J-S90039-16

2016 PA Super 270

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

VAUGHN NEAL,

Appellant No. 2656 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 1, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Municipal Court - Traffic Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0040246-2014

BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J. AND JENKINS, J.

OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016

Vaughn Neal appeals from an order entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his petition for writ of certiorari. Neal 

argued in his certiorari petition that the Philadelphia Municipal Court 

erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his person 

at the time of his arrest. We remand for further proceedings, including entry 

of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Municipal Court.

On November 28, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint 

in the Municipal Court charging Neal with knowing and intentional possession 

of a controlled substance (“simple possession”).1 On April 10, 2015, Neal 

presented a motion to suppress in the Municipal Court, claiming that the 

police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain, frisk or search him and lacked 

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1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
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probable cause to seize a Bic lighter from his person or open the lighter to 

search its interior.2 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Honorable 

Jacqueline Frazier-Lyde denied the motion to suppress without entering 

findings of fact or conclusions of law. Judge Frazier-Lyde simply announced: 

“Motion to suppress denied.” N.T., 4/10/15, at 14-15. 

On May 1, 2015, Neal proceeded to trial before another Municipal 

Court judge, who found him guilty of simple possession and sentenced him 

to six months’ probation. 

On May 29, 2015, Neal filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing that the Municipal Court 

erroneously decided the motion to suppress. Initially, the Court of Common 

Pleas granted Neal’s petition, but the Commonwealth moved for 

reconsideration. On July 31, 2015, the Court of Common Pleas granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration and denied Neal’s petition. Neal 

filed a timely appeal to this Court, and both Neal and the Court of Common 

Pleas complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Neal raises two issues in this appeal:

1. Did not the courts below err in denying [] Neal’s motion to 

suppress physical evidence, where a police officer stopped [] 

Neal simply because he had exited a car that the police officer 

knew had been involved with drug activity in the past?

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2 The parties allege that the arresting officer found packets of crack cocaine 

stored inside the lighter. 
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2. Did not the courts below err in denying [] Neal’s motion to 

suppress physical evidence, where a police officer searched [] 

Neal’s cigarette lighter, a closed container without a warrant, or 

warrant exception?

Brief For Appellant, at 3.

Because Judge Frazier-Lyde failed to enter findings of fact or 

conclusions of law, we remand the case with instructions for Judge FrazierLyde to enter these findings and conclusions. We explain our decision as 

follows.

A suppression hearing is an evidentiary proceeding in which “the 

Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence 

and of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in 

violation of the defendant’s rights. The defendant may testify at such 

hearing ...” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). At the conclusion of the suppression 

hearing, “the judge shall enter on the record a statement of findings of fact 

and conclusions of law as to whether the evidence was obtained in violation 

of the defendant’s rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute, and 

shall make an order granting or denying the relief sought.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

581(I).

When the Municipal Court (1) denies a motion to suppress, (2) finds 

the defendant guilty of a crime, and (3) imposes sentence, the defendant 

has the right either to request a trial de novo or to file a petition for a writ of 

certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

1006(1)(a). If the defendant files a certiorari petition challenging the denial 
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of a suppression motion, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

sits as an appellate court and reviews the record of the suppression hearing 

in the Municipal Court. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118–

19 (Pa.Super.2011); Commonwealth v. Menezes, 871 A.2d 204, 207 n. 2 

(Pa.Super.2005). Importantly, when performing this appellate review, the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County applies precisely the same 

standard that the Superior Court applies in appeals from common pleas 

court orders denying motions to suppress. Specifically,

[the court of common pleas] is limited to determining whether 

the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, [the court of common pleas] may consider 

only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in 

the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression 

court’s factual findings are supported by the record, [the court of 

common pleas is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse 

only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the 

appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on 

allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal 

conclusions are not binding on the court [of common pleas], 

whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the 

court[] below are subject to [ ] plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010). The scope of 

review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record created 

at the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa.2013).

In prior decisions, when courts of common pleas have denied 

suppression motions without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
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we have vacated the order denying suppression and remanded with 

instructions for the suppression judge to enter findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 703 

(Pa.Super.2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 68 

(Pa.Super.2003)). The same remedy should apply when the Municipal Court 

denies a suppression motion and the defendant subsequently files a petition 

for writ of certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. 

Just as this Court cannot perform appellate review of a common pleas order 

denying a suppression motion until the common pleas court enters findings 

of fact and conclusions of law, Landis, Menezes, supra, neither can the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County perform appellate review of a 

Municipal Court order denying a suppression motion until the Municipal Court 

enters findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Because the Municipal Court failed to enter findings of fact and 

conclusions of law into this record, we order the following:

(1) The order denying Neal’s petition for writ of certiorari is vacated;

(2) This case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County with instructions to remand the case to the Municipal 

Court with instructions that Judge Frazier-Lyde enter findings of fact and 

conclusions of law;

(3) Following entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County shall reconsider Neal’s 
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petition for writ of certiorari by reviewing the evidentiary record in 

accordance with the standards articulated in Jones and L.J.;

3

and

(4) We relinquish jurisdiction. Landis, 89 A.3d at 704 n. 10 (“given 

our disposition of this appeal, we decline to retain jurisdiction for the 

purposes of the filing of a statement of the court’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law with respect to the suppression issue”).

Order denying Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari vacated. Case 

remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

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3

In Landis, we took the additional steps of vacating the common pleas 

court’s order denying the motion to suppress and the defendant’s judgment 

of sentence. These steps are not necessary in the present case.

In Landis, the court of common pleas did not enter findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, but it subsequently filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that 

applied the wrong standard (reasonable suspicion instead of probable 

cause). Therefore, we “vacate[d] the order denying Appellant's motion to 

suppress for reconsideration of the evidence in light of the probable cause 

standard and the filing of a statement of its findings of fact and conclusions 

of law.” Id., 89 A.3d at 703.

Here, unlike Landis, there is no indication that Judge Frazier-Lyde applied 

the wrong standard to Neal’s motion to suppress. She simply neglected to 

enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. The entry of these findings and 

conclusions is the only step that is necessary to complete the record for 

appellate review by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016