IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 19, 2016 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RODNEY EARL JONES

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2012-C-2035 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge

No. M2015-01373-CCA-R3-CD – Filed December 6, 2016

_____________________________

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Rodney Earl Jones, of first degree 

felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life 

for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for the especially aggravated 

robbery conviction, ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, the 

Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for severance; 

(2) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury about his co-defendant‟s out of 

court statements; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After 

review, we affirm the Defendant‟s convictions. 

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

G. Jeff Cherry and Christopher Beauchamp, Lebanon, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Rodney Earl Jones.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Counsel;

Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Brian Ewald, Assistant District Attorney 

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from the murder of the victim, Victor M. Parham, which occurred 

on or about March 14, 2012. For this murder, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the 

Defendant and two co-defendants, Alberto Conde-Valentino and Xavier Tull-Morales, 

for the first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery of Victor M. 
2

Parham. The Defendant filed a motion to sever, which the trial court denied. At the 

Defendant‟s trial on these charges, the parties presented the following evidence: Carlos 

Burroughs testified through an interpreter that he was incarcerated serving a sentence for 

DUI at the time of the trial. Mr. Burroughs said that he and the victim had been friends 

since the third grade and that they were like brothers. The two, who had been roommates 

for several years, spoke by telephone every day and saw each other frequently. Mr. 

Burroughs stated that he and the victim lived together at a residence on Allen Road 

(“Allen Road Residence”) in Donelson, Tennessee. Mr. Burroughs eventually moved 

out, and the victim remained living at the Allen Road Residence. 

Mr. Burroughs described the victim, saying that he was good with his family and 

never had a problem with anyone. Mr. Burroughs knew the victim‟s girlfriend, Starnesha 

Grant, and his brother, Darius Parham. Mr. Burroughs said the victim owned a lawn care 

service. Mr. Burroughs said that the victim never discussed selling drugs, and Mr. 

Burroughs was not aware that the victim engaged in this activity.

Mr. Burroughs testified that he called the victim around 12:00 p.m. on his last day 

of DUI class. The two spoke on the telephone, laughing, and the victim said that he had 

to go to his house. When Mr. Burroughs got out of his class late that evening, he again 

tried to call the victim. When the victim did not answer either of his phones, which was 

unusual, Mr. Burroughs began calling other people to determine the victim‟s 

whereabouts. Mr. Burroughs said that he called the victim‟s girlfriend, Ms. Grant, who at 

first seemed unconcerned. She called him back and inexplicably said that she did not 

want to go to the Allen Road Residence alone. She came and picked up Mr. Burroughs, 

and the two of them went to the Allen Road Residence together at around 8:00 or 9:00 

p.m. Mr. Burroughs recalled that, when Ms. Grant picked him up, she was driving the 

victim‟s car, which was not unusual. 

Mr. Burroughs said that he looked around the victim‟s home, finding all the doors 

locked and the lights off. Ms. Grant‟s car, which the victim often drove, was parked in 

the driveway. Mr. Burroughs said that Ms. Grant seemed “nervous” and repeatedly asked 

him to break into the home. Mr. Burroughs declined and suggested they contact the 

victim‟s brother, Mr. Parham, who lived with the victim at the time. Mr. Burroughs said 

that he assumed that the victim was with a friend, and the idea that he was dead never 

occurred to him. 

Mr. Burroughs said that he returned home, wanting to contact Mr. Parham before 

entering the residence. He asked Ms. Grant to keep him apprised of any developments. 

Ms. Grant and Mr. Parham contacted him the next morning, and he went back to the 

Allen Road Residence, where police were investigating a crime scene. Mr. Burroughs 

said that he stayed at the residence until police removed the victim‟s body from the scene.
3

Mr. Burroughs said that, a few weeks later, he and several of the victim‟s friends 

and family were back at the Allen Road Residence cleaning. The victim‟s cousin found a 

bullet on the floor, and they called the police. The police asked several questions with 

regard to the bullet. 

During cross-examination, Mr. Burroughs testified that when the bullet was found

the group left it on the floor untouched. During further cross-examination, Mr. 

Burroughs agreed the victim had two phones, explaining that one was a work phone and 

the other a personal phone.

During redirect examination, Mr. Burroughs testified that, after Ms. Grant dropped 

him off that evening before victim‟s body was found, she called him later to ask him 

whether he thought the victim would mind if Ms. Grant allowed Mr. Parham to sleep at 

her residence that evening. She wanted to know whether Mr. Burroughs thought that this 

would make the victim angry. Mr. Burroughs told her that he thought it was fine. 

Starnesha Grant testified that she was a twenty-eight year old grievance analyst for 

CVS pharmacy. At the time of these events, Ms. Grant attended Cumberland University 

as a nursing student and also cared for her daughter, who was seven at the time. Ms. 

Grant recalled that she and the victim had dated for three years at the time of his death. 

Ms. Grant said that the victim owned several vehicles, one was a work truck and the 

others were personal cars. She said that she often drove the victim‟s two-door car, and he 

drove her four-door car because they liked each other‟s cars better. 

Ms. Grant acknowledged that the victim sold drugs. She said that he sold 

marijuana, prescription pills, and ecstasy. Ms. Grant said that the victim had cash onhand at all times, sometimes in large amounts. Ms. Grant said that, if the victim carried 

this money with him, he would place it in different locations on his person. For example,

he would store some of the cash in his shoes and some in his pockets. In this way, the 

victim attempted to avoid detection as a drug dealer if stopped by police. Ms. Grant said 

that when the police first questioned her about the victim‟s drug dealing she did not 

answer honestly and denied that the victim sold drugs.

Ms. Grant confirmed that Mr. Burroughs and the victim were as close as brothers. 

She said that the two contacted each other daily. She also recalled meeting the victim‟s 

brother, Mr. Parham, after Mr. Parham was released from jail a few months before the 

victim‟s murder. Ms. Grant said that Mr. Parham was living in the victim‟s Allen Road 

Residence, which was the reason that the victim still rented the residence. The victim 

had obtained an apartment nearby but kept the Allen Road Residence for Mr. Parham. 
4

Ms. Grant said that there was only one key to the Allen Road Residence because 

she had broken the spare key. She said that this sometimes posed a problem because the 

victim insisted on keeping the only key, so Mr. Parham was sometimes locked out of the 

residence. Ms. Grant said that the victim had two phones, one of which she had recently 

purchased for him as a Valentine‟s Day gift. Ms. Grant said that, routinely, the victim 

immediately responded to her calls if he did not answer, either by calling her back or 

responding by text. 

Ms. Grant said that she knew the Defendant because the Defendant had previously 

lived with the victim. Ms. Grant recounted that the Defendant and the victim lived 

together before she and the victim began dating, but the victim had introduced her to the 

Defendant on several occasions. Ms. Grant said the victim could not drive because of his 

multiple DUI convictions, so she sometimes drove the victim places. She said she drove

him to the Defendant‟s house “a couple of times.” 

Ms. Grant recalled the events surrounding her finding the victim dead. She said 

that the victim had spent the night with her, and the two awoke together on March 14, 

2012. Ms. Grant awoke at 8:00 a.m. because she had to go to work, and the victim

returned to sleep in her bed. When she arrived at work, her outfit did not meet the dress 

code, so she returned home to change. When she arrived home briefly to change, she 

found the victim still asleep in bed. Ms. Grant said that she went to work and did not 

speak with the victim all day. After work, but before her night class, she went to the 

Allen Road Residence. Ms. Grant, who was driving the victim‟s black car, saw her white 

car, which he sometimes drove, parked and unlocked at the residence. She found this 

unusual. She assumed this meant that the victim had just run into his house for a minute 

and intended to return quickly. Ms. Grant smoked some marijuana and texted the victim 

to tell him that she was in the driveway. She then placed the remainder of her marijuana 

in the trunk of the white car.

Ms. Grant said that, when the victim did not text her back, she became concerned. 

She knocked on the door and looked around the house. After seeing nothing, she decided 

to leave and go to her class. As she was leaving, she thought she saw something in the 

window and went again and knocked on the door. Getting no response, Ms. Grant left 

and went to her class. Ms. Grant said that she and the victim‟s brother Mr. Parham texted 

each other during her class, and he asked her whereabouts. She left her class at 8:30 

p.m., retrieved her daughter, and then went back to the Allen Road Residence. There, she 

retrieved the marijuana from the trunk of the white car, finding it strange that there were 

no lights on in the house and that the white car was still unlocked. Ms. Grant said that, 

because she had her daughter with her, she did not knock on the doors of the residence

because she needed to get her daughter home and in bed. 
5

Ms. Grant recalled that, when she arrived home, she started repeatedly calling the 

victim. When she did not get an answer, she started calling the local jails, the hospitals, 

and the victim‟s friends. Ms. Grant said she asked her neighbors to watch her sleeping 

daughter, and she asked Mr. Burroughs to go with her to the victim‟s house. She said 

that the two checked the house, again finding no answer, and she asked Mr. Burroughs to 

break a window. He declined, saying that the victim would be upset about the broken 

window. The two then left the residence. 

Ms. Grant testified that she drove Mr. Burroughs back to his residence while 

continuing to attempt to contact the victim‟s brother and friends. She spoke with Mr. 

Parham, who also seemed concerned about the victim‟s welfare. He informed her that, 

because the Allen Road Residence was locked, he did not have anywhere to stay the 

night. He asked to stay at her apartment. Ms. Grant called Mr. Burroughs because the 

victim had previously expressed concern about Mr. Parham staying at her apartment. Mr. 

Burroughs agreed that the victim would approve, so she allowed Mr. Parham to stay with 

her. 

The following morning, March 15, 2012, the victim‟s mother contacted her and 

asked if she had spoken with the victim, and she informed the victim‟s mother that she 

had not. Ms. Grant and Mr. Parham dropped off her daughter at daycare at 6:00 a.m. and 

went to the victim‟s house. Mr. Parham “popped a lock” on the door, and the two entered 

the house. They immediately saw the victim lying on his stomach on the floor. They 

also saw a knife on the floor, so she thought someone had stabbed the victim. Ms. Grant 

said that she turned the victim over and attempted to resuscitate him, believing that she 

could save him. Mr. Parham called 911. She at some point spoke with the operator and 

expressed that she was a nursing student and attempting to save the victim. 

Ms. Grant recalled that both she and Mr. Parham felt devastated by finding the 

victim dead. At one point, Mr. Parham, who was crying, punched a hole in one of the 

walls. When the emergency responders arrived, they asked Ms. Grant and Mr. Parham to 

wait outside. Ms. Grant recalled crying and being upset. The victim‟s mother arrived. 

The police also arrived, and a police officer transported Ms. Grant to the police station

where she provided a statement. Ms. Grant said that she consented to the police 

searching her home and car and to swabbing her hands for gunshot residue. The police 

took the phones that she had in the black car. On the day of the victim‟s funeral, Ms. 

Grant deleted text messages from her personal cell phone that related to drug dealing 

activities. She said that she did this because she did not want to lose custody of her 

daughter. 

During cross-examination, Ms. Grant testified that she knew that there was a 

surveillance system at the Allen Road Residence, and she knew how to turn it on and off. 
6

She believed that it recorded to a VHS tape. She denied taking the tape out of the 

surveillance system, saying that she did not go upstairs in the residence that day. Ms. 

Grant agreed that she knew that drug deals occurred at the Allen Road Residence, but she 

denied participating in any of those. She said she participated in other drug deals. She 

said that she “exchanged money for drugs” but denied that she was a “drug dealer.” 

During further cross-examination, Ms. Grant testified that she had no explanation for why 

her phone and the victim‟s phone were “pinging from the same address” after she found 

his body. She agreed that she initially declined to give the police her phone because it 

was her only method of communication. She said that a police officer saw her delete a 

text message about selling five Lortabs. The officer then took the phone from her. 

Ms. Grant testified that the victim owned an AK47 assault rifle or some other type 

of rifle. He also owned another weapon, but she was unsure of the make or model of it. 

He routinely kept those weapons at the Allen Road Residence. She said that the victim 

did not keep his weapons at her home but that police found a box of .380 ammunition at 

her house, which she said belonged to the victim. Ms. Grant said that the victim was a 

convicted felon, so she sometimes purchased ammunition for him. 

Darius Parham testified that the victim was his older brother. Mr. Parham said 

that he moved into the Allen Road Residence almost two weeks before the victim died. 

The two planned to move, so the victim never made Mr. Parham a key for the residence. 

Mr. Parham recalled that the victim had a surveillance camera, explaining that the 

victim‟s room was far from the front door, and the camera enabled him to see who had 

arrived at the residence. Mr. Parham recalled that the victim was very close with Mr. 

Burroughs, saying that the two spoke regularly.

Mr. Parham said that, the day before the victim died, Mr. Parham was away from 

the residence and, when he returned, he called the victim to let him into the Allen Road 

Residence. The victim did not answer his phone and did not call him back, which was 

unusual. Eventually Mr. Parham contacted Ms. Grant, and he spoke with Mr. Burroughs, 

both of whom had not heard from the victim. 

Mr. Parham testified that he did not have anywhere to stay the night before he 

found the victim‟s body, so he asked Ms. Grant if he could stay at her residence for the 

night. She agreed, and he went to her home late that evening. Mr. Parham recalled that 

Ms. Grant told him that she had called the local jails and the hospital looking for the 

victim. Mr. Parham slept in the living room. 

Mr. Parham said that, when he awoke the next morning, he and Ms. Grant took her 

daughter to daycare, and then she went to the Allen Road Residence. He said that he 

used his identification card to open the lock of the door, and he immediately saw a knife 
7

on the floor. Thinking the victim had been stabbed, Mr. Parham flipped the victim over. 

Mr. Parham said that he knew that the victim was dead because he was “too hard” to be 

alive. Mr. Parham said Ms. Grant tried to resuscitate the victim, but he knew that it was 

too late. He called 911, and he said he had listened to the 911 recording, upon which he 

and Ms. Grant sounded upset. Mr. Parham said that because he was so upset over his 

brother‟s death, he punched a hole in one of the walls. Mr. Parham said that police 

officers questioned him, took his fingerprints, and tested his hands for gunshot residue. 

Mr. Parham recalled that, a couple of weeks later when he and some other 

relatives and friends were cleaning the victim‟s house, he found a bullet on the floor 

where the victim‟s body had been lying. He said that they called the police, who 

responded and took pictures. 

During cross-examination, Mr. Parham testified that he was not aware that the 

victim sold drugs from the residence, believing that this activity was in his past. He said 

that several people had access to the residence during the time between the victim‟s death 

and the time they found the bullet. This included the property owner, his mother, his 

uncle, and himself. On redirect, Mr. Parham agreed that he “maybe” stated, “some bitch 

must have done this.” He explained that he believed that the victim suffered a stab 

wound and that only a woman would stab someone. 

Iris Pinson testified that she did not want and was scared to testify. Ms. Pinson 

recalled that, at the time of the victim‟s death, she lived in a housing project in Davidson 

County. A man named Xavier Tull-Morales, a codefendant in this case, resided in a 

home behind Ms. Pinson‟s home in a housing project. She recalled that the two became 

acquainted and eventually became friends, seeing each other daily. Their relationship 

was not a romantic one, but she got the impression that he was romantically interested in 

her. Through co-defendant Tull-Morales, Ms. Pinson met the Defendant and codefendant Conde-Valentino. 

Ms. Pinson testified that co-defendants Tull-Morales and Conde-Valentino were 

frequently together. Co-defendant Conde-Valentino came to co-defendant TullMorales‟s home every day and sometimes stayed there for days at a time. Co-defendant 

Conde-Valentino‟s residence was in Dodge City, where he lived with his mother. Ms. 

Pinson said, however, that co-defendant Conde-Valentino came to the neighborhood 

frequently because his girlfriend also lived in their development. 

Ms. Pinson said that the two co-defendants would sometimes come to her home, 

which she shared with her two children and her fifteen-year-old sister, of whom she had 

custody. They also engaged in social activities together, but Ms. Pinson never went to 

co-defendant Tull-Morales‟s home because his older sister, Kathy, who lived with him 
8

did not like Ms. Pinson. Co-defendants Tull-Morales and Conde-Valentino told her that 

they were cousins.

Ms. Pinson said that she also met the Defendant through co-defendant TullMorales because the Defendant and co-defendant Tull Morales were friends. Ms. 

Pinson‟s friend, Patri, who was also related to co-defendants Tull-Morales and CondeValentino, dated the Defendant. When Patri visited Ms. Pinson, the Defendant came to 

see her there on several occasions. Ms. Pinson knew the Defendant, who spoke fluent 

Spanish and drove a black SUV. 

Ms. Pinson recalled a day in March 2012 when the three men came to her home. 

The Defendant drove there and approached her back porch on foot. The other two codefendants walked toward her back porch also. At the time, co-defendant Tull-Morales 

began bragging that he was going to “rob somebody.” Ms. Pinson did not take this 

statement seriously because co-defendant Tull-Morales had made similar statements in 

the past, as had the other men, but never carried through with them. Ms. Pinson said she 

had seen co-defendant Tull-Morales rob someone in the past, but he used a water gun and 

did not hurt the victim. 

Ms. Pinson said that both co-defendant Conde-Valentino and the Defendant were 

present when co-defendant Tull-Morales made his statement. She also said that codefendant Conde-Valentino made similar statements at the time about robbing someone. 

The Defendant stated that they could get drugs and money from the robbery. Ms. Pinson 

said that none of the men discussed the intended victim or location of the crime. She did 

not see a weapon in their possession until the men got into the Defendant‟s car, at which 

time she saw the Defendant and co-defendant Conde-Valentino each with a weapon. Ms. 

Pinson said that, while co-defendant Tull-Morales said that he had a weapon, he was 

unarmed. 

Ms. Pinson said that she did not see the three men again until dark that night. The 

three men came to her home, and she noted that co-defendant Tull-Morales had a lot of 

blood on his hands and shirt. He changed his shirt at her home. Ms. Pinson also saw that 

co-defendant Tull-Morales was carrying two baggies that she thought contained drugs;

one baggie appeared to contain cocaine and the other appeared to contain pills. He also 

had “a lot of money” with him. Co-defendant Conde-Valentino also had a similar 

amount of blood on his shirt and hands as co-defendant Tull-Morales, and he also 

changed his shirt. Ms. Pinson said that, when the two men were upstairs changing, she 

saw them use the drugs that they had in their possession. Ms. Pinson said that the 

Defendant did not use the drugs. She also recalled that he only had a small smear of 

blood on his hand and none on his shirt. 
9

Ms. Pinson testified that, when both co-defendants removed their shirts, they 

placed them in a grocery plastic bag, which they gave to the Defendant. The Defendant 

left her home with the bag. 

Ms. Pinson testified that co-defendant Tull-Morales told her what had happened. 

He said that he had waited in the car for a long time and then went up to the residence, 

knocked on the door, and said he had to go to the bathroom. The occupant of the home 

let him enter, he walked past the man, and then he shot him. Ms. Pinson said codefendant Tull-Morales said that “he blew his face off.” He made these statements, she 

said, in the presence of the other two defendants. Ms. Pinson noted that co-defendant 

Tull-Morales seemed “very messed up off drugs” at the time he made these statements. 

His words were slurred but he did not seem tired. 

Ms. Pinson said that co-defendant Conde-Valentino said that he stabbed the 

robbery victim and had “unloaded” on him. He made this statement in the presence of 

both co-defendants. Ms. Pinson confirmed that co-defendant Conde-Valentino was 

“shaky,” “nervous,” and that he kept saying that he was going to go to jail. Co-defendant 

Conde-Valentino then threw up multiple times. Ms. Pinson said that the two codefendants began arguing, and the Defendant seemed like he did not know what either of 

them was talking about. Ms. Pinson took from their conversation that the men had 

already divided up the proceeds of the robbery but that co-defendants Conde-Valentino 

and Tull-Morales were both upset because they felt their portion was unfair. 

Ms. Pinson said that the Defendant told her to keep her “mouth shut” about what 

she had heard in her apartment. Other than that, he “pretended like nothing had 

happened.” 

Ms. Pinson said she asked the men to leave, saying that her kids were asleep. She 

said she “got them out as fast as [she] could.” She said she did not receive any drugs or 

money from them. The men also were no longer in possession of the weapons she had 

seen them with earlier. Ms. Pinson testified that she did not call the police because she 

was scared that she or her children would be hurt.

 

Ms. Pinson recalled that, a couple of weeks later, she, her sister, and co-defendant 

Tull-Morales were watching the news on television. A photograph of the Allen Road 

Residence surrounded by police tape appeared on the screen during the news story, and 

Ms. Pinson realized that she recognized the residence and had been there before. The 

report then showed a photograph of the victim, and Ms. Pinson realized that she knew the 

victim of the robbery. Ms. Pinson told co-defendant Tull-Morales that she knew the 

victim, and he apologized to her. Ms. Pinson said that before the news story she did not 

know where their robbery had occurred or whom they had killed.
10

Ms. Pinson said that she knew the victim as “Vic” and that she had met him 

almost two years before because he was friends with her sister‟s boyfriend. She had not 

seen him in the seven months before his death. She said that they had “hung out a couple 

of times” with her sister and her boyfriend. She said she knew the victim sold drugs, and 

she had purchased marijuana from him in the past. Ms. Pinson also had heard that the 

victim sold “pills,” but the victim did not discuss his business around her. 

Ms. Pinson recalled that, after the robbery, co-defendant Tull-Morales repeatedly 

told her how he had killed the victim. He told her that there were “pieces of his hair and 

stuff all over the place.” She said that, after the initial night that the men came to her 

home, co-defendant Conde-Valentino did not speak about the robbery with her. He told 

her he was scared that he would go to jail, but he did not mention the substance of the 

crime. After the night of the robbery, she did not interact at all with the Defendant as the 

Defendant “disappeared from the projects after it happened.” 

Ms. Pinson said that, a couple of weeks after the murder, a number of police 

officers “raided” her home. She said that she lied to police, telling them that codefendant Tull-Morales was in California even though he was still living behind her. She 

told them that she did not know anything about the crimes. They left a telephone number 

for her to contact if she remembered anything relevant.

Ms. Pinson testified that co-defendant Tull-Morales told her that he was going to 

leave town. He explained that he did not want to go back to prison. He told her that 

“Patri” and “Louie” were going to drive him to Florida. When she saw co-defendant 

Tull-Morales leave, it appeared as if the Defendant was driving him and that Patri and 

Louie were in the car. Ms. Pinson said that she was upset to see co-defendant TullMorales leave. After he left, she still saw co-defendant Conde-Valentino around the 

housing project, but she did not see the Defendant again. Ms. Pinson said that she later 

learned that co-defendant Tull-Morales was in Zephyrhills, Florida, when he contacted 

her via Facebook. The two also spoke by telephone. 

Ms. Pinson said that, after co-defendant Tull-Morales left town, she contacted the 

police. She explained that she had known the victim and felt “horrible” and as if she 

could not “live with [herself]” if she did not tell the truth. She gave the police the entire 

story and told them that co-defendant Tull-Morales still contacted her via phone. She 

attempted to do a “controlled call” in their presence but was unable to reach co-defendant 

Tull-Morales. The police gave her recording equipment, and she recorded one of their 

later conversations, during which she was able to elicit statements from co-defendant 

Tull-Morales about this incident. 
11

Ms. Pinson agreed that it was difficult to understanding the recording. She said, 

however, that in response to her question about whether co-defendant Tull-Morales shot 

the victim, he said that he knocked on the door, said he had to go to the bathroom, walked 

inside the home, and shot the victim. He also said that he shot the “mother f**ker in the 

face.” Ms. Pinson agreed that she led co-defendant Tull-Morales on during the 

conversation, telling him that she loved him and that she wanted him to come back and 

be with her. She referenced prior conversations about a daughter that the two wished to 

have in order to induce him to meet her in Knoxville, Tennessee, where the police 

apprehended him. 

During cross-examination by the Defendant‟s attorney, Ms. Pinson testified that 

she never sold marijuana or prescription pills to the victim but that she had sold 

prescription pills in the past. She said, however, that she had a “pill problem” at the time 

of the robbery, so she was purchasing pills and not selling them. She maintained that she 

never used any of the pills that the defendants brought to her home after the robbery. She 

said that she purchased her pills from the victim instead. She said that, from the amount 

of blood on the defendants, she assumed there would have been blood in the Defendant‟s 

car. Ms. Pinson said that she had heard that the victim made a lot of money from selling 

drugs. 

During cross-examination by co-defendant Tull-Morales‟s attorney, Ms. Pinson 

testified that co-defendant Tull-Morales did not have much money at the time of the 

robbery or after. She said in her phone call to him that she offered to send him money to 

purchase a phone. Ms. Pinson said that many men in the “projects” brag about doing 

criminal activity that they do not actually commit. She said “[e]verybody thinks they are 

a thug or a gangster.” She said the only way she knew whether co-defendant TullMorales committed this crime was through his own statements. She agreed that the 

victim‟s face was not “blown off,” so co-defendant Tull-Morales at least lied about that 

fact. Ms. Pinson said that the defendants bragged about what they had done to multiple 

people in the projects. 

During cross-examination by co-defendant Conde-Valentino‟s attorney, Ms. 

Pinson said that if she omitted telling police about seeing some of the defendants with 

weapons it was because she was “scared to death” at the time of her interview. She said 

she told police that the defendants returned with $10,000. She said that they had “a lot” 

of money and that they told her it was $10,000. 

The State then presented the testimony of several law enforcement officers from 

the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department who described the crime and investigation

identifying the suspects. Police officers responded to a call about a stabbing at the Allen 

Road Residence on March 15, 2012, at around 8:00 a.m. When Officer Larry Benz and 
12

Officer Daniel Crockett arrived, Mr. Parham waved them toward the residence. Officer 

Crockett stayed outside with Mr. Parham while Officer Benz went inside where he

observed Ms. Grant performing CPR upon the victim‟s body. Officers described both 

Ms. Grant and Mr. Parham as “hysterical.” Officer Benz asked Ms. Grant to cease CPR, 

reassuring her that paramedics were on their way. Officer Benz called for assistance and 

secured the crime scene. Mr. Parham and Ms. Grant provided statements to Officer 

Crockett at the scene about how they were related to and knew the victim and the story of 

how they found the victim. 

When officers entered the home, they found the victim‟s body partially against the 

front door, making it hard to get into the door. In searching the crime scene, Officer 

Johnny Lawrence found a total of five .380 shell casings, three on the floor near the 

victim and one behind the couch. The victim had on only one blue and white tennis shoe, 

and the other matching shoe was lying on the floor nearby. An officer found a knife, 

upon which there was no blood or human matter, in the hallway between the living room 

and the kitchen area. There was a bloodstain on the closet door near the knife, which an 

officer swabbed for DNA testing. Special Agent Chad Johnson tested the DNA collected 

from various locations at the crime scene, and determined that the DNA swab taken from 

the hallway door of the crime scene matched the DNA of co-defendant Alberto CondeValentino. Officer Jeb Johnston saw some damage to the drywall in the house. Officer 

Johnston also found a closed-circuit camera monitoring system in one of the upstairs 

bedrooms. Officers never recovered a tape from the system.

When Detective Andrew Injaychock arrived at the scene, the medical examiner 

was examining the victim‟s body. The detective walked through the crime scene and 

then he interviewed Ms. Grant and Mr. Parham, both of whom he found cooperative. Mr. 

Burroughs arrived later, and Detective Injaychock also interviewed him. All three 

individuals provided the detective with the victim‟s cell phone number and their own cell 

phone numbers. Ms. Grant told him that she attempted to “clone” the victim‟s phone, 

and the detective said that there was also information that the victim had additional 

girlfriends. The detective said that, when looking at Ms. Grant‟s phone, he noticed that 

she had deleted texts. For several reasons, including these, Ms. Grant initially became 

the focus of his investigation. 

Officer Lawrence performed Gunshot Residue Tests on both Ms. Grant and Mr. 

Parham. Officers sent these tests to the TBI for testing, and Special Agent Robert Miles 

testified that neither revealed the presence of any gunshot residue. Special Agent Robert 

Miles testified that these results could be because Ms. Grant and Mr. Parham had not

fired a weapon or because they washed their hands after firing a weapon. 
13

Officer Lynette Mace photographed the crime scene, and she identified those 

photographs for the jury. Officer Mace photographed the exterior and interior of the 

Allen Road Residence, Mr. Parham and Ms. Grant, and the victim‟s body. Officers 

agreed that the scene around the victim‟s body was not a large, bloody crime scene. 

While photographing Mr. Parham, Officer Lawrence discovered that Mr. Parham had 

both of the victim‟s cell phones in his possession. She also photographed a cooler 

located upstairs in which there was a shoebox containing $251 and a baggie of an 

unknown substance she believed to be drugs. Detective Injaychock determined the

substance was crushed Ecstasy pills. Officer Lawrence photographed the knife block 

from which it appeared that a knife was missing. Officers were able to recover some 

fingerprints from the crime scene. Detective Injaychock said, however, all of the usable 

fingerprints recovered belonged either to the victim or to Mr. Parham, who was living in 

the home at the time. 

Among other things, from the crime scene, officers collected two firearm 

magazines, several rounds of ammunition, spent cartridge casings, Hydrocodone, a white 

shirt, a Samsung cell phone, glass from the table, a mug, some candy wrappers, business 

cards, keys with a remote, a thumb drive, cigarette butts, and a baggie with the substance. 

Officer Tommy Simpkins processed the two vehicles in front of the Allen Road 

Residence. Officer Simpkins gathered evidence from the black Toyota, which included

one pill bottle containing forty blue pills and another bottle containing twenty-four blue 

speckled pills. From the white Pontiac, Officer Simpkins collected thirty-seven whole 

pills and thirteen half pills. Officer John Nicholson supervised the other officers 

gathering evidence, and he assisted in gathering evidence. He looked in trash cans 

located outside the residence. He found a $100 American Express gift card and a shell 

casing on the ground along the grassy part of the driveway. The shell casing was from a 

9mm gun and appeared similar but different from the five shell casings found inside the 

Allen Road Residence. 

On March 29, 2012, Officer Charles Linville went to the Allen Road Residence 

and used a metal detector to search the backyard. He did not find anything of 

investigative value. On March 31, 2012, Mr. Parham informed police that, when the 

family moved items out of the home, they saw a projectile. Detective Injaychock went 

and gathered the projectile, noting that it was located down in some kind of a hard 

surface close to the front door where they found the victim‟s body.

Detective Injaychock executed a search warrant at Ms. Grant‟s home, looking for 

the victim‟s phone, a weapon, and to obtain Ms. Grant‟s DNA. To execute the warrant, 

he followed Ms. Grant from the victim‟s funeral to her apartment, where Ms. Grant also 

provided consent to search the residence. The detective said that he did not find the 
14

victim‟s phone or a weapon but that he did find some live unspent .380 ammunition in 

the residence. During the search, Detective Injaychock informed Ms. Grant that he 

suspected her of committing this crime and that he intended to confiscate her phone. She 

became upset and started manipulating data on her phone, deleting items. The detective 

said that he forcibly took Ms. Grant‟s phone. When officers analyzed the phone, nothing 

on it indicated that she participated in the victim‟s murder. He, however, did not know 

what she had deleted from the phone. 

Detective Injaychock said that he received a tip about some “male Hispanics” who 

could have committed these crimes. Based upon this tip, he and other offers went to a 

local housing project and interviewed Ms. Pinson. The detective found Ms. Pinson 

uncooperative, and she did not give officers very much information. 

Detective Injaychock examined the victim‟s phone records and found that the 

phone that placed a call to the victim‟s phone shortly before his death was registered to a 

woman who lived on Lake Drive. While the detective was following this lead, Ms. 

Pinson contacted police and gave her version of the events. Armed with this information, 

Detective Injaychock determined that the woman who lived on Lake Drive and to whom 

the phone was registered was the Defendant‟s mother-in-law. Analyzing the phone 

records, it appeared that this phone contacted the victim‟s phone several times a day 

leading up to his death and then never again after the phone call placed shortly before his 

death. Detective Injaychock determined that, at the time of the last phone call, the 

Defendant‟s phone was “pinging off” a tower that was almost in front of the Allen Road 

Residence. 

Under the direction of Detective Injaychock, Detective Jason Moyer gathered 

several days of surveillance video from a barbecue restaurant and a denture business both 

of which were located near the Allen Road Residence. He found nothing of value from 

the denture business video but, in the video footage from the restaurant, he saw a black 

SUV, with a stripe similar to the stripe on the Defendant‟s vehicle, passing the restaurant 

at 11:56 a.m. and again at 1:39 p.m. Detective Moyer said that the video did not show 

the license plate of the vehicle or who was operating the vehicle. 

Detective Injaychock said that, based upon Ms. Pinson‟s statement, the 

surveillance video, and the Defendant‟s Facebook posts, he went to the Defendant‟s 

address on Winwood Place looking for a black GMC Yukon. Detective Injaychock noted 

that time data showed that, at the same time that the barbecue restaurant surveillance

video showed the black SUV driving past the restaurant, the phone associated with the 

Defendant was using cell towers located near the Allen Road Residence. 
15

On May 20, 2012, Detective Injaychock went to the address associated with the 

Defendant‟s wife, Ms. Meklit Melke, on Windwood Place, where he believed that the 

Defendant also resided. He saw an SUV that appeared to match the one in the 

surveillance video, noting that both vehicles had trim across the door panel. The tires of 

the vehicle were flat. Officers towed the Defendant‟s GMC Yukon, which was registered 

to Ms. Melke, into custody. They contacted Ms. Melke, who gave consent for the 

officers to search the vehicle. Officer Linville assisted in processing the vehicle, and he 

said officers gathered fingerprints from the vehicle and photographed it. They conducted 

a presumptive blood test, looking for the presence of blood. All the spots tested negative. 

Officer Linville conducted a presumptive blood test on the knife found at the Allen Road 

Residence, which tested negative for the presence of blood. Detective Injaychock 

testified that all of the usable fingerprints found in the Yukon belonged to Ms. Melke, the 

Defendant, or their son. He further testified that none of the DNA swabbings taken from 

the GMC Yukon showed anything of investigative value.

The medical examiner provided the police with the victim‟s clothing, fingernail 

clippings, projectiles the medical examiner recovered from the victim‟s body, and a DNA 

swab of blood from the victim‟s wrist. Detective Injaychock sent much of this evidence 

to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigations (“TBI”) for testing. Special Agent Alex 

Brodhag testified that testing showed that all five of the .380 recovered cartridge cases

matched. He noted that the cases found at the scene were of a different brand than those 

found in Ms. Grant‟s home. Special Agent Brodhag determined that the five bullets 

police recovered, four from the victim‟s body and the one found at his home, had all been 

fired by the same weapon.

Detective Injaychock testified that, following up on the initial tip that led them to 

Ms. Pinson, he attempted to contact co-defendant Conde-Valentino at his house in North 

Nashville. Co-defendant Conde-Valentino spoke to the officers in Spanish. The 

detective determined that, because of the language barrier, he needed to return later with 

another officer who could interpret. When he returned, upon questioning, co-defendant 

Conde-Valentino said that he knew both the Defendant and co-defendant Tull-Morale as 

“acquaintances” but that he did not “hang out” with them frequently. He told officers 

that he did not know the victim and had never been to the victim‟s home. At first, codefendant Conde-Valentino denied ever being in the Defendant‟s vehicle but, upon 

further questioning, he said he might have been in the SUV. 

Detective Injaychock spoke with the Defendant about this murder in June 2012. 

The Defendant told him that he and the victim were friends but that they did not “hang 

out” a lot. The Defendant said that the last time that he saw the victim was a few days 

before his death when they met at a Wal-Mart. The Defendant never definitively said 

whether he saw the victim on March 14, 2012. The Defendant denied any involvement in 
16

the victim‟s murder. The Defendant agreed that he knew both the co-defendants from the 

housing project and said he was “kind of watching out for them.” The Defendant denied 

ever taking co-defendant Tull-Morales to Florida. 

All three attorneys for the defendants cross-examined Detective Injaychock. As 

relevant to this appeal, the detective testified that Ms. Grant was at the crime scene when 

he arrived. He further agreed that the victim was killed with .380 ammunition and that he 

found that size of ammunition in Ms. Grant‟s home. Police never recovered the victim‟s 

cell phone. This was true despite the fact that the victim‟s cell phone was still active and 

pinging off cell phone towers after the police were called to the crime scene. He further 

noted that Ms. Grant‟s cell phone and the victim‟s cell phone appeared to be traveling in 

tandem after the murder occurred. Detective Injaychock opined that this was perhaps 

because Ms. Grant had attempted to “clone” their phones through an app. 

Detective Injaychock agreed that he had interviewed a witness who said that the 

victim told her that Ms. Grant was jealous of another woman. According to the witness, 

the victim recounted that Ms. Grant stabbed him but that he did not call the police. 

The detective testified that the Winwood address was located less than a mile from 

the Allen Road Residence. He agreed that, therefore, the Defendant‟s cell phone would

access similar cell towers when he was going to his own home. Detective Injaychock 

agreed that co-defendant Tull-Morales surrendered himself. He said that there was no 

fingerprint, DNA, or blood evidence that connected co-defendant Tull-Morales to the 

crime. 

The detective agreed that Ms. Pinson‟s account of how much blood there was on 

the co-defendants after the murder did not comport with what he knew about the crime 

scene. Additionally, Ms. Pinson‟s statement that co-defendant Tull-Morales shot the 

victim in the face did not match the victim‟s actual injuries. 

During the redirect examination of Detective Injaychock, he agreed that a 

conversation that he listened to between co-defendant Tull-Morales and Ms. Pinson also 

placed co-defendant Tull-Morales at the crime scene. He further agreed that Ms. Pinson 

relayed to him only information that she had received from the defendants and never 

claimed to have seen the crime occur, which accounted for some of the discrepancies in 

her story.

Dejyitnu Gabru testified that her daughter, Meklit Melke, dated the Defendant, and 

they had two children together. Ms. Gabru signed up for a Sprint family phone plan, and 

she identified the number associated with the Defendant. She said that she purchased this 

phone for one of her grandsons, the Defendant‟s son, and that she later learned that the 
17

Defendant used this phone. Ms. Gabru confirmed that the Defendant drove Ms. Melke‟s 

GMC Yukon vehicle and that he lived in a house that Ms. Gabru owned on Winwood 

Place with Ms. Melke and their two sons. During cross-examination, Ms. Gabru testified 

that she learned from the police that the Defendant used the cell phone number she 

purchased for her grandson. She never saw the Defendant use this number.

Antwonie Jobe testified that he was facing federal drug charges at the time of this 

trial and that he had other prior felony drug-related convictions. Mr. Jobe testified that he 

hoped to receive a lesser sentence in exchange for his helpful, truthful testimony. The 

prosecutor of his case, however, had not made him any promises. Mr. Jobe said he did 

not want to testify against the Defendant and that he only decided to do so after he 

himself faced federal drug-related charges. Mr. Jobe said he had known the Defendant

for about twenty years. The two grew up in the same neighborhood and were friends. 

They lost contact while Mr. Jobe was incarcerated but resumed their friendship in 2007 

when he was released. 

Mr. Jobe testified that the Defendant came to his home occasionally and that the 

two spoke by telephone frequently. Mr. Jobe identified the Defendant‟s phone number as 

being the same number Ms. Gabru had purchased for her grandson. Mr. Jobe, whose 

primary source of income was the distribution of marijuana and cocaine, also knew the 

victim. He had grown up with the victim, they were acquaintances, and Mr. Jobe knew 

that the victim sold marijuana and pills. He did not know the victim to sell cocaine. Mr. 

Jobe said that while he and the victim both sold drugs they were geographically located 

in different parts of Nashville and their businesses did not overlap.

Mr. Jobe said that, the day before the victim‟s murder, some time in the morning, 

the Defendant came to his home in a black GMC Yukon that the Defendant drove. The 

Defendant came to his home to retrieve some “gas money.” Mr. Jobe said that this was 

not unusual and that there were a few people, whom he considered friends, that he would 

occasionally give $20 for gas. The Defendant had with him two men who the Defendant 

referred to as his “Little Gs.” Mr. Jobe said that, because he was a drug dealer who had 

both money and drugs with him, he was concerned about the identity of these men. He 

was concerned both for his safety and because the Defendant had never brought anyone 

to his home before. 

Mr. Jobe said that he walked up toward the SUV to see who was with the 

Defendant. When he looked inside the SUV, he saw co-defendant Tull-Morales and codefendant Conde-Valentino. Mr. Jobe said, at the time, he realized he had previously 

seen the Defendant with these two men in a housing project in South Nashville on 

multiple occasions. Mr. Jobe said the two men stayed in the SUV while Mr. Jobe and the 

Defendant went inside the home. Mr. Jobe gave the Defendant a marijuana cigarette and 
18

$20, and the Defendant told him that he and the two co-defendants were planning to 

“rob” the victim. This did not surprise Mr. Jobe because the Defendant had twice 

previously mentioned robbing the victim. He asked Mr. Jobe to participate, and Mr. Jobe 

declined.

Mr. Jobe said that the Defendant stated that he had sold pills to the victim in the 

past, acting as a middleman. The victim then sold the pills to the victim‟s customers. 

The Defendant told Mr. Jobe that he intended to set up a false deal and get $2,000 from 

the victim. Mr. Jobe said that he tried to talk the Defendant out of robbing the victim

during their twenty to thirty minute conversation. Mr. Jobe said that he gave the 

Defendant extra marijuana and cocaine and told him to go home and “chill.” The 

Defendant said that he was going to go home. Mr. Jobe believed that he had diffused the 

situation.

Mr. Jobe said that the Defendant called him later that evening at around 5:00 or 

6:00 p.m. The Defendant, who seemed nervous and scared, told Mr. Jobe that the 

Defendant should have listened to Mr. Jobe because the victim might be dead. Mr. Jobe 

said that he watched the news and learned that the victim was dead. He drove and picked 

up the Defendant, who told him that the robbery had gone all wrong. The Defendant 

produced a small handgun and said he had to get rid of it. Mr. Jobe said the Defendant 

attempted to place the gun in Mr. Jobe‟s glove box, but Mr. Jobe told him that he could 

not. Mr. Jobe said that, at the time, they were driving on a bridge over a lake, and the 

Defendant then threw the gun into the lake. During their conversation, the Defendant 

told him that he had been to the victim‟s house the day before. The Defendant asked Mr. 

Jobe to be his alibi. He asked Mr. Jobe to say that the Defendant was working for Mr. 

Jobe‟s lawn care service on the day that the murder occurred. Mr. Jobe declined. 

Mr. Jobe testified that, in subsequent conversations in the weeks that followed, the 

Defendant told Mr. Jobe that he was going to kill himself. He said that he was going to 

meet with two detectives, shoot one of them, forcing the other to shoot the Defendant. 

The Defendant said that he believed that co-defendant Tull-Morales had told his 

girlfriend about the crime, and Mr. Jobe understood the Defendant to be saying that he 

was going to attempt to kill co-defendant Tull-Morales. Mr. Jobe said that he told the 

Defendant not to kill co-defendant Tull-Morales and suggested that he instead take him 

out of town. A few days later, the Defendant called Mr. Jobe and informed him that he 

had done as Mr. Jobe suggested and taken co-defendant Tull-Morales to Florida. 

During cross-examination, Mr. Jobe testified that violence was part of the drug 

trade, in which both he and the victim participated. He agreed that he did not know what 

type of gun he saw the Defendant with, describing it as “chrome” and a small caliber like 
19

a .25, .32, or .380. Mr. Jobe agreed that he slowed down his car so that the Defendant 

could throw the weapon into the river. 

Mr. Jobe testified that when the Defendant said he was planning to rob the victim 

the two co-defendants were not within earshot. He agreed that, the day before this 

murder, the Defendant called him a number of times. On the day of the murder, he and 

the Defendant spoke for the first time at 7:33 a.m. They then spoke again at 7:58 a.m., 

8:19 a.m., 8:22 a.m., 8:31 a.m., 8:37 a.m., 8:40 a.m. There was a pause in their phone 

calls, and they spoke again at 11:08 a.m., and 11:46 a.m., 11:58 a.m., and 12:04 p.m., and 

12:59 p.m. on the day of the murder. Mr. Jobe maintained that he did not know the dates 

of the murder but that he knew that he had seen on the news that the victim was dead 

before he drove the Defendant around and the Defendant threw out his weapon. 

Andrew Vallee, a detective with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 

testified that he participated in this investigation. He obtained the cell phone records for 

the victim, the Defendant, and Ms. Grant. He also ordered swabs for DNA be taken from 

the three defendants. The detective testified as an expert in cell phone analysis about the 

operation of cell phones in general. 

Detective Vallee testified that the phone records for the phone belonging to the 

victim showed Ms. Grant listed in the subscriber information. Further, it showed that the 

victim called the Defendant at 10:04 a.m. and 10:15 a.m. on the day of his murder. The 

victim‟s last outgoing call on the day of his death occurred at 11:42 a.m. The phone 

records showed that the victim‟s phone was “no longer responding to the network” after 

12:16 p.m. on the day of his death. He explained that this could mean any number of 

things, including that his cell phone was turned off, destroyed, or in a tunnel.

The detective said that the Defendant‟s phone listed the subscriber as Ms. Gabru. 

He noted that the antenna connections on the phone showed that it was located near I-40 

and I-24 from 9:35 a.m. to 10:59 a.m. on the day of the murder. At 11:07 a.m., the phone 

was located next to the airport. The phone records then indicated the phone was in the 

Hermitage area at 11:44 a.m., and the Donelson area from 11:46 a.m. to 11:50 a.m. From 

11:52 a.m. until almost 12:30 p.m. the cell phone used two towers, one 0.71 miles south 

of the crime scene and one 0.553 miles from the residence. At 12:16 p.m., the time of the 

final communication with the victim‟s phone, the Defendant‟s phone and the victim‟s 

phone were pinging off the same tower. 

Detective Vallee testified that he analyzed the victim‟s and Ms. Grant‟s cell phone 

records to determine whether they were located in the same area at the time of this crime. 

The records were consistent with Ms. Grant‟s testimony that she went to the victim‟s 

house looking for him on multiple occasions. 
20

During cross-examination, Detective Vallee testified that while the phone records 

indicated where the cell phones were at specific times, he had no idea who possessed the 

cell phones at that same time. The detective agreed that he did not analyze data from the 

phones of Ms. Pinson or Mr. Jobe. He also could not analyze data from the victim‟s 

phone because police officers never found that phone. Detective Vallee agreed that 

neither co-defendant Tull-Morales nor co-defendant Conde-Valentino owned a cell 

phone. 

Johnny Ray Crumby, Jr., a detective with the Metropolitan Nashville Police 

Department, testified that he interviewed both the Defendant and co-defendant CondeValentino. Recordings of these interviews were introduced but were not played for the 

jury. During the interview, the Defendant said that he was using his son‟s phone at the 

time of the murder. Detective Crumby also identified a map of the area near the Allen 

Road Residence. During cross-examination, Detective Crumby agreed that he misled the 

defendants during his interview with them in an attempt to get them to tell him what had 

happened. 

Thomas Deering, MD, testified as an expert in forensic pathology that he 

responded to the scene of this murder on March 15, 2012 with a group of investigators. 

He observed the victim‟s body, which personnel then brought to the Medical Examiner‟s 

Office for examination. Dr. Deering testified that the victim was twenty-eight years old 

at the time of his death. The doctor performed an autopsy on the victim‟s body and 

opined from the state of the victim‟s body that the victim had been killed the previous 

day. Dr. Deering testified that he found multiple injuries to the victim‟s body, including 

six different gunshot wounds. Four of the bullets that created those wounds were still in 

the victim‟s body. The most significant wound was one that entered the victim‟s left 

shoulder, traveled through his chest, and hit his right lung. That bullet hit a portion of the 

victim‟s aorta causing significant internal bleeding and remained there until removed by 

the doctor. This wound alone was fatal. 

Dr. Deering explained that the amount of blood in the chest cavity explained the 

lack of blood at the crime scene. He said the blood flows to the area of least resistance 

and, therefore, after the perforation of the victim‟s aorta, the blood flowed into his chest 

cavity rather than outside of his body. He further opined that the wounds occurred in 

close temporal proximity and from a distance of greater than two feet. The doctor 

testified that multiple gunshot wounds caused the victim‟s death and that the manner of 

death was homicide. 
21

During cross-examination, Dr. Deering agreed he did not find any stab wounds. 

The doctor agreed that there were six bullet wound tracks but that he only found four 

bullets. He said that the other two bullets must have been at the scene. 

Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated robbery

and first-degree felony murder. The trial court sentenced him to life for the first degree 

murder conviction and to twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, 

ordering that the sentences be served consecutively. It is from these judgments that the 

Defendant now appeals. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion for severance; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury about his 

co-defendant‟s out of court statements; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 

convictions.

A. Motion for Severance 

1. Motion Hearing

The Defendant first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion 

for severance. Co-defendant Conde Valentino also filed a pretrial motion for severance. 

In it, he contended that the co-defendant Tull-Morales and the Defendant may have made 

pretrial statements implicating him and that the State intended to use these statements 

during the trial. During the hearing on the motion to sever, the Defendant joined codefendant Conde-Valentino‟s motion, noting that the only defendant who had made a 

statement to the police was co-defendant Tull-Morales. 

At the hearing, counsel for co-defendant Conde-Valentino contended that the 

motion to sever was based upon Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 479 (1968) and 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(c)(1). Counsel pointed out several statements 

as being problematic. The first statement identified by Counsel was made by codefendant Tull-Morales during a phone conversation with Ms. Pinson that implicated the 

other defendants. Counsel conceded that the State had redacted the phone call to omit 

reference to the other defendants, which he said appeared to satisfy his Bruton claim.

Counsel for co-defendant Conde-Valentino then stated that Ms. Pinson‟s statement 

about watching the news with co-defendant Tull-Morales at which time he said that he 

committed this murder should be limited to the co-defendant implicating himself and not 

his co-defendants. 
22

Counsel also took issue with Ms. Pinson‟s proposed testimony that the three codefendants came to her home, planned the robbery, left her home, and returned bloody. 

He said that her statement attributed to co-defendant Tull-Morales that he and codefendant Conde-Valentino went to the door of the victim‟s home and asked to use the 

bathroom violated Bruton. He pointed out that Ms. Pinson‟s statements that co-defendant 

Tull-Morales told her that he and co-defendant Conde-Valentino shot the victim also 

violated Bruton. Counsel said that the only way to afford his client his right to 

confrontation was to sever the cases for trial. 

The State‟s attorney argued that it had adequately redacted the phone call. As to 

Ms. Pinson‟s other proposed testimony, the State expressed its belief that it could ensure 

that the State could properly limit Ms. Pinson‟s testimony. It agreed that if the State did 

not the defendants would have a right to a mistrial but that a pretrial severance was 

unnecessary. The State noted that Ms. Pinson could testify about what each individual 

said but not what one individual said about what another individual did. 

The trial court reserved ruling on the motion, saying that it wanted to hear from 

Ms. Pinson before so doing. At the next pretrial hearing, the parties noted that the State 

intended to call Mr. Jobe, and upon hearing that, the defendants filed another motion to 

sever based upon his proposed testimony. Mr. Jobe testified at the hearing, and his 

testimony comported with is trial testimony detailed above. 

The trial court ultimately denied the motions to sever. 

2. Waiver

On appeal, the Defendant contends that several statements made during the trial 

violated Bruton. He takes issue with Ms. Pinson‟s testimony, which he quotes in detail, 

and argues that in her testimony she offers statements of the co-defendants implicating 

the Defendant. He further asserts that the testimony would have been inadmissible if the 

Defendant was tried separately. 

The State contends that the Defendant waived this issue by not raising a 

contemporaneous objection and by failing to raise it in his motion for new trial. See

Tenn. R. Evid. 103; Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). Importantly, none of the defendants raised a 

contemporaneous objection. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) requires “a timely 

objection . . ., stating the specific ground of objection if the specific ground was not 

apparent from the context.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) (“[N]o issue presented for review 

shall be predicated upon error in the . . . jury instructions granted or refused ... unless the 

same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be 

treated as waived.”); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as 
23

requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take 

whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an 

error.”). We note, however, that prior to the trial the parties had discussed limiting Ms. 

Pinson‟s testimony because of potential Bruton issues, and the State had assured the trial

court that it believed that it could successfully prepare Ms. Pinson in this regard. The 

State attempted to elicit testimony narrowly, but the witness deviated in some of her 

responses. Further, while his issue was not as artfully crafted in his motion for new trial, 

the motion still addresses Ms. Pinson‟s testimony. We decline to treat the Defendant‟s

issue as waived. See Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a) ( “Once the court makes a definitive ruling on 

the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not 

renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”).

3. Bruton

The Defendant cites to three specific instances during Ms. Pinson‟s testimony that he 

states raise Bruton issues. The Defendant describes the first instance as being in response 

to the State‟s questioning. He notes that the prosecution asked Ms. Pinson “[a]gain I 

need to limit what he said to you to just what . . . [co-defendant] Conde-Valentino did or 

had been up to that day, with that in mind what did he say?” Ms. Pinson then replied 

that:

“[h]e said he walked in – he walked up the stairs, knocked on the door 

and was let in and he said, uh, he ran around the couch and he was stabbed, 

I don‟t remember if he said [the Defendant] or him did it, but he said that 

he stabbed him and he said he unloaded on him.” 

As a second example, the Defendant notes that, when the State asked “[i]t had 

already happened. So any argument was about the divvying up share?”, Ms. Pinson 

responded, “Yes, [co-defendant Tull-Morales] said that . . . he didn‟t get what he 

deserved, you know, it was supposed to be split up three ways.”

In his third and final example, the Defendant notes that the State asked Ms. Pinson 

about what statements co-defendant Tull-Morales had made about what he had done. 

Ms. Pinson responded, 

“He told me that he waited in the car for a really long time and then he told 

me that he went up the stairs and knocked on the door and said that he had 

to go to the bathroom. He was let in and he said that the couch was sitting 

this way and he said he walked past him and got his attention and he shot 

him. He said he blew his face off.” 
24

The Defendant states that these three statements violate Bruton. He further asserts 

that they do not fall within the hearsay exception regarding conspiratorial statements. 

Finally, the Defendant contends that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The law on a motion for severance includes that “[t]he grant or denial of a motion 

for severance of defendants is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and [the reviewing court] will not disturb the trial court‟s ruling absent clear abuse 

of that discretion.” State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Hunter v. 

State, 440 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tenn. 1969); State v. Burton, 751 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1988)). “The test is whether or not the defendant was clearly prejudiced in his 

defense by being jointly tried with his codefendant.” State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484, 

491 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing State v. Wiseman, 643 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1982)); see also Dotson, 254 S.W.3d at 390 (“The test to be applied . . . in 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion is whether the [d]efendant was 

„clearly prejudiced.‟” (quoting Hunter, 440 S.W.2d at 6)). “The record must 

demonstrate that „the defendant was clearly prejudiced to the point that the trial court‟s 

discretion ended and the granting of [a] severance became a judicial duty‟ before an 

accused is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.” Burton, 751 S.W.2d at 447 (quoting 

Hunter, 440 S.W.2d at 6); see also State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

2000).

Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]n 

indictment, presentment, or information may charge two or more defendants . . . if each 

of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense included.” Tenn. R. 

Crim. P. 8(c)(1). If the defendant bases his motion for severance upon a co-defendant‟s 

out-of-court statement that “makes reference to the defendant but is not admissible 

against the defendant,” the trial court must first determine if the State plans to offer the 

statement into evidence at trial. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(c)(1). If the State does so intend, it 

must choose one of the following:

(A) a joint trial at which the statement is not admitted in evidence or at 

which, if admitted, the statement would not constitute error;

(B) a joint trial at which the statement is admitted in evidence only after all 

references to the moving defendant have been deleted and if the redacted 

confession will not prejudice the moving defendant; or

(C) severance of the moving defendant.
25

Id. A defendant may also seek severance on the basis that it is necessary “to promote a 

fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants.” Tenn. R. Crim. 

P. 14(c)(2)(A).

In Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that admission of a statement 

of a non-testifying co-defendant that incriminates the complaining defendant violates the 

complaining defendant‟s constitutional right of confrontation. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126; 

see U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 9; Smart v. State, 544 S.W.2d 109, 111-

12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976). The Bruton rule should only be applied when the nontestifying co-defendant‟s statement constitutes „a significant portion of the evidence of 

guilt,‟ and . . . if „ample evidence was available to demonstrate [the defendant‟s] guilt 

without reliance upon his co-defendant‟s confession,‟ the violation would be considered 

harmless error.” State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tenn. 1984). If “the properly 

admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the 

codefendant‟s admission is so insignificant by comparison[,]” then the improper use of 

the admission is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Schneble, 405 U .S. at 430; see 

Elliot, 524 S.W.2d at 478. Reversal is not required unless it is proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the error complained of contributed to the verdict. Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also State v. Lonta Montrell Burress, Jr., and 

Darius Jerel Gustus, No. E2013-01697-CCA-R3CD, 2014 WL 6855226, at *16 (Tenn. 

Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 4, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. 

The record shows that the three comments complained about by the Defendant 

were in response to the State‟s questioning but that the State did not intentionally elicit 

these responses. In the first instance, Ms. Pinson stated that she could not remember 

whether co-defendant Conde-Valentino said that he shot the victim or if he said that the 

Defendant shot the victim. In the second example, Ms. Pinson said that co-defendant 

Tull-Morales told her that the proceeds of the robbery were supposed to be split three 

ways. In the third and final example offered by the Defendant, Ms. Pinson said that codefendant Tull-Morales told her that he waited in the car for a long time, walked up the 

stairs to the victim‟s home, said he had to use the restroom, and shot the victim. 

We can quickly dismiss the Defendant‟s complaint raised as to the third example 

of a Bruton violation. The testimony of Ms. Pinson does not qualify pursuant to Bruton

as it does not implicate the Defendant in any way. This Court has previously declined to 

apply Bruton to an accomplice‟s confession when it did not incriminate the defendant. 

See Dorsey v. State, 568 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that [p]ostBruton cases, as well as the ABA Standards, make it clear, that the rule in Bruton does 

not apply to confessions which do not implicate the non-confessing defendant . . . .”);

State v. Thomas J. Faulkner, No. E2000-00309-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 378540, at *10-
26

11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 17, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 10, 

2001). 

We also decline to accept the Defendant‟s argument that Ms. Pinson‟s statement 

regarding the division of the proceeds of the robbery violated Bruton. Bruton does not

bar the admission of a co-conspirator‟s statement made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

See State v. Crabtree, 655 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), superseded by 

statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tenn. 1995). 

Such a statement is admissible hearsay and would, therefore, be admissible if the 

defendant were tried separately. See Tenn. R. Evid 801(1.2)(E). 

The issue then is whether co-defendant Tull-Morales statement of dissatisfaction 

with the distribution of the proceeds of the robbery falls within the hearsay exception 

regarding statements of co-conspirators. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2)(E). The Defendant 

contends that they were statements made in “casual conversation” and not in furtherance 

of any conspiracy. The State disagrees. Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by 

the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 

of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible in evidence 

except as provided by exceptions in the Tennessee Rules of Evidence or other applicable 

law. See Tenn. R. Evid. 802. One of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is a statement of 

a co-conspirator. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2)(E). Under this exception, hearsay is 

admissible if it constitutes “a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course 

of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id.

A conspiracy is defined as a combination between two or more persons to do a 

criminal or unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means. See State v. 

Alley, 968 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). To be admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception, a statement must be made “during the course of” a 

conspiracy. This means that the conspiracy must have been occurring or ongoing at the 

time the statement was made. See State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tenn. 1995); 

Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d at 554; NEIL COHEN ET AL., TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 803

(1.2)(6) (3d ed. 1995). If the conspiracy had not begun or had already concluded when 

the statement was made, the statement will not be admissible under the co-conspirator 

exception. Id. The exception also requires that the statement be “in furtherance of” the 

conspiracy. In short, the statement must be one that will advance or aid the conspiracy in 

some way. See State v. Heflin, 15 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Commentators have explained that:

[a] statement may be in furtherance of the conspiracy in countless 

ways. Examples include statements designed to get the scheme started, 

develop plans, arrange for things to be done to accomplish the goal, update 
27

other conspirators on the progress, deal with arising problems, and provide 

information relevant to the project. While such statements are ordinarily 

made to other conspirators, Rule 803(1.2)(E) does not so require. 

Statements to third parties may qualify if in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 803(1.2). 6, p. 522. 

Casual conversation between or among co-conspirators is not considered to be in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. See Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 170. Federal case law 

holds, and we agree, that casual conversation between or among co-conspirators should 

not necessarily have been deemed to have occurred “in furtherance of” the conspiracy. 

State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 170 (Tenn. 1994). 

We conclude that co-defendant Tull-Morales‟s statements, as recounted by Ms. 

Pinson, regarding the unfair division of the proceeds of the robbery, which the parties 

then rectified was in furtherance of the conspiracy. The men colluded before this murder 

and discussed killing or robbing the victim. They then left Ms. Pinson‟s apartment, 

armed with weapons, and drove to the victim‟s home where they entered, robbed, shot, 

and killed him. As a result of their robbery, they obtained money and drugs that they 

then split. They returned to Ms. Pinson‟s home, each man having blood on him, and 

argued about the distribution of the proceeds. The Defendant told Ms. Pinson to say 

nothing about what had happened. The men washed themselves of the blood and at least 

two of them used some of the drugs they obtained during the robbery. The statements 

made about the proceeds occurred while the three defendants were cleaning themselves 

from committing the crime, discussing the proceeds, and ensuring that witnesses 

remained silent. The conspiracy was ongoing at the time the statements were made, and 

the statement‟s admission did not violate Bruton.

We agree with the Defendant that his final example offered, that Ms. Pinson 

testified that she could not remember whether co-defendant Conde-Valentino said he or 

the Defendant stabbed the victim, violates Bruton. This is a statement made by a codefendant potentially implicating the Defendant. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126. The issue 

then becomes whether this statement is harmless. As previously stated, the Bruton rule 

should only be applied when the non-testifying co-defendant‟s statement constitutes „a 

significant portion of the evidence of guilt,‟ and . . . if „ample evidence was available to 

demonstrate [the defendant‟s] guilt without reliance upon his co-defendant‟s confession,‟ 

the violation would be considered harmless error.” Ogle, 666 S.W.2d at 60. If “the 

properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the 

codefendant‟s admission is so insignificant by comparison[,]” then the improper use of 

the admission is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Schneble, 405 U .S. at 430; see 

Elliot, 524 S.W.2d at 478. Reversal is not required unless it is proven beyond a 
28

reasonable doubt that the error complained of contributed to the verdict. Chapman, 386 

U.S. at 24967); Burress, 2014 WL 6855226, at *16.

In the case under submission, we conclude reversal is not required. Ms. Pinson‟s 

statement that she could not recall whether co-defendant Conde-Valentino said that he or 

the Defendant stabbed the victim constituted an insignificant portion of the evidence of 

the Defendant‟s guilt. The evidence showed first that the victim was not stabbed but that 

he was shot six times. It also showed that the Defendant told Mr. Jobe that he intended to 

rob the victim and that Mr. Jobe attempted to stop him. The Defendant then went to Ms. 

Pinson‟s apartment and met his two co-defendants. The three decided to rob the victim, 

and the Defendant and two co-defendants left Ms. Pinson‟s home in the Defendants‟ 

vehicle with the Defendant driving and the Defendant and co-defendant Conde-Valentino 

were armed with guns. The Defendant‟s phone placed him in the location of the murder 

at the time of the murder, and the surveillance video of a nearby restaurant showed that a 

car matching the description of the car driven by the Defendant‟s car was near the 

victim‟s home at the time of the murder. After the murder, the Defendant, who had blood 

smeared on his hands, went to Ms. Pinson‟s house where he washed up and told her to 

“keep [her] mouth shut about what had happened.” The following day, the Defendant 

contacted Mr. Jobe, told him the victim “might be dead” because the robbery “went 

wrong,” and Mr. Jobe saw the Defendant dispose of his weapon. The Defendant asked 

Mr. Jobe to say that the Defendant was working for Mr. Jobe at the time of the murder, 

and Mr. Jobe declined. A few days later, the Defendant contacted Mr. Jobe and told him 

that he might have to kill co-defendant Tull-Morales because he believed that he had said 

something about the crime. Mr. Jobe encouraged him not to and suggested that he send 

co-defendant Tull-Morales to another location. Thereafter, Ms. Pinson saw co-defendant 

Tull-Morales get in to the SUV to leave his home and travel to Florida. In the face of this 

evidence, we conclude that the Defendant has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the error complained of contributed to the verdict. He is not entitled to relief on this 

issue.

B. Jury Instruction Regarding Out of Court Statements

The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the 

jury about his co-defendant‟s out of court statements, which he asserts was a required 

instruction. The State counters that the Defendant has waived review of this issue 

because he failed to request any such jury instruction or to object to the omission of the 

instruction. The State correctly notes that the Defendant did not file a written request for 

this instruction or verbally ask for the instruction at the time that the trial court discussed 

proposed jury instructions and did not object to the omission of the instruction. 
29

A trial court has the duty to fully instruct the jury on the general principles of law 

relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 464 

(Tenn. 1999); State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Elder, 982 

S.W.2d 871, 876 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Nothing short of a “„clear and distinct 

exposition of the law‟” satisfies a defendant‟s constitutional right to trial by jury. State v. 

Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 150 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting State v. McAfee, 737 

S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)). In other words, the trial court must instruct the 

jury on those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, 

which are necessary for the jury‟s understanding of the case. Elder, 982 S.W.2d at 876. 

Because questions regarding the propriety of jury instructions are mixed questions of law 

and fact, our standard of review here is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. 

State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Smiley, 38 S.W.3d 521, 524 

(Tenn. 2001).

We conclude that the Defendant has waived full appellate review of this issue 

because the Defendant failed to file a written request for such a special jury instruction. 

See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(a); Leath, 461 S.W.3d 73, 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (citing 

State v. Mackey, 638 S.W.2d 830, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (stating that Rule 30 

“envisions that such requests be made in writing” and that oral requests for instructions 

are not sufficient for an appellate court to place a trial court in error for rejecting a 

requested jury instruction)). Failure to submit a special request in writing constitutes a 

waiver of the issue. See State v. Vickers, 985 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State 

v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The issue is still reviewable for 

plain error. State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tenn. 2006).

In determining whether plain error review is appropriate, the following factors 

must be established:

(a) the record . . . clearly establish[es] what occurred in the trial court;

(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law [has] been breached;

(c) a substantial right of the accused [has] been adversely affected;

(d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and 

(e) consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.”

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 

626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). On appeal, the defendant has the burden of 

establishing that these five factors are met. State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Tenn. 
30

2007) (citing State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2007)). The appellate court 

need not consider all five factors if any single factor indicates that relief is not warranted. 

Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283.

We conclude that this issue does not require plain error review because 

consideration of this issue is not necessary to do substantial justice. As stated above, the 

only issue that violated Bruton was the statement testified to by Ms. Pinson when she said 

that she could not recall whether co-defendant Conde-Valentino said that he or the 

Defendant stabbed the victim. As articulated above this was not a great portion of the 

evidence against the Defendant. Further, there was proof that the victim was not, in fact, 

stabbed. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

C. Sufficiency of Evidence

The Defendant finally contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 

convictions noting that there was no evidence that he or his co-defendants knowingly 

obtained or exercised control over the victim‟s property. The State counters that the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant‟s convictions. We agree with the State.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court‟s standard 

of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

State, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(e), State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid, 

91 S.W.3d 247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This rule applies to findings of guilt based upon 

direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and 

circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1999). In the absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established 

exclusively by circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 

1973). The jury decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and “[t]he 

inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are 

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the 

jury.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted).

“The standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] is the same whether the 

conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or 

reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1990). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact 

from the evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999); Liakas v. State, 
31

286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956). “Questions concerning the credibility of the 

witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the 

evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 

1997); Liakas, 286 S.W.2d at 859. “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial 

judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in 

favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978); 

State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Tenn. 1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated 

the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge 

and the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe 

their demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be 

given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 

523 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest 

legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record, as well as all reasonable 

inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 775 (citing 

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilt against a 

defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the 

convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally 

insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 

(Tenn. 2000).

First degree felony murder is “[a] killing of another committed in the perpetration 

of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, act of terrorism, arson, rape, robbery, 

burglary, theft, kidnaping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aircraft 

piracy . . . .” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2014). “No culpable mental state is required for 

conviction under subdivision (a)(2) . . . except the intent to commit the enumerated 

offenses or acts in such subdivisions.” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(b). A conviction for 

especially aggravated robbery, as relevant to this case, requires proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt that a defendant committed an “intentional or knowing theft of property 

from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear” with the use of a 

deadly weapon and the victim suffered serious bodily injury. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401(a), -

403 (2014). “A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of 

property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the 

owner‟s effective consent.” T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (2014). 
32

A defendant is criminally responsible as a party to an offence if the offense is 

omitted by the defendant‟s own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the 

defendant is criminally responsible, or by both. T.C.A. § 39-11-401(a). One way to 

establish criminal responsibility is to prove the accused, while acting with the intent to 

promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of 

the offense, solicited, directed, aided, or attempted to aid another person in committing 

the offense. T.C.A. § 39-11-402(2). Criminal responsibility is not a separate or distinct 

crime. State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999). A defendant convicted by 

the theory of criminal responsibility is guilty in the same degree as the principal who 

committed the crime and is considered to be a principal offender. Id. at 171.

In the case under submission, before this murder, the Defendant told Mr. Jobe that 

he intended to rob the victim by creating a false drug deal. He went to the housing 

project where the two co-defendants lived and there the three discussed robbing the 

victim. The Defendant left Ms. Pinson‟s home, armed with a weapon, and drove his two 

co-defendants to the victim‟s home. He went into the home and was present while the 

victim was shot six times. Co-defendant Conde-Valentino‟s blood was found in the 

victim‟s home. The Defendant returned to Ms. Pinson‟s home with blood on his hands. 

There the parties discussed the division of proceeds, and the Defendant told Ms. Pinson 

not to say anything about the offense. The Defendant, while with Mr. Jobe the following 

day, disposed of his weapon and asked Mr. Jobe to provide him an alibi. The Defendant 

expressed his intention to kill co-defendant Tull-Morales to ensure that he did not tell 

anyone about the crime. Upon Mr. Jobe‟s suggestion, he assisted co-defendant TullMorales in leaving the area. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to sustain the 

Defendant‟s convictions for especially aggravated robbery and first degree felony 

murder. He is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that

the Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‟s judgments. 

_________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE