IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 339A19

Filed 11 December 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: D.M., M.M., D.M.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) and on writ of certiorari 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review orders entered on 15 April 2019 and 18 

June 2019 by Judge Shamieka L. Rhinehart in District Court, Durham County. This 

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 2020,

but was determined upon the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to 

Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee for petitioner-appellee Durham County Department 

of Social Services; and William A. Blancato for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Sean P. Vitrano for respondent-appellant father.

Christopher M. Watford for respondent-appellant mother.

ERVIN, Justice.

Respondent-father Marcus B. and respondent-mother Danita M. appeal from 

orders entered by the trial court terminating their parental rights in their minor 

children D.M., M.M., and D.M.1 After careful consideration of the arguments that 

 

1 D.M., M.M., and D.M. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion 

as, respectively, “David,” “Michael,” and “Danielle,” which are pseudonyms used to protect 

the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading.
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have been advanced in the parents’ briefs in light of the record and the applicable 

law, we affirm the trial court’s termination orders.

I. Factual Background

On 25 August 2015, the Durham County Department of Social Services filed a 

petition alleging that David and Michael were neglected juveniles. In its petition, 

DSS alleged that, from 22 May 2014 to 24 June 2015, the family had received in-home 

services that were intended to address the parents’ problems with domestic violence 

and substance abuse. However, respondent-father failed to engage in services that 

were intended to address issues relating to domestic violence, mental health, or 

substance abuse during this time. Although the last documented incident of domestic 

violence involving the parents had occurred on 18 January 2015, a social worker 

observed “aggressive, controlling speech” that respondent-father had directed toward

respondent-mother on three separate occasions between 6 July 2015 and 14 August 

2015.

DSS further alleged that, on 5 July 2015, it had received a new report that the 

parents had left David and Michael, who were three and one years old, respectively,

at the time, in the family home by themselves. According to DSS, the family home

was “regularly filthy, cluttered, and unsanitary with open garbage and roaches on 

the floor.” Respondent-mother told representatives of DSS that she absented herself 

from the home every evening until it became time for the children to go to bed because 

respondent-father would drink alcohol, become confrontational, and act in a verbally 
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aggressive manner. Although respondent-mother was five months pregnant with her 

eleventh child, she admitted to DSS representatives that she had smoked marijuana

until relatively recently. On 14 August 2015, respondent-mother left the family home 

with David and Michael and entered a domestic violence shelter.

On 22 October 2015, Judge William A. Marsh, III, entered an order 

determining that David and Michael were neglected juveniles in that they “are not 

receiving proper care or supervision or live in an environment injurious to their 

welfare.” Judge Marsh ordered that David and Michael remain in respondentmother’s custody on the condition that she provide them with a safe and stable living

environment and abstain from being with respondent-father in the presence of the 

children. In addition, Judge Marsh prohibited the parents from residing together 

with the children. As a precondition for allowing the parents to reunify with the 

children, Judge Marsh ordered respondent-mother to ensure that the children were

properly supervised at all times; to participate in and complete domestic violence 

services and follow all recommendations; refrain from engaging in physical 

altercations with respondent-father; actively participate in mental health and 

substance abuse services and comply with all resulting recommendations; submit to 

random drug screens; complete a parenting program; and obtain and maintain safe 

and stable housing. Similarly, Judge Marsh ordered respondent-father to ascertain 

the amount of child support that he should be required to pay through the IV-D

program; ensure that the children were properly supervised at all times; participate 
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and complete anger management services through the Duke Addictions program; 

refrain from engaging in physical altercations with respondent-mother; comply with 

all substance abuse and mental health recommendations that he received from Duke 

Addictions; submit to random alcohol screens; complete a parenting program; and 

obtain and maintain gainful employment or some other lawful source of income.

On 8 December 2015, respondent-mother gave birth to Danielle. On 6 July 

2016, respondent-mother was arrested and charged with driving while impaired. As 

a result, David and Michael were placed in the temporary legal custody of respondentfather by consent on 13 July 2016.

On 20 September 2016, DSS filed a petition alleging that Danielle was a 

neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained the entry of an order placing David, 

Michael, and Danielle in nonsecure custody. In its petition, DSS alleged that, on the 

evening of 19 September 2016, the parents had been drinking and began arguing. At 

6:00 a.m., respondent-father awoke and could not locate David and Michael. After 

law enforcement officers had been notified, David and Michael were found at the 

home of an individual who had been authorized to supervise respondent-mother’s 

visits with the children and who reported that she had “heard something at the door”; 

that “it was the children trying to get in”; that, upon opening the door, she saw “a 

small red car drive away;” and that, while she could not identify the vehicle’s driver,

“[respondent-mother] is known to drive a small red car.” At the time that the parents
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arrived at the police station, they were observed to be under the influence of an 

impairing substance and placed under arrest.

The issues raised in the 20 September 2016 petition came on for hearing before 

Judge Marsh on 10 November 2016. On 10 November 2016, Judge Marsh entered an 

order determining that Danielle was a neglected and dependent juvenile. In addition, 

Judge Marsh found that the parents had completed a parenting program, that

respondent-mother was not currently engaged in substance abuse and mental health 

treatment, and that respondent-father needed to engage in substance abuse 

treatment. As a precondition for allowing the parents to reunify with Danielle, the 

trial court ordered respondent-mother to resume her participation in mental health 

therapy; ensure that Danielle was properly supervised at all times; refrain from

engaging in physical altercations with respondent-father; actively engage in mental 

health and substance abuse services and follow any resulting recommendations; 

submit to random drug screens; maintain safe and stable housing; and participate in

supervised visitation with Danielle. Similarly respondent-father was ordered to 

ensure that Danielle was properly supervised at all times; refrain from engaging in

physical altercations with respondent-mother; maintain gainful employment or some 

other source of lawful income; maintain stable housing; refrain from the use of

impairing substances; and complete services with Duke Addictions.

After a permanency planning hearing held on 2 February 2018 and 27 March 

2018, the trial court entered an order on 5 June 2018. In its order, the trial court 
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found that respondent-mother had completed active parenting and anger 

management classes in September 2017 and that respondent-mother had been

referred to a family violence case manager with DSS on 6 September 2017, had been

referred for domestic violence counseling, and was awaiting the assignment of a 

counselor. The trial court further found that respondent-mother had begun

participating in Vision’s Substance Abuse Comprehensive Outpatient Treatment on

31 October 2016 and that, after several negative urine screens, it had been

determined that respondent-mother no longer needed these services. In addition, the 

trial court found that respondent-mother had been referred to Carolina Outreach on 

9 November 2017 with a recommendation that she begin weekly occupational therapy 

and medication management. However, respondent-mother had only attended three 

therapy sessions since January 2018 and was not consistently engaged in the

medication management process. In view of the fact that respondent-mother was 

participating in substance abuse services at Visions, DSS had not received random 

drug screening information and had referred respondent-mother to Duke Family 

Care for that purpose. On 26 March 2018, respondent-mother had begun full-time

employment as a housekeeper at a hotel. Finally, the trial court found that it was 

not possible for the children to be returned to respondent-mother in the near future

because she was still engaged in mental health treatment and attempting to secure 

stable housing and employment.
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In the same order, the trial court found that respondent-father had been

working three days a week at a Bojangles restaurant and was earning a weekly 

amount of $200 in addition to the $1,060 in Supplemental Security Income that he 

received each month. Although respondent-father had been participating in the 

Substance Abuse Comprehensive Outpatient Treatment program, Visions had

determined that he was no longer eligible to receive their services for insurancerelated reasons in November 2017. In addition, even though respondent-father had 

been referred to B & D Integrated Solutions, he had not been receiving services from 

that entity. Respondent-father had completed a domestic violence assessment and 

active parenting and anger management classes in September 2017. On the other 

hand, respondent-father had not been attending Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics 

Anonymous meetings. The trial court further found that it was not possible for the 

children to be returned to respondent-father because he had not been consistently 

participating in mental health treatment and lacked stable housing. In addition, the 

trial court expressed “uncertain[ty]” concerning the level of sobriety that respondentfather had achieved and maintained given that respondent-father had not 

participated in random drug screening. As a result, based upon all of these 

considerations, the trial court established a primary permanent plan for all three 

children of reunification, with a secondary permanent plan of adoption. After a 

permanency planning hearing held on 25 June 2018, the trial court entered an order
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instructing respondent-mother to present negative drug and alcohol screens and

requiring respondent-father to re-engage in substance abuse treatment.

On 20 June 2018, DSS filed a motion seeking to have the parents’ parental 

rights in the children terminated based upon neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1);

willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that had

led to the children’s removal from the family home, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and 

dependency, N.C.G.S. §. 7B-1111(a)(6). The termination petition came on for hearing

before the trial court in early 2019, with the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding 

having been conducted on 20 and 21 February 2019 and 20 and 21 March 2019 and 

with the dispositional phase of the proceeding having been conducted on 16 and 17 

April 2019. On 15 April 2019, the trial court entered an adjudication order 

determining that the parents’ parental rights were subject to termination on the basis 

of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 

conditions that had led to the children’s removal from the family home. On 18 June 

2019, the trial court entered a dispositional order concluding that termination of the 

parents’ parental rights would be in the children’s best interests and terminating the 

parents’ parental rights in the children. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).

The parents noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s termination

orders. On 22 November 2019, the trial court entered an order dismissing 

respondent-mother’s appeal on the grounds that she had failed to attach a certificate 

of service to her notice of appeal. On 11 December 2019, respondent-mother filed a 
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petition seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of the trial 

court’s termination orders on the merits. On 27 December 2019, this Court allowed 

respondent-mother’s certiorari petition.

II. Substantive Legal Analysis

In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination orders before this Court, the 

parents contend that the trial court erred by determining that their rights in the 

children were subject to termination for neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and willful 

failure to make reasonable progress, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). “[A]n adjudication of 

any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of 

parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2019). For that 

reason, we begin our analysis by considering whether the trial court erred by 

determining that the parents’ parental rights in the children were subject to 

termination for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

Termination of parental rights proceedings involve the use of a two-stage 

process. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, 1110 (2019). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 

bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence 

of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General 

Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1109(f) (2019)). “If [the trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed 

in [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111 are present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at 

which the court must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile[s] to 
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terminate parental rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 

(2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1110).

“This Court reviews a trial court’s adjudication decision pursuant to N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1109 ‘in order to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent 

and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law,’ with the 

trial court’s conclusions of law being subject to de novo review on appeal.” In re 

N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 74, 833 S.E.2d 768, 772 (2019) (citations omitted). “Findings of 

fact not challenged by respondent[s] are deemed supported by competent evidence 

and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) 

(citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)). “A trial 

court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is 

deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary 

finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379, 831 S.E.2d 305, 310 (2019) (citing In re 

Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 403−04, 293 S.E.2d 127, 132 (1982)).

“[A] trial judge may terminate a parent’s parental rights in a child in the event 

that it finds that the parent has neglected his or her child in such a way that the child 

has become a neglected juvenile as that term is defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101.” In re 

M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 869, 844 S.E.2d 916, 920 (2020) (citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)

(2019)). A neglected juvenile is “[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age . . . whose 
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parent . . . does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline” or “who lives in an 

environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).

“[I]n deciding whether a child is neglected for purposes of 

terminating parental rights, the dispositive question is the 

fitness of the parent to care for the child ‘at the time of the 

termination proceeding.’ ” In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426, 

435, 621 S.E.2d 236, 242 (2005) (quoting In re Ballard, 311 

N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984) (emphasis 

omitted)). In the event that “a child has not been in the 

custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior 

to the termination hearing, ‘requiring the petitioner in 

such circumstances to show that the child is currently 

neglected by the parent would make termination of 

parental rights impossible.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). In 

such circumstances, the trial court may find that a parent’s 

parental rights in a child are subject to termination on the 

grounds of neglect in the event that the petitioner makes 

“a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect 

by the parent.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d 

at 167 (citation omitted).

In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80, 833 S.E.2d at 775.2 “When determining whether future 

neglect is likely, the trial court must consider evidence of changed circumstances 

occurring between the period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.” 

In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 95, 839 S.E.2d 792, 797 (2020) (citing In re Ballard, 311 

N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)). “A parent’s failure to make progress in 

 

2 As we have noted today in our opinion in In re R.L.D., No. 122A20, slip op. at 5 & 

n.3 (N.C. Dec. 11, 2020), a showing of past neglect and a probability of future neglect is not 

necessary to support a determination that a parent’s parental rights in a juvenile are subject 

to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in light of the fact 

that such a determination is also permissible in the event that there is a showing of current 

neglect.
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completing a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of future neglect.” In re M.A., 374 

N.C. at 870, 844 S.E.2d at 921 (quoting In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 633, 637, 810 

S.E.2d 370, 373 (2018)).

In Finding of Fact No. 8,3 the trial court found that the family had received inhome services from 22 May 2014 to 24 June 2015 in order to address the parents’

substance abuse and domestic violence problems. Subsequently, all three children 

were found to be neglected juveniles. In Finding of Fact Nos. 10 and 11, the trial 

court found that David and Michael had been removed from respondent-mother’s care

and placed in the temporary custody of respondent-father on 13 July 2016 as a result 

of the fact that respondent-mother had been charged with driving while subject to an 

impairing substance. In the aftermath of this determination, the parents were 

allowed to be in each other’s presence as long as they were able to refrain from

engaging in domestic violence and utilizing impairing substances. In Finding of Fact 

No. 12, the trial court found that, on 19 September 2016, the children came into DSS 

custody based upon improper supervision, the parents’ substance abuse problems, 

and the level of conflict between the parents.

In Finding of Fact Nos. 14 through 25 and Finding of Fact No. 31, the trial 

court described respondent-mother’s progress, or lack thereof, in addressing the 

 

3 The references to specific findings of fact contained in the remainder of this opinion 

are all to the adjudication order that the trial court entered on 15 April 2019 given that all 

of the parents’ challenges to the trial court’s decision to terminate their parental rights in the 

children are directed to that order.
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barriers to reunification that had been found to exist, which included substance abuse

problems, mental health concerns, unstable housing, domestic violence issues, and 

the lack of appropriate parenting skills. In Finding of Fact Nos. 23 through 32, the 

trial court described respondent-father’s progress, or lack thereof, in addressing the 

barriers to reunification that had been found to be exist, which included substance 

abuse problems, mental health concerns, domestic violence issues, the lack of stable 

housing and gainful employment, and the absence of appropriate parenting skills. 

The trial court found that, “[b]ased on the fact of the lack of insight as it relates to 

[d]omestic [v]iolence issues, inconsistency in mental health services, lack of stable 

housing and lack of consistency in random drug screens, . . . the risk of harm to these 

children still exists” and “the children would live in an environment injurious to their 

welfare if returned to their parents.” As a result, the trial court determined that 

“[t]here is a reasonable probability of repetition of neglect” if the children were 

returned to their parents’ care.

A. Respondent-Father’s Appeal

Although respondent-father has not questioned the propriety of the trial 

court’s determination that the children had been the subject of a prior adjudication 

of neglect, he does challenge the lawfulness of the trial court’s decision that there was 

a reasonable probability that the neglect that the children had experienced would be 

repeated in the event that they were returned to his care in light of his alcohol abuse,

the existence of domestic violence concerns, the inconsistent level of mental health 
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services that he had received, and the fact that he lacked stable housing. More 

specifically, respondent-father asserts that some of the trial court’s findings of fact 

lack sufficient evidentiary support and that the remaining findings do not suffice to 

establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that the neglect that the children 

had experienced would be repeated if they were returned to his care.

As the trial court’s order reflects, respondent-father has an extensive history 

of substance abuse and involvement in domestic violence dating back to May 2014. 

It is undisputed that, in September 2016, all three children were taken into DSS 

custody as a result of the parents’ failure to provide them with proper supervision, 

the parents’ abuse of impairing substances, and the existence of conflict between the 

parents. After carefully considering the record developed before the trial court, we 

are satisfied that the trial court’s findings suffice to support its determination that 

there was a likelihood that the children would be neglected in the event that they 

were returned to the parents’ care.

As an initial matter, respondent-father argues that the portion of Finding of 

Fact No. 36(a) stating that his “last random [drug] screen was back in May 2018 and 

he is currently not receiving treatment for substance abuse” lacks sufficient record 

support. Respondent-father argues, in reliance upon his own testimony at the 

termination hearing, that he had returned to Visions about three weeks earlier and

that he had been participating in a substance abuse aftercare program and drug 

screens as part of that process. According to respondent-father, the record contains 
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evidence tending to show that his last assessment and alcohol screening, which was 

negative, had occurred on 10 January 2019.

After carefully reviewing the record evidence, we are unable to conclude that

the challenged portion of Finding of Fact 36(a) is supported by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence. As we have already noted, the adjudicatory phase of the 

termination hearing commenced on 20 February and concluded on 21 March 2019. 

For that reason, a month elapsed between the date upon which the termination

hearing began and the date upon which it concluded. At the 21 February 2019

hearing date, Sheena Wagner, a substance abuse counselor with the Duke Family 

Care Program, testified that she had last obtained a drug screen from respondentfather in May 2018 and that she had closed respondent-father’s case in September 

2018 in light of his failure to submit to three random drug screens. A closure report 

generated by Duke Family Care on 18 September 2018 and admitted into evidence 

confirmed this portion of Ms. Wagner’s testimony. In addition, Ms. Wagner testified 

that she had conducted a reassessment for respondent-father in January 2019 and

that he had reported his participation in the aftercare program at Visions on that 

occasion. After recommending that respondent-father continue to participate in that 

aftercare program, Ms. Wagner contacted Visions and learned that respondent-father 

“had not been engaged for some months.”

On the other hand, respondent-father testified at the 20 March 2019 hearing

that he had returned to Visions aftercare just a few weeks earlier. The trial court 
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appears to have found this testimony to be credible in Finding of Fact No. 27, in which 

it stated that respondent-father had “returned [ ] to Visions approximately three 

weeks ago.” In addition, a Duke Family Care progress summary that was accepted 

into evidence at the termination hearing indicates that respondent-father had

submitted to a drug screen in January 2019 and had tested negative for the presence 

of all substances. The contents of this progress summary were reflected in Finding 

of Fact Nos. 24 and 29. As a result, in light of the fact that the trial court’s findings 

generally appear to accept the validity of respondent-father’s contention that he had 

recently returned to participation in substance abuse treatment and had tested 

negatively shortly before the end of the termination hearing, we disregard the 

challenged portion of Finding of Fact 36(a) in evaluating the validity of the trial 

court’s determination that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were 

subject to termination on the basis of neglect in light of his alleged failure to 

adequately address his substance abuse problems. See In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 358, 

838 S.E.2d 173, 177 (2020) (disregarding a finding of fact that lacked sufficient 

evidentiary support in determining whether the trial court had properly found the 

existence of grounds for terminating a parent’s parental rights).

In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the record support for certain of 

the trial court’s findings of fact, respondent-father argues that the trial court’s 

remaining findings of fact do not support the trial court’s determination that there is 

a reasonable probability of repetition of neglect if the children were returned to his 
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care based upon his failure to adequately address his alcohol abuse problems. As the

trial court’s unchallenged findings and the record evidence reflect, however,

respondent-father had an extensive history of substance abuse; the parents had

received in-home services from 22 May 2014 to 24 June 2015 for the purpose of

addressing problems relating to substance abuse and domestic violence; and the 

children had been removed from the home on 19 September 2016 after an evening 

during which the parents had been arguing and drinking alcohol. In addition, the 

trial court’s findings and the record evidence reflect that respondent-father’s

treatment at Duke Family Care was terminated in September 2018 after Ms. Wagner 

had been unable to make contact with him for three consecutive months. Although

respondent-father does appear to have completed a reassessment and drug screen in

January 2019, his most recent drug screen prior to that date had been approximately 

eight months earlier. In addition, even though the record contains evidence tending 

to show that respondent-father had begun participating in a substance abuse 

aftercare program at Visions before the conclusion of the termination proceeding, his 

involvement in that program had only commenced after the motion to terminate his 

parental rights in the children had been filed and the termination hearings had

actually begun. A careful review of the trial court’s findings and the record evidence 

demonstrates that the record contains ample support for the trial court’s

determination that, in light of respondent-father’s “extensive substance abuse 

histor[y]” and his inconsistent involvement in the drug screening process, 
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respondent-father had failed to establish “the status or durability” of his sobriety and

to mitigate the risks that continued alcohol abuse might pose for the children. See In 

re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167–68 (stating that the trial judge has the 

responsibility for evaluating the credibility and weight to be afforded to the evidence

and to determine the reasonable inferences that should be drawn from the credible 

evidence).

In addition, respondent-father argues that the trial court had erred by 

determining that it was likely that the neglect that the children had previously 

experienced would recur in the event that they were returned to his care on the basis 

of the trial court’s determination that he had failed to adequately address the issue 

of domestic violence. In respondent-father’s view, the trial court lacked any basis in 

the evidentiary record for making Finding of Fact No 36(b), in which the trial court 

determined that, even though “there may be no reported domestic violence incidents 

between these parties since 2016, this does not mean to this Court that the mother 

or father have expressed meaningful insight about how domestic violence impacts 

them or could cause harm to their children.” More specifically, respondent-father 

contends that he had not been called upon to testify about his understanding of the 

impact that domestic violence would have upon the parents or the children, that no 

expert witness had testified that he was oblivious to the adverse effects that domestic 

violence could cause, and that the manner in which the trial court had addressed this 

issue in its order had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof with respect to the 
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domestic violence issue away from DSS and onto him. Once again, we are not 

persuaded by respondent-father’s argument.

In its termination order, the trial court made unchallenged findings that the 

parents had an extensive history of domestic violence dating back to May 2014, with 

DSS having taken the children into its custody on 19 September 2016 as the result, 

in part, of the “arguing of the parents.” In addition, the trial court judicially noticed

the finding contained in the initial adjudication order “that these children are 

neglected due to the domestic violence between both the parents.” The trial court 

further found that respondent-father had been referred to Penny Dixon, a contractor

for DSS associated with the Durham Crisis Response Center, for a domestic violence 

assessment and that, even though respondent-father had completed the assessment 

process on September 2017, he had failed to comply with Ms. Dixon’s recommendation 

that he participate in long-term individual counseling, with respondent-father having

claimed in his testimony at the termination hearing that he had been waiting on a 

return call from Ms. Dixon. As a result of the fact that respondent-father “did not 

exercise any initiative to follow through with [Ms. Dixon,]” the trial court found that 

there had been “no expressed insight from the father about how domestic violence 

impacts him[.]”

Respondent-father’s assertion that the trial court had no basis for finding that 

he had not attained an understanding of the potential ill effects of domestic violence 

in the absence of an admission on his own part or testimony to that effect from an 
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expert witness lacks merit. In view of the fact that the record contains evidence 

tending to show an extensive history of domestic violence between the parties dating 

back to May 2014, the trial court could have reasonably found that respondentfather’s failure to comply with the recommendation that he participate in long-term, 

individual counseling for the purpose of addressing the issue of domestic violence was 

tantamount to a failure on his part to adequately recognize and address the role that 

domestic violence had played in his own life and that of his children. In addition, 

rather than improperly shifting the burden of proof with respect to domestic violence

from DSS to respondent-father, the challenged portion of the trial court’s termination 

order merely noted that respondent-father had failed to successfully rebut the 

evidence that DSS had presented in support of its contention that he had failed to 

adequately address his domestic violence issues. See, e.g., In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 

118, 125, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984) (holding that, instead of impermissibly shifting 

the burden of proof from the petitioner to the parent, the challenged finding of fact

was “nothing more than an accurate statement of the procedural stance of the case”

and simply stated that “the respondents did not produce evidence that contradicted 

the allegations set forth in the petition”).

Similarly, respondent-father contests the validity of the trial court’s 

determination that there was a probability that the neglect that the children had 

previously experienced would be repeated in the event that they were returned to his 

care given his failure to adequately address concerns relating to his mental health 
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Opinion of the Court

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and housing stability. The trial court’s findings concerning respondent-father’s 

failure to address the issues of substance abuse and domestic violence, which were 

the two central problems that led DSS to intervene in the life of the family beginning 

in May 2014 and that resulted in the children’s removal from the family home in 

September 2016, are sufficient, standing alone, to support the trial court’s

determination that there was a likelihood that the children would be neglected in the

future in the event that they were returned to respondent-father’s care. See In re 

M.A., 374 N.C. at 870, 844 S.E.2d at 921 (holding that, even though the respondent 

claimed to have made reasonable progress in addressing the issues of substance use, 

domestic violence, and income and housing stability, the trial court’s findings 

concerning the respondent’s failure to adequately address the issue of domestic 

violence, which was the primary reason that the children had been removed from the 

home, were, standing alone, sufficient to support a determination that a repetition of 

neglect was likely to occur). For that reason, we will refrain from addressing 

respondent-father’s remaining challenges to the trial court’s determination that his 

parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), including those relating to mental health and 

housing concerns. As result, given that the trial court did not err by determining that 

respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the 

basis of neglect; that the existence of a single ground for termination suffices to 

support the termination of a parent’s parental rights in a child, see In re A.R.A., 373 
IN RE D.M., M.M., D.M.

Opinion of the Court

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N.C. 190, 194, 835 S.E.2d 417, 421 (2019); and that respondent-father has not

challenged the validity of the trial court’s best interests determination, we affirm the 

trial court’s termination order with respect to respondent-father.

B. Respondent-Mother’s Appeal

Like respondent-father, respondent-mother acknowledges that the children 

had previously been adjudicated to be neglected juveniles while arguing that the trial 

court erred by finding that there was a likelihood that the earlier neglect would be 

repeated in the event that the children were returned to her care. In support of this 

contention, respondent-mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidentiary support 

for certain of the trial court’s findings of fact and asserts that there had been a 

“marked change in [her] circumstances” from the time of the children’s removal from 

her home to the time of the termination hearing. After a thorough review of the 

record, we are convinced that the trial court’s findings regarding respondent-mother’s 

failure to adequately address the issues of substance abuse and domestic violence

have sufficient evidentiary support and support its determination that there was a 

likelihood of future neglect in the event that the children were returned to her care.

As an initial matter, respondent-mother challenges a portion of Finding of Fact 

No. 36(c), in which the trial court found that it is “uncertain as to the status and 

durability of [respondent-mother’s] sobriety and . . . that the risk of harm to the 

children has not been removed by these parents,” as lacking in sufficient evidentiary 

support. According to respondent-mother, the quoted portion of the trial court’s 
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Opinion of the Court

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adjudication order is “not an actual finding” given that the trial court failed to carry 

out its duty to “ascertain the truth from the various circumstances” and has done 

nothing more than state that “the court is not certain as to what to find.”

After examining Finding of Fact No. 36(a) in its entirety, we have no hesitation 

in concluding that the language upon which respondent-mother’s argument rests 

states a logical inference that the trial court chose to make from other evidentiary 

facts. See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (stating 

that “[a]ny determination reached through ‘logical reasoning from evidentiary facts’

is more properly classified a finding of fact”). At the beginning of Finding of Fact 

36(a), the trial court provided a detailed discussion of respondent-mother’s lack of 

progress in addressing her substance abuse problems. Among other things, the trial 

court found that respondent-mother’s case at Duke Family Care had been closed in 

September 2018 after Ms. Wagner had been unable to contact respondent-mother for 

three consecutive months. In addition, the trial court found that, while respondentmother tested negatively when screened for alcohol use in January 2019, her most 

recent test result before that date had been provided in May 2018. Finally, the trial 

court found as a fact that:

both of these parents have extensive substance abuse 

histories and because of a lack of being consistent in 

participating in random drug screens for alcohol, this 

Court is uncertain as to the status and durability of their 

sobriety and finds that the risk of harm to the children has 

not been removed by these parents; when the parents are 

under the influence they create an injurious environment 
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Opinion of the Court

-24-

where they become incapable of providing proper 

supervision and care.

Thus, when considered in its entirety, Finding of Fact No. 36(a) consists of (1) a 

description of respondent-mother’s extensive history of substance abuse and her

inconsistent record of participating in required drug screens and (2) a reasonable

inference that the extent and duration of respondent-mother’s sobriety had not been 

demonstrated. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167–68 (holding that 

the trial court “had the responsibility to ‘pass upon the credibility of the witnesses 

and the weight to be given to their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be 

drawn therefrom’ ” (quoting Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 359, 160 S.E.2d 29, 33 

(1968))). As a result, we hold that Finding of Fact No. 36(a) constitutes a proper 

finding on the part of the trial court.

In addition, respondent-mother argues that Finding of Fact No. 36(a) lacks 

sufficient record support. In support of this assertion, respondent-mother relies upon 

findings of fact made in the 5 June 2018 permanency planning order that she had 

several negative urine screens from 31 August 2017 to 20 October 2017, that she had

a negative drug screen on 27 March 2018, and that she submitted to drug screens

during her period of relapse in April and June 2018 and upon an unchallenged finding

of fact contained in the trial court’s termination order that she provided a negative 

drug screen in January 2019. In further support of her challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidentiary support for Finding of Fact No. 36(a), respondent-mother points to
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Opinion of the Court

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the results of drug screens administered by her probation officer in “mid-late 2018”

that did not test for alcohol. Finally, respondent-mother directs our attention to

testimony from her probation officer that she had regularly met with respondentmother since September 2018 without detecting any odor of alcohol or seeing any 

evidence of alcohol use and that the records maintained by DSS concerning her visits 

with the children from September 2018 to February 2019 did not contain a single 

indication that respondent-mother smelled of alcohol or appeared to be intoxicated.

The fundamental problem with respondent-mother’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidentiary support for Finding of Fact No. 36(a) is that the trial 

court never found that respondent-mother had ever failed or refused to submit to drug 

screens or had ever had negative results during the drug screening process. 

Similarly, the trial court never found that respondent-mother had or had not been

observed to be under the influence of alcohol at any time since September 2018. 

Instead, Finding of Fact No. 36(a) simply states that respondent-mother had been 

inconsistent in her participation in the drug screening process. In unchallenged 

Finding of Fact No. 23, the trial court found that, while respondent-mother 

participated in two drug screens in April and May of 2018, she “did not get randomly 

screened from June to December 2018.” In addition, respondent-mother missed a

drug screening appointment scheduled for 30 July 2018, with her Duke Family Care

case having been closed in September 2018 after Ms. Wagner could not contact 

respondent-mother for three consecutive months. As a result, we conclude that 
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Opinion of the Court

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Finding of Fact No. 36(a) has ample evidentiary support. See In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 

at 379, 831 S.E.2d at 310 (stating that a “finding that is supported by clear, cogent, 

and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence 

that would support a contrary finding) (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 403–04, 293 

S.E.2d at 132).

Next, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that there 

was a likelihood that the neglect that the children had previously experienced would 

be repeated in light of the fact that she had demonstrated the existence of a marked 

change in circumstances relating to her substance abuse problems at the time of the 

termination hearing. The argument that respondent-mother makes in support of this 

contention relies upon an attempt to shift the focus from her inconsistency in 

submitting to random drug screens and a claim that DSS had failed to prove that she 

had consumed alcohol after the summer of 2018. The record does, of course, reflect 

that respondent-mother last tested positive for the presence of alcohol in April of 2018 

and that she had tested negative for the presence of all controlled substances,

including alcohol, in January 2019. On the other hand, the trial court’s unchallenged 

findings of fact establish that respondent-mother did not submit to random drug 

screens from June to December 2018 and that her case with Duke Family Care had 

been closed in September 2018 after she failed to respond to Ms. Wagner’s attempts 

to make contact with her. In light of respondent-mother’s extensive substance abuse 

history and her failure to consistently participate in the drug screening process, we
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Opinion of the Court

-27-

hold that the trial court had an ample evidentiary basis for determining that

respondent-mother had failed to achieve a stable or durable state of sobriety 

sufficient to eliminate the risk of harm to her children.

In addition to her challenge to the trial court’s treatment of her struggles with 

substance abuse, respondent-mother objects to the manner in which the trial court 

addressed the issue of her involvement with domestic violence. As an initial matter, 

we note that the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact establish that respondentmother had completed a domestic violence assessment in September of 2017, at which 

it had been recommended that respondent-mother complete domestic violence 

counseling, and that respondent-mother had never presented a certificate of 

completion indicating that she had obtained the recommended counseling. In 

addition, the trial court’s findings reflect that respondent-mother had received 

counseling at the Durham Crisis Response Center from May 2018 to December 2018.

According to respondent-mother, Finding of Fact No. 20, in which the trial 

court stated that the counseling sessions in which respondent-mother participated at

the Durham Crisis Response Center “do not contain[ ] counseling particularly on 

domestic violence,” lacks sufficient evidentiary support. Respondent-mother makes 

a similar challenge to Finding of Fact No. 36(b), in which the trial court found, in 

pertinent part, that:

[respondent-mother] has an extensive history of being in 

domestic violence relationships with her partners which 

stems from at least 1997 when a former partner fractured 
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Opinion of the Court

-28-

her bone. . . . The court takes judicial notice of the findings 

of fact in the adjudication order that these children are 

neglected due to the domestic violence between both the 

parents. The Court finds that there may be no reported 

domestic violence incidents between these parties since 

2016, this does not mean to this Court that [respondentmother] or [respondent-father] have expressed meaningful 

insight about how domestic violence impacts them or could 

cause harm to their children. The court reviewed 

[respondent-mother’s exhibit #4 — Assessment from the 

Durham Crisis Response Center]; [respondent-mother] 

discussed in one session about maintaining sobriety, the 

care of her children in foster care, how to handle grief and 

to get her children back.

In respondent-mother’s view, the trial court erred by finding that her counseling 

sessions at the Durham Crisis Response Center did not address domestic violence 

issues.

In support of her contention that she had received domestic violence counseling 

at the Durham Crisis Response Center, respondent-mother points to an intake form 

in which she indicated that she wanted to address “domestic violence, coping skills”

and to counseling notes that mention issues relating to the safety of the children, the 

management of grief, an analysis of past deficiencies in the decisions that she had 

made, and the need to control her substance abuse. According to respondent-mother,

her counselor at the Durham Crisis Response Center “would have used these topics 

to relate to domestic violence or would have redirected [respondent-mother.]”

In its adjudication order, the trial court stated that it had reviewed respondentmother’s assessment from the Durham Crisis Response Center and the records 
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Opinion of the Court

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relating to respondent-mother that had been generated by that entity relating to 

respondent-mother through December 2018. The counseling case notes indicate that 

various topics had been discussed during the counseling that respondent-mother had 

received at the Durham Crisis Response Center, such as “concerns about safety of 

[the] children in foster care,” respondent-mother’s desire for reunification with the 

children, and the changes that respondent-mother was “making to maintain 

sobriety.” The Durham Crisis Response Center records only contain a single 

reference to the issue of domestic violence, which appears in a set of case notes that 

are dated 18 June 2018. For that reason, we hold that the trial court’s determination 

that the counseling that respondent-mother received at the Durham Crisis Response

Center did not involve any particular focus upon issues relating to domestic violence 

had ample evidentiary support and that, even though the record might support a 

contrary decision, “this Court lacks the authority to reweigh the evidence that was 

before the trial court.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 12, 832 S.E.2d at 704; see also In re 

Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110–11, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252–53 (1984) (stating that “our 

appellate courts are bound by the trial courts’ findings of fact where there is some 

evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings 

to the contrary.”)

Similarly, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that 

there was a likelihood that the neglect that the children had experienced would be 

repeated in the event that they were returned to her care given that she had 
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Opinion of the Court

-30-

demonstrated that there had been a marked change in her circumstances relating to 

the issue of domestic violence issues by the time of the termination hearing. In 

support of this contention, respondent-mother maintains that she had been able to 

show improvement in her situation as it relates to domestic violence by “refrain[ing]”

from respondent-father, having been involved in no reported incident of domestic 

violence involving respondent-father for three years, obtaining a domestic violence 

assessment, and engaging in counseling at the Durham Crisis Response Center.

As we have previously indicated, the trial court did not err by finding that the 

counseling that respondent-mother had received at the Durham Crisis Response

Center did not place any particular emphasis upon issues relating to domestic 

violence. In addition, the trial court acknowledged that there had been no reported

incidents of domestic violence involving the parents since 2016 and that respondentmother had obtained a domestic violence assessment in 2017. Even so, given

respondent-mother’s extensive history of participation in interpersonal relationships

involving domestic violence and her failure to complete the recommended domestic 

violence counseling, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that respondentmother had failed to express “meaningful insight about how domestic violence 

impacts them or could cause harm to their children.” For that reason, we hold that

the trial court did not err by determining that respondent-mother had failed to 

adequately address the issue of domestic violence by the time of the termination 

hearing and that its findings of fact with respect to this issue suffice to support its 
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Opinion of the Court

-31-

determination that there was a likelihood of future neglect in the event that the 

children were returned to her care.

In light of our determination that the trial court’s findings with respect to the 

issues of substance abuse and domestic violence suffice to show the existence of the 

required likelihood of future neglect in the event that the children were returned to 

respondent-mother’s case, we need not address respondent-mother’s challenge to the 

trial court’s determination that she had failed to adequately address her mental 

health and housing problems. See In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 870, 844 S.E.2d at 921

(holding that a parent’s failure to adequately address the issue of domestic violence 

can be sufficient to support a determination that there is a likelihood of future 

neglect). In view of the fact that the trial court did not err by finding that respondentmother’s parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of 

neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), that the existence of a single ground 

for termination will suffice to support the termination of a parent’s parental rights in 

a child, see In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 194, 835 S.E.2d at 421, and that respondentmother has not challenged the trial court’s determination that the termination of her 

parental rights would be in the children’s best interests, we affirm the trial court’s 

termination order with respect to respondent-mother as well.

AFFIRMED.