IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Holly Brandy, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 2425 C.D. 2015

 : SUBMITTED: May 27, 2016

Unemployment Compensation Board :

of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: November 22, 2016

Claimant Holly Brandy petitions for review of an order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that affirmed a referee’s 

decision denying her unemployment compensation benefits under Section 402(b) 

of the Unemployment Compensation Law,1 which provides that an employee is 

ineligible for benefits during any week “[i]n which his unemployment is due to 

voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.” 

We affirm.2

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 

802(b).

2 A determination of whether necessitous and compelling cause for a voluntary quit exists is 

a question of law, subject to plenary review by this Court. Johnson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

of Review, 869 A.2d 1095, 1104 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
2

Claimant worked for Employer Hunter Truck Sales & Service as a 

receptionist from July 2011 to June 2015. Employer operates facilities at different 

locations and its headquarters is in Butler. Until May 1, 2015, the staff at its

Pittsburgh location included Claimant, another female, and thirty-six men. After 

May 1st, Claimant became the only female employed at the Pittsburgh location. In 

any event, after Claimant alleged that two managers had been subjecting her to 

sexual harassment, Employer placed her on paid leave starting May 5th in order to 

conduct an investigation. Ultimately, Employer discharged both managers from 

employment and Claimant returned to work May 26

th

.

Upon her return, Claimant perceived that three individuals, including 

her supervisor, remained on good terms with her, but that a number of other 

employees “were cold, shunned her, and gave her ‘dirty looks.’” Finding of Fact 

(F.F.) No. 10. Having considered her pre-leave working environment to be 

normal,3she “became convinced that rumors which were unfavorable to her had 

swept through the workplace, causing her formerly cordial coworkers to resent 

her.” Id., Nos. 11 and 12. Although the vice president of human resources, Carrie 

Ginocchi, and Claimant’s direct supervisor, Andrew Weleski, sought to ensure that 

Claimant was satisfied with her working conditions and encouraged her to report 

incidents of retaliatory conduct, she became distressed as to how her coworkers’ 

treatment of her had changed. Alleging that the change in her working 

environment caused her to become ill and require medication for her nerves, 

Claimant “made it clear to [Ms. Ginocchi and Mr. Weleski] on a number of 

occasions that she was dissatisfied with the environment to which she was being 

subjected.” Id., No. 15. Once, when she brought her concerns to the attention of 

 

3

Presumably, Claimant meant normal but for the alleged sexual harassment.
3

Mr. Weleski, he opined that he was uncertain as to how to address the issue and 

suggested that she might wish to tell her coworkers the truth.4 Id., No. 16.

On June 17th, matters came to a head when Claimant came to believe 

that her supervisor intended to reprimand one of the friendly managers for talking 

to her. Contrary to her understanding, however, the purpose of their meeting was

for the supervisor to direct the manager to respond to telephone calls that were 

coming in during busy times. Id., No. 19. In any event, without discussing the 

matter with her Employer or requesting a transfer to an alternate position or 

facility, Claimant tendered her resignation letter the following day. Id., No. 22. 

Therein, Claimant asserted that she was resigning due to the hostile work 

environment that she had experienced ever since making sexual harassment 

allegations, that her coworkers had been treating her like an outcast, that 

management had failed to rectify the situation despite her reports, that she was 

expected not to have conversations with anyone while other employees had no 

such restrictions, that the one person who spoke to her was reprimanded for doing 

so, and that she believed that she had no choice but to resign. Id., No. 20.

Subsequently, Claimant applied for unemployment compensation 

benefits, which the UC Service Center denied. The referee affirmed the UC 

Service Center’s denial of benefits. The Board affirmed, adopting and 

 

4

Pursuant to Claimant’s undisputed testimony, Mr. Weleski stated: “I don’t understand why 

they’re acting like this. I don’t know how I can fix it. Maybe if you tell them the truth they’ll 

stop. Tell them what really happened because they’re just going by what they’re hearing.” 

August 18, 2015, Hearing, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 7; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 9a. 

Claimant responded that, “I don’t feel I should have to defend myself to them. I didn’t do 

anything wrong.” Id. at 8; R.R. at 10a.
4

incorporating the referee’s findings and conclusions.5 Additionally, despite 

expressing sympathy for Claimant’s plight, the Board, in pertinent part, found:

[C]laimant did not make a reasonable effort to preserve 

the employment relationship prior to quitting. [She]

testified that she believed that the manager was 

reprimanded for talking to her . . . and this incident is 

what prompted her to quit her employment; however, 

[she] made no effort to discuss her beliefs with the 

employer prior to turning in a resignation notice on June 

18, 2015. [Her] last communication with human 

resources occurred on June 3, 2015 . . . . [She] has not 

demonstrated that it would have been futile to address her 

concerns with the employer prior to resigning, especially 

in light of the fact that the employer credibly testified 

that it requested the claimant to report specific incidents 

of what she perceived to be retaliation in the workplace. 

Finally, [she] did not credibly establish that she had to 

quit for any medical reason.

November 3, 2015, Board Decision at 1. Accordingly, acknowledging that 

Claimant was clearly unhappy working for Employer, the Board nonetheless 

concluded that her subjective concerns, such as coworkers talking to her only about 

business and not personal matters, did not rise to the level of necessitous and 

compelling cause for a voluntary quit. Id. Claimant appealed the Board’s order 

and Employer intervened in the appeal to this Court.

6

A claimant in a voluntary quit case bears the burden of proving that

his or her separation from employment was involuntary. Bell v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Review, 921 A.2d 23, 26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). An employee has 

voluntarily quit for unemployment compensation benefit purposes when he or she 

resigns, leaves, or quits without action by the employer. Lee v. Unemployment 

 

5

It is within the Board’s province to determine credibility and evidentiary weight. Oliver v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 5 A.3d 432, 438 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

6

The Board indicated that it would not be filing a brief in this matter.
5

Comp. Bd. of Review, 33 A.3d 717, 720 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). An employee who 

voluntarily terminates his or her employment bears the burden of proving 

necessitous and compelling cause for leaving his or her job. Brunswick Hotel & 

Conf. Ctr., LLC v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 906 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2006). Specifically, the employee must establish that: “(1) 

circumstances existed which produced real and substantial pressure to terminate 

employment; (2) such circumstances would compel a reasonable person to act in 

the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and, (4) the 

claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her employment.” Id. at 660.

On appeal, Claimant maintains that the Board erred in focusing on the 

alleged reprimand of the friendly employee as the incident prompting her to quit

and, instead, should have concentrated on the retaliatory behavior that she 

experienced after alleging sexual harassment and returning from a leave of 

absence. She emphasizes that she reported both the initial sexual harassment by 

the two managers and the subsequent hostility that she experienced upon her return 

to work. In addition, she notes that an employee is expected to tolerate only a 

certain level of conduct, that not all of the responsibility to resolve a situation is

placed on him or her, and that an employer ultimately bears the responsibility for 

eliminating harassment in the workplace. Comitalo v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

of Review, 737 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Accordingly, alleging that she 

took the necessary common sense action of reporting her coworkers’ retaliatory

conduct and that Employer did nothing to alleviate the hostile work environment, 
6

she argues that the Board erred in determining that she failed to establish 

necessitous and compelling cause for her voluntary quit.7

As the record reflects, Claimant resigned due to the allegedly hostile 

work environment that ensued after her leave of absence and culminated in her 

mistaken belief that a manager was reprimanded for talking to her. Regardless of 

whether a reprimand occurred, Claimant perceived that final incident to be 

indicative of the hostile work environment that resulted from her report of sexual 

harassment and Employer’s discharge of two managers. To that end, although we 

acknowledge case law indicating that the incident precipitating the voluntary quit 

should be the focus of the inquiry as to whether there are necessitous and 

compelling grounds for a voluntary quit,8the timeline of events in the present case 

is fairly condensed. Accordingly, without concentrating overly much on whether 

that final incident, alone, would have been sufficient to constitute necessitous and 

compelling grounds for a voluntary quit, we turn to determining whether

Claimant’s work environment was sufficiently intolerable such that it constituted 

necessitous and compelling cause for her voluntary resignation.

Like the Board, we sympathize with Claimant’s situation. Her 

undisputed testimony indicates that formerly friendly coworkers childishly turned 

their heads when she walked by, gave her dirty looks, made exchanging paperwork 

 

7 While it is true, as Claimant maintains, that sexual harassment may constitute necessitous 

and compelling cause for a voluntary quit, Collier Stone Co. v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, 876 A.2d 481, 484 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), the record does not reflect that the 

initial sexual harassment that she experienced was the reason for her voluntary quit. 

Accordingly, we reject Claimant’s implication that sexual harassment constituted necessitous 

and compelling cause for her resignation.

8

See, e.g., Hussey Copper, Ltd. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 718 A.2d 894, 899 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (holding that, “unless the precipitating event gave Claimant a necessitous 

and compelling reason to quit, then benefits should be denied.”)
7

awkward, pretended that she had not spoken, and did not include her in the 

collective lunch order that she previously had orchestrated. August 18, 2015, 

Hearing, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 7, 9; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 9a, 11a. 

This unpleasant working atmosphere, however, is not tantamount to unbearable or 

unendurable working conditions. It is well established that normal workplace 

strains are insufficient to justify a voluntary resignation. The working conditions 

must be tantamount to intolerable. Ann Kearney Astolfi DMD PC v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 995 A.2d 1286, 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

Furthermore, the Board concluded that Claimant failed to make a 

reasonable effort to preserve her employment because she failed 1) to discuss the

final incident with Employer regarding the alleged reprimand of a friendly coworker; and 2) to demonstrate that it would have been futile to do so. As the 

Board determined and the evidence reflects, Claimant’s last communication with 

Ms. Ginocchi was June 3, 2015, well before Claimant’s June 18th resignation. 

August 18, 2015, Hearing, Claimant’s Exhibit 3 at 1; R.R. at 53a. In addition, the 

Board found that “the employer credibly testified that it requested the claimant to 

report specific incidents of what she perceived to be retaliation . . . .” November 3, 

2015, Board Decision at 1. In that regard, the Board adopted the referee’s decision 

therein concluding that “the employer made extraordinary efforts to retain the 

claimant and to address legitimate concerns upon her return.” August 18, 2015, 

Referee’s Decision at 3. “It is the duty of the appellate court to examine the 

testimony in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the fact-finder has 

ruled, giving that party the benefit of all logical and reasonable inferences from the 

testimony . . . .” Penn Hills Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 437 

A.2d 1213, 1218 (Pa. 1981).
8

Finally, we address Claimant’s contention that health-related issues 

constituted necessitous and compelling cause for her voluntary quit. In order to 

have a compelling health reason to quit, a claimant must establish the following: 

1) competent testimony of adequate health reasons; 2) communication of those 

health problems to the employer; and 3) availability to work if reasonable 

accommodations can be made. Astolfi, 995 A.2d at 1290. Here, despite the fact 

that Claimant in her e-mail exchange with Ms. Ginocchi referenced some physical 

and emotional issues,9the Board concluded that Claimant did not credibly establish 

that she resigned for health reasons. November 3, 2015, Board Decision at 1. 

Although a claimant’s own testimony and/or supporting medical documents may 

be sufficient to establish the existence of a medical reason for a voluntary 

termination, Lee Hosp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 637 

A.2d 695, 698 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), his or her evidence must constitute competent

evidence that adequate health reasons existed to justify the voluntary quit. We find 

no error in the Board’s determination and, accordingly, agree that Claimant failed 

to satisfy the foregoing criteria.

Accordingly, we affirm.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Senior Judge

 

9

See August 18, 2015, Hearing, Claimant’s Exhibit 3 at 3; R.R. at 55a.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Holly Brandy, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 2425 C.D. 2015

 :

Unemployment Compensation Board :

of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is hereby AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Holly Brandy, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, : No. 2425 C.D. 2015

Respondent : Submitted: May 27, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

DISSENTING OPINION

BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: November 22, 2016

I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that Holly Brandy’s 

(Claimant) “unpleasant working atmosphere . . . is not tantamount to unbearable or

unendurable working conditions[,]” Majority Op. at 7, and that Hunter Truck Sales & 

Service (Employer) “made extraordinary efforts to retain [C]laimant and to address 

legitimate concerns upon her return.” Id. (quoting Referee Dec. at 3). Because the 

Referee’s findings of fact (FOF) are internally inconsistent and do not support the 

Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review’s (UCBR) conclusions that 

Claimant did not try to preserve her employment and that the last incident was her

sole reason for resigning, I would reverse the UCBR’s order affirming the Referee’s

decision denying Claimant UC benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment 

Compensation Law (Law).1

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §

802(b) (relating to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature).
AEC - 2 -

Initially, herein the Referee specifically found:

15. [C]laimant made it clear to the individuals[, the vice 

president of human resources and Claimant’s direct 

supervisor,

2

] on a number of occasions that she was 

dissatisfied with the environment to which she was being 

subjected.

16. When [C]laimant brought concerns to the attention of 

her direct supervisor, he indicated that he was uncertain 

of how to address the matter and suggested that

[C]laimant may wish to tell her co[-]workers the truth.

. . . . 

20. [C]laimant did not discuss this matter with 

[E]mployer prior to tendering her resignation letter June 

18, 2015, which includes the following, ‘I am sending this 

letter to inform you of my immediate resignation for my

position . . . . Unfortunately my resignation is due to the 

hostile work environment I’ve been experiencing since 

turning in the sexual harassment I endured for years, I no

longer can keep coming into work under these conditions. I 

have been ousted by the other employees. I have reported 

these actions to the proper management multiple times with 

no action taken to rectify it. Also today the only person in 

parts who has talked to me got yelled at for stopping by 

my desk for a minute and was told he is not allowed to do 

that yet all the men are allowed to stop and talk to anyone at 

any time with nothing being said, yet the one person who

defended me and talks to me was yelled at for stopping for a 

minute. I have been treated extremely different since 

returning to work. I have forced myself to sit there day 

after day with anxiety due to being treated like an outcast. I 

am expected to have no conversations with anyone while 

there are no restrictions for any other employees. I feel I 

have no choice and that I am being forced to resign. . . .’

21. [C]laimant elected to resign only after coming to the 

conclusion that the manager who was speaking with her 

was reprimanded for doing so.

 

2

See Referee Dec. at 2, FOF 14.
AEC - 3 -

Referee Dec. at 2 (emphasis added). Clearly, FOF 15 - Claimant made it clear on a 

number of occasions that she was dissatisfied with her work environment - is contrary 

to FOF 20 - Claimant did not discuss the matter prior to tendering her resignation. 

Further, FOF 21 - Claimant elected to resign only after the final incident - is contrary 

to FOF 20 - Claimant’s “resignation is due to the hostile work environment I’ve been 

experiencing since turning in the sexual harassment I endured for years.” Id. 

Moreover, the UCBR’s conclusion that “[C]laimant did not make a reasonable effort

to preserve the employment relationship prior to quitting[]” is also contrary to the 

Referee’s FOFs and the record evidence. UCBR Dec. at 1.

Next, the Majority categorizes Claimant’s co-workers’ actions as 

“childish[]” and concludes that “[t]his unpleasant working atmosphere . . . is not 

tantamount to unbearable or unendurable working conditions [because] . . . normal 

workplace strains are insufficient to justify a voluntary resignation.” Majority Op. at 

6, 7 (emphasis added). However, in reaching this conclusion the Majority 

disregarded the fact that Claimant’s co-workers ignored her, made it so difficult for 

her to do her job that she was having panic attacks and taking Xanax, see Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 11a,

3

and were telling other co-workers that Claimant was having 

sex with the discharged employee. See R.R. at 10a; see also FOF 11, which 

minimizes this record evidence (“[C]laimant became convinced that rumors which 

were unfavorable to her had swept through the workplace[.]”). Yet, this testimony is 

undisputed.

Last, it is perplexing that, in the face of the Referee’s FOF 16, the UCBR 

concluded that Claimant did not try to preserve her employment. See R.R. at 9a; see 

also FOF 16 - “When [C]laimant brought concerns to the attention of her direct 

 

3

See also Referee Dec. at 2, FOF 13 (“[C]laimant was greatly distressed by how her 

treatment had changed upon her return and concludes that it caused her to become ill and to require 

medication to control her nerves.”).
AEC - 4 -

supervisor, he indicated he was uncertain how to address the matter . . . .” The 

Referee specifically found that Claimant discussed her complaints with her direct 

supervisor as well as Employer’s human resources’ vice president who similarly did 

nothing to alleviate the hostile working conditions. Certainly, under such 

circumstances, it is reasonable for Claimant to believe that any further attempts to 

change her work environment and, thus, preserve her employment, would be futile.

As this Court explained in Comitalo v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, 737 A.2d 342 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999):

Before quitting, [Claimant] advised [her direct supervisor] 

about [her co-workers’] retaliatory harassment and the 

hostile behavior of her co-workers, but [her direct 

supervisor] merely suggested that [Claimant tell her coworkers the truth about her sexual harassment] rather than 

taking immediate action under the circumstances presented 

to protect [Claimant] from further harassment. Employer 

postulates that [her direct supervisor’s] response was 

appropriate and that [Claimant] had the burden to take steps 

to retain her job. Notwithstanding Employer’s position, 

[Claimant] believed that Employer would not sufficiently 

remedy her current situation in view of Employer’s earlier 

response and the failure of [her direct supervisor] to 

indicate that Employer would act to resolve the current 

harassment against her. The Court cannot say that these

circumstances would not produce real and substantial 

pressure to terminate one’s employment and would not

compel a reasonable person to act any differently.

Id. at 345 (emphasis added); see also Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Review, 654 A.2d 264, 266-67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (“[B]ecause the 

pressure to terminate employment was real and substantial, and because the employer 

could not alleviate the harassment after the claimant provided the requisite notice, the 

[UCBR] did not err in concluding that the claimant had good cause for voluntarily 

quitting.”).
AEC - 5 -

The Referee found as a fact: “[C]laimant did not request nor was she 

offered a transfer to an alternate position or facility in which she would not be 

required to interact with the individuals whom she feels had treated her poorly.” 

Referee Dec. at 2, FOF 22 (emphasis added); see also Referee Dec. at 3 (“By failing 

to request an alternate position and/or an alternate worksite, [C]laimant did not 

satisfactorily exhaust reasonable alternatives. It is not [E]mployer’s responsibility to 

offer such a position under these circumstances, rather it is [C]laimant’s burden to 

exhaust alternatives.”). The law is well-established that it is unlawful to retaliate 

against or treat someone differently for having filed a sexual harassment complaint. 

See Section 5(d) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA);

4

Section 704(a) 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).5 Moreover, it is 

contrary to common decency and repugnant that after Employer placed Claimant 

on leave pending investigation of her sexual harassment complaint, the UCBR 

determined that in order to preserve her employment Claimant was required to ask 

for a transfer. “[T]here is a certain level of conduct that an employee will not be 

required to tolerate and the Court will not place all responsibility upon an 

 

4 Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 955(d). Section 5(d) of the 

PHRA states that it shall be unlawful: “For any person, [or] employer, . . . to discriminate in any 

manner against any individual because such individual has opposed any practice forbidden by [the 

PHRA], or because such individual has made a charge, testified or assisted, in any manner, in 

any investigation, proceeding or hearing under [the PHRA].” 43 P.S. § 955(d) (emphasis added). 

While the Dissent recognizes that Claimant filed her sexual harassment complaint under 

Employer’s sexual harassment policy, the rationale is the same as Claimant had the right to file a 

sexual harassment claim under state and federal law.

5

Section 704(a) of Title VII provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 

discriminate against any of his employees . . . to discriminate against 

any individual, . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 

unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made 

a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
AEC - 6 -

employee to resolve his or her work dilemma. Ultimately the employer bears the 

responsibility for eliminating harassment against employees in the workplace.” 

Collier Stone Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 876 A.2d 481, 484 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Comitalo, 737 A.2d at 345). Claimant is 

not to be adversely affected for filing a sexual harassment complaint. See 43 P.S. § 

955(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Employer’s actions herein are even more egregious 

because its sexual harassment investigation substantiated Claimant’s sexual 

harassment complaint and Employer discharged the harassers for their unlawful 

conduct. 

Because the record evidence clearly reveals that despite Claimant’s 

numerous complaints, Employer did not attempt to alleviate the harassment directed 

toward Claimant and Claimant’s circumstances produced a real and substantial 

pressure to terminate her employment, I would reverse the UCBR’s order.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge