### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 3, 200 9

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. STEV EN WATS ON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr iminal Cou rt f or Shelby Coun ty No. 06-02908 Jame s M. Lamme y, Jr., Judge

No. W2008-00452-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed Augu st 6, 2009

Th e de fe nd ant, Ste ve n Watso n, wa s c on vic te d by a She lby Cou nty jur y of a g g ra vate d a ssa ult , a Cla ss C felony , and sente nced to a term of s i x y ea rs. He w as orde red to ser ve six months in t he Shelby County Cor re c tio na l Ce nte r, wi th t

he ba lanc e of

his se nte nc e on

pr ob a tio n. Th e de fe nd ant w a s a lso order ed to pay

$8800 in restitution to t he victim. On appe al, the def endant ha s raised f

ive issues for revie w: (1) whe ther the evidence is sufficie nt to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court

err ed in allowing the defendant to be questioned reg arding a six teen- y ear -old prior c onviction; (3) whether the cour t erre d in its application and weig hing of enhanc ing a

nd mitigatin g fa ct ors; (4) whether the cour t erre d i n denying the defe ndant’s re quest for f ull probation; and (5) w hether the

c ourt e rr e d b y or de ri ngre sti tut ion in the a mou nt of $8 80 0 b e pa id t o th e vic timwi tho ut p ro of of his medical bills or lost wag es. B eca use of a n untimely

filed motion fo r n ew tria l, the defe ndant has waived r eview of

his evidentiar y i s sue re g ardingthe prior c onviction. After r eview, w e conc lude that th e ev i d ence is sufficient and that the sentenc e imposed, with reg ard to leng th and manner of service , is proper. With reg ard to the or der of restitution, we conc lude that, wh i l e t h e amount of restitution ordere d was prope rly established, re m an d i s nece ssary for a deter mination of the defe ndant’s abilit y t o p ay as re quired by statute. The judg ment of convic tion and sentenc e ar e aff irmed in all other r espec ts.
Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cr iminal Cou rt A ffirm ed in Part; Rem anded i n Part

J OHN E VERET T W I L L I AMS , J.
, de liv e re d the op ini on of the c ou rt , in wh ic h J .C. M C L IN and C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , JJ., joined.

Coleman Gar

rett and Micha el Campbell, Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Steven Watson.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., At torne y G e ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Me lis sa Rob e r g e , A s s ist a nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney Ge nera l; and Lora Fowler and Da vid Zak, Assistant District Attorneys Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION-2- Fa c tu al B ac kgr ound

The defenda

nt and the victim, Robert Patterson, we re involved in a n alterc ation on October 22, 2005, which re sulted in the defe ndant’s convic tion for aggrav at ed assault. The victim, a selfemploy ed ele ctricia

n, had pre viously

worke d for the de fenda

nt in houses which he constructe d and

renovated as part of hi s community development c orporation. The victim acknowle dg ed that he ha d abused c rac k coca ine but stated that he ne ver stole to support his drughabit.

At a pp ro xima te ly

10 :30 a .m. , th e de fe nd ant w e nt t o t he vi cti m’s h ome to q ue sti on him reg ardingceil i n g fans a

nd door knobs which ha d been stolen f rom a house the defe ndant was constructingin the neig hborhood. The vic tim, at the defe ndant’s re quest, went outside, whe re the defe ndant immediately

acc used the victim of stealing the items. The victim told the defenda nt he had no idea

what he w as talking about and turned to w alk bac k inside the house. At this point, the de fe nd ant h it the vic timin t he he a d w ithhis fi st, and a sc uf fl e be tw e e n th e tw o men en su e d, wi th the de fe nd ant k

no c kin g the vic timto t

he g ro un d an d kic kin g him

. Ev e ntu a lly , the vic timwa s a ble to gr ab a pie ce of

woo d ly ing in a

flower bed and swung it at the defe ndant. Afte r the two men sto pp e d f ig hti ng , th e de fe nd ant i nf or me d th e vic timtha

t he ha d a w itn e ss w ho ha d s e e n th e vic tim brea k into the defe ndant’s prope rty . The victim wante d to confront t h e wi t n es s , and he a nd the defe ndant rode to the house tog ether in the defe ndant’s truc k.

Up on arr ivi nga t th e pr op e rt

y , th e de fe nd ant and the vic time nte re d th e ho me and we nt i nto a bac k bedroom whe re A ndrey Wil lett was p aint ing. T he victim asked the defe ndant wher e the witness was, a

nd the defendant replied, “here’ s my witness,” and pr ocee ded to “c rac k” an a luminum b as eb al l b at o v er t h e vi ct i m ’s h ea d

. T h e v i ct i m wa s m o m en t ar i l y kn o ck edu n co n s ci o u s

. Al t h o u gh Mr. Will ett was in the room in which the incident occ urre d, he did not see the defe ndant use the bat

on the vic tim a s Mr

. Wille t’ s ba c k wa s tur ne d to the me n. Ho we ve r, he he ard the bat hit the vic tim

and saw the de fe nd ant s tand ingov e r t he ble e din g vic tim , who wa s ly ingon the fl oo r. Mr . Wil le tt g ot betwee n the men and told the de fenda nt not to hit the victim ag ain.

After being helped up by Mr. Wil let, the victim, blee ding heavily
, walked back to his home. Once he ar

rived, he phoned the police to r eport what had occ urre d. The de fenda nt had also ca lled the police to re port the bre ak-in a nd theft of his p ro p er t y

. Police first went to the de fenda nt’s proper ty , and he informed the office rs that he had g otten into an alterc ation with the man he be lieved responsible for the brea

k-in and theft. Whil e ther e, the of fice rs wer e informe d of the victim’s re port and w e n t to h is h o me to s p e a k w it h h im

. A f

te r w ar d s , th e v ic ti m w a s ta k e n to T h e M ed by

a mbu lanc e , w he re thi rt

y -s e ve n s tit c he s w e re a dmi nis te re d to c lose hi s he a d w ound . H e wa s a lso treated for two br oken ribs, as w ell as injuries to his ne ck and back. Police investigating at the sce ne
we r e u n a b le to lo c a te th e b a t u s e d to h it th e v ic ti m, d e s p it e b o th

th e v ic ti m’ s an d

M r

. Wil let’s informing them that one wa s used.

Ba sed on the a

bove fa cts, a Shelby

County g rand jury

returne d an indictment cha rg ing the defe ndant with ag g ravated assault by use of a deadly wea pon. At a subseque nt jury t ri al , the defe ndant testified in his own beha lf and pre sented a theory of self- defe n s e. Ac co rdi ng to the-3-

defe ndant, he went to the vi ctim’s home t o acc use hi m of t he theft beca use t he victim was a

known dr ug us e r wh o ha d pre vio us ly sto le n fr om h im. Th e de fe nd ant a lso state d th a t he ha d r e c e ive d a c a ll in the ear ly

morning hours from a

neig hbor w h o s t at ed that she had seen the victim behind the defe ndant’s prope rty , althoug h she did not see the victim with any thing. The defe ndant furthe r te sti fi e d th a t it

wa s th e vic timwh o s tart e d th e ori g ina l a lte rc a tio n b y a tta c kin gthe de fe nd ant w ith a metal electric al box cover

. He also testified t hat he believed that the defe ndant was hig h and drunk during the confrontation and that he retrieved the baseba ll bat from his truck duringthe conf rontation to k e e p th e vic timfr om a

tta c kin g him wi th a br ic k. He a c kn ow le dg e d carr y ing the bat in to t

he ho us e when he and the victim enter ed, but he testified that he only hit the vic tim when the victim rushed him after pic king up a

putty knife.

Following the pre sentation of evide nce, the defe ndant was convicted a s char g ed. The trial court subseque ntly

sentenc ed the de fenda

nt as Rang e I , standard of fende r to six y ear s, six months of which w as to be ser

ved in jail and the ba l an ce o n p ro b at i on. The c ourt also orde red that the defe ndant pay

the victim $8800 in restitution for medical bills and l o s t wage s. The judg ment of conviction was enter ed by the t rial court on Dec ember 14, 2007. Thirty -nine da y s later, on January 22, 2008, the def

endant f iled his moti on for ne w trial. F ollowing a hear ing on the motion, the trial court e ntere d an orde r deny ing the motion. This appeal follows.

Ana lys is

On appe al, the def

endant ha s raised f

ive issues for our revie w: (1) whe ther the e vidence was sufficie nt to permit a rational trie r of f act to find him g uilty

bey ond a reasonable doubt; (2) whethe r the c ourt e rr e d in a llo wi ngthe de fe nd ant’ s si xtee n- y e ar- old pr ior fe lony c on vic tio n to c ome int o evidenc e duringcross-e x amination; (3) whe ther the se ntence imposed is ex cessive ba sed upon improper a

pplication of enha

nceme nt fac tors and on improper weig hing o f enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors; (4) whether the court erre d in denying the defe ndant’s re quest for f ull probation; and (5) whether

the co u rt er red in orde ring $8800 in restitution be paid to the defe ndant without proof of me d ic a l b il ls an d lo s t w a g e s

. A s anin it ia l m a tt e r , th e St a te h a s c o r r e c tl y n o te d th a t t he defe ndant filed a

n untimely

motion for new tria l a

nd asser ts that, as a re sult, he has waive d revie w of the e videntiary

issue reg ardingthe admission of his prior conviction. We ag ree

.

Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure 33 (b ) s ta te s th a t:

A motion for a ne w trial shall be made in writing, or if made orally in open court shall be r educe d to writing, w ithin thi rty day s of the date the orde r of se ntence is entere d. The Court shall upon m otion allow amendment libera lly until the day

of the hea ring on a motion for a ne w trial.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b). This provision is mandatory
, and the time for filing ma y not be extended. Te nn . R. Crim. P. 4 5( b) ; se e als o S tat e v . M ar tin , 940 S.W .2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) . The thirty -day provision is jurisdi ctional, and a n untimely

motion is a nullity

. State v. Dodson , 780 S.W .2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) . Thus, a trial c ourt does not have jurisdiction to rule on a mot ion filed-4-

outside the t hirty -day

period. State v. Bough
, 152 S.W .3d 453, 460 (Tenn. 2004). More over, a trial judge ’s er

roneous c onsideration of a n untimely

m o tion “does not validate the motion, and an

a pp e llate c ourt

wi ll n ot c on sid e r t

he iss ue s r a ise d in

the mot io n un le ss t

he iss ue or

iss ue s w ou ld

re s u l t in the dismi ssal of the prose cution ag ainst the ac cused.” Dodson
, 7 8 0 S. W. 2 d at 780. Consequently , “[i] f a motion for ne w trial i s not timely filed, all issues are deeme d waived e x cept for suff iciency of evide nce a

nd sentenc ing.” Id . ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e)

. F ur the rm or e , th is c ourt lac ks the a uth or ity to w a ive the un tim e ly

fi lin g of a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. State v. Givham , 6 16 S.W. 2d 61 2, 61 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ); se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a)

. As pre v i o u s l y

noted, the def

endant’ s judgme nt of conviction wa s entere d Dec ember 14, 2 0 0 7 . The re cord r efle cts that his motion for new trial wa s filed on J anuar y 22, 2008, thirty -nine day s later. Thus, the motion was f iled outsi d e t h e re quisite thirty -day period a nd is, theref

ore,
un tim e ly and a nu lli ty . A s su c h, the e vid e nti ary iss ue ra ise d by the de fe nd ant is wa ive d, and the on ly issues which may

be conside red on a

ppeal a re suf ficienc y of the e vidence and sente ncing

.
Al thoug h n ot a

rgue d b y the State , w ithre g ard

to r e vie w o f t

ho se iss ue s, we mus t a lso conclude that the notice of appea l doc ument filed in this case was untimely

. Rul e 4 (a ) o f t he T e n n e s s e e R

u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d

u r e r e qu i r e s t h e f

i l i n g o f a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h i nt h i rt y d a ys of the e ntr y of jud g me nt o r, purs ua

nt t o Ru le 4( e ), the e ntr

y of an ord e r de nying mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. Be cause the defendant’s moti on for new t rial i n this case wa s a nullity , it did not t oll the thirty -day period for

filing the notice of a

ppeal. As suc h, the def

endant had t h i rt y d ay s from entry of the judgme nt in t h i s ca s e t o file his notice of a ppeal. The notice of a

ppeal in this case was filed on Fe bruar y 25, 2008, well outside the t h i rt y -d ay p eriod whic h beg an to run on De cembe r 14, 2007. Thus, the appe al document in thi s ca s e wa s also untimely . Howeve r, unlike the timely filing of a motion for new tria l, the timely filing of a notice of appea l is not a prere quisite to the jurisdiction of this court, and this court may waive the require ment in the interest of justice. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a)

. Waiver is not automatic and should onl y occur when “the i ntere st of justice” mandates waive r of the require ment. Sta te v

. Ro be rt W ill iam Ro c k

we ll , No. E2006-01717- CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvil le, Aug . 13, 2007). In this case, we conclude that the intere st of justice requir es that we waive the timely

filing of the notice of

appea l in order to re view the suff iciency of the e vidence and the sentenc e imposed.

I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence

Th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at trial was ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a finding that he wa s g uilty bey ond a re asonable doubt. I n consideringthe issue of suff iciency of the evidenc e, we apply

the rule that where the suffic iency o f t h e evidence is cha lleng ed, the r eleva nt qu e sti on fo r t he re vie wi ngc ourt

is “ wh e the r, a ft e r v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he light m os t f

a vo ra ble to the [S tate], anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond

a re asonable doubt.” J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 99 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9 ( 19 79 ); se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) . Moreove r, the State is entitled to the s t rongest leg itimate view of the evidenc e and all re asonable infere nces w hich may be dra wn there from. Sta te v . H

arris , 839 S.W .2d 54 , 7 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . A ll q ue sti on s in vo lvi ng the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the we ig ht a

nd va lue to-5-

be g iven the evidence, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the t rier of fac t. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). This court will not rewe igh or ree valuate the evidenc e prese nted. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. “A guilty

verdic t by

the jury , approve d by

the trial judg e, ac cre dits the testimony of the witnesses for the S tate and r esolves all conf licts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grac e , 49 3 S. W.2 d 4 74 , 4 76 (T e nn . 1 97 3) . A jur y c on vic tio n re mov e s the pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e wi th which a defe ndant i s initially cloake d and replace s it with one of g uilt so that, on appea l, a convicte d defe ndant has the bur den of de monstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. Sta te v. T ug gle , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

. These rules are applicable to f indings of g uilt pre dicated upon direc t evidenc e, cir cumstantial evidenc e, or a combination of both. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

. On appe al, t he defenda

nt acknow ledg es t hat he “ca nnot argue to this Honorable Court that absolut el y n o evidenc e exists t o support his conviction, [but ] he submit s that the rec ord does not

rea sonably

support the conviction . . . whe n proper ly viewed a g ainst the hig h standard of Jack son v. Virginia. ” Th is c ourt

ha s r e pe a te dly

he ld t hat Jack son v. Virginia a dd

re sse s tw o im

po rt ant a sp e c ts of a sufficie ncy

revie w on appe al: (1) the ma nner of revie w of the c onvicting e vidence ; and (2) the standard of

revie w for le g al suffici en cy

. T h e scope of our e x amination of the e vidence is not equivalent to that of a

jury

. I n a challeng e to the s ufficie ncy of t he evidence, this court does not retry the de fe nd a nt. W e e mph a size tha t ou r e xami natio n in

a su ff ic ie nc y re vie w i s n ot t o r e vis it inconsistent, contradic ting, implausible, or nonc redible pr oof, as these issues are resolved sole ly by the jury

. Rather, we look to the rec ord to de termine whether there was substa n t i v e probative

e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the ve rd ic t. T he se c on d in qu ir y , th e qu e sti on

of le g a l su ff ic ie nc y , th e n f

oll ow s: wh e the r t he re c or d c on ta ins e vid e nc e fr om w hic h th e jur y c ou ld h a ve fo un d the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt. Every rea sonable hy

p o t h esi s of innocenc e nee d not be dispelled; it is onl y

nece ssary

that proof e x ists which supports the elements of the crime.

Pur su ant t o T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -1 01 (a )( 1) (2 00 6)
, a pe rs on c omm its

a ssa ult wh o “[i]nt e nti on a lly , kno wi ng ly or re c kle ssl y c a us e s bod ily inj ur

y to an oth e r. ” Th e a ssa

ult is ag g ravated if a pe rson intentionally or knowing ly commits an assault as def ined in section 39-13- 101(a) (1) a

nd, as re levant her e, “[u]ses or display s a dea d l y wea pon.” T.C.A. § 39-13- 102(a) (1) (2 00 6) . Ade a dly

we a po n is d efi ne d a s “ any

thi ngthat in

the mann e r o f i ts u se or

int e nd e d u se is capa ble of c ausing death or

serious injury .” T.C.A. § 39-11- 106(a) (5) ( 2006).

I n sup po rt of his argume nt that the e vid e nc e is not su ff ic ie nt, the de fe nd ant as ks us to r e ly upon information which wa s established only if the def

endant’ s own testimony

was be lieved, namely : (1) the victim had stolen fr om him on more than one oc casion to support hi s drug habit; (2) the victim started the e arlier alterc ation by

hitting the def

endant in the face with an elec trical box

cover ; and (3) he only

attacke d the victim with the bat when he saw the vic tim gra b a putty knife. Hi s ar gu m en t i s essentially a cha lleng e to the victim’s cr edibility and a c halleng e to the jury ’s reje ction of his self-de fense theory

. The victim testified in contra diction to each of the points relied up on by the de fe nd ant. Th e c on tr a dic tin g te sti mony wa s p la c e d b e fo re the jury and
, as is the ir-6-

province , they

acc redited the testimony of t he victim

. As an appellate court, it is not our func tion to rewe igh c redibility

deter minations or conflicts in the evidenc e. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d at 623.

Review of the rec ord establishes that the evidenc e, viewed in the light most favor able to the State, was suff

icient to allow the jury

to find the defe ndant g uilty of ag g ravated as s au l t bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. The v i ct i m t es t i fied that he and the de fenda nt, following a

n alterc ation at the victim’s home
, proce eded to the defe ndant’s proper ty which was under construction. Upon enter ing the house, the vic tim observed the defenda nt pick up a base ball bat. When the victim asked the de fe nd ant w he re the a lle g e d w itn e ss w a s, the de fe nd ant res po nd e d “ ri g ht h e re ,” and pr oc e e de d to

sw ingthe bat and

hit the vic timin t

he he a d, c a

us inga wo un d w hic h r e qu ir e d th ir ty -s e ve n s tit c he s. We must conclude that this head wound, a long w ith two broken ribs and va rious injuries to the

v i ct i m ’s h ead a

nd neck, w as suffic ient to establish bodily injury . Additionally , this court has previously

held that a ba seball bat may be a de adly

wea pon. State v. Shane Dela n o Hunt er , No. M2 00 7- 01 02 6- CCA -R 3- CD (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. , a t N a sh vil le , M ay

6, 20 08 ); State v. Shawn McCobb and Marcus W

alker , No. W2006-01517-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. Ap p ., at J ackson, Sept. 26, 2007). A s s u c h
, w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d w a s s u f f ic ie n t to e s ta

b li s h e a c h of the

re qu ir e d e le me nts of

the of fe ns e be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.
II. Sentencing Issu es

A. Exc e ssiv e S e n t e nc e Bas e d Up on A pplic at ion and W e igh t G ive n t o Enha nc e m e nt and Mitigating Fact ors

Next, t h e def

endant c ontends that the sentenc e imposed by the trial cour

t is ex cessive. S p e c i f i c a l l y, h e c h a l l e n g e s t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s a p p l i c a t i o no f

t w o e n h an c e m e n tf

a c t o r s

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, he asse rts that the co u rt er re d i n deter mining that any

enhanc ement fa ctors found outwe ighe d the applicable mitigating fac tors. When an accuse d challeng es t he leng th, rang e, or ma nner of service of a se ntence , this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sentenc e with a pr esumption that the de te rm inatio ns ma de by the tr ia l c ourt are c or re c t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 06 ); State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn.1991)

. This presumption is “conditioned upon the a ffirmative sh ow ingin t

he re c or d th a t the tr ia l c ourt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s and a ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” Ashby
, 82 3 S. W.2 d at 16 9; see also State v. Carter , 254 S.W .3d 335, 344-45 (T e nn . 2 00 8) ; State v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W .2d 540, 543-44 (Te nn. 1999). The bur den is on the def endant to show that the sentenc ing w as i mproper. T.C.A. §40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. I f our

re vie w r e fl e c ts tha

t th e tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to c on sid e r t

he se nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s and a ll r e le va nt f a c ts

and c ir c ums tanc e s, the n r e vie w o f t he c ha lle ng e d s e nte nc e is p ur e ly de novo without the pr esumption of cor rec tness. Ashby , 823 S.W. 2d 16 6, 16 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) ; see also Carter , 254 S.W .3d at 344-45.

I n conductinga de novo revie w of a sentenc e, th i s co u rt m u st consider: (a ) the e vidence adduce d at the tri al and the se ntencinghear ing; ( b) the pre sentenc e re port; (c) the principles of

s en t encing a

nd arguments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and cha rac teristics of the criminal conduc t involved; (e) e vidence and information offer ed by the par ties on the enha

nceme nt and mitigating f

actor s set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35-113 and 40-35- 114;-7-

(f) any statistical information provided by the Administrative Offic e of the Courts as to Tennesse e
se nte nc ingpr a c tic e s f

or sim ila r of fe ns e s; and (g ) any state me nt the de fe nd ant w ish e s to make in h is

ow n be ha lf a

bo ut se nte nc ing

. T. C.A

. § 40 -3 5- 21 0( b) (2 00 6) ; see also Carter , 254 S.W .3d at 343; Sta te v . I mf e ld , 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (Tenn. 2002)

.
The defe ndant’s criminal conduct, whic h is the subject of this appea l, occur red subse quent to the enac tment of the 2005 Amendments to the SentencingAct, which be came eff ective June 7, 2005. The amended statute no long er imposes a presumptive sentenc e. Carter , 254 S.W .3d at 343. As furthe r explained by

our supre me cour

t in Carter ,
the trial cour

t is free to select a

ny sentenc e withi n the applica ble ra ng e so longas the leng th o f t h e sentenc e is “c onsistent with the purposes and princ iples of [the Sentencin g Ac t] .” Those pur poses and pr inciples include “ the impositi on of a sentenc e justly

deser ved in re lation to the s eriousness of the offe nse,” a punishment sufficie nt “to preve nt crime a nd promote re spect for

the law,” and conside ration of

a d e f e n d a n t’ s “ p o te n ti a l o r

la c k o f p o te n ti a l f

o r

. . . r e h a b il it a ti o n [. ]”

Id . (citations and f

ootnote omitted). The 2005 Amendme nt further deleted appellate revie w of the weig hing of

the enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors, as it r ender ed these fac tors mere ly advisory and non-binding in the sentenc ing. Id. at 344. Under c ur re nt se nt enci ng law, the tr ia l c ourt is, nonetheless, r equire d to “consider ” an a dvisory se nte n c in g

g u id e li n e that is releva

nt to the sentencing deter mination, including the a

pplication of enhancing and mitigating f actor s. Id . Howeve r, the trial court’s w eig hing of

various mi t i g ating and enha ncing fac tors is now left to the trial cour t’s sound discretion. Id . at 3 44. Thus, the 2005 re vision to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-210 incre ased the amount of discre tion a trial court e x erc ises when imposing a sente ncing term. Id

.
Nonethele ss, to facilitate a ppellate r eview, the trial court is required to place on the re cord its reasons for

imposing the spec ific sentenc e, includingthe identifica t i o n o f t he mitigating a nd enhanc ement fa ctors found, the specific fa ct s s u pporting eac h enhanc ement fa ctor found, a nd the

me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mit ig a tin g and e nh ancem ent fa c tor s h a ve be e n e va luate d a nd ba lanc e d in deter mining the se ntence

. Id . at 34 3. I f our re vie w re fl e c ts that the tr ia l c ourt a pp lie d in a pp ro pr ia te mitigating and/or e nhance ment fac tors o r o t herw ise failed to f ollow the SentencingAct, the pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss f a ils and our r e vie w i s de novo

. Id . at 345. Howe ver, e rror in the application of a

n enhanc ing f

actor or fa ctors will not ne cessa rily require modification of the sentenc e if the sentenc i n g re cord r efle cts that the trial cour t considere d the provisions of Tenne ssee Code Anno ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b )( 1) -( 7) in d e te rm ini ngthe sp e c if ic se nte nc e le ng th. Un de r t he se g uid e lin e s, we pr oc e e d to re vie w the de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc ingargume nts

. The applicable sentencing rang e for a defenda nt convicted of a C lass C felony and sente nced as a Rang e I offe nder is three to six y ear s. T.C.A. § 40-35-112( c)( 3) (2006) . As previously noted, the trial cour

t imposed the max imum s en tence of six y ear s. I n deter mining the leng th of the sentenc e, the trial court applied two enhanc ement fac tors: ( 1) the defe ndant had a previous history of cr iminal convictions or criminal beha vio r; an d (2 ) the pe rsonal injuries inflicted upon or the-8-

amount of damag e to the prope rty sustained by

or take n from the victim was pa rticularly g reat. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 1), (6) (2006). Additionally , the cour t determined o n e applicable mitigating fac tor, that being that the defe ndant, “althoug h g uilty of the c rime, committed the off ense unde r such unusual circ umstances that [it is] unlikely that a s u s tained intent to violate the law motivated the criminal conduc t.” T.C.A. § 40-35-113 ( 11) (2006)

.
On appea l, the defe ndant contests the application of both enha nceme nt fac tors. Wit h reg ard to fac tor (1), he argues t hat t he court err ed in applying this fac tor bec ause the prior convic tion which th e d e f e n d an t ha d

w a s s ta le
, s p e c if

ic a ll y a s ixt e e n

- y e ar

- o ld

c o n v ic ti o nf

o r a g g r a v a te d

r o b b e r y

. We reje ct the petiti oner’ s argument that the fa ctor wa s improperly applied. Reg ardle ss of the ag e of the prior convic tion, the conviction rema ins as part of the defe ndant’s prior rec o rd. Additionally , the

rec ord also re flec ts that the defe ndant had a p ri o r conviction for driving on a suspende d license, further supporting a

pplication of the fa ctor.

Wit h reg ard to fa ctor (6) , that the persona l injurie s inflicted wer e g reat, the defe ndant ar g ues that this factor w as misapplied beca use it wa s an ele ment of the off ense. H e conte nds that in order to char g e a de fenda

nt with ag g ravated assault, “there ha s to be a ser ious bodily injury committed; otherwise, the defe ndant will be char g ed with a simple a ssault.” We disag ree . Simpl e assa ult occurs wh e n a pe rs on “ int e nti on a lly , kno wi ng ly , or re c kle ssl y c a us e s bo dil yinj ur y ” to another . T.C.A. § 39-12-101( a)( 1) (e mphasis added) . Ag g rava t ed as s ault occur s when a person “ intentionally

or kn ow ing ly

c omm its an a ssa

ult

. . . a nd (A ) [c ]au se s se ri ou s b od ily inj ur y ; or ( B ) [ u ] s e s o r

d i s p l a ys
a dead ly we a

po n. ” T. C.A . § 39 -1 3- 10 2( a )( 1) (A )- (B ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult statu t e i s w r i t t e n i n t h e d i s j u n c t i v e ; t h u s , c o n t r ar

y t o t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s ar g u m e n t , i t i s p os sib le to commit an ag g ravated assault whe re no se rious bodily injury exis ts if a dea dly

wea pon is used.

Whil e we ag ree with the defe ndant that an element of the offe nse cannot be used to e nhance his sentence , in this case, we cannot co n clude that one was. The defe ndant was indicte d and

c on vic te d of c omm itt ing a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult by us e of a de a dly we a po n. Thus , on ly pr oo f o f b od ily injury , not serious bodily

injury , was re quired to establish the char g ed cr ime. I n Sta te v . S e an Im fe ld
, this court has pre viously

rec og nized that “serious bodily injury ” is not an ele ment of the offe nse as char g ed in this case. N o. E2000-00094-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App.
, at Kn o x v ille, Feb. 27, 2001).

The Im

fe ld c ourt we nt on to not e that “pr oo f of se ri ou s bod ily inj ur y wi ll a lw ay s c on sti tut e proof of particula

rly g reat injury ,” which suppor ts application of enha

nceme nt fac tor (6). Id . (citing S ta tev

. Jones , 8 83 S.W .2d 597, 602 (Tenn. 1994) ). “Ser ious bodily injury ” mea

ns bodily injury which in v o lv e s a

s u b s ta n ti a l r is k o f d e a th
, p r o tr a c te d

u n c o n s c io u s n e s s , e xtr e me p h y s ic a l p ain, protrac ted or obvious disfig ureme nt, or protrac ted loss or substantial impair ment of a func tion of a bodily member, or g an, or me ntal fac ulty

. Id. We ag ree with the trial court’s conclusion that serious bo dil y inj ur y wa s e sta bli sh e d in thi s c a se un de r t

wo fa c e ts o f the de fi nit ion . T he c ourt no te d th a t “ it strains the imag ination . . . [ that hitting a victim in the head a nd] l aying the m out with an aluminum baseba ll bat . . . if that doesn’t invoke a substantial risk of death, I , fra nkly don’t know what would.” We ag ree . The c ourt also conc luded that the victim suff ere d protrac ted and obvious disfig ureme nt-9-

based upon the thirty -seve n stitches and the rema ining sc ar, “ a ver y siz eable , noticeable scar

that [t he

c ourt ] co uld

se e fr om f

or ty -fi ve or fi ft y

fe e t” awa

y . We lik e wi se a g re e that th is i s su ff ic ie nt t o establish serious bodily

injury

. Be cause the rec ord supports the conclusion that serious bodily injury

was e stablished, we f

ind no error in the court’s a pplication of the fa ctor that the injuries suf fer ed

wer e par ticularly g reat.
Finally , the def

endant c o n t en ds that “the c ourt err ed in finding bey ond a re asonable doubt that th e a g g ra

vatin g fa c tor s o utw e ig he d th e [de fe nd ant’ s] mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. ” I n sup po rt of hi s argument, he relies upon the mitigatingevidenc e pre sented that he was a n ordaine d minist er a

nd a active c ommunity

activist; that he renova

tes and builds homes for low inc ome people; that he sponsors L ittle L eague footba ll teams; and that he re ceive d a colleg e deg ree fo l lowing his prior rele ase f rom prison.

The defe ndant’s argument must fa il, howe ver, as the new sentenc ing act, under which he wa s sentenc ed, dele ted appe llate re view of the weig hing of enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors, as they

w e r e r e n d e r e d me r e ly a d v is o r y

. Carter , 2 5 4 S.W .3d at 344. All the fa cts relied upon by the defe ndant wer e pre sented to the trial c ourt, and the c ourt, throug h its stateme n t s o n the re cord, obviously considere d such fa cts. I f the re cord e stablishes that th e cour t considere d the advisory fac tors along with all the principles of se ntencing , the trial cour t’s weig hing of

various mitigating and en h an ci n g fa ct o rs is now left to the trial c ourt’s sound discre tion. Id . A s su c h, thi s is su e is without merit.

B. F ull Probation

Ne xt, th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e tr ial cou rt e rr e d in de nyinghis re qu e st f

or fu ll probation. At the time the defe ndant committed the offe nse, a defe ndant who rec eived a sente nce of ten y ears or less wa s elig ible for pr obation, subject to ce rtain exceptions not applicable he re. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 30 3(a) (20 06 ). Ho we ve r, e ve n th ou g h e lig ibl e , h e is n ot a uto ma tic a lly

e nti tle d to pr ob a tio n a s a

ma tte r o f l aw. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 30 3( b)

. Mo re ov e r, the burd e n is on the de fe nd a nt t o show that the denia l of full probation wa s improper. Id .; se e als o S tat e v . S um me rs , 159 S.W .3d 586, 5 9 9

- 6 0 0 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2d a t 16 9) ; State v. Bak

er , 9 6 6 S. W. 2d 429, 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that “[a] criminal defendant se eking full probation bea rs the burden of appea l of showing the sentenc e actua lly imposed is imprope r, and that full probation will be in both the best interest of the de fenda nt and the public”)

.
There is no brig ht line rule for deter mining whe n a def

endant should be g rante d probation. State v. Bingham , 910 S

. W

. 2 d 4 4 8, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)
, overruled on othe r grounds by State v Hoope r , 2 9 S.W.3 d 1, 9 -1 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . E ve ry se nte nc ingde c isi on

ne c e ssa ri ly re qu ir e s a
case -by -ca se ana ly sis. Id

. I n deter mining one’ s suitabilit y

for f ull probation, the court may consider the ci r c u ms ta

n c e s o f th e o f f e n s e , th e d e f

e n d an t’ s p o te n ti a l o r

la c k o f p o te n ti a l f

o r r e h a b il it a tion, whether full probation will unduly depre ciate the seriousness of the offe nse, and w hether a sente nce other than f

ull probat i o n wo uld provide an e ffe ctive dete rre nt to others likely to commit si milar

c ri me s. T. C.A . § § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b )( 4) , - 10 3( 5) , - 10 3( 1) (B ) ( 20 06 ); see also Bingham , 910 S.W .2d at-10-

456. Denial of

probation may

be base d solely

upon the circ umstances of the offe nse whe n they

are of such a nature as to outweig h all other fa ctors fa voring probation. Id. (c i t i n g Fletche r , 805 S.W .2d at 788-89).

I n deter mining whether to g rant or deny full probation, additional co n s iderations include the defe ndant’s criminal rec ord; social history and pre sent condition of the defe ndant, including his or her me ntal and phy sical conditions wher e appr opriate; defe ndant’s ame nability

to corre ction and g ener al atti tude, i ncluding behavior since

arr e st, ho me e nv ir on me nt, c ur re nt d ru g us a g e , e mot ion a l st a

bil ity , p a st e mpl oy

me nt, g ener al re putation, marital stability , family re sponsibili ty , and the be st interests of both the defe ndant and the public.

Sta te v . B lac k

hu rst , 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d

8 8 , 9 7 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g State v. W a s h i n g ton , 866 S.W. 2d 95 0, 95 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; State v. Boy d , 925 S.W .2d 237, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ).

Although de terre nce i s a fa ct o r t o b e co n s i d er ed
, i t wi l l n ot alone support a denial of alternative sentenc ing. Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2d a t 17 0. Tr ia l c ourt s are a c c or de d s ig nif ic ant l a tit ud e in deter mining whe ther de terre nce is ne ce s s ary and inca rce ration appr opriately

addre sses that nee d. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d at 10. We will presume that a tr ial court’s de cision to incarc erate a de fenda nt on the basis of a

need f or deterre nce is corre ct if any rea sonable pe rson looking at the entire r ecor d

c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t : ( 1 ) a

n e e d t o d e t e r s i m i l ar c r i m e s i s p r e s e n ti nt h e p art i c u l ar c o m m u n i t y, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whol e; and ( 2) inca

rce ration of the de fenda

nt may rationally

serve
as a deter rent to others similarly

situated and likely

to commit si milar crimes. Id

. I n ma kin g the se deter mina t i o ns, a trial cour

t is to consider: (1) whe ther other incidents of the c harg ed off ense a re incre asing ly

prese nt in the communi t y , j u risdiction, or the state a s a whole; (2) whether the de fe nd ant’ s c rime was th e re su lt o f i nte nti on a l, k no wi ng , o r r e c kle ss c on du c t or wa s o the rw ise mot ivate d b y

a de sir e to p ro fi t or

g a in f ro m the c ri min a l be havio r; (3 ) w he the r t he de fe nd ant’ s c ri me and convic tion have re ceive d substantial publicity bey ond that normally expected in the ty pical ca se; (4 ) w h e th e r th e d e f

e n d an t w a s a me mb e r o f a c r im in a l e n te r p r is e o r s u

b s ta n ti a ll y e n c o u rag ed or

a ssi ste d o the rs in a c hie vin g the c ri min a l ob je c tiv e ; and

(5 ) wh eth e r t

he de fe nd ant h a s p re vio us ly eng ag ed in cr iminal conduct of the sa me ty pe as the offe nse in question, irrespe ctive of w hether such conduct resulted i n previous arrests of convictions. Id

. at 10-12. These fac tors are meant to serve only as a guide, and a

court ne ed not find that all of these fac tors are prese n t b ef o re or dering incar cer ation based on a need to de ter similar cr imes. State v. Edward Clay and Timothy B. Clay
, No. M2002-01319-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App., at Na shville, Apr. 29, 2003).

I n order ing a

sentenc e o f split confinement in this case , the trial cour t made the f

ollowing fi nd ing s o f f

a c t:

L ooking a t the probation cr iteria, the nature a nd c ir cumstance s of the cr iminal conduct involved
, t h e def endant’ s potential or lack of potential for r ehabilitation. Y o ukn o w , a tf

i r s tg l an c e , yo ukn o w , w i t h o u tt h e a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, yo uw o u l d

s ay,-11-

of cour se he is; but, y ou know - but y ou g et one major felony ever y ten y ear s. Idon’t know - I don’t know about his ang er pr oblem- it seems like he ha s one.

“Whether he ’s sentenc ed to full probation would unduly depre ciate the

se ri ou sn e ss o f t

he of fe ns e .” Ime an, I thi nk the a ve ra g e pe rs on on the str e e t w ou ld think that if Ihit this person in the ba ck of the head or the front of

the hea d with a baseba ll bat, Iwonder

what my odds [ ] of g oing to jail ar e. I mean, I think y our
aver ag e per son would say , “You know, Iwould expect to serve at least a fe w day s.” You know, it’s almost laug hable. I t’s kind of comical, almost, to thi nk that someone

c ou ld t hink, “ Wel l, I

c ou ld w ha c k th is guy in the fr on t of the he a d - c ra c k h is s ku ll - g ive him thirty -seve n stitches, and they ’re g oing to g ive me probation.” You know. I t’ s w hy the de te rr e nt e ff

e c t is so imp or

tant.

Yo u k no w, the re ’s se ve n th ou sa nd a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult in ou r c ity

that sa me ye ar - o v e r 5 0 0 0 t h e n e x tye ar

. W h a tk i n d o f m e s s a g e d o e s t h a ts h o w t h a t , “ H e y,
ever y body , come to Division V of Criminal Court, and y ou’ll g et probation for whac king some body

with a base ball bat.” I

don’t think that [ ] would be a very g ood de te rr e nt e ff

e c t, fr ank ly ; and we ig hin g e ve ry thi ng , I thi nk [the de fe nd ant] s ho uld have kn own b e tte r t

ha n to do thi s. He wa s a

ng ry , a nd Ido n’ t be lie ve that f

ull probation would be a

ppropriate in this case.

On appe al, th e d ef

endant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d in relying upon “ an unauthenticated broc hure c o m p i l ed by the Attorney

Gene ral’s O ffice of the statistical cr imes committed during the 2005 y ear .” He asser ts that the b ro ch u re s h o uld not have bee n admitted because i t “ s e r

v e d n o p u r p o s e o th e r

th anto p r e

ju d ic e th e tr ia l c o u rt a g a in s t t h e [d e f e n d an t] by showing that the number of ag g ravated assaults in Shelby [C ]ount y wer e on the rise and that there

was a need to se nd a messag e to the public.”

Alt h o u gh n o t

s p ec i fi ca l l y

an al y z i n g al l th e r eq u i s i t e c o n ce rn s fo r d en y i n g fu l l p ro b at ion, after

a revie w of the re cord, w e conc lude that the trial c ourt did consider the fac ts and rea ched the proper
c on c lus ion

tha t th e de fe nd ant h a d f

a ile d to c arr

y his burd e n o f e sta

bli sh inghis su ita

bil it y for f

ull probation. The tr ial court e x plicitly ref ere nced the defe ndant’s contr ibutions t o and wor k in the community for which he had been rec og nized. Nonethele ss, in assessing the defe ndant’s potential fo r r eh ab i l i t at i o n , h e n o t edt h at t h e d ef en d an t a p p ea re d

t o h av e a n ger

i s s u es an d

wa s i n cu rr i n g a
ma jor fe lony c on vic tio n e ve ry

te n y e ars . T he c ourt

a lso , in m ul ti pl e state me nts , in dic a te d th a t it believed that the nature of circ ums tance s of the off ense w ere serious and e specia lly violent. The

c ourt no te d th e se ve ri ty

of the de fe nd ant’ s in

jur ie s a nd sp e c if ic a lly state d th a t, l ike the jur

y , it did not be li e v e th e d e f

e n d an t’ s c la im o f s e lf

- d e f e n s e , n o ti n g th a t th e d e f

e n d an t w a s mu c h la

r g e r and y oung er tha

n the victim. Moreove r, a rea ding of the court’s finding s establishes that it conclude d that allowing the def

endant to ser

ve his entire s en t en ce on probation would depr eciate the

s e r i o u s n e s s o f

t h e o f f e n s e an d w o u l d s e n d t h e w r o n g m e s s a g e t o o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y. We ag ree with these finding s.-12-

Whil e the tria l court did not expl icitly analy ze the five fa ctors to deter m i n e if the ne ed for deter renc e supported a

denial of f

ull probation, the cou rt o b v i o u s ly rea ched suc h a finding based upon its stateme nts, a

nd we ag ree that conclusion is suppor ted by the rec ord. Wit h reg ard to fa ctor (1), the inc rea sing pr esenc e of a g g ravated assaults in the community , we c onclude this fac tor weig hs in favor f

or the ne ed for

deter renc e. W e re

j ec t the def

endant’ s argument that the document submitt ed by

the State should not have be en re l i ed u p on. I t was cle arly an off icial publication, ref lecting that there wer e sever al thousand ag g ravated assaults committed a nnually

. Fa ctor (2) , that the conduc t was the re sult of intentional, knowing, or rec kless conduct also weig hs in favor of the need f or dete rre nce. T he def

endant, upon be ing inf

ormed of the brea

k-in, drove to the vic tim’s home, conf

ronted him, and attacked him. After taking the victim ba ck to the proper ty , he, without provocation, swung a

baseba ll at the victim’s head. The rec ord is void of any evidenc e with re g ard to f a c tor (3 ), e xce ssi ve pu

bli c ity , o r f

a c to r (4) , a

c ri min a l e nte rp ri se ; thus , th e se fa c tor s mi tig a te ag ainst the nee d for de terre nce. H oweve r, fa ctor (5) , previous similar conduct, we ighs in fa vor of the ne e d f or de te rr e nc e . T he State pr e se nte d e vid e nc e tha t th e de fe nd ant, a lth ou g h no t c ha rg e d w ith

a cr ime, had previously attacke d and assa ulted a man whom he believed ha d stolen a ce ll phone from him. After r eview, w e conc lude that the bala ncing of thes e factors supports the trial cour t’s conclusion that t h e n ee d fo r dete rre nce w as pre sent in this case. As suc h, we f ind no error

in the court’s de nial of the de fenda nt’s reque st for a se ntence of full probation.

C. Restit ution
Finally , the def

endant c ontends that the t ri al co u rt err ed in awa rding $8800 in restitution direc tly to the victim without proof of his medical bills and lost wag es. W hen a de fenda nt challeng es
a trial court’s restitution or der, this court conducts a de novo revie w wit h a pre sumption t hat the trial court’s de terminations are corr ect. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 40 1( d) ; State v. Johnson
, 968 S.W .2d 883, 884 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. A trial court, in conjunction with a sentenc e of c onfinement or pr obation,

m ay order

a def endant to make restitution to the victim of the offense

. T

. C. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 4 ( c ) (2) (2006). “ The purpose of re stitut ion is not onl y to compensate th e victim but also to puni sh and reha bilitate the g uilty .” Johnson , 968 S.W. 2d a t 88 5 ( c itatio n o mit te d) . T he sta nd ard s se t f

or th i n Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -3 04 , w hic h g ov e rn re sti tut ion

in c on jun c tio n w ith probation, ar e applica

ble to restitution issues in c ases involving total c onfinement. T.C.A. § 40-35- 304(g ) (2006) . The statute indicates that the amount o f restitut ion should be based on a victim’s pecunia ry loss. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 30 4( b) . Pe c un iary los s in c lud e s:
(1) All spec ial damag es, but not g ener al damag es, as substantiated by evidenc e in the

rec ord or as ag ree d to by

the def endant; and ( 2) Reasona

ble out-of- pocket e x penses incurre d by t h e victim resulting from the f iling of c harg es or c ooperating in the investigation and prosec ution of the o ff en se; provided, that pa

y ment of spec ial prosec utors shall not be consider ed an out- of-poc ket expense.-13-

T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 0 4 ( e )

. S p e c i a l d a m a g e s ar e t h o s e w h i c h ar e “ t h e a c tu a l
, b u tn o tt h e n e c e s s a r y,
re su lt o f t

he inj ur y c omp la ine d o f, and

wh ic h in

fa c t f oll owit as a natur a l and pr oximate conseque nce.” Sta te v . Le wis , 917 S.W .2d 251, 255 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.

I t is unnecessa

ry for the sentenc ing court to de termine restitution in acc ordanc e with the strict rules of da

mag es applied in c ivil cases. Johnson , 968 S.W .2d at 887. Howeve r, althoug h the rules of dama ges ar e re laxed, they are not completely

discarde d. State v. Bottoms , 87 S.W .3d 95, 108 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ). Th e su m of re sti tut ion or de re d must be re a so na ble bu t do e s n ot h a ve to mirror or equal the pre cise pe cuniar y loss. Sta te v . S

mi th
, 898 S.W .2d 742, 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 1 9 9 5 ). There is no set formula or me thod for dete rmining the amount. Johnson , 9 69 S.W. 2d a t 88 6. Th e se nte nc ingc ourt mus t c on sid e r n ot o nly

the vic tim ’s los s but a lso the financ ial resour ces a nd future a

bility of the de fenda

nt to pay or per form in deter

mining the amount and method of p aym ent. I n deter mining the a

ppropriate amount of re stitut ion, a trial court must asce rtain bot h the amount of t he victim ’s l oss and the amount which the de fenda nt can

rea sonably

be expected to pa

y

. Bottoms , 87 S.W .3d at 108 ; seealso T.C.A. § 40-35-304( d).

A victim seeking restitution must prese nt sufficient e vidence to allow the trial cour t to make a reasonable
, reliable deter mination as to the amount of the vic tim’s losses. Id

. Ge ne ra l st a te me nts by a vic timre g ard ingthe a mou nt o f h is o r h e r l os s c on ta ini ngno e xplanatio n as to howthe vic tim

arr ived at the amount ar e i n s u fficient. Sm ith
, 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t7 4 7

. W h i l e a

v i c t i m ’ s t e s t i m o n y, standing alone, may be sufficie nt to establish specia l da mag es for the purposes of restitut i o n , t he victim should ex plain how he or she ar rived at the amount of dama g es re quested

. Fur ther documentation supporting the victim’s testimony is helpful.

When orderingrestitution, the trial court shall spec ify the amount of time f

or pay ment and may permit pay

ment or per formanc e of r estitution i n installments. T.C.A. § 40-35-304(c )

. H o w e v e r, the cour t may not establish a pay

ment or per formanc e schedule which extends bey ond the maxim um statutory term of pr obation supervision that could have been imposed f or the off ense. Id

.
Th e de fe nd ant’ s e nti re argume nt w ithre g ard to t his iss ue is a s f

oll ow s:

The trial c ourt err ed in re quiring that [ t he def endant] pay

restitution in the amount of $8,800.00 direc tly to the vi ctim, who was an admitted drugabuser . The trial court did not direc t the [defendant] to pay damag es to t h e R egi o n al M edica l Center, nor

did the trial court e ven require proof that the victim had damag es totaling $8800.00. The only

thing that the tr ial judge said was, “Mr. Patter son, Iexpect y ou to pay The Med in f

ull for what they

are out.” . . . The tria l co u rt d i d n o t require proof of the victim’s lost wag es or that the vic tim ever re ally worke d a consistent job. The $8800.00 was just a number that the State thre w out to the trial judg e, and he ag ree d without question.-14-

I nitially , we note that the defe ndant has fa iled to cite to any law supporting hi s argument that the re stitut ion ordere d was improper . Pursuant to Tennesse e Rule of A p p ellate Proc edure 27, the issue could be de emed wa ived. Nonethe less, we e lect re view in the intere st of justice.

F oll ow ingre vie w o f t

he re c or d, we c on c lud e tha t th e de fe nd ant’ s ar g ume nt is w ith ou t me ri t. Contrary to his assertion, the $8800 was not a random figure “ thrown” out by the State. I ncluded in the prese ntence repor

t are medical bill s totaling $7301.26, incurre d by the vi ctim as a r esult of the injuries cause d by the defendant’s assault. L ikewise, the vic tim testi fied at the sentenc ing he aring that he wa s a self- employ ed ele ctricia n and that he ha d been una ble to work for

a period of six wee ks due to his injuries. Upon questioning, he stated t hat he had los t $2500 in income during that pe riod, inc lud ingthe job he wa s sc he du le d to pe rf or m th e da y of the a ssa ult . T he de fe nd ant e xpla ine d h is estimation of t he los t wag es, and the t rial court specific ally stated t hat he found t he victim to be a

cre dible witness in this reg ard. See State v . Charles R. Turner , N o. M200 3-0 20 64 -C CA -R 3- CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec . 1, 2004) (testimony of victim expl aining how he a rrived at fi g ur e fo r l os t w a g e s su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

re st it ut io n awa

rd ). Th e vic tim ’s me dic a l bi lls and los t

wa g e s, bo th p e c un iary

los se s in c ur

re d a s a re su lt of the de fe nd ant’ s a ssa ult , to ta l $8 80 1. 26 . T hu s, we must conc lude that the re cord suppor ts the trial court’s a

war d of re stitut io n i n t h e amount of $8800.

L ike wi se , the de fe nd ant’ s argume nt that the tr ia l c ourt awa rd e d the re sti tut ion

to t he vic tim
, an admitted druguser, without d i re ct ing that he pay the medica l bills is also without merit. The victim in the case is the pe rs o n wh o incurre d the losses as he is pe rsonally responsible for

the medical bills incurre d as a r esult of this assault. Thus, he is the p ro p er person to re ceive that restitution. I t is his responsibility to se e that the medica l bills are paid; that is not a matter for the court’s dire ction. Nonethele ss, the court infor med the victim that he should f orwa rd the re stitut ion

rec eived to the pr oper pa

rties, thus, making the victim awar e of w hat the re stitut ion was aw arde d for.

Although not r aised by the defe ndant on appea l, a nd notwithstanding that the amount of the restitution was supported by the evidence presented, the rec ord is silent with reg ard to a ny finding by the tr ia l c ourt

of the de fe nd ant’ s a

bil ity to p ay the or de re d r e sti tut ion

duri ngthe le ng th o f h is

se nte nc e . T he re c or d e sta

bli sh e s that the de fe nd ant is e mpl oy e d b y c or po ra tio ns wh ic h d e a l w ithhis

c on str uc tio n o f h ome s f

or the c omm

un ity , b ut n o me nti on

is m a de of his e arn ing s. As thi s is a require d finding presc ribed by the statute, we must remand for a dete rmination of the def endant’ s ability to pay the orde red r estitution during the sc heduled pe riod. Se e Ar dieMa e Culbr e ath , No. M2007-01157-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jul y 21, 2008).-15- CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nt of conviction and se ntence imposed, with respec t to leng th and manner

of ser vice, a re affirme d. Howeve r, wit h reg ard to the order of restitution, the

case is remande d for a

deter mination of the defe ndant’s ability to pay

.

___________________________________ JOHN EVE RETT WILL IAMS, JUDGE