J-S65022-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TEREL D. DIXON, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

STEVEN VALSAMIDIS,

Appellee No. 156 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 17, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County

Civil Division at No(s): 10449-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, OLSON AND PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016

Appellant, Terel D. Dixon, appeals pro se from the order entered on 

December 17, 2015, granting a petition for judgment on the pleadings filed 

by Steven Valsamidis (Valsamidis) and dismissing Appellant’s pro se claims 

for breach of contract and fiduciary duty. Appellant also challenges the trial 

court’s grant of Valsamidis’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1, 

thereby barring Appellant from pursuing additional, frivolous pro se litigation 

raising the same or related claims. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. In 2011, Valsamidis, an attorney, represented Appellant on murder 

charges in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. On August 5, 2011, Appellant pled 

guilty to third-degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to 12 to 30 

years of incarceration. Appellant did not appeal. On January 6, 2012, the 
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trial court granted Valsamidis’ request to withdraw as counsel. On June 27, 

2012, Appellant filed a timely pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA court appointed 

counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. On November 16, 2012, 

following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied relief. Appellant 

appealed the PCRA court’s determination and we affirmed. See 

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 83 A.3d 1069 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished 

memorandum). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal on 

November 21, 2013, which our Supreme Court denied on May 6, 2014. 

See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014). Appellant filed a 

second pro se PCRA petition that the trial court denied as untimely on 

September 16, 2014. We affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 2015 

WL 7194807 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum).

Currently on appeal is Appellant’s pro se professional liability complaint 

against Valsamidis filed on March 24, 2014. Appellant subsequently 

amended the complaint three times thereafter, filing his fourth complaint, on 

March 20, 2015, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. 

Valsamidis filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to 

dismiss. Appellant filed preliminary objections to both motions. The trial 

court scheduled a hearing. Appellant failed to make a written request to 

participate via video conference from prison despite the trial court’s advance 

notice to do so. Accordingly, Appellant was not present when the trial court 

held argument on December 8, 2015. By order and accompanying opinion 
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entered on December 17, 2015, the trial court granted both motions filed by 

Valsamidis. This timely appeal resulted.1 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

motion to inspect the record?

II. Whether the lower court erred in failing to issue a 

judicial opinion and/or an order to Appellant’s motion 

for reconsideration?

III. Whether the lower court erred in holding an ex parte

hearing?

IV. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the 

complaint pursuant to the collateral estoppel doctrine 

in that the defendant/Appellee failed to establish that 

the “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue” 

prong of the collateral estoppel doctrine applied to 

[Appellant’s] claims and whether the trial court erred 

in granting [] Appellees’ motion for judgment on the 

____________________________________________

1

 It appears that Appellant may have filed a motion for reconsideration; 

however, the docket does not reflect that Appellant filed one. The docket 

does show that Valsamidis filed a response to Appellant’s motion for 

reconsideration on January 21, 2016. The trial court did not rule on the 

motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2016, Appellant filed a notice of 

appeal simultaneously with a motion to inspect the record and a request for 

transcripts. On January 27, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying 

relief on Appellant’s request to inspect the record, citing its December 17, 

2015 opinion that barred Appellant from pursuing additional claims against 

Valsamidis arising out of the same or related claims. In two additional 

orders dated the same day, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

and directed the court administrator to order transcription. After the trial 

court expressly granted an extension to file the Rule 1925(b) statement, 

Appellant complied on March 3, 2016. The trial court issued an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on March 11, 2016, adopting the rationale 

from the opinion issued on December 17, 2015. 
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pleadings as [] Appellee’s failure created sufficient 

doubt as to the applicability of the collateral estoppel 

doctrine as it pertains to [] Appellant’s claims?

V. Whether the lower court failed to adjudicate [] 

Appellee’s amended answer and new matter pleading 

and Appellant’s pleadings filed in response thereto 

and whether the lower court’s failure resulted in the 

relevant pleadings not being closed, making the 

adjudication of [] Appellee’s motion for judgment on 

the pleadings premature?

VI. Whether the trial court erred in granting [] Appellee’s 

motion for judgment on the pleadings in that the filing 

of the motion was an unreasonable delay of trial and 

whether the trial court erred in granting [] Appellee’s 

motion to dismiss (pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1) well 

after the commencement of the action resulting in 

both motion[s] being filed in an untimely manner?

VII. Whether the trial court erred in granting [] Appellee’s 

motion for judgment on the pleadings in that there 

were disputed issues of material fact, the court did 

not limit its review to the relevant pleadings and 

documents, [] Appellee’s motion violated the 

requirements of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(i), the collateral 

estoppel doctrine cannot be raised in a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings and the issues contained in 

the complaint were not actually litigated and could not 

have been raised on collateral review as is required to 

support a collateral estoppel defense?

VIII. Whether the trial court erred in granting [] Appellee’s 

motion to dismiss (pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1) in 

that the grounds for the motion were waived for 

failure to include said grounds in the amended answer 

and new matter pleading, the issues sought to be 

dismissed under the rule were not fully heard and 

resolved, the civil complaint proceeded as one matter 

as opposed to “serial complaints” and Appellant 

substantiated the factual basis of the claims contained 

in the complaint in prior court proceedings?
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IX. Whether the trial court erred in failing to adjudicate 

Appellant’s petition to transfer the venue pleading 

prior to adjudicating Appellee’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings/motion to dismiss resulting in 

Appellee’s pleadings being premature or otherwise not 

heard by a fair and impartial tribunal?

X. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the oral 

agreements entered between [] Appellant and [] 

Appellee were parol evidence rather than being 

independent from the written contract and whether 

the trial court erred in failing to consider parol 

evidence in support of the breach of contract claims?

XI. Whether the lower court erred in treating Appellant’s 

breach of fiduciary duty claims as legal malpractice 

claims in that the burden of proof between the two 

causes of action are distinct and different, [] Appellee 

was no longer employed and there was no basis for 

Appellee’s duty, the claims contained therein do not 

aver any failure to “exercise ordinary skill and 

knowledge” and the collateral estoppel doctrine 

cannot attach to a breach of fiduciary duty cause of 

action?

XII. Whether the trial court erred in not sustaining 

Appellant’s preliminary objections filed to the 

defendant/Appellee’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings?

XIII. Whether the trial court’s memorandum opinion and 

order dismissing the complaint was based on 

irrelevant and impertinent evidence offered by [] 

Appellee?

XIV. Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the 

complaint pursuant to the collateral estoppel doctrine 

in favor of Appellee’s contentions rather than ruling 

that the collateral estoppel doctrine worked to [] 

Appellant’s favor in that the PCRA court specifically 

found the similar contentions raised therein were 

raised in the complaint to be true?
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XV. Whether Judge McBride should have recused himself 

from the lower court proceedings?

XVI. Whether the lower court erred in not addressing the 

application for subpoena submitted by [] Appellant 

prior to holding the ex parte hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7 (complete capitalization omitted).

We adhere to the following standards:

Judgment on the pleadings is permitted under Pennsylvania 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1034, which provides that “after the 

pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to 

unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for judgment 

on the pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). A motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. It may 

be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Appellate review of an order granting judgment on the 

pleadings is plenary and we apply the same standard 

employed by the trial court. Our review is confined to the 

pleadings and relevant documents. We must accept as true 

all well pleaded statements of fact, admissions, and any 

documents properly attached to the pleadings presented by 

the party against whom the motion is filed, considering only 

those facts that were specifically admitted. Southwestern 

Energy Prod. Co. v. Forest Res., LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 185 

(Pa. Super. 2013). We will affirm the grant of such a motion 

only when the moving party's right to succeed is certain and 

the case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly be 

a fruitless exercise.

McLafferty v. Council for the Association of Owners of Condominium 

No. One, Inc., 2016 WL 4743511, at *3 (Pa. Super. September 12, 2016).

We reviewed the certified record, the parties’ briefs, the relevant law, 

and the trial court’s opinion entered on December 17, 2015. We conclude 

that the opinion meticulously, thoroughly, and accurately disposes of all of 

Appellant’s challenges on appeal. The trial court determined that Appellant’s 
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breach of contract claim, premised on Valsamidis’ purported oral promise 

that Appellant would receive a specific sentence, failed because the fee 

agreement, the only written contract between the parties, provided: 

“Attorney offers no guarantee or promise to [Appellant] as to any 

outcome[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/2015, at 5 (unpaginated). Appellant 

also claimed Valsamidis breached the parties’ contract by coercing Appellant 

into pleading guilty. The trial court determined that the contractual 

language Appellant relied upon, “Attorney will perform the tasks reasonable, 

necessary and ordinary to prepare [...] and will render Attorney’s best 

professional skills in representing [Appellant’s] interests” was “a recitation of 

the standard of care all attorneys owe their clients” and not a breach of a 

specific contract term as required in asserting a breach of contract claim 

sounding in legal malpractice. Finally, the trial court determined that the 

second count of Appellant’s complaint, while averred as a breach of fiduciary 

claim, actually alleged legal malpractice. The trial court recognized that the 

PCRA court concluded Valsamidis was effective in his representation of 

Appellant and, thus, collateral estoppel barred Appellant from re-litigating 

the identical claims presented to the PCRA court in a subsequent legal 

malpractice action against Valsamidis. Id. at 6-8 (unpaginated). We agree. 

There are no disputed issues of fact and Valsamidis’ right to prevail is clear 

and certain. 

Moreover, our review of the order granting Valsamidis’ motion to 

dismiss Appellant’s breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims pursuant to 
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Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Coulter v. 

Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014). “[T]he court abuses its 

discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or 

exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason [or] if it does not follow 

legal procedure.” Id. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1 governs a 

defendant’s motion to dismiss frivolous claims brought by a pro se plaintiff 

and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Rule 233.1. Frivolous Litigation. Pro Se Plaintiff. 

Motion to Dismiss

(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se 

plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file 

a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that

(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related 

claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior 

action against the same or related defendants, and

(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant 

to a written settlement agreement or a court 

proceeding.

* * *

(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the 

court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional 

pro se litigation against the same or related defendants 

raising the same or related claims without leave of court.

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a)&(c). 

Here, the trial court determined Appellant “filed four [amended] 

complaints against Valsamidis, all essentially alleging ineffective assistance 

of counsel [and Appellant’s] claim has not changed from his first PCRA filing 
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to []his [f]ourth [c]omplaint.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/2015, at 8 

(unpaginated). Accordingly, the trial court determined Appellant’s 

“continued complaints amount to frivolous litigation.” Id. at 9 

(unpaginated). Upon review, we agree. Therefore, we affirm on the basis 

of the trial court’s opinion and adopt it as our own. Because we have 

adopted the trial court’s opinion, we direct the parties to include the trial 

court’s opinion in all future filings relating to our examination of the merits 

of this appeal, as expressed herein. Moreover, we reject Appellant’s 

argument that the trial court failed to address his motion for reconsideration, 

motion to inspect the record, and ex parte hearing claim, having already 

determined the trial court properly barred Appellant from pursuing additional 

pro se litigation against Valsamidis raising the same or related claims and 

because Appellant did not request leave of court. See Pa.R.C.P. 233.1. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2016

 
@Y 

·...___. __ 

the guilty plea proceedings, the Defendant asked the Plaintiff specifically if he knew what rights 

Beaver County. On this date, the Plaintiff entered into a guilty plea to Third Degree Murder. At 

licensed attorney, represented the Plaintiff on August 5, 2011 in the Court of Common Pleas of 

The relevant procedural history of this case is summarized as follows, The Defendant, a 

Procedural and Factual Background 

heard and resolved. Plaintiff is barred from pursuing additional claims against Defendant. 

Dismiss is also granted pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. § 233.1 because this issue has already been fully 

breach of fiduciary duty claim shall be GRANTED. Furthermore, Defendant's Motion to 

Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Plaintiffs breach of contract claim and 

provided at the Argument, as well as the Briefs filed by each party, this Court finds that 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure § 233.1. After considering all of the evidence 

Valsadmidis', Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the alternative, Motion to Dismiss 

Oral argument was held in this case on December 8, 2015 following Defendant's, Steven 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

STEVEN V ALSAlvIIDIS, 

Defendant 

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Circulated 11/10/2016 03:27 PM 
November 16, 2012, and the Court denied the Petition, finding there was no basis for the 

ineffectiveness of counsel claims. The Plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which also 

denied relief on August 20, 2013. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 83 A.3d 1069 (Pa.Super.2013) 

(unpublished memorandum). The Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal on 

November 21, 2013 with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 91 A.3d 

161 (Pa.2014). That Petition was likewise denied on May 6, 2014. Id. Next, Plaintiff filed a 

second prose PCRA appeal, which was denied by the Court of Common Pleas on September 16, 

Act ("PCRA") Petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. A Hearing was held on 

he was giving up by entering into a guilty plea and if he was satisfied by the Defendant's 

representation of him. The Plaintiff answered in the affirmative to both questions. The Court 

accepted the plea, finding that it was entered into intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily. The 

Plaintiff was sentenced on August 12, 2011 to twelve years of incarceration. At the sentencing 

hearing, the Plaintiff was advised that his case required a minimum of seven and a half years of 

incarceration, with a possible maximum sentence of twenty to forty years. The Defendant 

represented the Plaintiff at this hearing as well, and argued for a mitigated sentence for his 

client. After considering the severity of the crime (the victim was shot ten times), the Plaintiffs 

prior criminal history, reports prepared by psychiatrists and the Plaintiffs self-defense claim, the 

Court found that a sentence of twelve to thirty years of incarceration was appropriate. 

Approximately one month later, the Defendant received a letter from the Plaintiff expressing his 

gratitude for the Defendant's services and stating, "I owe you at least 8 years of my life." The 

Defendant is currently serving his sentence in a State Correctional Institution. 

Nearly a year later, on June 27, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a pro se Post-Conviction Relief 
I The second PCRA Petition alleged errors made by the Judge in the first PCRA appeal and alleged the Defendant 

had become aware of new facts. The Petition was ultimately dismissed as untimely. 

2 This Court issued an Order on October 27, 2015, notifying the Plaintiff that he could participate in the argument 

via video-conference if he made a written request to the Court at least two weeks before the date of the Oral 

Argument. The reason for this requirement was due to past experience with State Correctional Institutions, wherein 

ten days' notice was required to schedule the video-conference. The Plaintiff made a written request, but it was not 

received by the courthouse until December 3, 2013. On the date ofthe hearing, the State Correctional Institution 

and this Cami is ready to Grant the Defendant's Motions. 

December 8, 2015. The Plaintiff did not attend the Argument. 2 The pleadings are now closed 

to the Defendant's Motions and both parties submitted Briefs. Oral Argument was held on 

Motion to Dismiss that is currently before this Cami. The Plaintiff filed Preliminary Objections 

response to both. The Defendant then filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a 

Defendant filed an Amended Answer and Amended New Matter, and the Plaintiff filed a 

contract and breach of fiduciary duty in the Defendant's legal representation of the Plaintiff. The 

March 20, 2015, which is the substance of this Opinion. The Fourth Complaint alleges breach of 

the Third Complaint on February 3, 2015. In response, the Plaintiff filed a Fourth Complaint on 

legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The Defendant filed Preliminary Objections to 

December 11, 2014. The Third Complaint alleged professional negligence, breach of contract, 

for ineffective assistance of counsel was denied. The Plaintiff then filed a Third Complaint on 

and that the Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from bringing this action because his PCRA Petition 

filed Preliminary Objections on November 21, 2014, alleging he had not been properly served 

against the Defendant. On May 12, 2014, the Plaintiff filed a Second Complaint. The Defendant 

In the instant case, the Plaintiff filed a professional liability suit prose on March 24, 2014 

by the Pennsylvania Courts. 

point, the Plaintiffs claim for ineffective assistance of counsel has been fully heard and denied 

May 19, 2015. Com v. Dixon, 2015 WL 7194807, at *1 (Pa. Super. May 19, 2015). At this 

2014. 1 The Plaintiff appealed again to the Superior Court, and the Cami denied the appeal on 
where the defendant is currently incarcerated was contacted and no such arrangements had been scheduled by the 

Defendant to allow the video conferencing to take place. This Court also noted that other documents were received 

from the Defendant prior to the two week deadline on November 18, 2015, so there does not appear to be a valid 

reason for the Defendant's inability to timely notify the court. 

the Pleadings. 

parties show that the Plaintiffs claim lacks merit and the Defendant is entitled to Judgment on 

attorneys owe to their client. However, general principles of law and the agreement between the 

legal representation. More accurately, the claim relies on a breach of the standard of care all 

claim is based on a fee agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant for the Defendant's 

Plaintiff alleges in Count I of his Fourth Complaint, a breach of contract claim. This 

Contract Claim. 

I. Defendant is entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiff's Breach of 

agrees with all three arguments and will address each argument in tum. 

Defendant makes three arguments as to why his Motion should be granted. This Court 

Motion to be granted, the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id 

sought. See Morgan v .. Mcl'hail, 672 A.2d. 1359 (Pa. Super, 1996). Thus, in order for the 

only if it is clear on the face of the pleading that the law will not provide or permit the recovery 

that of a Demurrer; a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a Demurrer may be sustained 

Herman v. Stern, 213 A.2d 594 (Pa. 1965). The standard of review for this Motion is identical to 

all of the pleadings and responsive pleadings filed by the moving and non-moving parties, See 

Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). In deciding a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court must consider 

time as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." 

Procedure 1034(a). The Rule provides, "[a]fter the relevant pleadings arc closed, but within such 

Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings arc governed by the Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Analysis 
agreements, "au attorney who agrees for a fee to represent a client is by implication agreeing to 

provide that client with professional services consistent with those expected by the profession at 

large." Bailey v. Tucke!', 621 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. 1993). Thus, a breach of contract claim may 

properly be premised "on an attorney's failure to fulfill his or her contractual duty to provide the 

agreed-upon legal services in a manner consistent with the profession at large." Gorski v. Smith, 

812 A.2d 683, 694 (Pa. Super. 2002). However, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant failed to 

fulfill his duties in a manner consistent with the legal profession. 

Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that the Defendant gave promises and 

expectations to the Plaintiff regarding the sentence he would receive. However, the only written 

contract that existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is the fee agreement. That fee 

agreement provides: "Attorney offers no guarantee or promise to Client as to any outcome in the 

above-captioned case or otherwise." In contractual claims, when parties deliberately reduce their 

agreements to writing, "the law declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only evidence 

of this agreement." Gianni v. Russel & Co., Inc., 126 A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924 ). Thus, because the 

fee agreement promises no particular outcome to the Plaintiff, and the fee agreement operates as 

the only evidence for this Cami to consider, the Plaintiffs argument lacks merit. 

Moreover, the Plaintiff also argues that the Defendant breached his contractual duty to 

him by coercing him to enter into a guilty plea instead of proceeding to trial as the Plaintiff 

allegedly directed the Defendant to do. The Plaintiff bases this argument on the fee agreement, 

which provides: "Attorney will perform the tasks reasonable, necessary and ordinary to prepare 

A breach of contract requires, "( 1) the existence of a contract, including its essential 

terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3) resultant damages." CoreStates 

Bank, NA. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. 1999). With regard to attorney-client 
for the foregoing and will render Attorney's best professional skills in representing Client's 

interests." This language is not a specific contract provision, but rather, is a recitation of the 

standard of care all attorneys owe their clients. Hence, when contract claims are based on 

violations of the standard of care owed by an attorney and not on a specific contract term, the 

courts routinely dismiss the claims. See, e.g., Saferstein v. Paul, Mardinly, Durham, James, 

Flandreau & Rodger, P.C., 1997 WL 102521 (E.D. Pa. 1997) aff'd sub 110111., Saferstein v. Paul, 

I 27 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1997) ( dismissing the claim and finding that while it is possible to bring a 

legal malpractice claim under a contract theory in Pennsylvania, "the plaintiff must point to 

specific contractual obligations that the defendant allegedly violated" in order to prevail). 

Based on the foregoing, this Cami finds that the Defendant is entitled to Judgment on the 

Pleadings on Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint. 

II. Defendant is entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiff's Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty Claim. 

In Count II of the Plaintiff's Complaint, he asserts a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 

Plaintiff sets forth sixteen reasons in which he believed the Defendant committed a breach of his 

fiduciary duty in representing the Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings. However, the essence of 

Count II reads as a legal malpractice claim and not a breach of fiduciary duty claim. As such, 

the Plaintiffs claim is baned by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

In any legal malpractice action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a potential defense. 

See Alberici v. Tinari, 542 A.2d 127, 130 (Pa. Super. 1988). Specifically, "[a] client who has 

unsuccessfully raised the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the 

underlying criminal action is estopped from re-litigating identical issues in a subsequent 
upon attorney error ... 

until he has pursued post-trial remedies and obtained relief which was dependent 

(5) Moreover, a plaintiff will not prevail in an action in criminal malpractice unless and 

(4) As a result of the injury, the criminal defendant/plaintiff suffered damages. 

would have obtained an acquittal or a complete dismissal of the charges; 

defendant/plaintiff, i.e., "but for" the attorney's conduct, the defendant/plaintiff 

(3) The attorney's culpable conduct was the proximate cause of an injury suffered by the 

(2) Reckless or wanton disregard of the defendant's interest on the part of the attorney; 

(1) The employment of the attorney; 

elements: 

attorney resulting from his representation, the Plaintiff must establish the following five 

explained that in order to succeed on a legal malpractice claim against a criminal defense 

Expanding on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Cami of Pennsylvania 

here. 

reasons explained below, this Court finds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel properly applies 

had a full opportunity to argue that issue, and the issue must have actually been decided. For the 

Id. at l 32. More concisely put, the issue and party must be the same, the party must have 

(1) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the one presented in 

the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against 

whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 

adjudication and (4) the party against whom it was asserted had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a prior action. 

Pennsylvania has four requirements: 

malpractice action against his defense attorney, Id. In order for this doctrine to apply, 
Bailey, 621 A.2d al 115. When these five elements are not met, specifically when the Plaintiff 

fails to obtain post-conviction relief, the Plaintiff cannot succeed on a claim for legal 

malpractice. See, e.g., Harrigan v. Rolle, 2014 WL 7146970, at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2014) 

( explaining that in order for a Plaintiff to prevail in a claim of criminal legal malpractice, the 

Plaintiff must successfully obtain post-trial remedies). The Plaintiff has received no post-trial 

remedies here. 

As explained above, the Plaintiff filed a PCRA Petition alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel on June 2 7, 2012. This Petition was denied after a full hearing on the merits by the Trial 

Court on November 16, 2012. At that hearing, the Court heard all of the evidence and found that 

the claim had no merit. In fact, the Court noted that the Plaintiff himself had actually thanked 

the Defendant for his representation in a handwritten letter shortly after the sentencing took 

place. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff appealed to both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court, and 

both Co mis denied relief. Thus, the Plaintiff's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been 

fully heard and decided. Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel here, this claim is based on 

(I) the same issue; (2) there has been a final judgment on the merits; (3) the Plaintiff is the same; 

and (4) the Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in his PCRA Petition. 

Likewise applying the five elements established by Bailey, at minimum the Plaintiff has failed to 

meet the fifth element and show that he has obtained relief via post-trial remedies. Therefore, the 

Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from bringing this action and any additional actions arising out 

of the same cause of action against the Defendant. 
the Plaintiffs claim has not changed from his first PCRA filing to this Fourth Complaint. In 

essentially alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the rule to the facts at bar, first, 

Here, the Plaintiff has filed four separate civil complaints against the Defendant, all 

to secure relief for injuries they perceived but could not substantiate." Gray, 53 A.3d at 835. 

increase in serial lawsuits of "dubious merit filed by pro se litigants disaffected by prior failures 

Id This Rule was promulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in order to address the 

(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court may bar the pro se 

plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation against the same or related defendants 

raising the same or related claims without leave of court. 

(b) The court may stay the action while the motion is pending. 

(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a written settlement 

agreement or a court proceeding. 

( 1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se 

plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and 

(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of 

common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that: 

§233.1. Frivolous Litigation. Pro Se Plaintiff. Motion to Dismiss, 

§ 233.1. The Rule provides: 

a new Rule of Civil Procedure has been enacted to prevent frivolous litigation. See Pa.R.C.P. 

Defendants from serial complaints filed by pro se Plaintiffs after the claims have been resolved, 

instance of a pro se litigant filing numerous claims against the same party. In order to protect 

Each Complaint has been filed pro se, and this is the first to reach this level. This is not the first 

The instant Opinion arises from the Plaintiffs Fourth Complaint against the Defendant. 

Civil Procedure § 233,1. 

IH. Defeudanr's Motion to Dismiss is Granted Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 
Holding 

Therefore, because the Plaintiff has failed to establish a valid breach of contract claim or 

a valid breach of fiduciary claim, and because the Plaintiff has already been denied relief on his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim and is collaterally estopped from asserting that same 

claim again, this Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to 

Count I and Count II in the Plaintiffs Complaint. Furthermore, this Cami GRANTS the 

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P § 233.1 and bars the pro se 

Plaintiff from asserting further claims against this Defendant arising out of the same or related 

occurrences. For the foregoing reasons, this Court issues the following Order: 

each, he alleges the Defendant failed to represent him adequately at his plea and sentencing 

hearings. Second, this matter has already been addressed by the Courts in the Plaintiffs first 

PCRA Petition. Because this issue has already been resolved, these continued complaints 

amount to frivolous litigation. Therefore, it is proper for this Court to dismiss this action and to 

bar the pro se Plaintiff from pursuing additional litigation against the Defendant arising out of 

the same or related claims.