15-1094 

Jalloh v. Lynch 

BIA 

Vomacka, IJ 

A095 164 602 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

6th day of December, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

PETER W. HALL,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

MUCTARR JALLOH, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 15-1094 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Andy Wong, New York, New York. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Leslie 

McKay, Assistant Director; Jessica 

A. Dawgert, Trial Attorney, Office 

of Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. 
2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Muctarr Jalloh, a native and citizen of Sierra 

Leone, seeks review of a March 25, 2015, decision of the BIA 

affirming a March 5, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge 

(“IJ”) denying Jalloh’s application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Muctarr Jalloh, No. A095 164 602 (B.I.A. Mar. 

25, 2015), aff’g No. A095 164 602 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 5, 

2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts and procedural history in this case. 

 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. 

See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 

(2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well 

established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. 

Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

 Jalloh raised two claims for asylum, one based on harm he 

suffered during a civil war in Sierra Leone, and another based 

on his opposition to female genital mutilation (“FGM”), which 

he alleges his daughters would have to undergo if they accompany 
3

him to Sierra Leone. Because the agency denied these claims 

for different reasons, we address them separately. 

I. Claim Based on Past Harm 

 The agency denied on credibility grounds Jalloh’s claim 

based on beatings he allegedly suffered during a civil war in 

Sierra Leone. In pre-REAL ID Act cases such as Jalloh’s, an 

adverse credibility determination must be based on “specific, 

cogent reasons” that “bear a legitimate nexus” to the finding, 

and any discrepancy must be “substantial” when measured against 

the record as a whole. See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 

297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Nonetheless, our “review of the IJ’s credibility findings is 

highly deferential . . . and the IJ’s ‘administrative findings 

of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Majidi v. 

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). Here, the adverse credibility is supported 

by substantial evidence. 

 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination on the basis of two inconsistencies. The first 

relates to the cause of damage to Jalloh’s teeth and nose. 

Jalloh submitted a medical report from a U.S. doctor which 

recounted, based on Jalloh’s statements, the beating Jalloh 

suffered at the hands of a rebel political party in 1999. The 
4

doctor stated: “Patient showed signs of physical abuse that he 

sustained in Sierra Leone in the following ways . . . Nose: 

Patient had nasal bone fracture . . .[;] Mouth: Patient had 

extensive dental workup at Harlem Hospital as 6 of his teeth 

had been damaged due to severe trauma.” Jalloh testified, 

however, that the problems with his teeth were due to routine 

dental issues and that he could not remember how he hurt his 

nose. 

 The second inconsistency related to whether Jalloh was 

beaten once or twice by rebels. Jalloh testified that he was 

beaten twice and confirmed that the first beating was severe, 

but his application stated that he was beaten in 1999, while 

in 1997, rebels merely pushed him out of the way to get to his 

father. When confronted with this inconsistency, he testified 

that, in 1997, the rebels were pushing him away and threatening 

to kill him, and he considered that a beating. 

 Both of the above inconsistencies are supported by the 

record, and they undermine Jalloh’s account of the only two 

incidents of past harm he alleged in his application. Zhou Yun 

Zhang v. U.S. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2004), overruled 

on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 

F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007); Xian Tuan Ye v. DHS, 446 F.3d 289, 295 

(2d Cir. 2006). 
5

 As to the inconsistencies regarding Jalloh’s injuries, he 

argues that he never told the doctor that his injuries were due 

to beatings in Sierra Leone and that the doctor’s conclusions 

were based on the doctor’s independent interpretation of the 

evidence. However, it was Jalloh’s burden to establish his 

claims for relief, and he submitted the doctor’s report without 

further explanation, even though medical records from Harlem 

Hospital may have confirmed or contradicted the doctor’s 

conclusions. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (establishing that 

alien bears burden of establishing asylum eligibility). Given 

that the only evidence supporting Jalloh’s claim that the doctor 

incorrectly inferred the cause is Jalloh’s own statement, there 

is no evidence compelling the conclusion that the doctor’s 

report is inaccurate. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Majidi, 430 

F.3d at 79-80. 

 As to the inconsistency regarding the severity of the 1997 

incident, the IJ was not required to credit Jalloh’s explanation 

that being pushed out of the way even under threat of violence 

constituted a beating. Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81. Jalloh’s 

explanation was inconsistent with his testimony that the 1997 

beating was severe. 

 Given our “highly deferential” review of the agency’s 

credibility findings, we conclude that there is no evidence 

compelling the conclusion that Jalloh testified credibly. 
6

Majidi, 430 F.3d at 79; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Because the 

inconsistencies identified by the agency concerned “the very 

persecution from which [Jalloh] sought asylum” and the injuries 

caused by the alleged persecution, they provide substantial 

evidence in support of the adverse credibility determination. 

Xian Tuan Ye, 446 F.3d at 295 (quoting Majidi, 430 F.3d at 81). 

Accordingly, with respect to this claim based on past harm, the 

adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims 

were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 

444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). 

II. Claim Based on Future Opposition to FGM 

 The agency also concluded that Jalloh failed to meet his 

burden of showing an objectively reasonable fear of future 

persecution based on his opposition to FGM. To establish 

asylum eligibility based on a well-founded fear of persecution, 

an applicant must show that “he subjectively fears persecution” 

and that “his fear is objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire 

v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). An alien may 

make this showing either by offering evidence that “‘he would 

be singled out individually for persecution’” or by proving “the 

existence of ‘a pattern or practice in his . . . country . . 

. of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to 
7

the applicant. . . .’” Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 

564 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)). 

 There is no error in the agency’s determination that Jalloh 

failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution. He is not 

eligible for asylum based on the harm that his daughters might 

suffer. See Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 

2007). And there is no evidence in the record that adults who 

oppose FGM are subject to harm in Sierra Leone. As the IJ 

pointed out, the 2010 State Department report indicates that 

FGM is in decline. Moreover, Jalloh alleged that his family 

was threatening him because of his opposition to FGM, but he 

also testified that his family was not in Sierra Leone. Given 

the absence of any objective evidence that Jalloh would be 

harmed on the basis of his opposition to FGM, the agency 

reasonably concluded that he did not have a well-founded fear 

of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 

129 (2d Cir. 2005). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk