings. Accordingly, Walker has abandoned any challenge to 

the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment as to that claim. 

See Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330.

3 Finally, Appellant Ryan Walker’s counsel’s motion to withdraw is 

GRANTED. The motion to stay the proceedings is DENIED AS MOOT. 

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