NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 15-3675

______________

CHARLES BRIDGES,

 Appellant

v.

COMMISIONER SOCIAL SECURITY; JASPER J. BEDE;

JANET LANDESBURG, REANA SWEENEY

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 5-12-cv-02316)

Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr., District Judge

______________

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 5, 2016

BEFORE: SHWARTZ, GREENBERG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 1, 2016)

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OPINION*

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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

____________________

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a District Court order

entered on October 1, 2015, dismissing this case that Charles Bridges, a Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), initiated against the 

Commissioner of Social Security and certain individual SSA employees.

1

 The case arose

out of Bridges’ loss of designation in 2010 as the Hearing Office Chief Administrative 

Law Judge (“HOCALJ”) in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, followed by the circumstance that 

he was not later designated as the HOCALJ at any other location within SSA

Administration Region 3, the Harrisburg SSA region. At the time that he lost the 

designation as the Harrisburg HOCALJ Bridges resumed his duties as an ALJ but without

the HOCALJ managerial and administrative duties. Significantly, Bridges’ loss of the 

HOCALJ designation and defendants’ actions of which he complains in this action did 

not reduce his compensation or eliminate other employee benefits and they did not 

deprive him of his status as an ALJ.

2

 Bridges attributes the SSA actions of which he 

complains as an “invidious effort to reduce the number of favorable eligibility 

determinations of disability benefits.” Appellant’s br. at 13. 

In March 2013, Bridges filed an amended complaint with numerous counts 

asserting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, due process of law, Bivens, and 

 1 The procedural history that we set forth is only partial but is adequate for purposes of 

this opinion.

2 Bridges at no point in either his opening or reply brief claims that he lost compensation 

or other employee benefits by reason of his loss of the HOCALJ designation or any 

action that defendants took.
3

Pennsylvania state law claims.

3

 Bridges again complained in his amended complaint 

about his 2010 loss of designation as a HOCALJ and defendants’ failure to select him to

be the HOCALJ at any other SSA office within SSA region 3. In addition, the amended 

complaint included claims of race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 

a violation of due process, and various common law claims. Bridges later sought to 

supplement and/or amend his complaint to challenge certain SSA administrative actions 

taken after the initiation of this action, some of a general nature and some affecting 

Bridges individually, including a change in the position description of the duties of SSA 

ALJs. 

On February 21, 2014, Bridges filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining 

order and preliminary injunction challenging a SSA directive issued on February 18, 

2014. The directive, issued because his supervisors believed some of his decisions did 

not comply with SSA policies, required Bridges to attend self-guided training before 

continuing to hear cases. The directive, however, did not have an adverse financial effect 

on Bridges because during the ten-day period, he was paid his normal salary. Moreover, 

after he completed the training, he again was scheduled to hear cases as an ALJ. The 

District Court denied Bridges’ motion on February 24, 2014. Bridges appealed from that 

order but we dismissed the appeal as moot on April 6, 2015. See Bridges v. 

Commissioner, 607 F. App’x 168 (3d Cir. 2015).

 3 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 

S.Ct. 1999 (1971). The District Court dismissed the state law claims but we are not 

concerned with them on this appeal as Bridges does not challenge their dismissal. 
4

Shortly before Bridges first sought, as we describe above, a temporary restraining 

order and preliminary injunction, defendants moved to dismiss the action. On March 28, 

2014, the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint 

with the exception of Count II in which Bridges alleged that his rights had been violated

when he lost his HOCALJ designation. Bridges subsequently moved for reconsideration 

of the March 28, 2014 order to the extent that it dismissed his amended complaint. In 

addition, he separately filed a motion for leave to file another amended complaint. The 

Court deferred ruling on the motion until it entered a final order dismissing the case. On 

April 17, 2014, defendants again moved to dismiss Count II of the amended complaint, 

but the Court did not rule on that motion until the end of the case. 

While Bridges’ foregoing motions were pending, on October 20, 2014, he again

filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, this 

time challenging a directive to him to meet with the SSA management to discuss the 

quality of some of his closed decisions. Furthermore, he sought an injunction barring the 

SSA from conducting a “focused quality review” of his past decisions and from meeting 

with him to discuss such a review. On October 24, 2014, the District Court denied the 

motion because it concluded that Bridges had not demonstrated that he was likely to be 

successful on the merits or had suffered irreparable harm from the actions of which he 

complained. Bridges appealed from the order denying this motion but we dismissed the 

appeal as moot. 

Before we dismissed the appeal from the denial of the foregoing motion, Bridges

on March 20, 2015, again moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
5

injunction, this time challenging a March 10, 2015 SSA order that he cease holding new 

hearings. The District Court held a hearing on the motion at which Bridges asserted that 

he no longer was allowed to hear cases and that, in effect, he had been suspended or 

removed from his position. The SSA, however, subsequently notified the Court that on 

July 30, 2015, it had directed Bridges to resume a reduced hearing schedule, and he was 

scheduled to hold hearings in September and October 2015.

On September 30, 2015, the District Court issued an opinion and order, entered on 

October 1, 2015, from which Bridges now appeals and which was the final order in this 

case. The Court denied Bridges’ motions for reconsideration, leave to file another

amended complaint, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction. Finally, 

the Court in its order granted defendants’ second motion to dismiss Count II of the 

amended complaint as the Court held that Bridges did not have a property interest in his 

HOCALJ designation and therefore he had not suffered a deprivation of his due process 

rights when he lost that designation. Bridges v. Colvin, 136 F. Supp. 3d 620, 650 (E.D. 

Pa. 2015). The Court in granting the motion addressed a legal theory that defendants

advanced that differed from that which it considered when it entered its original order 

denying the motion to dismiss the count as defendants based their earlier motion “on the

ground that the claim is precluded by Title VII.” Bridges v. Astrue, Civ. No. 12-cv02316, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42493, at *58-59 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014). The 

September 30, 2015 order terminated the case as the Court already had dismissed the rest 

of the complaint. Bridges then appealed to this Court and we now consider this appeal.
6

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and we have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. To the extent that we are reviewing the orders dismissing the action, 

our review is plenary. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 

2009). To the extent that we are reviewing discretionary decisions of the District Court 

our review is on an abuse of discretion basis. See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 

706 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2013); Int’l Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agric.

Implement Workers of Am., 820 F.2d 91, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1987). 

In Bridges’ opening brief, he set forth the issues as follows:

A. Whether the September 30, 2015 Order should be reversed 

because it constitutes an error of law or a manifest abuse of judicial 

discretion in the following respects?:

(1) The Order Violates The Principles of ‘Law of the Case’ to the 

Extent the Order Has Permitted the Social Security Administration 

to Contest For a Second Time, Via a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, Count 

II of Appellant’s Complaint Alleging a Violation of Due Process 

When All Arguments Pertaining Thereto Were Considered and 

Rejected by Judge Gardner in Bridges v. Astrue, et al., (Order 

dated March 28, 2014); 2014 WL 1281158;

(2) The Order is Contrary to the Holding of the Supreme Court in 

Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. ____, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed. 2d 

433 (2012) In Concluding That the Civil Action was Not a ‘Mixed 

Case,’ Alleging, Both, Personnel Action Violations Serious 

Enough to Appeal to the Merits Systems Protection Board and Also 

Alleged That the Agency Actions Were Based on Racial 

Discrimination;

(3) The September 30, 2015 Order and the Order of March 28, 

2014, Should be Reversed to the Extent the District Courts Have 

Concluded That a 45-Day Rule to Timely Exhaust Administrative 

Remedies Prior to Filing Suit With the District Court Applies in 

This Case As These Conclusions are Contrary to the Applicable 
7

Regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2), Which Mandates a Period 

Beyond 45 Days Under Enumerated Circumstances That Exist in 

the Present Case;

(4) The March 28, 2014 and September 30, 2015 Orders Constitute 

Errors of Law and/or Abuse of Judicial Discretion By Holding That 

Federal Rules 15(a) and 15(d) Pertaining to Amended and 

Supplemental Pleadings, Operate to Deny Bridges’ Motions to 

Amend the Complaint to Address the Lawfulness of Adverse 

Employment Actions Taken Against Him at Such Time as he 

Became a ‘Rank and File’ Administrative Law Judge With 

Privileges and Immunities Contained in the APA;

(5) The September 30, 2015 Order Constitutes an Error of Law and 

an Abuse of Judicial Discretion Based Under the Holdings of Hart

v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) and Planned 

Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of the State of N.J., 297 

F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002) Concerning Reconsideration;

(6) The September 30, 2015 Order Constitutes an Error of Law in 

That it has Erroneously Interpreted the Extent of Due Process to 

Which Appellant was Entitled Based on the Holdings of Cleveland 

Bd. of Education v. Laudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 

L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985) and Progeny;

(7) Whether the Third Circuit Should Exercise De Novo Review 

and Plenary Review of Questions of Law to Decide Whether the 

Social Security Administration Has Engaged in Patent Violations 

of the Administrative Procedures Act and Adverse Employment 

Actions Against Bridges by the Following Actions?:

(7)(A) – The Lawfulness of the Social Security 

Administration’s Change in Position Description (Third 

Circuit Docket No. 14-1580);

(7)(B) – The Lawfulness of the Security Administration’s Use 

of a Process Called, ‘Focused Review’ (Third Circuit 15-

4555);

(7)(C) – The Lawfulness of a March 10, 2015 Employment 

Directive That Precluded Bridges From Presiding Over 

Disability Appeals, Indefinitely, (ECF #87).
8

Appellant’s br. at 3-5.

Defendants, now appellees, viewing the case more narrowly than Bridges, defined

the issues as follows:

1. Did the district court properly deny—as untimely, procedurally 

unauthorized, and substantively baseless—Bridges’ motion for 

reconsideration of the dismissal of all but one of his claims?

2. Did the district court properly dismiss Count II of the amended 

complaint (alleging due process violations), because Bridges possessed no 

constitutionally protected property interest?

3. Did the district court properly deny Bridges’ motion for leave to 

file a second amended complaint, because the amendment he sought (on 

wholly unrelated events) would have been futile?

4. Did the district court properly deny, as moot, Bridges’ third 

motion for injunctive and declaratory relief, because the requested relief 

had already occurred?

Appellees’ br. at 3.

We are fortunate on this appeal to have the benefit of two comprehensive District 

Court opinions addressing the issues in the case at great length, Colvin, 136 F. Supp. 3d 

620, the opinion accompanying the final order issued on September 30, 2015, and entered 

October 1, 2015, from which Bridges appeals, and Astrue, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42493,

an opinion dealing with orders entered on issues that the Court considered on motions 

previously advanced from which Bridges partially appeals. After our examination of 

these opinions and orders, the record in this case, and the parties’ briefs, we are in accord 

with the result ultimately reached in the District Court dismissing this case in its entirety. 

Accordingly, we do not repeat the Court’s painstaking analyses of the federal statutes and 

regulations on which Bridges relies and the Court addressed in reaching its result.
9

We, however, do address one issue because the District Court did not discuss it. 

Bridges correctly points out that the Court in its opinion issued on September 30, 2015,

entered on October 1, 2015, dismissed Count II of the amended complaint, even though 

that count had survived defendants’ original motion to dismiss. He argues that the Court 

therefore did not comply with the law of the case principle. See Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 

F.3d 97, 117 n.21 (3d Cir. 2010). The law of the case principle establishes that when a 

court decides an issue its decision will govern decisions on the same issue in later 

proceedings in the same case. But application of the rule is a discretionary, not absolute,

process and if, as happened here, a party advances a basis for a court to reach a different 

result than it did previously the court will not be bound by its earlier decision. See Africa 

v. City of Philadelphia (In re City of Philadelphia Litig.), 158 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 

1998). In this case defendants advanced a new basis for the Court to dismiss Count II. In 

this regard, as we explained above, the Court originally denied defendants’ motion to 

dismiss that count as it rejected defendants’ claim that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

barred granting Bridges relief on that count. See Astrue, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *58-

59. But when defendants renewed the motion they successfully based it on the ground 

that Bridges did not have a property interest in his designation as a HOCALJ. Colvin, 

136 F. Supp. 3d at 650. In granting defendants’ motion the Court held that he had not

been deprived of a property interest when he lost that designation and thus he had not 

suffered a due process deprivation by reason of that loss. Id. at 648-50. As we explain 

below that ruling was correct. 
10

In any event, the law of the case principle does not bind an appellate court from 

rejecting a result reached in a trial court. After all, if it had such an effect then a party

could not take a meaningful appeal to an appellate court from an order or judgment of an 

inferior court. Thus, even if the District Court should not have dismissed Count II in its 

final order because application of the law of the case principle precluded it from doing so,

we are free to affirm that order. 

We recognize that we could hold that the application of the law of the case 

doctrine bound the District Court to the original decision to deny the motion to dismiss 

Count II. If we did so we could remand this case to the District Court with instructions to 

reinstate that count. Then, at some later date, after the completion of the case on Count 

II, if the defendants lost the case they could appeal and raise a contention that the Court 

should have dismissed the count on the merits because Bridges did not have a property 

interest in his HOCALJ designation. See Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 804 F.3d 

136, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2015).

We, however, will not require the parties to engage in such up and down 

proceedings, no doubt at considerable expense, that would burden them for no good 

reason. We point out in this regard that defendants did not have a right to appeal from 

the denial of their motion to dismiss Count II in the March 28, 2014 order at the time that 

the District Court entered that order because the Court had not yet entered a final 

judgment. Then, after the Court entered the final judgment defendants had no reason to 

appeal from the earlier order denying their motion to dismiss Count II as the entry of the 

second order gave them the relief they sought with respect to this count. Accordingly, 
11

even though defendants have not appealed from the March 28, 2014 order denying their

motion to dismiss Count II, we will review the Court’s order dismissing Count II on the 

merits in considering Bridges’ appeal.

On the merits, we will affirm the order of October 1, 2015, dismissing Count II of 

the amended complaint. Bridges argues that the order upheld SSA action that denied him 

due process of law, citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 

105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985). Though it is clear that a public employee can have a property 

interest in his employment, Bridges did not have a property interest in his designation as 

a HOCALJ. After all, when he lost that designation he did not lose his position as an 

ALJ and he did not lose any salary or other benefits. Moreover, he did not have a 

reasonable expectation that he would have the HOCALJ designation on a long term basis 

as he had served as a HOCALJ at the will and pleasure of his employer. See Thomas v. 

Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, his tangible “loss” when 

he no longer was designated as the Harrisburg HOCALJ was the responsibility to 

undertake the managerial and administrative duties that accompanied that designation

without additional compensation. See Butler v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 331 F.3d 1368, 1373-

74 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Though we recognize that titles can have value and therefore the 

loss of a title can be a loss of a property interest, we will not reach a conclusion that 

Bridges’ designation as a HOCALJ was a property interest entitled to the protection of 

due process of law before he lost it. Therefore, even though he thought that he had been 

treated unfairly when he lost his HOCALJ designation, his protectable legal interests 
12

were unscathed by the loss. Accordingly, the District Court correctly dismissed Count II

of the amended complaint.

4

 

The order entered October 1, 2015, will be affirmed. To the extent that Bridges 

appeals from the March 28, 2014 order that order will be affirmed.

 4 Bridges has filed a motion asking us to take judicial notice of a district court case. 

Inasmuch as we do not need to address that case to decide this appeal, we deny the 

motion as moot.