[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-12930

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00560-WTH-PRL

TERRY A. BURLISON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SARAH RITTERHOFF WILLIAMS,

Individually and as a County Court Judge, 

JEFFREY W. BENEFIELD, 

CASSANDRA K. BENEFIELD, 

MARION COUNTY FLORIDA, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(January 28, 2014)

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Before HULL, MARCUS, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Terry A. Burlison, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal 

of his civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

1

 After reviewing the record 

and the parties’ briefs, we affirm. 

I

Mr. Burlison alleged in his complaint that on September 19, 2012, Judge 

Sarah Ritterhoff Williams—both in her individual capacity and in her official 

capacity as Marion County Court Judge—Jeffrey W. Benefield, and Cassandra K. 

Benefield engaged in discussions with one another in the case of “Benefield v. 

Burlison in [the] absence of representatives of opposing party.” D.E. 1 at 3. Mr. 

Burlison asserts that these discussions were conducted “under color of state law,” 

and violated his constitutional right to due process. Mr. Burlison also alleged that 

 1 Mr. Burlison’s notice of appeal states that he is appealing from the district court’s denial 

of his “Motion for New Trial.” D.E. 30. “The general rule in this circuit is that an appellate 

court has jurisdiction to review only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which are 

specified in an appellant’s notice of appeal.” Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 

1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). “[A]n appeal[, however,] is not lost if a mistake is made in 

designating the judgment appealed from where it is clear that the overriding intent was 

effectively to appeal” the original judgment. Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 

738–39 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Burlison is a pro se

litigant, and because it appears he intended to appeal the order of dismissal, we will construe Mr. 

Burlison’s notice of appeal to include that order. Mr. Burlison offers no argument on the denial 

of his “Motion for New Trial,” so that claim is abandoned. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 

870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not

briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”) (citation omitted). 

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Marion County “is liable for damages for its failure to train its judicial officers 

[concerning] rules impose[d] upon its judicial officer[s] under Florida State Code 

of Judicial Conduct.” Id. at 3. Mr. Burlison’s complaint, however, did not allege 

any facts concerning the nature of the discussions between the defendants, the 

subject matter and status of the “Benefield v. Burlison” matter, how the defendants 

were acting under color of state law, or how Mr. Burlison’s due process rights 

were violated. 

Marion County and the Benefields responded by filing motions to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and Judge 

Ritterhoff Williams moved for a more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(e). Mr. Burlison filed responses to each motion, essentially arguing that he had 

sufficiently alleged claims for relief and sufficient facts to place Judge Ritterhoff 

Williams outside of any immunity protections.

Before the district court addressed the defendants’ motions, Mr. Burlison 

filed a motion for temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin the Benefields 

from accessing Mr. Burlison’s mobile home, and a motion for preliminary 

injunction seeking to enjoin the defendants from executing a writ of possession

obtained in the “Benefield v. Burlison” state court matter, and/or actually taking 

possession of the mobile home. These motions asserted facts which, coupled with 

the allegations in Mr. Burlison’s complaint, indicated to the district court that the 

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instant federal action was related to or arose out of a state court proceeding, or a 

final state court judgment. The district court denied Mr. Burlison’s motion for

temporary restraining order for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and M.D.

Fla. Local Rules 4.05 and 4.06. The court, however, reserved ruling on the motion 

for preliminary injunction, and directed the parties to show cause in writing, 

supported by evidence, why Mr. Burlison’s complaint should not be dismissed for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

In response to the district court’s order to show cause, Judge Ritterhoff 

Williams submitted evidence that the September 19, 2012, discussion referenced in 

Mr. Burlison’s complaint related to a hearing in a state civil eviction matter, Jeffrey 

W. Benefield and Cassandra K. Benefield v. Terry A. Burlison, Case No. 12-1901-

SC, in which the Benefields were seeking to evict Mr. Burlison from their mobile 

home park and to recoup unpaid rent. Judge Ritterhoff Williams was the judge 

presiding over the matter. 

The record evidence submitted to the district court reflects that all parties,

including Mr. Burlison, attended the September 19, 2012 hearing, which was held 

to determine whether Mr. Burlison was in default for failing to pay his rent into the 

court’s registry. During the course of the hearing, Judge Ritterhoff Williams 

entered a default judgment of possession in favor of the Benefields. Subsequent to 

the ruling, Mr. Burlison stated, “[i]f I find you have lacked jurisdiction to rule in 

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this matter that will not be treated kindly. Real good. Thank you very much.” 

D.E. 23-2 at 27:17. It appears that Mr. Burlison then voluntarily left before the 

hearing concluded, as there was no further discussion from him following his 

remarks to the court regarding its jurisdiction. After Mr. Burlison apparently left 

the courtroom, the attorney for the Benefields, the court clerk, and Judge Ritterhoff 

Williams continued to discuss administrative matters—such as how and when the 

Benefields could obtain the monies previously deposited in the court’s registry—

for the balance of the hearing. 

On October 3, 2012, Judge Ritterhoff Williams entered two orders

memorializing her September 19th oral decision granting final default judgment in 

favor of the Benefields, granting possession of Mr. Burlison’s mobile home to the 

Benefields, and directing the clerk of court to issue a writ of possession to the 

Marion County Sheriff’s Department.

After reviewing the responses submitted by all parties, the district court 

found that the “discussions, and the entire hearing on September 19, 2012, relate 

directly to the final default judgment and final judgment of possession entered by 

Judge Ritterhoff Williams. Thus, any § 1983 claims raised in [federal court] are 

inextricably intertwined with the state court judgments.” D.E. 26 at 4-5. In 

dismissing Mr. Burlison’s complaint, the district court explained that it had to

abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because 

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“[i]n order for Mr. Burlison to prevail on his § 198[3] claim, the [c]ourt would 

necessarily have to review, interfere with, and/or overrule Judge Ritterhoff 

Williams’ final orders of default judgment and possession.” Id. at 5. 

II

We review de novo a district court’s determination that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim in light of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. 

See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009).2

 

III

Mr. Burlison’s opening brief designates a single issue on appeal: whether the 

district court correctly determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested it of 

subject-matter jurisdiction.3

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal courts 

from exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining 

of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 

(2005). Mr. Burlison, however, offers no argument on the Rooker-Feldman issue 

 2 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-17 (1923); District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). 

3 Mr. Burlison also appears to raise a new Fourth Amendment claim on appeal. We, 

however, do not generally consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See 

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held 

to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. But, issues not raised below are 

normally deemed waived.”) (citations omitted).

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on appeal, and so we conclude that he has abandoned it. See Timson, 518 F.3d at

874. See also Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (holding that passing references to an issue in the statement of the case 

in an initial brief without “elaborat[ion] [of] arguments on the merits” constitutes a 

waiver).

IV

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Burlison’s 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine. 

AFFIRMED.

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