Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 48A02-1603-AD-709 | December 8, 2016 Page 1 of 7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David W. Stone 

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

John T. Wilson

Anderson, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re the Adoption of A.G. & 

J.G.

A.R.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

M.G. & J.G.,

Appellees-Petitioners.

December 8, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1603-AD-709

Appeal from the Madison Circuit

Court

The Honorable Dennis D. Carroll, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C06-1407-AD-34

Brown, Judge.
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[1] A.R. appeals from the trial court’s amended decree of adoption. A.R. raises 

five issues. We find dispositive the restated issue of whether the court abused 

its discretion in granting a motion to withdraw appearance filed by A.R.’s civil 

public defender. We reverse and remand. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 16, 2014, a Petition for Adoption was filed by M.G. and Je.G. 

(“Petitioners”) which alleged that Je.G. is the natural father of A.G. and Ju.G. 

(the “Children”), that M.G. was married to Je.G., and that A.R. is the natural 

mother of the Children. On July 30, 2014, A.R., pro se, filed a general answer 

and denial asking the court to deny the petition for adoption. An entry in the 

chronological case summary (“CCS”), dated September 16, 2014, states that 

A.R. requested the appointment of a civil public defender, the court heard 

evidence and found A.R. did not have the money or means to prosecute the 

case, and the court appointed William Byer, Jr., (“Attorney Byer”) as a civil 

public defender to represent her. On October 9, 2014, A.R. by counsel filed an 

amended objection to the petition for adoption. An entry in the CCS dated 

November 5, 2015, states that a hearing was scheduled for December 10, 2015, 

at 1:00 p.m. 

[3] An entry in the CCS dated November 9, 2015, states that, at the request of 

counsel, the matter was set for hearing on December 10, 2015, at 2:30 p.m., and 

another CCS entry on that date states that the hearing originally scheduled for 

1:00 p.m. on December 10, 2015, was rescheduled to 2:30 p.m. on the court’s 

own motion. Also on November 9, 2015, Attorney Byer filed a motion to 
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withdraw appearance stating that A.R. had failed to cooperate or communicate 

with him.

1

 On November 12, 2015, the court granted the motion to withdraw

appearance.

2

 

[4] The court held the scheduled adoption hearing on December 10, 2015, and the 

hearing was concluded on December 17, 2015. At the beginning of the hearing 

on December 10, 2015, A.R. asked if she could request another attorney and 

stated that she received the motion to withdraw appearance immediately before 

she was picked up and taken to jail for an unrelated matter.

3

 The court did not 

appoint replacement counsel and Mother did not have counsel throughout the 

hearing. The trial court stated: 

So what I might do . . . is let [Petitioners] put on your evidence, 

it’s all recorded and then I’ll make a judgment as to whether or 

not other counsel should be appointed who can come listen to 

the record or you’re on your own. You can, you can, if it’s 

important to you you can come up with the sums and get counsel 

to represent you to come listen to the record to see whatever 

needs to be done. But it doesn’t seem to me to be fair when 

people take off court, they’re here and they shouldn’t have to be 

sent away. 

 

1 The certificate of service to Attorney Byer’s motion to withdraw states that it was served upon Petitioners’ 

counsel but does not state it was served upon A.R.

2 The court’s order granting the motion to withdraw appearance does not list A.R. in its distribution list. 

3 A.R. testified she was in jail because she had been picked up for failure to appear in another cause. 

Petitioners elicited testimony from a State Trooper that he had stopped A.R. on December 2, 2015, and that 

she was transported to the Madison County Jail. 
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Transcript at 16. During the continued hearing on December 16, 2015, the 

court stated: 

[W]hat I probably will do . . . is let [Petitioners] finish up your 

evidence and let [A.R.] offer anything she wants to offer pro se . .

. Then what I will probably do is either appoint counsel or say 

no we’re not appointing counsel again but we’ll leave the record 

open for a period of time. If you want to retain counsel, you 

know from Court that everything we do is recorded, so a lawyer

can come in whether that’s appointed counsel or retained 

counsel, a lawyer can come in, listen to the record, give you 

advice, decide what, if anything, to do on your behalf. I’m 

probably gonna go in that direction.

Id. at 83. Near the end of the hearing, the court stated: 

But what I think I am likely to do when the evidence is closed is 

put an entry on . . . , and unless I change my mind it will say one 

of two things. That the evidence has been closed but, the 

evidence in Court has been closed but the record is being left 

open for a period, and I’ll state a number of days, for either the 

Court to appoint another lawyer to represent you to review this 

record or for you to retain private counsel, if you chose to do so, 

to review the record and then if nothing additional is filed then it 

will be, the record will be closed. If something is additional filed 

we’ll wait and see what that is but, before we’d try to jump the 

gun on that. . . . 

[R]eally the issue is whether or not it’s gonna be [A.R.’s] 

responsibility if she wants to have counsel to figure out how to do 

that or if she chooses not to whether the Court would appoint 

counsel for her or how we’ll proceed on that. 

Id. at 138-139. 
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[5] A CCS entry dated December 17, 2015, states in part: 

Because [A.R.] offered on [sic] satisfactory explanation for 

[Attorney] Byer’s withdrawal, no new PD will be appointed. 

However, the record will be left open until 12/29/15 to provide 

[A.R.] with an opportunity to privately retain counsel, if she 

chooses, to review the recorded record and file such 

supplemental motion(s) as may be appropriate. If counsel does 

not timely enter an appearance and file pleading(s), the evidence 

will be finally closed and the issues submitted to the Court.

Appellant’s Appendix at 7-8. 

[6] The court issued a decree of adoption on February 4, 2016, and an amended 

decree of adoption on February 11, 2016. 

Discussion

[7] The dispositive issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

Attorney Byer’s motion to withdraw appearance. A.R. argues that the court 

abused its discretion in granting Attorney Byer’s motion to withdraw 

appearance that did not comply with local rules and that this court has held that 

the appointment of counsel is required in an adoption case. Petitioners argue 

that Mother invited the error of which she complains by failing to cooperate or 

communicate with her attorney prior to the adoption hearing, that the denial of 

replacement counsel was harmless, and that remanding for a new adoption 

hearing would be against the Children’s best interest. 

[8] We have held that parents whose parental rights are being terminated against 

their will, including in cases of termination of parental rights by an adoption 
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which is contested by a biological parent, have three rights: (1) the right to be 

represented by counsel; (2) the right to have counsel provided if they could not 

afford private representation; and (3) the right to be informed of the two 

preceding rights. See In re Adoption of G.W.B., 776 N.E.2d 952, 953-954 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Ind. Code § 31-35-1-12 (cited in 

G.W.B., noting the advisement applies in cases of termination of parental rights 

by adoption over the objection of a birth parent, and providing that parents 

must be advised that they “are entitled to representation by counsel, provided 

by the state if necessary, throughout any proceedings to terminate the parentchild relationship against the will of the parents”). 

[9] Madison County Local Rule LR48-TR3.1-26 provides in part: 

B. An attorney’s appearance for a party will be withdrawn upon 

the filing of a motion, if:

1. Another attorney simultaneously appears for the party;

2. The attorney provides satisfactory evidence that the 

party has discharged the attorney; or

3. The party acquiesces to the withdrawal.

C. In all other circumstances, an attorney seeking permission to 

withdraw an appearance shall file a written motion stating 

justification for the withdrawal. The attorney shall give the party 

21 days’ written notice of the attorney’s intention to seek 

permission to withdraw. This notice shall (1) inform the party 

that failure to secure new counsel may result in dismissal of the 

party’s case or in entry of a judgment or ruling against the party, 

(2) set forth the date of any scheduled hearing or trial, and (3) 

include any other pertinent information.
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[10] The November 9, 2015 motion to withdraw appearance filed by Attorney Byer 

did not state that one of the conditions in section B of the rule occurred and did 

not state whether Attorney Byer provided A.R. with twenty-one days’ written 

notice with the information required in section C of the rule. Petitioners do not 

point to the record to show that Attorney Byer complied with the local rule. 

The trial court abused its discretion in granting Attorney Byer’s motion to 

withdraw appearance in violation of the local rule. See K.S. v. Marion Cnty. 

Dep’t of Child Services, 917 N.E.2d 158, 164-165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (observing, 

in a case involving the termination of parental rights, there was no evidence that 

the mother’s attorney informed the mother of her intent to withdraw as required 

by a local rule, that parents involved in termination proceedings have a right to 

counsel, and that the local rule’s requirement that a withdrawing attorney 

expressly inform her client in writing of her intent to withdraw protects that 

interest, and holding the trial court abused its discretion in granting the 

mother’s attorney’s motion to withdraw her appearance in violation of the local 

rule). Further, A.R. did not have an attorney representing her during the 

adoption proceeding which terminated her parental rights. 

Conclusion

[11] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[12] Reversed and remanded. 

Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.