In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MARCUS SHEROD HARRIS,

Defendant‐Appellant,

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Case No. 13 CR 952 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 7, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and MAGNUS‐

STINSON, District Judge.

MAGNUS‐STINSON, District Judge. Marcus Harris commit‐

ted three armed robberies in 2013, two in Indiana and one in

Illinois. He was arrested and charged in state court for one of

                                                 

 Of the Southern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
2 No. 16‐1023

the Indiana robberies. While the Indiana case was pending,

federal authorities sent Harris a target letter concerning the

Illinois robbery. Harris requested and was appointed a federal

public defender, but his federal public defender failed to ad‐

vise Harris or his state defense attorney of the progress of the

federal proceedings before his guilty plea and sentencing in

Indiana state court. He was later charged by federal indict‐

ment and pled guilty in federal court to the Illinois robbery,

and stipulated to the uncharged Indiana robbery as relevant

offense conduct.

At his federal sentencing, the parties agreed that Harris’

federal public defender’s failure to update him about the fed‐

eral proceedings prejudiced Harris because had he not been

convicted in state court, and had all of the robberies been

charged in one federal proceeding, his sentencing guideline

range in his federal court case would have been lower. The

parties agreed to a hypothetical guideline range to compen‐

sate for the federal public defender’s error. Harris claims that

the district court committed procedural error when it failed to

accept the hypothetical guideline range or to explain why it

rejected it. We disagree and affirm his sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2013, Harris committed three armed robberies as a

member of an organized group of armed robbers: 1) on Janu‐

ary 28, 2013, he robbed a T‐Mobile store in Schererville, Indi‐

ana; 2) on January 31, 2013, he robbed a Sprint store in Addi‐

son, Illinois; 3) and on February 4, 2013, he robbed an AT&T

store in LaPorte, Indiana. Shortly after the last robbery, he was

arrested by Indiana authorities and charged in state court for

the robbery in LaPorte. While in state custody, Harris received

a target letter from federal authorities informing him that he
No. 16‐1023 3

might be charged in federal court for the robbery in Addison.

In early March 2013, Harris requested and was appointed a

federal public defender to represent him with respect to any

federal charges. The parties agreed that his federal public de‐

fender failed to advise him or his state defense attorney of the

progress of the federal proceedings.1

Harris pled guilty in state court on December 20, 2013, and

was sentenced to ten years in prison on January 24, 2014. On

February 6, 2014, Harris was charged by federal indictment

for the robbery in Addison and for brandishing a firearm dur‐

ing the robbery. On January 8, 2015, he pled guilty to Count 2

for robbery and Count 3 for brandishing a firearm. As part of

the plea agreement, he stipulated that he committed the rob‐

bery in Schererville and agreed to its consideration as relevant

conduct for purposes of the sentencing guidelines.

On December 10, 2015, the district court conducted Harris’

sentencing. Harris’ counsel pointed out that the parties agreed

to a lower sentencing guideline range because they recom‐

mended grouping Harris’ conviction in state court as though

it were part of his federal case rather than as a separate state

court conviction. This hypothetical guideline calculation

would have resulted in an adjusted offense level of 28 and a

criminal history category of III, which would have given the

district court a hypothetical sentencing guideline range of 97

to 121 months for Count 2. The parties agreed that this hypo‐

thetical sentencing guideline range was a way to ameliorate

                                                 

1 A criminal complaint was filed in federal court on December 6, 2013, and

it detailed three robberies, including the robbery in Addison. It named two

codefendants and referenced several potential unnamed codefendants.

Harris was later identified as one of the unnamed codefendants when he

was charged by federal indictment on February 6, 2014.
4 No. 16‐1023

the federal public defender’s failure to notify Harris or his

state defense attorney about the federal proceedings. The par‐

ties also raised other considerations, including that Harris

had already served three years of his state court sentence and

that his federal sentence should run concurrently with his

state court sentence.

After considering the parties’ recommendation, the dis‐

trict court determined that because Harris did plead guilty in

state court, that conviction was part of his criminal history ra‐

ther than a grouped offense in his federal case. Given this fact,

the district court calculated an adjusted offense level of 272

and a criminal history category of IV, which resulted in a

guideline range of 100 to 125 months for Count 2 with a man‐

datory consecutive sentence of 84 months for Count 3. Reject‐

ing the Government’s recommendation of 204 months, the

district court calculated a sentence of 196 months—112

months for Count 2 and 84 months consecutive for Count 3—

but it reduced the sentence by 36 months to give Harris credit

for the three years that he served in state custody. The district

court sentenced Harris to a total of 160 months in federal cus‐

tody to run concurrently with his state court sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

Harris argues that the district court erred when it failed to

adopt the hypothetical sentencing guideline range or explain

why it rejected it. Harris reiterates that the parties agreed to

this recommendation because of the error by Harris’ federal

public defender.

                                                 

2 The District Court applied the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines, which re‐

sulted in a lower offense level.
No. 16‐1023 5

In response, the Government claims that the district court

did address this issue and that it gave Harris every consider‐

ation that he requested in his sentence. The Government as‐

serts that the district court’s treatment of Harris’ Indiana con‐

viction as a prior conviction and not as a stipulated offense

was proper under the Guidelines.

We review de novo a district court’s sentencing procedures.

United States v. Howard, 729 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2013). The

district court commits procedural error by not adequately ex‐

plaining its choice of sentence. United States v. Spiller, 732 F.3d

767, 769 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Schlueter, 634

F.3d 965, 966–67 (7th Cir. 2011)). It must show that it exercised

its discretion by commenting on a defendant’s principal argu‐

ments that are “not so weak as not to merit discussion;” how‐

ever, “little explanation is necessary when a court decides to

impose a sentence within the Guidelines range.” Howard, 729

F.3d at 664 (citations omitted).

At the outset of Harris’ sentencing hearing, the district

court acknowledged the parties’hypothetical guideline calcu‐

lation. The district court noted, however, that because Harris

had in fact been convicted in state court, his adjusted offense

level was 27 and his correct criminal history category was IV,

which resulted in a sentencing guideline range of 100 to 125

months. The district court further explained that whether it

followed the parties’recommendation or not, it was aware of

the difference and indicated that it was under no obligation to

adopt the hypothetical sentencing guideline range because

the state court conviction had actually occurred. Thus, the dis‐

trict court sufficiently considered the issue and committed no

error. See United States v. Gary, 613 F.3d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2010)

(“The district court is required only to consider the argument,
6 No. 16‐1023

at least to the extent it pointed to anything unusual about ...

[the] circumstances, and to provide a sufficient explanation of

its treatment of the issue.”).

In addition, the district court afforded Harris considerable

leniency in determining his sentence. After considering the

parties’ arguments and the sentencing factors pursuant 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court concluded that the proper

sentence for Harris was 196 months. It then subtracted 36

months to account for the three years that Harris had served

in state custody, which resulted in a sentence of 160 months.

It further ordered the sentence to run concurrently with his

state court sentence. The sentence imposed was below both

the hypothetical and actual guideline ranges. We therefore

conclude that the district court committed no error, ade‐

quately addressed Harris’ arguments, and sufficiently ex‐

plained its below guidelines sentence.

Harris further claims that after the district court imposed

his sentence, it failed to ask whether it addressed the parties’

main arguments as directed by United States v. Garcia‐Segura,

717 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2013). In Garcia‐Segura, we encouraged

district courts to inquire whether defense counsel is satisfied

that the court has addressed the defense’s principal argu‐

ments after imposing a sentence but before advising the de‐

fendant of his right to appeal. Id. at 569. Although the district

court did not make this specific inquiry, it did inquire of each

party whether the court had omitted anything. Harris clearly

understood the import of this inquiry, as he responded by ask‐

ing if the court would order that the sentence begin immedi‐

ately and if the court would recommend a facility near Chi‐

cago. The district court affirmatively responded to both re‐
No. 16‐1023 7

quests. We find no error, as Harris was both given an oppor‐

tunity to respond, and did respond, following the district

court’s determination of his sentence.

In any event, the district court’s shorthand question here

would be harmless error—if any—given that Harris was able

to appeal the sentencing issue rather than having it deemed

waived. See United States v. Cruz, 787 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir.

2015) (“[Defendant’s] arguments were waived when, at the

end of the sentencing hearing, the judge asked if he had ad‐

dressed all of the arguments, and [Defendant’s] lawyer an‐

swered yes.”).

III. CONCLUSION

Forthe reasons noted above, we AFFIRM Harris’ sentence.