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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

MICHAEL B. STAHLEY :

APPELLANT :

:

: No. 632 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 4, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000910-2004

 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016

Appellant, Michael B. Stahley, appeals from the April 4. 2016 Order 

dismissing his amended Petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA),42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

A jury found Appellant guilty of forcible rape, involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse, simple assault, burglary, terroristic threats, and theft 

arising from a break-in and sexual assault that occurred on or about May 21, 

2004. On October 2, 2006, the trial court adjudicated Appellant a sexually 

violent predator (“SVP”), and imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-two 

and one-half years’ to forty-seven and one-half years’ imprisonment. This 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Court affirmed Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence. Commonwealth v. 

Stahley, 965 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum). The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal on May 2, 2011. Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence became final, 

therefore, on August 1, 2011. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 

1196, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also US. Sup. Ct. R. 13. 

On March 20, 2009, while Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

was pending in the Supreme Court, Appellant filed his first PCRA Petition. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant relief and 

dismissed Appellant’s Petition. Appellant timely appealed from the order 

denying his PCRA Petition, and this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. 

Stahley, 15 A.3d 535 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum). 

On March 4, 2016, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA Petition. On 

March 9, 2016, the PCRA court issued an Order and Notice of Intent to 

dismiss Appellant’s PCRA Petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907, concluding that Appellant’s Petition was untimely filed and Appellant 

had failed to plead and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s 

time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

On March 23, 2016, Appellant filed an Answer to the Notice of Intent 

to dismiss his PCRA Petition. On April 4, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s petition. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the 

PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court err when it dismissed the PCRA when 

the right asserted is a Constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that Court to 

apply retroactively. The Supreme Court of the United 

States or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has 

recognized the following retroactive Constitutional rights 

after my period for filing: The mandatory sentence is 

unconstitutional as per Supreme court of Pa. The Superior 

court also states that cases under 42 Pa.C.S. 9718 is 

unconstitutional. Based on United States Supreme Court 

decision on the mandatory sentences contained in section 

9718 is unconstitutional. Mandatory minimum Sentencing 

statutes in Pa. containing the language appearing in 

section 9718 (c) “are void in their entirely”.

2. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 9545 (b) and that it does not 

meet any of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements. 

Because of an illegal sentence “is primarily restricted to 

those instances in which the term of the prisoner’s 

sentence is not authorized by the statutes which govern 

the penalty” for the crime of conviction. Collateral relief 

courts will, however, consider a motion to correct an illegal 

sentence based on a decision of the court holding that the 

eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibits a 

punishment for a type of crime or a class of offenders. 

The defendant had been prosecuted was unconstitutional 

or because the sentence was one the Court could not 

lawfully impose. “A conviction or sentence imposed in 

violation of a substantive rule is not just erroneous but 

contrary to law and, as a result, void. But a majority of 

this court, eager to reach the Merits of this case, resolves 

the question of our jurisdiction by deciding that the 

Constitution requires State Post-Conviction Courts to adopt 

Teague’s exception for so-called “substantive” NEW RULES 

and to provide State law remedies for The violations of 

those rules to prisoners whose sentences have long ago 

became final. This conscription into Federal service of 

State Post-Conviction Courts is nothing short of 

astonishing.
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Appellant’s Brief at 1 (verbatim).

We note at the outset that Appellant’s Brief is, at best, confusing, and, 

at worst, incomprehensible. However, it appears that Appellant is 

essentially arguing that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his Petition as 

untimely because he is serving an illegal mandatory minimum sentence. Id.

at 6-7. 

We review the denial of a PCRA Petition to determine whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its Order is otherwise 

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 

2014). Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, however, we 

must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the 

underlying PCRA Petition. No court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely 

PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 983 (Pa. 2008).

Appellant attempts to invoke our jurisdiction by averring that he is 

entitled to relief under the PCRA as a result of the constitutional right 

recognized in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 2164 

(2013), and its progeny. This claim fails.

A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the 

underlying judgment becomes final; a judgment is deemed final at the 

conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), (3). The statutory exceptions to the timeliness 
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requirement allow for very limited circumstances to excuse the late filing of 

a petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

Here, Appellant appears to be invoking the timeliness exception found 

in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant’s Brief at 7. In order to obtain relief 

under this subsection, a petitioner must plead and prove that “the right 

asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court 

of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). A petitioner asserting a 

timeliness exception must file a petition within 60 days of the date the claim 

could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

With respect to Appellant’s claim on appeal the trial court opined as 

follows:

Here, [Appellant] alleges that his sentence is

unconstitutional pursuant to the Pennsylvania Superior 

Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wolfe, wherein the 

Court held that mandatory sentences imposed pursuant to 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1) are unconstitutional and not 

severable in light of [Alleyne, supra]. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 

800, 806 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal granted, 121 A.3d 433 

(Pa. 2015). Accordingly [Appellant] attacks the 

constitutionality of his sentence under the third PCRA time 

bar exception. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

[Appellant’s] argument fails on a number of fronts. 

Initially, even if this [c]ourt were to determine that 

Alleyne created a new constitutional right, and therefore 

implicate[s] one of the exceptions to the PCRA time bar, 

the Superior Court has unequivocally held that Alleyne
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does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral 

review.[1] See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 

995-96 (Pa. Super. 2014). As [Appellant’s] judgment 

became final well before Alleyne was decided, this 

argument is meritless and this [c]ourt lacks jurisdiction to 

consider [Appellant’s] instant Petition. See 

Commonwealth v. Hall, [771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001).]

Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) requires defendant’s 

[sic] to file a PCRA [P]etition within sixty (60) days of the 

date the claim could have been presented. Alleyne was 

decided on June 17, 2013, more than two and one half 

years before [Appellant] filed the instant PCRA Petition. 

Wolfe was decided on December 24, 2014, almost one 

and one half years before [Appellant] filed the instant 

PCRA Petition. Accordingly, even if Alleyne did create a 

new constitutional right and it was determined to apply 

retroactively, [Appellant’s] instant petition is untimely 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Finally, [Appellant] alleges that he was sentenced under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1) which concerns offenses against 

infant persons. [Appellant] is wrong. The victim in the 

underlying case was thirty (30) years-old at the time the 

offense was committed. See Motion for PCRA Restoration 

of Appeal Rights, ¶ 18(a), 9/17/07. [Appellant] was not 

sentenced under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1), and no mention 

of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1) exists in the record. As such, 

even if the instant PCRA [Petition] satisfied the 

aforementioned requirements, [Appellant’s] argument fails 

on substantive grounds.

PCRA Opinion, 6/6/16, at 4-5 (unpaginated, footnotes omitted).

We agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant’s instant 

PCRA petition was patently untimely and that he failed to prove the 

applicability of any of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions. Therefore, the PCRA 

 

1 Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explicitly held that Alleyne

does not apply retroactively on collateral review. Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016).
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court lacked jurisdiction to address his claims and properly dismissed his 

Petition seeking relief under Alleyne. Furthermore, our review of the record 

confirms that Appellant was not sentenced under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718. 

Accordingly, even if he had timely filed his PCRA Petition, we agree with the 

PCRA court that he would likewise not be entitled to relief on substantive 

grounds. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2016