2020 IL App (3d) 180409 

Opinion filed April 30, 2020 

Modified Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing filed June 8, 2020 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

THOMAS BROWN,

 

Petitioner-Appellee,

 

 

 v.

 

THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE,

 Respondent-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Putnam County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-18-0409 

Circuit No. 16-MR-13 

The Honorable 

Stephen A. Kouri, 

Judge, presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Presiding Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Holdridge dissented, with opinion. 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

OPINION

¶ 1 Petitioner, Thomas Brown, filed a petition in the trial court seeking relief from a decision 

of the Illinois State Police (ISP) revoking his Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) Card. After 

an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the petition and directed the ISP to issue Brown a 

FOID card. The ISP appeals. We reverse the trial court’s judgment. 
2 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In September 2001, Brown pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the misdemeanor offense 

of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse in California. He was sentenced to three years of 

probation and was required to pay a fine and to attend anger management counseling. The 

conviction stemmed from an incident where Brown had gotten into an argument with his thenwife, Suzie Brown; picked her up; and dropped her or let her fall over his back, causing her to 

get a “road rash.” Brown and Suzie were later divorced in 2007 but remained on friendly terms. 

¶ 4 For several years after the 2001 California conviction, Brown held a FOID card and 

owned and possessed firearms in Illinois, apparently without incident. In January 2013, Brown 

filed an application to renew his FOID card. When Brown was asked on the renewal application 

whether he had ever been convicted of domestic battery or a substantially similar offense 

(misdemeanor or felony), he checked “no.” Brown’s FOID card was later renewed.

¶ 5 At some point prior to or during July 2016, Brown tried to purchase a gun from a 

federally licensed firearms dealer. The ISP ran a background check on Brown for the purchase 

and learned of Brown’s 2001 California conviction, which the ISP classified as being an 

“aggravated domestic battery[ ] or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction.” The 

ISP revoked Brown’s FOID card based upon that conviction and, in July 2016, sent Brown a 

letter notifying him of the revocation and directing him to turn over any guns in his possession to 

the police. See 430 ILCS 65/8(l) (West 2016) (authorizing the ISP to revoke a person’s FOID 

card if the person has previously been convicted of a domestic battery, aggravated domestic 

battery, or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction). Brown complied. All of the 

guns that Brown turned over were manufactured outside the state of Illinois.
3 

¶ 6 In August 2016, the month after Brown had received the revocation notice, he filed a 

petition in the trial court under section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID 

Act) (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2016)) seeking relief from the ISP’s decision revoking his FOID 

card. Among other things, Brown alleged in the petition that he was qualified under Illinois law 

to hold a FOID card, that issuing him a FOID card would not be contrary to federal law, and that 

certain portions of the FOID Act and of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (FGCA) (18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(9) (2012)) were unconstitutional as applied to him. The ISP opposed Brown’s petition. 

¶ 7 In April 2018, an evidentiary hearing was held on the petition. During the hearing, the 

parties presented the testimony of three witnesses and numerous pieces of documentary 

evidence, most of which were admitted into evidence by stipulation. In addition to establishing 

many of the facts set forth above, the evidence presented at the hearing can be summarized as 

follows. 

¶ 8 Brown testified that he was 51 years old, worked as a truck driver, and lived in Putnam 

County. He had been working for the same employer for the past 14 years and was licensed to 

manage and transport hazardous materials. Brown had never been convicted of a felony but had 

been convicted of the domestic offense in California, which he referred to in his testimony as a 

domestic battery.

¶ 9 At the time of the September 2001 offense, Brown and his then-wife, Suzie, were driving 

a truck together as a team. A load that Brown and Suzie were supposed to pick up got canceled, 

and Brown and Suzie had to get a motel room in California. They had a few drinks at the bar and 

got into a little bit of an argument. Brown picked up Suzie and was carrying her in what he 

described as a “playful moment,” and Suzie fell off of or down Brown’s back and onto the 

ground causing Suzie to get a little bit of a “road rash” on her arm. The police were apparently 
4 

called by someone, and they arrested Brown for battery. Brown sat in jail for three days waiting 

for his case to go before the court. Brown pled guilty to the offense because otherwise it would 

have cost him $5000 to bail out of jail so that he could fight the case and he was advised by the 

company that he worked for at the time to take the plea bargain. Brown’s understanding of the 

plea agreement was that he was to be given court supervision and three years of probation. 

Brown later learned that he did not receive court supervision and that he was given a conviction 

instead. As a result of the plea, Brown also paid a fine of approximately $500 and performed 

community service work and anger management counseling but was not required to serve any 

postjudgment jail time. Brown did not remember being advised at the time of the plea that a 

guilty plea would affect his gun rights in any way. According to Brown, he did not intend to hurt 

Suzie when the incident happened and, to the best of his knowledge, Suzie was not hurt as a 

result of the incident, other than her road rash. Suzie did not seek medical treatment and did not 

call the police. There were no other incidents of domestic violence between Brown and Suzie 

during their relationship. A letter from Suzie was admitted into evidence during the hearing, 

which gave a similar account of what had occurred during the 2001 California incident and 

stated Suzie’s opinion that Brown was not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety if 

his FOID card was reinstated and that reinstating Brown’s FOID card would not be contrary to 

the public interest.

¶ 10 As for his other criminal encounters, Brown stated that he was placed on court 

supervision in 2005 for a driving under the influence charge in Bureau County and that he 

successfully completed the period of supervision. Brown was also charged in 2005 with battery 

for a bar fight he had gotten into in LaSalle County. Brown stated on the witness stand, however, 

that he was merely defending himself during that incident and that the charge was later dropped.
5 

Brown also had a conviction in 1988 in Minnesota when he was a minor for assault in the fifth 

degree. A letter from the Bureau County sheriff was admitted into evidence during the hearing, 

which indicated that Brown had lived in Bureau County for the past seven years without 

incident. 

¶ 11 With regard to his fitness to possess a firearm, Brown testified that he had held a FOID 

card for about 20 or 25 years and that he had owned firearms since he was about 16 years old. 

Brown had used firearms in the past for hunting and for target practice and had never used a 

firearm in a dangerous manner to himself or to others. Brown stated on his FOID card renewal 

application that he had never been convicted of domestic battery because he thought that he had 

received court supervision on the California offense, not because he was trying to deny that 

something had happened. Brown wanted to be able to possess firearms for protection so that he 

could teach his current wife, who was a FOID card holder, how to use weapons and for hunting 

purposes. Brown learned that there was a problem with his FOID card when he went to purchase 

another gun and his purchase was denied. When Brown’s FOID card was revoked, he turned all 

of his and his wife’s firearms over to the sheriff’s department. Brown’s wife later took 

possession of the firearms with court permission and now kept those firearms in her and Brown’s 

home. 

¶ 12 Brown had never tried to have his California domestic violence conviction vacated or 

expunged and had never applied for a governor’s pardon for the California offense. Other than 

filing this lawsuit, Brown had done nothing else to try to get his California conviction removed 

from his record. 

¶ 13 Brown’s current wife, Kari Brown, testified at the hearing in support of Brown’s petition. 

Kari stated that she and Brown had been married since 2010. Before Brown’s FOID card was 
6 

revoked, he participated in target practice with Kari and taught her how to clean a firearm. Kari 

had always known Brown to be careful with firearms and had no reason to believe that Brown 

would act contrary to the public interest if he was granted a FOID card or that he would be a 

danger to public safety. 

¶ 14 Lieutenant Jennifer Radosevic testified at the petition hearing on behalf of the ISP and 

stated that she was the assistant bureau chief in the ISP’s Firearms Services Bureau. Radosevic 

described the FOID card process in general and the role of the Firearms Services Bureau in the 

FOID card process and in the firearm purchase process. According to Radosevic, the ISP 

revoked Brown’s FOID card because of a federal and state firearm prohibitor—Brown’s 

September 2001 California conviction of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse. When Radosevic 

was asked about Brown’s reply on his FOID card renewal application that he had never been 

convicted of a domestic battery or similar offense, Radosevic stated that Brown’s answer to that 

question was clearly incorrect. Radosevic noted that a person could have his FOID card 

application denied or his FOID card revoked for providing false information on a FOID card 

application and could also be charged with perjury. During Radosevic’s testimony, a copy of 

Brown’s FOID card renewal application and certain other ISP records were admitted into 

evidence as business records of the ISP. 

¶ 15 After all of the evidence had been presented, the trial court took the case under 

advisement and gave the parties time to file written closing arguments. The following month, in 

May 2018, after the written closing arguments had been submitted, the trial court issued a onepage written ruling granting Brown’s petition. In the ruling, the trial court stated that it was 

granting the petition based upon the “unique circumstances presented herein, including the fact 

that guns [were] lawfully in the home of [Brown], with the approval of the State.” The trial court 
7 

noted in its ruling that the “ ‘conviction’ entered years ago in the [California] domestic battery 

case [had] been disputed by the alleged victim.” As part of its ruling, the trial court directed the 

ISP to issue Brown a FOID card. The ISP appealed. 

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, the ISP argues that the trial court erred in granting Brown’s section 10 petition 

and in directing the ISP to issue Brown a FOID card. In support of that argument, the ISP asserts 

first that the trial court did not have the authority to grant Brown section 10 relief because doing 

so was contrary to federal law since Brown was prohibited from possessing a firearm under 

federal law and did not qualify for an exception to the federal firearm prohibition. Second, and in 

the alternative, the ISP asserts that trial court should not have granted Brown section 10 relief 

because the manifest weight of the evidence presented at the hearing showed that Brown was 

likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that granting Brown relief would be 

contrary to the public interest. Third, and also in the alternative, the ISP contends that Brown’s 

as-applied constitutional challenge in this case should not be considered by this court because it 

is premature since Brown has never pursued any of the other available avenues of relief, such as 

a pardon or expungement. For all of the reasons stated, the ISP asks that we reverse the trial 

court’s judgment. 

¶ 18 Brown argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. In support of 

that argument, Brown asserts first that the trial court correctly granted his petition and correctly 

directed the ISP to issue him a FOID card because (1) section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Act and 

section 922(g)(9) of the FGCA are unconstitutional as applied to him; (2) he was not required 

under the law to pursue a pardon or other administrative remedy before bringing his as-applied 

constitutional challenge; and (3) the trial court’s decision, which Brown characterizes as a grant 
8 

of his as-applied constitutional challenge, was supported by ample evidence showing that Brown 

was not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that granting Brown’s petition 

would not be contrary to the public interest. Second, and in the alternative, Brown asserts that the 

trial court correctly granted Brown’s petition because Brown was entitled to relief under the 

FOID Act and because granting Brown relief was not contrary to federal law. In making that 

assertion, Brown contends that he qualified for an exception to the federal firearm prohibition 

because the trial court restored Brown’s civil rights when it determined in the section 10 

proceeding in this case that Brown should be allowed to possess a firearm. Brown recognizes 

that his contention in that regard has been rejected by the various districts of the Illinois 

Appellate Court that have ruled upon this issue, including this district (see, e.g., People v. 

Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 160527, ¶¶ 20-22 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument on appeal 

that the trial court granting the petitioner his FOID card constituted civil rights restored for the 

purpose of the exception under federal law to the firearm prohibition)), but makes the argument, 

nonetheless, to preserve the issue for any possible subsequent appeals.1

 For all of the reasons set 

forth, Brown asks, albeit somewhat implicitly, that we affirm the trial court’s ruling, granting 

Brown’s petition and directing the ISP to issue Brown a FOID card. 

¶ 19 The issue raised in this appeal potentially presents both questions of fact and questions of 

law. As to the questions of fact, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings, which 

were made after an evidentiary hearing, and will not reverse those findings unless they are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 251 (2002). 

1 After the appeal in this case was filed and oral arguments were heard, the supreme court issued 

its decision in Johnson v. Department of State Police, 2020 IL 124213. In Johnson, the supreme court 

held that for the purpose of the federal firearms prohibition exception (1) gun rights were civil rights and 

(2) gun rights restored through a section 10 proceeding constituted civil rights revoked and restored when 

the prior disqualifying conviction took place in Illinois. See Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 30.
9 

As to the questions of law, however, we apply a de novo standard of review. See O’Neill v. 

Director of Illinois Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (3d) 140011, ¶ 21. 

¶ 20 Under section 10 of the FOID Act, a person whose FOID card has been revoked because 

of a prior conviction of domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, or a substantially similar 

offense in another jurisdiction may petition the trial court for a hearing on the revocation. 430 

ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2016). At the hearing, the trial court must determine whether substantial 

justice has been done. Id. § 10(b). If the trial court finds that substantial justice has not been 

done, it will direct the ISP to issue a FOID card to the petitioner. Id. The trial court may not grant 

relief, however, unless the petitioner has proven the following four requirements to the trial 

court’s satisfaction: (1) that the petitioner has not been convicted of a forcible felony within 20 

years of the petitioner’s FOID card application or at least 20 years has passed since the end of 

any period of imprisonment imposed in relation to such a conviction; (2) that the circumstances 

regarding a criminal conviction (where applicable), the petitioner’s criminal history, and the 

petitioner’s reputation are such that the petitioner is not likely to act in a manner that would be 

dangerous to public safety; (3) that granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; 

and (4) that granting relief would not be contrary to federal law. Id. § 10(c). As the fourth 

requirement indicates and as the statute itself separately notes, the trial court may not grant relief 

to the petitioner if the petitioner is prohibited from obtaining, possessing, or using a firearm 

under federal law. Id. § 10(b), (c); Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶¶ 18-19; Heitmann, 2017 IL App 

(3d) 160527, ¶ 12; People v. Frederick, 2015 IL App (2d) 140540, ¶¶ 28, 31-34; Baumgartner v. 

Greene County State’s Attorney’s Office, 2016 IL App (4th) 150035, ¶¶ 25-30; Odle v. 

Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶¶ 25-33; see also Coram v. State of 

Illinois, 2013 IL 113867, ¶ 101 (Burke, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) (stating 
10 

in the special concurring opinion that the 2013 amendments to the FOID Act make clear that the 

trial court no longer has the authority to grant relief under section 10 if the trial court concludes 

that the applicant would be in violation of federal law if he or she were to possess a firearm); 

Coram, 2013 IL 113867, ¶¶ 123-24 (Theis, J. dissenting, joined by Garman, J.) (making a similar 

statement in the dissenting opinion). 

¶ 21 Under the applicable federal law in this case—the FGCA—a person who has been 

convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is prohibited from 

possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (prohibiting possession “in or affecting 

commerce”). The FGCA defines a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as an offense that 

is a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law and that has as an element the use or 

attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon committed by a current 

or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim (or other specified relationship to the victim). 

Id. § 921(a)(33)(A). For an offense to qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 

under the FGCA, the existence of a domestic relationship between the offender and the victim 

does not have to be a required element of the offense. Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 160527, ¶ 18. 

Thus, a conviction of simple battery will constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 

under the FGCA if the victim of the offense was the offender’s spouse or child. Id.

¶ 22 The FGCA provides a limited exception to the federal prohibition on firearm possession 

for those persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. See 18 

U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012); Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 160527, ¶¶ 19, 25, 29. Pursuant 

to that exception, a person will not be considered to have been convicted of a misdemeanor 

crime of domestic violence (for the purpose of the federal firearm prohibition) if the 

misdemeanor conviction has been expunged or set aside or if the offender has been pardoned or 
11 

has had his civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of 

civil rights for such an offense), unless such a pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights 

expressly provides that the offender may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. 18 

U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012); Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 160527, ¶¶ 19, 25, 29. 

¶ 23 In the present case, after having reviewed the record of the trial court proceedings, we 

find that the trial court erred when it granted Brown’s section 10 petition. The crime of which 

Brown was convicted in California in 2001 clearly qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012); Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 160527, ¶ 18. It 

does not appear that Brown disputes that portion of the determination. Therefore, unless the 

limited exception under the FGCA applies, Brown is prohibited from possessing a firearm under 

federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012); Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 160527, ¶¶ 19, 25, 

29. 

¶ 24 The exception cannot apply in this case, however, because Brown’s California conviction 

was never expunged or set aside, Brown was never pardoned for that conviction, and Brown 

never had his civil rights revoked and restored in California as a result of that conviction. See 18 

U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012); Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 26 (recognizing that the law of 

the convicting jurisdiction controls whether civil rights have been restored); Heitmann, 2017 IL 

App (3d) 160527, ¶¶ 19, 25, 29. Although Brown claims that the trial court granting him relief 

under the FOID Act constitutes civil rights revoked and restored under the federal statutory 

exception and our supreme court has recently held that the right to keep and bear arms is a civil 

right for purposes of that exception, the exception still does not apply to Brown here because
12 

Brown has not shown that he had his civil rights revoked and restored in California—the 

convicting jurisdiction. See Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 26.2

¶ 25 It must be concluded, therefore, that Brown did not qualify for the limited exception 

under the FGCA (see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012); Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 

160527, ¶¶ 19, 25, 29) and that the trial court erred in granting Brown’s section 10 petition.

Having so determined, we need not rule upon the ISP’s other assertions in support of its position. 

¶ 26 In addition, although Brown asks this court to rule upon his as-applied constitutional 

challenge to section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Act and section 922(g)(9) of the FGCA, this court has 

already ruled in Heitmann that such a challenge is premature where, as here, the petitioner still 

has other remedies available to him to obtain relief, such as a pardon or expungement. See 

Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 160527, ¶¶ 36, 40. 

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Putnam 

County. 

¶ 29 Reversed.

¶ 30 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.

¶ 31 The majority concludes that, although our supreme court has recently held that the right to 

keep and bear arms is a civil right for purposes of the limited exception provided under the FGCA 

(Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 37; 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012)), Brown cannot meet this 

2

 As noted in the previous footnote, in Johnson, the supreme court held, among other things, that 

gun rights were civil rights for the purpose of the federal firearms prohibition in a case where the prior 

disqualifying conviction took place in Illinois. See Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 30. Contrary to the 

assertion of the dissent in this case, respondent has not shown that California (the convicting jurisdiction) 

has held that gun rights were civil rights or that the removal and automatic restoration of gun rights alone, 

and no other rights, satisfied the civil rights restored provision for the purpose of the federal firearms 

prohibition. 
13 

exception because he did not have his gun rights revoked and restored in California. I respectfully 

disagree with this finding for the following reasons. 

¶ 32 On September 22, 2001, Brown was convicted of a misdemeanor in California for inflicting 

corporal injury to a spouse. See Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a) (West 2001) (this statute is designated 

in California as a “wobbler,” where a defendant can be charged and punished with either a 

misdemeanor or a felony). He was sentenced to a period of three years’ probation, 78 hours of 

anger management counseling, and $443 in fines. Brown successfully completed his probation and 

his anger management counseling and paid his fines. 

¶ 33 A conviction for inflicting corporal injury to a spouse subjected Brown to a firearm 

prohibition, which revoked his eligibility to possess a firearm for 10 years from the date of his 

conviction, specifically, until September 22, 2011. See Cal. Penal Code § 12021(c)(1) (West 2001) 

(now codified as Cal. Penal Code § 29805(a) (West 2012)). Thus, after the 10-year revocation 

period expired, Brown’s right to possess a firearm was automatically restored by operation of 

California law. See id. This restoration of Brown’s gun rights changed his legal status by means 

of the state’s dispensation of forgiveness and demonstrated that, despite his conviction, he was 

sufficiently trustworthy to possess a firearm. See Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 26. As such, it is 

evident that Brown’s gun rights were, in fact, revoked and restored in California. 

¶ 34 Therefore, I would find that the trial court’s order granting Brown’s section 10 petition was 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence as the record demonstrated (1) that he was not 

convicted of a forceable felony, (2) neither his criminal history nor his reputation indicated that he 

would act in a manner dangerous to public safety, (3) granting relief was not contrary to public 

policy, and (4) granting relief was not contrary to federal law because Brown met the FGCA 
14 

exception as his gun rights were revoked and restored in California. See 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 

2016); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012).

¶ 35 As a final matter, I note the majority’s strenuous reliance on Heitmann, 2017 IL App (3d) 

160527, ¶ 21 (holding that “gun rights” were not the type of “civil rights” contemplated under the 

FGCA). Much of that opinion on the issue of restoration of civil rights has been rendered obsolete 

given our supreme court’s recent decision in Johnson. 

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
15 

No. 3-18-0409 

Cite as: Brown v. Illinois State Police, 2020 IL App (3d) 180409 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Putnam County, No. 16-MR-13; 

the Hon. Stephen A. Kouri, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellant: 

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, 

Solicitor General, and Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel), for appellant. 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellee: 

James R. Angel, of Princeton, for appellee.