J-S75030-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BILLY LANGLEY

Appellant No. 801 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 12, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013927-2008

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2016

Billy Langley appeals from the order of the Philadelphia County Court 

of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On October 21, 2009, Langley pleaded guilty to charges of thirddegree murder, robbery, forgery under altered writings, theft by unlawful 

taking, possessing instruments of crime, and access device used to or 

attempted to be used to obtain services.1 At Langley’s guilty plea hearing, 

the trial court conducted an extensive colloquy, which included inquiry into 

Langley’s mental health. Langley told the court that he was currently on a 

number of medications that helped him “understand better.” N.T., 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 3701(a)(1)(i), 4101(a)(1), 3921(a), 907(a), 

and 4106(a)(1), respectively.
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10/21/09, at 4. After the colloquy, the court accepted Langley’s guilty plea, 

which the court found was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 25. 

Immediately following the guilty plea, the trial court held a sentencing 

hearing. At the hearing, the court asked Langley’s counsel, from the 

Defender Association of Philadelphia (“Defender Association”), if there was 

anything she wanted to tell the court about her client. Id. Counsel told the 

court that Langley “has had an ongoing mental health problem since the age 

of ten,” id. at 25-26, and that although Langley had not been taking his 

medicine at the time of the crimes, he had complied with his medication 

regimen since entering prison, id. at 26-27. The court sentenced Langley to 

an aggregate term of 40 to 80 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 27-37. 

On October 29, 2009, Langley filed a pro se motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. The trial court appointed new defense counsel for a hearing on 

Langley’s motion. Counsel requested all mental health evaluations of 

Langley that were in the possession of the Defender Association. The 

hearing took place on March 15, 2010. Counsel from the Defender 

Association2informed the court that Langley’s competency “while 

investigated, was not truly an issue.” N.T., 3/25/10, at 6. He also said that 

no written report on Langley’s competency had been prepared, but that the 

____________________________________________

2 The attorney from the Defender Association who had represented 

Langley at the guilty plea hearing was unavailable to testify at the March 15, 

2010 hearing. Another attorney from the Defender Association testified in 

her stead.
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Defender Association had received an oral report from a psychologist. Id. at 

7. The court instructed counsel from the Defender Association and Langley’s 

newly appointed counsel to discuss the investigation into Langley’s mental 

health. Id. at 11. After the discussion, Langley’s new counsel told the court 

she was concerned about “[getting] pulled into a PCRA down the road” if she 

was to rely on the representations made by counsel from the Defender 

Association. Id. at 12. 

Langley’s counsel then told the court that Langley wished to withdraw 

his motion. Id. at 18. Langley, via a video conference call, testified that he 

and counsel had met one week earlier, and that at the meeting he had told 

counsel that he no longer wished to proceed with the motion. Id. at 22-23.3 

During subsequent questioning, Langley confirmed that the medication he 

was taking helped him to think. N.T., 3/15/10, at 27. Langley testified that 

he understood the consequences of withdrawing the motion, and informed 

the court that he wished to withdraw his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Id. at 32-33. The trial court found that Langley made this decision 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. at 33.

____________________________________________

3 Upon questioning by his counsel, Langley testified that he did not 

read, but that he understood English and that he understood what was 

happening at the hearing. N.T., 3/15/10, at 24-25. He also told the court 

that he had understood counsel during their meeting the previous week. Id.

at 25. 
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On March 25, 2011, Langley filed a pro se PCRA petition, after which 

the PCRA court appointed counsel. On August 24, 2012, Langley filed an 

amended PCRA petition. On July 2, 2015, Langley filed a supplemental 

amended PCRA petition, to which he attached a report from Dr. Steven 

Samuel, who had performed a psychological evaluation of Langley.4 In his 

report, Dr. Samuel opined that Langley had been unable to enter a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary plea at the time he entered his guilty plea. Dr. 

Samuel’s Rpt., 6/22/15, at 6. On December 11, 2015, the Commonwealth 

filed a motion to dismiss Langley’s PCRA petition. On January 12, 2016, the 

PCRA court sent Langley notice of its intent to dismiss his petition pursuant 

to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. On February 12, 2016, the 

PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing.5 Langley filed a timely 

notice of appeal on March 14, 2016.

6

 Both Langley and the PCRA court 

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

____________________________________________

4 Although the trial court had found that Langley was competent 

during his guilty plea colloquy, at PCRA counsel’s request, and “out of an 

abundance of caution,” the PCRA court allocated funds to counsel to hire Dr. 

Samuel for the purposes of a psychiatric examination and evaluation of 

Langley. Opinion, filed 4/15/16, at 6 (“1925(a) Op.”).

5 On February 2, 2016, Langley filed a motion to obtain new PCRA 

counsel, which the PCRA court granted. New PCRA counsel was appointed 

on February 29, 2016.

6 Although 30 days after February 12, 2016 was Sunday, March 13, 

2016, Langley had until Monday, March 14, 2016 to file a timely notice of 

appeal. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (When last day of time period “fall[s] on Saturday 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Langley raises the following question on appeal:

Did the PCRA Court err in dismissing [Langley’s] 

PCRA Petition without a hearing when PCRA counsel 

presented an expert psychologist report showing that 

[Langley] could not have engaged in a plea colloquy 

that was made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily?

Langley’s Br. at 4. The issue as stated addresses only whether a hearing is 

required to determine whether Langley entered his guilty plea knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily. Langley’s brief, however, also argues that his 

counsel was ineffective, and accordingly, that a hearing is required to 

determine whether counsel was ineffective for allowing Langely to plead 

guilty despite his alleged incompetence to do so. Langley’s Br. at 11.7

A PCRA court must hold a hearing only where the PCRA petition, or the 

Commonwealth’s answer, raises an issue of material fact. Commonwealth 

v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 849 (Pa. 2014) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(1)-

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

or Sunday, . . . such day shall be omitted from the computation.”); Pa.R.A.P. 

107 (“Chapter 19 of Title 1 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (rules 

of construction) so far as not inconsistent with any express provision of 

these rules, shall be applicable to the interpretation of these rules . . . .”).

7 When analyzing claims for ineffectiveness of counsel, we begin with 

the presumption that counsel was effective. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 

A.3d 244, 259-60 (Pa. 2011). “[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving 

ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1137 (Pa. 

2009). To overcome the presumption of effectiveness, a PCRA petitioner 

must demonstrate that: “(1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable 

merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged did not have a 

reasonable basis for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance.” Id. “A 

claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner’s evidence fails to 

meet any of these prongs.” Id. 
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(2)). “If a PCRA petitioner’s proof is insufficient to establish a prima facie

case, or his allegations are refuted by the existing record, an 

evidentiary hearing is unwarranted.” Id. at 849 (citations omitted) 

(emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Morris, 684 A.2d 1037, 

1042 (Pa. 1996) (holding that evidentiary hearing is not required when there 

are no disputed factual issues). “A PCRA court’s decision denying a claim 

without a hearing may only be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 36 A.3d 1, 17 (Pa. 2011). The 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has previously explained the abuse of 

discretion standard as follows:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of 

judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a 

dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of 

the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of 

giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must 

be exercised on the foundation of reason, as 

opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice 

or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when the 

course pursued represents not merely an error of 

judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or 

where the record shows that the action is a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (citation 

omitted).

Langley claims that the opinions expressed in Dr. Samuel’s report 

necessitate an evidentiary hearing on his competence to enter a guilty plea. 

Disagreeing, the PCRA court found:
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As a basis for his conclusion that petitioner was not 

able to enter into a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary guilty plea, Dr. Samuel stated that 

petitioner was not medicated at the time of the guilty 

plea. . . . 

However, as demonstrated by his testimony, 

[Langley] was medicated at both hearings, and the 

medication helped petitioner to understand what was 

going on: 

The Court: And I believe you’ve been 

previously diagnosed as being bipolar 

from the time that you were ten years 

old?

[Langley]: Yes.

The Court: And are you presently - well, 

it says here that you are on medication

in the last week: Haldol, Cogentin, and 

Prozac. Are you on anything today? The 

same medication?

[Langley]: Yes, ma'am, yes.

The Court: Does that help you 

understand better or prevent you from 

understanding?

[Langley]: It helps me.

The Court: Okay. If at any time I say 

something that you don't know what I'm 

talking about or you're unclear, don't just 

agree with me to agree. You can always 

talk to your attorney, Ms. Younis.

N.T. 10/21/09 at 4.

[Defense counsel]: Are you on any 

medication that would interfere with your 

ability to understand what you're doing?
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[Langley]: I'm on psych meds.

[Defense counsel]: Okay. And for the 

record, what are those meds?

[Langley]: Haldol, Cogentin, and 

depression medicine.

[Defense counsel]: And we talked - I'm 

sorry, because we did talk about this last 

week, you take those through the prison; 

is that correct?

[Langley]: Yes, ma'am.

[Defense counsel]: And they've been 

prescribed to you for how long?

[Langley]: Two years.

[Defense counsel]: There's been no 

change in your medication in the last 

week or so; is that correct? 

[...]

[Langley]: No, ma'am.

[...]

[Defense counsel]: And that medication 

actually helps you to think is what you 

told me; is that true?

[Langley]: Yes.

N.T. 3/15/10, at 26-27.

1925(a) Op. at 8 (emphasis in original). 

With respect to Dr. Samuel’s report, the PCRA court found:

Dr. Samuel himself admits that [Langley’s] 

schizophrenia is “in partial remission on medication.” 

Dr. Samuel Report, 6/22/15, at 3. Further, Dr. 

Samuel states that [Langley’s] diagnosis of sedative 
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use disorder and cannabis use disorder is “in 

sustained remission in a controlled environment.” 

Id. Although Dr. Samuel states that, in his opinion, 

[Langley] was unable to enter into a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, he failed to 

state how [Langley’s] diagnoses affected the 

voluntariness of his plea. As [Langley] was in 

custody at the time of his guilty plea and at the time 

he chose to withdraw his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea, [Langley] was being administered the 

medications that helped him to think more clearly. 

[Langley] himself testified that he was taking his 

medication at those times, which helped control his 

illness and helped him to understand what was 

taking place. A review of the entire colloquy, as well 

as of the notes of testimony from the March 15, 

2010 hearing, support the conclusion that [Langley] 

had been taking his medication and that he had a 

rational as well as factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him during the entirety of his 

plea. Even if he were not able to read the colloquy 

himself, everything was sufficiently explained to 

[Langley] by this Court, and had already been 

explained to him by his attorneys. N.T. 10/21/09 at 

15-16.

Id. at 8-9. The PCRA court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing 

Langley’s petition without a hearing. Dr. Samuel’s report creates no issue of 

material fact necessitating an evidentiary hearing, as Langley’s mental 

health history, by itself, did not preclude the trial court from finding that he 

was competent to stand trial or enter a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. 

Frey, 904 A.2d 866, 873 n.10 (Pa. 2006). Similarly, the report creates no 

issue of material fact as to Langley’s ineffectiveness of counsel claim, which 

fails if the underlying competency claim fails. 
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Moreover, Langley offers no explanation for the discrepancy between 

his statements at the hearings and Dr. Samuel’s report regarding whether 

Langley was medicated at the time he entered his guilty plea. Langley 

states only that “medication ingestion is not a polar issue and it is these 

potential wrinkles and inconsistencies that ought to be explored at en [sic] 

evidentiary hearing.” Langley’s Br. at 12. Rather than indicating that 

Langley was confused or unable to comprehend what was happening at the 

hearings, the record establishes that Langley affirmed numerous times that 

he understood what was happening. N.T., 10/21/09, at 8-25, 40-41; N.T., 

3/15/10, at 21-33. The PCRA court’s decision to dismiss Langley’s petition 

without a hearing was not an abuse of discretion.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2016