J-S68024-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TIMOTHY WILSON

Appellant No. 76 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 2, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012631-2006

 CP-02-CR-0012634-2006

 CP-02-CR-0015573-2006

 CP-02-CR-0015576-2006

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2016

Timothy Wilson (“Appellant”) appeals from the order denying as 

untimely his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion 

to withdraw. We affirm the order denying Appellant post-conviction relief 

and grant counsel’s motion.

On August 29, 2007, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to 

various robbery and related charges at four separate dockets. That same 

day, the trial court accepted the plea, and imposed an aggregate sentence of 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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five to ten years’ incarceration. Appellant filed neither a post-sentence 

motion nor a direct appeal. 

On July 9, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. On October 13, 2015, PCRA 

counsel filed a “no-merit” letter and motion to withdraw pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On 

November 5, 2015, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent 

to dismiss Appellant’s petition because it was untimely, and no time-bar 

exceptions applied. In this same order, the PCRA court granted PCRA 

counsel’s motion to withdraw. Appellant did not file a response. By order 

entered December 2, 2015, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

Appellant filed a pro se appeal on December 17, 2015. The PCRA court 

appointed appellate counsel on February 4, 2016. 

In lieu of an advocate’s brief, Appellant’s counsel has filed a purported 

Anders1 brief and a petition to withdraw. Compliance with Anders applies 

to counsel who seeks to withdraw from representation on direct appeal. 

Because Anders imposes stricter requirements than those imposed when 

counsel seeks to withdraw during the post-conviction process pursuant to 

Turner and Finley, we may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a 

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1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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Turner/Finley no merit letter. See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 

816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011). Thus, we will assess counsel’s assertion 

that the issue Appellant wishes to raise has no merit under a Turner/Finley

analysis.

This Court has summarized:

The Turner/Finley decisions provide the manner for 

post[-]conviction counsel to withdraw from representation. 

The holdings of those cases mandate an independent review 

of the record by competent counsel before a PCRA court or 

[an] appellate court can authorize an attorney’s withdrawal. 

The necessary independent review requires counsel to file a 

“no-merit” letter detailing the nature and extent of his [or 

her] review and list each issue the petitioner wishes to have 

examined, explaining why those issues are meritless. The 

PCRA court, or an appellate court if the no-merit letter is 

filed before it, see Turner, supra, then must conduct its 

own independent evaluation of the record and agree with 

counsel that the petition is without merit[.]

[T]his Court [has] imposed additional requirements on 

counsel that closely track the procedure for withdrawing on 

direct appeal. . . . [C]ounsel is required to 

contemporaneously serve upon his [or her] client his [or 

her] no merit letter and application to withdraw along with a 

statement that if the court granted counsel’s withdrawal 

request, the client may proceed pro se or with a privately 

retained attorney[.]

Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 140 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Counsel in this case has complied with the mandates of Turner

and Finley, as summarized in Reed. See Counsel’s Amended Petition to 

Withdraw, 6/24/16. Thus, we must determine whether we agree with 

counsel’s assessment of Appellant’s claim.

Counsel phrases Appellant’s issue as follows:
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I. DID THE PETITIONER FILE A TIMELY PCRA 

PETITION, OR DOES AN EXCEPTION TO THE TIME 

LIMITATION FOR FILING A PCRA PETITION APPLY 

SUCH THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT 

ADDRESSING THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a 

petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 

1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a 

hearing on the petition if the PCRA court determines that the petitioner’s 

claim is patently frivolous and is unsupported. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 

772 A.2d 1011, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2001).

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year 

of the date the judgment is final unless the petition alleges, and the 

petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition set 
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forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) applies.2 A PCRA petition invoking one of 

these statutory exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the 

claims could have been presented.” See Hernandez, 79 A.3d 651-52 

(citations omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). The exceptions must 

be pled in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see 

also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 28, 

2007, when the thirty-day time period for filing an appeal to this Court 

expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Thus, Appellant had until 

September 28, 2008, to file a timely PCRA petition. As Appellant filed the 

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2 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9545(b)(1). 
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instant petition in July of 2015, it is patently untimely unless he has satisfied 

his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions 

applies. See Hernandez, supra. 

According to Appellant, his PCRA petition is timely because, under the 

“governmental interference exception” provided for in 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i), he was “not informed of his rights to file a post sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to file a direct appeal.” Anders Brief 

at 10. Appellant’s PCRA petition asserts that he “was not advised of his 

appellate rights or his right to file a motion to withdraw his plea of guilt,” 

that this alleged fact satisfies the time-bar exception in Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii), and that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence.” PCRA Petition, 7/9/15, at 4. Appellant’s 

averments are confusing. As further noted by Appellant’s counsel, “It is 

unclear whether Petitioner asserts that he filed his pro se PCRA petition 

within sixty days of being notified of his post-sentence and appellate rights. 

However, the transcript of the plea and sentencing proceedings indicates 

that he was in fact informed of those rights at that time.” Anders Brief at 

10.

Upon review, we agree with counsel that Appellant’s claim is devoid of 

merit because he has failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s 

time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. Our review of the sentencing transcript 
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refutes Appellant’s claims because it shows that Appellant acknowledged at 

sentencing that his trial counsel had explained his post-sentencing rights to 

him and he agreed to waive the reading of them. See N.T., 8/29/07, at 17. 

We further note that after the filing of the Anders Brief, Appellant filed 

with this Court a “Pa.R.App.P. 1925(b) MEMORANDUM OF LAW,”3in which 

he asserted that his claim constitutes “after-discovered evidence June 2015 

within the (60 days) of 9545(b)(1)(ii) in his PCRA” . . . due to “medication 

and mental health illness, and learning disability that the appellant was 

suffering from.” Appellant’s Pa.R.App.P. 1925(b) MEMORANDUM OF LAW, 

9/22/16, at 6. However, Appellant has not developed this claim in any 

meaningful way beyond these unsupported assertions. See 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(explaining that the general rule remains that a mental illness or 

psychological condition, absent more, will not serve as an exception to the 

PCRA’s jurisdictional time requirements). The claim thus is unproven and 

provides no basis for an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Based on the 

foregoing, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the PCRA 

court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition on the basis that it is 

time-barred. 

Order affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. 

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3 Although it was docketed as an “Application for Relief,” we treat it as a 

response to counsel’s Anders Brief. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2016