62 February 16, 2017 No. 9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Stephanie M. DOWELL,

individually and

on behalf of others similarly situated,

Petitioner on Review,

v.

OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

 an Oregon corporation,

Respondent on Review.

(CC 1205-06486; CA A153170; SC S063079)

En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted March 8, 2016.

Charles Robinowitz, Law Offices of Charles Robinowitz, 

Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner 

on review. Also on the briefs was Genavee Stokes-Avery.

Thomas M. Christ, Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland,

argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on 

review.

Hadley Van Vactor, Portland, filed the brief for amicus 

curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

NAKAMOTO, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of 

the circuit court are affirmed.

Walters, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which 

Baldwin, J., and Brewer, J., joined.

______________

* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Henry C. Breithaupt, 

Judge pro tempore. 268 Or App 672, 343 P3d 283 (2015).
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 63

Case Summary: In 2008, plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. 

Among the costs she incurred as a result were $430.67 in transportation expenses 

accrued in the course of traveling to various medical appointments and picking 

up medications. Plaintiff applied for PIP medical benefits under her Oregon automobile insurance policy, and defendant insurance company paid for the medical care she had received from her healthcare providers. Defendant, however, 

declined to pay for the transportation costs associated with obtaining that care. 

Plaintiff subsequently filed an action against defendant, arguing that medical 

expenses under ORS 742.524(1)(a) included, as a statutory matter, transportation costs and that as a result, defendant had breached its contract with her by 

failing to reimburse her for those expenses. On defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, however, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s action and the Court of 

Appeals went on to affirm that judgment in a written decision. In scrutinizing 

the statutory phrase “expenses of medical *** services” as it was used in ORS 

742.524(1), the Court of Appeals examined the text and context of the statute, 

opining that the phrase meant “something that is expended to secure a benefit 

relating to work that is performed by another, when that work involves the practice of medicine[.]” After thus narrowing the meaning of that phrase, the Court 

of Appeals concluded that it could not be read to include transportation expenses 

related obtaining medical services. Held: The decision of the Court of Appeals 

and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed. After examining the text, 

context, and legislative history of ORS 742.524(1) the Court concludes that the 

legislature intended the phrase “expenses of medical ** * services” to encompass 

costs that originate with, or arise by virtue of, the rendering of medical treatment 

or the work performed by a physician. Such costs would include the medications, 

medical supplies, and equipment prescribed by a physician for treatment of the 

injured person. The legislature did not intend, however, for ordinary transportation expenses incurred in the course of obtaining medical treatment or medications to qualify as a covered PIP benefit.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court 

are affirmed.
64 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

NAKAMOTO, J.

Auto insurers in Oregon must provide personal 

injury protection (PIP) benefits to their insureds for certain 

automotive injury-related expenses, regardless of who is at 

fault in an accident. ORS 742.520(1). The PIP medical benefits at issue in this case “consist of the following payments for 

the injury or death of each person” covered: “All reasonable 

and necessary expenses of medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance and prosthetic services incurred within one 

year after the date of the person’s injury, but not more than 

$15,000 in the aggregate for all such expenses of the person.” 

ORS 742.524(1)(a) (2007).1

 On behalf of herself and others 

similarly situated, plaintiff contended in her action against 

defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company that insurers

must pay transportation costs incurred to obtain medical 

care as part of PIP medical benefits. The trial court concluded that the PIP statutes, ORS 742.518 to 742.542, do not 

require insurers to pay for transportation costs and granted 

summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed, and 

the Court of Appeals affirmed. Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. 

Co., 268 Or App 672, 343 P3d 283 (2015).

The question on review is whether the PIP medical 

benefit in ORS 742.524(1)(a) includes the insured plaintiff’s 

transportation costs to receive medical care. We hold that 

PIP benefits for the “expenses of medical ** * services” do 

not include an insured’s transportation costs for traveling to 

receive medical care. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the 

Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff 

had an Oregon auto insurance policy issued by defendant. 

In 2008, plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. 

1 In 2009, the legislature amended ORS 742.524(1)(a), but those amendments apply only to policies issued or renewed after the January 1, 2010, effective date. Or Laws 2009, ch 66, §§ 1, 3. The legislature again amended the statute in 2015, but those amendments apply only to policies issued or renewed after 

the January 1, 2016, effective date. Or Laws 2015, ch 5, §§ 4, 7. Because this 

case involves a pre-2010 policy, those 2009 and 2015 amendments do not apply. 

For that reason, all the citations in this opinion are to the 2007 version of the 

relevant statutes, except where otherwise noted.
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 65

Among other expenses, plaintiff incurred $430.67 in transportation costs to attend medical appointments and to obtain 

medication. She then applied for PIP medical benefits under 

her insurance policy. Defendant paid for plaintiff’s medical 

care, but it declined to pay for her transportation expenses 

to obtain her medical care.

Plaintiff then filed a complaint for breach of contract, both for herself and on behalf of others similarly situated. She alleged that her claim for medical expenses under 

ORS 742.524(1)(a) included her transportation costs and 

that defendant had breached its contract by failing to reimburse her for those expenses. Defendant responded by moving for summary judgment, arguing that ORS 742.524(1)(a)

did not require it to pay for transportation costs. After a 

hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and 

entered a judgment in defendant’s favor.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals narrowed the case 

to a single question: Does the phrase “expenses of medical 

*** services” in ORS 742.524(1)(a) require an insurer to pay 

an insured’s expenses for transportation to attend medical 

appointments and to obtain medication? Dowell, 268 Or App 

at 675.2

 The Court of Appeals answered that question by 

considering the statute’s text and context.3

 After examining dictionary definitions of the four words in the phrase 

“expenses of medical ** * services,” the Court of Appeals 

concluded that, considered as a whole, the phrase meant 

“something that is expended to secure a benefit relating to 

work that is performed by another, when that work involves 

the practice of medicine (the maintenance of health, and the 

prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease).” Id. at 677. After 

considering the phrase’s context, particularly the remaining text of the statute and other PIP provisions pertaining 

to payments to “providers” of medical services, the Court of 

2 In their briefs before the Court of Appeals, the parties referred to the actual 

auto policy underlying this matter, which they described as essentially mirroring 

the text of ORS 742.524(1)(a). That policy, however, is not part of the appellate 

record, and the resolution of this case does not depend on it. Because the wording 

of the policy and the statute are the same, this case focuses on the proper interpretation of ORS 742.524(1)(a), not the wording of a policy that might arguably 

provide a PIP benefit more generous than the one that is statutorily required.

3 Neither party presented any legislative history to the court.
66 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

Appeals concluded that the legislature had not intended the 

statute to include expenses of transportation to obtain medical services. 268 Or App at 677-78.

We allowed plaintiff’s petition for review to address 

the interpretation of ORS 742.524(1)(a). On review, plaintiff 

contends that two statutes, ORS 731.008 and ORS 731.016, 

serve as the starting point for construing the phrase 

“expenses of medical * * * services.” According to plaintiff, 

the legislature’s declarations in those two statutes require 

us to liberally construe ORS 742.524(1)(a), and, read in 

that light, the phrase at issue should be understood as a 

reference to “the costs to obtain medical services,” including 

the costs for transportation to a doctor’s office or hospital to 

obtain medical advice and treatment. Consequently, plaintiff asserts that transportation costs to obtain medical services qualify as PIP benefits.

Second, plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals 

decision conflicts with the purpose and policy of the PIP statutes, which is to reduce litigation and to ensure prompt payment of claims. Because health care is not available without 

traveling to a doctor or hospital, plaintiff argues, those travel 

costs are especially burdensome to rural residents who may 

have to travel a significant distance. Plaintiff also asserts 

that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals will encourage 

insurance companies to deny injured persons payment for 

medication, medical supplies, and medical equipment.

Finally, plaintiff contends that sources of law outside the PIP statutes are persuasive authority in favor of her 

interpretation of the statute. She relies on decisions from 

courts in other jurisdictions that have held that the PIP 

benefits in those jurisdictions include the reasonable cost of 

travel to a health care provider.

Defendant responds that the text and context of the 

statute limit payment to the cost of services expressly listed 

in ORS 742.524(1)(a) that are performed by a “provider,” 

that is, a licensed healthcare provider. Noting that the statute refers only to ambulance services and not to other transportation, and that it contains a presumption concerning 

payments for healthcare providers, defendant argues that 

PIP benefits are not meant to cover “providers of non-health 
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 67

care services,” such as a taxicab or bus service, or services 

that insureds perform for themselves, such as driving to the 

doctor’s office. (Emphasis in original.) Defendant also contends that the out-of-state authorities cited by plaintiff are 

not helpful because of differences in the relevant statutes 

and case law.

Our measure of legislative intent takes into account 

the legislative history of the PIP benefit statute, in addition 

to its text and context. As explained below, we ultimately conclude that the Oregon Legislative Assembly did not intend 

to include the expenses of transportation to obtain medical 

services as a PIP medical benefit in ORS 742.524(1)(a), but 

we arrive at that conclusion after rejecting both parties’ 

rationales for their divergent readings of ORS 742.524(1)(a).

II. ANALYSIS

The issue presented involves statutory construction, 

which we resolve by applying familiar principles set out in 

PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 

859 P2d 1143 (1993), and State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-

72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). To discern the meaning of the statute most likely intended by the legislature that enacted it, 

we examine the text and context of the statute and, where 

appropriate, legislative history and pertinent canons of construction. State v. Walker, 356 Or 4, 13, 333 P3d 316 (2014); 

Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72.

A. Oregon’s PIP Statutory Scheme

To aid our discussion, we begin with a brief overview of the PIP statutory scheme. PIP is a form of no-fault 

insurance mandated by Oregon law to be included in any 

motor vehicle liability policy. ORS 742.520(1). PIP coverage 

is governed by ORS 742.518 to 742.544. PIP benefits “consist 

of payments for expenses, loss of income and loss of essential 

services as provided in ORS 742.524.” ORS 742.520(3).

An insurer must pay PIP benefits “promptly after 

proof of loss has been submitted to the insurer.” ORS 

742.520(4). We have explained that “the obvious purpose 

of [the PIP statutes] is to provide, promptly and without 

regard to fault, reimbursement for some out-of-pocket losses 

resulting from motor vehicle accidents.” Perez v. State Farm 
68 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

Mutual Ins. Co., 289 Or 295, 300, 613 P2d 32 (1980) (emphasis added). Indeed, since their creation, in general, PIP benefits have consisted of payments for “medical expenses and 

loss of income.” Kessler v. Weigandt, 299 Or 38, 40 n 3, 699 

P2d 183 (1985) (discussing the predecessors of ORS 742.520 

and ORS 742.524, namely, former ORS 743.800, renumbered 

as ORS 742.520 (1989), and former ORS 743.805, renumbered as ORS 742.524 (1989)).

This case involves the PIP medical benefit in ORS 

742.524(1)(a), which requires payment for

“[a]ll reasonable and necessary expenses of medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance and prosthetic services 

incurred within one year after the date of the person’s 

injury, but not more than $15,000 in the aggregate for all 

such expenses of the person.”

That statute also contains a presumption that expenses of 

medical and other listed services claimed by a “provider” on 

behalf of an insured are reasonable and necessary, unless 

the insurer timely denies the claim:

“Expenses of medical * ** services shall be presumed to 

be reasonable and necessary unless the provider is given 

notice of denial of the charges not more than 60 calendar 

days after the insurer receives from the provider notice of 

the claim for the services.”

Id.

The term “provider” is statutorily defined. ORS 

742.518(10) (stating that “provider” has the meaning given 

to that term in ORS 743.801). As used in the presumption 

described in ORS 742.524(1)(a), a “provider” is “a person 

licensed, certified or otherwise authorized or permitted by 

laws of this state to administer medical or mental health 

services in the ordinary course of business or practice of a 

profession.” ORS 743.801(13). A number of other provisions 

in the PIP statutes refer to payments to providers. See, e.g., 

ORS 742.525, ORS 742.528.

An insurer may deny a PIP claim for medical 

expenses; however, the “potential existence of a cause of 

action in tort does not relieve an insurer from the duty to 

pay [PIP] benefits.” ORS 742.520(5). Disputes over PIP 
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 69

payments may be adjudicated in either of two forums. If the 

parties mutually agree, they can use binding arbitration. 

ORS 742.520(6).4

 Or, like plaintiff, an insured who contends 

that the insurer wrongly denied PIP benefits may choose to 

file a civil action against the insurer.

B. Text and Context of ORS 742.524(1)(a)

With that overview, we turn to construe ORS 

742.524(1)(a). We begin with the text of the statute. Sanders 

v. Oregon Pacific States Ins. Co., 314 Or 521, 527, 840 P2d 

87 (1992). The phrase directly at issue contains four terms: 

“expenses,” “of,” “medical,” and “services.” In construing 

those terms, we pay careful attention to “the exact wording 

of the statute.” State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 323 Or 275, 280, 917 

P2d 494 (1996). That is because the text provides the best 

evidence of the legislature’s intent and the starting point 

for our analysis. PGE, 317 Or at 611; see also Whipple v. 

Howser, 291 Or 475, 480, 632 P2d 782 (1981) (stating that 

there is “no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a 

statute than the words by which the legislature undertook 

to give expression to its wishes”).

None of the statutory terms set out above are 

defined by statute, nor are they legal terms of art. Therefore, 

our task is to determine the intended meaning of those 

words, applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction. 

When the legislature has not defined a word or a phrase, 

we assume, at least initially, that the word or phrase has 

its “plain, natural, and ordinary” meaning. PGE, 317 Or at 

611; accord Wright v. Turner, 354 Or 815, 827, 322 P3d 476 

(2014). This court frequently consults dictionary definitions 

in such cases on the assumption that, if the legislature did 

not provide a specialized definition for a term, the dictionary 

will help to shed light on its meaning as intended by the 

legislature. State v. Murray, 340 Or 599, 604, 136 P3d 10 

(2006).

4 ORS 742.520(6) provides, in part:

“Disputes between insurers and beneficiaries about the amount of personal injury protection benefits, or about the denial of personal injury protection benefits, shall be decided by arbitration if mutually agreed to at the time 

of the dispute.”
70 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

The dictionary definition of “expense” is straightforward. “Expense” means “2 a : something that is expended 

in order to secure a benefit or bring about a result” or “b : the 

financial burden involved typically in a course of action or 

manner of living : cost.” Webster’s Third Int’l Dictionary 800 

(unabridged ed 2002) (boldface in original). Thus, in ordinary usage, the word “expenses” means something that is 

expended, a cost, to secure a benefit or bring about a result.

In part, Webster’s defines “of” to mean “5 b : from as 

the place of birth, production, or distribution : having as its 

base of operation, point of initiation, or source of issuance or 

derivation.” Id. at 1565. That definition appears to suggest 

a derivation that is not necessarily geographical, but, if the 

dissent is correct that the definition has only a “locational 

meaning.” Dowell, 361 Or at 92 (Walters, J., dissenting), 

other definitions point in a similar direction. For example, 

“of” is also defined as being “6—used as a function word to 

indicate the cause, motive, or reason by which a person or 

thing is actuated or impelled” or “15—used as a function 

word to indicate a quality or possession characterizing or 

distinguishing a subject.” Id. More broadly, though, “of” is 

defined as “11 : relating to : with reference to : as regards 

: ABOUT.” Id. Although there are many other definitions, 

none comes as close as the foregoing to address the problem 

before us.

The word “medical” has two possible definitions 

in this context. “Medical” means “1 : of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or with the practice of medicine often 

as distinguished from surgery” or “2 : requiring or devoted 

to medical treatment * **—distinguished from surgical.” 

Webster’s at 1402 (emphasis in original).

Finally, the noun “service” also is defined in many 

ways. But in this case, the applicable definitions of “service” 

are either “2 : the performance of work commanded or paid 

for by another” or “9 a : action or use that furthers some 

end or purpose : conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something : deeds useful or instrumental 

toward some object.” Webster’s at 2075.

In light of those definitions, the phrase “expenses of 

medical * ** services” can, as a textual matter, plausibly be 
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 71

read in different ways. Each of the parties offers a different 

understanding of the phrase, but we conclude that there is a 

third plausible reading.

In the strictest reading, which defendant urges, the 

PIP expenses authorized for “medical ** * services” are the 

costs for the professional work performed by a physician or 

other person who renders medical care. Plaintiff objects that 

defendant and the Court of Appeals have focused too narrowly on “services,” which omits from PIP benefits a variety 

of nonservice medical costs that are necessary adjuncts of 

medical treatment, including medications and other medical 

supplies and equipment, such as bandages and crutches.

By relying on the broader meaning of the word 

“of,” plaintiff offers the most expansive view of the phrase 

“expenses of medical * * * services.” In plaintiff’s view, that 

phrase refers to a cost that is related in some way to work 

that involves medical care or the practice of medicine. In 

accordance with that view, plaintiff contends that transportation to receive medical care is “related” to the benefit of 

work performed by a healthcare provider because, as a practical matter, transportation usually is needed for the injured 

person to obtain medical treatment. Defendant disagrees, 

arguing that transportation costs—other than ambulance 

services—are not “related” to medical care and instead are 

ancillary.

In our view, however, there is a third reading of the 

phrase that neither party proffers. In it, the dictionary definitions point to costs that have as their source or derivation 

an action or use that is devoted or instrumental to medical 

treatment. In other words, “expenses of medical *** services,” ORS 742.524(1)(a), can refer to costs that originate 

with the rendered medical treatment or the physician’s performance of work. That meaning of the phrase is consistent 

with PIP benefit coverage for items such as medications or 

crutches that injured individuals use as part of their medical treatment.

In light of those alternatives, the text alone does 

not provide a definitive answer regarding what the legislature intended in ORS 742.524(1)(a). But of course, we do not 

interpret a statutory phrase solely on the basis of dictionary 
72 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

definitions. State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 96, 261 P3d 1234 

(2011). Statutory construction in Oregon requires an examination of word usage in context to determine what the legislature most likely intended. See, e.g., State v. Fries, 344 

Or 541, 546-50, 185 P3d 453 (2008) (considering context to 

determine which of multiple definitions was intended by the 

legislature).

We begin with plaintiff’s contextual argument. She 

argues that we are required by general provisions in the 

Insurance Code to liberally interpret insurance law in favor 

of insureds. Plaintiff relies on ORS 731.016, which provides:

“The Insurance Code shall be liberally construed and 

shall be administered and enforced by the Director of the 

Department of Consumer and Business Services to give 

effect to the policy stated in ORS 731.008.”

The policy referred to in ORS 731.016 states that “the 

Insurance Code is for the protection of the insurance-buying 

public.” ORS 731.008. Plaintiff and amicus curiae Oregon 

Trial Lawyers Association further contend that, under

Carrigan v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 326 Or 97, 

104-05, 949 P2d 705 (1997), the declaration in ORS 731.016 

is a command to courts construing the Insurance Code.

We agree that both ORS 731.008 and ORS 731.016 

are statutes that are related to, and function as, context 

for ORS 742.524(1)(a), which is part of the Insurance Code. 

Nevertheless, we reject plaintiff’s argument that those statutes, coupled with our decision in Carrigan, require us to 

liberally construe the PIP statute at issue in her favor.

In large part, plaintiff’s argument depends on overreading Carrigan, which was decided at a time when Oregon 

courts followed a strict analytical framework for statutory 

interpretation that proceeded in stages, as prescribed by 

PGE, 317 Or 606. The court in Carrigan summarized that 

framework:

“In construing a statute, this court’s task is to discern 

the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and 

Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). To discern legislative intent, this court first looks to the text and 

context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P2d 1143. If the 

intent of the legislature is clear from text and context, we 
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 73

proceed no further. Id. at 611, 859 P2d 1143. If the text and 

context do not make the legislature’s intent clear, we then 

inquire into legislative history. Id. at 611-12, 859 P2d 1143. 

Finally, if the legislative history, coupled with text and context, still provides no clear answer, we then turn to legal 

maxims. Id. at 612, 859 P2d 1143.

326 Or at 101. In Carrigan, we adopted a liberal construction of ORS 742.520(2)(a) (1997)—but only at the last stage 

of that analytical framework set out above: the application of 

“maxims of statutory construction.” 326 Or at 104. Because 

the text and context of the PIP statute at issue in Carrigan, 

together with its legislative history, were not dispositive, we 

resorted to a maxim of statutory construction suggested by 

the statutory interpretive directive in ORS 731.016: a rule of 

“liberal construction” to further the protection of the insurance-buying public in insurance cases. Carrigan, 326 Or at 

104-05; see also Pierce v. Allstate Ins. Co., 316 Or 31, 38-39, 

848 P2d 1197 (1993) (acknowledging a rule of “liberal construction” as a general maxim of statutory construction in 

insurance cases). Carrigan, therefore, does not control our 

analysis of the context of ORS 742.524(1)(a), and in this 

case, we need not employ a “liberal construction” rule as a 

maxim of statutory construction.5

In this case, the context of the disputed phrase 

undercuts plaintiff’s proffered reading of ORS 742.524(1)(a).

The first problem with plaintiff’s reading of the phrase is 

the fact that ORS 742.524(1)(a) specifically mentions one 

kind of transportation service for which insurers must make 

payment: “ambulance” services. “Ambulance” is not defined 

in the PIP or insurance statutes. However, ambulance services are regulated in Oregon, as described in ORS chapter 

682. In that chapter, the legislature defines an “ambulance” 

5 Countering plaintiff’s proposed rule of liberal construction, defendant 

argues that, by its terms, the statute on which it is based, ORS 731.016, appears 

to instruct the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services, 

not the courts, to liberally construe the Insurance Code when promulgating 

agency rules and to administer and enforce that code to protect of the insurancebuying public. Defendant further argues that application of the PIP statutes in 

favor of injured insureds like plaintiff does not necessarily advance the legislature’s stated policy of protecting the insurance-buying public, which includes all 

Oregon drivers who are required to purchase auto insurance. We need not delve 

into the origin, validity, and effect of the “liberal construction” maxim of statutory construction, because we need not apply it in this case.
74 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

as a vehicle “that is regularly provided for the emergency 

transportation of persons who are ill or injured or who have 

disabilities.” ORS 682.025(1). Accordingly, the legislature 

expressly required PIP benefits to include payment for the 

cost of specialized medical transportation, along the lines 

of the other listed medical and dental care described in the 

PIP benefit in ORS 742.524(1)(a). Subsection (1)(a) of the 

PIP benefits statute, however, does not include payment 

more broadly for “transportation” services, when the legislature could have easily done so by including ordinary transportation as a covered expense.

Other than her more general argument that courts 

should read the PIP statutes in an insured’s favor, plaintiff 

does not have a response to the specific inclusion of ambulance services and the absence of general transportation 

services in the list of statutorily mandated medical benefits 

in ORS 742.524(1)(a). In light of that context, we are not persuaded by the argument that ORS 731.008 and ORS 731.016 

change the contextual analysis of the statute by favoring 

injured parties covered by an auto policy, whether or not 

ORS 731.008 and ORS 731.016 form legislative instructions 

for courts—as opposed to the Director of the Department of 

Consumer and Business Services—as the courts construe 

provisions in the Insurance Code.

Looking at the statute as a whole, we see yet another 

problem for the broad reading advanced by plaintiff, given 

ORS 742.524(1)(e). That statute provides that child care is 

to be paid as a PIP benefit in limited circumstances, when 

persons with injuries serious enough to require a 24-hour 

hospital admission are unable to work:

“If the injured person is a parent of a minor child and 

is required to be hospitalized for a minimum of 24 hours, 

$25 per day for child care, with payments to begin after 

the initial 24 hours of hospitalization and to be made for as 

long as the person is unable to return to work if the person 

is engaged in a remunerative occupation or for as long as 

the person is unable to perform essential services that the 

person would have performed without income if the person 

is not usually engaged in a remunerative occupation, but 

not to exceed $750.”
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 75

If plaintiff’s broad reading of the phrase “expenses 

of medical ** * services” is correct, then all expenses that 

an injured person incurs to actually obtain medical care—

whether transportation costs or, for example, child care costs 

for trips to the doctor and physical therapy—are mandated 

PIP benefits. Subsection (1)(e) of ORS 742.524, however, 

does not state that the child care PIP benefits described 

above are different from or to be paid in addition to any 

other actual child care expenses incurred to receive medical 

services. Thus, ORS 742.524(1)(e) casts additional doubt on 

plaintiff’s proposed construction of ORS 742.524(1)(a).6

At the same time, we remain unconvinced that context supports defendant’s opposing view of the statute. As 

mentioned, the statute contains a presumption providing 

that “[e]xpenses of medical *** services are presumed to be 

reasonable and necessary unless the provider receives notice 

of denial of the charges not more than 60 calendar days after 

the insurer receives from the provider notice of the claim for 

the services.” ORS 742.524(1)(a) (emphasis added). And, in

Ivanov v. Farmers Ins. Co., 344 Or 421, 429, 185 P3d 417 

(2008), we recognized that the “reasonable and necessary” 

presumption applies when “a healthcare provider submits a 

PIP claim for medical expenses on behalf of an insured.” 

(Emphasis added.) No parallel presumption exists for nonhealthcare providers in ORS 742.524(1)(a). As a result, 

defendant draws the conclusion that the “reasonable and 

necessary” presumption is designed to cover what it views 

to be the universe of PIP medical benefit claims, namely, 

claims for professional services by healthcare providers. 

Defendant further argues that other PIP statutes that refer 

to “providers” supply evidence for that conclusion as well, 

citing ORS 742.525(1)(b). That statute states that a healthcare provider cannot charge more than the amount in “fee 

6 The dissent supports plaintiff’s argument, suggesting that, by using the 

word “all” in the phrase “all reasonable and necessary” costs of the listed medical services, the legislature meant to include all expenses in some way related 

to obtaining medical care, including transportation. Dowell, 361 Or at 87-88 

(Walters, J., dissenting). The word “all,” however, modifies “reasonable and necessary”; therefore, the statute requires that, for any covered medical care that 

qualifies as a covered PIP benefit, an insurer must pay the expense or cost of the 

care if it was reasonable and necessary. The term does not clarify whether the 

legislature meant to include transportation as a medical benefit.
76 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

schedules for medical services” published by the Director of 

the Department of Consumer and Business Services pursuant to ORS 656.248.7

We conclude, however, that the presumption and 

the procedures for claims by healthcare providers manifest 

the legislature’s decision to address the claims process for 

healthcare providers in the PIP statutes and not a limitation 

on the scope of PIP medical benefits. It is apparent from the 

PIP statutory scheme that the legislature has not enacted 

presumptions or detailed procedures designed to manage 

how insurers calculate amounts that they must pay for all 

mandated PIP benefits and resulting disputes regarding 

those amounts. For example, PIP benefits include loss of 

income for those usually engaged in a remunerative occupation, ORS 742.542(1)(b), and loss of essential services for 

those who are not usually engaged in a remunerative occupation, ORS 742.542(1)(c). Yet those provisions of the benefits statute do not include any presumptions that might limit 

a variety of conceivable disputes that could occur between 

the injured person and the insurer regarding amounts that 

must be paid for losses. Thus, although the presumption for 

payments to healthcare providers was designed to reduce 

disputes over medical bills,8

 there simply is no similar 

7 Several other PIP statutes also address procedures relating to payments 

to healthcare providers. Under ORS 742.528(1), the procedure for denying payment requires notice to an insured within the same window of time permitted for 

denials of healthcare provider claims: the insurer must provide “written notice 

of the denial, within 60 calendar days of receiving a claim from the provider, to 

the insured[.]” And if the insurer receives a claim by a healthcare provider, the 

insurer must timely provide “a copy of the notice of the denial *** to a provider of 

services under ORS 742.524(1)(a).” ORS 742.528(2). Additionally, ORS 742.529 

allows an insurer to seek reimbursement from healthcare providers. If an insurer 

pays PIP benefits “based on information that appeared to establish proof of loss 

and the insurer paying the benefits later determines” that it was not responsible 

for the payment, “the insurer shall give notice and explanation to the provider 

that the payment was incorrectly issued. Immediately after receiving the notice 

and explanation the provider shall promptly repay the insurer.” ORS 742.529.

8 The presumption was added to the statute in 1987. As the testimony of one 

of the opponents of the presumption indicates, the presumption was designed to 

induce prompt payment of medical bills. At a public hearing for House Bill (HB) 

2443 before the Senate Business, Housing and Finance Committee, a manager 

for a medical cost containment company read from prepared testimony in opposition to HB 2443. She contended that “[t]he wording in [HB] 2443 would prohibit 

insurers identifying accuracy and utilization issues in medical bills.” Exhibit K, 

Senate Business, Housing and Finance Committee, May 12, 1987 (accompanying 

statement of Faye Stump).
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 77

presumption in place for any other “expenses of medical * ** 

services” that an injured person may claim. In other words, 

the absence of presumptions for mandated PIP benefits is 

not anomalous in the PIP statutory scheme.

That leaves the third meaning suggested by the 

text of the phrase “expenses of medical *** services”: costs 

that originate with, or that are actuated by, the rendered 

medical treatment or the physician’s performance of work. 

Such costs would include the medications and medical supplies and equipment that a physician prescribes for treatment of the injured person. None of the relevant context discussed above contradicts that reading, and that reading is 

supported by legislative history.

C. Legislative History

Neither party urges us to consider the legislative 

history of ORS 742.524(1)(a) to support their differing views 

of the statute. But, as we have done in numerous cases, we 

review the legislative history to determine whether the statute contains any latent ambiguity overlooked in our “plain 

meaning” analysis. See, e.g., Ware v. Hall, 342 Or 444, 452 

n 6, 154 P3d 118 (2007) (“[t]o the extent that text and context le[ft] any doubt about the legislature’s intent, the legislative history remove[d] it”). We review pertinent legislative 

history, bearing in mind that “an examination of legislative 

history is most useful when it is able to uncover the manifest general legislative intent behind an enactment.” Errand 

v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 320 Or 509, 539 n 4, 888 

P2d 544 (1995) (Graber, J., dissenting).

The origin and development of ORS 742.524(1)(a) 

is a bit cluttered due to the renumbering of statutes, but 

demonstrates that the phrase at issue, “expenses of medical * ** services,” is essentially unchanged in form since 

the original PIP legislation was enacted. In 1971, the legislature enacted House Bill (HB) 1300, which incorporated 

the PIP benefits provision. Or Laws 1971, ch 523, § 2. The 

benefits provision in section 2 of the bill was codified as former ORS 743.800, and the phrase currently found in ORS 

742.524(1)(a) was written as “expenses for medical * ** services.” (Emphasis added.) In 1981, the benefits provision was 

moved to former ORS 743.805, Or Laws 1981, ch 414, § 2, 
78 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

and the phrase was changed to its current form, with “of” 

replacing “for.”9

 In 1987, former ORS 743.805 was amended 

to include the presumption discussed above. Or Laws 1987, 

ch 588, § 2. And, finally, in 1989, former ORS 743.805 was 

renumbered as ORS 742.524.

At their inception in 1971, PIP benefits were directed 

toward prompt payment of two types of major expenses: 

medical costs and replacement of loss of income (or cost of 

essential services for those not employed in a remunerative 

occupation). As introduced, HB 1300 proposed the creation 

of PIP benefits and procedures for obtaining those benefits. 

During consideration of the bill, Insurance Commissioner 

Bateson, a proponent, and others testified. In his presentation to the Subcommittee on Financial Affairs of the 

House State and Federal Affairs Committee, Commissioner 

Bateson explained the purpose of the bill:

“This bill is designed to meet the problem of speed and 

certainty of payment of medical costs and loss of wages as 

a result of personal injuries sustained in auto accidents.”

Exhibit C, Subcommittee on Financial Affairs, House State

and Federal Affairs Committee, HB 1300, Feb 24, 1971 

(accompanying statement of Insurance Commissioner 

Cornelius Bateson). He elaborated on section 2 of the bill, 

which described PIP benefits of “up to $3,000 of medical 

payment” and “85% of wage loss for 1 year after a 14-day 

waiting period” or “cost of essential services provided by a 

person who is not normally engaged in a remunerative occupation for 1 year after a 14-day waiting period.” Id.

In a separate written statement, Bateson described 

his creation of “a special advisory committee on auto insurance.” Exhibit E, Subcommittee on Financial Affairs, House 

State and Federal Affairs Committee, HB 1300, Feb 24, 

9 The change in the words from “for” to “of” might prompt a question as to 

whether the legislature intended to change the scope of covered expenses. The 

parties agree that the wording change does not appear to have been intended 

as meaningful, and we are not aware of any legislative history to the contrary. 

Although the dissent views the term “for” as having a broad meaning that is 

consistent with the broad meaning of the term “of” that the dissent advances, 

Dowell, 361 Or at 93-94 (Walters, J., dissenting), “for” can also mean “because of” 

or “on account of,” Webster’s at 886, which is consistent with our reading of the 

term “of” in the statute.
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 79

1971 (accompanying statement of Commissioner Bateson). 

According to Bateson, that committee met frequently throughout 1970, and it “considered the problems of automobile 

insurance in Oregon, considered a number of possible solutions and prepared recommended legislation which [was] 

submitted to the 1971 Legislature.” Id. The committee 

reached several conclusions, including:

“3) That speed of payment of a claim is often as important as whether or not it is paid at all. Prolonged adjustment procedures during which the injured party is without 

wages or wage replacement, during which hospital, doctor 

or repair bills go unpaid.

“* ** That bill is HB 1299.

“4) That *** there are still many people whose coverage for economic loss sustained in auto accidents is less 

than adequate.

“Loss of wages and medical bills is the major source 

of such economic losses. While a majority of auto policies 

provide ‘Med-pay’ coverage, wage loss coverage is rare as a 

first party auto coverage. Therefore the committee has prepared a bill which provides for the mandatory inclusion of 

$3,000 of medical payments and 85% of actual wage loss for 

one year (subject to certain limitations) in each insurance 

policy which covers a private passenger automobile. This 

bill is HB 1300.”

Id.

At that same hearing, Ulrich, Underwriting Superintendent of State Farm Insurance Companies and President 

of the Automobile Plan of Oregon, also testified, reading a 

one-page statement. In that statement, Ulrich agreed “with 

the basic desirability of including medical payments coverage and loss of income benefits in policies carried by Oregon 

motorists.” Exhibit D, Subcommittee on Financial Affairs, 

House State and Federal Affairs Committee, HB 1300, Feb 

24, 1971 (accompanying statement of Paul Ulrich). Ulrich 

also raised another theme of the hearing: concerns over 

the costs. Ulrich stated that the proposed coverage “will 

certainly increase the cost of auto insurance by a substantial amount. In some cases, the increase will affect motorists who neither need nor want the coverage because other 
80 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

coverage is carried.” Id. The concern over costs and the effect 

that the law would have on low-income Oregonians who had 

to purchase auto insurance was shared by Representative 

Howard at an April 14, 1971, hearing before the House State 

and Federal Affairs Full Committee and by Representative 

Stathos at a May 3, 1971, hearing before the same committee. 

Minutes, House State and Federal Affairs Full Committee, 

Apr 14, 1971, 1; Minutes, House State and Federal Affairs 

Full Committee, May 3, 1971, 2.10

At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on May 19,

1971, Commissioner Bateson explained HB 1300 much as he 

had done in the earlier subcommittee meeting, although, by 

that time, the limits placed on the amounts of PIP benefits 

for wage loss had been reduced. Bateson also addressed the 

committee’s concern with premium costs. Tape Recording, 

Senate Judiciary Committee, HB 1300, May 19, 1971, Tape 

10, Side 2 (statement of Commissioner Bateson). Smith, a 

member of the Commissioner’s Advisory Committee, testified 

that HB 1300 would solve some problems, including delayed 

payments and insured motorists not receiving some form of 

indemnity when injured. Tape Recording, Senate Judiciary 

Committee, HB 1300, May 19, 1971, Tape 10, Side 2 (statement of Edwin E. Smith). Another problem that HB 1300 

would solve, added Smith, would be a reduction in litigation, 

particularly concerning smaller claims, because HB 1300 

would ensure that an individual’s wages and medical bills

would be paid, thereby reducing the incentive to sue. Id.

Thus, the legislative history available to us from 

1971 does not indicate that the legislature was concerned 

with delayed payments to injured motorists for their transportation costs to receive medical care. Instead, that history 

demonstrates that the legislation leading to ORS 742.524(1)(a)

was introduced to encourage prompt payment of two major 

types of losses for injured motorists, namely, medical costs 

and lost wages, a conclusion underscored by the testimony 

of Insurance Commissioner Bateson and other insurance 

industry and advisory committee witnesses.

10 Although it is not our usual practice to cite legislative committee minutes 

as authority for the discussion of the bill that took place in the committee, in this 

case, we must make an exception. We do so because the Oregon State Archives 

has “not received tapes of the Full Committee except for a few meetings in June.”
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 81

We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that 

a failure to read ORS 742.524(1)(a) to include an insured’s 

transportation expenses incurred for traveling to and from 

medical providers would frustrate the legislative policy of 

ensuring prompt reimbursements for an injured person’s 

expenses and thereby reducing litigation between drivers. 

We reject plaintiff’s suggestion that the purpose of PIP benefits is to “provide for broader, not more restrictive, coverage.” 

That proposition may be supported by Colorado law, which 

plaintiff cites as authority, but there is nothing in the legislative history of ORS 742.524(1)(a) that suggests that the legislature’s purpose in enacting the PIP benefits statute was

to fully compensate injured motorists on a no-fault basis.

In summary, although the legislative history is not 

as detailed as it could be, the evidence available indicates that 

the legislative committees considering HB 1300 understood 

that the rationale for the legislation included reducing litigation while maintaining reasonable insurance premiums. 

Both legislators and the insurance industry voiced concerns 

about the effect of PIP benefits on increases in premiums 

for auto insurance. And, specifically as to the medical PIP 

benefits, the discussion in legislative committee hearings in 

1971, concerning “medical bills,” “medical payments,” and 

“medical expenses,” focused on medical care. The descriptions of what the PIP medical benefit was intended to cover 

were not limited to healthcare providers’ services; instead, 

they more broadly described the medical benefit.

Thus, the legislative history is consistent with our 

reading of the phrase “expenses of medical * * * services” in 

ORS 742.524(1)(a) as including (1) the cost of professional services provided by licensed or certified healthcare providers

and (2) medications and medical supplies and equipment 

that they have prescribed for the injured motorists that they 

treat. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court and the 

Court of Appeals that the legislature did not intend transportation costs for medical care to be a benefit under the PIP 

statutes.

D. Out-of-State Cases

Plaintiff nevertheless contends that four out-of-state

cases are persuasive authority for a contrary interpretation 
82 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

of ORS 742.524(1)(a). Plaintiff correctly notes that courts in 

other jurisdictions have held that transportation expenses 

to and from healthcare providers are compensable under 

their relevant state’s PIP statutes. It is undisputed that the 

majority approach among the states is that transportation 

expenses to and from health care providers are reimbursable PIP expenses. See, e.g., 12 Couch on Insurance § 171.64 

(3d ed) (“Transportation expenses incurred traveling to 

and from medical providers for treatment of covered injuries arising out of an automobile accident are compensable 

under a no-fault or Personal Injury Protection (PIP) insurance policy because these transportation costs are incurred 

in connection with, and are causally related to, reasonable 

and necessary medical services.”); 4 Automobile Liability 

Insurance 4th § 56:1 (“The cost of transportation to and from 

a doctor’s office in order to receive necessary medical treatment is normally a reimbursable medical benefit expense.”). 

However, for the following reasons, those cases do not persuade us that plaintiff’s, or the dissent’s, interpretation of 

ORS 742.524(1)(a) is correct.

We address only two of plaintiff’s out-of-state 

cases—Malu v. Security Nat’l Ins. Co., 898 So 2d 69 (Fla 

2005), and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 902 P2d 1386 (Colo 

1995)—because only those cases involved statutory texts 

analogous to the text at issue in ORS 742.524(1)(a).11 But 

despite the superficial similarity between the PIP statutes 

construed in Malu and Smith and in ORS 742.524(1)(a), 

those two cases are of limited persuasive value, because 

of the policy and interpretive principles that the courts in 

those cases applied.

In Malu, the Florida PIP statute provided that the 

following medical expenses were compensable:

“Eighty percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and 

11 The other two cases that plaintiff cites, Plemmons v. New Jersey Auto. Full 

Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 622 A2d 275 (NJ Super Ct App Div 1993), and Davis v. 

Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 489 NW2d 214 (Mich 1992), are not useful, because 

they involved statutes that, by their express terms, provided broader coverage 

than does ORS 742.524(1)(a).
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 83

rehabilitative services, including prosthetic devices and 

medically necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing 

services.”

Fla Stat § 627.736(1)(a) (2003) (emphases added). The 

Florida Supreme Court held that the state’s PIP statute 

required an insurer to reimburse transportation costs that 

an insured incurred in connection with medical treatment 

that was reasonably medically necessary. Malu, 898 So 2d 

at 76. In doing so, the court underscored that it had previously held that “the PIP statute should be interpreted 

liberally to effectuate the legislative purpose of providing 

broad PIP coverage for Florida motorists.” Id. at 74 (emphasis added; citations omitted). And the court determined that 

“[i]nterpreting the statutory language to include such travel 

expenses [was] consistent with effectuating this legislative 

purpose.” Id.

The court bolstered that determination by highlighting the Florida legislature’s tacit consent to the inclusion 

of transportation expenses in PIP benefits. The court noted 

that, 17 years before, in Hunter v. Allstate Insurance Co., 

498 So 2d 514 (Fla 5th Dist Ct App 1986), a Florida appeals 

court had “held that medical transportation expenses were 

reimbursable under the statute.” Id. at 75. The Florida 

Supreme Court stressed that the compensability of medical 

transportation expenses under the PIP statute “ha[d] never 

been questioned by the Legislature since” that 1986 decision, a fact that led the court to conclude that the legislature 

had “tacitly approved” of that construction. Malu, 898 So 2d 

at 75-76.

In Smith, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 

“[m]ileage costs for travel to and from health care providers for treatment of injuries arising from an automobile accident are expenses for medical services that must 

be paid by the insurer under” the Colorado Auto Accident 

Reparations Act (Act), Colorado’s PIP statute, Colo Rev 

Stat § 10-4-706(1)(b) (1994) (repealed by Laws 1997, HB 

97-1209, § 8, eff July 1, 2003). 902 P2d at 1389. That statute provided that an insurer must reimburse the following

expenses:
84 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

“all reasonable and necessary expenses for medical, chiropractic, optometric, podiatric, hospital, nursing, X-ray, 

dental, surgical, ambulance, and prosthetic services, and 

non-medical remedial care and treatment rendered in 

accordance with a recognized religious method of healing, 

performed within five years after the accident for bodily 

injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle.”

Colo Rev Stat § 10-4-706(1)(b) (emphasis added). The court 

explained that the “legislative intent and policy behind the 

Act are to maximize, not minimize[,] insurance coverage 

** * and to ensure that persons injured in automobile accidents are fully compensated for their injuries.” Smith, 902 

P2d at 1387.12 The court also discussed public policy, noting that, “[i]n the modern health care system, travel to and 

from health care providers is an essential element of medical treatment” and that “the cost of transportation expenses 

is especially burdensome in the case of rural residents who 

may have to travel significant distances to obtain medical 

services.” Id. at 1388. The court therefore concluded that 

both the text of the statute and the statute’s remedial purpose of maximizing insurance coverage required that travel 

expenses necessary to obtain medical services be compensable. Id. at 1389.

As illustrated by the foregoing discussion, in reaching the conclusion that transportation expenses were reimbursable, the courts in Malu and Smith relied heavily on the 

legislative purpose of providing broad or maximum PIP benefits coverage and on public policy. We are satisfied that the 

statutory schemes in those states—Florida and Colorado—

differ from Oregon’s PIP statutory scheme.

Although Oregon’s PIP statute has similar text, the 

Oregon PIP statutes do not include a statement dictating 

that the purpose of the PIP statutes is to provide broad coverage, nor has this court so stated. In fact, our case law recognizes limited, not broad, PIP benefit coverage. In Perez, 

12 The Act’s legislative declaration provided:

“The general assembly declares that its purpose in enacting this part 7 is to 

avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents[.]”

Colo Rev Stat § 10-4-702 (emphasis added).
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 85

we stated that the PIP statutes were created to provide 

reimbursement for some, not all, out-of-pocket losses resulting from motor vehicle accidents. Perez, 289 Or at 300.

Moreover, it appears that, in at least two ways, 

Oregon’s PIP statute is more limited than the acts in other 

states. Most of the various state PIP statutes “require an 

insurer to provide coverage for reasonable and necessary 

medical expense incurred within a specified period following the accident.” 4 Automobile Liability Insurance 4th 

§ 56:1. The one-year period in the 2007 version of the Oregon 

PIP statutes is the shortest of the periods specified.13 Id. 

The longest fixed period appears to be that of the former 

Colorado act in setting a five-year period; and Florida, along 

with four other states, does not impose a time limit at all. 

Id. In addition, reimbursement for medical expenses under 

Oregon’s PIP statutes has been subject to a cap of $15,000 

since 2003.14 Therefore, we do not consider Malu or Smith to 

be helpful in our interpretation of ORS 742.524(1)(a).

In sum, the legislature did not intend expenses for 

ordinary transportation to receive medical treatment or to 

obtain medication to be PIP benefits under ORS 742.524(1)(a).

Instead, we conclude that the phrase “expenses of medical 

*** services” in that statute requires an insurer to pay for 

healthcare bills and items that a physician or other healthcare provider prescribes for treatment, such as medications 

and medical supplies and equipment.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.

13 Oregon now has a two-year period. See ORS 742.524(1)(a) (2015) (PIP benefits consist of “expenses of medical *** services incurred within two years after 

the date of the person’s injury”).

14 In contrast, the dissent views the existence of the cap on the total PIP 

benefit as being consistent with an expansive understanding of covered medical 

benefits that would include transportation costs, observing that including transportation costs “would not increase the total benefits” for the injured person given 

the cap. Dowell, 361 Or at 98 (Walters, J., dissenting). Although the total benefit 

for a covered individual does not increase under the dissent’s interpretation of the 

statute, there can be no question that the total cost of PIP claims would increase. 

Should the legislature wish to extend PIP benefits to include the cost of travel to 

obtain medical services, it is free to do so. However, as we view the terms of the 

statute, insurers are not required to pay for those costs, and we cannot add them 

to “expenses of medical *** services” in ORS 742.524(1)(a). 
86 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

WALTERS, J., dissenting.

If the terms of ORS 742.524(1)(a) (2007) unambiguously precluded payment of transportation expenses, then 

this court would have no choice but to interpret that statute to deny injured motorists access to necessary medical 

care. However, as the majority acknowledges, the text of 

ORS 742.524(1)(a) is not so clearly limited; it can be read to 

require payment of such expenses. The statute’s text requires 

payment of “[a]ll reasonable and necessary expenses of 

medical *** services,” ORS 742.524(1)(a), and the word 

“expenses” means “a cost[] to secure a benefit or bring about 

a result,” 361 Or at 70. Because transportation costs may 

be costs incurred to secure the benefit of medical services, 

the statute’s text may be understood to require payment of 

such costs, and its context and legislative history demonstrate that that is, in fact, what the legislature intended. 

As context, the legislature has instructed that the statute 

was enacted for “the protection of the insurance-buying public,” ORS 731.008, and that it must be “liberally construed,” 

ORS 731.016. The statute’s legislative history indicates that 

the legislature intended to require insurers to promptly pay 

their insureds’ economic losses to increase insureds’ chances 

for full recovery and to avoid the need for contentious thirdparty litigation.

Had the majority given effect to the statute’s text, 

context, and legislative history, and followed the lead of all 

courts that have considered the question, the majority would 

have interpreted ORS 742.524(1)(a) to require insurers to 

pay transportation costs. Instead, the majority chooses a 

unique interpretation of ORS 742.524(1)(a) that requires 

insurers to pay other costs incurred to secure the benefit 

of medical services—costs for medication, supplies, and 

equipment—but not transportation costs. That interpretation departs from law and logic and leaves those who do not 

have the means to travel to secure necessary medical care 

without the same chances for full recovery and opportunity 

to avoid litigation that others have. That is wrong, and I 

dissent.

I begin by explaining in more detail the reasoning that this court would engage in if it were to follow its 
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 87

ordinary paradigm and interpret ORS 742.524(1)(a) to 

require payment of transportation expenses. I then show 

how far the majority reaches—disregarding the meaning 

of the word “expenses,” relying on an illogical meaning of 

the word “of,” refusing to interpret the statute in accordance 

with legislative direction, and turning away from the statute’s legislative history—to deny insureds the benefit of the 

insurance policies that they are required to purchase.

If this court were to follow settled law, it would 

focus, first, on the statute’s text and give ORS 742.524(1)(a)1

its plain meaning. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 

317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). ORS 742.524(1)(a)

requires payment of “[a]ll” reasonable and necessary 

“expenses” of medical services. Giving the word “expenses” 

its ordinary meaning, ORS 742.524(1)(a) requires payment 

of costs “expended to secure a benefit relating to work that is 

performed by another, when that work involves the practice 

of medicine.” Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co., 268 Or App 

672, 677, 343 P3d 283 (2015).2

 Because transportation may 

be necessary to secure a physician’s treatment, transportation costs come within those statutory terms: They are costs 

expended to secure a medical benefit. The legislature did not 

intend to cover only some of the reasonable and necessary 

1 ORS 742.524(1)(a) requires the insurer to reimburse the insured for

“[a]ll reasonable and necessary expenses of medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance and prosthetic services incurred within one year after the 

date of the person’s injury, but not more than $15,000 in the aggregate for all 

such expenses of the person.”

2 The Court of Appeals arrived at that meaning by examining the dictionary 

definitions of the statutory terms:

“‘Expense’ may be defined as ‘something that is expended in order to secure 

a benefit or bring about a result[.]’ Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 800 

(unabridged ed 2002). ‘Of’ may be defined as ‘relating to: with reference to: 

as regards: ABOUT[.]’ Id. at 1565 (boldface in original). ‘Medical’ may be 

defined as ‘of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or with the practice 

of medicine often as distinguished from surgery[,]’ and ‘medicine’ may be 

defined as ‘the science and art dealing with the maintenance of health, and 

the prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease[.]’ Id. at 1402. ‘Service’ may be 

defined as ‘the performance of work commanded or paid for by another[.]’ Id.

at 2075. Thus, the plain meaning of ‘expenses of medical *** services’ may 

be construed as something that is expended to secure a benefit relating to 

work that is performed by another, when that work involves the practice of 

medicine (the maintenance of health, and the prevention, alleviation, or cure 

of disease).” 

Dowell, 268 Or App at 676-77 (brackets in original).
88 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

costs expended to secure medical benefits; it intended to 

cover “[a]ll” such costs. ORS 742.524(1)(a).

Having given the statute’s text its ordinary meaning, this court then would turn, for context, to other statutes 

that, like ORS 742.524(1)(a), are part of the Insurance Code. 

See Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or 

309, 322, 374 P3d 829 (2016) (quoting PGE, 317 Or at 611) 

(“The context of the statute includes ‘other provisions of the 

same statute and other related statutes.’”). ORS 731.008 

provides that “the Insurance Code is for the protection of 

the insurance-buying public,” and ORS 731.016 provides 

that the Insurance Code “shall be liberally construed.”

Oregon law requires that all drivers obtain liability insurance and purchase first-party PIP insurance. ORS 

806.080. Therefore, drivers who pay premiums for that insurance are members of the insurance-buying public. Drivers 

who suffer injuries may have to travel long distances to 

obtain specialized care. In most respects, Oregon is a rural 

state, and Portland is a hub for specialized medical care. See 

Horton v. OHSU, 359 Or 168, 171, 376 P3d 998 (2016) (pediatric surgery specialist performed operation to remove mass 

on plaintiff’s liver); Ackerman v. OHSU Medical Group, 233 

Or App 511, 514, 227 P3d 744 (2010) (plaintiff underwent 

surgery at OHSU to repair injured disc in neck); Clarke v. 

OHSU, 343 Or 581, 586, 175 P3d 418, 421 (2007) (plaintiff 

underwent surgery at OHSU to repair congenital heart 

defect). Giving effect to the statute’s context and following 

the legislature’s instructions, this court would construe 

ORS 742.524(1)(a) liberally, so that those who pay PIP premiums and who need specialized care receive payment for 

all reasonable and necessary costs that they incur to secure 

medical services, including transportation costs. This court 

followed exactly that method of analysis in Gearhart v. PUC, 

356 Or 216, 244, 339 P3d 904 (2014) (reading related statutes together and following legislature’s direction that laws 

administered by Public Utility Commission should be “liberally construed”), and State v. Walker, 356 Or 4, 17, 333 P3d 

316 (2014) (considering instruction that ORICO statutes 

“shall by liberally construed” in its construction of those 

statutes).
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 89

Having considered relevant statutory context, this

court also would look to the legislative history of ORS 

742.524(1)(a) and would find that it supports an interpretation of the statute that requires payment of transportation 

costs incurred to secure medical services. The legislative 

history indicates that the legislature required drivers to 

purchase first-party PIP insurance to provide speedy payment of economic losses to increase injured persons’ chances 

of recovery and to reduce third-party litigation. In a portion 

of that legislative history that the majority quotes, but only 

selectively, Dowell, 361 Or at 78-79, Commissioner Bateson 

explained that there was a need for first-party insurance 

because

“speed of payment of a claim is often as important as 

whether or not it is paid at all. Prolonged adjustment procedures during which the injured party is without wages or 

wage replacement, during which hospital, doctor or repair 

bills go unpaid and during which needed rehabilitation is 

delayed, frequently damage the claimant’s family, his credit 

rating and his chance for full recovery. Delay in settlement 

may also engender in the claimant an attitude toward 

the insurer which will be uncooperative, even vengeful, 

and may lead to a larger ultimate claim or settlement 

than would have been the case if prompt payment were

made.

Exhibit E, Subcommittee on Financial Affairs, House State

and Federal Affairs Committee, HB 1300, Feb 24, 1971 

(accompanying statement of Insurance Commissioner 

Cornelius Bateson) (emphases added). Commissioner Bateson

further explained

“[t]hat, despite the uninsured motorists coverage which 

is required in every auto liability insurance policy issued 

in Oregon, there are still many people whose coverage 

for economic loss sustained in auto accidents is less than 

adequate.”

Id. (emphasis added).

If this court were following settled principles of statutory construction, the court would interpret ORS 742.524(1)

(a) to have a meaning consistent with the legislature’s articulated purposes. See State v. Johnson, 339 Or 69, 81 n 7, 116 
90 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

P3d 879 (2005) (discerning legislature’s “clear overall purpose in enacting” the statute). In Commissioner Bateson’s 

words, paying an injured person’s economic loss would 

increase the person’s chance for full recovery and reduce the 

need for third-party litigation. To the contrary, precluding 

payment of transportation expenses would defeat the legislature’s purposes. If an injured person did not have the 

means to travel for specialized care, not only would bills go 

unpaid, the person would not receive necessary treatment, 

reducing the person’s chances for full recovery. And, even 

if the injured person did have the means to travel, the only 

way that the person could recover transportation expenses 

would be to bring a third-party action, defeating the legislature’s purpose of avoiding the need for such litigation. The 

legislature’s purposes explain why it chose to require payment of “[a]ll” reasonable and necessary “expenses of medical * ** services.” ORS 742.524(1)(a) (emphasis added).

Finally, if this court were to follow settled law, it 

also would look to the reasoning of other courts for guidance. See, e.g., Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 419, 840 P2d 

65 (1992) (looking to decisions of other state courts interpreting parallel constitutional provisions for guidance). In 

doing so, this court would find that all of the courts that 

have considered the matter have interpreted their PIP 

statutes to require payment of transportation costs. See

Anderson et al, 12 Couch on Insurance § 171.64 (3d ed 1984) 

(“Transportation expenses incurred traveling to and from 

medical providers for treatment of covered injuries arising 

out of an automobile accident are compensable under a 

no-fault or Personal Injury Protection (PIP) insurance 

policy[,] because these transportation costs are incurred 

in connection with, and are causally related to, reasonable 

and necessary medical services.”); Arthur Larson & Lex 

K. Larson, 5 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 94.03, 

94-98 (2012) (“Transportation costs necessarily incurred in 

connection with medical treatment are compensable, even if 

the act speaks only of medical and hospital services.”).

For instance, in Malu v. Security Nat’l Ins. Co., 

898 So 2d 69 (Fla 2005), the Florida Supreme Court held 

that its similarly worded PIP statute required payment of 
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 91

transportation expenses.3

 That court previously had held 

that “the language of the PIP statute should be interpreted 

liberally to effectuate the legislative purpose of providing 

broad PIP coverage for Florida motorists.” Id. at 76 (citations 

omitted). In Malu, the court determined that “[i]nterpreting the statutory language to include such travel expenses 

[was] consistent with effectuating this legislative purpose.” 

Id.; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 902 P2d 1386 (Colo 

1995) (relying on remedial purpose of statute in favor of 

insured motorists).

Had the majority been guided by that legal authority, it, too, would have required payment of transportation 

expenses necessarily incurred in connection with medical 

treatment. Instead, however, the majority reads the phrase 

“expenses of medical * * * services,” ORS 742.524(1)(a), to 

require an insurer to pay the cost of medication, supplies, 

and equipment that healthcare providers prescribe, but not 

the cost of transportation. Dowell, 361 Or at 81. As I will 

explain, that conclusion does not follow from the statute’s 

text, context, or legislative history.

The majority begins, as it must, with the statute’s 

text and correctly recognizes that the word “expense” means 

“something that is expended, a cost, to secure a benefit or 

bring about a result.” Id. at 70. However, instead of grappling 

with the fact that transportation can be “a cost[] to secure a 

benefit or bring about a result”—medical care—the majority 

interprets the phrase “expenses of medical *** services” to 

mean “costs that originate with, or that are actuated by, the 

rendered medical treatment or the physician’s performance 

of work.” Id. at 77. The majority then reasons that costs for 

items such as medication, supplies, and equipment qualify, 

but costs for transportation do not. Id.

In arriving at its interpretation of the phrase 

“expenses of medical *** services,” the majority commits 

3 The Florida statute provided that the following medical expenses were 

compensable:

“Eighty percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitative services, including prosthetic 

devices, and medically necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing services.”

Fla Stat § 627.736(1)(a) (2003) (emphases added).
92 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

two errors. The majority’s first error is in defining the word 

“expenses” to mean “a cost[] to secure a benefit” but then 

reading that word and its meaning out of its interpretation 

of the phrase. That error violates the tenet of statutory construction that requires that the court give meaning to all the 

words that the legislature uses. See ORS 174.010 (“[W]here 

there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”); 

see also Force v. Dept. of Rev., 350 Or 179, 190, 252 P3d 306 

(2011) (“Statutory provisions, however, must be construed, if 

possible, in a manner that ‘will give effect to all’ of them.”).

The majority’s second error is in transferring its 

focus to the meaning of the word “of” and the definition that 

it ascribes to that word. Instead of giving the word “of” the 

meaning adopted by the parties and the Court of Appeals—

“relating to”—the majority selects other dictionary definitions to conclude that it means “originate with” or “actuated 

by.” Dowell, 361 Or at 77. The majority first says that “of” 

means “from as the place of birth, production, or distribution :

having as its base of operation, point of initiation, or source 

of issuance or derivation,” id. at 70 (emphasis added), as 

used in the phrase “[of] or relating to Italy,” Webster’s Third 

New Int’l Dictionary 1565 (unabridged ed 2002). Then, the 

majority says, even if that locational meaning is not correct, 

the word “of” also can have two alternative meanings: It 

can be used as a function word to (1) “indicate the cause, 

motive, or reason by which a person or thing is actuated or 

impelled,” as in the phrase “die [of] shame”; or (2) “indicate 

a quality or possession characterizing or distinguishing a 

subject,” as in the phrase “men [of] goodwill.” Id. at 1565; 

361 Or at 70. The majority then selects words from the locational meaning of the word “of” and one of the alternative 

definitions that it suggests and decides that the word “of” 

means “originate with” or “actuated by.” 361 Or at 77. Thus, 

the majority interprets the phrase “expenses of medical * ** 

services” to mean costs that “originate with” or are “actuated by” medical services. Id.

The meaning that the majority gives to the word “of” 

cannot be the meaning that the legislature intended. First, 

the legislature used the word “of” in conjunction with the preceding word “expenses,” which, as the majority recognizes, 
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 93

means costs to secure a benefit. Id. at 70. Therefore, the legislature must have used the word “of” to describe the nature 

of the costs that an insured incurs to secure insurance benefits: Those costs not only must be costs incurred to secure 

some benefit; they must be costs to secure the benefit of the 

listed medical services. That understanding of the meaning 

of the word “of” is consistent with the definition that the parties and the Court of Appeals deem appropriate—“related 

to”—and with the second alternative definition that the 

majority posits—that the costs that an insured incurs must 

have qualities that distinguish them from other costs. In 

other words, the costs “of” services must be costs related to 

the listed services or incurred to secure the listed services. 

In contrast, however, the legislature could not have intended 

the word “of” to have the meaning ascribed by the majority. 

The legislature knew that the reason that a motorist incurs 

costs is that the motorist has suffered injuries in a motor 

vehicle accident; the motorist’s motive for incurring costs is 

to obtain treatment of those injuries, and those injuries are 

the originating source of the costs. The legislature did not 

use the word “of” as a function word to refer to the motive 

that impels an insured to incur costs.

Second, the legislature expressly required payment

of at least one listed expense that does not “originate with” and 

that is not “actuated by” medical services. ORS 742.524(1)(a)

requires payment of expenses of “ambulance” services, and 

such expenses precede and do not “originate with” medical 

treatment. Ambulance costs also are not “actuated by” medical treatment. If the legislature had intended the word “of” 

to mean “originat[ing] with” or “actuated by” medical treatment, that intent would be at odds with its requirement that 

insurers compensate insureds for ambulance expenses.

Third, the conclusion that the legislature did not 

use “of” to mean “originate with” or “actuated by” is clear 

from the fact that the legislature used the word “of” interchangeably with the word “for”; the word “for” does not have 

those meanings. As originally enacted, ORS 742.524(1)(a) 

used the word “for” rather than “of” in the phrase “reasonable and necessary expenses for” medical services. Or Laws 

1971, ch 523, § 2. As the majority recognizes, that change in 

use “does not appear to have been intended as meaningful.” 
94 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

Dowell, 361 Or at 78. The word “for” is defined to mean, 

among other things, “as regards : in respect to : concerning.” 

Webster’s 886. It also is defined to mean “so as to secure a 

result.” Id. It is not defined to mean “originate with” or “actuated by.” To have used the words “of” and “for” interchangeably, the legislature must have understood those words to 

have a common meaning, and that common meaning can 

only be “relating to” or “to secure a result.”4

Fourth, even if the word “of” could be used to mean 

“originate with,” or “actuated by,” the statute would require 

payment of transportation costs when a physician directs an 

injured person to obtain specialized care at a distant location. When the majority interprets the word “of” to include 

costs “prescribed” by a physician, such as medications, but 

not to include transportation costs, presumably because they 

are not “prescribed,” the majority adds a requirement that 

the statute does not include and violates another tenet of 

statutory construction. See ORS 174.010 (“In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained 

therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what 

has been inserted[.]”).

When the majority turns to statutory context to 

determine whether it supports the textual meaning that the 

majority posits, the majority again commits error. As noted, 

the legislature directs that “the Insurance Code is for the 

protection of the insurance-buying public,” ORS 731.008, 

and “shall be liberally construed,” ORS 731.016. Although 

the majority agrees that those statutes function as context for its interpretation of ORS 742.524(1)(a), it refuses 

to “employ” them. Dowell, 361 Or at 73. That is not what 

this court has done in the past. For instance, in Walker, a 

case that this court decided in 2014, this court applied the 

legislative instruction that the ORICO statutes “shall by 

liberally construed” in its analysis of the statute’s text and 

context. 356 Or at 17.

4 The majority argues, in a footnote, that “for” can also mean “because of” or 

“on account of,” and that that meaning is consistent with the meaning that the 

majority ascribes. Dowell, 361 Or at 78 n 9. But an injured motorist incurs costs 

to secure a benefit because of or on account of the motorist’s injuries, not because 

of or on account of “medical services.”
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 95

The majority does not explain its departure from 

Walker. Instead, the majority addresses plaintiff’s argument 

that a 1997 case, Carrigan v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 

Co., 326 Or 97, 104, 949 P2d 705 (1997), requires liberal construction of the PIP statutes. The majority observes that, in 

Carrigan, the court considered the legislature’s instruction 

only after it had considered the text, context, and legislative 

history of the statute at issue and found that the statute’s 

meaning remained unclear. Dowell, 361 Or at 73. Perhaps 

that was what the court did in Carrigan in 1997, but that 

was not what the court did in Walker in 2014. Moreover, 

Carrigan does not justify refusing to give the legislature’s 

instruction any consideration at all.

In this case, the majority not only fails to give effect 

to ORS 731.016 and ORS 731.008 as statutory context, it 

compounds its error by refusing to consider those statutes at 

any point in its analysis. If the majority intends to claim that 

the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 742.524(1)(a)

so clearly compel a result that it can disregard the legislature’s interpretive direction, then it should explicitly stake 

out that claim.

The majority does not do so. Instead, the majority 

acknowledges that the text of the statute can be read in at 

least three different ways, Dowell, 361 Or at 70-71, and says 

that its context does no more than indicate “a problem” with 

plaintiff’s reading of the statute, id. at 73-74.

Significantly, the majority does not draw support 

for its own unique interpretation of the statute from the 

statutory context on which it relies, nor could it. The “problem” that the majority identifies is that ORS 742.524(1)(a) 

mentions one kind of transportation expense (ambulance 

services) but not others, a reference that the majority claims 

casts doubt on plaintiff’s interpretation. Id. That “problem” 

would, however, present the same difficulty for the majority’s interpretation as it does for plaintiff’s. For instance, 

the statute mentions one type of medical service provider 

who provides one type of medical equipment—prosthetic 

service providers who provide prosthetic devices—but not 

other types of medical service providers who provide other 

items, such as pharmacists who provide medication. The 
96 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

statute also specifically mentions certain service providers—

medical, surgical, and dental service providers—but does 

not mention other service providers—pharmacists, nurses, 

or optometrists.5

 Applying the majority’s logic, reference to 

certain specific service providers and the items that they 

provide would exclude payment for others. For instance, 

payment for both pharmacists and the medications that 

they provide would be excluded.

The majority does not, and cannot, claim that the 

statute’s context demonstrates, unambiguously, that its 

interpretation of ORS 742.524(1)(a) is the correct one. In fact, 

looking more closely at the “problem” to which the majority 

points demonstrates that the legislature intended to impose 

a general requirement that insurers pay all reasonable and 

necessary costs to secure what are generally thought of as 

medical services and also specifically listed some services 

that it considered medical in nature—surgical and dental 

services, for example—to make clear the breadth of its reference. In doing so, the legislature did not intend to exclude 

other services, such as pharmaceutical, nursing, or optometry services, or the costs necessary to secure the benefit of 

those services.

Turning to legislative history, the majority observes 

that the legislature did not discuss transportation expenses 

and reasons that that “does not indicate that the legislature 

was concerned with delayed payments to injured motorists 

for their transportation costs to receive medical care.” Id. 

at 80 (emphasis added). The majority cannot say what that 

silence does indicate because it knows full well that legislative silence is an unreliable indicator of legislative intent. 

See State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 492, 268 P3d 568 (2011) 

(noting that, because fact of legislative silence can give rise 

to competing inferences, it is generally not a dispositive indicator of intent).

The majority nevertheless concludes that “the legislative history is consistent with our reading of the phrase 

‘expenses of medical ** * services’ in ORS 742.524(1)(a) as 

including (1) the cost of professional services provided by 

5 See ORS 677.060(7) (excluding pharmacy, nursing, and optometry services, 

among others, from regulation of medicine).
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 97

licensed or certified healthcare providers and (2) medications and medical supplies and equipment that they have 

prescribed for the injured motorists that they treat.” Dowell, 

361 Or at 81 (emphasis added). How can that be so? The 

legislative history fails to include a discussion of the costs of 

medications, medical equipment, and the services of pharmacists and nurses. If legislative silence does not indicate 

that the legislature was concerned with payment of transportation expenses, it also does not indicate that the legislature was concerned with payment of the costs of medications, medical equipment, or the services of pharmacists or 

nurses.

The majority also makes reference to the legislature’s discussion of the cost of PIP benefits, but it is wrong 

to conclude that the legislature worded ORS 742.524(1)(a) 

as it did to limit payment of costs necessary to secure medical treatment. The legislative history demonstrates that 

the costs of providing payment for “[a]ll” reasonable and 

necessary “expenses for medical ** * services” were known 

to the legislature and did not concern it. Many companies 

already were selling, and drivers already were purchasing, 

first-party insurance to cover medical expenses; the significant added benefit in the PIP statutes was coverage for wage 

loss.6

 Furthermore, the method that the legislature chose to 

6 In 1971, when the legislation at issue in this case was first enacted, Oregon 

drivers were not required to have liability insurance to ensure that they would be 

financially responsible for damages caused by their careless driving. Exhibit E, 

Subcommittee on Financial Affairs, House State and Federal Affairs Committee, 

HB 1300, Feb 24, 1971 (accompanying statement of Insurance Commissioner 

Cornelius Bateson). However, the 1971 legislative history indicates that many 

drivers nevertheless obtained liability insurance and had some coverage that 

protected them even if a third party was not at fault or was not financially responsible. Id. Oregon law required that liability insurance policies include coverage 

for damages caused by uninsured motorists, and the majority of policies issued 

in Oregon contained some form of “med-pay” coverage—payment of an insured’s 

medical expenses without regard to fault. Id. Few policies, if any, contained coverage for wage loss. Id. That was not satisfactory, in the eyes of the Insurance 

Commissioner, Cornelius Bateson. He told the legislature that the system “by 

which people protect themselves against financial loss due to auto accidents” 

was far from perfect, and, nationally, “[had] been subjected to close scrutiny 

and substantial criticism.” Subcommittee on Financial Affairs, House State and 

Federal Affairs Committee, Feb 24, 1971 (statement of Insurance Commissioner 

Cornelius Bateson).

In response to questions about increased premiums under the new law, 

Commissioner Bateson replied that the cost of coverage from a substandard 

insurance company insuring a high risk youthful driver with a “hot rod” car was 
98 Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co.

contain medical costs was to require that they be reasonable 

and necessary, and to impose both monetary and durational 

caps. ORS 742.524(1)(a)-(e). An insurer is required to pay no 

more than $15,000 for aggregate medical expenses incurred 

within one year7

 after the date of the person’s injury.8 ORS 

742.524(1)(a). Interpreting that statute to require payment 

of an injured person’s transportation expenses would not 

increase the total benefits for which that person would be 

eligible.

Furthermore, if a concern with cost were to indicate 

an intent to preclude payment of transportation expenses, it 

would also indicate an intent to preclude payment for medication. The cost of medication is significant. See Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Expenditures,

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/health-expenditures.htm

(Oct 7, 2016) (accessed Feb 14, 2017) (prescription drugs 

accounted for 9.8 percent of total United States health 

expenditures in 2014—$294 billion).

The majority does not claim or demonstrate that the 

text, context, and legislative history of ORS 742.524(1)(a)

unambiguously demonstrate that it must be interpreted 

as the majority reasons—to require an insurer “to pay for 

healthcare bills and items that a physician or other healthcare provider prescribes for treatment, such as medications 

and medical supplies and equipment.” Dowell, 361 Or at 85.

Therefore, even if only at the last step of its analysis, the 

majority should have returned to the legislature’s direction 

to interpret ORS 742.524(1)(a) liberally for the benefit of the 

insurance-buying public. Had it done so, the majority would 

have interpreted that statute to cover not only the cost of 

“prescribed” medication and equipment, but also to cover 

“[a]ll” reasonable and necessary costs to secure the benefit 

of medical treatment, including transportation costs.

estimated to be an additional premium of $18 per year, while the cost for a driver 

with a good record would probably not exceed an additional $14 or $15 per year. 

Tape Recording, Senate Judiciary Committee, HB 1300, May 19, 1971, Tape 10, 

Side 2. Mr. Bateson also said that one company was selling coverage slightly more 

beneficial than the bill required for an additional premium of $7 per year. Id.

7 The current version of the ORS 742.524(1)(a) (2015) provides that PIP benefits consist of “expenses of medical *** services incurred within two years after 

the date of the person’s injury.” 

8 Originally, PIP benefits were capped at $3,000. Or Laws 1971, ch 523, § 2.
Cite as 361 Or 62 (2017) 99

The majority’s failure to give ORS 742.524(1)(a) 

an interpretation that its words permit, that accords with 

legislative direction, and that fulfills its purposes may not 

be without remedy. Perhaps those in need will be able to 

seek, and caring physicians will take the time to write, prescriptions for transportation to secure specialized medical 

care. After all, there is no conceptual difference between a 

physician’s direction to obtain medication and a physician’s 

direction to obtain transportation. Or, perhaps, the legislature will take time from other pressing matters to expressly 

instruct insurers that “expenses of medical * ** services” 

include the reasonable and necessary costs of transportation 

to procure those services. ORS 742.524(1)(a).

But even if a remedy exists, the majority’s failure 

sounds an alarm of injustice that extends beyond this case. 

The majority’s conclusion that those without access to medical care must forgo it or wait the time and bear the uncertainty that litigation entails and that PIP benefits were 

designed to avoid is not legally correct, and the means that 

the majority adopts to justify that end deviate from our legal 

norms. I dissent.

Baldwin and Brewer, JJ,. join in this dissenting 

opinion.