PRESENT: All the Justices 

KEITH I. GLENN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record Number 070796 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 January 11, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Keith I. Glenn appeals from the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed his convictions for robbery 

and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Code §§ 18.2-58 

and 18.2-22. On appeal, Glenn contends the denial of his motion 

to suppress certain evidence obtained in a search of his 

grandfather's house was reversible error. For the reasons set 

forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

 On January 8, 2004, a magistrate issued a warrant for 

Glenn’s arrest in relation to a robbery in the City of Colonial 

Heights. The following day, officers of the Colonial Heights 

Police Department and the Sussex County Sheriff's Office 

attempted to execute the warrant at the address listed on the 

warrant. The occupants of the residence at that address 

directed the officers to another location, the home of Glenn's 

grandparents. Responding to the officers’ knock, Glenn answered 

the front door of his grandparents’ home and was immediately 
2

arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. The officers then 

entered the living room and asked Glenn's grandfather, Ernest 

Brooks, if he owned the home. Brooks, unable to speak because 

of previous strokes, nodded in affirmation. The officers 

similarly determined from Brooks that Glenn was living in the 

home but did not pay rent. After obtaining this information, 

the officers asked Brooks for permission to search the house, 

which Brooks again granted with a nod of his head.1

 The officers 

did not ask for Glenn’s consent, but he was detained in the 

living room with Brooks during the officers’ conversation and 

the subsequent search. 

 After Brooks consented to the search of his house, Glenn 

identified to the officers the bedroom where Glenn slept. The 

door to that room was open and unlocked. An officer searched 

the room and found, among other things, three mattresses propped 

against a wall and boxes of women's clothing, but no evidence 

relating to the robbery. As the officer left the room, he 

looked down the hallway, where a second bedroom was located. 

Glenn then stated, "Oh, yeah, I sleep in that bedroom as well." 

The officer then entered the second bedroom, which was also open 

and unlocked, and saw a pair of pants on the bed and a closed 

backpack on the floor. The backpack had no outward indicia of 

 1

 Glenn presents no challenge to the grandfather’s capacity 

to knowingly and intelligently grant voluntary consent for the 

search. 
3

ownership such as a nametag or monogram and had no locking 

device. 

The officer opened the backpack and discovered the robbery 

victim's cellular telephone and a wallet containing Glenn’s 

identification and $45. Officers then escorted Glenn to the 

second bedroom where he identified the backpack as his own and 

volunteered that he found the cellular telephone on the ground 

in Colonial Heights. Glenn remained “calm” throughout the 

search and did not protest the search of the rooms or any 

containers in those rooms. 

 Prior to trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Colonial 

Heights, Glenn filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in 

the backpack, contending that neither his “grandfather nor any 

third party is capable to assent and/or waive” Glenn’s Fourth 

Amendment rights regarding his personal property in a closed 

container in his bedroom. Glenn's grandmother testified at the 

hearing that Glenn lived in the home without paying rent, but 

that Glenn had keys to the home. She further testified that she 

could enter the two rooms searched at any time and that the 

women's clothes found in Glenn's bedroom belonged to her. 

Glenn's grandmother also testified that the backpack belonged 

exclusively to Glenn and was never used by her or Brooks. 

 The circuit court found that Brooks consented to the search 

of his house “without reservation or qualification” and that 
4

“[Glenn] was present at the search, observed the search and took 

no action to countermand his grandfather’s permission by 

advising the police that he objected to the search of that 

portion of the residence he later claimed he occupied.” The 

circuit court then denied the motion to suppress. Glenn 

subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Code 

§ 19.2-254, reserving his right to appeal the issues raised in 

his suppression motion. The circuit court accepted the plea, 

found Glenn guilty, and sentenced him to seven years’ active 

incarceration. 

On appeal in the Court of Appeals, a divided panel of that 

court reversed his convictions, holding that the circuit court 

erred by not granting Glenn’s motion to suppress. Glenn v. 

Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 556, 563, 633 S.E.2d 205, 209 (2006). 

However, on rehearing en banc, Glenn's convictions were 

affirmed. Glenn v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 413, 416, 642 

S.E.2d 282, 283 (2007). The court held that "the police 

officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the 

grandfather's consent to search his house included permission to 

open a backpack found on the floor in one of the rooms." Id. at 

422, 642 S.E.2d at 286. This conclusion was based in part on 

the fact that “[n]othing about the backpack itself put the 

officers on notice that Glenn claimed an exclusive privacy 

interest in it.” Id. at 423, 642 S.E.2d at 286 (emphasis in 
5

original). Although the police had no “positive knowledge that 

the closed container” was Brooks’, they did not have “reliable 

information that the container” was not under Brooks’ control. 

Id. at 420, 642 S.E.2d at 285. The Court of Appeals also found 

support for its conclusion in the United States Supreme Court's 

decision in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), because 

Glenn was present at the time of the search, but failed to 

object. We awarded Glenn this appeal. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Appellate review of a trial court's denial of a defendant's 

motion to suppress is de novo when the defendant claims that the 

evidence sought to be suppressed was seized in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573, 570 

S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002). In performing this review, we consider 

the evidence "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth," 

McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 

(2001), and "accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all 

inferences fairly deducible from the evidence." Riner v. 

Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 303, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2004); see 

also Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313-14, 541 S.E.2d 872, 

877-78 (2001). The defendant bears the burden of establishing 

that the denial of his suppression motion was reversible error. 

Murphy, 264 Va. at 573, 570 S.E.2d at 838. 

III. ANAYLSIS 
6

 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Warrantless searches and seizures in a person's home are 

presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 

586 (1980). However, courts recognize exceptions to this 

general rule in several circumstances, including when a party 

voluntarily consents to the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well settled that one of 

the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of 

. . . a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted 

pursuant to consent.”). As in any Fourth Amendment review, the 

touchstone of our analysis is the reasonableness of the search 

under the circumstances. E.g., United States v. Knights, 534 

U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 

185 (1990); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971)). 

Depending on the circumstances, a search may be deemed 

reasonable when conducted pursuant to voluntary consent offered 

not by the defendant himself but by a third party who shares 

access to the premises or object being searched with the 

defendant. 

The authority which justifies the third-party consent 

. . . rests . . . on mutual use of the property by 

persons generally having joint access or control for 

most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize 

that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit 
7

the inspection in his own right and that the others 

have assumed the risk that one of their number might 

permit the common area to be searched. 

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); see also

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 

(1969). 

Brooks, as the owner of the home, possessed the authority 

to consent to a search of his house, including a search of the 

rooms used by Glenn, a houseguest. On appeal, Glenn does not 

challenge Brooks’ authority to consent to a search of the entire 

house, including the room in which the backpack was located.2 

Rather, Glenn contends the Court of Appeals and circuit court 

erred in denying the motion to suppress because the third party, 

Brooks, had no authority to give consent to a search of a closed 

container of Glenn’s personal property. As the search of the 

fixed premises, the home, was proper, the issue before us is 

narrowed to whether there was a constitutionally valid consent 

for the search of a closed container within that house that the 

evidence later established belonged to Glenn rather than his 

grandfather. In other words, regardless of Brooks’ authority to 

 2

 See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978), 

in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 

Circuit determined that a mother "clearly had authority to 

permit inspection" of her son's bedroom because the son was "a 

mere guest occupant of the room in his mother's home, and the 

mother had the normal free access that heads of household 

commonly exercise in respect of the rooms of family member 

occupants." Id. at 541. 
8

authorize the search of his house, did that authority extend to 

closed containers located therein? 

Although involving the search of an automobile and not a 

home, the Supreme Court enunciated basic Fourth Amendment 

principles applicable to the search of a closed container in the 

seminal case of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982): 

A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to 

the entire area in which the object of the search may 

be found and is not limited by the possibility that 

separate acts of entry or opening may be required to 

complete the search. . . . When a legitimate search 

is under way . . . nice distinctions between closets, 

drawers, and containers, in the case of a home . . . 

must give way to the interest in the prompt and 

efficient completion of the task at hand. 

Id. at 820-21. 

 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 

search of an apartment when the officers incorrectly executed 

the search but acted with objective reasonableness based on the 

facts known to them at the time of the search. 

[I]n order to satisfy the reasonableness requirement 

of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of 

the many factual determinations that must regularly be 

made by . . . the police officer conducting a search 

or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant 

requirement [] is not that they always be correct, but 

that they always be reasonable. 

. . . . 

As with other factual determinations bearing upon 

search and seizure, determination of consent to enter 

must be judged against an objective standard: would 

the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . 
9

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that 

the consenting party had authority over the premises? 

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185, 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1, 21-22 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Glenn’s argument on appeal is essentially that any 

conclusion by the police that Brooks had the authority to 

consent to searching the backpack was objectively unreasonable 

as a matter of law. This is so, Glenn argues, because the 

police had no specific or direct knowledge, at the time of the 

search, that the backpack either belonged to Brooks or that 

Brooks had access to it. Glenn contends this is particularly 

relevant because he told the police that he used the room in 

which they found the backpack. In Glenn’s view, even if Brooks 

did voluntarily consent to a search which included the backpack, 

that consent was a nullity because Brooks had no authority over 

that item. 

Glenn’s argument points to the distinction, recognized by 

the Court of Appeals, that a person authorizing a search by 

consent can be either a person with actual or apparent authority 

over the object of the search. 

A third party has actual authority to consent to 

a search if that third party has either (1) mutual use 

of the property by virtue of joint access, or (2) 

control for most purposes. Even where actual 

authority is lacking, however, a third party has 

apparent authority to consent to a search when an 

officer reasonably, even if erroneously, believes the 

third party possesses authority to consent. 
10

Whether apparent authority exists is an 

objective, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry into 

whether the facts available to the officers at the 

time they commenced the search would lead a reasonable 

officer to believe the third party had authority to 

consent to the search. 

United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716-17 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Had Brooks 

been the only occupant of his residence, this distinction would 

be irrelevant. However, because there were multiple occupants, 

each with his or her own potentially distinct privacy interests, 

the question of authority is directly relevant to the 

reasonableness of the police search. 

 As the evidence at trial reflected, Brooks did not, in 

fact, have actual authority over the backpack. But that 

determination of a lack of actual authority after the search is 

not dispositive of the reasonableness inquiry. If the 

consenting party had the apparent authority to consent to the 

search, as it appeared to an objectively reasonable police 

officer, then the consent is valid for Fourth Amendment purposes 

as to another holder of a privacy interest in the object to be 

searched. Andrus, 483 F.3d at 722. In other words, if Brooks 

reasonably appeared to have the authority to consent to a search 

of the backpack, that apparent authority is sufficient to 

vitiate any Fourth Amendment claim by Glenn. 
11

Glenn is correct that the police did not affirmatively know 

that Brooks owned or used the backpack at the time of the 

search. On the other hand, nothing in the record shows the 

police knew that Brooks did not own or use the backpack. Had 

the backpack borne Glenn’s name or other identifying marks, or 

had the backpack been locked or secreted among possessions which 

were exclusively Glenn’s, there would likely be few 

circumstances where an objectively reasonable police officer 

could conclude Brooks had the authority to consent to a search 

of the bag. However, none of those circumstances exist in this 

case. In fact, the opposite is true. The backpack bore no 

indicia of ownership, evidenced no limitations on access, had no 

characteristics that reflected a use by reason of age or gender, 

and was located in a place open to all occupants of the house. 

The circumstance facing the police officer who found the 

backpack in a room to which he was directed by Glenn, without 

any objection to a search of its contents, was whether Brooks’ 

consent to search reasonably included the bag. We hold it was 

objectively reasonable for the police officer to conclude 

Brooks’ consent to search included the authority to consent to a 

search of the backpack. 

In reaching our decision, we are cognizant that some 

ambiguity attended the ownership and ability to access the 

backpack as the police officer seized and searched it. As noted 
12

above, it bore no identifying indicia and could as logically 

have belonged to Brooks as it could to Glenn. The backpack was 

located in a room that the police knew Glenn used, but which was 

also open to the grandparents. The fact that evidence at the 

suppression hearing reflected that the backpack belonged to 

Glenn has no effect on determining the reasonableness of the 

grandfather’s apparent authority for the search at the time the 

police first found the backpack as none of those facts were 

known by the police at the time of the search. 

The question becomes whether the latent ambiguity about who 

could access the backpack renders a search unreasonable until 

all ambiguity is removed. We find the Court of Appeals’ 

reference to the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 

1038 (7th Cir. 2000), convincing. That court’s analysis is 

instructive as that case also involved the authority to search a 

closed container belonging to a person other than the one who 

authorized a general search of the premises where the container 

was located. 

In Melgar, police obtained consent from Rita Velasquez to 

search the hotel room she rented. At the time of the search, 

several other persons were in the room, including the defendant, 

Ms. Melgar. Police found and searched a purse in the room which 

“had no personalized markings on the outside.” The contents 
13

showed the purse belonged to Melgar and contained incriminating 

items that led to her arrest. Melgar claimed her Fourth 

Amendment rights were violated because Velasquez had no 

authority to consent to a search of her purse. Id. at 1040. 

Even though the police did not affirmatively know the purse 

belonged to Melgar at the time of the search, the court 

concluded it was not objectively unreasonable for the police to 

conclude that Velasquez, the renter of the room, had the 

authority to authorize not only a search of the room, but of the 

unmarked purse. 

[T]he real question for closed container searches is 

which way the risk of uncertainty should run. Is such 

a search permissible only if the police have positive 

knowledge that the closed container is also under the 

authority of the person who originally consented to 

the search (Melgar’s view), or is it permissible if 

the police do not have reliable information that the 

container is not under the authorizer’s control. We 

are not aware of any case that has taken the strict 

view represented by the first of these possibilities. 

. . . . 

[W]e conclude that the scope of [the renter’s] consent 

encompassed [a] right to look into this container. 

A contrary rule would impose an impossible burden 

on the police. It would mean that they could never 

search closed containers within a dwelling (including 

hotel rooms) without asking the person whose consent 

is being given ex ante about every item they might 

encounter. We note that there is no possibility of 

such a rule for automobile searches, because the 

Supreme Court has already authorized this type of 

container search in that context. Our conclusion here 

rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that 

indicates that the container rule rests on general 
14

principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend 

on the special attributes of automobile searches. 

Id. at 1041 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-821 and Wyoming v. 

Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999)) (emphasis in original). 

 The rationale in Melgar reflects a correct balancing of the 

competing interests involved in determining the reasonableness 

of a search in a Fourth Amendment context. Like the hotel room 

in Melgar, there was a valid consent to search the Brooks’ house 

in the case at bar. It was as objectively reasonable for the 

police to believe Velasquez had the authority to authorize a 

search of the unmarked purse in her room as it was for the 

police to believe Brooks had the authority to consent to a 

search of the unmarked backpack in his house. The police had no 

basis to believe that the backpack did not belong to Brooks or 

that he did not use it, just as they had no basis to believe the 

purse did not belong to Velasquez. Contrary to Glenn’s 

implication that the police should infer the backpack was the 

possession of the younger person, nothing in the record as of 

the time of the search would support that inference. To the 

contrary, it would be common knowledge that the elderly, such as 

the disabled grandfather, utilize backpacks or similar devices 

on their wheelchairs, walkers, or otherwise as an aid for their 
15

infirmities.3

 It was no less likely for the police to reasonably 

conclude the unidentified, unlocked, backpack was as open to 

Brooks in his own house as it was to Glenn, the houseguest. As 

did the court in Melgar, we conclude it was objectively 

reasonable for the police to conclude that the person consenting 

to the search of the premises, Brooks, appeared to have the 

authority to authorize the search of the backpack within the 

rooms open to him in his own home. 

 Our conclusion is further bolstered by the recent decision 

of the United States Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 

U.S. 103 (2006). While Randolph did not involve the search of a 

closed container, that case established important Fourth 

Amendment parameters in determining the reasonableness of 

consent to search where more than one person appears to have 

 3

 Glenn’s citation to the decision of the Indiana Supreme 

Court in Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957 (2001), does not support 

his position. In that case, a boyfriend and girlfriend occupied 

the same apartment. Police removed the girlfriend on an 

unrelated warrant and obtained consent from the boyfriend to 

search the apartment. During the search, the police discovered 

a purse and seized contraband in it and charged the girlfriend 

with its possession. The Indiana Supreme Court correctly held 

police could not have reasonably believed the boyfriend had the 

authority to consent to a search of the girlfriend’s purse. “We 

also find that the [prosecution] failed to justify the search on 

the basis of apparent authority. At the time [the officer] 

decided to search Krise's purse, he knew that the handbag was a 

woman's purse and that Krise was the only woman living in the 

house.” Id. at 971. 

 No such identifying factor is present in the case at bar to 

affect the determination of the reasonableness of the appearance 

of Brooks’ authority to consent to a search of the backpack. 
16

some authority or reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

premises to be searched. While Matlock had established that a 

co-occupant could grant voluntary consent to a search of 

premises over which she had material rights with an absent cooccupant, Randolph verified such a consent was ineffective if 

the other co-occupant was indeed present and objected. The 

Supreme Court then further explained that if the search is 

otherwise objectively reasonable, a potential objector who 

raises no objection to the search when he has the opportunity to 

do so “loses out.” 

[W]e have to admit that we are drawing a fine line; if 

a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting 

is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s 

permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, 

whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited 

to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out. 

 This is the line we draw, and we think the 

formalism is justified. . . . [W]e think it would 

needlessly limit the capacity of the police to respond 

to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field if 

we were to hold that reasonableness required the 

police to take affirmative steps to find a potentially 

objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission 

they had already received. 

Id. at 121-22. 

 The Supreme Court’s Randolph analysis aptly applies on the 

facts of this case. Glenn could have objected to the search of 

either of the bedrooms, but failed to do so even though he was 

in conversation with the police officers before and during the 

search. In fact, it was Glenn who directed the police to the 
17

bedroom in which the backpack was located, but without any hint 

of an objection to its being searched.4

 Insomuch as Brooks’ 

apparent authority to consent to the search was otherwise 

objectively reasonable, Glenn “loses out” due to his failure to 

make any objection despite ample opportunity to do so.5

IV. CONCLUSION 

The facts available to the officers at the time of the 

search of the Brooks house were sufficient to lead an 

objectively reasonable police officer to believe that Brooks had 

authority to consent to a search of the backpack. Accordingly, 

there was no error in denying Glenn’s motion to suppress. 

We will therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

Affirmed. 

 4

 Cf. United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 534-35 (4th Cir. 

2004) (“[T]he scope of a consent search is not limited only to 

those areas or items for which specific verbal permission is 

granted. Consent may be supplied by non-verbal conduct as well. 

. . . [The defendant] confirmed the propriety of the search by 

not objecting . . . .”). 

5

 Glenn’s citation to Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 

(1990), is without merit. Olson stands for the proposition that 

a houseguest, like Glenn, has standing to raise a Fourth 

Amendment challenge to the search of his property within the 

premises where he has guest privileges. Id. at 100. Glenn’s 

standing is not at issue in this case; he clearly has standing 

to raise the Fourth Amendment issue he argues, notwithstanding 

any potential waiver of that argument under Randolph. However, 

Glenn’s standing has no relevance to a decision on the merits as 

to whether it was objectively reasonable to conclude Brooks had 

apparent authority to consent to a search of the backpack.