IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 08–0776

Filed November 5, 2010

TANEIA GALLOWAY,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 

George Stigler, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment ruling enforcing a

parent’s preinjury releases of her minor child’s personal injury claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Joanne Moeller, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.
2

HECHT, Justice.

A parent signed release forms waiving her minor child’s personal 

injury claims as a condition of the child’s participation in an educational 

field trip. This action was filed against the State after the child was 

injured during the trip. The district court granted the State’s motion for 

summary judgment, concluding the releases signed by the parent 

resulted in an enforceable waiver of the child’s personal injury claim. On 

appeal from the summary judgment ruling, we conclude the releases 

violate public policy and are therefore unenforceable.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In July of 2005, fourteen-year-old Taneia Galloway attended a field 

trip to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with Upward Bound, a youth outreach 

program organized by the University of Northern Iowa and the State of 

Iowa. On the field trip, Galloway was injured when she was struck by a 

car as she attempted to cross the street.

Before Galloway went on the field trip, her mother signed two 

documents entitled “Field Trip Permission Form” and “Release and 

Medical Authorization.” The first document read:

Classic Upward Bound Summer Residential Program

Field Trip Permission Form

Dear Parent(s)/Guardian(s):

Each summer the participants of the Classic Upward Bound 

Program attend field trips locally and out-of-town. This form 

must be completed in order for your son/daughter to 

participate in said events.

As the parent/guardian of Taneia Galloway, I hereby 

give my permission for him/her to participate in ALL field 

trips sponsored by the University of Northern Iowa Classic 

Upward Bound Program during the Summer Residential and 

the Academic Year Program. Taneia Galloway understands 

he/she is to follow all rules of the Classic Upward Bound 

Program while participating in these field trips.
3

Furthermore, I will not hold the University of Northern 

Iowa or any of its employees or agents responsible for any 

accidents, losses, damages or injuries resulting from the 

son/daughter’s participation in any or all the field trips. I 

also release the Classic Upward Bound Program, the 

University of Northern Iowa, and its employees and agents 

from all liabilities.

If the student is living with both parents/guardians, both 

parents/ guardians must sign this form.

Galloway’s mother signed and dated the form on June 13, 2005. She 

also signed another form which read as follows.

RELEASE AND MEDICAL AUTHORIZATION

University of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound – Dates: 

June 1, 2005 – May 30, 2006

Read Carefully –

This document is a release and authorizes medical 

treatment.

Please return all copies of this form to the program staff. 

Registration is not considered complete until this completed 

form is filed with the University of Northern Iowa Classic 

Upward Bound Program.

The student will not be allowed to participate in the Classic 

Upward Bound Program if this information is not provided. 

This information is not routinely provided to individuals or 

organizations outside the University, except as provided by 

law.

In consideration of the University of Northern Iowa granting 

the student permission to participate in the Classic Upward 

Bound Program, I hereby assume all risks of her/his injury 

(including death) that may result from any program activity. 

As parent/guardian I do hereby release and agree to 

indemnify, defend and hold harmless the University of 

Northern Iowa, State Board of Regents, State of Iowa, Classic 

Upward Bound and its officers, employees, agents and all 

participants in the program from and against all liability 

including claims and suits of law or in equity for injury (fatal 

or otherwise) which may result from any negligence and/or 

the student taking part in program activities.

I certify that within the past year the student has had a 

physical examination and that she/he is physically able to 

participate in all Upward Bound activities. 
4

In the event of injury or illness, I hereby give my consent for 

medical treatment, and permission to program staff for 

supervising and performing, as deemed necessary by staff,

on-site first aid for minor injuries, and for a licensed 

physician to hospitalize and secure proper treatment 

(including injections, anesthesia, surgery, or other 

reasonable and necessary procedures) for the student. I 

agree to assume all cost related to any such treatment. I 

also authorize the disclosure of medical information to my 

insurance company for the purpose of this claim. I 

understand each student must provide her/his own medical 

insurance.

I understand that I am responsible for any medical or other 

charges related to the student’s attendance at the University 

of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound Program.

Galloway, through her mother as next friend,1 filed suit against 

various parties, including the State of Iowa. The State moved for 

summary judgment, contending the releases signed by Galloway’s 

mother waived any claims against it for negligence. The district court 

concluded the releases constituted a valid waiver of Galloway’s claims 

and granted summary judgment. Galloway appeals.2

II. Scope of Review.

Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. 

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment we must determine if “the 

moving party has demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of 

material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Huber v. 

Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1993). “Summary judgment is proper if 

the only issue is the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts.” 

Id. Determining the legal effects of a contract is a matter of law to be 

resolved by the court. Id. at 55–56.

 1

Taneia Galloway has since reached the age of majority and has been 

substituted as plaintiff.

2The district court denied the summary judgment motions of the other 

defendants, but Galloway has since dismissed her claims against the remaining 

defendants.
5

III. Discussion.

Galloway makes three arguments on appeal that we should 

conclude the releases signed by her mother are void and unenforceable. 

First, she asserts we should follow a majority of other state courts that 

have concluded it is against public policy for a parent to waive liability 

for a child’s injury before the injury occurs. In the alternative, she 

argues an application of the factors enunciated in Tunkl v. Regents of 

University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963), demonstrates it is 

against public policy to enforce releases signed by a parent as a 

condition of the child’s participation in an educational activity. Her final 

contention is that these particular releases are insufficient to waive the 

State’s liability because the intent to waive liability is not clearly 

expressed.

Galloway’s primary argument is that public policy considerations 

should lead this court to conclude preinjury releases executed by parents 

as a condition of their children’s participation in educational activities 

are incompatible with public policy and therefore unenforceable. In 

particular, she contends public policy should preclude enforcement of 

releases executed by parents because parents are ill-equipped to assess 

in advance the nature of risks of injury faced by children while they are 

participating in activities at remote locations under the supervision of 

others and because parents are uninformed of the nature and extent of 

the gravity of the injuries to which their children may be exposed when 

the releases are executed. 

The State, however, argues that public policy weighs in favor of 

enforcing preinjury releases signed by parents. The State contends that 

all of the arguments supporting the enforcement of preinjury releases 

executed by adults waiving liability for their own injuries apply with 
6

equal force to releases given by parents on behalf of their minor children. 

The State further contends the public policy of this state requires courts 

to give deference to parents’ child-rearing choices, including the choice to 

release third parties in advance for negligent injury to children. 

We begin with an acknowledgment of the challenging nature of

identifying which societal values are properly included within the 

purview of “public policy.” In our efforts to characterize the imprecise 

boundaries of the concept, we have made reference to the broad concepts 

of “public good,” In re Estate of Barnes, 256 Iowa 1043, 1051, 128 

N.W.2d 188, 192 (1964), and “ ‘established interest[s] of society.’ ” 

Walker v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1983) 

(quoting Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 335 

(Iowa 1980)). However, despite the difficulty of characterizing the exact 

elements of the public interest, we have considered and weighed public 

policy concerns when deciding important legal issues. For example, such 

considerations were a critical aspect of our analysis when we abolished 

the doctrine of immunity for charitable institutions. Haynes v. 

Presbyterian Hosp. Ass’n, 241 Iowa 1269, 1274, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 

(1950) (weighing and ultimately rejecting public policy justifications for 

the immunity doctrine). 

We have also confronted public policy considerations in the context 

of litigation between family members. Our understanding of the public 

interest prompted this court to exercise its authority to abrogate the 

doctrine of interspousal immunity. Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 

620 (Iowa 1979) (relying on the fundamental public policy that courts 

should afford redress for civil wrongs and rejecting the proposition that 

the doctrine of interspousal immunity involved determinations of public 

policy most appropriately made by the legislature). We again carefully 
7

considered public policy factors in the family context when we abolished 

the doctrine of absolute parental immunity and recognized a remedy for 

children injured by the negligent acts of a parent. Turner v. Turner, 304 

N.W.2d 786, 787–88 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting the argument that “domestic 

government” and “parental discipline and control” are matters of public 

policy justifying retention of parental immunity). In this case, we are 

called upon to decide whether public policy considerations should lead 

us to invalidate preinjury releases given by a parent purporting to waive 

her minor child’s claim for personal injuries. 

As the freedom to contract weighs in the balance when public 

policy grounds are asserted against the enforcement of a contract, courts 

must be attentive to prudential considerations and exercise caution. 

Tschirgi v. Merchs. Nat’l Bank of Cedar Rapids, 253 Iowa 682, 690, 113 

N.W.2d 226, 231 (1962). These considerations have led this court to 

repeatedly hold that “contracts exempting a party from its own 

negligence are enforceable, and are not contrary to public policy.” Huber, 

501 N.W.2d at 55. Notwithstanding this well-established general rule, 

Galloway urges us to join the majority of state courts who have examined 

the issue and have concluded public policy precludes enforcement of a 

parent’s preinjury waiver of her child’s cause of action for injuries caused 

by negligence. See Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll., 

630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Penn. 1985); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, 143 

A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 

358 (Fla. 2008); Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411, 414

(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 386

(N.J. 2006); Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558

(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970); Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber 

of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Munoz v. II Jaz
8

Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 209–10 (Tex. App. 1993); Hawkins ex rel. Hawkins

v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001); Scott ex rel. Scott v. Pac. W. 

Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10–11 (Wash. 1992). 

The State responds that parents’ preinjury releases of their 

children’s personal injury claims are entirely consistent with legal 

traditions and public policy giving deference to parents’ decisions 

affecting the control of their children and their children’s affairs. To be 

sure, we have noted that “a parent’s ‘interest in the care, custody, and 

control of [his] children’ is ‘ “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 

liberty interests recognized by” ’ the United States Supreme Court.” 

Lamberts v. Lillig, 670 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Iowa 2003) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2001)). Yet, 

the deference and respect for parents’ decisions affecting their children’s 

property interests is restricted to some extent by the public’s interest in 

the best interests of children. For example, this court has determined 

that the law will not permit a parent to compromise her child’s financial 

security by waiving child support payments from the other parent in 

exchange for relinquishment of visitation rights. Anthony v. Anthony, 

204 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Iowa 1973). We concluded in Anthony that an 

agreement to waive child support under such circumstances “makes the 

child’s best interest subservient to parental self interest.” Id. at 834. 

Consistent with the policy considerations noted by this court in Anthony, 

a modification of a child support order “is void unless approved by the 

court . . . and entered as an order of the court.” Iowa Code § 598.21C(3)

(2009). 

Parents’ authority to make decisions affecting their children’s 

affairs is limited in other contexts as well. If a conservator for a minor 

child has not been appointed, a parent’s authority to receive money or 
9

other property for his or her child under the Iowa Uniform Transfers to 

Minors Act is limited to an aggregate value of $25,000. Iowa Code 

§ 633.574; see also Iowa Code § 565B.7(3) (stating if a custodian has not 

been nominated, or all persons nominated to serve as custodians are 

unable, unwilling or ineligible to serve, a transfer may be made to an 

adult member of the minor’s family unless the property exceeds $25,000 

in value). Generally, a parent has no right, in the absence of 

authorization from a court, to release or compromise causes of action 

belonging to a minor. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child § 44, at 212 

(2002). This general rule is followed in this jurisdiction, where a parent 

serving as her child’s conservator adjusts, arbitrates, or compromises 

claims in favor of or against the ward with approval of the court. Iowa 

Code § 633.647(5). 

These limitations on parents’ authority to make legally enforceable 

transactions affecting the property and financial interests of their minor 

children are derived from a well-established public policy that children 

must be accorded a measure of protection against improvident decisions 

of their parents. We conclude the same public policy demands minor 

children be protected from forfeiture of their personal injury claims by 

parents’ execution of preinjury releases. By signing a preinjury waiver, a 

parent purports to agree in advance to bear the financial burden of 

providing for her child in the event the child is injured by a tortfeasor’s 

negligence. Sometimes parents are not willing or able to perform such 

commitments after an injury occurs. If parents fail to provide for the 

needs of their injured children, and the preinjury waiver in favor of the 

tortfeasor is enforced, financial demands may be made on the public fisc 

to cover the cost of care.
10

Beyond the public’s pure economic interest in protecting children 

against parents’ improvident decisions waiving their children’s causes of 

action before injuries occur, another compelling practical reason weighs 

in favor of protecting children from the harsh consequences of preinjury 

releases. An adult’s preinjury release of his claim for his own personal 

injuries will be enforced even if the releasing party did not read the 

document before signing. “It is well settled that failure to read a contract 

before signing it will not invalidate the contract. Absent fraud or 

mistake, ignorance of a written contract’s contents will not negate its 

effect.” Huber, 501 N.W.2d at 55 (citation omitted) (holding that an 

adult’s preinjury release was valid even though he did not read the 

document). While this court has found valid policy reasons supporting 

the rule allowing the enforcement of releases against adults who

voluntarily, and in some cases foolishly, waive their own personal injury 

claims in advance of injury, we believe the strong public policy favoring 

the protection of vulnerable minor children demands a different rule 

here. 

As the Washington Supreme Court has noted, if a parent lacks 

authority without court approval to compromise and settle her minor 

child’s personal injury claim after an injury has occurred, “it makes little, 

if any, sense to conclude a parent has the authority to release a child’s 

cause of action prior to an injury.” Scott, 834 P.2d at 11–12; accord

Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 387 (noting “children deserve as much protection 

from the improvident compromise of their rights before an injury occurs 

as [a rule requiring court approval of settlements of minor children’s 

claims] affords them after the injury”); Hawkins, 37 P.3d at 1066.

We also find it significant that in the instance of an adult releasing 

another party’s liability for negligence, the person reading the contract, 
11

and presumably comprehending and agreeing with its terms, is the 

person who will engage in the activity presenting the risk of injury for

which the release is contemplated. Thus, if an adult waives another’s 

liability by executing a preinjury waiver of her own personal injury 

claims, she is aware that she has done so and is on notice to be vigilant 

for negligence in the course of her participation. While participating in 

the activity, if she perceives an unreasonable risk of injury, the adult is 

free to withdraw from it. Children tend to be vulnerable in such 

situations, however, in ways adults are not. The parent who reads, 

understands, and executes a waiver of liability for her child is not the 

person who will participate in the activity. Accordingly, the child may or 

may not understand what has been forfeited as a condition of her 

participation in an activity. She may or may not have the knowledge and 

experience required to assess and avoid risks of injury created by the 

activity. Even if a parent exercises reasonable care in investigating the 

potential risks of injury before signing a waiver and in advance of her 

child’s participation, often (as in this case) the parent is not present with 

the child during the subsequent activity. The parent hopes and perhaps 

believes her child will be safe and properly supervised during the activity, 

but if she does not participate in the activity with her child, she has no 

ability to protect her child once the activity begins. And, even if the child 

is uncomfortable with some aspect of the activity or senses a risk of 

injury while participating in the activity, the child may or may not have 

the ability to remove herself from it. The child’s ability to avoid the risk 

of injury will vary greatly, depending on the age and maturity of the 

child, the type of activity, her access to a phone, the personality and 

competence of the people supervising the activity, and other factors. 
12

We conclude for all of these reasons that the public policy 

protecting children from improvident actions of parents in other contexts 

precludes the enforcement of preinjury releases executed by parents for 

their minor children. Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such 

releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of 

protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and 

tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s 

personal injury claim before an injury occurs.

The State urges the court to follow the decisions of a minority of 

jurisdictions upholding preinjury releases executed by parents waiving 

the personal injury claims of their minor children. The decisions 

following the minority rule arise in litigation filed against schools, 

municipalities, or clubs providing activities for children. See, e.g., Hohe 

v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (Ct. App. 1990) 

(upholding a preinjury release executed by a father on behalf of his minor 

child waiving any claims resulting from the child’s participation in a 

school-sponsored event); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 747

(Mass. 2002) (holding a parent has the authority to bind a minor child to 

a waiver of liability as a condition of a child’s participation in public 

school extracurricular sports activities); Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc.,

696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998) (concluding a parent may bind a minor 

child to a release of volunteers and sponsors of a nonprofit sports 

activity). The State contends the California, Massachusetts, and Ohio 

courts wisely determined public policy considerations justify the 

enforcement of parents’ preinjury waivers of their children’s claims. If 

such parental waivers are rendered unenforceable, the State posits 

recreational, cultural, and educational opportunities for youths will cease 

because organizations sponsoring them will be unable or unwilling to 

purchase insurance or otherwise endure the risks of civil liability. Our 
13

court of appeals expressed this generalized fear when it concluded the 

“[p]ublic interest is served by allowing the parties the freedom to enter 

into such agreements.” Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746, 

749 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (concluding “exculpatory provisions [in releases 

executed by adults waiving their own claims for personal injuries] 

actually promote [the] public interest because without such releases, it is 

doubtful these events would occur”).

We believe the fear of dire consequences from our adoption of the 

majority rule is speculative and overstated. We find no reason to believe 

opportunities for recreational, cultural, and educational activities for 

youths have been significantly compromised in the many jurisdictions 

following the majority rule. In the final analysis, we conclude the strong 

public policy favoring the protection of children’s legal rights must 

prevail over speculative fears about their continuing access to activities. 

We are mindful that if we have misapprehended the public policy 

considerations at work on this issue, the political branches of our 

government will adopt a different rule. 

Accordingly we conclude the district court erred in enforcing the 

releases in this case. Having decided the releases that are the subject of 

this case are not enforceable, we do not address other arguments 

advanced by Galloway for reversal.

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude preinjury releases executed by parents purporting to 

waive the personal injury claims of their minor children violate public 

policy and are therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, we reverse the 

district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

All justices concur except, Cady, J., and Ternus, C.J., who dissent.
14

08–0776, Galloway v. State

CADY, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. 

Courts are, at times, capable of deciding legal issues based on 

public policy. These times, however, occur when the public policy is 

clear and apparent. See Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 

275, 283 (Iowa 2000) (“The need for clarity in public policy is . . . 

recognized in our reluctance to search too far beyond our legislative 

pronouncements and constitution to find public policy to support an 

action.”). Otherwise, public policy is best left to our legislative branch of 

government to decide as representatives of the people. The question 

whether it is imprudent as a matter of law for a parent to waive legal 

liability on behalf of a child as a condition for the child’s participation in 

an educational field trip is a matter for the legislature, not judges. If the 

subject of parental field trip waivers has surfaced in this state as a 

matter of public concern, the legislature can properly examine the issue 

and take any appropriate action. 

I would affirm the decision of the district court. 

Ternus, C.J., joins this dissent.