SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

Patricia Gilleran v. Township of Bloomfield (A-15-15) (076114)

Argued September 13, 2016 -- Decided November 22, 2016

LaVecchia, J., writing for a majority of the Court.

In this appeal, the Court determines whether the security exclusions of the Open Public Records Act 

(“OPRA”), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, preclude disclosure of the day’s worth of video footage from a stationary security 

camera attached to the Bloomfield Town Hall that Plaintiff Patricia Gilleran requested from the Township of 

Bloomfield. 

Gilleran initially requested footage from a five-day period but settled on one day of recordings when asked 

by the Township to limit her request. The Township then denied Gilleran’s request, citing OPRA’s exemption for 

security information. Gilleran filed a complaint in the Law Division seeking the requested footage under OPRA and 

the common law right of access. 

Gilleran argued that the camera is in plain sight and captures video of a public area. She contended that the 

videotape is a government record subject to access under OPRA and that the Township should either grant her 

request in full or review its tapes, redact any exempt portions, and release the remainder. Stressing that OPRA’s 

animating purpose is to grant unfettered public access to government records, Gilleran urged the court to find that 

none of OPRA’s security exemptions creates a blanket exemption for surveillance video footage.

The Township countered that the camera, which is concealed by smoked glass, provides security for the 

Town Hall and/or the Law Enforcement Building adjacent to the Town Hall. According to the Township, the 

purpose of providing surveillance would be thwarted if the public were given access to the video records, which 

might include footage of confidential informants, domestic violence victims, police officers, and others whose safety 

could be jeopardized by release of the footage. The Township also argued that the videos should remain 

confidential to protect the secrecy of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of its surveillance system. The Township 

further asserted that, because review of surveillance video could impose substantial burdens on its resources, it 

should be able to resist a claim for surveillance videotape based on a security exemption without having to require 

its employees to review the footage.

The Law Division held that the Township had violated OPRA, ordered the Township to release the 

requested footage, and directed the parties to discuss reasonable attorney’s fees. The Township appealed, and the 

Appellate Division affirmed the order of the trial court. Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 440 N.J. Super. 490, 501 

(App. Div. 2015). The panel concluded that OPRA contains no blanket exemption for security information and that 

determining whether the government must review a recording should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The 

panel remanded the matter to the Law Division for a determination as to attorney’s fees.

The Court granted the Township leave to appeal. 223 N.J. 402 (2015).

HELD: Compelling release on demand of security surveillance video would be contrary to the legislative intent 

motivating OPRA’s exemptions based on security concerns. The Township’s explanation for denying the request for 

the footage was adequate. Requests for video from surveillance cameras protecting public facilities are better analyzed 

under the common law right of access. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and 

remands the matter for further proceedings based on the unresolved common law claim.

1. OPRA mandates that government records be made “readily accessible” upon citizen request “with certain 

exceptions[] for the protection of the public interest.” N.J.S.A. 41:1A-1. It is the government’s burden to show that 
2

a requested record falls within an exception, including one or both of the security exceptions, which protect 

“emergency or security information or procedures for any buildings or facility which, if disclosed, would jeopardize 

security of the building or facility or persons therein,” as well as “security measures and surveillance techniques 

which, if disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons, property, electronic data or software.” Ibid. (pp. 

13-14) 

2. The Court begins by assuming that surveillance video is a “government record” within the meaning of OPRA 

because neither party argues otherwise. Observing that a statute’s language is the best guide to the Legislature’s 

intent in enacting that statute, the Court then turns to the security provisions quoted above, which it reads in the 

context of related provisions in order to give meaning to the statute as a whole. (pp 15-16)

3. Viewed together, both security exemptions advance a discernable public policy with respect to the security 

systems of public buildings. The Court agreed with Gilleran that the two exceptions do not create a blanket 

exemption for any and all information about security measures. The Court stressed, however, that the two 

provisions were phrased in a way that allows flexibility in application for public safety purposes. (pp. 16-18)

4. The Court notes that the first exception maintains confidentiality when the release of information produced by 

certain security tools places at risk the very security system established for the protection of public buildings and 

people. The second exception reinforces the legislative desire to preclude disclosure of security measures and 

surveillance techniques that would create a risk for property and persons. Together, these exceptions prevent OPRA 

requests from interfering with security efforts, including in ways that the Legislature could not have predicted when 

it enacted OPRA. (pp. 18-19)

5. To protect the confidentiality of security information through one of these exceptions, the government must 

establish that the security tool (here, the camera) produces information that, if disclosed, would create a risk to the 

security of the building or the persons therein because of the revealing nature of the product of that tool. In this 

matter, the Township seeks to protect information about the camera itself, including the scope of the camera’s 

surveillance area, the clarity of the images the camera captures, and the frequency with which it captures images. 

The Court holds that, when such a concern is present, OPRA’s security exemptions bar access to a security system’s 

surveillance product. (pp. 19-22)

6. The Court stresses that this is the sensible application of the security exceptions because, if OPRA were 

interpreted to require unfettered access to the work product of any camera that is part of a governmental facility’s 

security system, then all such footage from every governmental facility would be subject to release on demand, 

creating the opportunity for the protection provided by such security systems to be dismantled. A better approach is 

to analyze requests for security footage under the common law right of access, which allows the need for access to 

be weighed against the needs of governmental confidentiality. (pp. 22-23)

7. The Court finds that the videotape requested in this matter is not subject to public access under OPRA’s security 

exclusions and that the Township provided an adequate basis for finding the footage to be exempt from release. (pp. 

23-24)

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, DISSENTING, expresses the view that OPRA, by its plain language, does not 

categorically exempt all security footage from public disclosure. Rather, OPRA requires public agencies to disclose 

public records, including security footage, unless a specific exception applies. The dissent would thus have 

remanded the case to the trial court to allow the Township to attempt to establish, based on what appears on the tape, 

that the requested footage either “would jeopardize security” or “would create a risk to” safety. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the trial court for 

further proceedings based on the unresolved common law right-to-access claim.

JUSTICES ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, AND SOLOMON join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s 

opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a separate, dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE TIMPONE joins. 

JUSTICE PATTERSON did not participate. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-15 September Term 2015

076114

PATRICIA GILLERAN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THE TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD 

and LOUISE M. PALAGANO, in 

her capacity as Records 

Custodian for the Township of 

Bloomfield,

Defendants-Appellants.

Argued September 13, 2016 – Decided November 22, 2016

On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate 

Division, whose opinion is reported at 440 

N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 2015).

Steven J. Martino argued the cause for 

appellants (Law Department, Township of 

Bloomfield, attorneys).

CJ Griffin argued the cause for respondent 

(Pashman Stein, attorneys).

Raymond R. Chance, III, Deputy Attorney 

General, argued the cause for amicus curiae

State of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, 

Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; 

Jeffrey S. Jacobson, Counsel to the Attorney 

General, on the letter brief).

Lance J. Kalik argued the cause for amicus 

curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New 

Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, 

attorney; Mr. Kalik, Mr. Barocas, and Jeanne 

M. LoCicero, of counsel; Mr. Kalik, 

Stephanie R. Wolfe, and John C. Kessler, on 

the brief).
2

Bruce S. Rosen submitted a brief on behalf 

of amici curiae The Reporters Committee for 

Freedom of the Press, Advance Publications, 

Inc., American Society of News Editors, The

Associated Press, Association of Alternative 

Newsmedia, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 

Gannett Co., Inc., Hearst Corporation, 

Investigative Reporting Workshop at American 

University, MPA – The Association of 

Magazine Media, National Association of 

Black Journalists, National Newspaper 

Association, National Press Photographers 

Association, National Public Radio, Inc., 

The New York Times Company, North Jersey 

Media Group, Inc., Online News Association, 

Radio Television Digital News Association, 

and Society of Professional Journalists 

(McCusker, Anselmi, Rosen & Carvelli, 

attorneys).

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion for the Court.

This appeal arises from a citizen request, pursuant to the 

Open Public Records Act (OPRA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to

-13, and the common law right of access, for essentially a day’s 

worth of video footage from a stationary security camera 

attached to the second-story rear area of Bloomfield Town Hall, 

adjacent to the police station. 

The Township of Bloomfield (Township) declined to release 

the videotape footage. According to the Township, allowing 

unrestricted access to security camera videotape -- which would 

reveal not only what is and is not captured by the security 

camera, but also when and how well it is captured -- would 

undermine the purpose of having a security camera system 
3

protecting the buildings and people within them. The Township

asserted that the security exclusions of OPRA permitted 

withholding the videotape. 

We granted leave to appeal from the Appellate Division’s 

affirmance of a trial court order compelling release of the 

video under OPRA. We conclude that OPRA does not require 

release of video footage that reveals security capacity for 

security surveillance systems protecting public buildings. 

Although we find no OPRA right of access to video footage from 

such surveillance systems, that does not mean that a citizen may 

not obtain, when appropriate, some portion of video from a 

public facility’s security surveillance system, but that request 

must be subjected to the common law balancing of interests under 

a right-to-know claim. That common law claim was not reached in 

this matter so we leave that analysis for another day in the 

circumstances arising in this appeal.

The security exceptions preserve the confidentiality of

emergency or security information or 

procedures for any buildings or facility 

which, if disclosed, would jeopardize security 

of the building or facility or persons 

therein; [and]

security measures and surveillance techniques 

which, if disclosed, would create a risk to 

the safety of persons, property, electronic 

data or software[.]

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.]
4

The wholesale release of videotape footage from a surveillance

camera, which is part of a government facility’s security system

protecting its property, workers, and visitors, would reveal 

information about the system’s operation and also its 

vulnerabilities, jeopardizing public safety. The compelled

release under OPRA, on demand for any or no reason, of a

security system’s operational product revealing otherwise 

nonpublic information about monitoring capability is at odds 

with the legislative intent in creating security exceptions to 

OPRA. The security exceptions will be applied in a commonsense

manner that fulfills the very purpose of having security-based 

exceptions, and we will do so mindful of present day practical 

challenges to maintenance of security in public facilities. 

We hold that the security exclusions preclude disclosure

under OPRA of the videotape requested in this matter. 

 I.

On April 7, 2014, plaintiff Patricia Gilleran emailed the 

Township’s Records Custodian requesting five days’ worth of 

footage -- March 31, 2014 to April 4, 2014, from 7:00 a.m. to 

9:00 p.m. -- from a stationary security camera, which was 

attached to the back of the municipal building and which, she 

claimed, appeared to be directed toward the rear of Town Hall 

and a parking area that encompassed the Mayor’s parking space.
5

A clerk1 for the Township spoke with Gilleran, indicated 

that five days of footage would be voluminous, and asked if the 

request could be winnowed. Gilleran accordingly reduced her 

request to one day of recordings: March 31, 2014, from 7:00 

a.m. to 9:00 p.m. On April 11, 2014, Gilleran was informed by 

email that her request was denied pursuant to OPRA’s exemption 

for security information.

Gilleran commenced this action against the Township and its 

Records Custodian by filing a complaint in the Law Division

seeking the requested footage under OPRA and the common law 

right of access. According to her complaint, plaintiff seeks 

the video footage to determine whether certain people had 

entered the municipal building. The complaint further alleges 

that the camera is in plain sight and captures video of a public 

area. Four photographs of the surveillance camera were appended 

to the complaint to depict that the camera is affixed to the 

second story of the municipal building’s wall, above a parking 

lot that includes the Mayor’s parking space. 

The complaint contends that the videotape is a government 

record subject to access under OPRA and requests the court 

either to direct the Township to release the requested footage 

 

1 In different places in the record, this person is listed as a 

“clerk/typist,” a records custodian, or an employee in the 

Municipal Clerk’s office who frequently responds to OPRA 

requests.
6

or to review the tapes in camera and order defendants to redact 

portions of the tape that are exempt and release the remainder. 

The complaint also demands the award of a civil penalty and 

attorney’s fees under OPRA. The complaint also seeks release of 

the videotape under the common law right of access. 

In its answer, the Township contends that the footage is 

exempt as security information. The Township submitted two 

certifications: one from the clerk who responded to Gilleran’s 

request and the other from Ted Ehrenburg, Bloomfield’s Township

Administrator. Ehrenburg certified that:

3. [] The camera from which the video was 

requested is located on the rear of Town Hall 

on the second story. Without revealing 

security information, the camera provides 

security for Town Hall and/or the Law 

Enforcement Building adjacent to Town Hall.

4. The cameras are strategically placed and 

smoked glass is placed over the cameras so 

that the public does not know the area that is 

being surveilled.

5. Allowing access by the public to the video 

surveillance would defeat the entire purpose 

of having security cameras on Town Hall.

6. Again, without revealing security 

information, the area which is potentially 

surveilled is not only used by public 

employees but Police Officers who report to 

and from work, confidential informants who are 

brought into the Police Station, witnesses who 

are brought into the Police Station, domestic 

violence victims who are brought into the 

Police Station and members of the public who 

seek to report crimes.
7

7. If the public is given access to the video 

tapes, the safety of these individuals could 

be put in jeopardy.

8. Therefore, video surveillance which is 

essential to the security of the township 

buildings should not be provided to the 

public.

On the return date of the court’s order to show cause, 

plaintiff argued that, because the case presents a novel OPRA 

issue, the court’s focus should be on the Act’s animating

principle, which is to grant unfettered public access to 

government records. Plaintiff urged the court to find that none 

of OPRA’s security exemptions creates a blanket exemption for 

surveillance video footage based on a concern for security and 

that, therefore, the Township was obliged to examine the video 

to determine whether some portion of its contents would pose a 

security risk. Plaintiff’s argument emphasized that the camera 

was placed in an obvious and public place and that one can stand

outside the building and observe the same people entering and 

leaving the building that the tape would have recorded. 

The Township argued that its employees should not be 

required to review security footage for the Township to resist a 

claim for surveillance videotape based on a security exemption. 

From a practical perspective, the Township maintained that 

requiring Township employees to review security footage for 

every public request could impose substantial burdens on the 
8

Township’s resources. The Township acknowledged that no 

Township official had viewed the entire footage before claiming 

a security exemption under OPRA for plaintiff’s request; 

nevertheless, the Township argued that the footage could pose 

security risks because it might reveal undercover officers,

witnesses, or victims seeking to maintain confidentiality. More 

fundamentally, the Township contended that the videos should 

remain confidential so the Township can maintain the secrecy of 

the scope of the security surveillance system. 

The Law Division held that the Township was in violation of 

OPRA and ordered release of the requested video footage within 

five days. The court also directed the parties to attempt

agreement on reasonable attorney’s fees under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. 

On July 1, 2014, the Township filed motions for leave to 

appeal and for a stay pending appeal, maintaining that “there is 

a security risk if [the tape is] produced,” and that the 

“revealing of security measures and surveillance techniques 

would create a risk of [sic] the safety of persons in the 

Township.” The Appellate Division granted the stay on July 2, 

2014. The Appellate Division also granted the application of 

the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) for 

amicus curiae status.

On May 13, 2015, the Appellate Division affirmed the order 

of the trial court. Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 440 N.J. 
9

Super. 490, 501 (App. Div. 2015). The panel rejected the 

Township’s argument that the fact that the video camera footage 

was part of a security system should have been sufficient 

justification to deny access. Id. at 497. Based on a statutory 

construction analysis, the panel held that OPRA’s statutory 

exclusions addressing security do not provide a blanket 

exemption for all security information. Ibid. 

Further, the appellate panel held that the record lacked 

sufficient specific information for it to conclude that 

activities and individuals’ identities revealed on the tape 

would pose a security risk if the tape were released. Id. at 

498. That said, the panel declined to conclude that an agency 

must review requested video recordings in order to claim an 

exemption based on security reasons, acknowledging that such a 

requirement could be unreasonably burdensome. Ibid. Rather, 

the panel stated that determining whether the government must 

review a recording should be addressed on a case-by-case basis, 

taking into consideration the length of the requested recordings 

and the nature of the information contained therein. Id. at 

500. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for additional

proceedings related only to the award of fees. Id. at 501.

Because final judgment had not yet been rendered, the 

Township properly sought leave to appeal to this Court, which we 
10

granted. 223 N.J. 402 (2015).2 The ACLU-NJ, which had been 

granted amicus curiae status before the Appellate Division,

filed an amicus brief in support of Gilleran. The Reporters 

Committee for Freedom of the Press and eighteen media 

organizations were granted amicus curiae status and filed a 

brief urging rejection of a “blanket exception” for surveillance 

videos. We also granted amicus curiae status to the Attorney 

General of New Jersey, who filed a brief in support of the 

Township.

 II.

The key distinction in the arguments of the parties lies in

how to interpret the security exceptions, both of which include 

the phrase, “if disclosed,” in identifying the type of security 

information or other material that is excluded from access as a 

“government record.” The parties further disagree on whether 

the security exceptions require the review and redaction of 

discrete material that can be identified as posing a security 

risk, subject to cost shifting and other accommodations

generally provided for through N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5. 

Plaintiff and the amici who support her right to request 

access to the security videotape believe that individualized 

review and excision is necessary to give meaning to the phrase,

 

2 A related notice of petition for certification was dismissed.
11

“if disclosed,” in the two security exclusions. Plaintiff and 

amici argue that the phrase requires the Township to review the 

tapes and excise only those portions of the tape that would 

create a security risk “if disclosed.” 

Plaintiff and amici also suggest that, if the Township is 

not required to review the tapes, then the Court will have 

interpreted the exception to be a “blanket exception” for all 

security measures. They point out that other OPRA exemptions 

containing similar “if disclosed” language have been applied to 

require an individualized assessment of the requested government 

record, with release authorized for those portions that do not 

pose the demonstrated risk that the exclusion seeks to avoid. 

Here they emphasize that the Township made no effort to 

demonstrate that portions of the video “would jeopardize” 

security because the Township acknowledged that no one had 

viewed the tape in its entirety. 

The Township and the Attorney General view the security 

exclusions differently. They dispute that the videotape merely 

provides information equivalent to that which a member of the 

public would otherwise view standing outside in the surveilled 

public place. Rather, they maintain that videotape from the 

Township’s stationary security camera, which is otherwise not 

available to be seen by the public, would disclose security 

information that reveals the security system’s operation and 
12

vulnerabilities –- what the government can view from the inner

workings of its security system. They maintain that allowing

general public access to their security measures, procedures, 

and techniques is contrary to the purpose of the security 

exceptions.

Accordingly, they argue that the revealing information

ordered to be released -- which would normally be known only to 

those who could see through the camera’s lenses or, in other 

words, who can view what the camera’s tapes capture, when, and 

how well -– was intended to be exempt as a category of 

information under the security exclusions. They emphasize that 

the security exclusions’ purpose in shielding the release of 

such sensitive information about a security system is designed 

to foster protection of public buildings and the people within 

them. They further argue that courts should apply the security 

exclusions and deny public access to a security system’s video 

when the government produces a certification that such 

information must remain confidential to avoid jeopardizing the 

security system’s operation. 

In further response to plaintiff’s and the ACLU-NJ’s 

position, they contend that their interpretation neither renders 

the “if disclosed” language meaningless nor creates a blanket 

exception for security-related information. They maintain that 

other security-related records remain available on request, 
13

subject to excision as needed prior to release. Their position 

also allows for release, based on a showing of need balanced 

against the government’s interests, through the common law right 

of access. 

 III.

Any analysis of OPRA must begin with the recognition that 

the Legislature created OPRA intending to make government 

records “readily accessible” to the state’s citizens “with 

certain exceptions[] for the protection of the public interest.” 

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (declaring public policy animating OPRA). OPRA 

substantively provides that “all government records shall be 

subject to public access unless exempt,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, and 

it places on the government the burden of establishing an 

exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. See Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 

N.J. 51, 66-67 (2008). The Act sets forth in detail the manner 

in which requests for inspection, examination, and copying of 

government records are to be addressed, at times underscoring 

the responsiveness and cooperation expected from custodians. 

See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5. 

OPRA expansively defines “Government record” or “record” to 

include

any paper, written or printed book, document, 

drawing, map, plan, photograph, microfilm, 

data processed or image processed document, 

information stored or maintained 

electronically or by sound-recording or in a 
14

similar device, or any copy thereof, that has 

been made, maintained or kept on file in the 

course of his or its official business by any 

officer, commission, agency or authority of 

the State or of any political subdivision 

thereof.

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.]

However, the Legislature established public-policy exceptions

from that definition, declaring that “[a] government record 

shall not include . . . information which is deemed to be 

confidential.” Ibid. Included in the information that the 

Legislature decreed to be confidential is

emergency or security information or 

procedures for any buildings or facility 

which, if disclosed, would jeopardize security 

of the building or facility or persons 

therein;

as well as

security measures and surveillance techniques 

which, if disclosed, would create a risk to 

the safety of persons, property, electronic 

data or software.

[Ibid.]

We now evaluate whether those exceptions were intended to 

exempt from disclosure the security camera videotape that 

plaintiff requested through OPRA.

 IV.

We begin our analysis with the assumption that video 

footage from a security camera is a “government record” under 

OPRA because no party has challenged that starting point, and we 
15

proceed directly to whether video footage from a public 

facility’s security surveillance camera is exempt from 

disclosure based on the public-interest policy concerns 

underlying the two security-related exemptions. See N.J.S.A.

47:1A-1 (characterizing exceptions as having been created “for 

the protection of the public interest”). 

The two government-record exemptions at issue categorize 

types of information or content sought to be excluded based on 

security concerns. One exemption addresses “security 

information or procedures . . . which, if disclosed, would 

jeopardize security of the building or facility or persons 

therein.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (emphasis added). The other 

addresses “security measures and surveillance techniques which, 

if disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons [or] 

property.” Ibid. (emphasis added).

Our task plainly involves statutory construction, the 

objective of which is to effectuate legislative intent. Cashin 

v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015). The best source for 

direction on legislative intent is the very language used by the 

Legislature. See State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).

The words used by the Legislature in the applicable

exemptions capture categories of information. Their terminology 

transcends reference to a singular document, or like item, that 

can be reviewed for redaction and encompasses material that 
16

provides insight into security methods and modalities. The 

first exemption references “security information or procedures”

the disclosure of which would jeopardize security of public 

buildings. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (emphasis added). The second 

speaks even more broadly in precluding disclosure of a category 

of information, specifically reaching records that reveal 

“security measures and surveillance techniques” so as not to 

place at risk the safety of property, which includes public 

buildings, and people. Ibid. (emphasis added). Our job is to 

understand the intent that animated those exemptions and to give 

it effect. Cashin, supra, 223 N.J. at 335. We do so fully 

aware that the Legislature also stated that “any limitations on 

the right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the 

public’s right of access.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. In attempting to 

understand what the Legislature intended, a court does not “view 

the statutory words in isolation but ‘in context with related 

provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.’” 

Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012)

(quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).

Viewed together, both security exemptions advance a 

discernible public policy with respect to the security systems

of public buildings, such as we have here. The two exemptions 

endeavor to keep from public scrutiny a swath of information 

that, if disclosed, would jeopardize or would undermine the 
17

effectiveness of the security system for public buildings

(property) and the people within them. We seek meaning and 

intent of the two exemptions by viewing them in context with 

each other. Murray, supra, 210 N.J. at 592.

We begin by agreeing with plaintiff that the Legislature 

was not creating a blanket exception for any and all information 

about security measures. Such a clear and direct exclusion 

could have been written, but that is not how the exemptions are 

fairly read. The “if disclosed” phrase must have meaning. See

State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 449 (2011) (stating that 

legislative words are not presumed superfluous). Certainly, 

there are types of security-related information that would 

appear disclosable without violating the Legislature’s 

overarching concern about the maintenance of public security and 

safety. Examples could include public-bidding documents in 

connection with acquisition of a security system and documents 

revealing the cost of the system. Such examples were readily 

acknowledged during argument in this matter. Thus, the 

exception does not create a “blanket exception” for all 

security-system-related material, as feared by plaintiff and 

amici. 

However, the Legislature plainly was concerned about

public-safety consequences when creating a shield in OPRA from 
18

the on-demand public disclosure of information that relates to 

public-facility security concerns. 

Even if neither security exception is meant to operate as a 

blanket exception, the Legislature’s exceptions -- written 

without knowing the extent of the public safety challenges that 

the future might bring -- were phrased in a way that allows 

flexibility in application for security purposes. They maintain 

the confidentiality of information categories when disclosure of

the information, considering the totality of its worth, would 

compromise the integrity of a security system and defeat the 

purpose to having security exceptions in OPRA. 

The first exception allows for the maintenance of secrecy 

when the consequence of releasing information produced by 

certain security tools places at risk the very security system 

established for the protection of public buildings and people. 

The second reinforces the legislative desire to preclude 

disclosure of security measures and surveillance techniques that 

would create a risk for property and persons. The language of 

those exceptions broadly permits a categorical exception if the 

information’s disclosure would create the very danger the 

security measures and surveillance techniques were meant to 

thwart. 

Current events since the new millennium make evident the 

present day difficulties of maintaining daily security for 
19

public buildings and people using them. The security exceptions 

prevent OPRA requests from interfering with such security 

efforts. Even if the Legislature could not have predicted 

precisely all the many types of criminal, terroristic events 

that have happened since OPRA was enacted, the Legislature 

created flexible exceptions to preserve public safety and 

security. Now, we know that knowledge of the vulnerabilities of 

a security system could allow an ill-motivated person to know 

when and where to plant an explosive device, mount an attack, or 

learn the movements of persons, placing a public building or 

persons at risk. Information that reveals the capabilities and 

vulnerabilities of surveillance cameras that are part of a 

public facility’s security system is precisely the type of 

information that the exceptions meant to keep confidential in 

furtherance of public safety.

To achieve exemption for such a category of security 

information, the governmental entity must establish that the 

security tool (here, the camera) produces information that, if 

disclosed, would create a risk to the security of the building 

or the persons therein because of the revealing nature of the 

product of that tool. We have recognized before the 

significance of the release of a “government record” when the 

mining of information from the government record can defeat the 

very purpose of the OPRA exclusion. In Education Law Center v. 
20

New Jersey Department of Education, 198 N.J. 274 (2009), this 

Court considered the impact that release of a document under 

OPRA would have on thwarting the purpose of an exclusion 

recognized under the Act. Specifically, we considered whether 

the release of a record that contained factual components could 

be subject to the deliberative-process privilege recognized and 

protected under OPRA. Id. at 299. In concluding that 

disclosure of a seemingly fact-based document could reveal 

deliberative content because that protectable type of 

information could be gleaned from thoughtful and contextual

review of the document, id. at 299-300, we held that the purpose 

to be served by the exception had to be honored in the case 

before the Court, id. at 300-02. The Court took a practical 

approach to preserving the purpose intended to be achieved by

the legislative creation of the exemption.

Here, we cannot allow ourselves to be blind to the very 

purpose of the security exceptions in issue. When determining 

whether OPRA meant to require the wholesale release of such 

security videotape, on demand, we must consider the videotape as 

a whole, with due regard for the information it can reveal about 

the Township’s security system. If the release of the product 

of a security system can lead to the undermining of the 

legislative public-interest policy embedded in the security

exclusions, the exemption protecting such information to avoid 
21

the risk of jeopardizing the security protection surely was 

intended to prevail in order to protect public safety.3

In this matter, the scope of the camera’s surveillance area 

(the width, depth, and clarity of the images, as well as when it 

operates, i.e. intermittently and, if so, at what intervals and 

are they regular) is the information that the Township seeks to 

protect. That the video may contain depictions of otherwise 

non-confidential views of an area outside a public building or 

may capture persons moving in a public area is not a complete 

way in which to assess the security worth of this requested 

government record. Such analysis provides a stunted review for 

addressing the purpose underlying the security exemptions. 

No doubt the security exceptions recognize the need, in 

some instances, to deny access to only a portion of a government 

record in order to avoid placing at risk the safety of a person

identifiable on the videotape.4 But when the public-security 

 

3 On this point, the dissent describes the majority opinion as 

not giving effect to the second prong of analysis under the 

exceptions, namely that the disclosure would jeopardize security 

or would create a risk to safety. See infra at __ (slip op. at 

9). That mistakes our analysis. Although under our 

interpretation of the statutory exemption no security footage 

can pass the second part of the test embedded in the exception, 

that is not to say that all security information is exempt 

because, as noted, security information includes more than just 

security video footage. The statutory language from the second 

prong to the exceptions is not omitted in our analysis.

4 When that is the only basis asserted for non-disclosure of an 

otherwise disclosable government record, then it would be 
22

concern is that access to the videotape product of the 

surveillance medium itself reveals security-compromising

information, then the exemptions can be relied on to bar,

categorically, under OPRA, a security system’s otherwise 

confidential surveillance product. 

A sensible application of the security exceptions supports 

denying release of information that undermines the operation of 

a government facility’s security system. Compelling the 

wholesale release to the public of videotape product of any 

security camera, or combination of cameras, from a government 

facility’s security system would reveal information about a 

system’s operation and also its vulnerabilities. Once OPRA is 

interpreted to require unfettered access to the work product of 

any camera that is part of a governmental facility’s security 

system, then footage from security cameras in all governmental 

facilities –- police stations, court houses, correctional 

institutions -- would be subject to release on demand. It takes 

no stretch of the imagination to realize that that would make it 

possible for any person to gather the information necessary to 

dismantle the protection provided by such security systems. 

 

appropriate for the governmental entity to review the tapes and

redact or excise certain portions. OPRA allows for cost 

shifting for the additional burden on public resources should 

that form of search expedition be requested in an appropriately 

tailored way. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.

 
23

Requests for videotape product from surveillance cameras 

protecting public facilities are better analyzed under the 

common law right of access where the asserted need for access 

can be weighed against the needs of governmental 

confidentiality. See O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 218 N.J.

168, 196-97 (2014) (noting that “the party requesting documents 

must explain why he seeks access to the requested documents” and 

relating three-part test used for evaluation of such requests); 

Educ. Law Ctr., supra, 198 N.J. at 302. We can envision 

circumstances when the need for access to a portion of a 

videotape, redacted as necessary, may justify release of the

requested material. For example, an accident occurring in an 

area surveilled near a public building or an incident of claimed 

brutality or misconduct captured on a facility’s security 

videotape may provide a legitimate interest to justify a partial 

disclosure under the common law right of access.5 Plaintiff’s 

common law right of access claim was never reached in this 

matter and so that balancing-of-interest analysis was not

performed. That is the context in which the give and take 

emphasized by the dissent should take place when security 

 

5 This Court also recognized recently the possibility of a 

judicially fashioned remedy that could include the required 

release of a portion of security videotape from cameras inside 

and outside a police building as part of required discovery in a 

DWI prosecution. See State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 600-01 

(2016).
24

videotape, capable of revealing vulnerabilities of the security 

system itself, is requested.

That said, we conclude that the broad brush of compelled 

release under OPRA, on demand for any or no reason, of the

Township’s security system’s surveillance videotape product, 

revealing its capabilities and vulnerabilities, is contrary to 

the legislative intent motivating OPRA’s exemptions based on 

security concerns. We hold that the videotape requested in this 

matter is not subject to public access under OPRA’s security

exclusions. Although a more expansive explanation by the 

Township would have been preferable, we are satisfied that the 

Township provided an adequate basis, through Mr. Ehrenberg’s 

certification, as buttressed by argument, to support its 

position that allowing general public access under OPRA to the 

video footage from the surveillance camera on Town Hall and the 

adjacent police station would undermine the security purpose of 

the camera and of the security system of which it is but a part.

 V.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the 

matter is remanded for further proceedings based on the 

unresolved common law right-of-access claim.

JUSTICES ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, AND SOLOMON join in JUSTICE 

LaVECCHIA’s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a separate, 

dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE TIMPONE joins. JUSTICE 

PATTERSON did not participate. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-15 September Term 2015

076114

PATRICIA GILLERAN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THE TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD 

and LOUISE M. PALAGANO, in 

her capacity as Records 

Custodian for the Township of 

Bloomfield,

Defendants-Appellants.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting.

This is a case of statutory interpretation. The outcome 

should depend on the language the Legislature used -- or chose 

not to use -- in the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A.

47:1A-1 to -13.

OPRA provides the public with access to government records. 

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Unless an exception in the statute applies, 

the law affords citizens a broad right of access. Ibid. 

Relying on the statute, Patricia Gilleran asked the Township of 

Bloomfield for footage from a video surveillance camera that is 

visible to the public and focuses on the back of Bloomfield’s 

Town Hall. The Township denied the request, and this action 

followed. 
2

The trial court found that OPRA does not create a “blanket 

exemption” for the disclosure of security tapes and ordered 

Bloomfield to disclose the footage. The Appellate Division 

affirmed. It carefully analyzed the language of the statute and 

agreed that “the statutory exclusions do not provide a blanket 

OPRA exemption for recordings made from security cameras.” 

Gilleran v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 440 N.J. Super. 490, 497 (App. 

Div. 2015). The panel also found that the Township did not meet 

its burden to establish that either of OPRA’s two securityrelated exceptions applies. Id. at 498. 

The majority takes a different approach. It concludes that 

all footage from security cameras is exempt from disclosure 

under OPRA because the footage would reveal the “capability” and 

“vulnerabilities” of the government agency’s security system. 

See ante at __, __, __ (slip op. at 4, 22, 24). The majority 

offers sound reasons why that approach makes sense. But the 

Court’s decision cannot overcome a fundamental problem: OPRA 

does not say that all security footage is categorically exempt 

from public disclosure. The Legislature could have written that 

standard into the law but did not. Instead, OPRA requires 

public agencies to disclose government records unless a specific 

exception applies, and the relevant exceptions do not exempt all 

security footage from disclosure. According to the language of 

the statute, the Township must demonstrate that surveillance 
3

footage “would jeopardize security” or “would create a risk to” 

safety to be exempt from disclosure. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The 

Township has not made that showing and, therefore, has not met 

its burden under the law. 

Courts must be guided by the Legislature’s policy choices, 

which appear in the words of the relevant statutes. Because, in 

my view, the majority has not followed the plain language of 

OPRA, I respectfully dissent.

I.

The statute provides the critical backdrop to this case. 

OPRA is designed “to maximize public knowledge about public 

affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry.” Mason v. 

City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008) (quoting Asbury Park 

Press v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 374 N.J. Super. 312, 

329 (Law Div. 2004)).

At the outset of the law, the Legislature declared that 

“government records shall be readily accessible for inspection, 

copying, or examination by the citizens of this State, with 

certain exceptions, for the protection of the public interest, 

and any limitations on the right of access . . . shall be 

construed in favor of the public’s right of access.” N.J.S.A.

47:1A-1 (emphasis added). 

The law’s overall design is straightforward. “[A]ll 

government records shall be subject to public access unless 
4

exempt.” Ibid. OPRA defines “government record[s]” broadly. 

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The law covers “information stored or 

maintained electronically,” which a political subdivision of the 

State made or maintained in the course of its official business. 

Ibid. The statute also exempts certain items from disclosure; 

the Legislature expressly carved out two dozen areas from the 

meaning of “government record.” Ibid. OPRA places the burden 

on public agencies to prove that an exception applies. N.J.S.A.

47:1A-6.

The law also provides various ways for agencies to limit 

disclosure. For example, as a general rule, before custodians 

allow access to government records, they must redact social 

security numbers, credit card numbers, unlisted telephone 

numbers, or driver license numbers from the records requested. 

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5. When part of a record is exempt from 

disclosure, “the custodian shall delete or excise” that portion 

and “shall promptly permit access to the remainder of the 

record.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g). Also, “[i]f a request for access 

to a government record would substantially disrupt agency 

operations, the custodian may deny access to the record after 

attempting to reach a reasonable solution with the requestor.” 

Ibid. And if “an extraordinary expenditure of time and effort” 

is needed “to accommodate” a request, the agency may charge a 

reasonable “special service charge” based on the actual cost of 
5

providing the copies requested. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(c); see also

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(d) (allowing reasonable service charges related 

to information technology).

II.

No party disputes that the surveillance footage sought in 

this case is a “government record.” The question before the 

Court is whether any exceptions apply to Ms. Gilleran’s request. 

The Township relies on two exceptions in the statute: 

emergency or security information or 

procedures for any buildings or facility 

which, if disclosed, would jeopardize security 

of the building or facility or persons 

therein; [and]

security measures and surveillance techniques 

which, if disclosed, would create a risk to 

the safety of persons, property, electronic 

data or software. 

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (emphasis added).]

Neither exception announces a blanket rule that applies to an 

entire category of information. Yet the Legislature 

specifically used that approach in other areas. It exempted 

“criminal investigatory records” from disclosure -- without 

qualification. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The same is true for 

“information . . . to be kept confidential pursuant to court 

order.” Ibid. Likewise, “information contained on individual 

admission applications” to any public institution of higher 

education is exempt across the board. Ibid.
6

The Legislature, however, did not exempt all “emergency or 

security information” or all “security measures and surveillance 

techniques.” Instead, OPRA excludes from the definition of 

“government record” only information or footage that, 

respectively, “would jeopardize security” or “would create a 

risk to” safety. Ibid.

To satisfy its burden and establish that the above 

exceptions applied, Bloomfield submitted a certification from 

its Township Administrator. He explained that “the camera 

provides security for Town Hall and/or the [adjacent] Law 

Enforcement Building.” He argued that video surveillance 

footage should not be disclosed because that “would defeat the 

entire purpose of having security cameras on Town Hall.” He 

added that “the public does not know the area that is being 

surveilled.” In addition, he explained that the safety of 

police officers, confidential informants, witnesses, domestic 

violence victims, and members of the public who enter the police 

station “could be put in jeopardy.” (Emphasis added.) 

The general language of the certification does not 

establish that the safety of any of those individuals would be 

jeopardized -- the standard used in the statute. In fact, 

because no one has examined the footage in question, the 

Township cannot represent that any confidential informants, 

witnesses, or victims appear on the tape. Beyond that, as the 
7

Appellate Division noted, the Township did not demonstrate that 

some feature of the camera would create a risk of harm if the 

footage were released. See Gilleran, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 

498. In short, the Township has not met its burden of proof --

that disclosure “would jeopardize security” or “would create a 

risk to” safety -- as the law requires. 

To be sure, the Township could have availed itself of 

remedies that OPRA provides. It could have reviewed the 

surveillance tape and redacted parts that, in fact, “would 

create a risk to the safety of persons” or “would jeopardize 

security.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The Township, for example, 

could have redacted portions that depict any confidential 

informants. It could have cropped blind spots from the 

videotape in order not to reveal the system’s limitations. If 

the Township could demonstrate that the manner and level of 

review required “would substantially disrupt” the Township’s 

operations, it could have denied access after first “attempting 

to reach a reasonable solution with the requestor.” N.J.S.A.

47:1A-5(g). In other words, Township officials could have 

negotiated with Ms. Gilleran about the scope of the request and 

asked her to narrow it further. At oral argument, counsel for 

Ms. Gilleran represented that she would have narrowed the 

request if asked. The Township could have also added a 

reasonable special service charge if satisfying the request 
8

involved “an extraordinary expenditure of time and effort.” 

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(c). But the Township did none of those things. 

Instead of speaking further with Ms. Gilleran, it simply denied 

her revised request for one day of video footage.

The majority finds that the release of security camera 

footage “would reveal information about a system’s operation and 

also its vulnerabilities.” See ante at __ (slip op. at 22). 

According to the majority, such disclosures are “at odds with 

the legislative intent in creating security exceptions to OPRA.” 

Id. at __ (slip op. at 4). The majority therefore concludes 

that footage from security cameras, which presumably reveals 

sensitive security information, is exempt from disclosure under 

OPRA. Id. at __, __, __ (slip op. at 4, 21, 24). 

That may be a sensible approach as a matter of policy. The 

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, the Reporters 

Committee for Freedom of the Press, and the media organizations 

that appear as amici strongly argue otherwise. But what matters 

in this appeal is what the Legislature said when it made policy 

choices in the body of the statute. The Legislature did not 

create a wholesale exception for security footage. Instead, it 

drafted two security exceptions that each contain two prongs: 

(1) the material sought must relate to “emergency or security 

information” or “security measures and surveillance techniques”; 

and (2) the agency must show that disclosure “would jeopardize 
9

security” or “would create a risk to” safety. N.J.S.A. 47:1A1.1. Unless both prongs are met, the exceptions cannot apply. 

The Court, however, effectively exempts security footage 

from disclosure across the board because of what the footage 

might reveal about how a security system operates. That 

standard is quite broad. Indeed, it is hard to see how security 

footage that covers even a modest amount of time could pass the 

majority’s test. Beyond that, the Court’s reading of the law 

gives no meaning to the second prong in both statutory 

exceptions. The analysis, therefore, runs contrary to a basic 

rule of statutory interpretation. Courts should give effect to 

every word of a statute and not read a law in a way that renders 

language superfluous. See H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 207 

(2015); In re N.B., 222 N.J. 87, 101 (2015); State v. Regis, 208 

N.J. 439, 449 (2011).

I would instead address both prongs of OPRA’s security 

exceptions, as the Appellate Division did. The panel noted that 

the Township 

provided no information . . . to indicate that 

important security strategies or techniques 

would be disclosed. For example, there was 

no indication that the security camera might 

have blind spots in its apparent surveillance 

areas, or that the clarity and sharpness of 

the imagery recorded would be revealed in a 

way that might compromise the strategic 

deterrent effect of the security camera or 

overall security system of the building.
10

[Gilleran, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 498.] 

In my view, the panel correctly found that the Township’s 

certification contained general statements that “were 

insufficient to justify withholding the recordings from 

disclosure.” Ibid.

III.

Security cameras have been around for a long time -- well 

before OPRA was enacted in 2002.6 Their purpose has always been 

to protect public safety. Against that backdrop, OPRA placed 

particular conditions on when security footage could and could 

not be disclosed; the language of the statute simply did not 

exempt all footage from disclosure. 

The Legislature, of course, is free to rewrite and broaden 

the security-related exceptions in the law. It can craft a 

categorical exception for security footage as it has done in 

other areas. But it is for the Legislature, not the courts, to 

modify the text of a statute. 

 

1 OPRA significantly altered and expanded upon the Right to Know 

Law, which had been enacted in 1963. Compare L. 1963, c. 73, 

with L. 2001, c. 404. Both security provisions were added as 

part of the new law. L. 2001, c. 404, § 1. The Assembly and 

Senate voted to adopt OPRA in early January 2002; the Governor 

signed the bill on January 8, 2002. Ibid. Just months before, 

our nation witnessed the tragic events of September 11, 2001. 

It is therefore not correct to suggest that the Legislature 

could not have predicted modern-day security issues and acts of 

terror when it enacted OPRA. See ante at __-__ (slip op. at 18-

19). 
11

When called on to interpret a statute, courts must examine 

the plain language of the law and give effect to the words the 

Legislature used. Morristown Assocs. v. Grant Oil Co., 220 N.J.

360, 380 (2015); State v. Terry, 218 N.J. 224, 234 (2014). To 

give sense to the statute as a whole, courts review particular 

language “in context with related provisions.” Murray v. 

Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012) (quoting 

DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)); see also Burnett 

v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009). Here, the broad 

exceptions the Legislature crafted for other categories of 

information offer telling context. 

OPRA itself adds another important rule of statutory 

construction. The law expressly declares that “any limitations 

on the right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the 

public’s right of access.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Reading OPRA’s 

security exceptions to exempt all security footage heads in the 

opposite direction. 

IV.

The Court remands this matter for further proceedings to 

assess what information might be available for disclosure under 

the common law right of access. The majority believes that 

requests for surveillance videos “are better analyzed under the 

common law.” See ante at __ (slip op. at 23).
12

The common law right of access, while important in its own 

right, is not a substitute for OPRA. OPRA presumes that records 

will be released unless an agency can show that they are wholly 

or partially exempt from disclosure. Under the common law,

requestors have access to a broader array of records but “must 

make a greater showing than required under OPRA.” Mason v. City 

of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 67 (2008). The common law right of 

access shifts the burden and requires requestors to “establish 

an interest in the subject matter of the material.” Ibid.

(quoting Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 50 (1997)). That 

interest “must outweigh the State’s interest in non-disclosure.” 

Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 303 (2009). 

Counsel also stressed a more practical difference between the 

two types of claims. Counsel observed that because attorney’s 

fees are available to a prevailing party under OPRA, see

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, but have not been available under the common 

law, fewer parties will be likely to pursue only common law 

requests in court.

 V.

The Township presented a legitimate legal argument about 

the scope of two OPRA exceptions, as to which there was little 

guidance in existing case law. The Township declined to 

disclose the surveillance footage without first examining what 

the tape contained. Under the circumstances, I would not order 
13

disclosure of the tapes at this time. I would instead remand 

the case to the trial court and permit the Township to try to 

satisfy either of the security-related exceptions in OPRA based 

on what appears on the tape. The Township would then be in a 

position to redact portions of the tape prior to disclosure, if 

it could establish that those parts “would jeopardize security” 

or “would create a risk to” safety. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. 

For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.