2016 IL 120729

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

(Docket No. 120729) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. ANITA ALVAREZ, 

Petitioner, v. HONORABLE CAROL M. HOWARD et al., Respondents.

Opinion filed December 1, 2016.

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and 

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Petitioner, Anita Alvarez, State’s Attorney of Cook County, seeks a writ of 

mandamus or prohibition against respondent, the Honorable Carol M. Howard, 

judge of the circuit court of Cook County. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a). 

Following a statutory amendment that raised the automatic transfer age for 

juveniles, defendant, Luis Montano, moved to send his pending criminal case to 

juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing. Respondent granted the motion. 
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The State now seeks a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing respondent to 

rescind her order. We hold that respondent’s order was in conformance with the 

law, and we therefore decline to award the State a writ of mandamus or prohibition. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On June 13, 2013, a grand jury indicted defendant, Luis Montano, for 29 counts 

of first degree murder, arising out of the shooting death of Eugenio Solano, and 4 

counts of attempted murder and 1 count of aggravated battery, arising out of the 

shooting of Raul Maza. The offenses were alleged to have occurred on March 29, 

2013.

¶ 4 Defendant was born on September 4, 1997, and was 15 years old at the time of 

the offenses. The charges against defendant were brought in criminal court, 

pursuant to the version of section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act in effect at the 

time: 

“§ 5-130. Excluded jurisdiction. 

 (1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-120 of this 

Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 

years of age and who is charged with: (i) first degree murder, (ii) aggravated 

criminal sexual assault, (iii) aggravated battery with a firearm as described in 

Section 12-4.2 or subdivision (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), or (e)(4) of Section 12-3.05 

where the minor personally discharged a firearm as defined in Section 2-15.5 of 

the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, (iv) armed robbery 

when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or (v) aggravated 

vehicular hijacking when the hijacking was committed with a firearm. 

 These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be 

prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.” 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 

2014).

¶ 5 While the charges against defendant were pending in criminal court, the 

legislature amended section 5-130(1)(a). Public Act 99-258 was approved by the 

Governor on August 4, 2015, and went into effect on January 1, 2016. Pub. Act 

99-258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Among the changes that Public Act 99-258 made was to 
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raise the age for automatic adult prosecution for the enumerated offenses from 15 to 

16 and to reduce the number of offenses that qualify for automatic transfer by 

eliminating subsections (iv) and (v). On February 8, 2016, defendant filed a 

“Motion to Transfer to Juvenile Court for Transfer Hearing,” alleging that the 

recent amendment removed criminal court jurisdiction over the case because 

defendant had been 15 years old when the offenses occurred. Defendant argued that 

the change to the statute was a purely procedural one that should be applied 

retroactively to pending cases and that the legislature had not included a savings 

clause preserving criminal jurisdiction over pending cases. 

¶ 6 The State filed a response, arguing that because the implementation of Public 

Act 99-258 was delayed until January 1, 2016, it is presumed to have a prospective 

effect. The State based its argument on the approach set forth by the United States 

Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and 

adopted by this court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 

Ill. 2d 27 (2001). According to the State, the legislature indicated the temporal 

reach of the statute by delaying its implementation date, and therefore it cannot be 

applied retroactively. 

¶ 7 Following a hearing, respondent granted defendant’s motion and transferred the 

cause to juvenile court. The court noted that the legislature had not included a 

savings clause for the amendment to section 5-130, which was significant because 

the legislature had included savings clauses for other provisions of the Juvenile 

Court Act amended by the same public act. For example an amendment to the 

discretionary transfer section of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 

405/5-805 (West 2014)) provided that, “[t]he changes made to this Section by this 

amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly apply to a minor who has been taken 

into custody on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th 

General Assembly.” Pub. Act 99-258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). The court further noted 

that the General Assembly had provided a savings clause for previous amendments 

to section 5-130 (see Pub. Act 94-574 (eff. Aug. 12, 2005); Pub. Act 98-61 (eff. 

Jan. 1, 2014)) and that this court had relied on another savings clause in Public Act 

98-61 to hold that an amendment to section 5-120 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 

ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2014)) was prospective only. See People v. Richardson, 

2015 IL 118255. The court then applied the Landgraf test for retroactivity and 

determined that the amendment to section 5-130 applies to pending cases. The 
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court explained that, because the legislature had not indicated the temporal reach of 

the amendment, the temporal reach was determined by reference to section 4 of the 

Statute on Statutes. See 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014). Section 4 has been interpreted to 

mean that substantive amendments are prospective only, while procedural ones are 

retroactive. See People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 507 (2002). The court noted that 

this court held in People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, that the juvenile transfer 

statute is purely procedural. Therefore, the amendment to section 5-130 was a 

procedural one that would apply retroactively. The court concluded that it no longer 

had jurisdiction over the case and ordered it transferred to juvenile court. 

¶ 8 The State then moved to reconsider. The State first argued that respondent erred 

in finding that the court had lost jurisdiction over the case. The State pointed out 

that, pursuant to the Illinois Constitution, the circuit courts have original 

jurisdiction over all justiciable matters, except where the supreme court is vested 

with original jurisdiction. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. Thus, whether a person is 

tried in juvenile or criminal court is a matter of procedure rather than jurisdiction. 

See People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 222 (1991). The State further argued that the 

court erred in ruling that the absence of a savings clause is indicative of legislative 

intent and that the amendment’s delayed implementation date meant that it was to 

be applied prospectively only. Finally, the State contended that, although the 

statutory amendment was procedural, it could not be applied retroactively because 

it would have a “retroactive impact.” 

¶ 9 Respondent denied the State’s motion but entered an order clarifying her 

previous order. Respondent agreed with the State that the circuit court is a unified 

court of jurisdiction. However, respondent explained that, by enacting the Juvenile 

Court Act, the legislature had exercised its power to change the law that governs 

which division of the circuit court has administrative responsibility for cases 

involving juveniles accused of violating the law. The court ruled that, for the 

reasons given in its previous order, the amendment applied retroactively and 

therefore defendant’s case belonged in juvenile court. Respondent transferred the 

case to juvenile court and explained that the State could then move the juvenile 

court to exercise its discretion to transfer the case back to criminal court. 

¶ 10 The State then moved in this court for leave to file an original action for a writ 

of mandamus or prohibition, arguing that respondent’s order transferring the case 
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was without legal basis or authority. The State requested a writ of mandamus or 

prohibition directing respondent to rescind her transfer order. The State further 

asked that, if all of the normal requirements for mandamus or prohibition had not 

been met, then this court should address the issue under its supervisory authority. 

This court granted the State leave to file its petition. 

¶ 11 ANALYSIS 

¶ 12 This court has discretionary original jurisdiction to hear mandamus cases. Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a). Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel 

a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty where no exercise of discretion 

is involved. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 192-93 (2009). A 

writ of mandamus will be awarded only if the petitioner establishes a clear right to 

the relief requested, a clear duty of the public official to act, and clear authority in 

the public official to comply with the writ. Although mandamus generally provides 

affirmative rather than prohibitory relief, the writ can be used to compel the 

undoing of an act. Id. at 193. 

¶ 13 A writ of prohibition may be used to “ ‘prevent a judge from acting where he 

has no jurisdiction to act or to prevent a judicial act [that] is beyond the scope of a 

judge’s legitimate jurisdictional authority.’ ” People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash, 118 

Ill. 2d 90, 97 (1987) (quoting Daley v. Hett, 113 Ill. 2d 75, 80 (1986)). Four 

requirements must be met for a writ of prohibition to be issued: (1) the action to be 

prohibited must be judicial or quasi-judicial, (2) the writ must be issued against a 

court of inferior jurisdiction, (3) the action to be prohibited must be outside either 

the inferior court’s jurisdiction or its legitimate authority, and (4) the petitioner 

must lack any other adequate remedy. People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d 

445, 450 (2007). 

¶ 14 Before addressing the merits of the State’s argument, we address respondent’s 

argument that the State may not seek mandamus or prohibition because it had a 

right to appeal the order transferring the case to juvenile court. Respondent notes 

that original actions for mandamus or prohibition may not be used to circumvent 

the normal appellate process. See Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill. 2d 127, 132 (2004); 

Nash, 118 Ill. 2d at 97. According to respondent, the trial court’s order transferring 

the case to juvenile court was appealable by the State under Illinois Supreme Court 
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Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) because it had the substantive effect of 

dismissing the indictments against defendant. Thus, because the State failed to 

avail itself of this avenue of relief, it cannot now seek mandamus or prohibition. 

We disagree. 

¶ 15 Pursuant to Rule 604(a), the State may appeal any order that has the substantive 

effect of dismissing a charge, and the dismissal does not have to be on one of the 

grounds listed in section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 

ILCS 5/114-1 (West 2014)). People v. Love, 39 Ill. 2d 436, 439-40 (1968). Thus, 

the relevant question here is whether the trial court’s transfer order had the 

substantive effect of dismissing the charges against defendant. The specific relief 

defendant requested was to have his case sent to juvenile court for a discretionary 

transfer hearing. The order that respondent entered transferred the case to juvenile 

court for further proceedings. When a court transfers a case between juvenile and 

criminal courts, the only question being decided is which forum will determine 

whether the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 

289, 302 (1979). Here, rather than dismiss the charges against defendant, the 

substantive effect of the court’s order was potentially to change the forum that will 

adjudicate the charges against him. 

¶ 16 Moreover, even when a court’s order actually dismisses a charge against a 

defendant, this court has held that the order is not appealable where the court’s 

order specifically contemplates further action. Thus, in People v. Heddins, 66 Ill. 

2d 404, 406 (1977), this court held that an order dismissing an indictment was not 

appealable under Rule 604(a)(1) when the order specifically held defendant to bail 

pending further proceedings in the cause. Similarly, in People v. Scholin, 62 Ill. 2d 

372, 373 (1975), this court held that a dismissal order was not appealable under 

Rule 604(a) where the order held defendant to bail and granted the State five days 

to file an amended information. Here, the court’s order clearly contemplated further 

proceedings in the cause. The order merely transferred the case to another forum, 

and defendant anticipated that once the cause was in juvenile court, the State would 

move for a discretionary transfer back to criminal court. Defendant’s motion even 

asked the court to send the case to juvenile court for a discretionary transfer 

hearing. 
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¶ 17 Admittedly, this court has held that an order denying a motion for a 

discretionary transfer from juvenile court to criminal court is appealable by the 

State. People v. Martin, 67 Ill. 2d 462 (1977). Nevertheless, the concerns that 

caused us to hold that such orders are appealable are not present in this situation. In 

Martin, we held that an order denying a transfer from juvenile court to criminal 

court was appealable because “the substantive effect of the trial court’s action *** 

was the dismissal of any future indictment” on the charge. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 

465. We further noted that an order granting a transfer from juvenile court to 

criminal court was appealable by the juvenile upon conviction (id. at 465-66) and 

explained that an order denying such a motion “ought not to be totally immunized 

from review” (id. at 466). Here, unlike in Martin, the effect of the trial court’s order 

was not the dismissal of any future indictment in criminal court. In fact, both sides 

anticipate that the State will move for a discretionary transfer back to criminal 

court. If the State loses that motion, the order would be appealable under Martin. 

Thus, we reject respondent’s argument that the State could have appealed the trial 

court’s transfer order, and therefore there is no procedural impediment to the State 

seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition. 

¶ 18 We turn now to the merits of the State’s argument. The State contends that 

respondent’s order transferring the case to juvenile court was not authorized by law 

because the statutory amendment changing the automatic transfer age from 15 to 16 

applies prospectively only. Respondent and defendant disagree, contending that a 

straightforward application of this court’s retroactivity jurisprudence shows that 

the amendment applies retroactively to pending cases. The parties generally agree 

as to the governing principles, but they disagree over how they should be applied to 

this particular statutory amendment. 

¶ 19 In Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 36-39, this court adopted the United 

States Supreme Court’s retroactivity analysis set forth in Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244. 

Under this two-part approach, the first question is whether the legislature has 

clearly indicated the temporal reach of the amended statute. Commonwealth 

Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 38. If so, then that expression of legislative intent must be 

given effect, absent a constitutional prohibition. Id. If not, then the court proceeds 

to step two and determines whether the statute would have a retroactive impact. A 

statute has a retroactive impact if it “ ‘would impair rights a party possessed when 

he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
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respect to transactions already completed.’ ” Id. (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 

280). If there is no retroactive impact, the statutory amendment may be applied 

retroactively; if there is a retroactive impact, the court presumes that the legislature 

intended the amendment to be prospective only. Id. 

¶ 20 We later clarified, however, that because of the existence of section 4 of the 

Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014)), application of the Landgraf test in 

Illinois would “prove uneventful.” Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (2003). 

Section 4 is a general savings clause, which this court has interpreted as meaning 

that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive 

changes are prospective only. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d at 506-07. Thus, as this court 

explained in Caveney, an Illinois court will never need to go beyond step one of the 

Landgraf test because the legislature has clearly set forth the temporal reach of 

every amended statute. Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 92, 94-95. If the temporal reach of 

the amendment is not set forth in the statutory amendment itself, then it is provided 

by default in section 4. Id. at 94. 

¶ 21 Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we consider first whether the 

legislature has clearly indicated the temporal reach of the statutory amendment 

changing the automatic transfer age from 15 to 16. As we noted above, the 

legislature did not include a savings clause with respect to this statutory change. 

The legislature did include a savings clause for other portions of Public Act 99-258, 

but it did not do so with respect to the amendments to section 5-130. Thus, there is 

nothing in the text of the amendment itself that indicates the statute’s temporal 

reach. 

¶ 22 The State, however, claims that the legislature indicated that the temporal reach 

of the amendment is prospective because the legislature delayed the amendment’s 

implementation date. The amendment was passed by the legislature in May 2015, 

but it did not become effective until January 1, 2016. This court has held that the 

delaying of a statute’s implementation date can be considered evidence that the 

legislature intended prospective application. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. 

Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 186-88 (2011); People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 201 

(2007). Those cases, however, were ones in which the legislature expressly delayed 

the implementation of the statute in the text of the statutory amendment. See Pub. 

Act 94-558 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006) (General Motors); Pub. Act 90-590 (eff. Jan. 1, 1999) 
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(Brown). By contrast, the amendment at issue here was delayed by operation of 

section 1(a) of the Effective Date of Laws Act (Effective Date Act) (5 ILCS 75/1(a) 

(West 2014)), which provides that, “[a] bill passed prior to June 1 of a calendar year 

that does not provide for an effective date in the terms of the bill shall become 

effective on January 1 of the following year, or upon its becoming a law, whichever 

is later.”1

 The Effective Date Act implements the constitutional directive that the 

General Assembly provide a uniform effective date for laws passed prior to June 1 

of a calendar year. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 10. The Effective Date Act helps 

to ensure that parties have sufficient opportunity to conform their conduct to the 

law (see Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 315 (1988)), and 

it “alleviate[s] confusion when the Governor’s action on a bill occurs subsequent to 

the specified effective date contained therein” (People ex rel. American Federation 

of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Walker, 61 Ill. 2d 112, 118 (1975)). 

¶ 23 Using the Effective Date Act in the manner the State suggests would be 

inconsistent with this court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, and it would create a 

conflict between the Effective Date Act and section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. As 

respondent notes, under Brown and Pappas, a statute that has an express delayed 

implementation date but is otherwise silent as to temporal reach will be applied 

prospectively. Under the State’s position, when an amendment is silent as to both 

temporal reach and effective date, the amendment would still be applied 

prospectively, regardless of whether it is substantive or procedural. Our case law 

teaches, however, that when a statute is silent as to temporal reach, section 4 of the 

Statute on Statutes supplies the default rule and procedural changes are applied 

retroactively. There is no support in this court’s jurisprudence for the proposition 

that the Effective Date Act trumps section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. 

 

1The rule for bills passed after May 31 is: “A bill passed after May 31 of a calendar 

year shall become effective on June 1 of the next calendar year unless the General 

Assembly by a vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house provides for an 

earlier effective date in the terms of the bill or unless the General Assembly provides for a 

later effective date in the terms of the bill; provided that if the effective date provided in the 

terms of the bill is prior to the date the bill becomes a law then the date the bill becomes a 

law shall be the effective date.” 5 ILCS 75/2 (West 2014). See also Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 

§ 10. 
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¶ 24 The State tries to draw support from Commonwealth Edison. In that case, the 

statutory amendment had a delayed implementation date due to the Effective Date 

Act. See Pub. Act 88-545 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995). The appellant argued that the delayed 

implementation meant that the General Assembly intended the amendment to be 

prospective only. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 41-42. This court rejected 

that argument because the legislature specifically said in the text of the amendment 

that it applied to “all cases pending on or after the effective date of this amendatory 

Act of 1994.” Id. at 42. This court explained that specific language as to the 

statute’s temporal reach would trump a general presumption of prospectivity 

arising from a delayed implementation date. Id.

¶ 25 We decline to give this passage in Commonwealth Edison the significance that 

the State reads into it. The court never even mentioned the Effective Date Act. The 

court merely noted the appellant’s argument that delayed implementation dates are 

evidence that the legislature intended prospective application and then held that any 

such presumption was irrelevant in the face of specific statutory language 

indicating retroactive application. There was no need for the court to consider 

whether an effective date that was delayed by operation of the Effective Date Act 

would raise the same presumption as one that was expressly delayed, as that 

presumption did not arise at all in the case. Further, this court has clearly stated that 

every time a statute has been amended, the legislature will have clearly set forth its 

temporal reach in one of two places: “either expressly in the new legislative 

enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.” (Emphasis added.) 

Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 406 (2009); see also Allegis Realty 

Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 332 (2006); Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 95. If the 

temporal reach is not set forth in the legislative enactment itself, the default is the 

Statute on Statutes, not the Effective Date Act. The State claims that the Effective 

Date Act “clearly shows a legislative preference that all of its laws operate 

prospectively only, unless specifically mandated to apply retroactively.” The 

problem with that position is that the legislature specifically enacted section 4 of 

the Statute on Statutes to provide how it wanted statutory amendments and repeals 

to be applied, and we must follow the legislature’s wishes, unless doing so would 

interfere with a constitutional right. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 38. 

Unlike the Effective Date Act, section 4 speaks directly to the temporal reach of 

statutory amendments and repeals. 
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¶ 26 Moreover, in a case in which this court did discuss the fact that a procedural 

statutory amendment had been delayed by the Effective Date Act, the court still 

held that it applied retroactively. People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81 (1988). In that case, 

the legislature shortened the time period for filing postconviction petitions from 20 

to 10 years. Id. at 83-84. Under the Effective Date Act, the amendment did not 

become effective until six months after its passage. Id. at 89. This court noted that 

statutes of limitation are procedural and that procedural amendments may be 

applied retroactively. Id. at 85. The court explained that the delayed 

implementation date gave people time to protect interests that may be affected by 

the amendment. Id. at 89. Thus, there is clearly nothing inconsistent with an 

amendment being applied retroactively even though its implementation is delayed 

by the Effective Date Act. 

¶ 27 Finally, it is clear that the legislature itself does not view the Effective Date Act 

as determining the temporal reach of statutory amendments. As we noted above, 

the legislature included savings clauses with respect to some portions of Public Act 

99-258 but not with respect to others. This is clear evidence that the legislature 

intended only some of the amendments to be prospective only. If the State is right 

that operation of the Effective Date Act renders all of the amendments prospective 

only, then these savings clauses would have been wholly unnecessary and 

superfluous. The legislature would never have to include a savings clause for any 

statutory amendment that lacked an effective date. For all of the above reasons, we 

do not believe that the Effective Date Act may be used to determine the temporal 

reach of the statute. 

¶ 28 Because the legislature did not set forth the amendment’s temporal reach in the 

amendment itself, we turn to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Under section 4, 

substantive amendments may not be applied retroactively, but “procedural law 

changes will apply to ongoing proceedings.” People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34, 46 

(2011). Here, both sides agree that the statutory amendment is procedural. This 

court held in Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 104, that “[w]hether a defendant is tried 

in juvenile or criminal court is purely a matter of procedure.” Pursuant to section 4, 

the legislature has clearly indicated that this statutory amendment should apply 

retroactively. Under the Landgraf test, this court will respect the legislature’s 

wishes as to the temporal reach of the statute, unless doing so would offend the 

constitution. As this court explained in Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 38, “if 
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the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute 

should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative 

intent must be given effect.” See also Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d at 46; Allegis Realty 

Investors, 223 Ill. 2d at 333-34 (“where as here the legislature clearly intends for a 

statute to be applied retroactively, Landgraf and our decisions applying that case 

require that we honor the legislature’s intention unless doing so would contravene 

the constitution”). The State does not argue that applying the amendment 

retroactively would offend the constitution, and when asked about this at oral 

argument, counsel for the State agreed that he was not aware of any way in which 

retroactive application would offend the constitution. Counsel for the State denied 

that this was the relevant test, which is a difficult position to maintain, given that it 

is step one of the Landgraf approach. Because there is no constitutional 

impediment to retroactive application, the amendment applies to pending cases. 

¶ 29 The State makes several other arguments against retroactive application of the 

amendment to section 5-130, but none withstand scrutiny. For instance, the State 

spends a significant portion of its argument discussing step two of the Landgraf

test. But, as this court has made clear, “in light of section 4 [of the Statute on 

Statutes], Illinois courts need never go beyond the threshold step of the Landgraf 

test.” Doe A., 234 Ill. 2d at 406. 

¶ 30 The State further argues that, even if procedural changes are retroactive under 

Section 4, that section mandates that such changes are applied to “the proceedings 

thereafter” and only “so far as practicable.” (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 

2014). The State notes that defendant’s case has been pending in criminal court for 

three years and that the indictment was properly filed in criminal court under the 

law that existed at the time. According to the State, section 5-130 was fully 

complied with when the indictment was filed, and no further proceedings will take 

place under section 5-130. At oral argument, counsel for the State cited footnote 29 

of Landgraf, where the court stated: 

“Of course, the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it 

applies to every pending case. A new rule concerning the filing of complaints 

would not govern an action in which the complaint had already been properly 

filed under the old regime, and the promulgation of a new rule of evidence 

would not require an appellate remand for a new trial. Our orders approving 
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amendments to federal procedural rules reflect the commonsense notion that 

the applicability of such provisions ordinarily depends on the posture of the 

particular case.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 n.29. 

The State contended that the Supreme Court’s statement about a new rule 

concerning the filing of complaints is the same situation that we have here. 

Similarly, the State relies on Brown, 225 Ill. 2d at 199-200, for the proposition that 

the mere existence of a newly enacted provision does not render the former 

provision invalid, nor does it render actions taken in reliance upon the former 

provision invalid. 

¶ 31 As respondent points out, however, no one is contesting the propriety of 

anything that has happened so far in this case. The question is whether, given the 

amendment, defendant should continue to be prosecuted in criminal court. The 

answer is no, because he is no longer in the class of juveniles who are subject to 

automatic transfer. We note that the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in 

Landgraf that statutes that simply “change[ ] the tribunal that is to hear the case” 

are regularly applied to pending cases. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274. 

¶ 32 The State further argues that, under section 4, procedural changes are applied 

retroactively only so far as is practicable and it is not practicable to transfer this 

case to juvenile court. The State points out that the case has been pending in 

criminal court for three years and that retroactive application would be so 

significantly disruptive as to be impracticable. “Practicable,” however, is not 

synonymous with “convenient.” Rather, it means “possible to practice or perform :

capable of being put into practice, done, or accomplished : FEASIBLE.” Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary 1780 (1993). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 

1291 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “practicable” as “reasonably capable of being 

accomplished; feasible); People ex rel. Williams v. Errant, 229 Ill. 56, 66-67 

(1907) (defining “practicable” as “ ‘that which may be done, practiced or 

accomplished; that which is performable, feasible, possible’ ” (quoting Streeter v. 

Streeter, 43 Ill. 155, 165 (1867))). Clearly, transferring this case to juvenile court 

for a transfer hearing is something that is feasible. 

¶ 33 In response to the State’s contention that transferring a case that has been 

pending in criminal court for three years will be disruptive and inconvenient, we 
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would simply note that the legislature had it within its power to make the 

amendment prospective only. The legislature has given clear instructions as to how 

it wants its statutes applied, and it is not this court’s function to second-guess the 

legislature’s choices. Rather, under the Landgraf test, this court will respect the 

legislature’s choice, unless doing so would interfere with a party’s constitutional 

rights. The Landgraf test strikes the proper balance between the roles of the 

legislature and the courts. The State is unable to identify any way in which 

retroactive application will violate the constitution, and this is fatal to the State’s 

argument. 

¶ 34 CONCLUSION 

¶ 35 Respondent did not err in transferring defendant’s case from criminal court to 

juvenile court. Under the previous version of section 5-130, defendant’s case was 

automatically transferred to criminal court because he was 15 years old when the 

crimes occurred. The legislature changed the automatic transfer age from 15 to 16, 

and this amendment was retroactive under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. 

Accordingly, defendant’s case belongs in juvenile court, unless and until it is 

transferred to criminal court pursuant to a discretionary transfer hearing. Because 

the circuit court’s transfer of the case was not even erroneous, let alone outside the 

court’s jurisdiction or its legitimate authority, there is no basis for this court to issue 

a writ of mandamus or prohibition. 

¶ 36 Writ denied.