NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MANDY P., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, E.R., M.R., R.R., 

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0243

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD27257

The Honorable Joseph C. Welty, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley

By Steven Czop

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MANDY P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

B R O W N, Chief Judge:

¶1 Mandy P. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her three children. For the following 

reasons, we conclude that reasonable evidence supports the court’s order 

and therefore affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Michael R. (“Father”)1 have three children: E.R. 

(born in 2006), M.R. (born in 2007), and R.R. (born in 2011). The Department 

of Child Safety (“DCS”) took the children into temporary physical custody 

in October 2013 when Mother and Father were arrested for various drug 

and theft charges with uncertain release dates. DCS alleged that Mother 

was unable to safely parent due to incarceration, substance abuse and 

domestic violence, and that she had neglected the children by failing to 

provide them with the basic necessities of life.2 When they were arrested, 

Mother admitted that she had a protective order against Father, and Father 

gave officers false information to prevent detection of such order. Mother 

also stated she smokes marijuana when “out with friends” and the children

aren’t around, and that she “took a [V]alium because she was so stressed 

out.” 

¶3 Mother waived her right to contest the dependency 

allegations and the juvenile court found the children dependent, adopting

a case plan of family reunification as to E.R. and M.R., and family 

reunification concurrent with severance and adoption as to the youngest 

child, R.R. Mother signed Form 1, Notice to Parent in Dependency Action, 

 

1 Father’s parental rights have also been terminated but he is not a 

party to this appeal.

2 DCS subsequently withdrew the incarceration ground when Mother 

was released from custody. 
MANDY P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

3

advising her of the need to attend all court hearings and the consequences 

for failing to attend without good cause. 

¶4 DCS offered Mother reunification services, including 

visitation, substance abuse testing and treatment, individual and domestic 

violence counseling, parent aide services, family reunification team, and 

psychological evaluation. Other than one positive drug test in November 

2013, as of June 2015, Mother had successfully completed counseling, a 

parent aide program, and substance abuse testing and treatment. Mother’s 

visitation with the children, however, was less successful and she 

fluctuated from supervised to unsupervised then back to supervised 

visitation. The children disclosed that on at least two occasions when 

Mother had unsupervised visitation, Mother allowed them to have contact 

with Father, they made a video for him, and he was “going to build them a 

house so they could all be a family again.” Mother told the case aide that 

“he is their father and I cannot make him leave.” 

¶5 In October 2015, the juvenile court granted DCS’s request to 

change the case plan to severance and adoption for all three children. DCS 

then filed a motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(8)(c) (fifteen months out-ofhome placement). DCS alleged that Mother continued to have contact with 

Father and allowed contact between Father and the children despite 

Father’s lack of participation in any DCS services with respect to his own 

dependency proceedings, his involvement in criminal activity, and his 

abuse of Mother. DCS also alleged termination would be in the children’s 

best interests. 

¶6 Mother appeared at the initial severance hearing in 

November 2015 and contested severance. During the hearing, the juvenile 

court set the date for the pretrial conference, and informed Mother of her 

rights set forth in Form 3, Notice to Parent in Termination Action, which 

included a warning that, in the event Mother failed to appear without good 

cause, the court could proceed with an adjudication hearing and terminate 

her parental rights based on the record and evidence presented. In March 

2016, Mother failed to appear at a report and review hearing, during which 

the court learned that Mother had admitted to her therapist she was taking 

prescription medication that was not prescribed for her. Based on this 

report, the court ordered Mother’s counsel to inform Mother that she was 

required to complete a random rule-out drug test. 

¶7 In April 2016, based in part on the recommendation of

psychologist Christina Lebovitz, DCS moved for and obtained an 
MANDY P. v. DCS et al.

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4

emergency hearing, alleging the existing visitation schedule and location 

would subject the children to potential harm, and asking the court to 

decrease Mother’s visitation to one hour once or twice per month. 

Lebovitz stated that Mother’s visits with the children were “unstructured,” 

with Mother at times falling asleep, failing to promptly respond to the 

children’s needs, and allowing unidentified adults in the home during 

visits. During one supervised visit with a parent aide in March 2016, the 

DCS case manager made a surprise visit and reported that E.R. and M.R.

were outside the home, unattended, “picking up trash such as cigarette 

butts, dirty diapers and glass,” and R.R. was also outside unsupervised. 

Lebovitz explained that during the dependency Mother was untruthful 

about having contact with Father, allowing at least two unauthorized, 

unsupervised visits between Father and the children, even though Father 

had not participated in any DCS services to reunify with the children. 

Lebovitz recommended that Mother have additional domestic violence 

counseling, but Mother failed to follow through or return the counselor’s 

calls. Mother’s previous psychologist, James Thal, observed that “it is 

troubling that [Mother] would expend effort and energy complying with 

case plan directives, but then repeatedly jeopardize her chances for 

reunification by blatantly facilitating unauthorized contact with [Father].” 

Mother failed to appear at the emergency hearing in April 2016, and the 

court ordered Mother’s visitation reduced. 

¶8 Mother also failed to appear at the May 2, 2016 contested 

severance hearing and her attorney advised she was unaware of Mother’s 

whereabouts. The juvenile court found Mother was present when the 

severance hearing was scheduled, had been advised of and understood the 

consequences for failing to appear, failed to appear without good cause,

and therefore had waived her legal rights and admitted the allegations in 

the motion to terminate. 

¶9 The juvenile court proceeded in Mother’s absence and heard 

brief testimony from Sabrina Stewart, a DCS caseworker. Stewart testified 

that Mother provided clean urinalysis testing and her participation in 

services and engagement in the proceedings was going “very well up until 

about January 2016,” when Mother stopped communicating with DCS. 

Stewart testified that DCS remained concerned about Mother’s “lack of 

behavior change” with respect to domestic violence and substance abuse, 

particularly since the “dependency is going on almost three years and . . . 

we’ve offered several services and she continues to exhibit the same 

behavior.” Stewart testified that Mother “continued to allow contact 

between the kids and [Father] despite [Father] not engaging and not 

maintain[ing] contact with [DCS].” Stewart further testified that there have 
MANDY P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

5

been drugs found in Mother’s home and Mother admitted to a therapist 

that she was using prescription medication that was not prescribed to her. 

Stewart acknowledged that the children’s contact with Father occurred 

about one year before the severance hearing, but explained that while

Mother said she unsuccessfully attempted to get a protective order against 

Father, she was unable to provide DCS with any court documentation. 

Stewart testified that although Mother maintained the same residence since 

January 2015, she failed to provide proof of her employment or income. 

Stewart also testified that termination would be in the children’s best 

interests. 

¶10 In a subsequent order setting forth the findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, the juvenile court granted the motion for termination. 

Mother’s timely appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

¶11 To support an order terminating parental rights, the juvenile

court must find at least one statutory ground is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 78, 

¶ 6 (App. 2005). Additionally, the court must find by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the termination is in the best interests of the child. Mario 

G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 285, ¶ 11 (App. 2011); A.R.S. § 8-

533(B). As the trier of fact, the juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and 

resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 

334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Accordingly, we will accept the court’s findings of fact 

“unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings.” Jennifer B. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997). 

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶12 A parent in a severance action is required to appear at the 

pretrial conference, status conference, and termination adjudication 

hearing. See A.R.S. § 8-537(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(D). The juvenile court 

may proceed in the parent’s absence and terminate the parent-child 

relationship based upon the record and evidence presented if the court 

finds that a parent (1) failed to appear without good cause; (2) had notice of 

the hearing; (3) was properly served; and (4) had been previously 

admonished regarding the consequences of failing to appear, including a 

warning that the hearing could go forward in the absence of the parent and 

that failure to appear may constitute a waiver of rights and an admission of 
MANDY P. v. DCS et al.

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the allegations contained in the motion to terminate. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

66(D)(2). 

¶13 Mother does not argue that she did not receive notice of the 

hearing date and time, was not properly served, that she was not 

admonished of consequences if she failed to appear, or that she had good 

cause for failing to appear. Instead, Mother challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting the grounds for termination, arguing no 

reasonable evidence supports the court’s termination order because she had 

stable housing, demonstrated through visitation that she could properly 

parent, consistently tested negative for drugs, and successfully completed 

counseling, parent aide, and substance abuse treatment. Mother further 

asserts that the record is silent as to any domestic violence between Mother 

and Father during the course of the dependency, or that her admitted 

contact with Father was inappropriate or harmful to her or the children, 

and the children’s disclosures about their contact with Father were a year 

before the severance hearing. She also argues that because at the time of 

the severance hearing Father was incarcerated and facing a significant 

sentence, “for the foreseeable future, Father would not be a factor to 

consider in Mother’s ability to parent the children.”3 

¶14 As a threshold matter, Mother’s arguments fail to recognize 

that she did not appear for three scheduled court hearings, the most 

important of which was the termination hearing. Thus, underlying our 

review of the sufficiency of the evidence is the presumption that by failing 

to appear, Mother admitted the allegations of the motion for termination. 

See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(D)(2). Nonetheless, DCS was still required to 

present evidence supporting the grounds for termination. See Manuel M. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 212, ¶ 23 (App. 2008) (noting that 

“parent’s failure to appear does not relieve the juvenile court of its 

obligation to assess the record and evidence presented and to determine 

whether the state has proven a statutory ground for termination by clear 

and convincing evidence[.]”) (internal quotation omitted). 

¶15 DCS sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The juvenile court found that DCS met its burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the children had been in 

an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months 

or longer; (2) DCS made a diligent effort to provide appropriate 

reunification services including domestic violence counseling, family 

 

3 In March 2016, Father was convicted of a class three felony and 

sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. 
MANDY P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

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reunification team, psychological evaluation, substance abuse treatment 

and testing; and (3) Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the children to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a 

substantial likelihood that she will not be capable of exercising proper and 

effective parental care and control in the near future.

¶16 We recognize, as did the juvenile court, that Mother

successfully completed many of the reunification services offered by DCS. 

However, for several months leading up to the termination hearing, Mother 

stopped communicating with DCS, failed to complete a rule-out drug test,

and failed to follow through with a domestic violence counseling referral.

She also failed to appear at a report and review hearing, an emergency 

hearing to reduce her visitation, and the severance hearing. Mother’s 

inaction at this crucial stage of the proceedings supports DCS’s position that 

she was unable to remedy the circumstances that led to removal of the 

children, and would not be capable of providing them proper care within 

the near future. Thus, we conclude that the record and the evidence 

presented at the termination hearing support the court’s order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights. 

B. Best Interests

¶17 Mother challenges the juvenile court’s decision that 

termination was in the best interests of the children, asserting the record

does not support the court’s conclusion that the children were exposed to 

domestic violence or substance abuse. She also argues that DCS could have 

explored issues of stability and permanency with a bonding assessment

prior to seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

¶18 To prove that severance is in the child’s best interests, DCS

must show that the child would either benefit from severance or be harmed 

by a continuation of the parental relationship. Mario G., 227 Ariz. at 288, ¶ 

26. We will uphold the juvenile court’s best interests determination if it is 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 

Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). It is sufficient that DCS show that severance 

would free the children for adoption, and that the children would benefit 

from finding an adoptive placement. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994); see also Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179-80, ¶¶ 19-20 (App. 2014) (explaining that a 

child’s best interests were served by severance when the child was not in 

an adoptive placement, but steps were being taken to permit her to be 

placed in an adoptive home). Additionally, DCS can establish that 

termination is in a child’s best interests by presenting evidence showing 
MANDY P. v. DCS et al.

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that an existing placement is meeting the needs of the child. Mary Lou C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004). 

¶19 Consistent with the juvenile court’s findings, Stewart testified 

at the May 2016 severance hearing that the current placement was meeting 

the needs of the children, an adoptive home had been identified for all three 

children, and adoption would provide permanency and stability. Mother’s 

psychologist recommended a best interests and bonding assessment be 

completed “due to the length of time the children have been in care,” which 

at that time was over two years. DCS, however, is not required to conduct 

a bonding assessment before a parent’s rights are terminated. The record 

supports the juvenile court’s best interests finding. 

CONCLUSION

¶20 Based on the juvenile court record and the evidence presented 

at the termination hearing, we affirm the court’s order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to her three children.