alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2015328EN.01000101.xml

| 5.10.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 328/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.10.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 328/1

---

Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

Official Journal of the European Union

(2015/C 328/01)

Last publication

Last publication

OJ C 320, 28.9.2015

Past publications

Past publications

OJ C 311, 21.9.2015

OJ C 302, 14.9.2015

OJ C 294, 7.9.2015

OJ C 279, 24.8.2015

OJ C 270, 17.8.2015

OJ C 262, 10.8.2015

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

---
T.C. Memo. 1999-319

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ALFREDO DOMINGUEZ, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 17302-98. Filed September 24, 1999. 

 

Alfredo Dominguez, pro se. 

Nancy L. Spitz, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined

deficiencies in petitioner's Federal income taxes in the amounts

of $82 and $17 for the taxable years 1996 and 1997, respectively. 

Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue. 
- 2 -

The sole issue for determination is whether petitioner is

entitled to the earned income credit for the tax years 1996 and

1997.

This case was submitted fully stipulated. The stipulation

of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by

this reference. Petitioner resided in Immokalee, Florida, when

the petition in this case was filed.

During the years at issue, petitioner was incarcerated at a

penal institution. Petitioner listed his occupation as beggar on

his 1996 and 1997 Federal income tax return. In 1996, petitioner

received money from family and friends in the amount of $1,100. 

In 1997, petitioner received money from family and friends in the

amount of $228. The family and friends who provided the money to

petitioner had no expectation of repayment. During the years in

issue, petitioner did not earn any income working for the prison.

Petitioner reported income from begging in the amount of

$1,100 on his 1996 Federal income tax return and claimed an

earned income credit in the amount of $82. Likewise, on his

income tax return petitioner reported income from begging in the

amount of $228 and claimed an earned income credit in the amount

of $17.

Petitioner is not entitled to the earned income credit he

claimed on his 1996 and 1997 tax returns. An eligible individual

is allowed an earned income credit for the taxable year in an
- 3 -

amount equal to the credit percentage of so much of the

taxpayer's earned income as does not exceed the earned income

amount. See sec. 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries,

tips, and other employee compensation. See sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). 

The money petitioner received from begging does not meet the

definition of earned income provided by section 32. Rather, the

money petitioner received from his family and friends was

received as a gift. A gift is a transfer that proceeds from a

"’detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * out of affection,

respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." Commissioner v.

Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v.

LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). In this case, petitioner's

friends and family did not have an expectation of repayment or

economic benefit. Instead, petitioner's family and friends

transferred money to petitioner with a detached and disinterested

generosity and out of charity. 

With respect to the earned income credit, petitioner had no

earned income, and, therefore, is not entitled to the earned

income credit.

Decision will be entered

for respondent.
08 July 2010

BEFORE THE

US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

Docket No.: DOT-OST-2010-0140

Request by the Association of European Ai rlines (AEA) for a 90-day extension of the comment period

On June 8, 2010, the Department of Tran sportation (DOT) issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections,” (NPRM) which seeks to expand upon the published Final Rule under the same title (DOT-OST-2007- 0022).

The aviation industry is and remains commi tted to providing exemplary service to its passengers and believes cooperation between carriers and governments can result in valuable improvements in the global aviati on system. However, the AEA believes that regulations in this area can lead to extensive unintended consequences, which could reduce service to passengers and adversely impact an industry pivotal to the global

economy.

The NPRM provides until August 9, 2010, 60 days from publication, for the public to comment on this Proposal. AEA respectfully requests an additional 90 days to submit comments regarding the NPRM, ci ting the following factors:

The NPRM seeks to impose on US and fo reign carriers significant and new regulatory burdens, which the industry must adequately analyze in order to provide comprehensive and useful comments to t he DOT. As the regulation would touch almost all aspects of an airline’s business , AEA members need to consult with multiple offices on the cost, timing, feasibility and potential unintended consequences of the proposal. Sixty days is not a sufficient time period in which to collect the extensive amounts of data and information from all affected parties necessary to evaluate this Proposal.

For these reasons, AEA requests an additional 90 days to collect the aforementioned essential information to provi de valuable comments on the NPRM.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of this request.

Yours sincerely,

Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS

Peter Leparulo, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Novatel Wireless, Inc. (the Company), and Kenneth Leddon, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies pursuant to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. Section 1350) that, to the best of his knowledge:

1.This annual report on Form 10-K, as amended, of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

2. The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end of the period covered by the Report and the results of operations of the Company for the period covered by the Report.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 16thday of March, 2010.



/S/    PETER
LEPARULOPeter LeparuloChairman and Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)/S/    KENNETH
LEDDONKenneth LeddonSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
EXHIBIT 21.1

SUBSIDIARIES OF deCODE genetics, Inc.

2.
MediChem Life Sciences, Inc., a Delaware corporation

SUBSIDIARIES OF ISLENSK ERFDAGREINING EHF.

1.
Islenskar krabbameinsrannsoknir ehf., an Icelandic private limited company (English name: deCODE Cancer ehf.)

2.
UVSUrdur, Verdandi, Skuld ehf.an Icelandic private limited company (acquired in January 2006)

SUBSIDIARIES OF MEDICHEM LIFE SCIENCES, INC.

1.
deCODE biostructures, Inc., a Washington corporation

2.
ThermoGen, Inc., an Illinois corporation

3.
Emerald BioSystems, Inc., a Delaware corporation

4.
deCODE Chemistry, Inc., an Illinois corporation

5.
MediChem Management, Inc., a Delaware corporation

---



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Exhibit
32.2








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT BY


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








I, Ed
Bailey, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Accounting of LightTouch Vein
& Laser, Inc.. (“the Registrant”) do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
the best of my knowledge, based upon the review of the Quarterly Report on Form
10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):





(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
result of operations of the Company.








Date:
      August 28,  2008
            /s/ Ed
      Bailey


Ed
      Bailey


Chief
      Executive Officer


And
      Principal Accounting Officer











* A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WYLMINA ELIZABETH HETTINGA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

TIMOTHY P. LOUMENA; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-17135

D.C. No. 5:13-cv-02217-RMW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2016** 

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Wylmina Elizabeth Hettinga appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations

arising from her state court divorce proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28

FILED

NOV 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Hettinga’s

requests for oral argument set forth in her opening brief and reply are denied.
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm. 

We affirm the district court’s dismissal because Hettinga failed to raise any

argument in her opening brief concerning the district court’s ground for dismissal,

and has therefore waived her appeal of the district court’s judgment. See Smith v.

Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in

its opening brief are deemed waived.”).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

2 14-17135
# STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT
TONI FLAD ROSSI VERSUS ANTHONY ROSSI NO. 2023 CW 0705
AUGUST 14, 2023
In Re: Toni Flad Rossi, applying for supervisory writs, 22nd

Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany, No. 2016-11187. BEFORE: McCLENDON, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.

WRIT DENIED. The criteria set forth in Berlitz Construction Co., Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 ( La. 1981) ( per curiam) are not met. However, we note that unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, the report of a licensed mental health professional prepared pursuant to La. R.S. 9:331 (B) is not admissible unless the licensed mental health professional is present at trial for crossexamination. See Barker v. Barker, 2014-0775 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/14), 167 So.3d 703, 705; Evans v. Evans, 2017-0627 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 5/16/18), 247 So.3d 120, 124.

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT FOR THE COURT PMc CHH SMM
DANIEL GRECCO, FORMER 

HUSBAND,

Appellant,

v.

ASHLEY GRECCO, FORMER 

WIFE,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-2913

_____________________________/

Opinion filed December 1, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County.

Christopher N. Patterson, Judge.

Kerry Adkison of Kerry Adkison, P.A., Chipley, for Appellant.

H. Matthew Fuqua of Fuqua & Milton, P.A., Marianna, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
Historical Data

Use the links below to view the historical data for each survey. Data are in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Excel file format.

2010

Third Quarter Excel [104kb]

Second Quarter Excel [107kb]

First Quarter Excel [154kb]

2009

Fourth Quarter Excel [114kb]

Third Quarter Excel [92kb]

Second Quarter Excel [76kb]

First Quarter Excel [71kb]

2008

Fourth Quarter Excel [81kb]

Third Quarter Excel [76kb]

Second Quarter Excel [71kb]

First Quarter Excel [67kb]

2006 Annual Report PDF [1.4mb]

2005 Annual Report PDF [1.1mb]

2004 Annual Report PDF [1.1mb]

Advance Report for Fourth Quarter 2006 PDF [487kb]

Advance Report for Fourth Quarter 2005 PDF [487kb]

You are here: Census.gov › Business & Industry › Manufacturing › Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization › Historical Data

Source: U.S. Census Bureau | Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization | (301) 763-4667 | Last Revised: December 16, 2010

Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization

Annual Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization

Manufacturers' Utilization of Plant Capacity

3/14/2011 Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization > H...

census.gov/manufacturing/.../index.html 1/1
#### May and Daniels, *vs.*Keep.

The Supreme Court have authority to grant the common-law writ of Certiorari, returnable bofore it, on a judgment rendered by a Justice, and will exorcise that function, in case an execution shall have been issued on the judgment and made returnable before an intervening term of the Circuit Court in the jurisdiction of which the . matter arose; upon security by bond being filed with the Clerk. ■

But cause must be shown to this Court, on applying for this writ» setting forth good cause why the application is made hére, instead of applying to the Circuit Court.

This was a motion made before the Supreme Court at the June term, 1849, for the allowance of a common-law certiorari, to remove the proceedings and judgment of the Justice before whom the same was tried, to this Court. This motion was founded upon a petition showing a judgment rendered against the applicants by the Justice, and also the errors in the proceedings and judgment before him, and showing also an excuse on the part of the defendants, for not having availed themselves of the benefit of an appeal from the judgment, to the Circuit Court, The petition prayed the allowance of the common-law certiorari, by this Court, because the Circuit Court within the jurisdiction of which the matter arose, would not be in session before the execution already issued on the judgment would be returnable.

*J. A. Sleeper,*

in support of the motion, produced the following authorities: *Session Laws of*1844, *Sec.*4, *page*17; *Sections*3 *and*8 *of article*7, *of the Constitution;*5 *Wendell’s R.,*98, 7 *do.,*667 *and*508; 7 *Cowen’s R.,*537; *ty Wendell’s R.,*433.

*286The Court

determined that it had the power to authorize the issuing of the writ; but in ordinary cases would not feel itself bound to allow it indiscriminately, where there was an opportunity of making application to a Circuit Court at a term of such a Court, and in accordance with this view of the case ordered that the writ issue in case a bond should be executed and .hied with the Clerk by the parties .making this motion.
Filed 12/5/16 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2016 ND 226

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Mark Anthony Butts, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20160125

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable Bruce B. Haskell, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Marina Spahr, Assistant State’s Attorney, 514 E. Thayer Avenue, Bismarck, N.D. 58501, for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.

Laura C. Ringsak, 103 S. Third St., Ste. 6, Bismarck, N.D. 58501, for defendant and appellant; submitted on brief.

State v. Butts

No. 20160125

Per Curiam.

[¶1]Mark Butts appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Butts argues the district court abused its discretion in concluding Butts failed to establish a fair and just reason why he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.  In State v. Lium, we laid out nine factors a district court could consider to determine whether a fair and just reason exists to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing.  2008 ND 232, ¶ 17, 758 N.W.2d 711.  Here, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying these factors by denying Butts’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Therefore, we affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Lisa Fair McEvers

Daniel J. Crothers

Dale V. Sandstrom

Carol Ronning Kapsner
Exhibit 31.b

I, Marc N. Teal, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Boston Capital Tax Credit Fund II Limited Partnership (the "Partnership");
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



1. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
2. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
3. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and





1. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



1. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
2. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.



|Date: February 14, 2008 | /s/ Marc N. Teal                     
|----------------------- | -------------------------------------
|                        | Marc N. Teal, Chief
Financial Officer



69
#### GLORIA A. HEALEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. GERARD M. HEALEY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division

Argued May 23, 1977

Decided August 3, 1977.

*45Before Judges Eritz, Abb and Peessleb.

*Mr. William, J. McGovern*argued the cause for appellant *(Messrs. McGovern and Boseman,*attorneys).

*Mr. Peter A. Adams*argued the cause for respondent *(Messrs. Adams, Adubato, Tafro & Connelly,*attorneys).

Per Curiam.

This is a matrimonial action in which plaintiff: wife, divorced by her husband in a prior Pennsylvania action in which she had appeared and contested, seeks support. In the Pennsylvania action she received no support judgment since support is unavailable under Pennsylvania *46statutory law. Both parties had been domiciliaries of New Jersey prior to the divorce, although the husband left and established a Pennsylvania residence some two years prior to the divorce judgment. The wife has never lived elsewhere than New Jersey since the date of her marriage to respondent. Her claim was decided adversely to her on a motion for summary judgment and she appeals.

Obviously we are not at all here concerned with the matter of fact as to whether appellant is entitled to support. We review only the determination of law, predicated wholly on *Newgard v. Newgard,*111 *N. J. Super.*515 (Ch. Div. 1970), that full faith and credit with respect to the Pennsylvania judgment of divorce, mandated by *U. S. Const.,*Art. IV, § 1, required the result reached below.

The matter is closely analogous to the question raised and answered in *Pierrakos v. Pierrakos,*148 *N. J. Super.*574 (App. Div. 1977). There New York, the forum of the divorce, had not adopted a statute permitting equitable distribution. We held that inasmuch as that issue could not have been raised in the New York court, our courts are not bound to deny equitable distribution of property here on the basis of the full faith and credit clause.

So here. All that we said in *Pierrakos*with respect to full faith and credit considerations applies with equal vigor to the matter before us. We leave to another day the question as to whether equities surrounding domiciliary considerations or the foreign divorce procedure should cause our courts to give effect to the consequences which the judgment would have in its forum, on a basis other than full faith and credit such as, perhaps, comity. Certainly the equities here do not intrude.

To the extent our determination is in disagreement with *Newgard v. Newgard, supra,*it is overruled.

Beversed and remanded for plenary hearing. We do not retain jurisdiction.