Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0591. CEDRIC ARRINGTON v. THE STATE.

In 2009, Cedric Arrington pled guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to 18

years’ imprisonment. In 2016, he filed a motion to vacate a void sentence, which the

trial court denied. Arrington now appeals. We lack jurisdiction because Arrington

failed to raise a colorable void-sentence claim.

“[A] petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate

remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686 SE2d 786)

(2009). Any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be

dismissed. See id. at 218 (2); Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 SE2d 150)

(2010). An appeal may lie from an order denying a motion to vacate or correct a void

sentence, but only if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact,

void. See Harper, supra at 217 n.1; Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 118, 119 (676 SE2d

465) (2009). “Motions to vacate a void sentence generally are limited to claims

that—even assuming the existence and validity ofthe conviction for which the sentence

was imposed—the law does not authorize that sentence, most typically because it

exceeds the most severe punishment for which the applicable penal statute provides.” 

von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 572 (2)(748 SE2d 446)(2013). Accordingly, when

a sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void. Jones v. State,

278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004).

In his motion, Arrington argued that his sentence was void because he received

ineffective assistance of counsel and the trial court engaged in an “irregular process”

to determine whether his plea was voluntary. These arguments, however, are

December 05, 2016
challenges to his conviction, not hissentence. See id. (“Rulings on pleadings asserting

erroneous procedure or unfair treatment are not subject to direct appeal because they

are not rulings on whether the sentence is void.”); Jordan v. State, 253 Ga. App. 510,

511 (1) (559 SE2d 528) (2002) (allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel “goes

only to challenge [defendant’s] conviction”). Arrington also complained that his

indictment was defective because it failed to include an additional charge of possession

of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

1 Regardless of whether the State

should have brought more charges against Arrington, this complaint does not challenge

the validity of the sentence imposed on the charge which was brought and to which he

pled guilty. Finally, Arrington argued that his sentence exceeded the maximum

allowable punishment for his crime. But OCGA § 16-8-41 (b) provides that armed

robbery is punishable by “imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than

ten nor more than 20 years.” Arrington’s 18-year sentence was within this statutory

range.

Because Arrington did not raise a colorable void-sentence claim, this appeal is

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. See Burg, 297 Ga. App. at 120.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

1 The indictment alleged that Arrington took money from a store employee “by

use of an object having the appearance of an offensive weapon, to wit: a firearm.” 

12/05/2016