[Cite as Hawkins v. State, 2016-Ohio-8016.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Tayrone L. Hawkins, : 

 Petitioner-Appellee, : 

 No. 15AP-979 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 08MS-45)

State of Ohio, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Respondent-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 6, 2016 

 

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and David L. 

Strait, for appellee. 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 

Taylor, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

HORTON, J. 

{¶ 1} Petitioner-appellee, Tayrone L. Hawkins ("Hawkins"), filed a petition under 

R.C. 2950.031(E) to contest his sex offender classification in the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas. After the trial court granted Hawkins the relief he sought, the state 

appealed. For the following reasons, we find that the trial court's entry exceeded the scope 

of relief allowed by the statute and therefore reverse and remand. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} Hawkins was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape under 

Cal.Penal Code 220 on June 22, 1989, in the Superior Court of the State of California, San 

Diego County. He was given a 4-year sentence, but was initially placed on probation. After 

probation was revoked, the sentence was imposed on May 18, 1990. Because Hawkins was 

given 321 days of credit for previous time in custody, his sentence roughly ended around 
No. 15AP-979 2 

July 1, 1993. (June 22, 1989 Information Summ. and May 23, 1990 Abstract of Jgmt., 

attached to Jan. 28, 2008 Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to File Memo. and Memo. Opposing 

Petition Contesting Reclassification.) 

{¶ 3} By 2008, Hawkins was living in Franklin County, Ohio.1 (Jan. 4, 2008 

Petition to Contest Reclassification, hereinafter "Petition.") On January 3, 2008, the 

Franklin County Sheriff sent Hawkins a notification that he had been classified as a Tier 

III sex offender under the revised version of Ohio's sex offender registration and 

notification law, the Adam Walsh Act ("AWA"), which subjected him to a lifetime 

registration requirement. (Petition.) 

{¶ 4} On January 4, 2008, Hawkins filed a petition under R.C. 2950.031(E) in the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, invoking the statutory process for contesting his 

classification as a Tier III sex offender under the AWA. (Petition.) 

{¶ 5} The trial court originally scheduled a hearing for February 22, 2008, but 

stayed the matter a number of times until finally ruling on the motion on May 29, 2012. In 

the entry granting Hawkins the relief he requested, the trial court stated the following: 

For good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS DefendantPetitioner's relief requested in his PETITION TO CONTEST 

RECLASSIFICATION and declares that Defendant-Petitioner 

is not subject to Revised Code Chapter 2950 based on his 

1989 conviction. Furthermore, the defendant is not under any 

statutory duty to verify his current address or to register as 

required by R.C. 2950.04 through 2950.06. It is hereby 

ordered that Defendant-Petitioner's name be removed from 

all sexually oriented lists maintained pursuant to Revised 

Code Chapter 2950 by the local or state agencies. 

(May 29, 2012 Entry.) 

{¶ 6} The state now appeals, asserting three assignments of error: 

[I.] THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 

RELIEF IN THIS PETITION-CONTEST PROCEEDING 

THAT WENT BEYOND VACATING THE TIER III 

CLASSIFICATION IMPOSED BY THE ADAM WALSH ACT. 

[II.] THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 

RELIEF THAT PURPORTED TO EXEMPT PETITIONER 

 

1 The exact date that Hawkins moved to Ohio is unknown. On January 4, 2008, the date that he filed the 

Petition, he stated that he "now resides in Franklin County," where he "registers as a sexually oriented 

offender" with the Franklin County Sheriff. (Petition at ¶ 2.) 
No. 15AP-979 3 

FROM ANY REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT, AS THE 

RECORD DID NOT CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY 

SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION. 

[III.] THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 

RELIEF WITHOUT HOLDING THE HEARING REQUIRED 

BY R.C. 2950.031(E). 

{¶ 7} After the parties filed their briefs on the merits, Hawkins filed motions in 

this court on February 19 and March 14, 2016: a motion to dismiss the appeal on grounds 

of res judicata, and a "MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE AND SUPPLEMENT 

RECORD ON APPEAL." 

II. ANALYSIS 

{¶ 8} After a brief discussion of the background of Ohio's sex offender registry 

and notification law, we will discuss the assignments of error in turn and then rule on the 

motions Hawkins has filed. 

{¶ 9} In 1996, the General Assembly "created Ohio's first comprehensive 

registration and classification system for sex offenders" with the passage of Am.Sub.H.B. 

No. 180, commonly known as Megan's Law. State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-

Ohio-2424, ¶ 7. "Under Megan's Law, sex offenders fell into one of three classifications, 

sexually oriented offenders, habitual sexual offenders, or sexual predators, based upon the 

crime committed and the findings made by the trial court at a sexual-classification 

hearing." State v. Hazlett, 191 Ohio App.3d 105, 2010-Ohio-6119, ¶ 3 (10th Dist.). 

{¶ 10} In 2007, Megan's Law was replaced with the AWA, 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 

10, which set forth a "tier system" that automatically classified sex offenders according to 

their crime. Bodyke at ¶ 20. As originally enacted, the AWA included an automatic 

reclassification scheme that would have retroactively applied to offenders previously 

classified under Megan's Law. See R.C. 2950.031. The scheme required the attorney 

general to "determine for each offender" what "new classification" under the AWA's tier 

system applied to each offender that had previously been classified under Megan's Law. 

R.C. 2950.031(A)(1). After the reclassification, the attorney general was to notify the 

offender of the new classification by registered mail. R.C. 2950.031(A)(2). 

{¶ 11} The AWA also included a process for offenders to file a petition challenging 

the attorney general's reclassification: 
No. 15AP-979 4 

An offender or delinquent child who is in a category described 

in division (A)(2) or (B) of this section may request as a 

matter of right a court hearing to contest the application to 

the offender or delinquent child of the new registration 

requirements under Chapter 2950 of the Revised Code as it 

will exist under the changes that will be implemented on 

January 1, 2008. The offender or delinquent child may 

contest the manner in which the letter sent to the offender or 

delinquent child pursuant to division (A) or (B) of this section 

specifies that the new registration requirements apply to the 

offender or delinquent child or may contest whether those 

new registration requirements apply at all to the offender or 

delinquent child. To request the hearing, the offender or 

delinquent child not later than the date that is sixty days after 

the offender or delinquent child received the registered letter 

sent by the attorney general pursuant to division (A)(2) of this 

section shall file a petition with the court specified in this 

division. 

* * * 

If at the conclusion of the hearing the court finds that the 

offender or delinquent child has proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that the new registration requirements 

do not apply to the offender or delinquent child, the court 

shall issue an order that specifies that the new registration 

requirements do not apply to the offender or delinquent child. 

R.C. 2950.031(E). 

{¶ 12} After the passage of the AWA, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that its 

reclassification provision violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because it "vest[ed] 

the executive branch with authority to review judicial decisions, and it interfere[d] with 

the judicial power by requiring the reopening of final judgments" that had previously 

classified offenders under Megan's Law. Bodyke at ¶ 55. In a subsequent decision, the 

court held that application of the AWA to defendants who had committed offenses before 

its enactment violated the prohibition on passing retroactive laws in Article II, Section 28, 

of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 

paragraph one of the syllabus. 

III. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 13} Citing State v. Bowling, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-36, 2015-Ohio-3123, and State 

v. Chapman, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-70, 2015-Ohio-4042, the state argues that the relief 
No. 15AP-979 5 

granted by the trial court exceeded the "narrow relief" that a petition-contest proceeding 

under R.C. 2950.031(E) allows. (Appellant's Brief at 6.) The state argues that the trial 

court went beyond the limited statutory authority for reclassification when it declared that 

Hawkins was not under any statutory duty to register. Under Bowling and Chapman, the 

state argues the only relief allowed by R.C. 2950.031(E) is a declaration stating whether 

the AWA applies to the petitioner. 

{¶ 14} Hawkins' only response to the state's first assignment of error is to assert 

that he is not subject to classification as a Tier III sex offender under the AWA because 

such retroactive application is void as a matter of law under Williams. (Appellee's Brief at 

5-8.) However, the state concedes that the trial court "correctly overturned the Tier III 

AWA classification," as Williams prevents Hawkins from being subject to a classification 

created by the newer law. (Reply Brief at 1.) Hawkins' response does not address the 

state's argument that the trial court's entry exceeded the scope of relief allowed under

Bowling and Chapman.

{¶ 15} In Bowling, an out-of-state offender moved to Ohio and registered as a 

"sexually oriented offender" under Megan's Law. Bowling at ¶ 2. After passage of the 

AWA and notification that he had been reclassified as a Tier III sex offender, the offender 

filed a petition under R.C. 2950.031(E) to contest the reclassification. Id. The trial court 

granted the petition, reinstated the offender's classification as a "sexually oriented 

offender," and declared that the requirements imposed upon the offender by the AWA 

were "a nullity." Id. at ¶ 3. The state appealed, arguing that because the offender had 

actually been classified a "sexual predator" by another state, the trial court erred by 

reinstating the classification of the offender as a "sexually oriented offender" under 

Megan's Law rather than a "sexual predator." Id. at ¶ 5. 

{¶ 16} We rejected the state's attempt to use the R.C. 2950.031(E) petition 

proceeding as "a vehicle for the state to challenge [the offender's] original classification" 

under Megan's Law. Bowling at ¶ 10. We observed that R.C. 2950.031(E) does not 

"authorize the trial court or [a court of appeals] to interpret Florida (or any other state) 

law for purposes of determining whether the original classification applied by Ohio is 

correct." Id. at ¶ 7. Rather, "the statute authorizes only a determination of whether the 

new Ohio 'Tier' classification [under the AWA] applies to the offender." Id. Accordingly, 
No. 15AP-979 6 

we affirmed the trial court's restoration of the offender to his prior Megan's Law 

classification as a "sexually oriented offender." Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 17} Chapman also involved an out-of-state offender who moved to Ohio, 

registered as a sexually oriented offender under Megan's Law, and filed a petition under 

R.C. 2950.031(E) to contest a subsequent reclassification under the AWA. Chapman at 

¶ 1-5. Applying Bowling and Bodyke, we again rejected the state's argument that the trial 

court should instead have reclassified the offender as a "sexual predator" under Megan's 

Law, as the petition process is not an opportunity to litigate a pre-AWA classification. Id.

at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 18} The facts of this case are nearly identical to Bowling and Chapman. 

Hawkins committed an offense in another state, moved to Ohio, registered as a sexually 

oriented offender under Megan's Law, and subsequently challenged his AWA 

reclassification by filing a petition under R.C. 2950.031(E). Like those offenders, Hawkins 

is entitled to the remedy allowed by the statute: a declaration that the AWA does not apply 

to him and reinstatement of his previous classification. 

{¶ 19} However, in a petition proceeding under R.C. 2950.031(E), Hawkins is not 

entitled to a declaration that he has no duty to register, or an order declaring his name be 

removed from any sex offender registry maintained by state or local authorities.2 The 

language employed by the trial court is broad enough to suggest that it applies to both 

Hawkins' classification under the AWA as well as his status as a "sexually oriented 

offender" under Megan's Law, and that he is free from any duty or obligation under either 

law. As Bowling and Chapman make clear, such a determination is outside the bounds of 

a permissible inquiry under R.C. 2950.031(E). Thus, the trial court erred insofar as its 

entry can be read as a determination that no Megan's Law classification applies to 

Hawkins. Accordingly, we sustain the first assignment of error, reverse and remand with 

instructions to the trial court to vacate the entry and conform any declaratory ruling on 

 

2 The fact that Hawkins may not litigate his status under Megan's Law with a petition for reclassification 

under R.C. 2950.031(E) does not foreclose him from seeking broader relief in another proceeding. See, 

e.g., State v. King, 1st Dist. No. C-140534, 2015-Ohio-3565 (reversing convictions for failing to register as 

a sex offender under former R.C. 2950.04 and allowing defendant to withdraw guilty pleas under Crim.R. 

32.1 where defendant did "not have a duty to register in Ohio as a sex offender [under Megan's Law] and 

thus could not have been convicted of violating that duty"). 
No. 15AP-979 7 

Hawkins' petition to the scope of relief allowed by R.C. 2950.031(E), as described in 

Bodyke, Chapman, and Bowling.

IV. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 20} In the second assignment of error, the state asserts that the trial court 

"erred in granting relief that purported to exempt petitioner from any registration 

requirement, as the record did not clearly and convincingly support such a conclusion." 

(Appellant's Brief at 14.) As discussed in the first assignment of error, the trial court erred 

insofar as its entry can be read as a determination that no Megan's Law classification 

applies to Hawkins. Under Bowling and Chapman, the trial court did not have the 

authority to declare that Hawkins was not subject to any registration requirement when 

granting his R.C. 2950.031(E) petition, as this language suggests that the trial court 

considered Hawkins' registration obligations under both Megan's Law and the AWA. 

Insofar as the state's second assignment of error challenges the evidentiary support for 

the trial court's determination of Hawkins' status under Megan's Law, the issue is 

rendered moot by the resolution of the first assignment of error, as we have reversed the 

trial court and it must vacate the entry in question. We, therefore, overrule the second 

assignment of error as moot. 

V. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 21} In its third assignment of error, the state argues that it was error for the trial 

court to grant Hawkins relief without holding the hearing required by R.C. 2950.031(E), 

asserting that a hearing is "mandatory." (Appellant's Brief at 29.) 

{¶ 22} We have previously rejected the state's attempts to characterize a hearing on 

an R.C. 2950.031(E) petition as mandatory. Jackson v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-644, 

2011-Ohio-2047, ¶ 14 (holding that the state is not "entitled to a statutorily-mandated 

hearing to present various arguments" on an R.C. 2950.031(E) petition, only the 

petitioner); Hosom v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-671, 2011-Ohio-1494, ¶ 11 (holding that 

because of Bodyke's severance of R.C. 2950.031 "any issues relating to that petition 

process, including whether the statute provides the state with the same right to a hearing 

as a petitioner, no longer constitute any justiciable controversy and are therefore moot"). 

The trial court is only required to hold a hearing on an R.C. 2950.031(E) petition if it is 

going to deny the petitioner the relief he seeks. 
No. 15AP-979 8 

{¶ 23} Furthermore, where the state admits that the AWA does not apply to the 

petitioner, as it does here, it is not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to hold a hearing 

because that is "the sole issue the hearing could address." Chapman at ¶ 13 (holding that 

the lack of a hearing on an R.C. 2950.031(E) petition does not prejudice the state where it 

concedes that the AWA does not apply to the petitioner). Accordingly, the third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

VI. HAWKINS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE 

RECORD 

{¶ 24} Hawkins has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, in which he asserts that 

the state's appeal is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and issue preclusion. He argues 

that the trial court declared, in an April 19, 2012 entry dismissing charges brought against 

him under R.C. 2950.05 for failing to provide a change of address, that he had no duty to 

register as a sex offender under R.C. Chapter 2950, and that the state never appealed from 

that determination. Hawkins has also filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal, 

requesting that this court take judicial notice of that case. 

{¶ 25} We denied Hawkins' motion to dismiss the appeal, noting that res judicata 

does not bar the state from appealing. (Mar. 9, 2016 Journal Entry.) Accordingly, we deny 

the "MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE AND SUPPLEMENT RECORD ON 

APPEAL." 

VII. CONCLUSION

{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the first assignment of error, overrule 

the second assignment of error as moot, and overrule the third assignment of error. 

Hawkins motions to take judicial notice and to supplement the record are denied. We 

reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to vacate the entry granting Hawkins' 

petition, and to conform any future relief granted under R.C. 2950.031(E) to the scope 

defined by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Bodyke, as well as this court in Chapman and 

Bowling. 

Motion to take judicial notice and supplement the record 

 denied; judgment reversed; case remanded. 

DORRIAN, P.J. and TYACK, J., concur. 

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