[Cite as State v. Ward, 2022-Ohio-3351.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JASIMINE WARD

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 29282

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-1206

(Criminal Appeal from

Common Pleas Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 23rd day of September, 2022. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ELIZABETH A. ELLIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0074332, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

 

CHARLES M. BLUE, Atty. Reg. No. 0074329, 401 East Stroop Road, Kettering, Ohio 

45429

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, P.J.
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{¶ 1} Jasimine Ward appeals from the trial court’s revocation of her community 

control and imposition of a three-year prison term for a felonious-assault conviction. 

{¶ 2} Ward contends the trial court violated her procedural due-process rights by 

failing to provide a written or oral statement of the evidence relied on and its reasons for

revoking community control. She also claims her sentence is contrary to law because the 

plea form underlying her conviction misstated the Ohio Revised Code section for 

felonious assault. 

{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court adequately set forth the evidence upon which 

it relied and its reasons for revoking community control. Ward also properly was convicted 

of felonious assault notwithstanding a scrivener’s error in her plea form, and her sentence 

is not contrary to law. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Background

{¶ 4} Ward was charged with two counts of felonious assault, both second-degree 

felonies. She pled guilty to one count in exchange for dismissal of the other count. Ward 

acknowledges that the trial court conducted a proper Crim.R. 11 hearing and correctly

advised her regarding a second-degree felony conviction for felonious assault. The 

written plea form, however, stated that Ward was pleading guilty to felonious assault in 

violation of R.C. 2903.12(A)(1), which defines the offense of aggravated assault. The 

offense of felonious assault is found in R.C. 2903.11. 

{¶ 5} In any event, the trial court accepted the plea and later sentenced Ward to 

community control for a felonious-assault conviction. Ward subsequently was served with 
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a notice of a community control revocation hearing. The notice alleged that she had 

violated several conditions of community control. Ward appeared for the hearing and 

admitted violating the terms of community control by failing to report to her probation 

officer, moving to Florida without permission, and being declared an absconder. Based 

on her admission, the trial court made a finding that Ward had violated community control. 

{¶ 6} The trial court then heard testimony from Nia Elliott, who was Ward’s 

probation officer. Elliott testified that Ward had failed to complete required aftercare 

treatment following a MonDay program, which was another charged community-control 

violation. Elliott also stated that Ward had not been consistent with drug screens and had 

tested positive for marijuana. The trial court noted that these things were not rule 

violations but that “they may go to her amenability to supervision.” Tr. Vol. I at 27. Ward 

then explained that she did not complete aftercare because she “felt like [she] really didn’t 

need a therapist” to “keep reliving everything[.]” Id. at 28.) After Ward’s statement, the 

trial court addressed her personally and revoked community control with the following 

explanation:

All right. Ma’am, based upon your admission, I am going to find that 

you violated the terms and conditions of community control. 

Much of Ms. Elliott’s testimony is unrelated to the actual violations, 

because those related to—your admissions, I should say, because those 

related primarily to leaving the State of Ohio. But her testimony went to 

whether you can—you are amenable to community control. And ma’am, I 

have to find that you’re no longer amenable to community control. And one 
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of those reasons is, is something you just said. And that’s like, I don’t need 

a therapist.

The experts, including the people at MonDay who did assessments 

of you, as well as Ms. Elliott, believe that that treatment was necessary. And 

I’m sure it was for a variety of reasons. But you’ve indicated, no, I don’t think 

I needed that. And that is a strong indication for me, among other things, 

that you are not amenable to community control. And I’m going to revoke 

community control.

Id. at 28-29.

{¶ 7} The trial court proceeded to impose a three-year prison sentence. This 

appeal followed.

II. Analysis

{¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, Ward alleges a procedural due-process 

violation based on the trial court’s failure to provide a written or oral statement of the 

evidence it relied on and its reasons for revoking community control. 

{¶ 9} The due-process requirements for a revocation hearing include providing a 

defendant “ ‘with a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and 

the reasons for revoking probation.’ ” State v. Klosterman, 2d Dist. Darke Nos. 2015-CA9, 2015-CA-10, 2016-Ohio-232, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Gilreath, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2000-

CA-1, 2000 WL 896319, * 2 (July 7, 2000); see also State v. McCoy, 2d Dist. Champaign 

No. 2020-CA-13, 2021-Ohio-456, ¶ 35, quoting State v. Norman, 2d Dist. Clark Nos. 

2017-CA-40, 2017-CA-41, 2018-Ohio-993, ¶ 18. The Ohio Supreme Court has held, 
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however, that an oral statement of the evidence and reasons for revoking community 

control also may satisfy due process. State v. Delaney, 11 Ohio St.3d 231, 234-235, 465 

N.E.2d 72 (1984); see also State v. Scott, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27299, 2017-Ohio4100, ¶ 11-13. 

{¶ 10} Here the trial court did not provide a written statement of the evidence it 

relied on and its reasons for revoking community control. Moreover, Ward contends the 

trial court’s oral explanation at the revocation hearing did not adequately identify its 

reasons for revoking community control. She notes that the trial court identified “one of” 

its reasons as being her belief that she did not need aftercare. She argues, however, that 

this statement implies the existence of other reasons, which the trial court did not identify. 

In response, the State maintains that plain-error review applies because Ward did not 

raise this issue below. See Klosterman at ¶ 15 (“The failure to object to a due process 

violation during a community control revocation hearing waives all but plain error.”). The 

State asserts that plain error does not exist. 

{¶ 11} Upon review, we find Ward’s argument to be unpersuasive. It is apparent 

from the trial court’s remarks that it relied on Elliott’s testimony and Ward’s own statement 

to find her no longer amenable to community control. The trial court cited Ward’s claim 

about not needing aftercare as one reason for finding a lack of amenability. As noted 

above, the trial court also recognized that Elliott’s testimony pertained to Ward’s 

amenability to community control. In particular, the trial court cited Elliott’s testimony 

about Ward’s inconsistency with drug screens and her positive marijuana test, noting that 

these issues “may go to her amenability to supervision[.]” From the context of the trial 
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court’s remarks, it appears that these were additional reasons for the trial court’s 

revocation decision. The record is devoid of any other potential reasons. Because the trial 

court adequately identified the basis for its ruling on the record during the revocation 

hearing, we see no error, plain or otherwise. The first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 12} In her second assignment of error, Ward contends her three-year prison 

sentence is contrary to law. She notes that the sentence was imposed for felonious 

assault, a second-degree felony. She recognizes that a three-year prison term is within 

the authorized range for that offense. Ward stresses, however, that the plea form 

underlying her conviction identified the offense to which she was pleading guilty as 

“Felonious Assault (Serious Physical Harm), in violation of ORC 2903.12(A)(1), a felony 

of the second degree.” Ward notes that this statutory citation is incorrect. Felonious 

assault is codified in R.C. 2903.11, not R.C. 2903.12, which addresses aggravated 

assault, a fourth-degree felony. Ward argues that the rule of lenity should apply to this

“ambiguity” in the plea form, entitling her to be sentenced for a fourth-degree-felony 

aggravated-assault conviction.

{¶ 13} In response, the State contends res judicata precludes Ward from 

collaterally attacking her felonious-assault conviction in an appeal from the revocation of 

community control. It appears to us, however, that Ward is not seeking to change her 

conviction from felonious assault to aggravated assault. Rather, in light of the numerical 

designation on her plea form and the rule of lenity, she argues that she actually was 

convicted of aggravated assault, thereby making her sentence for felonious assault 

contrary to law. She asserts that the “ambiguity” in the statutory reference should be 
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“interpreted in her favor as a fourth degree felony conviction for Aggravated Assault.” 

{¶ 14} Once again, we find Ward’s argument to be without merit. The plea and 

sentencing hearing transcripts establish beyond any doubt that Ward pled guilty to and 

was convicted of felonious assault, a second-degree felony. At the outset of the plea 

hearing, Ward confirmed that she was pleading guilty “to one count of felonious assault, 

a felony of the second degree.” Tr. Vol. I at 8. The prosecutor also read a statement of 

the charge, recited the elements of felonious assault, and correctly referenced R.C. 

2903.11. Id. at 10-11. Later in the plea hearing, the trial court accepted her plea to “one 

count of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree” and made a finding of guilt. Id. 

at 13. Thereafter, at the sentencing hearing where it imposed community control, the trial 

court noted that Ward was being sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea “to felonious assault, 

a felony of the second degree.” Sentencing Tr. at 2. The trial court’s September 20, 2018 

final judgment entry also reflected a conviction for felonious assault, a second-degree 

felony. An isolated scrivener’s error in Ward’s plea form does not transform her feloniousassault conviction into one for aggravated assault. That being so, the trial court did not 

err in imposing a three-year prison sentence for felonious assault after revoking 

community control. The three-year sentence is not contrary to law. The second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 15} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

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DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Elizabeth A. Ellis

Charles M. Blue

Hon. Mary Katherine Huffman