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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

---oOo---

________________________________________________________________

ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF ROYAL ALOHA, a Hawaii nonprofit corporation, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs.

CERTIFIED MANAGEMENT, INC., a Hawaii corporation; 

CHANEY BROOKS & COMPANY, LLC, a Hawaii corporation; 

MICHAEL DAVID BRUSER, an individual; TOKYO JOE’S, INC., 

a Hawaii corporation; MICHAEL T. MCCORMACK, individually 

and as Trustee under that certain unrecorded Michael T. 

McCormack Revocable Living Trust Agreement dated 

November 12, 1991; and MICHAEL T. MCCORMACK and SIGNA S. 

MCCORMACK, as Co-Trustees of The McCormack Ranch Trust 

dated January 6, 2005, Petitioners/Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

SCWC-15-0000445

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-15-0000445; CIV. NO. 12-1-1019-04)

DECEMBER 8, 2016

BY RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, 

JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-15-0000445

08-DEC-2016

08:58 AM
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I. Introduction

This case arises out of a dispute between the Association 

of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha (“AOAO”); its former property 

managers, Certified Management, Inc. (“CMI”) and Chaney Brooks & 

Co. (“Chaney Brooks”); and its former commercial tenants, 

Michael D. Bruser, Tokyo Joe’s, Inc. (“TJI”), and Michael and 

Signa McCormack. As the facts in this case are not disputed, 

they are taken from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s 

(“circuit court”) background section in its “Amended Conclusions 

of Law, and Order Granting Defendant Certified Management’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed 8/5/14 and Order Granting 

Joinder by: Defendant Chaney Brooks & Company, LLC to Defendant 

Certified Management, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed 

8/12/14.” 

The Royal Aloha condominium is a mixed-use residential and 

commercial project located in Waikīkī. It employed Chaney 

Brooks as its managing agent from 1995 to 2002, and CMI as its 

managing agent from 2003-2010. Bruser and TJI were the owners 

of commercial unit C-1. The McCormacks were the owners of 

commercial unit C-2. The AOAO installed an electricity 

submetering system in 1998 and hired electrical engineers to 

read each unit’s electricity submeter, then submit the readings 

to the managing agent, who would bill each owner for 

electricity. 
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Between 1998 and 2010, the commercial tenants of C-1 were 

never billed for electricity, and the commercial tenants of C-2 

were erroneously billed for a portion of C-1’s electricity 

costs. 

The AOAO sued CMI and Chaney Brooks for, inter alia, breach 

of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence, for the 

billing errors. The AOAO also sued the commercial tenants to 

recover hundreds of thousands of dollars in unbilled or 

erroneously billed electricity costs. 

The circuit court granted the property management 

companies’ motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of 

laches. The circuit court also granted Bruser and TJI’s 

(commercial tenants of C-1) motion for partial summary judgment, 

concluding that the commercial tenants had no obligation to 

indemnify the AOAO for electricity costs. The circuit court 

later amended its order granting the property management 

companies’ MSJ so that all claims against all defendants were 

barred under the doctrine of laches.

The AOAO appealed. The ICA issued a published opinion 

holding that “the defense of laches, as a matter of law, applies 

only to equitable claims,” reversing the grant of summary 

judgment in the defendants’ favor. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 

Royal Aloha v. Certified Mgmt., Inc., 138 Hawaii 276, 283-84, 

378 P.3d 992, 999-1000 (App. 2016) (footnote omitted). 
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Petitioners/Defendants-Appellees CMI, Chaney Brooks, 

Bruser, TJI, and the McCormacks (collectively, the Joint 

Defendants) present the following questions in their Joint 

Application for Writ of Certiorari1:

A. Whether the ICA gravely erred by holding, “We agree 

with the AOAO’s contention that the defense of laches, as a 

matter of law, applies only to equitable claims” – a 

contention never raised by the AOAO in Circuit Court which 

Petitioners pointed out in their Answering Brief.

B. Whether the ICA gravely erred by condoning or failing 

to recognize that the AOAO had materially misstated the 

Record on Appeal by falsely stating that the AOAO in 

Circuit Court objected to “using laches to dismiss legal 

claims” – despite the fact that Petitioners pointed out 

this misrepresentation in their Answering Brief.

C. Whether Hawaii law, HRAP Rule 28, and the doctrine of 

waiver precluded the ICA from basing its Opinion on the 

AOAO’s laches contention – which the AOAO failed to 

preserve, and did not involve a jurisdictional issue or 

plain error.

D. Whether Hawaii law, federal decisions, authority cited 

in the Opinion, and public policy are contrary to the ICA’s 

holding that “the defense of laches, as a matter of law, 

applies only to equitable claims.”

We accepted certiorari and now hold that laches is a 

defense at law and at equity, contrary to the ICA’s holding that 

laches is a defense in equity only. 

II. Background

A. Circuit Court Proceedings

1. Complaint and Answers

On April 13, 2012, the AOAO filed a Complaint against 

property managers CMI and Chaney Brooks, and commercial tenants 

 

1 Chaney Brooks filed a joinder to the Joint Application. Bruser, Tokyo 

Joe’s, Inc., Michael T. McCormack, and Signa S. McCormack also filed a 

joinder to the Joint Application. 
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Bruser, TJI, and the McCormacks due to the unbilled or 

erroneously billed electricity costs. The AOAO alleged the 

following against either or both of CMI and Chaney Brooks: 

breach of contract (Count I), breach of fiduciary duty (Count 

II), and negligence (Count III). The AOAO alleged the following 

claims only against CMI: negligent misrepresentation (Count IV) 

and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 

V). The AOAO also included the following claims against the 

commercial tenants Bruser, TJI, and the McCormacks’ trusts: 

indemnification (Count VI) and unjust enrichment (Count VII). 

Lastly, the AOAO raised claims for surety and guaranty 

obligations (Count VIII) and declaratory relief (Count IX) 

against Bruser, the McCormacks, and the McCormack trusts. The 

AOAO filed its First Amended Complaint three days later, raising 

the same claims. 

Defendant Chaney Brooks filed its Answer, denying the 

allegations raised in Counts I and II in the Complaint, and 

raising the defense of laches. Defendant CMI also filed its 

Answer, denying the allegations raised in all of the counts of 

the Complaint, raising the defense of unclean hands, and giving 

notice that it would assert other defenses constituting 

affirmative defenses as set forth in Hawaii Rules of Civil 

Procedure Rule 8(c) as the matter progressed. The commercial 

tenants filed their Answer, denying the allegations raised in 
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all of the counts of the Complaint, and raising the defense of 

laches. 

2. Bruser and TJI’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Bruser and TJI filed a motion for partial summary judgment 

[50:765-91], arguing that the AOAO was obligated to bill them 

the electricity costs but never had; therefore, Bruser and TJI 

were not responsible for paying the unbilled electricity costs, 

and the AOAO could not seek indemnification from them under 

Section 6.02 of the Bylaws for the same. Chaney Brooks and CMI 

joined in the motion for partial summary judgment. The circuit 

court granted Bruser and TJI’s motion for partial summary 

judgment. It also dismissed the rest of the claims against 

Bruser and TJI (i.e., restitution/unjust enrichment and quasisurety and guaranty) on the grounds of estoppel and laches. 

3. CMI’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Around the same time that Bruser and TJI filed their second 

motion for partial summary judgment, CMI filed its motion for 

summary judgment, asking the circuit court to dismiss all claims 

against it based on the doctrine of laches. It argued that the 

AOAO knew of the incomplete and incorrect electricity billings 

around 2000-2002 and waited 10-12 years to bring its lawsuit. 

CMI argued that the AOAO’s delay was unreasonable and resulted 

in severe prejudice to CMI, as “[c]ritical witnesses have died, 

critical facts cannot be recalled by those witnesses who have 
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not passed away, and voluminous documents and records have been 

destroyed or purged.” 

CMI acknowledged that this court, in dictum, “cited case 

law concerning whether laches bar legal claims, independent of 

the statute of limitations.” CMI was referring to Ass’n of 

Apartment Owners of Newtown Meadows v. Venture 15, Inc., 115 

Hawaii 232, 284, 167 P.3d 225, 227 (2007). CMI also cited to 

27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 117 (2014) for the following: “While 

some states without separate law and equity courts nevertheless 

hold laches inapplicable to legal actions, laches increasingly 

is applied to actions at law, such as actions seeking only 

damages.” CMI noted that law and equity have merged in Hawaii, 

as recognized in the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 2 

sets forth only “one form of action to be known as a ‘civil 

action.’”). According to CMI, in other jurisdictions where law 

and equity have merged, the defense of laches is applicable to 

legal claims as well as equitable claims. Specifically, CMI 

cited Bill v. Bd. of Educ. of Cicero School Dist. 99, 812 N.E.2d 

604, 613 (Ill. App. 2004); Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust 

of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 

2002); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 

2001); Telink, Inc. v. U.S., 24 F.3d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1994); 
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A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 

1029 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

Chaney Brooks joined in CMI’s MSJ. The AOAO’s memorandum 

in opposition counter-argued that the AOAO’s delay in bringing 

suit was not unreasonable, and that CMI’s unclean hands rendered 

its laches defense unavailable. The AOAO did not address CMI’s 

contention that laches is a defense at law and at equity.

The circuit court granted CMI’s motion for summary judgment 

and Chaney Brooks’ joinder thereto. The circuit court later 

amended its order granting summary judgment solely to note that 

summary judgment was granted against the AOAO on all claims, in 

favor of all defendants. Relevant to this appeal, the circuit 

court concluded the following:

2. Hawaii recognizes laches as an affirmative defense. 

Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 8(c). Laches 

applies to actions at law in states like Hawaii, which have 

merged law and equity courts. See HRCP Rule 1, Rule 2, 

Rule 8(c); Assoc. of Apt. Owners of Newtown Meadows v. 

Venture 15, Inc., 115 Hawaii 232, 284 (2007) (analyzing 

laches in an action in law).

The circuit court concluded that the AOAO’s delay in bringing

its lawsuit was unreasonable, as it knew that electricity was 

not being billed to the commercial tenants in 2001 or 2001 but 

waited 10 years to file its Complaint. The circuit court also 

concluded that the AOAO’s unreasonable delay caused severe and 

pervasive prejudice to the defendants due to evidentiary 

challenges, because Chaney Brooks had long since purged its 
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Royal Aloha documents, there was no written agreement regarding 

submetered electricity billing, several critical witnesses had 

died in the interim, and those who remained did not remember 

details about the submetered electricity billing. The circuit 

court initially filed its Final Judgment on May 5, 2015, then 

its Amended Final Judgment in favor of all defendants against 

the AOAO on June 25, 2015. The AOAO timely appealed. 

B. ICA Appeal

Relevant to this appeal, the AOAO raised the following 

point of error: “Whether the Circuit Court committed reversible 

error in applying the equitable defense of laches as the sole 

basis for the dismissal of the AOAO’s legal claims against CBC, 

CMI, BRUSER and the MCCORMACKS?” The AOAO argued that laches is 

an equitable defense and not applicable to actions at law. In 

support of this argument, the AOAO cited to Adair v. Hustace, 64 

Haw. 314, 320-21, 640 P.2d 294, 300 (1982), for the following 

proposition: Laches “acts to bar a court from considering an 

equitable action . . . Just as the statute of limitations 

establishes the requisite degree for actions at law, so is 

laches the rule for equitable actions.” The AOAO also cited the 

following cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Eighth Circuit, confining laches to equitable claims: Ashley v. 

Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 170 (8th Cir. 
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1995), and Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.3d 249, 256 (8th Cir. 

1970). 

In their Joint Answering Brief (filed by all of the 

defendants), the defendants counter-argued that the AOAO had 

waived any argument that laches did not apply to actions at law, 

for failure to raise this argument before the circuit court. In 

its Reply, the AOAO did not address the Defendants’ contention 

that it had waived the argument that laches is an equitable, not 

legal, defense. 

In a published opinion, the ICA agreed with the AOAO and 

held that “the defense of laches, as a matter of law, applies 

only to equitable claims.” Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Royal 

Aloha, 138 Hawaii at 283-84, 378 P.3d at 999-1000 (footnote 

omitted). The ICA recognized, in a footnote, that “both state 

and federal courts ‘are divided on whether laches applies only 

to equitable actions or applies also to actions at law.’” 138 

Hawaii at 282 n.6, 378 P.3d at 998 n.6 (citing 27A Am. Jur. 2d 

Equity § 117). The ICA cited to 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 117 

for the following proposition: “Some courts state that laches 

is usually available only in suits strictly in equity or in 

actions at law that involve claims of an essentially equitable 

character.” 138 Hawaii at 283, 378 P.3d at 998. The ICA then 

cited to Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of America, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
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521, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), a California case holding that, 

although declaratory relief is generally an action in equity, 

whether laches applies in such actions depends upon the nature 

of the underlying claim. 138 Hawaii at 283, 378 P.3d at 998. 

The ICA then considered the AOAO’s action to be essentially an 

action at law, as it sought primarily money damages against all 

of the defendants, and the declaratory relief sought was a 

judicial determination that certain defendants breached their 

contractual obligations, which is a legal claim. See id. 

Therefore, reasoned the ICA, laches did not apply in this case, 

which raised, at bottom, legal claims. See id.

After vacating, in part, the circuit court’s grant of 

summary judgment to defendants on the basis of laches, the ICA 

remanded this case to the circuit court to consider “whether 

some of the separately metered electricity usage costs were 

billed or charged, and suit filed, within the applicable statute 

of limitations periods.” 138 Hawaii at 286-87, 378 P.3d at 

1002-03.

III. Standard of Review

Whether laches is a defense available in an action of law 

is a question of law reviewable de novo. See Chirco v. 

Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 230 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(“[W]hen a reviewing court is presented with a threshold 

question of law as to whether the laches doctrine is even 
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applicable in a particular situation, . . . [its] review is de 

novo.”); Ditto v. McCurdy, 90 Hawaii 345, 351, 978 P.2d 783, 789 

(1999) (noting questions of law are reviewable de novo, under 

the right/wrong standard).

IV. Discussion

The Joint Defendants’ first three questions presented all 

concern whether the AOAO waived the argument that the laches 

defense applies only to equitable proceedings, and, therefore, 

whether the ICA gravely erred in addressing the issue. Despite 

any failure of the AOAO to raise this argument before the 

circuit court, the ICA properly addressed the issue on a de novo 

review of the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of defendants due to laches. See, e.g., Hawaii Cmty. Fed. 

Credit Union v. Keka, 94 Hawaii 213, 221, 11 P.3d 1, 9 (2000) 

(“We review [a] circuit court’s [grant or denial] of summary 

judgment de novo under the same standard applied by the circuit 

court.”) (brackets in original, citation omitted). The circuit 

court issued a conclusion of law that laches applied to the 

AOAO’s legal claims. The issue of the applicability of the 

laches defense is a legal one, which appellate courts also 

review de novo. See, e.g., Chirco, 474 F.3d at 230; Ditto, 90 

Hawaii at 351, 978 P.2d at 789 (“Questions of law are reviewable

de novo under the right/wrong standard.”) 
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The fundamental issue in this case is contained in the 

fourth question presented: whether the ICA gravely erred in 

holding that “the defense of laches, as a matter of law, applies 

only to equitable claims.” In Adair, 64 Haw. at 320-21, 640 

P.2d at 300, this court summarized the doctrine of laches in 

Hawaii as follows:

The doctrine of laches reflects the equitable maxim 

that “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on 

their rights.” Where applicable, it acts to bar a court 

from considering an equitable action . . . because of a 

perception that it is more equitable to defendants and 

important to society to promote claimant diligence, 

discourage delay and prevent the enforcement of stale 

claims.

There are two components to laches, both of which 

must exist before the doctrine will apply. First, there 

must have been a delay by the plaintiff in bringing his 

claim, and that delay must have been unreasonable under the 

circumstances. Delay is reasonable if the claim was 

brought without undue delay after plaintiff knew of the 

wrong or knew of facts and circumstances sufficient to 

impute such knowledge to him. Second, that delay must have 

resulted in prejudice to defendant. Common but by no means 

exclusive examples of such prejudice are loss of evidence 

with which to contest plaintiff’s claims, including the 

fading memories or deaths or material witnesses, changes in 

the value of the subject matter, changes in defendant’s 

position, and intervening rights of third parties.

(Citations and footnote omitted.) 

In its published opinion, to support its holding that the 

defense of laches applies only to equitable claims, the ICA 

quoted Adair, and on its face, Adair appears to confine the 

defense of laches to equitable claims only, but two subsequent 

opinions from this court have called that limitation into 

question. First, in Newtown Meadows, 115 Hawaii at 284, 167 

P.3d at 277, this court had the opportunity to address an AOAO’s 
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express argument that, because its negligence suit for damages 

was an action “[exclusively in law, not in equity[,] . . . the 

timeliness of suit is governed by law, as set forth in the 

applicable statute of limitations, not by equity and laches.” 

This court declined to expressly hold that laches applied in 

equity only and went on to state, “even assuming arguendo that 

laches governs the timeliness of the AOAO’s assertion of its 

negligence claims against [one of the defendants], [that 

defendant] has failed to present to this court any evidence of 

prejudice caused by the claimed unreasonable delay.” Id. This 

court then held “that the circuit court did not err in denying 

[that defendant’s] motion for summary judgment on the AOAO’s 

negligence claims based on laches.” 115 Hawaii at 285, 167 P.3d 

at 278. Thus, there is precedent for the application of laches 

to an action at law, even though this court did not outright 

hold that the defense of laches applied to equitable and legal 

claims.

Second, in a footnote in Thomas v. Kidani, 126 Hawaii 125, 

131 n.6, 267 P.3d 1230, 1236 n.6 (2011), this court acknowledged 

that Adair held that the statute of limitations applies to legal 

actions, and laches applies to equitable actions. The court 

then noted that the plaintiff in the Thomas case “d[id] not 

explain the applicability of the equitable doctrine of laches to 

her legal action for fraud.” Id. This court nonetheless went 
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on, as in Newtown Meadows, to “analyze [the plaintiff’s] 

argument assuming, but not deciding, applicability.” Id. Both 

Newtown Meadows and Thomas expressly acknowledged that there 

exists a question as to whether laches is a defense to legal 

claims and expressly left open the answer. 

In answering the question, the ICA decided that laches was 

not a defense to a legal claim, and, in its analysis, quoted a 

portion of a legal encyclopedia, 27A Am. Jur. 2d. Equity § 117, 

for the following proposition: “Some courts state that laches 

is usually available only in suits strictly in equity or in 

actions at law that involve claims of an essentially equitable 

character.” Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Royal Aloha, 138 

Hawaii at 283, 378 P.3d at 998. As the Joint Defendants point 

out in their application, however, the complete quotation reads 

as follows (with emphasis on language omitted):

In jurisdictions that have retained separate courts of law 

and equity, the laches defense may be cognizable only in 

courts of equity and may be available only where equitable 

relief is sought. Laches thus only applies to defeat 

equitable actions, not actions at law. Laches particularly 

does not apply to actions for damages or the recovery of 

money or property fraudulently obtained. Likewise, in some 

states where courts have equity and chancery sides, laches 

may not apply to legal actions, which include declaratory 

judgment actions or claims for damages for nonperformance 

of a contract.

While some states without separate law and equity courts 

nevertheless hold laches inapplicable to legal actions, 

laches is increasingly applied to actions at law, such as 

actions seeking only damages. Some courts state that 

laches is usually available only in suits strictly in 

equity or in actions at law that involve claims of an 

essentially equitable character.
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27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 117 (emphasis added and footnote 

omitted). The Joint Defendants argue that, in omitting the 

emphasized language, the ICA’s opinion “rewrites Hawaii law, is 

inconsistent with Hawaii law and better-reasoned federal and 

state case law, and is contrary to the judicial trend permitting 

laches to apply to all claims –- at least in jurisdictions in 

which courts of equity and law have merged –- which includes 

Hawaii.” 

The Joint Defendants’ argument is persuasive. Law and 

equity merged under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

(“FRCP”) in 1938. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 

846 (1999). Since that time, in the federal courts on the civil 

side, “There is one form of action —- the civil action.” Hawaii 

adopted the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (“HRCP”), patterned 

after the FRCP, in 1954. See You Dong Men v. Cho Kyung Ai, 41 

Haw. 574, 575 (Haw. Terr. 1957). This court specifically 

recognized the “aboli[tion of] courts of equity and courts of 

law in this jurisdiction,” noting that both have been “merged . 

. . into one ‘court’ which has cognizance over all civil 

matters.” Lau v. Valu-Bilt Homes, Ltd., 59 Haw. 283, 291, 582 

P.2d 195, 201 (1978). This court noted that “there is now no 

distinction between the forms of actions previously cognizable 

in courts of law or in courts of equity. With the adoption of 
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the HRCP, there is now but one form of action called the ‘civil 

action.’ HRCP Rule 2.” 59 Haw. at 291-92, 582 P.2d at 201. 

This court did go on to state, “These developments in the civil 

procedure of our courts, however, do not eliminate the 

substantive principles which differentiate actions of an 

equitable nature from those that are legal in nature.” Id. 

These statements seem to contradict each other and leave open 

the question of whether laches is applicable only in equity or 

at law as well.

We now hold that laches is a defense in all civil actions, 

in accordance with the modern trend. The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained the modern trend to 

apply laches to legal and equitable claims as follows:

Laches is an equitable doctrine but one increasingly 

applied in cases at law (such as this case, since the 

plaintiff is seeking only damages) as well. Not only is 

there a long tradition of applying equitable defenses in 

cases at law –- indeed, fraud itself is an equitable 

defense typically interposed in suits at law for breach of 

contract –- but with the merger of law and equity (Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 2) there is no longer a good reason to distinguish 

between the legal and equitable character of defenses. . . 

.

Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1991). Other 

jurisdictions are in accord. See also Teamsters, 283 F.3d at 

881 (“[A]s with many equitable defenses, the defense of laches 

is equally available in suits at law.”) (citations omitted); 

Hickerson v. Vessels, 316 P.3d 620, 622 (Colo. 2014) (“[O]ur 

case law, since early statehood, recognizes the application of 
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equitable remedies [in this case, laches] to legal claims.”); 

Bill, 812 N.E.2d at 612 (“While we agree that traditionally, 

statutes of limitations were generally applied to legal actions 

and the laches doctrine was applied to those actions based in 

equity, such ‘mechanical’ applications are no longer followed.”) 

(citation omitted); Dep’t of Banking and Finance v. Wilken, 352 

N.W.2d 145, 149 (Neb. 1984) (Holding that the defense of laches 

was applicable in a contract action as follows: “The common-law

rule is that equitable defenses cannot be used to defeat an 

action at law based on contract; however, we have not accepted 

that position, but, on the contrary, we have held that any 

defense, whether it be legal or equitable, may be set up in any 

case.”) (citations omitted); Moore v. Starcher, 280 S.E.2d 693, 

696 (W.Va. 1981) (“As an equitable concept, this theory is known 

as laches and it has been infused as well into actions at law.”) 

(citation omitted); McDaniel v. Messerschmidt, 382 P.2d 304, 307 

(Kan. 1963) (“Although plaintiff contends the doctrine of laches 

does not apply to pure actions at law, which he claims this to 

be, and applies only to suits in equity, our cases do not 

support his theory.”). We now adopt the rule that laches is a 

defense to any civil action, which includes both legal or 

equitable claims. In this case, the AOAO does not challenge the 

circuit court’s factual findings underlying its conclusion that 

its unreasonable delay prejudiced the defendants. Therefore, we 
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affirm the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment, on 

the basis of laches, in favor of all the defendants on all of 

the AOAO’s claims.

V. Conclusion

We now hold that, in this jurisdiction, laches is a defense 

to legal and equitable claims alike. We therefore reverse the 

ICA’s August 24, 2016 Judgment on Appeal, and affirm the circuit 

court’s “Amended Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting 

Defendant Certified Management’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

Filed 8/5/14 and Order Granting Joinder by: Defendant Chaney 

Brooks & Company, LLC to Defendant Certified Management Inc.’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed 8/12/14” entered on October 

10, 2014. 

John D. Zalewski /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

and Mark G. Valencia

for Petitioner/Defendant- /s/ Paula A. Nakayama

Appellee Certified

Management, Inc. /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna 

Thomas J. Wong /s/ Richard W. Pollack

and James H.Q. Lee

for Petitioner/ /s/ Michael D. Wilson

Defendant-Appellee

Chaney Brooks & Company, LLC

Yuriko Jane Sugimura

for Petitioners/DefendantsAppellees Michael David Bruser,

Tokyo Joe’s, Inc., Michael

T. McCormack, and Signa S.

McCormack

Matt A. Tsukazaki

for Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant