No. 91-547 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsEDWARD F. MILLER, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Carbon, 

The Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Jr., Judge 

presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Arthur J. Thompson: Thompson & Sessions, Billings, 

Montana. 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, 

Montana; Paul D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney 

General, Helena, Montana; A. W. "Tony" Kendall, 

Carbon County Attorney, Red Lodge, Montana. 

Submitted on Briefs: April 23, 1992 

Decided: June 2, 1992 

Filed: 

CLERK OF SUPRE:;$: COURT 

STATE OF ibiiiid'i'Ai$~ 

Clerk 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Defendant Edward F. Miller appeals the order of the District 

Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District, Carbon County, denying 

his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. Miller's motion was based on 

the recanting of testimony on which he based his Alford plea to the 

charges against him. We affirm. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused 

its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw pleas. 

D. and D., Miller's stepsons, ran away from home in June of 

1989. The boys walked and hitchhiked to Denver, Colorado to stay 

with an aunt. The aunt notified authorities in Denver that the 

boys were runaways. Subsequently, D. and D. told Denver police 

that they had experienced abuse from Miller and that they feared 

both Miller and their mother. The boys accused Miller of beating 

them with his fists, a two-by-four board, and a jack handle in 

addition to instances of sexual abuse. 

Denver police reported the boys' story to Denver Social 

Services. Social Services ultimately decided that the boys should 

be returned to the Carbon County, Montana, Department of Family 

Services and made arrangements for Ed Lambrecht, a Carbon County 

social worker, to meet the boys at the airport in Montana. Upon D. 

and D.'s return to Montana, Lambrecht placed the boys in various 

foster homes, but they ran away each time. 

On April 18, 1990, Miller was charged by amended information 

with one count of felony assault and two counts of felony sexual 

assault involving his three minor stepchildren. In addition to the 

2 
assault and sexual assault allegations against Miller by the boys, 

Miller's stepdaughter alleged sexual assaults by Miller. This 

physical and sexual abuse was alleged to have occurred with 

increasing frequency between January and June of 1989. Written 

statements and video-taped interviews of the children, detailing 

the children's allegations, were relied on in filing the charges. 

On April 23, 1990, Miller entered into a plea bargain 

agreement with the prosecutor in Carbon County; Miller agreed to 

plead guilty in exchange for the county attorney's recommendation 

of deferred sentences. Maintaining his innocence but agreeing that 

sufficient evidence was available to convict him, Miller entered an 

"Alford plea." See North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 

91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162. 

On June 18, 1990, Miller filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas on the basis that he was unaware of certain consequences when 

he entered the pleas. The District Court denied the motion. Prior 

to Miller's sentencing, the three children sent handwritten letters 

to the District Court again detailing their abusive home 

environment. The court considered these letters and, in October 

1990, sentenced Miller to three consecutive terms of three years in 

the Montana State Prison with eight of the nine years suspended. 

On appeal, we affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to 

withdraw. State v. Miller (1991), 248 Mont. 194, 810 P.2d 308. 

Sometime after June 1, 1991, and before July 8, 1991, and 

against Lambrecht's advice, D. and D. went to live with their 

mother, S.M. The boys wrote letters to the court at this time, 
recanting portions of their previous statements, letters, and 

interviews describing the abuse. D. and D. stated that they 

amplified and exaggerated the original charges against Miller at 

the urging of Ed Lambrecht. They asserted that Lambrecht 

threatened to have them placed in Pine Hills School for Boys unless 

they exaggerated the alleged abusive incidents. 

Miller based his second motion to withdraw pleas, made July 8, 

1991, on these recantations. After holding a hearing on the 

motion, receiving testimony and considering the entirety of the 

record before it, the District Court denied Miller's motion on the 

basis that neither minor boy was recanting truthfully. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial judge's decision not to 

allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea will be affirmed by this 

Court. State v. Long (1987), 227 Mont. 199, 738 P.2d 487. Miller 

argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because two 

of the three victims have recanted their testimony. He contends 

that the court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to 

withdraw the pleas on the basis of undisputed new evidence that D. 

and D. exaggerated the charges. 

The State contends that our review of this case is similar to 

our review of a motion for new trial based on recanting testimony. 

It argues that recanting testimony should be viewed with extreme 

suspicion by the courts. United States v. Adi (5th Cir. 1985), 759 

F.2d 404. In addition, the State argues that the district court 

has the discretion to evaluate the recanting testimony for 

veracity. State v. Perry (1988), 232 Mont. 455, 758 P.2d 268. 
In Perry, we adopted the prevailing judicial attitude that 

recanting testimony is to be viewed with great suspicion. Perrv, 

232 Mont. at 466, 758 P.2d at 275. While Perrv dealt with a motion 

for a new trial based on the recanting of trial testimony, the 

rationale for viewing recanting testimony with suspicion is equally 

applicable here. 

On its face, a recantation reveals a witness to be unreliable; 

it also raises other questions, such as whether the motive for 

recanting is fear. w, 232 Mont. at 466, 758 P.2d at 275. We 

stated in Perry that the weight to be given recanting testimony is 

for the district court to determine and that a new trial is 

required only when the court is satisfied that the recantation is 

true. Perrv, 232 Mont. at 466, 758 P.2d at 275. 

Here, the recanting witnesses testified at a hearing on 

Miller's motion. The court observed the demeanor and heard the 

testimony of both the recanting victims and Lambrecht. In its 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the District Court 

specifically concluded that the minor boys' recantation was false. 

The court relied on numerous factors in making that determination. 

First, the recantations came soon after the boys moved back into 

their mother's home. In addition, and of particular significance, 

the boys' original statements to Denver authorities preceded any 

contact with Lambrecht relating to their initial allegations. The 

court also noted the children's interest in the defendant's 

ultimate sentence throughout the earlier proceedings. Finally, the 

stepdaughter victim did not recant. 
The District Court held a hearing on ~iller's motion to 

withdraw his pleas. It heard and evaluated testimony, considered 

all the evidence, concluded that the recantations were not true, 

and denied the motion, We hold that the court did not abuse its 

discretion. 

Af f inned. 

We concur: