State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: December 1, 2016 D-68-16 

___________________________________

In the Matter of DOUGLAS D.

 SHEEHAN, a Suspended Attorney. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 ON MOTION

(Attorney Registration No. 3039476)

___________________________________

Calendar Date: October 17, 2016

Before: McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Egan Jr., Rose and Devine, JJ.

__________

Monica A. Duffy, Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third

Judicial Department, Albany (Michael K. Creaser of counsel), for

Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department.

__________

Per Curiam.

Respondent, a resident of Connecticut, was admitted to

practice in that jurisdiction in 1999. He was admitted to the

practice of law by this Court in 2000.

Following respondent's indefinite interim suspension from

the practice of law by order of the Superior Court of Connecticut

in November 2009, this Court, by order entered April 8, 2010,

similarly placed respondent on interim suspension until further

order of the Court (72 AD3d 1270 [2010]). Respondent has not

applied for reinstatement and said suspension remains in effect. 

This Court has now been advised that respondent was convicted in

November 2010 of conspiracy to commit wire fraud (see 18 USC §

1349) and wire fraud (see 18 USC § 1343) in the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut. Further, in

2011, respondent pleaded guilty in Connecticut to operation of a

motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter

DWI), which, due to respondent's previous 2006 DWI conviction, is

deemed a felony in Connecticut (see Connecticut General Statutes
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§ 14-227a; see also McCoy v Commissioner of Public Safety, 300

Conn 144 [2011]). In November 2013, respondent agreed to an

order extending his suspension from the practice of law in

Connecticut. To date, said suspension remains in place.

The Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial

Department (hereinafter AGC) now moves pursuant to Judiciary Law

§ 90 (4) (a) and (b) for an order striking respondent's name from

the roll of attorneys on the basis that he has been automatically

disbarred due to his felony convictions. Alternatively, AGC

moves pursuant to Uniform Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters

(22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 to impose discipline upon respondent in this

state based upon his suspension in Connecticut.1 Respondent has

not replied or otherwise responded to AGC's motion.

 As relevant herein, "[a]n attorney convicted of a felony

in [a foreign jurisdiction that is] essentially similar to a New

York felony is automatically disbarred" (Matter of Park, 95 AD3d

1648, 1648 [2012]; see Judiciary Law § 90 [4] [a], [e]). While

we do not find that respondent's federal felony convictions of

wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud meet this standard

under the circumstances herein (see Matter of Mueller, 129 AD3d

1293, 1294 [2015]), we are persuaded that respondent's 2011

felony DWI conviction in Connecticut is essentially similar to

the New York felony of DWI in violation of Vehicle and Traffic

Law § 1192 (2) and (3) and § 1193 (1) (c). Similar to those New

York statutes, the elements of Connecticut General Statutes § 14-

227a include the requirements of operating a motor vehicle while

1 AGC also notes that respondent failed to notify this

Court of any of his convictions as required by Judiciary Law § 90

(4) (c); nor did he file a copy of the 2013 Connecticut

disciplinary order with this Court within 30 days as required by

Rules of the Appellate Division, Third Department (22 NYCRR)

former § 806.19 (b) (see Uniform Rules for Attorney Disciplinary

Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.13 [d]). Additionally, respondent is

currently delinquent in this state with respect to his biennial

attorney registration obligation (see Judiciary Law § 468-a [5];

Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 8.4 [d];

Rules of Chief Admin of Cts [22 NYCRR] § 118.1 [h]).
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under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol content of

.08% or more by weight of alcohol. Moreover, Connecticut and New

York law both elevate such a conviction to a felony where there

has been a previous DWI conviction within the past 10 years

(compare Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 [1] [c], with Connecticut

General Statutes § 14-227a [g] [2] and McCoy v Commissioner of

Public Safety, 300 Conn at 145). Consequently, it is our view

that respondent's Connecticut DWI conviction is a proper

predicate for automatic disbarment pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90

(4) (b) as an analogue felony. Thus, our sole ministerial

obligation herein is to publicly confirm respondent's disbarred

status by now striking his name from the roll of attorneys nunc

pro tunc to the date of his guilty plea, July 1, 2011 (see Matter

of Dawson, 133 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2015]; Matter of Sanderson, 119

AD3d 1318, 1318 [2014]).

Finally, given this result, it is unnecessary to address

AGC's alternative request for the imposition of discipline based

upon respondent's 2013 suspension in Connecticut.

McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Egan Jr., Rose and Devine, JJ.,

concur.

ORDERED that the motion of the Attorney Grievance Committee

for the Third Judicial Department is granted in part and denied

in part in accordance with the findings set forth in this

decision; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent's name is hereby stricken from the

roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law of the State of New York,

effective nunc pro tunc to July 1, 2011; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent is commanded to desist and refrain

from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or as

agent, clerk or employee of another; and respondent is hereby

forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any

court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public

authority, or to give to another an opinion as to the law or its

application, or any advice in relation thereto; and it is further
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ORDERED that respondent shall comply with the provisions of

the Uniform Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters regulating

the conduct of disbarred attorneys (see Uniform Rules for

Attorney Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.15).

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court