IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-11285

JOHN STANCU, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

STARWOOD HOTELS AND RESORTS WORLDWIDE, INCORPORATED; 

SHERATON HOTEL, 

 Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:14-CV-2876

Before WIENER, CLEMENT, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant John Stancu, proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his Motion to Reopen the Case and Refer the Matter Back to 

Magistrate Judge Irma Ramirez for a Second Settlement Conference (“Motion 

to Reopen”). We affirm.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 5, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Stancu filed suit against his former employer, Defendant-Appellee 

Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.1 (“Starwood”), in August 2014, 

alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In December 

2014, the district judge scheduled the parties for a judicial settlement 

conference before Magistrate Judge Irma Ramirez. At the conference on 

January 22, 2015, the parties entered into and executed an “Agreement of 

Settlement and Release” (“Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement”).

A. The Settlement Agreement

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Stancu agreed to terminate his 

employment with Starwood, released any claims against Starwood, and 

promised not to disparage his former employer.2 In exchange, Starwood agreed 

to pay Stancu $63,000 “minus applicable taxes and withholding” and to return 

Stancu’s personal toolbox and the tools found in it.3 The Settlement Agreement 

also contained a confidentiality provision prohibiting Stancu from disclosing 

the provisions of the Agreement.

B. Dismissal

On January 26, 2015, the district court entered a 30-Day Order of 

Dismissal, dismissing “all claims . . . without prejudice for thirty (30) days, 

subject to the Parties’ right to reopen the case during that time if a settlement 

agreement is not reached.” The order stated that “[i]f the Parties cannot 

finalize a settlement, any party may reopen this action during this time” and

 

1 Although Stancu’s complaint also named “Sheraton Hotel” as a defendant, it is not 

a legal entity.

2 No provision of the Settlement Agreement gives Stancu reciprocal protection from 

disparagement by Starwood.

3 This is not expressly provided for in the text of the Settlement Agreement, but it 

appears from the briefing that both parties understood Starwood would return Stancu’s 

personal effects when Stancu met with human resources.

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that if the case was not reopened within the 30-day window, the case would be 

considered dismissed with prejudice.

On February 6, 2015, counsel for Starwood provided Stancu with the 

settlement check pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, and the parties filed 

a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing the matter with prejudice. On 

February 11, 2015, Stancu met with counsel for Starwood, who gave Stancu 

his final paycheck and returned a box to Stancu containing at least some of 

his tools.

C. The Motion to Reopen

On February 24, 2015, Stancu filed a Motion to Reopen, alleging that 

Starwood had breached the Settlement Agreement.4 To resolve the issues 

between the parties, the magistrate judge scheduled a follow-up settlement 

conference for April 15, 2015, but no agreement was reached.5

Ultimately, Magistrate Judge Ramirez recommended that Stancu’s 

Motion to Reopen be denied and that the remaining motions in the case be 

denied as moot. The magistrate judge construed Stancu’s Motion to Reopen as 

a motion seeking relief from the parties’ joint stipulation of dismissal, pursuant 

 

4 While the Motion to Reopen was still pending, Stancu filed a second lawsuit alleging 

age discrimination and retaliation and claiming that the previous settlement agreement was

void for Starwood’s alleged breach of the agreement. See Stancu v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts 

Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00672 (N.D. Tex. filed March 2, 2015). In response, Starwood 

moved to dismiss the second lawsuit and requested sanctions for a violation of the parties’ 

confidentiality agreement. 

5 Following the settlement conference, Stancu moved for sanctions for violation of the 

Settlement Agreement and to invalidate the Agreement, and Starwood filed a second motion 

for sanctions for violation of the magistrate judge’s order that the terms of the settlement 

remain confidential. On May 4, 2015, Starwood also filed a separate lawsuit against Stancu 

seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction

enjoining Stancu from breaching the confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions of the 

Settlement Agreement. The instant case was eventually consolidated with Stancu’s second 

lawsuit, which is still pending before the district court for the Northern District of Texas.

Stancu v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00672, ECF No. 25 (N.D. 

Tex. Apr. 24, 2016).

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to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the 

magistrate judge liberally construed Stancu’s arguments for relief as follows: 

(1) seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1) by alleging that the Settlement 

Agreement was invalid because there was no meeting of the minds between 

the parties; (2) seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(3) because Starwood had

purportedly breached the material terms of the Settlement Agreement by not 

paying Stancu the full amount agreed on, by failing to return all of Stancu’s 

personal effects, and by making disparaging comments about Stancu; and 

(3) seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) based on Starwood’s alleged bad faith, 

Starwood’s alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement, and the alleged lack 

of meeting of the minds.

Stancu objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendations and also 

alleged that Magistrate Judge Ramirez’s involvement in his case was a conflict 

of interest.6 On December 16, 2015, the district court accepted the magistrate 

 

6 Magistrate Judge Ramirez’s participation in the settlement discussions and her 

issuing her Findings and Recommendation regarding Stancu’s Motion to Reopen does not 

create a conflict of interest requiring recusal. Although we do not necessarily approve of the 

district court’s decision to refer Stancu’s Motion to Reopen to the same magistrate judge who 

presided over the parties’ settlement discussions, we cannot say that it was improper for the 

magistrate judge to review Stancu’s motion and issue her Findings and Recommendations. 

“We have stated that ‘[a]s a general rule, for purposes of recusal, a judge’s “personal” 

knowledge of evidentiary facts means “extrajudicial,” so facts learned by a judge in his or her 

judicial capacity regarding the parties before the court, whether learned in the same or a 

related proceeding, cannot be the basis for disqualification.’” Brown v. Oil States Skagit 

Smatco, 664 F.3d 71, 81 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Conkling 

v. Turner, 138 F.3d 577, 592 (5th Cir. 1988)). “Furthermore, we have explained that 

‘[o]pinions formed by the judge that are based on . . . events occurring during the proceedings 

do not constitute a basis for recusal unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.’” Id. at 81 (alterations in original)

(emphases added) (quoting Conkling, 138 F.3d at 593); see also Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., 587 

F. App’x 925, 934 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e cannot find authority for the proposition that 

participation in a mediated settlement conference categorically disqualifies a judge from later 

deciding a motion in that same case.”). Here, there is no indication of a deep-seated 

antagonism on the part of the magistrate judge toward Stancu. Moreover, Magistrate Judge 

Ramirez’s role in issuing the Findings and Recommendations does not bear on the district 

court’s ultimate denial of Stancu’s Motion to Reopen in this case because the district court 

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judge’s findings and recommendation and denied Stancu’s Motion to Reopen.

Stancu appeals the district court’s denial.

II. ANALYSIS

The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. This court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s judgment on 

the Motion to Reopen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion.7 In other words, “[i]t is not enough that the granting of

relief might have been permissible, or even warranted—denial must have been 

so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”8

Rule 60(b) states:

On motion . . . the court may relieve a party . . . from a final 

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 

(3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing 

party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 

released[,] or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that 

has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no 

longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

However, “[w]e have consistently held that the relief under Rule 60(b) is 

considered an extraordinary remedy . . . [and that] [t]he desire for a judicial 

process that is predictable mandates caution in reopening judgments.”9

 

reviewed the magistrate judge’s recommendation de novo, the district court adopted the 

Findings and Conclusions as its own, and nothing in the record suggests that Stancu was 

foreclosed from making, or hindered in pursuing, any arguments before the district court 

because of the magistrate judge’s involvement in the case. See Blackmon, 587 F. App’x at 934.

7 Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013).

8 Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981).

9 In re Pettle, 410 F.3d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1998)).

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Federal courts have consistently “refus[ed] to grant a party who voluntarily 

requests dismissal of a claim to obtain relief from that judgment under 

Rule 60(b).”10

A. Rule 60(b)(1)

Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to grant relief from judgment because of 

“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” The district court 

correctly characterized Stancu’s argument that the Settlement Agreement was 

invalid for lack of a meeting of the minds as a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).

Stancu’s argument is that the form of the Settlement Agreement was

misleading so he signed the agreement without being “sure of what Defendants 

had in mind during the settlement negotiations”—i.e., that this was 

a “mistake.”11

The evidence presented by Stancu is insufficient to show that he lacked 

knowledge of the material terms of the Settlement Agreement. Under Texas 

law,12 determining whether there was a meeting of the minds is “based on the

objective standard of what the parties said and did and not on their subjective 

state of mind.”13 Stancu does not allege that he was unable to or did not 

negotiate the terms of the Settlement Agreement; neither does he contend that 

 

10 Id. at 192–93 (giving examples).

11 Stancu specifically points to (1) the handwritten notes on the final copy of the 

Agreement, (2) Starwood’s failure to provide a fully typed version of the Agreement, (3) the 

fact that the name of the person signing on behalf of Starwood was not printed, and (4) the 

fact that the agreement was not notarized.

12 The Settlement Agreement contains a choice-of-law clause specifying that Texas 

law should govern any dispute over its interpretation or enforcement. Because neither party 

disputes the validity of this provision, it is valid and enforceable and any dispute about the 

Settlement Agreement is properly resolved under Texas law. Jimenez v. Sun Life Assurance 

Co. of Can., 486 F. App’x 398, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (setting forth several tests 

under which the validity of a choice-of-law clause can be tested, each of which establishes a 

rebuttable presumption that the provision is valid).

13 In re Capco Energy, Inc., 669 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Copeland v. 

Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)).

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any provisions were somehow vague or unclear. Rather, Stancu’s objections 

focus on the form of the document, not on its substance. Moreover, the parties’

arguments show that there was a meeting of the minds regarding what the

material terms were, even if there remains disagreement about whether

Starwood met those terms. Indeed, Stancu personally participated in the 

settlement negotiations, signed the Settlement Agreement, and later filed a 

Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Starwood. Together, these facts objectively 

show that Stancu was aware of the Settlement Agreement’s content. Therefore, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Stancu’s Motion to 

Reopen based on Rule 60(b)(1).

B. Rule 60(b)(3)

The district court also properly determined that Stancu’s argument that 

Starwood breached the Settlement Agreement could be construed as a motion 

for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3). “A party making a Rule 60(b)(3) 

motion must establish by clear and convincing evidence (1) that the adverse 

party engaged in fraud or other misconduct and (2) that this misconduct 

prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his case.”14

The facts of this case do not clearly show that Starwood breached the 

Settlement Agreement. First, Stancu’s assertion that Starwood disparaged 

him is not tantamount to a breach of the Settlement Agreement because no 

such prohibition exists in the Agreement. Second, Stancu alleges that 

Starwood failed to pay him the requisite sum required by the Settlement 

Agreement and did not return all of his personal belongings. Even though 

Stancu was admittedly not given the full dollar amount specified in the 

Settlement Agreement, he presented no evidence that the amount deducted 

 

14 In re Isbell Records, Inc., 774 F.3d 859, 869 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting Washington v. Patlis, 916 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1990)).

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was greater than the applicable tax and withholding amounts and therefore 

did not clearly demonstrate breach. Neither is Stancu’s contention that 

Starwood failed to return his toolbox and tools clearly supported by the 

evidence: Starwood provided affidavit testimony that it attempted to return all 

of Stancu’s items but Stancu refused to accept them. Thus, there is no clear 

evidence that Starwood breached the Settlement Agreement or engaged in the 

sort of fraud or misconduct contemplated by Rule 60(b)(3).

Courts have not generally interpreted “misconduct” in Rule 60(b)(3) to 

include the breach of a settlement agreement.15 Even if Stancu were correct 

that Starwood breached the terms of their settlement, this does not in and of

itself justify post-judgment relief, given the importance of maintaining finality 

of judgments and predictability of the judicial process.16 Because this court has 

not definitively determined whether breach of a settlement agreement 

constitutes “misconduct” under Rule 60(b)(3), the district court did not abuse 

its discretion by denying relief on these grounds.

C. Rule 60(b)(6)

Finally, Stancu’s objections in the Motion to Reopen could also be 

construed as a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). That subsection “is a 

residual clause used to cover unforeseen contingencies; that is, it is a means 

for accomplishing justice in exceptional circumstances.”17 Although there is 

some disagreement among the circuits regarding whether breach of a 

 

15 See Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 458–59 (6th Cir. 2008).

16 Importantly, if Stancu’s objection is an alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement, 

he is not without recourse. He has the option of bringing suit for breach of contract.

17 Steverson v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 508 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Stipelcovich v. Sand Dollar Marine, Inc., 805 F.2d 599, 604–05 (5th Cir. 1986)).

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settlement agreement can serve as a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),18

Stancu has not established that Starwood breached the Settlement Agreement

in the first place. Because Stancu has not demonstrated any “unforeseen 

contingencies” or “exceptional circumstances” that would otherwise justify 

relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying his Motion to Reopen.

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Stancu’s Motion to Reopen.

 

18 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994) (listing 

cases).

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