Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 16

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION I

No. CV-22-355

GAYLON SCROGGINS

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF 

HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR 

CHILDREN

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered January 25, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, EIGHTH 

DIVISION

[NO. 60JV-20-408]

HONORABLE TJUANA C. BYRD, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Gaylon Scroggins appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order terminating his 

parental rights to his children, MC1 and MC2. On appeal, Scroggins argues that grounds 

do not support termination of his parental rights and that termination is not in the 

children’s best interest. We affirm. 

On April 29, 2020, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) received a 

Garrett’s Law report involving MC2. The report stated that Scroggins’s wife, Kelly McElyea,

who is the children’s mother, tested positive for THC and methamphetamine less than 
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twenty-four hours after giving birth to MC2.1 McElyea denied the drug use, but MC2 had 

to be moved to the NICU because of withdrawals. 

Family service worker Cora Owens-Wilson completed a home assessment. OwensWilson found the home deplorable. She observed trash, clothes, and dog feces on the floor 

throughout the home. DHS took a seventy-two-hour hold on both MC2 and MC1. At the 

time of removal, the father, Scroggins, had a no-contact order due to domestic violence 

against McElyea and MC1. The domestic violence resulted in criminal charges against 

Scroggins for domestic abuse.

On May 11, 2020, DHS filed an amended petition for emergency custody of MC1 

and MC2, and on the same day, the circuit court entered an emergency order granting DHS’s 

petition. On May 14, the circuit court held a probable-cause hearing wherein it found 

probable cause that the emergency conditions that necessitated removal of the juveniles 

continued and that it was in the juveniles’ best interest to remain in the custody of DHS. 

Further, the circuit court ordered that McElyea have supervised visitation and denied 

Scroggins any visitation at that time. Additionally, the circuit court ordered McElyea and 

Scroggins to submit to drug-and-alcohol screens and psychological evaluations. Both MC1 

and MC2 were ordered to receive urine and hair-shaft drug screens. 

On June 18, the circuit court held an adjudication hearing wherein it adjudicated 

MC1 and MC2 dependent-neglected as a result of abuse, neglect, and parental unfitness. 

 

1McElyea executed a voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights, so she is not a 

party to this appeal.
3

Specifically, the circuit court found that McElyea subjected MC2 to neglect and MC1 to 

abuse due to drug exposure. UAMS records showed that MC2’s cord-blood sample tested 

positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and THC. McElyea tested positive for the 

same drugs at that time. Also, Arkansas Children’s Hospital records showed that after 

removal, MC1 also tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and THC on a 

hair drug test. 

The court determined that neither parent was a credible witness. Specifically, as to 

Scroggins, the court found him not credible when he testified that he was unaware of 

McElyea’s drug use. Further, while the court found that Scroggins did not contribute to the 

reason for removal since he was not living in the home when the juveniles were removed, 

the court did not find Scroggins to be a fit parent. The circuit court set the case goal as 

reunification, ordered Scroggins to submit to a hair shaft drug test, and ordered both parents 

to (1) submit to a psychological evaluation; (2) submit to random drug-and-alcohol screens 

and periodic hair shaft drug tests; (3) attend individual counseling; (4) submit to drug-andalcohol assessments; and (5) follow the recommendations and obtain/maintain stable 

housing. At that time, McElyea was allowed to have supervised visitation, but due to the nocontact order, Scroggins had no visitation rights. Later, on July 14, the circuit court found 

that based upon the psychological evaluation, and without any objection, supervised 

visitation was in the children’s best interest.

On October 6, the circuit court held a review hearing. The court found that Scroggins 

had moved out of his parents’ house because they were being considered as a placement for 
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the children, and he had moved in with his cousin. His next court date on the domesticabuse charges was set for December 7, 2020. Further, the court found that both parents were

willing to work on their relationship to stay together as a couple. Additionally, the court 

found that the parents had made an effort to comply with court orders. However, the court 

stated that “it remains to be seen how much actual progress is being made.” Scroggins’s 

psychological evaluation showed the capacity to parent. The court continued the goal of 

reunification and found that DHS had made reasonable efforts by providing an approved 

foster home; board payments; medical services; home visits; drug screens; supervised 

visitation; and referrals for psychological evaluations, parenting, drug-and-alcohol 

assessments, inpatient substance-abuse treatment, and counseling. 

On February 9, 2021, the circuit court held a permanency-planning hearing. At this 

hearing, the court continued the goal of reunification. Further, the court found the parents 

had made efforts to comply with court orders. Additionally, the circuit court found that 

Scroggins was living with a relative and attending individual counseling. He tested positive 

on an alcohol screen on October 8, 2020. He still had domestic-battery charges pending and 

visitation had only been by Zoom because of COVID-19. Additionally, the court declined to 

authorize unsupervised visitation for Scroggins and stated that he needed to resolve his 

criminal charges. The court found DHS had made reasonable efforts by providing an 

approved foster home; board payments; medical services; home visits; drug screens;

supervised visitation; and referrals for psychological evaluations, parenting, drug-and-alcohol 

assessments, inpatient substance-abuse treatment, and counseling. 
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On May 25, the circuit court held another permanency-planning hearing. At this 

hearing, the court continued the goal of reunification. The court found that Scroggins had 

tested positive for buprenorphine (BUP) on March 4, but seven other drug tests were 

negative. Additionally, the court found that both parents had violated the no-contact order 

when McElyea conceived a child with Scroggins in March. The court found that Scroggins 

had complied to the extent he could with court orders and the case plan. Scroggins visited 

the children, and there was testimony that he was taking online domestic-violence classes. 

Scroggins still had pending charges. The court stated that the parents shall continue in 

counseling, Scroggins shall submit to drug screens as requested, and Scroggins shall provide 

documentation of attendance of the online domestic-abuse counseling and also ensure that 

the issue is being addressed in his individual counseling. Further, Scroggins was ordered to 

resolve his criminal charges. Again, the court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts 

by providing an approved foster home; board payments; medical services; home visits; drug 

screens; supervised visitation; and referrals for psychological evaluations, parenting, drugand-alcohol assessments, inpatient substance-abuse treatment, and counseling. 

On September 30, 2021, the circuit court held a fifteen-month review hearing. The 

circuit court changed the goal of the case to adoption and termination of parental rights. 

Amanda Hope, DHS supervisor and acting caseworker since July 2021, testified that 

Scroggins had tested positive for BUP on March 4, 2021. He was not supposed to have 

contact with McElyea due to a no-contact order arising from a domestic-violence incident, 

but he and McElyea were expecting another child in December. Scroggins did complete 
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random drug screens, a psychological evaluation, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and a hairfollicle drug screen and was engaged in individual counseling for a time.

Though he had filed for divorce, Scroggins testified that he was willing to work with

McElyea to get back into the marital home. The court found that Scroggins had attended 

domestic-violence classes online and attended individual counseling until his therapist left. 

The court further found DHS had made reasonable efforts by providing an approved foster 

home; board payments; medical services; home visits; drug screens; supervised visitation; and 

referrals for psychological evaluations, parenting, drug-and-alcohol assessments, inpatient 

substance-abuse treatment, and counseling. 

On December 7, 2021, DHS filed a petition to terminate both McElyea’s and 

Scroggins’s parental rights. On February 4, 2022, the circuit court held a termination hearing 

and terminated Scroggins’s parental rights to both MC1 and MC2. Specifically, the circuit 

court found that DHS had met its burden of proving “subsequent factors” as provided by 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii) (Supp. 2021) as to Scroggins based 

on his lack of demonstrated parental fitness, unresolved criminal charges, and instability 

regarding his relationship with McElyea. Additionally, the circuit court found that it was in 

the juveniles’ best interest to terminate Scroggins’s parental rights because the children are 

adoptable and due to the potential harm they would suffer if returned to Scroggins’scustody. 

Specifically, the court found that if returned to Scroggins, the children would be at risk of 

domestic violence because he is likely to reunite with McElyea. It is from this termination 

order Scroggins now appeals.
7

Termination-of-parental-rights cases are given de novo review. E.g., L.W. v. Ark. Dep’t 

of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 44, at 8, 380 S.W.3d 489, 494. Additionally, appellate courts 

will not reverse a termination order unless the findings were clearly erroneous, meaning 

“although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 9, 380 S.W.3d at 

495. Further, appellate courts give due regard to the circuit court’s ability to assess a witness’s 

credibility. Id., 380 S.W.3d at 494. 

In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that at least one ground for termination existed and that termination is in the 

juvenile’s best interest. Id. at 9–10, 380 S.W.3d at 494–95. “Clear and convincing evidence 

is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the 

allegation sought to be established.” E.g., Watkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 

55, at 4. In considering the best-interest finding, the circuit court must consider the 

likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted and the potential harm that could be caused to 

the juvenile if returned to the parent. E.g., L.W., 2011 Ark. App. 44, at 11, 380 S.W.3d at 

496. However, unlike termination grounds, potential harm and adoptability are only factors 

for the circuit court to consider, and each factor need not be established by clear and 

convincing evidence. Id., 380 S.W.3d at 496. 

In its termination order, the circuit court found that DHS had proved by clear and 

convincing evidence the “subsequent factors” ground:
8

That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for 

dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile(s) in the custody 

of the parent(s) is contrary to the juvenile(s)’s health, safety or welfare and that despite 

the offer of appropriate family services, the parent(s) has/have manifested the 

incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate 

the parent(s)’s circumstances which prevent the placement of the juvenile(s) in the 

custody of the parent(s).

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). 

Scroggins contends this was in error. However, his argument is without merit. 

Scroggins’s brief simply states: “This ground fails because there have been no subsequent 

factors that arose for which an [sic] family services were offered, and Gaylon never showed 

an indifference to remedy any issues that arose after the case was opened.” Scroggins does 

not discuss the circuit court’s ruling as to the subsequent factors or how he remedied the 

issues that arose.

Here, the case was initially opened because DHS received a Garrett’s Law report 

involving MC2. Both MC2 and MC1 were removed from the legal custody of their parents, 

McElyea and Scroggins, because of McElyea’s substance abuse that seriously affected her 

ability to supervise and protect or care for the juveniles. At the time of removal, Scroggins 

had a no-contact order due to domestic violence against McElyea and MC1. The circuit court 

found that Scroggins needed counseling to address his anger and domestic-violence issues,

and drug testing. Throughout this case, DHS made meaningful efforts to reunify Scroggins 

with his children by offering him multiple family services, such as an approved foster home;

board payments; medical services; home visits; drug screens; supervised visitation; and 

referrals for psychological evaluations, parenting, drug-and-alcohol assessments, and 
9

outpatient counseling. Although there was a no-contact order in place throughout this case 

from a domestic-violence incident, Scroggins and McElyea had a baby who was born in 

December 2021. Further, Scroggins has failed to resolve his criminal charges as ordered.

Failure to comply with court orders can serve as a subsequent factor on which termination 

of parental rights can be based. See Gonzalez v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 425, 

at 9, 555 S.W.3d 915, 920. 

Scroggins has also demonstrated throughout this case that he is unwilling to sever his 

relationship with McElyea, even though evidence shows that is what is needed for the return 

of his children. Continuing in a relationship with a dangerous partner is sufficient evidence 

of factors arising subsequent to removal and can demonstrate a parent’s incapacity or 

indifference. See, e.g., Martin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. 115, at 12, 515 S.W.3d 

599, 607 (affirming circuit court’s subsequent-factors decision based on father’s inability to 

separate from his children’s abuser). 

In its termination order, the circuit court found that Scroggins 

has not had to provide full time, day and night around the clock care for the children. 

He has not gotten that far in the case after 22 months to demonstrate parental fitness 

on a full-time basis by extended time overnights or trial home placement.

The court also found that Scroggins was not fit to provide full-time care for the children, and 

there was no evidence to the contrary. The court went further, noting in the order that

Scroggins has checked the boxes as to court ordered services, but there is no evidence 

that his counseling has benefitted him to understand the consequences of his 

continued relationship with his wife and its effects on him and his ability to have 

custody of these children.
10

Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights. Barris v.

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 380. Here, the record is clear that returning the 

children to Scroggins would be contrary to their welfare on the basis of evidence 

demonstrating Scroggins’s indifference to remedying the circumstances preventing 

reunification—including his failure to remedy his criminal charges; his instability; and more 

importantly, his continued relationship with McElyea. As such, we affirm the circuit court’s 

finding that DHS proved the subsequent-factors ground. 

Sufficient evidence also supports the circuit court’s best-interest finding in this case. 

The court may determine whether it is in a juvenile’s best interest to terminate parental 

rights by considering the juvenile’s adoptability and the potential harm caused by returning 

the juvenile to the parent. E.g., Kloss v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 389, at 7, 

585 S.W.3d 725, 729–30. Scroggins fails to challenge the adoptability factor of the circuit 

court’s best-interest finding; thus, we are not required to address this factor on appeal. See, 

e.g., Easter v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 441, at 8, 587 S.W.3d 64, 608 (“Easter 

does not challenge the adoptability finding, so we address only the potential-harm prong of 

the circuit court’s best-interest finding.”). 

Scroggins does, however, challenge the potential-harm factor. For potential harm, 

“the trial court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively 

identify a potential harm.” E.g., Kloss, 2019 Ark. App. 389, at 7, 585 S.W.3d at 730. 

Here, the circuit court found that Scroggins and McElyea continued to have a 

relationship, including having another child together, despite the no-contact order in place. 
11

“A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior.” E.g., Perry v. Ark. Dep’t 

of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193, at 10, 625 S.W.3d 374, 381. Scroggins argues that there 

is no evidence that these children were mistreated by him. However, he completely ignores 

the fact that the no-contact order is in place because of his domestic violence against McElyea 

and MC1. 

Nevertheless, Scroggins maintains that the circuit court’s potential-harm finding was 

clearly erroneous because he completed the case-plan services. We have long held that 

completion of case-plan services is irrelevant when the parent continues to make decisions 

that are contrary to the best interest of the child, and an appellate court will not reverse a 

circuit court’s decision when the appellant’s argument is nothing more than a request to 

reweigh the evidence. E.g., Black v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 518, at 9, 565 

S.W.3d at 524 (“What matters is whether completion of the case plan achieved the intended 

result of making a parent capable of caring for the child; mere compliance with the orders 

of the court and DHS is not sufficient if the roots of the parent’s deficiencies are not 

remedied.”); Bentley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 374, at 13, 554 S.W.3d 285, 

293 (“But under the standard of review, we do not act as a super fact-finder, and it is not 

reversible error for the circuit court to weigh the evidence differently than how Bentley asks 

the evidence to be weighed.”). As such, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support 

a potential-harm finding and affirm the circuit court’s order terminating Scroggins’s parental 

rights.

Affirmed. 
12

GLADWIN and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Dusti Standridge, for appellant.

Demarcus D. Tave, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for 

appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.