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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

30 Nebraska Appellate Reports

IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

In re Interest of Madison T. et al., 

children under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Crystal L., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed January 11, 2022. Nos. A-21-102, A-21-120, A-21-121.

1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the findings made by the juvenile court below.

2. Juvenile Courts: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When the evidence is 

in conflict, an appellate court may consider and give weight to the fact 

that the juvenile court observed the witnesses and accepted one version 

of the facts over another.

3. Parental Rights: Proof. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016) contains 11 separate subsections, any one of which can serve as a basis for 

terminating parental rights when coupled with evidence that termination 

is in the best interests of the child.

4. ____: ____. To terminate parental rights, it is the State’s burden to show 

by clear and convincing evidence both that one of the statutory bases 

enumerated in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016) exists and that 

termination is in the child’s best interests.

5. ____: ____. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7) (Reissue 2016) operates 

mechanically and, unlike the other subsections of the statute, does not 

require the State to adduce evidence of any specific fault on the part of 

a parent.

6. Parental Rights: Juvenile Courts. Reasonable efforts to reunify a family are required under the juvenile code only when termination is sought 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(6) (Reissue 2016).

7. Parental Rights: Presumptions: Proof. A child’s best interests are presumed to be served by having a relationship with his or her parent. This 

presumption is overcome only when the State has proved that the parent 

is unfit.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

01/11/2022 08:07 AM CST
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

8. Parental Rights: Statutes: Words and Phrases. Although the term 

“unfitness” is not expressly stated in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 

2016), it derives from the fault and neglect subsections of that statute 

and from an assessment of the child’s best interests.

9. Parental Rights: Words and Phrases. Parental unfitness means a personal deficiency or incapacity which has prevented, or will probably 

prevent, performance of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing 

and which has caused, or probably will result in, detriment to a child’s 

well-being.

10. Parental Rights. The best interests analysis and the parental unfitness 

analysis, in the context of a termination of parental rights case, are separate inquiries, but each examines essentially the same underlying facts 

as the other.

11. Parental Rights: Words and Phrases. A termination of parental rights 

is a final and complete severance of the child from the parent and 

removes the entire bundle of parental rights; therefore, with such severe 

and final consequences, parental rights should be terminated only in the 

absence of any reasonable alternative and as the last resort.

12. Parental Rights: Guardians and Conservators: Proof. A guardianship 

in some instances might be a reasonable alternative to termination of 

parental rights. But there is no burden on the State to prove that termination is the only alternative available.

13. Parental Rights: Proof. A bridge order might in some instances be a 

reasonable alternative to termination of parental rights, but there is no 

burden on the State to prove that termination is the only reasonable 

alternative available. The only burden on the State is to prove, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights is in the 

best interests of the child and that one or more of the conditions set out 

in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016) exists.

14. Juvenile Courts: Statutes: Legislature: Child Custody. In enacting 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.02 (Cum. Supp. 2018), authorizing bridge 

orders, the Legislature crafted a solution for temporary continuity when 

the child is no longer in need of the juvenile court’s protection; the juvenile court has made, through a dispositional order, a custody determination in the child’s best interests; and the juvenile court does not wish to 

enter a domestic relations custody decree under the power granted by 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2740(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).

15. Parental Rights. Children cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care or be made to await uncertain parental maturity.

16. ____. Where a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate himself or 

herself within a reasonable time, the best interests of the child require 

termination of the parental rights.
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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

30 Nebraska Appellate Reports

IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

Appeals from the County Court for Custer County: Kale B. 

Burdick, Judge. Affirmed.

Vikki S. Stamm, of Stamm Romero & Associates, P.C., 

L.L.O., and Marsha E. Fangmeyer for appellant.

Steven R. Bowers, Custer County Attorney, and Kayla C. 

Clark for appellee.

Julie K.W. Gawrych, of Wroblewski & Gawrych Law Office, 

L.L.C., guardian ad litem.

Moore, Bishop, and Arterburn, Judges.

Bishop, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Crystal L. appeals from the decision of the county court 

for Custer County, sitting as a juvenile court, terminating her 

parental rights to three of her children. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Procedural Background

Crystal is the mother of Madison T., born in 2013; Conrad 

L., born in 2011; Hailey L., born in 2005; and Austin S., born 

in 2004. Austin is autistic and has “ODD” and “ADHD,” as 

well as some other mental health issues.

Stephen T. is the father of Madison. Benjamin G. is the father 

of Conrad. The State made no allegations against Stephen or 

Benjamin in these current juvenile cases. Because Stephen 

and Benjamin are not part of this appeal, they will only be 

discussed as necessary. We note that Madison and Conrad now 

live with their respective fathers.

Daniel K. is the father of Hailey. Hailey lives with Daniel, 

and neither were part of the current juvenile cases. Because 

Hailey and Daniel are not part of this appeal, they will only be 

discussed as necessary.

Nicholas S. is the father of Austin. There is some indication in our record that the State sought to terminate Nicholas’ 
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

parental rights, but the current status of his parental rights is 

not clear from our record. Because Austin’s father is not part 

of this appeal, he will only be discussed as necessary. We note 

that Austin currently lives with his maternal great aunt.

On December 31, 2018, Crystal went to a bar with a friend 

around 11 p.m. and left her children home alone. Austin, the 

oldest child, was 14 years old at the time; he is autistic and 

had been diagnosed with “ODD” and “ADHD.” Hailey was 

13 years old at the time, Conrad was 7, and Madison was 5. 

Crystal got “pretty intoxicated” at the bar. After leaving the 

bar after midnight on January 1, 2019, the friend, who had 

also been drinking, went to Crystal’s home in Broken Bow, 

Nebraska, to watch the children while Crystal went to another 

town with a different friend; Crystal ended up using methamphetamine. Crystal returned home midmorning on January 1, 

and her friend was still watching the children, but the friend 

left when Crystal got home. (At the time, it was thought that 

all four children were left at home on New Year’s Eve, but at 

the time of the termination hearing in November 2020, it was 

learned that Hailey was with her father on December 31, 2018; 

therefore, it was only Madison, Conrad, and Austin who were 

at Crystal’s home that night.)

On January 3, 2019, a law enforcement officer conducted 

a welfare check on the children at Crystal’s home. Crystal 

appeared to be under the influence that day. She admitted 

to relapsing on methamphetamine on New Year’s Eve and 

informed the officer that she had plans to go to inpatient 

treatment in Arizona the next day. Law enforcement left after 

Crystal’s grandfather arrived to take over care for the children. 

Crystal’s mother then picked the children up from Crystal’s 

grandfather and continued to care for them. A follow-up hair 

follicle test was performed on the children, and Madison’s test 

was positive for “THC”; the other children’s hair was not long 

enough to test.

Crystal left for treatment in Arizona on January 6, 2019, and 

on January 11, she signed a power of attorney for the children 
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

to be with her mother. In order to accommodate the children’s 

schooling, the maternal grandmother cared for the children at 

Crystal’s home during the week and in her own home in Taylor, 

Nebraska, on the weekends. The heating unit in Crystal’s home 

was “red-tagged” on January 10, and according to the grandmother, the landlord refused to repair or replace the unit until 

the rent was paid. As a result, the grandmother used space heaters to heat Crystal’s home.

The State filed separately docketed petitions on February 

8, 2019, alleging that Madison, Conrad, and Austin fell within 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016) because Crystal 

neglected or refused to provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, or other care necessary for their health, morals, or well-being; they lacked proper parental care by reason 

of the fault or habits of Crystal; or they were in a situation 

injurious to their health or morals.

At a hearing on February 26, 2019, the State made an oral 

motion for the care and custody of the children to be placed 

with Nebraska’s Department of Health and Human Services 

(DHHS). In its journal entry and order filed that same day, 

the juvenile court sustained the State’s motion. The juvenile 

court placed the children in the temporary care and custody of 

DHHS because Crystal was currently located at an out-of-state 

treatment facility and one of the children tested positive for 

exposure to controlled substances. Although Crystal signed a 

temporary delegation of parental powers on January 11 giving 

her mother her parental powers over the children for a period 

not to exceed 6 months, the court found that “[t]he delegation 

of parental powers does not appear to have been executed properly and [the] court questions its validity.” The court ordered 

DHHS to determine if the children’s current placement with 

their grandmother was appropriate and safe; if deemed unsafe 

or inappropriate, DHHS was to find an appropriate placement 

for the children. DHHS was also ordered to set up visits with 

the parents as deemed appropriate.

On March 17, 2019, all three children were moved from 

their foster home placement with their grandmother to a 
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Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

different relative foster home placement with their great aunt, 

where Austin has remained. On May 15, Madison was placed 

with her father, where she has remained. On June 14, Conrad 

was placed with his father, where he has remained.

A contested adjudication hearing was held on August 8, 

2019. Following the hearing, the juvenile court took the matter 

of adjudication under advisement, but ordered DHHS to “begin 

full panel drug testing” of Crystal, “forthwith.” On August 15, 

the juvenile court “sustain[ed] the allegations” of the petitions 

and adjudicated Madison, Conrad, and Austin as being within 

the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a).

The disposition hearing was held on October 24, 2019. The 

juvenile court approved and adopted the DHHS case plan and 

court report dated October 11, 2019, as modified, and ordered 

the parties to comply with its terms. The only goal pertaining 

to Crystal in the case plan was for Crystal to keep her home 

free from drug use in order to safely parent her children and 

provide for their needs. Strategies for that goal were for Crystal 

to (1) attend individual therapy to assist her in her sober living and (2) follow all recommendations made to her by her 

inpatient provider. Services to be utilized were inpatient treatment, individual therapy, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and/or 

Narcotics Anonymous (NA), and case management.

On February 19, 2020, Crystal filed an objection to the 

DHHS case plan and court report dated January 23, 2020. The 

review hearing on March 19 was continued to June 5. At the 

hearing on June 5, Crystal withdrew her objection to the January 

case plan and court report; the juvenile court adopted that case 

plan and court report and ordered the parties to comply with 

its terms. That case plan contained the initial goal, strategies, 

and services pertaining to Crystal, but also added a second 

goal for Crystal to provide age and developmentally appropriate supervision for her children. The strategies for the new 

goal were for Crystal to (1) learn and demonstrate knowledge 

of child development, (2) learn and demonstrate knowledge 

of appropriate child expectations, (3) supervise her children 
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Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

appropriately to their age and development, and (4) monitor 

all electronic usage and ensure it is appropriate. Services to be 

utilized regarding the new goal were case management, individual therapy, family therapy, and family support.

On August 26, 2020, Crystal filed a motion for bridge order 

in both Madison’s case and Conrad’s case. Crystal alleged 

that those two children had been placed with their respective fathers and that the juvenile court action may be safely 

closed once orders for custody, physical care, and visitation 

had been entered by the district court. She noted that filings 

had not yet been instituted in any district court. However, 

she requested that the juvenile court enter an order granting 

her and each child’s respective father joint legal and physical custody of their child, subject to a parenting plan setting 

forth a schedule for the physical placement of the child and a 

holiday schedule.

A DHHS court report and case plan dated August 27, 2020, 

recommended that a bridge order be completed for Madison 

and for Conrad, stating that DHHS believed the plan was in 

the best interests of those children and would “provide permanency for them with their fathers.” As for Austin, DHHS 

recommended that he remain placed with his great aunt as she 

“is able to provide the routine and structure in the best interest of Austin’s needs.” The report and case plan indicated that 

Austin’s great aunt would provide permanency for him “if 

the case were to go to a guardianship,” and the “primary permanency plan of Guardianship Relative is being achieved by 

01-19-2021.”

On September 1, 2020, Conrad’s father filed objections to 

Crystal’s motion for a bridge order and to the August 27 DHHS 

court report and case plan that recommended a bridge order 

be completed for Conrad. Also on September 1, the children’s 

guardian ad litem (GAL) filed objections to Crystal’s motion 

for a bridge order for Madison and for Conrad, and to the 

DHHS court report and case plan for all three children, because 

the GAL believed that it was in the children’s best interests to 
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

remain outside of Crystal’s legal and physical care, custody, 

and control.

On September 1, 2020, the State and the children’s GAL 

jointly filed motions to terminate Crystal’s parental rights 

to Madison, Conrad, and Austin pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-292(2), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (9) (Reissue 2016). The 

motions alleged as follows: Crystal substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected and refused to give the children 

or a sibling necessary parental care and protection. Crystal, 

being financially able, had willfully neglected to provide the 

children with the necessary subsistence, education, or other 

care necessary for their health, morals, or welfare or had 

neglected to pay for such subsistence, education, or other care 

when legal custody of the children was “lodged with other 

and such payment ordered by the court.” Crystal was unfit by 

reason of habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, 

or repeated lewd lascivious behavior, which conduct was seriously detrimental to the health, morals, or well-being of the 

children. Reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family 

had failed to correct the conditions leading to the adjudication 

of the children under § 43-247(3)(a). The children had been in 

an out-of-home placement for 15 or more of the most recent 22 

months. Crystal subjected the children to aggravated circumstances, including, but not limited to, chronic abuse, abandonment, and sexual abuse.

Termination Hearing

A consolidated permanency and review hearing, hearing 

on the objections to the case plan, hearing on the motion 

for bridge order, and hearing on the motion to terminate 

Crystal’s parental rights was held over the course of 3 days 

in November 2020. Numerous witnesses testified and several 

exhibits were received into evidence. A summary of the relevant evidence follows.

Kiela Richards testified that she has been a child and family services specialist with DHHS since May 2019. This family’s case was one of the first four cases on her caseload after 
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

completing training, and it was transferred to her in September 

or October from another caseworker who was leaving. Richards 

reviewed the case file when she was assigned to the case.

Richards testified that “N-FOCUS” is DHHS’ recordkeeping 

system; it includes, among other things, historical information 

of any DHHS contact or involvement with the family, children’s medications, doctors’ appointments, and ongoing things 

that the parents are doing. Richards’ review of N-FOCUS 

showed Crystal’s extensive history with DHHS. Richards’ testimony, along with the DHHS court reports and case plans 

received into evidence, revealed that Crystal had 17 accepted 

intakes and a total of 10 ongoing cases with DHHS.

The intakes noted in the DHHS court reports revealed 

numerous “unfounded” incidents involving alleged physical 

abuse or physical or emotional neglect related to one or more 

of the children from January 2010 to May 2018. Since they 

were deemed “unfounded,” we will not recount them here 

or consider them in our de novo review. Other intakes were 

as follows:

06-22-2010: . . . Court Substantiated, Physical 

Neglect[.] Caller reports that between 9:00 and 9:30 PM 

on 06-21-2010, 6 year old Austin . . . was found wandering around outside in his pajamas over 5 blocks from 

home. Crystal thought the grandmother was watching him 

and the grandmother thought that Crystal had taken him 

to McDonalds. Caller reports that Austin had been off of 

his [medications] for over a week. Crystal tested positive 

for both methamphetamine[] and marijuana.

. . . .

12-11-2011: . . . Agency Substantiated, Physical 

Neglect[.] Allegations of one of the children . . . not wearing weather appropriate clothing while playing outside 

and being left unsupervised.

. . . .

03-11-2012: . . . Court Substantiated, Physical 

Neglect[.] Allegations of Crystal being under the influence 
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

of methamphetamine and making methamphetamine in 

the family home with the children present.

. . . .

05-8-2017: [Disposition unknown.] The allegations are 

that Crystal beat Austin with a belt on 5/7/2017 after 

Austin lit a paper on fire in the home. Austin was kept 

home from school on 5/8/2017 because of the marks from 

the beating.

Crystal’s voluntary and court cases that were noted in the 

DHHS court reports were as follows:

Crystal had a court case from 3/2007 to 2/2009. 

During this time, the family completed Intensive Family 

Preservation, drug and alcohol services, individual therapy, and family support services. The family was successful and the case was closed in 2/2009.

Crystal had another court case from 11/2009 to 5/2010. 

During this time frame, the family completed IFP, individual therapy for Crystal and therapeutic visits as a family. This case was successful and was closed in 5/2010.

Crystal had a court case from 6/2010 to 6/2011. During 

this time, the family completed therapy, community intervention, drug and alcohol services and Families Care. 

This case had been dismissed due to Crystal putting in 

place therapy, ResCare, Families Care and had [two doctors] as supports.

Crystal had a voluntary case from 1/2012 to 3/2012 

that turned into a court case from 3/2012 to 8/2013. 

During this time, the family had home support[] services, 

drug and alcohol services, family support, and parenting skills. This case was dismissed in 8/2013 due to 6 

months of stability and consistency and was referred to 

Early Intervention Professional Partners Program through 

Region 3.

Crystal had a court case from 1/2015 to 4/2015. During 

this case, the family was involved with family support, 

therapy, and professional partners support services. This 
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

case turned to a voluntary case from 4/2015 to 5/2015. 

The family was successful and the case was dismissed.

Crystal had a voluntary case from 10/2015 to 2/2016. 

During this time, the family completed family support. 

There was an incident involving domestic violence. The 

perpetrator, Stephen[,] was asked to leave the home so 

the children could remain safe with Crystal. A safety plan 

was put in place and the case was closed.

Crystal had a voluntary case from 6/2017 to 10/2017. 

The family completed family peer support and IFP. 

Crystal was able to be successful with family support and 

the children were safe in the home. The case was closed.

Richards testified that the current case was opened in 2019 

because of drug use allegations, as well as Crystal’s extensive history with DHHS. Testimony from various witnesses 

was given regarding the events of December 31, 2018, when 

Crystal left the children at home while she went to a bar and 

later used methamphetamine, through January 3, 2019, when 

law enforcement performed a welfare check on the children, 

who were eventually left in the care of their grandmother when 

Crystal went to treatment in Arizona. Richards testified that 

the children were removed while their grandmother was caring 

for them because the home was not clean and the utilities were 

not working.

Richards stated that Crystal had two goals, the first of which 

was to keep her home free from drug use in order to safely 

parent her children and provide for their needs. To help her 

accomplish this goal, Crystal was to attend individual therapy 

to assist in her sober living and follow all recommendations 

by her inpatient provider. The services available to her were 

inpatient treatment, individual therapy, AA and NA, and case 

management.

Richards stated that Crystal reported attending inpatient 

treatment at a facility in Arizona from January to April 2019. 

DHHS did not have any releases signed by Crystal allowing 

them to get her treatment records from Arizona; Richards did 
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IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

not ask Crystal to sign any releases, but asked her personally to 

provide records. Richards asked Crystal to provide documentation, recommendations, and a discharge summary from the 

treatment facility, but Crystal did not do so. However, within 

the week prior to the termination hearing, Richards received an 

email from Crystal’s attorney with documents from the treatment facility in Arizona. An email and some treatment excerpts 

were received into evidence. The exhibits showed that Crystal 

had been at a wellness and/or recovery facility in Arizona in 

January, that she tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine after her arrival, and that her tentative discharge 

date was April 24; there is nothing to show whether she successfully completed treatment and what the recommendations 

were at the time of discharge.

Richards stated that Crystal also reported seeing Terry 

Dunlop for individual therapy; Richards asked Dunlop for 

an update regarding Crystal, but Dunlop reported that he had 

never seen Crystal as an individual therapy client and that he 

was only doing family therapy with her and Austin. Richards 

also stated that Crystal reported attending AA and NA support 

groups and having a sponsor, but Richards was not provided 

any documentation verifying Crystal’s attendance.

There was an incident in December 2019 when Austin 

showed pornography to Madison and Conrad during a visit 

with Crystal. Thereafter, Crystal was given a second goal, 

which was to provide age and developmentally appropriate 

supervision for her children. To help her accomplish this goal, 

Crystal was to learn and demonstrate knowledge of child 

development and appropriate child expectations, supervise her 

children appropriately to their age and development, and monitor all electronic usage and ensure it was appropriate. The services available to her were individual therapy, family therapy, 

family support, and case management. As stated previously, 

despite Crystal’s report that she attended individual therapy 

with Dunlop, Dunlop denied seeing Crystal as an individual 

therapy client. However, Crystal did attend family therapy and 
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Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

participated in family support and case management. Richards 

stated the pornography incident led to a forensic interview 

at the Family Advocacy Network (FAN). Crystal denied that 

Madison or Conrad told her about the pornography, and she 

claimed that she found out about it from Madison’s father. 

Conrad also reported that he was on Crystal’s phone without 

her monitoring his usage. The issue was discussed at a team 

meeting in December, and it was understood that there was not 

to be usage of electronics moving forward.

Richards testified that when the current juvenile case began 

in early 2019, Crystal had supervised visits with the children 

and at some point progressed to unsupervised visits. When 

Richards became involved with this case in September or 

October 2019, Crystal was having unsupervised visits with the 

children. Around the beginning of December, DHHS found out 

about the pornography incident, and because the children were 

scheduled for a forensic interview, visits were “paused” for a 

while, “maybe the month of December.”

Sara Stauffer testified that she was a forensic interviewer at 

FAN in Kearney, Nebraska. In December 2019, Stauffer interviewed Madison and Conrad. Madison “disclosed that Austin 

watches inappropriate [sic] on a telephone,” and “at that point 

had wiggled his private part at her”; but she never saw the 

private part. Madison stated that she told her mother and that 

her mother checked on Austin and got mad at him. Conrad 

also “disclosed that Austin’s inappropriate” and will “show 

him private parts . . . while watching on YouTube.” Crystal 

testified that Austin did not have her phone on the day of the 

incident and that the video was on the television, specifically 

YouTube. She subsequently “put passwords on the TVs and on 

the PlayStation,” and it was discussed at team meetings that the 

children should not be on electronics during visits.

Richards testified that when Crystal’s visits resumed in 

January 2020, they were supervised by the children’s great 

aunt. Austin’s visits have remained supervised since that time. 

However, for a short period of time, Madison’s and Conrad’s 
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Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

visits went back to being unsupervised. But there were concerns about Crystal’s truthfulness and the lack of information 

being provided about when and where she was taking the children on visits. For example, Crystal gave a plan of what she 

was going to do with the children for their visits, but she did 

not follow through with the plan, and it was later learned that 

they had done something else instead (e.g., she took Conrad 

to Madison’s father’s house instead of fishing). According to 

Richards, DHHS could not ensure the children’s safety was 

being taken into consideration. As a result, Conrad’s visits 

went back to being supervised; it is unclear if Madison’s visits 

did. The children’s great aunt supervised the sibling visits for a 

while, but then there were concerns about her supervising all of 

the children together. Independence Rising was then engaged 

to supervise some of the visits. Other than when Conrad was 

on the phone too much during one visit, Richards could not 

recall if there were any other concerns noted during visits.

An Independence Rising employee testified that from August 

23 to November 15, 2020, she supervised two visits between 

Crystal and all three children and seven visits when it was just 

Crystal and Conrad. All visits occurred in Crystal’s home and 

were 5 hours in length. During visits, the children appeared 

to be engaged with Crystal and did activities with her, and 

Crystal paid attention to them, redirected them when necessary, and prepared meals. The Independence Rising employee’s 

visitation notes received into evidence do not disclose any 

safety concerns.

Richards testified that at the time of the termination hearing 

in November 2020, Crystal was having weekly supervised visits with Austin and Conrad. Crystal’s visits with Madison had 

temporarily stopped; she was having unsupervised visits, but 

Madison’s father raised concerns that Crystal was not taking 

Madison to appropriate locations and that Madison was possibly around marijuana. Richards also learned that Crystal had 

some unauthorized visits with Madison, including two overnight visits. Richards stated she had recently sent a referral to 
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Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

Independence Rising for supervised visits with Madison. When 

asked if she believed it was in the children’s best interests 

to return to the unsupervised care of their mother, Richards 

responded, “I do not.”

Richards helped create exhibit 43, which included a table for 

each child showing the number of DHHS intakes throughout 

their lives, as well as the percentage of time they had been 

out of home, a DHHS ward, or involved in a voluntary case 

with DHHS. The exhibit contained additional intakes that were 

not included in the DHHS court reports and case plans quoted 

previously in this opinion. According to exhibit 43, Madison 

had a total of 21 intakes from 2013 to 2020. She had spent 

25.78 percent of her life out of home, 33.53 percent of her life 

as a DHHS ward, and 6.46 percent of her life involved in a 

voluntary case with DHHS. Conrad had a total of 35 intakes 

from 2011 to 2020. He had spent 28.46 percent of his life out 

of home, 39.99 percent of his life as a DHHS ward, and 6.25 

percent of his life involved in a voluntary case with DHHS. 

Austin had a total of 48 intakes from 2007 to 2020. He had 

spent 22.96 percent of his life out of home, 40.92 percent of 

his life as a DHHS ward, and 3.61 percent of his life involved 

in a voluntary case with DHHS.

Richards testified that Madison currently lived with her 

father and was “doing good” there. Conrad currently lived with 

his father and was doing “[v]ery, very well” there. Although 

the DHHS court report dated August 27, 2020, recommended 

that bridge orders be completed for Madison and Conrad, at the 

time of the termination hearing in November, Richards was not 

in support of a bridge order for Conrad because he was stable 

and where he needed to be to meet his safety, well-being, and 

permanency; if a bridge order was entered, DHHS would no 

longer be involved. Richards was not asked about her current 

thoughts on a bridge order for Madison.

Richards stated that Austin is autistic and had an increase 

of sexual behaviors, but he had not received the necessary 

services for those issues throughout his life; DHHS has “put 
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. . . a lot of services in place for Austin, and he is doing well.” 

Austin currently lived with his great aunt, and he was doing 

“[v]ery, very well” there.

According to Richards, on August 8, 2019, there was a 

referral and court order for Crystal to do drug patch testing. 

The DHHS case plan and court report dated January 23, 2020, 

states that “DHHS has received all negative drug patch results 

throughout the life of this ongoing case.” Richards stated there 

was a time when testing was not being conducted because 

of the COVID-19 pandemic. Crystal subsequently had drug 

patches that tested positive for THC.

A functional family facilitator with Independence Rising, an 

agency hired by DHHS, testified that she did drug testing for 

Crystal. Crystal does “Pharmchek sweat patches” for drug testing; “the “patch[es] can be worn on a shoulder blade, the arm, 

or the lower back” and are changed weekly. The patch tests for 

“a five-panel of drugs”: cocaine, opioids, methamphetamine, 

THC, and “PCP.” Crystal had weekly positive tests for THC 

on September 25 and October 2, 9, and 16, 2020; her patch 

from September 18 appeared to have been tampered with. 

Richards testified that Crystal’s drug patches on October 23 

and November 11 were also positive for THC; November 11 

was the week before the termination hearing began.

Crystal testified that this was her “sixth or seventh” case 

with DHHS. She stated that in 2007, both Austin and Hailey 

were removed from the home for approximately 1 year. In 

2009, Austin was removed from the home. In 2012, she used 

methamphetamine around the children, and as part of that court 

case, she completed treatment. (Stauffer testified that in 2012, 

Conrad tested “positive for ingestion and exposure to methamphetamine.”) Crystal stated that another juvenile case was filed 

in 2015, but was ultimately dismissed.

As to the current case, Crystal recounted the events from 

New Year’s Eve 2018 to her contact with law enforcement 

on January 3, 2019, as set forth previously. Crystal left for 
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treatment on January 5, while her mother stayed with the 

children. She was discharged on March 31 and returned to 

Nebraska. By that time, the children had been removed from 

her mother’s care.

Crystal stated that upon returning home from treatment, she 

attended individual therapy on a weekly basis for 3 to 4 months 

with “Judy,” and when Judy retired, Crystal switched to Dunlop, 

who was also seeing Austin; she stopped seeing Dunlop in 

December 2019 or January 2020. In addition to therapy, Crystal 

attended AA meetings two to three times each week.

Crystal testified that she had been doing drug patch testing 

for several months, since “the last court hearing.” She acknowledged that some results were positive for THC in September 

and October 2020. When asked if she had “an explanation of 

why the THC came up,” Crystal responded, “No.” She further 

stated, “I have asked people that do the patch changes [and] 

[t]hey said it could be medications that I am taking or it could 

simply be that it’s just not being put on right.” Crystal stated 

that she had a hair follicle test done on June 12 and October 

23, 2020, on her “own recognizance” to prove that she had 

been staying sober, and the hair follicle tests came back negative; she had “also taken a UA on [her] own recognizance, and 

it was negative for everything.”

Richards testified that she was aware that Crystal got two 

hair follicle tests done on her own initiative (i.e., not requested 

by DHHS), which had negative results. Richards contacted 

FAN and learned that if hair is treated or dyed in any way, it 

could affect the hair follicle test results. Crystal testified that 

she bleaches her hair and gets “perms”; she said she informed 

the laboratory that performed the hair follicle tests that she had 

bleached her hair and “they said that would be okay.” Stauffer, 

the forensic interviewer from FAN, testified that she does hair 

follicle tests at FAN and that FAN does not test hair which has 

been chemically dyed or treated because the results will come 

back as “inconclusive.”
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In her testimony, Crystal denied smoking marijuana in the 

last 2 years. She stated that she last used marijuana 17 years 

ago and that she last used methamphetamine on December 31, 

2018, and January 1, 2019. And she stated that before her most 

recent relapse, she had not used methamphetamine since 2012; 

however, she was confronted with her reports from treatment 

wherein she said she had been using methamphetamine three 

to four times per month, and had been using it on and off 

since 2012.

Crystal believes it would be in Austin’s best interests for his 

great aunt to have guardianship over him and for Crystal to 

continue to have contact with him. Austin’s great aunt testified 

that Crystal is a good mother and that if Austin does not get to 

see her, “it will be bad.” The great aunt stated that there were a 

couple of months when Austin did not have visits with Crystal 

and that he was “[r]eally aggressive, argumentative”; once visits resumed, he was “[p]retty good.”

Crystal believes she has beneficial relationships with 

Madison and Conrad and would like to continue to have contact with them.

Crystal testified that she has lived in Mason City, Nebraska, 

since March 31, 2019, in a home owned by the children’s 

great aunt; she does not pay rent. She enrolled in cosmetology school in June 2019, was a full-time student, and would 

graduate “[w]ithin the next couple of weeks.” She had “two 

job offers” for after graduation and wanted to move to Broken 

Bow to “be closer to [her] children.”

Daniel, Hailey’s father, testified that he got custody of 

Hailey via a district court order on January 17, 2019. When 

Hailey lived with Crystal, Hailey was “a mother” to her 

younger brother and sister. Daniel said Hailey “got the kids 

ready for school in the morning, helped them get dressed, 

helped them with breakfast, helped them with homework after 

school, . . . cooked dinner for them several nights a week . . 

. .” And she told Daniel that “she was basically their guardian 

at night to kind of protect them from some of the things that 
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she was afraid of them seeing and hearing,” e.g., Crystal’s 

“[b]ringing different men over to the house, being inebriated 

and being around the kids late at night.”

The children’s great aunt testified that prior to this case 

beginning, she provided childcare for Austin on Monday, 

Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday nights because Crystal 

worked the night shift (7 p.m. to approximately 7 a.m.); she 

would also have either Madison or Conrad those nights, while 

Hailey cared for the other child at their home. Crystal testified 

that Hailey was 13 years old when she would watch Madison 

or Conrad overnight while Crystal worked.

Stephen, Madison’s father, testified that Madison has been 

living in his home since June 2019. He confirmed that until 

recently, he and Crystal had gotten along very well, and he 

had even given her more visitation with Madison than he 

was supposed to. However, in the “past maybe month, month 

and a half” prior to the termination hearing, he began having 

safety concerns about where Crystal was taking Madison for 

visits. He said that Crystal’s boyfriend had been living across 

the street from him for about 6 months and that Crystal was 

taking Madison there on visits. According to Stephen, Crystal 

stays at her boyfriend’s house “half the time,” and people there 

“[smoke] pot, party[], stuff like that.” Stephen also stated that 

there was “[a] lot of fighting over there, [Crystal] and her 

boyfriend,” and that her boyfriend smokes “pot” and “hangs 

out with . . . that crowd.” Crystal has come to Stephen’s house 

on two occasions after she got in a fight with her boyfriend; 

one of those times she was “pretty intoxicated.” Stephen 

also found out that Crystal had been taking Madison, age 7, 

to AA meetings with her. Stephen stated that “after this last 

incident” when he confronted Crystal about taking Madison 

to AA meetings, Richards told him there would be no more 

weekly unsupervised visits. Stephen did not have an objection to a bridge order because “Maddie needs a mom,” but 

stated that Crystal had some “priorities and stuff she needs to 

work out.”
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Benjamin, Conrad’s father, testified that Conrad came to 

live with him in June 2019. Crystal’s visits started off fully 

supervised, went to unsupervised for a while, and then back 

to being fully supervised. Benjamin does not agree with a 

bridge order.

Julie Forrester testified that she is a licensed mental health 

practitioner. She saw Madison nine times from January 28 

through April 8, 2020. DHHS required Madison to attend therapy because it had been reported that she had been exposed 

to sexually explicit videos through her half brother during a 

visitation at Crystal’s home. Madison also witnessed her half 

brother masturbating in front of her at Crystal’s home. Forrester 

worked with Madison on personal safety skills. Forrester met 

with Conrad 20 times between October 23, 2019, and August 

20, 2020. They worked on Conrad’s anxiety. They also worked 

on personal safety skills because, like Madison, Conrad had 

been exposed to sexually explicit videos and masturbation by 

his half brother. Forrester said that in addition to the therapy 

sessions, she was “utterly shocked at what [she had] heard 

today” in court, and she “would recommend absolutely not” 

giving Crystal custody of Madison or Conrad.

Juvenile Court’s Decision

In its detailed and thorough order entered on January 8, 

2021, the juvenile court recounted the evidence presented at 

trial, including Crystal’s extensive history with DHHS. After 

summarizing the testimony and other evidence presented, the 

court made a specific finding that Crystal lacked credibility and 

that “little, if any, weight is given to Crystal’s testimony.”

The juvenile court considered each of the statutory grounds 

for termination alleged by the State and the GAL and found 

that statutory grounds for termination had not been proved pursuant to § 43-292(3) or (9). However, the court found by clear 

and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination 

existed pursuant to § 43-292(2), (4), (6), and (7). The court 

also found that Crystal was unfit, stating:
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Crystal’s neglect of her children is not limited to the 

circumstances that led to the adjudications in the abovecaptioned cases. The neglect began when Austin and 

Hailey were toddlers and has continued ever since. 

[DHHS] and the courts have intervened on several occasions, but Crystal has been unable to permanently correct 

[her] apparent deficiencies or incapacities. Crystal’s history is indicative of what the future holds in store for her 

and her children.

Finally, the court found that termination of Crystal’s parental 

rights was in the children’s best interests, and it terminated her 

rights to Madison, Conrad, and Austin.

In finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Crystal’s parental rights, the juvenile court also found 

that bridge orders were not in Madison’s or Conrad’s best 

interests. The court did not specifically address the request 

for a guardianship for Austin. Accordingly, the court sustained 

the objections to, and rejected, the DHHS case plan and court 

report dated August 27, 2020, and it denied the motions for 

bridge orders.

Crystal appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Crystal assigns, summarized and restated, that the juvenile 

court erred (1) at the permanency hearing by not finding that 

a termination of parental rights motion was going to be filed 

and instead leaving the goal as family preservation/reunification, (2) in finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate 

her parental rights, and (3) in finding that she was unfit and 

that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s 

best interests.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo 

on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of 

the findings made by the juvenile court below. In re Interest 

of Mateo L. et al., 309 Neb. 565, 961 N.W.2d 516 (2021). 
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However, when the evidence is in conflict, an appellate court 

may consider and give weight to the fact that the juvenile court 

observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts 

over another. Id.

ANALYSIS

[3,4] In Nebraska, the grounds for terminating parental 

rights are codified in § 43-292. That statute contains 11 separate subsections, any one of which can serve as a basis for 

termination when coupled with evidence that termination is in 

the best interests of the child. In re Interest of Mateo L. et al., 

supra. It is the State’s burden to show by clear and convincing evidence both that one of the statutory bases enumerated 

in § 43-292 exists and that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. In re Interest of Mateo L. et al., supra.

Notice of Termination

Crystal contends that she did not receive notice that a motion 

to terminate her parental rights was going to be filed prior to 

it actually being filed. She claims that there was not a timely 

permanency hearing and that there was no indication the matter was going to be referred for a termination. She notes that 

the DHHS case plans and court reports adopted by the court 

throughout the case indicated the goal was family preservation 

for Madison and Conrad; the goal for Austin was originally 

reunification but it was later changed to a relative guardianship. Richards explained at trial that the reason the goal for 

Madison and Conrad was family preservation was because 

they lived with their fathers and thus DHHS was preserving the 

children’s relationship with their fathers.

Despite her claim to the contrary, Crystal was provided adequate notice of the termination of parental rights proceedings. 

Termination of parental rights may be filed in an original petition, a supplemental petition, or motion. See Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-291 (Reissue 2016). Section 43-291 provides:

After a petition, a supplemental petition, or motion has 

been filed, the court shall cause to be endorsed on the 
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summons and notice that the proceeding is one to terminate parental rights, shall set the time and place for the 

hearing, and shall cause summons and notice, with a copy 

of the petition, supplemental petition, or motion attached, 

to be given in the same manner as required in other cases 

before the juvenile court.

Crystal does not contend that the procedure set forth in 

§ 43-291 was not followed in this case. Accordingly, she was 

given appropriate notice of the termination proceeding.

Statutory Grounds for Termination

We turn to the statutory bases alleged here. In their joint 

motions, the State and the children’s GAL sought to terminate 

Crystal’s parental rights under § 43-292(2), (3), (4), (6), (7), 

and (9). The juvenile court found § 43-292(2), (4), (6), and (7) 

existed by clear and convincing evidence.

[5] Section 43-292(7) allows for termination when “[t]he 

juvenile has been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen or 

more months of the most recent twenty-two months.” By the 

plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 43-292(7), 

there are no exceptions to the condition of 15 out of 22 

months’ out-of-home placement. In re Interest of Mateo L. et 

al., 309 Neb. 565, 961 N.W.2d 516 (2021). Section 43-292(7) 

operates mechanically and, unlike the other subsections of 

the statute, does not require the State to adduce evidence of 

any specific fault on the part of a parent. In re Interest of 

Mateo L. et al., supra. In other words, if the 15-out-of-22 

formula is met, § 43-292(7) is met. In re Interest of Mateo L. 

et al., supra.

In this case, the juvenile court ordered the children placed 

in the care and custody of DHHS on February 26, 2019, and 

DHHS was to determine a safe and appropriate placement for 

them. Although the children had already been living with their 

grandmother because Crystal was in an out-of-state treatment 

facility, we will treat February 26, 2019, as the start date of 

the out-of-home placement for purposes of our § 43-292(7) 

calculation. The children remained out of Crystal’s home 
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through at least November 20, 2020, when the termination 

hearing ended. That period easily satisfies the 15-out-of-22 

formula.

[6] The State has shown clearly and convincingly that 

§ 43-292(7) exists as a statutory basis for termination in this 

case. And since any one of the bases for termination codified 

in § 43-292 can serve as the basis for termination, we need not 

consider the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the other 

statutory bases for termination. In re Interest of Mateo L. et al., 

supra. Furthermore, we note that because we do not consider 

whether termination of Crystal’s parental rights was proper 

pursuant to § 43-292(6), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-283.01 (Cum. 

Supp. 2020), which requires reasonable efforts to reunify families, is not applicable to the instant case. Section 43-283.01 is 

only incorporated into § 43-292(6), not into the remaining subsections of § 43-292. See In re Interest of Andrew M. et al., 11 

Neb. App. 80, 643 N.W.2d 401 (2002). See, also, In re Interest 

of Mateo L. et al., supra (reasonable efforts to reunify family 

required under juvenile code only when termination is sought 

under § 43-292(6)).

We next consider whether termination is in the children’s 

best interests.

Best Interests and Unfitness

[7-10] Under § 43-292, once the State shows that statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist, the State 

must then show that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. In re Interest of Ryder J., 283 Neb. 318, 809 N.W.2d 

255 (2012). A child’s best interests are presumed to be served 

by having a relationship with his or her parent. In re Interest 

of Leyton C. & Landyn C., 307 Neb. 529, 949 N.W.2d 773 

(2020). This presumption is overcome only when the State 

has proved that the parent is unfit. Id. Although the term 

“unfitness” is not expressly stated in § 43-292, the Nebraska 

Supreme Court has said that it derives from the fault and 

neglect subsections of that statute and from an assessment of 

the child’s best interests. In re Interest of Mateo L. et al., 309 
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Neb. 565, 961 N.W.2d 516 (2021). In the context of the constitutionally protected relationship between a parent and a child, 

parental unfitness means a personal deficiency or incapacity 

which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance 

of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which 

has caused, or probably will result in, detriment to a child’s 

well-being. In re Interest of Leyton C. & Landyn C., supra. 

The best interests analysis and the parental fitness analysis 

are separate inquiries, but each examines essentially the same 

underlying facts as the other. Id.

We have previously recounted the evidence presented at 

the termination hearing, and we will not recount it again here. 

Notably, Crystal’s history with DHHS goes back to 2007. Since 

that time, there have been numerous intakes for the children and 

several voluntary or juvenile court cases. In the past, Crystal 

would successfully resolve a voluntary or court case only to 

have another one filed shortly thereafter, sometimes within a 

matter of months. And “‘one’s history as a parent speaks to 

one’s future as a parent.’” In re Interest of Sir Messiah T. et al., 

279 Neb. 900, 909, 782 N.W.2d 320, 328 (2010).

In the current juvenile cases, Crystal left her 14-year-old 

autistic child home alone with her 7-year-old child and her 

5-year-old child late at night while she got intoxicated at a bar. 

Crystal then went out of town and relapsed on methamphetamine while a friend, who had also been drinking, spent the 

night with her children. While we commend Crystal’s efforts to 

get herself into treatment within the next few days, the record 

is not clear whether she successfully completed that inpatient 

treatment, and it appears her sobriety did not last. She tested 

positive for THC beginning in September 2020, and she was 

still testing positive for THC the week before the termination hearing began in November. Crystal’s drug use is very 

concerning as Conrad tested positive for methamphetamine 

in 2012, Madison tested positive for THC in 2019, and drug 

use was one of the reasons the children were removed from 

Crystal’s care in the current case.
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In addition to her positive drug tests, Crystal was not truthful with DHHS on a number of occasions. She reported going 

to individual therapy when she did not, she had unauthorized 

visits with her children, and she did not keep DHHS informed 

of changes in her visitation plans on occasion. As a result, 

Crystal’s visits had to be supervised to ensure the children’s 

safety. At the time of the termination hearing in November 

2020, Crystal was having only weekly supervised visits with 

Austin and Conrad. And her visits with Madison were temporarily stopped while DHHS sent a referral to a visitation 

provider. We acknowledge it appears that, other than the pornography incident in December 2019, there were no safety 

concerns with Crystal’s visits, with the exception of recent 

events when Crystal took Madison to her boyfriend’s house 

where Madison’s father testified that people there “[smoke] 

pot” and “party[],” and also indicated that Crystal was taking 

Madison to AA meetings.

Forrester did not believe that Crystal should have custody of 

the children, and Richards did not believe that Crystal should 

have unsupervised contact with the children.

[11] A termination of parental rights is a final and complete 

severance of the child from the parent and removes the entire 

bundle of parental rights; therefore, with such severe and final 

consequences, parental rights should be terminated only in the 

absence of any reasonable alternative and as the last resort. 

In re Interest of Giavonna G., 23 Neb. App. 853, 876 N.W.2d 

422 (2016).

[12] Crystal believed that a guardianship, rather than a termination of her parental rights, was in Austin’s best interests. 

We acknowledge that a guardianship in some instances might 

be a reasonable alternative to termination of parental rights. 

But there is no burden on the State to prove that termination is the only alternative available. In re Interest of Q.R. 

and D.R., 231 Neb. 791, 438 N.W.2d 146 (1989). Also, the 

Nebraska Supreme Court has noted that a guardianship does 

not achieve the degree of permanency equivalent to parenthood 
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or adoption. See In re Interest of Antonio S. & Priscilla S., 270 

Neb. 792, 708 N.W.2d 614 (2005). A guardianship under the 

Nebraska Juvenile Code is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which retains the power to terminate 

the guardianship. Id. See, also, In re Interest of Amber G. et al., 

250 Neb. 973, 554 N.W.2d 142 (1996), disapproved on other 

grounds, In re Interest of Lilly S. & Vincent S., 298 Neb. 306, 

903 N.W.2d 651 (2017) (when guardianship is established, parent retains right to petition court for restoration of custody and 

full parental rights). Based on our de novo review, we conclude 

that a guardianship would not provide the permanency needed 

for Austin, as it would leave open Crystal’s right to petition the 

court for restoration of custody. Accordingly, a guardianship 

was not in Austin’s best interests.

[13] Crystal also believed that a bridge order, rather than 

a termination of her parental rights, was in Madison’s and 

Conrad’s best interests. Again, we acknowledge that a bridge 

order might in some instances be a reasonable alternative to 

termination of parental rights, but as also noted above, there 

is no burden on the State to prove that termination is the only 

reasonable alternative available. See In re Interest of Q.R. and 

D.R., supra. The only burden on the State is to prove, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights is 

in the best interests of the child and that one or more of the 

conditions set out in § 43-292 exists. See In re Interest of Q.R. 

and D.R., supra. The juvenile court concluded a bridge order 

would not be in the best interests of Madison and Conrad, and 

we agree.

A bridge order is an order transferring jurisdiction over the 

child from the juvenile court to the district court. In re Interest 

of Kamille C. & Kamiya C., 302 Neb. 226, 922 N.W.2d 739 

(2019). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.02 (Cum. Supp. 

2020). Section 43-246.02 provides in part:

(1) A juvenile court may terminate its jurisdiction 

under subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247 by transferring 

jurisdiction over the juvenile’s custody, physical care, and 
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visitation to the district court through a bridge order, if all 

of the following criteria are met:

(a) The juvenile has been adjudicated under subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247 in an active juvenile court 

case and a dispositional order in that case is in place;

(b) Paternity of the juvenile has been legally established . . . ;

(c) The juvenile has been safely placed by the juvenile 

court with a legal parent; and

(d) The juvenile court has determined that its jurisdiction under subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247 should 

properly end once orders for custody, physical care, and 

visitation are entered by the district court.

[14] The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed § 43-246.02 

for the first time in In re Interest of Kamille C. & Kamiya C., 

supra, wherein it noted that § 43-246.02(1)(d) indicates that 

a bridge order is appropriate only when the juvenile case can 

safely be closed. The legislative intent “was to authorize the 

creation of ‘“Bridge Orders” to transfer a case from juvenile 

court to district court when a noncustodial parent has been 

deemed fit to safely care for a child, and close the unnecessary 

juvenile case.’” In re Interest of Kamille C. & Kamiya C., 302 

Neb. at 236, 922 N.W.2d at 748. The court stated:

In enacting § 43-246.02, authorizing bridge orders, 

the Legislature crafted a solution for temporary continuity when the child is no longer in need of the juvenile 

court’s protection; the juvenile court has made, through a 

dispositional order, a custody determination in the child’s 

best interests; and the juvenile court does not wish to 

enter a domestic relations custody decree under the power 

granted by § 25-2740(3). Such custody decree is instead 

entered by the district court after the transfer of jurisdiction over the child from juvenile court to district court, 

which transfer is inherent to the bridge order. . . .

Upon transfer, the district court shall “give full force 

and effect to the juvenile court bridge order as to custody 
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and parenting time.” However, either party may “file a 

petition in district court for modification of the bridge 

order” and, if filed within 1 year after the filing date of 

the bridge order, “the party requesting modification shall 

not be required to demonstrate a substantial change of circumstance but instead shall demonstrate that such modification is in the best interests of the child.” In such modification proceedings, the statutory scheme requires no 

deference to the juvenile court’s judgment of the child’s 

best interests. . . . In other words, the custody determination made by the juvenile court has no legally preclusive 

effect and will be made anew by the district court if either 

parent is discontent with the custody arrangement originally set forth by the bridge order.

In re Interest of Kamille C. & Kamiya C., 302 Neb. at 237-38, 

922 N.W.2d at 748-49 (emphasis supplied).

The juvenile court in the current cases found that subsections (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c) of § 43-246.02 had been met, 

but that subsection (1)(d) had not. Based upon that finding, the 

juvenile court clearly was unable to conclude that its jurisdiction over Madison and Conrad should end. Nor was it ready, at 

least at that time, to award custody to their fathers by deeming 

them fit to safely care for them and thereby close the juvenile 

cases. We agree that while placement of Madison and Conrad 

with their respective fathers may have been the best alternative 

while these cases have been pending, the record is not sufficient to conclude that the children’s fathers should be awarded 

permanent custody, at least at this time.

For example, there was evidence that Conrad and his father 

did not know each other prior to the placement of Conrad with 

him in this case. Conrad’s father testified to his own challenges, 

noting that he had been “through treatment a couple of times” 

and did not quit “using” after that. He also indicated that in 

2018, he “kind of hit [his] rock bottom” and “lost everything[,] 

[l]ost [his] kids[,] [and] wasn’t able to be with [his] wife.” 

While noting he had not “used in two years,” he also said “it 
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doesn’t mean that I don’t have other problems in my life” and 

he was attending a program to address relationship and anger 

issues and “all kinds of stuff that are . . . habits, hangups, all 

that stuff.” Conrad’s father also discussed his concerns that a 

bridge order would ultimately allow Crystal to get Conrad back 

because he would not be able to financially afford to “fight 

her” in district court.

As for Madison’s father, he testified that prior to the placement of Madison with him, he had visits with Madison every 

other weekend. He acknowledged he had used “meth” before 

and knows the symptoms. He also admitted that he allowed 

Crystal to keep Madison overnight on a couple occasions in 

February 2020 and over Halloween weekend that year despite 

knowing Crystal was not permitted to have overnight visitation. Madison’s father testified that he did not have a driver’s 

license “[b]ecause of [his] DUIs . . . [f]our” of them. He 

explained that this was why he, Crystal, and Madison traveled 

to Kearney together before school started to shop for clothes. 

He did not talk to the caseworker, Richards, in advance, but 

was seen by Richards while shopping. Madison’s father also 

acknowledged that besides his “DUIs,” he had been in trouble 

with the law for misdemeanors, “[b]attery, [and] a couple possessions of marijuana.” But he claimed to have no convictions 

involving methamphetamine. Madison’s father indicated that 

he was still on probation. While he did not object to a bridge 

order, he did not agree to a “50/50 bridge order.”

In our de novo review of the record, we agree with the 

juvenile court that it would not be in Madison’s and Conrad’s 

best interests to terminate the court’s jurisdiction over them by 

entering bridge orders granting their custody to their respective 

fathers. Doing so would remove the children from the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction where it was in a better position to determine what next steps were necessary to advance the best interests of these children. Given the record before us, it is understandable why the juvenile court determined that these juvenile 

cases could not safely be closed. Accordingly, we agree with 
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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

30 Nebraska Appellate Reports

IN RE INTEREST OF MADISON T. ET AL.

Cite as 30 Neb. App. 470

the juvenile court’s determination that § 43-246.02(1)(d) had 

not been met and that bridge orders were not in the children’s 

best interests.

[15,16] The juvenile court found that it was in the best 

interests of Madison, Conrad, and Austin that Crystal’s parental rights be terminated. We agree. Crystal’s involvement with 

DHHS and the juvenile court date back to 2007, and the 

current juvenile court cases were filed in January 2019. In 

these current court cases alone, the children had been out of 

Crystal’s home for approximately 21 months at the time of the 

termination hearing. At the time of the termination hearing, 

Crystal was back to supervised visits and had recently been 

testing positive for drugs. These children deserve permanency. 

“Children cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care 

or be made to await uncertain parental maturity.” In re Interest 

of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 872, 744 N.W.2d 55, 65 (2008). 

And where a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate himself or herself within a reasonable time, the best interests of the 

child require termination of the parental rights. In re Interest of 

Ryder J., 283 Neb. 318, 809 N.W.2d 255 (2012). We find that 

the State has rebutted the presumption of parental fitness as 

to Crystal. We further find that there is clear and convincing 

evidence that it is in the children’s best interests to terminate 

Crystal’s parental rights.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the 

juvenile court terminating Crystal’s parental rights to Madison, 

Conrad, and Austin.

Affirmed.