J-S83042-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.R.K.

APPEAL OF: J.K., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 989 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered June 6, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 92 of 2015

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 2, 2016

J.K. (Father) appeals from the order entered June 6, 2016, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, which terminated 

involuntarily his parental rights to his minor daughter, J.R.K. (Child), born in 

November of 2011.1 We affirm. 

The orphans’ court summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

history of this matter as follows. 

On May 6, 2014[,] a Protection From Abuse (PFA) Order 

was entered on behalf of [Mother], giving temporary custody of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Child’s mother, R.R.C. (Mother), executed a consent to adoption form on 

September 18, 2015. The orphans’ court entered an order confirming 

Mother’s consent and terminating her parental rights to Child on June 24, 

2016. Mother has not filed a brief in connection with the instant appeal, nor 

has she filed her own separate appeal. 
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[Child] to Mother. According to the Order, Father’s custody 

would be supervised by the Westmoreland County Children’s 

Bureau [(WCCB)] or other agency until further Order of Court. 

Mother’s allegations of abuse included Father’s engaging in 

sexual conduct that was uncomfortable for [] Mother, Father’s 

viewing of child and incest pornography, and threats to kill her. 

She also expressed concern for her minor daughter’s safety. As 

a result, the PFA Order only permitted Father supervised 

visitation with [Child]. 

On June 3, 2014, [WCCB] took emergency custody of the 

minor child, based upon the Mother’s request that [Child] be 

removed from the home, and because of limitations upon 

Father’s contact with [Child] pursuant to the PFA Order. 

On June 24, 2014, the Court entered an Adjudication and 

Disposition Order placing [Child] in foster care. In that Order, 

the [c]ourt found that:

 Father informed the caseworker that he had been 

twice adjudicated delinquent on sex abuse 

charges[.]

 Father did not have a residence of his own.

 Father represented that he suffered from bipolar 

disorder with manic episodes.

 Father recognized that he had issues that he 

needed to deal with before he should be 

considered for custody of [Child]. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/18/2016, at 1-2 (unnumbered pages).

On October 16, 2015, WCCB filed a petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights to Child involuntarily. The orphans’ court held a termination 

hearing on May 5, 2016, during which the court heard the testimony of 

licensed clinical social worker, Cynthia King; psychologist, Carol Hughes; 

psychologist, Carol Patterson; licensed professional counselor, Joe Narduzzi; 
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WCCB caseworker, Elizabeth Messer; and Father. Following the hearing, on 

June 6, 2016, the court entered an order terminating Father’s parental 

rights. Father timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal. 

Father now raises the following issues for our review. 

I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that the moving party met its burden as to 

terminating the parental rights of Father under 23 Pa.C.S. 

§[]2511(a)(8)?

II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that the moving party met its burden under 

23 Pa.C.S. §[]2511(b) that the best interest of [Child] is met by 

terminating Father’s parental rights?

Father’s Brief at 4 (orphans’ court answers omitted).

We consider Father’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 
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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provides as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The 

child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8)[] does not require an 

evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that 

led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Father argues that he remedied the conditions that previously 

prevented him from caring for Child. Father’s Brief at 11. Specifically, 

Father contends that he has not had “any issues with regard to domestic 

violence” since WCCB opened its case, and that “there has not been any 

competent evidence on the record indicating that Father . . . is continuing to 

have sexual issues[.]” Id. at 10-11. Father asserts that he previously 
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completed mental health treatment, and that he is “only a moderate to low 

risk to re-offend.” Id.

The court concluded that involuntary termination was proper under 

section 2511(a)(8) because it has been over twelve months since Child was 

placed in foster care2, and, in that time, Father has not remedied the 

conditions that led to Child’s placement. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

7/18/2016, at 7 (unnumbered pages). In coming to this conclusion, the 

court emphasized that Father failed to comply with court-ordered mental 

health treatment, and that Father continues to lack stable employment and 

housing. Id. at 7, 9. In addition, the court observed that Father himself 

admitted that Child’s needs and welfare would best be served by remaining 

with her foster family. Id. These determinations are supported by the 

record.

During the termination hearing, WCCB caseworker, Elizabeth Messer, 

testified that Father was asked to complete a series of reunification 

objectives following Child’s adjudication of dependency. N.T., 5/5/2016, at 

153. These objectives included participating in parenting instruction, 

obtaining and maintaining stable and appropriate housing, securing and 

maintaining a verifiable and legal source of income, continuing with mental 

____________________________________________

2 As discussed above, Child was placed in foster care on June 3, 2014. At 

the time of the termination hearing, on May 5, 2016, Child had been 

removed from Father’s care for nearly two years.
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health treatment and individual counseling until successful completion, 

undergoing a psychosexual evaluation and complying with any 

recommended treatment, and participating in sexual abuse offender 

treatment. Id.

Concerning Father’s compliance with these objectives, Ms. Messer 

testified that Father participated in parenting instruction. Id. Despite this 

participation, Father made little, if any, progress in terms of parenting skill 

over the last two years. Id. at 153-54. Father also has failed to obtain 

stable and appropriate housing. Id. at 158-59, 171. Ms. Messer reported 

that Father resided in approximately six different locations over the last two 

years, “with some additional places that he has stayed for a night or two 

that we’re not necessarily aware of.” Id. at 154. Concerning Father’s 

employment, Ms. Messer believed that Father has been employed at eight 

separate locations since Child entered foster care. Id. at 159. Father did 

not provide her with paystubs or other verification for any of these jobs. Id.

at 161-66.

Further, with respect to Father’s mental health, Ms. Messer testified 

that Father stopped taking his medication and attending mental health 

treatment.3 Id. at 166. According to Ms. Messer, Father did complete a 

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3

Father testified that he began attending counseling and therapy “about two 

weeks ago.” N.T., 5/6/2016, at 194-95.
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psychosexual evaluation.4 Id. at 168. However, Father was discharged 

unsuccessfully from sex offender treatment. Id. at 167-68. 

Moreover, the record demonstrates that Father failed to make progress

toward completing his reunification objectives. Of the greatest significance, 

Father was discharged unsuccessfully from sex offender treatment. The 

record reveals that Father has a history of sexually abusing children as a 

juvenile, and that Father admitted to viewing child pornography as an adult. 

Id. at 29-30, 48. Psychologist, Carol Hughes, testified that Father remains a 

“moderate” risk to commit additional sexual offenses. Id. at 53. Given this 

evidence, it is clear that Father has failed to remedy the conditions that 

caused Child to be removed from his care. 

Finally, our review of the record confirms that terminating Father’s 

parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Father remains 

completely incapable of caring for Child, and it is doubtful that he ever will 

be capable. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims 

____________________________________________

4

Licensed clinical social worker, Cynthia King, testified that she was not able 

to complete Father’s psychosexual evaluation, because of Father’s inability 

to stay on topic during her appointments with him, and because Father failed 

to attend appointments. N.T., 5/5/2016, at 7-12, 17.
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of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

at 513. 

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).5

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5 We observe that Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b) both require a court 

considering a termination petition to assess the needs and welfare of the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Here, the orphans’ court found that Child is bonded with her preadoptive foster mother, and is flourishing in the care of her foster family. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/18/2016, at 10 (unnumbered pages). Father 

argues that he performed well during his visits with Child, and that the 

bonding evaluation presented to the court was “unbalanced” because it “did 

not adequately examine the strength of the parent-child bond.” Father’s 

brief at 12-13.

Concerning the relationship between Father and Child, psychologist 

Carol Patterson testified that she conducted bonding evaluations with 

respect to Child, Father, and Child’s foster mother. Id. at 83-85. Ms. 

Patterson evaluated Child with her foster mother on September 15, 2015, 

and evaluated Child with Father on December 7, 2015. Id. at 85. Based on 

these evaluations, Ms. Patterson opined that Child displays a strong bond 

with her foster mother. Id. at 87. In contrast, Child displays no bond with 

Father. Id. at 95. Ms. Patterson explained her conclusions as follows.

I concluded that [Child] displayed a strong bond with her 

foster mother during this assessment. She had good attention 

[and] concentration levels, which was really different in the two. 

When the foster mother was able to structure the situation, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

relevant child or children. However, the needs and welfare analysis required 

by Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the needs and welfare analysis 

required by Section 2511(b), and must be addressed separately. See In re 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]hile both 

Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the ‘needs and 

welfare of the child,’ . . . they are distinct in that we must address Section 

2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).”).
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[Child] was able to . . . concentrate up to 15-20 minutes on a --

like, a social play situation[.] [W]ith her father . . . her 

attention, [and] concentration were very short and she just went 

from one thing to the next.

She sought proximity to her foster mother. When they 

were playing, [Child] would go to her, sit next to her, go on her 

lap, be around her in the various play situation[s]. And she 

responded positively to all of her foster mother’s approaches 

towards her, which was pretty much the opposite of what 

happened with her father. She had a very short attention span. 

She initiated only one affectionate behavior towards him. She 

had negative responses to many of his approaches towards her 

and included him in only one activity in which she was engaged. 

Id. Ultimately, Ms. Patterson did not believe that any harm would come to 

Child if Father’s parental rights are terminated. Id. at 95-96. Ms. Patterson 

expressed concern, however, that separating Child from her foster mother 

“could be potentially devastating.” Id. at 96. 

Thus, we again conclude that the record supports the finding of the 

orphans’ court that terminating Father’s parental rights will best serve 

Child’s needs and welfare. The evaluations conducted by Ms. Patterson 

confirm that Child is bonded strongly with her foster mother, and that Child 

does not share a bond with Father. While Father suggests that Ms. 

Patterson failed to examine adequately the strength of the relationship 

between Father and Child, our review of the record belies this assertion. 

Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by terminating involuntarily Father’s parental rights to 

Child, we affirm the order of the orphans’ court.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016