UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

CAMPANELLA, HERRING, and PENLAND 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist DALLAS R. SUTTON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20150268 

Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division 

Rebecca K. Connally, Military Judge 

Colonel Alison C. Martin, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Lieutenant Colonel Oren H. McKnelly, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Colonel Mary J. Bradley, JA (on brief); Major Christopher D. 

Coleman, JA. 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie III, 

JA; Major Cormac M. Smith, JA; Captain Cassandra M. Resposo, JA (on brief). 

30 November 2016 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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HERRING, Judge: 

 Where the government is responsible for two-hundred and thirty-nine days 

elapsing between sentencing and action and forty-three days elapsing between the 

convening authority’s action and docketing with this court, we grant relief. 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of violating a general regulation, flight from apprehension, 

resisting apprehension, drunken operation of a vehicle, and assault consummated by 

battery in violation of Articles 92, 95, 111, and 128, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 895, 911, 928 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening 

authority approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct discharge, confinement 

for seven months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 

 This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

raises two allegations of error, one of which merits brief discussion and relief. 
SUTTON—ARMY 20150268 

2

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The convening authority took action two hundred and fifty-eight days after 

the sentence was adjudged, and it took forty-three additional days after convening 

authority action for this court to receive the record of trial and docket appellant’s 

case.1

 The government’s post-trial delay, was recounted, but not explained, in an 

affidavit by the 1st Cavalry Division’s Chief of Military Justice. The affidavit did 

not address the forty-three days it took to mail the three-volume record of trial to 

this court.2 Appellant submitted his brief alleging, inter alia, post-trial delay nearly 

five months after his case was docketed. The government filed its brief nearly four 

months later. 

There is a presumption of unreasonable delay where the convening authority’s 

action is not taken within 120 days of the completion of trial and where a record of 

trial is not docketed by the service Court of Criminal Appeals within thirty days of 

the convening authority’s action. United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 142 

(C.A.A.F. 2006). Post-trial delay in the administrative handling and forwarding of 

the record of trial and related documents to an appellate court is the “least 

defensible” type of post-trial delay and “worthy of the least patience.” United States 

v. Dunbar, 31 M.J. 70, 73 (C.M.A. 1990). 

Although we find no due process violation in the post-trial processing of 

appellant’s case, we must still review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of 

the dilatory post-trial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 

219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] 

required to determine what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all 

the facts and circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and 

unreasonable post-trial delay.”). See United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 

(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2000). We find relief from this court is appropriate. As such 

we provide relief in our decretal paragraph. 

 

1

 While the due date for appellant’s matters pursuant to Rule for Court Martial 

[hereinafter R.C.M.] 1105 was 10 December 2015 and defense counsel submitted 

these matters nineteen days past the due date, appellant states the defense was 

responsible for twenty-four days of post-trial delay using a chart that is mostly 

outdated after this court’s decision in United States v. Banks ̧ 75 M.J. 746 (Army Ct. 

Crim. App. 2016). Post Banks, the relevant time periods for calculating post-trial 

delay are between: completion of court-martial, convening authority’s action, and 

docketing with this court, plus up to twenty days past the due date for R.C.M. 1105 

matters, if requested by defense. 

2

 We invite the 1st Cavalry Division Office of the Staff Judge Advocate’s attention 

to Army Reg. 27-26, Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers, Appx. B. R. 5.3 

(Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), R. 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 

and R. 1.3 (Diligence) (1 May 1992). 
SUTTON—ARMY 20150268 

3

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilt are AFFIRMED. 

Given the dilatory post-trial processing, we affirm only so much of the sentence as 

extends to a bad-conduct discharge, 201 days confinement, and reduction to the 

grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been 

deprived by virtue of that portion of his sentence set aside by this decision, are 

ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c), and 75(a). 

Senior Judge CAMPANELLA and Judge PENLAND concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: