J-S02003-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ERMA MCMILLAN

Appellant

v.

CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES 

DELAWARE COUNTY

Appellee

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1791 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Civil Division at No(s): 2019-002356

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 27, 2022

Appellant, Erma McMillan (“Grandmother”), appeals pro se from the 

order entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, granting full 

legal and physical custody of minor children, Je.M. and Jo.M. (“Children”) to 

Delaware County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”). We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Grandmother is the maternal grandparent of Children. After the death of 

Children’s mother in 2014, Children were residing with Grandmother until 

2018 when Children were adjudicated dependent and CYS was granted legal 

and physical custody. On March 18, 2019, Grandmother filed the instant 

complaint for custody against CYS requesting sole physical and legal custody 

of Children. The trial court directed Grandmother to amend the pleading to 
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add Je.M.’s father, Ramon Berry (“Father”),

1 as a party and Grandmother 

complied on March 2, 2020. 

On March 1, 2021, the court conducted a pre-trial evidentiary hearing 

specifically to address the circumstances surrounding the dependency 

adjudication of Children in 2018. Deborah Plummer, a CYS intake supervisor, 

testified as follows. Children were referred to CYS in 2014 and 2016 regarding 

Children’s living conditions at Grandmother’s house. Specifically, concerns 

were raised over the presence of black mold and feces in the home, lack of 

electricity, and failure to enroll Je.M. in school. CYS filed petitions seeking to 

adjudicate Children as dependent in 2014 and 2016 but ultimately withdrew 

the petitions. In 2018, CYS received a third referral alleging that Je.M. had 

been sexually abused by Dwayne Brown, Grandmother’s boyfriend who lived 

in Grandmother’s residence. CYS attempted to do an assessment of the home 

to ensure the safety of Children but Grandmother was uncooperative. Mr. 

Brown was referred to Child Line Registry for sexual abuse of Je.M. and was 

indicated as a perpetrator after investigation. 

Lakisha Smith, a CYS caseworker supervisor, testified that after Children 

were adjudicated dependent, they were placed in foster care. CYS has had 

continuous legal and physical custody of Children since they were adjudicated

dependent. Children were initially placed in the same home but were 

____________________________________________

1 Jo.M.’s father is unknown. 
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separated when Je.M. was hospitalized in November 2018. Je.M. was 

diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Oppositional Defiance 

Disorder and was placed in a therapeutic home where he attends therapy and 

takes medication. Jo.M. was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 

depression, and impulsivity. Jo.M. has been living in the same foster home 

since June 2019 and is doing very well there. Children have virtual visits with 

one another due to the distance between their homes. 

Ms. Smith further testified that Grandmother was not initially considered 

as an option for kinship placement because she was being investigated as a 

perpetrator by omission due to concerns that she was aware of Mr. Brown’s 

abuse of Je.M. However, in 2019, CYS learned that Grandmother was not 

indicated for abuse or neglect and contacted Grandmother to inquire whether 

she would participate in the process to determine whether she could be a 

kinship resource for Children. Grandmother was uncooperative and refused 

to participate in a home study. Children have had no contact with 

Grandmother since they were adjudicated dependent. Ms. Smith reported 

that Grandmother has only reached out to CYS twice since Children have been 

in CYS custody. 

On May 11, 2021, the court conducted a custody trial. The guardian ad 

litem (“GAL”) testified that he met with Children on two occasions. According 

to the GAL, Je.M. remembered Grandmother and expressed a desire to live 

with Grandmother again. However, Je.M. was apprehensive of Mr. Brown and 
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described instances of physical abuse by Mr. Brown. Je.M. further indicated 

that he would not want to be present in the same house as Mr. Brown. The 

GAL testified that Jo.M. did not express a desire to live with Grandmother. 

The GAL noted that although Je.M. experienced some teasing from the other 

children at his foster home, both children were safe and secure in their current 

placement. The GAL testified that he attempted to set up a meeting with 

Grandmother but she did not respond to his inquiry. When asked by the GAL, 

Grandmother initially denied knowing Mr. Brown but later admitted to knowing 

him after evidence about their relationship was presented during a court 

hearing. Based on the uncertainty of Grandmother’s current relationship with 

Mr. Brown and the unknown condition of Grandmother’s house, the GAL 

opined that Grandmother should not be awarded custody of Children. 

Patrick Pearson, a long-time family friend of Grandmother, testified that 

he has known Children since their birth. Mr. Pearson stated that Grandmother 

would never harm Children or allow anyone to harm them. Grandmother was 

previously in a relationship with Mr. Brown but they are no longer involved. 

Further, Mr. Brown no longer resides with Grandmother but lives in New 

Jersey. Upon cross examination, Mr. Pearson admitted that his belief about 

Mr. Brown’s whereabouts was based on what he was told by Grandmother and 

Grandmother’s son. 

Father testified that while Children were staying with him for a visit in 

2018, Jo.M. told Father’s girlfriend that Mr. Brown touched Je.M. 
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inappropriately. Father informed Grandmother of his concerns but 

Grandmother did not believe him. Because of this, Father temporarily refused 

to return Children to Grandmother’s custody and informed the Chester Police 

Department of his concerns. Father testified that he believes Mr. Brown 

sexually abused Je.M. Father also reported instances of domestic abuse and 

physical altercations between Grandmother and Mr. Brown which were 

witnessed by Children. Father stated that he did not have objections to 

Children being returned to Grandmother’s custody. He testified that 

Grandmother did her best to care for Children but was unsure whether living 

with Grandmother was in Children’s best interests. 

Grandmother testified that Children resided with her and not with Father 

prior to their adjudication of dependency. In 2018, Father asked to see 

Children for a few days and refused to return them to Grandmother’s custody. 

Grandmother stated that the only other individual currently living in her house 

is her son. Grandmother requested full custody of Children and represented 

that she is acting in the best interests of Children. 

Je.M., who was eleven years old at the time of trial, testified that Mr. 

Brown would hurt him when he lived at Grandmother’s house. Specifically, 

Je.M. recounted instances where Mr. Brown pushed him down the stairs and 

scratched his arm, leaving a scar. Further, Je.M. testified that Grandmother 

and Mr. Brown would often get into physical altercations. Je.M. described 

witnessing one altercation where Grandmother’s son got involved, which 
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resulted in a violent fight between Grandmother’s son and Mr. Brown. Je.M. 

stated that he has not spoken with Grandmother since he was adjudicated

dependent but he would like to return to living with Grandmother. When 

asked about his current placement, Je.M. stated that he has had difficulties 

with the other boys at the house, specifically stating that two of the other boys 

showed him their private parts. 

Jo.M., who was ten years old at the time of the trial, testified that he 

gets along with everyone at his current foster home but would like to see his 

brother more often. Jo.M. does not recall anything bad occurring when he 

lived at Grandmother’s house. 

After considering all the evidence, the court entered an order on August 

13, 2021, which granted sole legal and physical custody of Children to CYS 

and supervised in-person visitation to Grandmother. On September 3, 2021, 

Grandmother timely filed a notice of appeal and contemporaneous concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

Grandmother raises the following issues for our review:

Whether the [trial court] ever possessed jurisdiction for 

adjudication of [Je.M.] and [Jo.M.], and was 

[Grandmother’s] right to a prompt disposition 

compromised, where the custody action lingered for more 

than three years while the children laid dormant in custody, 

and whether [Grandmother] should have retained custody 

in light of the lack of jurisdiction and continued and 

unjustifiable delay? 

Whether the trial court committed reversible error where 

the court failed to grant [Grandmother’s] application for 

termination of parental rights of the father of [Je.M.], 
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wherein, [Father] was deemed by the dependency court to 

be unfit, convicted of indecent assault and various other 

felonious crimes, drug dealer, drug addict, homeless, 

mentally unstable and failed to exercise any parental care

towards his child since the time of the child’s birth? 

Whether the trial court committed reversible error where 

the court refused to allow [Grandmother] to present 

mitigating and exculpatory evidence that neither she, nor 

her former paramour abused [Je.M.], and upon the court 

learning that [Grandmother] did not abuse the children, 

should she have been granted custody? 

Whether the trial court committed reversible error, and was 

it prejudicial to [Grandmother], where the court refused to 

allow [Grandmother] to object, contest or rebut issues 

within the scope of testimony and arguments offered up by 

[CYS] as follows: (1) whether [Grandmother] had the right 

to object to or rebut: testimony and evidence offered up by 

[Grandmother] of historical encounters and allegations in 

which CYS formerly had with [Grandmother], which were

deemed unfounded; (2) whether [Grandmother] had the 

right to object and offer mitigating evidence to the contrary?

Whether the trial court committed reversible error, and was 

it prejudicial to [Grandmother], where the court refused to 

allow [Grandmother] to present evidence that the CYS Case 

Worker (supervisor) who initially handled the dependency 

action, which is interchangeably related to the within action, 

that this person who was responsible for investigation of 

abuse of the children and who placed the children into 

custody was arrested two or more times for being under the 

influence of crack cocaine and alcohol, and was

subsequently convicted of the same, and terminated. 

Whether the trial court committed reversible error where 

the court failed to consider evidence that [Je.M.] was being 

physically and sexually abused while under the custody and 

control of [CYS], and both, the court and [CYS], who are 

deemed mandatory reporters, failed to intervene or deter 

further harm from befalling the child, which would have 

resulted in a different verdict? 

Whether the trial court committed reversible error where 
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the court persistently denied [Grandmother’s] written 

requests and oral motions for visitation and communication 

of her two grandchildren who were adjudicated dependent, 

based upon the father’s unfitness and, where the children 

have been in custody for three years without visitation from 

[Grandmother] and where [CYS] persistently refused to 

communicate with [Grandmother] altogether. 

Whether the court committed reversible error where the 

court sequestered [Grandmother] into the Judge’s 

chambers to accompany all other parties in order to 

interview and question [Je.M], and [Jo.M.] and failed to 

permit [Grandmother] to question the children, wherein, 

[Grandmother] acted in the capacity of an attorney of record

and (pro se litigant). In addition, was it error where the 

court failed to appoint an attorney to represent the legal 

issues of the children, and was it erroneous not to furnish 

[Grandmother] with ... information elicited from the 

children’s testimony and interview? 

Whether [Grandmother] was deprived of procedural due 

process and was entitled to proper notice and service of the 

guardian ad litem report, and ample opportunity to 

respond[?] In addition, was it prejudicial to [Grandmother]

where the court persuaded the guardian ad litem to take on 

dual roles permitting the guardian ad litem to represent 

[CYS], by allowing the guardian ad litem to argue and supply 

opinions as to whether [CYS] should be withdrawn from the 

custody action, moreover, was it prejudicial to 

[Grandmother], where the court permitted the guardian ad 

litem to examine and cross examine [Grandmother’s]

witness contrary to the rules of the court? 

Whether [Grandmother] had the right to be heard and 

contest to her application for objections to the guardian ad 

litem’s report, and whether she had the right to address, 

confront and or otherwise object to any portions of the said 

report in general. 

Whether the guardian ad litem exercised due diligence and

all reasonable efforts to visit and communicate with the two 

children to determine their interest and the best interest of 

the children, wherein, the guardian ad litem visited and met 

the children on (only) two occasions, and whether two visits 
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is ample and adequate time to determine the children’s best 

interests. 

Whether the Court committed reversible error where the 

court failed to adequately address the mandatory “Sixteen 

Child Custody Factors” in determining an award of custody 

to [Grandmother] as delineated under law.... 

(Grandmother’s Brief at 2-11) (re-ordered for purposes of disposition).

In reviewing a child custody order: 

[O]ur scope is of the broadest type and our standard is 

abuse of discretion. This Court must accept findings of the 

trial court that are supported by competent evidence of 

record, as our role does not include making independent 

factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of 

credibility and weight of the evidence, this Court must defer 

to the trial judge who presided over the proceedings and 

thus viewed the witnesses first hand. However, we are not 

bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its 

factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial 

court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the 

evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the 

trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are 

unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial 

court. 

S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 547-48 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal citation 

omitted).

In her first issue on appeal, Grandmother argues that the trial court 

“lacked jurisdiction” over this matter because the court failed to promptly 

schedule a trial as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4.

2

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2 Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4 provides in relevant part:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Preliminarily, Grandmother fails to cite to any authority for her bald 

assertion that the failure to promptly schedule a custody trial deprives the 

court of subject matter jurisdiction. Likewise, our review of the record reveals

that Grandmother failed to raise this issue before the trial court. Indeed, this 

Court has recently held that the failure to object to the timing and/or 

scheduling of a custody trial under Rule 1915.4 constitutes waiver on appeal, 

which belies Grandmother’s jurisdictional argument. See Nelson v. Kresge, 

No. 1417 EDA 2021 (Pa.Super. Feb. 23, 2022) (unpublished memorandum). 

See also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of 

this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value). Thus, Grandmother’s 

failure to preserve her claim before the trial court and on appeal constitutes 

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Depending upon the procedure in the judicial district, within 

180 days of the filing of the complaint either the court shall 

automatically enter an order scheduling a trial before a 

judge or a party shall file a praecipe, motion or request for 

trial, except as otherwise provided in this subdivision. If it 

is not the practice of the court to automatically schedule 

trials and neither party files a praecipe, motion or request 

for trial within 180 days of filing of the pleading, the court 

shall, sua sponte or on motion of a party, dismiss the matter 

unless a party has been granted an extension for good cause 

shown, or the court finds that dismissal is not in the best 

interests of the child. The extension shall not exceed 60 

days beyond the 180 day limit. A further reasonable 

extension may be granted by the court upon agreement of 

the parties or when the court finds, on the record, 

compelling circumstances for a further reasonable 

extension....

Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(b).
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waiver. See Nelson, supra. See also Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 

1089 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 719, 110 A.3d 998 (2014) 

(stating: “[O]nly claims properly presented in the [trial] court are preserved 

for appeal”); In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2013) (reiterating: “This Court will 

not consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant case or 

statutory authority”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating: “Issues not raised in the 

[trial] court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

In her second issue on appeal, Grandmother contends that the court 

erred by failing to terminate Father’s parental rights over Je.M. As the trial 

court noted, “[a]ny request by [Grandmother] made during the pendency of 

the custody matter concerning termination of parental rights would have been 

correctly dismissed as not appropriately pled as termination is not properly 

addressed in custody matters.” (Trial Court Opinion, filed August 13, 2021, 

at 8). We agree with the trial court that any termination of parental rights 

proceeding that might concern Father would be outside the scope of the

custody matter before the trial court in this case. As such, Grandmother’s 

second issue on appeal is without merit. 

In Grandmother’s third, fourth, and fifth issues combined, Grandmother 

alleges that the court erred by failing to allow Grandmother to: 1) present 

“mitigating and exculpatory evidence” that neither Grandmother nor Mr. 

Brown abused Children; 2) object, contest or present evidence to contradict
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CYS’s account of Grandmother’s past encounters with CYS; and 3) present 

evidence of the criminal history of an employee of CYS who handled Children’s 

dependency matter. 

Nevertheless, Grandmother’s brief fails to have any meaningful 

discussion of the nature and type of evidence she attempted to introduce,

when she attempted to introduce such evidence and why such evidence was 

admissible under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Because Grandmother’s 

brief is deficient such that we cannot properly assess the merits of her claim, 

Grandmother has waived her third, fourth and fifth issues on appeal. See In 

re R.D., 44 A.3d 657 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 618 Pa. 677, 56 A.3d 

398 (2012) (holding appellant waived issue, where argument portion of 

appellant’s brief lacked meaningful discussion of, or citation to, record and/or

relevant legal authority regarding issue generally or specifically; appellant’s 

lack of analysis precluded meaningful appellate review).

In her sixth issue on appeal, Grandmother argues that the court erred 

by failing to consider evidence that Je.M. was being physically and sexually 

abused while under the custody and control of CYS. Grandmother asserts that 

“[h]aving been made aware of such disturbing information ... both the court 

and CYS failed to take precautionary measures to modify the custody aspects 

of the child’s placement or simply award temporary custody to [Grandmother] 

until the time of trial.” (Grandmother’s Brief at 46). 

Again, Grandmother’s brief fails to cite to the record to indicate when 
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she introduced any evidence prior to trial that Je.M. was being physically and 

sexually abused in his CYS placement. See In re R.D., supra. Further, our 

review of the record shows that the only evidence before the court of any 

mistreatment of Je.M. at his current placement was Je.M.’s testimony at trial. 

Contrary to Grandmother’s assertion, the court did not disregard this evidence 

but credited it in its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered that 

Je.M. be immediately removed from his current placement. (See Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed August 13, 2021, at 29; Final Custody 

Order, filed August 13, 2021, at 2). Accordingly, Grandmother’s sixth issue 

on appeal merits no relief. 

In her seventh issue on appeal, Grandmother argues that the court 

erred by failing to grant Grandmother’s written and oral requests for visitation 

with Children during the pendency of this custody case. Once again, we note 

that Grandmother’s brief fails to cite to the record to demonstrate when she 

made any such written or oral requests. See In re R.D., supra. Our review 

of the record shows that Grandmother did not file any motions or petitions 

requesting interim custody of Children pending trial. Further, Grandmother 

failed to cite to any relevant authority to demonstrate why the failure to grant 

any such requests for visitation would constitute an abuse of discretion. See 

id. See also Whitley, supra. As such, Grandmother has waived her seventh 

issue on appeal. 

In her eighth issue on appeal, Grandmother argues that the court erred 
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by failing to allow Grandmother, who was a pro se litigant, to be present in 

the room when the court questioned Children. 

Prior to questioning Children, the court clearly explained on the record 

the procedure it intended to follow. (See N.T. Trial, 5/11/21, at 128-133). 

The court stated that it would allow each party to submit questions they 

wished to ask Children but would not allow them to ask questions themselves. 

All parties and counsel were instructed to wait in an adjoining room from which

they could hear Children’s testimony. Grandmother indicated that she wanted 

to ask questions to Children but did not object to the court’s proposed 

procedure. As such, Grandmother has not preserved this issue for our review. 

See Coulter, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

In her ninth, tenth and eleventh issues combined, Grandmother argues

that the court impermissibly allowed the GAL to argue, supply opinions, and 

cross-examine Grandmother’s witnesses at trial. In addition, Grandmother 

asserts that she was deprived of procedural due process because she only 

received the GAL’s report on the morning of trial even though she was entitled 

to be served with the GAL’s report no later than 20 days prior to trial under

231 Pa. Code § 1915.11-2.3 Grandmother contends that the court erred by 

refusing to hear argument on her objections to the GAL’s report and admitting 

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3 “The guardian ad litem shall file of record and provide copies of any reports 

prepared by the guardian ad litem to each party and the court not later than 

20 days prior to trial.” 231 Pa. Code § 1915.11-2(c). 
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it into evidence. Further, Grandmother argues that the GAL only met with 

Children two times and thus “it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 

to adopt the GAL’s report for the purpose of rendering it’s final judgment.” 

(Grandmother’s Brief at 93). 

Nevertheless, Grandmother failed to object at trial when the court 

allowed the GAL to cross examine her witnesses. As such, Grandmother has 

not preserved this issue for appellate review. See Coulter, supra.

Regarding Grandmother’s assertion that the court did not allow her to 

object to the admissibility of the GAL’s report, the court explained:

The trial court allowed [Grandmother] to make objections to 

the admissibility of the [GAL] report at trial. Although most 

of the “objections” were fact based and argumentative, 

[Grandmother] did state that she did not have the 

opportunity to read the report at which time the trial court

allowed [Grandmother] additional time to read the report. 

The trial court then overruled her objection and admitted 

the report. However, upon the filing of [Grandmother]’s 

objection to the admission of the [GAL] report the court 

reopened the record to determine whether the report should 

be admitted into evidence. 

At the hearing on the objection, the trial court determined 

that there was no denial of due process or prejudice to 

[Grandmother] in allowing the introduction of the [GAL]’s 

report at trial. The [GAL] provided the report to 

[Grandmother] as well as to counsel for CYS on the morning 

of the trial because as he explained on the record, he had 

been unable to finish his report within twenty days of the 

trial due to [Grandmother’s failure] to cooperate with an 

interview and home study. The trial court determined that 

it was purely due to [Grandmother]’s stalling and refusal to 

cooperate with the [GAL] that prevented him from 

submitting his report twenty days prior to the trial and that 

such refusal hampered the ability of the [GAL] to timely 

provide his report. [Grandmother] should not now have the 
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benefit of objecting to the introduction of the report when 

she was the sole reason as to why it was not completed 

more than twenty days prior to trial. 

Additionally, the trial court noted that [Grandmother] 

referenced the [GAL’s] report in her direct examination of 

the [GAL] and asked a question of the [GAL] while quoting 

the report. Therefore, the trial court concluded that 

[Grandmother] not only had the opportunity to read it prior 

to trial but also to comprehend it well enough to use it as 

part of her trial strategy. Therefore, there was no error to 

allow the introduction of the [GAL’s] report. 

Finally, the [GAL] testified consistently with his report and 

the conclusions in his report were repeated in his direct and 

cross examination testimony. Therefore, there was no 

prejudice to [Grandmother] for the trial court to read the 

report which reiterated the [GAL]’s testimony. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 10-11). The record supports the court’s analysis. 

Consequently, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in overruling 

Grandmother’s objection to the GAL’s report. See S.J.S., supra. Further, 

Grandmother’s complaint that the GAL only interviewed Children on two 

occasions implicates the credibility of the GAL’s findings. Determining 

credibility of evidence is strictly within the purview of the trial court and as 

such, we find no error in the court’s reliance on the GAL’s report in its 

determination. Id. Therefore, Grandmother is not entitled to relief on her 

ninth, tenth or eleventh issues on appeal. 

In her final issue on appeal, Grandmother argues that the court erred 

by failing to adequately address the custody factors. Specifically, 

Grandmother notes that the trial court failed to address factors 10 and 12 in 

its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Further, Grandmother alleges the 
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following errors in the court’s weighing of the remaining custody factors: 1)

finding that factors 1 and 8 weighed in favor of CYS when Grandmother 

testified that she has not been able to see Children since they were 

adjudicated dependent because CYS refused to communicate with her; 2) 

finding that factor 2 weighed in favor of CYS when all past allegations that 

Grandmother was abusive were deemed unfounded; 3) finding that factors 3, 

4 and 9 weighed in favor of CYS when Je.M. has been assaulted and sexually 

abused while under CYS custody; 4) finding that factor 6 weighed in favor of

neither party when Children have been separated for almost four years while 

in CYS custody; and 5) finding that factor 7 favored both parties when both 

children testified that they would prefer to live with Grandmother. 

Grandmother concludes that the court abused its discretion in awarding CYS 

sole physical and legal custody of Children. We disagree. 

The Child Custody Act provides: 

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody

(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, 

the court shall determine the best interest of the child by 

considering all relevant factors, giving weighted 

consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the 

child, including the following: 

(1) Which party is more likely to 

encourage and permit frequent and continuing 

contact between the child and another party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed 

by a party or member of the party’s household, 

whether there is a continued risk of harm to the 

child or an abused party and which party can better 
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provide adequate physical safeguards and 

supervision of the child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 

5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child abuse 

and involvement with protective services). 

(3) The parental duties performed by each 

party on behalf of the child. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in 

the child’s education, family life and community 

life. 

(5) The availability of extended family. 

(6) The child’s sibling relationships. 

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the 

child, based on the child’s maturity and judgment. 

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the 

child against the other parent, except in cases of 

domestic violence where reasonable safety 

measures are necessary to protect the child from 

harm. 

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain 

a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing 

relationship with the child adequate for the child’s 

emotional needs. 

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to 

the daily physical, emotional, developmental, 

educational and special needs of the child. 

(11) The proximity of the residences of the 

parties. 

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the 

child or ability to make appropriate child-care 

arrangements. 

(13) The level of conflict between the 
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parties and the willingness and ability of the parties 

to cooperate with one another. A party’s effort to 

protect a child from abuse by another party is not 

evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate 

with that party. 

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of 

a party or member of a party’s household. 

(15) The mental and physical condition of a 

party or member of a party’s household. 

(16) Any other relevant factor. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). 

“With any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best 

interests of the child. This standard requires a case-by-case assessment of 

all the factors that may legitimately affect the physical, intellectual, moral and 

spiritual well-being of the child.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 334 

(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 710, 68 A.3d 909 (2013) (quoting 

J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa.Super. 2011)). In expressing the 

reasons for its decision, “there is no required amount of detail for the trial 

court’s explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are 

considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.” 

M.J.M., supra at 336. A court’s explanation of reasons for its decision, which 

adequately addresses the relevant custody factors, complies with [the 

statute]. Id.

Instantly, the court explained in its opinion that its failure to specifically 

address factors 10 and 12 in its findings of fact and conclusions of law was an 
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inadvertent oversight. The court intended to list these factors with its analysis 

of factor 9 but unintentionally omitted it. We note that the court issued an 

extensive 36-page opinion of its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

covering all the evidence presented at trial and providing a detailed analysis 

of all the other custody factors. Notwithstanding its omission of expressly 

addressing factors 10 and 12, the court adequately covered the substance of 

those factors in its analysis of factors 3, 4 and 9 by discussing Children’s 

current needs and the abilities of the parties to meet those needs. (See

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 25-36). Our review of the court’s 

findings and fact and conclusions of law in toto makes clear the court 

adequately analyzed and considered all custody factors delineated in Section

5328(a). See M.J.M., supra. 

Specifically, the court found: 1) factors 1, 8, and 13 weighed in favor of 

CYS because CYS has been willing to permit contact between Grandmother 

and Children but Grandmother has been uncooperative; 2) factor 2 weighed 

in favor of CYS because Je.M. was physically and sexually abused by a member 

of Grandmother’s household and it is unclear whether Grandmother is still in 

contact with him; 3) factors 3, 4, and 9 weighed in favor of CYS because 

Children’s needs are being met by CYS and Grandmother has failed to 

establish that she can provide safe living conditions for Children; 4) factor 7 

favored both parties because Je.M. stated that he would prefer to live with 

Grandmother but does not want to have contact with Mr. Brown and Jo.M. did 
J-S02003-22

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not express a clear preference between Grandmother and his current 

placement; and 5) the remaining factors favored neither party. 

On appeal, Grandmother essentially asks this Court to reweigh the 

Section 5328(a) factors in her favor. We have carefully reviewed the record 

in this case and determined that the record supports the trial court’s 

reasonable findings, and those findings were not the result of an error of law. 

See S.J.S., supra. Therefore, we accept the trial court’s findings and decline 

to reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, Grandmother is not entitled to relief on 

any of her issues on appeal and we affirm the trial court’s order.4 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/27/2022

____________________________________________

4 On April 13, 2022, Grandmother filed three (3) applications for relief in this 

Court seeking to (1) complete the certified record with additional notes of 

testimony; (2) compel the GAL to file a brief; and (3) requesting oral 

argument. Nevertheless, the record contains all relevant transcripts 

necessary for our disposition of the appeal. Additionally, Grandmother cites 

no legal authority to support her claim that the GAL was required to file an 

appellate brief. Further, Grandmother was denied oral argument in this case 

based on the late filing of her appellate brief. For these reasons, we deny 

Grandmother’s applications for relief.