Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1603-CR-469 | November 18, 2016 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael G. Moore

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Charles Dunson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 18, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1603-CR-469

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable Shatrese Flowers, 

Judge

The Honorable Peggy Hart,

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G20-1412-F5-53840

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1603-CR-469 | November 18, 2016 Page 2 of 13

Case Summary

[1] Charles Dunson challenges his conviction for Level 5 felony carrying a 

handgun without a license. We affirm.

Issue

[2] Dunson raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly 

admitted into evidence a handgun seized during an investigatory stop.

Facts

[3] On November 20, 2014, officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police 

Department were dispatched to the 2400 block of Kenwood Avenue after a 

number of 911 calls reported men with guns in the area. There was angry 

shouting audible in some of the calls, and one of the dispatches to police noted 

those sounds. The dispatchers also relayed reports from callers that there were 

thirty people gathering and that one caller reported someone was attempting to 

kick in his door. 

[4] Officer Matthew Addington and Deputy William Bennett responded to the 

dispatches and participated in a traffic stop involving someone thought to be 

involved in the incident. Meanwhile, Officers Tiffany Wren and Cathy Faulk

also responded to the disturbance and spoke with Tamika Coleman, who was 

the victim of the altercation. Coleman was bleeding around her lips and nose, 

her nose appeared to be broken, and sections of her hair were torn out. 

Coleman’s shirt was also torn, and there were footprints on her shirt. Coleman

was “very upset, she was crying, she was agitated . . . .” Tr. p. 152. While 
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Officers Wren and Faulk talked to Coleman, a man drove past on a scooter or 

motorcycle, and Coleman indicated to the other nearby officers that he was 

“involved.”1 Id. 

[5] Officer Faulk issued a police radio broadcast indicating she had a “conscious 

and alert” female who was “bleeding from the face” and then stated “there’s a 

“black male on a silver scooter, he’s coming toward you; he may be involved” 

and described it as a “big scooter, looks like a motorcycle.” Ex. 3, track 14. 

Officer Addington responded, “I see it. It’s coming down Kenwood towards 

Twenty-Second,” and then stated, “I have him detained.” Id. 

[6] After Dunson stopped his motorcycle, Officer Addington approached him and 

“noticed a bulge[] in [Dunson’s] groin area . . . there was a flat top to it with a 

shirt over top that. Ah, there’s a larger bulge beneath that about the waist line a 

belt line of the pants of the driver.” Tr. p. 67. Officer Addington believed the 

bulge was a weapon, and he patted Dunson down. Officer Addington 

discovered a 9mm Ruger in Dunson’s waist band and seized it.

[7] The State charged Dunson with Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun 

without a license and enhanced the charge to a Level 5 felony because Dunson 

had a prior conviction for the same offense. Dunson filed two motions to 

suppress, both of which the trial court denied following evidentiary hearings.

 

1 Coleman testified during Dunson’s trial that she did not state Dunson was involved in the incident.
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[8] Dunson was tried in a bifurcated bench trial. During the trial, Dunson 

challenged the admissibility of the handgun. The trial court overruled 

Dunson’s objection, admitted the handgun into evidence, and found Dunson

guilty of carrying a handgun without a license. Dunson stipulated to the Level 

5 felony enhancement. The trial court sentenced Dunson to 2210 days in the 

Department of Correction. Dunson now appeals his conviction.

Analysis

[9] Because Dunson appeals following trial and did not seek interlocutory review of 

the denials of his motions to suppress, the issue in this matter is “appropriately 

framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence 

at trial.” Rhodes v. State, 50 N.E.3d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation 

omitted), trans. denied. “We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider 

conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. We also

consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. 

[10] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally prohibits a 

warrantless search or seizure absent a valid exception to the warrant 

requirement. Peak v. State, 26 N.E.3d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A 

traffic stop is a seizure. Id. However, an officer may “stop and briefly detain a 

person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion 

supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” Robinson v. 

State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind. 2014) (quotations omitted) (citing United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (2014)). “The existence of 
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reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at the totality of the 

circumstances to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and

objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing.” Peak, 26 N.E.3d at 1015. “The 

reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer, 

together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an 

ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to 

occur.” L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[Stops initiated pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 

1868 (1968)] are limited in scope and purpose. Their purpose is

not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to 

pursue his investigation without fear of violence . . . . Since 

reasonable suspicion is all that is necessary to support a Terry

stop and it is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . 

[t]he Fourth Amendment requires [only] some minimal level of 

objective justification for making the stop. 

[11] Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. 2006) (second and third alterations in 

original) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted), reh’g granted on other grounds. 

[12] Dunson contends the Terry stop in this case violated his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment2 because “[t]he stopping officers lacked reasonable suspicion to 

believe [he] was engaged in criminal activity prior to stopping him and any 

knowledge known to the investigating officer cannot be imputed on the 

stopping officer.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. Dunson acknowledges that 

 

2 Dunson does not challenge the propriety of the stop pursuant to the Indiana Constitution. 
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“information obtained by one investigating officer may be relied upon by other 

law enforcement officials called upon to assist in the investigation of a suspect”

under the theory of “collective knowledge.” Id. However, he contends that 

Officer Faulk’s radio broadcast that Dunson “‘may be involved’ is not specific 

and articulable enough to support the finding that the stopping offers had a 

reasonable suspicion that Dunson was involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 10. 

[13] Our supreme court has stated: “Information obtained by one officer may be 

relied upon by other law enforcement officials who are called upon to assist in 

the investigation and arrest of a suspect, as long as the officer who obtained the 

information possessed probable cause3to make the arrest.” Heffner v. State, 530 

N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. 1988) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. 

Ct. 675 (1985)).

In an era when criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and 

increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this 

rule is a matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of 

information concerning suspects that must be transmitted to 

other jurisdictions and enables police in one jurisdiction to act 

promptly in reliance on information from another jurisdiction.

Hensley, 469 U.S. at 230, 105 S. Ct. at 681.

 

3 We note that several of the cases on which we rely discuss collective knowledge of law enforcement officials 

as it relates to possessing probable cause and making arrests as opposed to reasonable suspicion and 

investigatory stops. Because the former is a higher standard, we see no reason these cases should not apply 

equally to arrest scenarios and scenarios, like the one at issue here, involving investigatory stops. See Clark v. 

State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 261 (Ind. 2013) (noting reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than that required for 

an arrest).
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[14] More recently, our supreme court again stated: 

Probable cause can rest on collective information known to the 

law enforcement organization as a whole, and not solely on the 

personal knowledge of the arresting officer. The police force is 

considered a unit. Where there is a police-channel 

communication to the arresting officer, he acts in good faith 

thereon, and such knowledge and information exist within the 

department, the arrest is based on probable cause. 

Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 

U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031 (1971), and Francis v. State, 161 Ind. App. 371, 316 

N.E.2d 416 (1974)); see also Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279, 292 (Ind. 1988) 

(“Probable cause should be determined on the basis of the collective 

information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole and not 

solely to the personal knowledge of the arresting officer,” and discussing 

“police-channel communication.”) (citing Benton v. State, 273 Ind. 34, 401 

N.E.2d 697 (Ind. 1980); Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 1983); and 

Hensley). There was such a “police-channel communication” from Officer 

Faulk to Officer Addington in this case and, pursuant to Heffner, Hensley, and 

Griffith, we conclude the investigative stop could properly be “based upon the 

collective information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole.” 

L.W., 926 N.E.2d at 58. 

[15] Dunson directs us to Jamerson v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),

and Murray v. State, 837 N.E.2d 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In 

Jamerson, three police officers received a request over dispatch from an 
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unidentified detective to locate Jamerson, who was reportedly sitting in a 

vehicle behind a specific residence. The detective indicated he was seeking 

Jamerson in connection with a carjacking incident. Individuals in the residence 

behind which Jamerson was sitting had notified the police that Jamerson was 

there. Based on the detective’s information, the three police officers 

approached Jamerson and detained him “for investigative purposes until the 

officers heard back from the county detective who had made the initial report.” 

Id. at 1053. One of the officers then observed a handgun underneath 

Jamerson’s car seat and seized it. Jamerson was charged with and convicted of 

carrying a handgun without a license. On appeal, Jamerson challenged the 

propriety of the investigatory stop. 

[16] This court rejected the State’s argument that the officers who detained 

Jamerson were acting “upon the police department’s collective knowledge that 

Jamerson was wanted in connection with [a carjacking].” Id. at 1056. Instead, 

this court noted that the responding officers “did not know who the detective 

was who had related [the] information over dispatch, that the detective never 

responded or came to the scene, that [they were] not in touch with the 

detective, and that [they] had no firsthand knowledge of any conversations this 

detective had had.” Id. at 1057. The court stated:

While the report over dispatch did make an assertion of illegality, 

such assertion was not supported by any specific and articulable 

facts. Indeed the message over dispatch asserted only that 

Jamerson was wanted in connection with an alleged crime of 

carjacking . . . . Yet no facts accompanied such assertion, and 
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the detective making the assertions never followed up with his 

claims and has yet to be identified. 

Id. Finally, this court noted that the officers who detained Jamerson “pointed 

to no statements or behaviors tending to corroborate Jamerson’s link to the 

alleged carjacking.” Id. at 1058. This court concluded: “the State has failed to 

demonstrate that Jamerson’s reported link to the alleged illegal activity was 

anything more than an unparticularized hunch on the part of the unnamed 

reporting officer” and that the officers did not make an adequate showing of 

reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Jamerson. Id.

[17] Jamerson is readily distinguishable from Dunson’s case. In Jamerson, the 

detective who broadcast a message regarding Jamerson’s alleged involvement in 

a crime was unidentified. The record in that case contained no information 

regarding the facts that led the unidentified detective to suspect Jamerson was 

involved in the carjacking. None of the officers who detained Jamerson had 

any knowledge of information that could have linked Jamerson to the 

carjacking.

[18] In contrast, Officer Faulk was known to Officer Addington and was working in 

conjunction with Officer Addington and other officers to investigate the reports 

regarding a disturbance. Even though Officer Faulk did not explain the basis 

for her reasonable suspicion in her radio broadcast, she has done so 

subsequently, and that information is part of the record and available for 

review. 
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[19] In Murray, a law enforcement officer responded to a dispatch regarding a 

disturbance at a pool hall. When the officer arrived, witnesses reported Murray 

had gotten into a fight and described his appearance and the car in which he 

left. The officer then radioed dispatch and related that information. The officer 

additionally radioed a second law enforcement officer and gave him a 

description of Murray and Murray’s vehicle and told the second officer that “he 

just needed to speak with Murray.” Murray, 837 N.E.2d at 224. The second 

officer soon observed Murray’s vehicle, initiated a traffic stop, and noticed 

Murray appeared to be intoxicated. The officer arrested Murray, and the State 

charged him with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Murray filed a motion 

to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, which the trial 

court granted. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s suppression order. 

This court concluded:

The record reveals that [the second officer] received no 

information from [the first officer] that Murray had been or was 

involved in criminal activity before [the second officer] made his 

investigatory stop. [The first officer] merely radioed other units 

that he “needed to speak with the subject.” In order to rely on 

collective knowledge, the knowledge sufficient for reasonable 

suspicion must be conveyed to the investigating officer before the 

stop is made. The collective knowledge cannot be relied upon 

after the fact. To hold otherwise would allow police officers to 

conduct investigatory stops before having any reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity.

Id. at 226. 
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[20] While there may be some factual similarities between Murray and this case, we 

believe that the collective knowledge of the police, the description of Dunson 

and the motorcycle he was riding, and the totality of the circumstances 

sufficiently differentiate the case. We further believe that the United States 

Supreme Court’s holding in Hensley and a number of our supreme court’s 

decisions lead us to this conclusion.

[21] We believe that a rationale similar to the one Justice O’Connor articulated in 

Hensley can be applied to this case. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231, 105 S. Ct. at 

681. Here, law enforcement officers were cooperating in investigating reports 

of a disturbance. Officers Faulk and Wren spoke to the victim while Officer 

Addington and Deputy Bennett detained a suspect. When Officers Faulk and 

Wren acquired information that Dunson may have been involved, they were 

outside their vehicles, and Dunson was travelling on a motorcycle. Officer 

Addington was nearby and available to assist his fellow officers. Requiring a 

law enforcement officer in Officer Faulk’s position to relay the exact details of 

her reasonable suspicion would be cumbersome and impractical, if not 

dangerous, in situations such as this one where the officers are simultaneously 

investigating the possible commission of a crime, keeping the area safe, and 

attempting to apprehend possible suspects. Requiring the level of detail 

Dunson suggests is necessary could hamstring an officer’s ability to effectively 

carry out his or her duties. Allowing officers to rely on the collective 

knowledge of the law enforcement organization is practical and leads to more 

efficient police work.
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[22] Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that 

Officer Addington’s investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. 

After multiple people made 911 calls reporting a disturbance, which reportedly 

involved a number of men, some of whom had guns, several law enforcement 

officers responded to the calls. Officers Faulk and Wren spoke to Coleman, 

who was injured in and upset by the incident, while Officer Addington and 

Deputy Bennett detained another individual who may have been involved. 

While Officers Faulk and Wren were speaking to Coleman, Dunson rode past 

on his motorcycle, and the victim identified Dunson as someone who was 

involved in the incident. Officer Faulk, who was engaged in her investigation, 

communicated to her fellow law enforcement officers that Dunson may have 

been involved and called on them for assistance. Collectively, the officers had

specific and articulable information from a known person—Coleman—

regarding Dunson’s involvement in the incident. That information was 

sufficient to lead an ordinarily prudent person to believe Dunson was involved 

in the criminal activity the officers were investigating. See L.W., 926 N.E.2d at 

55. Officer Addington thus had reasonable suspicion to detain Dunson in order 

to further investigate, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by admitting the evidence seized as a result of the investigatory stop. 4

 

4 Officer Addington testified he observed Dunson driving at an unsafe speed, and Dunson contends Officer 

Addington’s opinion that Dunson was speeding did not amount to reasonable suspicion that Dunson 

committed a traffic violation and did not justify the investigatory stop. Because we conclude the officers’ 

collective knowledge amounted to reasonable suspicion, we need not determine whether Officer Addington 

had reasonable suspicion to believe Dunson was speeding. 
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Conclusion

[23] The collective information known to the law enforcement organization was 

sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that Dunson had been involved in 

criminal activity. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 

evidence gathered as a result of the investigatory stop. We affirm.

[24] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.