alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7108
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ROGER DEWITT PRINCE, a/k/a Bill Prince, a/k/a Ike Davis, Defendant - Appellant, and DON PRINCE, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofSouth Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-96-122) Submitted: May 17, 2001 Decided: May 22, 2001 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.2 Roger DeWitt Prince, Appellant Pro Se. Scarlett Anne Wilson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Roger DeWitt Prince appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a new trial. We have reviewed the record and thedistrict court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Prince , No. CR-96-122 (D.S.C. July 20, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

___________________________

No. 97-60436

___________________________

ANNIE LEE BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

KENNETH S. APFEL,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

___________________________________________________ January 6, 1999

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Annie Lee Brown was denied widow's Social S ecurity benefits

administratively and this denial was affirmed by the district

court. The Commissioner denied benefits based on a determination

that, under Mississippi law, Annie Lee Brown was never legally

married to Amos Brown because Amos Brown had been previously

married to Curly Mae Brown and their marriage was never terminated

by divorce, annulment, or death.

The issue on appeal is whether the S ocial Security

Administration satisfied the strenuous proof Mississippi requires

to establish the invalidity of a second marriage.

Under Mississippi law, a subsequent marriage raises a strong2

presumption that the former marriage has been terminated by divorce

or death of the previous spouse. S ee, e. g., Erwin v. Hodge , 317

So. 2d 55, 57 (Miss . 1975) (presumption is “one of the strongest

known to the law”). In order to rebut this strong presumption, a

party challenging the validity of a second marriage must “show

where each party to the prior marriage had resided up to the time

of the second marriage, and then [] procure from the clerk of the

proper court in each such county a certificate of search showing

that no divorce or annulment had been granted by the court of which

he is clerk.” Pigford Bros. Construction Co. v. Evans , 83 So. 2d

622, 625 (Miss. 1955); see also Smith v. Weir

, 387 So. 2d 761, 764

(Miss. 1980); Erwin , 317 So. 2d at 57.

In the administrative hearing, the Social Security

A dministration did not present records from all the counties in

which Amos and Curly Mae Brown lived subsequent to their marriage

and prior to the marriage of Amos and Annie Lee Brown.

Specifically, they did not present records from Cook County,

Illinois and LeFlore C ounty, Mississippi. Therefore, under

Mississippi law, the presumption in favor of the se cond marriage

was not rebutted. The district court therefore erred in affirming

the Commissioner's determination that Annie Lee Brown's marriage to

Amos Brown was a nullity.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is

remanded to the Commissioner with directions to recognize Appellant

Annie Lee Brown as the surviving widow of Amos Brown and to pay

benefits accordingly.3

REVERSED and REMANDED.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3144

_____________________________

AKEEM WILLIAM DAVID 

JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

James M. Colaw, Judge.

May 17, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of two counts of resisting an officer 

without violence after he ran from officers, fell to the ground 

almost immediately, and continued to resist while on the ground 

until he was restrained and loaded into a patrol car. The entire 

encounter took twenty to thirty seconds. Because this incident 

amounts to one criminal episode and one criminal act, the dual 

convictions for resisting an officer without violence are a double 

jeopardy violation. See R.J.R. v. State, 88 So. 3d 264, 267 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2012) (“Florida courts have consistently held that a 

continuous resistance to an ongoing attempt to effectuate a 

person’s arrest or detainment constitutes only one single instance 

of resisting an officer.”); Williams v. State, 959 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. 
2

2d DCA 2007) (“When considering the issue of what constitutes a 

criminal episode in the context of resisting charges, courts have 

held that a defendant’s continuous resistance to a single ongoing 

attempt to effectuate his arrest constitutes a single episode of 

resisting.”). The remedy is to “reverse and remand for the trial 

court to vacate one of the convictions for resisting arrest without 

violence.” See Fogle v. State, 754 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2000).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROWE, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, 

Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, 

Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES−OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Roomlinx, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10−K for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael S. Wasik, Chief Executive Officer, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the SARBANES−OXLEY Act of 2002, that:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition and consolidated results of operation of the Company.




Date:
03/25/10
 By:
/s/Michael S. WasikMichael S. WasikChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
**EXHIBIT 21.1**

| **SUBSIDIARIES OF deCODE genetics, Inc.**                                                                                                  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Islensk erfdagreining  ehf., an Icelandic private limited company (English name: deCODE genetics  ehf.)                                      |
| 2. MediChem Life  Sciences, Inc., a Delaware corporation                                                                                   |
| **SUBSIDIARIES OF ISLENSK  ERFDAGREINING EHF.**                                                                                                 |
| 1. Islenskar  lyfjarannsoknir ehf., an Icelandic private limited company (English name:  Encode ehf.)                                           |
| 2. Islenskar  krabbameinsrannsoknir ehf., an Icelandic private limited company (English  name: deCODE Cancer ehf.)                              |
| 3. Vetrargardurinn ehf.,  an Icelandic private limited company (formerly known as Sturlugata 8 ehf.)  (merged with IE as of 31 March 2005) |
| 4. UVS—Urdur, Verdandi,  Skuld ehf.—an Icelandic private limited company (acquired in  January 2006)                             |
| **SUBSIDIARIES OF MEDICHEM LIFE  SCIENCES, INC.**                                                                                          |
| 1. deCODE biostructures, Inc.,  a Washington corporation                                                                                   |
| 2. ThermoGen, Inc.,  an Illinois corporation                                                                                               |
| 3. Emerald  BioSystems, Inc., a Delaware corporation                                                                                       |
| 4. deCODE  Chemistry, Inc., an Illinois corporation                                                                                        |
| 5. MediChem  Management, Inc., a Delaware corporation                                                                                      |

 

----
EX-4.34



 Exhibit 4.34 
 EQUITY INTEREST TRANSFER AGREEMENT 
 This transfer agreement (the
“Agreement”) is made and entered into on February 10, 2012 (the “Effective Date”) in Shanghai by and between the following two parties: 
 Transferor (the “Party A”): Shanghai Zhengduo Information Technology Co., Ltd 

Registered Place of Business: Room 1006, No.165, Caoxi Road, Shanghai, the People’s Republic of China 

Transferee (the “Party B”): Shanghai Giant Network Technology Co., Ltd 
 Registered Place of Business: Room 708, Building No.29, No. 396, Guilin Road, Shanghai, the People’s Republic of China 
 RECITALS 
 WHEREAS, the registered capital of Shanghai Juxian Network Technology
Co., Ltd. (the “Target Company”) is five million RMB, among which 2.04 million RMB was contributed by Party A that accounts for 40.8% of the entire registered capital. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of relevant laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China, and of the mutual covenants and agreements hereinafter set forth based on the principles of
equity, good faith, open, fair and impartial, the parties agree as follows: 
  

	1.	SUBJECT MATTER AND PRICE 

  

	1.1	Party A agree to transfer the 40.8% equity interest it held in the Target Company to Party B for the price of 2.04 million RMB. 


 

	1.2	Other interest collateral to the equity interest shall be transferred with the equity interest. 


 

	1.3	The Transferee should pay off the entire purchase price of the equity interest to the Transferor within five days from the date of signing of this Agreement.


  

	2.	PROMISES AND WARRANTIES 


Party A promises that the equity interest it transferred to Party B under Article 1 of this Agreement was legally owned by it, and Party A
has completed and effectual right of disposition on the equity interest. Party A also ensures that there are no mortgages, other rights of security or third-party right of recourse on the transferred equity interest. 

  
 1 









	3.	LIABILITIES FOR BREACH 


The defaulting party shall reimburse the damages of the other party. 

 

	4.	RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 


This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China. 

If any dispute shall arise in connection with this Agreement, the parties may solve the disputes by good faith negotiations. If the
dispute cannot be resolved through good faith negotiations, either party may submit the dispute to be resolved by the People’s Court of Shanghai Xuhui District. 
  

	5.	MISCELLANEOUS 

  

	5.1.	This Agreement is made in four counterparts. Each party of this Agreement has one counterpart and the Target Company holds two counterparts that shall be used during
relevant procedures. 

  

	5.2.	This Agreement shall take effect upon seal by both parties. 

  

			
	 PARTY A (SEAL): SHANGHAI ZHENGDUO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD

	
	 PARTY B (SEAL): SHANGHAI GIANT NETWORK TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD

		
	DATE:	 	February 10, 2012


  
 2
#### McKeown Estate

*Joseph Colavecchi,*for petitioner.

*Clarence R. Kramer,*for respondent.

November 30, 1977

REILLY, *P.J.,*

Mabel A. McKeown died intestate on September 28, 1975, and at the date of her death, she was the owner of a tract of real estate in Bell Township, Clearfield County, Pa. On October 29, 1975, Thomas E. McKeown, widower of Mabel A. McKeown, deeded to one Frank Kleboff his one-third interest in said real estate under the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code of June 30, 1972, P. L. 508, 20 Pa. C. S. A. §2101 et seq., said deed being recorded on November 18, 1975. James E. Freeman was granted letters of administration on December 8, 1975, and this matter is before the court upon his petition to set aside the conveyance from Thomas E. McKeown to Frank Kleboff.

Petitioner cites the Act of June 30, 1972, P. L. 508, sec. 2, effective July 1, 1972, 20 Pa. C. S. A. §3311, which states as follows:

“A personal representative shall have the right to and shall take possession of, maintain and administer all the real and personal estate of the de*116cedent, except real estate occupied at the time of death by an heir or devisee with the consent of the decedent.”

Since in this case the real estate was not occupied at the time of death by an heir or devisee, James E. Freeman claims that the purported sale from Thomas E. McKeown to Frank Kleboff should be set aside and that petitioner, as administrator of the estate, should take possession of the real estate. Petitioner further relies on the list of inventory and debts filed to the estate which indicates that without the inclusion of said real property there are insufficient assets in the estate with which to pay its debts.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Brose Estate, 423 Pa. 420, 223 A.2d 661 (1966), on a different factual basis, stated as follows:

“Under §501 of the Fiduciaries Act, April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, as amended, 20 P. S. 320.501, the personal representative of an estate has the right and responsibility to take possession of and administer all the real and personal estate of the decedent ...”

The act cited by the Supreme Court above was the forerunner of the current act quoted by this court and relied upon by petitioner. The Supreme Court went on to state in the above case:

“Finally, and not least important, it would constitute an unwise precedent to permit an individual to retain possession of an asset of an estate when the personal representative is charged with the responsibility of possessing and administering such asset, merely because that individual is, or may be, entitled to subsequently share in the distribution of the estate. The inherent dangers are self-evident.”

*117It appears to this court that the personal representative in this case had not only the right but the duty to take possession of the real estate involved, and, therefore, this court entered its order setting aside the sale and directing the real estate to be included in the inventory of the estate.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-15-00150-CR

Billy BENAVIDEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 229th Judicial District Court, Duval County, Texas

Trial Court No. 09-CRD-122

Honorable J. Manuel Banales, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI, JUSTICE BARNARD, AND JUSTICE MARTINEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED.

SIGNED December 7, 2016.

_____________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
1

Schaffner, Karen S.

From: Schaffner, Karen S.

Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 4:03 PM

To: 'Celia.Chu@tpcgrp.com'; 'Kelly.Nidini@tpcgrp.com'; 'Marise.Textor@tpcgrp.com'

Cc: Shedd.Steve@epamail.epa.gov

Subject: RTR MVL: review of TPC revised coordinates and responses

Attachments: TPC_corrected_latlong_Image2.jpg

Hi Celia, Kelly, and Marise: Thank you so much for your input on the 2005 NEI data set. I have one additional question 

and a few notes to share with you. 

A. Based on the revised coordinates sent on 17 Dec 2010, there are a few points that seem to be outside the 

facility boundary. See the attached map. I may have the facility boundary drawn incorrectly. 

a. There is one point outside the boundary at the bottom of the map. Please confirm whether the facility

boundary, as marked in yellow, is correct or whether it should be extended downward on the map to 

include the point just outside the facility boundary. 

b. Please confirm the point out to the left on the map; are the coordinates correct for this point, and it is 

truly part of the facility? 

B. Revisions made by KS: 

a. I revised the MACT_Code field for 3 MVL records from “1501” (for HON) to “0603” for MVL. I left the 1

record for Methanol unloading as MACT_Code 1501. 

b. I revised the records that were noted as duplicate records by marking to delete (Emission_Unit 0158 

with HAP 1,3-Butadiene and MTBE). 

C. With respect to item 9 from my 15 Nov 2010 email, for Emission_Unit 0066, I saw differing stack parameters for 

1 record (Emission_Unit 0066) from the June 2010 file we sent to TPC when compared to the 12 Oct 2010 file 

TPC sent. 

19June2010: Stack Ht (50); Exit gas T (833); Stack Diameter (3.599); Exit gas velocity (3.5385); Gas flow (36) 

12Oct2010: Stack Ht (50); Exit gas T (279); Stack Diameter (4.388); Exit gas velocity (65.6); Gas flow (993.2699) 

D. For Butadiene emissions from Emission_Release_Point_ID 0166, your note indicated emissions would be a 

“small number”; assumed 10 percent of the 2005 value, so included a 2009 value of 1.34 tpy 1,3-Butadiene for 

this emission source. 

If you could respond to item A as soon as you can, that would be great. Thank you, Karen 

Karen Schaffner

Air Quality Engineering Group

RTI International

3040 Cornwallis Rd (800 Park, C311)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

phone: (919) 316 3740

fax: (919) 541 7155
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-16-00140-CR

Matthew David LEAL,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 2, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 492801

Honorable Jason Wolff, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE BARNARD, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE PULLIAM

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed.

SIGNED December 7, 2016.

_____________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice
---

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Planton Tzouvalis, hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. | the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Acrongenomics Inc.
      for the period ended September 30, 2010 (the Report) fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934; and
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
|2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of Acrongenomics Inc.                                                                     

Date: November 17, 2010

| | /s/ Platon Tzouvalis         
| | -----------------------------
| | Platon Tzouvalis             
| | President and Director       
| | (Principal Executive Officer)

---
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of iVoice, Inc. (the “Company”), on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certify, pursuant  to and solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Date: August 12, 2010





By:  /s/ Jerome R Mahoney


Jerome R Mahoney


President, Chief Executive Officer and


Principal Financial Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40436

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE ARREDONDO-MUNOZ, also known as Jesus Arredondo-Munoz,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:15-CR-64-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jose ArredondoMunoz has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Arredondo-Munoz has not filed a response. We have 

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected 

therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 7, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-40436 Document: 00513788722 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/07/2016
No. 16-40436

2

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave 

to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities 

herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 16-40436 Document: 00513788722 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/07/2016