This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0996

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D. C., Parent

Filed December 5, 2016

Affirmed

Hooten, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-JV-15-2514

Nicole S. Gronneberg, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant D.C.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kathryn M. Eilers, Assistant County Attorney, St. 

Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Community Human Services 

Department)

Thomas Nolan, St. Paul, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, 

John, Judge.



U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HOOTEN, Judge

On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, appellant mother argues that 

the district court failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child. We affirm. 

 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

FACTS

At the time of trial, appellant D.C. was the biological mother of three children: 

K.D.D., born in August 2007; D.D.C., born in May 2009; and D.M.C., born in October 

2012. Only appellant’s parental rights to D.M.C. are at issue in this appeal.

1

 The county 

filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights to D.M.C. on September 18, 2015. 

A trial was held on the matter over four days: December 15, 2015; March 28-29, 2016; and 

May 9, 2016. The following evidence was presented at trial. 

Respondent Ramsey County Community Human Services Department (the county) 

first provided child protection services to appellant from 2008 to 2009. At that time, 

appellant received parenting education and the services of a public health nurse. Appellant 

received in-home parenting services beginning in February 2009. The county obtained a 

diagnostic assessment for appellant and provided her with bus cards, a car seat, a bassinet, 

a double stroller, and gift cards to a grocery store. Because she failed to continue attending 

high school, appellant lost her Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) benefits. 

The county obtained special needs daycare for the children until appellant was back on 

MFIP. During the time that she was receiving these services, appellant committed the 

offense of malicious punishment of a child against her nine-year-old brother. The county 

made a maltreatment determination against appellant as a result of this incident. 

Appellant received further child protection services beginning in June 2013 after a 

neighbor saw marks on D.D.C.’s back. Doctors at the Midwest Children’s Resource Center 

 

1 The parental rights of R.L., the adjudicated father of D.M.C., were terminated on March 

28, 2016. 
3

(MCRC) examined both K.D.D. and D.D.C. and determined that the children had injuries 

consistent with physical abuse. During an interview with a county employee, appellant 

stated that she “whooped [the children] hard.” The county made a maltreatment 

determination, and appellant was convicted of malicious punishment of a child. All three

children were put in out-of-home placement. 

In 2013, Michelle Seymore was assigned as the primary child protection worker for 

the family and continued to be the assigned social worker throughout the termination 

proceedings. Seymore created a case plan for appellant, which included parenting 

education, and helped appellant with finding housing, coordinating with her probation 

officer, and moving to Nebraska. 

Sometime in the summer or fall of 2013, the county referred appellant to a parenting 

trainer. Appellant met with the trainer from October 2013 to February 2014. The trainer 

taught appellant how to find and access resources and worked with appellant on parenting 

skills. Appellant told the trainer a number of times that she wanted her children to live 

with K.D., a woman who had been like a mother to appellant. The trainer observed that 

appellant did not seem committed to improving her parenting skills. At the time that the 

trainer’s parenting education work with appellant ended in February 2014, the trainer 

believed that appellant was not committed to making the changes necessary to become a 

good parent. 

After 152 days in out-of-home placement, the children were returned to appellant’s 

care for a trial home visit. The trial home visit ended 17 days later, when appellant was 

arrested, and subsequently convicted, of driving while impaired (DWI). After the trial 
4

home visit failed, the children went to live with K.D. at her home in Nebraska. The children 

lived in Nebraska with K.D. for a total of 179 days—from December 2013 to June 2014—

before they were returned to appellant’s care. The child protection case was subsequently 

dismissed. 

Appellant was involved with child protection a third time in January 2015, after 

D.D.C. reported that he had been sexually abused by two of appellant’s brothers. Medical 

staff at MCRC interviewed and examined D.D.C. regarding the sexual abuse. MCRC staff 

noted physical injuries to D.D.C., specifically several areas of abraded or scabbed lesions 

on his face and neck and two long, parallel, linear, red blanching marks below his right 

shoulder. When asked about D.D.C.’s injuries, appellant denied harming him and stated 

that she had had parenting classes that taught her appropriate disciplinary techniques. 

MCRC staff recommended that D.D.C. see a therapist who specializes in working with 

victims of child sexual abuse. Appellant failed to obtain therapy for D.D.C. 

During this involvement with child protection, an intake child protection worker 

made a referral to a social service agency so that appellant could obtain furniture for her 

apartment. Though the furniture provided by the program is free, the county paid for the 

agency’s application and furniture delivery fees. 

Appellant became involved with child protection a fourth time in April 2015 after 

K.D.D. reported to school staff that her mother had choked her, lifted her off the ground, 

and threatened her. K.D.D. stated that she was afraid to go home. The responding police 

officer determined that the children needed to be placed on a police hold, rather than 

returned to appellant’s care. A child protection worker interviewed K.D.D., who again 
5

stated that her mother choked her and lifted her off the ground. K.D.D. and D.D.C. both 

reported that appellant had slapped D.D.C the previous day and stated that they did not 

want to return home because they were scared. K.D.D. and D.D.C. gave consistent 

accounts of abuse by appellant to Seymore and the guardian ad litem (GAL). The county 

made a third maltreatment determination against appellant. 

When appellant learned that K.D.D. and D.D.C. had been put on a police hold, 

appellant called K.D. and asked if K.D. would come to Minnesota to take D.M.C. In April 

2015, D.M.C. was placed with K.D. and remained there through the termination 

proceedings. 

In May 2015, a case aide for the county provided appellant with a case plan, and

appellant signed the plan and returned it. The case plan required, among other things, that 

appellant undergo parenting education, a parenting assessment, a mental health assessment, 

anger management, and counseling. The case aide transported K.D.D. and D.D.C. to visits 

with appellant and supervised the visits. The case aide noted that appellant always came 

late to the visits and always brought someone else with her. The case aide stated that 

appellant spent most of her time interacting with the adults she brought with her to the 

visits, rather than the children. 

In June 2015, both K.D.D. and D.D.C. were scheduled to fly to Hawaii for an 

extended visit with their father. Appellant testified that she was not notified that the two 

older children were being sent to Hawaii and that she was not offered a farewell visit. The 

case aide testified that she informed appellant of the farewell visit and asked that appellant 
6

bring clothes for the children, but appellant refused. Appellant did not attend the farewell 

visit. 

Seymore testified that when she first started working with appellant in 2015, their 

communication was “great.” However, appellant’s communication dropped off in May 

2015 and there were “long periods of silence throughout [the] case.” Indeed, appellant 

agreed that she had virtually no contact with Seymore between May 2015 and December 

2015. During the pendency of the case, appellant frequently moved between Minnesota 

and Nebraska. Prior to December 2015, appellant did not comply with any aspects of her 

case plan. Furthermore, appellant failed to keep the county apprised of her address, despite 

court orders directing her to inform the county of any address changes. Appellant’s 

frequent moves interfered with her ability to access services. After trial started, Seymore 

began making referrals for a number of services because it was at that point that she and 

appellant resumed having ongoing contact.

During the trial, in early 2016, appellant underwent a parenting assessment and 

psychological evaluation. Appellant falsely reported to the evaluator that she obtained 

therapy for D.D.C. after he was sexually abused. The evaluator opined that appellant 

lacked empathy for exposing her children to domestic violence, instability and 

inconsistency in parenting, and physical abuse. The evaluator diagnosed appellant with 

posttraumatic stress disorder and alcohol use disorder and as having borderline and 

histrionic personality disorder features. The evaluator recommended that appellant address 

her mental health needs through long-term individual therapy. The evaluator also 

recommended that appellant receive psychiatric medication evaluation and treatment, 
7

dialectical behavioral therapy skills training, anger management and skills training, and 

parenting education and skills training. The evaluator opined that “[t]he prognosis appears 

poor for [appellant] being able to meet her individual mental health needs and therefore 

being able to meet her child’s growing needs and maintaining his safety in the near future.” 

The evaluator opined that D.M.C. would be at risk of physical harm in appellant’s care if 

she did not receive the recommended services. 

On the first day of trial, December 15, 2015, appellant testified that she had not used 

any drugs other than alcohol and marijuana in the previous six months. But, appellant’s 

hair follicle sample tested positive for cocaine and oxycodone from the time period 

between late September 2015 and late December 2015. There is no evidence in the record 

suggesting that appellant had been prescribed oxycodone. After Seymore made a referral

for random urinalysis (UA) testing, appellant had to submit to UA testing twice a week and 

she provided clean UAs. 

Appellant’s case plan required that she undergo counseling. Appellant initially

testified that she had been meeting with a therapist named Michael Yow for approximately 

a year, but later testified that her therapist’s name was Michael Yar. Appellant was unable 

to provide an address for her therapist or explain how she paid for the sessions. 

After considering this evidence, the district court filed an order terminating 

appellant’s parental rights to D.M.C. As of the date of the district court’s order, D.M.C. 

had been in out-of-home placement for a total of 872 days, well beyond the permanency 

deadline established by Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.503 (2014) (providing that

district court must commence permanency proceedings no later than 12 months after child 
8

is placed in foster care). The district court concluded that the county had proven by clear 

and convincing evidence that appellant’s parental rights should be terminated on three 

separate statutory grounds: failure to comply with parental duties; palpable unfitness; and 

failure of reasonable efforts by the county to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home 

placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5) (2014). The district court 

also determined that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in the best interests of 

D.M.C., the county made reasonable efforts to reunite D.M.C. with appellant, and the 

provision of further services to appellant to reunify her with D.M.C. “would be futile and 

unrealistic under the circumstances of this case.” This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the 

county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.2 Courts presume that parents are fit 

to care for their children, and “[p]arental rights may be terminated only for grave and 

weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) 

(quotation omitted). The petitioning county has the burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under at least one of the statutory grounds. Id.; 

see Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (2014) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of 

statutory ground to terminate parental rights). 

 

2 Although appellant purports to challenge the district court’s determination that there was 

a statutory ground for termination of her parental rights and the district court’s conclusion 

that termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the best interests of D.M.C., appellant’s 

arguments are limited to her contention that the county failed to make reasonable efforts. 

Therefore, we only address appellant’s argument that the county failed to make reasonable 

efforts. 
9

A reviewing court “gives considerable deference to the district court’s decision to 

terminate parental rights,” but “closely inquire[s] into the sufficiency of the evidence to 

determine whether it was clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 

N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We give the district court’s decision considerable 

discretion because the district court “is in a superior position to assess the credibility of 

witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). We review the 

district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 

N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). This court will 

affirm a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights if at least one statutory ground 

is supported by clear and convincing evidence, termination is in the best interests of the 

child, and the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 

385. 

Minnesota law requires that a district court make “specific findings” in every 

termination proceeding “that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify 

the child and the parent were made” or “that reasonable efforts for reunification [were] not 

required” as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 260.012 (2014). Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 

(2014). The district court must make “individualized and explicit findings regarding the 

nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent 

and reunite the family.” Id., subd. 8(1). 

When determining whether reasonable efforts have been made, 

the [district] court shall consider whether services to the child 

and family were:

(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; 

(2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
10

(3) culturally appropriate;

(4) available and accessible; 

(5) consistent and timely; and 

(6) realistic under the circumstances. 

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). Alternatively, the district court may conclude that “provision of 

services or further services for the purpose of rehabilitation is futile and therefore 

unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id. 

“Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of 

form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 

N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 

2007). Determining whether the county provided reasonable efforts requires consideration 

of the length of the county’s involvement, the nature of the problems presented, and the 

quality of the effort given. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 88. We review a district court’s finding 

that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family for clear error. See J.R.B., 

805 N.W.2d at 901. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the 

weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re 

Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660–61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). 

We conclude that the district court’s determination that the county made reasonable 

efforts to reunify appellant and D.M.C. is supported by clear and convincing evidence and 

does not constitute error. The county provided extensive services to appellant throughout 

her lengthy history with child protection. During her first involvement with child 

protection in 2008 to 2009, the county made a referral for a public health nurse and 

parenting education, provided appellant with in-home parenting, obtained a diagnostic 
11

assessment for appellant, provided appellant with supplies to help her care for her children, 

and obtained special needs daycare for appellant’s children. Child protection provided 

appellant with case plans for the children in 2013 to 2014, during her second involvement 

with child protection. The county also referred appellant to a parenting trainer, helped her

secure housing, and coordinated with appellant’s probation officer. Appellant attended and 

completed anger management and chemical dependency treatment and received individual 

therapy. The county made a referral to an agency for furniture during appellant’s third 

involvement with child protection. 

During appellant’s fourth involvement, the county provided appellant with a case 

plan, which appellant signed on May 20, 2015. Among other things, the case plan included 

parenting education, a mental health assessment, anger management, counseling, a

parenting assessment and chemical dependency assessments. Prior to the first court 

hearing in this case, a child protection worker met with appellant to discuss a visitation 

plan, the children’s needs, and potential placements for the children. The county

transported the two older children to visits with appellant and supervised the visits and 

arranged a farewell visit between the two older children, appellant, and D.M.C.

Appellant argues that the county did not provide her with any services during the 

first eight months of the current child protection case. First, we note that since the 

beginning of the child protection matter, appellant maintained that she is a good parent, she 

does not need services, and services will not improve her parenting skills. Indeed, during 

her parenting assessment and psychological evaluation, after the first day of trial, appellant 

denied that she needed services to help her with parenting issues. 
12

Moreover, while the county did not provide any referrals to appellant before the first 

day of trial, appellant greatly impeded her ability to receive services from the county. 

According to Seymore, there were “long periods of silence” throughout the case, but 

communication picked up in December around the time the termination trial began. 

Seymore testified that she had difficulty contacting appellant by phone. The GAL testified 

that it generally took her two or three days to reach appellant by phone, appellant’s phone 

number changed during the case, and she was only able to find out appellant’s new phone 

number by making calls to appellant’s family members. 

Appellant moved and traveled back and forth between Minnesota and Nebraska 

during the case, but failed to keep Seymore apprised of her address, interfering with her 

ability to receive services. Seymore testified that most of the time she was not sure where 

appellant was and that there were occasions when appellant stated that she was living in 

one state, when she was really living in another state. Seymore stated that there have been 

instances where she worked to provide services for appellant in one state only to learn that 

appellant has moved back to the other state and that appellant’s “[m]oving back and forth 

made it impossible to provide services.” Appellant’s moves also interfered with her 

medical coverage, creating a barrier to her ability to access services. 

Seymore began making referrals for appellant after the first day of trial because that 

was when she started to have ongoing contact with appellant. Seymore made referrals for 

random UAs, hair follicle testing, a chemical dependency assessment, a parenting 

assessment, and a psychological evaluation. Seymore and the GAL arranged a meeting 

with appellant in January 2016 to review the updated case plan. However, appellant 
13

disputed whether her children were in need of services and began screaming at Seymore 

before storming out of the meeting. 

During the proceedings, appellant failed to take advantage of the opportunity to visit 

D.M.C, despite the county’s efforts to facilitate such visitation. Seymore testified that at 

first appellant did not communicate with Seymore or request any visits with D.M.C. 

Seymore testified that she later set up supervised visits for appellant with D.M.C. in 

Nebraska, but prior to the first visit, appellant returned to Minnesota. Though appellant’s 

fiancé testified that appellant had been to Nebraska approximately half a dozen times 

during the three months between the first and third days of trial, appellant never told 

Seymore that she was visiting Nebraska and would like to visit D.M.C. 

Appellant contends that she asked Seymore for guidance on case plan requirements 

on multiple occasions throughout the case, but Seymore responded by telling appellant that 

she did not know what appellant needed and that appellant would have to come up with 

her own services. Seymore testified that appellant came to her office in August 2015 and 

asked what she could do to get her children back. Seymore stated that she told appellant 

something to the effect of “You tell me what you need. I don’t know what you need. I 

gave you what I thought you needed and that didn’t work.” Seymore testified that appellant 

then stormed out of her office and “cried and screamed down the hall talking about she’s a 

good mom, that she [doesn’t] abuse her kids.” Seymore testified that she gave appellant a 

similar response when appellant came to Seymore in October 2015 asking what she could

do to get her children back. Seymore clarified that her reference to efforts in the past 

referred to the services provided in the prior child protection matters and her efforts to 
14

engage appellant in the case plan at the beginning of the fourth child protection matter. 

Seymore explained that she was looking for suggestions. Seymore testified, “[I]t’s 

important for parents to be able to have a conversation about what they need, have some 

insight about where their deficiencies are. And then my role would be to find services that 

then fit into those deficiencies in order to create long-term behavior change.” At this point, 

appellant had been provided with the case plan, had received extensive services in the prior 

child protection cases, but continued to demonstrate the same parenting deficiencies. 

Under these circumstances, Seymore’s attempts to seek insight into what services would 

enable appellant to remedy her parenting deficiencies were reasonable. 

Finally, appellant argues that this case is similar to In re Children of T.R. In T.R., 

the county did not provide the noncustodial father a valid chemical dependency evaluation, 

despite his acknowledged drug and alcohol use, and did not offer the father chemical 

dependency treatment. 750 N.W.2d. at 666. Additionally, the county did not provide 

appellant with services to help the father to understand the proceedings, despite his lack of 

verbal skills and low average I.Q., and the county did not visit the home the father rented 

in order to comply with the case plan’s requirement to obtain suitable housing. Id. After 

contrasting the substantial services the mother received with the services offered to the 

father and noting that no services were offered to address the father’s lack of verbal skills 

and difficulty in understanding the proceedings, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 

the county’s efforts with regard to the father were not reasonable and reversed the 

termination of his parental rights. Id. 
15

The facts of this case are distinguishable. Appellant received extensive services, 

including parenting education, therapy, chemical dependency treatment, and anger 

management services in prior child protection cases. In the child protection matter that led 

to the termination proceedings, the county provided appellant with a case plan that required 

appellant to undergo parenting education, a parenting assessment, a mental health 

assessment, anger management, and counseling. However, appellant’s own actions 

impeded the county’s ability to provide services, as appellant completely failed to engage 

with the case plan during the first eight months of the case, failed to keep in contact with 

Seymore, and moved back and forth between Minnesota and Nebraska. And, there is no 

indication in this case that appellant did not understand the termination proceedings. 

Appellant argues that her case is like T.R. because the county did not make any 

referrals for services after receiving the results of her evaluations, specifically focusing on 

the recommendations of the parenting assessment and psychological evaluation report. 

Seymore made the referral for those services sometime after the first day of trial in 

December 2015. The evaluator met with appellant on three dates to complete these 

evaluations: January 12, 2016; January 19, 2016; and March 22, 2016. The written report 

was drafted on March 28. Seymore testified that she received the parenting assessment 

and psychological evaluation report approximately six to eight weeks before the final day 

of trial in May 2016. On March 28, appellant testified that she was planning on moving 

back to Nebraska the following day. Given the relatively late completion of the 

assessments, appellant’s frequent moves and history of failure to keep the county apprised 

of her whereabouts, and Seymore’s testimony that it takes longer to set up services out of 
16

state, the county’s failure to make further referrals for appellant in the last few weeks before 

the final day of trial is not unreasonable. 

In conclusion, the record shows that the county provided appellant with extensive 

services in her three prior involvements with child protection. In the fourth child protection 

involvement, appellant failed to engage in the case plan until the first day of trial and the 

county’s attempts to engage appellant in services were impeded by appellant’s belief that 

she did not need services, her frequent moves between Minnesota and Nebraska, and her 

failure to keep in contact with the county. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that 

the district court’s finding that further services would be futile and unrealistic is clearly 

erroneous. We conclude that the district court’s determination that the county made 

reasonable efforts to reunify appellant and D.M.C. is supported by clear and convincing 

evidence and does not constitute error. 

Affirmed.