IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2017

RUSSELL LEAKS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission

No. T20152889 James A. Hamilton, III, Commissioner

No. W2016-01609-COA-R3-CV

This appeal involves a suit filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of 

Tennessee. The claimant alleged that he was seized without a warrant or probable cause, 

in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The 

State sought dismissal, alleging that the Claims Commission did not have the requisite 

jurisdiction to hear such a claim. The Claims Commissioner agreed and dismissed the 

claim. The claimant appeals. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Tennessee 

Claims Commission Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S. and BRANDON O. GIBSON, J., joined.

Russell Leaks, Memphis, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; and Andrée S. Blumstein, 

Solicitor General; and Pamela S. Lorch, Senior Counsel, Nashville, Tennessee, for the

appellee, the State of Tennessee. 

04/04/2018
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Russell Leaks (“Claimant”) was provided a conditional release from the Tennessee 

Department of Correction (“TDOC”) on June 19, 2014, following his voluntary 

completion of a TDOC program. Thereafter, on July 3, 2014, TDOC officials returned 

Claimant to custody, the reasons for which are unclear from the record.1

On June 26, 2015, Claimant filed a “Claims for Damages” with the Tennessee 

Division of Claims Administration. Claimant sought damages for his illegal seizure in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claim was 

transferred to the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Claims Commission”) with James 

A. Hamilton, III serving as the Claims Commissioner. Claimant then filed a “Claim for 

Damages” in which he again maintained that he was illegally seized and that his 

subsequent detention was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The State filed a 

motion to dismiss, alleging that the Claims Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

to entertain such a claim. Claimant objected, citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-

8-307, which governs actions based upon the “negligent care, custody, and control of 

persons.” He also requested a default judgment based upon the State’s failure to file a 

response within 30 days of the filing of his “Claim for Damages.” 

The Claims Commission dismissed the claim, finding that it did not have the 

requisite authority to hear claims asserting an alleged violation or deprivation of Fourth 

Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The Claims Commission also 

denied Claimant’s motion for default judgment, finding that the complaint was never 

served upon opposing counsel.2 Lastly, the Claims Commission denied any allegations 

based upon section 9-8-307 because Claimant failed to plead the action in his complaint. 

Further, Claimant asserted that the actions at issue were intentional, not negligent. 

Claimant filed a timely appeal in this court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(1) 

(“The decisions of the individual commissioners or, when rendered, decisions of the 

entire commission regarding claims on the regular docket may be appealed to the 

Tennessee court of appeals pursuant to the same rules of appellate procedure which 

govern interlocutory appeals and appeals from final judgments in trial court civil 

actions[.]”). The trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss a case based on lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction is a conclusion of law. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 

(Tenn. 2008); Button v. Waite, 208 S.W.3d 366, 369 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. 

 

1 Claimant alleges in his brief that TDOC officials came to his residence with a letter, advising him to 

submit himself to their custody because it had been determined that he was not eligible for release. 

2

Instead, the Claims Commission advised the State of the claim and instructed the State to file a response 

by May 6, 2016. The State responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss along with a Memorandum of Law 

in Support prior to May 6. 
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Cawood, 134 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tenn. 2004)). The trial court’s conclusions of law are 

subject to a de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 

at 47; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

The Tennessee Constitution provides that “[s]uits may be brought against the State 

in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may direct.” Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 

17. “This constitutional provision reflects sovereign immunity, the notion that a 

sovereign governmental entity cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.” 

Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S .W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted); 

Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tenn. 2000). “The rule of sovereign immunity in 

Tennessee is both constitutional and statutory. It is not within the power of the courts to 

amend it.” Jones v. L & N Railroad Co., 617 S.W.2d 164, 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

The legislature has waived its sovereign immunity as to certain actions brought 

before the Claims Commission. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-301, et seq. The relevant 

code section provides that “[t]he commission or each commissioner sitting individually 

has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the [S]tate based on 

the acts or omissions of ‘[S]tate employees’” that fit within one of several categories.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1). “Outside of these categories, no jurisdiction exists for 

claims against the State.” Morton v. State, No. M2008-02305-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 

3295202, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2009). 

The Tennessee Legislature expressly revoked jurisdiction for claims involving the 

negligent deprivation of constitutional rights in 1989. Shell v. State, 893 S.W.2d 416, 

418-19 (Tenn. 1995). While jurisdiction remains for actions involving the negligent 

deprivation of statutory rights, no jurisdiction is provided for claims based upon 

intentional conduct of the State’s employees. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(d) (“The 

state will not be liable for willful, malicious, or criminal acts by state employees, or for 

acts on the part of state employees done for personal gain.”).

On appeal, Claimant now requests relief based upon the TDOC’s employees’ 

violation of Section 40-7-103 for failure to secure a warrant before his arrest. A party 

may not offer a new issue for the first time on appeal. See Lane v. Becker, 334 S.W.3d 

756, 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Campbell Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. BrownleeKesterson, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 457, 466-67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)). Moreover, the Claims 

Commission would lack jurisdiction over this claim as well. In order to sustain a claim 

of negligent deprivation of statutory rights, the claimant must prove “that the general 

assembly expressly conferred a private right of action in favor of the claimant against the 

state for the state’s violation of the particular statute’s provisions[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

9-8-307(a)(1)(N). Here, the allegations stem entirely from the intentional failure to 

comply with section 40-7-103, which does not confer a private right of action.
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With the above considerations in mind, we affirm the dismissal of the claim. The 

case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be necessary. 

Costs of the appeal are taxed to the appellant, Russell Leaks.

_________________________________ 

JOHN W. McCLARTY, JUDGE