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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

JACLYN SHOSHANA LEVINE, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

October 16, 2014 

v No. 317690 

Ingham Circuit Court 

BRIARWOOD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION 

OF OKEMOS, 

LC No. 12-001032-CZ 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: SAAD, P.J., and O’CONNELL and MURRAY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order that did not grant her a declaratory judgment 

against defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiff is a homeowner in the Briarwood subdivision in Okemos, and she owns a 

German Sheppard. When the dog was a puppy, plaintiff sought defendant Briarwood 

Homeowners Association’s (“Briarwood’s”) permission to build a fence outside her home so that 

the dog would have a secure outdoor space. When Briarwood rejected her application to do so,1

plaintiff brought this action in the Ingham Circuit Court, and asked the court to, among other 

things: (1) issue a declaratory judgment stating that her proposed fence was acceptable under 

Briarwood’s restrictive covenants; and (2) enjoin Briarwood from interfering with its 

construction. 

 

1

 Briarwood, however, failed to comply with its own restrictive covenants when it rejected 

plaintiff’s application—the covenants state that Briarwood is required to answer an application 

for architectural changes within 30 days of submission, and it failed to answer plaintiff’s 

application within that time period. 
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 The trial court granted plaintiff partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(10),2

 because defendant failed to respond to plaintiff’s fence building application 

within 30 days, as required by defendant’s own restrictive covenants.3 However, the trial court 

did not address whether plaintiff was entitled to a declaratory judgment stating that her proposed 

fence was acceptable under Briarwood’s restrictive covenants. Accordingly, the trial court’s 

ruling permitted plaintiff to build her fence, but did not grant the declaratory relief she sought. 

 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it did not grant her request for a 

declaratory judgment against Briarwood. Specifically, she asserts that a declaratory judgment is 

necessary to protect her ability to build a fence because Briarwood has supposedly placed a 

“moratorium” on all new fence construction. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. 

Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817, 823 (1999). When analyzing a motion 

for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we “consider[] affidavits, pleadings, 

depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties . . . in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a 

genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id. at 120. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 As our Supreme Court recently stated, “it is well established that a court will not decide 

moot issues. This is because it is the principle duty of [a] Court to decide actual cases and 

controversies.” People v Richmond, 486 Mich 29, 34; 782 NW2d 187 (2010) (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted), amended 784 NW2d 204 (2010). An issue “becomes moot when 

an event occurs that renders it impossible for the reviewing court to grant relief.” CD Barnes 

Assoc, Inc v Star Heaven, LLC, 300 Mich App 389, 406; 834 NW2d 878 (2013). Put another 

way, courts do not review moot actions because doing so “would be a purposeless proceeding.” 

Richmond, 486 Mich at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 

2

 The trial court initially held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

defendant responded to plaintiff’s fence application within 30 days, as required by the 

association’s covenants, but our Court held on appeal that this decision was based on a 

misreading of the plain language of the covenants. Levine v Briarwood Homeowners Ass’n, 

unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, April 28, 2013 (Docket No. 315363). The trial court 

subsequently modified its holding on remand and ruled that defendant had failed to respond to 

plaintiff’s fence application within 30 days—meaning that plaintiff’s fence complied with the 

Association’s restrictive covenants and that she was free to build it. 

3

 Again, as mentioned in n 1, supra, Briarwood’s restrictive covenants require a committee or the 

Association’s board of directors to approve or disapprove of proposed architectural changes to 

neighborhood properties within 30 days of application. 
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 Here, plaintiff’s action is moot. The trial court effectively held that plaintiff’s planned 

fence complied with Briarwood’s restrictive covenants because Briarwood did not respond to 

plaintiff’s building application within 30 days. Moreover, plaintiff provides no evidence to 

support her contention that Briarwood placed a “moratorium” on all new fence construction in 

her community, beyond a notice on the association’s website that stated it would no longer 

accept new applications for fence construction. There is no evidence in the record that 

Briarwood has changed its restrictive covenants to bar fence construction, or that it has placed 

any legal restrictions on its residents to prevent them from doing so. Even if Briarwood had 

changed its restrictive covenants to bar new fence construction, plaintiff’s fence would not be 

subject to that restriction, as the trial court already granted her the right to build her fence in its 

partial grant of summary disposition. 

 Plaintiff is thus free to build the fence, making her action over whether she may build a 

fence “a purposeless proceeding.” Richmond, 486 Mich at 35. We cannot “grant [plaintiff] 

relief” that she already possesses. CD Barnes Assoc, 300 Mich App at 406. Nor do we render 

advisory opinions. Rozankovich v Kalamazoo Spring Corp (On Rehearing), 44 Mich App 426, 

428; 205 NW2d 311 (1973). Plaintiff’s legal rights were properly vindicated at the trial court 

and do not require any further vindication by our Court. In light of our holding, we need not 

address defendant’s remaining issues, which are without merit. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray