In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-21-00058-CV 

SAMUEL SAN MIGUEL, APPELLANT 

V. 

MARSHA MCLANE, MICHAEL SEARCY, RACHAEL KINGSTON, CHRIS SALINAS, 

JOHN COCHRAN, ADAM PIERCE, VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ, MICHAEL ARNIVEZ, 

AND EVELYN LEMER, APPELLEES 

On Appeal from the 154th District Court 

 Lamb County, Texas 

Trial Court No. DCV-20286-19, Honorable Felix Klein, Presiding 

July 26, 2022 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER, and DOSS, JJ. 

The 435th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, found Appellant Samuel 

San Miguel, appearing here pro se and in forma pauperis, to be a sexually violent predator 

according to Texas Health and Safety Code Chapter 841.1 By order of that court, he was

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.00-.153. In passing Chapter 841, the Texas 

Legislature found that “a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists and that 

those predators have a behavioral abnormality that is not amenable to traditional mental illness treatment 

modalities and that makes the predators likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of sexual violence.” 
2

committed for treatment and supervision coordinated by the Texas Civil Commitment 

Office (TCCO) at a treatment facility located in Littlefield, Lamb County, Texas. 

During his in-facility treatment in Littlefield, San Miguel filed suit against Marsha 

McLane,2 Michael Searcy, Rachel Kingston, and Cris Salinas, as well as John Cochran, 

Adam Pierce, Victoria Rodriguez, Michael Arnivez, and Evelyn Lemer in the 154th District 

Court of Lamb County. San Miguel alleged violations of law remediable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, claiming his constitutional rights were violated due to the denial of his request for 

a computer/word processor and printer, and more time to access the law library.3 San 

Miguel’s petition notes he is housed in the Secure Management Unit of the facility. He 

alleges “he remains to this day on protective management because he is in fear for his 

safety[] and wellbeing from the TCCC staff.” His location in the Secure Management Unit 

is purportedly one of the reasons cited by the Appellees for denying San Miguel access 

to the equipment he desires.

4

San Miguel’s suit sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive 

damages for alleged violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 

United States Constitution. Appellees joined in a plea to the jurisdiction, contending 

After completing periods of imprisonment for at least two counts of sexual crimes, San Miguel was civilly 

committed for long-term supervision and treatment as a sexually violent predator.

2 McLane is the TCCO executive director. The other defendants, according to San Miguel’s live 

petition, are TCCO employees. San Miguel alleges each defendant is liable in his or her individual and 

official capacities. For this opinion the appellees are designated in groups because the McLane appellees 

are represented by the Office of the Attorney General while the Cochran appellees are represented by a 

private law firm. Both groups filed an appellees’ brief. 

3

In another portion of his petition, San Miguel also complains his rights were violated when he was 

prohibited from passing documents to another Texas Civil Commitment Center (TCCC) patient, alleging 

the documents were necessary for obtaining legal advice.

4 He complains he is treated “worse than the rest of the TCCC Population” and has been supplied 

with “less property than a prison inmate is allowed.”
3

Chapter 841 requires that San Miguel bring his lawsuit in the committing court (the 435th 

District Court), rather than the court in the county in which San Miguel is housed. 

Following a brief non-evidentiary hearing the Lamb County district court agreed and 

sustained the jurisdictional plea. It dismissed San Miguel’s suit without prejudice. This 

appeal followed. 

Analysis

Chapter 841 includes the jurisdictional provision that “The committing court retains 

jurisdiction of the case with respect to a proceeding conducted under [Subchapter 

E] . . . .” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.082(d) (emphasis added). Subchapter 

E includes requests by the committed person for less restrictive housing and supervision. 

See id. § 841.0834(b); Cupit v. Tex. Civil Commitment Office, No. 07-18-00228-CV, 2018 

Tex. App. LEXIS 9384, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(cleaned up). Because the essence of San Miguel’s underlying complaint is the 

restrictiveness of his housing and supervision, we find that Chapter 841 would require 

San Miguel to file a suit challenging such restrictions in the 435th District Court. Id.

San Miguel filed his appellate brief on April 23, 2021, before the appellate record 

was filed. By letter of April 28, we notified San Miguel of the brief’s deficiency and offered 

the opportunity to file a corrected brief after the record was filed. The record was filed in 

our Court on June 22, 2021. 

By letter to the parties of July 7, 2021, we pointed out additional deficiencies with 

San Miguel’s brief; viz., the brief did not: (1) contain a statement of facts and argument 

supported by appropriate citations to the appellate record, (2) concisely identify an issue 
4

for review, and (3) provide a clear argument with appropriate citations to legal authorities. 

We offered San Miguel the opportunity to file a conforming brief by August 5, 2021 and

enclosed a copy of the record. Finally, we admonished San Miguel that failure to file a 

conforming brief by the deadline would result in submission of his previous brief and a 

potential finding that San Miguel waived appellate arguments. San Miguel offered no 

response and filed no corrected brief. Accordingly, San Miguel’s April 23 brief was 

deemed to be submitted. In their responsive briefs, Appellees argue San Miguel waived 

any issue on appeal due to inadequate briefing. 

Pertinent to the present matter, an appellant’s brief must: “state concisely all issues 

or points presented for review”; “state concisely and without argument the facts pertinent 

to the issues or points presented . . . supported by record references”; and “contain a 

clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to 

authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f),(g),(i). We notified San Miguel of 

these deficiencies, provided him a copy of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record, and 

on peril of waiver for failure to comply allowed San Miguel an opportunity to file a 

conforming brief. San Miguel nevertheless took no action to cure such deficiencies. 

“Failure to brief, or to adequately brief, an issue by an appellant effects a waiver of that 

issue on appeal.” Sunnyside Feedyard v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 106 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.). “Failure to either cite authority or advance substantive 

analysis waives the issue on appeal.” Id. 

However, this appeal does not end with a discussion of Chapter 841 or a finding 

that San Miguel has waived error due to inadequate briefing. Mindful of our responsibility 

to “review and evaluate pro se pleadings with liberality and patience, but otherwise apply 
5

the same standards applicable to pleadings drafted by lawyers,”

5 we find that San Miguel

presented one non-waived argument: that his suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

preempted the Texas Health and Safety Code’s jurisdictional provisions. We therefore 

examine San Miguel’s federal preemption argument. 

The Supremacy Clause preempts any state law that “contradicts or interferes with 

an Act of Congress.” Hayfield Northern R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 

U.S. 622, 627, 104 S. Ct. 2610, 81 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1984); see also Rose v. Arkansas State 

Police, 479 U.S. 1, 3–4, 107 S. Ct. 334, 93 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1986) (per curiam) (concluding 

state worker’s compensation statute was preempted by Supremacy Clause when state 

statute authorized conduct that Congress intended to prohibit). Federal preemption of 

state law occurs where the two laws plainly contradict, and when “the incompatibility 

between state and federal law is discernible only through inference.” Hayfield Northern 

R.R. Co, 467 U.S. at 627. Absent express preemption, a court “must inquire more deeply 

into the intention of Congress and the scope of the pertinent state legislation.” Id. at 628.

Even if Congress has not completely displaced state regulation, state law is preempted if 

it actually conflicts with federal law, such as where “state law stands as an obstacle to the 

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 

Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300, 108 S. Ct. 1145, 99 L. Ed. 2d 316 

(1988).

We therefore determine whether Chapter 841 is incompatible with federal law or 

expressed Congressional objectives. “State courts as well as federal courts have 

5 Corona v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 245 S.W.3d 75, 78 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied).
6

jurisdiction over § 1983 cases.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 

110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990); Heirs of Del Real v. Eason, 374 S.W.3d 483, 485 n.1 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.) (same). As the United States Supreme Court observed in 

Howlett:

When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule 

regarding the administration of the courts, we must act with utmost 

caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the claim. The 

requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law 

as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement 

that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the 

federal claim is presented. The general rule “bottomed deeply in belief 

in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that 

federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.” The States thus have 

great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own 

courts.

496 U.S. at 372.

Unlike the state statute at play in Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 129 S. Ct. 

2108, 173 L. Ed. 2d 920 (2009),

6

the case chiefly relied on by San Miguel, Chapter 841 

does not interfere with the accomplishment or execution of the full purposes and 

objectives of section 1983. Specifically, Chapter 841 does not limit the form or substance 

of San Miguel’s section 1983 complaint. It does not immunize Appellees from suit or 

liability, alter or diminish section 1983’s remedies, or increase San Miguel’s burden of 

proof. San Miguel directs us to no provision of federal law that would be in conflict with 

Chapter 841, which simply compels where his suit must be heard. We therefore conclude 

that Chapter 841 is not preempted by federal law. 

6

In Haywood, a New York statute essentially prohibited its state trial courts from exercising 

jurisdiction over section 1983 suits against state correction officers. 556 U.S. at 731.
7

Conclusion

San Miguel’s appellate complaint is overruled. The order of the trial court is 

affirmed.

Lawrence M. Doss

 Justice