Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC12-1760

____________

DWIGHT T. EAGLIN,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

____________

No. SC13-1785

____________

DWIGHT T. EAGLIN,

Petitioner,

vs.

JULIE L. JONES, etc.,

Respondent.

[June 25, 2015]

PER CURIAM.

Dwight T. Eaglin, who was twenty-seven years old at the time of the crimes,

was convicted and sentenced to death for the June 2003 murders of correctional 

officer Darla K. Lathrem and inmate Charles Fuston. Eaglin committed the 
- 2 -

murders while attempting to escape from Charlotte Correctional Institution, where 

he was serving a life sentence for a prior murder. This Court affirmed his 

convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935, 950

(Fla. 2009). 

Eaglin now appeals the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief, 

filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and simultaneously 

petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, 

§§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

postconviction court’s denial of relief and deny Eaglin’s petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts of the crimes as follows:

The evidence at trial established that in 2003, the Charlotte 

Correctional Institution was undergoing a renovation of the inmate 

dormitories. That same year, Eaglin, [Stephen] Smith, and [Michael] 

Jones, who were part of a group of inmates permitted to participate in 

the renovation process, began planning an escape attempt. With 

regard to the escape plans, the inmates constructed an escape ladder 

and a metal tool that would hook to the outer lights of the prison, but 

the tool was destroyed a month before the attempted escape. Eaglin 

blamed [the inmate victim, Charles] Fuston and John Beaston, another 

inmate, for destroying the tool.

Two inmates, Kenneth Christopher Lykins and Jesse Baker, 

testified to what they heard about the escape plans. Lykins testified 

that he overheard Eaglin, Smith, and Jones talking about their 

upcoming escape. Specifically, Eaglin stated that he would kill 

Fuston before he left because “he didn’t like the way he disrespected 

him.” Lykins also overheard Eaglin state that he would kill anyone 
- 3 -

who tried to stop him from doing what he was going to do. On crossexamination, Lykins, a twelve-time convicted felon, was impeached 

with an affidavit in which he denied knowing anything about the 

escape or the killing of Lathrem and Fuston. He explained this prior 

inconsistency by stating he had been concerned with his own safety.

Jesse Baker, another inmate and nine-time convicted felon, also 

testified to overhearing the escape plans. He specifically heard 

Eaglin, Smith, and Jones stating that “they would kill any bitch that 

got in their way.” Further, Baker testified that Eaglin wanted to 

“straighten” Fuston, which indicated an intent to kill. Baker was 

impeached with the fact that he suffered from severe depression and 

was previously housed in the psychiatric dorm and the crisis unit of 

the prison.

Additional testimony from correctional officers working at the 

time of the escape attempt established that on June 11, 2003, Eaglin 

was observed attempting to jump on the outer-perimeter fence of the 

prison. When officers responded to the scene, Eaglin was sprayed 

with chemical agents and subdued. Thereafter, Officer Lathrem was 

found in a mop closet, huddled in a fetal position with injuries to her 

head area. A medium-sized sledgehammer was located near her body. 

Fuston was located in another cell lying on the floor with blood 

coming from underneath his head. He was unconscious but still 

breathing at that time. Beaston was found conscious in a secured cell 

with a large wound in the middle of his forehead. Beaston was the 

only surviving victim of the attacks.

The morning after the attempted escape, Eaglin was questioned 

regarding the murders. Eaglin stated he wanted the “chair,” and that 

he “tried to kill those three people.” Eaglin also admitted that he tried 

to “jump the fence.”

With regard to the injuries suffered by the victims, the medical 

examiner, Dr. R. H. Imami, testified that Lathrem’s injuries included a 

hemorrhage in her right eye, two injuries on the right side of her head, 

and injuries on her face. Dr. Imami found no evidence of defensive 

wounds or injuries and concluded that skull and brain injuries were 

the cause of Lathrem’s death. The cause of these injuries was heavy, 

blunt force trauma. Dr. Imami opined that Lathrem was struck at least 

three times and that any of the blows would have caused her death. 

Finally, Dr. Imami stated that she believed the sledgehammer entered 

into evidence caused the injuries.
- 4 -

Dr. Imami also conducted the autopsy of Fuston. Fuston had 

injuries to the right and left sides of his face and head, the back of his 

head, and his mouth, in addition to skull fractures caused by blunt 

trauma. In total, Fuston suffered three to four fatal blows. Dr. Imami 

did not see typical defensive wounds but she observed a small skin 

scrape on the back of Fuston’s left hand. She opined that the scrape 

could have been caused when he fell or during subsequent medical 

intervention. Ultimately, Dr. Imami concluded that skull and brain 

injuries by blunt-force trauma to the head were also the cause of 

Fuston’s death and that the trauma was caused by a hammer.

Upon the testing of evidence obtained during the investigation 

of the murders, Lathrem’s DNA was discovered on the sledgehammer 

that was near her body. Both Lathrem’s and Fuston’s DNA were 

located on the pants Eaglin wore on the day of the murder. Lathrem’s

DNA was also located on Eaglin’s left boot. On cross-examination, 

defense counsel referred to earlier testimony of a corrections officer 

who testified that he assisted in removing Lathrem’s body from the 

mop closet and then escorted Eaglin to the visiting park. The crime 

laboratory analyst conceded that this scenario presented the possibility 

of cross-contamination between Lathrem’s blood and Eaglin’s clothes. 

She also stated that she did not analyze every item sent to her but she 

matched the DNA profile of Lathrem to DNA found on codefendant 

Smith’s right shoe.

The defense presented no witnesses but moved for a judgment 

of acquittal, which was denied by the court. The jury convicted 

Eaglin of the first-degree murders of Lathrem and Fuston.

Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 939-40. 

During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Eaglin’s prior 

violent felony—first-degree murder with a sentence of life imprisonment without 

the possibility of parole. Id. at 940. He was serving this sentence at the time of the 

murders in this case. Id.

Prior to testifying during the penalty phase, Eaglin stated on the record that 

he did not want to present background mitigation evidence regarding his childhood 
- 5 -

and that his counsel had decided not to present mental health mitigation—a 

decision with which Eaglin informed the trial court that he agreed. Id. at 945. 

Although Eaglin had informed counsel at the outset of the case that he did not want 

counsel to contact members of his family, counsel nonetheless undertook an 

investigation into Eaglin’s background. Id.

Upon review of this potential mitigation, counsel ultimately agreed with 

Eaglin’s decision not to present this information, explaining on the trial record that 

the presentation of mental health mitigation to the jury could be “dangerous,” and 

stating during postconviction proceedings that Eaglin’s background represented a 

“double-edged sword” that could adversely affect his case. Id. at 946. Instead, the 

theme of the defense’s mitigation presentation was that the conditions at the 

correctional facility contributed to the occurrence of the crime, including 

inadequate supervision over construction, a failure in security staffing systems, and 

permitting inmate mobility. Id. at 940, 944 n.4. 

Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended that Eaglin be sentenced 

to death by a vote of eight to four for each murder. After conducting a Spencer1

hearing, the trial court entered its order sentencing Eaglin to death. Id. at 941. The 

trial court found that the following statutory aggravators applied to Eaglin’s 

murder of Officer Lathrem: (1) the murder was committed by a person under 

 

1. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
- 6 -

sentence of imprisonment; (2) Eaglin had a prior violent felony conviction; (3) the 

murder was committed for the purpose of effecting an escape from custody; (4) the 

murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); and (5) the victim was a law 

enforcement officer engaged in the performance of legal duties (merged with 

escape from custody). Id. With respect to Eaglin’s murder of Fuston, the trial 

court found that the following statutory aggravators applied: (1) the murder was 

committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Eaglin had a prior 

violent felony conviction; and (3) the murder was CCP. Id.

After reviewing a presentence investigation report (PSI), the trial court 

found in mitigation that “Eaglin suffered from a severely abusive childhood with a 

severely dysfunctional family.” Id. The trial court assigned this mitigator some 

weight. Id. However, the trial court rejected the proposed mitigators stemming 

from the allegations of prison negligence. Id. Finding that the aggravators 

outweighed the mitigators, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and 

sentenced Eaglin to death for both murders. Id. On direct appeal, this Court 

affirmed Eaglin’s convictions and death sentences. Id. at 950.2 

 

2. Eaglin raised six issues on direct appeal, all of which this Court rejected: 

(1) the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from impeaching a State 

witness; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to admit into penalty-phase evidence 

the videotape of an interview of a former guard trainee; (3) the jury and the trial 

court were not presented with available mitigation evidence, and the trial court 

failed to consider all mitigating evidence available in the record; (4) the trial court 

erred in using Eaglin’s supposed lack of remorse against him in sentencing him to 
- 7 -

Eaglin subsequently filed a timely initial motion for postconviction relief

and an amended motion for postconviction relief, ultimately raising eleven claims.3 

Following a Huff4 hearing, the postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing 

on several of Eaglin’s claims: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 

adequately advise Eaglin regarding his limited waiver of penalty-phase mitigation 

 

death; (5) the trial court erred in giving an instruction on and finding the CCP 

aggravator; and (6) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 941. 

3. Eaglin’s postconviction claims were as follows: (1) his constitutional 

rights were violated because he was denied access to public records; (2) requiring 

him to file his postconviction motion within one year after his conviction and 

sentence became final, as required by rule 3.851, violates due process and equal 

protection guarantees; (3) counsel were ineffective before trial and during the guilt 

phase of trial for (A) failing to argue, in the motion to suppress Eaglin’s 

statements, that he was not capable of adequately understanding his Miranda rights 

and therefore did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights; 

(B) failing to move for a change of venue and failing to undertake voir dire of the 

jurors regarding publicity of the case during jury selection; and (C) failing to 

challenge the admissibility of scientific evidence and testimony; (4) counsel were

ineffective for failing to adequately advise Eaglin regarding the nature, 

circumstances, and consequences of his limited waiver of penalty-phase mitigation 

and failing to advise the trial court of Eaglin’s history of mental illness and noncompliance with necessary medication prior to the in-court colloquy; (5) counsel 

were ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare mitigation 

evidence; (6) newly discovered evidence established that the forensic evidence 

presented by the State lacks scientific rigor; (7) Florida’s lethal injection procedure 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (8) the State’s use of inconsistent and 

irreconcilable theories in order to obtain the death sentence was unconstitutional; 

(9) the combination of these errors constituted cumulative error; (10) Eaglin’s 

convictions are unreliable because the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and 

(11) the appointment of Dr. Harry Krop as a confidential competency expert 

created a conflict of interest. 

4. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
- 8 -

and failing to advise the trial court of his history of mental illness and noncompliance with necessary medication prior to an in-court colloquy; (2) trial

counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare 

mitigation evidence; and (3) trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of 

trial for failing to argue that Eaglin was not capable of adequately understanding 

his Miranda5rights.

After the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Eaglin’s 

amended motion for postconviction relief. This appeal follows, and Eaglin also 

petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 

ANALYSIS

I. Rule 3.851 Claims

On appeal to this Court, Eaglin raises three claims challenging the 

postconviction court’s denial of relief. First, Eaglin asserts that his trial counsel 

were ineffective during the penalty phase. Second, Eaglin contends that he also 

received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, pertaining to

motions to suppress his inculpatory statements. Finally, Eaglin asserts that the 

postconviction court erred in summarily denying two of his postconviction claims. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Penalty-Phase Counsel

 

5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- 9 -

In his first claim on appeal, Eaglin argues that trial counsel were ineffective 

during the penalty-phase proceedings based on two alleged errors. First, Eaglin 

contends that trial counsel were ineffective with respect to his statement that he did 

not wish to present background mitigation and that he agreed with counsel’s 

strategic decision to not present mental health mitigation during the penalty phase. 

As part of this claim alleging that his waiver of mitigation was not knowing and 

voluntary, Eaglin contends both that the colloquy undertaken by the trial court did 

not satisfy the requirements articulated by this Court in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 

2d 246 (Fla. 1993), and that counsel were ineffective in failing to inform the trial 

court that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was not medicated prior 

to the colloquy. Second, Eaglin argues that trial counsel were ineffective for 

failing to undertake an adequate investigation into his background and mental 

health history, and thereby could not adequately advise him regarding the 

presentation of this mitigation during the penalty phase. We address each aspect of 

this ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel claim in turn.

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has explained that for ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: 

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 

lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 

competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 

Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
- 10 -

demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 

proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A court 

considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 

specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 

clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.

Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. 

Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted)). 

As to the second requirement of prejudice, this Court has explained:

With respect to those claims alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel specifically during the penalty phase, penalty-phase prejudice 

under the Strickland standard is measured by “whether the error of 

trial counsel undermines this Court’s confidence in the sentence of 

death when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and 

the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.” Hurst [v. 

State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1013 (Fla. 2009)]. Under this standard, a 

defendant is not required “to show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct 

more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, 

but rather that he establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in [that] outcome.’ ” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44

(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). “To assess that 

probability, [the Court] consider[s] ‘the totality of the available 

mitigation evidence . . .’ and ‘reweigh[s] it against the evidence in 

aggravation.’ ” Id. at 41 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

397-98 (2000)).

Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865, 873 (Fla. 2013).

“[T]his Court’s standard of review is two pronged: (1) this Court must defer 

to the [trial] court’s findings on factual issues so long as competent, substantial 

evidence supports them; but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the 

deficiency and prejudice prongs.” Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 472 (Fla. 2010) 

(quoting Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla. 2004)). “Thus, under 
- 11 -

Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law 

and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower court’s factual findings.” 

Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999). 

1. Knowing & Voluntary Waiver of Mitigation

Eaglin’s first argument involves the colloquy undertaken prior to penaltyphase testimony, during which Eaglin and his counsel informed the trial court that 

Eaglin did not wish to present mitigation evidence regarding his background and 

that counsel had made the strategic decision not to present mental health 

mitigation—a strategic decision with which Eaglin informed the trial court he

agreed. Eaglin now asserts that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because 

the trial court’s colloquy did not comply with the requirements established by this 

Court in Koon, 619 So. 2d 246, and because counsel failed to advise the trial court 

of his mental illness and lack of medication. 

As an initial matter, we reject Eaglin’s argument pertaining to the adequacy 

of the Koon inquiry itself because this claim should have been raised on direct 

appeal. See Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 853-54 (Fla. 2003). Moreover, even if 

this claim was not procedurally barred, it would still be without merit because 

Koon is not applicable where the defendant does not waive all penalty-phase 

mitigation. See Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 188 (Fla. 2005) (“[T]he 

requirements of Koon are not applicable in this case because [the defendant] 
- 12 -

presented mitigating evidence.”). As we recognized on direct appeal in rejecting 

Eaglin’s claim that the trial court failed to consider all available mitigation in the 

record, this is not a case in which the defendant waived his right to present 

mitigation evidence. See Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 945. 

We also reject Eaglin’s argument pertaining to counsel’s performance during 

the colloquy, which the postconviction court denied after holding an evidentiary 

hearing. Specifically, Eaglin contends that counsel were aware that Dr. Harry 

Krop, a psychologist retained by the defense, had diagnosed Eaglin with bipolar 

disorder and that, as a result of this diagnosis, he was at a greater risk of suffering 

manic episodes, which he asserts directly affected his ability to have a rational 

understanding of the proceedings against him. 

As noted by the postconviction court in denying this claim, however, trial 

counsel had no reason to question Eaglin’s competency due to his bipolar 

diagnosis. Therefore, trial counsel’s decision not to inform the trial court about his

bipolar diagnosis and its effect on his competency prior to the colloquy cannot be 

deemed deficient. In fact, Eaglin recognizes that trial counsel were well aware of 

Eaglin’s bipolar diagnosis prior to the penalty phase. Indeed, prior to the guilt 

phase of the trial, counsel had retained Dr. Krop to undertake an evaluation of 

Eaglin’s mental health status. 
- 13 -

Although Dr. Krop diagnosed Eaglin with bipolar disorder and antisocial 

personality disorder, he also informed counsel that he “did not feel that there was 

neuropsychological impairment” and that Eaglin was a “very intelligent 

individual.” Intelligence testing undertaken by Dr. Krop prior to trial indicated 

that Eaglin had a full scale IQ score of 117. Additionally, Dr. Krop specifically 

testified during the postconviction evidentiary hearing that, based on his evaluation 

of Eaglin, he had no concerns regarding his competency, and counsel testified that 

they were aware of Dr. Krop’s diagnoses. 

Moreover, co-counsel Doug Withee testified that during the trial 

proceedings, Eaglin was “bright” and “alert” and that Withee “did not have any 

problem communicating with . . . Eaglin [and Eaglin] did not appear to have any 

problem communicating with [him]. [Eaglin] seemed to understand the whole 

picture.” Co-counsel Neil McLoughlin supported Withee’s impressions of Eaglin, 

stating that in his view Eaglin was competent and that there was “no good-faith 

basis” to undertake a competency evaluation. 

Accordingly, Eaglin has not demonstrated that counsel’s decision not to 

inform the trial court of his bipolar disorder and medication regime constituted

deficient performance. We therefore conclude that this argument is without merit

and reject Eaglin’s claim.

2. Failure to Adequately Advise Eaglin Regarding Presentation of Background &

Mental Health Mitigation Evidence
- 14 -

Eaglin’s next argument is that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 

properly advise him regarding the decision not to present background and mental 

health mitigation during the penalty phase. Specifically, Eaglin asserts that trial

counsel did not undertake a meaningful investigation into these two categories of 

potentially mitigating evidence and therefore could not adequately advise him on 

the potential merit of presenting such evidence. Additionally, Eaglin argues that, 

although trial counsel may have undertaken some limited investigation into 

potential mitigation, counsel decided to present only the prison negligence 

mitigation before reviewing the results of this investigation. Moreover, Eaglin 

contends that counsel’s strategy to pursue prison negligence mitigation evidence in 

lieu of “conventional” mitigation evidence was patently unreasonable.

Eaglin claims that, through several lay witnesses, he could have presented 

compelling mitigation evidence regarding his traumatic childhood and extensive 

head trauma that he suffered while boxing and playing football. In support, Eaglin 

called multiple lay witnesses at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Although 

none of these witnesses testified during the penalty phase, each of them asserted 

that they were available and would have testified if they had been asked. 

Additionally, Eaglin argues that he could have presented compelling mental health 

mitigation. In support, Eaglin presented the testimony of numerous mental health 
- 15 -

experts during the postconviction evidentiary hearing to explain the extent of his

mental health problems, including alleged brain damage and bipolar disorder. 

After reviewing the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the 

postconviction court determined that trial counsel’s investigation into Eaglin’s 

potential background and mental health mitigation was adequate and that counsel’s 

decision not to present this mitigation represented reasonable trial strategy. With 

respect to trial counsel’s investigation, the postconviction court noted that “[t]he 

record reflects that the defense team visited [Eaglin’s] mother, grandfather, and 

other family members, retained a defense mental health expert, and retained a 

mitigation specialist.” The postconviction court concluded that trial counsel’s 

decision not to present background or mental health mitigation was clear trial 

strategy, made after having adequately investigated Eaglin’s background and 

mental health and with his complete agreement with that strategy at that time. 

As to deficiency, the postconviction court concluded as follows:

Merely because postconviction counsel has secured experts 

years after trial who have more favorable opinions does not establish 

that trial counsel was deficient for relying on the defense experts at 

the time of trial. Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000); Jones 

v. State, 732 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1999). The information from Dr. Krop 

at the time of trial reveal[ed] no evidence of post concussive 

syndrome, seizures, or that Defendant’s brain was not functioning 

normally. Rather, Dr. Krop found no neurological impairment. Trial 

counsel were not ineffective for relying on this information in 

formulating their trial strategy and deciding to focus on what they 

believed was the more effective mitigation evidence of negligence on 

the part of the Department of Corrections. 
- 16 -

Regarding Eaglin’s potential background mitigation, the postconviction 

court explained that Eaglin’s mother left him when he was three years old and thus,

“even had she been called to testify at trial, it is unlikely she would have been able 

to provide any information about [Eaglin] except his first year or so, and nothing 

about the rest of [his] life.” The postconviction court also explained that, while

Eaglin’s brother would have been able to testify about the childhood abuse both he 

and Eaglin suffered, Eaglin “presented no testimony [at the postconviction 

evidentiary hearing] that [he] was negatively affected mentally by that abuse.” In 

fact, Eaglin’s brother affirmatively testified that “their abusive childhood did not 

result in [Eaglin] behaving erratically or unpredictably.” The postconviction court 

concluded that “any potential mitigation evidence regarding [Eaglin’s] abusive 

childhood . . . would have been countered in cross-examination by all the positive 

aspects of his life and his accomplishments in spite of enduring an abusive 

childhood.”

Regarding Eaglin’s potential mental health mitigation, the postconviction 

court explained that his “family and friends did not testify as to any obvious signs 

of mental illness or drastic mood changes, and that [Eaglin] did not report any such 

symptoms until he was arrested.” The postconviction court observed that “the 

defense experts merely diagnosed [Eaglin] with bipolar disorder based on one prior 

diagnosis given without any supporting testing, and based solely on [Eaglin’s] own 
- 17 -

self-reporting.” In addition, the postconviction court found significance in

Eaglin’s “inconsistencies in self reporting his symptoms to defense experts during 

postconviction evaluations.”

Ultimately, the postconviction court determined that even if there was 

deficiency, there was no prejudice established. We agree. We do not address 

deficiency because it is clear that the prejudice component cannot be established

even if counsel were deemed deficient. See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546 (“A 

court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific 

ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice 

component is not satisfied.” (quoting Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932)).

Even if counsel had presented testimony during the penalty phase that shed 

light on Eaglin’s abusive childhood, his dysfunctional family, and that he suffered 

from mental health disorders, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase 

would not be undermined when viewed in the context of the penalty phase 

evidence and the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court. See Hurst, 18 

So. 3d at 1013. Both of Eaglin’s death sentences were supported by multiple 

aggravators, two of which—CCP and prior violent felony conviction—this Court 

has recognized as among the most serious aggravators under Florida’s death 

penalty scheme. See Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 974 (Fla. 2011). Further, the 

prior violent felony aggravator is especially significant in this case, given that 
- 18 -

Eaglin was serving a life sentence for a prior murder when he committed the 

murders in this case. 

In addition, although the jury did not hear information regarding Eaglin’s 

childhood, the trial court considered his abusive childhood based on the PSI. In 

fact, the trial court found as a nonstatutory mitigator that “Eaglin suffered from a 

severely abusive childhood with a severely dysfunctional family.” The trial court 

assigned this factor some weight, but still concluded that the numerous aggravators 

outweighed the mitigators. See Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 941. 

Accordingly, we conclude that any alleged failures of counsel during the 

penalty phase do not undermine confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase. 

We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief on this claim.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Guilt-Phase Counsel

In his next claim, Eaglin asserts that trial counsel were ineffective during the 

guilt-phase proceedings for failing to effectively argue several motions to suppress

statements Eaglin made to Florida Department of Law Enforcement Agent 

Uebelacker after his arrest. The statements at issue occurred on the morning of 

June 12, 2003, at Charlotte Correctional Institution, where Agent Uebelacker met 

Eaglin in an administrative office at the prison. When Eaglin entered the office, he 

made several unsolicited spontaneous statements to Agent Uebelacker, which
- 19 -

included references to wanting the electric chair and that Eaglin had “tried to kill 

those three people.” 

After Eaglin made these statements, Agent Uebelacker read Eaglin his 

Miranda rights. Then, after Eaglin stated that he understood his rights, Agent

Uebelacker asked him if he would allow the interview to be recorded. In the 

recorded interview, Eaglin himself actually recited his Miranda rights for Agent

Uebelacker without solicitation. To ensure that Eaglin understood his rights, 

Agent Uebelacker proceeded to read Eaglin his Miranda rights again. During the 

recorded interview, Eaglin stated that he “decided to jump the fence” and reiterated 

that he wanted “the chair.” 

Eaglin’s trial counsel filed multiple motions to suppress the statements, 

arguing several theories of suppression, including a Miranda violation and lack of 

voluntariness. With respect to Eaglin’s claim that his statements were not 

voluntary, counsel argued that Eaglin was unable to exercise free will because he 

suffered from lacerations on his arms, back, and legs; was sprayed with a chemical 

agent during the escape attempt; was kicked in the head; received minimal medical 

treatment; and had not slept for more than thirty hours. The trial court denied the 

motions to suppress. 

In his postconviction claim, Eaglin argued that trial counsel were deficient in 

litigating the motions to suppress because counsel should have argued that a 
- 20 -

bipolar “manic episode” rendered him incapable of knowingly and voluntarily 

waiving his Miranda rights. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing 

on this claim but ultimately denied it. 

We conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. 

Eaglin has not established either that trial counsel were deficient in litigating the 

motions to suppress or that raising the bipolar “manic episode” as a basis to 

suppress his statements would have resulted in the motions being granted. 

In support of this claim, Eaglin relies on testimony elicited during the 

postconviction evidentiary hearing that demonstrated he may have been suffering 

from a bipolar “manic episode” at the time he met with Agent Uebelacker. 

Specifically, Eaglin points to the testimony of Dr. Philip Harvey, a clinical 

psychologist, who testified that it was his opinion that Eaglin was suffering from a 

bipolar “manic episode” at the time of the crimes and that bipolar “manic 

episodes” can last for several days. Dr. Harvey explained that suffering from a 

bipolar “manic episode” can affect an individual’s judgment. This testimony was 

supported by Dr. David Pickar, a psychiatrist, who also testified at the 

postconviction evidentiary hearing that Eaglin was likely experiencing bipolar 

manic symptoms on the day of the murders. 

However, as noted by the postconviction court, this testimony presented at 

the postconviction evidentiary hearing is contradicted by the evidence that was 
- 21 -

presented during the trial proceedings regarding the motions to suppress. For 

example, a nurse at the correctional facility testified before the trial court that she 

observed Eaglin in a holding cell following his apprehension, and he was “alert 

and oriented, responding to her questions verbally.” Eaglin also testified during a 

hearing on the motions to suppress, where he admitted that he had made the 

statements, that he had recited his rights during the recorded interview, and that he 

understood those rights. 

Trial counsel litigated the motions to suppress at length, asserting multiple 

bases for suppression. Although Eaglin now contends that trial counsel were

deficient in not raising his mental illness, his postconviction counsel did not 

question trial counsel during the evidentiary hearing regarding their strategy in 

litigating the motions to suppress or why the bipolar “manic episode” was not 

raised. While we disagree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that this 

failure to specifically question trial counsel constituted a waiver of the claim, we 

agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that the evidence Eaglin did 

present fails to establish that he was incapable of understanding his Miranda rights. 

Eaglin has also failed to demonstrate how, even if the bipolar “manic episode” had 

been raised in litigating the motions to suppress, this would have resulted in the 

motions being granted. Accordingly, because Eaglin cannot demonstrate either 

deficiency or prejudice, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim. 
- 22 -

C. Summarily Denied Claims

Eaglin also asserts on appeal that the postconviction court erred in 

summarily denying two claims without holding an evidentiary hearing: (1) the 

State utilized inconsistent, irreconcilable, and misleading theories of prosecution in 

his trial and the trial of one of his codefendants, Stephen Smith; and (2) the State 

withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963). Because both of these claims are refuted by the record, we affirm the 

postconviction court’s summary denial of these claims.

1. The State’s Use of Inconsistent Theories of Prosecution in Eaglin’s Trial 

& in the Trial of Eaglin’s Codefendant

Eaglin first asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 

his claim that the State utilized inconsistent theories in prosecuting Eaglin and 

codefendant Stephen Smith and thereby violated his due process rights. 

Specifically, Eaglin argues that in Smith’s trial, the State argued that Smith had 

been planning the escape for months and only brought Eaglin in as the “muscle” 

shortly before the escape attempt. He also argues that Smith, who did not testify at 

Eaglin’s trial, said in a recorded statement that was introduced at Smith’s trial that 

there was no plan to kill inmate Fuston or whichever prison guard they 

encountered. Eaglin asserts that in his trial, the State conversely portrayed him as 

the primary actor, which directly conflicts with the State’s theory in Smith’s trial. 
- 23 -

Even if the use of inconsistent theories of prosecution could rise to the level 

of a due process violation, the postconviction court correctly concluded that the 

State presented consistent theories of prosecution in Eaglin’s and Smith’s trials. 

As noted by the postconviction court, “the State argued in Smith’s case that Eaglin 

committed the murders, followed Smith’s plan, and Smith was a principal. At 

[Eaglin’s] trial, the State again argued [Eaglin] committed the murders.” A review 

of the record supports the postconviction court’s factual findings. 

 The fact that the State used consistent prosecution theories is further 

bolstered by the fact that the trial court in Smith’s case stated that the State could 

not argue that Smith may have wielded the sledgehammer. Therefore, Eaglin’s 

claim is refuted by the record, and the postconviction court did not err in 

summarily denying this claim. 

2. The State Withheld Exculpatory Evidence from Eaglin in Violation of Brady

Eaglin next asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 

his claim that the State withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense in 

violation of Brady. Specifically, Eaglin asserts that the State failed to disclose to 

the defense that one of his other codefendants, Michael Jones, had been offered a 

plea agreement in exchange for his cooperation. Additionally, Eaglin contends 

that, as part of a plea agreement, the State Attorney’s Office agreed that it would 

use its best efforts to have codefendant Jones incarcerated in a prison outside the 
- 24 -

State of Florida and that letters between an assistant state attorney and the Florida 

Department of Corrections (DOC) regarding these efforts were not revealed. 

Eaglin claims he only learned of this information on May 20, 2011, upon 

postconviction counsel’s review of Jones’s 2008 court file at the Charlotte County 

Clerk’s Office.

The record conclusively refutes this claim because the record demonstrates 

that on November 10, 2005, an assistant state attorney took proffered testimony 

from Jones while in the presence of Jones’s counsel, and on December 22, 2005, 

the assistant state attorney provided a copy of Jones’s proffered testimony to 

Eaglin’s co-counsel Withee. At the outset of the proffer, the State made clear that 

the parties had not entered into a plea agreement. In the proffer, Jones discussed 

the escape attempt that occurred on the night of the murders, consistently 

implicating Eaglin in the escape attempt. Jones did not testify at Eaglin’s trial, and

Eaglin was subsequently convicted of the murders on March 31, 2006. 

After Eaglin was convicted and sentenced to death, Jones subsequently 

entered into a plea agreement with the State in January 2007. In return, Jones

would be sentenced to life in prison, and the State Attorney’s Office would use its 

best efforts to encourage the DOC to allow Jones to serve his sentence outside the 

State of Florida. In Jones’s plea colloquy, the State confirmed on the record that 

these were terms agreed to in the plea agreement. 
- 25 -

In order to show a Brady violation, Eaglin must demonstrate that “(1) 

favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or 

inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, 

[he] was prejudiced.” Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d 1002, 1027-28 (Fla. 2014). 

With respect to Jones’s proffer, the record refutes Eaglin’s claim that this 

information was suppressed by the State. As noted by the postconviction court, a 

transcript of this proffer was provided to Eaglin’s co-counsel Withee on December 

22, 2005, months before Eaglin’s trial. Similarly, Eaglin’s claim that the State 

suppressed the terms of Jones’s plea agreement, including that the State Attorney’s 

Office would use its best efforts to ensure Jones served his sentence out of state, is 

refuted by the record in that the State agreed to the terms of the plea agreement in 

open court, during Jones’s plea colloquy, which took place in January 2007.

Moreover, the record refutes Eaglin’s assertion that the allegedly suppressed 

information constituted favorable evidence. The record shows that Jones’s proffer, 

as well as the terms of the subsequent plea agreement, were not exculpatory. In his 

proffer, Jones consistently inculpated Eaglin in the escape attempt. Further, 

neither the proffer itself nor the terms of the plea agreement had any impeachment 

value, as Jones did not testify at Eaglin’s trial and did not enter into the plea 

agreement until after Eaglin had already been convicted. 
- 26 -

For all these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial 

of this claim. We turn next to Eaglin’s habeas corpus petition.

II. Habeas Corpus Petition

In his habeas petition, Eaglin raises one issue—appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to identify and raise on direct appeal that an actual conflict of 

interest was created when the trial court appointed Dr. Krop to serve as a 

confidential competency expert for Eaglin’s codefendant, Michael Jones. Eaglin 

asserts that Dr. Krop’s appointment as a competency expert in Jones’s case 

prejudiced his own case and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise this claim on direct appeal. Eaglin also asserts that his appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to supplement the record with portions of the Jones trial

transcript. We disagree. 

In preparation for trial, Eaglin’s counsel retained Dr. Krop on March 22, 

2004, to undertake a mental health evaluation. Dr. Krop interviewed Eaglin, 

administered testing, and ultimately diagnosed him with bipolar disorder and 

antisocial personality disorder. Although trial counsel originally indicated that 

they intended to call Dr. Krop during the penalty-phase proceedings, counsel 

decided against presenting mental health mitigation, and Dr. Krop did not testify. 

Eaglin was ultimately sentenced to death on March 31, 2006, and he filed his 

notice of appeal in this Court on April 21, 2006.
- 27 -

Several months after the trial court had sentenced Eaglin to death and Eaglin 

had filed his notice of appeal, Jones attempted to enter into a plea agreement 

regarding the first-degree murder of the correctional officer killed during the 

escape attempt. However, the trial court did not initially accept Jones’s plea and 

orally appointed Dr. Krop, along with two other doctors, to evaluate Jones’s

competency. Subsequently, in October 2006, the trial court issued a written order 

appointing Dr. Krop to undertake a competency evaluation in Jones’s case. In 

accordance with this appointment, Dr. Krop undertook a competency evaluation of 

Jones, and the trial court ultimately accepted Jones’s plea in January 2007. 

Eaglin alleges that Dr. Krop’s subsequent appointment as a competency 

expert in Jones’s case created a conflict of interest due to the fact that he had 

previously served as a confidential mental health expert in Eaglin’s case. Eaglin 

alleges that the conflict of interest is established by “the simple fact that he was 

working as a confidential psychologist for two codefendants with opposing 

interests.” Based on this alleged conflict of interest, Eaglin asserts that the counsel 

he received was adversely affected. In seeking habeas corpus relief, Eaglin argues 

that appellate counsel’s failure to raise this conflict of interest on direct appeal 

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Eaglin 

relies on this Court’s opinion in Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (Fla. 
- 28 -

2003), in which this Court stated that it was error for a postconviction court to 

allow a mental health expert to testify for the State at an evidentiary hearing where 

that expert had previously been appointed as a confidential mental health expert for 

a codefendant. This Court stated that, because the codefendants’ interests were 

antagonistic, a conflict of interest existed, and it was unlikely that the expert could 

render a truly objective opinion. Id. 

While Eaglin appears to analogize Walton to this case, Walton is completely 

inapposite. Unlike in Walton, Eaglin cannot establish any alleged conflict of 

interest that prejudiced his case, as Dr. Krop did not offer any testimony at 

Eaglin’s trial and was only appointed to Jones’s case after he had completed all 

work on Eaglin’s case and after Eaglin was convicted and sentenced to death. 

Moreover, Dr. Krop, along with two other mental health experts, evaluated Jones 

only for competence and did not undertake any further investigation into Jones’s

mental health. Thus, Eaglin’s reliance on Walton is misplaced, and his assertion 

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this argument on direct 

appeal is unavailing. 

Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to 

raise this meritless issue on direct appeal, or for failing to supplement the record in 

order to facilitate presentation of this meritless claim. See Jennings v. State, 123 

So. 3d 1101, 1124 (Fla. 2013) (holding that appellate counsel was not deficient for 
- 29 -

failing to raise a meritless issue on appeal). Therefore, we deny Eaglin’s petition 

for habeas corpus relief. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief, 

and we also deny Eaglin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 

and PERRY, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Two Cases: 

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County, 

Christine Hissam Greider, Judge - Case No. 082003CF0015250001X

And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 

Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, William 

McKinley Hennis, III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional CounselSouth, and Elizabeth Tandiwe Stewart, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional 

Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen D. Ake, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent