* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 95-50762

(Summary Calendar)

_______________

FREDERICK GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROUND ROCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

DISTRICT, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ROUND ROCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(A-95-CV-424)

_______________________________________________

March 7, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Frederick Griffin appeals the district court's judgment

dismissing his civil rights action with prejudice. We affirm.

I

Round Rock Independent School District ("RRISD") is a public

school district. The Director of Staffing at RRISD reviews each
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application for a teaching position and selects applicants to be

interviewed at the central office. Following the interview, the

interviewer evaluates the applicant and submits the results to a

data bank, which is periodically updated. Thereafter, certain

applicants are called back to be interviewed by a campus

administrator for a specific position, and the campus administrator

then makes a recommendation to the Personnel Office regarding

filling the vacant position.

Griffin applied to RRISD for a mathematics teaching position

in July 1991 and was interviewed the following month by the

Director of Staffing. Griffin was not called back to interview for

a specific position and was not hired for the 1991-92 school year

or for any subsequent school year. His application, however,

remained in "active" status in RRISD's data bank, and in the

following years he was requested by letter to update his

information. In October 1992, Griffin drafted a complaint to the

Texas Commissioner of Education, alleging race discrimination by

RRISD, but did not mail the letter until almost a year later. In

July 1995, Griffin filed a pro se action against RRISD, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"), alleging that

RRISD discriminated against him in its hiring on the basis of race.

Acting on a motion to dismiss brought by RRISD, the district court

concluded that Griffin's action was barred by the statute of

limitations and dismissed all of his claims with prejudice.

Griffin filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II
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Griffin contends that the district court erred in granting

RRISD's motion to dismiss. We review a district court's Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Robertson v. Plano City of Texas, 70

F.3d 21, 23 (5th Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

appropriate if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). We will affirm

the dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would

entitle him to relief. Robertson, 70 F.3d at 23. We take as true

the facts alleged in the complaint, but we cannot assume facts not

alleged. Id.

The district court concluded on the basis of Griffin's October

1992 letter to the Commissioner of Education that his claim was

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For actions

brought under § 1983 and Title VI, we borrow the forum state's

general personal injury limitations period, which in Texas is two

years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. § 16.003; see Ali v. Higgs, 892

F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying two-year statute of

limitations to § 1983 action); Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d

1514, 1521 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's

determination that Title VI action was barred by two year statute

of limitations).

In cases alleging discriminatory failure to hire, the filing

period begins to run when "facts supportive of a Title VII charge

or civil rights action are or should be apparent to a reasonably

prudent person similarly situated, . . . or upon the happening of
 

1 Griffin argues that the limitations period did not begin to run until

he actually sent the letter in August 1993. Our focus, however, is on the time

at which when Griffin knew about the facts underlying his alleged discrimination,

not on when he chose to make a formal complaint. Nilsen, 621 F.2d at 121.

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events which, in fairness and logic, should have alerted the

average lay person to act to protect his rights, or when he should

have perceived that discrimination was occurring." Nilsen v. City

of Moss Point, 621 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Griffin's October 1992 letter

to the Commissioner of Education clearly establishes that Griffin

at that time believed that he was not hired by RRISD on account of

his race.1 We therefore conclude that the applicable statute of

limitations began to run at that time, and expired in October 1994,

some nine months before Griffin filed his suit in district court.

Griffin contends that the district court erred in applying the

statute of limitations to bar his claim because he is alleging a

"continuing violation." Griffin argues that the discrimination

against him was an ongoing matter because he was not hired in any

of the subsequent years, even though his application remained

active in the RRISD data bank. Although we have not formulated a

consistent standard for determining when a continuing violation

exists, "the core idea is that equitable considerations may require

an extension of the filing period when supportive facts exist."

Frazier, 980 F.2d at 1521; see also Abrams v. Baylor College of

Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Where the unlawful

employment practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a

series of discrete acts, the violation may be found to be a
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continuing one that relieves a plaintiff who makes such a claim

from the burden of proving that the entire violation occurred

within the actionable period.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Griffin has not asserted any facts which suggest that the alleged

discrimination was hidden or was not apparent to a reasonably

prudent person similarly situated. We therefore conclude that

there are no equitable considerations in this case to support the

extension of the Texas two-year limitations period. See Dumas v.

Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1980)

(rejecting plaintiff's argument that discrimination was a

"continuing violation" where plaintiff's name remained on the

employment register of eligible candidates, and concluding that

statute of limitations began to run at the time plaintiff wrote

letter reflecting her belief she was the victim of race

discrimination).

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's

dismissal of Griffin's claims with prejudice.