alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANNES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Peoples First,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Hugh J. Garchinsky, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted to Section 906 of the Sarbannes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

          (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements
               of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
               Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly
               presents, in all material respects, the financial
               condition and result of operations of the
               Company.

                              BY:  /s/Hugh J. Garchinsky
                                 -------------------------------
                                 Hugh J. Garchinsky
                                 President and Chief Executive
                                   Officer

                                   August 13, 2003
#### Fauntleroy v. Philadelphia Gas Heating Company

*581
      *Benjamin Pomerantz,*for plaintiff.

*Paul Leo McSorley,*for defendant.

November 28, 1979

WILSON, *J.,*

In November, 1972, plaintiff purchased from defendant a gas fired boiler for heating purposes in a building used as a residence. The boiler broke down and was repaired January 29, 1974, at a cost of $300. The boiler broke down again. Defendant determined that repair or replacement was called for. At that time the boiler had been in use 41 months. This court takes judicial notice of the fact that heating systems are sold as capital items for use over many years during the fife of a building. In April, 1976, plaintiff was forced to have the boiler replaced by Philadelphia Gas Service and Royal-B, Inc. at a cost of $1,295. Willie Horton, who testified on behalf of plaintiff and who had spent 15 years in the scrap iron business, testified that he examined the boiler and saw weak spots in it.

This court is of the view that the boiler sold plaintiff was defective and not fit for the particular purpose intended (namely heating a residence). It is true the boiler broke down after the written warranty expired. It should be borne in mind that we are not here dealing with a malfunction that was not easily corrected as defendant would have us believe, but a defect such as to cause defendant to suggest replacement within 41 months. These repeated breakdowns should have put defendant on notice that in fact plaintiff had not received that for which he bargained, namely a working boiler. This coupled with the testimony that the boiler had weak spots is convincing proof.

*582For defendant’s breach of the implied warranties, plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum that will make him whole. Plaintiff paid out $1,595 for repairs and a new boiler. He is entitled to recover that sum. Accordingly, the following finding is made.

FINDING

And now, after trial, consideration and based upon the foregoing reason, this November 28, 1979, the court enters its finding in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $1,595.
EX-4.14



 Exhibit 4.14 

Power of Attorney 
 (February 5, 2010) 
 We, Xu Enhai and Han Deling, own 100% (Xu Enhai accounts for 66.7%, and Han
Deling accounts for 33.3%) of the equity of QIGI&BODEE Technology (Beijing) Co., Limited (hereinafter “QIGI TECHNOLOGY”). And with respect to such equity, we hereby irrevocably authorize QIGI&BODEE International Technology
(Beijing) Limited (hereinafter “WFOE”) to exercise the following rights in the valid term of this Power of Attorney: 
 Exclusively
authorize the representative(s) as appointed by WFOE to, as our agent, on behalf of us, and at its/their own discretion, exercise the rights including but not limited to: 1) participate in the shareholders’ meeting of QIGI TECHNOLOGY; 2) at the
shareholders’ meeting of QIGI TECHNOLOGY, exercise all the shareholder rights that the shareholders of QIGI TECHNOLOGY shall enjoy in accordance with the relevant laws and the articles of association, including but not limited to all the
nomination rights and voting rights. 
 Without imposing any restriction to this authorization, the representative(s) as appointed by WFOE will
be entitled to, within the scope of authorization, represent us to execute the transfer contracts as agreed in the Exclusive Option Agreement (we will act as a party thereto upon being required), for example, timely perform the Equity
Pledge Contract and the Exclusive Option Agreement that we executed as a party thereto on February 5, 2010. 
 All the actions
as taken by WFOE in respect of the equity as held by us in QIGI TECHNOLOGY shall be deemed as our actions, and all their execution of the relevant documents shall be deemed as our execution, and we will acknowledge such actions and execution.








 For the above matters, WFOE may appoint the representative(s) from time to time, without notifying us
thereof in advance or obtaining our consent thereon. 
 During the period when we are the shareholders of QIGI TECHNOLOGY, this Power of
Attorney will be irrevocable and keep valid, and its valid term will commence from its execution date. 
 During the valid term of this Power of
Attorney, we hereby waive to exercise all the rights related to the equity of QIGI TECHNOLOGY, which we have granted to WFOE through this Power of Attorney, and will not exercise such rights without the consent of WFOE. 








									
	Signatories:	 		 		 	
			
	Xu Enhai	 		 	Han Deling
					
	Signature:	 	 /s/ Xu Enhai
	 		 	Signature:	 	 /s/ Han Deling

					
	Witness:	 		 		 		 	
					
	Signature: *
AIR QUALITY DIVISION

2015

Technical Analyses and Information Supporting the

Designation Recommendation for Oklahoma

2010 Sulfur Dioxide Primary NAAQS

for

Noble, Choctaw, and Muskogee Counties

In Oklahoma

Submitted to EPA

September 2015
exv4wt






THE UNITED STATES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK




ENDORSEMENT



Notwithstanding any provision in the Contract or Certificate (“Contract”) to the
contrary, this Endorsement becomes a part of the Contract to which it is attached. Should any
provision in this Endorsement conflict with the Contract, the provisions of this Endorsement will
prevail.





	 	 	“Pursuant to Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), same-sex marriages
currently are not recognized for purposes of federal law. Therefore, the favorable
income-deferral options afforded by federal tax law to an opposite-sex spouse under Internal
Revenue Code sections 72(s) and 401(a)(9) are currently NOT available to a same-sex spouse.
Same-sex spouses who own or are considering the purchase of annuity products that provide
benefits based upon status as a spouse should consult a tax advisor. To the extent that an
annuity contract or certificate accords to spouses other rights or benefits that are not
affected by DOMA, same-sex spouses remain entitled to such rights or benefits to the same
extent as any annuity holder’s spouse.”




Signed for the Company to be effective as of the Contract Date.




THE UNITED STATES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK




 ¬1




FSE-6249 (12/09)
#### Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Apcoa, Inc.

July 12, 1984

*Joseph J. Van Jura,*for plaintiffs.

*Anthony Piazza,*for defendants.

WALSH, J.,

This matter is before the court by way of defendant, City of Scranton’s preliminary objections to plaintiff’s complaint. The *114preliminary objections are in the nature of a demurrer.

The city argues that if the allegations of plaintiffs complaint are assumed to be true, there is no right to recover against the city because of Section 8553(d) of the Governmental Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 8541. Section 8553(d) states:

> “(d) Insurance Benefits — If a claimant receives or is entitled to receive benefits under a policy of insurance other than a life insurance policy as a result of losses for which damages are recoverable under subsection (c), the amount of such benefits shall be deducted from the amount of damages which would otherwise be recoverable by such claimant.”

Plaintiffs complaint makes it clear that plaintiff is seeking reimbursement against the city under the doctrine of subrogation. The complaint states their insured was paid the amount of their claim and they seek reimbursement from the city. The language of the statute is clear that plaintiff insured could not receive this amount of money because of the limitation on recovery.

It is a well settled principle of law and equity that the doctrine of subrogation cannot be used to accomplish by indirection that which a statute forbids to be done by direction 60 C.J. Subrogation, Section 8; also Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Borough of Hamburg, 22 D. & C. 3d 454 (1982). The subrogee carrier’s rights can rise no higher than the party claimant whom he represents and for whom he is the legal substitute.

ORDER

Now, this March 22, 1984, the preliminary objections of defendant, City of Scranton, is sustained and the complaint against the said City of Scranton is dismissed.
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-16-00401-CR

____________________

NOMAN KHATRI, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 15-11-11878-CR

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

The trial court sentenced Noman Khatri on August 10, 2016. Khatri filed a 

notice of appeal on October 17, 2016. We notified the parties that Khatri filed the 

notice of appeal too late to perfect an appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b) (“In a 

criminal case, appeal is perfected by timely filing a sufficient notice of appeal.”).

Khatri did not file a response.

The Court finds that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 26.2(a)(1). No motion for extension of time was timely filed. See Tex. R. 
2

App. P. 26.3. The Court finds it is without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

 ________________________________

 LEANNE JOHNSON

 Justice

 

Submitted on December 6, 2016

Opinion Delivered December 7, 2016

Do Not Publish

Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21 -0583 IN THE MATTER OF: N.T., A Youth. **ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including September 7, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 3 2022

08/03/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0583
#### Frasier v. Greenblatt

*780
      *Melvin Brookman,*for plaintiff.

*Richard S. March,*for defendants.

June 23, 1978

JENKINS J.,

Plaintiff tenant was injured on July 28, 1974, by a falling ceding in the apartment she leased from defendants. On October 28, 1976, more than two years after the incident, she filed this action in assumpsit, pleading breach of an implied warranty of habitability and claiming personal injury damages.

Defendants initially raised preliminary objections that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions: Act of June 24,1895, P.L. 236,12 P.S. §34. This court denied those objections without opinion and defendants now ask for a judgment on the pleadings, having again raised the limitations issue by way of answer and new matter.

Rules 1017(b)(4) and 1030 of the Pa.R.C.P. provide that affirmative defenses must be raised by way of answer and new matter except where, inter alia, the defense is a non-waivable statute of limitations which appears applicable from the face of the complaint, and which destroys plaintiffs right of action. The exception would allow this issue to be pled by preliminary objection.

In the instant case the complaint lies, by its own terms, in assumpsit. The cause of action for breach *781of implied warranty under a lease is relatively new to Pennsylvania, having been only recently upheld by our Superior Court. See Pugh v. Holmes, no. 367, March term, 1977 (Filed April 13, 1978). Under these circumstances, it certainly could not be held that the bar of 12 P.S. §34 appears on the face of plaintiff’s complaint, and this court therefore overruled defendants’ preliminary objections under Rule 1017(b)(4).

Defendants now ask this court for a judgment on the pleadings and that motion must be granted. Plaintiff’s contention that this action is governed by the four-year statute of limitations in the Uniform Commercial Code is without merit. That statute is applicable only to “goods” which are the subject of a “contract of sale.” See Uniform Commercial Code of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3, as amended, 12A P.S. §§2-105, 106, 725. While this court agrees with plaintiff’s argument that tenants are as much consumers as are the purchasers of automobiles and household appliances, we cannot extend the U.C.C. to cover real estate transactions when they are specifically exempted in section 2-107. We are further without the power to read into the code any interpretation which would apply its sections to leases rather than sales.

We therefore hold that 12 P.S. §34 requires that plaintiffs action be dismissed.

ORDER

And now, June 23, 1978, upon consideration of the motion for judgment on the pleadings and answer thereto, it is ordered and decreed, that the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted and judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff in the above matter.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED SE PTEMBER 28, 2016

NO. 03

- 16

- 00646

- CR

Donald Palacio, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 21ST DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUS TICES GOODWIN AND BO URLAND

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

-- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction signed by the district court. Having reviewed

th e record, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Therefore, the Court

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction

. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay

costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
No *2,428.*

#### ANDREW J. POPE, Respondent, *v.*MICHAEL DALTON, Appellant.

Docümentaby Evidence. — Eight op Counsel to inspect. — After deeds, or other documents, have been admitted in evidence, the opposite counsel have a right to inspect them at any time during the progress of the trial..

Appeal from the Fourth District Court, City and County of San Francisco,

The facts are stated in the-opinion.

*E. A. Lawrence,*for Appellant.

*G. F.*and *W. 3. Sharp,*for [Respondent.

Crockett, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court; [Rhodes, C. J., Wallace, J. and Temple, J., concurring

The action is ejectment, and on the trial the plaintiff put in evidence certain deeds, through which he claimed to have darraigned title to the demanded premises. Afterward, in the progress of the trial, the defendant’s attorney, whilst engaged in the cross-examination of a witness for the plaintiff, desired to inspect the deeds already in evidence, but which were in the custody of the plaintiff’s attorney, and who refused to submit them to the inspection of the defendant’s attorney, on the ground that they were the private papers of the plaintiff, and on the further ground, as he alleged, that on that morning the defendant’s attorney had inspected the deeds at the office of the plaintiff’s attorney. On this refusal the defendant’s attorney moved the Court to compel the plaintiff’s attorney to produce the deeds for inspection, and, on his refusal to produce them, to strike them out as evidence. The motion was denied, and the defendant, having excepted, assigns this ruling as error. No brief has been filed on behalf of the respondent, and we are, therefore, furnished with neither argument nor authority in support of what we cannot but deem an extraordinary ruling. To deny to counsel, in the progress of a trial, a full opportunity to inspect documentary evidence offered by his *639adversary is an error too patent to'require discussion. Nor can we infer that no damage resulted to the defendant from this ruling. On the contrary, there may have been the most satisfactory reasons why it was important to the de-fence to have an inspection of the deeds.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
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---

EXHIBIT 32.2(a)


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





(ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)





In connection with the periodic report of Dynegy Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Holli C. Nichols, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify
as of the date hereof, solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and





(2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.





Date: August 10, 2009
By:
/s/    HOLLI C. NICHOLSHolli C. Nichols
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
### Attachment A

– Revised San Joaquin Valley PM 2.5 

### Design Values

Monitoring Site Type Speciation 2013 Annual

DV 1 2020

Corrected

Annual DV 1 2013 24

- hr

DV 2 2018

Corrected

24

- hr DV 2

Bakersfield

- California

Street FRM Bakersfield

California 16.4 14.4 65 53

Bakersfield

- 410 E

. Planz FRM Bakersfield

California 17.0 3 15.0 56 3 46

Clovis

- N

. Villa Avenue 4 FRM /FEM

- BAM Fresno

- 1 st 16.4 14.6 58 48

Fresno

- 1st Street /Garland 5 FRM Fresno

- 1 st 15.4 13.6 62 51

Fresno

- Hamilton and Winery FRM Fresno

- 1 st 14.7 13.0 64 52

Hanford

- S

. Irwin Street FEM

- BAM Visalia

- N

. Church 17.0 14.5 60 47

Madera FEM

- BAM Fresno

- 1 st 18.1 16.2 52 44

Manteca

- 530 Fishback Rd

. FEM

- BAM Modesto 14 th 10.2 9.3 37 32

Merced

- 2334 M Street FRM Modesto 14 th 11.1 10.0 49 42

Merced

- S. Coffee Road FEM

- BAM Modesto 14 th 13.3 12.0 42 36

Modesto

- 14 th FEM

- BAM Modesto 14 th 13.6 12.3 51 44

Stockton

- Hazelton Street FEM

- BAM Modesto 14 th 13.8 12.7 45 40

Tranquility FEM

- BAM Fresno

- 1 st 7.9 7.1 30 26

Turlock

- S

. Minaret Street FEM

- BAM Modesto 14 th 15.7 14.2 53 46

Visalia

- N

. Church Street FRM Visalia

- N

. Church 16.6 14.3 56 44

1 Desi gn values equal to or less than 15 μ g/m 3 attain the annual PM 2.5 standard

. 2 Design values equal to or less than 65 μ g/m 3 attain the 24

- hour PM 2.5 standard.

3 Does not include 167.3 μ g/m 3 measured on May 05, 2013 (supporting docum entation provided in Attachment B to Appendix F of the Plan ).

4 Clovis 2013 DV is based on combined FR M /FEM BAM data.

5 2013 DV is based on 2011 data for Fresno

- 1 st (060190011) and 2012/2013 data for Fresno

- Garland (060190008)

.
United States Department of Agriculture

National Agricultural Statistics Service

1400 Independence Avenue, SW · Washington, D.C. 20250

www.nass.usda.gov

USDA is an equal opportunity provider, lender, and employer.

Milk Production

What is included in NASS Estimates

To assist users who may have questions about what is included in NASS milk production

estimates, the definitions below provide the details of what is accounted for and excluded in the 

various components of the report. NASS procedures for inclusion and exclusion are unchanged 

from previous years. 

Definitions of Estimates in Monthly Milk Production and Agricultural Prices Reports:

Milk Cows: Cow, regardless of breed, kept primarily to produce milk for sale or home use.

Milk Production: Product of number of milk cows multiplied by rate per cow. Milk production 

includes milk produced by farms, prisons, churches, universities and other institutional herds for 

sale, home consumption, or feed.

All Milk Price: Gross price received by farmers per hundredweight (cwt) of milk sold at 

average fat test. The gross price is before deductions for items such as hauling and stop charges, 

advertising and promotion costs, and coop dues. It does not include hauling subsidies, but does 

include premiums and discounts for quality, quantity, or other reasons. The price per 

hundredweight equals total gross receipts divided by pounds of milk sold and multiplied by 100.

Question: Is milk dumped figured into milk per cow and milk production estimates?

Answer: NASS milk production and milk per cow estimates include dumped milk. 

Administrative data used for estimating milk production from sources such as 

Federal Milk Marketing Orders and Milk Cooperatives include pounds of milk 

dumped.

Question: How is the milk that was dumped valued in the Ag Prices publication prices 

received calculation?

Answer: NASS utilizes administrative and survey data to estimate the monthly all milk 

price. Payments received by farmers for dumped milk, as well as the pounds of 

dumped milk, are included in the data used by NASS. The all milk price is 

calculated by dividing total dollars received by total pounds. 

See the NASS website for additional information about Milk Production and the All Milk Price. 

https://www.nass.usda.gov/Surveys/Guide_to_NASS_Surveys/Milk/index.php

Questions: Contact Travis Averill, Livestock Branch Chief – Travis.Averill@usda.gov

Updated: May 20, 2020