Present: All the Justices 

LEROY COLEMAN 

v. Record No. 971833 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 June 5, 1998 

VERDONDA COLEMAN, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 

 Katie Coleman executed a will in which she gave her 

daughter Shirleeta a life estate in certain real property. 

The will further provided that "[u]pon termination of said 

life estate all the rest residue . . . of my estate I give as 

follows: A. One half in fee simple absolute to my daughter, 

Ms. Verdonda Coleman. B. One half divided equally between 

[my] daughter, Shirleeta Coleman, and my son Melvin Coleman." 

Katie Coleman died in 1992. Shirleeta died intestate in 1994, 

unmarried and without any children. Leroy Coleman, 

Shirleeta's father, was her sole heir at law. Verdonda and 

Melvin Coleman filed a petition seeking a determination of the 

ownership of the remainder interest devised to Shirleeta. 

 The trial court determined that Shirleeta's interest in 

the residuary estate was a contingent remainder which lapsed 

at her death and passed to Melvin and Verdonda under Code 

§ 64.1-65.1. Shirleeta did not have a vested remainder in her 

mother's estate, according to the trial court, because 

Shirleeta did not possess a "present capacity" to take her 
residuary interest upon termination of the prior life estate. 

"[T]he prior life estate could only terminate upon Shirleeta's 

death; therefore, she could never take her remainder interest 

because in order for it to come into existence, she had to 

die." 

 On appeal, Leroy Coleman asserts that the trial court's 

determination was in error because it ignores the early 

vesting rule and is inconsistent with Allison v. Allison, 101 

Va. 537, 44 S.E. 904 (1903). We agree and will reverse the 

decision of the trial court. 

 The early vesting rule is a firmly established principle 

of will construction in Virginia. It provides that unless the 

intention to postpone vesting is clearly indicated in the 

will, all devises and bequests are to be construed as vesting 

at the testator's death. Chapman v. Chapman, 90 Va. 409, 411, 

18 S.E. 913, 913 (1894). Nothing in Katie Coleman's will 

indicates any intent to postpone vesting of the remainder 

interest in the residuary estate. See Crews v. Hatcher, 91 

Va. 378, 379, 382, 21 S.E. 811, 812 (1895)("At the death of my 

[wife], I direct that the remaining portion of my estate shall 

be equally divided" does not show intent to postpone vesting.) 

Accordingly, applying the early vesting rule, Shirleeta's 

interest in the residue of her mother's estate vested at the 

time of her mother's death. 

2
This conclusion is also consistent with Allison, which 

allowed a life tenant to also own a remainder in the 

testator's residuary estate. 101 Va. at 540-56, 44 S.E. at 

904-10. In that case, the testator left his daughter a life 

estate and, on her death, the remainder was to be divided 

among her surviving children. If there were no surviving 

children, the remainder was to be divided among the testator's 

"heirs at law." Id. at 540, 44 S.E. at 904-05. Citing a 

number of English and American cases, Allison held that the 

testator's "heirs at law" were to be determined at the time of 

the testator's death, not at the death of the life tenant. 

Id. at 543-55, 44 S.E. at 906-10. Thus, the life tenant, an 

heir of the testator at the time of his death, also had a 

remainder interest in the residual estate which vested in her 

at the time of the testator's death, subject only to being 

divested in the event her children survived her. Id. at 542, 

556, 44 S.E. at 905, 910. As in Allison, the life tenant here 

acquired a remainder interest in the testator's residual 

estate which vested in her at the time of the testator's 

death. 

 The trial court's conclusion that a life tenant cannot 

also own a vested remainder because the life tenant cannot 

have a "present capacity" to take possession upon termination 

of the life estate misapplied the distinction between vested 

3
and contingent interests. A vested remainder is an estate in 

land that presently exists in a definite person, but the 

actual enjoyment of it is deferred until the termination of a 

previous estate. The certainty or uncertainty of the right of 

enjoyment, not the certainty of actual enjoyment distinguishes 

vested and contingent interests. 1 Frederick Deane Goodwin 

Ribble, Minor on Real Property § 709 (2d ed. 1928). In this 

case, the right of enjoyment of the residuary estate vested at 

the testator's death -- only the actual enjoyment of the right 

was deferred until the termination of the life estate. 

 For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is 

reversed and final judgment will be entered declaring that 

Shirleeta's one-fourth interest in the residual estate of 

Katie Coleman vested in her at her mother's death and at 

Shirleeta's death passed to her sole heir, Leroy Coleman. 

Reversed and final judgment.

4