Filed 5/3/18 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

LA MIRADA AVENUE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION OF HOLLYWOOD et al.,

P laintiff s and Responden t s ,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.

,
Defendants and Appellants ;

TARGET CORPORATION,

Real Party in Interest and Appellant. B282137

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. BS140889, BS140930 )

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Richard L. Fruin

, Jr., Judge

. Affirmed.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Terry Kaufman Macias, Assistant City Attorney, Kenneth Tom Fong and Kimberly Ai

-

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the excepti on of Part II of the Discussion section.2

Hua Huangfu, Deputy City Attorneys; Burke, Williams & Sorensen and Anna Corinne Shimko for Defendants and Appellants City of Los Angele s and Los Angeles City Council.

Morri son & Foerster, Miriam A. Vogel; Shoreline Law Corporation , Andrew S. Pauly and Damon A. Thayer for Real Party in Interest and Appellan t Target Corporation

.
The Silverstein Law Firm, Robert P. Silverstein and David E. Wright for P laintiff and Respondent La Mirada Avenue Neighbo rhood Association of Hollywood.

The Law Office s of David Lawrence Bell and David Bell for P laintiff an d Respo ndent Citizens Coalition Los Angeles.

* * * * * * Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, 1 a trial court may award attorney’s fees to the “successful party” in a lawsuit that “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest” if, among other things, the lawsuit
confers “a significant benefit” upon “the general public or a large

c lass of persons.” If a party is “successful” and has conferred a “significant benefit” by prevailing at trial and obtaining a judgment that a construction project violates the zoning laws in existence at the time, is that party preclud ed from obtaining attorney’s fees under section 1021.5 because the losing party gets the zoning laws changed and the project’s validity under the changed law has yet to be finally determined? We conclude that
the answer is “no.” Consequently, and because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of attorney’s fees, we affirm the awards of attorney’ s fees

.

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.3 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts Real party in i nterest Target Corporation (Target) wants to
build a retail store on the corner of Western Avenue and Sunset
Boulevard in Ho llywood, California. For purposes of zoning, that location is subject to the Los Angeles Municipal Code as well as to a more specif ic Station Neighborhood Area Plan (SNAP), which for this location is the
Vermont/Western Transit Oriente d District S pecific Plan. Within the geographic area covered by the SNAP, the loc ation falls
within Subarea C. Under the law in effect at the time,

co mmercial buildings in Subarea C (other than hospitals and
“mixed use” buildings (that is, part commercial and part residential) ) (1) could not exceed 35 feet in height, (2) were required to incorporate certain aesthetic design elements aimed at avoiding th e look of a “big box” store, (3) could not have more than 390 parking spaces, (4) were required to limit the hours during which they accept deliveries, and (5) if the square footage exceeds 40,000 square fe et, were required to offer free delive ry to local residents. Target submitted two plans to defendant the City Council of the City of Los Angeles (the City or City Council). Initially, Target sought to build a retail store that complied with the above stated requirements of the Municipal Code and the SNA P. Subsequently, however, Target submitted a new proposal to build a Super Target retail store. The Super Target store would be nearly 75 feet in height, complete with a transit plaza, an above ground parking lot with 458 parking spaces, and 163,862 squa re feet of re tai l space (the Project).4 Because the Project did not comply with the SNAP, the City Council granted eight variances (called “exceptions”) from the SNAP pursuant to Los Angele s Municipal Code section
11.5.7. F.2. These var iances excepted the Project from the SNAP’s height restrictions, many of its design element requir ements, its parking space limit , its delivery time restrictions

, and its free delivery req uireme nts.
II. Procedural Background
A. Writ Petitions
P laintiffs La Mirada Avenue Nei ghborhood Asso ciation of Hollywood (La Mirada ) and Citizens Coalition Los Angeles (Citizens) (collectively, plaintiffs), both of which are “community association[s]” that “advocate for residential quality of life issues,” filed separate petitions for a wri t of mandate against the City (and naming Target as the real party in interest). In their operative f

irst a mended p etitions, plaintiffs generally alleged “a substantial interest in ensuring that the City’s decisions are in conformity with the requirements of the law.” More specifically, one or both of those petitions alleged : (1) the Project violated the
California Envi ronmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) because the Project’s environmental impact report was deficient; (2) the Project violated the Los Angeles Municipal Code because the eight variances from the SNAP were not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the City Council denied plaintiffs a fair hearing; and (4) the City did not comply with the laws governing op en me etings. With respect to the alleged violation of the Municipal Code, plaintiffs sought (1) “to vacate and set aside the actions approving the [SNAP] exceptions for the Project, and [to have] the C ourt invalidate the excep tions”; (2) to “enjoin the City

. . . from granting any authority, permits or5

entitlements

. . . pursuant to the [SNAP] except ions”; and (3) to “enjoin

. . . any activities or construction pursua nt to the [SNAP] exceptions.”
B. Trial Court’s Partial Grant of the Writ Petition s Following full briefing, the trial court issued a 28

- page order partly granting and partly denying plaintiffs’ writ petition s

. The court denied the writ s insofar as they alleged violations of CEQA and the denial of a fair hearing. And plaintiffs had by that time already abandoned their claim that the City Council had
vi olated the open meeting laws. However, the court concluded that six of the eight SNAP variances violated the Los Angeles Municipal Code because they were not suppor ted by substantial evidence; of the variances alleged to be invalid, the court only upheld the variance for the number of parking spaces and the
waiver of t he home delivery requirement. In July 2014, the trial court entered judgment for plai ntiffs on the writ s invalidating six of the eight Municipal Code variances, enjoining any actions “in furtherance of” those variances, and “immediately

. . . restrain[ing] . . . all construction activities.” The judgment also authorized plaint iffs to seek attorney’s fe es. C. Appeal s of Writ Petition s ( La Mirada I

) Both Target and La Mirada appealed the judgment. While the appeal s w ere pending, and at Target’s urging, the City Council amended the SNAP to create a new Subarea F, to delineate Subarea F’s geographical bo u ndaries to include the Project , and to define Subarea F’s zoning rules to allow for big
retail stores like the Project

. Target asked this Court to hold the pending appeal s in abeyance and consolidate them with the anticipated appeals in the next round of litigation challenging the SNAP amendments.6

In a published ruling, this Court dismissed the appeal s as moot but left the judgment intact. ( La Mirad a Avenue Neighborhood
As s n

. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 586, 588

- 59 2 ( La Mirada I ).)
D. Challenges Under New Zoning Laws Plaintiffs filed new petitions for a writ of mandate in
separate case s , challenging the Project’s validity under the newly
amend ed SNAP

. After a trial held on March 30, 2017, the court
vacated the Ci ty’s approval of the Project. Target’s appeal of that challenge is pending before us in Citizens Coalition Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles

, B282142.
E. Litigation over Attorney’s Fees
A fter the La Mirada I appeal was dismissed

, plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to s ection 1021.5 for prevailing on their chal lenges to the SNAP variances. After full briefing and a hearing , the trial court granted La Mirada attorney’s fee s totaling $793,817.50 and Citizens attorney’s fees of $180,320. The court concluded that plaintiffs had “been successful at each stage of the litigation,” and that the lawsuit had conferred a “significant benefit

. . . on [City] residents” because it “up held the building limitations specified in [the SNAP] against th e City’s approval of exceptions that did not meet the legal requirements for variances.” The court rejected the argument that “recent amending of the” SNAP undermined the propriety of a fee award. The court went on to calculate the fee amount by evaluating the reasonableness of the time spent and the hourly rate, adjusting down a few of the hours and rates, and using a mul tiplier of 1.4.7 F. Appeal s of Attorney’s Fees Award s Target and the C ity filed timely notice s of appeal from each
of the attorney’s fees order s

. We consolidated these appeals.
DISCUSSION As a general rule, parties in litigation pay their own attorney’s fees. ( Laffitte v. Robert Half Inter nat
., Inc. (2016)

1 Cal.5th 480, 488.) Section 1021.5 is an exception to that rule. ( Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire
Protection (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 ( Ebbetts Pass ).) Derived from the ju dicially crafted “private attorney g eneral doctrine” ( Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917 ( Woodland Hills )), s ection 1021.5 is aimed at encouraging litigants to pursue meritorious public interest litigation vindicating important rights and benefitting a broad swath of citizens, and it achieves this aim by compensating successful litigants with an award of attorney’s fees. ( Id.

at pp. 924

- 925; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 C a l.3d 25, 43, 47.) Target argues that that the trial court’s attorney’s fees
order s must be overturned because (1) plaintiffs have not established their eligibility for such fees under s ection 1021.5, and (2) the amount of fees awarded is excessive. We review the first question with a mixed standard of review: To the extent we

construe and define the statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees, our review is de novo; to the extent we assess whether those requirements were properly applied, our review is for an abuse of discretion. ( Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175; Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018, 1025

- 1026.) We review the second question for an abuse of discretion. ( Graham

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 578 ( Graham ).)8

I. Eligibility for Attorney’s Fees Under Section 1021.5 To obtain an order requiring the losing party to pay attorney’s fees under s ection 1021.5, the movant must establish that (1) it is “a successful party” in an “action ,” (2) the action “ has
resulted in the enforcem ent of an important right affecting the public interest

, ” (3) the action has “conferred” “a significant benefit” “on the general public or a large class of persons

, ” and (4) an award of attorney’s fees is “appropriate” in light of “the necessity and financ ial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity.” (§ 1021.5; Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 317

- 318 ( Press ); Ebbetts Pass

, supra , 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 381 [movant bears burden of proof].) And if the successful party obtained damages, the party must also establish that the attorney’s fees “should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery.” (§ 1021.5.) Target contends that the trial court erred in ruling that plai ntiffs were successful (the first requirement) and that plaintiffs’ action conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons (the third requirement). Target’s attack on these two requirements boils down to the same basic pr emise

— namely, plaintiffs have yet to be successful or to confer any significant benefit because Target may yet prevail in getting the Project approved under the new zoning laws. As we explain below, this premise is invalid.
A. Success
What do es it mean to be “successful”?
When it comes to s ection 1021.5, the successful party is “the party to litigation that achieves its objectives.” ( Graham

, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 571; Folsom v. Butte County Assn . of9

Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 686 ( Folsom ) [loo king to “litigation aim”]; Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1103 ( Harbor ) [successful party is the one who “vindicate[s] the principle upon which [it] brought th[e] action”].)
This definition is both “pragmatic” and “broad.” ( Graham

, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 565.) To be the successful party, a party need not obtain final judgment in its favor. ( Ibid

. ; Ma ria P

.

v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290

- 1291.) It need not succeed on all of its claims. ( River Watch v . County of San Diego Depart. of
Environmental Health (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 768, 782

- 783 ( River Watch ).) And it need not “personally benefit [] ” from its success. ( Harbor

, supra , 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1089

- 1103 [party

“ succeeded ” when court invalidated G overnor’s authority to make
line

- it em veto, even though ruling would not be retroactively applied to benefit that party]; accord, Ebbetts Pass

, supra , 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 382.) Indeed, because the “critical fact” to success “is the impact of the action, not the manner of its
resolution” ( Folsom

, supra , 32 Cal.3d at p. 685), the party need not “win” the lawsuit at all: It is enough to show that the lawsuit was a “catalyst” that motivated the defendant to alter its behavior, be it through voluntary action growing out of a
settlement or oth erwise. ( Graham , at p. 567; Ma ria P. , at pp.
1291

- 1292 [emphasizin g need for “causal connection” between lawsuit and defendant’s subsequent conduct].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that plaintiffs were a successful party for two distinct but interlocking reasons. First, plaintiffs sought a writ that would “vacate and set aside” the City Council’s grant of eight variances
from the SNAP , and it did so as a way to vindicate their “interest in ensuring that the City’s decisions a re in conformity with the10

requirements of the [Municipal Code].” Plaintiffs achieved this objective when the trial court invalidated six of the eight variances for noncompliance with the Municipal Code. Second, plaintiffs’ lawsuit served as a catalyst th at motivated the City

— a defendant in this action

— to amend the SNAP to create a new Subarea F sp ecifically to make the Project lawful under the Municipal Code. A party is successful when, as here, its lawsuit directly prompts a “legislative fix.” (See Sag aser v. McCarthy (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 288, 314 [noting that the “impact” of a lawsuit “might in clude legislative changes

. . . or amendments in policy”].)
B. Significant Benefit Whether a successful party’s lawsuit confers a “significant
benefit” on the general public or a large class of person s is a function of (1) “the significance of the benefit

, ” and (2) “the size of the class receiving [the ] benefit .” ( Woodland Hills

, supra , 23 Cal.3d at pp. 939

- 940.) In evaluating these factors, courts are

to “realistic[ally] assess[]” the law suit’s “gains” “in light of all the pertinent circumstances.” ( Id. at p. 940.) A benefit need not be monetary to be significant. (§ 1021.5 [defining “a significant benefit” as either “pecuniary or nonpecuinary”].) Wher e, as here, the nonpecuniary benefit to the public is the proper enforcement of the law, the successful party must show that the law being enforced furthers a significant policy. ( Woodland Hills

, supra , 23 Cal.3d at pp. 939

- 940 [so holding because “the Le gislature did not intend to authorize an award of attorney fees in every case involving a statutory
violation ” ].) In such instances , the significant benefit and important right requirements of s ection 1021.5 to some extent dovetail. ( Id. at p. 935 [notin g that courts must exercise “some11

selectivity” when deciding which rights are “important”]; accord, Marini v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 829, 836 ( Marini ) [noting that an “important” right “cannot be based on
trivial or peripheral public policies ”].)
The “ extent of the public benefit” from the lawsuit must be “substantial,” but “need not be great.” ( River Watch

, supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 781 ; Cen ter for Biological Diversity

v. County of San Bernardino (2010 ) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 894;
cf. Concerned Citizens of La Habra v. City of La Habra (2005)

131 Cal.App.4th 329, 335

- 336 [lawsuit result ed in correction of a
“minute blemish” in environmental impact report; no significant benefit]; Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. , North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330, 336 [lawsuit result ed in remand for reasons articulated by the appellate court but not by the successful party;

no significant benefit]; United States v. Eastern Municipal Water
Dist

. (C.D.Cal. Jan. 3, 2011, No. CV 04

- 8182 CBM (RNBx)) 2011
U.S. Dist. L exis 161 6 74 [lawsuit secur ed procedural victory wholly duplicated by another suit brought by United States; no significant benefit]; Marini

, supra , 99 Cal.App.3d at pp. 837

- 838 [lawsuit preserv ed municipal court’ s discretion to implement a

pre trial diversion program for drunk drivers, brought by drunk driver; no significant benefit].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that plaintiffs’ lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons. The chief benefit identified by
the trial court

— requiring the City to adhere to the Municipal Code’s “legal requirements” for granting variances from the
SNAP

— furthers a significant public policy. Our Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of “preserv[ing] the12

integrity of” a “locality’s governing general plan” for zoning ( Woodland Hills

, supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 936), including through judicial oversight that “prevent[s] unjustifi ed variance awards”
th at threaten to “subver[t]

. . . the critical reciprocity upon which zoning regulation rests” ( Topanga Assn . for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 517

- 518). 2 (Accord, Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (201 5) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1263 [“Zoning laws concern ‘a vital public interest’ ”].) What is more, the vindication of this significant policy benefits not only the

p ersons living near the Project and the persons living within the geographical boundaries of the SNAP at issue in this case, but also all residents of the City of Los Angeles who benefit from the trial court’s ruling that hold s the City Council’s zoning decisions to the letter and spiri t of the Municipal Code.
C. Impact of New Zoning Law Target conte nds that plaintiffs were not successful part ies
and th at they have not conferred any significant benefit because the validity of the Project under the new zoning law is still pending and ha s yet to be finally adjudicated. In support of this “wait and see” approach

, Target makes what boil s down to two

argumen ts

. First, Target asserts that plaintiffs’ objective was to stop the Target store from ever being built and that they have not yet
ach ieved that objective because Target may still prevail in its position that the Project is v alid under the new zoning law.

2 In light of the significance of this public policy, we need not decide whether another of the interests served by the zoning laws

— namely, preserving adequate housing

— is its elf independently significant.13 This assertion is both factually ina ccurate and legally
untenable. It is factually inaccurate because the stated objective of plaintiffs’ writ petitions, with respect to the SNAP variances, was
to set aside and invalidate th e eight variances initially granted by the City Council as well as to enjoin any further construction contingent upon their validity. At no point did plainti ffs allege that their writ petition s w ere aimed at stopping the Project
forevermore. Target’s assertion is also legally untenable because success for purposes of s ection 1021.5 does not require a showing that the successful party put the entire dispute t o rest for once and all. To the contrary, s ection 1021.5 contemplates “in terim attorney fee awards” for successes conferring a significant benefit before the matter is finally litigated. ( Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 805, 832

- 833.) As long as an interim benefit is “complete regardless of subsequent proceedings,” a court may recognize that benefit by an award of attorney’s fees. ( Ciani

v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 563, 576; Cen ter for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino

, supra , 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 895 [“the ‘substantial benefit’
criterion” is to be considered “in the context of the outcome of the current litigation, and not on speculative future events”].) In this case, the trial court’s ruling that the SNAP variances violated the Municipal Code as it existed at that time was reduced to a judgment, a judgment that was left intact after
La Mirada I

. For that reason, the ruling s underlying the fee
award s in this case are more final than the typical “interim” ruling handed down before judgment. Indeed, the judg ment s in
this case are interim only against the backdrop of the broader14

litigation between the parties, which continues only because the City amended the zoning law and thereby prompted a new round of petitions challenging the Proj ect under the new zoning law. That the City by amending the zoning law is just trying to “get it right,” as Target urges, is beside the point ; the proper focus is on the “litigation objectives” of the prevailing plaintiff ( Graham

, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p p . 571

- 572 ), not the motives of the losing
defendant. What is more, Target’s assertion leads to an absurd result. A court may only grant writ relief after applying “ ‘ the law in
existence at the time of its decision. ’ ” ( Atlantic Richfield Co.

v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1059, 1065 , italics
omitted .) Consequently, a writ petitioner can, at most, seek to
invalidate a “final administrative order or decision” und er the
law then in existence. (§ 1094.5, subd. (a).) Target, however, invites us to deny attorney’s fees to a writ petitioner who succeeds under the law in existence at the time because it has yet
to succeed under the law as it might be amended in the fu ture , even though that petitioner cannot seek (and a court cannot award) such “now

- and

- forevermore” relief. We decline to define success as requiring one to achieve the impossible. Second, Target cites cases holding that a party may not obtain attorney’s fees under s ection 1021.5 “until the benefit is secure.” ( Folsom

, supra , 32 Cal.3d at p. 679; Urbaniak v. Newton (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1837, 1844.) Applying this standard, courts have held that a party’s success in overturning a grant of summary judgmen t against it is not “secure” because the victory merely sets the matter for trial, where the merits will be
determined for the first time. ( Urbaniak

, at p. 1844; Miller

v

. California Com. on Status of Women (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d15

454, 458

- 459.) These case s are distinguishable where, as here, the party has obtained a final judgment in its favor on the merits
under the law in existence at the time and where what remains to be finally adjudicated is the validity of a project under the law

as s ubsequent ly amen ded. 3
II. Amount of Fees In fixing the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded under

s ection 1021.5, a trial court must : (1) calculate a “lod e star” amount of fees, which is defined as the product of (a) the reasonable number of hours spen t litigating the matter
, and (b) the reasonable rate of hourly compensation; (2) decide
whether to allocate those fees between claims on which the successful party prevailed and those on which it did not; and ( 3) determine whether to apply a “multiplier” that either
incre ases or decreases the amount of fees. ( Graham

, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 579; Press

, supra , 34 Cal.3d at p. 322 ; Woodland
Hills

, supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 942.) Target attac ks the trial court’s rulings on each of these three steps.
A. Calculation of Lod e star In calculating the lod e star figure, the trial court “ ‘ must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended ’ ” and
examine the “ ‘ p revailing hourly rates.’ ” ( Graham

, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 579.) In this case, the trial court examined the
declar ations and billing record s submitted by each plaintiff and

3 In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs were successful and conferred a significant benefit in obtaining a judgment invalida ting the SNAP variances under the prior law, we need not decide whether plaintiffs independently succeeded and conferred a significant benefit for the litigation that resulted in the published opinion in La Mirada I

.16

ultimately discounted all of the time spent by one of La Mirada ’s attorneys and reduced the hourly rate of Citizens’ attorney

. Target assails the trial court’s calculation of the lodestar by complaining generally that plaintiffs used too many lawyers and “impermissibly high [hourly] rates.” As the appellant, Target has the burden to affirmatively show error in this calculation ( V aughn v. Jona s (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 601); Target’s generalized, broadside attack does not do so. Target further asserts that the trial court “ignored” its expert’s contrary opinions regarding the reasonableness of the time spent and the hourly rates, but the court did no such thing; instead, it considered, but ultimately “disa gree[d]” with those opinions.
B. Allocation
A trial court has the discretion to reduce the lod e star “based on the plaintiff’s degree of success.” ( Save Our Uniquely
Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 11 85 ; Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989.) However, this discretion must be exercised against the backdrop policy that fee awards under

s ection 1021.5 “or dinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent.” ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 6 2 1, 624, 639; Ketchum v. Moses (20 0 1) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 ( Ketchum ) .) This background presumption acknowledges that attorneys will not know in advance which of many potentially meritorious legal theories a court will adopt and that the reduction of “attorney s ’ fees of a successful party because he did not prevail on all [of those theories], make s it the attorney, and not the defendant, who pays the cost of enforcing th [e] public right.” ( Sundance

v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 273 , italics added ;17

Guardians of Turlock’s Integrity v. Turlock City Council (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 584, 601.) Target argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not reducing the lodestar amount to account for plaintiffs’ failure to prevail on their CEQA challenge, their due process challenge, their open meeting law challenge, and their challenges to two of the eight S NAP variances. Contrary to what Target asserts, the
trial court was not required to allocate the attorney’s fees between the successful and unsuccessful claims. Because Target makes no further argument as to why the trial court abused its
discretion in d eclining to depart from the baseline presumption favoring an award for “all hours reasonably spent,” we have no
basis to disturb the court’s decision not to do so.
C. Multiplier A trial court also has the discretion to adjust the attorney’s
fees award up wards or downwards by applying a multiplier to the
lodestar . (

Ketchum

, supra , 24 Cal.4th at p p

. 1131

- 113 2 .) In deciding whether t o exercise this discretion, courts typically
examine “ ‘ (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ’ ” ( Graham

, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 579 , quoting Ketchum

, at p. 1132.) In this case, the trial court elected to apply a multiplier because plaintiffs’ counsel “worked on a contingency,” “received no compensation for four years” other than $17,000 in costs, “had to decline other non

- contingent engagements” and “accomplished a si gnificant public benefit.” The court nonetheless noted that “[t]hese circumstances are, to some extent, offset by the certainty [plaintiffs] will be able to collect the18

full amount o f the attorney’s fees award.” Thus, the court rejected La Mirada’s reque st for a multiplier of 2 and Citizens’ request for a multiplier of 1.75 , and instead applied one of 1.4 to both fee awards

. Target does not appear to attack the trial court’s examination of the factors relevant to applying the multiplier,
but instead asse rts that the multiplier renders the fee award s excessive in light of the “high base fees” already included in the lodestar. This argument fails because we have already rejected its premise: The c ourt did not fix the lodestar at an unreasonably high level . Moreover, the court’s ultimate fee awards are not unreasonably high for the duration, complexity

, and intensity of litigation that underlies the fee award s in this case.
DISPOSITION
The order s are affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to their

costs on appea l.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

______________________, J. HOFFSTADT We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J. ASHMANN

- GERST

_________________________, J. CHAVEZ