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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

JACLYN SHOSHANA LEVINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED October 16, 2014

v No. 317690 Ingham Circuit Court BRIARWOOD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF OKEMOS, LC No. 12-001032-CZ

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: S AAD , P.J., and O’C ONNELL and M URRAY , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order th at did not grant her a declaratory judgment against defendants. For the reas ons stated below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a homeowner in the Briarw ood subdivision in Okemos, and she owns a German Sheppard. When the dog was a puppy, plaintiff sought de fendant Briarwood Homeowners Association’s (“Bria rwood’s”) permission to build a fe nce outside her home so that the dog would have a secure outdoor space. When Briarwood rejected her application to do so, 1 plaintiff brought this action in the Ingham Circuit Court, and asked the court to, among other things: (1) issue a declaratory judgment statin g that her proposed fence was acceptable under Briarwood’s restrictive covenants; and (2) en join Briarwood from in terfering with its construction.

1 Briarwood, however, failed to comply with its own restrictive covenants when it rejected plaintiff’s application—the covena nts state that Briarwood is requi red to answer an application for architectural changes within 30 days of s ubmission, and it failed to answer plaintiff’s application within that time period.-2- The trial court granted plaintiff part ial summary dispositi on pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), 2 because defendant failed to respond to plaintiff’s fence bui lding application within 30 days, as required by defendant’s own restrictive covenants. 3 However, the trial court did not address whether plaintiff was entitled to a declaratory j udgment stating that her proposed fence was acceptable under Briarwood’s restrictive covenants. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling permitted plaintiff to build her fence, but di d not grant the declarator y relief she sought.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial cour t erred when it did not grant her request for a declaratory judgment against Bria rwood. Specifically, she asserts th at a declarator y judgment is necessary to protect her ability to build a fence because Briarwood has supposedly placed a “moratorium” on all new fence construction.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817, 823 ( 1999). When analyzing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) , we “consider[] affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any materi al fact, the moving party is enti tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id . at 120.

III. ANALYSIS

As our Supreme Court recently stated, “it is well established that a court will not decide moot issues. This is because it is the princi ple duty of [a] Court to decide actual cases and controversies.” People v Richmond , 486 Mich 29, 34; 782 NW2d 187 (2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), amended 784 NW2d 204 (2010). An issue “becomes moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the reviewing court to grant relief.” CD Barnes Assoc, Inc v Star Heaven, LLC , 300 Mich App 389, 406; 834 NW 2d 878 (2013). Put another way, courts do not review moot actions because doing so “would be a purposeless proceeding.” Richmond , 486 Mich at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2 The trial court initially held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant responded to plainti ff’s fence application within 30 days, as required by the association’s covenants, but ou r Court held on appeal that this decision was based on a misreading of the plain language of the covenants. Levine v Briarwood Homeowners Ass’n

, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, Ap ril 28, 2013 (Docket No. 315363) . The trial court subsequently modified its holding on remand and ruled that defendant had failed to respond to plaintiff’s fence application within 30 days—m eaning that plaintiff’s fence complied with the Association’s restrictiv e covenants and that sh e was free to build it.

3 Again, as mentioned in n 1, supra, Briarwood’s restrictive covenants require a committee or the Association’s board of directors to approve or disapprove of pr oposed architectural changes to neighborhood properties within 30 days of application.-3- Here, plaintiff’s action is moot . The trial court effectively held that plaintiff’s planned fence complied with Briarwood’s restrictive co venants because Briarwood did not respond to plaintiff’s building application within 30 days. Moreover, pl aintiff provides no evidence to support her contention that Briarwood placed a “m oratorium” on all new fence construction in her community, beyond a notice on the association’s website that stated it would no longer accept new applications for fence construction. There is no evidence in the record that Briarwood has changed its restrict ive covenants to bar fence cons truction, or that it has placed any legal restrictions on its residents to prevent them fr om doing so. Even if Briarwood had changed its restrictive covenant s to bar new fence construction, plaintiff’s fence would not be subject to that restriction, as the trial court alre ady granted her the right to build her fence in its partial grant of su mmary disposition.

Plaintiff is thus free to build the fence, making her action over whether she may build a fence “a purposeless proceeding.” Richmond , 486 Mich at 35. We cannot “grant [plaintiff] relief” that she already possesses. CD Barnes Assoc , 300 Mich App at 406. Nor do we render advisory opinions. Rozankovich v Kalamazoo Spring Corp (On Rehearing) , 44 Mich App 426, 428; 205 NW2d 311 (1973). Plaintiff’ s legal rights were properly vi ndicated at the trial court and do not require any further vi ndication by our Court. In lig ht of our holding, we need not address defendant’s remaining i ssues, which are without merit.

Affirmed.

/s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Peter D. O’Connell /s/ Christopher M. Murray