Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

LUTHER WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-13-1198

Filed September 20, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 09-CR-1885; the 

Hon. Maura Slattery Boyle, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed and remanded for resentencing.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Sharifa Rahmany, all of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Mary P. Needham, and Jesse B. Guth, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of 

counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Pierce and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant Luther Washington, who represented himself at his jury trial, was convicted of 

murder with a firearm enhancement. At his sentencing hearing, Washington again represented 

himself. The sentencing court imposed a term of 30 years’ incarceration for murder with an 

additional consecutive 60-year term for the firearm enhancement. This court granted 

Washington’s motion to file a late notice of appeal. 

¶ 2 Washington argues he was not properly admonished regarding his right to counsel as 

required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984), both before trial and later 

when he elected to proceed pro se for sentencing. Washington also argues he was not fit for 

trial and the trial court should have ordered a second fitness hearing. The State responds that 

Washington was found fit for trial at his first evaluation hearing and the trial court was not 

obligated to sua sponte order another fitness hearing. And, the State asserts Washington was 

properly admonished regarding his right to counsel before trial. The State agrees with 

Washington, however, that he was not properly admonished when he elected again to proceed 

pro se for sentencing, and this court should remand for a new sentencing hearing. 

¶ 3 We affirm Washington’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing. The trial 

court properly admonished Washington before trial when he discharged his attorney and 

proceeded pro se. The trial court appointed a new assistant public defender to represent 

Washington on posttrial motions, but Washington discharged him. We find the requirements 

of Rule 401(a) were substantially met, and Washington knowingly and intelligently waived his 

right to an attorney at trial. In addition, the record supports the trial court’s finding that 

Washington was fit for trial. But, we reverse and remand for resentencing as the “continuing 

waiver” rule did not apply. Washington requested and received posttrial counsel, and the trial 

court did not substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 401(a) before accepting 

Washington’s waiver of his right to counsel for the sentencing hearing.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 On the night of September 13, 2008, Garfield Rogers was found facedown in an alley 

behind his house with a gunshot wound to the head. Earlier that day, Rogers and Washington 

visited Debra Lewis and her children at her home. Lewis, a relative of Washington’s, had 

known Rogers for 35 years. After spending the day at Lewis’s home, Rogers and Washington 

left late in the evening in Washington’s car. 

¶ 6 Three months later, Washington was arrested in an abandoned building. When arrested, he 

was carrying the gun that forensics later determined killed Rogers. 

¶ 7 Between February 2009 and April 2011, the office of the public defender represented 

Washington. In October 2010, the trial court sua sponte ordered two psychiatric evaluations 

after Washington’s assistant public defender informed the court that Washington questioned 

whether Rogers’ death resulted from a shooting. After the two evaluators reached opposite 

conclusions, the trial court held a fitness hearing on January 14 and March 9, 2011. 

Washington’s attorney stated for the record that Washington believed he was fit for trial and 

opposed any finding of unfitness. 

¶ 8 At the hearing, Dr. Susan Messina, licensed clinical psychologist at forensic clinical 

services for the State, testified she evaluated Washington on two separate occasions in October 
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and November 2010. She diagnosed Washington with “persecutory type delusional disorder” 

but stated that Washington understood the charges against him and the role of each participant 

in the trial. She opined, however, that he was unfit to stand trial. 

¶ 9 Dr. Nishad Nadkarni, staff psychiatrist, evaluated Washington on December 22, 2010. At 

the time, Washington was prescribed an antipsychotic medication plus Benadryl for side 

effects. Washington self-reported a diagnosis of “paranoid schizophrenia” but denied 

symptoms of mania or a major depressive episode. Dr. Nadkarni said Washington “exhibited 

no psychiatric or cognitive impairments.” Dr. Nadkarni deemed Washington’s affect and 

mood stable; thought process logical; and, in terms of his articulation, at least above average 

intelligence. Washington was well-focused on the task, and based on his criminal history and 

reports of behavior in Cermak Health Services, Dr. Nadkarni opined that Washington 

manifested antisocial personality traits; in other words, he was a sociopath. 

¶ 10 Dr. Nadkarni considered Washington fit for trial. Washington demonstrated a “strong 

understanding” of the charge and a “strong comprehension” of the nature of the proceedings, 

correctly identified the roles of various courtroom personnel, and displayed the capacity to 

assist counsel in his defense. Washington expressed frustration with his defense counsel but 

was logical and rational in reporting his problems communicating with counsel. 

¶ 11 On March 9, 2011, the trial court found Washington fit for trial, stating “Mr. Washington is 

intelligent, functioning, and does not suffer from any mental health issues that renders him 

unfit.” The assistant public defender requested leave to withdraw as counsel, which was 

denied. 

¶ 12 The following month, the trial court sua sponte ordered an additional evaluation for sanity. 

On the next court date, in May, Washington asked to proceed pro se but requested the court 

“allow me to have standby counsel for technicalities to assist me.” The trial court informed 

Washington he was charged with first degree murder, with a sentence “anywhere from a 

minimum of 20 years” up to life imprisonment. The trial court also told Washington he had a 

right to counsel and an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one. After more 

discussion, Washington requested, and was granted, “one opportunity to speak to [the assistant 

public defender] before we finalize it.” The case was passed and recalled. Washington told the 

court he “would like to” represent himself. 

¶ 13 On June 23, Washington filed a motion for a bill of particulars and a motion requesting the 

charging document. He also requested standby counsel. The case was continued twice more. 

On each occasion the trial court stated Washington was present representing himself on a 

charge of first degree murder. Washington filed multiple motions at each appearance. 

¶ 14 On September 20, Dr. Fidel Echevarria, staff psychiatrist with forensic clinical services, 

examined Washington and reviewed his clinical records. Dr. Echevarria opined that 

Washington was mentally fit for trial, legally sane at the time of the alleged offense, and 

understood his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Echevarria’s report 

noted Washington identified the charge of first degree murder as a felony and he defined 

felony to mean, “In my case, it’s what they call a class M something like 20 to 60 and a little bit 

more because a gun was involved, possibly up to life.” On September 30, based on this report, 

the trial court, without holding a hearing, found Washington fit for trial. 

¶ 15 In October and November, Washington appeared pro se and filed multiple motions each 

time. In November, Washington filed two motions, one requesting “assistance to assist in my 

pro se defense,” which was denied. Washington then stated he was “receiving a lot of bias” in 
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the courtroom and was “not getting any assistance.” After a lengthy colloquy, the trial court 

informed Washington: “We will try this as a bench or a jury sometime in January. Whatever 

you choose.” 

¶ 16 In January 2012, Washington stated he had “water in [his] ear” at the previous court date 

and was unable to hear the rulings on his motions. Washington stated that he wanted to 

represent himself but also filed another motion for “assistance,” which the trial court denied. 

¶ 17 Five months later, in May 2012, Washington filed pro se a motion for a substitution of 

judge for cause. Washington argued his motion before Judge Kazmierski and insisted that he 

wanted an attorney for his case saying: “I am not qualified to fight. I want to gather some 

evidence and I need someone to help me present it.” Washington then accused the trial judge 

(Judge Slattery Boyle) of not allowing him to subpoena witnesses; he accused the assistant 

public defender who had been assigned to his case until April 2011 of conducting “a charade.” 

Judge Kazmierski denied the motion and informed Washington that if he could not afford an 

attorney, Judge Slattery Boyle would appoint a public defender. 

¶ 18 Between November 2011 and June 2012, Washington appeared pro se at 20 court dates and 

filed about 100 motions. On August 6, 2012, the trial court denied 12 motions Washington 

filed pro se, including a motion to “exhume the victims’ body” and a motion objecting to 

“being forced to appear in court every five or ten days as a pro se litigant.”

¶ 19 Trial

¶ 20 Jury selection began on August 14, 2012. Before trial, Washington stated he was not going 

to participate but that during the trial he wanted to sit in the back of the courtroom. The trial 

court denied his request. Washington refused to answer when asked if he objected to the 

State’s motion to sever the armed habitual criminal count and motion to exclude witnesses. 

The court then proceeded to voir dire. 

¶ 21 Washington introduced himself to the jurors by saying he was not participating in the trial 

because he was denied “all” due process and that he was “apparently a schizophrenic and I’m 

not entitled to no experts as written in Ake versus Oklahoma [sic].” During the rest of the 

voir dire Washington either did not respond to questions asked of him or announced that he 

was not participating. Finally he objected “to everything pertaining to this trial.”

¶ 22 Washington’s opening statement consisted of statements that the deputy sheriffs dragged 

him into the courtroom because he was protesting participating in the trial, that if the charges 

were true he would not have been offered a second degree murder plea, and that he did not 

have a police report saying that Rogers died of a gunshot wound. He again announced he was 

not “offered” any due process and was not participating in the trial.

¶ 23 The State presented four witnesses who were present at Lewis’s house on September 13, 

2008. Each testified that Washington and Rogers spent the day playing dominoes and visiting. 

Rogers left with Washington around 9 p.m. Washington made no objections, and when it was 

his turn to cross-examine each witness, he stated he was not participating in the trial. At one 

point he stated “you haven’t allowed me a chance to participate—in the adversarial 

proceedings thus far.”

¶ 24 The State called a friend of Washington’s, William Friday, who answered almost every 

question either with the statement “I don’t know” or “I don’t recall.” When the trial court asked 

Washington if he had cross-examination, he stated, “Your Honor, I’m not participating in these 
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proceedings.” The trial court then recessed until the next day, prompting Washington to 

comment: “Your [H]onor, for the purposes of the record I object. You’ve not allowed me to 

have any of my witnesses. You’ve not given me any due process. These cuffs are tight. My 

ankles are bleeding. And I don’t know if I’m going to be able to make it.”

¶ 25 The next morning, when the court reconvened, Washington told the court outside the 

presence of the jury that he would not participate in trial and that he “did not ask for a jury trial. 

I want the record to reflect that as well.” The trial court responded: 

“You indicated your unwillingness. You said you were not going to plead guilty. I 

am completely aware of the record and I am going to make the record. For the purpose 

of this, you have exerted all of your Constitutional Rights, you have supplied the Court 

with case law, you have maintained your fitness. And the Court is of the belief that your 

behavior is intentional, you[r] behavior here today is your willingness and your intent 

to preserve the record for purpose[s] of appellate—appeal. And you have the right not 

to be a participant. That is completely up to you. 

Now, if you would like to be out here and not be disruptive, that’s fine, but if you 

would prefer to sit in back and listen via microphone and waive your right to be out 

here, that is also your choice. I will leave that up to you.” 

Washington then stated, “for purposes of the record, I never asked for a jury trial. And if you 

have me on record asking for one, it’s continued obstruction that has been going on all through 

these proceedings.” 

¶ 26 The State called former Assistant State’s Attorney John McNulty who testified William 

Friday had signed a written statement that on September 14, 2008, Washington asked him to 

keep in his apartment a bag that contained a gun. Washington told him he was afraid he would 

be caught with the gun. Friday refused, but Washington returned two days later and left the 

bag. Washington arrived a few days later, took the gun out of the bag, and began loading it. 

Friday protested, and Washington then left with the bag and the gun. Washington declined 

cross-examination. 

¶ 27 An assistant State’s Attorney who conducted the grand jury, the Chicago police officer 

who found the body, a homicide detective, and a CTA investigator testified. Washington 

declined cross-examination. 

¶ 28 After a lunch break, the deputies brought Washington to the courtroom. Washington stated 

he was not participating in the trial as there was no Chicago police report “saying there was a 

homicide.” While the assistant State’s Attorney opened sealed evidence envelopes, 

Washington was lying on the floor of the courtroom. Washington did not look at any of the 

evidence, stated he was not participating, and that he did not ask for a jury trial. He then told 

the court, “You didn’t offer me a bench trial.” 

¶ 29 Dr. Adrienne Segovia, Cook County assistant medical examiner who conducted the 

autopsy on Rogers, identified the bullet and casing that were recovered during the autopsy. 

When the assistant State’s Attorney brought them to show Washington, he stated “you know 

that those weren’t recovered from his head.” The cause of death was a gunshot wound to the 

head; the manner of death was homicide. 

¶ 30 The arresting officer and the crime scene technician both testified. The next day, a 

subpoena specialist for Washington’s cell phone company, an FBI special agent regarding cell 
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phone data, and an Illinois State Police forensic specialist specializing in firearms 

identification testified. Washington declined to cross-examine. 

¶ 31 The State rested. After some discussion outside the presence of the jury, Washington rested 

his defense. 

¶ 32 The State made its closing argument, and the trial court instructed the jury. After 

deliberating approximately 21⁄2 hours, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder. The jury 

also found that Washington “personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the 

death.”

¶ 33 Sentencing Hearing 

¶ 34 On September 12, 2012, at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

addressed Washington as follows: 

“Mr. Washington, sir, you have previously been found guilty. I will admonish you 

again. You do have rights, even in the post sentencing case. You have chosen to 

represent yourself, which is your right, but at this point, sir, I can appoint an attorney if 

you cannot afford one to represent you in the sentencing phase of this case, and that 

attorney again could prepare all motions and/or on your behalf if you so desire. You are 

entitled to an attorney. I could appoint a Public Defender if you like. I don’t have to if 

you want to continue to represent yourself. Would you like an attorney to be appointed 

for you, sir?” 

Washington requested an attorney to represent him “in this motion for new trial that I have 

prepared.” The trial court appointed the public defender and the cause was then continued, 

with the trial court telling Washington, “Since you want an attorney, you will get your 

attorney.” 

¶ 35 On the next court date two weeks later, the assistant public defender assigned to the case 

was unable to be in court. The following colloquy occurred: 

“THE COURT: Mr. Washington, you want a lawyer; correct[?]

 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

 THE COURT: All motions that are stricken that are filed on 9-18. As you have a 

request for an attorney, there is only one attorney. 

 THE DEFENDANT: Then I don’t want an attorney. I want to proceed. I want to 

proceed on these motion[s] that I filed. 

 THE COURT: No. Once you have requested one, the game plan is over. You have 

requested one. I am going to bring in [the assistant public defender]. Motion Defendant 

to next week, October 4, 2012, for attorney. Motion stricken as of 9-18 because he is 

requesting an attorney. 

THE DEFENDANT: I object. I don’t want no attorney. I object for the purposes of 

the attorney. 

THE COURT: Overruled.”

¶ 36 On October 4, the assistant public defender appeared with Washington. When asked, 

Washington stated he would “appreciate [assistant public defender] if you can help me with 

my motion for a retrial. That’s what I’m asking for.” Washington’s motions filed during the 

case were then tendered to the assistant public defender. 
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¶ 37 With the assistant public defender appearing, the trial court continued the case four times. 

In February, Washington filed pro se a motion for cocounsel and a second motion alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court asked Washington whether he wanted to 

represent himself: “this was done in September. This is a delay tactic by Mr. Washington, 

either you withdraw your motion, or you represent yourself, or he represents you.” Washington

answered the trial court’s question regarding proceeding pro se: “For the purposes of the 

record, Edwards vs. Indiana—I am the architect of the defense.” 

¶ 38 Because Washington did not answer directly, the trial court adjourned for one day. The 

next day the assistant public defender appeared and the trial court struck the pro se motions. 

Washington objected. The trial court then set a court date “for post-trial motions and 

sentencing.” Washington objected. The trial court overruled his objection; Washington said, 

“Did I tell you I wanted you to represent me? Did I tell you that I needed you?” Washington 

then told the court he was firing the assistant public defender. The trial court stated, “[assistant 

public defender], you are now fired. You are no longer representing him,” and set a date for 

sentencing. Washington objected, and the trial court overruled his objection. Washington 

inquired about the motion for a new trial, and the trial court stated it would be heard on the 

same date as sentencing. 

¶ 39 On March 22, 2013, Washington appeared pro se and filed several motions. When told to 

argue his motion for a new trial, he responded: “Your Honor, I’m not qualified to argue the 

motion. I was going to ask for appointment of counsel other than the Public Defender.” The 

trial court denied this request, ruled on the motions, denied the motion for a new trial, and 

proceeded to sentencing. 

¶ 40 The State presented two victim impact statements from Debra Lewis, one of the witnesses 

at trial, and from Rogers’ sister. The State also cited in aggravation Washington’s criminal 

history of eight prior felony convictions, three of which were gun-related and carried prison 

terms. 

¶ 41 In allocution, Washington stated that the State’s sentence recommendation for the gun 

enhancement finding was in error because the State was “going to waive the gun charge” at the 

beginning of trial. He also argued (i) there was no police report regarding a cause of death, (ii) 

the judge was “working for” someone, and (iii) he was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic 

but was not “crazy.” In mitigation, Washington stated he had been an “entrepreneur” for “over 

30, 40 years” and created jobs with his moving service (Washington was 53 years old at 

sentencing and had been incarcerated three different times for a total of 81⁄2 years). 

¶ 42 Before imposing sentence, the trial court noted that Washington’s presentation of motions 

and how he chose to conduct himself were “strategic in an attempt to impugn or cause error in 

this case.” The trial court remarked that, contrary to his assertions regarding running a business 

and providing jobs and income for people, Washington “could not have been a productive 

family man.” The trial court then sentenced Washington to consecutive terms of 30 years’ 

incarceration for murder and 60 years for “proximate cause.”

¶ 43 The Office of the State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent Washington on 

appeal. 
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¶ 44 ANALYSIS 

¶ 45 Washington first argues that the trial court did not substantially comply with Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 401(a) before permitting him to “twice proceed pro se.” Washington did 

not raise this issue in his posttrial motion. Errors affecting substantial rights may be addressed 

on review even if they were not raised in a posttrial motion. People v. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 

742 (1992). The right to counsel is so fundamental that it should not be “lightly deemed 

waived.” People v. Robertson, 181 Ill. App. 3d 760, 763 (1989). Further, defendant’s 

substantial rights are affected during the sentencing stage, and defendant has a constitutional 

right to counsel. Id. Therefore, we will address the merits of this issue. 

¶ 46 Waiver of Right to Counsel 

¶ 47 Generally, a criminal defendant must make an “unequivocal” request to represent himself 

or herself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-36 (1975); People v. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d 44, 

116 (2011). “Just as the right to counsel is fundamental, the right to represent oneself is of 

equal dignity.” People v. Ogurek, 356 Ill. App. 3d 429, 436 (2005) (citing People v. Simpson, 

204 Ill. 2d 536, 573 (2001)). 

¶ 48 For a defendant to invoke the right of self-representation, he or she must “knowingly and 

intelligently relinquish the right to counsel.” Baez, 241 Ill. 2d at 115-16. That is the purpose of 

Rule 401(a), to ensure a defendant’s waiver is knowing and voluntary. People v. Haynes, 174 

Ill. 2d 204 (1996). Before permitting waiver of counsel, Rule 401(a) requires the trial court 

determine the defendant understands (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the sentence range, 

including the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected due to other convictions; and 

(3) the right to counsel and to have counsel appointed due to indigency. Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) 

(eff. July 1, 1984). Strict, technical compliance with Rule 401(a) is not always required; 

“[r]ather, substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record 

indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the 

defendant received did not prejudice his [or her] rights.” Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236. 

¶ 49 When a defendant expresses a desire to proceed without counsel, the defendant is entitled 

to be advised of his or her right to the assistance of counsel, as well as the right to 

self-representation. People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80 (2006). For an effective waiver of 

counsel, the admonishments must be in substantial compliance with Rule 401(a). Id. at 84 (no 

substantial compliance where no admonishments made). The admonishments must be 

provided when the court learns defendant chooses to waive counsel so that defendant can 

consider the decision’s potential ramifications. People v. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 742, 750 

(1992). 

¶ 50 On review, the trial court’s decision on a defendant’s election to represent himself or 

herself will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion, which occurs when the court’s 

ruling is arbitrary and without a logical basis. People v. Hunt, 2016 IL App (1st) 132979, ¶ 16 

(new trial ordered where trial court denied defendant his constitutional right to 

self-representation). Whether the trial court properly admonished defendant presents a 

question of law that we review de novo. People v. Pike, 2016 IL App (1st) 122626, ¶ 114.

¶ 51 Washington argues that the trial court’s failure to substantially comply with Rule 401(a) 

invalidated his waivers of counsel. Our first inquiry is whether substantial compliance 

occurred or not. Recently, we found substantial compliance with the rule based on all of the 

admonitions given, the discussions between the trial court and the defendant, and even 
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“accepting the claim that the trial court should have admonished defendant about the 

possibility of his Class X status.” People v Maxey, 2016 IL App (1st) 130698, ¶ 47 (strict 

compliance with Rule 401(a) not necessary for pro se defendant at trial and sentencing). 

¶ 52 Further, the supreme court has found substantial compliance in multiple cases in which the 

defendant was misinformed about the minimum sentence. For example, in People v. Kidd, 178 

Ill. 2d 92, 114 (1997), the supreme court found substantial compliance by informing defendant 

of the nature of the charges, explaining the maximum sentence was the death penalty, and 

advising him of his right to counsel despite incorrect admonishment regarding one of the 

charges and the minimum sentence. In Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, the trial court substantially 

complied with the requirements of the rule when it informed the defendant of minimum and 

maximum sentences for a murder charge but not for a lesser burglary charge. Id. at 243. In 

People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321 (1989), the trial court incorrectly informed the defendant 

that the minimum sentence was 20 years, rather than natural life. Id. at 334. Finally, the 

supreme court found no prejudice when the defendant was not informed that the minimum 

sentence was life but rather informed that the maximum sentence was the death penalty. 

People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 133-34 (1987). 

¶ 53 In May 2011, Washington stated he wished to proceed to trial pro se. The trial court 

informed him the charge was first degree murder, with a sentence “anywhere from a minimum 

of 20 years” up to life imprisonment. The trial court also told Washington he had a right to 

counsel and an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one. After more discussion, 

Washington asked for an opportunity to speak to his public defender. The case was passed and 

later recalled. Washington then told the court he “would like to” represent himself. Certainly, 

conferencing with his public defender assisted Washington with considering the 

“ramifications” of the decision. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 750. 

¶ 54 Finding substantial compliance, we turn to the effectiveness of Washington’s waiver. A

knowing and intelligent waiver requires “full awareness of both the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d at 104-05. 

The waiver of counsel must be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous. People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 

2d 1, 21 (1998). The purpose of requiring a clear and unequivocal waiver is to “(1) prevent the 

defendant from appealing [either] the denial of his right to self-representation or the denial of 

his right to counsel, and (2) prevent the defendant from manipulating and abusing the system 

by going back and forth between his request for counsel and his wish to proceed pro se.”

People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530, 538 (2002). 

¶ 55 To determine whether defendant’s waiver was clear and unequivocal, a reviewing court 

looks to the overall context of the proceedings (Id. at 538-39), including a defendant’s conduct 

following the request to represent himself or herself. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d at 23-24. We consider 

the entire record in reaching our conclusion. See People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 133 

(1996) (direct questioning regarding defendant’s schooling provides one possible means to 

assess defendant’s ability to understand nature of right being waived). “The determination of 

whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, *** depend[s], in each 

case, upon the particular facts and circumstances of that case, including the background, 

experience, and conduct of the accused.” Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d at 105. 

¶ 56 After almost three years of pretrial proceedings during which Washington was represented 

by counsel, the trial court accepted Washington’s waiver of his right to counsel. As the State 

points out, Washington filed pro se over 100 motions. With the trial date approaching, 
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Washington insisted that he did not have discovery and when the trial court closed discovery, 

Washington moved for a substitution of judge, a somewhat sophisticated maneuver, which was 

denied. Washington then filed more motions. Jury selection began in August 2012. 

Washington announced he was not participating and proceeded to do just that. It is evident that 

the trial judge had ample opportunity in the pretrial proceedings to observe Washington and 

fully assess his ability to understand the proceedings. The record indicates that Washington 

was literate, educated, responsive, oriented, and comprehended what was going on. 

Washington also had an extensive criminal history and demonstrated a familiarity with the 

judicial process. In the words of the trial judge, Washington “knew what he was doing when he 

waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself.” See People v. Ware, 407 Ill. App. 

3d 315, 340-41, 348 (2011) (reviewing court must consider defendant’s conduct “as a whole”).

¶ 57 Pro Se Representation at Sentencing 

¶ 58 The State agrees with Washington that he should have been admonished again before 

proceeding to sentencing, and therefore, this court should remand for a new sentencing hearing 

with proper admonishments. We accept the State’s concession.

¶ 59 Generally, once a defendant makes a valid waiver of counsel, that waiver remains in effect 

throughout later stages of the proceedings, including posttrial stages. People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 

2d 85, 91-92 (1982). The “continuing waiver” rule has two exceptions: (1) the defendant later 

requests counsel or (2) other circumstances suggest that the waiver is limited to a particular 

stage of the proceedings. People v. Cleveland, 393 Ill. App. 3d 700 (2009) (defendant’s lack of 

legal assistance and his own ineffective advocacy during this stage of proceedings may have 

contributed to lengthy sentence). 

¶ 60 Circumstances requiring readmonishments before sentencing include lengthy delays 

between trial stages or a defendant’s later request for counsel. People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 

117, 138 (1996). In Cleveland, the appellate court considered circumstances almost identical to 

this case. There, the defendant waived his right to counsel during pretrial proceedings and was 

properly admonished according to Rule 401(a). Cleveland, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 702. After 

defendant was tried and convicted, he requested that counsel be reappointed to assist him in 

posttrial proceedings. At the posttrial hearing, the defendant once again waived counsel, and 

the trial court allowed him to represent himself without giving any admonishments. We held 

that “where a defendant waives counsel, proceeds pro se, requests counsel for a distinct stage 

of the proceedings, receives counsel, and then decides to waive counsel again,” the trial court 

must readmonish the defendant. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 712. 

¶ 61 At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court addressed Washington as quoted 

supra ¶ 34. Washington then requested an attorney to represent him “in this motion for new 

trial that I have prepared.” The trial court appointed the public defender and the cause was 

continued, with the trial court telling Washington, “Since you want an attorney, you will get 

your attorney.” 

¶ 62 By asking Washington if he wished to have assistance of counsel, the trial court at least 

implicitly informed defendant that he had a right to counsel and that the trial court would 

appoint counsel if he could not afford one, thus satisfying the third admonishment required by 

the rule. However, as in Cleveland, the trial court did not state either the nature of the charges 

or the minimum and maximum penalties, as required. Id. at 709. 
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¶ 63 The difficulties the trial court faced are evident in the following exchange on the next court 

date, two weeks later. The assigned attorney was not present, and Washington responded “yes” 

when asked if he wanted a lawyer but immediately changed his mind when the trial court told 

him his pro se motions were stricken. The trial court continued the hearing for two weeks to 

have the assistant public defender appear. Washington stated: “I object. I don’t want no 

attorney. I object for the purposes of the attorney.” On October 4, the assistant public defender 

appeared with Washington. When asked, Washington stated he would “appreciate [assistant 

public defender] if you can help me with my motion for a retrial. That’s what I’m asking for.” 

Washington’s motions filed during the case were then tendered to the assistant public 

defender. 

¶ 64 On November 15 and December 21, 2012, and January 9, 2013, with an assistant public 

defender appearing, Washington was granted more continuances. On February 7 Washington 

filed pro se a motion for cocounsel and a second motion alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The trial court asked Washington whether he wanted to represent himself as follows: 

“this [trial] was done in September. This is a delay tactic by Mr. Washington, either you 

withdraw your motion, or you represent yourself, or he represents you.” Washington answered 

the trial court’s question regarding proceeding pro se with the following: “For the purposes of 

the record, Edwards vs. Indiana—I am the architect of the defense.” 

¶ 65 At this point, the trial court dismissed Washington’s attorney and set a date for a hearing on 

Washington’s motion for a new trial and for sentencing. 

¶ 66 Washington was fully informed and vacillated numerous times; the trial court faced an 

extremely formidable task. But Rule 401(a) admonishments must be provided when the court 

learns defendant chooses to waive counsel and proceed pro se “so that defendant can consider 

the ramifications of such a decision.” People v. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 742, 750 (1992) (no 

admonishments outlined in Rule 401(a) were provided at the sentencing hearing). 

¶ 67 At the sentencing hearing, Washington continued to argue his numerous motions while the 

trial court repeatedly tried to redirect him to mitigating factors for sentencing purposes. At one 

point the court even suggested he talk about his education, family, and personal history. 

“Defendant’s insistence on disputing the merits of the charge rather than focusing on the 

relevant sentencing issue once again signifies his ineffectiveness.” Cleveland, 393 Ill. App. 3d 

at 712. Finally, Washington stated in mitigation that he was an “entrepreneur” for “over 30, 40 

years,” creating jobs with his moving service, but Washington was 53 years old at sentencing 

and had been incarcerated three different times for a total of 81⁄2 years. 

¶ 68 Before imposing sentence, the trial court noted that Washington’s presentation of motions 

and how he chose to conduct himself were “strategic in an attempt to impugn or cause error in 

this case.” While the record supports this assessment, we must conclude that Washington was 

not adequately admonished after he decided to dismiss his posttrial attorney. The continuing 

waiver rule is voided by a later request for representation. Cleveland, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 

708-09. Moreover, the trial court’s admonishment when Washington waived counsel before 

trial had occurred almost two years before he pronounced himself “architect” of his own 

defense. Viewing the record in its entirety, as we must, under the facts of this case, we find the 

trial court did not substantially comply with Rule 401(a). Therefore, we remand for 

resentencing. 
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¶ 69 Fitness to Stand Trial 

¶ 70 “Due process bars the prosecution of an unfit defendant.” People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 

186 (2010). Illinois law presumes a defendant fit to stand trial or plead and be sentenced. 725 

ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2008). A defendant is unfit if, because of a mental or physical condition, 

he or she is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or her 

or unable to assist in his or her defense. Id. To be competent to stand trial, the defendant must 

have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him or her. People 

v. Weeks, 393 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1009 (2009). 

¶ 71 Under section 104-16, a hearing on fitness determines a defendant’s (1) “knowledge and 

understanding of the charge, the proceedings, the consequences of a plea, judgment or 

sentence, and the functions of the participants in the trial process”; (2) ability to “observe, 

recollect and relate occurrences, especially those concerning the incidents alleged, and to 

communicate with counsel”; and (3) “social behavior and abilities; orientation as to time and 

place; recognition of persons, places and things; and performance of motor processes.” 725 

ILCS 5/104-16(b) (West 2008). Based on the evidence before it, the court or jury decides the 

issue of a defendant’s fitness to stand trial or to plead. 725 ILCS 5/104-16 (West 2008). 

¶ 72 The trial court must order a fitness hearing if a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness is 

raised. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 2010). The test of a bona fide doubt is objective, 

examining whether facts raise a “real, substantial, and legitimate doubt” regarding the 

defendant’s mental capacity to meaningfully participate in his or her defense. People v. 

Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 518 (1991). Whether a bona fide doubt exists is within the 

discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to observe the defendant and evaluate 

his or her conduct. People v. Tolefree, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689, ¶ 53. A trial court abuses its 

discretion only where no reasonable person would take the court’s view or where its ruling is 

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Id.

¶ 73 At the fitness hearing, Dr. Messina concluded Washington had “persecutory type 

delusional disorder” and opined that he was unfit to stand trial. On the other hand, Dr. 

Nadkarni opined that Washington was fit to stand trial despite manifesting antisocial 

personality traits indicating he was a sociopath. According to Dr. Nadkarni, during the 

evaluation Washington demonstrated a “strong understanding” of the charge and “strong 

comprehension” of the nature of the proceedings. Washington correctly identified the roles of 

various courtroom personnel and, although frustrated with his public defender, displayed the 

capacity to assist counsel in his defense. Dr. Nadkarni believed Washington to be logical and 

rational in reporting his problems communicating with her. 

¶ 74 After the hearing, the trial court found Washington fit for trial. The “quality of the trial 

court’s observation of the defendant” (People v. Schoreck, 384 Ill. App. 3d 904, 920 (2008)) 

constitutes a significant factor. 

¶ 75 In People v. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d 212 (2004), the supreme court explained if the trial court is 

not convinced that a bona fide doubt of fitness is raised, it has the discretion under section 

104-11(b) to grant the defendant’s request for appointment of an expert to aid in that 

determination. Id. at 217; 725 ILCS 5/104-11(b) (West 2000). If, after a fitness examination is 

completed, the trial court determines that there is bona fide doubt, then a fitness hearing would 

be mandatory under section 104-11(a). Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d at 217. Conversely, if “the trial 

court finds no bona fide doubt, no further hearings on the issue of fitness would be necessary.” 

Id. In other words, “[t]he mere act of granting a defendant’s motion for a fitness examination 
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cannot, by itself, be construed as a definitive showing that the trial court found a bona fide

doubt of defendant’s fitness.” Id. at 222. See People v. Gentry, 351 Ill. App. 3d 872, 877 

(2004) (court’s order for fitness examination does not necessarily imply finding of bona fide

doubt). 

¶ 76 The trial court must order a fitness hearing if a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness is 

raised. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 2010). Relevant factors a trial court may consider in 

assessing whether a bona fide doubt of fitness exists include (i) a defendant’s irrational 

behavior, (ii) demeanor at trial, (iii) prior medical opinions on the defendant’s competence, 

and (iv) any representations by defense counsel on the defendant’s competence. Brown, 236 

Ill. 2d at 186-87. The mere fact that a defendant suffers from mental disturbances or requires 

psychiatric treatment does not necessarily raise a bona fide doubt as to fitness because he or 

she may be competent to participate at trial even though his or her mind is otherwise unsound. 

Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d at 519.

¶ 77 Almost six months after the fitness hearing, the trial court ordered another behavior clinical 

examination because Washington’s defense counsel and the trial court had concerns about his 

understanding of the charges. Dr. Echevarria reviewed the clinical records and examined 

Washington. Dr. Echevarria proclaimed Washington mentally fit to stand trial, legally sane at 

the time of the alleged offense, and cognizant of his Miranda rights. Dr. Echevarria’s report 

noted Washington identified the charge of first degree murder as a felony carrying a possible 

sentence of 20 to 60 years and “because a gun was involved, possibly up to life.” Based on this 

report, the trial court found Washington fit to stand trial. We find no abuse of discretion. 

¶ 78 Washington concludes this argument by asking this court to remand his case to the trial 

court for a determination of whether he was a “gray area” defendant, i.e., fit to stand trial but 

not fit to represent himself, under the standards established in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 

164, 172 (2008). But Edwards “did not hold there was a higher standard of competence 

requiring an additional inquiry before a trial court permitted a defendant to proceed pro se. 

Rather, Edwards simply held that a defendant’s right to self-representation was not absolute 

***.” People v. Allen, 401 Ill. App. 3d 840, 851 (2010). That right could be limited if a 

defendant was not mentally competent to proceed pro se, yet was still competent to stand trial 

represented by counsel. Id.

¶ 79 Edwards concluded that the Constitution “permits judges to take realistic account” of a 

defendant’s mental capacities. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177. Particularly applicable is the 

Edwards court’s declaration that “the trial judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this 

case, who presided over one of Edwards’ competency hearings and his two trials, will often 

prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the 

individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.” Id.

¶ 80 The record does not establish that Washington was delusional or irrational, as he now 

asserts. Before the trial began and after the jury reached its verdict, Washington vigorously, 

persistently, and concretely argued his case to the trial court when he wanted to. And his 

refusal to participate during his jury trial reflects deliberate conduct on his part. We agree with 

the trial judge that Washington’s actions were premeditated and purposeful, albeit misguided. 

With his vacillating positions, copious pretrial motions, and persistent courtroom chicanery, 

Washington sought to obstruct an orderly prosecution. When counsel represented him, 

Washington adamantly insisted he did not need the assistant public defender assigned to his 

case. After “firing” his public defenders, he requested counsel and then objected to having 
- 14 - 

counsel. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court—Washington resolved to 

delay the proceedings, obscure the issues, and confound the trial court. 

¶ 81 The frequent court dates during the years between Washington’s indictment in February 

2009 through his sentencing hearing in September 2012, bespeaks the trial court’s deep 

familiarity with Washington’s mental state and competency. Washington asks this court to 

substitute its judgment for that of the well-informed and discerning trial court in a 

discretionary ruling. Based on the totality of the record, we cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding Washington fit to stand trial and fit to represent himself. 

¶ 82 Affirmed and remanded for resentencing.