In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2809 

JACKSON COUNTY BANK, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

MATHEW R. DUSABLON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:18-cv-01346 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 6, 2019 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jackson County Bank sued its former 

employee, Mathew R. DuSablon, in Indiana state court, asserting various state law claims, including theft of property 

and breach of contract. Following his unsuccessful motion to 

dismiss, DuSablon removed the case to federal court. The district court remanded the case to state court for want of jurisdiction and untimely removal and further ordered DuSablon 
2 No. 18-2809 

to pay the costs and fees for the wrongful removal. DuSablon 

now appeals the remand order and the district court’s imposition of sanctions. We dismiss the appeal of the district 

court’s remand order and affirm its award of costs and fees. 

I. Background 

Jackson County Bank (“JCB”) is an Indiana state-chartered 

bank. Although not a registered broker-dealer, JCB had a 

third-party agreement with INVEST Financial Corporation, a 

registered broker-dealer, to offer securities to JCB customers. 

Mathew R. DuSablon, who resides in Indiana, began 

working for JCB in 2007. In July 2017, JCB assigned DuSablon 

to assist the bank in identifying and establishing an investment business with a new third-party broker-dealer. DuSablon, however, failed to perform his job and abruptly resigned on January 8, 2018. JCB thereafter learned that DuSablon had transferred customers’ accounts from JCB’s former 

third-party broker-dealer, INVEST, into his own name and 

had started a business to compete with JCB. 

On February 28, 2018, JCB filed suit in Indiana state court, 

seeking a preliminary injunction and asserting state-law 

claims against DuSablon, including violation of the Indiana 

Uniform Trade Secrets Act, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, unfair competition, civil conversion, and computer trespass. DuSablon moved to dismiss, 

arguing with references to federal law that JCB is an unlicensed broker-dealer and therefore lacks standing to enforce 

its rights in the information at issue; and that Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (“FINRA”) rules bar the suit. 

JCB responded that it had standing and is not subject to 

FINRA rules. The court denied the motion on April 20, 2018. 
No. 18-2809 3

Days later, on May 2, 2018, DuSablon removed this case to 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, asserting that the federal district court “has exclusive 

jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78aa and the Securities 

and Exchange Act of 1934.” Acknowledging that JCB did not 

plead a federal claim, DuSablon contended that JCB’s response to his motion to dismiss in state court “raises a federal 

question as all of [JCB’s] claims against [DuSablon] rest upon 

the legality of direct participation in the securities industry 

which is determined and regulated by the [Securities] Act.” 

On May 11, 2018, JCB moved to remand for lack of jurisdiction, and also argued, among other things, that DuSablon 

used the removal statute inappropriately to postpone preliminary injunction proceedings in state court and “run the 

clock” on his non-compete. The district court granted the motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and that the removal was untimely. The district court accordingly remanded 

the case to state court and additionally ordered DuSablon to 

pay JCB costs and fees of $9,035.61 under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

II. Discussion 

DuSablon appeals the district court’s remand and sanctions orders. JCB, for its part, requests additional costs and 

fees under § 1447(c) for its defense of this appeal. 

DuSablon challenges the district court’s order remanding 

this case to state court. But “[a]n order remanding a case to 

the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable 

on appeal or otherwise,” subject to exceptions not pertinent 

here. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see also PNC Bank, N.A. v. Spencer, 

763 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). We therefore dismiss 

this aspect of DuSablon’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See
4 No. 18-2809 

Adkins v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2003) 

(“[T]he rule of nonreviewability ... in § 1447(d) means that 

even remands based on an erroneous belief in the lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be reviewed....”). 

DuSablon next challenges the district court’s award of 

costs and fees to JCB pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). This we 

can review. See, e.g., Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 

407, 409–10 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that an appellate court has 

jurisdiction to review sanctions under § 1447(c)). Under 

§ 1447(c), “‘[a]n order remanding a removed case to state 

court ‘may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.’” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134 (2005) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). A district court may award fees 

under § 1447(c) where “the removing party lacked an ‘objectively reasonable basis’” for seeking removal. Wolf v. Kennelly, 

574 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Martin, 546 U.S. at 

141). Sanctions may be awarded when removal is clearly improper, id., but not necessarily frivolous, Martin, 546 U.S. at 

138–40 (further explaining the rationale for fee-shifting in appropriate cases). 

We review a district court’s decision to award sanctions 

for abuse of discretion. See Wolf, 574 F.3d at 410. And here, we 

find no abuse of discretion, as we agree that DuSablon lacked 

an objectively reasonable basis to remove this case to federal 

court. The impropriety of removal, as the district court observed, was “not a close question.” JCB did not plead any federal claim nor is any federal question apparent from the face 

of its complaint. See Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Servs, Inc., 205 

F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2000). The complaint is based entirely 

on state law and any potential federal defense cannot form the 
No. 18-2809 5

basis for removal. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 

392 (1987); Studer v. Katherine Shaw Bethea Hosp., 867 F.3d 721, 

723 (7th Cir. 2017). 

DuSablon nonetheless argues that JCB’s state law claims 

involve significant questions of federal securities laws. But 

DuSablon cannot manufacture a basis for removal by injecting federal issues into a case under these circumstances. See 

Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC, 827 F.3d 586, 

589 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding in a breach of contract action that 

an allegation that a defendant violated federal statutes is insufficient to create subject-matter jurisdiction). This is particularly so because, as the district court observed, DuSablon 

cited no cases supporting his position nor attempted to apply 

controlling law, namely Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’r & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314–15 (2005) (invoking federal 

jurisdiction over state law claim to quiet title to property 

seized by federal government where the validity of the seizure was “the only legal or factual issue[] in the case”). 

Other considerations support the district court’s exercise 

of discretion. The first is the court’s finding that “DuSablon’s 

conduct in defending the motion to remand” suggested that 

“removal was undertaken at least in part to delay a resolution 

of the noncompete issues to his benefit and to allow for a second bite at the apple after losing his motion to dismiss in state 

court.” We see no clear error in this finding. The second consideration is the untimeliness of DuSablon’s removal. Despite 

his claimed ignorance of the supposed substantial federal 

question until JCB responded to his motion to dismiss, DuSablon’s motion itself raised many issues of federal law. The district court properly determined that DuSablon was or should 
6 No. 18-2809 

have been aware of his asserted grounds for removal more 

than 30 days prior to his notice of removal. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in determining that DuSablon lacked an objectively reasonable basis to remove the case to federal court. 

Finally, JCB requests an award of costs and fees incurred 

in defending this appeal.1 “[L]itigants who receive an award 

of fees in the district court under § 1447(c) automatically receive reimbursement for the expense of defending that award 

on appeal.” MB Fin., N.A. v. Stevens, 678 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 

2012). JCB is therefore “entitled to an award of ‘legal fees for 

the cost of work reasonably performed in defense of the district court’s decision.’” PNC Bank, 763 F.3d at 655 (quoting 

M.B. Fin., 678 F.3d at 500). JCB has fourteen days from the date 

of this decision to submit a statement of fees. DuSablon will 

have fourteen days to respond. 

III. Conclusion 

We DISMISS the appeal of the district court’s remand order and AFFIRM its award of costs and fees. 

 

1In its brief, JCB also requests fees under Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 38. But JCB did not file a separate motion under Rule 38, so we 

deny its request. See Vexol, S.A. de C.V. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 882 F.3d 633, 

638 (7th Cir. 2018) (denying request for sanctions where party did not submit a “‘separately filed motion’” for sanctions) (quoting FED.R. APP. P. 38).