J-S07033-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MIGUEL ANGEL RUIZ, :

:

Appellant : No. 1276 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 21, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-36-CR-0003468-1991

BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2017

Miguel Angel Ruiz (“Ruiz”) appeals, pro se, from the Order dismissing 

his fourth Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

In September 1991, Ruiz killed a car dealer during a test drive. On 

June 23, 1992, Ruiz entered into a negotiated guilty plea to one count each 

of murder of the first degree, robbery, and criminal conspiracy in exchange 

for the Commonwealth not seeking the death penalty. That same day, the 

trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of life in prison. Ruiz did not file 

a direct appeal.

Ruiz previously filed three PCRA Petitions, all of which were denied or 

dismissed. On May 16, 2016, Ruiz filed the instant PCRA Petition. The PCRA 

court issued a Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 Notice. Ruiz 

filed a pro se Response. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed Ruiz’s 
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Petition. Ruiz filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement.

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA 

level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court 

and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s 

ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal 

error.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

Initially, under the PCRA, any petition “including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filled within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (emphasis added). A judgment 

of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s 

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely 

filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). 

Here, Ruiz’s Petition is facially untimely under the PCRA. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an 

untimely petition if the appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of three 

exceptions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii). Any PCRA petition 

invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date 
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the claim could have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b); Albrecht, 994 A.2d 

at 1094.

Here, Ruiz invokes the newly-recognized constitutional right exception 

based on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). See Brief for 

Appellant at 4-18.1 In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that 

increases the sentence for a given crime must be submitted to the jury and 

found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. The 

Supreme Court reasoned that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs where 

these sentence-determinative facts are not submitted to a jury. Id. at 

2156. Ruiz argues that because Alleyne renders his sentence illegal, there 

is no need to determine whether Alleyne applies retroactively. See Brief for 

Appellant at 5-6, 7, 13, 15-17, 18.

Initially, based upon our review of the written sentencing Order and 

the sentencing hearing transcript, the trial court did not impose a mandatory 

minimum sentence. However, even if the trial court had imposed a 

mandatory minimum sentence, Ruiz’s May 16, 2016 PCRA Petition was filed 

well over sixty days after June 17, 2013, the date that Alleyne was decided. 

 

1 Ruiz cites to various cases from this Court and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania that held that mandatory minimum sentencing statutes to be 

unconstitutional based upon the reasoning in Alleyne. See, e.g., Brief for 

Appellant at 4-5, 6, 7-13, 18. However, the rulings in those cases are based 

solely upon Alleyne, and the Courts did not state that those rulings apply 

retroactively. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (recognizing that “a new rule of constitutional law is applied

retroactively to cases on collateral review only if the United States Supreme 

Court or our Supreme Court specifically holds it to be retroactively applicable 

to those cases.”).
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See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 

A.2d 513, 517 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “[w]ith regard to [a newly]-

recognized constitutional right, this Court has held that the sixty-day period 

begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.”). 

Further, the rule established in Alleyne does not apply retroactively 

where, as here, the judgment of sentence is final. See Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016) (holding that “Alleyne does 

not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review.”); see also 

Miller, 102 A.3d at 995 (stating that while Alleyne claims go to the legality 

of the sentence, a court cannot review a legality claim where it does not 

have jurisdiction). Ruiz failed to meet the requirements of the newlyrecognized constitutional right exception. Thus, the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Ruiz’s fourth PCRA Petition.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2017