J-A25022-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

D.W., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

B.K.V., JR.,

Appellee No. 620 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 2008-5-0774

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 06, 2016

This is an appeal by D.W. (“Mother”) from a support order relating to 

B.V. (“Child”), her seventeen-year-old son with B.K.V., Jr. (“Father”).1 We 

are compelled to reverse and remand.

The trial court described the parties as “frequent flyers in Lebanon 

County Support Court.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/16, at 1. The trial court 

summarized the facts and procedural history as follows:

MOTHER and FATHER are the parents of [B.V.], who was 

born [i]n March [of] 1999. The parties were married on May 1, 

1998 and separated on September 12, 2008. The parties had 

originally reached a private agreement on the amount of child 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 The parties “also have an emancipated [son] who is not subject to” the 

order appealed. Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/16, at 2 n.1.
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support, but MOTHER requested modification on August 5, 

2014.[2] After a hearing on December 11, 2014, the Domestic 

Relations Master (DRM) recommended that FATHER pay 

$1,624.65 per month from the date of filing through the end of 

2014 and $1,458.49 per month for 2015. MOTHER filed 

exceptions and, after hearing oral arguments, we remanded the 

case to the DRM via an Opinion dated March 30, 2015. Among 

other things, we directed the DRM to clarify how she evaluated 

FATHER’s income from 933 Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) that 

were awarded to him in 2010 and vested in 2014.

Subsequent to a remand hearing conducted on April 23, 

2015, the DRM explained that she evaluated the stocks based on 

the difference between their value on the date of the property 

settlement, $35.63, and the exercise price, $61.48. She then 

multiplied this difference by 933 to arrive at $24,118.05, which 

figure she added to FATHER’s 2014 income. In the end, 

FATHER’s obligation, effective August 5, 2014 through the end of 

the year, was $1,639.65 per month, about $15 per month more 

than the previously-calculated figure. For 2015, FATHER’s 

obligation was $1,505.92 per month, less than a $50 per month 

increase from the previously calculated figure. MOTHER again 

filed exceptions, arguing, inter alia, that the DRM valued 836 of 

FATHER’s stock options (award no. 19655) incorrectly, and that 

she failed to include the income from 359 RSUs (award no. 

41075) that vested on August 1, 2015.

While we denied most of MOTHER’s Exceptions via an 

Opinion issued on August 6, [2015,] we agreed that the DRM’s 

methodology for valuing the 836 stock options was incorrect. 

Instead, to account for the quid pro quo value of the stock 

options at equitable distribution, we measured the difference in 

the present value, $78.10 (as of the date of the remand hearing, 

April 23, 2015), and the value on the date of the property 

settlement, $35.63. Multiplying this figure times the number of 

shares yielded $29,786.68. Subtracting this figure from 

____________________________________________

2

 Mother “works for the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in Caucus 

Operations,” and Father “sells medical devices, which require[s] him to 

travel extensively. In addition to his salary and commissions, he receives 

stock options and corporate perquisites as part of his compensation 

package.” Trial Court Remand Opinion, 3/30/15, at 2.
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$65,291.60 ($78.10 x 836 shares) yielded $35,504.92, which 

number we added to FATHER’s 2015 gross income. This resulted 

in a monthly obligation for 2015 of $1,639.92.

We specifically declined to address the RSUs that vested 

on August 1, 2015, noting that they were not yet vested at the 

time of the hearing, but that we would not prevent MOTHER 

from addressing them once they did vest. Predictably, on 

September 1st, MOTHER filed [a] Petition for Modification. A 

hearing was conducted on October 29, 2015 and the DRM issued 

her Recommendations on November 20th[, 2015]. Again, 

MOTHER timely filed exceptions, disputing the DRM’s 

methodology in evaluating the RSUs.

We heard oral arguments on February 23, 2016. At oral 

argument, both counsel agreed that it made little sense to 

continue fighting over relatively small amounts of money. 

Counsel therefore asked if we would agree to receive and base a 

prospective decision upon a stipulation of facts. We afforded the 

parties 10 days to submit a stipulation regarding their income. 

We also agreed that if the parties could reach a consensus on 

the facts, we would fashion a Court Order dictating FATHER’s 

prospective obligation based on this stipulation rather than 

remanding the case to the DRM yet again. On March 7, we 

received a Stipulation of Facts showing that:

(1) FATHER’s wages, tips and compensation, as 

reflected by his W-2, were $248,754.40, his 

Medicare wages and tips were $266,754.40 and his 

gross pay was $271,131.37.

(2) MOTHER’s wages, tips and compensation for 

2015, as reflected by her W-2, were $55,980.63, 

and her Medicare wages and tips were $59,732.84. 

Although the stipulation itself did not list MOTHER’s 

gross pay, her unofficial W-2, which was attached, 

lists her gross pay at $60,036.13.

(3) FATHER had $30,728.88 in gross income from 

stock options in 2015. The net, post-tax value of the 

RSUs FATHER exercised on August 1, 2015 was 

$19,519.11. His net receipts from RSUs in 2015 

[were] $21,243.69.
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(4) He has 194 RSUs that were granted after the 

divorce that will mature on July 30, 2016.3

3 He also has stock options that will 

mature in 2017, but this will be after the 

parties’ son has become emancipated.

(5) FATHER contributed $18,000 to his 401(k) in 

2015.

(6) FATHER paid $4,981.41 in 2015 for medical, 

dental, vision and life insurance benefits for himself 

and his family.

(7) MOTHER paid $600.29 in 2015 for medical, 

dental and vision benefits that will benefit herself 

and her children.

(8) MOTHER made $3,752.21 in mandatory 

contributions to the State Employees Retirement 

System.

(9) FATHER pays $1,700 per month in alimony to 

MOTHER. This payment will terminate on March 31, 

2016.

(10) FATHER’s fixed vehicle allowance of $398.44 is 

part of his income.

(11) Neither party has experienced an increase in 

income to date in 2016.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/16, at 2–6 (some footnotes omitted).

The trial court entered an order on March 29, 2016, directing Father to 

pay $1,571.96 per month in child support plus $157.20 per month in 

arrears, effective August 1, 2015. Effective April 1, 2016, the amount of 

child support increased to $1,710.45 per month, and the amount in arrears 

increased to $171.04 per month. The court directed Father to provide 
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medical coverage through his employment. Mother filed a timely appeal on 

April 19, 2016. Both Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.3

Mother raises the following issues in her appellate brief:

A. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in its March 29, 2016 Order when it failed to calculate 

as part of [Father’s] income Vested Stock Options from 2014 

that it previously included as income in its August 4, 2015 Order 

for calendar year 2015?

B. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in its March 29, 2016 Order when it failed to provide 

an adjustment for the health insurance premium [Mother] 

contributes to cover the parties’ minor child? 

C. Did the Trial Court err[] as a matter of law and/or abuse[] its 

discretion in its March 29, 2016 Order when it deducted 

[Father’s] voluntary retirement contributions of $18,000.00 

annually from his gross income in determining his support 

obligation?

Mother’s Brief at 10.4

____________________________________________

3

 We note the deplorable state of the record certified to us on appeal. While 

a list of ninety-four docket entries was provided, none of the items in the 

record bear corresponding numbers, rendering the numbered list useless as 

an aid to locating documents. There are eight subparts to the record, two of 

which are single pages, with no explanation or organization to the subparts. 

While we could have remanded for the provision of organization to the 

record, with considerable waste of time and talent we have been able to 

locate the items crucial to our disposition of this case. Such dereliction will 

not be tolerated in the future.

4

 For the sake of clarity and ease of disposition, we have re-ordered issues 

B and C.
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Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision in a support case is 

well settled:

When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse 

the trial court’s determination where the order cannot be 

sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the 

broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the 

discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. 

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in 

reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, 

or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either 

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note 

that the duty to support one’s child is absolute, and the purpose 

of child support is to promote the child’s best interests.

Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 853–854 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

The trial court explained the atypical process in this case due to the 

parties’ agreement to a stipulation of facts, as follows:

The situation we face in the case at bar is different from 

the norm. Here, the parties have agreed to a stipulation of 

facts, and they have asked us to determine support based upon 

that stipulation and our contextual knowledge about the parties 

gleaned via the extensive support litigation we handled in 2015. 

Our Superior Court has long recognized that courts have wide 

discretion when handling support matters. See Kotzbauer v. 

Kotzbauer, 937 A.2d 487, 489 (Pa. Super. 2007). Given the 

tortured history of this case, and given the fact that both counsel 

have asked us to eschew the so-called “normal” support process 

in Lebanon County, we will undertake the unusual step of 

eschewing a remand to the DRM in favor of simply rendering our 

own de novo decision based upon the stipulation of the parties.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/16, at 6–7.

In a three-paragraph argument, and citing testimony from a Master’s 

hearing on October 29, 2015, Mother first asserts that Father has recurring 
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stock options in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Mother’s Brief at 19 (citing 

N.T., 10/29/15, at 15). She contends that the trial court concluded in an 

August 4, 2015 order that the 2014 stock options shall be included as 

income for the calendar year 2015. Id. She maintains that this conclusion 

provided additional monthly income attributable to Father of $2,958.74. Id. 

(citing Trial Court Opinion (Exceptions), 8/4/15, at 14–15.) Mother suggests 

the trial court relied on MacKinley v. Messerschmidt, 814 A.2d 680 (Pa. 

Super. 2002), for the proposition that stock options must be considered as 

income for purposes of support. She further avers that while the trial court 

indicated it would consider the vested stock options as part of Father’s 2015 

income, Trial Court Opinion (Exceptions), 8/4/15, at 14 n.12, the trial court, 

in its March 29, 2016 order, modified the child support payments “effective 

August 1, 2015.” Mother’s Brief at 20. The effect of this action, Mother 

suggests, is that the trial court never included in its calculations the 2014 

stock options for the period from August of 2015 through December of 2015. 

Mother posits that this failure by the trial court granted to Father a fivemonth “increase in income for which he was not paying support” to Child. 

Id. Therefore, Mother claims the amount of Father’s income for the months 

August 2015 through December 2015 should be increased by $2,958.74 per 

month. Id.

Based upon the following explanation by the trial court, we conclude 

that this issue is waived:
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As outlined in our March 29, 2016 Opinion, the parties 

requested us to render a decision based upon a Stipulation of 

Fact. We acceded to the parties’ request. When the parties 

forwarded the Stipulation, we had a question about what we 

perceived to be an ambiguity regarding FATHER’s RSU. As a 

result, we authored a letter to the parties. That letter is 

attached to this Opinion as Exhibit A. Following our letter, we 

received a response from FATHER’s counsel. That response is 

attached as Exhibit B.1 MOTHER’s counsel did not respond 

at all.

1

 We believe that at least one date is incorrect. We 

recall receiving the letter before we issued our March 

2016 Opinion.

Fairly read, the communication outlined above between 

counsel and [this c]ourt confirmed our belief that FATHER’s total 

RSU for 2015 was $30,728.88. To the extent that MOTHER now 

claims that we erred in determining the amount of the RSU as 

set forth on the Stipulation, MOTHER has no one to blame but 

herself. We afforded her with the opportunity to present 

information via the stipulation regarding the RSU’s and the 

opportunity to supplement the record and /or object to FATHER’S 

claim that he received “only” $30,728.88 in RSU payments 

during 2015. She did neither. Based upon the communication 

between counsel and [this c]ourt outlined above, it would be 

disingenuous to argue that this [c]ourt erred by valuing 

FATHER’s RSU receipts at anything other than $30,728.88.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 4/28/16, at 2–3 (emphases added).

The parties specifically stipulated that Father’s income in 2015 

included the amounts listed on his W-2 and included only the total stock 

options exercised of $30,728.88 before taxes. When the trial court later 

requested clarification, Mother did not respond; therefore, the trial court had 

no further information from Mother and no way to ascertain Mother’s 

disagreement with the trial court’s determination of Father’s income. “On 

appeal, we will not consider assignments of error that were not brought to 
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the tribunal’s attention at a time at which the error could have been 

corrected or the alleged prejudice could have been mitigated.” State Farm 

Mutual v. Dill, 108 A.3d 882, 885 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc), appeal 

denied, 116 A.3d 605 (Pa. 2015) (citing Tindall v. Friedman, 970 A.2d 

1159, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2009)). This issue is waived.

We next address whether the trial court failed to provide an 

adjustment for the health insurance premium [Mother] contributes to cover 

the parties’ minor child. Mother references Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b), which 

provides that health insurance premiums that provide coverage on behalf of 

the parties’ children “shall be allocated between the parties in proportion to 

their net incomes....” Mother’s Brief at 22. Mother refers to a methodology 

for calculating the allocable premium amount where specific evidence is not 

proffered by the moving party:

In the event that evidence . . . is not submitted by either party, 

it shall be calculated as follows. First, determine the cost per 

person by dividing the total cost of the premium by the number 

of persons covered under the policy. Second, multiply the cost 

per person by the number of persons who are not owed a 

statutory duty of support, or are not parties to, or the subject of 

the support action. The resulting amount is excluded from 

allocation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b)(2).

In accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16, Mother maintains that the trial 

court should have utilized the same methodology it used to calculate the 

portion of Father’s premium to be allocated between the parties to calculate 

the portion of Mother’s premium to be allocated between the parties. 
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Instead, according to Mother, it granted Husband an adjustment for the 

portion of his insurance premium covering Child but did not do the same for 

Mother, where her insurance policy grants Child health benefits beyond that 

of Father’s insurance. Mother’s Brief at 23.

Father responds that in determining the total adjustment to be made 

for payment of the insurance premium, the trial court excluded three-fourths 

“of the amount which Father pays for health insurance, and allowed only 

one-quarter (1/4) of the payments which Father actually makes, indicating 

that since four individuals were covered, and only one” is the minor child, 

“only one-quarter (1/4) of the premium should be allocated” for Child. 

Father’s Brief at 13–14. Mother’s annual cost for her premium apparently is 

$600.29, which covers three individuals on her plan. Trial Court Opinion, 

3/29/16, at 5. Thus, she is contending that one-third of these premiums, or 

$200.00 annually, is the amount the court should have allocated toward 

insurance. Father also notes that Father, not Mother, has been ordered to 

provide health insurance. Father’s Brief at 14.

The trial court addressed the issue as follows:

According to the parties’ stipulation, both MOTHER and 

FATHER pay money for medical, dental and vision insurance. The 

stipulation indicates that FATHER contributes $4,981.41 “for the 

benefit of himself and his family.” The stipulation further 

stipulates that MOTHER contributes $600.29 “for the benefit of 

herself and her children.” Nothing was specifically presented to 

indicate which children were or were not covered by the amounts 

contributed by each parent.
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Health insurance premiums are addressed in 

Pennsylvania’s Support Guidelines. Generally, health insurance 

premiums are to be

allocated between the parties in proportion to their 

net . . . incomes, including the portion of the 

premium attributable to the party who is paying it, 

as long as a statutory duty of support is owed to the 

party who is paying the premium. If there is no 

statutory duty of support owed to the party who is 

paying the premium, the portion attributable to that 

person must be deducted from the premium as set 

forth in subdivision (2) below.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16 -6(b)[(1)]. Subdivision (2) states:

When the health insurance covers a party to whom 

no statutory duty of support is [owed . . . ] the 

portion of the premium attributable to them must be 

excluded from allocation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b)(2). Moreover, the Support Guidelines 

also create a methodology that can be applied when a parent 

pays for health insurance that covers more than simply the 

children who are the subject of the Support Order. The rules 

state:

In the event that evidence as to this portion is not 

submitted by either party, it shall be calculated as 

follows. First; determine the cost per person by 

dividing the total cost of the premium by the number 

of persons covered under the policy. Second, 

multiply the cost per person by the number of 

persons who are not owed a statutory duty of 

support, or are not parties to, or the subject of the 

support action. The resulting amount is excluded 

from allocation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b)(2). Furthermore, the rules provide an 

example that is almost exactly on point:

Example 3. The parties are divorced and Mother is the obligee of

a child support order. Father, the obligor, pays $200 per month 

toward the cost of a health insurance policy provided by his 
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employer that covers himself and the parties’ child. Mother pays 

$400 per month for her employer-sponsored health insurance 

that covers only herself. The amount of the premium Father 

pays to cover the parties’ child, $100 ($200 premium divided 

between two covered persons, Father and the child), will be 

allocated between the parties in proportion to their respective 

incomes. The portion of the premium that covers Father will not 

be allocated because the parties are no longer married and he is 

not owed a duty of support by Mother. The premium Mother 

pays to provide her own coverage will not be allocated because 

the parties are no longer married and she is not owed a duty of 

support by Father.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b)[Example 3].

In this case, there is no need for both MOTHER and 

FATHER to provide insurance coverage for the children. In our 

Court Orders entered in 2015, we ordered that FATHER provide 

health insurance for the children. In her most recent 

Recommendation, the DRM similarly imposed a responsibility 

upon FATHER to provide health insurance for the children.

Without proof that MOTHER’s payment of $600.29 per year 

was needed to purchase insurance that was not available 

through FATHER’s plan, we are not inclined to apply the Support 

Guidelines to MOTHER’s payment of $600.29. With respect to 

FATHER’s payment of health insurance benefits, we note that 

FATHER’s payment of $4,981.41 covers four individuals, only 

one of whom is the child in question. Therefore, the calculation 

that applies in this case will be as follows:

(1) $4,981.41 ÷ 4 individuals covered = $1,245.35 

per person.

(2) $1,245.35 per person x 3 individuals not owed a 

duty of support = $3,736.06 that must be excluded 

from consideration.

(3) $1,245.35 = the amount of FATHER’s insurance 

contribution that can be allocated solely for the child 

at issue.
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Based upon the above, we will allocate the sum of $1,245.35 to 

the parties in accordance with their percentage of net income as 

outlined in the preceding sections of the Support Guidelines.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/16, at 11–14.

We have considered the arguments of the parties and the explanation 

of the trial court and considered the record as a whole. Based upon the 

record, we conclude that this issue is meritless.

Finally, Mother asserts, relying on Portugal v. Portugal, 798 A.2d 

246, 253 (Pa. Super. 2002), that in its August 4, 2015, and March 29, 2016 

orders, the trial court declined to include Father’s voluntary retirement 

contributions as income for purposes of child support. Mother’s Brief at 

20. Mother maintains that she sought Father’s voluntary contributions, not 

Father’s employer’s contributions. She avers that the parties’ Stipulation of 

Facts provided that Father voluntarily contributed $18,000 to his 401(k) in 

2015. Mother identified the issue in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

In Portugal, the wife argued that the trial court erred in failing to 

include the husband’s contribution to his 401(k) plan and his employer’s 

matching contribution to the plan, in the court’s determination of the 

husband’s income. The Portugal Court examined Pa.R.C.P. 1920.16-5 and 

concluded, “Upon our consideration of this provision, we find that only nonvoluntary retirement payments are properly excludable from a parent’s net 

monthly income. Conversely stated, the trial court must include any 

voluntary contributions that a parent makes to his/her retirement 
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plan as income for support purposes.” Portugal, 798 A.2d at 252 

(emphasis added). An employer’s contributions to a pension plan were held 

to constitute income for purposes of support “if the employee could access 

his employer’s contributions (regardless of penalties) at the time of the 

support calculation.” Id. at 253. In MacKinley v. Messerschmidt, 814 

A.2d 680 (Pa. Super. 2002), we articulated that our holding in Portugal was 

“based on the dominant interest of the children’s immediate need, as well as 

the recognition that children should not be made to wait for support[,] and 

parents should not be permitted to defer income to which they are entitled 

until they choose to avail themselves of it.” MacKinley, 814 A.2d at 683.

The trial court provided, based upon the DRM’s disposition, a detailed 

and convincing explanation addressing why Husband’s employer’s

contributions properly were not included in the calculation of Husband’s 

income. However, that is not the issue identified and presented by Wife.

In its explanation regarding Husband’s employer’s contribution, and 

relying upon the description of the DRM, the trial court identified the types of

retirement plans both parties enjoy, as follows:

The court directed both [Mother] and [Father] to produce 

records regarding the present ability or inability to access funds 

in their respective employer retirement accounts.

Mother provided a letter from her employer indicating that 

she is enrolled in a defined benefit plan. Mother is not allowed 

to access the employer contributions to the plan other than as a 

monthly annuity at the time of retirement.
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Father provided the Vanguard statements for his 401(k) 

retirement plan, Exh. 4. Father did not provide a plan summary 

for the 401(k) plan. Based on the information provided by Exh. 

4, the plan is a qualified plan.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/16, at 8–9 (quoting Supplemental Findings and 

Recommendations of Domestic Relations Master, 5/15/15, at 2). The 

specific focus of both the DRM and the trial court was analysis of whether 

Husband’s employer contributions were accessible to Husband.

Our review of the record reveals that Mother’s exceptions to the DRM’s 

recommendations identified, inter alia, the Master’s failure to include 

Husband’s voluntary contributions to his 401(k) plan as income available for 

support. Upon remand by the trial court, the DRM addressed only the 

employers’ contributions. Mother raised the issue again in her Pa.R.A.P. 

1925 (b) statement, and once more, the trial court focused exclusively on 

Husband’s employer’s contributions.

The trial court stated the following in addressing the issue:

As we see it, both MOTHER and FATHER have contributed 

monies from present income to create resources for future 

retirement. According to the parties’ stipulation, FATHER has 

contributed $18,000.00 to his 401(k) account, which translates 

to approximately 7% of his pre-tax income. MOTHER has 

contributed $3,752.00 to her retirement account, which 

translates to approximately 6.7% of her pre-tax income. There 

is simply no evidence that either MOTHER or FATHER is “hiding” 

current income by placing it into a retirement account, and there 

is no evidence that either MOTHER or FATHER is attempting to 

circumvent the child support process by manipulating retirement 

contributions to artificially deflate current income. Given their 

respective earnings, we do not find either MOTHER’s retirement 

contribution or FATHER’s retirement contribution to be 

inappropriate or manipulative.
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Given that we have concluded that both MOTHER and 

FATHER have set aside an appropriate amount for their own 

future retirement, we will not treat their respective retirement 

contributions differently. As we stated in August of 2015: “What 

is good for the goose is good for the gander.” If we will not be 

considering MOTHER’s decision to set aside 6.7% of her income 

for retirement, then neither will we consider FATHER’s decision 

to set aside 7% of his income for future retirement. In our view, 

this approach effectuates justice for all concerned.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/16, at 10–11.

Our review of the record compels our agreement with Wife that the 

trial court erred. Mother had no discretion but to contribute a designated 

percentage of her earnings into the state retirement system, and the trial 

court was compelled to deduct those amounts from Mother’s monthly gross 

income in calculating her net income. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(c)(1)(C) 

(“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, the court shall deduct only the 

following items from monthly gross income to arrive at net income: . . . nonvoluntary retirement payments.”) Conversely, Portugal requires that “the 

trial court must include any voluntary contributions that a parent makes to 

his/her retirement plan as income for support purposes.” Portugal, 798 

A.2d at 252. Thus, we are compelled to remand this matter to the common 

pleas court. 

Case remanded for a determination of whether Father’s contributions 

to his 401(k) plan are voluntary, and if so, they shall be included as income 

to Father pursuant to Portugal and its progeny. In all other respects, the 

appeal is affirmed.
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Order reversed and case remanded for proceedings consistent with 

this Memorandum. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/6/2016