UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DALE JUSTIN HUDDLESTON, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

CYNTHIA COFFMAN, Colorado 

Attorney General; COLORADO PAROLE 

BOARD; COLORADO DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS; JASON 

LENGERICH, Warden of Buena Vista 

Correctional Facility, 

 Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 16-1293 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-02848-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Dale Huddleston seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the 

district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. We deny a COA and 

dismiss the appeal. 

I

 In 1999, Huddleston was convicted in Colorado state court of first degree 

sexual assault and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to eight years’ 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 5, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

imprisonment and five years of mandatory parole. In November 2002, Huddleston 

filed a state petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he should not be subject 

to mandatory parole. His petition was denied, and Huddleston voluntarily dismissed 

his appeal from that order. Huddleston later filed a § 2254 petition challenging his 

conviction in 2007. This petition was dismissed as time-barred. 

 In 2006, while on parole, Huddleston pled guilty to aggravated robbery and 

second degree kidnapping in Colorado state court. He was sentenced to sixteen 

years’ imprisonment and five years of mandatory parole. As a result of his guilty 

plea, Huddleston’s parole from his 1999 conviction was revoked. In 2009, he filed a 

motion in state court seeking to credit 281 days of pre-trial confinement toward his 

2006 sentence. That motion was denied on the basis that Huddleston’s pre-trial 

confinement time was properly credited to his 1999 sentence. 

 On December 30, 2015, Huddleston filed a habeas petition in federal district 

court. In an amended petition, he asserted three claims: (1) he was unlawfully 

subjected to mandatory parole for his 1999 conviction; (2) he was wrongfully denied 

pre-trial credit toward his 2006 conviction; and (3) he is being denied sex-offender 

and medical treatment. The district court dismissed his petition and declined to grant 

a COA. Huddleston now seeks a COA from this court. 

II

A state prisoner may not appeal the denial of habeas relief under § 2241 

without a COA. See Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2000). We 

will issue a COA only if Huddleston demonstrates “that reasonable jurists could 
3 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved 

in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) 

(quotations omitted). 

The district court properly dismissed Huddleston’s first claim, in which he 

argues that the trial court wrongly sentenced him to a mandatory term of parole for 

his 1999 conviction. Such a claim must be pursued under § 2254 because it 

challenges “the validity” rather than “the execution of a sentence.” McIntosh v. U.S. 

Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Ayala v. Dep’t of Corr., 

No. 99-1401, 1999 WL 1020847, at *1, 198 F.3d 257 (10th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999) 

(unpublished table opinion) (attack on “the validity ab initio of [a] mandatory 

[parole] term” sounds in § 2254). And because Huddleston has already challenged 

his 1999 conviction in a § 2254 petition, the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider Huddleston’s claim absent prior authorization from this court. In re Cline, 

531 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 

In his second claim, Huddleston argues he was improperly denied pre-sentence 

credit toward his 2006 conviction. This claim may be pursued under § 2241 because 

it attacks the execution of his sentence. McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 811-12. However, 

§ 2241 petitions are subject to a one-year limitations period. Dulworth v. Evans, 442 

F.3d 1265, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006). To be timely in this case, Huddleston had to file 

his petition within one year of “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 
4 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Huddleston was aware of the factual circumstances underlying his 

claim by at least 2009, when he filed a state court motion seeking the same 

application of pre-trial credit. Because he waited more than one year to assert his 

claim in federal court and does not provide any argument warranting statutory or 

equitable tolling, his claim is time-barred. 

The district court dismissed Huddleston’s third claim, which concerns the 

denial of sex-offender and medical treatment, as not cognizable in habeas. 

Huddleston does not address this claim in his combined application for a COA and 

opening brief and has thus waived it. See United States v. Springfield, 337 F.3d 

1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (claim waived if petitioner “failed to address that claim 

in either his application for a COA or his brief on appeal”). 

III

 For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We 

GRANT Huddleston’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge