NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TREVOR M., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.C., T.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0187

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015JD201404066

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson

By Harriette P. Levitt

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda L. Adams

Counsel for Appellee
TREVOR M. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which Chief

Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Trevor M. (Father) appeals the court’s termination of his 

parental rights to T.C. and Ty.C. (the children). On appeal, Father argues 

that (1) he was not provided adequate reunification services and (2) the 

court abused its discretion in finding Father’s incarceration as grounds for 

severance. The Arizona Department of Child Safety (DCS) responded, and

agreed the juvenile court erred in terminating Father’s rights based on 

length of sentence. DCS requests this court “reverse the termination order 

and remand to the juvenile court for further proceedings.” We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, 

and the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1 

and -2101.A (West 2016).1

¶2 Under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4, a parent’s rights can be terminated 

when the parent “is deprived of civil liberties due to conviction of a felony” 

and the length of the sentence is such “that the child will be deprived of a 

normal home for a period of years.” (Emphasis added.). There is no “bright 

line” definition of the length of time required to deprive a child of a normal 

home, Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 29 (2000); 

however, the utilization of present tense language in the statute requires a 

parent to be deprived of civil liberties, depriving the child of a normal 

home, at the time of severance. See State v. Gomez, 212 Ariz. 55, 61, ¶ 35 (2006). 

¶3 At the time dependency proceedings were initiated, Father 

was incarcerated. DCS later moved for termination of Father’s rights in 

September 2015, alleging length of incarceration as the exclusive grounds 

for severance. Father was released from custody on March 24, 2016 and a

contested severance hearing was held on April 8, 2016. Father appeared

and testified on his own behalf. The court interpreted Michael J. to allow it

to sever parental rights based solely on length of incarceration, even if the 

 

1 We cite to the current version of applicable statutes absent any 

change material to this decision.
TREVOR M. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

3

parent facing severance has been released from custody. We disagree that 

A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4 permits severance when, as here, the parent has been 

released from custody, and there are no other grounds for severance 

alleged.

¶4 Because there is no evidence to sustain the court’s ground for 

severance, we need not review the adequacy of services offered to Father. 

We reverse the court’s determination and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision.