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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45682

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: August 22, 2018

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Jerome County. Hon. John K. Butler, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ted S. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

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GRATTON, Chief Judge 

Michael R. Murphy appeals from the district court’s order denying his Idaho Criminal 

Rule 33(c) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2006, a judgment of conviction and sentence was entered upon Murphy’s 

guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine. On November 9, 2017, Murphy 

filed an I.C.R. 33(c) motion to withdraw his 2006 guilty plea. The district court denied 

Murphy’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Murphy timely appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Murphy argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mindful of controlling precedent regarding jurisdiction to 
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entertain a Rule 33(c) motion, Murphy argues the district court abused its discretion by denying 

his motion. The State argues that the trial court was correct in denying Murphy’s motion 

because the motion was not timely filed.

Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law, over which this Court exercises 

free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004); State v. Savage, 145 

Idaho 756, 758, 185 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2008). Post-judgment motions to withdraw guilty 

pleas are authorized by I.C.R. 33(c). Once a judgment becomes final, however, a trial court does 

not have jurisdiction to amend or set aside the judgment absent a statute or a rule extending 

jurisdiction. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003); State v. Armstrong, 

146 Idaho 372, 377-78, 195 P.3d 731, 736-37 (Ct. App. 2008). A judgment becomes final at the 

expiration of time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal, and a motion to withdraw 

a guilty plea may not be granted thereafter. Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714; 

Armstrong, 146 Idaho at 377-78, 195 P.3d at 736-37.

The district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 

Murphy’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Murphy’s motion was untimely. The 

judgment of conviction was entered on October 16, 2006. The judgment became final forty-two

days therefrom, when Murphy failed to appeal the original judgment. See Idaho Appellate 

Rule 14(a). Contrary to Murphy’s assertion, manifest injustice, the only ground for granting a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea post-sentencing under I.C.R. 33(c), does not create an exception 

to the trial court’s loss of subject matter jurisdiction upon a judgment becoming final. Murphy 

does not argue, nor can he show, that there is a statute or rule that extends the jurisdiction of the 

district court. 

III.

CONCLUSION

Murphy’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely and the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider the motion. The order denying Murphy’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.