J-S80031-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

R.A.

v.

A.F. 

 Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2101 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Dated June 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Domestic Relations at 

No(s): No. A06-2018-60978-A-37

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2019

Appellant A.F. appeals from the order granting Appellee R.A.’s request 

for a final protection order under the Protection From Abuse (PFA) Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence 

to support the entry of a PFA order. We affirm.

The facts underlying this matter are well known to the parties and are 

aptly summarized in the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/10/18, at 

1-3. Accordingly, we need not reiterate them here. In sum, on June 6, 2018, 

Appellee filed a PFA petition against her ex-husband, Appellant. On June 13, 

2018, the parties appeared for an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable 

Jeffrey G. Trauger. Appellee and Appellant had counsel, and both testified at 

the hearing.1

____________________________________________

1 Appellee testified through an interpreter at the proceedings in this matter.
J-S80031-18

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At the conclusion of the June 13, 2018 hearing, the trial court entered 

a three-year PFA order against Appellant. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained 

of on appeal. The trial court issued a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion in 

support of the trial court’s conclusion at the hearing, where the court had 

stated that “based upon the totality of the circumstances as testified to . . . 

this is a [matter falling under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(5)] under the statute, and 

that a protection from abuse order is warranted as specified under 

Pennsylvania law.” N.T., 6/13/18, at 129.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in granting a [PFA] Order because 

there was insufficient evidence to find that [A]ppellee was in 

reasonable fear of bodily injury as required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 

6102(a)(5) simply by virtue of the fact that a tracking device was 

installed in the BMW that the parties jointly leased which was 

repossessed for nonpayment of lease payment, where [A]ppellee 

did not testify that she was in fear of bodily injury because of the 

tracking device, or that she was even aware of its installation prior 

to the hearing date, and where [A]ppellee offered no testimony or 

evidence of any threats by [A]ppellant to cause [A]ppellee 

physical harm, but instead claimed that [A]ppellant threatened to 

post embarrassing content about her on the internet, and that her 

“primary fears” related to her immigration status because of the 

legal documents that she signed in connection with her divorce 

from [A]ppellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.2

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In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant also raised an issue regarding 

whether venue was appropriate in Bucks County. This issue has been 

abandoned on appeal.
J-S80031-18

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Appellant asserts that “there was insufficient evidence to find that 

[A]ppellee was in reasonable fear of bodily injury . . . simply by virtue of the 

fact that a tracking device was installed in the BMW.” Id. at 18. Appellant 

argues that the fact that a tracking device was installed in the vehicle “alone 

appears to be the lynchpin that [caused] the court [to] believe[] there was a 

‘course of conduct’ that placed [A]ppellee in reasonable fear of bodily injury.” 

Id. at 21. However, according to Appellant, Appellee was not aware before 

the hearing that the tracking device had been installed, and therefore, this 

fact could not be the basis for the entry of a PFA order against him. Id.

Following our review of Appellant’s arguments and the record, we 

conclude that the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Jeffrey G. Trauger properly 

addresses the arguments raised in this appeal. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/10/18, at 

4-8. The court’s factual findings are supported in the record, and the court 

appropriately analyzed the totality of the circumstances. The trial court did 

not rely solely on the fact that a tracking device had been installed in 

Appellee’s car as a basis to enter a final PFA order. Instead, Appellee testified 

that she was afraid of the Appellant and provided details regarding multiple 

incidents that caused her fear. See, e.g., N.T., 6/13/18, at 13-14. 

As the trial court noted at the evidentiary hearing on June 13, 2018, its 

conclusion that a PFA order was warranted was based on its credibility 

determinations and all of the circumstances presented in the case. See N.T., 

6/13/18, at 129. Therefore, we discern no error in the court’s conclusion that 
J-S80031-18

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sufficient evidence was presented justifying a PFA order against Appellant,

and we affirm of the basis of the trial court’s discussion of this issue. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/21/19
Circulated 01/31/2019 02:28 PM

,,,-..._, 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON" PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

FAMILY GOURTDIVISION 

R ]A NO. A06-2018-60978-A-40 

'• 

v, 

a 

2101 EDA2018 

case #: iOlll-tl097.6-0017 A 12053W2· 

Main (Public) 

Coo�· 5214 . J9dge'37 

Rcpt"Z1049700 9111�189·4335AM 

OPINION 

A- F- (hereinafter referred to as ''Appellant''), appeals to Pennsylvania Superior Court 

from the final Protection from Abuse Order (hereinafter referred to as ''PFA

1') entered by this Court 

on June 13� 2018 against him on behalf of R- A• (hereinafter .referred to as "Appellee"). 

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of.Appellate Procedure 1925(a), we now file this Opinionin the abovecaptioned.matter in support of the Court's i:uling. 

I.. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On June 6, 20'18, Appellee filed a handwritten Petition for Protection from Abuse ("PFN') 

against.Appellant, alleging, among other things, that she.was fearful for her life after Appellant posted 

an online video alleging- false accusations about her committing infidelity, A&further alleged that 

Appellant continued to threaten to post more videos and inappropriate pictures -of her online which 

might cause hetfamily or otherpersons to kill her upon her return to Egypt as it violates cultural and 

religious beliefs; An ex·.parte hearing was held before the Honorable Susan Devlin Scott on June_ 6, 

201�, and A• was- granted a temporary PF A Order. A full evidentiary heating upon the Petition was 

held before the undersigned ou June 13, 2018 with .thepresence of a certified court-appointed.Arabic 

· interpreter .as requested by Appellee. The Court heard testimony from: Appellant and Appellec, and 

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after examining the record, assessing witnesses' credibility and consideringthe evidence and testimony 

presented, 

the Court entered a final Order awarding Appellee Protection from Abuse from Appellant 

for the maximum statutory period of three (3) years, which.is the subject of this appeal, 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Th� !e·co�d 'before this Court reflects that Appellant, forty-seven (47) years old and Appellee, 

thirty (30) years old, were married in 2015 and divorced in 201-7. (N.T. 6/13/2018, p; 9) Their 

marriage was a family-arranged marriage in accordance with the parties' religion and Egyptian culture. 

The marriage tqoki place in their home country of �gypt through both parties' families without the 

physical presence of Appellant, but by Appellant's representation through his brother. (�tT. 

6/13/2018, P: 37) The parties had only comm1cnicateq. through the internet (i.e. Skype) and did. not 

physically meet prior to Appellee :arriving in the UnitedStates in 2015 when the parties effectuated 

the marriage-under .American law. (N.T. 6/13/2018, P: 3'8) Both parties agreed the marriage was 

flawed and consented to the dissolution of the marriage in 2017. 

Appellee testified ,$he came to the United States with money ofan approximate, value of Ten 

Thousand U.S. Dollars {$10,000). (N.T. 6/13/2018, P: 39) Due to the fact that Appellee was in a 

new country, with no friends or family members other than Appellant and alanguage barrier, Appellec 

relied on and trusted Appellanr's.recommendations in prepatmg and signing various. legal documents 

including her immigration p�pe.rs; (N .T. 6 /13 /2018, P: 71) Appellee also trusted Appellant with her 

money which he. allegedly used for investment piliposes. (N .. T, 6/ B/2018, p. 11} Afte,r the divorce, 

Appellant thei:¢afte.t used the Ten Thousand Dollars {$10AOO) along with his own money to buy a 

house'jointly owned together. with Appellee and a friend of Appellant. (N.T .. 6/13/201'8, p.'11, 41�

42) Evidence before. the Court confirmed the house located at 505 Orchard Avenue, Warminster, 
Bucks County, Pennsylvania (hereinafter referred to as "Residence") is jointly owned by Appellant 

and.Appellee. (:N':r. 6/13/2018,pp'. 10-11) 

The record reflects that after the divorce, Appellee resided at the Residence, Appellant stated 

he would occasionally-reside there.but the panties would stay in separate bedrooms. (N.T; 6/13/2018, 

p. 113) The record also confirms Appellant changed the Iocks at one point and thereafter Appellee 

began :tesiding with friends when she no longer had access to the Residence. 

In the Petition filed with the Court on June 6, 2018, and the Surpletnental Petition filed on 

June 12, 2018, Appellee listed multiple incidents where Appellant threatened to hurt her. Appellee 

testified Appellant communicated his 'threats and intimidation to her personally and to her family. 

(N�T. 6/1:3/201�, pp. 13-15, 18, 24, 29, �2-34) After consideration of all evidence and testimony 

presented at the June 13, 2018 hearing, the Court granted .Appellee'.s .r�q),lest for a finalPFAOrder 

for a period of three (3) years. On.July Ji, 2018, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior 

Court appealing the June 13, 201.8 final PFA Order. On July '16, 2018, this Court ordered Fattah to 

file a Concise Statement of Errors which he has done. The Court now files this Opinion in support 

of its ruling. 

III. STATEMENT OF ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON Af>PEAL 

On July 16, 2018, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (b) directing Appellant 

to file of record and serve on the undersigned a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal 

within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. The Order also directed that "anyissue not 

properlyincluded in the concise statement shall be deemed waived." 

Ori August 6, 2018, Appellant filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 

set .forth Perbativ1,her;ein: 

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1. Whether this Honorable Court 'lacked proper venue because 

plaintiff failed to. establish that either party resided or 'was 

employed within Bucks County at the time the Protection from 

Abuse actionwas brought, filled to establish that any alleged act 

of abuse. occurred within Bucks County, and did not request 

possession of a residence located in Bucks County? 

2. Whether this Honorable Court erred ih granting a Protection from 

,1\buse Order because there was-insufficient evidence to findthat 

plaintiff was in reasonable fear of bodily injury is required by.2;, 

Pa.C.S. § 6J02(a)(5) simply by virtue of the fact that a tracking 

device was. installed in the BMW that the parties jointly leased 

which was repossessed for nonpayment of lease payment; where 

plaintiff did not testify that she was in fear of bodily injury because 

of the tracking device, or that she was even aware of its installation 

prior to the hearing date, and where plaintiff.offered no testimony 

or evidence of any threats by defendant to cause plaintiff physical 

harm, but instead claimed that defendant threatened to .post 

embarrassing content about her on the internet, and that her 

"primary fears" related to her itnmiw=:.\tfon status because of the 

legal documents that she signed in connection with her divorce 

from defendant? 

IV. DISCUSSION 

TI1e Superior Court has continuously held that the standard of review in PE'\ orders is 

evaluating the trial court's Iegal.conclusions for an error of.law or abuse of discretion, Ttout v. Strube, 

97 A. 3d 387 (Pa, Super. 2014). when considering issues of statutoryinterpretation, the applicable 

standard of review is de.novo and the.scope of review is plenary. Scoffv. Shay, 928 A.2d 312, 314 

(Pa. Super. 2007). 

"When faced with a :sufficiency challenge under the [PFAA] we review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the petitioner and, gta11ting [him] the benefit of all reasonable inferences, 

determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the, t:nal court's conclusion by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Custer y, Cochran, 9J3 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2007). Tn a 

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hearing on a petition for an order for protection from abusepursuant to Protection from Abuse Act, 

theSuperior Court defers to credibility determinations of trial court as to witnesses who appeared 

before it. lg. ''The preponderance of evidence standard is defined as the greater weight of the 

'evidence, i.e.,_ to tip a scale slightly is the criterijon] or requirement for preponderance of the-evidence." 

Ferriv. Ferd, 854A.2d 600, 602-603 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations and 9uotations omitted) . 

Appellant initially argues that this Court lacked p�oper venue. Under Pa.R.C.P. § 1901, an 

action for protection from abuse may be brought in a county inwhichr (1) the plaintiff resides, either 

temporarily or permauentiy, or is employed; (2) the defendant -may he served; or (3) the abuse 

occurred. Pa.R,..C.P. §19.0i(a.). The record before this. Court 'established that both parties have 

ownership interest in the ,property 'located at 505 Orchard .Avenue, Warminster, Bucks County 

Pennsylvania, where Appellee resided prior to Appellant changing the locks. That residential property 

is also where Appellant was residing with his new wife at the time of the filing ofthe Protection from 

Abuse action and at: the time of the final hearingheld onjune 13, 1018. .Accordingly, the. Court did 

not err in _ finding propervenue in Bucks County, and Appellant's contention is wholly without merit: 

Appellant also argues that the Court erred in granting a final Protection from Abuse Order in 

favor of Appellee 'because there was a lack of sufficient evidence to support the conclusions Appellee 

was placed in reasonable fear of bodily fujuLr as -required under. 23 Pa.C.$. § 6102(a)(5)'. Appellant 

claims the mere factthat he installed a tracking device in A ppellee's car without her knowledge is not 

sufficient to meet the requirements under 23 Pa.CS. § 6102(�)(5). The record, however, includes 

numerous actions by F�which support the Court's conclusion in this case. 

"The P.FA Act operates to protect victims of domestic violence and permit the. courts to 

respond quickly and flexibly to both early si�s and subsequent acts of abuse with the. issuance of 

protection orders." Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 617 (Pa.Euper, 2012} (citations om:itted). 

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The statute specifically provides protection for "family or household members" of the alleged abuser, 

Id. The term "family or household members" is defined as "spouses or persons who have been 

spouses, persons living as spouses· or who lived as spouses, parents and children, other persons related 

by consanguinity or affinity, current or former sexual or intimate, partners or persons who share 

biological parenthood." Id. 

It is also well-established that •'[p]ursuant to the PFA .Act, 23 Pa:C.S,A. §§ 6101-6117, aPFA 

petitioner 'must-prove the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence/ and that '[a] [PFA] 

Petitioner is not required to establish [that] abuse occurred .beyond a reasonable doubt., but only to 

establish it by a preponderance or the evidence.r" Boykin v .. Brown, 868 A2d 1264, 1265�126!) (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citjng 23 Pa.C.S . .t\. § 6i67(a); Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 982-83 (1993). 

The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act, 23Pa.C.S. § 6102,.defin� "ab�e"in,pertirient 

part as follows: 

§ 6102; Definitions 

(a) General rule.--The followingwords and phrases when usedin this chapter 

shall.have the meanings given to them iii this. section unless the context clearl y 

indicates otherwise: 

"Abuse." The occurrence of one-or more of the.following acts between family 

01: household members, sexual or intimate partnexs or persons who share 

biological parenthood: 

(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, .knowingly or 

recklessly causing bodily injury�. serious bodily injui:y:, -tape, 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual.assault, statutory· 

sexual assault, aggravated indecent. assault, indecent assault or 

incest with or without a deadly weapon .. 

(2) Placing another in reasonable feat of imminent serious 

bodily injury. 

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(5) Knowingly engaging 'in a course ofconduct or repeatedly 

committing acts toward another person, including following 

the person, without proper authority, under circumstances 

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which place the person in: reasonable feai: of bodily injury, The 

definition of this paragraph applies only- to proceedings 

commenced under this title and is inapplicable to any criminal 

prosecutions commenced under Title. 18 (relating to crimes 

and offenses). 

23 Pa. CS.A. § 6102. 

It is the firm conclusion ofthis Court that Appellapt (may have illegally and possibly being 

sufficientgrounds for criminal charges) installed a. GPS trackingdevice in Appellee's vehicle without 

her knowledge or consent. In addition, the record shows F- took advantage of Appellee's 

language battier, lack of family, and the complete· trust she plated in Appellant. to facilitate the false 

claim on her immigration application that she was a lesbian and thereafter conveying that claun 'and 

related infottnation online to persons in. Egypt, effectively precluding her ability to return home 

without facing a threat of violence. The record before this Court is convincing and clear thatAppellee 

feltseverely threatened andiintimidatedby Appellant. Appelleewas visibly-shaken and terrified during 

her testimony at theJune 13, 2018 hearing, Appellee testified that .Appellant would -call and text her, 

and ifshe did uot.respond, Appellantwc:iuid scream and yellather, Appellee also testified that when 

Appellant could not reach her, he would contact her family in Egypt threatening to spread rumors 

about-Appellee's infidelity and other immoral behaviors which are not fittin� to prevailing religious 

beliefs and fu:tnily traditions. (N'.T. 6/t.3/2018, pp. 32-34, 56) Appellant, in fact, posted a video on 

Facebook, which may v� well.place Appell,ee's life in danger should herimmigration.status change 

and she is forced to return to Egypt. (N,T. 6/1.3/2018, pp. 32�33,50-51, 65) 

Throughout her testimony, Appellee repeatedly stated, that .Appellant threatened to alter her 

immigration status, again taking advantage of Appellee's lack ofknowledge; an action which might 

.force hereto be deported back to· Egypt where- 'her life is threatened as- result of Appellant's posted 

video on Fatebook, claims of her lesbianismj.as well as other behaviors not fitting the Islamic 'religfon. 

Appellant continued to threaten Appellee that he would post naked pictures of her. Disturbingly, 

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Appellee testified Appellant would frequently show up in the same places where Appellee happened 

to be including the bank, her job, and other public places (likely using the tracking device he installed 

without Appellee's knowledge or consent onher vehicle). (N.T. 6/13/2018, pp. 22, 61) 

It is troubling to this Court that F- appealed the final PF A Order in his continued effort 

to threaten and intimidate Appellee, The parties were married for a short period of time, both agreed 

their marriage did not work and both consented to the divorce which was finalized May 2017. The 

'·� . parties never had children. Appellant has moved on with his life, remarried, and at the time of the 

hearing, his new wife was pregnant. Appellant further testified without any corroborating evidence 

and without any credibility that Appelleethreatened him and his pregnant wife. (N.T. 6/13/2018, p. 

116) Based on the· foregoing and all of the evidence and testimony as witnessed by this Court; there 

is absolutely no reason for Appellant to be in contact with Appellce or to otherwise track her 

whereabouts by GPS on his personal cell phone. His attorney should assist him in resolving the 

remaining ownership interest related to the property located at 505 Orchard Avenue, Warminster, 

Bucks County, Pennsylvania, to conclude that last connection between the parties. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Based upon the foregoing reasons, this Court finds an abundance of credible evidence was 

presented attrial supported the decision to grant the final three (3) year Protection from Abuse Order, 

and, therefore, we recommend that this appea1 be denied and dismissed. 

BYTHE COURT: 

N.B. Ii u:i yOU! '.ri'lS.PO:lSilil!l�"'{ 

to n..-<1tjfy � mte�ted ��!'3 

of t'il� abov'\8 ootiort 

Date: September 10, 2018 

8 
RtmdaAttia 11. Abdo/ Fattah' 

Bi1cks Co1il�(j Guat of Common Pleas Citti! Disision, No. A06,2018-60978-A-40 

Copies to; 

Erin C. Lentz-McMahon, Esquire 

Mclvlahon, Lentz & Thompson 

21 West Airy Street 

Norristown; PA 19401 

Attomry far DejeJ1dt1ii t 

Barbara Kaner, Esquire 

Bucks County Legal Aid Society 

60 .North MainStreet 

Doylestown,'PA 18901 

Attor11ryj�rPM11tiff 

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