41200 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 122 / Friday, June 24, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

(b) The civil money penalty for 

election sensitive reports that are filed 

late or not filed shall be calculated in 

accordance with the following schedule 

of penalties: 

If the level of activity in the 

report was: 

And the report was filed late, the civil money penalty 

is: Or the report was not filed, the civil money penalty is: 

$1–$4,999.99 a ...................... [$64 + ($13 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)].$643 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$5,000–$9,999.99 .................. [$129 + ($13 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$771 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$10,000–24,999.99 ................ [$193 + ($13 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$1,157 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$25,000–49,999.99 ................ [$410 + ($32 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$1,800 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$50,000–74,999.99 ................ [$615 + ($103 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$4,101 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$75,000–99,999.99 ................ [$820 + ($137 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$5,468 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$100,000–149,999.99 ............ [$1,230 + ($171 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$6,834 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$150,000–199,999.99 ............ [$1,640 + ($205 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$8,201 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$200,000–249,999.99 ............ [$2,050 + ($239 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$10,252 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$250,000–349,999.99 ............ [$3,076 + ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$12,302 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$350,000–449,999.99 ............ [$4,101+ ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$13,669 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$450,000–549,999.99 ............ [$5,126 + ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$15,036 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$550,000–649,999.99 ............ [$6,151 + ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$16,403 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$650,000–749,999.99 ............ [$7,176 + ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$17,770 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$750,000–849,999.99 ............ [$8,201 + ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$19,136 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$850,000–949,999.99 ............ [$9,227 + ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$20,503 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

$950,000 or over ................... [$10,252 + ($273 × Number of days late)] × [1 + (.25 × 

Number of previous violations)].

$21,870 × [1 + (.25 × Number of previous violations)]. 

aThe civil money penalty for a respondent who does not have any previous violations will not exceed the level of activity in the report. 

(c) If the respondent fails to file a 

required report and the Commission 

cannot calculate the level of activity 

under paragraph (d) of this section, then 

the civil money penalty shall be $7,518. 

* * * * * 

§ 111.44 [Amended] 

■ 4. In § 111.44, paragraph (a)(1) is 

amended by removing ‘‘$110’’ and 

adding in its place ‘‘$137’’. 

Dated: June 16, 2016. 

On behalf of the Commission. 

Matthew S. Petersen, 

Chairman, Federal Election Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2016–14877 Filed 6–23–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6715–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 25, 121, and 129 

[Docket No.: FAA–2014–0500; Amdt. Nos. 

25–142, 21–376, and 129–53] 

RIN 2120–AK30 

Fuel Tank Vent Fire Protection 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is amending certain 

airworthiness regulations for transport 

category airplanes to require fuel tank 

designs that prevent a fuel tank 

explosion caused by the propagation of 

flames, from external fires, through the 

fuel tank vents. This final rule requires 

a delay of two minutes and thirty 

seconds between exposure of external 

fuel tank vents to ignition sources and 

explosions caused by propagation of 

flames into the fuel tank, thus 

increasing the time available for 

passenger evacuation and emergency 

response. These amendments apply to 

applications for new type certificates 

and certain applications for amended or 

supplemental type certificates. The 

amendments also require certain 

airplanes produced in the future and 

operated by air carriers to meet the new 

standards. 

DATES: Effective August 23, 2016. The 

compliance date for the requirements in 

§ 25.975 is August 23, 2016. The 

compliance date for the requirements in 

§§ 121.1119 and 129.119 is August 23, 

2018. 

ADDRESSES: For information on where to 

obtain copies of rulemaking documents 

and other information related to this 

final rule, see ‘‘How to Obtain 

Additional Information’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

action, contact Mike Dostert, Propulsion 

and Mechanical Systems Branch, ANM– 

112, Transport Airplane Directorate, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 122 / Friday, June 24, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 41201 

1A vapor space is any portion of the airplane fuel 

tanks and the fuel tank vent system that, if such 

tanks and system held any fuel, could contain fuel 

vapor. 

2Flame propagation is the spread of a flame in 

a combustible environment outward from the point 

at which the combustion started. 

3A fuel tank vent system is a system that 

ventilates fuel vapor from the airplane fuel tanks to 

the atmosphere. A fuel tank vent system ensures 

that the air and fuel pressure within the fuel tank 

stay within structural limits required by § 25.975 

(a). 

4AC 25.975–1 is available on the FAA Web site 

at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/

advisory_circulars/. 

5AD 99–03–04 BOEING: Amendment 39–11018; 

Docket 98–NM–50–AD (effective March 9, 1999). 

6AD 2011–15–02 LOCKHEED: Amendment 39– 

16749; Docket No. FAA–2010–1305 (effective 

August 19, 2011). 

7Special Aviation Fire and Explosion Reduction 

(SAFER) Advisory Committee Final Report, Volume 

1, FAA–ASF–80–4, dated June 26, 1978, through 

June 26, 1980. A copy of this report has been placed 

in the docket of this proceeding. 

Aircraft Certification Service, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind Ave 

SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

telephone (425) 227–2132; facsimile 

(425) 227–1149; email Mike.Dostert@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the 

United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 

106 describes the authority of the FAA 

Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation 

Programs, describes in more detail the 

scope of the agency’s authority. 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701, ‘‘General Requirements.’’ Under 

that section, the FAA is charged with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

and minimum standards, for the design 

and performance of aircraft, that the 

Administrator finds necessary for safety 

in air commerce. This regulation is 

within the scope of that authority. It 

prescribes new safety standards for the 

design and operation of transport 

category airplanes. 

I. Overview of Final Rule 

A. General 

The FAA is amending title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 

25, 121, and 129 as described below. 

The intent of this rule is to prevent fuel 

tank explosions caused by ignition from 

external ignition sources of fuel vapor 

either contained in vapor spaces 1 or 

exiting from vapor spaces through the 

fuel tank vent outlets. Potential external 

ignition sources include, but are not 

limited to, ground handling equipment, 

fuel fires that result from refueling 

spills, or ground fires that follow a 

survivable crash landing in which the 

fuel tank and the vent system remain 

intact. Means to prevent or delay the 

propagation of flame 2 from external 

sources into the fuel tank through the 

fuel tank vent system 3 would also 

prevent or delay fuel tank explosions 

following certain accidents. These 

means include flame arrestors or fuel 

tank inerting. This prevention or delay 

would provide additional time for the 

safe evacuation of passengers from the 

airplane and for emergency personnel to 

provide assistance. 

This rule applies to applications for 

new type certificates and applications 

for amended or supplemental type 

certificates on significant product-level 

change projects in which § 25.975, 

‘‘Fuel tank vents and carburetor vapor 

vents,’’ is applicable to a changed area. 

Additionally, a new operating 

requirement in both 14 CFR part 121, 

‘‘Operating Requirements: Domestic, 

Flag, and Supplemental Operations,’’ 

and 14 CFR part 129, ‘‘Operations: 

Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign 

Operators of U.S.-Registered Aircraft 

Engaged in Common Carriage,’’ applies 

to airplanes that are issued an original 

airworthiness certificate after a specified 

date. The FAA is not requiring retrofit 

of the existing fleet. 

Concurrent with the publication of 

this rule, the FAA is publishing 

Advisory Circular (AC) 25.975–1 that 

provides guidance concerning means of 

compliance with the revised § 25.975.4

II. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

This rulemaking addresses the 

problem of fuel tank explosions caused 

by flame propagation from fires outside 

the airplane reaching the fuel tank 

through the fuel tank vents. Fires 

outside of the airplane fuel tanks can be 

caused by ignition of fuel spilled during 

refueling, fuel and oil spillage from 

engines that separate from the airplane 

following an accident, or fuel leaking 

from damaged airplane fuel tanks. In 

some cases, external fires have ignited 

fuel vapors that have exited the fuel 

tank vents, resulting in flames traveling 

back through the vent lines into the fuel 

tank and causing fuel tank explosions. 

These explosions have caused passenger 

fatalities and prevented emergency 

personnel from assisting survivors. 

Existing requirements address some 

ignition sources. Airworthiness 

standards in § 25.981 for preventing fuel 

system explosions include requirements 

to prevent ignition sources inside the 

fuel tanks caused by failures of airplane 

components or external heating of the 

fuel tank walls. The fuel tank venting 

standards in § 25.975 include 

requirements to ensure fuel tank 

structural integrity following failures of 

the refueling system that could result in 

overfilling of the fuel tanks, or clogging 

of the vents due to ice. Section 25.954, 

‘‘Fuel system lightning protection,’’ 

requires that fuel tank vents be designed 

and arranged to prevent the ignition of 

fuel vapor within the system by 

lightning strikes. These regulations, 

however, do not address the risk posed 

by flame from external ignition sources 

entering the fuel tank through the fuel 

vents. 

Most new type designs and transport 

category airplanes currently in 

production include flame arrestors or 

other means to prevent flame 

propagation through the fuel vent lines 

into the fuel tanks. However, some 

models of newly manufactured 

airplanes produced under older type 

certificates and introduced into the U.S. 

fleet do not have a means of preventing 

fuel tank explosions caused by external 

ignition sources. In addition, lack of a 

specific part 25 regulation to address 

this has resulted in some applicants 

completing initial airplane designs and 

applying for a U.S. type certificate 

without having accounted for the risk of 

flame propagation through fuel vent 

lines. 

B. History 

These amendments stem from an 

industry study of potential post-crash 

survivability and FAA airworthiness 

actions in response to accidents that 

involved fuel tank explosions. The FAA 

has issued airworthiness directives 

(ADs) that require flame arrestors, or 

verification of their functionality, on 

several airplane models. In 1999, 

following a review of fuel tank 

explosions on older designs, the FAA 

issued an AD 5 mandating incorporation 

of flame arrestors on Boeing Model 737 

airplanes. That AD action eliminated 

the risk of fuel tank explosions from 

flames entering the fuel tanks through 

the fuel tank vents on early models of 

the Boeing 737. More recently, in 2008, 

the FAA issued an AD requiring 

installation of flame arrestors on the 

Lockheed Model 382.6

The Special Aviation Fire and 

Explosion Reduction (SAFER) Advisory 

Committee 7 examined transport 

category airplane post-crash fires and 

determined that four fuel tank 

explosions resulting from post-crash 

fires could have been avoided if flame 

arrestors or surge tank explosion 


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41202 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 122 / Friday, June 24, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

8Boeing developed surge tank explosion 

suppression systems that were installed on some 

Boeing airplanes to prevent a lightning strike from 

igniting fuel vapor in the fuel tank vent system. 

These systems used light sensors that activated the 

discharge of fire suppression agent into the vent 

surge tank to prevent the fire from traveling through 

the vents into the airplane fuel tanks. 

9SAFER Report, page 49, Figure 3. 

10 John Hickey, Director, Aircraft Certification 

Service, to Craig Bolt, Assistant Chair, Transport 

Airplane and Engine Issues Group, 14 June 2005. 

11This time includes 1 minute for a fire to 

penetrate the fuselage skin and an additional 4 

minutes for the fire to burn through the insulation. 

12 DOT/FAA/AR–99/57, ‘‘Fuselage Burnthrough 

Protection for Increased Postcrash Occupant 

Survivability: Safety Benefit Analysis Based on Past 

Accidents,’’ September 1999. 

13 DOT/FAA/AR–09/18, ‘‘Determination of 

Evacuation and Firefighting Times Based on an 

Analysis of Aircraft Accident Fire Survivability 

Data,’’ May 2009. 

suppression systems 8 had been 

installed in the airplane fuel tank 

vents.9 The SAFER Committee 

examined methods of preventing fuel 

tank explosions following impact in 

survivable accidents, including 

controlling the fuel tank flammability 

using nitrogen inerting systems, using 

fire suppression systems, and 

installation of flame arrestors. 

The SAFER Committee determined 

the most practical means of preventing 

post-crash fuel tank explosions was the 

use of flame arrestors. Flame arrestors 

stop the flame from traveling through 

the fuel tank vents by quenching the 

flame. Flame arrestors are typically 

made of numerous small stainless steel 

passages that remove heat from the 

flame so it dies out before passing into 

the fuel tank. This delays propagation of 

ground fires into the fuel tank and 

subsequent explosions, providing 

additional time for the safe evacuation 

of passengers. The two flame arrestors 

installed on a typical transport airplane 

weigh approximately 2 to 4 pounds 

each. 

In 1995, based on the SAFER 

Committee report, the FAA issued an 

NPRM entitled, ‘‘Fuel System Vent Fire 

Protection,’’ (60 FR 6632), dated 

February 2, 1995. That NPRM proposed 

to require 5 minutes of fuel tank vent 

fire protection in new type designs for 

transport category airplanes, and amend 

certain operating rules to require retrofit 

of the existing fleet of transport category 

airplanes. The FAA received comments 

on the NPRM that questioned the 

proposed 5-minute standard and the 

accuracy of the economic analysis 

related to the proposed retrofit 

requirement. Comments also suggested 

that the FAA should develop additional 

guidance, in the form of an AC, to 

provide an acceptable method of 

qualifying flame arrestors as a means of 

meeting the proposed requirement. 

To address those 1995 comments, the 

FAA obtained additional cost 

information from component suppliers, 

and drafted an AC that included a 

means of demonstrating compliance. 

That means of compliance was the 

installation of fuel tank vent flame 

arrestors that would prevent 

propagation of flames through the fuel 

tank vents into the fuel tanks for a 

minimum of 2 minutes and 30 seconds. 

In 2001, the FAA tasked its Aviation 

Rulemaking Advisory Committee 

(ARAC) to review a draft final rule, 

including the FAA’s proposed 

disposition of public comments, and the 

draft AC. In 2002, due to the ARAC 

tasking, the FAA published in the 

Federal Register a notice of withdrawal 

of the NPRM that had been published in 

1995. Because of industry resource 

issues and FAA rulemaking 

prioritization activities, however, no 

work was done on these ARAC taskings. 

The FAA published a withdrawal of the 

tasks on June 21, 2004. 

As an alternative, the FAA developed 

a strategy for a number of rulemaking 

projects that had been tasked to the 

ARAC. In 2005, the FAA issued a 

letter 10 to the head of the Transport 

Airplane and Engine Issues Group 

describing the agency’s intent to use the 

process under 14 CFR 21.21 of finding 

an unsafe design feature to address the 

need to prevent flame propagation 

through fuel tank vents. Since 2005, the 

FAA has used issue papers applicable to 

specific certification projects, which 

have resulted in the inclusion of flame 

arrestors in the design of new type 

certificated airplanes. 

Prior to the FAA’s issuance of the 

2005 letter, however, many 

manufacturers had followed industry 

recommendations and voluntarily 

introduced flame arrestors into their 

new type designs. 

However, some business jets and 

smaller transport category airplanes do 

not incorporate flame arrestors or other 

means to prevent flame propagation into 

the fuel tanks. Also, some airplanes 

operating under 14 CFR part 121 do not 

have such means, including older 

models like the DC–9 and MD–80, and 

all DHC–8 turboprops and Canadair 

Regional Jets, both of which are still in 

production. This amendment addresses 

those airplanes. 

As discussed in the NPRM, the FAA 

based the 2 minute and 30 seconds, in 

part, on previous Aerospace Industries 

Association (AIA) comments to the 

NPRM the FAA published in 1995 that 

proposed a 5-minute standard. AIA 

stated that flame arrestors in production 

at that time could not meet the proposed 

5-minute standard and that 5 minutes 

was overly conservative. Based on those 

comments, the FAA reviewed the 

capability and the service experience of 

in-production designs, as well as the 

conservatism of the flame-holding test 

methods used for evaluating flame 

arrestor performance. In 1996, the FAA 

determined that a 2 minute and 30 

second capability allowed flame 

arrestors in production at that time to 

provide adequate evacuation and 

emergency response time. Since that 

time, under §§ 21.21(b)(2) and 25.601, 

the FAA has applied issue papers to 

new type certification projects that 

approved applicants’ proposals to 

reduce the risk of fuel tank explosions 

by incorporating flame arrestors with a 

2 minute and 30 second delay 

capability. 

The FAA also reviewed other rules 

related to passenger safety when 

selecting the delay of 2 minute and 30 

seconds for a fuel tank vent protection 

standard. Section 25.803, ‘‘Emergency 

evacuation,’’ sets a performance-based 

standard that, under specified 

conditions, the airplane must be capable 

of being evacuated within 90 seconds. 

The conditions assume the availability 

of a minimum number of exits and that 

all passengers are uninjured and 

physically capable of departing the 

airplane. However, experience has 

shown that this is not always the case 

after an accident, so additional time is 

needed for passenger evacuation and 

emergency response. 

Section 25.856, ‘‘Thermal/Acoustic 

insulation materials,’’ sets minimum 

standards for preventing penetration of 

a fuel fire through the airplane fuselage, 

including testing requirements in 

appendix F of part 25 that require 5 

minutes as the minimum burn-through 

time.11 Studies of past accidents 12 13

show the greatest benefits in evacuating 

passengers and allowing emergency 

crews time to arrive are provided with 

a minimum burn-through time of 5 

minutes. However, flame arrestors that 

meet a 5-minute standard would need to 

be significantly larger and heavier than 

a flame arrestor meeting the 2 minute 

and 30 second standard. Such arrestors 

could also require changes to the fuel 

system vent lines in order to meet 

airplane refueling performance 

requirements, resulting in additional 

cost. Therefore, a minimum standard of 

2 minutes and 30 seconds is appropriate 

for preventing the propagation of flames 

from outside the tank through the fuel 

tank vents into fuel tank vapor spaces. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 122 / Friday, June 24, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 41203 

14The previously approved Lockheed 328 and 

Embraer flame arrestors would not have met the 2 

minute and 30 second requirement. 

C. Summary of the NPRM 

On August 1, 2014, the FAA issued an 

NPRM proposing to amend §§ 25.975, 

121.1119, and 129.119. The Federal 

Register published that NPRM as Notice 

No. 14–07, Docket No. FAA–2014–0500, 

on August 15, 2014 (79 FR 48098). In 

that NPRM, the FAA proposed to 

require that fuel tank designs prevent 

fuel tank explosions, for a minimum of 

2 minutes and 30 seconds, caused by 

propagation of flames from outside the 

tank through the fuel tank vents into 

vapor spaces when any vent is 

continuously exposed to flame. 

The comment period closed on 

September 29, 2014. 

D. General Overview of Comments 

The FAA received 19 comments from 

10 commenters representing airplane 

manufacturers, regulators, a pilots 

association, and individuals. The Air 

Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and 

three individuals provided general 

comments in support of the 

amendments. The other commenters 

generally supported the proposed 

changes; however, some commenters 

suggested changes. 

The FAA received comments on the 

following areas of the proposal: 

• Minimum time for preventing flame 

propagation; 

• Applicability of new §§ 121.1119 

and 129.119; 

• Applicability and compliance time 

for newly manufactured airplanes; and 

• Economic evaluation. 

III. Discussion of the Final Rule and 

Public Comments 

A. ‘‘Fuel tank vents and carburetor 

vapor vents’’ (§ 25.975) 

With some modification from what 

the FAA proposed in the NPRM, this 

final rule adds a new paragraph, (a)(7), 

to § 25.975 to require fuel tank vent 

systems be designed to prevent the 

propagation of flames from outside the 

tank through the fuel tank vents into 

fuel tank vapor spaces for a period of 2 

minutes and 30 seconds. The intent of 

this new requirement is to prevent or 

delay fuel tank explosions to allow safe 

evacuation of passengers and crew, and 

to allow emergency personnel time to 

reach an accident and provide 

assistance. 

Boeing recommended replacing the 

proposed minimum time requirement of 

2 minutes and 30 seconds with 90 

seconds. Boeing commented that, to 

meet the proposed requirement, current 

Boeing airplanes may need to be 

redesigned, and current flame arrestor 

installations would have to be 

redesigned and recertified, both at 

significant cost. Boeing also commented 

that 90 seconds would allow sufficient 

time to evacuate passengers safely and 

be consistent with other evacuation time 

limits in § 25.803. 

When considering Boeing’s comment 

that its designs would not meet the 

proposed 2 minute and 30 second delay, 

the FAA requested certification data for 

in-production Boeing designs and 

confirmed that existing Boeing flame 

arrestors meet the 2 minute and 30 

second standard. Boeing’s own data, 

from its approved flame arrestor 

installations, do not support its 

suggested standard of only 90 seconds. 

Also, as previously discussed, research 

data from accidents used to develop the 

requirements in § 25.856 do not support 

Boeing’s position that a 90-second 

standard would provide adequate safety. 

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 

Company and Embraer commented their 

currently approved flame arrestor 

systems may not comply with the 

standard and would necessitate redesign 

of the systems for new production 

airplanes. 

While the FAA determined that 

most 14 of these systems would not 

require redesign, the FAA has 

concluded that it would not be costeffective to require redesign of any 

existing systems that do not meet the 

new standard. Therefore, we have 

revised the provisions of §§ 121.1119 

and 129.119 to prohibit operation of 

new production airplanes unless an 

FAA-approved means to prevent fuel 

tank explosions caused by propagation 

of flames from outside the fuel tanks is 

installed and operational. Both of these 

regulations permit the continued 

installation and operational use of 

previously approved means to prevent 

such fuel tank explosions. For those 

airplanes that do not currently have 

such approved means, the design 

approval holder would be required to 

show compliance with the new standard 

to obtain approval. 

Lockheed requested a reduction of the 

minimum time requirement to 120 

seconds for airplanes approved for 

cargo-only operations due to shorter 

evacuation times needed for fewer 

occupants in the airplane. In addition, 

Lockheed contends that the FAA has 

previously accepted designs on cargo 

airplanes that did not meet the 2 minute 

and 30 second standard. 

Lockheed raised a valid point 

regarding the Lockheed 382 cargo 

airplanes equipped with flame arrestors. 

In considering this request, the FAA 

reviewed past certification data and 

supporting documentation submitted by 

Lockheed. Lockheed amended the 

design of the Lockheed 382 to include 

fuel tank vent flame arrestors in 2008. 

At that time, there was no regulatory 

requirement for a 2 minute and 30 

second capability for the fuel tank vent 

flame arrestors. Therefore, based on 

retrofit of flame arrestors into an 

existing design and the operation of the 

airplane for cargo use only, the FAA 

approved a 2-minute capability for the 

flame arrestor installation on those 

airplanes. 

Since 2008, however, the FAA has 

determined that cargo operations should 

not be a basis for a fuel vent protection 

regulatory requirement. Cargo airplanes 

are commonly modified and operated in 

various configurations that may allow 

carriage of supernumeraries and 

passengers. Providing longer fuel tank 

vent protection time may also prevent a 

fuel tank explosion that endangers 

ground support or emergency response 

personnel. Therefore, the FAA does not 

agree with Lockheed that a 2-minute 

standard should be adopted as the 

standard for all cargo transport 

airplanes, and the FAA is adopting 

§ 25.975(a)(7) as proposed. 

Embraer requested the rule be limited 

to preventing fuel tank explosions 

following a crash landing. Embraer 

supported its request by inferring that 

§ 25.979, ‘‘Pressure fueling system,’’ and 

associated refueling procedures 

included in aircraft maintenance 

manuals address explosions during 

refueling and other ground operating 

conditions. 

The FAA does not agree that the 

regulation should only apply to postcrash scenarios. In addition to fuel and 

oil spillage following survivable 

accidents, fires outside of the airplane 

fuel tanks have been caused by fuel 

spilled during refueling and leaking 

airplane fuel tanks. These external fires 

may ignite fuel vapors that exit the fuel 

tank vents, resulting in flames traveling 

back through the vent lines into the fuel 

tank, causing fuel tank explosions. 

Therefore, this amendment addresses 

any event that could result in fire 

outside the fuel tanks, including 

refueling operations. Additionally, it is 

not redundant of § 25.979 because that 

section only addresses the design of the 

fueling system, which would not 

address or prevent situations of spillage 

from improper fueling practices or 

leakage from malfunctioning fueling 

systems. 

The FAA made minor editorial 

changes to new paragraph (a)(7) in 

§ 25.975 from what was proposed in the 


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15AD 59–20–02 LOCKHEED: Effective October 

15, 1959, for items (1) and (2) and December 1, 

1959, for item (3). 

16AD 67–23–02 BOEING: Amendment 39–462. 

Effective September 10, 1967. 

17AD 92–16–14 BEECH: Amendment 39–8323; 

Docket No. 92–NM–95–AD; effective September 1, 

1992. 

18AD 2011–15–02 LOCKHEED: Amendment 39– 

16749; Docket No. FAA–2010–1305; effective 

August 19, 2011. 

NPRM. The edits are for clarity and do 

not change the effect of the regulation. 

B. Amendment to §§ 121.1119 and 

129.119, ‘‘Fuel tank vent explosion 

protection’’ 

With minor modifications from what 

was proposed in the NPRM, the FAA is 

adding new operations rules requiring 

operators of certain transport category, 

turbine powered airplanes produced 

more than 2 years after the effective date 

of this rule to have FAA-approved fuel 

tank vent fire protection means to 

prevent fuel tank vent explosions. This 

requirement is added to 14 CFR part 

121, ‘‘Operating Requirements: 

Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental 

Operations,’’ and 14 CFR part 129, 

‘‘Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and 

Foreign Operators of U.S.-Registered 

Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage.’’ 

As discussed above, the FAA is not 

requiring manufacturers with currently 

approved flame arrestors to redesign 

their systems in order to comply with 

§§ 121.1119 and 129.119. 

This amendment applies to subject 

airplanes that are issued an original 

airworthiness certificate beginning 24 

months after the effective date of this 

final rule. The FAA based the 24-month 

compliance period on time estimates 

needed to design and develop fuel tank 

vent protection means for existing 

airplane models that do not have 

previously approved flame arrestors. 

Flame arrestor technology is currently 

available. Adaptation of this technology, 

and the certification and incorporation 

of the design into airplanes currently in 

production should be achievable within 

the two-year compliance time. 

Bombardier recommended 

withdrawal of the proposed changes to 

parts 121 and 129, citing a lack of 

demonstrated safety improvement and 

the added cost of flame arrestors. 

The FAA accounted for the cost to 

Bombardier products in the economic 

evaluation for the NPRM and found 

safety benefits based on industry 

recommendations and the risks 

documented in the ADs issued on 

certain airplane models. In addition to 

the 737 AD discussed in paragraph IIB, 

the FAA has issued other ADs to either 

require flame arrestors or verify their 

functionality on the Lockheed Model 

1649A piston airplane,15 Boeing Models 

707 and 720,16 the Beech Model 400A,17

and the Lockheed Model 382.18 The 

FAA has found that there is a safety 

benefit and economic justification to 

include a requirement in this 

amendment to bring all newly produced 

airplanes that are subject to this 

rulemaking that will operate under the 

requirements of § 121.1119 or § 129.119 

up to the level of safety established for 

the airplanes that are subject to these 

referenced ADs. Therefore, the FAA did 

not make any changes as a result of this 

comment. 

Embraer stated that it believes that the 

FAA’s intent is to address specifically 

those higher capacity airplanes 

operating in scheduled airline service, 

and to prevent operators from escaping 

compliance by reducing the passenger 

or payload capacity to below the 

specified limits; and it believes that the 

FAA’s intent is not to also require 

compliance for certain business jets that 

happen to be on a type certificate. 

Embraer noted that these smaller 

airplanes do not operate in part 121, but 

there are foreign-based charter operators 

who operate airplanes leased from U.S. 

owners who have FAA operating 

certificates issued under § 129.1(b). 

Embraer noted that if these operators 

were U.S. based, they would be part 135 

air taxi operations that would not be 

subject to the requirements proposed in 

the NPRM. Therefore, Embraer 

suggested that the proposed § 129.119 

be revised to except the Bombardier CL– 

600–2B16 and the Embraer EMB–135BJ. 

The FAA does not concur with the 

request to exclude specific models from 

coverage under § 129.119. As proposed, 

this section would exclude airplanes 

with capacities below the specified 

thresholds. However, as Embraer 

recognizes, the proposed § 129.119(a) 

included the following qualifier: ‘‘as a 

result of original type certification or 

later increase in capacity.’’ The 

proposed § 121.1119(a) contained this 

same language. Embraer correctly points 

out that, for certain Embraer and 

Bombardier models, this would have the 

unintended effect of applying the 

requirements to business jets that are 

included on the same type certificates as 

larger air carrier airplanes, even though 

the business jets have capacities below 

those specified in §§ 129.119 and 

121.1119. To prevent the requirement 

from applying to these smaller 

airplanes, the FAA has eliminated the 

quoted qualifier in both identified 

sections in this final rule. In the future, 

if either Embraer or Bombardier choose 

to amend the type certificates to 

increase the capacity of these airplanes 

above the specified thresholds, 

§§ 129.119 and 121.1119 would apply to 

those newly produced airplanes. 

C. Comments on the Economic 

Evaluation 

EASA supported the proposal but 

commented that the regulatory 

economic evaluation should be revised 

to include the ATR42 and ATR 72 

(ATR42/72). EASA noted these airplane 

models do not have flame arrestors in 

the fuel tank vents and would be 

affected by the flame arrestor 

requirement for newly manufactured 

airplanes entering U.S. service under 

parts 121 and 129. 

The FAA does not agree. Certification 

costs incurred by foreign manufacturers 

are not included in cost analyses of 

proposed U.S. regulations. Costs 

incurred by U.S. operators of foreignproduced airplanes are included in such 

analyses. For this final rule, however, 

the FAA estimates these costs to be 

minimal for newly produced ATR42/72 

airplanes, since the FAA expects the 

annual number of ATR42/72 deliveries 

to be few, if any. The FAA has 

determined that there are no planned 

deliveries of ATR42/72 airplanes to U.S. 

airline operators after 2018 when the 

final rule will take effect. Therefore, the 

FAA is not revising the economic 

analysis to include the ATR42/72. 

Embraer also commented that the cost 

of the rule should be revised to include 

modification of an additional airplane 

model. One of its airplane models is 

designed to open a secondary refueling 

valve when the airplane being refueled 

does not have a flame arrestor. The 

primary vent outlets located near the 

wing tips have previously approved 

flame arrestors that meet the rule. The 

only affected airplane model with the 

open secondary vent design is the 

EMB145. Embraer currently has no 

orders or forecast deliveries for EMB145 

airplanes with the unique secondary 

refueling vent. 

In addition, even if future sales of this 

model occur, costs incurred by foreign 

manufacturers are not included in the 

costs of compliance, as costs directly 

attributable to foreign entities are not 

included in the cost-benefit analysis of 

U.S. regulations. Therefore, the FAA did 

not change the economic evaluation in 

response to this comment. 

D. Differences Between the NPRM and 

the Final Rule 

The FAA is adopting these rules as 

proposed in the NPRM with 

modifications as discussed above. 

Specifically, the FAA is revising 

§§ 121.1119 and 129.119 to remove the 


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qualifying statement ‘‘as a result of 

original type certification or later 

increase in capacity,’’ and to require 

only that fuel tank vent system 

explosion prevention means for new 

production airplanes be FAA-approved. 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

direct that each Federal agency shall 

propose or adopt a regulation only upon 

a reasoned determination that the 

benefits of the intended regulation 

justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) 

requires agencies to analyze the 

economic impact of regulatory changes 

on small entities. Third, the Trade 

Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96–39) 

prohibits agencies from setting 

standards that create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States. In developing U.S. 

standards, the Trade Act requires 

agencies to consider international 

standards and, where appropriate, that 

they be the basis of U.S. standards. 

Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform 

Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) requires 

agencies to prepare a written assessment 

of the costs, benefits, and other effects 

of proposed or final rules that include 

a Federal mandate likely to result in the 

expenditure by State, local, or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation with 

base year of 1995). This portion of the 

preamble summarizes the FAA’s 

analysis of the economic impacts of the 

final rule. The FAA suggests readers 

seeking greater detail read the full 

regulatory evaluation, a copy of which 

is in the docket for this rulemaking. 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined that this final rule: (1) 

Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is 

not an economically ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in section 

3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is not 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities; (5) will not create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States; and (6) will not impose 

an unfunded mandate on state, local, or 

tribal governments, or on the private 

sector by exceeding the threshold 

identified above. These analyses are 

summarized below. 

Total Costs and Benefits of This Final 

Rule 

The FAA finds the final rule to be 

cost-beneficial because the costs of the 

rule are low enough that the benefits of 

preventing just two fatalities outweigh 

the expected costs ($4.9 million in 

present value benefits versus $4.4 

million in present value costs). If this 

action is not taken, a hazard will 

continue to exist even though effective 

and low-cost means are available to 

minimize or eliminate it. 

Who is potentially affected by this Rule? 

This rule applies to applicants for 

new type certificates, amended and 

supplemental type certificates involving 

significant product-level changes, and 

manufacturers and operators of 

currently certificated airplanes 

produced two or more years after the 

effective date of this rule. This rule does 

not require retrofit of the existing fleet. 

Principal Assumptions and Sources of 

Information 

• Discount rate is 7 percent (Office of 

Management & Budget, Circular A–94, 

‘‘Guidelines and Discount Rates for 

Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 

Programs,’’ October 29, 1992, p. 8). 

• Value of statistical life (VSL) begins 

at $9.2 million in 2013, and increases 

thereafter by an annual growth factor of 

1.0107. Memorandum: Guidance on 

Treatment of the Economic Value of a 

Statistical Life in Department 

Analyses—2014 Adjustment, June 13, 

2014. United States, Office of the 

Secretary of Transportation. 

• For small part 25 manufacturers: An 

FAA study anticipates two U.S. airplane 

certifications in next 10-year period, 

twenty-one annual U.S. deliveries per 

U.S. certification; three foreign airplane 

certifications in next 10-year period, 

eleven annual U.S. deliveries per 

foreign certification, 15-year airplane 

production run; 30-year retirement age. 

Internal FAA study. 

• Current airplane models that could 

be affected by production cut-in 

requirement: Bombardier Dash 8, CJ– 

700, and CJ–900. FAA 2013 Fleet 

Forecast, Fleet Forecast Sheet ‘‘FAA 

U.S. Airlines 2013–2013 1–18–2103,’’ 

‘‘Totals & FAA Tables.’’ 

• The period of analysis for new 

certifications is 45 years to account for 

a complete product life cycle 

determined by a 15-year production 

period and a 30-year service period. 

• Certification cost estimates for part 

25 airplanes—Small U.S. part 25 

airplane manufacturers. 

• Maintenance cost per airplane 

(every four years) for Bombardier CJ– 

700/CJ–900 regional jets (subject to 

production cut-in)—$240. This estimate 

is much lower than the U.S. estimate 

because it is for passenger airplane 

models while the U.S. estimate is for 

business jet models. Since business jets 

are more prone to sit for extended 

periods of time, their flame arrestors can 

more easily be clogged by ice, mud 

daubers, or other debris, thus requiring 

more frequent and longer maintenance. 

• Minimal fuel costs as flame 

arrestors weigh between 2 and 4 pounds 

each. 

Costs of This Final Rule 

The costs of the final rule are 

engineering, production, and 

maintenance compliance costs for 

newly certificated part 25 airplanes and 

for the production cut-in of part 25 

airplanes used in part 121 operations. 

The FAA first estimates compliance 

costs for new certifications and then for 

the production cut-in. 

For newly certificated airplanes, 

compliance costs consist of engineering 

and production costs of U.S. 

manufactured airplanes delivered to 

U.S. operators and maintenance costs of 

both U.S. and foreign airplanes 

delivered to U.S. operators. U.S. part 25 

manufacturers directly incur the 

engineering and production costs while 

U.S. operators directly incur the 

maintenance costs. Engineering and 

production costs incurred by foreign 

manufacturers are not included in the 

costs of compliance, as costs directly 

attributable to foreign entities are not 

included in the U.S. social cost and 

benefit analysis of U.S. regulations. 

To calculate the cost of new U.S. 

certifications, the FAA assumes that all 

new certifications will be approved one 

year after the effective date of the rule, 

with production beginning one year 

later. Using an airplane life cycle model, 

the FAA estimates the economic impact 

for two new certificates, production of 

21 airplanes/certificate/year, production 

runs of 15 years and an airplane 

retirement age of 30 years. Compliance 

costs per year are calculated over an 

airplane life cycle of 45 years. 

Cost estimates were solicited from 

small part 25 manufacturers because 

large airplane manufacturers (Boeing 

and Airbus) are already compliant with 

the final rule. These cost estimates are 

shown in the table below. 


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19 Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. 

20We do not estimate costs for the analogous part 

129 requirement as these costs are directly incurred 

by foreign operators. 

INDUSTRY COST ESTIMATES USING FLAME ARRESTORS TO COMPLY WITH FINAL RULE ($ 2013) 

Cost category Cost Notes 

Nonrecurring Engineering Costs ............................................................... $ 142,000 per model. 

Recurring Cost (Hardware & Installation) ................................................. 3,000 per model (two flame arrestors @$1,500 each). 

Maintenance Cost (U.S. manufactured airplanes) .................................... 415 per airplane annually. 

Maintenance Cost (Bombardier manufactured airplanes) ........................ 240 per airplane every 4 years. 

The basic cost estimates consist of 

nonrecurring (one-time) engineering 

costs, production costs for two flame 

arrestors per airplane (one per fuel tank) 

and maintenance costs per airplane per 

year. The Bombardier maintenance cost 

estimate is used for estimating 

production cut-in costs of compliance. 

Incorporating the industry cost 

estimates into the airplane life cycle 

model, the FAA finds total costs for new 

certification airplanes to be $16.2 

million with present value of $4.2 

million. $2.2 million of these costs 

(present value $1.2 million) are directly 

incurred by U.S. manufacturers, and 

$14.0 million (present value $2.1 

million) are directly incurred by U.S. 

operators.19 For details, see the full 

regulatory evaluation in the docket. 

In addition to the requirement 

applying to new certifications, the final 

rule will also require a production cutin for currently produced part 25 

airplanes used in part 121 operations.20

To calculate this cost, the FAA first 

notes that the only currently produced 

and U.S.-operated airplane models not 

already in compliance are the 

Bombardier Dash 8 turboprops and 

Bombardier CRJ–700/CRJ–900 regional 

jets. The final rule will apply to these 

Bombardier models produced beginning 

in 2018. Since the FAA forecasts no 

Dash 8 deliveries to U.S. airline 

operators after 2017, the FAA expects 

no Dash 8 compliance cost for those 

operators. 

The FAA does forecast the delivery of 

338 CRJ–700 and 161 CRJ–900 model 

airplanes to U.S. airline operators over 

the period 2018–2033. The engineering 

and production compliance costs for 

these airplanes are not included in our 

cost estimates because, as noted above, 

costs directly incurred by foreign 

entities are not included in the cost and 

benefit analysis of U.S. regulations. 

Accordingly, for these airplanes the 

FAA assesses the impact on U.S. 

operators only, using Bombardier’s 

maintenance cost estimate of $240 every 

four years. Allocating this cost as $60 

annually and assuming a production 

period of 16 years, the FAA calculates 

the maintenance costs for these 

airplanes from the first year of service 

to the retirement year of the last 

airplanes produced, using a procedure 

analogous to that used for new 

certification airplanes. The FAA finds 

these costs to operators to be $898,200 

with present value $178,439. 

Production cut-in costs of $898,200 

(present value $178,439) added to new 

certification airplane costs of $16.2 

million (present value $4.2 million) 

yield total rule costs of $17.1 million 

(present value $4.4 million). 

Benefits of This Final Rule 

Notwithstanding the absence of postcrash fuel tank explosions in recent 

years and lacking other sufficient bases 

upon which to estimate future risks, the 

merits of the final rule can be assessed 

by considering the number of fatalities 

that would need to be prevented to 

offset the costs of the rule. 

The FAA estimates the breakeven 

benefits of the rule by estimating the 

number of averted fatalities necessary to 

offset the $4.4 million present value 

costs of the rule. The FAA finds that just 

two averted fatalities would offset these 

estimated costs. For details see the full 

regulatory evaluation in the docket. 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) establishes ‘‘as 

a principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ The RFA 

covers a wide-range of small entities, 

including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. Agencies 

must perform a review to determine 

whether a rule will have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. If the agency 

determines that it will, the agency must 

prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis 

as described in the RFA. 

However, if an agency determines that 

a rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the RFA provides that 

the head of the agency may so certify 

and a regulatory flexibility analysis is 

not required. The certification must 

include a statement providing the 

factual basis for this determination, and 

the reasoning should be clear. 

All small U.S. manufacturers affected 

by this rule are wholly owned 

subsidiaries of large companies, who 

have more than 1,500 employees (the 

small business criterion for aircraft 

manufacturing) and, therefore, are not 

classified as small entities by the Small 

Business Administration. Part 121 

operators will be directly affected by the 

average $415 annual maintenance cost 

per airplane. These costs are minimal, 

especially compared to the high cost of 

new part 25 airplanes. The FAA 

received no comments on this same 

finding in the NPRM. 

If an agency determines that a 

rulemaking will not result in a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, the 

head of the agency may so certify under 

section 605(b) of the RFA. Therefore, as 

provided in section 605(b), the head of 

the FAA certifies that this rulemaking 

will not result in a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. 

C. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such as 

the protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 


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statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. 

The FAA has assessed the effect of 

this final rule and determined that its 

purpose is to ensure the safety of U.S. 

civil aviation. Therefore, the rule is in 

compliance with the Trade Agreements 

Act. 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$155.0 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This final rule does not contain such a 

mandate; therefore, the requirements of 

Title II of the Act do not apply. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the 

FAA consider the impact of paperwork 

and other information collection 

burdens imposed on the public. The 

FAA has determined that there is no 

new requirement for information 

collection associated with this final 

rule. 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these proposed 

regulations. 

G. Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 312f and involves no 

extraordinary circumstances. 

V. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency determined that this action will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, or the relationship between 

the Federal Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and, therefore, 

does not have Federalism implications. 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

The FAA analyzed this final rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

agency has determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ under the 

executive order, and it is not likely to 

have a significant adverse effect on the 

supply, distribution, or use of energy. 

VI. How To Obtain Additional 

Information 

A. Rulemaking Documents 

An electronic copy of a rulemaking 

document may be obtained by using the 

Internet— 

1. Search the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

2. Visit the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ or 

3. Access the Government Printing 

Office’s Web page at http://

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/. 

Copies may also be obtained by 

sending a request (identified by notice, 

amendment, or docket number of this 

rulemaking) to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue 

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 

calling (202) 267–9680. 

B. Comments Submitted to the Docket 

Comments received may be viewed by 

going to http://www.regulations.gov and 

following the online instructions to 

search the docket number for this 

action. Anyone is able to search the 

electronic form of all comments 

received into any of the FAA’s dockets 

by the name of the individual 

submitting the comment (or signing the 

comment, if submitted on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

C. Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act 

The Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 

1996 requires the FAA to comply with 

small entity requests for information or 

advice about compliance with statutes 

and regulations within its jurisdiction. 

A small entity with questions regarding 

this document, may contact its local 

FAA official, or the person listed under 

the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

heading at the beginning of the 

preamble. To find out more about 

SBREFA on the Internet, visit http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/

rulemaking/sbre_act/. 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

14 CFR Part 121 

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

14 CFR Part 129 

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

The Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

amends parts 25, 121, and 129 of title 

14, Code of Federal Regulations as 

follows: 

PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS 

STANDARDS: TRANSPORT 

CATEGORY AIRPLANES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 25 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702 and 44704. 

■ 2. Amend § 25.975 by revising 

paragraphs (a)(5) and (6) and adding 

paragraph (a)(7) to read as follows: 

§ 25.975 Fuel tank vents and carburetor 

vapor vents. 

(a) * * * 

(5) There may be no point in any vent 

line where moisture can accumulate 

with the airplane in the ground attitude 

or the level flight attitude, unless 

drainage is provided; 

(6) No vent or drainage provision may 

end at any point— 

(i) Where the discharge of fuel from 

the vent outlet would constitute a fire 

hazard; or 

(ii) From which fumes could enter 

personnel compartments; and 

(7) Each fuel tank vent system must 

prevent explosions, for a minimum of 2 

minutes and 30 seconds, caused by 

propagation of flames from outside the 

tank through the fuel tank vents into 

fuel tank vapor spaces when any fuel 


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41208 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 122 / Friday, June 24, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

tank vent is continuously exposed to 

flame. 

* * * * * 

PART 121—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, 

AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS 

■ 3. The authority citation for part 121 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40103, 

40113, 40119, 41706, 42301 preceding note 

added by Pub. L. 112–95, sec. 412, 126 Stat. 

89, 44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709– 

44711, 44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44729, 

44732; 46105; Pub. L. 111–216, 124 Stat. 

2348 (49 U.S.C. 44701 note); Pub. L. 112–95, 

126 Stat 62 (49 U.S.C. 44732 note). 

■ 4. Add § 121.1119 to subpart AA to 

read as follows: 

§ 121.1119 Fuel tank vent explosion 

protection. 

(a) Applicability. This section applies 

to transport category, turbine-powered 

airplanes with a type certificate issued 

after January 1, 1958, that have: 

(1) A maximum type-certificated 

passenger capacity of 30 or more; or 

(2) A maximum payload capacity of 

7,500 pounds or more. 

(b) New production airplanes. No 

certificate holder may operate an 

airplane for which the State of 

Manufacture issued the original 

certificate of airworthiness or export 

airworthiness approval after August 23, 

2018 unless means, approved by the 

Administrator, to prevent fuel tank 

explosions caused by propagation of 

flames from outside the fuel tank vents 

into the fuel tank vapor spaces are 

installed and operational. 

PART 129—OPERATIONS: FOREIGN 

AIR CARRIERS AND FOREIGN 

OPERATORS OF U.S.-REGISTERED 

AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN COMMON 

CARRIAGE 

■ 5. The authority citation for part 129 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1372, 40113, 40119, 

44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711, 

44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901–44904, 

44906, 44912, 46105, Pub. L. 107–71 sec. 

104. 

■ 6. Add § 129.119 to subpart B to read 

as follows: 

§ 129.119 Fuel tank vent explosion 

protection. 

(a) Applicability. This section applies 

to transport category, turbine-powered 

airplanes with a type certificate issued 

after January 1, 1958, that have: 

(1) A maximum type-certificated 

passenger capacity of 30 or more; or 

(2) A maximum payload capacity of 

7,500 pounds or more. 

(b) New production airplanes. No 

certificate holder may operate an 

airplane for which the State of 

Manufacture issued the original 

certificate of airworthiness or export 

airworthiness approval after August 23, 

2018 unless means, approved by the 

Administrator, to prevent fuel tank 

explosions caused by propagation of 

flames from outside the fuel tank vents 

into the fuel tank vapor spaces are 

installed and operational. 

Issued under authority provided by 49 

U.S.C. 106(f) and 44701(a) in Washington, 

DC, on June 7, 2016. 

Michael P. Huerta, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2016–14454 Filed 6–23–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–7491; Directorate 

Identifier 2015–NE–39–AD; Amendment 39– 

18569; AD 2016–13–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; General 

Electric Company Turbofan Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

General Electric Company (GE) GE90– 

76B, GE90–77B, GE90–85B, GE90–90B, 

and GE90–94B turbofan engines. This 

AD was prompted by an uncontained 

failure of the high-pressure compressor 

(HPC) stage 8–10 spool, leading to an 

airplane fire. This AD requires eddy 

current inspection (ECI) or ultrasonic 

inspection (USI) of the HPC stage 8–10 

spool and removing from service those 

parts that fail inspection. We are issuing 

this AD to prevent failure of the HPC 

stage 8–10 spool, uncontained rotor 

release, damage to the engine, and 

damage to the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective July 29, 

2016. 

ADDRESSES: See the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

7491; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

Frost, Aerospace Engineer, Engine 

Certification Office, FAA, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 

781–238–7756; fax: 781–238–7199; 

email: john.frost@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all GE GE90–76B, GE90–77B, 

GE90–85B, GE90–90B, and GE90–94B 

turbofan engines. The NPRM published 

in the Federal Register on January 13, 

2016 (81 FR 1582). The NPRM was 

prompted by an uncontained failure of 

the HPC stage 8–10 spool, leading to an 

airplane fire. The NPRM proposed to 

require ECIs or USIs of the HPC stage 8– 

10 spool and removing from service 

those parts that fail inspection. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent failure of the 

HPC stage 8–10 spool, uncontained 

rotor release, damage to the engine, and 

damage to the airplane. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM (81 FR 1582, 

January 13, 2016) and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Support for the NPRM (81 FR 1582, 

January 13, 2016) 

The Air Line Pilots Association 

expressed support for the NPRM (81 FR 

1582, January 13, 2016). 

Request To Change Applicability 

British Airways, United Airlines, and 

The Boeing Company commented that 

HPC stage 8–10 spool, part numbers (P/ 

Ns) 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02 are 

not required in the Applicability 

paragraph of this AD. They noted that 

the associated AD 2015–27–01, (81 FR 

1291, January 12, 2016) and the 

precipitating event involved only HPC 

stage 8–10 spool, P/N 1694M80G04. 

We disagree. HPC stage 8–10 spool P/ 

Ns 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02 are 

susceptible to the same failure mode as 

HPC stage 8–10 spool, P/N 

1694M80G04. However, we 


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