J-A25020-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ASHLEY LAUREN WILMER,

Appellant No. 296 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 16, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0003487-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2016

Appellant, Ashley Lauren Wilmer, appeals from the February 16, 2016 

judgment of sentence entered following her conviction at a bench trial of 

possession of drug paraphernalia. Following our careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

On October 27, 2013, Pennsylvania State Trooper Charles 

D. Smolleck and Trooper Shoap were on foot patrol in the 

Cumberland County portion of Shippensburg, Pennsylvania. The 

Troopers came upon [Appellant’s] residence, a sorority house, 

and observed multiple individuals standing on the roof yelling 

incoherently. Trooper Smolleck also noted a young man who 

appeared severely intoxicated who was unsteadily climbing on 

the roof about twenty feet from the ground.

Trooper Smolleck was afraid that the young man was 

about to fall off the roof and injure himself severely, possibly 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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dying. He and Trooper Shoap approached the front door of the 

residence and sought permission to enter, but none of the 

people inside would open the door for them. At that time, 

Trooper Shoap attempted unsuccessfully to kick in the door. 

Then, fearing the imminent danger to the young man’s safety, 

Trooper Shoap broke a side window and entered the residence, 

immediately heading upstairs to safeguard the young man. In 

their efforts to reach the roof, the Troopers were forced to 

remove and possibly damage an air conditioning unit from a 

window. Unfortunately, by the time they arrived at the rooftop, 

the young man had already fallen and was being treated by first 

responders.

At this point the Troopers retraced their steps and exited 

the residence. While they were exiting, Trooper Smolleck noted 

a baggie of marijuana and a marijuana grinder sitting in plain 

view on a coffee table. He seized the evidence and brought it 

outside to a patrol vehicle where he placed it in a secure 

location. Ultimately, these items would not form the basis for 

the charges against [Appellant].

After securing the evidence, Trooper Smolleck reentered 

the residence and began trying to identify an actual resident of 

the house for the purpose of filing an incident report. This was a 

less than straightforward task as most of the people present 

claimed they were only visitors to the house. Once inside, he 

approached [Appellant’s] bedroom and knocked on the door. He 

did this without any intention of arresting [Appellant] or anyone 

else in the residence, but to document any residents’ names for 

his incident report relating to the damage to the window and air 

conditioning unit caused by the Troopers in the furtherance of 

their duties.

After [Appellant] admitted to being a resident of the 

house, Trooper Smolleck began to take down her information. 

During their conversation the Trooper noted a glass marijuana 

bong and a paraphernalia pipe sitting in plain view. When 

asked, [Appellant] admitted to ownership of the contraband. On 

that basis, Trooper Smolleck charged [Appellant] with the 

possession of drug paraphernalia.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/19/16, at 1–3.
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Appellant was charged with one count of possession of drug 

paraphernalia, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), an ungraded misdemeanor. 

Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence on May 15, 2015; the court 

held a hearing on July 6, 2015, following which it denied the motion. 

Appellant proceeded to a stipulated nonjury trial and was found guilty as 

charged on February 16, 2016. The trial court sentenced Appellant to pay 

the costs of prosecution and a $50.00 fine. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal on February 19, 2016; both Appellant and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following single issue for our review:

I. Did the suppression court make an error of law in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress where the police entry into 

Appellant’s residence was without consent, a warrant, or 

exigent circumstances?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (full capitalization omitted).

Appellant assails the trial court’s denial of her suppression motion.

In evaluating a suppression ruling, we consider the evidence of 

the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and any 

evidence of the defendant that is uncontradicted when examined 

in the context of the record. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 

A.3d 325, 330 (Pa. Super. 2012). This Court is bound by the 

factual findings of the suppression court where the record 

supports those findings and may only reverse when the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Id.

Commonwealth v. Haynes, 116 A.3d 640, 644 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Moreover, on October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court in In re L.J., 79 A.3d 

1073 (Pa. 2013), clarified that the scope of review of orders granting or 
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denying motions to suppress is limited to the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing. Because Appellant’s suppression hearing post-dates 

the filing date of L.J., which was held to be prospective, L.J. applies to this 

case. Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Appellant acknowledges that the troopers’ initial entry into the 

residence, where Trooper Shoap broke a window so that he could unlock the 

front door, was effectuated in order to remove an intoxicated person who 

was in danger of falling from the porch roof of the residence. The people 

inside of the house, who were laughing at the troopers, refused to open the 

door to admit them. N.T. (Suppression), 7/6/15, at 10. Nevertheless, 

Appellant claims that while Trooper Smolleck believed the individual was in 

danger of falling from the roof and that entry into the residence was 

necessary to safely remove him, there was no evidence that the individual 

actually needed emergency aid or that he requested assistance from the 

troopers. Appellant’s Brief at 10.

Appellant also maintains that the trooper’s second entry, which 

occurred after the individual on the roof had indeed fallen, was without 

consent, warrant, or exigent circumstances, and was therefore unlawful. 

She suggests that any exigency giving rise to the initial entry had dissipated. 

Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant fails to cite support for this claim. Id.

The Commonwealth points out Appellant’s acknowledgment of the 

validity of the doctrine permitting police to enter a residence without a 
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warrant when they reasonably believe someone inside is in need of 

emergency assistance. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. It avers, however, 

that Appellant disputes the applicability of the doctrine in this case. The 

Commonwealth posits that the relevant question is “whether there was an 

objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance was 

needed, or persons were in danger.” Id.

The Commonwealth further responds that the troopers’ reentry was a 

continuation of the initial entry, which was valid. Commonwealth’s Brief at 

11. In support, it cites Commonwealth v. Witman, 750 A.2d 327, 337 

(Pa. Super. 2000), where we held that when police are conducting an 

investigation based on exigent circumstances, entry and reentry for 

purposes of the initial investigation constitutes one continual search.

Our review of the record compels our agreement with the 

Commonwealth and the trial court. Appellant is incorrect regarding the 

exigency of the initial entry. To claim that an exigency did not exist because 

the inebriated individual(s) did not ask for help has no bearing in fact or 

reason. This event occurred after midnight, the seven people on the bi-level 

roof were screaming and yelling, one individual was separated from the 

other six and was stumbling, running back and forth, was visibly intoxicated, 

and he ignored police instructions. N.T. (Suppression), 7/6/15, at 3–9.

“Generally, the police will be excused from compliance with the 

warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution in only limited 

circumstances. One of these circumstances is when the police 
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reasonably believe that someone within a residence is in need of 

immediate aid.” Commonwealth v. Galvin, 603 Pa. 625, 985 

A.2d 783, 795 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051, 130 S.Ct. 

2345, 176 L.Ed.2d 565 (2010) (citations omitted). Additionally, 

“it is widely recognized that situations involving the potential for 

imminent physical harm in the domestic context implicate 

exigencies that may justify limited police intrusion into a 

dwelling in order to remove an item of potential danger.” 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 560 Pa. 34, 742 A.2d 661, 664 

(1999) (citations omitted). The relevant inquiry is “whether 

there was an objectively reasonable basis for believing that 

medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.” 

Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 

L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted) [emphasis added]. “The calculus of reasonableness 

must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that 

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Ryburn v. Huff, 

___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 987, 992, 181 L.Ed.2d 966 (2012) 

(citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Potts, 73 A.3d 1275, 1280–1281 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(emphasis added).

Here, police concern for the inebriated individual running on the roof 

obviously was justified. N.T. (Suppression), 7/6/15, at 9. The troopers’ 

quick thinking in contacting “fire, and EMS and Shippensburg Borough” was 

fortuitous, because as the troopers feared, by the time they were able to 

gain entry to the home, that person had already fallen, and the EMS 

personnel were there to render aid. Id. at 9–11.

We reject Appellant’s suggestion that the threat of injury to the person 

on the roof was “simply a possibility” and “not imminent,” and therefore, 

police should have ignored the exigency because the inebriated man 

obviously did not want their help. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Such 
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abandonment of their safety objective because the party-goers at the 

sorority house refused to open the door would have amounted to a 

dereliction of the troopers’ duty. “Indeed, the officers would have been 

remiss in their duty had they abandoned the scene simply because no one 

answered the door.” See Commonwealth v. Davido, 106 A.3d 611, 622 

(Pa. 2014) (in domestic dispute case, where police officers had a reasonable 

belief that person inside residence needed assistance, exigent circumstances 

existed to support officers’ warrantless entry into residence). As our 

Supreme Court explained:

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the “Fourth 

Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless 

entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person 

within is in need of immediate aid.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 

U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). See also

Commonwealth v. Miller, 555 Pa. 354, 724 A.2d 895, 900 

(1999) (limited number of circumstances will excuse police from 

compliance with Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause 

requirements; one such circumstance occurs when police 

reasonably believe that someone within residence is in need of 

immediate aid); Commonwealth v. Norris, 498 Pa. 308, 446 

A.2d 246, 248 (1982) (warrantless entry into residence may be 

permitted, inter alia, “when the officers may in good faith believe 

that they or someone within are in peril of bodily harm.”); 

accord Commonwealth v. Galvin, 603 Pa. 625, 985 A.2d 783, 

795–96 (2009).

Id. at 622. The Davido Court continued:

We agree that “[e]rring on the side of caution is exactly what we 

expect of conscientious police officers ... where rescue is the 

objective, rather than a search for crime,” “and we should not 

second-guess the officers’ objectively reasonable decision to 

enter and search a residence without a warrant in such a case.”
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Id. at 624–625 (quoting U.S. v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2007)). In light of the totality of the circumstances, police entry to the 

sorority house was reasonable under the circumstances.

We also conclude that police reentry into the sorority house was 

reasonable. As the trial court observed:

[T]he Troopers’ subsequent reentry into the residence after 

exiting to secure contraband was also justified by the exigent 

circumstances that gave rise to the initial entry. The initial 

justified warrantless entry required the Troopers to damage 

private property in the furtherance of their duty. This demanded 

a second entry to establish the identity of the residents of the 

home to file an incident report. As such, the reentry was not 

unlawful and the drug paraphernalia discovered in plain sight 

was not subject to suppression.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/19/16, at 4.

From the time of their initial entry, the troopers were engaged in only 

one endeavor with one goal—aiding the man on the roof. Once they gained 

access to the house, they proceeded to the room that would give them 

access to the porch roof. N.T. (Suppression), 7/6/15, at 11. To reach the 

man, to even see the man, they had to remove a window air conditioner 

unit. Id. Once they removed it, “the individual was gone, and we observed 

him laying flat on his back on the ground with the fire and EMS [personnel] 

tending to him and bringing a stretcher and a neck brace for the individual.” 

Id.

Trooper Smolleck testified, “We turned around to exit the 

residence . . . . [W]e retraced our steps back downstairs. At that point is 
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whenever I saw . . . a small baggie of marijuana and a marijuana grinder” in 

plain view. N.T. (Suppression), 7/6/15, at 12. Trooper Smolleck placed the 

contraband in his patrol car, and as stated supra, this contraband did not 

form the basis for the charge against Appellant. Because the troopers had 

broken a window to gain access and damaged the air conditioner unit, they 

had to complete an incident report. Trooper Smolleck testified as follows:

Because now we need[ed] to type up an incident report 

stating the reason the window was broken, the reason that we 

needed to gain entry, and then if the air conditioner was broken 

from us pulling it out of the window, possibly why the air 

conditioner was broken. We needed all the individuals [who] 

lived there for the incident report and documentation to the 

Commonwealth on the damages to the building.

Id. at 13. Thus, Trooper Smolleck returned to the house and knocked on an 

interior door, which was opened from the inside. Id. at 14. He asked “who 

lived at the residence”; Appellant raised her hand and “approximately five 

other young ladies in there . . . said we are just here visiting.” Id. Trooper 

Smolleck explained his purpose of documenting names for the incident 

report, and Appellant said, “Okay, that’s fine, I will give you my 

information.” Trooper Smolleck continued, “At that point I started to gather 

her information, and in plain view on a nightstand beside her was a glass 

marijuana bong and a paraphernalia pipe, at which point I asked whose that 

was and [Appellant] said that it was hers.” Id. The bong and pipe formed 

the basis for the instant charge. Id.
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There was no unwarranted delay in time, nor was there any purposeful 

search. The items taken into the custody of police were in plain view as the 

trooper completed his report. We reiterate that when police are properly 

authorized to enter a dwelling under the exigent circumstances doctrine, 

they are also authorized to return to complete the necessary paperwork 

required by the emergency situation that allowed them to enter the dwelling 

in the first place. It was entirely reasonable for Trooper Smolleck to reenter 

the sorority house to obtain the name(s) of people who lived there in light of 

the forced damage to the property. While in the house for this legitimate 

purpose, the officers observed in plain view drug paraphernalia. There was 

no inspection of drawers or closets; indeed, there was no search at all. The 

officers’ immediate return to the residence would seem to be normal and 

reasonable police procedure under the circumstances. Trooper Smolleck’s 

reentry into the sorority house and seizure of contraband in plain view did 

not exceed the bounds permissible under the exigency rule. Furthermore, 

Trooper Smolleck’s return to complete his report merely was part of one 

continuous episode, initially justified by exigent circumstances. Appellant 

cites to no controlling case law, and there is no logical basis for holding that 

a single entry is mandated under these circumstances, nor any rule that 

prohibits an officer, legitimately on the premises, from returning to the 

residence to perform the police functions which are then immediately 

justified and required. Cf. Witman, 750 A.2d at 337 (where police are 
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conducting a valid search pursuant to a defendant’s implied consent, the 

initial investigation in its entirety is permissible and such an investigation 

may require officials “to remain on the scene for an extended period of time 

repeatedly entering or re-entering the building . . . .”) (citing Michigan v. 

Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 n.6 (1978)).

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Therefore, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2016