IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY

UCHEAMAKA MBA, :

: C.A. No: K14A-06-008 RBY

Appellant, :

:

v. :

:

BAYHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER, :

INC., :

:

Appellee. :

Submitted: November 3, 2014

Decided: December 5, 2014

Upon Consideration of Appellant’s Appeal from

the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board

AFFIRMED 

ORDER

Ucheamaka MBA, Pro se. 

E. Chaney Hall, Esquire, Greenburg Traurig, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Pro

Hac Vice Johnine P. Barnes, Esquire, Washington, DC for Appellee. 

Paige J. Schmittinger, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,

Wilmington, Delaware for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 

Young, J.
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

2

SUMMARY

Ucheamaka Mba (“Appellant”) appeals from a decision of the Unemployment

Insurance Appeal Board (“the Board”), denying her application for unemployment

insurance compensation. Appellant filed a claim for benefits in January 2014,

following a prolonged absence from her position at Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc.

(“Appellee”). The heart of this appeal is controlled by 19 Del. Code § 3314(2),

providing that employees who voluntarily quit their jobs without good cause shall be

disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The resolution of thismatterrests

upon whether the Board properly found that Appellant’s indefinite leave, and

subsequent filing for unemployment insurance, fit the scenario contemplated by the

statute. This Court is to reverse the ruling of the Board only if the opinion was not

based in substantial evidence, or was the result of legal error. Finding neither to be

the case, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Board.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Appellant began working for Appellee on April 9, 2010, as a Nursing

Assistant/Unit Secretary. By her own request, Appellant switched to part-time status,

starting on July 18, 2010. On October 24, 2010, Appellant, again of her own accord,

asked for an additional reduction in hours, switching to what is known as “relief”

status. Citing her husband’s travel schedule, Appellant took advantage of Appellee’s

policy of allowing employees to take a six month, unpaid leave of absence, wherein

the employee’s position is held open for her. Alternatively, the employee is able to

reapply as an internal hire when ready. Appellant was granted such leave on March

6, 2013.
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

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During this time, Appellee was in regular contact with Appellant, discussing,

among other things, Appellant’s expected time frame for returning to work. Appellant

initially stated she would be returning in September or October. Having not heard

from Appellant, Appellee’s representative, Debbie Hines (“Hines”), contacted

Appellant in October 2013. By email dated October 20, 2013, Appellant informed

Hines that she would not be able to return to work until December, as her mother had

recently passed away. Hines responded that Appellant would be placed on

“administrative separation,” as the six months had now expired, but that she was free

to reapply at any time. Although there is some discord between the parties as to the

exact meaning of Appellant’s reply email dated October 23, 2013, it can at least be

said Appellant acknowledged the separation, promising to be in touch once the

funeral arrangements were completed. On October 28, 2013, Appellant received a

letter from Appellee, memorializing the administrative separation. This letter did not,

however, mention the possibility of re-application. Following this exchange, it is

undisputed that Appellant never attempted reinstatement with Appellee. 

Upon the completion of the funeral arrangements for her mother, Appellant

applied for unemployment insurance benefits in January 2014. This claim was denied,

and Appellant appealed. On March 4, 2014, the Appeals Referee determined that

Appellant was, indeed, eligible for unemployment benefits. The Referee based her

decision on 19 Del. Code § 3314(2), holding that Appellant had not been discharged

for just cause, and thus, could rightfully receive the insurance payments. Appellee

appealed this decision to the Board, which reversed the ruling of the Appeals Referee.

This time, the Board applied 19 Del. Code § 3314(1), finding that Appellant had
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

1

 29 Del. C. §10142(d); Avon Prods. v. Lamparski, 203 A.2d 559, 560 (Del. 1972).

2

 Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (citing Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).

3

Id. (quoting Cross v. Calfano, 475 F.Supp. 896, 898 (M.D. Fla. 1979)). 

4 Delaware Transit Corp. v. Roane, 2011 WL 3793450, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 24,

2011) (quoting Straley v. Advanced Staffing, Inc., 2009 WL 1228572, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr.

30, 2009)). 

5

 Lehman Brothers Bank v. State Bank Commissioner, 937 A.2d 95, 102 (Del. 2007).

6

 Anchor Motor Freight v. Ciabattoni, 716 A.2d 154, 156 (Del. 1998).

4

voluntarily left Appellee’s employ, lacking good cause. The Board denied

Appellant’s benefits. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For administrative board appeals, this Court is limited to reviewing whether the

Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal errors.1

Substantial evidence is that which “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.”2 It is “more than a scintilla, but less than preponderance of the

evidence.”3 An abuse of discretion will be found if the board “acts arbitrarily or

capriciously...exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has

ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.”4 Where an

agency has interpreted and applied a statute, the court’s review is de novo.

5

 In the

absence of an error of law, lack of substantial evidence or abuse of discretion, the

Court will not disturb the decision of the board.6
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

7

State ex rel. Dep’t of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 297 A.2d 412, 414 (Del.

Super. Ct. 1975) (“[t]his Court does, however, review questions of law. The specific question

raised by this appeal, i.e. whether the undisputed factual situation amounted to....a voluntary

quitting of a job without good cause, is a question of law subject to review”). 

8

 19 Del. C. § 3314(1).

9

See Gsell v. Unclaimed Freight, 1995 WL 339026, at *1, n. 2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 3,

1995) (where appellant was pro se “[t]he Court has attempted to characterize [Appellant’s]

position as recognizable legal argument”). 

5

DISCUSSION

Appellant asks this Court to reverse the holding of the Board, denying her

claim for unemployment insurance. In contemplating Appellant’s request, this Court

is limited in its review of the Board’s decision to examining whether the Board based

its findings on substantial evidence, and whether any legal error was committed.

Specific to the case at bar, the Court is further asked, soundly within its reviewing

authority, to rule upon a question of law: did the Appellant, as a matter of law, leave

her position voluntarily and without good cause?7

 The factual scenario presented by the instant matter, is governed by 19 Del.

Code § 3314(1), which provides in relevant part: “[a]n individual shall be disqualified

for benefits....[f]or the week in which [the individual] left work voluntarily without

good cause attributable to such work...”8 Summarizing Appellant’s argument, it is her

position that she did not voluntarily leave her job with Appellee, but instead was

discharged.9 The definition of “voluntarily” leaving work has been specifically

distinguished frombeing discharged: “[t]he phrase voluntarily quitting means leaving
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

10 Id., at *3 (internal quotations omitted). 

6

on one’s own motion, as opposed to being discharged.”10 As such, Appellant argues,

she should not be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Appellee

counters that Appellant did, in fact, leave of her own accord, and further that she

lacked the “good cause” mandated by the controlling statute. 

The determination of whether Appellant left of her own free will or was

terminated by Appellee rests upon what Appellant understood regarding her

employment status. The Board, in making its ruling that Appellant withdrew from

work voluntarily, relied on a series of communications between Appellant and

Appellee. Both parties appear to be in agreement that on or about March 6, 2010,

Appellant temporarily made herself unavailable to Appellee. The understanding

between the parties, at that point, was that Appellant would return to the active duty

pool in a few months time. The Board reviewed an email chain between Appellant

and Hines in which Appellant requested additional time off. Although sensitive to

Appellant’s family emergency, Hines informed Appellant that, given the amount of

time she had already been absent, she would now be placed on an “administrative

separation.” Hines further instructed that Appellant should “reapply,” when she was

available to work again. Appellee also mailed a letter to Appellant, formalizing the

separation. 

The meaning of the “administrative separation,” and, more on point, what

Appellant understood this to mean, is the focal point of the dispute. The Board, in

reviewing the communications between the parties, determined Appellant

comprehended that she was not being discharged. Since she did not return to work –
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

11 See e.g., Sandefur v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.,1993 WL 389217 at * 4 (Del.

Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1993) (“an employee does have an obligation to inform an employer of

resolvable problems and to make a good faith effort to resolve them before simply leaving”);

Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 785 (Del. 2011) (an employee “must

bring the problem to the attention of someone in authority to make the necessary adjustments,

describe the problems in sufficient detail to allow for resolution, and to give the employer

enough time to correct the problem”). 

12 Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.3d 64, 66 (Del. 1965). 

13 Behr v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1995 WL 109026 at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 7,

1995).

7

even after being told she could reapply at any time – but instead filed for

unemployment insurance, the Board concluded Appellant left her job voluntarily.

Appellant’s position, meanwhile, was that the administrative separation was a

discharge. She claims that she did not make further contact with Appellee, as she

believed herself to be ineligible for work. The Board also did not find any “good

cause” for Appellant’s voluntary withdrawal. As per the Board, if, as Appellant

contends, she truly believed herself ineligible for reinstatement, it was her

responsibility to seek out Appellee to find a resolution, before simply leaving work.11

In reviewing the Board’s decision, the Court is to avoid behaving as a “trier of

fact with authority to weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, and

make its own factual findings and conclusions.”12 In the present matter, the Board

made the factual determination that, at the time Appellant applied for unemployment

insurance, she was aware and understood that Appellee had not discharged her by its

communications. To the extent this finding was based in “substantial evidence,” this

Court is to take this conclusion at face value.13 Moreover, substantial evidence is that
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

14 Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994). 

15 See e.g. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 4 (citing Appellant’s October 23, 2013 email to

Hines: “I understand that you will have to file the separation...I will keep in touch with you

when I get back”) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in the original). 

16 Gsell, 1995 WL 339026 at *2. 

17 Sandefur, 1993 WL 389217 at *2. 

18 Gsell, 1995 WL 339026 at *3.

8

which a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”14

The Board, with regard to Appellant’s understanding of her employment status

on “administrative separation,” centered its finding upon the written exchanges

between the parties. The Board engaged in a weighing of credibility between

Appellant’s interpretation of the writings, and that of Appellee’s. A reasonable trier

of fact could, based upon the language used by Appellant, determine that she

comprehended that the administrative separation did not permanently terminate her

relationship with Appellee.15 As such, this Court finds that the Board’s decision was

firmly rooted in substantial evidence.

“Whether this factual situation amounted to a voluntary quitting of the job

without cause is a question of law subject to review by this Court.”16 Although factual

findings are accepted, where supported by substantial evidence, a Court must next

inquire whether the Board applied the law correctly to these facts.17 Specific to the

matter at hand, in order to affirm the Board’s opinion, the Court must conclude that

Appellant’s understanding of her continued ability to reapply, and her subsequent

failure to do so, constitute a “conscious intention to leave or terminate the

employment.”18
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

19 1995 WL 339026 at *1. 

20 Id., at *3. 

21 Id.; see also Behr, 1995 WL 109026 at *1 (holding that employee voluntarily

abandoned his employment where he failed to report when he said he would, failed to contact the

employer for several weeks...”). 

9

 In examining the facts of this case, the Court finds it instructive to review the

Gsell v. Unclaimed Freight.

19 In holding that the evidence and factual findings of the

Board did not “substantiate a conscious intention to leave or terminate employment,”

the Gsell court was moved by “the absence of evidence that [Appellant] failed to

report on a date set by the employer or agreed to by the parties...”

20 The Gsell

employer did not communicate to the Appellant-employee adequately, the means for

her reinstatement. The Appellee here, by contrast, clearly stated that Appellant was

free to return to work. Moreover, she was being “separated” only until that time when

she was willing or able to be reinstated. The decision to reapply, appears to have been

left entirely to Appellant’s whim. The Board determined, based upon the substantial

evidence before it, that Appellant’s status was known and unambiguous to her. Her

failure to reach out to her employer was, therefore, correctly interpreted by the Board

as a “conscious intention to leave or terminate the employment.”21

The Board also reasoned that Appellant’s voluntary withdrawal from

employment was without “good cause.” Pursuant to 19 Del. Code § 3314(1), where

an employee leaves voluntarily, there must be good cause in order to qualify for

unemployment benefits. Good cause is understood to mean “such cause as would

justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

22 Sandefur, 1993 WL 389217 at *4. 

23 White v. Security Link, 658 A.2d. 619, 622 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994). 

24

 See e.g., Sandefur,1993 WL 389217 at *4 (“an employee does have an obligation to

inform an employer of resolvable problems and to make a good faith effort to resolve them

before simply leaving”); Thompson, 25 A.3d at 785(an employee “must bring the problem to the

attention of someone in authority to make the necessary adjustments, describe the problems in

sufficient detail to allow for resolution, and to give the employer enough time to correct the

problem”). 

25 White, 658 A.2d. At 622.

10

the unemployed.”22 This cause must further be “for reasons connected with

employment.”23

 In coming to this conclusion, the Board focused on the requirement that “good

cause” arises only after an effort is made by the employee, to resolve the matter

motivating her withdrawal.24 The Board stressed the many instances in which

Appellee indicated that Appellant should be in touch. Even if she were unclear about

her status during the “administrative separation,” the onus was on her to clarify the

situation. The Court is satisfied with the Board’s interpretation of the governing

statute, and its application to the facts at hand. Failing an attempt at clarification, as

courts have interpreted the statute to require, Appellant’s voluntary quitting was not

justified by good cause.

The Court understands Appellant to suggest that the “good cause” for her leave

from work was the death of her mother. As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that

the “good cause” must be “for reasons connected with employment.”25 Although

tragic, bereavement does not fall under this definition. It is necessarily, something

outside of Appellant’s employment. In an attempt to bolster her argument, Appellant
Ucheamaka Mba v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. 

C.A. No.: K14A-06-008 RBY

December 5, 2014, 2014 

26 19 Del. C. § 3314(2).

27 The Appellee, in its Answering Brief, additionally raised the argument that Appellant

should be denied unemployment compensation, as a result of having been discharged for just

cause, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2). As this Court affirms the Board’s ruling under 19 Del.

C. § 3314(1), this Court does not address the § 3314(2) argument. 

11

cites to 19 Del. Code § 3314(2), which provides in relevant part: “[a]n individual,

who is discharged from work because the individual is providing care for that

individual’s...parent with a verified illness or disability, will not be considered to

have been discharged from work for good cause...”26 Appellant certainly took time

off as a result of a parent, but the Court does not read the statute to cover the

organizing of funeral arrangements. The statute is plainly inapplicable.

The Board’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, in

finding that Appellant voluntarily left Appellee’s employ without good cause, the

Board committed no errors of law. Hence, the Board did not abuse its discretion. The

decision is AFFIRMED.

27

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Robert B. Young 

 J.

RBY/lmc

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Counsel 

Ucheamaka Mba, Pro se

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