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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

LORA L. THAXTON, M.D., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 6, 2016 

v No. 327545 

Monroe Circuit Court 

KEVIN W. BLANCHARD, LC No. 08-032453-DM 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and MURRAY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this divorce matter, plaintiff, Lora L. Thaxton, M.D., appeals as of right the trial 

court’s order regarding child support. In the same order, the trial court found Thaxton in 

contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred by defendant, 

Kevin W. Blanchard, litigating the issue. We affirm. 

I. CHILD SUPPORT 

 Thaxton first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it found her income for 

purposes of child support was $154,478.90 in the year 2013. We disagree. “Generally, child 

support orders . . . are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”1

 But “factual findings underlying 

the trial court’s decisions are reviewed for clear error.”2

 In this case, the trial court had previously entered an order requiring the parties to submit 

their tax returns to the Friend of the Court (FOC) annually, which the FOC would use to 

recalculate child support each year. Thaxton’s 2013 tax returns stated income, after deductions, 

of approximately $55,000; Blanchard’s income was approximately $70,000. Based on these tax 

returns, the FOC found that Blanchard should pay $73 monthly in child support for the parties’ 

two children. Blanchard objected to the FOC’s recommendation. Blanchard believed that 

Thaxton, a doctor licensed to practice in six states and who owned her own practice, had 

voluntarily reduced her income in 2013, making it proper to impute income to Thaxton. 

 

1 Clarke v Clarke, 297 Mich App 172, 178-179; 823 NW2d 318 (2012). 

2 Id. at 179. 
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 After a long discovery process,3

 the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Thaxton 

testified that she accurately reported her income in her tax returns. Karl Haiser, a certified public 

accountant and expert in forensic accounting, testified that this was not the case. After reviewing 

Thaxton’s bank statements and comparing what he discovered to Thaxton’s tax returns, Haiser 

determined that Thaxton had underreported her income by nearly $100,000 in 2013. The trial 

court found Haiser’s testimony credible. The trial court ordered the FOC to recalculate the child 

support obligation using Haiser’s figure of $154,478.90 as Thaxton’s income for 2013. As a 

result, Thaxton was ordered to pay approximately $900 a month in child support. 

 Thaxton argues that Haiser’s analysis was flawed because he did not consider her 

business expenses, which are deductible from her income. Thaxton is incorrect. Haiser began 

with Thaxton’s own tax returns, which, as Thaxton testified, included her business expenses as 

deductions. After examining the bank records and finding additional, unreported income, Haiser 

added the amount of unreported income to the final number reached by Thaxton. Thus, in both 

Thaxton’s returns and in Haiser’s analysis, Thaxton’s business deductions were taken into 

account, and in the precise amount reported by Thaxton.4

 The remainder of Thaxton’s argument goes to whether the trial court erred by finding 

Haiser credible, and Thaxton not believable. This Court defers to the trial court on matters of 

credibility, as the trial court is able to see and hear the witnesses that testify before it, and thus, is 

in a much better position to make such determinations.5 Thaxton presents no reason to deviate 

from this well-accepted principle. 

 We also note that in her brief on appeal, Thaxton makes a number of false factual 

assertions. She contends that the trial court was “unaware of the prior order” requiring the 

parties to submit tax information to the FOC each year for a determination of child support. But 

the trial court was very aware of the existence of the order. In fact, the trial court quoted this 

very order at length in its opinion after the evidentiary hearing. Thaxton claims that Haiser had 

“never performed accounting services for a medical practice[.]” Haiser testified that in his 

accounting practice, two of his clients were medical practices. 

 Thaxton also notes that Haiser did not have the benefit of reviewing “tax returns or profit 

and loss statements for” her business. But she omits to mention that she repeatedly informed the 

trial court that she had provided all of her tax returns to Blanchard, and she testified that the tax 

information and bank records she provided were all that was needed to determine her income.6

 

 

3

 The discovery process is discussed in more detail in Part II of this opinion. 

4

 It is unclear how Thaxton could have any confusion regarding this issue. At the evidentiary 

hearing, Haiser specifically explained to the trial court and to Thaxton that his calculations took 

Thaxton’s business expenses into account, and that he “accepted her expenses as reported.” 

5 Butler v Simmons-Butler, 308 Mich App 195, 200; 863 NW2d 677 (2014); Shann v Shann, 293 

Mich App 302, 305; 809 NW2d 435 (2011). 

6

 As Thaxton testified at the evidentiary hearing: 
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Thus, according to Thaxton’s own testimony, these profit and loss statements were not relevant.7

 

Thaxton also implies that the trial court punished her for proceeding without counsel. Nothing in 

the record would suggest that this is true. Rather, the trial court gave Thaxton considerable 

leeway and many opportunities to comply with its orders. In sum, none of Thaxton’s arguments 

are credible, and all are without merit. 

II. CONTEMPT REGARDING DISCOVERY 

 Thaxton next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found her in 

contempt and sanctioned her for violating several discovery-related orders. We disagree. A trial 

court’s issuance of a contempt order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.8

 Issues of law 

related to the contempt decision are reviewed de novo.9

 

 As this Court has explained: 

 There is inherent power in the courts, to the full extent that it existed in the 

courts of England at the common law, independent of, as well as by reason of 

statute, which is merely declaratory and in affirmation thereof, to adjudge and 

punish for contempt. . . . Such inherent power extends not only to contempt 

committed in the presence of the court, but also to constructive contempt arising 

from refusal of defendant to comply with an order of the court. Such power, 

being inherent and a part of the judicial power of constitutional courts, cannot be 

limited or taken away by act of the legislature nor is it dependent on legislative 

provision for its validity or procedures to effectuate it.[10]

By statute, our legislature has also provided the circuit courts with the power to hold parties in 

contempt for “disobeying any lawful order, decree, or process of the court.”11 If such 

“misconduct has caused an actual loss or injury to any person the court shall order the defendant 

to pay such person a sufficient sum to indemnify him, in addition to the other penalties which are 

imposed upon the defendant.”12 In addition, a trial court may require a party to pay the opposing 

Q. Okay, is all the information about your gross income in those statements? 

A. Every bit of information that you requested and that is relevant to this case for 

2013 is reflected in my bank statements and my tax returns. 

7

 Nor did Haiser believe that these statements would have been of any relevance. Haiser 

explained that “the bank statements are really the final proof of what the income is because that’s 

what went in the bank and that’s all I needed for my report.” 

8 In re Moroun, 295 Mich App 312, 335; 814 NW2d 319 (2012). 

9 Id. at 336. 

10 In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 243 Mich App 697, 708-709; 624 NW2d 443 (2000), 

quoting In re Huff, 352 Mich 402, 415-416; 91 NW2d 613 (1958). 

11 MCL 600.1701(g). 

12 MCL 600.1721. 
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party’s reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by that party’s failure to comply 

with discovery.13 

 Thaxton largely contends that, contrary to the trial court’s determination, she did comply 

with court orders and the discovery process. Thaxton is incorrect. Thaxton disobeyed the trial 

court’s orders related to the disclosure of her financial information and failed to appear for at 

least two hearings ordered by the court. At the outset, Thaxton objected to producing her tax 

information for 2011, 2012, and 2013, arguing that it was irrelevant and that there was an 

existing order protecting the information. After explaining to Thaxton that both of her objections 

were meritless,14 Thaxton agreed to provide her tax information if Blanchard did the same. The 

Court ordered the exchange of information within the following three days. But the day before 

she was to give her tax documents to Blanchard, Thaxton filed a motion for reconsideration. She 

argued that her tax information should remain private, despite having agreed to exchange her 

information two days earlier. Although the trial court’s order still stood, Thaxton did not provide 

her tax information to Blanchard, who had himself complied with the trial court’s order. This 

prompted Blanchard to file a motion to compel compliance with the order. 

 Thaxton did not appear for the hearing on the motion, at which the trial court formally 

denied the motion for reconsideration.15 At a hearing held about a week later, Thaxton appeared 

with what she claimed were all of her tax documents. She provided these to Blanchard’s counsel 

at the hearing, but only after obtaining a court order that the documents not be disseminated. 

However, at the following hearing, Blanchard’s counsel explained that Thaxton failed to include 

1099s as the trial court had ordered. At this hearing, Thaxton provided her 1099 forms for 2013, 

 

13 See MCR 2.313(B)(2). “For purposes of this subrule an evasive or incomplete answer is to be 

treated as a failure to answer.” MCR 2.313(A)(4). 

14 As the trial court explained, the protective order Thaxton referenced did not survive the 

divorce judgment, which entered prior to the proceedings at issue in this case. As for relevancy, 

Thaxton contended that because the issue was her 2013 income, her 2012 and 2011 tax 

information was irrelevant. As the trial court explained to Thaxton on multiple occasions, 

Blanchard’s primary theory was that Thaxton had voluntarily reduced her income in 2013. Thus, 

the prior years’ returns and financial information were relevant to establish whether any income 

should be imputed to Thaxton. See, e.g., 2013 MCSF 2.01(G)(2)(k) (as one of many factors to 

be considered when determining “the amount of potential income that [a] parent could earn,” the 

court should ask “[w]hether there has been a significant reduction in income compared to the 

period that preceded the filing of the . . . motion for modification.”). 

15 Thaxton had apparently sent a motion seeking to adjourn the hearing or to permit her to appear 

by telephone to Blanchard, but the motion was not received by the trial court. Thaxton later 

maintained that this motion was shown on the trial court’s register of actions. It is not. 

Thaxton’s response to the motion to compel is shown in the register of actions, but this motion 

contained no request for an adjournment or to appear by telephone. Regardless, the trial court 

attempted to contact Thaxton by telephone for approximately 30 minutes, but was unable to 

reach her. 
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but not for 2012 or 2011. It does not appear that Thaxton ever provided these missing 

documents to Blanchard, in violation of the trial court’s order. 

 Thaxton was also evasive with respect to Blanchard’s discovery requests for information 

related to her income. After Thaxton provided unresponsive answers to Blanchard’s discovery 

requests, Thaxton was ordered to supplement her responses. She did supplement her responses, 

but provided no additional information.16 This led to the trial court ordering her to provide either 

three years of bank statements or a signed release that would allow Blanchard to obtain the 

statements himself. The idea of a release came to pass after Thaxton objected to producing the 

bank statements herself on the basis that doing so would be too onerous a task. Despite her 

objection, Thaxton was able to provide the statements at the next hearing. But she also 

apparently had enough time to go through the statements and black out the portions she did not 

want to disclose, leading to the court ordering her to produce unadulterated bank statements. 

 At this same hearing, Blanchard provided two years of bank statements, and signed a 

release to allow Thaxton to obtain the missing year. Although it was abundantly clear that the 

issue of financial information was limited to a three-year period, and despite Blanchard having 

provided statements for two of these three years, Thaxton attempted to subpoena Blanchard’s 

bank records for a six-year period, from 2008 through 2014.17 At a subsequent hearing that 

Thaxton failed to attend in person, the subpoena was quashed, and Thaxton held in contempt for 

her blatant violation of the trial court’s orders. 

 The result of Thaxton’s unwillingness to divulge financial information was that 

Blanchard was forced to retain an expert to examine the tax information and bank statements that 

were eventually made available to him. This led to the realization that Thaxton had not reported 

all of her income on her tax returns, which were the documents utilized by the FOC to determine 

child support each year. Thaxton’s evasiveness and false reporting of income was also the 

ultimate cause of Blanchard’s attorney fees spent litigating this matter. The trial court 

appropriately required Thaxton to pay a portion of Blanchard’s attorney fees and expert witness 

fees caused by her various refusals to comply with the trial court’s orders. 

 

16 Specifically, when asked for her “gross monthly income . . . and all deductions made 

therefrom” for a period of 24 months, Thaxton responded that she did not have a monthly 

income. When later ordered to supplement her responses, she explained that she had “no regular 

monthly income. I do not draw a salary. I do not receive a paycheck. As funds are needed to 

pay recurring personal expenses and are available after payment of necessary business expenses 

[sic].” However, at the evidentiary hearing, Thaxton admitted that she understood that gross 

monthly income would include all income to her business in a one-month period. She then 

explained that she did not track her gross monthly income. 

17 Thaxton later claimed that she did so in an effort to obtain information relevant to a possible 

future motion regarding medical expenses. The trial court explained that this motive was 

improper, as Thaxton was attempting to use the court’s power of subpoena to go on a fishing 

expedition on an issue unrelated to the proceedings for which the trial court had stated it would 

allow a subpoena. 
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 Thaxton complains that the trial court sanctioned her for proceeding without an attorney. 

There is simply no basis for reaching such a conclusion. Clearly, the trial court sanctioned 

Thaxton for her repeated violations of its orders and her general refusal to comply with 

discovery, not her failure to obtain counsel. 

 Thaxton contends that Blanchard also violated court orders related to discovery but was 

not sanctioned, and argues that she was treated differently by the trial court for the same conduct, 

which she believes was biased against her. This is not the case. Thaxton complains that 

Blanchard did not comply with the trial court’s order regarding bank statements. But he did 

comply with the court’s ruling, providing two years of bank statements and a release for the 

third. Thaxton does correctly note that Blanchard did not timely respond to her discovery 

requests. But Thaxton omits to mention why this was so. Given Thaxton’s history, there was a 

concern that Blanchard would be at a strategic disadvantage if he responded to discovery 

requests without an equal exchange from Thaxton. Thus, the trial court ordered the exchange of 

discovery requests in its presence, and Blanchard complied with this order. Nor did Thaxton file 

a motion to compel responses to her discovery requests. On the whole, any violation by 

Blanchard in not initially responding to the requests paled in comparison to Thaxton’s conduct. 

The trial court’s comparative treatment of Thaxton and Blanchard does not demonstrate any bias. 

 Again implying that the trial court treated her unfairly, Thaxton contends that the “final 

straw for the [trial] court was apparently a false, and evidently malicious, report delivered to him 

that I had filed a complaint against him.” Again, Thaxton provides an incomplete recitation of 

the record. At the final pretrial conference, the trial court informed Thaxton that the clerk’s 

office had stated that Thaxton filed a complaint against the presiding judge, and asked if this 

were true. The presiding judge made this inquiry because it would bear on whether he could 

continue to hear the matter. But contrary to Thaxton’s argument on appeal, after Thaxton 

explained that she had not filed any such complaint, the presiding judge explained that he would 

put the matter out of mind and assume that the clerk’s office had miscommunicated what 

occurred. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this apparently erroneous report had any 

effect on the proceedings. 

 On the whole, Thaxton offers no supportable arguments that would call the trial court’s 

decision into question. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order requiring Thaxton to pay 

attorney fees and expert witness fees to Blanchard. 

III. CONTEMPT REGARDING ORTHODONTIC TREATMENT 

 In the final issue raised in this appeal, Thaxton contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it found her in contempt for making a unilateral decision regarding orthodontic 

treatment for the parties’ oldest child, DB. We disagree. 

 DB began seeing Dr. Carl Wheeler in 2011. In 2014, Thaxton and Blanchard had many 

conversations via email regarding Wheeler’s recommendation that DB receive braces. In 

multiple emails, Blanchard asked for a cost estimate and objected to the treatment until he 

received the estimate. Blanchard also found another orthodontist who, unlike Wheeler, would 

have been an in-network provider under Blanchard’s insurance policy, which covered DB’s 

orthodontic care. Blanchard asked Thaxton for her availability to meet with this orthodontist. 
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Thaxton, however, ignored the email, and instead, chose to have Wheeler install DB’s braces. 

Blanchard then filed a motion asking the trial court to hold Thaxton in contempt for making a 

unilateral decision regarding DB’s medical care despite the fact that in the divorce judgment, the 

parties were given joint legal custody. After hearing evidence on the issue, the trial court agreed 

that Thaxton’s decision was in violation of the divorce judgment, and ordered Thaxton to pay the 

entire out-of-pocket cost of Wheeler’s treatment. 

 Thaxton disputes the trial court’s factual finding that she did not have Blanchard’s 

consent to go forward with Wheeler’s treatment, claiming that this “was clearly not true.” In her 

brief on appeal, Thaxton makes a number of factual assertions that, were they true, would tend to 

undermine the trial court’s conclusion. However, all of Thaxton’s factual representations are 

false. Thaxton states that Blanchard testified that he did, in fact, see an estimate of the cost of 

Wheeler’s treatment. But when presented with a copy of a cost estimate at the hearing, 

Blanchard testified that he had never before seen the document. Thaxton also contends that 

“Blanchard admitted that the estimate of costs was sent to him at both his work e-mail and his 

personal e-mail . . . .” At the portion of the record cited by Thaxton, Blanchard was asked if he 

remembered receiving emails in 2011 and 2012. The cost estimate Thaxton contends was 

emailed to Blanchard is dated October 22, 2013, and thus, could not have been provided in the 

emails sent to Blanchard. Thaxton claims that Blanchard acknowledged that Thaxton had 

discussed finances and insurance coverage with him. But at the part of the record she cites, no 

such discussion is mentioned. Rather, Blanchard testified that he received an explanation of 

benefits after the braces were installed. 

 Overall, Thaxton’s argument is entirely meritless. Rather, the record shows that 

Blanchard did not consent to Wheeler’s treatment, and that his lack of consent was clearly and 

unequivocally communicated to Thaxton. Despite having joint legal custody over DB, Thaxton 

ignored Blanchard’s wishes and made a significant medical decision entirely on her own. Under 

the circumstances, the trial court chose a reasonable sanction: Thaxton was ordered to pay the 

entire out-of-pocket cost of the medical treatment she chose. Thaxton fails to demonstrate that 

this outcome is an abuse of discretion. 

IV. FURTHER SANCTIONS 

 After reading Thaxton’s filings in this Court, we conclude that sanctions are appropriate 

pursuant to MCR 7.216(C)(1)(b). Under this rule: 

(1) The Court of Appeals may, on its own initiative or on the motion of any party 

filed under MCR 7.211(C)(8), assess actual and punitive damages or take other 

disciplinary action when it determines that an appeal or any of the proceedings in 

an appeal was vexatious because 

* * * 
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(b) a pleading, motion, argument, brief, document, or record filed in the case or 

any testimony presented in the case was grossly lacking in the requirements of 

propriety, violated court rules, or grossly disregarded the requirements of a fair 

presentation of the issues to the court.[18]

 As is explained throughout this opinion, Thaxton has consistently misrepresented the 

facts of this matter. She makes factual assertions that are directly contradicted by the record. 

She also provides incomplete statements of fact that seem to be made in an effort to mislead this 

Court into believing that she is the victim of unfair treatment by the trial court. In reality, despite 

her contumacious behavior, the trial court was rather forgiving, providing her multiple 

opportunities to comply with its directives and acquiescing to her demands for protective orders 

that seem entirely unnecessary. We conclude that Thaxton’s appellate brief is “grossly lacking 

in the requirements of propriety” and “grossly disregarded the requirements of a fair presentation 

of the issues to the court.” As such, we award Blanchard damages not exceeding his “actual 

damages and expenses incurred” on appeal, “including reasonable attorney fees . . . .”19 

V. CONCLUSION 

 The trial court’s order is affirmed. Having concluded that Blanchard is entitled to the 

actual damages and expenses incurred pursuing this appeal, pursuant to MCR 7.216(C)(2), we 

remand the matter for a determination of Blanchard’s actual damages, including reasonable 

attorney fees. The trial court shall enter an order awarding damages to Blanchard in the amount 

it determines he incurred defending this appeal. 

 We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

 

18 MCR 7.216(C)(1)(b). 

19 MCR 7.216(C)(2).