### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00620- CR

Henry G onzales, Jr., Appellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 299 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -DC- 12- 9040 23, H ONO RAB LE K AREN R. SAGE, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenc ed to life imprisonment. He appea ls his conviction in seven points. We will affirm the trial c ourt’s judg ment.

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND Appellant was char g ed with murder afte r Mary Rivas was found deceas ed o n the porch of her boy friend’ s home. At trial, the medica l examiner testified that Rivas had bee n killed in an assault by intentionally inflicted stab wounds. Rivas’s boy friend, Ruben Gonzales (appe llant’s brother) , testified that he had been stay ing at the hospital during the time frame in question and that Rivas had called him at the hos pital from his home phone the night befor e her body was found. Ruben testified t h at during the phone call, he could hear appellant’ s voice in the background, demanding to talk to him. He further testified that at one point during the phone call he hear d Rivas
say “mother fu—,” but that befor e she finished the curse word, the call was abruptly disconnec ted.Ruben testified that this was the last contac t he had with h i s gi rl friend befor e his daug hter found

Rivas’s dece ased bloody body on the porch the foll owing day

. No ot her w itnesses testified to the events of tha t evening

.

Appellant did not testify at trial, but in a video rec ording that was shown to the jury , he admitted to p o l i ce detec tives during a custodial interrog ation that he had been drinking and smoking c rac k at Ruben’s house w ith Ri vas on the ni g ht in question and that, althoug h he did not

reme mber stabbing her, he did reme mber standing over her bloody body at some point afte r he and the dece ased had an arg ument. Evidence showed that appellant sustained two cuts on the fing ers of his le ft hand during the evening in que stion a nd that drops of his blood we re f ound throug hout the living room and kitchen of Ruben’s house as well as progressingalong sever al blocks of sidewalk and cea sing at a water fauc et outside a g as station. A blood y six -inch knife was found behind a dumpster nea

r the g as station, and DNA testing c onfirmed that the bl ood on the knife be longe d to both the dece ased a

nd appellant.

DISCUSSIO N Appellant’s first issue asser ts that the trial court err ed in prohibiting defe nse counsel from asking the following question during voir dire: “You’ re convince d that it is more likely than
not that [t he defe ndant] did commit th e m u rd er , but y ou are not convince d beyond a rea sonable doubt. I f y ou found y ourself in that situation, could y ou follow the law and acquit th e p erson on trial? ” The State objected that this was an improper commitment question, to which the trial court responde d that it would allow proper que stions such as, “Will y ou hold the State to its standard of bey ond a rea sonable doubt? ” and “Do y ou have a problem with that standard in that circ umstance? ”

2Appellant explained that the question he soug ht to ask was “Whether [t he venire ] can follow the law

and acquit if they are not convince d bey ond a rea sonable doubt of this man’s g uilt? ” Appellant then inquired whether the trial court was instructing him that he was not permitted to a sk that question,
to which the trial court replied, “Ye s.” Def ense counsel then as ked a rephr ased question about

rea sonable doubt, to which the State did not objec t.

Both the State and appellant ag ree that appellant soug ht to ask a commitment question, and we concur . See Standefer v. State , 59 S.W .3d 177, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (c o m m itment question binds prospec tive juror to verdic t or asks prospec tive juror to ref rai n fr o m resolving issue, based on one or more fac ts contained in question). The point of contention is whether the commi tment question was proper. Id. at 181-82. We conclude that the questi on wa s
proper beca

use it sou gh t t o deter

mine whether the venire members could follow the law by

co m mitti ng to an acquittal if they wer e not convince d bey ond a rea sonable doubt of appellant’s
g uilt and beca

use it did not include any additi o n al fac ts beyond those require d for this leg al require ment. See id. ; Caton v. Stat e , 66 Tex. Crim

. 4 7 3 , 475 (1912) (holding as proper questions substantively same as question here ); see also Fuller v. State , 363 S.W .3d 583, 588 n.28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (prospe ctive juror would b e ch al l engea ble for cause if she equate d proof bey ond

rea sonable doubt with preponde ranc e of evidenc e or clea r and convincing evidenc e). Acc ording ly , the trial cou rt abused its discretion in prohibiting defe nse counsel from asking the question. See Barajas v. State , 93 S.W .3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Howard v. State , 941 S.W .2d 102, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Having deter mined that the trial court err ed, we must conduct a harm analy sis. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.2.

3Whil e defe nse counsel was prohibited from phrasing his prefer re d q u ery in one

particula r way , he was not entirely prec luded from discussing an d ex plaining the bey ond-area sonable-doubt standard. There fore , we will revie w the harm under the non-constitutional-harm analy sis, as the limit ation that the trial court place d on defe nse counsel’s pref err ed voir dire was not “so substantial” as to rise to the level of constitutional err or. Easley v. State , 424 S.W .3d 535, 541-
42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (whe re defe nse counsel was not f orec losed from explaining conce pt of “bey ond a rea sonable doubt,” err or wa s non-constitutional); W oods v. State , 152 S.W .3d 105, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (denia l of proper question in voir dire assessed as non-constitutional err or).
Acc ording ly , we will consider whether appell an t ’s substantial rig hts wer e aff ecte d there by and disreg ard the err or if they wer e not. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State , 43 S.W .3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (substantial rig ht is aff ecte d when err or has substantial and in j u ri ous eff

ect or influence in determining jury ’s ver dict).

Be sides the fac t that appellant was allowed to elicit the same g ener al information as that likely to be g leane d from his pref err ed question, the jury was instructed in the char g e that “[t] he
prosec ution has t he burden of proving the defe n d ant g uilty and it must do so by proving eac h and

ever y element of the offe nse char g ed b ey o n d a re asonable doubt and if it fails to do so, y ou must acquit the defe ndant” and that “[i] n the event y ou have a rea sonable doubt as to the defe ndant’s g uilt afte r considering all the evidenc e befor e y ou, and these instructions, y ou will acquit the defe ndant.” This char g e proper ly i n s t ru cted the jury on the burden of proof beyond a rea sonable doubt and the circ umstances under which they must acquit appellant. Fur thermore , this instruction contained substantively the sam e i n fo rm ati on as that included in appellant’ s pref err ed voir-dire question.

4Absent evidenc e to the contra ry , which we do not h av e, we presume the jury followed the trial
court’s instructions. Hutch v. State , 922 S.W .2d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). On this rec ord and in light of this presumption, we conclude that the voir-dire err or did not have a substantial and injurious influence on the jury ’s verdic t beca use the jury was char g ed with the very same duty appellant e arlier

soug ht to address in voir dire

. Additionally , the evidenc e of g uilt was overw helming, considering the phy sical and
DNA evidenc e; the testimony of Ruben, the medical examiner, and the detec tives; a nd appellant’ s

own s tatements during his cus t o d i al i n t er view. I n light of the evidence, the voir-dire err or would have ha d littl e, if a

ny , influence on the jury ’s deliber ations. Fi n a ll y , w e n o te that in closing arg ument, defe nse counsel revisited the State’s burden of proof and his pref

err ed prese ntation of that topic by submitt ing to the jury t h at t h e S t ate had “prove n that [t he defe ndant] probably did k i l l [ t he dece ased], but [i t] didn’t prove bey ond a

rea sonable doubt that he did.” (Emphasis added.) Fur thermore , the jury char g e specific ally order ed the jury that its verdic t must be unanimous and must ref lect the individual verdic t of eac h juror rathe r than a “mer e acquie scenc e in the conclusion o f t h e other jurors.” When viewed in context of the

overw helming evidenc e of appellant’ s g uilt, the trial court’s jury instructions, and appellant’ s ability
to g ener ally pursue the issue of rea sonable doubt during voir dire, we conclude that the trial court’s

err or i n prohibiting defense counsel from asking his one prefer red voir-dire question did not have

a substan t i al an d i njurious influence in deter mining the jury ’s verdic t. Acc ording ly , we overr ule appellant’ s first issue.

5We next addre ss appellan t ’s complaint that the trial court err ed in denying his

reque st for a self-de fense instruction in the j ury ch ar ge. See Ferrel v. State , 55 S.W .3d 586, 591 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (def endant is entitled to instru cti on on self-de fense if issue is raised by evidenc e). The State responds, as it did at trial, that there was no evidenc e on the essential element of the offe nse requiring that the victim be t h e fi rst ag g ressor. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 9.31, .32. 2
Ba sed on our r eview of

the re cord, w e ag ree . The only evidenc e t o whi ch appellant points as alleg edly raising the defe nse is (1) two cuts he sustained on t h e fi n gers of his left hand during the time of the offe nse and (2) an
arg ument he alleg edly had with the victim. Although appellant argue s o n appea l that the cuts 3

wer e defe nsive wounds, sustained in response to the victim’s first ag g ressive act towards him with the knife tha t cause d her death, there is nothing in the re cord to support such a n infere nce. A s the trial court corr ectly conclude d, the cuts on appellant’ s hand, without more, wer e i n s ufficie nt as a
matter of law to raise the element of self-de fen s e re q u i ri n g the victim to have been the first
ag g ressor. See Shaw v. State , 243 S.W .3d 647, 657-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“r aised by the

This is appellant’ s six th issue, b u t fo r the sake of brevity , we addre ss his points out of 1 order

. See Tex. R. App. P . 47.1, 47.4. The State also arg

ues that appellant did not admit the underly ing acts, another require ment 2 for a self- defe nse instruction. See V anBrackle v. State , 179 S.W .3d 708, 715 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). We need not r eac h this arg ument beca use of our deter mination of the s elf-de fense issue on the basis of fir st ag g ression. As appellant did not testify at trial, evidenc e of the arg ument to which he ref ers arose only 3 in the context of his statements to police office rs during the videotaped custodial interrog ation afte r his arr est. I t is not a require ment that a defe ndant testify to raise the issue of self-de fense , but there must none theless be evidenc e that he believed himself to be in dang er and of an attack or appar ent attack by the victim. Smith v. State , 676 S.W .2d 584, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 6evidenc e” means there is some evidenc e on eac h element of defe nse t h at , if believed by jury ,

would support rational infe renc e that ele ment is true). The arg ument appellant a lleg edly had with the victim is also insufficient, wit h o u t more, to raise the defe nse, as an arg ument does not equate with an ac t or attempted a ct of violenc e.

Appellant’s contention that he acte d in s elf-defe nse ag ainst the victim’s initial
ag g ression relies on mere speculat i o n ra t h er than rea sonable infere nces that the jury could have made from the admitted evidenc e. See Hoo p er v. State , 214 S.W .3d 9, 15-16 (Tex. Crim. App.
2 0 0 7 ) (“ S p ec ulation

. . . about the possible meaning of fac ts and evidenc e . . . is not sufficie n t l y based on fac ts or evidenc e to support a finding bey ond a rea sonable doubt.”). The trial court did not

err in ruling that the evidenc e did not raise the issue of self-de fense and in not g iving an instruction

acc ording ly

. See Shaw , 243 S.W .3d at 657-58. We over rule a ppellant’s six th issue. Appellant’s fourth issue asser ts that the trial court err ed in excluding ev i dence of the vi ct im’s criminal history alleg edly demonstrating her char acte r for violence, specific ally evidenc e that she had previously threa tened a

n Austin peac e off

icer with a knife when he arr ested her for prostitution and for which she was convicted of assault eleve n y ear s prior to her mur der.
Howe v er , wh i l e evidence of a pertinent char acte r trait of the victim of a crime offe red by the defe ndant is ad m i ssible, such evidenc e must g ener ally be in the form of opinion or reputa tion testi m o n y . S

ee T ex. R. Evid. 404(a) (2); Ex parte Miller , 330 S.W .3d 610, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Torres v. Sta t e , 7 1 S.W .3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Evidence of other crimes,
wrong s, or acts is not admissi ble to prove the char acte r of the vic tim to show action in c onformity there with. Tex. R . Evid. 404(b).

7Specific acts of violence may be admissible to show that the victim wa s the first

ag g ressor but only to the ex tent that the acts are rele vant apa rt from showing action in conf ormity with such char acte r, for instance to prove the victim’s specific intent, motive, or state of mind with
respe ct to the offe nse for which the defe ndant is be ing tried. Torres , 71 S.W .3d at 760. Howeve r, in the context of a def

endant’ s intent to prove that the dec ease d was the first ag g ressor, in or der to introduce evidenc e of a specific , v i o l en t act, there must first be some evidenc e of a violent or
ag g ressive a ct by

the dec ease d that tends to raise the issue of self- defe nse and tha t the specific act

m ay explain. Id. at 761; see also Torres v. State , 117 S.W .3d 891, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 0 0 3 ) (bef ore defe ndant may introduce evidenc e of prior specific act that tends to explain dece dent’s later conduct, there must be some evidenc e of ag g ression by dece ased during events that g ave rise t o criminal cha

rg es in ca se). Thus, for the victim’s criminal history to have been admissible in this case , the r e must have first been some evidenc e of her ag g ression that raised the i s s u e o f s el f-defense

. As alre ady discussed, there was not. T here fore , evidenc e of the victim’s c riminal history was not a dmissibl e, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. See Tienda v. State , 358 S.W .3d 633,
638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (trial court’s rul i n g o n ev i d entiary matter is revie wed for abuse of discretion, which does not occur if ruling is within zone of rea sonable disag ree ment). We overr ule appellant’ s fourth issue.

I n his fifth issue, appellant arg ues that the trial court abused its discretion in deny ing his motion for continuance so that he could procur e the attendanc e of an alleg edly materia l witness—the peac e office r whom the dece ased had threa tened with a knife eleve n y ear s prior. See

8Renteria v. State , 206 S.W .3d 689, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (g ranting or deny ing continuance

is within sound d i s cr et i o n of trial court); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 29.13 (trial court
may g rant continuance “whe n it is made to appea r to the satisfac tion of the court that by some unexpected occur

renc e since the trial beg an, which no rea sonable diligenc e could have anticipated, the applica

nt is so taken by

surprise that a

fair tr ial cannot be had”)

. After revie wing the entire rec ord, we conclude that appellant ha s not demonstrated that he was actua lly prejudice d by the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance

. See Gallo v. State , 239 S.W .3d 757, 764 (T ex . C ri m . App. 2007). As alre ady discussed, the peac e office r’s testimony about the assault committed by the victim would not have been admissible. Additionally , in his motion for new trial, appellant did not raise the issue of the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance and offe red no aff idavit from the peac e office r indicating what his testimony would have been. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.2 (motion f or new trial is prer equisite for issue on appea l when

nece ssary to adduce fac ts not in rec ord); Flores v. Stat e , 18 S.W .3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—Austin
2 0 0 0 , no pet.) (motion for new trial alleg ing fac ts outside rec ord without supporting aff idavits is fata lly defe ctive). A motion for new trial is ordinarily the means by which to make a sho wi ng of prejudice , Gonz a l es v. State, 304 S.W .3d 838, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), and even if the
peac e officer ’s t estimony would have been admissibl e, appellant made no showing as t o what the additional evidenc e would have demonstrated from which we could evalua te whether he was prejudice d. We overrule appellant’ s fifth issue.

Appellant’ s s ec o nd issue complains that his rig hts to due proce ss and to counsel

wer e violated by virtue of the State’s alleg ed withholding of exculpatory evidenc e prior to trial. See

9Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Specifica lly , appellant complains that the State withheld

evidenc e of the dece ased’ s criminal rec ord, not disclosing it until the penultimate day of trial, despite his prior reque sts for exculpatory evi d en ce and despite the court’s g ranting of his motion for disclosure of excul patory evidenc e. Howeve r, to find reve rsible err or under Brady , the appellant
must show that the evidenc e centr al to the Brady claim would have been admissible, besides making other required showings; t he S tate does not have a duty to disclose materia l evidence favor able to the def ense if it would be ina dmissibl e. See P ena v. State , 353 S.W .3d 797, 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Be cause , as discussed a bove, the evidence of t he victim ’s prior criminal acts was not admissible, there was no reve rsible Brady err or. Acc ording ly , we overr ule appellant’ s second issue. 4
I n his third issue, appellant arg ues that the trial court err ed in denying his reque st for a limit ing instruction reg arding out-of-c ourt statements made by two homicide detec tives during their custodial interrog ation of him. At trial, appellant objected on the basis of hear say to all of the decla ratory statements made by the detec tives and pub l i s h ed to the jury in the form of the video

rec ording of his interrog ation. Appellant arg ues that the detec tives’ statements wer e inadmissible 5
hear say , and to the extent that they wer e admissible for a purpose other than the truth of the matters

asser ted, the trial court was require d to instruct the jury about the limit ed scope of the evidenc e due

Be cause the issue of the inadmissibil ity of the victim’s c riminal rec ord is dispositive, we 4 do not rea ch appe llant’s additional alleg ation that the State in fac t withheld the evidenc e. Represe ntative of the objected- to statements was the following , made by Detec tive Whit e: 5
I mean, I mean when y ’all wer e fig hting, when, when y ou and [t he dece ased] wer e having the arg ument, and g et—and when , when thi n g s wer e st arting to g et heated. You s aid t hat y ou wer e hit ting it [ i.e., smoking the cra ck pipe] and y ou went—y ou lost contr o l an d then the next thing y ou knew y ou wer e standingover he r. 10to his reque st for such instruction. See Tex. R. Evid. 105 (a ) (w hen evidence that is admissible as

to one party or for one purpose but not admissibl e as t o an o t h er party or for another purpose is admitted, court shall re strict evidenc e to proper scope a nd instruct jury

acc ording ly), 802 (he arsa y is not admissi ble except as provide d by statute or rule s). The rec ord ref

lects that twice the State repr esente d to the trial co u rt that it was

o f f e r in g th e c h a ll e n g e d e v id e n c e f o r th e tr uth o f th e ma

tt e r s a s s e r te d

. We c o n c lu d e th a

t th e d e te c ti v e s ’ videotaped s tatements wer e inadmissible as hear say unless an exception applied. See id. R. 801 (hea rsay is statement, other than one made by decla rant while testify ing at trial, offe red to prove truth of matter a sserted) , 802 (hea rsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or rule s). Neither
at trial nor on appea l has the State identified any applicable hear say exception. Acc ording ly , we hold that t he trial court abused its discretion in admitting the detec tives’ statements f o r a ll p u r p o s e s , in c lu d in g f

o r th e tr uth o f th e ma

tt e r s a s s e r te d to b y th e d e te c ti v e s , in s te a d o f a d mi tt in g them with a

n
appropr iate limiting instruction as appe llant reque sted. See id. R. 105(a).

Having deter

mined that the trial court err ed in f ailing to g ive a limiting instruction,

w e mu s t c o n s id e r w

h e th e r a p p e ll a n t’ s s u b s ta n ti a l r ig h ts w e r e a f

f e c te d

. J o n e s v
. S ta te , 1 1 9 S. W. 3 d 4 1 2 , 4 2 4

- 2 5 ( T e x. A

p p . — F o r t Wo r th 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t

. ) ( f

a i l u r e to g iv e li mi ti n g in s tr

u c ti o n is n o n - c o n s ti tu

ti o n a l

er ror); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) (re view of non-constitutional err ors); Jones v. St a t e , 944 S.W .2d 642, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (cour t’s failure to g ive rule 105(a) limit ing instruction is reviewe d for ha

rmless err or). Having examined t h e re co rd as a whole, we have fair assura nce that this err or did
not influence the jury or h ad b u t a s l i ght eff ect. See Routier v. State , 112 S.W .3d 554, 577 (Tex.

11Crim. App. 2003); see also Motilla v. State , 78 S. W

. 3d 352, 355-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (in

deter mining whether substantial rig hts wer e aff ecte d, appellate court should consider testimony and phy sical evidenc e, n at u re o f evidenc e, char acte r of alleg ed err or, and overw helming evidenc e of
g uilt). Most of th e detec tives’ statements wer e para phrase s of appellant’ s own proper ly admitted

s t atements that he made during the custodial interview and there fore wer e cumulative of t h at evidenc e. Fur

thermore , the statements would likely have been understood by a rea sonable juror to have been rele vant fo r a purpose other than for their truth (as the detec tives did not witness the murder) , such as to g lean information from appellant as an investiga tive technique. The rema ining
sta t em ents by the detec tives wer e para phrase s of statements alleg edly made by Ruben during
De t ec t i v e Whit e’s interview with him at the hospital and wer e cumulative of fac ts contained i n Ruben’s trial testimony and in phone rec ords admitted at trial

. Also, both detec tives and Ruben

wer e ava ilable for c ross-examination at trial.

M o r e o v e r , a s a lr e a d

y d is c u s s e d , th e re was overw helming evidenc e of appellant’ s g u il t in the form of DNA and phy sical evidence, includ i n g t h e bloody knife containing appellant’s and the victim’s DNA and evidenc e that appellant was with the dece ased at the time of the offe nse. After examining the entire rec ord, we conclude that appellant’ s substantial rig hts wer e not aff ecte d by the trial court’s error in failing to g ive t he jury a li miting i nstruction ab o u t t h e detectives’ videotaped statements, and we acc ording ly overr ule his third issue. Finally , appellant’ s seventh issue asser ts that the trial court m ad e multipl e err ors throug h o u t the trial proce eding s that, viewed toge ther, cumulatively resulted in depriving him of a fair trial. Although a number of err ors may be fou n d h ar m fu l in their cumulative eff ect,

12Chamberlain v. State , 998 S.W .2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the “cumulative err or doctrine

provides relief only when constitutional err ors so ‘fa tally infec t the trial’ that they violated the trial’s fundame ntal fairne ss,’” United States v. Be ll , 367 F.3d 452, 471 ( 5th Cir. 2004).

Be sides the six issues alre ady addre ssed, appellant cites an additional n i netee n alleg ed err ors within this seventh issue. We have previously cautioned parties bring ing cumulativeharm claims to brief ea ch alleg ed err or separ ately befor e discussing their cumulative eff ect, with appropr iate citations to the rec ord and rele vant leg al au t h o ri t y ; otherwise, the party runs the risk of having the claim dismiss ed as multifarious. W alls v. State , No. 03-12-00055- CR, 2014 WL
120 8 0 1 7 , at * 5 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated for publication); see also Davis v. State , 329 S.W .3d 798, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (conc luding that single point of err or asse rting constitutional and statutory claims was multifarious). Howeve r, we

re gar d ap pellant’s true issue here to be that the t rial court exhibi ted an improper bias or prejudice
ag ainst him, depriving him of a fair trial, rathe r than that the cumulative eff ect of these multipl e

a ll e g e d “ e r

r o r s ” s u f f ic ie n tl y r a is e d th e h a

r m le v e l to o n e w a

r r a n ti n g a r e v e r s a l. S

e e B r a c y v
. G r a m le y , 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997). There fore , we consider whether the trial court’s conduct, as ref lected i n the rec ord as a whole, rises to a level display ing “dee p-sea ted favor itism or antago n i s m . ” S ee Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (judicial rema rks durin g co u rs e o f trial that are critica l, disapproving , or even hostile to counsel, parties, or their case s, ordinarily do not support bias

or partiality challeng e). Having viewed the rec ord in its entirety , we conclude that the trial court’s conduct—in the form of appellant’ s cited twenty -plus “er rors” and the trial court’s verba l r emar ks

ma d e th r o u g h o ut tr ia l— d o n o t r is e to s u c h a le v e l. A c c o r d in g ly , w e o v e r r u le a p p e ll a n t’ s s e v e n th is s u e .

13CONCLUSION
Fo r t he fore g oing rea sons, we overr ule eac h of appellant’ s issues and aff irm the trial court’ s judgme nt.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Scott K. Field, Just ice
Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Goodwin, and F ield Affir med Filed: De cembe r 4, 2014 Do Not Publish

14