alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0547. JUANDA ROBERTS v. STONE GATE COTTAGES

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION.

Juanda Roberts has filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s order granting

Stone Gate Cottages CondominiumAssociation’s motion for summary judgment and

entering judgment against Roberts in the amount of $5,565.23. We lack jurisdiction.

First, Roberts’s appeal is untimely. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30

days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of. OCGA § 5-6-

38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement

to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d

756) (1995). The trial court entered its order on July 6, 2016, but Roberts did not file

her notice of appeal until September 9, 2016, 65 days later.

 Second, Roberts has failed to file an application for discretionary appeal as

required by OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6). “Although the grant of a motion for summary

judgment is in general directly appealable, where the amount of the judgment is

$10,000.00 or less, an application for discretionary appeal isrequired.” (Punctuation

omitted.) Ca-Shar v. McKesson Corp., 204 Ga. App. 865, 865 (420 SE2d 810) (1992)

(citing OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6)). Asthe total judgment in favor of Stone Gate Cottages

Condominium Association is less than $10,000.00, the entry of summary judgment

provides no basis for a direct appeal in this case. See Ca-Shar, supra at 865-866.

Roberts’s failure to follow the required procedure deprives us of jurisdiction to

consider her appeal. See Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655)

(1998).

 Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

November 22, 2016
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/22/2016
#### Prudential Trust Company to use *v.*Hildebrand

(No. 2).

October 7, 1907:

Argued April 16, 1907.

Appeals, Nos. 124, 125, 126,127, 128 and 129, April T., 1907, by S. J. Campbell, from order of C. P. No. 1, Allegheny Co., Sept. T., 1905, No. 57, on exceptions to auditor’s report in case of The Prudential Trust Company to use of Michael P. Howley v. W. E. Hildebrand, former owner, with notice to Frank P. Howley, present owner.

Before Rice, P. J., Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Beaver, JJ.

Affirmed.

Opinion by

Beaver, J.,

The appeal in this case and the five which follow it in regular order are from a decree, distributing a fund in the hands of the sheriff, arising from the sale of.the real estate of the defendant.

The claims represented by these appeals were judgments upon writs of sci. fa. upon mechanics’ liens filed against six separate properties belonging to the defendant. The money for distribution was awarded to the plaintiff who claimed under a mortgage which was alleged by the appellant to be a junior lien upon' the premises from the sale of which the fund arose.

The question raised by the appeal is similar to that in No. 123 of April Term, 1907, in which an opinion has this day been filed, ante, p. 249.

The court below held the mechanics’ liens in all of the cases invalid and the appellant here seeks to reverse the decree of distribution, on the ground that, judgment having been entered upon the sci. fa. upon the mechanics’ liens, the question of the validity of the lien was thereby established and that the appellee here was bound by that judgment, except as to the mere question of the priority of lien.-

For the reasons stated in the opinion in 123 of April Term, 1907, the appellant’s contention cannot prevail.

The decree is, therefore, affirmed and the appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7556

ERIC MARADIAGA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DARREN WILSON, Highway Patrolman; DAVID THOMLEY, Captain and

Highway Patrolman,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Patrick Michael Duffy, District

Judge. (4:05-cv-2836-PMD)

Submitted: February 21, 2008 Decided: April 7, 2008

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eric Maradiaga, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Jonathan Bridgmon,

Ruskin C. Foster, Hanna Stokes Green, MCCUTCHEN, BLANTON, JOHNSON

& BARNETTE, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina; Donna Seegars Givens,

WOODS & GIVENS, LLP, Lexington, South Carolina; Harry H. Stokes,

Jr., MCANGUS, GOUDELOCK & COURIE, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Eric Maradiaga appeals the district court’s order

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, granting

summary judgment to the Defendants, and denying relief on his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons

stated by the district court. Maradiaga v. Wilson, No. 4:05-cv2836-PMD (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2007). We also deny the motion to

appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 4(o)



JEFFERSON
NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY


Home
Office: Dallas, Texas 75201


Administrative
Office: [10350 Ormsby Park Place, Louisville, Kentucky 40223]


Telephone:
[1-866-667-0561]


(hereinafter
called the Company)


ENDORSEMENT


The
Contract to which this Endorsement applies (hereinafter referred to as “Contract”) shall be modified in the following
particulars effective as of the effective date set forth below. In the case of a conflict with any provision in the Contract,
the terms of this Endorsement will control.


The Annuity
Date may not be later than the date on which the ANNUITANT reaches attained age 100 (the “Maximum Maturity Date”).


The Contract
will automatically be forced into a fixed annuitization for a guaranteed period of ten years if the Owner does not select an Annuity
Date on or before the Maximum Maturity Date. It is understood that upon the death of the Annuitant, any amounts remaining under
the guaranteed period will be distributed at least as rapidly as under the method of distribution being used as of the date of
the Annuitant's death.


 


Effective
Date: [xx/xx/xxxx]


 


Signed for Jefferson National
Life Insurance Company





 


	Signed	Signed
	 	 
	President	Secretary








    	1
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3019 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3019

  To require the United States Postal Service to designate a single, 
              unique ZIP code for particular communities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 20, 2021

    Mr. Rubio (for himself and Mr. Scott of Florida) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
               Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To require the United States Postal Service to designate a single, 
              unique ZIP code for particular communities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ZIP CODES.

    Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the United States Postal Service shall designate a single, unique ZIP 
code for, as nearly as practicable, each of the following communities:
            (1) Ocoee, Florida.
            (2) Miami Lakes, Florida.
            (3) Oakland, Florida.
            (4) Village of Estero, Florida.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 31.4



I, Barry D. Michaels, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A to the Annual Report on Form 10-K (this Amendment) of Cardima, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.



Date: May 2, 2005



|                                   
|-----------------------------------
|/s/    BARRY D. MICHAELS           
|Barry D. Michaels                  
|Interim Chief Financial Officer and
|Secretary
| 1.   | I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Insituform Technologies, Inc.; |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 3.   | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 4.   | The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 5.   | The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | /s/ David A. Martin                                                                                                            |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | David A. MartinSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer) |
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6805

JAMES WILLIE HAWKINS, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

KEITH W. DAVIS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Senior

District Judge. (3:15-cv-00145-JRS)

Submitted: November 17, 2016 Decided: November 28, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Willie Hawkins, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Victoria Lee 

Johnson, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

James Willie Hawkins, Jr., seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for 

relief from the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012); Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 

363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will 

not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). 

When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Hawkins has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Reserve System

                    The companies listed in this notice have applied to the Board for approval, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841*et seq.*) (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR part 225), and all other applicable statutes and regulations to become a bank holding company and/or to acquire the assets or the ownership of, control of, or the power to vote shares of a bank or bank holding company and all of the banks and nonbanking companies owned by the bank holding company, including the companies listed below.                

The applications listed below, as well as other related filings required by the Board, are available for immediate inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The applications will also be available for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their views in writing on the standards enumerated in the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the proposal also involves the acquisition of a nonbanking company, the review also includes whether the acquisition of the nonbanking company complies with the standards in section 4 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise noted, nonbanking activities will be conducted throughout the United States.

Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding each of these applications must be received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of the Board of Governors not later than April 30, 2015.

A. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Colette A. Fried, Assistant Vice President) 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60690-1414:

                    1.                     *Foresight Financial Group, Inc.,*                     Rockford, Illinois; to acquire 100 percent of the voting shares of State Bank of Herscher, Herscher, Illinois.                

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 31, 2015.

Michael J. Lewandowski,

Associate Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 2015-07663 Filed 4-2-15; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
#### Brown v. Bensalem Township School District

*Jerome N. Berenson,*for plaintiff.

*John L. McDevitt,*for defendant.

January 20, 1984

GARB, *P.J.,*

Plaintiffs have instituted suit seeking recovery for certain physical injuries allegedly incurred by the minor plaintiff. It is alleged that he suffered these injuries while a spectator at a baseball game held at an athletic field owned by defendant school district. The basis of plaintiffs cause of action is the alleged inadequate supervision by the agents, servants and employees of defendant school district in failing properly to supervise the aforesaid baseball game and to protect plaintiff as a spectator thereof.

Defendant has filed preliminary objections as in the nature of a demurrer asserting that it is immune from such liability. We agree, sustain the preliminary objections and dismiss the complaint.

By virtue of the Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, §221(1) 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8541, et seq. the legislature has ordained immunity from liability for “local agencies”. That section provides that “no local agency” shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any action of the “local agency” or an employee thereof, except as otherwise provided by the act. Section 8542 provides for the specific exceptions *124from this statutory governmental immunity none of which apply herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiffs assert that a local school district does not constitute a “local agency”.

Admittedly, the term “local agency” is not defined in this subchapter of the Judicial Code. However, “local agency” is defined in Section 8501 of the Judicial Code as “a government unit other than the Commonwealth government.” It is specifically provided, interestingly, that the term does include an “intermediate unit”. The term “government unit” is defined in § 102 of the Judicial Code as “the General Assembly and its officers and agencies, any government agency or any court or other officer or agency of the unified judicial system.” The same section of the Judicial Code defines “government agency” as “any Commonwealth agency or any political subdivision or municipal or other local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision or local authority.” (Emphasis supplied.) A “political subdivision” is defined in the Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 877, No. 160, §2, 1 Pa. C.S.A. §1991, the consolidated statutes applicable to all statutes enacted after 1937, as “any county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, *school district,*vocational school district and county institution district.” (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, we determined that the term “local agency” includes the defendant school district. As such, we are satisfied that the defendant is immune from suit in this case and the complaint must be dismissed.

ORDER

And now, this January 20, 1984, it is hereby ordered that the preliminary objections as in the nature of a demurrer are sustained and the complaint is dismissed.
Order entered August 4, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01443-CV

IN RE BRUNO KUBLER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS INSOLVENCY ADMINISTRATOR 

OF THIELERT AIRCRAFT ENGINES GMBH, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 191st Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-09151

ORDER

Before Justices Myers, Evans, and Schenck

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we CONDITIONALLY GRANT relator’s

petition for writ of mandamus. We ORDER the trial court to issue a written order(s) within 

fifteen (15) days of the date of this order vacating the trial court’s December 2, 2016 order 

denying relator’s motion to dismiss intervenor’s claims and motion to strike intervenor’s claims, 

granting relator’s motion to dismiss intervenor’s claims, and dismissing intervenor’s claims. We 

further ORDER the trial court to file with this Court, within thirty (30) days of the date of this 

order, a certified copy of its order(s) issued in compliance with this order and with the Court’s 

opinion of this date. Should the trial court fail to comply with this order, the writ will issue. 

We ORDER real party in interest Technify Motors GmbH to bear the costs, if any, of 

this original proceeding. 

/s/ DAVID J. SCHENCK 

JUSTICE
#### Knox and another vs. The People’s Insurance Company of Newark.

*December 17, 1880*

*January 11, 1881.*

*Reversal of Judgment.*

A judgment is reversed upon the ground that the court erred in its finding upon the litigate'd question of fact.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Fond dto Lao*County.

The plaintiffs appealed from a'judgment in favor of the defendant.

For the appellants there was a brief by *Raymond c& Hasel-tine,*their attorneys, with *Vilas <& Bryant*of counsel, and oral argument by *Wm. F. Vilas.*

*G. W. Cate,*for respondent.

LyoN, J.

The facts in this case are the same as in *Knox v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., supra.*

At the trial the parties stipulated that all of the material allegations of the complaint are true, and submitted the cause *681upon the single question of fraudulent concealment of facts by the plaintiff. That question was tried by the court, without a jury, on the testimony which had been given on the same question in the other case. The issue was found against the plaintiffs. On the same testimony we held in the other case that the finding was erroneous. It must be held so here.

*By the*Court.— Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with dh’eetions to the circuit court to give judgment for the plaintiffs for the relief demanded in the complaint.
Order entered May 9, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00040-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.P. AND S.P., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-20-04783

ORDER

We REINSTATE this appeal.

As directed by this Court, the trial court conducted a hearing and signed an 

order on appellant’s Rule 306a motion finding that appellant or his counsel first 

either received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the judgment on November 

19, 2021. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5); TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(c). In light of the trial 

court’s finding, appellant’s notice of appeal filed on December 10, 2021 was 

timely. Accordingly, we DENY appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file 

his notice of appeal as moot.

Because the clerk’s and reporter’s records have been filed, appellant shall

file his brief on the merits within thirty days of the date of this order.

/s/ KEN MOLBERG

JUSTICE