Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1512-PL-2309 | December 2, 2016 Page 1 of 17

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Julia Blackwell Gelinas

Thomas E. Wheeler, III

Maggie L. Smith

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

David L. Steiner

Kyle Hunter

Deputies Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Gregory F. Hahn

Bryan H. Babb

Bradley M. Dick

Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

First American Title Insurance 

Company,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Stephen W. Robertson, 

Insurance Commissioner of the 

state of Indiana, in his official 

capacity, on behalf of the

Indiana Department of 

Insurance,

Appellee-Respondent.

December 2, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1512-PL-2309

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Michael D. Keele, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D07-1105-PL-19374

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1512-PL-2309 | December 2, 2016 Page 2 of 17

Case Summary

[1] First American Title Insurance Company (“FATIC”) appeals the trial court’s 

dismissal of its complaint against Stephen Robertson, Insurance Commissioner

of the State of Indiana (“Commissioner”), in his official capacity, on behalf of 

the Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”). We affirm.

Issue

[2] FATIC raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial 

court properly dismissed FATIC’s Writ of Prohibition and Action for Mandate, 

Request for Declaratory Relief, and Verified Amended Petition for Judicial 

Review against IDOI.

Facts

[3] In March 2009, the IDOI issued a market conduct examination warrant to 

FATIC and retained a third party to conduct the examination.1 The third party 

filed its Verified Market Conduct Examination Report with the IDOI on 

September 30, 2010. The IDOI forwarded the report to FATIC on October 18, 

2010, and FATIC filed a response on November 10, 2010. Under Indiana

Code Section 27-1-3.1-11(a), the Commissioner was required to enter an order 

 

1 This market conduct examination was authorized by Indiana Code Chapter 27-1-3.1 and was part of an 

industry-wide investigation regarding title insurance in Indiana. See also Robertson v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of 

Florida, 982 N.E.2d 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, and Com. Land Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 

394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 
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within thirty days after the end of the period allowed for the receipt of written 

submissions or rebuttals:

(1) adopting the examination report as filed or with modification 

or corrections;

(2) rejecting the examination report with directions to the 

examiners to reopen the examination for purposes of obtaining 

additional data, documentation or information, and refiling the 

report under this chapter; or

(3) calling for an investigatory hearing with no less than twenty 

(20) days notice to the company for purposes of obtaining 

additional documentation, data, information and testimony.

Ind. Code § 27-1-3.1-11(a). 

[4] The Commissioner failed to enter an order. On December 20, 2010, the 

Commissioner requested a retroactive extension of time, to which FATIC 

agreed. The Commissioner again failed to file a timely order and requested 

another retroactive extension of time, to which FATIC again agreed. Although 

the Commissioner was supposed to file his order by February 4, 2011, he failed 

to do so. On March 21, 2011, the Commissioner requested that FATIC agree 

to another retroactive extension of time, but FATIC declined.

[5] Despite the failure to issue a timely order, the Commissioner issued an order on 

April 15, 2011, appointing an administrative law judge and ordering that an 

investigatory hearing be held. On May 17, 2011, FATIC filed a petition for 

judicial review and declaratory relief with the trial court. In the petition, 
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FATIC sought relief pursuant to the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act 

(“AOPA”), Indiana Code Chapter 4-21.5-1, and the Uniform Declaratory 

Judgment Act, Indiana Code Chapter 34-14-1. FATIC argued that the order 

was void because it was not timely filed. Rather than file a complete agency 

record, FATIC filed only the documents necessary to address the timeliness 

issue that was raised. 

[6] IDOI filed a motion to dismiss, arguing in part that the petition should be 

dismissed because FATIC failed to file the complete agency record. The trial 

court rejected that argument, concluding that FATIC had provided all of the 

documents necessary to address the principal issue presented. Then, in May 

2012, the trial court entered finding of fact and conclusions thereon denying 

FATIC’s petition for judicial review and declaratory judgment. The trial court 

concluded that “FATIC has failed to demonstrate that it was prejudiced by 

[IDOI’s] failure to act on the Report within thirty (3) days of FATIC’s response 

or within thirty (30) days of the last agreed extension.” Appellant’s App. Vol. I 

p. 142. 

[7] FATIC appealed this decision and argued that the Commissioner’s failure to 

comply with the statutory deadline rendered his order void and that the trial 

court erred by requiring a separate showing of prejudice. Although FATIC 

requested that this court reverse the trial court’s order and grant the petition for 

judicial review and declaratory judgment, FATIC did not separately discuss the 

declaratory judgment action in its appeal. The IDOI cross-appealed, arguing 

that FATIC’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies deprived the trial 
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court of subject matter jurisdiction and that FATIC failed to submit sufficient 

materials for judicial review. On the cross-appeal issues, we concluded that the 

IDOI’s exhaustion of administrative remedies argument was waived because it 

was raised for the first time on appeal. First American Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson ex 

rel. Indiana Dept. of Ins., 990 N.E.2d 9, 12-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Relying in 

part on Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty. Surveyor’s Off., 850 

N.E.2d 957, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, we also held that the 

materials submitted by FATIC were sufficient for judicial review, and we 

affirmed the trial court’s denial of IDOI’s motion to dismiss. As for the issues 

presented by FATIC, we held that, because the Commissioner failed to issue a 

timely order, its order was void. We also concluded that FATIC was not 

required to demonstrate prejudice. Although the declaratory relief claim was 

not addressed in the appeal, we reversed the trial court’s denial of FATIC’s 

petition for judicial review and declaratory relief and remanded with 

instructions to grant the petition.

[8] The IDOI sought transfer to our supreme court, which was granted. See First 

American Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757 (Ind. 2014). Our supreme 

court summarily affirmed the portion of our opinion holding that the IDOI’s 

exhaustion of administrative remedies claim was waived. In a footnote, the 

supreme court also summarily affirmed “that portion of the Court of Appeals 

opinion declaring the Commissioner’s hearing order untimely and void, as well 

as that portion of the opinion declaring that a petitioner seeking judicial review 

of an agency decision need not demonstrate a separate showing of prejudice.” 
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Id. at 760 n. 3. However, the court then held that, because FATIC failed to file 

the complete agency record with the trial court, its petition for judicial review 

could not be considered. See id. at 762-63 (discussing Teaching Our Posterity 

Success, Inc. v. Ind. Dept. of Educ., 20 N.E.3d 149, 155 (Ind. 2014) (abrogating 

Izaak Walton and similar cases)). Thus, the court held that the trial court erred 

by failing to grant IDOI’s motion to dismiss the petition.

[9] The IDOI then sought rehearing of the supreme court’s opinion and took issue 

with the language of the footnote that summarily affirmed a portion of our 

opinion. IDOI noted a “substantial tension, if not outright conflict” between

ordering the dismissal of FATIC’s judicial review petition and summarily 

affirming the Court of Appeals’ opinion regarding the timeliness of the 

Commissioner’s order and FATIC’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

First American Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 27 N.E.3d 768, 769 (Ind. 2015). The 

supreme court agreed and granted rehearing “to delete the first clause of 

footnote three.” Id. The court affirmed “[i]n all other respects. . . .” Id. 

Consequently, the court deleted that portion of the footnote that summarily 

affirmed the “Court of Appeals opinion declaring the Commissioner’s hearing 

order untimely and void” but left intact the portion of the footnote that 

summarily affirmed our opinion “declaring that a petitioner seeking judicial 

review of an agency decision need not demonstrate a separate showing of 

prejudice.” First American Title Ins. Co., 19 N.E.3d at 760 n.3. 

[10] On remand to the trial court, FATIC filed a “Writ of Prohibition and Action for 

Mandate, Request for Declaratory Relief, and Verified Amended Petition for 
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Judicial Review.” Appellant’s App. Vol. I p. 39. In the section regarding its 

request for declaratory relief, FATIC alleged that an administrative agency’s 

void action is subject to collateral attack at any time. Id. at 55 (citing Mies v. 

Steuben Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 970 N.E.2d 251, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), 

trans. denied). IDOI filed a motion to dismiss FATIC’s filing. IDOI argued, in 

part, that AOPA was FATIC’s exclusive remedy and that, based on the 

supreme court’s opinion, FATIC’s AOPA claim failed. IDOI also argued that 

FATIC’s writ of prohibition and mandate and declaratory judgment actions 

failed because they were based on the same conduct as the AOPA claim. 

According to IDOI, FATIC could “not simply bring an AOPA claim dressed as 

a declaratory judgment action.” Id. at 191. IDOI argued that the writ of 

prohibition and mandate and declaratory judgment claims were barred by res 

judicata and the law of the case doctrine. In response, FATIC argued that res 

judicata and the law of the case doctrine were inapplicable and that the 

Commissioner’s void order was subject to collateral attack at any time. 

[11] The trial court granted IDOI’s motion to dismiss. The trial court “dismisse[d] 

the original Verified Petition consistent with the Supreme Court’s clear 

directive.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. I p. 16. The trial court also concluded 

that the “declaratory judgment was not a separate claim that could survive 

dismissal” and that FATIC could not amend the petition. Id. at 17. The trial 

court dismissed the mandate and declaratory judgment claims in the amended 

petition based on res judicata. Finally, the trial court concluded that AOPA 

was the exclusive means for judicial review of IDOI’s action and, “where an 
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administrative remedy is available, filing a declaratory judgment action is not a 

suitable alternative.” Id. at 19 (citing Outboard Boating Club of Evansville, Inc. v. 

Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 952 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. 

denied). The trial court determined that, “[b]ecause the AOPA provided 

[FATIC] with ‘an administrative remedy,’ [FATIC] may not bring declaratory 

judgment and mandate claims raising the same issue.” Id. The trial court 

dismissed FATIC’s petitions and remanded to IDOI for further proceedings. 

FATIC filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied after a 

hearing.

[12] FATIC sought to stay the administrative proceedings, which the administrative 

law judge and the trial court denied. FATIC then initiated this appeal, and at 

FATIC’s request, this court stayed all underlying administrative proceedings 

pending completion of this appeal. 

Analysis

[13] FATIC appeals the dismissal of its Writ of Prohibition and Action for Mandate, 

Request for Declaratory Relief, and Verified Amended Petition for Judicial 

Review. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal 

sufficiency of the claim, not the facts supporting it. Thornton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 

585, 587 (Ind. 2015). “When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must 

‘view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with 

every reasonable inference construed in the non-movant’s favor.’” Id. (quoting 

Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020, 1025 (Ind. 2013)). We review a trial 
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court’s grant or denial of a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion de novo. Id. “We will 

not affirm such a dismissal ‘unless it is apparent that the facts alleged in the 

challenged pleading are incapable of supporting relief under any set of 

circumstances.’” Id. (quoting City of E. Chicago, Indiana v. E. Chicago Second 

Century, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 611, 617 (Ind. 2009)). 

[14] FATIC argues that the trial court’s dismissal of its action was improper because 

it was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a 

declaratory judgment action regarding an agency action that was ultra vires and 

void. FATIC also argues that its writ of prohibition and action for mandate 

and its declaratory judgment action are not barred by res judicata. IDOI 

responds that FATIC’s action is barred by res judicata. 

[15] We begin by noting, as IDOI does, that FATIC makes no argument regarding 

its AOPA claim, which was again dismissed by the trial court. Consequently, 

we will address only FATIC’s claims for writ of prohibition and mandate and 

declaratory judgment.

[16] We first address IDOI’s argument that FATIC’s claims are barred by res 

judicata. The doctrine of res judicata operates to preclude the litigation of 

matters that have already been litigated. Northlake Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., L.L.C. 

v. State Dep’t of Health, 34 N.E.3d 268, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The principle 

of res judicata is divided into two branches: claim preclusion and issue 

preclusion. Id. “Claim preclusion applies where a final judgment on the merits 

has been rendered which acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the 
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same issue or claim between those parties and their privies.” Id. “Issue 

preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, bars the subsequent 

relitigation of the same fact or issue where the fact or issue was necessarily 

adjudicated in a former suit and the same fact or issue is presented in a 

subsequent action.” Id. Claim preclusion is relevant here.

[17] “Claim preclusion applies where a final judgment on the merits has been 

rendered and acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the same issue or 

claim between those parties and their privies.” Afolabi v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 

849 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “When claim preclusion applies, 

all matters that were or might have been litigated are deemed conclusively 

decided by the judgment in the prior action.” Id. In order for a claim to be 

precluded, the following four requirements must be satisfied: 

(1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court 

of competent jurisdiction; 

(2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the 

merits; 

(3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, 

determined in the prior action; and 

(4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action must have 

been between the parties to the present suit or their privies. 

Id. In determining whether the doctrine should apply, it is helpful to inquire 

whether identical evidence will support the issues involved in both actions. Id.
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[18] There is no question here that the former judgment was rendered by a court of 

competent jurisdiction, that the former judgment was rendered on the merits, 

and that the controversy adjudicated in the former action was between the 

parties to the present suit. FATIC, however, argues that res judicata should not 

bar its action because the issue of whether the Commissioner’s order was void 

was presented in the former action, in the appeal before this court, and in the 

appeal before our supreme court but the supreme court chose not to resolve it. 

According to FATIC, “when a party affirmatively raises an issue on appeal and 

the appellate court chooses not to address that issue, Indiana law holds that res 

judicata applies only to the issues actually decided, it does not apply to issues 

raised by the parties but never addressed by the court.” Appellant’s Br. p. 40 

(citing Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006), Helms v. Rudicel, 986 

N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, Think Tank Software Dev. 

Corp. Chester, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 1169, 1176-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). 

[19] IDOI relies on and the trial court cited to Richter v. Asbestos Insulating & Roofing, 

790 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, which we find persuasive. 

In Richter, a worker filed a complaint against multiple companies alleging that 

he had been exposed to asbestos by the companies. He reached a settlement 

with some of the companies and voluntarily dismissed his complaint with 

prejudice. He later died, and his estate filed a wrongful death action against 

multiple companies, including four companies that had been dismissed with 

prejudice from the worker’s original action. The companies filed a motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing that the estate’s suit 
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was barred because the worker had brought his personal injury claim to 

judgment during his lifetime. The trial court determined that collateral estoppel 

and res judicata barred the estate’s claims.

[20] On appeal, we noted:

Although the Estate asserts that the wrongful death claim filed in 

January 2002 necessarily differs from the claims that were 

initially brought in 1997, we note that Terry’s alleged exposure to 

asbestos containing various products manufactured or distributed 

by the companies, evidence of Terry’s development of lung 

cancer as a result of the alleged exposure to asbestos from the 

products as well as evidence regarding the allegedly defective 

products that contained asbestos were issues in both cases. In the 

action filed in the Allen Circuit court, the [Estate] alleged 

negligence and outrageous conduct, strict liability, conspiracy, 

breach of warranty, and loss of consortium, all of which were 

based upon Terry’s exposure to asbestos and the subsequent 

diagnosis of lung cancer. In essence, [the Estate] is now 

attempting to prove a wrongful death claim by alleging 

negligence and strict liability based on the same claimed 

exposures to the products that were asserted in the first action. 

Therefore, it can be said that the claims brought by [the Estate] 

are “inextricably woven” with the first action and could have 

been litigated in that proceeding.

Richter, 790 N.E.2d at 1003. We concluded: 

[I]t is apparent that Terry’s claimed disability from asbestos 

exposure and the companies’ alleged misconduct could have 

been litigated in the earlier court action. [The Estate] is merely 

asserting those same claims in the subsequent action that she 

chooses to label as a wrongful death action. Permitting [the 

Estate] to re-litigate those claims after Terry’s death would 
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effectively grant her a second bite at the apple. The [Estate] had 

voluntarily dismissed their claims against the defendants on 

October 28, 1999, and the companies had prepared in 

anticipation of that trial. The companies would essentially be 

penalized in the event that [the Estate] would be permitted to sue 

them again for the same claims more than two years later. Such 

a result would violate the spirit of the res judicata doctrine that 

prevents such conduct. Similarly, were we to rule otherwise in 

circumstances such as those presented here and allow this case to 

proceed, the settlement of claims would be unlikely. That is, a 

case might never be settled until the individual dies. 

Id. at 1004. Consequently, we determined that the matter was, or could have 

been, determined in the prior action and that the estate’s claim was barred by 

res judicata.

[21] Similarly, here, FATIC’s original claim included a petition for judicial review 

and a declaratory judgment action. The trial court denied FATIC’s “Verified 

Petition for Judicial Review and Declaratory Relief.” Appellant’s App. Vol. I 

p. 142. FATIC then appealed the denial but made no specific argument 

regarding its requested declaratory relief before either this court or our supreme 

court. Our supreme court did not address the request for declaratory relief and 

determined that the trial court erred by failing to grant the Commissioner’s 

motion to dismiss.2 FATIC’s original petition for judicial review and 

 

2

FATIC now argues that its request for declaratory relief remained pending because IDOI’s motion to 

dismiss concerned only its request for judicial review. However, FATIC never raised this argument during 

its first appeal process. Further, regardless of whether the trial court is now addressing the initial request for 

declaratory relief or the refiled claim, we conclude that it is barred by res judicata.
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declaratory relief and its current petition for a writ of prohibition and mandate, 

judicial review, and declaratory judgment both addressed the Commissioner’s 

failure to file a timely order. FATIC is merely asserting the same claim that our 

supreme court previously rejected due to FATIC’s failure to file the entire 

agency record. 

[22] Despite this situation’s similarity to Richter, FATIC argues that its current 

declaratory judgment action was proper. FATIC notes that the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies through AOPA may not be appropriate if an agency’s 

action is challenged as being ultra vires and void or otherwise beyond the scope 

of the agency’s authority. Johnson v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc., 829 N.E.2d 979, 

983 (Ind. 2005) (citing Indiana Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Twin Eagle LLC, 798 

N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ind. 2003)). FATIC further argues that “[a] void action is 

subject to collateral attack at any time.” Mies v. Steuben Cty. Bd. of Zoning 

Appeals, 970 N.E.2d 251, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). FATIC contends that the 

Commissioner’s untimely order was beyond statutory authority and void and, 

as such, was subject to collateral attack. 

[23] Twin Eagle and Johnson both discussed an agency’s action challenged as ultra 

vires and void in the context of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Twin 

Eagle was a declaratory judgment action brought by a real estate developer 

against the Indiana Department of Environmental Management challenging 

whether some interim regulations governing wetlands’ development were 

applicable to its project. Although IDEM argued that the developer had failed 

to exhaust its administrative remedies, the trial court addressed the declaratory 
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judgment action. In this context, our supreme court discussed the exhaustion 

of administrative remedies requirement and noted:

Even if the ground of the complaint is the unconstitutionality of 

the statute, which may be beyond the agency’s power to resolve, 

exhaustion of administrative remedies may still be required 

because administrative action may resolve the case on other 

grounds without confronting broader legal issues. Ordinarily, an 

administrative agency must resolve factual issues before the trial 

court acquires subject matter jurisdiction. But exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is not required if a statute is void on its 

face, and it may not be appropriate if an agency’s action is 

challenged as being ultra vires and void. More generally, if an 

action is brought upon the theory that the agency lacks the 

jurisdiction to act in a particular area, exhaustion of remedies is 

not required. To the extent the issue turns on statutory 

construction, whether an agency possesses jurisdiction over a 

matter is a question of law for the courts. 

Twin Eagle, 798 N.E.2d at 844. The court concluded that the issues presented 

regarding IDEM’s legislative authority to regulate the waters were pure 

questions of law. However, whether the regulations were applicable to the 

particular waters was a matter for administrative determination.

[24] Similarly, Johnson involved a seller of fireworks challenging the State Fire 

Marshal’s ability to require certificates of compliance from each of its wholesale 

locations instead of one certificate from its central warehouse. Our supreme 

court determined that exhaustion of administrative remedies was required prior 

to the fireworks seller initiating a complaint against the Fire Marshal. The 

court held:
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[T]here is absolutely no question in the present case of the Fire 

Marshal’s legal authority to license fireworks wholesalers; the 

question here is at most a mixed question of law and fact—and, 

quite likely in our view, a pure question of fact—as to whether 

each of the individual outlets selling fireworks is itself a 

wholesaler. The Court of Appeals was incorrect to hold that the 

Fire Marshal’s authority is a question of statutory construction (a 

pure question of law), relieving Celebration from exhausting its 

administrative remedies. We find this to be a question of fact 

properly resolved through the administrative process. 

Johnson, 829 N.E.2d at 983.

[25] There is no claim here that IDOI lacks jurisdiction or general authority to 

investigate claims like those presented here. Rather, the issue is whether the 

Commissioner’s order was timely. As in Johnson, this type of fact-sensitive 

issue should be resolved in the first instance by the administrative agency, not 

through a declaratory judgment action or action for prohibition and mandate. 

Further, we note that neither Twin Eagle nor Johnson addressed the specific issue 

presented here—whether res judicata prevented FATIC from filing a 

declaratory judgment action and action for prohibition and mandate after 

having received an unfavorable result through the first appeal process.

3

 FATIC 

 

3

FATIC relies on Town of Pittsboro Advisory Plan Com’n v. Ark Park, LLC, 26 N.E.3d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), 

which we find unpersuasive here. In Ark Park, a developer filed a petition for judicial review and declaratory 

judgment after the town council denied its PUD concept plan application. The developer filed to file a timely 

and complete board record, and the trial court denied the town council’s motion to dismiss and allowed the 

developer additional time to file the record. On appeal, we held that the trial court erred by denying the 

motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review based on the developer’s failure to file a complete and 

timely record. With respect to the declaratory judgment action, the town council argued that a declaratory 

judgment action was improper under these circumstances and that it was merely an attempt to circumvent 
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had an administrative remedy here and was required to pursue that remedy. 

Outboard Boating Club of Evansville, Inc. v. Indiana State Dep’t of Health, 952 

N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[W]here an administrative remedy is 

available, filing a declaratory judgment action is not a suitable alternative.”).

Although its remedy failed due to its failure to file the complete agency record, 

res judicata prevents FATIC from taking a second bite at the apple by filing the 

instant action. We conclude that the trial court properly granted IDOI’s motion 

to dismiss.

Conclusion

[26] The trial court properly granted IDOI’s motion to dismiss because FATIC’s 

claims are barred by res judicata. We affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Riley, J., concur.

 

the judicial review process. We concluded that the developer presented no facts on which the trial court 

could have granted declaratory judgment and that its “specific constitutional challenge was not a proper 

claim for declaratory judgment.” Ark Park, 26 N.E.3d at 122. This action did not concern whether res 

judicata prevented a claimant from filing a declaratory judgment action after being unsuccessful in its first 

petition for judicial review.