IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ROBERT BALDWIN, JR.,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D16-1055

JACQUELINE BALDWIN,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed November 18, 2016

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Putnam County,

Scott C. Dupont, Judge.

Timothy Keyser, of Keyser & Sharbaugh, 

P.A., Interlachen, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

LAMBERT, J,

In this dissolution of marriage action, Robert Baldwin, Jr., (“Former Husband”) 

appeals the final order on equitable distribution.1 Former Husband raises three issues on 

 

1 The trial court bifurcated the proceedings below; however, they later became 

trifurcated. The court first entered a final judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, 

reserving jurisdiction as to all other pending matters. The court next entered a final order 

on timesharing, alimony, and child support, reserving jurisdiction to address the equitable 

distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities. The court’s third final order, now under

review, distributed the assets and liabilities.
2

appeal, two of which are challenges to separate interlocutory orders holding him in 

indirect civil contempt. See Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) 

(holding that an appeal of a final order includes review of all interlocutory orders leading 

to the final order, whether separately appealed or not (citations omitted)). We affirm the 

final order of equitable distribution without further discussion and affirm the second order 

of indirect civil contempt for reasons explained below. However, we vacate the first order 

of indirect civil contempt, dated July 1, 2015, because the trial court’s failure to provide 

Former Husband with any notice of the contempt proceeding violated his right to due 

process.

The parties appeared before the court for trial on July 1, 2015, on their respective 

petitions for dissolution of marriage. At the onset of the trial, the court began questioning 

each party regarding the marital assets to be divided. Based upon the initial responses 

that it received to this inquiry, the court became concerned that Former Husband had not 

complied with an earlier court order that required the parties to disclose all of their assets 

at least seven days prior to trial. The court then reviewed Former Husband’s financial 

affidavit filed in the case, and thereafter summarily “moved into an order to show cause 

hearing giving [Former Husband] an opportunity to explain why he should not be held in 

indirect civil contempt for failing to comply with mandatory disclosure.” After considering 

Former Husband’s testimony and explanation, the court held Former Husband in indirect 

civil contempt, immediately placed him into custody, and entered a civil contempt order

that same day, which allowed Former Husband to purge his contempt by filing a detailed, 

accurate, and complete financial affidavit listing all marital assets.2 Former Husband 

 

2 As a result of this contempt proceeding, the court postponed the trial.
3

promptly complied with this contempt order and was released from custody the following 

day.

Former Husband argues that the trial court erred in holding the show cause hearing 

without allowing him sufficient time to prepare a defense to the contempt charge. We 

agree. However, because he was held in civil contempt and has long since filed the 

required financial affidavit and been released from custody, the question of mootness 

arises. An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial 

determination can have no actual effect. See DeHoff v. Imeson, 15 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 

1943). Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, an appellate court may consider a 

moot issue when the question raised is likely to recur. Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 

212 (Fla. 1992) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 1984)). Here, based 

on certain language used by the court in its order, it appears likely that the trial court will 

implement this same summary civil contempt procedure in other family law cases. 

Therefore, we find it necessary to address the error in the civil contempt proceedings. 

“It is a fundamental tenet of our system of civil justice that a party must have actual 

notice of and time to prepare for a contested hearing.” Dileo v. Dileo, 939 So. 2d 181, 

184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). 

Moreover, “[w]hile a person facing civil contempt sanctions is not entitled to the full 

panoply of due process rights afforded to a person facing indirect criminal contempt 

charges, he or she is nonetheless entitled to a proceeding that meets the fundamental 

fairness requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.” Bresch v. Henderson, 761 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2000) (citation omitted). These fundamental principles are applicable for civil contempt 
4

hearings in the family law context. Dileo, 939 So. 2d at 184 (citing Woolf v. Woolf, 901 

So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (additional citation omitted)). In this case, the trial court’s 

failure to provide Former Husband with proper notice and time to prepare for a civil 

contempt proceeding clearly violated his right to due process. 

Accordingly, we affirm the final order of equitable distribution and the second order 

of indirect civil contempt,3 but remand with directions that the trial court vacate its July 1, 

2015 order of civil contempt.

AFFIRMED, but REMANDED with directions.

TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.

 

3

In the second contempt proceeding, which resulted in Former Husband being 

immediately placed into custody, where he remained until released four days later after 

satisfying the purge requirement of that order, the trial court provided Former Husband 

with only two days’ notice for the hearing. Two days’ notice is insufficient notice of a 

contempt hearing. Woolf, 901 So. 2d at 911 (citations omitted). However, we have not 

vacated this second order of indirect civil contempt because Former Husband did not 

argue for reversal of this order due to insufficient notice and the grounds upon which he 

did seek reversal lacked merit.