[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 13

- 12930 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 5:12

- cv - 00560

- WTH

- PRL

TERRY A. BURLISON, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus SARAH RITTERHOFF WILLIAMS, Individually and as a County Court Judge, JEFFREY W. BEN EFIELD, CASSANDRA K. BENEFIELD, MARION COUNTY FLORIDA, Defendants

- Appellees.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distric t of Florida

________________________ ( January 28, 2014 ) Case: 13-12930 Date Filed: 01/28/2014 Page: 1 of 72 Before HULL , M ARCUS , and J ORDAN , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Terry A. Burlison , proceeding pro se , appeal s the district court’ s dismissal of his civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 f or la ck of subject

- matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine

. 1 After reviewing the record and the parties’ brief s, we affirm.
I Mr. Burlison alleged in his complaint that on September 19, 2012, Judge Sarah Ritterhoff Williams

— both in her individual capacity and in her official capacity as Marion County Court Judge

— Jeffrey W. Benefield , and Cassandra K. Benefield engaged in discussions with one another in the case of “ Benefield v. Burlison in [the] absence of repr e sentatives of opposing party.” D.E. 1 at 3. Mr. Burlison asserts that these discussions were conducted “under color of state law,” and violated his constit utional right to due process. Mr. Burlison also alleged that

1 Mr. Burlison’s notice of appeal states that he is appealing from the district court’s denial of his “Motion for New Trial.” D.E. 30. “ The general rule in this circuit is that an appellate court has jurisdiction to review only those judgments, orders or portions thereof whic h are specified in an appellant’ s notice of appeal. ” Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc. , 825 F .2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). “[A] n appeal [, however,] is not lost if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed from where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively t o appeal” the original judgment. Kicklig hter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc. , 616 F .2d 734, 738

– 39 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted) . Because Mr. Burlison is a pro se litigant, and because it appears he intended to appeal the order of dismissal, we will construe Mr. Burlison’ s not ice of appeal t o include that order. Mr. Burlison offers no argument on the denial of his “Motion for New T rial , ” so that claim is abandoned. S e e Timson v. S a mpson , 518 F .3d 870, 874 ( 11th C i r . 2008) (“ W hile we r ead b r i ef s f il e d b y p r o s e litig a nts lib era l l y , issu e s not b r i efe d on a pp ea l b y a p r o se liti g a nt a r e d ee m e d a b a ndon e d

. ” ) ( c it a tion omitt e d )

.

Case: 13-12930 Date Filed: 01/28/2014 Page: 2 of 73 Marion County “is liable for damages for its failure t o train its judicial officers [concerning] rules impose[d] upon its judicial officer[s] under Florida State Code of Judicial Conduct.” Id. at 3. Mr. Burlison’s complaint, however, did not allege any facts concerning the nature of the dis cussions between the d efendants, the subject matter and status of the “ Benefield v. Burlison ” matter, how the d efendants were acting under color of state law, or how Mr. Burlison’s due process rights were violated. Marion County and the Benefields responded by filing motion s to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief under Fed. R

. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and Judge Ritterhoff Williams moved for a more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Mr. Burlison filed responses to each motion, essentially arguing that he had sufficiently alleged claims for relief and sufficient facts to place Judge Ritterhoff Williams outside of any immunity protections

. Before the district court addressed the defendants’ motions, Mr. Burlison filed a motion for temporary restraining order , seeking to enjoin the Benefields
from accessing Mr. Burlison’s mobile home , and a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the defendants from executing a writ of possess i on obtained in the “ Benefield v. Burlison ” state court matter, and/or actually taking possession of the mobile home

. These motions asserted facts which , coupled with the allegations in Mr. Burlison’s complaint, indicated to the district court that the

Case: 13-12930 Date Filed: 01/28/2014 Page: 3 of 74 instant federal action was related to or aros e out of a state court proceeding, or a final state court judgment. T he district court denied Mr. Burlison’s motion for temporary restraining order for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and M.D. Fla. Local Rules 4.05 and 4.06 . The court, however, reserved ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction, and directed the parties to show cause in writing , supported by evidence, why Mr. Burlison’s complaint should not b e dismissed for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction under th e Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. In response to the district court’s order to show cause, Judge Ritterhoff Williams submitted evidence that the September 19, 2012 , discussion referenced in Mr. Burlison’s complaint relate d to a hearing in a state civil eviction matter, Jeffrey W. Benefield and Cassandra K. Benefield v. Terry A. Burlison , Case No. 12

- 1901

- SC , in which t he Benefields were seeking to evict Mr. Burlison from their mobile home park and to recoup unpaid rent. Judge Ritterhoff Wil liams was the judge presiding over the matter. The record evidence submitted to the district court reflects that a ll parties , including Mr. Burlison, attended the September 19, 2012 hearing , which was held
to determine whether Mr. Burlison was in default for failing to pay his rent into the court’s registry. During the course of the hearing, Judge Ritterhoff Williams
entered a default judgment of possession in favor of the Benefields

. Subsequent to the ruling, Mr. Burlison stated, “[i] f I find you have lacked jurisdiction to rule in

Case: 13-12930 Date Filed: 01/28/2014 Page: 4 of 75 this matter that will not be treated kindly. Real good. Thank you very much. ”
D.E. 23

- 2 at 27:17. It appears that Mr. Burlison then voluntarily left before the hearing concluded, as t here was no further discussion from hi m following his remarks to the court regarding its jurisdiction

. After Mr. Burlison apparently left the courtroom, the at torney for the Benefields, the court c lerk, and Judge Ritterhoff Williams continued to discuss administrative matters

— such as how and when the Benefields could obtain the monies previously deposited in the court’s registry

— for the balance of the hearing. On October 3, 2012, Judg e Ritterhoff Williams entered two order s memorializing her September 19 th oral de cision granting fin al default judgment in favor of th e Benefields, granting possession of Mr. Burlison’s mobile home to the Benefields , and directing the clerk of c ourt to issue a writ of possession to the Marion County Sheriff’s Department

. After reviewing the responses sub mitted by all parties, t he district court found that the “ discussions, and the entire hearing on September 19, 2012 , relate directly to the final default judgment and final judgment of possession entered by Judge Ritterhoff Williams. Thus, any § 1983 clai ms raised in [federal court] are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgments. ” D.E. 26 at 4

- 5. In dismissing Mr. Burlison’s complaint, the district court explained that it had to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine, because

Case: 13-12930 Date Filed: 01/28/2014 Page: 5 of 76 “[i] n order for Mr. B urlison to prevail on his § 198[3] claim, the [c] ourt would necessarily have to review, interfere with, and/or overrule Judge Ritterhoff Williams’ final orders of d efault judgment and possession.” Id. at 5.
II
We r eview de novo a district court’s deter mination that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim in light of the Rooker

– Feldman doctrine.
See Nicholson v. Shafe , 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). 2
III Mr. Burlison’s opening brief designates a single issue on appeal: whether the district court correctly determined that the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine divested it of subject

- matter jurisdiction. 3 The Rooker

- Feldman doctrine pre vents federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over “ cases brought by state

- court losers complaining of injuries caused by state

- court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic In dus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)

. Mr. Burlison, however, offers no argument on the Rooker

- Feldman issue

2 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 , 415

- 17 (1923); D istrict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 , 476 (1983).

3 Mr. Burlison also appears to raise a new Fourth Amendment claim on appeal. W e , however, do not generally consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal

. See Tannenbaum v. United States , 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“ Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. But, issues not raised below are normally deemed waived.”) (citations omitted).

Case: 13-12930 Date Filed: 01/28/2014 Page: 6 of 77 on appeal, and so we conclude that he has abandoned it. See Timson , 518 F .3d at
874. See also Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster , 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that passing references to an issue in the statement of the c ase in an initial brief without “elaborat[ion] [of] arguments on th e merits” constitutes a waiver).
IV Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismis sal of Mr. Burlison’ s complaint for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine.
A FFIRMED . Case: 13-12930 Date Filed: 01/28/2014 Page: 7 of 7