NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

STUDENT, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-35552

D.C. No. 3:12-cv-01837-AC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

John V. Acosta, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 10, 2016**

Portland, Oregon

Before: McKEOWN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and DORSEY,***

District Judge.

Student appeals the district court’s order reversing in part a decision by the

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for 

the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 5 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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administrative law judge (“ALJ”) related to special education services provided by 

Forest Grove School District (“the School District”) under the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. The excerpts of 

record in this case are sealed, so our disposition does not repeat the facts, which are 

known to the parties. We review for clear error the district court’s findings of fact,

and we review de novo the appropriateness of an education program. Gregory K. 

v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.

The IDEA provides federal funding to assist state and local agencies with 

educating disabled children, but funding is conditioned on compliance with certain 

goals and procedures. N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 

541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008); 20 U.S.C. § 1400. The ultimate goal of the 

IDEA is to ensure that children with disabilities receive a “free appropriate public 

education” by providing special education and related services to meet each child’s 

unique needs and prepare each child for the future. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

As a threshold matter, Student challenges the district court’s determination 

that the ALJ’s opinion was entitled little deference. We agree with the district 

court that the ALJ’s opinion is entitled to little deference in this instance because it 

is not “thorough and careful”: for example, the ALJ’s analysis is dominated by 
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block quotations from various documents and legal standards; lacks detailed

discussion of witness testimony, especially of expert witness testimony; and fails 

to consider the record as a whole. See Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 

1524 (9th Cir. 1994).

School districts must comply with the IDEA’s procedural and substantive 

requirements. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 

U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982). When determining whether a school district failed to 

provide a student with a free appropriate public education, the court must inquire 

first into whether the district complied with the IDEA’s procedural requirements 

and, then, whether the student’s individualized education plan was “reasonably 

calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id. Student argues 

that the School District violated her procedural and substantive rights under the 

IDEA.

To show harm, procedural inadequacies generally must result in the loss of 

an educational opportunity or seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to 

participate in the formulation of a student’s individualized education plan. L.M. v. 

Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir. 2008). Even assuming

that the School District did not comply strictly with IDEA procedures, Student has 
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not shown that the failure to provide prior written notice, reevaluate her mental 

health, conduct age-appropriate transition assessments, or provide progress reports

affected her or her parents’ substantive rights. The School District also did not 

commit procedural error when determining Student’s class placement, because the 

record reflects that Student’s parents actively participated in the formation of her 

individualized education plan and that the School District adjusted Student’s 

services at times after input from her parents and others, considered Student’s 

various educational options, and substantiated its decisions with evidence and 

evaluations. See K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 

2011); J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).

Likewise, the School District did not violate Student’s substantive rights. A 

school district provides a free appropriate public education if it: “(1) addresses the 

child’s unique needs, (2) provides adequate support services so the child can take 

advantage of the educational opportunities, and (3) is in accord with the [child’s] 

individualized education program.” Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg 

ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 1995). Notably, an “appropriate” 

public education need not be the “absolutely best;” it must only provide “a basic 

floor of opportunity” that is “individually designed to provide individual benefit.” 
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See Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21, 200–01). 

Even under a higher standard than suggested in Gregory K., Student has not shown

that the School District failed to provide her with a free appropriate public 

education.

Here, Student’s individualized education plan contained concrete 

measurements of Student’s progress; Student’s May 2009 and April 2010 plans 

appropriately addressed her anxiety; and Student’s supposed lack of progress is not 

entirely supported by the record and, where it is, did not result in the denial of free 

appropriate public education. See id. Likewise, the School District was not 

required to conform all of Student’s classes to her parents’ preferred teaching 

method. Id. To the extent Student’s March 2011 and November 2011 transition 

plans were not based on age-appropriate assessments under 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa), any claimed error did not deny Student a free 

appropriate public education because the two transition plans were years from 

Student’s graduation date and sufficiently focused on the development of Student’s 

post-secondary skills. See Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314. Additionally, Student’s 

class placement appropriately balanced her educational limitations and goals, 

Student’s socialization and other non-academic needs, the effect that Student’s 
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preferred teaching style would have had on other students, and the costs to the 

School District. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H. 

ex rel. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.