This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A16-0387 

In the Matter of: 

Ashley Danielle Martin, 

individually and o/b/o M. M. F. and M. B. F., petitioner, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Kent Michael Freundl, 

Appellant. 

Filed December 5, 2016 

Affirmed in part and reversed in part 

Schellhas, Judge 

Blue Earth County District Court 

File No. 07-FA-15-4504 

Ashley Danielle Martin, Mankato, Minnesota (pro se respondent) 

Steven D. Winkler, Jones and Magnus, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Reyes, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

SCHELLHAS, Judge 

Appellant challenges an order for protection granted to respondents, arguing that 

the district court improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence and that the evidence 

is insufficient to support the court’s findings. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
2 

FACTS 

Appellant Kent Freundl and respondent Ashley Martin began a romantic 

relationship in 2008. They began living together in 2009 and have two minor sons, M.M.F. 

and M.B.F. The parties separated April 1, 2015, and the children resided with Freundl until 

Martin graduated from nursing school and took her test sometime in May. Thereafter, the 

parties co-parented their children and shared responsibilities. 

Over the weekend of October 30 to November 3, 2015, Freundl had the children at 

his home. On the morning of November 3, Freundl’s parents took the children to school 

because Freundl began working early that day in his position as a security counselor at a 

state treatment center. Around 4:30 p.m., Martin texted Freundl about obtaining the 

children’s duffle bags, which the parents used to transport the children’s clothes and 

personal belongings between the parties. At first Freundl was short with his texted 

responses, but a text-message altercation between the parties soon ensued, fueled in part 

by Freundl’s receipt of “child support papers.” Freundl texted Martin that she better not 

come because he had been drinking a lot. Freundl also texted, “I wouldn’t come if I was 

you. I’ll f---ing beat your ass. I’m sick of getting f---ed over by stupid b----es.” He also 

texted that the children would rather be with him. When Martin responded that the text 

didn’t make any sense, Freundl replied, “that text may not have made sense—probably not, 

I’ve been drinking heavily since I’m going to pay out my ass to see the kids during work.” 

Freundl later texted, “Turn around, I’m locking my house and don’t f---ing come here.” 

Martin, who already had the children in her car, responded, “Should I bring the cops? 
3 

You’ll give me their stuff.” She then called a police station, spoke with a dispatcher, and 

drove to the police station to request a police escort to Freundl’s home. 

Two police officers in separate squad cars escorted Martin to Freundl’s home. The 

children were seated in the rear seat of Martin’s car. When the police and Martin arrived, 

Freundl was sitting on the curb drinking a beer and talking on the telephone. He walked to 

his deck, retrieved the children’s duffle bags, and walked back to the car and began 

screaming at the police officers and at Martin for bringing the “f---ing cops.” He put the 

bags in the back of Martin’s car and shut the hatchback door. He believes that he opened 

the door to the children’s seat and gave M.M.F. a hug before putting the duffle bags in the 

car. But he continued to behave belligerently toward the police. The officers then instructed 

Martin to get into her car, and one of the officers approached Freundl and spoke to him 

about a foot from his face. The children began screaming and crying, and the officers told 

Martin to go home. Later, the police contacted Martin and told her that Freundl had made 

a 911 call in which he threatened to kill her and the officers. 

On November 4, 2015, Martin sought an order for protection (OFP) for herself and 

the children, and the district court granted it ex parte on November 5. After an evidentiary 

hearing on January 8, 2016, the court granted an OFP, effective until January 8, 2018, on 

behalf of Martin and the parties’ children. 

This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N 

A district court is authorized to issue an OFP to “restrain the abusing party from 

committing acts of domestic abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(1) (2014). 
4 

“Domestic abuse” includes “(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault”; or “(2) the 

infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” that is “committed 

against a family or household member by a family or household member.” Id., subd. 

2(a)(1)−(2) (2014). “The decision to grant an OFP under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse 

Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 . . . is within the district court’s discretion.” Pechovnik v. 

Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). 

Freundl argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the OFP. A petitioner 

must prove the existence of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Oberg v. 

Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App. 2015). “A district court’s decision to issue an 

order for protection under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act will be reversed on appeal 

when it lacks sufficient evidentiary support.” Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. 

App. 2004). An OFP lacks evidentiary support when the findings are clearly erroneous, 

contrary to the weight of the evidence, or not supported by the evidence as a whole. Id. On 

appeal, “[w]e neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness 

credibility, which are exclusively the province of the factfinder.” Id. “[W]e review the 

record in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, and we will reverse those 

findings only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99 (quotation omitted). 

At the evidentiary hearing, both Freundl and Martin testified, and Martin offered 

the following exhibits: 

Exhibit A: 11/3/2015 Police Incident Report 

Exhibit B: 07-CR-15-4511 Criminal Complaint 

Exhibit C: 12/9/15 Police Incident Report 
5 

Exhibit D: 07-CR-15-5185 Criminal Complaint. 

Over Freundl’s hearsay objection to exhibits A and D, the court admitted the exhibits “not 

for the truth of what is contained in the reports but rather that the reports were made and 

that an incident occurred,” saying “I will take note of that.” Freundl did not object to the 

admission of exhibits B and C. 

Issuance of OFP to protect Martin 

Martin testified that Freundl’s conduct caused her to feel fear and anxiety for herself 

on November 3, 2015. She also testified about the content contained in exhibits A and D, 

including Freundl’s 911 call and other matters. The district court sustained Freundl’s 

objection that the testimony contained inadmissible hearsay. Freundl argues that the district 

court erroneously admitted exhibits A and D and that without those exhibits, the evidence 

is insufficient to support the OFP. Although the court may have erred by admitting exhibits 

A and D because they contained hearsay, including Freundl’s alleged threats against Martin 

and the officers made during a 911 call, any error was harmless. Even without the exhibits, 

Martin’s unrefuted testimony about Freundl’s text threats to harm her was sufficient to 

support the issuance of the OFP as to Martin. “An OFP is justified if a person manifests a 

present intention to inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault on the 

person’s spouse.” Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99. “Present intent to inflict fear of imminent 

physical harm, bodily injury, or assault can be inferred from the totality of the 

circumstances, including a history of past abusive behavior.” Id. “An overt physical act is 

not necessary to support the issuance of an OFP.” Id. 
6 

We also note that even if the district court had excluded exhibits A and D, Freundl 

did not object to the district court’s admission of exhibit B, which describes Freundl’s 911 

call and his ensuing threats to Martin and the police officers. The record therefore contains 

unobjected-to evidence about Freundl’s alleged 911 threats. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 

N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (concluding that objections not argued to and considered 

by the district court are waived). 

Freundl argues that because the record contains no evidence of past domestic abuse, 

the evidence is insufficient to support the issuance of an OFP. But past abuse is only one 

factor in determining whether an OFP is necessary to protect a petitioner. See Boniek v. 

Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. App. 1989) (“Past abusive behavior, although not 

dispositive, is a factor in determining cause for protection.”). 

In its OFP, the district court found that domestic abuse occurred, as follows: 

[Freundl] threatened to kill [Martin] in a 911 emergency call, 

indicating that if she called the cops again, she would be dead 

and police would have a murder on their hands. [Freundl] 

doesn’t recollect these statements because he was drinking so 

heavily. He also texted [Martin], threatening to kick her ass. 

He displayed behavior at the time of an exchange of property 

when the children were present that frightened and alarmed all 

three victims. 

 

We conclude that Freundl’s text-message threats toward Martin and his threats made 

during his 911 call constitute sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that 

Freundl committed domestic abuse against Martin. We therefore affirm that order. 

 
7 

Issuance of OFP to protect M.M.F. and M.B.F. 

   “[A]n OFP may be granted only to a victim of domestic abuse.” Schmidt ex rel. 

P.M.S. v. Coons, 818 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Minn. 2012). Martin testified that she felt fear and 

anxiety for herself and her children because of Freundl’s behavior on November 3, 2015.1

The district court found that Freundl’s conduct “frightened and alarmed all three victims.” 

Although the evidence supports a finding that the children were frightened and alarmed by 

Freundl’s conduct and witnessing the events of November 3, 2015, nothing in the record 

would support a finding that Freundl threatened the children, intended to cause fear in them 

that he would cause them bodily harm, or caused the children to fear that he would cause 

them bodily harm. 

 “[U]se of the phrase ‘infliction of fear’ in the [domestic abuse] statute implies that 

the legislature intended that there be some overt action to indicate that appellant intended

. . . to put respondent in fear of imminent . . . physical harm.” Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 

N.W.2d 604, 605 (Minn. App. 1986) (quoting Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. 

App. 1984)). We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the issuance of an 

OFP on behalf of the children and we therefore reverse that order. 

Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

 

1

 We cannot help but wonder whether Martin exhausted all alternatives to taking the 

children with her to the police station and to retrieve the children’s belongings, given 

Freundl’s text threats and admitted intoxication.