FILED

June 22, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

TENNESSEE FARMERS MUTUAL, ) FOR PUBLICATION

INSURANCE COMPANY )

) Filed: June 22, 1998

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Knox Chancery

v. )

) Hon. Frederick D. McDonald,

JOSEPH A. FARMER and wife ) Chancellor

DEBRA J. FARMER, )

)

Defendants/Appellants. ) Appeal No.

) 03S01-9707-CH-00081

For Defendants/Appellants: For Plaintiff/Appellee

Norbert J. Slovis Robert W. Knolton

Douglas C. Weinstein KRAMER, RAYSON, LEAKE,

LOCKETT, SLOVIS & WEAVER RODGERS & MORGAN 

Knoxville, Tennessee Oak Ridge, Tennessee

O P I N I O N

COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED;

CASE REMANDED

TO COURT OF APPEALS. DROWOTA, J.
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We granted this appeal to determine whether or not the Court of Appeals erred

in finding that the “Motion to Reconsider” filed by the defendant, Debra Farmer, was

not sufficient to allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction. We conclude that the

“Motion to Reconsider” was in substance a Rule 59.04, Tenn. R. Civ. P., motion to

alter or amend the judgment which allowed the trial court to retain jurisdiction of the

cause and which tolled commencement of the time for filing a notice of appeal until

entry of an order granting or denying the motion. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeals which held that the “Motion to Reconsider” is not

authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure and will not serve to extend the appellate

process and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with

this decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The defendants, Debra and Joseph Farmer, were injured in a car accident on

March 28, 1989. The plaintiff, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, their

automobile insurance carrier, paid the medical expenses incurred by the Farmers.

Thereafter, the defendants filed suit and obtained a recovery against the third party

tortfeasor involved in the accident. When Tennessee Farmers asserted its

subrogation rights, Joseph Farmer reimbursed it for the medical payments it had

made on his behalf, but Debra Farmer refused to reimburse Tennessee Farmers,

asserting that she had not been made whole by the recovery from the third party

tortfeasor.

Tennessee Farmers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a

determination of its subrogation rights against Debra Farmer. On June 23, 1995, the
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trial court held that Tennessee Farmers was entitled to reimbursement for medical

expenses it had paid on behalf of Debra Farmer. Less than thirty days later, on July

20, 1995, Debra Farmer filed a “Motion to Reconsider,” in which she requested that

the trial court alter or amend its judgment to find in her favor. After a hearing, the

Chancellor granted the motion, finding that Debra Farmer had not been made whole

by the recovery against the third party tortfeasor and ruling that Tennessee Farmers

had no right of subrogation against that recovery. The Chancellor entered the order

reflecting the altered judgment on August 7, 1996.

On August 29, 1996, within thirty days of the trial court’s entry of the order,

Tennessee Farmers filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The parties filed

their briefs, and upon mutual consent, waived oral argument and submitted the

matter to the Court of Appeals for decision on the briefs alone. 

The Court of Appeals issued an opinion in which it vacated the trial court’s

judgment of August 7, 1996 and reinstated the trial court’s initial judgment of June 23,

1995 in favor of Tennessee Farmers. In so holding, the Court of Appeals found that

the trial court’s initial declaratory judgment became final thirty days after its entry

because the “Motion to Reconsider” is not designated by the applicable rules of civil

and appellate procedure as one which tolls commencement of the thirty day period

within which a notice of appeal must be filed.

Thereafter we granted permission to appeal, and for the reasons herein

explained, now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis of this issue with Rule 4(a), Tenn. R. App. P., which

requires, in an appeal as of right, that a notice of appeal be “filed with and received

by the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment

appealed from; . . . .” However, subsection (b) of Rule 4 specifies that, if timely filed,

certain post-trial motions will toll commencement of the thirty day period until the date

on which an order is entered granting or denying the motion. Subsection (b) of Rule

4 provides as follows:

In a civil action, if a timely motion under the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party: (1) under Rule 50.02

for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict; (2)

under Rule 52.02 to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether

or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is

granted; (3) under Rule 59.02 for a new trial; (4) under Rule 59.04 to

alter or amend the judgment; the time for appeal for all parties shall run

from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying

any such motion.

(Emphasis added). This principle is reiterated in Rule 59.01, Tenn. R. Civ. P., which

provides:

Motions to which this rule is applicable are (1) under Rule 50.02 for

judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict; (2) under

Rule 50.02 to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not

an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted;

(3) under Rule 59.02 for a new trial; or (4) under Rule 59.04 to alter or

amend the judgment. These motions are the only motions

contemplated in these rules for extending the time for taking steps in

the regular appellate process. Motions to reconsider any of these

motions are not authorized and will not operate to extend the time for

appellate proceedings.

(Emphasis added.) Rule 59.04, Tenn. R. Civ. P., provides that “[a] motion to alter or

amend a judgment shall be filed and served within (30) days after the entry of

judgment.” 
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In this Court, Debra Farmer asserts that the decision of the Court of Appeals

was an overly technical application of these rules which considered the form rather

than the substance of the motion. She argues that despite its title, the “Motion to

Reconsider” was in substance a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the trial court’s

judgment. She asserts that its filing within thirty days of entry of the trial court’s initial

judgment tolled commencement of the time for filing a notice of appeal until the date

on which an order was entered granting or denying the motion. In contrast,

Tennessee Farmers argues that the Court of Appeals’ judgment should be affirmed

because a “Motion to Reconsider” is not listed in the applicable rules of civil and

appellate procedure as one which tolls commencement of the thirty day period for

filing a notice of appeal.

If we were to consider only the form of the motion filed by Debra Farmer,

Tennessee Farmers would prevail in this appeal because the title “motion to

reconsider” is not included among those which toll commencement of the time for

filing a notice of appeal. However, courts must consider the substance of a motion

in determining whether it is in fact one of the specified post-trial motions which toll

commencement of the time.

This rule was applied in Bemis Co. Inc. v. Hines, 585 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tenn.

1979), in which the plaintiff had filed a written “Motion to Set Aside Decree and

Restore the Cause to the Docket.” Although commenting that “neither the title nor

the format of the motion bears a striking resemblance to the usual motion for new

trial,” this Court found it to be “clearly ascertainable from a reading of the motion that,

in substance, . . .“ it was a motion for a new trial.
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This rule was also applied by the Court of Appeals in Hawkins v. Hawkins, 883

S.W.2d 622 (Tenn. App. 1994), a case factually similar to this one. There the plaintiff

filed a written post-trial motion which she designated as a “Motion to Reconsider.”

The Court of Appeals noted, “[t]hough she called it a motion to reconsider, ‘it is

clearly ascertainable from a reading of the motion that, in substance,’ it amounts to

a motion to alter.” Id. at 624, quoting Bemis Co. Inc., 585 S.W.2d at 575. 

Requiring courts to consider the substance of a post-trial motion, rather than

its form, is consistent with the rules of civil procedure. Rule 8.05, Tenn. R. Civ. P.,

explicitly states that “[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required.”

(Emphasis added.) Moreover, allowing the form of a motion to control its substance

could result in the dismissal of many appeals and would, in turn, defeat the mandate

of Rule 1, Tenn. R. App. P., which instructs that the rules of appellate procedure are

to be “construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every

proceeding on its merits.” Accordingly, we hold that when determining whether a

post-trial motion is one of those designated by the rules of civil and appellate

procedure as tolling commencement of the time for filing a notice of appeal, courts

must consider the substance of the motion, rather than its form. To avoid confusion,

however, attorneys filing post-trial motions should utilize the titles referenced in Rule

4, Tenn. R. App. P. and Rule 59.01, Tenn. R. Civ. P.

Applying this rule, we conclude that the “Motion to Reconsider” filed in this

case by Debra Farmer is in substance a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the
1W e emphasize that the “Motion to Reconsider” at issue in this appeal was not a mo tion to

reconsider a previou sly decided motion under R ule 59.01 , Tenn . R. Civ. P. Indeed, th at rule spec ifically

provides that motions to reconsider previously decided post-trial mo tions are “n ot authorized an d will

not operate to extend the time for appe llate proce edings.” R ule 59.01 , Tenn . R. Civ. P.; see also

Daug herty v. Lumbermen’s Underwriting Alliance, 798 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that the

filing of a m otion to reconsider the denial of a motion for new trial does not toll commencement of the

time for filing a notice of appeal).

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initial judgment of the trial court.1

 Since the motion was timely filed within thirty days

of the initial judgment of the trial court, the Chancellor retained jurisdiction to act on

the motion and the thirty day time period for filing a notice of appeal did not

commence until the trial court entered the August 7, 1996 order granting the motion.

The Court of Appeals’ decision reversing and vacating the Chancellor’s final order of

August 7, 1996 and reinstating the June 23, 1995 order in plaintiff’s favor was

erroneous.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons previously stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of

Appeals which reinstated the initial judgment of the trial court. We remand this case

to the Court of Appeals for a determination of the pretermitted issues of the plaintiff’s

appeal from the judgment of the trial court entered August 7, 1996.

_____________________________________

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III,

JUSTICE

Concur:

Anderson, C. J.

Birch, Holder, Barker, JJ.