alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATEOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**ANDCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**OF**

**VYYOINC.**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Vyyo Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterending September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof (the “Report”), Wayne H. Davis, as Chief Executive Officerof the Company, and Robert K. Mills, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company,each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:

 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/ Wayne H. Davis             |   |
|--------------------------------|--------|
| Wayne Davis                    |   |
| Chief Executive  Officer       |   |
| November 13,  2007             |   |
|                           |   |
| /s/  Robert K. Mills |   |
| Robert K. Mills      |   |
| Chief Financial  Officer       |   |
| November 13,  2007             |   |

 

 

----
#### Portuondo’s Estate.

*Practice, O. C.*— Power *of attorney to collect judgment*— *Revocation*— *Lapse of time*— Presumption *of constituent’s death.*

The Orphans’ Court will not permit the collection of a judgment against administrators as garnishees under a power of attorney executed by a non-resident who has not been heard from for seven years, as a question may arise whether the power has not been revoked by the constituent’s death. In such case, the amount due on the judgment will be directed to be paid Into court with leave to the attorney to make application to take out of the money so deposited his reasonable charges and expenses incurred in the proceedings.

Petition and answer. O. C. Phila. Co., April T., 1921, No. 251.

*B. F. Owens,*for petitioner; *Henry A. Hoefler,*contra.

April 28, 1922.

Thompson, J.,

This case was heard on petition and answer,

and from the same and the record it appears that John Latham obtained a judgment against Charles W. Mayer in Common Pleas No. 1, December Term, 1906, No. 8929, for the sum of $2035.92, on March 18, 1907; that the said Mayer is entitled to a distributive share in the estate of Margaret Portuondo, deceased, in an amount largely in excess of said judgment, interest and costs; that the said John Latham issued an attachment execution on his judgment, summoning Francis A. Dugro and Francis R. Mayer, administrators *c. t. a.*under the will of Margaret Portuondo, deceased, in which proceeding a judgment was entered against said administrators as garnishees on March 7,1922, for $2085.92, with interest from March 18, 1907, and costs. The present petition is for an order on said administrators *c. t. a.*to pay the amount of the judgment entered against them as garnishees to Bernard F. Owens, Esq., of this bar, who alleges that he has a power of attorney from the said John Latham authorizing him to collect said judgment, and the answer of respondents, *inter alia,*raises the question as to whether said power of attorney is at present in force, for reasons therein stated. Upon the argument, it appeared that the power of attorney was given in 1907, and that Mr. Owens has not heard from his client since 1915, at which time the latter was in London, he being an Englishman by birth.

*465In view of the lapse of time since Latham was last heard from, a question may arise as to whether the power of attorney given by him to Mr. Owens is not revoked by Latham’s possible death, and we are, therefore, of opinion that the amount due on said judgment should be paid into this court, and it is so ordered.

Leave is, however, given to Mr. Owens to make application to this court to take out of said moneys so deposited his reasonable charges and expenses rendered in said proceedings as provided for in the power of attorney.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. JORGE GOMEZ

- GOMEZ,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 20

- 50163
D.C. No. 3:17

- cr - 01287

- LAB

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2021 * *
Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges. Jorge Gomez

- Gomez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 99

- month sentence and one condition of supervised release imposed upon remand following his jury

- trial conviction for attempted reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 23 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 20

- 50163

§ 1291, and we affirm.
Gomez

- Gomez first contends that the district court erred procedurally by insufficiently explaining the sentence. We review for plain error, se e United S tates v. Valencia

- Barragan , 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that
there is none. The district court considered and rejected Gomez

- Gomez’s argument s for a shorter sentence, including the circumstances of the ongoing
COVID

- 19 pandemic. And it explained in detail how Gomez

- Gomez’s immigration and criminal history justified the above

- Guidelines sentence.
Gomez

- Gomez also contends that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United
States , 552 U.S. 3 8, 51 (2007) . The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances

. See Gall , 552 U.S. at 51

. Finally, Gomez

- Gomez contends that the district court’s imposition in the written judgment of the standard supervised release condition that Gomez

- Gomez not commit any federal, state, or local cr ime conflicts with its oral pronouncement
of the condition. We disagree. Read in context, t he court’s oral pronouncement was a shorthand description of the condition contained in the written judgment. To the extent the district court’s oral pronouncemen t was ambiguous, the later written judgment clarified the ambiguity. S ee U nited States v. Garcia , 37 F.3d 1 359, 1 3683 20

- 50163

(9th Cir. 1994 ) , abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jackson , 167 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
  I, Curtis Wade Fox certify that:
  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Electronic Corporate Filing Services, Inc . ;
  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;
  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
  4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:
  a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and
  c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;
  5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
  a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and
  6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
   Date: November 14, 2003
 
 /s/Curtis Wade Fox
 Curtis Wade Fox
 Sole Officer/Director
FRANKLIN ROLLE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-2006

_____________________________/

Opinion filed November 7, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Columbia County.

Leandra G. Johnson, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, C.J., JAY, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          49,050
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  362,516
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (12,794)
<INVENTORY>                                      9,268
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               471,012
<PP&E>                                       1,121,250
<DEPRECIATION>                               (752,298)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 916,272
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          396,455
<BONDS>                                         15,100
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        77,637
<OTHER-SE>                                     180,925
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   916,272
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,379,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,371,125
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,847
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,160
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,028
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,315
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,713
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,713
<EPS-BASIC>                                     0.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12


</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 7, 2016

d1130

Order 

Clerk

December 7, 2016

153810

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 153810

COA: 323920

Wayne CC: 13-011474-FH

TONI ALICIA LILEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 31, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 7, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-16-00252-CV

KAREN KRISTINE SILVIO, Appellant

V.

THE WINDSOR AUCTION COMPANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 269th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2015-40326

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a judgment signed February 2, 2016. The notice of 

appeal was filed March 22, 2016. To date, our records show that appellant has not 

paid the appellate filing fee. See Tex. R. App. P. 5 (requiring payment of fees in 

civil cases unless party is excused by statute or by appellate rules from paying 

costs). Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.207. 
2

On April 19, 2016, appellant filed an affidavit of indigence, which was 

referred to the trial court. Both the Harris County District Clerk and appellee filed 

contests to appellant’s affidavit of inability to pay costs. On May 3, 2016, the trial 

court signed an order sustaining the contests.

On May 10, 2016, appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial 

court’s order sustaining the contests to the affidavit of indigence. On May 20, 

2016, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the 

contests.

On May 20, 2016, this court further ordered appellant to pay the appellate 

filing fee and provide the court with proof of payment for the record on or before 

June 6, 2016, or the appeal would be dismissed. Appellant has not paid the 

appellate filing fee or provided proof of payment for the record. Accordingly, the 

appeal is ordered dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c) (allowing involuntary 

dismissal of case because appellant has failed to comply with notice from clerk 

requiring response or other action within specified time). 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Busby, Donovan, and Wise.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1



              CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements (Form S-8 No. 333-19971 and Form S-8 No. 333-33709) pertaining to
the Panavision Inc. Stock Option Plan, of our report dated February 16, 1999
with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of
Panavision Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
December 31, 1998.


                                                  ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Los Angeles, California
March 18, 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

November 21, 2016

No. 14-1610

JEFFREY J. HEFFERNAN,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF PATERSON; MAYOR JOSE TERRES;

POLICE CHIEF JAMES WITTIG; POLICE DIRECTOR MICHAEL WALKER

(D.N.J. No. 2-06-cv-03882)

Present: VANASKIE, GREENBERG and COWEN, Circuit Judges

1. Motion filed by Appellant to amend the Judgment.

Respectfully,

Clerk/tyw

ORDER

The foregoing motion is granted. The August 25, 2016 Order of this Court is amended by 

vacating the remand of this matter to the District Court. The Clerk of Court is directed to 

mark this appeal closed based on the settlement reached by the parties.1

By the Court,

s/ Thomas I. Vanaskie

CircuitJudge

Dated: December 7, 2016

tyw/cc: Mark B. Frost, Esq.

Ryan M. Lockman, Esq. Anthony V. D’Elia, Esq.

Victor A. Afanador, Esq. Roosevelt Jean, Esq.

Susana Cruz-Hodge, Esq. Thomas P. Scrivo, Esq.

Erik E. Sardina, Esq. Gary Potters, Esq.

 

1 The members of the panel express our sincere gratitude to the head of our excellent 

mediation program, Joe Torregrossa, for his stellar efforts in facilitating an amicable 

resolution of this controversy.
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of vFinance, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2001 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Leonard J. Sokolow,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
the best of my knowledge and belief:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


Date:  August 18, 2003              By: /s/ Leonard J. Sokolow
                                        ----------------------
                                     Name:  Leonard J. Sokolow
                                    Title:  Chief Executive Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to vFinance, Inc. and will be
retained by vFinance, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

BENNY LEE HODGE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Case No. 08-403 (RJL) 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION, et af., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

ORDER 

,fL-... 

F or the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion entered this I ~ (Jay of 

February, 2011, it is hereby 

ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [#15] is 

GRANTED; and it is further 

ORDERED that the plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#18] 

is DENIED; and it is further 

ORDERED that final judgment be entered for the defendants on all counts in the 

Complaint. 

SO ORDERED.
Exhibit
      32.1




CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
      TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Superclick, Inc. (the "Company") on
      Form
      10-QSB/A for the quarter ending January 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Periodic Report"), I, Sandro
      Natale, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, that:





1.
      the
      Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
      the
      information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




Dated:
              December 20, 2007
            By:
            /s/
              Sandro NataleName:
              Sandro NataleTitle:
              President & Chief Executive Officer
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1383 

CA 15-00880 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, VALENTINO, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

ELDIN KOVACIC, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RALPH DELMONT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, 

CAITLIN BUTLER AND DAVID P. BUTLER, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL R. ARCHILLA, BUFFALO (MARK A. FORDEN OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

FEROLETO LAW, BUFFALO (JOEL P. FEROLETO OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

SCHNITTER CICCARELLI MILLS, PLLC, EAST AMHERST (BRITTANY A. NASRADINAJ

OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Catherine

R. Nugent Panepinto, J.), entered November 12, 2014. The order denied

the motion of defendant Ralph Delmont for summary judgment dismissing

the complaint against him. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted,

and the complaint against defendant Ralph Delmont is dismissed. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries he sustained when the vehicle operated by Ralph Delmont

(defendant), in which plaintiff was a passenger, was rear-ended by a

vehicle operated by defendant Caitlin Butler. We agree with defendant

that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment

dismissing the complaint against him. Defendant met his initial

burden by establishing that he had brought his vehicle to a complete

stop when it was rear-ended by the vehicle operated by Caitlin Butler

(see Zielinski v Van Pelt [appeal No. 2], 9 AD3d 874, 875-876; Ruzycki

v Baker, 301 AD2d 48, 50). In opposition, plaintiff and the Butler

defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally

Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Contrary to their

contentions, plaintiff consistently testified at his deposition that

defendant had brought his vehicle to a complete stop at the time of

the collision, and there are no issues of witness credibility that

would preclude summary judgment. “ ‘The papers submitted by the

plaintiff [and the Butler defendants] fail to show any [conduct by

defendant] from which it could be inferred that any negligence on
-2- 1383 

CA 15-00880 

[defendant’s] part caused the . . . accident’ ” (Zielinski, 9 AD3d at

875-876; see Nozine v Anurag, 38 AD3d 631, 631-632).

Entered: December 23, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Richard Turner, Appellant

No. 06-15-00221-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 102nd District Court of 

Bowie County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 13F0329-

102). Opinion delivered by Justice Burgess, 

Chief Justice Morriss and Justice Moseley

participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find there was partial error in the judgment 

of the court below. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Richard Turner 

was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and to reflect that this is a second degree 

offense. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We further order that the appellant, Richard Turner, pay all costs of this appeal.

RENDERED DECEMBER 2, 2016

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk