NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0624n.06

No. 15-2381

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CRAIG EDWARD HUNNICUTT, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Craig Hunnicutt moved the district court to reduce his sentence pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after the United States Sentencing Commission reduced base offense 

levels for most drug-trafficking crimes. Given his violent past and non-exemplary behavior 

while incarcerated, the district court declined. Hunnicutt appeals, contending the district court 

erred by failing to consider his post-incarceration rehabilitation efforts. As the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Hunnicutt’s motion for a reduced sentence, we affirm. 

I.

In 2006, Hunnicutt pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
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crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The district court sentenced him to a total of 204 

months of imprisonment. Defendant did not appeal that judgment. 

Defendant has unsuccessfully moved three times for a reduced sentence pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). First, on December 13, 2010, the district court declined to reduce 

Hunnicutt’s sentence on account of the United States Sentencing Commission’s retroactive 

reduction in the base offense level Guideline for crack cocaine offenses by way of Amendments 

706 and 711. Even though it found defendant eligible for a reduced sentence, it exercised its 

discretion and denied his request, in pertinent part, as follows: 

The government’s brief . . . presents a compelling portrait of a Defendant who has 

repeatedly squandered multiple opportunities for earlier custodial release by 

quickly reverting to violent misconduct. Even while in federal custody on this 

sentence, Defendant has found himself on the wrong side of disciplinary sanctions 

for, among other things, carrying an 8-inch metal shank as a weapon. 

Defendant’s attempt to explain away the shank as needed protection is 

unconvincing. Defendant’s prison misconduct also includes possession of 

intoxicants and lying to staff. These incidents are all as recent as 2009. 

(Citation omitted.) Hunnicutt appealed this decision, but we dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. 

No. 10-2694, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. May 19, 2011). 

On January 15, 2013, the district court denied Hunnicutt’s request for a reduced sentence 

based on Amendment 750. It again found defendant to be eligible, but declined to exercise its 

discretion on similar grounds: “Mr. Hunnicutt’s behavior even while incarcerated shows that he 

is a threat to society.” We affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion because the district court 

“considered the motion, the policy statement set forth in USSG § 1B1.10, and the sentencing 

factors set forth in § 3553(a).” No. 13-1107, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. June 11, 2013). 
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That brings us to the present appeal—the district court’s November 5, 2015, denial of a

motion based on Amendment 782. Once again, the district court found defendant to be eligible 

for a sentence reduction, but declined to so reduce: 

Defendant was convicted before this Court of drug dealing and possessing a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant’s Presentence 

Investigation Report shows a fearsome fellow who has, starting when he was 

12 years old and throughout his life, done what he pleases, threatens others with 

serious injury and death and perpetrates violence. Furthermore, as shown on the 

Sentence Modification Report, Defendant has not shown an ability to conform to 

the rules of the Bureau of Prisons, and he is considered a “high security

inmate.” . . . After considering Defendant’s request, his criminal conduct, his 

continuing breaking of the rules, his danger to the community, the nature of his 

original offenses, and the facts and circumstances set forth in his original 

Presentence Investigation Report, this Court has decided that it will not reduce 

Defendant’s sentence. 

(Citation omitted.) Hunnicutt contends this was an abuse of discretion by failing to address his 

“arguments about the progress he has made in prison,” such as his “educational pursuits, his 

addiction recovery pursuits, or his anger-management pursuits.” 

II.

“A district court may modify a defendant’s sentence only as authorized by statute.” 

United States v. Howard, 644 F.3d 455, 457 (6th Cir. 2011). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a 

district court must first determine whether the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction and 

then “must consider the § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the authorized 

reduction is warranted under the circumstances.” Id. at 458 (citing United States v. Watkins, 

625 F.3d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 2010)). We review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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III.

Section 3582 “does not create a right to a reduced sentence.” United States v. Curry, 

606 F.3d 323, 330 (6th Cir. 2010). Nor does it “constitute a full resentencing of the defendant.” 

Id. (citation omitted). Rather, it requires that a district court consider “both the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors and ‘the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community 

that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment,’” and permits the 

district court to “consider post-sentencing conduct of the defendant.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B)). “[D]istrict courts must provide some explanation for decisions under 

§ 3582(c)(2).” Howard, 644 F.3d at 460. 

Our decisions in Curry and Howard illustrate this “some explanation” principle. In 

Curry, the order denying sentence modification was “cursory at best,” but was satisfactory:

[T]he record had been amply developed before the resentencing motion at issue 

here was filed. [The district court] had already considered the relevant factors in 

some depth at the original sentencing and the first resentencing under Booker. . . . 

[The district court judge] indicated he had reviewed the entire record, including 

the parties’ recommendations, and had considered all the relevant § 3553(a) 

factors and the Sentencing Guidelines in making his decision. Under the 

circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that he abused his discretion in denying 

the defendant's motion for further modification of his sentence. 

606 F.3d at 331. In Howard, however, the district court fell short of this “minimal 

requirement”—it did not explain its decision and just checked two boxes on an order without 

detailing “which of the § 3553(a) factors were applicable.” 644 F.3d at 461. 

Here, the district court’s decision falls comfortably within Curry’s realm of satisfactory 

explanation. We said as much during Hunnicutt’s last appeal: 

The order denying Hunnicutt’s § 3582(c)(2) motion shows that the district court 

considered the motion, the policy statement set forth in USSG § 1B1.10, and the 

sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a). The parties’ responses to the Sentence 

Modification Report were also before the court, and they further discussed the 
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pertinent § 3553(a) factors, including the history and characteristics of the 

defendant and the need to protect the public from his conduct in the future. 

Moreover, the district court judge was aware of the record and Hunnicutt’s 

particular characteristics because he was the judge who sentenced Hunnicutt in 

2007. See Curry, 606 F.3d at 331. Under these circumstances, Hunnicutt cannot 

plausibly argue that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for 

reduced sentence. See Watkins, 625 F.3d at 281; Curry, 606 F.3d at 331. 

No. 13-1107, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. June 11, 2013). The only thing that has arguably changed is 

defendant requested that the court reduce his sentence on account of his efforts to better himself 

while incarcerated. But as we have repeatedly said, a district court need not consider postsentencing conduct when evaluating a § 3582(c)(2) motion. Curry, 606 F.3d at 330. Nor do we 

“require the district court to articulate its analysis of each sentencing factor as long as the record 

demonstrates that the court considered the relevant factors.” Watkins, 625 F.3d at 281. And we 

have found no abuse of discretion in similar cases involving defendants who raise significant 

safety concerns in light of pre- or post-sentencing conduct. See, e.g., United States v. 

Greenwood, 521 F. App’x 544, 548–49 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Daniel, 414 F. App’x 

806, 809 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jones, 407 F. App’x 22, 26 (6th Cir. 2011).1 The 

district court did not abuse its discretion here. 

IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court.

 

1We also decline to consider defendant’s new arguments in reply regarding some of the 

facts relied upon by the district court that were contained in defendant’s presentence report—and 

as defendant admits, facts to which his counsel did not object—because “[a]n argument raised 

for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered by this Court.” Overstreet v. LexingtonFayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002).