United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-1429

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jermaine L. Gadson

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: November 14, 2016

Filed: December 2, 2016 

[Unpublished]

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SMITH and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Jermaine L. Gadson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He reserved the right to appeal
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress a pistol, ecstasy pills, marijuana, 1

and a digital scale seized following a stop and search of the vehicle Gadson was

driving. Gadson appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the law

enforcement officer had no objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation had

occurred.

On December 2, 2012, Kansas City Police Officer Mark Porter wassurveilling

a residence and observed three people leave the residence, get into a car, and proceed

westbound on Longview Road. Officer Porter followed. Although another vehicle

was between them, Officer Porter testified that he had a clear view of the car as it

entered and exited a traffic circle. 

A double-headed arrow painted on Longview Road at the entrance to the traffic

circle indicates that a vehicle may proceed straight onto the innermost lane of the

traffic circle or turn right to stay on the outermost lane. The car Officer Porter was

following entered the outermost lane and 100 feet later veered right out of the traffic

circle onto Red Bridge Road. Officer Porter testified that the car failed to signal as

it exited the traffic circle. Officer Porter believed based on his knowledge with

respect to this traffic circle that the person driving the vehicle should have signaled

because he was making a right turn at an intersection. Officer Porter relayed the car’s

failure to signal to Officer John Dawdy. Dawdy stopped the car, which was driven

by Gadson. Subsequentsearches of Gadson and the vehicle uncovered the drugs and

gun.

After he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gadson

moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop, arguing that he did not

commit a traffic infraction because he did signal right, or alternatively, that Officer

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

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District of Missouri.

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Porter did not have an objectively reasonable basis for believing a traffic violation

occurred. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion on the grounds

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that there was no evidence to support Gadson signaling and Officer Porter could have

reasonably believed that Gadson’s failure to signal violated a Kansas City ordinance. 

After independently reviewing the record, the district court adopted the magistrate

judge’s recommendation and denied the motion to suppress. Gadson appeals the

denial, contending only that there was no objectively reasonable basis for believing

a traffic violation occurred.

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact

for clear error. United States v. Ways, 832 F.3d 887, 892 (8th Cir. 2016). “Any

traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” United

States v. Adler, 590 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Wright,

512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008)). “[A]s long as an officer objectively has a

reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law” he may

conduct a traffic stop. United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2013)

(quoting United States v. Coney, 456 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2006)).

Gadson argues that his purported failure to signal upon exiting the traffic circle

was not a violation of Kansas City law as set out in Kansas City, Missouri Code of

Ordinances Section 70-454, which provides in relevant part:

No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection . . . or

otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right

or left upon a roadway, unless and until such movement

can be made with reasonable safety. No person shall so

turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the

manner provided in this division.

The Honorable Sarah W. Hays, United States Magistrate Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri.

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This statute, according to Gadson, did not require a signal upon exiting the traffic

circle because he entered the circle in the outermost lane and stayed in that lane until

it carried his vehicle out of the circle, never turning or changing lanes. He further

argues that Officer Porter was not objectively reasonable in believing his actions

constituted a violation of the ordinance.

We need not decide whether Section 70-454 required Gadson to signal because

an officer may make a traffic stop based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law. 

See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014); United States v. Smart, 393

F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he validity of a stop depends on whether the

officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in mistake

cases the question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an

objectively reasonable one.”). Even if Officer Porter was mistaken in his belief that

signaling was required prior to exiting the traffic circle, the officer’s error of law was

reasonable. Section 70-454 requires a signal whenever a person “turn[s] a vehicle

from a direct course or move[s] right or left upon a roadway.” An objectively

reasonable officer in Officer Porter’s position could believe that Gadson wasrequired

to use his turn signal as he veered right while exiting the traffic circle.

Gadson argues that Officer Porter’s belief was not objectively reasonable

because his rationale for requiring a signal at this intersection and not others is

“conflicting and implausible.” But “[w]e do not examine the subjective

understanding of the particular officer involved” in determining whether an officer’s

mistake was reasonable. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539. Because Officer Porter had an

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objectively reasonable basis for believing Gadson breached a traffic law, the stop was

permissible.3

The judgment is affirmed.

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The government argues, in the alternative, that the officer’s discovery of 3

Gadson’s pre-existing outstanding warrants attenuated any unconstitutionality of the

initial stop under Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). Because we resolve this

case on other grounds, we need not address this argument.

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