IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-11084

Summary Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RYAN OMAR WHEATON,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:92-CR-60-A

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No. 96-11158

Summary Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO BLADE MALANITINI,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:96-CR-050-A

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No. 96-11084

No. 96-11158

No. 96-11460

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 * Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

June 20, 1997

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No. 96-11460

Summary Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DOROTHY J. GAINEY,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:94-CR-024-1-A

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Before SMITH, DUHE, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendants-appellants Ryan Omar Wheaton, Antonio Blade

Malanitini (a/k/a Malantini), and Dorothy J. Gainey appeal from

prison sentences imposed by the district court after it had

revoked their terms of supervised release, based on their

violation of conditions of their release. At their request, the
No. 96-11084

No. 96-11158

No. 96-11460

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defendants’ appeals have been consolidated for appeal. 

All three defendants contend that the district judge, in

sentencing them following the revocation of supervised release,

abused his discretion by applying a personal “policy” of

sentencing defendants to terms above the ranges listed in policy

statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines. In support

of this claim, they call this court’s attention to other cases

before the same sentencing court that involve the imposition of

sentences after the revocation of supervised release. Because

this contention is raised by all three defendants for the first

time on appeal, it is reviewed only for plain error. See United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993); United States v.

Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). We

have reviewed the briefs and the record and we perceive no plain

error.

The defendants also argue for the first time on appeal that

the policy statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines

are mandatory upon sentencing courts when sentencing for

violations of supervised release, and that the sentencing court

in their cases failed to apply those statements. This court,

however, has already held that the Chapter 7 policy statements

are merely advisory. See United States v. Escamilla, 70 F.3d

835, 835 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1368 (1996);

see also Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th
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No. 96-11158

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Cir. 1991) (one panel may not overrule the decision of a prior

panel in the absence of en banc consideration or superseding

decision of the Supreme Court). 

Finally, defendant Malantini contends for the first time on

appeal that the sentencing court denied him his right to crossexamine a Probation Officer on the issue whether he qualified for

an exception to the revocation of his supervised release. 

Malantini has not shown plain error as to this claim. See

Calverley, 37 F.3d at 164. 

The appellants’ motion for this court to take judicial

notice, construed as a motion to supplement the record, is

GRANTED.

AFFIRMED.