Supreme Court

No. 2015-245-C.A. 

(P1/14-1482AG)

State :

v. :

Jose Lopez. :

 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before 

publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to 

notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 

250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 

222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
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Supreme Court

No. 2015-245-C.A. 

(P1/14-1482AG)

State :

v. :

Jose Lopez. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on

October 26, 2016, on appeal by the defendant, Jose Lopez (defendant or Lopez), from judgments 

of conviction entered in the Superior Court, following a jury trial. Lopez was convicted of 

murder in the first degree, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and conspiracy to 

commit murder. Lopez, who was a juvenile at the time of the murder, was acquitted of one 

count of carrying a firearm without a license.1 

Before this Court, Lopez contends that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a 

new trial. Specifically, he argues that the trial justice overlooked and misconstrued material 

evidence and that the weight of the evidence did not support the verdicts in this case in light of

the bias and interests of the state’s witnesses. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 

judgments of conviction.

 

1

Lopez turned seventeen years old four days after the murder and was waived out of Family 

Court following a hearing. 
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Facts and Travel

On Christmas Eve 2013, twenty-one-year-old Ryan Almeida (Almeida) was murdered 

outside his mother’s home at The Galego Court housing project (the Manor) in Pawtucket, 

Rhode Island. The facts and circumstances leading up to this homicide portray a vengeful and 

violent gang feud between the “Chad Brown” and the “East Side” street gangs. Jason “Heavy” 

Gonzalez (Gonzalez), Daquan Watts (Watts), and Lopez are members of the Chad Brown gang,

and the decedent was an alleged member of the rival East Side gang. Although the intense 

antagonism between the two gangs is deeply rooted, the animosity escalated in June 2013 when 

Lopez’s cousin, Jose “Hova” Sanchez, was murdered, allegedly by members of the East Side 

gang. 

The facts of this case are chilling. In the early morning hours of December 24, 2013, 

Gonzalez, Watts, and Lopez “went for a ride” to the East Side of Providence “[t]o see if [they 

could] see anybody from that side of town.” They drove up Pleasant Street, down Camp Street, 

and down Doyle Avenue, looking for enemies to shoot, to no avail, when Watts suggested that 

they go to the Manor and look for Almeida. After driving past the guard shack at the Manor, 

Watts directed them to the back of the Manor, where he knew Almeida lived with his mother. 

Gonzalez and Watts noticed a black car with its engine running and its lights on. Although the 

vehicle appeared to be unoccupied, there were two occupants in the car—Janelle Lewis (Lewis) 

and her boyfriend. Lewis, an eyewitness to the murder, testified at trial. Her testimony 

corroborated the testimony of Gonzalez and Watts and supported their accounts that Lopez was 

the shooter. After noticing Lewis’s vehicle, the Chad Brown gang proceeded out of the Manor 

and parked on a side street across from the complex. 
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According to both Gonzalez and Watts, Gonzalez got out of the car and asked for the gun 

but Lopez objected, declaring that he “wanted to do it.” Watts and Gonzalez watched as Lopez 

pulled a gun out of his shoe and put it in the pocket of his gray hooded sweatshirt. Lopez asked 

Watts to accompany him because Watts knew his way around the Manor; Gonzalez remained in 

the car. Watts and Lopez tightened the hoods of their sweatshirts and proceeded into the Manor 

toward Almeida’s apartment. According to Watts, Almeida was coming out of his home when 

Lopez pulled out the gun, aimed, and fired. Watts heard a total of five gunshots. As Almeida 

fell to the ground, Lopez and Watts ran back to the car where Watts told Gonzalez that it was 

Almeida who was coming out of the house, and that “[Lopez] had got him.” Watts added, “I 

heard [Almeida] scream. I think he got hit five times.” Lopez agreed, stating, “I think I hit

him.” The gunshots awakened Almeida’s mother, who ran to the door and saw her son lying on 

the ground outside, bleeding from his abdomen. In his final moments, Almeida worried for his 

mother, stating, “Ma, don’t run out here. I think they’re still out here.” Almeida died of a 

gunshot wound to the torso; the manner of death was homicide. It was Christmas Eve morning. 

The defendant testified at trial and contested this version of events. According to Lopez, 

it was he who was driving the car that evening, a white Toyota Solara that he had borrowed from 

his friend, Nathaniel Robinson (Robinson). After Lopez picked up Watts, Gonzalez, and Tyron

Wilcox (Wilcox), Watts suggested that they drive to the East Side to look for rival gang 

members. Lopez agreed because it was the East Side gang that had killed his cousin, but he 

stated: “I’m not shooting nobody or nothing.” Lopez testified that he did not want to “put 

[Robinson’s] car in a situation.” As they were driving to the East Side, Wilcox asked to be taken

home to his house in the Manor to “get something.” When they reached the Manor, Lopez drove 

past the guard shack, circled around, and exited the complex. He parked across the street, as 
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instructed by Watts. Notably, Lopez claimed that he did not notice a black car with its lights on 

parked in the back of the Manor because he “wasn’t paying attention.”

Lopez testified that Watts and Wilcox got out of the Solara, donned their hoodies, and 

walked toward the Manor without speaking a word. Lopez testified that he did not see a gun, 

and did not know where Watts and Wilcox were going because he “wasn’t paying attention.” 

When the men returned to the vehicle, about five minutes later, Lopez asked, “What the hell. 

What’s going on?” Lopez claimed that neither man responded, but that he saw Watts hand 

something to Gonzalez. He could not identify the item because he “wasn’t paying attention.” 

Also, he did not learn of the shooting until the next day, when he watched the news. Lopez

averred that he later spoke with Watts, who confirmed that he was the shooter. 

Although the events leading up to the shooting were disputed by the witnesses at trial, it 

was uncontested that Lopez was the first member of the group to speak with the police in the 

aftermath of the shooting. However, defendant’s version of the events did not support the facts 

uncovered by the detectives during their investigation, including the facts disclosed by Lewis,

whose physical description of the shooter matched that of Lopez. Lopez was arrested on April 4, 

2014, after the detectives secured an arrest warrant based on surveillance images captured by a 

camera on the guard shack of the Manor. The images depict the Toyota Solara entering into the 

complex in the early morning hours of December 24, 2013; based on the images, the police 

traced the vehicle to Lopez. After an initial denial, Lopez eventually admitted that he had been 

the driver of the Solara, but that Watts was the shooter. Subsequently, the detectives secured 

warrants for Watts and Wilcox, and then arrested Gonzalez. 

When Watts and Gonzalez learned that Lopez “gave up everybody” and “point[ed] the 

finger at [them],” the tables turned. Watts and Gonzalez agreed to cooperate with the state and 
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testify against Lopez.

2

 At trial, both Watts and Gonzalez declared that Lopez was the shooter. 

Their testimony and that of the other witnesses for the state convinced the jury of Lopez’s guilt. 

He was convicted of murder, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and conspiracy to 

commit murder. 

After the trial justice denied Lopez’s motion for a new trial, he was sentenced to two 

mandatory consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for first-degree murder and for 

discharging a firearm resulting in death. He also was sentenced to a consecutive ten-year term of 

suspension and probation for conspiracy to commit murder. Lopez filed a timely notice of 

appeal to this Court; he was eighteen years old at the time. 

Standard of Review

When passing on a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, “the trial justice must 

determine ‘whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Staffier, 21 A.3d 287, 290 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. 

Peoples, 996 A.2d 660, 664 (R.I. 2010)). “When making this determination, ‘the trial justice acts 

as a thirteenth juror, exercising independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses and on the 

weight of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Heredia, 10 A.3d 443, 446 (R.I. 2010)). 

“Specifically, ‘the trial justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, 

(2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then 

(3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the 

jury.’” Id. (quoting Heredia, 10 A.3d at 446). “If the trial justice agrees with the jury’s verdict, 

 

2 Watts pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a 

license; he was sentenced to serve a single life sentence for first-degree murder and ten years 

concurrently for conspiracy and carrying a firearm without a license. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to 

conspiracy and carrying a firearm without a license; he was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 

ten years, three years to serve with seven years suspended and probation. 
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the inquiry is complete and the motion for a new trial should be denied.”3Id. (citing State v. 

Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I. 2006)). 

Furthermore, “[i]n cases in which the trial justice has articulated a sufficient rationale for 

denying a motion for a new trial, the decision will be given great weight. Such a judgment will 

be disturbed only if the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material evidence relating to 

a critical issue or if the justice was otherwise clearly wrong.” State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363, 

1367 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Robbio, 526 A.2d 509, 513 (R.I. 1987)). “This Court employs a 

‘deferential standard of review because a trial justice, being present during all phases of the trial, 

is in an especially good position to evaluate the facts and to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses.’” State v. Baptista, 79 A.3d 24, 29-30 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Paola, 59 A.3d 99, 

104 (R.I. 2013)).

Analysis

The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial justice erred in denying defendant’s 

motion for a new trial. Specifically, we are tasked with considering whether the trial justice 

overlooked or misconceived material evidence and clearly erred when he credited the testimony 

of two biased cohorts—Watts and Gonzalez. We perceive no error.

After carefully reviewing the record before us, we are satisfied that the trial justice

properly weighed the evidence presented at trial and independently assessed the credibility of the 

witnesses when he concluded that he agreed with the jury’s verdict. See Banach, 648 A.2d at 

1367 (holding that the trial justice did not err in denying a motion for a new trial where he 

 

3

 See State v. Staffier, 21 A.3d 287, 290-91 (R.I. 2011) (“If, however, the trial justice does not 

agree with the jury verdict, he or she is required to proceed to a fourth step in the new trial 

analysis to ‘determine whether the verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence and 

fails to do substantial justice. If the verdict meets this standard, then a new trial may be 

granted.’” (quoting State v. Guerra, 12 A.3d 759, 765-66 (R.I. 2011))). 
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reviewed the physical evidence presented at trial, independently assessed the credibility of the 

witnesses, and articulated his reasons for the denial). The trial justice prefaced his reasoning for 

denying the motion by quoting from this Court’s decision in State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098

(R.I. 1992), stating:

“[W]hen a defendant elects to testify, he runs the very real risk that 

if disbelieved, the trier of fact may conclude that the opposite of 

his testimony is the truth. * * * As long as there exists some other 

evidence of the defendant’s guilt, disbelief of a defendant’s sworn 

testimony is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt. * * * ‘A trier of 

fact is not compelled to accept and believe the self-serving stories 

of vitally interested defendants. Their evidence may not only be 

disbelieved, but from the totality of the circumstances, including 

the manner in which they testify, a contrary conclusion may be 

properly drawn.’” Id. at 1109 (quoting United States v. Cisneros, 

448 F.2d 298, 305 (9th Cir. 1971)). 

We consider this passage befitting for the issue at hand. This case was a straightforward

credibility contest between defendant and his co-conspirators, Watts and Gonzalez. The 

defendant elected to testify, and the jury rejected his testimony, a repudiation that the trial justice 

found to be “not at all surprising.” 

The trial justice assessed defendant’s credibility by recounting portions of his testimony, 

honing in on the myriad of untruths that he offered to the jury. The inconsistencies began with

defendant’s claim “that he was not a member of the Chad Brown gang” despite his appearance in 

Facebook photographs flaunting the iconic Chad Brown “C” hand sign and his repeated

Facebook references to his friends as “fellow gang members.” The defendant testified that he 

“didn’t know there was a gun in the car” even though the nearly identical testimony of Watts and 

Gonzalez named him as the gunman. The trial justice found that, in further conflict with 

defendant’s apparent ignorance of the gun, is the sad reality of gang life—that “one never 

enter[s] into enemy territory without a gun”—and that there is “no reason to go into enemy 
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territory unless [intending] to shoot somebody.” The trial justice concluded that defendant’s 

testimony, in addition to his disclaimer that he would drive to the East Side but not shoot at 

anyone, was “simply not credible. At the very least, [defendant] knew full well that this car ride 

was bent on violence and, as well, revenge and retaliation for [his cousin’s] death.” The 

defendant’s version of the moments after the shooting, when he stated that Watts and Gonzalez 

returned to the car and neglected to mention the shooting, also was categorized by the trial 

justice as “simply ridiculous.”

In contrast to defendant’s testimony, the trial justice credited that of Watts and Gonzalez 

and found “[a]t the very least, the evidence demonstrated that all three of them were involved in 

a conspiracy to commit murder. * * * Gonzalez last saw the gun in Lopez[’s] hands, and Watts 

said he saw Lopez actually shoot Almeida.” The trial justice concluded, based on the evidence 

adduced at trial, that the jury was warranted in accepting that testimony. We are inclined to 

agree. When a defendant in a criminal case elects to testify on his own behalf, he can expect 

rigorous cross-examination from the prosecution that may well serve as the final persuasive 

factor convincing the jury of his guilt. 

In the context of a motion for a new trial, this Court has articulated that, even if “the 

evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are so nearly balanced that 

reasonable individuals could arrive at different results * * * the new trial motion must be 

denied.” Connors v. Gasbarro, 448 A.2d 756, 759 (R.I. 1982). Here, however, the approximately 

one hundred and fifty pages of the record devoted to defendant’s testimony yields little room for

a near balance of the evidence or the potential for reasonable minds to arrive at different results. 

Rather, after a fair reading of defendant’s testimony, any doubt that existed in the minds of the 

jurors after the testimony of Watts and Gonzalez evaporated. See State v. Cacchiotti, 568 A.2d 
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1026, 1029 (R.I. 1990) (affirming the denial of a motion for a new trial where the defendant’s 

own testimony, when viewed in the context of other highly credible testimony, in all likelihood 

caused the jury to convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter). 

Thus, when the credible testimony of Watts and Gonzalez is considered in light of 

defendant’s inconsistent, self-serving offering, a rational factfinder could fairly find defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1109 (considering the independent 

evidence adduced at trial in light of the defendant’s “patently incredible testimony—testimony 

full of inconsistencies and contradictions” to conclude that “neither the trial justice nor any 

rational juror could have entertained any reasonable doubt about [the defendant’s] guilt”). 

Consequently, we are satisfied that the trial justice neither overlooked nor misconceived material 

evidence nor was the trial justice otherwise clearly wrong in reaching the same result as the jury. 

We note that the main thrust of defendant’s appeal—that the trial justice should have 

believed defendant’s testimony and not that of the state’s witnesses, who he alleges were biased 

and were driven by motives to lie—is but an attempt to have this Court reassess the credibility of 

the witnesses, an exercise in which we decline to engage. See Banach, 648 A.2d at 1368 (noting 

that, credibility determinations belong in a trial court but not in this Court). 

At the motion for a new trial stage in a criminal prosecution, credibility assessments are 

exclusively within the province of the trial justice who “is under no obligation to sift through a 

witness’s testimony and discard only those portions that are patently unbelievable.” Banach, 648 

A.2d at 1368. Rather, the trial justice may “believe[] one set of facts and disbelieve[] the other.” 

Id. (quoting Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 526 (R.I. 1992)); see also Mattatall, 603 A.2d at

1108 (“[The trial justice] may accept or reject conflicting testimony and draw all reasonable 

inferences therefrom.”). In the case before us, the jury and the trial justice were presented with 
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the possibility that defendant may have been framed by his cohorts; yet, it was their version of 

the events that was accepted as true and the testimony of defendant was rejected. 

The defendant points us to discrepancies between Watts’s testimony and Gonzalez’s 

testimony in arguing that the two gang members colluded against him. However, “the presence 

of some inconsistencies between or among [the statements] of a witness or witnesses at different 

points in time does not ipso facto render the testimony unworthy of belief.” State v. Jensen, 40 

A.3d 771, 781 (R.I. 2012). Of course, crediting the testimony of Watts and Gonzalez, and 

rejecting that of defendant, was within the discretion of the trial justice in passing on a motion 

for a new trial. We defer to that discretion. See Fontaine, 602 A.2d at 526 (“This court will not 

act as the arbiter of credibility * * * because that remains a determination that is expressly 

entrusted to the trial justice.”); see also Paola, 59 A.3d at 106 (“[W]e ‘defer to trial justices who 

experience firsthand the delivery and demeanor of a witness’s testimony.’” (quoting State v. 

Ferreira, 21 A.3d 355, 366 (R.I. 2011))). 

The trial justice determined that, based on the evidence at trial, the jury was warranted in 

finding defendant guilty. The weight of the evidence, namely the independent eyewitness 

testimony of Lewis, coupled with that of Watts and Gonzalez, clearly established that defendant 

was the shooter rather than an unsuspecting getaway driver who “wasn’t paying attention.” See

State v. Vanasse, 593 A.2d 58, 67 (R.I. 1991) (“If in [the trial justice’s] independent assessment 

the trial justice determines that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury, as 

factfinders, to conclude that it proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for a new trial 

must be denied.” (citing State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1302 (R.I. 1980))). 

Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial justice fulfilled his role as the thirteenth juror 

by independently weighing the evidence in light of his charge to the jury and assessing the 
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credibility of the witnesses. His conclusion that he agreed with the verdict thus ended his role in 

the new trial analysis. We decline to disturb that decision. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgments of conviction. The papers 

in this case shall be remanded to the Superior Court. 
RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S 

OFFICE

Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet

TITLE OF CASE: State v. Jose Lopez.

 

CASE NO: No. 2015-245-M.P.

(P1/14-1482AG)

COURT: Supreme Court

DATE OPINION FILED: December 6, 2016 

JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court 

JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:

 Associate Justice Robert D. Krause

ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:

 For State: Virginia M. McGinn

 Department of Attorney General

 

For Defendant: Kara J. Maguire

 Office of the Public Defender