alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### Yuneec Q500 Typhoon

The Yuneec Q500 Typhoon (UA) will be the aircraft referred to in the petition submitted by Petitioner : Kenneth Williams 5401 Autumn LN. Dickinson, Texas 77539 281

- 914

- 3109 This UA has an excellent performance rating and excellent review history. The manufacture reports less than a 4% return rate on this UA (the less than 4% includes ANY type of return issue) This implicates that the UA has an exceptional safety/performance record

. The UA has several safety features including: GNSS&GLONASS GPS, GPS Hold, Home (return auto pilot), low battery warn ing, including returning to home if low battery warning is ignored, smart mode, allowing the UA to operate directly by stick direction rather than UA’s positioning, viewable transmitter screen displaying GPS location, altitude, speed, distance from transmi tter, satellite connections. The transmitter utilizes 2.4 GHz allowing no interference in transmitting signal. The UA has auto land, compass sensor, Air Pressure sensor and the weight of the UA is less than 4lbs operational weight. The UA is limited to a fl ight height of 400ft. the UA has a 25 minute flight time, and petitioner will limit flights to 25% of the listed flight time to ensure battery life during the operational flight. Information obtained from : Yuneec USA 5555 Ontario Mills Parkway Ontario, CA. 91764 1

- 855

- 284

- 8888 USCS@yuneec.com See attached documentation provided from the above “Yuneec USA”
#### Patricia Garan, Respondent, v Don & Walt Sutton Builders, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[773 NYS2d 416]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant Don *&*Walt Sutton Builders, Inc., appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Pagones, J.), dated August 29, 2002, as denied those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, and third causes of action insofar as asserted against it and for summary judgment on its counterclaim. Justice Altman has been substituted for former Justice Friedmann *(see 22*NYCRR 670.1 [c]).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

*350The Supreme Court correctly denied those branches of the appellant builder’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, and third causes of action insofar as asserted against it. The appellant contends that its contract with the plaintiff was for a “new home” governed by General Business Law article 36-B. According to the appellant, the plaintiff failed to comply with the statutorily required notice conditions precedent to suit thereunder (see General Business Law § 777-a [4]), thus barring her statutory claims (see *Rothstein v Equity Ventures,*299 AD2d 472 [2002]; *Taggart v Martano,*282 AD2d 521 [2001]; *Pinkus v V.F. Bldrs.,*270 AD2d 470 [2000]; *Rushford v Facteau,*247 AD2d 785 [1998]). Moreover, because the plaintiff’s statutory remedies are exclusive (see *Fumarelli v Marsam Dev.,*92 NY2d 298 [1998]), the appellant argues, the remaining three causes of action asserting common law causes of action must also be dismissed.

Contrary to the appellant’s contentions, however, this case does not fall within General Business Law article 36-B. Rather, it is governed by General Business Law article 36-A. The home constructed by the appellant for the plaintiff on the plaintiffs land is a “custom home” as defined by General Business Law § 770 (7). The parties’ contract is thus one for “home improvement” (General Business Law § 770 [3]) which is governed by General Business Law article 36-A *(see Biggs v O’Neill,*309 AD2d 1110 [2003]). Pursuant to General Business Law § 772 (2), “[n]othing in [article 36-A] shall impair, limit, or reduce the statutory, common law or contractual duties or liability of any contractor.” Accordingly, the notice condition precedent provisions of General Business Law article 36-B (General Business Law § 777-a [4]) have no application to this case. Thus, the Supreme Court correctly sustained the plaintiff’s first three causes of action, and did not award judgment on the counterclaim. Altman, J.P., Florio, S. Miller and Luciano, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.0


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Roebling  Financial Corp, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  we,
Robert P. Hawkins,  Jr.,  President  and Chief  Executive  Officer,  and John Y.
Leacott,  Chief Financial  Officer,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss.1350,  as
adopted pursuant toss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Robert P. Hawkins, Jr.                      /s/ John Y. Leacott
-------------------------------------           --------------------------------
Robert P. Hawkins, Jr.                          John Y. Leacott
President and Chief Executive Officer           Chief Financial Officer




August 6, 2002
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-16-00827-CV

In re The State of Texas, ex rel. Jennifer A. Tharp

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Relator State of Texas, through Jennifer A. Tharp, the Criminal District Attorney of

Comal County, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a motion for temporary stay. See Tex.

R. App. P. 52.8, 52.10. We grant the motion for temporary relief and stay all proceedings, pending

further order of this Court. The Court orders the real party in interest to file a response to the petition

for writ of mandamus on or before December 16, 2016. The Court furtherrequests that any response

filed by respondent, the Honorable Dib Waldrip, also be filed on or before December 16, 2016.

It is ordered December 6, 2016.

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Bourland
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

WESTERN DISTRICT 

In the Matter of 

LORENZO C. FITZGERALD 

 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

No. 2231 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 

Board File No. C1-14-361 

(District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 

No. 13-BG-1502) 

Attorney Registration No. 42249

(Out of State) 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

 AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2016, having failed to reply to this Court’s 

directive to provide reasons against the imposition of a reciprocal suspension, Lorenzo 

C. Fitzgerald is suspended from the practice of law in this Commonwealth for a period 

of one year. He is directed to comply with all the provisions of Pa.R.D.E. 217. 

 Mr. Justice Eakin did not participate in the decision of this matter.
Dismissed and Opinion Filed May 3, 2022

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 21

- 00740

- CV

NATALIE THARP , Appellant

V. CAMERON RENEAU , Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC

- 21

- 02362

- E

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Molberg Before the Court is app ellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution

. By order dated February 23, 2022, we granted appellant’s second motion for an extension of time to file her brief, extended the deadline to March 21, and cautioned her that further extension requests would be disfavored. To date, appellant has not filed a brief , a response to appell ee’s motion, or otherwise communicated with the Court. In light of these circumstances, we grant appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(a)(1) ; 42.3(b)

.

210740f.p05 /Ken Molberg/ / KEN MOLBERG JUSTICE– 2

– 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

NATALIE THARP, Appellant

No. 05

- 21

- 00740

- CV V.
CAMERON RENEAU, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC

- 21

- 02362

- E. Opinion delivered by Justice Molberg. Justices Reichek and Garcia participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED

.

J udgment entered this 3 rd day of May , 2022

.
#### Stack v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company

Before Robinson, P.J., Conaboy, Kosik and Walsh, JJ.

*Paul A. McGlone,*for plaintiffs.

*Lawrence M. Ludwig,*for defendant.

January 6, 1978

KOSIK, *J.,*

Plaintiffs insured their premises and the contents thereon with insurance policies issued by defendant insurance company. On February 4,1976, afire destroyed the premises and the contents. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in assumpsit and alleged that defendant had breached the insurance contract by its failure to *114pay moneys in accordance with the terms of the contract. Defendant’s answer, by way of new matter, averred that defendant did not have to fulfill the terms of the contract because the fire was caused by arson. Plaintiffs now seek leave to amend their complaint by adding a cause of action for punitive damages. Plaintiffs claim that the Unfair Insurance Practices Act of July 22, 1974, P.L. 589, 40 P.S. §1171.1 et seq., allows for this independent cause of action when an insurance company has exercised bad faith in refusing to settle and adjust claims.

It is clear that the case law of Pennsylvania does not provide for a private cause of action for punitive damages for the alleged bad faith in settling and adjusting claims. See Very, The Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act — The Sleeping Giant, 46 Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly 438 at 444. Similarly, the Unfair Insurance Practices Act, supra, does not provide for this private cause of action for punitive damages. Indeed, the fact that the statute in question sets forth administrative remedies to sanction the type of conduct alleged by plaintiffs indicates that plaintiffs are limited to these administrative remedies: Collins v. Northwestern National Insurance Group, 2 D. & C. 3d 568 at 574 (1977). Finally, the case of Frizzy Hair Stylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co., 392 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (1977), which was relied upon by plaintiffs in their brief, has been reversed: Frizzy Hair Stylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co., _N.Y.S. 2d_(1977).

ORDER

Now, January 6, 1978, it is hereby ordered that the petition to amend the complaint is denied.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 23, 2016

s1122

Order 

Clerk

November 23, 2016

153290

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 153290

COA: 323316

Wayne CC: 13-009150-FC

THOMAS LEE WINGARD,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 14, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We DIRECT the Wayne County 

Prosecuting Attorney to answer the application for leave to appeal within 28 days after 

the date of this order. The prosecutor shall specifically address: (1) whether the 

defendant’s August 28, 2013 statement was inadmissible under Missouri v Seibert, 542 

US 600 (2004); and (2) if so, whether defense counsel’s failure to challenge the 

admissibility of the statement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The application for leave to appeal remains pending.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  
    
    The Form 10-Q of the Company for the three months ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m or 78o(d)); and
 
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Michael K. RobinsonMichael K. RobinsonChief Executive Officer,

President and Assistant Treasurer
PD1396-14COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALSAUSTIN, TEXASTransmitted 5/20/2015 5:38:47 PMAccepted 5/26/2015 8:28:33 AMABEL ACOSTACLERK
##### 



Exhibit 23.3 Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm The Board of Directors
Ultra Petroleum Corp.: We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement No. 333-89522 on
Form S-3 of Ultra Petroleum Corp. of our reports dated March 15, 2005 with respect to the
consolidated balance sheets of Ultra Petroleum Corp. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2004 and
2003, and the related consolidated statements of operations and retained earnings, shareholders
equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2004,
managements assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as
of December 31, 2004 and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of
December 31, 2004, which reports appear in the December 31, 2004 annual report on Form 10-K of
Ultra Petroleum Corp. Our report on the consolidated financial statements refers to the adoption of Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 143, Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations, on January 1,
2003. KPMG LLP
Denver, Colorado
March 15, 2005
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2919 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2919

  To designate Indigenous Peoples' Day as a legal public holiday and 
 replace the term ``Columbus Day'' with the term ``Indigenous Peoples' 
                     Day'', and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 30, 2021

   Mr. Heinrich (for himself, Mr. Lujan, Mr. Padilla, Ms. Smith, Ms. 
 Warren, and Mr. Kaine) introduced the following bill; which was read 
          twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To designate Indigenous Peoples' Day as a legal public holiday and 
 replace the term ``Columbus Day'' with the term ``Indigenous Peoples' 
                     Day'', and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Indigenous Peoples' Day Act''.

SEC. 2. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' DAY AS A LEGAL PUBLIC HOLIDAY.

    Section 6103(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
striking the item relating to Columbus Day and inserting the following:
            ``Indigenous Peoples' Day, the second Monday in October.''.

SEC. 3. TERM ``COLUMBUS DAY'' REPLACED.

    Any reference to ``Columbus Day'' in any law, rule, regulation, or 
other official paper in effect as of the date of the enactment of this 
Act shall be deemed to be a reference to ``Indigenous Peoples' Day''.
                                 <all>
```
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00009-CR

JOHNATHAN LEE WOOD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 8th District Court

Hopkins County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1323123

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Johnathan Lee Wood has filed a notice of appeal from his conviction of continuous 

sexual abuse of a child under fourteen and the resulting sentence of life imprisonment. The issue 

before us is whether Wood perfected his appeal. We conclude that he did not and dismiss the 

appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Sentence was imposed in this matter October 17, 2013, and Wood timely-filed a motion 

for new trial on November 14, making his notice of appeal due January 15, 2014. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 26.2. Wood’s notice was not filed until January 21, 2014, and Wood did not file a 

motion seeking an extension of the deadline for filing his notice. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b), 

26.3.

A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Olivo v. State, 

918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Rodarte v. State, 860 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1993)). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interprets Rule 26.3 of the Texas 

Rules of Appellate Procedure strictly to require an appellant in a criminal case to file his notice 

of appeal and a motion for extension of time within the fifteen-day period for filing a late notice 

of appeal. Id. According to the high court, “When a notice of appeal is filed within the fifteenday period but no timely motion for extension of time is filed, the appellate court lacks 

jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 209 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per 

curiam).

We notified Wood by letter dated February 11, 2014, of this jurisdictional defect and 

provided him an opportunity to cure the defect or otherwise demonstrate to the Court how it had 
3

jurisdiction over the appeal. We received no response from Wood. We note that Wood recently 

submitted a lengthy brief to this Court raising numerous points of error; however, nowhere in 

that brief does he address the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

Because Wood failed to file a motion for extension of time in addition to his late-filed 

notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522.

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Bailey C. Moseley

Justice

Date Submitted: March 20, 2014

Date Decided: March 21, 2014

Do Not Publish
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 2, 2016

No. 04-14-00620-CV

Rosa Obregon PEREZ, Ricardo O. Perez, individually and as next friend of Rosa Elia Perez, 

Maria Perez Jalomus, Juan Jose Perez, Julio Perez, Jr., and Fernando Perez,

Appellants

v.

THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,

Appellee

From the 83rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 26130

Honorable Robert Cadena, Judge Presiding

ORDER ON APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice1

Marialyn Barnard, Justice1

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice1

Upon further review, a majority of the court has determined to withdraw the order dated 

July 11, 2016. The motion for rehearing en banc filed by appellee on April 28, 2016 is DENIED. 

It is so ORDERED on December 2, 2016.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO: ___________________________

 Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

 1 Dissents to the denial of en banc reconsideration.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Healthway Medical Care, P.C., as Assignee of Juan Arias, Appellant, <br><br>against<br><br>Infinity Group, Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered February 5, 2015. The order denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that, upon the application of Pennsylvania law, plaintiff was ineligible for reimbursement of no-fault benefits because the Pennsylvania commercial automobile insurance policy at issue in the case at bar had been rescinded, ab initio, due to misrepresentations the policyholder had made on his insurance application. By order entered February 5, 2015, the Civil Court denied plaintiff's motion and granted defendant's cross motion.</p><p>For the reasons stated in <i>Healthway Med. Care, P.C., as assignee of Eusebia Arias v Infinity Group</i> ( Misc 3d, 2016 NY Slip Op [appeal No. 2015- 524 Q C], decided herewith), as defendant's submissions did not conclusively establish that plaintiff's assignor (the driver of the vehicle) was anything other than an innocent third-party, the order is modified by providing that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied. </p><p>Aliotta, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.</p><br>Decision Date: December 07, 2016<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Acrongenomics Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ron Lizée, Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







Date: May 19, 2006

By:/s/ Ron Lizée

Name:  Ron Lizée

Title:    Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer)
February 23, 2001

Mariner Energy, LLC
Mariner Holdings, Inc.
Mariner Energy, Inc.
580 WestLake Park Blvd., Suite 1300
Houston, Texas  77079
Attention:     Mr. Robert E. Henderson
                    Chairman of the Board
Dear. Mr. Henderson:
        I hereby resign from my position as a member of the Board of Directors of each of Mariner Energy, LLC, Mariner Holdings, Inc.
and Mariner Energy, Inc. effective immediately.  It has been a pleasure serving with you and the other members of the Boards of Directors of these companies.

| | Very truly yours,   
| | --------------------
| | /s/ Jere C. Overdyke
| | Jere C. Overdyke