UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1533

KATHRYN T. HOLLIS; ANDRE D. HOLLIS; M.H., an infant, by and 

through his father and next friend, Andre D. Hollis,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; AXIS SURPLUS INSURANCE COMPANY, 

INC., d/b/a Axis, d/b/a Axis Insurance, d/b/a Axis Capital, 

d/b/a Axis U.S. Insurance; SCHAEFER PYROTECHNICS, INC.; 

KIMMEL R. SCHAEFER; JACQUELINE M. GASS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior

District Judge. (1:15-cv-00290-JCC-JFA)

Submitted: March 3, 2017 Decided: March 22, 2017

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nathan D. Rozsa, Scott A. Surovell, SUROVELL ISAACS PETERSEN & 

LEVY PLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellants. Paul D. Smolinsky, 

JACKSON & CAMPBELL, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellee

Lexington Insurance Company. H. Robert Yates, III, O’HAGAN 

MEYER PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee Axis Surplus 

Insurance Company, Inc.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kathryn Hollis and her two sons received injures from a 

fireworks explosion. The underlying state court action alleges 

that the fireworks company, its president, and another employee 

committed 19 breaches of duty that resulted in M.H.’s injuries. 

The issue in this declaratory judgment action is whether the 

underlying complaint alleges a single occurrence or 19 

occurrences under the fireworks company’s applicable insurance 

policy with Lexington Insurance Company. The policy covers up 

to $1 million per occurrence and $2 million in the aggregate.

In the present declaratory judgment action, the district 

court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, found that 

the underlying complaint alleged one occurrence. We agree and 

thus affirm.

We review a district court’s resolution of cross-motions 

for summary judgment de novo. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 

516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003). A district court may only award 

summary judgment when no genuine dispute of material fact 

remains and the record shows that the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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Here, the district court resolved the cross-motions in 

favor of the insurer, Lexington.* The dispute is subject to 

Pennsylvania law.

In the liability insurance context, Pennsylvania law 

applies a cause approach to defining occurrences. Donegal Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 293 (Pa. 2007). Under 

the cause approach, Pennsylvania courts find a single occurrence 

if there “was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing 

cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage.” 

D’Auria v. Zurich Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1986); see also Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 294-95.

Here, regardless of the number of alleged negligent acts or 

victims, the injuries have a single proximate cause — the 

misfired firework that exploded near Kathryn and her sons. See

Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 296. Because the injuries only have 

one cause, only one occurrence took place.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order resolving 

the cross-motions for summary judgment in Lexington’s favor. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

 * The district court found the claim against the excess 

insurer, Axis, non-justiciable. The Hollises have not 

challenged that ruling on appeal.
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED