J-S58039-16

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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

2016 PA Super 271

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHANNON LEMOR WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 1895 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order October 9, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002349-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES, J., and PLATT, J.*

OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016

Appellant, Shannon Lemor Williams, appeals from the order entered in 

York County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to dismiss the 

charge of persons not to possess a firearm.1 We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

The Commonwealth alleges that on March 19, 2014, 

[Appellant] physically assaulted the victim...and threatened 

her with a gun. The Commonwealth has charged 

[Appellant] with, inter alia, person[s] not to possess a 

firearm, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), stemming 

from the March 19, 2014 incident, which occurred in York 

County. [Appellant] was also indicted in federal court on 

one count of possession of a firearm by a person 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). 
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previously convicted of crime punishable by imprisonment 

to a term exceeding one year, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1), based on the same incident. On April 7, 2015, 

[Appellant] was found not guilty of the federal charge 

following a jury trial. On July 13, 2015, [Appellant] filed 

the instant Motion to Dismiss the § 6105(a)(1) state 

charge [pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111,] due to his federal 

acquittal. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed October 9, 2015, at 1-2). The court denied 

Appellant’s motion to dismiss on October 9, 2015. Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal on October 27, 2015.2 The court ordered Appellant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

and Appellant timely complied. 

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

DENYING...APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO 18 

PA.C.S. [§] 111? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

Appellant argues the Pennsylvania and federal charges stemmed from 

the same incident. Appellant concedes the Pennsylvania and federal 

statutes in question each require proof of a fact not required by the other. 

Appellant contends, however, that the statutes are designed to prevent 

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2 A defendant is entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal as of right 

from an order denying a non-frivolous motion to dismiss pursuant to 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 111. Commonwealth v. Savage, 566 A.2d 272 (Pa.Super. 

1989). Here, the court found Appellant’s motion was not frivolous as it 

presented a good faith argument requiring statutory analysis. Therefore, we 

have jurisdiction over Appellant’s interlocutory appeal. See id. 
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substantially similar harms or evils, i.e., possession of firearms by people 

who have been convicted of serious crimes. Appellant concludes his 

acquittal of the federal charge of unlawful acts compelled dismissal of the 

Commonwealth’s charge of persons not to possess a firearm. We disagree. 

The issue of whether a criminal charge is barred under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

111 presents a question of law subject to plenary review. Commonwealth 

v. Calloway, 675 A.2d 743 (Pa.Super. 1996). Section 111 provides in 

relevant part:

§ 111. When prosecution barred by former 

prosecution in another jurisdiction

When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent 

jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United States 

or another state, a prosecution in any such other 

jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this 

Commonwealth under the following circumstances:

(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in 

a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title 

(relating to when prosecution barred by former 

prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent 

prosecution is based on the same conduct unless:

(i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly 

convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he 

is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a 

fact not required by the other and the law defining 

each of such offenses is intended to prevent a 

substantially different harm or evil[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111(1)(i). The application of Section 111(1)(i) involves a 

three-step analysis: 

The first inquiry is whether...the prosecution which the 

Commonwealth proposes to undertake involves the same 
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conduct for which the individual was prosecuted by the 

other jurisdiction. If the answer to this question is yes, 

then we must determine whether each prosecution 

requires proof of a fact not required by the other, and

whether the law defining the Commonwealth offense is 

designed to prevent a substantially different harm or evil 

from the law defining the other jurisdiction’s offense. If 

the Commonwealth cannot satisfy both of these requisites, 

then the prosecution may not proceed.

Calloway, supra at 747. “[W]hen a defendant raises a non-frivolous prima 

facie claim that a prosecution may be barred under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111, the 

prosecution bears a burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

either that the ‘same conduct’ is not involved, or that a statutory exception

to the statutory bar on reprosecution applies.” Commonwealth v. Wetton, 

591 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Pa.Super. 1991) (emphasis removed). 

Section 6105(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act states:

§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, 

control, sell or transfer firearms

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense 

enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this 

Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or 

whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall 

not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture 

or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, 

transfer or manufacture a firearm in this 

Commonwealth.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). 

The federal “unlawful acts” statute provides in relevant part:

§ 922. Unlawful acts
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* * *

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year;

* * *

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 

possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 

ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition 

which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 

foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Instantly, the Pennsylvania and federal charges were both based on 

the same conduct of Appellant. Therefore, to prosecute Appellant for a 

violation of Section 6105(a)(1), the Commonwealth had to establish (1) the 

Pennsylvania and federal charges each require proof of a fact not required 

by the other; and (2) the law defining each offense is intended to prevent a 

substantially different harm or evil. See Calloway, supra. The federal 

“unlawful acts” statute requires proof that the defendant (1) possessed or 

transported a firearm or ammunition; (2) possessed or transported the 

firearm or ammunition in a manner that affected interstate/foreign 

commerce; and (2) has been convicted of any crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

By contrast, the Pennsylvania statute requires proof that the defendant (1) 

possessed, used, controlled, sold, transferred, or manufactured a firearm (or 
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obtained a license to do any of the foregoing activities); and (2) has been 

convicted of a specific type of offense listed in Section 6105(b) or 6105(c), 

or meets one of the miscellaneous conditions set forth in Section 6105(c).3 

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). Thus, each statute requires proof of a fact 

not required by the other. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111(1)(i). Appellant 

concedes this first element of proof. 

With respect to the harms which the statutes are intended to prevent, 

the trial court reasoned:

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the purpose of 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 in Commonwealth v. Gillespie[, 573 

Pa. 100, 105, 821 A.2d 1221, 1224 (2003), cert. denied, 

540 U.S. 972, 124 S.Ct. 442, 157 L.Ed.2d 320 (2003)], 

when it stated, “[t]he current version of [Section] 6105 

also expanded the class of convictions from “crime[s] of 

violence” to include certain potentially violent crimes. ... 

The clear purpose of [Section] 6105 is to protect the public 

from convicted criminals who possess firearms, regardless 

of whether the previous crimes were actually violent....”

In support of the intent for the federal offense, the 

Commonwealth cites to section 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) for 

evidence of what harm the statute was intended to 

[prevent]. Section 922(q) addresses crime as being a 

“pervasive, nationwide problem” that is exacerbated at the 

local level “by the interstate movement of drugs, guns, 

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3 Appellant was previously convicted of possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance, which meets the criteria of Section 6105(c)(2). See

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(2) (applying prohibition on firearm possession to: “A 

person who has been convicted of an offense under the act of April 14, 1972 

(P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and 

Cosmetic Act, or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any 

other state, that may be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 

two years”). 
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and criminal gangs.” The statute heavily addresses the 

impact that interstate movement of firearms has on 

schools around the country. It explicitly states that the 

“occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in 

a decline in the quality of education in our country,” and 

that Congress has the power to “ensure the integrity and 

safety of the Nation’s schools by enactment of this 

subsection.” The [c]ourt finds that the federal offense is 

broader in scope with reference to the intent to control the 

interstate movement of firearms at a national level, with a 

special focus on protecting the safety of those around 

school zones.

The federal statute also discusses the problem of the ease 

of firearm movement through interstate commerce and the 

fearful effect it can produce in citizens to travel through 

certain areas due to violent crime and gun violence. The 

federal prohibition applies regardless of the type of offense 

as long as the offense is punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding one year. The state offense is 

also concerned with public safety but enumerates 

particular offenses that are intended to target individuals 

who have violent or potentially violent prior offenses. 

While both statutes enshrine the general recognition that 

guns in the hands of convicted criminals can lead to crime, 

the state statute is focused principally upon locally denying 

access to persons who have committed potentially violent 

offenses as well as actual violent offenses in order to 

minimize future physical harms to citizens within the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

The federal statute focuses more broadly and seeks to 

prevent much broader national social and economic harms, 

including the adverse impact upon the nation’s educational 

system and the chilling effect upon interstate commerce. 

As such, the state and federal laws, while generally 

seeking to reduce crime, intend to prevent substantially 

different harms of a different scope. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 4-6) (footnotes omitted). We agree with the court’s 

analysis. The Pennsylvania statute and the federal statute each (1) requires 

proof of a fact the other does not; and (2) targets harms that differ 
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substantially in scope. Therefore, the court properly denied Appellant’s 

motion to dismiss. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 111(1)(i); Calloway, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016