alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2868 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

<DOC>

                                                       Calendar No. 138
117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2868

  To temporarily extend the public debt limit until December 16, 2022.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 28, 2021

  Mr. Schumer introduced the following bill; which was read the first 
                                  time

                           September 29, 2021

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To temporarily extend the public debt limit until December 16, 2022.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT.

    (a) In General.--Section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, 
shall not apply for the period beginning on the date of enactment of 
this Act and ending on December 16, 2022.
    (b) Special Rule Relating to Obligations Issued During Extension 
Period.--Effective on December 17, 2022, the limitation in effect under 
section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, shall be increased to 
the extent that--
            (1) the face amount of obligations issued under chapter 31 
        of such title and the face amount of obligations whose 
        principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States 
        Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary 
        of the Treasury) outstanding on December 17, 2022, exceeds
            (2) the face amount of such obligations outstanding on the 
        date of enactment of this Act.
    (c) Extension Limited to Necessary Obligations.--An obligation 
shall not be taken into account under subsection (b)(1) unless the 
issuance of such obligation was necessary to fund a commitment incurred 
pursuant to law by the Federal Government that required payment before 
December 17, 2022.
                                                       Calendar No. 138

117th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 2868

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

  To temporarily extend the public debt limit until December 16, 2022.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           September 29, 2021

            Read the second time and placed on the calendar
```
#### Samuel Alkoff, Plaintiff, *v.*Joseph B. Miller, as Trustee, etc., Defendant..

Supreme Court, Special Term, Bronx County,

December 8, 1937.

*775
      *Harry*Fogler, for the plaintiff.

*Albert W. Fribourg [Louis M. Fribourg*of counsel], for the defendant.

Frankenthaler, J.

As pledgee of the second bond and mortgage, Anny Alkoff held the legal title thereto, and the pledgor, Gurian Realty Corporation, possessed only an equity of redemption. *(Matter of Gilbert,*104 N. Y. 200, at pp. 208, 209, 211; *Sands*v. *Gilleran,*159 App. Div. 37, 39. See, also, Jones on Collateral Securities [3d ed.], §§ 7, 143, 151, 152 and 153.) Had the pledgor defaulted upon its indebtedness prior to the time that the rights of the pledgee were cut off by the first mortgagee’s foreclosure sale, she could have exercised the power of sale conferred upon her by the pledgor and transferred good title to the bond and mortgage, thereby cutting off the equity of redemption possessed by the pledgor. Although the foreclosure action instituted by the first mortgagee did not extinguish the indebtedness owing to Anny Alkoff from Gurian Realty Corporation or the bond secured by the second mortgage, it did have the effect of extinguishing her legal title to the mortgage itself, and she therefore had no mortgage to sell under the power of sale. The power of sale did not confer upon Anny Alkoff the right to sell the equity of redemption belonging to Gurian Realty Corporation. It merely empowered her, by selling legal title to the mortgage, to cut off said equity of redemption. It follows that the quitclaim deed and release obtained from Gurian Realty Corporation affected no rights of *776Anny Alkoff and that the plaintiff, as purchaser from her, obtained no right to redeem from the first mortgage under section 46 of the Civil Practice Act.

The motion is granted in so far as it seeks summary judgment dismissing the complaint. It is accordingly unnecessary to consider the other branches of the motion. Settle order.
WYN-EX10.1_2013.3.31-Q1




Exhibit 10.1
AMENDMENT NO. 2
TO
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
AMENDMENT, dated March 15, 2013 (“Amendment”), made to the Employment Agreement dated as of November 19, 2009, as first amended effective March 1, 2011 (together, the “Employment Agreement”), by and between Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and Franz Hanning (the “Executive”).  Except as provided herein all terms and conditions set forth in the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive have previously entered into the Employment Agreement; and
WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive desire to amend the Employment Agreement as set forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, effective as of the date first written above, the Employment Agreement is hereby amended as follows: 
1.The first sentence of Section IV.A. of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
For services rendered by the Executive pursuant to this Agreement during the Period of Employment, the Company will pay the Executive base salary at an annual rate equal to seven hundred fifteen thousand dollars ($715,000) or such greater amount as may be determined from time to time by the Company in its sole discretion (the “Base Salary”).
2.    The first sentence of Section IV.B. of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety and replaced with the following:
In addition, the Executive will be eligible to receive an annual incentive compensation award in respect of each fiscal year of the Company during the Period of Employment targeted to equal $800,000, effective January 1, 2013, subject to the terms and conditions of the annual bonus plan covering employees of the Company, and further subject to such performance goals, criteria or targets reasonably determined by the Company in its sole discretion in respect of each such fiscal year (each such annual bonus, an “Incentive Compensation Award”).
3.    Section VII.A.i. and Section VIII.C.iv. of the Employment Agreement are each hereby amended to replace the reference to “$700,000” with “$800,000”.
4.    From and after the date hereof, all references to the Employment Agreement shall mean the Employment Agreement as amended hereby. Except as expressly amended hereby, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect, and is hereby ratified and confirmed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this Amendment to be executed this 15th day of March 2013.





	
		
	EXECUTIVE

	 
	/s/ Franz Hanning

	 
	Franz Hanning

	 
	 




	
		
	WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE CORPORATION

	By:
	/s/ Mary Falvey

	 
	Name: Mary Falvey

	 
	Title: Executive Vice President
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0612. PAUL PENN, JR. v. PENNY MAC CORPORATION.

In this dispossessory action brought by Penny Mac Corporation against Paul

Penn, Jr., the magistrate court issued a writ of possession in favor of Penny Mac

Corporation, and Penn filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the superior court. On

August 22, 2016, the superior court issued an order dismissing Penn’s petition. Penn

then filed this direct appeal on October 7, 2016. We lack jurisdiction for two reasons.

First, Penn’s appeal is untimely. Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed

within 30 days of entry of the decision or judgment sought to be appealed. See

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The underlying subject matter of an appeal, however, controls

over the relief sought in determining the proper appellate procedure. See Rebich v.

Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 467-468 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). The underlying subject matter

here is a dispossessory judgment. Under OCGA § 44-7-56, an appeal from a

dispossessory judgment must be filed within seven days of the date the judgment was

entered. See Ray M. Wright, Inc. v. Jones, 239 Ga. App. 521, 522-523 (521 SE2d

456) (1999). Penn’s appeal is untimely, as it was filed 46 days after the superior

court’s order was entered.

Second, Penn failed to file an application for discretionary appeal as required. 

“[A]ppeals from decisions of the superior courtsreviewing decisions of lower courts

by certiorari or de novo proceedingsshall be by application for discretionary appeal.” 

Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003) (punctuation

omitted); see also OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). 

Accordingly, Penny Mac Corporation’s motion to dismiss the appeal as

untimely is hereby GRANTED, and this appeal is hereby DISMISSED. However,

November 30, 2016
Penny Mac Corporation’s motion for immediate transmittal of the remittitur upon

rendition of judgment is hereby DENIED. Penny Mac Corporation included that

motion within its motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, in violation of Court of

Appeals Rule 41 (b), which provides that all motions shall be filed as separate

documents, and shall not be filed as joint, compound, or alternative motions.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/30/2016
May 14, 2015

U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations

West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

To Whom It May Concern:

I hereby respectfully request authorization to operate a multi-rotor aircraft for commercial purposes 

(e.g. – real estate videography or similar activities). I intend to form a small business for this purpose, 

and will operate the unmanned vehicle per FAA regulations, remaining clear of all unauthorized 

airspace, as noted on currently available Sectionals and other FAA-provided charts. 

As a licensed private pilot since 1997, with instrument rating, I understand and will respect the 

limitations that the law and common sense would place upon such an operation, and will endeavor to 

remain abreast of changes to the airspace, including SUA’s, MOA’s, and TFR’s as required. I am also 

aware that further rulemaking is likely in the future, and will comply with these regulations as such 

changes are made.

The multi-rotor vehicle I intend to use initially for this operation is pre-programmed to remain below 

400 ft AGL, and incorporates geo-fencing capabilities to prevent the vehicle leaving my line of sight. 

Other details regarding this vehicle, or any others I may employ in the future for this purpose will be 

provided upon request.

Please advise if there is any other information I can provide to make this process a smooth one for your 

department.

Thank you in advance for considering my request, and I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

David C. Kilmer

8-6 Heather Hts

Reading, PA 19606

(c) 484-431-4700
ex10x2.htm


Exhibit 10.2


 


 


 



Pure Bioscience, Inc.


1725 Gillespie Way


El Cajon, CA 92020












April 16, 2013







Re:           Securities Purchase Agreement, dated April 16, 2013







Dear Mr. Lee:







Pure Bioscience, Inc. (the “Company”) is entering into that certain Securities Purchase Agreement, dated April 16, 2013 (the “Purchase Agreement”) with the undersigned (the “Holder”) and certain other Purchasers named therein (each a “Purchaser” and collectively, the “Purchasers”) pursuant to which the Company is selling and the Purchasers are acquiring Shares and Warrant Shares (as such terms are defined in the Purchase Agreement, and together, the “Registrable Securities”).  In connection with the Purchase Agreement, the Company has agreed to provide the Purchasers with certain registration rights with respect to the Registrable Securities.







The Company has agreed to prepare and file with the Securities Exchange Commission a registration statement on Form S-1 or other appropriate form under the Act, to register for resale the Shares and Warrant Shares issued as part of the Purchase Agreement within 30 days of the Closing Date.  The Company will use its best efforts to have the Registration Statement become effective, and to keep such Registration Statement effective until the earlier of (i) the date on which all Registrable Securities covered by such Registration Statement have been sold, (ii) the date on which all Registrable Securities covered by such Registration Statement may be sold without volume restrictions pursuant to Rule 144(b)(1), and (iii) three (3) years from the Closing.







Sincerely,







PURE BIOSCIENCE, INC.












By:  /s/ Michael L. Krall


Michael L. Krall, President/CEO












ACCEPTED AND AGREED:












HARMONY BIOSCIENCE, INC.












By:/s/ Tom Lee


Tom Lee, President
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-15-00148-CR

MICHAEL PAUL HENDRIX, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 5th District Court

Cass County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-F-00198

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
2

O R D E R

Appellant Michael Paul Hendrix was convicted of injury to a child and sentenced to sixtyfive years’ imprisonment. Hendrix’ court-appointed appellate counsel, Butch Dunbar, filed an 

Anders1brief on October 12, 2016. On October 21, 2016, Hendrix filed his pro se motion for 

access to the record. Accordingly, in accord with Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 321–22 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014), we are required to enter an order specifying the procedure to be followed to 

ensure Hendrix’ access to the record. This order is entered for the purpose of satisfying our duties 

as detailed in Kelly. See id.

Dunbar has advised this Court that he has maintained a copy of the reporter’s record in 

Hendrix’ case and that he will provide a copy of the reporter’s record to Hendrix. Because Dunbar 

does not have a copy of the clerk’s record, this Court will provide a copy of that record to Hendrix. 

Dunbar is ordered to report to this Court, in writing, when the reporter’s record has been made 

available to Hendrix. Once we receive that notification and are satisfied that Hendrix has likewise 

received the clerk’s record, this Court will set a firm deadline for Hendrix to file his pro se response 

to Dunbar’s Anders brief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT

Date: October 25, 2016

 

1See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
#### Commonwealth v. Killian

*574
      *Helen M. Koschoff,*assistant district attorney, for the Commonwealth.

*John A. Mihalik,*for defendant.

June 28, 1985

MYERS, P.J.,

This case comes to us on a summary appeal from a speeding citation for driving 35 miles per hour in a 15 mile per hour school zone.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 7, 1984, at approximately 3:27 p.m., defendant, Headley Killian, was accused of operating a motor vehicle at a speed of 35 miles per hour in a school zone.

Defendant’s sole defense is that the charges against him should be dismissed, since the Commonwealth failed to prove that the school zone in question had been established by proper administrative procedures.

DISCUSSION

Section 3365(b) of the Vehicle Code (75 Pa. C.S. §3365(b)), states in relevant part that: “Establishment of a school zone, including its location and hours of operation, shall be approved by the department.” The procedures that must be followed in order to establish a school zone are set forth in 67 Pa. Code §211.75(a). That section provides as follows:

> “A school zone speed limit may be established in *575accordance with § 3365(b) of the Vehicle Code (75 Pa. C.S. § 3365(d)) provided that a engineering traffic study, justifying the proposed school zone speed limit, has been conducted in accordance with §201.32 (relating to school zone speed limits), and the proposed school zone speed limit has been approved by the department. The school zone’s speed limit shall be established only within a school zone established as a result of an engineering and traffic study made in accordance with and approved by the department.”

In the present case, the Commonwealth failed to introduce any evidence that an engineering and traffic study was made or that the proposed school zone speed limit had ever been approved by the department. Due to the lack of evidence that these procedural requirements were met, the Commonwealth has failed to sustain its burden of showing that the school zone was properly established. Without such evidence, we are compelled to find defendant not guilty of violating the school zone speed limit.

ORDER OF COURT

And now, this June 28, 1985, after hearing held, we adjudge defendant not guilty. Costs to be paid by the County of Columbia.
# C_2016114EN.01000102.xml

| 31.3.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 114/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.3.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 114/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7925 — Newell Rubbermaid/Jarden)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2016/C 114/02)

On 22 March 2016, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in the English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32016M7925. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32016M7925. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
Exhibit 4.32

 

SPOUSAL CONSENT

 

I, Leng Jinghao, am the lawful spouse of  He Chuan. I hereby consent unconditionally that a certain percentage of the equity interest in Shanghai Renren Games Technology Development Co., Ltd. that is held by and registered in the name of my spouse will be disposed pursuant to the arrangements under the Loan Agreement, the Amended and Equity Option Agreement and the Equity Interest Pledge Agreement, which were executed by my spouse on November 30, 2012.

 

I further undertake not to take any action with the intent to interfere with the above arrangements, including making any claim that such equity interest constitutes property or community property between myself and my spouse. I hereby waive unconditionally and irrevocably any rights or entitlements whatsoever to such equity interest that may be granted to me according to any applicable laws.

 

	
 
    	
Leng Jinghao
    
	
 
    	
/s/ Leng Jinghao
    
	
 
    	
Date: November 30, 2012
    


 











 

SPOUSAL CONSENT

 

I, Chen Yan, am the lawful spouse of  Liu Jian. I hereby consent unconditionally that a certain percentage of the equity interest in Shanghai Renren Games Technology Development Co., Ltd. that is held by and registered in the name of my spouse will be disposed pursuant to the arrangements under the Loan Agreement, the Amended and Equity Option Agreement and the Equity Interest Pledge Agreement, which were executed by my spouse on November 30, 2012.

 

I further undertake not to take any action with the intent to interfere with the above arrangements, including making any claim that such equity interest constitutes property or community property between myself and my spouse. I hereby waive unconditionally and irrevocably any rights or entitlements whatsoever to such equity interest that may be granted to me according to any applicable laws.

 

	
 
    	
Chen Yan
    
	
 
    	
/s/ Chen Yan
    
	
 
    	
Date: November 30, 2012
    


 

2
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-13-00286-CV

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS - PAN AMERICAN

v.

MARION AYALA

On Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 2 of Hidalgo County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CL-11-0015-B

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against 

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

January 9, 2014
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

In the interest of H.A.B. and J.B., children, * From the 29th District Court

 of Palo Pinto County,

 Trial Court No. C46657.

No. 11-16-00249-CV * December 8, 2016

* Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

 This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the 

appeal should be dismissed. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

the appeal is dismissed.