UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

HAIGHT, PENLAND, and WOLFE 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private First Class RICHARD T. MANRIQUEZ 

 United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140893 

Headquarters, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk 

Randall Fluke, Military Judge 

Colonel Jan E. Aldykiewicz, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Captain Payum Doroodian, JA (argued); Lieutenant Colonel Charles 

D. Lozano, JA; Major Christopher D. Coleman, JA; Captain J. David Hammond, JA 

(on brief). 

For Appellee: Major Anne C. Hsieh, JA (argued); Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; 

Major Steven J. Collins, JA; Major Anne C. Hsieh, JA (on brief). 

20 May 2016 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent. 

WOLFE, Judge: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of desertion terminated by apprehension 

and one specification of larceny of $2,600, in violation of Articles 85 and 121, 

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885 and 921 (2012) [hereinafter 

UCMJ]. The court-martial sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for eighteen months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction 

to the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged and 

credited appellant with four days of pretrial confinement.1

 This case was referred to 

 

1

 A pretrial agreement limited confinement to eighteen months, with a provision that 

the convening authority would disapprove any adjudged confinement in excess of 

(continued . . .) 
MANRIQUEZ – ARMY 20140893 

2 

us for review under Article 66(b), UCMJ. Appellant assigns two errors, both of 

which merit discussion.2

 

BACKGROUND 

 Appellant arrived at Fort Polk, Louisiana on 30 May 2013. On 30 October 

2013, appellant packed his belongings and deserted his unit. He did not intend to 

return to the Army. On 30 November 2013, the Army issued a deserter warrant for 

appellant. 

In August of 2014, while still in a deserter status, appellant got a job as a 

cashier at a Wal-Mart in Pineville, Louisiana. From 23-25 September 2014, while 

serving as a cashier, appellant illicitly activated $2,600 worth of Wal-Mart gift cards 

and took them out of the store. He subsequently used the gift cards to buy 

merchandise at Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart detected the theft and notified the Pineville 

Police Department, who arrested appellant. On 29 September 2014, the Pineville 

Police Department returned appellant to military control pursuant to the deserter 

warrant. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

Appellant raises two assignments of error, both calling into question the 

providency of his guilty plea to stealing gift cards from Wal-Mart. Specifically, 

appellant pleaded guilty to a specification that he: 

[D]id, at or near Pineville, Louisiana, between on or about 

23 September 2014 and on or about 25 September 2014, 

steal Wal-Mart gift cards, of a value of about $2,600.00, 

the property of Wal-Mart. 

During the providence inquiry, appellant described his conduct as follows: 

 

(. . . continued) 

twelve months if appellant made restitution to the larceny victim (Wal-Mart) before 

the convening authority’s action on the case. As appellant failed to make restitution, 

the convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged. 

2

 Appellant personally claims, pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 

(C.M.A. 1982), that his sentence was disproportionately severe based on the 

circumstances of his case and as compared to other persons he has met while in 

confinement. We find the sentence to be appropriate. 
MANRIQUEZ – ARMY 20140893 

3 

On August 12th, 2014, I applied for a job at the Wal-Mart 

located in Pineville, Louisiana. I was hired as a full-time 

cashier on August 25th, 2014. . . . [B]eginning on 

September 23d [2014] . . . . I began activating store gift 

cards by using my cash register to place money on the 

cards. I did not pay for the cards, nor did any store 

customers pay for the cards. I wrongfully took gift cards 

belonging to Wal-Mart and used my cash register to place 

money belonging to Wal-Mart on these cards. The funds 

used to place value on the gift cards did not belong to 

myself or any customer. The funds used to place value on 

the gift cards belonged to Wal-Mart. 

Before I was apprehended by civilian law enforcement for 

this offense, I had placed $2,600.00 worth of money using 

my cash register to activate these cards. I intended to 

permanently deprive Wal-Mart of the use and benefit of 

the money placed on these gift cards after activating these 

cards by placing store funds on the cards. I used these 

cards to purchase food, clothing, and other items from the 

store for myself and my family members. 

 In the stipulation of fact, appellant agreed that on 23 September 2014, he 

“methodically selected Wal-Mart gift cards worth $200.00 from under his register, 

activated the cards without paying for them, and placed them into his pocket.” He 

further agreed that on 25 September 2014, “he methodically selected six additional 

cards and activated them without paying for them.” Appellant stipulated that on the 

two separate days he stole “$2,600.00 worth of gift cards.” 

A. What is the Value of a Gift Card? 

 We review a military judge’s decision to accept a plea for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “It is an 

abuse of discretion for a military judge to accept a guilty plea without an adequate 

factual basis to support it . . . [or] if the ruling is based on an erroneous view of the 

law.” United States v. Weeks, 71 M.J. 44, 46 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citation omitted). 

 In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the military judge 

abused his discretion in accepting appellant’s guilty plea because gift cards have no 

“tangible value” other than the value of the “plastic card.” 

 

In short, appellant asks us to treat a gift card in a manner similar to a debit, 

credit, or access device. Under this theory, when appellant activated and took the 

gift cards—or, in his words, “placed money” on the gift cards—he had only engaged 
MANRIQUEZ – ARMY 20140893 

4 

in the theft of a piece of plastic of negligible value. Accordingly, the substantial 

theft only occurred when appellant used the gift cards to acquire goods from WalMart. As neither the providence inquiry nor the stipulation of fact adequately 

related the value of the goods appellant purchased with the gift cards, this reasoning 

would require us to set aside the finding of guilty as to larceny, at least in part. 

Appellant’s argument is not without merit. Gift cards share some of the 

characteristics of debit or credit cards. The President has specified that 

“[w]rongfully engaging in a credit, debit, or electronic transaction to obtain goods or 

money is an obtaining-type larceny by false pretense . . . usually . . . from the 

merchant offering them.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2012 ed.) 

[hereinafter MCM], pt. IV, ¶ 46.c.(1)(i), (iv); United States v. Williams, 75 M.J. 129, 

132 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (“[T]ypically, when larceny is by means of a wrongful credit or 

debit transaction, the money or goods were wrongfully obtained from the merchant 

or bank, making them the person stolen from.”); United States v. Cimball Sharpton, 

73 M.J. 299, 301 (C.A.A.F. 2014); United States v. Lubasky, 68 M.J. 260, 263 

(C.A.A.F. 2010).3

 Accordingly, if we were to treat a gift card and debit card 

similarly, the substantial theft occurs not when the card is taken, but when the card 

is used. 

However, at least in the context of a guilty plea, we decline to adopt 

appellant’s view of these offenses. 

First, gift cards are unlike debit and credit cards in that they do not require 

any deception to use. Credit and debit cards are issued to persons with unique 

account numbers associated with the card and the particular account holder. The 

unauthorized use of a credit or debit card requires that (to some greater or lesser 

extent) the user falsely represent he has the authority to use the card. This is why 

such crimes are usually an “obtaining” type larceny by “false pretenses.” Gift cards, 

 

3

 We note that this case presents entirely different issues than those presented in 

Williams, Lubasky, and Cimball Sharpton. On appeal, those cases answered the 

question of “whom did the accused steal the goods or money from?” Williams, 75 

M.J. at 132. As a larceny specification needs to place an accused on notice of what 

he is defending against, a broad reading of these cases is that the specification needs 

to allege the person or entity with whom the accused interacted. For a taking 

offense, this is usually the person from whose possession or control the accused 

removed the property, even if the property is ultimately owned by someone else. 

For an obtaining-type offense, which involves theft by deception, this is usually the 

entity that the accused initially deceived (e.g., by holding himself out as an 

authorized user of the card). However, in this case those concerns are not present, 

as appellant interacted at every stage solely with Wal-Mart. 
MANRIQUEZ – ARMY 20140893 

5 

similar to gift certificates and coupons, may be used by the bearer without any 

representation. In other words, “false pretenses” are not required to use a stolen gift 

card. Use of a stolen gift card requires no more deception or false representation 

than the use of stolen cash, a stolen gift certificate, or a stolen baseball ticket. 

Accordingly, we view this case as a theft by “taking” not “obtaining.” 

Second, it is clear that the illicitly actived gift cards that appellant removed 

from Wal-Mart had “value” greater than that of a piece of plastic. “Value is a 

question of fact to be determined on the basis of all the evidence admitted.” MCM, 

pt. IV, ¶ 46.c.(1)(g)(i) (emphasis added). Here, as this was a guilty plea, we need 

not look further than appellant’s own admissions that he “placed $2600.00 worth of 

money” on the gift cards and then “stole $2600.00 worth of gift cards.” When 

appellant argues in his brief that he “did not ‘place money’ or ‘store funds’ on the 

gift cards,” he is disagreeing with facts that he admitted at trial. United States v. 

Johnson, 42 M.J. 443, 445 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (it is appropriate to reject facts asserted 

on appeal that contradict an appellant’s admissions during a guilty plea). More 

broadly, it is clear that activated gift cards have a “market value” that is greater than 

the cost of the plastic used to make the card. See, e.g., MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 

46.c.(1)(g)(iii) (the value of stolen property is determined by market value). An 

activated gift card, like a movie ticket, sports ticket, or lottery ticket, is an object 

with value. Id. (“Writings representing value may be considered to have the value—

even though contingent—which they represented at the time of theft”). 

Third, our sister courts that have addressed this issue have either directly or 

indirectly found that gift cards possess a value beyond their weight in plastic. In 

United States v. Perrine, ACM S31972, 2013 CCA LEXIS 234, at *9-11 (A.F. Ct. 

Crim. App. 18 Mar. 2013) (unpublished), review denied, 72 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 

2013), the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals specifically rejected the idea that a 

gift card “cannot be stolen because it is ‘intangible’ and not ‘capable of being 

possessed.’” Under facts that presented identical issues of law in appellant’s case, 

the Perrine court found that “appellant did take possession of ‘tangible property’ 

that had value . . . [when] [h]e walked away from the AAFES customer service 

counter carrying a gift card . . . .” Id. 

While Perrine is the only case that specifically addresses the value of gift 

cards, other courts have assumed as much. See United States v. Murphy, NMCCA 

201300100, 2013 CCA LEXIS 1049 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 29 Oct. 2013) 

(unpublished) (affirming conviction for theft of a gift card); United States v. 

Gordon, ACM S32008, 2013 CCA LEXIS 675 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 26 Jun. 2013) 

(unpublished) (affirming conviction for gift card theft). Indeed, in Cimball 

Sharpton, our superior court summarized the investigation as “reveal[ing] that the 

appellant used her [Government Purchase Card] to make about $20,000 in 

unauthorized purchases, mostly gift cards.” 73 M.J. at 779. In all of these cases it 
MANRIQUEZ – ARMY 20140893 

6 

is clear that the courts view the accused as having taken or obtained something 

valued far in excess of a piece of plastic.4

 

 Appellant’s admissions that he placed money on the gift cards and then took 

$2600 worth of gift cards (with the intent to permanently deprive Wal-Mart of their 

value) was sufficient to establish the providency of his plea to larceny. 

B. Duplicitous Pleading 

 Appellant’s second assignment of error alleges that two larcenies were 

improperly aggregated into a single larceny of $2,600.00. Appellant correctly notes 

that he stole gift cards on two separate days. However, we nonetheless do not 

believe appellant is entitled to relief for two independent reasons. 

 First, appellant forfeited this issue by failing to raise it at trial, and any error 

does not amount to plain error. Furthermore, by pleading guilty, the appellant 

waived this issue. United States v. Schweitzer, 68 M.J. 133, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2009) 

(“An unconditional guilty plea generally ‘waives all defects which are neither 

jurisdictional nor a deprivation of due process of law.’”) (quoting United States v. 

Rehorn, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 488-89, 26 C.M.R. 267, 268-69 (1958)). As this waiver 

was part of a negotiated pretrial agreement, we see no basis to exercise our “highly 

discretionary power” to notice forfeited and waived error. United States v. Butcher, 

56 M.J. 87, 93 (C.A.A.F. 2001). 

 Second, as appellant claims that the specification alleges two separate 

larcenies, the appropriate remedy at trial for a duplicitous specification would have 

been severance. See Rule for Courts-Martial 906(b)(5) (“Severance of a duplicitous 

specification into two or more specifications”). Although not as clear as might be 

preferred, the stipulation of fact indicates that appellant took thirteen $200 gift cards 

totaling $2,600.00. Appellant stipulated that he took six cards on the second day. 

Thus, it appears that severance would have resulted in two specifications of larceny, 

 

4

 Although not presented here appellant’s view of the law would be problematic in 

other circumstances. Consider, for example, an accused who takes a gift card from 

another individual and intentionally destroys the card, preventing its use by the 

owner. In such a case no goods are ever obtained from the use of the card. Under 

appellant’s view of the law, only a piece of plastic was stolen, even in circumstances 

where the owner has suffered an unrecoverable loss of the gift card’s face value. 
MANRIQUEZ – ARMY 20140893 

7 

each alleging a theft of over $500.00.5 Accordingly, we find appellant has suffered 

no prejudice from being charged with a single specification of larceny. 

CONCLUSION 

 Having found no substantial basis in law or fact to question appellant’s pleas, 

and finding the sentence appropriate, the findings and sentence as adjudged and 

approved by the convening authority are AFFIRMED. 

 Senior Judge HAIGHT and Judge PENLAND concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

 

5

 This case is therefore distinguishable from United States v. Harding, 61 M.J. 526 

(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2005). In that case, the government combined several 

larcenies over several weeks and months in order to exceed the $100 (now $500) 

threshold for the increased maximum punishment for larceny. Here, appellant stole 

multiple gift cards worth an aggregate value of more than $500 on at least one of the 

days alleged. The reasonable inference from the stipulation of fact is that he stole 

more than $500 on both days alleged. In either case, we fail to find prejudice to a 

substantial right of appellant. See UCMJ art. 59(a). 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: