This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1566

OSK III, LLC,

Respondent,

vs.

HLI, LLC, et al.,

Defendants,

Timothy J. Lambrecht,

Appellant.

Filed March 23, 2015

Affirmed

Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CV-14-735

Allen E. Christy, Patrick C. Summers, DeWitt Mackall Crounse & Moore S.C., 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Timothy J. Lambrecht, Medina, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Reilly, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

REILLY, Judge

Appellant Timothy Lambrecht challenges the entry of summary judgment against 

him, arguing that the district court erred by denying his request for a continuance. 
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Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the continuance, we 

affirm. 

FACTS

In August 2006, the Port Authority of the City of Saint Paul (Port Authority) and 

HLI, LLC, a Minnesota limited liability company, executed a loan agreement. Port 

Authority then assigned the loan to Business Loan Conduit (BLC). Appellant, Joseph 

Hanson, and InCompass, Inc., served as guarantors for the loan.1The principal amount 

of the loan was $1.4 million. A real estate mortgage secured the debt created by the loan 

agreement, and HLI recorded the mortgage in the Ramsey County recorder’s office. The 

mortgage encumbered a multi-unit commercial office building and the surrounding real 

property owned by HLI. HLI failed to pay the monthly payments and interest due under 

the loan since March 2012. HLI also failed to pay real property taxes due during 2008 

and the following years. These failures constituted a “default” under the terms and 

conditions of the mortgage. 

In July 2012, BLC initiated a judicial foreclosure action and served appellant and 

the other defendants with a summons and complaint. In the complaint, BLC alleged that 

HLI failed to make the monthly installment payments, and failed to or refused to pay real 

property taxes dating back to 2008. HLI, Lambrecht, and InCompass served a joint 

answer on BLC, but the answer was never filed with the court.

 

1 Although HLI, Lambrecht, Hanson, InCompass, XYZ Corporation, John Doe, and Jane 

Doe are all named parties, this appeal involves only Lambrecht. Appellant and Hanson

were the only parties to appear at the summary-judgment hearing. The district court 

entered default judgment against Hanson, XYZ, John Doe, and Jane Doe, and these 

parties did not appeal. 
3

In February 2014, BLC assigned its rights and interests in the loan agreement to 

National New Markets Tax Credit Fund I, L.P (NNMTCF). On March 12, 2014, BLC 

moved for summary judgment pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 56 and default judgment 

pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 55. A summary-judgment hearing was scheduled for 

April 16, 2014. On March 24, 2014, counsel for appellant HLI and InCompass withdrew. 

Appellant’s counsel did not file a formal notice of withdrawal with the court. On 

March 28, 2014, NNMTCF assigned its rights and interests in the loan agreement to 

respondent OSK III. Respondent’s attorneys, Allen Christy and Patrick Summers, also

represented BLC and continued to represent OSK. 

Appellant sought a continuance of the April 16 summary-judgment hearing. OSK 

opposed the continuance. On April 1 and 2, the district court informed appellant that he 

would need to file a formal motion for a continuance. Appellant did not file a motion for 

a continuance or a response to the summary-judgment motion. 

At the summary-judgment hearing, both appellant and Hanson appeared pro se.

When asked by the district court why the record did not contain a response to the 

summary-judgment motion, appellant informed the court that he did not file a response to 

respondent’s motion for summary judgment because “there was no way [appellant] had 

enough time to replace counsel.” Appellant stated that he had contacted the judge’s staff 

on March 31 to request a continuance. The district court then explained to appellant:

And what the response [to your e-mail request] said was that I 

don’t consider continuance requests made informally by email or with a phone call. If the request is contested –

sometimes the attorneys will agree or the parties will agree on 

a continuance. If it’s contested, I need to have a motion for a 
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continuance. So that information was passed along to you, 

and I do not see any motion for a continuance that was filed 

with the Court as a result of that communication to you.

When asked by the court if the attorneys appellant interviewed could have filed a 

motion for continuance, appellant told the court that “[n]one of them wanted to touch – I 

didn’t want to pay them to work through the night, to even work on it at that point. I was 

frustrated, but I – I just couldn’t afford to do it at that time.” 

The court then asked appellant what attempts he made to find substitute counsel. 

Appellant informed the court that, on the day his former counsel withdrew, he 

“immediately picked up the phone and called an attorney, and he had asked me to send 

him all of the documents.” Appellant later sent the attorney another e-mail on April 1, 

asking if there was any “movement on this.” At this point, the attorney told him he did 

not have time “to work over the weekends and nights for you on this one.” Appellant 

also claimed that he called three or four other attorneys on March 25. But these attorneys 

“didn’t feel right to [him] that they were – you know, that they were really real estate 

attorneys.” Appellant finally found an attorney with whom he was satisfied, and the 

attorney told appellant that he would “likely take it if [appellant] [could] get the 

continuance, because, again, you know, dishing money out for double-time for these 

attorneys is not something I’m in a position to do right now.” 

The district court then clarified that “there’s been no answer by any party or no 

responsive pleading that’s been filed.” And when asked by the district court what factual 

issues existed, appellant replied, “[W]e should never have been coerced to sign the 

contracts. We know for a fact, beyond a doubt, that there’s documents that [respondent] 
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has in [its] hands that show that we did not qualify for this loan.” Respondent opposed 

appellant’s oral request for a continuance. Counsel for respondent explained that the 

resulting prejudice from a continuance would be the payment of property taxes that will 

become due. In May 2013, property taxes for the encumbered property were around 

$56,000, and counsel presumed that the 2014 taxes would be in the same range. 

The district court issued an order on May 20, 2014, denying appellant’s motion for 

a continuance, granting summary judgment against appellant and entering default 

judgment against Hanson, XYZ, John Doe, and Jane Doe. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request 

for a continuance to obtain counsel after his previous attorney withdrew from the case.2

This court reviews the district court’s denial of a motion for a continuance for an abuse of 

discretion. Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 572 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied

(Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 105 provides that the “[w]ithdrawal of 

counsel does not create any right to continuance of any scheduled trial or hearing.” The 

advisory-committee comment clarifies that “withdrawal or substitution of counsel may be 

 

2

In his reply brief, appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

and raises issues related to the loan transaction, due process, and federal law. Appellant 

did not make these arguments in his principal brief. Accordingly, the arguments in 

appellant’s reply brief are not properly before the court and will not be considered on 

appeal. See Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 654 N.W.2d 201, 704, 707 

(Minn. App. 2002) (“If an argument is raised in a reply brief but not raised in an 

appellant’s main brief, and it exceeds the scope of the respondent’s brief, it is not 

properly before this court and may be stricken from the reply brief.”), review denied

(Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).
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part of a set of circumstances justifying the exercise of the court’s discretion to grant a 

continuance.” Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 105 1997 comm. cmt.

The district court has a duty to ensure fairness to a pro se litigant by allowing 

reasonable accommodations so long as there is no prejudice to the adverse party. Kasson 

State Bank v. Haugen, 410 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Minn. App. 1987). Nevertheless, while the 

court may make some accommodations for a pro se party, a pro se party is “generally 

held to the same standard as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Black v. 

Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Minn. App. 2005).

Appellant primarily relies on Weise v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 370 N.W.2d 676, 

678 (Minn. App. 1985), and Haugen to support his argument. Although in both Weise 

and Haugen this court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying a 

continuance, in these cases the litigants had either just a day’s notice or no notice of the 

event triggering the continuance request. Weise, 370 N.W.2d at 678; Haugen, 410 

N.W.2d at 395. Here, appellant had notice of the summary-judgment hearing on 

March 12, 2014, and his attorney withdrew on March 24. Appellant had 17 business days 

to secure new counsel or file a motion for a continuance. Although appellant requested a 

continuance, he did so informally by e-mailing the court after he was informed that he 

needed to file a formal motion because the continuance was contested. 

Appellant also testified that he made a diligent effort to find alternative counsel, 

but that he was unable to find suitable counsel before his summary-judgment response 

was due. The district court found that appellant’s actions did not constitute a diligent 

effort. The district court noted that when appellant “was asked about what efforts he had 
7

made to retain counsel, he stated that he had interviewed several attorneys, but had not 

hired one because of high hourly rates, what he believed to be insufficient real estate 

experience, or his busy travel schedule.” The district court concluded that appellant 

“failed to establish good cause for a continuance, did not demonstrate adequate diligence 

in seeking replacement counsel, and did not demonstrate significant prejudice to his 

interests if his oral motion was denied.” Moreover, the record reveals that, in the twoplus years since the initiation of this lawsuit, appellant failed to conduct any discovery. 

Based on the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

appellant’s informal oral motion for a continuance. Appellant’s failure to secure an 

attorney before the summary-judgment hearing was largely due to financial concerns and 

not due to a lack of time or notice. The district court informed appellant of the proper 

procedure to file a continuance, and he failed to follow the district court’s directions. 

Affirmed.