alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**170 KA 13-00563** 
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, APPELLANT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID PERRY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

BROOKS T. BAKER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATH (JOHN C. TUNNEY OF COUNSEL), FOR APPELLANT.

JOHN M. SCANLON, BINGHAMTON, FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an order of the Steuben County Court (Joseph W. Latham, J.), entered November 28, 2012. The order granted that part of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, that part of the motion seeking to dismiss the indictment is denied, the indictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to Steuben County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.

Memorandum: On appeal from an order granting that part of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.10 (2) (b), the People contend that County Court erred in determining that the statute of limitations had expired. We agree. Defendant was charged by an indictment with grand larceny in the second degree based on the theory that he stole in excess of $50,000 in New York State retirement disability benefits to which he was not entitled. Defendant applied for those benefits in 2004 or 2005, and received payments from February 17, 2005 through February 28, 2012.

It is well settled that the People may aggregate “a series of single larcenies governed by a common fraudulent scheme or plan even though the successive takings extended over a long period of time” ( People v Rosich , 170 AD2d 703, 703, lv denied 77 NY2d 1000; see People v Cox , 286 NY 137, 142-143, rearg denied 286 NY 706; People v Tighe , 2 AD3d 1364, 1365, lv denied 2 NY3d 747). The offense of grand larceny as alleged in this case is therefore properly characterized as a continuing crime ( see People v First Meridian Planning Corp. , 86 NY2d 608, 615-616), and “the [s]tatute of [l]imitations of a continuous crime is governed by the termination and not the starting date of the offense” ( People v Eastern Ambulance Serv. , 106 AD2d 867, 868; see People v DeBeer , 35 AD3d 1275, 1276, lv denied 8 NY3d 921). The statute of limitations in this case did not begin to run until the**-2- 170 KA 13-00563** 

final taking in February 2012 ( see generally People v RandallWhitaker, 55 AD3d 931, 931, lv denied 12 NY3d 787), and the prosecution commenced shortly thereafter in March 2012 was thus timely pursuant to CPL 30.10 (2) (b).

Defendant contends that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the allegedly fraudulent filing, relying on People v O’Boyle (136 Misc 2d 1010, 1012-1013). That case, however, is inapposite inasmuch as the defendant in that case was charged with insurance fraud, whereas defendant in this case is charged with grand larceny.

Entered: February 14, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
July 30 , 2015

Mr. Edward Regan

806 W. Curtiss Street

Bozeman, MT 59715

Dear Mr. Regan :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains wh y we can not process your

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can No t Process Your Request

We entered your May 1 3 , exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA

- 20 15

- 16 4 3 ), but

we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does no t comply

with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further,

you must send us all of the following:

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do No t Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close th e docket without notifying you

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267

- 9677.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MARK GRUDZIELANEK,

Appellant,

v.

MARK DAMERAU,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-1718

[March 29, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Edward A. Garrison, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2016-CA008883-XXXX-MB.

Kevin F. Richardson and Christopher J. Ryan of Clyatt, Richardson & 

Ryan, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Stephanie L. Serafin and Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Kreusler -Walsh 

Vargas & Serafin, P.A., West Palm Beach; and Charles D. Thomas of 

Thompson & Thomas, PA, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CIKLIN, CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2814 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2814

      To provide for affordable access to insulin and epinephrine.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 23, 2021

  Mr. Kennedy introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To provide for affordable access to insulin and epinephrine.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Vital Medication Affordability 
Act''.

SEC. 2. ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE LIFE-SAVING DRUGS.

    Section 330(k)(3) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
254b(k)(3)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (M), by striking ``; and'' and 
        inserting a semicolon;
            (2) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (O); 
        and
            (3) by inserting after subparagraph (M) the following:
                    ``(N) in the case of a center that participates in 
                the drug discount program under section 340B, the 
                center has established, written practices to make 
                insulin and injectable epinephrine available at or 
                below the discounted price paid by the center or 
                subgrantee of the center under the drug discount 
                program under section 340B (plus a minimal 
                administration fee) to patients whose household income 
                in equal to or less than 350 percent of the Federal 
                poverty line and who--
                            ``(i) have a cost-sharing requirement under 
                        a health insurance plan for insulin or 
                        injectable epinephrine under which the patient 
                        out-of-pocket share is more than 20 percent of 
                        the total amount charged by the center for such 
                        insulin or epinephrine;
                            ``(ii) have a high unmet deductible under a 
                        health insurance plan; or
                            ``(iii) have no health insurance; and''.
                                 <all>
```
1

Filed 9/23/24 P. v. Nakooka CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHARLES NAKOOKA,

Defendant and Appellant.

C099612 

(Super. Ct. Nos. 

STKCRFE20040006884 & 

SF091043A )

Appointed counsel for defendant Charles Nakooka asks this court to review the 

record from his postjudgment order and determine whether there are any arguable issues 

on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We exercise our discretion to do so 

but find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. 

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2004, defendant pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder. 

He admitted to using a gun during these offenses and to committing the voluntary 
2

manslaughter for the benefit of a street gang. The trial court sentenced defendant to 28 

years 8 months in prison. 

In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 

formerly 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). (See People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 

984.) The trial court appointed counsel, received briefing, and issued an order to show 

cause. 

At the evidentiary hearing, over defendant’s objection, the trial court considered 

the preliminary hearing transcript as well as the parole transcript, both submitted by the 

prosecutor. The transcripts showed that during the early evening of February 7, 2004, 

witnesses saw a fight between some young men. One of those young men fired shots at 

the victim. Two of the witnesses identified defendant as the shooter. At his parole 

hearing, defendant acknowledged he shot the victim but said it was in self-defense. 

The trial court concluded the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant was the actual killer. The court thus found defendant was not eligible for relief 

and denied the petition. 

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening 

brief that sets forth the facts and procedural history of the case and requests this court to 

review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.

(People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right 

to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the date the opening brief was filed and 

has not filed a supplemental brief.

Having undertaken an examination of the entire record pursuant to Wende, we find 

no errors that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
3

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 

1172.6 is affirmed.

 /s/

MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 /s/

MAURO, Acting P. J.

 /s/

KRAUSE, J.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           5,785
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,959
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,112
<INVENTORY>                                      2,471
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                13,501
<PP&E>                                         220,450
<DEPRECIATION>                                  60,469
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 234,293
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,370
<BONDS>                                        127,067
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      84,031
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   234,293
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               150,651
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   79,927
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                10,361
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,320
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,935
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 18,469
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             18,463
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    18,463
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
FAMOUS DAVE'S OF AMERICA, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED JANUARY 2, 2000 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-KSB.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-04-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-02-2000
<CASH>                                           1,712
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,108
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,069
<PP&E>                                          45,143
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,401
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  43,326
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,239
<BONDS>                                          5,077
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        43,356
<OTHER-SE>                                    (16,346)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    43,326
<SALES>                                         47,575
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                47,575
<CGS>                                           16,081
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   53,852
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 446
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (6,610)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,610)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,610)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.75)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.75)


</TABLE>
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 582

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

EN BANC

No. CR-12-950

THOMAS RAINEY

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: NOVEMBER 30, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE DALLAS 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 20CR-10-26] 

HONORABLE DAVID CLINGER, 

JUDGE

MOTION STRICKEN 

PER CURIAM

Ms. Teresa Bloodman, appellant’s former attorney, tendered a motion requesting this 

court to reconsider our recent opinion in this case. See Rainey v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 505. 

Although Ms. Bloodman alleges that our opinion removed her from this case because of 

briefing deficiencies, we removed her because she had recently been placed on interim 

suspension pending disbarment proceedings and was, therefore, currently prohibited from 

practicing law. Id. Thus, we appointed Mr. Jonathan Streit to represent appellant in this 

case, to correct the briefing deficiencies noted, and to submit a substituted brief in this 

appeal. Id. 

A person who is not a licensed attorney may not practice law in Arkansas Abel v. 

Kowalski, 323 Ark. 201, 913 S.W.2d 788 (1996). In Davenport v. Lee, 348 Ark. 148, 72 

S.W.3d 85 (2002), our supreme court held that where a party not licensed to practice law 

in this state attempts to represent the interest of others by submitting himself or herself to 
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 582

2 

the jurisdiction of the court, those actions, such as filing pleadings, are rendered a nullity. 

Thus, because Ms. Bloodman is currently unauthorized to practice law, has been removed 

from this case, and is, therefore, prohibited from representing appellant, we must strike this 

motion as a nullity. See Abel, supra. 

Motion stricken. 

 VIRDEN, J., not participating.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DELAWARE

RICHARD A. AVERSA, :

 :

Appellant. : I.D. No. 1601003130

 : In and for Kent County

v. :

 :

STATE OF DELAWARE, :

 :

Appellee. :

ORDER

Submitted: November 10, 2016

Decided: December 1, 2016

On this 1

st

day of December, 2016, after considering the record below and the

briefs of the parties, it appears that:

1. On May 3, 2015, a Kent County Court of Common Pleas jury convicted

Appellant Richard A. Aversa (hereinafter “Mr. Aversa”) of failure to stop at a stop

sign, in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4164(a). After a jury convicted him, the Court of

Common Pleas fined Mr. Aversa $25.

2. Mr. Aversa appeals the conviction to this Court alleging, inter alia, newly

discovered evidence, violations of his right to counsel, and erroneous evidentiary

decisions of the trial court. The written Court of Common Pleas decision appealed by

Mr. Aversa examined his present claims and included the trial court’s consideration of

a motion pursuant to Court ofCommon Pleas CriminalRule 61. The Court ofCommon

Pleas denied all claims of Mr. Aversa seeking to overturn his conviction.

3. The State, in its Answering Brief, alleges lack of Superior Court jurisdiction

to hear Mr. Aversa’s appeal. Pursuant to Article IV, Section 28, of the Delaware

Constitution of 1897, an appeal to the Superior Court is authorized “in all cases in
which the sentence shall be imprisonment exceeding one (1) month, or a fine exceeding

One Hundred Dollars ($100).” Furthermore, pursuant to this Constitutional provision,

although additional jurisdiction may be conferred by the General Assembly by statute,

the operative statutory provision references only the constitutional appeal jurisdiction

conferred by Section 28 of Article IV.1 Here, Mr. Aversa was not sentenced to

imprisonment and the fine imposed was less than the appeals threshold of one hundred

dollars. Accordingly, the Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Mr.

Aversa’s appeal regarding this traffic violation.

WHEREFORE, Appellant Richard Aversa’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction.

/s/Jeffrey J Clark 

 Judge

1

See 11 Del. C. § 5301(c)( providing for an appeal of any Court of Common Pleas “order,

rule, decision, judgment or sentence . . . to the Superior Court . . . as provided in Section 28,

Article IV of the Constitution of the State”).

2
Document

Exhibit 10.2
Executed Version

Certain identified information marked with “[***]” has been omitted from this document because it is both (i) not material and (ii) the type that the registrant treats as private or confidential.
AMENDMENT No. 10 TO PURCHASE AGREEMENT COM0270-15
This Amendment No. 10 COM0312-20 (the "Amendment No. 10"), dated as of September 18, 2020 (“Amendment No. 10”) is between Embraer S.A. ("Embraer") and Aircastle Holding Corporation Limited (“Buyer”) collectively referred to herein as the “Parties”, and constitutes an amendment and modification to Purchase Agreement COM0270-15 dated June 12th, 2015 as amended from time to time (the "Purchase Agreement").
All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meaning when used herein as provided in the Purchase Agreement and in case of any conflict between this Amendment No. 10 and the Purchase Agreement, this Amendment No. 10 shall control.
WHEREAS, [***].
WHEREAS, [***].
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration which is hereby acknowledged, Embraer and Buyer hereby agree as follows:
1. [***].
2. [***].
3. [***].
4. REINSTATEMENT OF PURCHASE AGREEMENT
All other provisions and conditions of the referenced Purchase Agreement, as well as its related Attachments, which are not specifically modified by this Amendment No. 10 shall remain in full force and effect without any change.
5. COUNTERPARTS
This Amendment No. 10 may be signed by the parties hereto in any number of separate counterparts with the same effect as if the signatures thereto and hereto were upon the same instrument and all of which when taken together shall constitute one and the same instrument.
This Amendment No. 10 may be signed by facsimile with originals duly signed to follow by an internationally recognized courier.
[INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK – SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]









Exhibit 10.2
Executed Version











IN WITNESS WHEREOF,  EMBRAER and BUYER, by their duly authorized officers, have entered into and executed this Amendment No. 10 to be effective as of the date first written above.


									
	EMBRAER S.A.	AIRCASTLE HOLDING    CORPORATION LIMITED

	



By          /s/ Fabiana Klajner Leschziner
Name:   Fabiana Klajner Leschziner
Title:      EVP and General Counsel


	



By          /s/ Stephen Quinn
Name:  Stephen Quinn
Title:     Director

	



By           /s/ Simon Henry Newitt
Name:   Simon Henry Newitt
Title:      VP Contract




	
	Place:   São José dos Campos, SP
             Brazil	Place:   Stamford,CT
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-590

In Re: DEREK DION CURTIS, I,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Submitted: March 18, 1997 Decided: March 31, 1997

Before MURNAGHAN and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Derek Dion Curtis, I, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Derek Dion Curtis, a federal prisoner, petitions this court

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).

Curtis alleges that he was never indicted by a grand jury and never

waived indictment and that court officials, the Assistant United

States Attorney, and the federal public defender conspired to use

a bogus indictment to prosecute him.

A court will not entertain a § 2241 petition unless a motion

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.

1214, is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [an

inmate's] detention." See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381

(1977). The petitioner bears the burden of showing the inadequacy

or ineffectiveness of a § 2255 motion. McGhee v. Hanberry, 604 F.2d

9, 10 (5th Cir. 1979).

As in his previous § 2241 petition in which he raised identical claims, Curtis has failed to present any facts showing that

§ 2255 is an inadequate remedy. See In re Curtis, No. 95-8059, 1995

WL 538976 (4th Cir. Sept. 12, 1995) (unpublished), cert. denied,

___ U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-7104).

Curtis' conclusory allegations that the district court and the

prosecutor used a bogus indictment do not establish that the remedy

under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. See McGhee, 604 F.2d at

11.

Accordingly, we deny this petition. Curtis' motions for immediate adjudication and for bail pending a decision are now moot and
3

are denied for that reason. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

PETITION DENIED