NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for GSR Mortgage 

Loan Trust 2006-1F, its successors and/or assigns, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL NEMINSKY; ARLENE NEMINSKY, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0084

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2015-012069

The Honorable Michael L. Barth, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Aldridge/Pite LLP, Phoenix and San Diego, CA

By Laurel I. Handley and Janet M. Spears

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Michael and Arlene Neminsky, Scottsdale

Defendants/Appellants

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.
US BANK v. NEMINSKY

Decision of the Court

2

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 Appellants Michael and Arlene Neminsky appeal the 

superior court judgment in favor of U.S. Bank National Association as 

Trustee for GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F (“U.S. Bank”). For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 U.S. Bank purchased the Neminskys’ home (the “Property”) 

at a trustee’s sale on June 17, 2015. It then served a written demand on the 

Neminskys to deliver possession of the Property. The Neminskys refused, 

and U.S. Bank filed a forcible entry and detainer action (“FED” action)

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-1173.01 seeking 

immediate possession of the Property. 

¶3 The Neminskys filed an answer to U.S. Bank’s complaint and 

requested a hearing. In response, U.S. Bank filed a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(c); RPEA 9(d) (party in an FED action 

may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings after the answer is filed). 

After a hearing,1 the superior court granted the motion, found the 

Neminskys guilty of forcible detainer, and held that U.S. Bank was entitled 

to immediate possession of the Property. The Neminskys appeal. 

DISCUSSION

¶4 The Neminskys argue the superior court erred in granting 

judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, they contend their answer raised

factual questions about whether U.S. Bank was the proper party to initiate 

the FED action. 

¶5 A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted if 

the “allegations set forth a claim for relief and the answer fails to assert a 

legally sufficient defense.” Pac. Fire Rating Bureau v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 83 

Ariz. 369, 376 (1958). All well-pled material allegations of the non-moving 

party are taken as true, and all allegations of the moving party which have 

been denied are taken as false. Jamison v. S. States Life Ins. Co., 3 Ariz. App. 

131, 133 (1966) (citation omitted); Food for Health Co., Inc. v. 3839 Joint 

Venture, 129 Ariz. 103, 106 (App. 1981). Because the superior court granted 

 

1 Although the superior court’s judgment makes reference to a trial, 

both the judgment and the minute entry for the hearing show there was no 

trial – only oral argument regarding U.S. Bank’s motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. 
US BANK v. NEMINSKY

Decision of the Court

3

U.S. Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, we view the facts in 

favor of the Neminskys, but review the superior court’s legal conclusions

de novo. See Napier v. Bertram, 191 Ariz. 238, 239, ¶ 1 (1998); Shaw v. CTVT 

Motors, Inc., 232 Ariz. 30, 31, ¶ 8 (App. 2013), as amended (Mar. 29, 2013) 

(citation omitted).

¶6 Here, U.S. Bank alleged it held valid title to the Property and, 

as a result, the right to possess the Property. In support of this allegation,

U.S. Bank attached a copy of the trustee’s deed showing (1) it purchased the 

Property at the trustee’s sale, and (2) it was the grantee under the deed of 

trust issued by the trustee. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33–811(B), the trustee’s 

deed created a “‘presumption of compliance’ and ‘conclusive evidence’ 

that” the foreclosure sale “was conducted regularly in accordance with the 

required statutory notice.” In re Hills, 299 B.R. 581, 586 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 

2002) (citing Triano v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 131 Ariz. 581, 583 (App.1982)); 

accord Main I Ltd. P’ship v. Venture Capital Constr. & Dev. Corp., 154 Ariz. 256,

260 (App. 1987). Based on this evidentiary presumption, the trustee’s deed 

established that U.S. Bank held good title to the Property. In re Hills, 299 

B.R. at 586; BAM Invs., Inc. v. Roberts, 172 Ariz. 602, 604 (App. 1992). 

¶7 In their answer, the Neminskys do not deny that U.S. Bank 

purchased the Property at the trustee’s sale, or that the trustee’s deed 

established it held title to the Property. Rather, the Neminskys allege that 

Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”), not U.S. Bank, was the “real party 

in interest.” 

¶8 The Neminskys’ allegation that Nationstar is the real party in 

interest is not well pled. The forcible detainer action was filed in the name 

of U.S. Bank, and U.S. Bank is listed as the grantee on the trustee’s deed. 

All of the allegations in the complaint list U.S. Bank as the party having title 

to the Property and the right of possession, and the superior court’s 

judgment was issued in favor of U.S. Bank. Indeed, all motions and 

documents submitted by the plaintiff are in the name of U.S. Bank. In short, 

apart from speculating about whether Nationstar is the “true” plaintiff in 

this litigation, all of the rights, title, and judgment in this case are in favor 

of U.S. Bank, not Nationstar. Cf. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 

417, 420, ¶ 14 (2008) (in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court 

is not required “to speculate about hypothetical facts that might entitle” a 

party to relief.). 

¶9 The only allegations the Neminskys offer in support of their 

claim is a corporate disclosure statement attached to their answer. See Ariz. 

R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument which is an exhibit to a 
US BANK v. NEMINSKY

Decision of the Court

4

pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”). However, we are only left to 

guess what relevance this statement, which was filed by Nationstar in an 

unrelated federal case, bears to this case. The disclosure statement merely 

shows that Nationstar and U.S. Bank were co-defendants in another case; it 

does not show that Nationstar is the real party in interest in this case. 

Accordingly, we find no error. 

¶10 The Neminskys also argue that U.S. Bank lacks the capacity 

to initiate a lawsuit in Arizona because it is not registered with the Arizona 

Corporation Commission. In support of their argument the Neminskys rely 

on A.R.S. § 10-1502, which states that “[a] foreign corporation transacting 

business in this state without a grant of authority shall not be permitted to 

maintain a proceeding in any court in this state until it is authorized to 

transact business.” 

¶11 The Neminskys, however, ignore the fact that isolated acts of 

purchasing property, recording a deed, and filing a FED action do not 

amount to “transacting business” under A.R.S. § 10-1502. See A.R.S. § 10-

1501(B) (“[t]he following activities . . . do not constitute transacting business 

. . . 1. [m]aintaining, defending or settling any proceeding . . . 10. 

[c]onducting an isolated transaction that is completed within thirty days 

and that is not one in the course of repeated transactions of a like nature”); 

see also Norman v. Del Elia, 111 Ariz. 480, 483 (1975) (citation omitted)

(holding that to transact business in the state “a corporation must be 

engaged in an enterprise of some permanence and durability, and must 

transact within the state some substantial part of its ordinary business, and 

not merely a single act.”). Thus, based on the plain language of A.R.S. § 10-

1501, U.S. Bank did not lack the capacity to initiate and maintain its FED 

action against the Neminskys. 
US BANK v. NEMINSKY

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶12 For the above reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

judgment.