United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 1, 2019*

Decided May 1, 2019

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐1905

KEVIN AUSTIN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 14‐cv‐9823

John Robert Blakey,

Judge.

O R D E R

Kevin Austin was fired from his job as a driver for the City of Chicago after City

officials realized that he previously had been fired and designated as ineligible for

rehire. Austin then filed this employment‐discrimination suit, alleging that the City of

Chicago discharged him because of his race (black) and in retaliation for engaging in

protected activity. The district court entered summary judgment in the City’s favor.

Seeing no error in that decision, we affirm the judgment.

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐1905    Page 2

Austin first worked for the City as a laborer in the Department of Streets and

Sanitation from 1998 until his termination in 2006. The department’s commissioner fired

Austin after an internal investigation revealed that he (1) had been arrested in 2005 for

knowingly possessing a stolen vehicle (though the criminal charge was later dismissed),

and (2) had failed to disclose a conviction from 1988 (when he was 17 years old) on his

initial job application. The investigator recommended that Austin “never be rehired.”

After an appeal and a full evidentiary hearing (at which Austin testified and was

represented by counsel), the City’s Personnel Board upheld Austin’s termination. The

Board found that he had knowingly possessed a stolen vehicle in violation of a

personnel rule that barred employees from engaging in “any act or conduct prohibited

by [law].” The Board’s decision did not mention his 1988 conviction, but Austin later

explained that he had omitted this conviction from his job application because he was a

minor at the time, so he did not believe that he was obligated to disclose it. He

subsequently had the conviction expunged from his criminal record.

Austin reapplied to work for the City in 2007 and 2010. Both times, the City

responded that his 2006 termination “for cause” made him ineligible for re‐hire. The

City’s 2010 response specifically noted that Austin was “ineligible for re‐employment

with the City of Chicago permanently.”

In 2012, Austin again applied to work for the City, and this time was hired as a

driver with the Streets and Sanitation department. During the hiring process, the City

conducted a background check without properly reviewing its ineligible‐for‐rehire list.   

About a year later, Austin complained to human resources that several white

drivers were allowed to report to the same starting location every day, while he was

dispatched to locations all over the city. After this conversation, Austin was permitted

to report to a single location; he expressed satisfaction with this new arrangement.

In mid‐2014, City officials eventually noticed that Austin had been designated as

ineligible for reemployment. Based on this information and a review of Austin’s

personnel file, the Department of Streets and Sanitation Commissioner fired him.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Austin sued the City for racial

discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.   

§ 2000e‐2(a)(1), 3(a). The district court entered summary judgment for the City,

concluding that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that either Austin’s race or his
No. 18‐1905    Page 3

complaints about discriminatory job assignments led to his termination. See Ortiz v.

Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).

On appeal, Austin has not meaningfully developed the arguments in his brief,   

see FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8), but we touch upon the two arguments that we can discern.

Austin first contends that he was wrongly placed on the ineligible‐for‐rehire list for not

disclosing a 1988 conviction on his first job application because, he now insists, he was

“never convicted of a crime.” But not only did Austin admit (in a declaration and other

district court filings) that he was, in fact, convicted of a crime in 1988, he forfeited this

argument by failing to raise it in the district court. See Betco Corp., Ltd. v. Peacock, 876

F.3d 306, 309 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]his court has ‘long refused to consider arguments that

were not presented to the district court in response to summary judgment motions.’”).   

Austin also argues that he should not have been placed on the ineligibility list

because he never was convicted of possessing a stolen vehicle. This argument misses

the point. The Personnel Board determined that Austin had engaged in conduct

prohibited by law—conduct that, regardless of whether it led to a criminal conviction,

violated the City’s personnel rules. As the district court noted, Austin “does not—and

cannot—dispute that these rules applied to him as a City employee.” Moreover, Austin

has not pointed to any evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer that he was

terminated because of his race or complaints about discriminatory job assignments,

rather than his violation of personnel rules. See Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 871 (7th Cir.

2018); Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765.

AFFIRMED