IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Zion Bullitt Avenue Limited :

Partnership, :

Appellant : 

v. :

: No. 1977 C.D. 2015 

Westmoreland County Tax Claim : Submitted: August 12, 2016

Bureau :

:

v. :

: 

Moween Trust :

Re: Tax Map No. 29-01-10-0-156 :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge 

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE COLINS FILED: December 21, 2016

This is an appeal filed by Zion Bullitt Avenue Limited Partnership 

(Zion) from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

(trial court) overruling Zion’s objections and exceptions to an upset tax sale of a 

property in Penn Borough, Westmoreland County that it owned (the Property).1 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

As stipulated by the parties, Zion is a limited partnership whose 

limited partners are Abraham Zion and his three children, Mark, Joshua, and 

 

1

The Property, sometimes referred to as the “Penn warehouse,” was used to store metal-working 

equipment and clothing manufacturing equipment such as presses and sewing machines. 

(August 19, 2014 Deposition of Mark S. Zion, Reproduced Record at 360a, 363a.) 
2

Adina. (Stipulated Facts, Reproduced Record (R.R.) ¶1 at 125a.) Zion 

Pennsylvania Corporation is a Delaware corporation created to serve as Zion’s 

general partner; since 1986, Zion Pennsylvania Corporation has been the general 

partner of Zion and has held a one percent interest in Zion. (Id.) Until December 

2011, Abraham Zion had managing responsibilities for Zion; Mark Zion assumed 

managing responsibilities for Zion as of January 2012 and has been involved with 

the Property in varying degrees since 1986. (Id., R.R. ¶¶ 3,7 at 126a.) 

Zion owned the Property from at least 1986 through September 10, 

2012, the date of the tax sale, and throughout this period the Westmoreland County 

Tax Claim Bureau (WCTCB) listed Zion’s mailing address as 41 Madison Avenue, 

New York, NY, 10010 (the Madison Avenue Address). (Stipulated Facts, R.R. ¶ 8 

at 126a.) Zion paid all property taxes levied upon the Property through 2009, but 

in 2010, 2011, and 2012, Zion failed to pay any property taxes on the Property. 

(Id., R.R. ¶ at 127a.) 

The tax bills for the Property in 2010, 2011, and 2012 were each 

addressed to the Madison Avenue Address; each was returned by the United States 

Postal Service to the tax collector for Penn Borough. (Id., R.R. ¶¶ 12, 14-16 at 

127a-128a.) Following the return of the tax bill in 2010, the tax collector accessed,

via an internet search, an address for Zion at 4630 Fieldstone Road, Riverdale, 

New York 10471-3314 (the Fieldstone Address), which was at all relevant times 

the residence of Abraham Zion. (Id., R.R. ¶¶ 14-16 at 127a-128a.) The tax 

collector, who was prohibited from changing the address without a signed request 

from the taxpayer, re-sent the tax bill in an envelope requesting that Zion change 

its address; the tax bill was not returned, and Zion did not request a change of 

address. (Id.) The tax bills for 2011 and 2012 were similarly re-sent to the 

Fieldstone Address together with requests that Zion change its address and a 
3

change of address form, but no address change was made. (Id., R.R. ¶¶ 15-16 at 

127a-128a.).

On April 6, 2011, the WCTCB sent, via certified letter to the Madison 

Avenue Address, a Notice of Return and Claim showing outstanding taxes for the 

Property for 2010; the Notice of Return and Claim was returned as not deliverable 

as addressed and unable to forward; the WCTCB made no further attempts to 

obtain a different address to which to send the Notice of Return and Claim. (Id., 

R.R. ¶¶ 22-23 at 129a.) On May 7, 2012, the WCTCB sent, via certified mail

restricted delivery, a Notice of Public Sale to the Madison Avenue Address; the 

notice was returned marked undeliverable. (Id., R.R. ¶ 28 at 130a.) The WCTCB 

sent a second notice, using a proof of mailing, to the Madison Avenue Address 30 

days prior to the tax sale. (Id., R.R. ¶ 32 at 130a.) On July 26, 2012, the 

Westmoreland County Sheriff posted the Property, which posting was observed by 

numerous individuals. (Id., R.R. ¶¶ 37, 39 at 131a-132a.) A Notice of Public Sale 

for the Property was published both in newspapers in general circulation and in the 

Westmoreland County Law Journal. (Id., R.R. ¶ 44 at 133a.) No Zion partner 

visited the Property between the date of the posting and the date of the tax sale. 

(Id., R.R. ¶ 45 at 133a.) On September 10, 2012, the WCTCB exposed the 

Property for a tax upset sale for a price of $16,407.14 for delinquent taxes for the 

years 2010 and 2011, the current taxes for the 2012 year, plus the costs of sale, and 

Moween Trust purchased the Property for $20,182.66. (Id., R.R. ¶¶ 47-48 at 

133a.) Zion filed Objections and Exceptions to the tax sale of the Property on 

October 17, 2013; the trial court permitted the filing of Amended Objections and 

Exceptions on January 23, 2015. (Id., R.R. ¶¶ 49, 51 at 133a.)

At an evidentiary hearing held on March 25, 2015, the trial court 

received testimony and exhibits and requested the submission of briefs. Oral 
4

argument was held on July 30, 2015. On September 16, 2015, the trial court issued

an opinion and order denying Zion’s amended objections and exceptions, and 

confirming the September 10, 2012 tax sale. 

In its opinion, the trial court acknowledged that given Zion’s 

“substantial” arguments as to the WCTCB’s failure to comply with technical notice 

requirements of the Real Estate Sales Tax Law (RESTL),2Zion may well have 

prevailed had a failure to comply with such requirements been the only issue; the 

trial court determined, however, that the requirement of strict compliance with the 

RESTL had been waived, because Zion clearly had actual notice of the tax sale. 

(Trial Court Opinion and Order, R.R. at 193a-205a.) Zion timely appealed the trial 

court’s decision to this Court.3

Before this Court, Zion argues that the trial court rendered its decision 

that Zion had actual notice of the tax sale without supporting evidence, contending 

that its conclusion depends entirely on the deposition testimony of Frank Trigona, 

who had been engaged by Zion to monitor an environmental cleanup involving 

demolition and remediation at the Jeannette Glass Plant, one of three other 

properties, in addition to the Property, that it owned in Westmoreland County.

4

 

 

2 Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5860.101-5860.803

3

In tax sale cases, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the common pleas court 

abused its discretion, clearly erred as a matter of law, or rendered a decision with a lack of 

supporting evidence. Dwyer v. Luzerne County Tax Claim Bureau, 110 A.3d 223, 225 n.2 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015).

4

In a 2015 unreported opinion, Zion Bullitt Avenue Limited Partnership v. Westmoreland County 

Tax Claim Bureau, Westmoreland County Industrial Development Corporation, and City of 

Jeannette, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1396 C.D. 2014, filed June 4, 2015), appeal denied, 132 A.2d 460 

(Pa. 2016), this Court considered Zion’s appeal from a trial court order denying Zion’s 

objections and exceptions to the tax sale of the Jeannette Glass Plant property, which occurred on 

the same day as the tax sale of the Property. In that case, our Court affirmed the trial court, 

which determined that despite Mark Zion’s testimony that neither he nor his father signed the 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

(August 19, 2014 Deposition of Mark S. Zion, R.R. at 368a, 371a.) Zion asserts 

that because the trial court erred in its determination that Zion had actual notice of 

the tax sale, we should then set aside the tax sale as a result of the WCTCB’s 

failure to comply with the pre-sale notice requirements of the RETSL. Zion asserts 

that the WCTCB: 1) failed to comply with the notice provisions of Section 308(a) 

of the RETSL, 72 P.S. § 5860.308(a), by failing to post the Property with a notice 

of return of taxes and entry of claim after receiving notice from the postal 

authorities that the Notice of Return and Claim sent by certified mail to the 

Madison Avenue Address was returned as undeliverable; and 2) failed to comply 

with the notice provisions of Section 602(e) of the RETSL, 72 P.S. § 

5860.602(e)(2), and Section 607(a) of the RETSL, 72 P.S. § 5860.607a(a), by 

failing to undertake any reasonable additional efforts to identify Zion’s correct 

address and notify it at such address after it received notice that the mailed Notice 

of Sale was not delivered to Zion.

At his deposition, Mr. Trigona testified that he became aware of the 

impending tax sale of the Property when he encountered Lou Martino, 

Westmoreland County Deputy Sheriff (the Sheriff) at the Jeannette Glass Plant 

property, as the Sheriff was posting the property for nonpayment of taxes. 

(October 23, 2013 Deposition of Frank M. Trigona, R.R. at 288a.) Mr. Trigona 

indicated that he asked the Sheriff if he was also posting Zion’s other properties, 

 

(continued...)

receipt for the notice of tax sale, which was sent to the Jeannette Glass Plant property’s 

registered mailing address, the Fieldstone Road Address, and signed by someone using the name 

“Zion,” the requirements of RETSL had been met, and even assuming Abraham Zion did not 

personally sign the return receipt for the notice of the tax sale, Zion received implied notice of 

the sale, which was sufficient to establish actual notice.
6

and the Sheriff replied that he was. (Id., R.R. at 290a.) Mr. Trigona stated that he 

then entered a construction trailer at the plant site, phoned Mark Zion, and told him 

that the Sheriff had just told him that he was posting all four of the Zion-owned 

properties, including the Property. (Id., R.R. at 293a.) Mr. Trigona indicated that 

there were a few other people in the trailer when he made this phone call, including 

Chelsey Rittenour, who was the general contractor performing demolition for Zion. 

(Id., R.R. at 294a.) Mr. Trigona further testified that during the phone call, Mark 

Zion directed him to go to all the other properties, including the Property, and pick 

up the postings and put them in the construction trailer. (Id., R.R. at 296a.) Mr. 

Trigona recounted that he would have to drive to the Property, and he did not know 

if he would be able to get around to it that day, to which Mark Zion replied, “Okay. 

Just get them, put them in the trailer.” (Id.) At the conclusion of the phone call, 

Mr. Trigona testified, a general discussion ensued among the people in the trailer, 

including Dan Hamilton, a Zion employee, regarding the fact that Zion had not 

paid its taxes. (Id., R.R. at 294a-295a.) A few days later, Mr. Trigona stated, he 

reported to Mark Zion that he had gone to the Property, but found only a stake 

there, with no paper; he also reported that he picked up both stake and paper at the 

Jeannette Glass Plant and at another Zion-owned property, on 6th Street in 

Jeannette, PA, but had been unable to locate either a stake or paper at the fourth 

Zion-owned site, on Chambers Avenue. (Id., R.R. at 297a.) Mr. Trigona testified 

that over the next week, he spoke to Mark Zion by phone on four different 

occasions and each time they discussed the posted properties, including the 

Property. (Id., R.R. at 298a.) He stated that approximately one month later, he 

spoke again to Mark Zion about the posted properties, and Mark Zion told him, 

“Oh, I got with [Mark Zion’s father, Abraham Zion] and we got it handled.” (Id., 

R.R. at 299a.) Mr. Trigona testified that on the day of the tax sale, he received a 
7

phone call from a friend at the courthouse who informed him that three of the four 

Zion-owned properties, including the Property, had been sold at the tax sale, but 

that the property on Chambers Avenue had not been sold. (Id., R.R. at 300a.) Mr. 

Trigona stated that he hung up the phone and immediately telephoned Mark Zion 

to inform him, offering to go to the courthouse with a check, but Mark Zion again 

told him that he would take care of it. (Id., R.R. at 301a.)

Mark Zion testified that Mr. Trigona never conveyed to him that the 

Property was posted for an upset tax sale; rather, he testified at a deposition and 

again at the March 25, 2015 hearing that the first time he learned that there were 

outstanding property taxes on the Property was either the day of the tax sale or the 

day after; he indicated that his conversations with Mr. Trigona were limited to 

conversations about environmental issues at another Zion-owned property, 

specifically the Jeanette Glass Plant. (August 19, 2014 Deposition Transcript, R.R. 

at 382a; March 25, 2015 Hearing Transcript, R.R. at 153a; Stipulated Facts, R.R. 

¶¶ 3,7 at 126a.)

The Sheriff testified that he had discussed the posting of the Property 

with Mr. Trigona both before, and after he posted the Property. (March 25, 2015 

Hearing Transcript, R.R. at 139a-140a.) The WCTCB and Moween Trust also 

offered Mark Zion’s phone records demonstrating that numerous conversations 

occurred between Mark Zion and Mr. Trigona in the period beginning with the day 

the Property was posted through the day of the tax sale. 

The trial court concluded that it was “clear...that [Zion] had actual 

notice of the Property being exposed for tax sale.” (Trial Court Opinion and 

Order, R.R. at 199a.) The trial court opined that Mr. Trigona’s testimony was:

credible and supported by subsequent testimony, as it 

was substantiated by the testimony of [the Sheriff], who 
8

confirmed that all of the alleged conversations between 

himself and Mr. Trigona took place. Further, witness 

Chelsea Rittenour further confirmed Mr. Trigona’s 

testimony, indicating that he overheard conversations 

taking place between Mr. Trigona and Mr. Zion, 

confirming that Mr. Trigona told Mr. Zion that the 

properties were posted with notice of the tax sale. In 

addition, Mr. Trigona truthfully testified to occurrences 

which were possibly detrimental to his own character, 

including his taking the postings from the properties and 

hiding them at Mark Zion’s instruction. The Court views 

all of Mr. Trigona’s testimony as truthful, credible, and 

substantiated.

(Id., R.R. at 202a.) The trial court further opined that in addition to Mr. Trigona’s 

testimony, there was significant circumstantial evidence to show that Zion had 

actual notice of the sale of the Property, including the testimony regarding 

witnesses informing Mark Zion of the impending tax sale of not one, but all of his 

Westmoreland County properties together with Mark Zion’s testimony that he

knew that nonpayment of taxes can result in the loss of property.5 (Id., R.R. at 

203a.) The trial court also determined that the posting of the Property had been 

proper. (Id., R.R. at 204a.) 

This Court has established that where actual notice is established, the 

formal requirements of notice need not be met. Citimortgage, Inc. v. KDR 

Investments, LLP, 954 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); Cruder v. 

Westmoreland County Tax Claim Bureau, 861 A.2d 411, 415 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); 

Stanford-Gale v. Tax Claim Bureau of Susquehanna County, 816 A.2d 1214, 1217

 

5

The trial court also noted that notices of sale for other Zion properties in Westmoreland County 

were sent to the Fieldstone Road address, where Abraham Zion resided, and Mark Zion testified 

that he collected the mail at Fieldstone Road, which is the same location where the tax bills for 

the Property were sent by the tax collector and the tax bills were not returned as undeliverable. 

(Trial Court Opinion, R.R. at 202a.)
9

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Sabbeth v. Tax Claim Bureau of Fulton County, 714 A.2d 

514, 517 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). In Sabbeth, our Court acknowledged that case law 

discussing what constitutes actual notice appears to be fact specific and fails to 

define the term “actual notice,” stating:

Black’s Law Dictionary 1061-1062 (6th ed. 1990) defines 

actual notice as follows: Actual notice has been defined 

as notice expressly and actually given, and brought home 

to the party directly. The term “actual notice,” however, 

is generally given a wider meaning as embracing two 

classes, express and implied; the former includes all 

knowledge of a degree above that which depends upon 

collateral inference, or which imposes upon the party the 

further duty of inquiry; the latter imputes knowledge to a 

party because he is shown to be conscious of having the 

means of knowledge. In this sense actual notice is such 

notice as is positively proved to have been given to a 

party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed 

to have received personally because the evidence within 

his knowledge was sufficient to put him upon inquiry. 

Sabbeth, 714 A.2d at 517. In Sabbeth, where the taxpayer received written notice 

but failed to open the envelope and worked at the subject property at the time it 

was posted, the Court found that the record was replete with facts which showed 

that the owner had implied actual notice of the tax sale and therefore had a duty to 

undertake further inquiry. Id. Similarly, in Cruder, the Court held that evidence 

supported a finding of implied actual notice where the taxpayer worked at the 

property each day and had paid three months of delinquent taxes just two days 

after his controller signed for the tax sale notice. 861 A.2d at 416. Zion argues 

that Sabbeth and Cruder are distinguishable and inapposite; here, Zion argues, it 

received no written notices from WCTCB and no Zion partner visited the Property 

at the relevant times. 
10

In Sabbeth, where the trial court found credible the testimony of the 

property owner that she had received, but had not opened the notice of tax sale 

until the day of the sale, this Court rejected the tax claim bureau’s argument that 

the owner’s testimony was self-serving and unsupported by substantial evidence, 

noting that “it is well-settled that this Court is bound by the credibility 

determinations of the trial court.” Sabbeth, 714 A.2d at 516. Likewise, we are 

bound by the determination of the trial court that all of Mr. Trigona’s testimony 

was truthful, credible, and substantiated.

 Accordingly, we find no error here. Zion’s managing partner 

received - directly and repeatedly - in the form of conversations with Mr. Trigona, 

notice that a tax sale was scheduled for the Property. The evidence therefore 

supports a finding of express actual notice of the tax sale such that any failure by 

the WCTCB to comply with statutory requirements of RESTL were waived. We 

therefore discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order denying 

Zion’s amended objections and exceptions to the tax sale and we affirm the trial 

court’s order. 

______________________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Zion Bullitt Avenue Limited :

Partnership, :

Appellant : 

v. :

: No. 1977 C.D. 2015 

Westmoreland County Tax Claim :

Bureau :

:

v. :

: 

Moween Trust :

Re: Tax Map No. 29-01-10-0-156 :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2016, the order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County in the above-captioned matter is 

AFFIRMED. 

______________________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Zion Bullitt Avenue Limited :

Partnership, :

Appellant :

: 

v. : No. 1977 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: August 12, 2016

Westmoreland County Tax Claim :

Bureau :

:

v. :

:

Moween Trust :

Re: Tax Map No. 29-01-10-0-156 :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: December 21, 2016

The majority holds that the notice provisions of the Real Estate Tax 

Sale Law (Tax Sale Law)1 may be disregarded where a tax claim bureau can show 

that an individual with an investment interest in a partnership receives a telephone 

call reporting that the partnership’s real property has been scheduled for a tax sale. 

Inexplicably, the majority sweeps aside our well-established precedent that a tax 

claim bureau must strictly follow the written notice provisions of the Tax Sale 

Law. Further, the “actual notice” of a limited partner does not constitute notice to 

 

1 Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§5860.101 – 5860.803.
MHL-2

the partnership, a separate legal person, whose general partner is a business 

corporation. Respectfully, I must dissent.

Zion Bullitt Avenue Limited Partnership owns real property in

Westmoreland County. Its general partner is Zion Pennsylvania Corporation, and 

the Partnership’s limited partners are Abraham Zion, Mark Zion, Joshua Zion, and 

Adina Zion. Four of the Partnership’s Westmoreland County properties are 

located in Jeannette, for which the Tax Claim Bureau has a mailing address of

4630 Fieldstone Road, Riverdale, New York. One of the Partnership’s 

Westmoreland County properties is located in Penn Borough, for which the Tax 

Claim Bureau has a mailing address of 41 Madison Avenue, New York, New 

York. 

The 2010 tax invoices for the Partnership’s Penn Borough property 

were returned to the Penn Borough taxing authority as undeliverable. When the 

taxes were not paid, Penn Borough’s taxing authority forwarded the invoices to the 

Westmoreland Tax Claim Bureau for collection. On April 6, 2011, the Tax Claim 

Bureau sent a Notice of Return and Claim showing the outstanding property taxes 

for the year 2010. It sent the notice to the Madison Avenue address by certified 

mail. The mailing was returned as undeliverable. On May 7, 2012, the Tax Claim 

Bureau sent a Notice of Public Sale by certified mail, again to the Madison Avenue 

address. Again the notice was returned as undeliverable. The Tax Claim Bureau

then sent a second notice by first class mail to the Madison Avenue address 30

days before the tax sale; posted the Penn Borough property with a notice of the 

sale; and published notice of the sale in newspapers of general circulation. On 

September 10, 2012, the Tax Claim Bureau sold the Partnership’s Penn Borough 
MHL-3

property at a tax upset sale. Thereafter, the Partnership filed a petition to vacate 

the sale. 

The majority holds that strict compliance with the Tax Sale Law was 

not required because the trial court found, as fact, that one of the limited partners,

Mark Zion, learned in a phone call that the Penn Borough property had been posted 

for a tax sale. The Partnership vigorously contests this finding of the trial court.

2

 

Regardless, the majority’s holding departs from the statutory requirement, and our 

precedent, that a tax claim bureau must undertake an effort to locate the owner of 

property scheduled for a tax sale when notice of the sale is returned by the U.S.

Postal Service as undeliverable.

Section 602(e) of the Tax Sale Law requires the tax claim bureau to 

give each owner of a property notice of the impending sale by certified mail. If the 

tax claim bureau does not receive a return receipt from every owner at least 10 

days before the sale, the tax claim bureau must then give that owner notice by first 

class mail. Section 602(e) states: 

(e) In addition to such publications, similar notice of the sale 

shall also be given by the bureau as follows:

(1) At least thirty (30) days before the date of the 

sale, by United States certified mail, restricted 

 

2

The Partnership contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that Mark 

Zion had “actual” notice by reason of a phone call from a contractor engaged to do construction 

for the Partnership. This caller filed a lien against the Partnership’s property shortly after giving 

a deposition. The caller, now deceased, did not testify in court. The Partnership contends that, 

as a matter of law, the trial court could not make a credibility determination in favor of the caller 

without being able to view his demeanor and in light of his animus toward the Partnership. The 

Partnership also contends that the witness who supposedly corroborated the caller’s deposition 

did not do so because that witness testified about the Partnership’s properties in Jeannette, not 

the one in Penn Borough that was sold at the upset sale.
MHL-4

delivery, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, 

to each owner as defined by this act.

(2) If return receipt is not received from each 

owner pursuant to the provisions of clause (1), 

then, at least ten (10) days before the date of the 

sale, similar notice of the sale shall be given to 

each owner who failed to acknowledge the first 

notice by United States first class mail, proof of 

mailing, at his last known post office address by 

virtue of the knowledge and information possessed 

by the bureau, by the tax collector for the taxing 

district making the return and by the county office 

responsible for assessments and revisions of taxes. 

It shall be the duty of the bureau to determine the 

last post office address known to said collector and 

county assessment office.

72 P.S. §5860.602(e) (emphasis added). 

Section 607.1(a) of the Tax Sale Law3addresses what must be done 

when the certified mailing is returned to the tax claim bureau as unclaimed by any 

of the owners of the property. It states: 

When any notification of a pending tax sale or a tax sale subject 

to court confirmation is required to be mailed to any owner, 

mortgagee, lienholder or other person or entity whose property 

interests are likely to be significantly affected by such tax sale, 

and such mailed notification is either returned without the 

required receipted personal signature of the addressee or under 

other circumstances raising a significant doubt as to the actual 

receipt of such notification by the named addressee or is not 

returned or acknowledged at all, then, before the tax sale can be 

conducted or confirmed, the bureau must exercise reasonable 

efforts to discover the whereabouts of such person or entity and 

notify him. The Bureau’s efforts shall include, but not 

necessarily be restricted to, a search of current telephone 

directories for the county and of the dockets and indices of the 

 

3 Added by Section 30 of the Act of July 3, 1986, P.L. 351, 72 P.S. §5860.607a(a).
MHL-5

county tax assessment offices, recorder of deeds office and 

prothonotary’s office, as well as contacts made to any apparent 

alternate address or telephone number which may have been 

written on or in the file pertinent to such property. When such 

reasonable efforts have been exhausted, regardless of whether 

or not the notification efforts have been successful, a notation 

shall be placed in the property file describing the efforts made 

and the results thereof, and the property may be rescheduled for 

sale or the sale may be confirmed as provided in this act. 

72 P.S. §5860.607a(a) (emphasis added). In short, where a tax claim bureau has 

doubt about whether a mailed notice of a tax sale has been received by the 

property’s owner, it “must exercise reasonable efforts to discover the whereabouts 

of such person or entity and notify him.” Id. 

Here, the Tax Claim Bureau knew, with certainty, that its notice was 

not received by the Partnership. Each of its mailings was returned as 

undeliverable. Nevertheless, it made no effort to “discover the whereabouts of [the 

Partnership] and notify [it].” Id. Specifically, the stipulation provides as follows: 

23. Following return of the Notice of Claim marked 

undeliverable, the [Tax Claim Bureau] put the original in the 

file and undertook no further current efforts to obtain a different 

address to which to send the Notice of Claim or any other 

writings directed to the Property owner. 

***

28. In this case, the [Tax Claim Bureau] sent a Notice of Public 

Sale out ... in May 7, 2012, via restricted delivery, to Zion at 41 

Madison Ave., New York, NY 10010-2202 [and] ... [t]his 

notice was returned to the [Tax Claim Bureau] marked 

undeliverable. 

***

30. The [Tax Claim Bureau’s] file reflects that it did not 

undertake additional efforts to find another address for Zion for 

this property. 
MHL-6

Stipulation ¶¶23, 28, 30; Reproduced Record at 129a-130a (R.R. ___). The 

majority holds that the Tax Claim Bureau was excused from making a 

“reasonable” effort to “discover [the Partnership’s] whereabouts” because the trial 

court found, as fact, that one of the limited partners, Mark Zion, received a 

telephonic message from a third party that the Penn Borough property had been 

posted for a tax sale.

In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies upon Sabbeth v. Tax 

Claim Bureau of Fulton County, 714 A.2d 514 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). In that case, 

the tax claim bureau effected actual notice of the tax sale by certified mail to the 

owner, which it followed with a first-class mailing, a posting of the property and

notice publications in newspapers of general circulation. Stated otherwise, it 

undertook all of the notice requirements of the Tax Sale Law. This Court rejected 

the owner’s effort to set aside the sale for alleged “technical difficulties in the 

notice sent to her by regular mail.” Id. at 516. Notably, those “technical 

difficulties” are not identified in the opinion, but it is clear that the certified 

mailing was followed by a first class mailing.

The critical fact in Sabbeth was that the owner let the certified mailed 

notice, which was signed for at her office, sit on her desk for 53 days without 

opening the envelope containing the notice. She finally opened the envelope on 

the day of the sale, by which time the property had been sold. The trial court set 

aside the sale for the stated reason that the owner did not have actual notice. This 

Court reversed. 

We held that the tax claim bureau satisfied its duty with the successful 

delivery of the certified mailing. We explained that the certified mailing gave the 

owner “actual notice of the tax sale of the subject property but [she] sought to 
MHL-7

avoid the consequences of her inaction by claiming complete ignorance.” Id. at 

518. This Court has recognized that the Sabbeth holding was based upon the 

“peculiar combination of facts.” In re Dauphin County Tax Claim Bureau, 834 

A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Sabbeth did not establish a broad principle 

that if an owner has actual notice, by some means, then the tax claim bureau is 

excused from its statutory notice obligations.

Rather, Sabbeth stands for the proposition that a tax claim bureau does 

not have the responsibility to ensure that the owner, who received the certified 

mailing, then actually read the notice so delivered. We have previously explained

that Sabbeth turned on the fact that the owner, who received the statutory notice 30 

days before the sale, “simply declined to open the envelope.” Citimortgage, Inc. v. 

KDR Investments, LLP, 954 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (discussing 

Sabbeth).

Here, by contrast, as the trial court acknowledged, “it is 

uncontroverted that [the Partnership] did not receive written notice from the [Tax 

Claim Bureau] of the tax sale of the Property.” Trial Court op. at 8 (emphasis 

added). The mailings were returned as undeliverable. The parties further 

stipulated that none of the limited partners visited the property at the relevant 

period of time or saw the posting on the Penn Borough property. No one with 

authority to act for the Partnership signed for, or received, the certified mailing of 

the notice of sale, as was the case in Sabbeth.

Nor does it matter, as the trial court supposed, that the Partnership did 

not submit a change of address form to the Tax Claim Bureau or that Mark Zion

did not take the initiative to determine whether taxes were current. Trial Court op. 

at 8, 10. In Smith v. Tax Claim Bureau of Pike County, 834 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. 
MHL-8

Cmwlth. 2003), this Court rejected the tax claim bureau’s contention that the 

taxpayer had the responsibility to give the bureau notice of her change of address. 

This Court explained that “the focus is not on the alleged neglect of the owner, 

which is often present in some degree, but on whether the activities of the [b]ureau 

comply with the requirements of the statute.” Id. (citations omitted). The taxpayer 

“did not have a duty to give the [b]ureau notice of her address change.” Id. See 

also Rivera v. Carbon County Tax Claim Bureau, 857 A.2d 208, 217-18 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2004) (rejecting tax claim bureau’s claim that taxpayer must provide a 

timely change of address). In Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota v. Tax Claim 

Bureau of Monroe County, 817 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), this Court refused 

to excuse the tax claim bureau’s failure to follow the notice requirements of the 

Tax Sale Law because Wells Fargo, the property’s owner, did not check on 

property taxes when it purchased the property.

Section 602(e)(2) obligated the Tax Claim Bureau to “do something to 

try and locate the property owner before automatically mailing the second notice to 

the same address.” Rossi v. Indiana County Tax Claim Bureau, 494 A.2d 526, 528 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (emphasis in original). It had the “duty” to determine another 

address for the Partnership. This could have been easily done because the 

Partnership had another address listed with the Tax Claim Bureau for its Jeannette 

properties in Westmoreland County. This other address was also known to the 

Westmoreland County Assessment Office and to the tax collector for Penn 

Borough. See 72 P.S. §5860.602(e)(2).

Instead, the Tax Claim Bureau simply resent the second notice of sale 

to an address identified by the U.S. Postal Service as an undeliverable address. Id. 

Simply, 
MHL-9

a tax claim bureau may not ignore the mandatory additional 

notification requirements and proceed with a sale when mailed 

notification is unsuccessful or when other circumstances raise 

doubt as to its actual receipt.

In re 1999 Upset Sale of Real Estate, 811 A.2d 85, 90 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

This Court has repeatedly set aside tax sales where the tax claim 

bureau has not made a reasonable effort to locate the taxpayer after a mailing is 

returned. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Luzerne County Tax Claim Bureau, 110 A.3d 223 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). This Court has also invalidated sales where the bureau 

undertook some effort to locate the taxpayer, but failed to conduct that search in 

accordance with the statute’s terms. See, e.g., 777 L.L.P. v. Luzerne County Tax 

Claim Bureau, 111 A.3d 292, 294, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); Rice v. Compro 

Distrib., Inc., 901 A.2d 570, 577 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). This precedent is 

controlling here.

It is a well-established principle that the tax claim bureau must strictly 

follow the notice requirements of the Tax Sale Law. The factual circumstances 

specific to Sabbeth are not present here because the Partnership did not “decline[ ]

to open the envelope.” Citimortgage, 954 A.2d at 761. The Partnership never 

received an envelope from the Tax Claim Bureau. When the mailing to the 

Partnership was returned as undeliverable, it was incumbent upon the Tax Claim 

Bureau to make a reasonable effort to locate the Partnership’s whereabouts. The 

Tax Claim Bureau did nothing. It did not make even the modest effort of checking 

its own records for an alternate address for the Partnership.

In any case, Mark Zion’s “actual notice” is irrelevant. The owner of 

the Penn Borough property was the Partnership, not Mark Zion.

4

 The majority 

 

4

Section 102 of the Tax Sale Law defines “owner” as:

(Footnote continued on the next page . . .)
MHL-10

acknowledges that Mark Zion is a limited partner but concludes that his knowledge 

can be attributed to the Partnership. Mark Zion had “managing responsibility ... 

and knew what properties” the Partnership owned. Stipulation, ¶3; R.R. 126a. In 

addition, 

7. Mark Zion was involved with the Property in varying 

degrees from at least 1986 through September 10, 2012.

Stipulation ¶7; R.R. 126a. That a limited partner is active does not make that 

limited partner a general partner or alter ego of the partnership.

Section 8523 of the Pennsylvania Revised Uniform Limited 

Partnership Act,5states

 

(continued . . .)

the person in whose name the property is last registered, if registered according to 

law, or, if not registered according to law, the person whose name last appears as 

an owner of record on any deed or instrument of conveyance recorded in the 

county office designated for recording and in all other cases means any person in 

open, peaceable and notorious possession of the property, as apparent owner or 

owners thereof, or the reputed owner or owners thereof, in the neighborhood of 

such property; as to property having been turned over to the bureau under Article 

VII by any county, “owner” shall mean the county.

72 P.S. §5860.102. 

5

The Pennsylvania Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 15 Pa. C.S. §§8501-8594, was 

repealed on November 21, 2016, and replaced by the Pennsylvania Limited Partnership Act of 

2016, H.B. 1398, 200th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2016) (effective April 1, 2017). Notably, 

Section 8632 of the Pennsylvania Limited Partnership Act of 2016 specifically states that a 

limited partner is not an agent of the limited partnership. Section 8632 provides: 

(a) General Rule. – A limited partner is not an agent of a limited partnership 

solely by reason of being a limited partner. 

(b) Creation of partnership liability. – A person’s status as a limited partner does 

not prevent or restrict law other than this chapter from imposing liability on a 

limited partnership because of the person’s conduct. 

15 Pa. C.S. §8632 (effective April 1, 2017). In short, the applicable legal principle will not 

change under the new statute.
MHL-11

[a] limited partner is not liable, solely by reason of being a 

limited partner, under an order of a court or in any other manner 

for a debt, obligation or liability of the limited partnership of 

any kind or for the acts of any partner, agent or employee of the 

limited partnership. 

15 Pa. C.S. §8523(a). Section 8523, which repealed former 59 Pa. C.S. §521, 

eradicated the previous rule that a limited partner is liable for the obligations of the 

limited partnership if the limited partner participates in the control of the business. 

The comment to Section 8523 states that as a result of this change, 

a limited partner is not liable in the capacity of a limited partner 

for the obligation of the partnership, regardless of what role the 

limited partner may play in the management or control of the 

business. That result is separate from the question of whether a 

limited partner who is also an officer or employee of the limited 

partnership will be liable for his or her own acts in the other 

capacity. A person who is a general partner and also holds an 

interest as a limited partner will, of course, be liable for the 

obligations of the partnership in the capacity of a general 

partner. 

15 Pa. C.S. §8523 (Committee Comment 2001) (emphasis added). 

In short, notice to a limited partner does not constitute notice to the 

limited partnership itself. The result can be different if the limited partner is also a 

general partner or an officer or employee of the limited partnership. Here, 

however, the stipulation states only that Mark Zion had some “managing 

responsibilities” for the Partnership. It does not provide that he had authority to act 

on behalf of the Partnership. Nor was there a stipulation that he served as an 

officer of the corporation that was the general partner of the Partnership. 

A limited partner’s “actual notice” is of no consequence. Our 

Supreme Court has said “[a]s a matter of law, notice to a limited partnership can 

never constitute notice to a limited partner.” Department of Revenue for the 
MHL-12

Bureau of Accounts Settlement v. McKelvey, 587 A.2d 693, 695 (Pa. 1991). 

Although stated in the context of notice to a limited partnership proving 

insufficient to constitute notice to a limited partner, the reasoning applies equally 

here. Therefore, a finding that Mark Zion had actual notice of the sale is

insufficient to establish notice to Zion. 

Because the Tax Claim Bureau made no effort, reasonable or 

otherwise, to locate the Partnership when its certified mailing of the sale notice

was returned as undeliverable, I would set aside the sale of the Partnership’s 

property. The majority’s overbroad reading and application of Sabbeth erodes our

well-established precedent that strict compliance with the Tax Sale Law is the 

order of the day.

 ______________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge