IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0547

Filed December 2, 2016

Upon the Petition of 

KENT D. LANGHOLZ,

Appellant,

And Concerning,

HAROLD E. BRUMBAUGH,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Mary E. 

Chicchelly, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals the district court order prohibiting the 

redissemination of its ruling granting permanent injunctive relief and 

denying the expansion of the terms of a permanent injunction. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Jacob R. Koller of Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman PLC, Cedar 

Rapids, for appellant.

Laura A. Kamienski of Ackley, Kopecky & Kingery, L.L.P., Cedar 

Rapids, for appellee.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

A father filed for an injunction precluding communication and 

contact between his minor child and her former softball coach. After a 

trial, the district court granted a permanent injunction against the 

former coach that prevented him from contacting or communicating with 

the child, but allowed him to attend certain extracurricular activities and 

to be present in the home of the child’s mother. The district court also 

sealed all records and its ruling granting permanent injunctive relief. 

The father filed a motion requesting that the district court allow for the 

redissemination of the ruling granting permanent injunctive relief. The 

father also requested that the district court expand the terms of the 

permanent injunction. The district court denied the motion, but allowed 

redissemination of the terms of the permanent injunction. The father

appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we remand the case for a 

hearing consistent with the Iowa Open Records Act to determine whether 

the ruling on permanent injunctive relief should be sealed and its 

breadth. We also conclude the district court did not err in denying the 

motion to expand the terms of the permanent injunction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Because the ruling in this case has been sealed by the district 

court and we must determine whether this ruling was correct, we omit 

the underlying factual findings and concentrate on the procedural 

history.

Kent Langholz (Kent) is the father and Angela Hagedorn (f/k/a 

Angela Langholz) (Angela) is the mother of K.M.L. and S.E.L. Harold 

Brumbaugh (Harold) is the former softball coach of K.M.L. In October

2013, Kent filed an ex parte application for injunctive relief, which the 
3

district court granted on October 2. The terms of the temporary 

injunction were as follows:

[T]hat the Respondent, Harold E. Brumbaugh, is enjoined 

and restrained from communicating and/or otherwise 

contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter, including but 

not limited to, visiting any residence in which K.M.L. and 

S.E.L. reside and attending the sporting or other 

extracurricular events of either child.

As part of the temporary injunction, the district court also ordered “that 

the Petitioner’s Exhibits 1-9 are received under seal and shall not be 

available to the public.”

The district court held a hearing on January 8, 2014, to determine 

whether the ex parte temporary injunction would remain in effect during 

the proceedings. During the hearing, the parties agreed on the following 

terms for the temporary injunction:

[A] temporary injunction is entered against Respondent, 

Harold E. Brumbaugh, and he shall be enjoined and 

restrained from communication with and/or otherwise 

contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, 

including but not limited to, contact or communications 

through a third party, passing gifts, or attending the sporting 

or other extracurricular events of either child; provided, 

however, that the Respondent may attend the 

extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, which may 

also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and he may 

attend any game or event at any sports complex, provided 

that neither child is participating in the game or event which 

he is attending and he makes every effort to avoid visual 

contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times.

Notably, the stipulated temporary injunction did not prevent Harold from 

being present at the children’s residence so long as neither child was 

present. The parties also agreed that the clerk of court would seal all 

documents except for court orders, decrees, and judgments.

Harold was mostly compliant with the terms of the injunction. 

However, during one of K.M.L.’s softball tournaments in September 
4

2014, Harold was present to coach another team. During the game, 

Harold stood behind her dugout, walked by the dugout multiple times, 

and did not make any effort to stay out of K.M.L.’s sight. Kent reported 

that after the tournament, K.M.L. was not acting like herself and became 

withdrawn, moody, and quiet.

The trial on Kent’s petition seeking permanent injunctive relief was 

held on January 27 and 28, 2015. On February 4, the district court 

entered its ruling granting Kent’s request for a permanent injunction. 

The terms of the permanent injunction are as follows:

Defendant Harold Brumbaugh shall be enjoined and 

restrained from communicating with and/or otherwise 

contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, 

including but not limited to, all written and in person 

contact or communications, all contact or communications 

through a third party, passing notes or gifts, or attending the 

sporting or other extracurricular events of either child; 

provided, however, that Defendant Harold Brumbaugh may 

attend the extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, 

which may also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and 

he may attend any game or event at any sports complex, 

provided that neither child is participating in the game or 

event which he is attending and he make every effort to avoid 

visual contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times, and shall 

be no closer in proximity to them than 100 feet. This 

injunction shall remain in place until K.M.L. and S.E.L. each 

reach the age of majority.

The district court ruling also ordered that the “ruling shall be sealed and 

shall be accessible only by the parties and their counsel.” 

On February 13, Harold filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of

Civil Procedure 1.904(2). In his motion, Harold requested the district 

court prevent redissemination of the ruling granting injunctive relief. He 

also asked the district court to eliminate the portion of its ruling that 

provides he “shall be no closer in proximity to [K.M.L. and S.E.L.] than 

100 feet.” In response, Kent filed a motion pursuant to rule 1.904(2) 

asking the district court to expand its ruling to prevent Harold from 
5

being present at Angela’s home and to prevent him from attending any 

games that either K.M.L. or S.E.L. were participating in. Kent also 

resisted Harold’s request to prohibit redissemination of the district court 

ruling granting permanent injunctive relief.

On February 27, the district court issued its ruling on the 1.904(2) 

motions. The district court denied the request to modify any of the 

provisions of the permanent injunction, noting that the terms of the 

permanent injunction were “carefully drawn . . . to address the dangers 

and potential for injury found by the Court throughout the record as a 

whole.” The district court found that the terms of the permanent 

injunction already provided the necessary protection for the children,

and that Kent’s proposed terms would be overly burdensome and would 

exceed what was necessary to protect the children.

The district court did, however, order that the ruling granting 

permanent injunctive relief shall be sealed and “shall not be 

disseminated in any manner by the parties and their counsel. The 

parties and their counsel shall, however, be allowed to communicate only 

the fact that an injunction is in place.” Specifically, the parties are 

allowed to communicate that an injunction is in place that prevents 

Harold from having contact with the children, including the 100-foot 

distance rule at extracurricular activities. The district court noted in its 

ruling that the purpose for sealing the file was to protect the privacy and 

best interests of K.M.L. and S.E.L. The district court subsequently 

amended its February 4 ruling to read,

[T]his ruling shall be sealed and shall be accessible only by 

the parties and their counsel, and shall not be redisseminated in any manner by the parties and their 

counsel. The parties and their counsel, shall, however, be 

allowed to communicate only the fact that an injunction is in 

place which prohibits Defendant from having any contact 
6

with the minor children at issue herein, including the 100 

foot rule at games and tournaments, in order to effectuate 

enforcement of the terms of the injunction.

On March 10, Kent filed a second motion pursuant to rule 1.904(2) 

and asked the district court to amend its ruling to allow redissemination 

of the ruling for permanent injunctive relief, which Harold resisted. The 

district court issued a ruling on March 25 that denied Kent’s motion. 

The district court directed the clerk of court to execute a writ of 

injunction that stated,

Defendant Harold Brumbaugh shall be enjoined and 

restrained from communicating with and/or otherwise 

contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, 

including but not limited to, all written and in person 

contact or communications, all contact or communications 

through a third party, passing notes or gifts, or attending the 

sporting or other extracurricular events of either child; 

provided, however, that Defendant Harold Brumbaugh may 

attend the extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, 

which may also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and 

he may attend any game or event at any sports complex, 

provided that neither child is participating in the game or 

event which he is attending and he make every effort to avoid 

visual contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times, and shall 

be no closer in proximity to them than 100 feet. This 

injunction shall remain in place until K.M.L. and S.E.L. each 

reach the age of majority.

The writ was ordered not to be sealed and to be subject to 

redissemination by the parties as necessary to enforce the district court’s 

February 4 ruling granting permanent injunctive relief. The ruling itself

containing the terms of the permanent injunction was to remain sealed.

Kent filed an appeal on March 27, which we retained.

II. Standard of Review.

Generally, our review of an equitable proceeding is de novo. Bank 

of Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Iowa 2014). To the extent 

we are asked to engage in statutory interpretation, our review is for 

correction of errors at law. Id.; Iowa Film Prod. Servs. v. Iowa Dep’t of 
7

Econ. Dev., 818 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Iowa 2012). In equity cases, although 

the trial court’s factual findings are not binding, we give weight to the 

court’s assessment of witness credibility. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); see 

also Wellmark, Inc. v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Review, 875 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Iowa 

2016).

“An injunction may be obtained as an independent remedy [in] an 

action in equity, or as an auxiliary remedy in any action.” State ex rel. 

Dobbs v. Burche, 729 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Lewis Invs., 

Inc. v. City of Iowa City, 703 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 2005)). When the 

injunction is sought as an independent remedy, our review is de novo. 

Id. When it is obtained as an auxiliary remedy, our review is for 

correction of errors at law. Id. This case was filed and tried as an 

equitable action, and therefore our review is de novo. See id. 

III. Analysis.

A. Sealing the Ruling on Permanent Injunction. At the time 

the temporary injunction was ordered, the parties agreed that the clerk 

would “seal all documents except for court orders, decrees, and 

judgments.” When the district court issued the permanent injunction on 

February 4, 2015, it ordered the ruling to be sealed and only accessible 

by the parties and their counsel. 

On March 10, Kent filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1.904(2) asking the district court to amend its ruling to allow 

redissemination of the ruling on permanent injunction. Kent’s motion 

was denied. The district court, noting its inherent authority, stated that 

the reason for sealing the record was to protect the privacy and best 

interests of the Langholz children. The district court also clarified that, 

although the terms of the injunction are sealed, the parties are able to 

communicate the fact that an injunction is in place which prohibits 
8

Harold from having any contact with K.M.L. or S.E.L. The district court 

further noted that communicating the underlying reasons for the 

injunction was not necessary for its enforcement. 

Kent alleges that he agreed to seal the court file with the exception 

of any court orders, decrees, and judgments, but he did not agree to seal 

the ruling granting permanent injunctive relief itself. He argues that 

there is no statutory support for sealing the ruling granting the

injunction under the Iowa Open Records Act. Kent further argues that 

Harold did not properly request an order sealing the contents of the 

ruling on permanent injunction under the Iowa Open Records Act, but 

rather requested a limitation in a posttrial motion. Because Harold did 

not request an order under the Act, the district court did not hold a 

hearing or make the necessary findings to authorize sealing the district 

court’s ruling granting permanent injunctive relief. 

Harold responds that there are several provisions under the Iowa 

Open Records Act that protect information relating to minors and these 

provisions are consistent with the stated reason given by the district 

court for not allowing redissemination of the ruling granting the

permanent injunction. Harold also argues that the ruling references an 

interview between K.M.L. and an employee of the Child Protection Center 

(CPC), which constitutes child abuse information that is statutorily 

protected from redissemination under Iowa Code chapter 235A (2015).1

The general purpose of the Iowa Open Records Act is to “open the 

doors of government to public scrutiny [and] to prevent government from 

1In the alternative, we are asked to define the parameters of the inherent 

authority of the district court to seal records of court proceedings. However, it is not 

necessary to address the issue of inherent authority in order to resolve this case. The 

legislature has provided a mechanism to resolve disputes involving the sealing of public 

records in chapter 22. 

 
9

secreting its decision-making activities from the public, on whose behalf 

it is its duty to act.” Iowa Film Prods. Servs., 818 N.W.2d at 217

(alteration in original) (quoting City of Riverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d 

643, 652 (Iowa 2011)). The Act carries with it “a presumption of 

openness and disclosure.” Id. (quoting Gabrilson v. Flynn, 554 N.W.2d 

267, 271 (Iowa 1996)).

The Iowa Open Records Act generally requires every person to 

“have the right to examine and copy a public record and to publish or 

otherwise disseminate a public record or the information contained in a 

public record.” Iowa Code § 22.2(1). However, it also states “[t]he 

following records shall be kept confidential, unless ordered by a court, by 

the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized 

to release such information.” Id. § 22.7. The legislature has amended 

the list in section 22.7 several times since the original enactment, and 

there are currently over sixty types of records that are exempted from 

disclosure. ACLU of Iowa, Inc. v. Records Custodian, 818 N.W.2d 231, 

233 (Iowa 2012).

If a public record does not fall under one of the stated exemptions, 

the district court may still grant an injunction to restrain the 

examination of the record. Iowa Code § 22.8(1). This injunction is an 

equitable remedy that is independent of the section 22.7 listed 

exceptions. Burton v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics, 566 N.W.2d 182, 

189 (Iowa 1997). However, a district court may only issue this injunction 

if it finds that “the examination would clearly not be in the public 

interest” and that “the examination would substantially and irreparably 

injure any person or persons.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 22.8(1)). The 

petition requesting the injunction should support these findings, and the 

district court should hold a hearing to determine whether the burden has 
10

been met. See id.; see also Hall v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 

478, 487 (Iowa 2012) (establishing that the burden of demonstrating the 

elements is on the person resisting disclosure). The party opposing 

disclosure must establish the elements by clear and convincing evidence. 

Iowa Code § 22.8(3). In addition to the statutory exemptions contained 

in section 22.7, there are also separate laws requiring documents to be 

kept confidential. See Burton, 566 N.W.2d at 189 (holding that, in 

addition to 22.7 exemptions, effect should be given to any statute outside 

chapter 22 that requires otherwise public records to be kept 

confidential). Therefore, there may be other legal grounds for sealing all 

or part of a court order.

When determining whether the injunction should be issued, the 

district court “shall take into account the policy of this chapter that free 

and open examination of public records is generally in the public 

interest.” Iowa Code § 22.8(3). This is true even when allowing access to 

the records “may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public 

officials or others.” Id. In addition to the statutory limitations, we have 

also adopted a five-factor test that balances privacy with the benefits of 

public disclosure:

(1) the public purpose of the party requesting the 

information; (2) whether the purpose could be accomplished 

without the disclosure of personal information; (3) the scope 

of the request; (4) whether alternative sources for obtaining 

the information exist; and (5) the gravity of the invasion of 

personal privacy.

Clymer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 601 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Iowa 1999) (quoting 

DeLaMater v. Marion Civil Serv. Comm’n, 554 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Iowa 

1996)).

In Gabrilson, we addressed the question of whether the district 

court could grant injunctive relief under section 22.8 when it had not 
11

been specifically pled. 554 N.W.2d at 274. The plaintiff filed a two-count 

petition that included a count for injunctive relief pursuant to chapter 

22. Id. at 270. The district court then dismissed the count of the 

petition including the chapter 22 claim, therefore never determining 

whether injunctive relief was required. Id. Both parties later filed 

competing rule 179(b) motions to enlarge the district court findings.2 Id. 

The district court granted the motions and held that certain documents 

were confidential as statutorily excluded documents under Iowa Code 

section 22.7(19). Id. The district court issued an injunction pursuant to

section 22.8 as an independent avenue of relief, finding that the 

requirements of the section had been met as a matter of law. Id.

The defendant, Flynn, contended that his motion to enlarge was 

effectively a petition for injunctive relief pursuant to section 22.8, even 

though it was not so labeled. Id. at 274. His motion to enlarge requested 

that the district court hold “as a matter of law that Carolyn Gabrilson 

cannot publish, disseminate, and distribute the Eleventh Grade 

Assessment Test and the scoring rubrics, because [under section 22.7] 

these documents are confidential.” Id. He further argued that Gabrilson 

had both proper notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing on 

the motions to enlarge. Id.

While the district court sealed the documents under section 22.8, 

the documents also fell under one of the section 22.7 exceptions. Id. 

Because a section 22.7 exception applied, we declined to answer the 

question and instead held that the district court could issue the 

injunction under section 22.5, the section giving force to the exceptions 

found in section 22.7. Id. We held that depriving the district court of 

2This motion is now a rule 1.904 motion. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904.

 
12

injunctive remedies under the particular facts of Gabrilson would 

frustrate the purpose of the Iowa Open Records Act. Id. We found that

when a record is granted confidential status under section 22.7 an 

injunction is the proper remedy when someone seeks to disclose those 

records. Id. In that situation, it made no difference how the injunction 

was labelled because the documents are granted confidential status as a 

matter of law. Id.

In contrast to Gabrilson, no section 22.7 exception clearly applies 

in this case, and therefore the records carry “a presumption of openness 

and disclosure.” Iowa Film Prods. Servs., 818 N.W.2d at 217 (quoting 

Gabrilson, 554 N.W.2d at 271). We now hold that if no exclusions apply 

under section 22.7, and the sole injunctive relief sought is under 22.8, 

the district court must conduct a hearing and make factual findings as 

provided by the statute. By enacting the Iowa Open Records Act, the 

legislature enacted a statutory scheme intended to address when public 

records may be sealed. Here, this procedure was not followed by the 

district court.

Harold also specifically argues that the ruling contains information 

about a child abuse investigation and is therefore prevented from 

redissemination under chapter 235A. See Iowa Code §§ 235A.15, .17. 

Generally, the purpose of chapter 235A is to maintain the confidentiality 

of information in a central child abuse registry and to prevent the 

redissemination of information of founded child abuse reports. See, e.g., 

id. § 235A.12. Harold claims that the interview between K.M.L. and the 

CPC employee constitutes child abuse information under section 
13

235A.17.3 See id. § 235A.17. While section 235A.17 does prohibit the 

redissemination of child abuse information in certain circumstances, it 

narrowly defines “subject of a child abuse report” to mean a child named 

as a victim of founded abuse; that child’s parent, or legal guardian; or 

the individual named as having abused a child. Id. §§ 235A.15, .17. 

Further, “child abuse information” is defined by statute as “any or all 

data maintained by the department in a manual or automated data 

storage system,” in addition to report data, assessment data, and 

disposition data. Id. § 235A.13(2)(a)–(c). Again, this definition

encompasses founded reports of child abuse. “Report data” is restricted 

to cases where the department has determined the allegation of child 

abuse is founded. Id. § 235A.13(10). “Assessment data” includes 

information regarding services available to children who are victims of 

founded child abuse and their families. Id. § 235A.13(1). “Disposition 

data” refers to an opinion or decision “as to the occurrence of child 

abuse.” Id. § 235A.13(5).

In this case, the CPC employee determined that the allegation of 

child abuse was not founded. This could be considered disposition data 

under the applicable statute. See id. However, the district court did not 

conduct a hearing on this or make factual findings as to the statute’s 

applicability. Therefore, the appropriate remedy in this case is to remand 

to the district court so that it can conduct a hearing and make factual 

findings consistent with Iowa Code section 22.8 before it can seal a court 

document, order, or ruling that is not otherwise required to be kept 

3The interview was with a social worker of a CPC at the request of the 

Department of Human Services.

 
14

confidential under Iowa Code section 22.7, or another independent 

provision of Iowa law. 

B. Scope of Injunction. The scope of the permanent injunction 

issued by the district court restrains Harold from

communicating with and/or otherwise contacting K.M.L. and 

S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, including but not limited 

to, all written and in person contact or communications, all 

contact or communications through a third party, passing 

notes or gifts, or attending the sporting or other 

extracurricular events of other child; provided, however, that 

Defendant Harold Brumbaugh may attend the 

extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, which may 

also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and he may 

attend any game or event at any sports complex, provided 

that neither child is participating in the game or event which 

he is attending and he make every effort to avoid visual 

contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times, and shall be no 

closer in proximity to them than 100 feet. This injunction 

shall remain in place until K.M.L. and S.E.L. each reach the 

age of majority. 

The scope of the injunction as issued still allows Harold access to 

Angela’s residence so long as the children are not present. It also allows 

Harold to attend certain events the girls participate in if his stepgrandchildren are also participants. Even if Harold attends his stepgrandchildren’s extracurricular activities, he is still required to avoid eye 

contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. and remain at least 100 feet away during 

the events.

Kent requests that the scope of the permanent injunction be 

modified to prevent Harold from having access to Angela’s home, even 

when the children are not there. He is concerned that Harold will leave 

notes for K.M.L. at Angela’s home. He is also worried that once K.M.L. 

receives her driver’s license in January, she will be able to stop by 

Angela’s home while Harold is visiting. Kent also requests that the scope 

of the injunction be expanded to prevent Harold from attending any 
15

extracurricular activity of either child, regardless of whether his stepgrandchildren are participants. After the temporary injunction was 

entered, Harold attended a softball tournament and stood directly behind 

K.M.L.’s dugout or in K.M.L.’s line of sight. After being in Harold’s 

presence at the game, K.M.L. acted like she was “in a funk” or not herself 

for a few days. She was withdrawn and moody, and was affected by 

Harold’s presence at her game.

Harold argues that the scope of the permanent injunction should 

not be expanded because it would do nothing to further protect K.M.L. or 

S.E.L. He also argues there is no evidence that Angela would not protect 

K.M.L. in the absence of Kent’s suggested provisions. Harold claims that 

limiting his ability to attend the games of his step-grandchildren would 

harm his familial relationships. Harold asserts that expanding the scope 

of the injunction would only serve to punish him, rather than to protect 

K.M.L.

While we emphasize that a permanent injunction is a remedy that 

should be granted only with caution, an injunction is warranted when it 

is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff and when there 

is no other adequate remedy at law. In re Estate of Hurt, 681 N.W.2d 

591, 595 (Iowa 2004); Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Iowa 

2003).

A plaintiff who seeks a permanent injunction must establish 

“(1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial 

injury or damages will result unless the request for an injunction is 

granted; and (3) that there is no adequate legal remedy available.” City of 

Okoboji v. Parks, 830 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Sear v. 

Clayton Cty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 590 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa 

1999)). When determining whether an injunction is the proper remedy, 
16

the court must weigh the relative hardship to each party. Opat, 666 

N.W.2d at 604. A permanent injunction should be structured so it 

affords relief to the complainant but does not interfere with the legitimate 

and proper actions of the person against whom it is granted. 42 Am. 

Jur. 2d Injunctions § 11, at 606 (2010). A permanent injunction should 

only be ordered to prevent damage likely to occur in the future; it is not 

meant to punish for past damage. Id.

Generally, the scope of the violation determines the scope of the 

remedy provided in the permanent injunction. Dobbs, 729 N.W.2d at 

436. The scope “should be set forth with certainty and clearness so that 

persons bound by the decree may readily know what they must refrain 

from doing without speculation or conjecture.” Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 605 

(quoting 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Iowa 1994)). It 

should be “drawn narrowly enough to address the harm sought to be 

redressed.” Matlock v. Weets, 531 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Iowa 1995).4

On appeal, Kent argues that the permanent injunction should be 

expanded to prevent Harold from visiting Angela’s home and from 

attending any of the children’s games. The question we must answer is 

whether, absent the additional requested provisions, Kent’s right to 

manage and care for his children is invaded or threatened to be invaded. 

See, e.g., City of Okoboji, 830 N.W.2d at 309.

The harm that Kent seeks to avoid by expanding the terms of the 

injunction is already prevented by the current terms of the permanent

injunction. Kent expresses concern that the girls could stop by to visit 

Angela while Harold is already present. However, the terms of the 

4The district court found that Kent had met his burden of demonstrating a 

permanent injunction was appropriate, and neither party has appealed the underlying 

grounds for the injunction.

 
17

injunction imposed by the district court already prohibit Harold from “all 

. . . in person contact or communications.” Should this situation occur, 

the permanent injunction would already require Harold to leave Angela’s 

house.

Kent also believes that Harold will use his opportunity to visit 

Angela to leave notes for K.M.L. Again, the terms of the permanent

injunction already prevent Harold from “passing notes or gifts.” If Harold

does pass a note to K.M.L. while present at Angela’s house, the 

injunction already provides a remedy. Kent cannot use concern that 

Harold will violate a term of the permanent injunction in the future to 

justify its expansion. The scope of the injunction already “set[s] forth 

with certainty and clearness” that Harold is prohibited from 

communicating with the girls in person or through a third person, and 

from passing notes or gifts. Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 605 (quoting 205 Corp., 

517 N.W.2d at 552).

Kent also expresses concern that Harold has previously attended a 

softball game as the coach for another team and repeatedly walked by or 

stood behind K.M.L.’s dugout. Kent described K.M.L. as being “in a 

funk” and “not herself” for days after the game. Again, the terms of the 

permanent injunction already prevent this type of behavior. The 

injunction requires that Harold “make every effort to avoid visual contact 

with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times” and prevents him from being closer 

than 100 feet while the children are participating in extracurricular 

activities. The proper remedy for Kent in this situation would be to 

enforce the current terms of the permanent injunction rather than seek 

to expand it. Kent has failed to establish that not expanding the terms of 

the permanent injunction would cause the “invasion or threatened 
18

invasion of a right.” City of Okoboji, 830 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting Sear, 

590 N.W.2d at 515).

Kent also fails to establish that “substantial injury or damages will 

result unless the request for an injunction is granted.” Id. (quoting Sear, 

590 N.W.2d at 515). In order to demonstrate injury or damages, Kent 

must be able to show that “there is a real and immediate threat the 

injury will either continue or be repeated” unless the requested terms are 

included in the permanent injunction. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 2, at 

592. As stated above, all of the actions Kent seeks to prevent by 

expanding the terms of the permanent injunction are already addressed 

in the current terms of the injunction. If Harold does have contact with 

the girls at Angela’s house, leave notes, or remain in their line of sight at 

softball games, Kent already has a remedy: the enforcement of the 

current permanent injunction. 

Likewise, Kent is unable to demonstrate that “there is no adequate 

legal remedy available” if the terms of the injunction are not expanded. 

City of Okoboji, 830 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515). 

His proposed terms do not prevent any harm that is not already 

contemplated by and included in the current permanent injunction. The 

legal remedy for Kent’s concerns that Harold will communicate with the 

girls or loiter nearby during their softball games is to enforce the terms of 

the permanent injunction. 

We hold that Kent has not demonstrated that the terms of the 

permanent injunction should be expanded.

IV. Conclusion.

The district court did not conduct a hearing or otherwise make 

factual findings pursuant to Iowa Code section 22.8. While sealing the 

ruling granting the permanent injunction and issuing a separate writ of 
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injunction may be an appropriate remedy in this case, no hearing was 

conducted pursuant to the Iowa Open Records Act in support of the 

district court conclusion. We therefore remand the case for a hearing 

regarding redissemination of the district court’s ruling granting 

permanent injunctive relief consistent with the requirements of the Iowa 

Open Records Act. We also hold the terms of the permanent injunction 

should not be expanded. We affirm the decision of the district court with 

regard to the terms of the injunction and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.