alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, District Judge, United States 1

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

____________

No. 95-2208

____________

Leon Burgess, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Unknown Bone, Unknown Lawrence, *

Unknown Gaides, Unknown Ghumm, *

Unknown Edwards, Unknown Wisdom,*

Unknown Crocker, Unknown Adams, *

Unknown Wagner, Unknown Tilley, * Appeal from the United States

A. Henson, Unknown Kitchell, * District Court for the

Unknown Smith, Unknown Gelbauch,* Eastern District of Missouri

Unknown Dicus, Unknown Bergner, *

Unknown Turnbull, Unknown Dunn, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Unknown Weber, Unknown Hutchins,*

Unknown Hartley, Unknown Howell,*

Unknown Bowen, Unknown Roper, *

Unknown Pogue, Unknown Delo, *

Unknown Wells, Unknown Bingham, *

Unknown Reed, *

*

Appellees. *

____________

 Submitted: April 12, 1996

 Filed: July 5, 1996

____________

Before McMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Leon Burgess, an inmate who was transferred to the Jefferson

City Correctional Center from the Potosi Correctional Center

(Potosi) in December 1994, appeals from a final order entered in

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 1
-2-

Missouri granting summary judgment in favor of twenty-four Potosi

officials (the Potosi defendants) and three contracted medical

employees of Potosi from Correctional Medical Systems (the CMS

defendants). Burgess brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that (1) the Potosi and CMS defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by using

excessive force against him and failing to respond to his medical

needs; and (2) the Potosi and CMS defendants violated his due

process rights by conspiring to conceal the excessive force

incident. Upon summary judgment motions by both sets of

defendants, the district court held that the Potosi defendants were

entitled to qualified immunity and that Burgess had failed to

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the CMS

defendants had violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

Burgess v. Kevin Bone, et al., No. 4:94-CV-1346-CAS (E.D. Mo.

Apr. 20, 1995) (memorandum and order). For reversal Burgess argues

that (1) the district court erred in entering summary judgment

against him in light of the alleged confiscation of his legal file

in October 1994 by the Potosi defendants and by officials at the

Jefferson City Correctional Center and (2) the Potosi defendants

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to access to courts in

confiscating his legal file. Having carefully reviewed the record

and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that no error of law or fact

appears and that an opinion would lack precedential value.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EPA DR # 4024 

April 27, 2010
EPA DR # 4024 

April 27, 2010
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N
NO. 03-12-00252- CR
Ke nneth Eu gene Dr one, Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee
F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F MI LAM CO UNTY, 20TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. CR23,0 46, H ONO RAB LE JO HN Y OUNGB LOO D, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Kenne th Eug ene Drone has filed a motion to dismiss this appea l. We g rant the motion and dismiss the appe al. SeeTex. R. App. P . 42.2(a)
.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Rose and Goodw in Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: Aug ust 30, 2012 Do Not Publish
#### Robison v. Clearfield Area School Directors

*James A. Naddeo,*for plaintiffs.

*Robert Marsh,*for defendant.

September 16, 1977

REILLY, *P.J.,*

This matter comes before the court upon a complaint in equity to determine whether the Clearfield Area School District must provide free transportation to the plaintiffs, as well as room and board, during their attendance at the Western Pennsylvania School for the Deaf. Defendant has interpreted the act involved, to wit, the Public School Code of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, section 1331, as amended, 24 P.S. §13-1331, to restrict their responsibility to either providing transportation to and from the school, or suitable board and lodging for each child, and have, as a result thereof, been providing room and board for the plaintiffs in Pittsburgh from Monday through Friday. Plaintiffs, however, have been faced with the problem of either paying their own room and board at Pittsburgh over the weekends or providing their own transportation from Pittsburgh to Clearfield and from Clearfield back to Pittsburgh on these weekends.

*509This court has concluded that the fair and equitable interpretation of the act involved requires the local school district either to maintain plaintiffs by providing room and board in Pittsburgh for the entire seven day week, or provide them with transportation to and from Pittsburgh on the weekends. To hold otherwise would place undue hardship on the plaintiffs in their efforts to secure an education and would discriminate against them solely on the basis of their handicap.

Wherefore, the court enters the following

ORDER

Now, September 16, 1977, following hearing into the above-captioned action, it is the order of this court that the defendants are directed to provide plaintiffs with full maintenance, room and board during the course of their enrollment at the Western Pennsylvania School for the Deaf for a full seven days a week or, in the alternative, to provide them with necessary and proper transportation expenses to and from Pittsburgh each week. Said order to be effective with the commencement of the school year in September, 1977.
Exhibit 10.8

    

  

   

  

  
    Enphys Acquisition Corp.

    
      216 East 45th Street, 13th Floor

      New York, New York 10017

      

      

    

    October [•], 2021

    

    

    [Subscriber]

    [Notice Address]

    [City, State Zip]

    

    

    
      	Re:	Subscription Agreement


    

    

    

    Ladies and Gentlemen:

    

    

    Reference is made to that certain Subscription Agreement of even date herewith by and between the Company and Subscriber (the “Subscription Agreement”). Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Subscription
      Agreement.

    

    

    The Company has advised Subscriber that the number of Public Units to be issued in the IPO may increase.  In connection therewith, the
      parties hereto desire to fix the number of Public Units to be purchased by Subscriber in accordance with the Subscription Agreement as well as the number of Class B Shares to be issued to Subscriber in respect thereof.

    

    

    Accordingly, in the event that more than 25,000,000 Public Units are offered pursuant to the IPO (excluding any Public Units sold as a
      result of the exercise of the Over-Allotment Option), in lieu of the percentage of Public Units and Class B Shares to be purchased by or issued to Subscriber, as applicable, set forth in the Subscription Agreement, and without derogating from any of
      the other terms or conditions of the Subscription Agreement, the parties hereto agree that Subscriber shall be issued [________] Class B Shares, subject to and conditioned upon [Subscriber / the Subscriber Group in the aggregate] purchasing in the
      IPO the lesser of (x) [1,225,000 / 2,475,000] Public Units and (y) a number of Public Units representing not more than [4.99% / 9.99%] of the total number of Public Units offered pursuant to the IPO, in each case in accordance with, and subject to
      the terms and conditions of, the Subscription Agreement.

    

    

    In the event of a conflict between the terms of the Subscription Agreement and this letter agreement, the terms of this letter agreement
      shall control.

    

    

    

    

    

    

    (Signature page follows)

    
      
        


    

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned
      have executed this Agreement as of the date first set forth above.

    

    

    	 	
            COMPANY

          
	 	 
	 	
            Enphys Acquisition Corp.

          
	 	 
	 	
            By:

          	 
	 	 	
            Name:

          	 
	 	 	
            Title:

          	 


    

    

    	
            Acknowledged and Agreed:

          	 
	 	 	 	 
	
            SUBSCRIBER

          	 
	 	 	 	 
	
            [Subscriber]

          	 
	 	 	 	 
	
            By:

          	  	 
	 	
            Name:

          	 	 
	 	
            Title:

          	 	 


    

    

    	
            Acknowledged and Agreed:

          	 
	 	 	 	 
	
            Enphys Acquisition Sponsor LLC

          	 
	 	 	 	 
	
            By:

          	 	 
	 	
            Name:

          	 	 
	 	
            Title:
1 The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-2504

___________ Dennis Yates, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Missouri. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner * of Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: October 13, 2009 Filed: October 15, 2009

___________ Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Dennis Yates appeals from the district court’s 1 order affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied his application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental secu rity income. Yates alleged he became disabled on February 25, 2002, after falling off a box car at work. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Yates’s impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, shoulder pa in with history of rotator cuff repair, and-2- COPD, were severe but di d not equal a listed impairment, either singly or in combination; his allegations regarding the degree of his pain and limitations were not fully credible; he had the residual functi onal capacity (RFC) to perform light work with some additional limitations; and he c ould perform his past relevant work (PRW) as car salesman and service writer. We reject Yates’s arguments for reversal as follows.
Yates argues that the ALJ disregarded th e opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Eric Sollars, and instead credited the RFC assessment of Dr. David W. Cathcart, a consulting physician who examined him one time. We hold that the record supports the ALJ’s decision to credit Dr. Cathcart’s RFC assessment, as he conducted a thorough physical examination and consideredthe objective medical evidence in the record, while Dr. Sollars’s notes do not i ndicate extensive physical examinations, and his extreme limitations are not supported by the record. See Wagner v. Astrue , 499 F.3d 842, 849 (8th Cir. 2007) (ALJ may cred it other medical evaluations over that of treating physician when other assessment is supported by bette r or more thorough medical evidence, or where treating physic ian renders inconsistent opinions that undermine credibility of such opinions). In addition, while Yates argues that the ALJ failed to consider the functi onal demands of his PRW as he performed it and compare it to his RFC, the ALJ elic ited testimony from the vocational expert that, given the RFC the ALJ found supported by the record, Yates could perform his PRW. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2) (VE may offer evid ence concerning demands of claimant’s PRW, either as claimant actually performed it or as generally performed in national economy); Wagner , 499 F.3d at 853-54 (ALJ may pr operly elicit testimony from VE in evaluating claimant’s capacity to pe rform PRW, and may look at functional demands as required by employers in national economy).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

______________________________
Exhibit
99.1   PLX
TECHNOLOGY, INC. ANNOUNCES CONVERSION OF
 OXFORD
ACQUISITION NOTE
 
 
 SUNNYVALE,
Calif. – (May 27, 2009) – PLX Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: PLXT) today announced
the approval of the issuance of 3.4 million shares of the Company’s common stock
to satisfy the $14.2 million principal balance of the promissory note the
Company issued in connection with its acquisition of Oxford Semiconductor,
Inc.
  On
Friday, May 22, 2009, the Company held a special meeting of shareholders to vote
on the issuance of 3.4 million shares of PLX® common stock to satisfy the note
for the Oxford acquisition, which was completed January 2, 2009.  The
issuance of the 3.4 million common shares was approved with 99.6 percent of the
voted shares in favor of the conversion.  After the issuance of the
3.4 million shares of common stock, the total outstanding shares of common stock
will be approximately 37.0 million.
  About
PLX
 PLX Technology, Inc. (www.plxtech.com),
based in Sunnyvale, Calif., USA, is a leading global supplier of
high-performance, feature-rich, system-interconnect semiconductors, SoC and
software solutions for the communications, storage, server, compute,
embedded-control, and consumer markets. The Company provides a competitive
advantage through an integrated combination of experience, innovative silicon,
powerful designtools, and synergetic global partnerships. These
unmatched PLX solutions are based on established technologies including PCI
Express, USB, SATA, Ethernet, and FireWire that enable our customers to develop
equipment with industry-leading performance, scalability, security, and
reliability, and bring their designs to market faster.
 
 PLX
and the PLX logo are trademarks of PLX Technology, Inc., which may be registered
in some jurisdictions.  All other product names that appear in this
material are for identification purposes only and are acknowledged to be
trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective
companies.
  Editorial
contact:                                                                                                                                          Company
contact:


Jerry
Steach                                                                                                                                                
Arthur O Whipple, CFO


CommonGround Communications (for
PLX)                                                                                       
 PLX Technology, Inc.


Tel:
415.222.9996                                                                                                                                      
Tel: 408.774.9060


jsteach@plxtech.com                                                                                                                                   investor-relations@plxtech.com
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

 

 

**CONSENTOF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

        Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in Registration StatementNo. 333-56996, 333-96825, 333-110905 and 333-139622 on Form S-8 andRegistration Statement Nos. 333-130128, 333-132576 and 333-139621 on Form S-3of our reports dated March 17, 2008, relating to the consolidatedfinancial statements of deCODE genetics, Inc. and subsidiaries (whichreport expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraphrelating to the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123R,*Share-Based Payment*, effective January 1,2006) and our report dated March 17, 2008, relating to the effectivenessof deCODE genetics, Inc’s internal control over financial reporting, appearingin this Annual Report on Form 10-K of deCODE genetics, Inc. andsubsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2007.

 

 
| /s/ DELOITTE &  TOUCHE LLP |   |
|------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                     |   |
| Boston, Massachusetts                    |   |
| March 17, 2008                      |   |

 

 

 

----
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 09**  **- 764**  **3**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

v. ROHAN ALEXANDER WALTERS, a/k/a Dave, a/k/a Roha n Williams , Defendant

- Appell ant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia , at Charleston

. Joseph R. Goodwin , Chief District Judge. ( 2 : 9 7

- cr - 00157

- 2; 2:09

- c v - 0 0 589 )

Submitted : April 5, 2010 Decided: May 11, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER a nd MOTZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirm ed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Rohan Alexander Walters , Appellant Pro Se. Gary L. Call, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Rohan Alexander Walters appeals the district court ’s order denying his petition for writ of audita querela . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the dist rict court. United
States v. Walters , Nos. 2:97

- cr - 00157

- 2; 2:09

- cv - 00589 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 21, 2009) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would no t aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
SANGUI BIOTECH INTERNATIONAL, INC.
                             A COLORADO CORPORATION
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sangui Biotech International,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended September 30, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Wolfgang Barnikol, Chief Executive Officer, President and Chief
Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS 1350, as adopted pursuant
to SS 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authentication, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed from within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Sangui Biotech
International, Inc., and will be retained by Sangui Biotech International, Inc.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.





Dated:  March __, 2005                      /s/ Wolfgang Barnikol
                                            _________________________________
                                            By:   Wolfgang Barnikol
                                            Its:  Chief Executive Officer,
                                                  President and Chief Financial
                                                  Officer
No. 2,096.

#### HIMMELMAN *v.*BYRNE *et al.*

Wallace, J.,

rendered the opinion of the Court, Crockett, J., and Temple, J., concurring.

The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed and cause remanded, upon the authority of *Chambers*v. *Satterlee.*

By

Rhodes,. C. J.:

I dissent.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Patrick J. Kealy, Chief Executive Officer of Star Energy Corporation (the Company), certifies, under the standards set forth and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





|                      |  |                                      
|--------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: August 14, 2008 |  | /s/ Patrick J. Kealy                 
|                      |  | Patrick J. Kealy                     
|                      |  | Chief Executive Officer and President
|                      |  | (Principal Executive Officer)        

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will
be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[No. 15652.

Department One.

December 1, 1894.]

#### IDA B. BALDWIN, Respondent, *v.*HERMAN ZADIG et al., Appellants.

Purchase of Stocks ok Margin — Interest not Recoverable on Amount Paid. — One who sues to recover money voluntarily paid for the purchase of stocks on margin or to be delivered at a future day, in contravention of the provisions of section 26 of article IV of the constitution, is not entitled to recover interest thereon.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, and from an order refusing a new trial.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

*Edmund Tauszky,*for Appellants.

*Van Ness & Redman,*for Respondent.

Harrison, J.

This cause involves similar questions to those presented in *Kullmann*v. *Simmens, post,*p. 595, this day decided, and the other cases therein referred to. The agreement between the parties in *Wetmore*v. *Barrett,*103 Cal. 246, included all the terms of the agreement under which the transactions between the plaintiff and defendant herein were had, and nearly all the points presented on this appeal were presented and considered in that case. The court, however, erred in the present case in allowing interest to the plaintiff upon the several sums of money which she paid to the defendants. This money was not loaned by her to the defendants, but was voluntarily placed by her in their hands for an illegal purpose. As the money was applied by the defendants to the express purpose for which the plaintiff placed it in their hands, she cannot claim that it was detained by them from her until after she had made a demand for'its return. Both of the parties to the transaction were *in pari delicto,*and except for the provision of the constitution, there would be no right of recovery in the plaintiff, and we think that this right of recovery *595must be measured by the terms of tbe constitution in which it is given.

The court below is directed to modify the judgment by deducting therefrom the amount allowed for interest on the sums deposited by the plaintiff with the defendant, and as so modified the judgment and order will stand affirmed.

Garoutte, J., and Van Fleet, J., concurred.

Hearing in Bank denied.

Beatty, O. J., dissented from the order denying a hearing in Bank, and filed the following opinion on the 29th of December, 1894.

Beatty, C. J.

I dissent from the order denying a rehearing in this case.

The judgment, in my opinion, is not sustained by the findings. It is nowhere found that transactions in question were sales of stock on margin or for future delivery, nor do the special facts found necessarily imply such sales. That the evidence would have sustained such a finding may be true, but that is not sufficient. This court cannot take evidence — however conclusive— in place of a finding necessary to sustain the judgment.