UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4468

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DENITA HILL,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. 

(1:14-cr-00225-GLR-1)

Argued: October 28, 2016 Decided: November 29, 2016

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Joanna Beth Silver, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Tamera Lynn Fine, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE 

OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Joshua 

Felsen, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Denita Hill of one count of wire fraud 

conspiracy and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Hill now 

appeals, arguing that the district court clearly erred in 

imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

Hill worked as an accountant with the City of Baltimore’s 

Finance Department Bureau of Accounting and Payroll Services 

(BAPS). As relevant here, Hill’s job entailed verifying the nonreceipt of lost or stolen checks and completing paperwork for 

the reissuance of such checks. Hill become disgruntled with her 

employment and began creating a plan with her friend Robert 

Johnson. Hill told Johnson that she had found a way to steal 

money without anyone noticing—by reissuing checks that had 

already been cashed by their recipients. Hill said she could 

reissue the checks, sign them over to Johnson, and he could cash 

them. Hill also told Johnson that she could handle any 

investigation. The two agreed to Hill’s plan and, on two 

separate occasions, Hill submitted and processed paperwork for 

duplicate checks for lump-sum retirement benefits that had 

already been cashed by their recipients. After the checks were 

issued by other BAPS employees, Hill gave them to Johnson, who 

cashed them. 
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Shortly thereafter, Joyce Lochridge, a fraud investigator 

for M&T Bank, became suspicious of the deposits and contacted 

Russell Connelly, an agent with the City of Baltimore’s Office 

of the Inspector General. Conelley contacted a supervisor in the 

Finance Department to inquire about the paperwork supporting the 

checks. Conelley also tried unsuccessfully to contact the 

retirees directly.

Less than an hour after Conelley called the Finance 

Department, Hill (unsolicited) called Conelley to tell him that

she had looked into the checks and that they were properly 

reissued. Hill told Conelley that she had spoken to the retirees 

and both told her they had received the checks and signed them 

over to Johnson. Conelley pressed Hill, asking why two unrelated 

retirees would both sign their checks over to Johnson, and Hill 

opined that the retirees might be trying to avoid a garnishment. 

Conelley spoke again with Lochridge, and Lochridge told him of a 

similar conversation that she had with Hill. Later that day, 

Conelley interviewed Hill. During that interview, Hill repeated 

her earlier explanation that she had investigated the checks and 

determined that there was no impropriety. She further claimed 

that she did not know Johnson.

After speaking with Hill, Conelley resumed his efforts to 

find the underlying paperwork supporting the reissuance of the 

checks. As part of this effort, he went to the BAPS office to 
4

lead a search. During the search, Conelley determined that the 

paperwork supporting the two checks was not with the paperwork 

for other checks reissued on those days. In fact, although 

multiple employees aided Conelley in this search, the paperwork 

was never recovered. Several BAPS employees testified that they 

would never reissue a check without the corresponding paperwork. 

For example, Kevin Logan—who had reissued one of the checks 

cashed by Johnson—testified that he specifically remembered 

having supporting paperwork when he issued the check.

Based on the foregoing, a federal grand jury indicted Hill 

and Johnson on one count of wire fraud conspiracy, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, two counts of substantive wire fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and two counts of aggravated 

identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Johnson pled 

guilty, but Hill proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Hill of 

wire fraud conspiracy and the two counts of aggravated identity 

theft but acquitted her of the substantive wire fraud counts. 

Following trial, the probation office prepared a PreSentence Report (PSR), recommending a two-level enhancement for 

obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The PSR noted 

that “[i]n addition to destroying evidence, Ms. Hill reportedly 

reached out to investigators after the investigation was under 

way and tried to derail the investigation. In addition, she lied 

to investigators during an interview.” (J.A. 958). 
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At sentencing, Hill objected to the obstruction 

enhancement. She conceded that she intended to obstruct justice 

but argued that she failed to do so as defined by the Guidelines 

because the investigation uncovered that she was the 

perpetrator. In response to this argument, the district court 

noted that “even if the delay is for a day, I mean, that day 

bought her a day to potentially grind the evidence, grind the 

paperwork.” (J.A. 987-88). The court also asked the Government 

to make its strongest case that Hill’s conduct fell within the 

enhancement. The Government argued that the missing paperwork 

was material to its case because it kept them from being able to 

complete a paper trail back to Hill and likely led to Hill’s 

acquittal on the substantive wire fraud count.

Following argument, the district court held that the 

evidence supported the enhancement. The court found that Hill’s 

conduct obstructed justice in three ways. First, the court 

referred to Johnson’s testimony that Hill “had a plan in place 

to be able to thwart the investigation.” (J.A. 994). Second, the 

court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hill 

destroyed the paperwork and then explained that the “missing 

documentation clearly was material and . . . hindered the 

investigation.” (J.A. 994). Finally, the court noted that Hill 

made “material misrepresentations” to Agent Conelley that 

“obstructed the investigation in this case, and hindered it” 
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because the misrepresentations bought her additional time to 

destroy the paperwork and cover her tracks. (J.A. 994). 

With the obstruction enhancement, the district court found 

that Hill’s offense level was 19 and her Guidelines range was 

30-37 months. The court then varied downward four levels and 

sentenced Hill to 18 months imprisonment on the wire fraud 

count. The court also sentenced Hill to an additional 24 months 

imprisonment on the aggravated identity theft counts, 

consecutive to the 18-month sentence for wire fraud conspiracy, 

for a total sentence of 42 months imprisonment. Hill timely 

appealed.

II.

On appeal, Hill challenges only the two-level enhancement 

for obstruction of justice. We review the district court’s legal 

interpretations of the Guidelines de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error. United States v. Medina-Campo, 714 

F.3d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 2013). When, as here, a district court 

offers several independent bases for the obstruction 

enhancement, we need only uphold one in order to affirm. United 

States v. Ashers, 968 F.2d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding 

that “if the enhancement was applied properly on an alternative 

basis, the resulting adjusted offense level is correctly 

determined”). 
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The enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. § 

3C1.1, provides:

If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, 

or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration 

of justice with respect to the investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of 

conviction . . . increase the offense level by 2 

levels.

Application Note 4(G) states that “providing a materially false 

statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly 

obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution 

of the instant offense” warrants the enhancement. U.S.S.G. 

§ 3C1.1, app. note 4(G). 

We hold that the district court did not clearly err in 

finding that Hill provided materially false statements to a law 

enforcement officer.* To begin, the statements Hill made to 

Conelley during her phone call and later interview were both 

material and false. A statement is material under § 3C1.1 when 

“if believed,” the statement “would tend to influence or affect 

the issue under determination.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, app. note 6. 

Hill’s statements, in which she offered a false explanation for 

the need to reissue the checks and explained why the recipients 

 * On appeal, Hill argues for the first time that Conelley is 

not a “law enforcement officer” for purposes of the enhancement. 

The district court did not plainly err in finding otherwise; 

Agent Conelley served as the lead agent in Hill’s prosecution 

and worked for the city agency responsible for investigating 

fraud by city employees. 
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would turn the checks over to Johnson clearly meet the 

“conspicuously low” bar for materiality. United States v. 

Gormley, 201 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Likewise, the district court did not err in 

finding that the statements significantly obstructed the 

investigation because, as the court explained, they bought Hill 

time to destroy the underlying paperwork and cover her tracks. 

That the jury acquitted Hill of the wire fraud charges is 

further support for the court’s conclusion that Hill’s 

statements significantly impeded the investigation and 

prosecution. Moreover, the fact that Hill was ultimately 

unsuccessful in her attempts to divert the investigation does 

not let her escape the enhancement. See United States v. Hicks, 

948 F.2d 877, 884-85 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying enhancement for 

obstruction when defendant threw cocaine out of his car during a 

high speed chase but, after arrest, helped officers recover the 

evidence). 

III.

Because the district court did not clearly err in finding 

that Hill made materially false statements to Conelley that 

significantly impeded the investigation and prosecution, we find 

that the court correctly imposed the two-level enhancement for
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obstruction of justice. We accordingly affirm Hill’s conviction 

and sentence.

AFFIRMED