This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-1103

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: 

C. L. C., D. L. F., III, D. E. L., Jr., Parents.

Filed December 5, 2016

Reversed

Halbrooks, Judge

Wabasha County District Court

File No. 79-JV-15-965

Kurt J. Knuesel, Knuesel Law Firm, Winona, Minnesota (for appellant C.L.C.)

D.L.F., III, Rochester, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Mark Jarstad, Wabasha, Minnesota (for respondent D.E.L., Jr.)

Karrie Kelly, Wabasha County Attorney, Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County 

Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Wabasha County)

Michelle Frohrip, Rochester, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and 

Kirk, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HALBROOKS, Judge

Following the district court’s adjudication of her children as children in need of 

protection or services (CHIPS), appellant argues that the district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction. We conclude that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, but 
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because the district court failed to comply with the requirements of Minn. R. Juv. Prot. 

P. 40.02 in adjudicating the children as CHIPS, we reverse.

FACTS

Appellant C.L.C. is the mother of two children, A.F. and G.L., whose fathers are 

respondents D.L.F. and D.E.L., respectively. In October 2015, the Wabasha County 

Department of Social Services (the county) petitioned the district court to adjudicate A.F. 

and then unborn G.L. as CHIPS. On January 22, 2016, the day set for trial, the county 

informed the district court that the parties had reached an agreement. The three parents 

agreed to admit the allegations in the CHIPS petition, on the understanding that the district 

court would withhold adjudication for 90 days under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02. The 

district court outlined the agreement on the record:

All right, I will accept the factual bases for the three 

admissions. I will follow the agreement and agree to a 90-day 

withholding of adjudication on condition that the parties 

cooperate fully with Social Services and the case plan. That 

you meaningfully engage in any mental health or chemical 

dependency treatment that is recommended for you, and should 

we be reviewing this roughly halfway through the period of the 

stay to see how things are going?

The district court emphasized to the parents that “there’s an awful lot riding on this,” noting 

that if they did well, “the case gets dismissed in 90 days.”

The district court thereafter made written findings that the parents had validly 

admitted the allegations in the petition, specifically that the children were without proper 

food, clothing, shelter, or education under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(3) (2014). The 

district court found that the children were in need of protection or services on that basis, 
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and that the children’s best interests would be served by remaining in the custody of the 

parents (both children were then living with C.L.C. and D.E.L.) under protective 

supervision of the county. The order provides that the adjudication of the children as 

CHIPS “shall be withheld in accord with rule 40.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile 

Protection for a period of 90 days.” 

After a March 14 review hearing, based on C.L.C.’s and D.E.L.’s lack of progress

with their case plans as well as an incident involving two other children in their care, the 

district court transferred custody of A.F. to his father, D.L.F., and instructed the county to 

file a formal motion for emergency protective care (EPC) of G.L. After a hearing, the 

district court denied the EPC motion because the county had not shown material changes 

supporting out-of-home placement at that time. The stay of adjudication remained in place.

The district court next held a review hearing on April 20, 2016, which was 89 days 

into the 90-day stay of adjudication. At the hearing, the district court ordered out-of-home 

placement for G.L. based on “material, significant issues that have come up within the last 

week or week and a half.” Significantly, the stay of adjudication was not addressed at the 

April 20 review hearing or in the recommendations filed in advance of this hearing. 

Shortly after the hearing, the county realized that it had overlooked the CHIPS 

adjudication in its proposed order. Later on April 20, the county filed a letter with an 

amended proposed order calling for revocation of the stay and adjudication of the children 

as CHIPS. The letter states that the filing was served on counsel for parents, but C.L.C.’s 

counsel contends that he was never served. 
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On April 21, the district court signed two orders: a review-hearing order (filed April 

21) and an amended review-hearing order (filed April 26). The review-hearing order 

reiterated the factual bases and statutory grounds for the district court’s CHIPS finding, 

directed out-of-home placement for G.L., and continued to withhold adjudication under 

rule 40.02 “and the order handed down at the January 22, 2016 hearing which provided for 

a 90 day stay.” The amended review-hearing order was identical in all respects except that 

it revoked the stay of adjudication, made findings regarding the stay, and adjudicated the

children as CHIPS. 

The district court held an intermediate disposition hearing on June 1, 2016. At this 

hearing, C.L.C.’s counsel argued that if the stay expired without a CHIPS adjudication at 

a hearing, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Because no one present 

could recall with certainty whether the 90-day stay or CHIPS adjudication had been 

addressed at the April 20 hearing, the district court continued the hearing for two weeks so 

that a transcript could be obtained.

On June 15, the hearing resumed, and the county noted, based on its review of the 

transcript that, “in no way was the—the revocation of the stay discussed” at the April 20 

hearing. The county argued that the district court nevertheless retained subject-matter 

jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 12(2) (2014) because the parents had not 

complied with the terms of their case plans as required by the January 22 agreement. In 

the alternative, the county noted that it had prepared a new CHIPS petition for the district 

court’s consideration if the district court concluded that a new petition was necessary. The 

district court took the matter under advisement.
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In a June 21, 2016 order, the district court determined that it “retain[ed] subject

matter jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 12(2) and thus 

the ability to adjudicate the children [as CHIPS].” The order states that the CHIPS 

adjudication had originally been stayed in accord with rule 40.02, but that in its April 21

review-hearing order, the district court had withheld adjudication going forward under 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 12 (2014). The June 21 order revoked the stay and 

adjudicated the children as CHIPS. C.L.C. now appeals.

D E C I S I O N

C.L.C. argues that, under the plain language of Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02, the 

district court erred in determining that it retained “subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

parties” when the 90-day stay expired. The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction 

presents a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Welfare of Children of 

D.M.T.-R., 802 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn. App. 2011). 

Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the court’s power “to hear and determine a 

particular class of actions and the particular questions presented.” McCullough & Sons, 

Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 584-85 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

Because, generally, Minnesota district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over CHIPS 

matters, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter. The specific 

question before us is whether the district court’s jurisdiction over this matter terminated 

upon the expiration of the 90-day stay. 

In support of her jurisdiction argument, C.L.C. cites a case that applies Minn. R. 

Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(F), a rule that expressly provides for termination of juvenile 
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court jurisdiction over a delinquency matter when it has continued without adjudication for 

180 days. See In re Welfare of M.J.M., 766 N.W.2d 360, 364-65 (Minn. App. 2009)

(holding that a district court does not have jurisdiction to revoke a stay of adjudication in 

a juvenile delinquency matter after expiration of the 180-day period allowed by law to 

continue the stay), review denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009). Because Minn. R. Juv. Prot. 

P. 40.02 contains no similar termination-of-jurisdiction provision, C.L.C.’s argument that 

the district court here lacked jurisdiction after the 90-day stay expired is unpersuasive. We 

conclude that the district court correctly determined that it retained subject-matter 

jurisdiction over this CHIPS matter after the 90-day stay of adjudication expired. But this 

does not end our inquiry.

Under rule 40.01, if the district court makes a finding that the statutory grounds set 

forth in a CHIPS petition are proved, the district court shall either adjudicate the child as 

CHIPS or withhold adjudication under rule 40.02. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.01. Here, the 

district court found that the children were in need of protection or services based on the 

parents’ admissions to the allegations in the petition. After finding that the children were 

in need of protection or services, the district court withheld adjudication “in accord with 

rule 40.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection for a period of 90 days.” See

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.01. 

Under rule 40.02, when it is in the best interests of the children, a district court may 

withhold a CHIPS adjudication for up to 90 days from the finding that the statutory grounds 

set forth in the petition have been met. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02, subd. 1. The rule 

further provides: 
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At a hearing, which shall be held within ninety (90) days 

following the court’s withholding of adjudication, the court 

shall either:

(a) dismiss the matter without an adjudication if 

both the child and the child’s legal custodian have complied 

with the terms of the continuance; or

(b) adjudicate the child in need of protection or 

services if either the child or the child’s legal custodian has not 

complied with the terms of the continuance. . . .

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02, subd. 2. Thus, when the district court withholds adjudication 

after making a CHIPS finding, it must either dismiss the matter or adjudicate the children 

as CHIPS at a hearing while the stay is in force.

Here, the 90-day period began on January 22, 2016 and ended on April 21, 2016. 

Two review hearings were held during the 90-day stay, the first on March 14 and the second 

on April 20. No argument was made at either hearing that the parents had complied with 

the terms of the stay by cooperating fully with their case plans and engaging meaningfully 

in recommended treatment. Thus, dismissal of the matter under rule 40.02, subd. 2(a), was 

not appropriate, and the district court was required by rule 40.02, subd. 2(b), to adjudicate 

the children as CHIPS at a hearing.

Not only did the district court not adjudicate the children as CHIPS at the April 20

hearing, neither the parties nor the district court even mentioned CHIPS adjudication or the 

90-day stay. It appears from the transcript that the focus of the hearing was the case-plan 

compliance of C.L.C. and D.E.L. and whether out-of-home placement for G.L. was 

appropriate at that time. The adjudication issue appears simply to have been overlooked.

The county attempted to correct the oversight later that day by calling it to the 

district court’s attention with an amended proposed order addressing adjudication. In part 
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because it appeared at the next hearing that C.L.C. may not have been properly served with 

the county’s proposed order and because there was a question of subject-matter jurisdiction

raised, the district court heard arguments on the question of CHIPS adjudication. The 

district court then filed a new order on June 21, revoking the stay and adjudicating the 

children as CHIPS. 

In the June 21 order, the district court stated that its April 21 order “continued to 

withhold adjudication pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 12.” But the April 21 

order makes no mention of Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 12. The April 21 order reiterates 

the earlier CHIPS finding and states that the adjudication “shall continue to be withheld in 

accord with both rule 40.02 . . . and the order handed down at the January 22, 2016 hearing 

which provided for a 90 day stay.” The 90-day stay of adjudication that was granted on 

January 22, 2016 expired on April 21, 2016 without a CHIPS adjudication at a hearing. 

When a district court withholds adjudication under rule 40.02, the district court must 

conduct a hearing within 90 days at which it either dismisses the case based on compliance 

or adjudicates the children as CHIPS. Here, the district court did not adjudicate the children 

as CHIPS at a hearing within 90 days of the January 22 stay of adjudication. Because the 

CHIPS adjudication did not comply with rule 40.02, we reverse.

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Reversed.

 

1

 C.L.C. also argues that the district court’s amended review-hearing order filed on April 

26 should be vacated as it was the result of an ex parte communication by the county. 

Having reversed on other grounds, we decline to reach this argument.