NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee

v.

MARSHALL EDWARD LEEDS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0709

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-450698-001

The Honorable Jerry Bernstein, Commissioner

AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender, Phoenix

By Joel M. Glynn

Counsel for Appellant

Marshall Edward Leeds, Kingman

Appellant 
STATE v. LEEDS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Marshall Edward Leeds timely appeals from his conviction 

and sentence for one count of misconduct involving weapons, a class 4 

felony. After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable 

question of law that was not frivolous, Leeds’ counsel filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 

2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), asking 

this court to search the record for fundamental error. This court granted 

counsel’s motion to allow Leeds to file a supplemental brief in propria 

persona, and Leeds did so. We reject the arguments raised in Leeds’

supplemental brief and, after reviewing the entire record, find no 

fundamental error. Therefore, we affirm Leeds’ conviction and sentence as 

corrected.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 On October 18, 2013, D.P., Leeds’ probation officer, joined by 

other officers, visited Leeds’ home and conducted a “probation search” for 

a weapon. After answering the door, Leeds was handcuffed and then asked 

for the weapon. Leeds initially said his father’s guns were in storage, but 

eventually admitted the gun was on a table in the bedroom. After a quick 

search, the officers located the gun in the bedroom. Officers arrested Leeds, 

and, subsequently, at the police station, read Leeds his Miranda rights. 

Leeds admitted to carrying the gun while walking the family dog around 

the neighborhood because he was worried about his safety. He also 

acknowledged he knew carrying a gun was illegal. 

¶3 Based on the foregoing evidence, a jury found Leeds guilty of 

one count of misconduct involving weapons. Leeds admitted to being on 

probation at the time of the offense. At the combined “priors trial” and 

sentencing hearing, the court found Leeds had committed two historical 

 

1We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the jury’s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Leeds. State 

v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989). 
STATE v. LEEDS

Decision of the Court

3

priors. The court sentenced Leeds to a presumptive term of ten years as a 

category three repetitive offender and awarded Leeds 329 days of

presentence incarceration credit. 

DISCUSSION

I. Supplemental Brief 

¶4 As we construe his supplemental brief, Leeds first argues the 

superior court improperly denied his motion to suppress the gun. We 

review this issue for clear and manifest error. State v. Walker, 215 Ariz. 91, 

94, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d 220, 223 (App. 2007). 

¶5 Although the Fourth Amendment protects against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, reasonable suspicion justifies a 

warrantless search of probationers. State v. Adair, 1 CA-CR 14-0115, slip op. 

at *1 , ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Sep. 3, 2015) (search of probationer’s home valid when 

reasonable under the totality of the circumstances); see also U.S. v. Knights, 

534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (reasonable 

suspicion sufficient under Fourth Amendment for search of probationer); 

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006)

(under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion justifies 

searching a parolee). D.P. testified at the suppression hearing that Leeds’ 

counselor had told him Leeds was carrying a gun because he was worried 

about being attacked in his neighborhood. The counselor also told D.P. that 

Leeds’ behavior was “increasingly paranoid and he was having some 

delusions.” This information provided D.P. with reasonable suspicion to 

perform the probation search for a gun.

¶6 Leeds next argues the officers violated his Miranda rights 

when they questioned him about the gun while he was in handcuffs, but 

before his arrest. Leeds did not raise a Miranda argument in the superior 

court, and thus we review for fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 210 

Ariz. 561, 564-65, ¶ 8, 115 P.3d 601, 604-05 (2005). 

¶7 Under the “public safety exception” to the Miranda rule, the 

officers did not need to read Leeds his Miranda rights before asking him 

about the gun. When officers ask questions that are objectively “necessary 

to secure their own safety or the safety of the public,” the officers need not 

first give Miranda warnings. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659, 104 S. 

Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984); see also State v. Leteve, No. CR-12-0535, 

2015 WL 4747709, at *2, ¶ 9 (Ariz. Aug. 12, 2015). Here, the State presented 

evidence at the suppression hearing that Leeds had a gun and was paranoid 

and delusional,see supra ¶ 5, which created a reasonable need for the officers 
STATE v. LEEDS

Decision of the Court

4

to protect their safety. Thus, the court was not required to suppress Leeds’ 

pre-Miranda statements. 

¶8 Finally, Leeds argues the State failed to present sufficient

evidence to support his conviction because it neither tested the gun for 

DNA or fingerprints nor did it present any witnesses who testified to seeing 

him with a gun. We review this issue de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 

562, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011).

¶9 Although the State did not test the gun for DNA or 

fingerprints and did not present any witnesses who testified to seeing Leeds 

with a gun, it was under no obligation to do so. See State v. Torres, 162 Ariz. 

70, 76, 781 P.2d 47, 53 (1989) (“Police generally have no duty to seek out and 

obtain potentially exculpatory evidence.”) (citation omitted); see also State v. 

Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 382, ¶ 24, 224 P.3d 192, 198 (2010) (appellate court 

reviews sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether jury’s findings 

are supported by substantial evidence; that is, evidence that is adequate to 

support a reasonable person’s conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt); State v. Henry, 205 Ariz. 229, 232, ¶ 11, 68 P.3d 455, 458 

(App. 2003) (substantial evidence may be direct or circumstantial; denial of 

Rule 20 motion reviewed for abuse of discretion). Based on our review of 

the record, the State presented sufficient evidence supporting Leeds’ 

conviction, see supra ¶ 2, and it was not obligated to present further 

evidence. 

II. Anders Review

¶10 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. Leeds received a fair 

trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and 

was present at all critical stages.

¶11 The jury was properly comprised of eight members and the 

court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charge, Leeds’

presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the necessity of 

a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and considered a 

presentence report; Leeds was given an opportunity to speak at sentencing

and did so; and his sentence was within the range of acceptable sentences 

for his offense.

¶12 Although the superior court imposed a sentence within the 

permissible range for a repetitive offender with two historical prior 

convictions, the sentencing minute entry fails to describe Leeds’ historical 

convictions. Thus, we correct the sentencing minute entry to add the 
STATE v. LEEDS

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following after “THE COURT FINDS that the Defendant has two prior 

convictions”: 

Solicitation of Possession of Narcotic Drugs, a 

class 6 Felony committed on August 14, 2009, 

and convicted on September 30, 2010, in 

Maricopa County Superior Court cause number 

CR2009-154104-001; and 

Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class 6 

Felony committed on August 2, 2012, and 

convicted on March 22, 2013, in Maricopa 

County Superior Court cause number CR2012-

153454-001. 

¶13 The sentencing minute entry also mistakenly refers to Leeds’ 

current offense as “Non Dangerous - Non Repetitive” and cites A.R.S. § 13-

702 (West 2015), a statute that only applies to first-time offenders.

2 At the 

sentencing hearing, however, the court properly found Leeds was a 

category three repetitive offender. Thus, we correct the sentencing minute 

entry to reflect that Leeds’ current offense was “Non Dangerous -

Repetitive,” replace A.R.S. § 13-702 with A.R.S. § 13-703 (West 2015), which 

applies to repetitive offenders, and change “Class 4 FELONY” to “Class 4 

FELONY, with 2 prior felony convictions.”

CONCLUSION

¶14 We decline to order briefing and affirm Leeds’ conviction and 

sentence as corrected. 

¶15 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Leeds’ representation in this appeal have ended. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform Leeds of the outcome of this appeal 

and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984).

¶16 Leeds has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if 

he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court’s own 

 

2Although the Arizona Legislature has amended certain 

statutes cited in this decision after the date of Leeds’ offense, the revisions 

are immaterial to the resolution of this appeal. Thus, we cite to the current 

version of these statutes. 
STATE v. LEEDS

Decision of the Court

6

motion, we also grant Leeds 30 days from the date of this decision to file an 

in propria persona motion for reconsideration.