J-S62005-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DAVID ANTONIO RUFFIN

Appellant No. 378 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 21, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0000023-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2016

David Antonio Ruffin (“Appellant”) appeals from the dismissal of his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9541 et seq. After careful review, we affirm.

On April 6, 2015, Appellant pleaded guilty to institutional vandalism,1

resisting arrest,2retail theft,3and disorderly conduct.4 Appellant’s counsel 

field a petition for appeal bail, which the trial court denied. On May 20, 

2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to pay a fine of $50.00 for the 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3307.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3929.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503.
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retail theft and an aggregate sentence of eight to thirty months’ 

incarceration on the other convictions.5 Appellant did not file a direct 

appeal.

On July 23, 2015, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition.6 The 

Commonwealth filed its answer to the petition on September 1, 2015. On 

October 22, 2015, appointed PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley7 no-merit 

letter in which he indicated there were no meritorious issues, together with a 

petition to withdraw. On December 8, 2015, the PCRA court filed a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a 

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5 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive sentences of 

three to twelve months’ incarceration for the institutional vandalism 

conviction, three to twelve months’ incarceration for the resisting arrest 

conviction, and two to six months’ incarceration for the disorderly conduct 

conviction. Each sentence was a standard range sentence.

6 The allegations contained within Appellant’s PCRA petition included, in their 

entirety:

I never spit on nobody. I never caused any damage to 

Carbondale Police Station nor threw ceiling panels at officers. I 

only attempted to steal one bag of chips, I payed [sic] for the 

rest.

I have never escaped from any institution.

I need a different attorney. He failed to file motion of 

reconsideration, and the plea bargain, for time served.

PCRA Petition, p. 4.

7 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.1988) and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super.1988) (en banc).
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hearing (“Notice of Intent to Dismiss”),8to which Appellant responded on 

December 28, 2015. On January 21, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed the 

petition.9 On February 11, 2016, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.10

In his pro se brief, filed with this Court on May 19, 2016, Appellant 

raises the following issues for review:

1. Whether the representation afforded to appellant was 

defective when his attorney erred in putting no effert into 

appellant bail reduction petition, when counsel was first afforded 

to appellant.

2. Whether appellant’s plea of guilty was unconstitutional when 

the court and my (appellant) attorney erred in not informing me 

the true nature of the charges against me, not providing me with 

the correct statute description(s).

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8

In its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the PCRA court rephrased Appellant’s 

issues as (1) an assertion “that the description of the crimes alleged by the 

Commonwealth is incorrect, and [(2)] that [Appellant] was promised a 

sentence of time served but did not receive it.” Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 

p. 2. The PCRA court further acknowledged that Appellant attempted to 

raise an illegal sentence claim in response to appointed counsel’s 

Turner/Finley letter. See id.

9 On August 17, 2016, this Court remanded this matter out of an abundance 

of caution to determine whether the PCRA court had actually granted 

appointed PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. 

Ruffin, 378 MDA 2016 (unpublished memorandum). On August 23, 2016, 

the PCRA court entered an order confirming that, on December 8, 2015, it 

had entered an order allowing PCRA counsel to withdraw. See Docket No. 

CP-35-CR-0000023-2015, p. 7.

10 The PCRA court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, filed April 7, 2016, adopts the 

reasoning contained in the court’s December 8, 2015 Notice of Intent to 

Dismiss as its 1925(a) opinion.
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3. Whether the representation afforded to appellant was 

defective in not investigating and or performing certain pretrial 

functions.

4. Whether representation afforded to appellant was defective 

when attorney erred in introducing appellant’s mental health 

evaluation, misconduct’s received at Lackawanna county prison, 

and out-of-state warrants.

5. Whether representation afforded to appellant was defective 

when attorney erred in not objecting to the admissibility of 

appellant’s misconduct’s received at Lackawanna county prison 

(LCP), the colored uniform used to designated RHU (restricted 

housing unit) status, out-of-state warrants, mental health 

evaluation, and district attorney introducing details of the case 

that were not in the affidavit.

6. Whether my plea of guily was unconstitutional when the trial 

court erred in allowing me (appellant) to continue entering my 

plea of guilty accepting my plea of guilty after representation 

afforded to me yell at me, using double entendre that ment to 

me a threat after the trial court asked me did I pull down ceiling 

tille panels in the Carbondale Police Station bathroom.

7. Whether my conviction was based upon evidence the 

prosecution and my attorney knew or should have known was 

false.

8. Whether attorney afforded to appellant was defevtive and 

ineffective when attorney erred in not filing an appeal although 

appellant would have wanted to file one.

9. Whether appellant was denied his Eighth Amendment right to 

be free from excessive fines, costs, and cruel and unusual 

punishment

10. whether the trial court erred in sentencing appellant outside 

the standard and aggravated ranges of appellant’s guidelines 

and did not state valid reason for aggravated sentence. 

Appellant’s Brief, Statement of Questions Presented11 (verbatim).

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11 Appellant does not begin numbering his brief until the Argument section.
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Our standard of review is well-settled. “In reviewing the denial of 

PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 

86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa.2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support 

for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 

A.3d 185, 191-192 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). “The scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court 

and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 

311 (Pa.2014) (citation omitted). “It is well-settled that a PCRA court’s 

credibility determinations are binding upon an appellate court so long as 

they are supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d 

998, 1013 (Pa.2013) (citation omitted). However, this Court reviews the 

PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 

1080, 1084 (Pa.Super.2014) (citation omitted).

Appellant first claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to put any 

effort into his bail petition. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 1. This issue is waived 

and lacks merit.

Initially, while Appellant did raise a claim in his PCRA petition that trial 

counsel failed to file a motion for reconsideration or obtain an alleged time 

served plea deal, Appellant did not raise a claim pertaining to counsel 

ineffectiveness resulting from a lack of effort put into a bail petition. 
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Accordingly, Appellant waived this issue for review. See Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (Pa.2006) (“an issue is waived where it was 

not presented in the original or amended PCRA petition below”).

Further, even had Appellant properly raised the issue, it lacks merit. 

Pennsylvania courts apply the Pierce12 test to review claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel:

When a petitioner alleges trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in a 

PCRA petition, he must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from ineffective 

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the 

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have 

taken place. We have interpreted this provision in the PCRA to 

mean that the petitioner must show: (1) that his claim of 

counsel’s ineffectiveness has merit; (2) that counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and (3) that 

the error of counsel prejudiced the petitioner-i.e., that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for the error of counsel, the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. We 

presume that counsel is effective, and it is the burden of 

Appellant to show otherwise.

Commonwealth v. duPont, 860 A.2d 525, 531 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of 

proving all three prongs of this test. Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787 

A.2d 312, 319-320 (Pa.2001). “If an appellant fails to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence any of the Pierce prongs, the Court need not 

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12 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa.1987).
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address the remaining prongs of the test.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 

979 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa.2010) (citation omitted).

Here, at the guilty plea hearing, trial counsel argued for Appellant to 

remain free on appeal bail following his guilty plea. N.T. 4/6/2015, pp. 8-

12. The trial court’s denial of the request does not transform counsel’s 

advocacy into ineffective assistance. See Commonwealth v. Chester, 587 

A.2d 1367 (Pa.1991) (a court may not make a finding of ineffectiveness 

merely because a trial strategy was unsuccessful). 

Next, Appellant claims that his guilty plea was unconstitutional 

because trial counsel failed to inform him of the true nature of the charges 

against him. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 1. Initially, Appellant did not raise 

this claim in his PCRA petition, and it is accordingly waived. Further, trial 

counsel and the trial court explained the nature of the charges Appellant 

faced at his guilty plea hearing. See 4/6/2016, pp. 2, 4, 5-7. Accordingly, 

this claim also lacks merit.

Thirdly, Appellant claims counsel failed to investigate his case and that 

the Commonwealth failed to proffer sufficient evidence to convict him of 

institutional vandalism. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2. Appellant did not 

raise these claims in his PCRA petition, and they are waived. Further, 

Appellant waived these evidence-based claims when he pleaded guilty. See 

Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1275 (Pa.2014) (“upon entry 

of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all claims and defenses other than those 
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sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and what 

has been termed the “legality” of the sentence imposed”).

In his fourth claim, Appellant argues trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by introducing a mental health evaluation. See

Appellant’s Brief, p. 2. This claim is also waived because Appellant did not 

raise it in his PCRA petition. Further, the guilty plea transcript reveals 

counsel mentioned Appellant’s mental health evaluation in the course of 

Appellant’s bail motion, after Appellant’s guilty plea had been entered. See

N.T. 4/6/2016, pp. 9-11. Accordingly, this claim fails.

Fifth, Appellant claims counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

the admissibility of Appellant’s conduct at Lackawanna County Prison in 

relation to the trial court’s imposition of his sentence. See Appellant’s Brief, 

p. 3. This issue is waived by Appellant’s failure to object at sentencing and 

failing to raise it in his PCRA petition. Further, a defendant’s conduct in 

prison is admissible for the trial court’s consideration in imposing sentence. 

See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1017 n.3 

(Pa.Super.2003) (noting that conduct during incarceration appropriate to 

consider at sentencing because it is not otherwise accounted for in 

Sentencing Guidelines). Accordingly, this claim too fails.

In his sixth claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

allowing him to plead guilty after trial counsel yelled at him. See Appellant’s 

Brief, pp. 3-4. This claim is waived for Appellant’s failure to raise it in his 

PCRA petition. Additionally, the guilty plea transcript reveals that Appellant 
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knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea with the court. See

4/6/2015, pp. 3-8. Accordingly, in addition to being waived, this claim lacks 

merit.

Seventh, Appellant claims the prosecution withheld exculpatory 

evidence from the defense. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 4. Appellant waived 

this claim by failing to raise it in his PCRA petition and by pleading guilty.

Appellant’s eighth claim contends trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a direct appeal. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 5. While a petitioner 

is ordinarily entitled to automatic reinstatement of his direct appeal rights 

when counsel fails to file a requested direct appeal,13 Appellant waived this 

claim by failing to raise it in his PCRA petition.

In his ninth claim, Appellant claims the imposition of court costs and a 

$50.00 fine for retail theft violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free 

from cruel and usual punishment. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6. Appellant 

waived this claim by failing to raise it in his PCRA petition. Further, in light 

of the fact Appellant faced a maximum fine of $300.00 for his retail theft 

conviction, his $50.00 fine did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. 

Finally, court costs are not a “punishment” governed by the Eighth 

Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Ciptak, 657 A.2d 1296, 1297 

(Pa.Super.1995), appeal granted, order rev’d on other grounds, 665 A.2d 

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13 See Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706, 714 (Pa.Super.2011). 
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1161 (Pa.1995) (citations omitted) (“A defendant who has been convicted of 

a crime, [sic] is liable for the costs of prosecution . . . The defendant’s 

liability for costs is not part of the punishment for the offense, and it is not a 

sentence to pay something additional to any penalty imposed by law. 

Instead, the costs of prosecution are incident to judgment.”). This claim 

fails.

Finally, Appellant’s tenth claim alleges the trial court erred in 

sentencing him outside the standard and aggravated range of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 6. Again, Appellant waived 

this claim by failing to include it in his PCRA petition. Further, contrary to 

Appellant’s claims, the trial court sentenced Appellant within the standard 

range, despite Appellant’s terrible conduct at the Lackawanna County Prison. 

See N.T. 5/20/2015, p. 6. Accordingly, Appellant’s tenth claim lacks merit.

Appellant’s claims fail for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, we 

affirm the order of the PCRA court dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Order affirmed. Appellant’s applications for bail, release, and 

correction of the original record denied.14 Appellant’s application to expedite 

denied as moot.15

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14 Appellant filed applications for bail on April 19, May 11, 2016, and August 

25, 2016, an application for correction of the record on May 5, 2016, and 

applications for release on June 22 and July 11, 2016.

15 Appellant filed a “Motion for Expediant [sic] Rule” on October 5, 2016.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2016