Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1511-CR-1947 | December 5, 2016 Page 1 of 9

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James A. Edgar

J. Edgar Law Offices, Prof. Corp.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andre Anderson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 5, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1511-CR-1947

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Shatrese M. 

Flowers, Judge

The Honorable David Seiter, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G20-1409-F5-44249

May, Judge.

[1] Andre Anderson appeals the admission at trial of a handgun found pursuant to 

a search of his car following his arrest. We reverse.
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Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 18, 2014, Anderson was pulled over by Indianapolis 

Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) Officer Cory Heiny after Officer 

Heiny ran the license plate on the car and discovered its owner, Anderson, had 

an outstanding warrant for strangulation and his driving privileges were 

suspended. After confirming the driver was Anderson, Officer Heiny requested 

he step out of the vehicle. Anderson did so but not before removing his jacket. 

Officer Heiny found Anderson’s removal of his jacket to be “uncommon.” (Tr. 

at 34.) 

[3] Officer Heiny handcuffed Anderson and “placed [him] on the median between 

[two police cars].” (Id. at 28.) Officer Heiny then returned to Anderson’s car 

and searched it before having it towed “because the vehicle was impeding 

traffic.” (Id. at 12.) When Officer Heiny picked up Anderson’s jacket, he 

noticed it was heavy, so he searched the pockets. Officer Heiny discovered a 

loaded handgun in the pocket. Anderson did not have a license to carry it. 

[4] The State charged Anderson with Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun 

without a license1 and Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license.2

Anderson filed a motion to suppress the handgun. The trial court denied the 

motion. At trial, Anderson objected to the admission of the handgun but the 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 (2014).

2 Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(e)(2)(A) (2014).
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objection was overruled. The trial court found Anderson guilty and imposed a 

three-year sentence. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Anderson did not seek interlocutory review of the denial of his motion to 

suppress but instead appeals following trial. This issue is therefore 

“appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting the evidence at trial.” Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2003). Our standard of review of rulings on the admissibility of 

evidence is essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial 

motion to suppress or by trial objection. Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 

1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider 

conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. However, we 

must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.

[6] “Although a trial court’s determination of historical facts is entitled to 

deferential review, we employ a de novo standard when reviewing the trial 

court’s ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.” 

Lindsey v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

In other words, when a trial court has admitted evidence alleged 

to have been discovered as the result of an illegal search or 

seizure, we generally will assume the trial court accepted the 

evidence presented by the State and will not reweigh that 

evidence, but we owe no deference as to whether that evidence 

established the constitutionality of a search or seizure.
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Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[7] In his “Field Arrest Report,” Officer Heiny framed the search as a “[s]earch of 

the vehicle incident to arrest.” (Ex. Vol. at 34.) In the Affidavit for Probable 

Cause, Officer Heiny refers to the search as “an inventory of the vehicle prior to 

towing it from the roadway[.]” (App. at 23.) The trial court declared the search 

a “valid search incident to arrest,” (id. at 73), and did not decide whether the

search was proper as an inventory search. 

[8] The State now argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

the evidence because, regardless of whether the search was an inventory search 

or a search incident to arrest,3 admission of the handgun did not violate 

Anderson’s rights under the United States Constitution or the Indiana 

Constitution. Thus, we must determine whether the search of Anderson’s car 

was lawful as either a search incident to arrest or an inventory search.

[9] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Fourteenth 

Amendment extended to state governments the Fourth Amendment’s 

requirements for constitutionally valid searches and seizures. Figert v. State, 686 

N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ind. 1997). If the search is conducted without a warrant, the 

 

3 The State also alleges the “handgun was admissible . . . because Defendant abandoned the jacket.” 

(Appellee’s Br. at 11.) However, it neither provides argument nor cites legal authority in support of this 

assertion. Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Hollowell v. State, 707 

N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, we do not consider this argument. 
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burden is on the State to prove that, at the time of the search, an exception to 

the warrant requirement existed. Vehorn v. State, 717 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Ind. 

1999). One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. White v. State, 

772 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. 2002). Another exception is the inventory search of 

a vehicle. Lewis v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1116, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will 

address each separately.

Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

[10] In 1969, the United States Supreme Court held a search incident to arrest is

justified only “for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his 

immediate control’ - construing that phrase to mean the area from within which 

he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel v 

California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), reh’g denied, abrogation recognized by Davis v. 

U.S., 564 U.S. 229 (2011). Then, in 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court held “when 

a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 

automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 

passenger compartment of that automobile.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 

460 (1981), reh’g denied, abrogation recognized by Davis v. U.S., 564 U.S. 229

(2011). Subsequently, the Court held the search of the passenger compartment 

of a car, incident to the arrest of the car’s driver and sole occupant, was not 

justified when that driver “could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons 

or evidence at the time of the search[.]” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 

(2009). 
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[11] Despite that controlling precedent, the State asserts we should follow DeLong v. 

State, 670 N.E.2d 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). When being arrested, DeLong asked 

to remove his jacket and he then placed it on the trunk of the police car. As an

officer was in the process of returning the jacket to DeLong’s girlfriend, “he felt 

a hard, cylindrically shaped object in [it.]” Id. at 57. At that point, the officer 

searched the jacket incident to arrest, and we upheld that search as justified. 

However, DeLong is factually distinguishable. DeLong’s jacket was on the 

trunk of the police car and needed to be given to DeLong’s girlfriend before the 

officers could depart the scene with DeLong, and in the process, the officer felt 

something suspicious. Here, the officers entered Anderson’s car in order to 

search the jacket. As that entry was prohibited by Gant, we decline to follow 

DeLong.

[12] As the U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue since Gant, we are 

constrained to hold in accordance therewith that the search of Anderson’s 

jacket incident to his arrest was unconstitutional because the police unlawfully 

entered the passenger compartment of Anderson’s car to access the jacket.4

 See 

Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.

 

4 As we find the search unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, we need not address Anderson’s 

argument based on the Indiana Constitution. See Holly v. State, 918 N.E.2d 323, 325 n.2 (Ind. 2009) (where 

search violates federal constitution, state constitution analysis is unnecessary). 
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Inventory Search

[13] U.S. Constitution Fourth Amendment and Indiana Constitution Article 1, 

Section 11 questions require independent analyses but both hinge on 

reasonableness – the State must prove inventory searches are reasonable under 

either analysis. Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016). We consider 

the “evidence favorable to the trial court’s decision” and “any uncontested 

evidence favorable to the appellant.” Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind. 

1993). We will not overturn the court’s ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. 

“The ultimate determination of reasonableness, however, is not a factual 

finding but a constitutional legal question meriting independent consideration.” 

Id.

[14] The police are authorized under their community caretaking function to 

impound vehicles. See Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 375 (caretaking function allows 

impoundment when vehicle is “abandoned and obstruct[s] traffic, create[s] a 

nuisance, or invite[s] thieves and vandals). However, when impounding a 

vehicle, the officer must act “according to standard criteria and on the basis of 

something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Fair, 627 

N.E.2d at 432 (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987)). 

“Otherwise, community-caretaking impoundments could too readily be used

‘for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence’ under the 

pretext of an administrative inventory.” Id. at 435 (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 

U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). In order for the warrantless impoundment of a vehicle to be 

reasonable, the Indiana Supreme Court has established a two-prong standard: 
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“(1) that the belief that the vehicle posed some threat or harm to the community 

or was itself imperiled was consistent with objective standards of sound 

policing, and (2) that the decision to combat that threat by impoundment was in 

keeping with established departmental routine or regulation.” Id. at 433

(internal citations omitted). Both prongs must be satisfied – if the State cannot 

meet one, we need not consider the other. Wilford, 50 N.E.2d at 376. 

[15] Anderson does not argue that the impoundment of his car was unlawful. 

Instead, he asserts the search did not comply with the police department’s 

policy because no inventory was produced. Therefore, we shall focus on the 

second prong of the standard.

[16] Officer Heiny testified he “did a [sic] inventory search of the vehicle because the 

vehicle was impeding traffic and the vehicle was going to be towed incident to 

arrest.” (Tr. at 12.) The State offered into evidence Indianapolis Metropolitan

Police Department’s policy on “Towing/Impounding Vehicles.”5

 (Ex. Vol. at 

13.) Under Section IV(A), the policy requires the officer conducting the 

inventory search to make a “detailed listing of any property found in the 

vehicle,” (id. at 17), and Section IV(B) of the policy requires the officer to list all 

property in his or her personal notebook. (Id. at 18.) Officer Heiny testified he 

signed a property slip, but the State did not admit any such slip into evidence. 

 

5 The policy states, under Section I(A)(11) Procedure, that a vehicle may be towed if it is “[o]wned or 

operated by person under custodial arrest for any charge.” (Ex. Vol. at 14). 
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Officer Heiny also testified he had not made a recorded list and he did not have 

a list in his notebook. 

[17] While the police department has a procedure in place to tow vehicles, nothing

produced at trial demonstrates Officer Heiny followed that procedure. This 

search, therefore, does not fall within the inventory search exception because 

Officer Heiny did not follow procedures set out by the Indianapolis 

Metropolitan Police Policy. See Friend v. State, 858 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006) (to comply with reasonableness standards, an inventory search must 

comply with “standard police procedures”).6

Conclusion

[18] The search of Anderson’s jacket was not lawful as a search incident to arrest or

an inventory search; thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 

the handgun into evidence. Accordingly, we reverse Anderson’s conviction of 

Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license with a prior conviction.

[19] Reversed.

Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.

 

6 We decline to address the State’s inevitable discovery argument because it does not apply under the Indiana 

constitution. See Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), (“inevitable discovery rule is not 

applicable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution”), trans. denied.