Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Hanna v. Creative Designers, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 143727

Appellate Court 

Caption

GHADA HANNA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CREATIVE DESIGNERS, 

INC.; LUTHERAN HOME FOR THE AGED; KEN BRUCE; and 

EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN ALTENHEIN GENSELOSCHAFT

VON CHICAGO, Defendants (Creative Designers, Inc., DefendantAppellee).

District & No. First District, Fourth Division 

Docket No. 1-14-3727

Rule 23 order filed

Rule 23 order

withdrawn

Opinion filed

May 26, 2016

August 11, 2016

September 15, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-L-12602; the 

Hon. Kathy Flanagan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

David J.E. Roe, of Mt. Prospect, for appellant.

Bruce Farrel Dorn & Associates, of Chicago (Ellen J. O’Rourke, of 

counsel), for appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 In February 2013, plaintiff Ghada Hanna filed her amended complaint for premises 

liability against defendants Creative Designers, Inc. (Creative Designers), Lutheran Home for 

the Aged (Lutheran Home), Ken Bruce, and Evangelical Lutheran Altenhein Genseloschaft 

Von Chicago, alleging negligence to properly own, manage, maintain, and control the 

premises, specifically a shelf, which fell and injured plaintiff on December 16, 2010. Creative 

Designers and Bruce filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Lutheran Home filed a 

separate motion for summary judgment. Following briefing, the trial court granted both 

motions for summary judgment.

¶ 2 Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Creative Designers 

but does not challenge summary judgment in favor of the other defendants. On appeal, plaintiff 

argues that the trial court erred in (1) determining that a tenant/lessee is not liable for a 

defective and/or dangerous condition on the premises the tenant/lessee controls; (2) 

determining that when a landlord is responsible for repair on a property, the tenant/lessee is 

relieved of control of the property for any unsafe conditions; and (3) granting summary 

judgment in favor of Creative Designers when a genuine issue of material fact existed. 

¶ 3 In November 2012, plaintiff filed her initial complaint for premises liability against the 

defendants. In February 2013, plaintiff filed an amended four count complaint for premises 

liability, with identical counts raised against each of the four defendants. In her complaint, 

plaintiff alleged that on December 16, 2010, she was lawfully on the premises of 1250 Village 

Drive, Arlington Heights, Illinois, when she was “struck violently on her head and/or neck due 

to the dangerous and unsafe conditions to wit, a falling, unsecured shelf, located on the 

aforesaid premises.” According to the complaint, Creative Designers owned, managed, 

maintained, and controlled the premises and had a duty to properly secure the shelf with 

reasonable care and caution so that those lawfully upon said premises would not be injured. 

Notwithstanding this duty, Creative Designers breached its duty by carelessly and negligently 

(1) managing, maintaining, and controlling the premises to allow an unsecured and/or 

defective shelf to remain and fall on plaintiff; (2) permitting the premises to become an 

unreasonably dangerous condition by failing to secure the shelf; (3) failing to warn plaintiff of 

the dangerous and defective conditions of the premises, including the shelf; (4) allowing the 

premises to remain in an unsafe and dangerous condition although Creative Designers knew or 

should have known of the defective and dangerous conditions; and (5) failing to make any 

inspections of the premises although Creative Designers knew or in the exercise of ordinary 

care should have known the premises should have been inspected. As a direct and proximate 

cause of one or more acts of negligence by Creative Designers, plaintiff sustained severe and 

lasting injuries. The complaint repeated these allegations for each count against the other 

defendants. 

¶ 4 After discovery, including depositions, interrogatories and other filings, the facts of the 

case are as follows. Creative Designers is an Illinois corporation engaged in the business of 

cosmetology. Ken Bruce is the president of Creative Designers and operates the salon. 
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Pursuant to a lease agreement between Creative Designers and Luther Village Owners 

Corporation (Luther Village), Creative Designers agreed to operate a salon in a designated 

space in the Luther Village Retirement Community, located in the Wittenberg Commons, 1250 

Village Drive in Arlington Heights. The salon was primarily to serve residents of the 

community. According to the lease, Luther Village purchased and installed all fixtures in the 

salon, and the fixtures remained the property of Luther Village throughout the lease term. 

Luther Village was responsible for repairs of any damage to the fixtures resulting from defects 

in the material, workmanship, or normal wear and tear. Luther Village was also responsible for 

any repairs caused by negligence on the part of Creative Designers or its employees, but said 

repairs were to be paid by Creative Designers. Under the lease, Creative Designers were to 

permit Luther Village’s employees to clean the premises. 

¶ 5 In 1993, Bruce was contacted by an administrator from Luther Village to inquire if he was 

interested in operating a salon at the community. Bruce signed a lease in January 1994 to 

operate the salon at that location. He operated as a sole proprietor until Creative Designers was 

formed in 1996. His wife, Shirley Bruce, has acted as the day-to-day manager of the salon 

since 1994. Creative Designers employs stylists as independent contractors at the salon. Each 

independent contractor has a one-year contract, which can be renewed annually. Plaintiff was 

hired as an independent contractor in 2008. 

¶ 6 In July 2008, Luther Village renovated the salon. The new fixtures, including shampoo 

bowls, countertops, work stations, and necessary equipment were selected and installed by 

Luther Village. Bruce and the stylists were consulted and shown samples of the textures for the 

walls and floors as well as photographs of the fixtures with the recommendations of Luther 

Village, and Bruce accepted the recommendations. Creative Designers did not contribute to 

the cost of the renovation. Bruce testified at his deposition that Luther Village was responsible 

for cleaning and maintenance of the salon since the inception of the lease. It was his 

understanding that the Luther Village maintenance staff performed regular inspections of the 

fixtures in the salon, including the flip-top countertops. At some point after installation, a 

request was made to cut the depth by a couple inches because the countertops were too deep for 

the workstation. Shirley testified at her deposition that plaintiff had never made any complaints 

to her regarding the countertops. She was not aware of maintenance finding any problems with 

the countertops. 

¶ 7 In their depositions, Shirley, Sally Doti, another independent contract stylist at Creative 

Designers, and William Scherdin, director of the Luther Village maintenance department at the 

time of the incident, described the use of the flip-top countertops. The countertops were 

attached by a spring lever and could be lifted and locked into an upright position to access the 

shampoo bowl and some storage space. When the countertop was lifted, a lock would catch 

and one would hear an audible click sound to know the countertop was secured in the upright 

position. To release the countertop, one needed to push a lever to release the lock with one 

hand, while lowering the countertop with the other hand. There was an audible click upon 

release as well. Scherdin stated that the maintenance department inspected the countertops on a 

quarterly basis as part of a routine inspection of the salon. The inspection included checking 

the hinges, ensuring the screws were tight, and confirming the locking mechanism was 

operational. No repairs had been required. Scherdin said that he had not received any 

complaints about the countertops. Doti stated that she had never had a problem with the 
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countertops nor a situation in which the countertop did not lock properly into an upright 

position. 

¶ 8 In contrast, plaintiff testified at her deposition that there was no sound made when the 

countertop locked into the upright position. She also stated that to bring the countertop down, 

she would push it toward the mirror, further forward, to release the lock and then lower it. She 

denied that she had to push a lever to release the lock. She testified that the screws on the 

countertop at her station had come loose in the past which was reported to Bruce, Shirley, or 

maintenance, but she was unable to specify when this had occurred prior to the day of the 

incident. 

¶ 9 In November 2010, Bruce decided to terminate plaintiff’s independent contract, and she 

was given 30-days notice with plaintiff’s last day to be December 31, 2010. The termination 

was based on customer complaints and plaintiff’s objection to giving manicures to customers. 

Around December 15, 2010, Bruce had an encounter with plaintiff’s daughter, which resulted 

in Bruce terminating plaintiff’s employment at the end of business on December 16. 

¶ 10 On December 16, 2010, plaintiff lifted and locked the countertop without incident at least 

six or seven times throughout the day. Toward the end of business, plaintiff was closing her 

station. She testified that she lifted the countertop to put shampoo and a comb sterilizer into 

storage. She did not hear a click indicating that the countertop was locked in the upright 

position. Immediately after she lifted the countertop, she stated that it fell, striking her on the 

back of the head, neck, and shoulder, and she was injured. 

¶ 11 Shirley, Doti, and Jane Dirks, another independent contract stylist, were working at the 

time of the incident. Shirley testified that she was in the restroom outside of the salon at the 

time of the incident. Doti testified that she was at her station at the time of the incident. She 

said that prior to the incident, plaintiff had been cashing out her station and counting money. 

Doti turned to her station but a couple minutes later heard plaintiff say, “ow.” Doti turned 

around and saw the countertop on plaintiff’s right shoulder. She did not see the countertop fall. 

Doti stated that she did not hear the locking mechanism click prior to the incident. In a 

statement, Dirks said she worked at the station next to plaintiff. She observed plaintiff doing 

bookwork and counting her money on top of her station. Dirks had her back to plaintiff and 

continued to work on a customer. Shortly thereafter, she heard a cry from plaintiff and saw 

plaintiff leaning into the sink with the countertop leaning on plaintiff. Dirks went and notified 

Shirley. Dirks stated that she did not hear the countertop click into place nor did she hear a 

“thunk” when the countertop would have struck plaintiff. Dirks said that she had never seen the 

countertops fall, and if the screws were loose, you would have them checked. 

¶ 12 Following the incident, Shirley summoned the Luther Village nurse to check plaintiff. The 

paramedics were called as part of protocol. Plaintiff declined treatment, stating that she would 

see her own doctor. Scherdin was informed of the incident. He and another member of the 

maintenance department went to inspect plaintiff’s workstation that day. Scherdin testified that 

his inspection found no issues with the locking mechanism, and the screws were tight. He lifted 

the countertop to a locked position and lowered it without issue. In his opinion, it was operator 

error that caused the incident. 

¶ 13 In January 2011, plaintiff sent Creative Designers a letter notifying it of the injury she 

sustained on December 16, 2010, pursuant to the Worker’s Compensation Act (820 ILCS 

305/1 et seq. (West 2010)). In the letter, she stated that she was injured “when attempting to 
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lower the hinged countertop by the shampoo bowls. The countertop fell, hitting [her] 

shoulders, neck and head.” 

¶ 14 In July 2014, Creative Designers and Bruce filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 

that they did not have an ownership interest in the premises where the salon was located nor 

did they have an ownership interest in the fixtures in the salon. Both the premises and the 

fixtures were owned by Luther Village. Further, Luther Village maintained the fixtures and 

undertook the responsibility for inspections of the salon and its fixtures. Accordingly, they 

were not liable for the alleged defect. Additionally, they argued that there was no evidence that 

they had notice of any defect in the countertop, as plaintiff raised and lowered it multiple times 

that day without incident. Also, the inspection by the Luther Village maintenance department 

disclosed no issues and the countertop was in working order. 

¶ 15 In response, plaintiff argued that there was a question of material fact as to whether (1) 

negligent management of the salon by Creative Designers and Bruce caused the dangerous 

condition, (2) the countertops were an unsafe condition on the premises, and (3) holiday 

decorations prevented the countertops from operating properly. 

¶ 16 In October 2014, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Creative 

Designers and Bruce. The court found that Creative Designers was a tenant in possession of the 

salon, but under the lease agreement, Luther Village as the landlord handled the cleaning, 

inspection, repair, and maintenance responsibilities for the salon. “Thus, even if the counter 

top was defective or loose, the [Luther Village] maintenance department was responsible for 

repair and any question of notice of a problem would be as to Luther Village and not to Ken 

Bruce.” The court further found that even if plaintiff previously reported loose screws, she has 

not shown that this condition existed on the day of the incident. The court found any contention 

related to holiday decorations to be “speculative and not supported by the evidence.”

¶ 17 This appeal followed. Plaintiff does not challenge the grant of summary judgment as to 

Bruce personally. 

¶ 18 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 

file, together with any affidavits and exhibits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010). We review cases 

involving summary judgment de novo. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 

342, 349 (1998).

¶ 19 “In order to recover in an action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a 

duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury to the plaintiff 

proximately caused by the breach.” Sameer v. Butt, 343 Ill. App. 3d 78, 85 (2003). “The 

question of the existence of a duty is a question of law, and in determining whether a duty 

exists, the trial court considers whether a relationship existed between the parties that imposed 

a legal obligation upon one party for the benefit of the other party.” Sameer, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 

85. “In considering whether a duty exists in a particular case, a court must weigh the 

foreseeability that defendant’s conduct will result in injury to another and the likelihood of an 

injury occurring, against the burden to defendant of imposing a duty, and the consequences of 

imposing this burden.” Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1991). “Where no duty exists, 

the plaintiff cannot recover.” Clifford v. Wharton Business Group, L.L.C., 353 Ill. App. 3d 34, 

40 (2004).
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¶ 20 Section 343 sets forth the circumstances under which “[a] possessor of land is subject to 

liability for physical harm” to persons on his land. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 

(1965). Section 343 states: 

“A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 

condition on the land if, but only if, he 

 (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 

should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 

 (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 

protect themselves against it, and 

 (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.” 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, at 215-16 (1965). 

See also Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 478 (1976). 

¶ 21 “The term ‘possessor’ with respect to possession of land is defined in the Restatement as ‘a 

person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it.’ ” Madden v. F.H. 

Paschen/S.N. Nielson, Inc., 395 Ill. App. 3d 362, 375 (2009) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 328E, at 170 (1965)). “The two requirements under that subsection are occupation and 

intent to control the land, as opposed to the activities or individuals thereon.” O’Connell v. 

Turner Construction Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 819, 824 (2011). “The concept of ‘control’ is closely 

tied with the ability to exclude people from the use of a piece of property or to direct how that 

property is to be used.” Williams v. Sebert Landscape Co., 407 Ill. App. 3d 753, 756 (2011). 

¶ 22 “Only the party in control of the premises can be held liable for a defective or dangerous 

condition on the premises.” Hilgart v. 210 Mittel Drive Partnership, 2012 IL App (2d) 110943, 

¶ 38. 

“ ‘It is axiomatic that if a landlord retains control of a portion of the premises leased 

to the tenant it has the duty, as the party in control, to use ordinary care in maintaining 

that part of the premises in a reasonably safe condition. [Citations.] Conversely, a 

landlord is not liable for injuries caused by a defective condition on the premises leased 

to a tenant and under the tenant’s control.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Vesey v. Chicago 

Housing Authority, 145 Ill. 2d 404, 413 (1991) (quoting Rowe v. State Bank of 

Lombard, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 220-21 (1988)). 

¶ 23 Generally, “a landlord is not liable for injuries caused by a defective or dangerous 

condition on premises leased to a tenant and under the tenant’s control.” Gilley v. Kiddel, 372 

Ill. App. 3d 271, 275 (2007). However, there are exceptions, including that “a lessor may be 

liable (1) where the lessor has expressly agreed to keep the premises or parts of it in good 

repair; or (2) where the lessor has voluntarily assumed the maintenance obligation by its 

conduct.” Fan v. Auster Co., 389 Ill. App. 3d 633, 648 (2009) (citing O’Rourke v. Oehler, 187 

Ill. App. 3d 572, 580 (1989)). “Only the party in control of the premises can be held liable for a 

defective or dangerous condition on the premises.” Hilgart, 2012 IL App (2d) 110943, ¶ 38. 

¶ 24 Further, “[w]here a defendant is charged with negligence because of his failure to perform 

an act allegedly required by contract, the question of whether the defendant actually had a duty 

to act will be determined by the terms of the contract.” Gilley, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 275. “ ‘[T]he 

defendant’s duty will not be extended beyond the duties described in the contract.’ ” Id.

(quoting Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League, 140 Ill. App. 3d 127, 134 

(1986)). 
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¶ 25 Plaintiff argues that Creative Designers possessed and was in control of the premises and, 

thus, had a duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition to ensure that invitees would not 

be injured. To find such a duty, plaintiff points to language in the lease stating, “Tenant shall 

maintain the Premises in as good condition as when Tenant took possession.” Plaintiff relies on 

the Second District decision in Gilley for support. 

¶ 26 In that case, the plaintiff was the girlfriend of the tenant. She fell down stairs located within 

the tenant’s apartment and filed suit against the landlord. The trial court granted the landlord’s 

motion to dismiss the complaint. Gilley, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 272-73. On appeal, the reviewing 

court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the landlord retained control over the premises 

because the lease agreement gave the landlord the right to enter the property to make repairs. 

Id. at 275-76. The court held that such a provision, without more, is not sufficient to impose a 

duty on the landlord and give him control over the premises while the tenant has possession 

under the lease. Id. at 276-77. The court found the lease provision requiring the tenant to 

maintain and keep the premises in good repair makes the tenant responsible for any injuries to 

invitees. Id. at 276. 

¶ 27 In response, Creative Designers contends that simply occupying the premises did not 

amount to possession, nor did they have control over the premises. Creative Designers relies 

on the decision in O’Connell. In that case, an employee of a subcontractor hired by an 

independent contractor brought a negligence suit against the construction manager for a school 

district’s building project following an injury he received while at work arguing, in relevant 

part, that the construction manager owed him a duty under section 343 of the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the construction 

manager. O’Connell, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 820-22. 

¶ 28 On appeal, the reviewing court found that there was no evidence to show a question of 

material fact that the construction manager possessed the land as intended by section 343 and 

affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 824-26. “There is no allegation, for example, 

that [the construction manager] could exclude anyone from the premises or that it could even 

alter what was built where, all of which could denote dominion over the construction site.” Id. 

at 825. Plaintiff alleged that the construction manager that had general responsibility for safety 

on the project and coordination of the contractors and activities on the construction site, the 

court found that the plaintiff failed to show that this authority amounted to a right or intent to 

control the premises. Id. at 825-26. 

¶ 29 Creative Designers contend that as in O’Connell, its control of people and activities on the 

premises does not equate to control and dominion of the land itself. Unlike the lease in Gilley, 

Creative Designers notes that the lease agreement with Luther Village contained specific 

provisions entitling Luther Village to retain control. First, the lease for the space was not for 

the tenant to use as it wanted and was limited only to what was provided in the lease. The lease 

specifically stated that the tenant’s business and permitted use was “retail beauty salon and 

barber shop serving primarily residents of Luther Village.” The lease also provided that Luther 

Village was responsible for housekeeping and maintenance of the premises. Significantly, the 

lease stated: 

“Tenant acknowledges that Landlord has purchased and installed all furniture and 

fixtures (including trade fixtures) located in the Premises as of the date hereof. Said 

furniture and fixtures shall remain the property of Landlord throughout the Term of the 

Lease. Landlord agrees to repair any damages to Landlord’s furniture and fixtures 
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resulting from defects in material or workmanship or caused by normal ‘wear and tear’. 

Any damage to Landlord’s furniture or fixtures caused by negligence of Tenant or 

Tenant’s employees, agents or contractors shall be repaired by Landlord and paid for 

by Tenant. All such repair costs shall be paid by Tenant within thirty (30) days 

following the receipt of an invoice. Notwithstanding Section 13 of the Lease, any 

furniture or fixtures installed by Tenant shall remain Tenant’s property and shall be 

properly maintained by Tenant, at Tenant’s cost.”

¶ 30 This lease term expressly provides that Luther Village has undertaken control over the 

maintenance and care of the fixtures in the salon, which included the flip-top countertops. The 

evidence showed that Luther Village renovated the salon space in 2008. The workstations, 

including the flip-top countertops, were selected and paid for by Luther Village. While 

plaintiff asserts that the selection was a joint effort between Luther Village and Creative 

Designers, Bruce testified that Luther Village showed him their selections and he offered no 

objection. Plaintiff thus contends that Creative Designers had control because its president, 

Bruce, “accepted what fixtures would be put into the salon.” Plaintiff has not cited any 

authority that a consultation over selection of fixtures would amount to control where the 

language of the lease dictates that the landlord retains control, through ownership, and repairs 

of the fixtures. 

¶ 31 Creative Designers did not own nor did they have control over the repair and maintenance 

of the countertops. Under the lease, Luther Village, as the lessor, undertook a duty to maintain 

and control the fixtures in the premises. The evidence showed that Luther Village’s 

maintenance department routinely inspected the fixtures in the salon, including the 

countertops. We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s contention that Creative Designers shared 

control because the stylists or Shirley reported issues to Luther Village maintenance. Under the 

lease, the sole entity responsible for any repairs was Luther Village. 

¶ 32 Luther Village owned the salon, and Creative Designers leased the use of the salon as its 

business and had no ownership interest in the salon under the lease. It is clear that Creative 

Designers and Luther Village intended that the duty of repair rest solely on Luther Village. 

Absent control over the premises, Creative Designers did not owe a duty to plaintiff as a matter 

of law and was entitled to immunity. See Hilgart, 2012 IL App (2d) 110943, ¶ 38 (“Only the 

party in control of the premises can be held liable for a defective or dangerous condition on the 

premises.”). Luther Village expressly agreed that the fixtures were its property and agreed to 

repair any damages to those fixtures “resulting from defects in material or workmanship or 

caused by normal ‘wear and tear.’ ” Since plaintiff has not shown a question of material fact as 

to whether Creative Designers owed her a duty of care, summary judgment was proper. 

¶ 33 Further, even if we found a duty of care by Creative Designers, plaintiff has not shown that 

Creative Designers had reasonable notice of a dangerous condition on the premises. Although 

the trial court did not primarily consider notice as a basis in its decision, we may affirm on any 

basis in the record on appeal. Evans v. Lima Lima Flight Team, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 407, 418 

(2007). 

¶ 34 Under section 343 of the Restatement, “there is no liability for landowners for dangerous or 

defective conditions on the premises in the absence of the landowner’s actual or constructive 

knowledge.” Tomczak v. Planetsphere, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1038 (2000). First, there is 

no evidence, nor any argument by plaintiff, that Creative Designers had actual notice of any 

current defect in plaintiff’s countertop. 
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¶ 35 “To prove constructive notice, a plaintiff must show that the hazardous condition existed 

for a sufficient amount of time or that, through the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant 

should have discovered the dangerous condition.” Hornacek v. 5th Avenue Property 

Management, 2011 IL App (1st) 103502, ¶ 29. As to constructive notice, plaintiff asserts that 

Creative Designers had constructive notice because it “knew that the screws would get loose 

on the countertop and knew that the hairstylists lifted and lowered the counter at least a dozen 

times a day.” However, even if we presume plaintiff’s description of the incident was accurate, 

plaintiff has offered no evidence to show a connection between a prior report of loose screws 

such that Creative Designers had constructive notice that the countertop at plaintiff’s station 

was defective at the time of the incident in that it would not remain secured in an upright 

position. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she lifted the countertops at least six to seven 

times that day without noticing any problems or defects. Nothing in the depositions or other 

evidence in the record show that a hazardous condition existed for a period of time or that 

Creative Designers would have discovered the defect through reasonable care. Since Creative 

Designers did not have constructive notice of any defect in the countertops, plaintiff has not 

shown a question of material fact. Therefore, summary judgment was proper on this alternative 

basis. 

¶ 36 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 37 Affirmed.