NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0649n.06

No. 16-1124

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT BRANNON,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

LLOYD RAPELJE,

Respondent-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. After a four-day trial in the Monroe 

County Circuit Court, Robert K. Brannon was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct

for acts committed against his six-year-old niece. Brannon subsequently moved for a new trial, 

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the state trial 

court granted Brannon’s motion for a new trial, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. 

The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the 

conviction. Brannon then filed a petition for habeas relief in the U.S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of Michigan, arguing that counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to 

investigate and present expert testimony regarding the reliability of the victim’s testimony. The 

district court conditionally granted a writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel in failing to investigate and present expert testimony. We REVERSE the district court’s 
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judgment regarding Brannon’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and REMAND for 

consideration of his remaining claims.

I. BACKGROUND

The charges against Brannon arise out of events that occurred as early as 1995. The 

prosecution’s case rested primarily on testimony from Brannon’s niece, who stated that when she 

was six years old, while staying at her grandparents’ house in Michigan, Brannon anally 

penetrated her with a crayon. R. 6-17 (9/29/2008 Trial Tr. at 251‒56) (Page ID #1062‒67). 

Brannon’s niece did not tell anyone about this incident until about ten or eleven years later, after 

she learned that her aunt was sexually assaulted by Brannon. Id. at 256‒58, 306 (Page ID 

#1067‒69, 1117). The prosecution also offered testimony from the niece’s mother, grandfather, 

and aunt, as well as the detective from the Kane County Child Advocacy Center who interviewed 

the niece several years later.

The defense’s strategy focused on undermining the niece’s credibility as a witness. 

Brannon’s counsel, Attorney Michael Schloff, offered testimony from alibi witnesses to 

demonstrate that Brannon did not visit the grandparents’ house when the alleged conduct took 

place. Brannon’s wife testified that they had traveled during the summer in question, but not to 

her parents’ home in Michigan, and obtained bank records to corroborate her testimony. R. 6-19 

(10/01/2008 Trial Tr. at 58‒68, 90‒97) (Page ID #1487‒97, 1519‒26). Brannon’s former boss 

testified to business activity and expense reports that further supported the testimony of 

Brannon’s wife. Id. at 171‒73, 182 (Page ID #1600‒02, 1611). Schloff also offered testimony 
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from individuals who were friendly or close with Brannon’s niece when they were children, and 

who had never heard of any inappropriate activity between Brannon and his niece. Id. at 192‒96 

(Page ID #1621‒25).

After a four-day trial, Brannon was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual assault. 

Brannon filed a motion for a new trial, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

prosecutorial misconduct, great weight of the evidence, and erroneous admission of evidence. 

The trial court denied all but the first claim, for which it granted an evidentiary hearing.

The inquiry at the evidentiary hearing primarily concerned Schloff’s decision not to call 

certain expert witnesses. One witness was Dr. Terence Campbell, one of the three expert 

witnesses with whom Schloff spoke prior to trial. R. 6-28 (Ginther Hr’g Tr. at 13‒14) (Page ID 

#2011‒12). Campbell told Schloff that he could provide “some favorable testimony” by 

explaining problems with delayed memory and phenomena whereby false memories are created 

in children by the suggestion and repetition of facts. Id. at 13, 18‒20 (Page ID #2011, 2016‒18). 

He also warned Schloff, however, that his testimony would likely “have both good and bad 

components.” Id. at 19‒20 (Page ID #2017‒18). In particular, Campbell anticipated that he 

would have to admit that delayed reporting of sexual abuse was common. Id. at 17‒20, 25 (Page 

ID #2015‒18, 2023).

Schloff was also asked about his decision not to interview or call as a witness Dr. 

Katherine Okla, who was listed as a potential witness for the prosecution. Schloff admitted that 

he did not contact Okla because he believed attorney-client privilege precluded him from doing 
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so, and in any case, he did not believe that Okla would speak to opposing counsel. Id. at 26‒27 

(Page ID #2024‒25). He did, however, obtain a trial transcript from another trial at which Okla 

had testified, contacted an attorney from that case, and discussed Okla’s past publications with 

Campbell, who was familiar with her work. Id. at 14, 25‒26 (Page ID #2012, 2023‒24). Schloff 

did not contact Okla even when, two weeks before trial, the prosecution informed him of their 

decision not to call Okla as a witness. Id. at 23‒24 (Page ID #2021‒22).

Instead, Schloff decided at that time not to call any witnesses, because he feared that 

either his expert or an expert called by the prosecution in rebuttal would offer an opinion that 

delays in reporting of sexual abuse are common. Id. at 24‒26 (Page ID #2022‒24). He stated 

that, “I felt that the jury, when it initially heard that there was a ten-year delay, was gonna be 

very bothered by that and was gonna be quite suspicious of that delay and was going to want to 

hear why that delay occurred or perhaps how it could be explained. And I fully expected that 

Katherine Okla would provide that answer.” Id. at 24 (Page ID #2022).

The state trial court found that defense counsel had been ineffective and granted 

Brannon’s motion for a new trial. R. 1-2 (Trial Ct. Order at 19) (Page ID #109). The Michigan 

Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that counsel had failed adequately to investigate the benefit 

of expert witnesses. People v. Brannon, No. 292617, 2010 WL 1052272, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 

Mar. 23, 2010). The Michigan Supreme Court then reversed in a one-paragraph order and 

remanded for reinstatement of the conviction. People v. Brannon, 486 Mich. 1070 (2010). On 

remand, the trial court imposed a 20-to-40 year sentence on Brannon. His conviction was
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affirmed by the appellate court, People v. Brannon, No. 303267, 2013 WL 4528453, at *1 (Mich. 

Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied Brannon relief in a standard 

order, People v. Brannon, 495 Mich. 935 (2014). Brannon did not appeal to the U.S. Supreme 

Court or seek collateral review before the state trial court.

Brannon then filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief in the Eastern District of 

Michigan, raising eleven claims. Without addressing the remaining claims, the district court 

granted Brannon relief based on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to 

investigate and present expert testimony. R. 8 (Dist. Ct. Order at 1‒2) (Page ID #3172‒73). 

This appeal by the state followed.

II. ANALYSIS

In order to succeed on an ineffective-counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate both 

deficiency and prejudice. The first prong “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The second prong requires a showing that 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

Where, as here, a petitioner’s claim was previously adjudicated on the merits in state 

court, federal habeas review is further limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under § 2254, we may not

grant federal habeas relief “with respect to [a] claim that was adjudicated on the merits in [s]tate 
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court proceedings unless” the state court’s decision “was contrary to” clearly established federal 

law, “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, or reached a conclusion “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” before the state court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts are bound by the 

statute’s terms, and we may not grant the writ where “‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)

(citation omitted).

In reviewing Brannon’s claim, therefore, we cannot simply ask whether counsel’s 

performance fell below the acceptable standard outlined in Strickland. Id. Nor can we reverse a

state court’s determination merely because we would have found a Strickland violation on direct 

review. See id. (reversing a grant of relief where “it is not apparent how the [court’s] analysis 

would have been any different without AEDPA”); McGowan v. Burt, 788 F.3d 510, 513 (6th Cir. 

2015) (reversing a district court’s grant of relief because “its analysis more closely resembles de 

novo review”). The key inquiry is not merely whether the state court’s application was incorrect. 

Rather, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard 

was unreasonable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. Even where a federal court would reach a 

contrary conclusion on direct review, it “must determine what arguments or theories supported or

. . . could have supported, the state court’s decision,” and reverse only in those extreme cases 

“where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision 

conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.” Id. at 102.
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Here, the district court’s holding did not properly take into account the limits of 

§ 2254(d). After finding Schloff’s performance “unreasonable and prejudicial” based upon its 

own evaluation under Strickland, the district court concluded that the state court’s decision to the 

contrary was “objectively unreasonable.” R. 8 (Dist. Ct. Order at 17) (Page ID #3188). 

Although it found that Schloff’s trial decisions were unreasonable, the district court did not

explain why “fairminded jurists could not disagree that the conclusion reached by the Michigan 

Supreme Court was erroneous,” id., and made no effort to identify “what arguments or theories 

supported . . . the state court’s decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. Under the deferential 

terms imposed by AEDPA, we must reverse the grant of habeas relief.

Although there may be compelling reasons to view Schloff’s performance as deficient, 

the Michigan Supreme Court’s determination that he “made a reasonable strategic decision to 

forego expert testimony in light of the possibility that the witness might also provide testimony 

favorable to the prosecution” was not objectively unreasonable. Brannon, 486 Mich. at 1070. 

Schloff contacted three potential experts and discussed the delayed-reporting phenomenon at 

length with Campbell. He learned that while Campbell could render favorable opinions 

regarding the effect of delay and repetition of facts on a child’s memory, he might also represent 

that delayed reporting is common in sexual assault cases, which could have adversely affected 

Brannon’s case.

The state court’s determination that foregoing expert testimony constituted a “reasonable 

strategic decision” is supported by federal law. The Supreme Court has recognized that counsel 
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may sometimes forego key arguments when raising them could “increase[] the likelihood of the 

prosecution[] producing its own evidence . . . or transform the case into a battle of the experts.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 108‒09. Indeed, because criminal cases impose such a high burden of 

proof on the prosecution, “it sometimes is better to try to cast pervasive suspicion of doubt than 

to strive to prove a certainty that exonerates.” Id. at 109. Here, Schloff could have reasonably 

believed that producing his own expert would prompt the prosecution to present unfavorable 

evidence that would further damage Brannon’s case. Moreover, foregoing this evidence may 

have been a reasonable strategic decision given Schloff’s belief that the jury would be suspicious 

of the delay in reporting, which, coupled with the alibi defense, could cast a sufficient amount of 

doubt on the prosecution’s case. See R. 6-28 (Ginther Hearing Tr. at 24) (Page ID #2022).

Considering the “arguments or theories [that] . . . could have supported[] the state court’s 

decision,” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102, it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree as to 

whether trial counsel’s actions and omissions were justified as reasonable strategic decisions. 

Although there is evidence that Schloff’s performance reflects flawed interpretations of the law,

that alone is insufficient to overturn a state court’s decision under AEDPA. Because the state 

court did not unreasonably apply the Strickland standard, Brannon is not entitled to federal 

habeas relief on his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate and 

present expert testimony. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for 

consideration of Brannon’s remaining ten claims.
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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment regarding 

Brannon’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and REMAND for consideration of his 

remaining claims.