J-S71027-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

AARON WILSON

Appellant No. 663 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 19, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0339311-1994

 CP-51-CR-0339381-1994

 CP-51-CR-0339451-1994

 CP-51-CR-0402631-1994

 CP-51-CR-0402811-1994

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 07, 2016

Appellant, Aaron Wilson, appeals from the order dismissing his 

“Petition for Common Law Writ of Error Coram Nobis,” which challenged the 

validity of his guilty plea entered in 1994. Wilson contends that the court 

below erred in concluding that the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) 

applied to his petition. After careful review, we affirm.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Wilson pled guilty to five 

counts of robbery, four counts of criminal conspiracy, four counts of violating 

the Uniform Firearms Act, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of imprisonment of five to ten years.

The present petition was filed on June 9, 2015. In his petition, Wilson 

conceded that this sentence expired on March 17, 2004. See Petition, 

6/9/15, at 2. He asserted that he was challenging the conviction because it 

was a predicate for his subsequent conviction on federal firearms charges. 

See id., at 3-4. He therefore claimed that in 1994, the trial court did not 

have jurisdiction over several of his charges, and further, that his guilty plea 

counsel was ineffective in several regards. See id., at 5-6.

The court below treated Wilson’s petition as a PCRA petition and 

concluded that he was not eligible for relief due to the fact that he was no 

longer serving a sentence for the convictions he was challenging. The court 

thus dismissed the petition. This timely1appeal followed.

On appeal, Wilson argues that the court erred in concluding that the 

PCRA applies to his petition. The PCRA states that it “shall be the sole means 

of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and 

statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter 

takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

____________________________________________

1 Wilson’s appeal was docketed on February 19, 31 days after the filing of 

the trial court’s order dismissing his petition. Wilson, however, was 

incarcerated in federal prison at the time, and his petition is dated February 

10. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the prisoner mailbox rule 

applies, and Wilson’s appeal was timely filed. See Smith v. Pa. Bd. Of 

Prob. and Parole, 683 A.2d 278, 281 (Pa. 1996). 
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9542. We have previously set forth the well-established province of the 

PCRA as follows:

Under the plain words of the statute, if the underlying 

substantive claim is one that could potentially be remedied under 

the PCRA, that claim is exclusive to the PCRA. Commonwealth 

v. Eller, 569 Pa. 622, 807 A.2d 838, 845 (2002). It is only 

where the PCRA does not encompass a claim that other collateral 

procedures are available. Commonwealth v. Chester, 557 Pa. 

358, 733 A.2d 1242 (1999). 

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1232-1233 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

See also Commonwealth v. West, 595 Pa. 483, 497, 938 A.2d 1034, 

1043 (2007) (“[T]he PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief ... to the 

extent a remedy is available under such enactment.”). “[C]oram nobis relief 

does not become available merely because the PCRA refuses to remedy a 

petitioner’s grievance; rather, we look at the claims a petitioner is raising.” 

Pagan, at 1233. The fact that a petitioner’s ultimate goal is escape from the 

collateral consequences of his conviction does not change the fact that he is 

seeking relief from his judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. 

Descardes, 136 A.2d 493, 501 (Pa. 2016).

Here, the issues raised in Wilson’s petition challenge the legality of his 

convictions, and therefore his judgment of sentence. These claims are 

“clearly encompassed by the PCRA.” Id., at 501-502; Pagan, at 1233. Thus, 

the fact that Wilson has conceded that he is not currently serving a sentence 

for these convictions is a fatal defect. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i).

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/7/2016