This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A16-0573 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Jerry Lee Collins, 

Appellant. 

Filed December 5, 2016 

Affirmed 

Cleary, Chief Judge 

Polk County District Court 

File No. 60-CR-15-610 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney, 

Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and 

Ross, Judge. 

 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

CLEARY, Chief Judge 

 On appeal from a sentencing order, appellant Jerry Lee Collins challenges the 

district court’s denial of his motion for a downward dispositional departure. Because we 

conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm. 

FACTS 

 On April 11, 2015, appellant was involved in an altercation with his adult son L.W. 

at appellant’s apartment. Upon arrival, police spoke with L.W. and observed a straight, 

three-inch laceration on L.W.’s neck that was bleeding slightly. L.W. appeared moderately 

intoxicated and smelled of alcohol. Appellant also appeared intoxicated and told police 

that L.W. struck him in the face, destroyed his property, and walked into a knife. Appellant 

reported no injuries. After appellant showed police where the knife was located, police 

arrested him. 

 The next day, an officer interviewed appellant in jail. Appellant said that he had a 

folding knife out and open and believed that L.W. walked into it. Police again spoke with 

L.W., who said that appellant put the knife to his neck and then said, “See what I can do to 

you.” L.W. said that appellant had threatened to kill him and would not allow him to leave 

the apartment. 

 Appellant was charged with assault in the second degree while using a dangerous 

weapon in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014), and with terroristic threats in 

violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2014). Appellant pleaded guilty to the second-
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degree assault charge in exchange for the dismissal of the terroristic-threats charge. Under 

the plea agreement, both parties were free to present argument about the appropriate 

sentence. 

 Prior to sentencing, probation completed a presentence investigation (PSI), which 

revealed that appellant had several violent felonies dating back to 1993 and a number of 

past misdemeanors on his criminal record. The PSI report showed that appellant had 

violated the terms of his probation in 1996 and 2007 for underlying felonies, resulting in 

executed sentences, and had also violated his probation in 2003 for a misdemeanor. At the 

time of the offense, appellant was under a probationary supervision term stemming from a 

2011 conviction for failing to register as a predatory offender. The sentencing worksheet, 

which revealed that appellant had five criminal-history points, noted that the presumptive 

sentence was 51 months in prison. 

 Appellant moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that he was 

particularly amenable to probation. Probation recommended the guidelines executed 

sentence and noted that while appellant was doing well on supervision until the April 2015 

offense, he did not show remorse for the actions at issue. 

 At sentencing, appellant was heard on his motion. The state opposed the departure 

motion, arguing that appellant was not amenable to probation because he had a criminal 

history going back 20 years, which included violent offenses, and because he had violated 

probation in the past. 
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 After considering appellant’s motion, the state’s response, and reading a letter from 

appellant addressed to the court, the district court told appellant, “I cannot find any 

substantial and compelling reason under the law for a dispositional departure in your case, 

and I cannot find under the law that you’re particularly amenable to probation, as required, 

based upon not only the facts of this case but upon your significant criminal history.” The 

district court sentenced appellant to a 51-month prison term. Appellant now appeals. 

D E C I S I O N 

 Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion 

for a downward dispositional departure. Appellate courts give district courts great 

discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). “[I]t would be a rare 

case which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 

6, 7 (Minn. 1981). 

 District courts must pronounce the presumptive “sentence within the applicable 

range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances” that 

distinguish the case and overcome the presumption in favor of the guidelines sentence. 

Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2014); Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308. A defendant’s particular 

amenability to probation is a valid reason to depart dispositionally from an executed 

sentence to a stayed sentence. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). “Numerous 

factors, including the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his 

attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family, are relevant to a 
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determination whether a defendant is particularly suitable to individualized treatment in a 

probationary setting.” Id. Even where circumstances exist to depart, a district court is not 

obligated to grant a departure motion. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). 

A district court, though, is required to exercise its discretion “by deliberately considering 

circumstances for and against departure.” State v. Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. 

App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002). 

 Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to depart 

because there was evidence of a particular amenability to probation—mainly, appellant had 

significant chemical and mental health needs, he had been accepted into a chemicaldependency treatment program, and he had a good attitude towards treatment and 

rehabilitation. Appellant also argued to the district court that he was remorseful, dedicated 

to changing, and was successful on probation up until the current offense. 

 However, the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does 

not obligate a district court to depart or impose a shorter sentence or probation instead of a 

presumptive sentence. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011). 

 Here, the district court noted on the record that it considered appellant’s written 

motion and the PSI report. The district court also heard appellant’s arguments in open 

court and read appellant’s letter to the court, in which he asked for a chance to attend 

chemical-dependency treatment. After considering appellant’s motion and the state’s 

response, the district court could not find any substantial and compelling reasons under the 

law to depart and agreed with the state that appellant was not particularly amenable to 
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probation because of his criminal history. Because the district court deliberately 

considered circumstances for and against departure, it properly exercised its discretion in 

refusing to depart from the presumptive sentence. 

Affirmed.