FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 October 6, 2004 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

 Honorable Fern M. Smith, United States District Judge for the Northern District of *

California, sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 03-15078

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-00103-CV-ORL-22-KRS

MULTI-FINANCIAL SECURITIES, CORP.,

(f.n.a. IFG Network Securities, Inc.)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RUA L. KING,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(October 6, 2004)

Before BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and SMITH , District Judge. *

SMITH, District Judge:
 Although it should go without saying, we point out that the validity of King’s underlying 1

claim is irrelevant to the arbitration issues on appeal. We hereby determine only whether the district

court correctly compelled IFG to defend King’s claims in the arbitral forum, not whether we deem

those claims meritorious. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68,

80 S. Ct. 1343, 1346, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1960).

2

IFG Network Securities, Inc. (“IFG”) appeals the district court’s September 3,

2003, order compelling arbitration of its dispute with Rex King, now deceased, and

Rua King (“King”). On appeal, IFG argues that the district court erred by finding

King entitled to arbitration under the National Association of Securities Dealers

(“NASD”) Code of Arbitration Procedure (“Code”) and by refusing to conduct an

evidentiary hearing to resolve alleged fact issues. We hold, generally, that the Code

is a written agreement binding IFG to arbitrate and, specifically, that the instant

dispute is between a member (IFG) and a customer (King) and arises in connection

with that member’s business, thereby satisfying the Code’s enumerated requirements.1

We, consequently, affirm the district court’s order compelling arbitration.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time IFG filed its complaint, it was a member of the NASD. Following

the advice of Anthony Micciche (“Micciche”), a registered representative of IFG,

King and her late husband entered into a trust agreement with Intrados, S.A.

(“Intrados”), a Panamanian company. On May 2, 1999, King tendered two checks

totaling $45,800.00 to Intrados. Intrados, in turn, invested that money in Evergreen
3

Securities, Ltd. (“Evergreen”). Evergreen now is bankrupt and King has lost her

entire investment. In connection with his association with Evergreen, Micciche pled

guilty to the crime of selling unregistered securities.

According to King, she relied, at least in part, on Micciche’s affiliation with

IFG in making the investments at issue. In support of that reliance, King submitted

to the district court a copy of an IFG business card which Micciche allegedly

provided her in the course of their business dealings. On its face, the business card

indicates that Micciche is affiliated with IFG. Micciche countered: “I did not provide

[King] with a business card or correspond with [King] on letterhead referring to

IFG. . . . I did not provide [King] with any documents referring to IFG . . . or

indicating that IFG . . . was involved with [her] offshore trust, its trustee . . . or the

Evergreen Security Ltd. investment the trustee made in their trust.” Micciche never

reported his activities involving King, Intrados, or Evergreen to IFG, IFG did not

approve of the sale of Evergreen by its representatives, IFG does not have any record

of the purchase of this investment by or for King, King never opened an account with

IFG, King does not have any written contract with IFG, and IFG did not receive or

disburse funds for this transaction.

On September 4, 2002, King initiated an arbitration proceeding against IFG,

claiming that it violated federal and state securities laws, breached a contract,
4

engaged in fraud, negligence, and gross negligence, and breached a fiduciary duty.

King’s substantive claim, in essence, is that IFG failed to supervise Micciche,

contrary to its obligations, resulting in her losses through the failed Evergreen

investment. Although King did not have a contract with IFG, she demanded

arbitration under Rules 10101(c) and 10301(a) of the Code. In response, on January

27, 2003, IFG filed this action against King demanding a declaratory judgment that

arbitrability is an issue for judicial determination, that the parties have no valid

agreement to arbitrate, that Micciche had no authority to act on IFG’s behalf with

respect to Evergreen, and that “IFG [] did not violate the federal securities laws.”

IFG’s complaint also seeks an injunction against the then-pending arbitration

proceedings. King, in response, filed a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.

A magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny both IFG’s

injunction request and King’s motion to compel arbitration because “there is disputed

evidence on the question of whether Micciche told [King] that he was affiliated with

IFG, or gave her other indicia of his affiliation with IFG. . . .” Both parties objected.

On September 3, 2003, the district court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing or trial

and compelled arbitration, holding that “a customer’s direct dealings with an

associated person of a[n]NASDmember are sufficient to compel a[n] NASD member

into arbitration” and that King’s “claim has a ‘sufficient nexus’to IFG[’s] [] business
5

activities so as to entitle [King] to arbitration in conformance with the NASD Code

of Arbitration Procedure.” The arbitration panel held a hearing and found in favor

of King.

IFG appealed to this Court the district court’s September 3, 2003 order

compelling arbitration.

II. JURISDICTION

IFG’s appeal is timely, this Court has appellate jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also

Household Bank v. JFS Group, 320 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] federal

district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action if, as

here, a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint alleges facts demonstrating the defendant

could file a coercive action arising under federal law.”).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo questions of law, such as a district court’s

interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate (and whether it binds the parties to

arbitrate), but accepts the district court’s findings of fact that are not clearly

erroneous. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-948, 115 S.

Ct. 1920, 1926, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995).

IV. ANALYSIS
6

The Federal Arbitration Act, preliminarily, only applies if the parties agreed “to

arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4. “[A]rbitration

is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any

dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. This axiom recognizes the fact that

arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have

agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v.

Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-49, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1418, 89

L. Ed. 2d 648 (1986) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although there is no

direct written agreement to arbitrate between IFG and King, the Code serves as a

sufficient written agreement to arbitrate, binding its members to arbitrate a variety of

claims with third-party claimants. See Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts

P’ship, 41 F.3d 861, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1994).

To determine whether IFG’s written agreement to arbitrate governs its dispute

with King, the Court must interpret the Code as it would a contract under the

applicable state law, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2527

n.9, 96 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1987), giving effect (as it does when interpreting any contract)

to the parties’ intent expressed by the ordinary meaning of the language they used.

Beans v. Chohonis, 740 So.2d 65, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Interfirst Fed. Sav.

Bank v. Burke, 672 So.2d 90, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). But, unlike other
7

contracts, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved

in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460

U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S. Ct. 927, 941, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983).

Rule 10101(c) provides:

This Code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed and adopted pursuant

to Article VII, Section 1(a)(iv) of the By-Laws of the Association for the

arbitration of any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in

connection with the business of any member of the Association . . .

between or among members or associated persons and public customers,

or others. . . .

NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10101(c). And, Rule 10301(a) provides:

Any dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for submission under the

Rule 10100 Series between a customer and a member and/or associated

person arising in connection with the business of such member or in

connection with the activities of such associated persons shall be

arbitrated under this Code, as provided by any duly executed and

enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of the customer. . . .

NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10301(a). To compel arbitration,

therefore, an investor must show that his or her claim: involves a dispute between a

member and a customer or an associated person of the member and a customer; and,

arises in connection with the business activities of the member or in connection with

the activities of the associated person.

A. Customer Disputes
8

King’s dispute with IFG is one between a customer and a member. Rule

10101(c) only applies to “disputes . . . between or among members or associated

persons and public customers, or others” and Rule 10301(a) only applies to “disputes

. . . between a customer and a member and/or associated person.” Preliminarily,

whether King is an IFG customer, as defined by the Code, is a legal question of

contract interpretation for the Court, see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Warren Bros. Co.,

Div. of Ashland Oil, Inc., 355 So.2d 785, 787 (Fla. 1978), and, under the circumstance

at bar, the Court does not require an evidentiary hearing because the underlying

factual circumstances are undisputed (the parties agree that King was a customer of

Micciche and that Micciche was a person associated with IFG). The instant matter

is distinguishable from Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003), where

the Second Circuit found that whether certain investors actually were customers at all

presented a triable issue of material fact. Id. at 177-78. Unlike Bensadoun, there is

no proffer of facts to contradict King’s allegations that she dealt directly with

Micciche, whom IFG concedes was its representative; rather, the different question

posed to this Court is whether King was a “customer,” as that term is used in Rules

10101(c) and 10301(a), solely because she is a customer of a person associated with

IFG.
 There is no dispute that, at all relevant times, IFG was a “member” and Micciche was an

2

“associated person,” as those terms are used in Rules 10101(c) and 10301(a).

 The Court will not consider the extrinsic evidence presented by IFG regarding the 3

purported intent ofthe NASD because the rules at issue are clear and unambiguous. See Bombardier

Capital Inc. v. Progressive Mktg. Group, Inc., 801 So.2d 131, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

9

We conclude that King is a “customer,” as that term is defined and used by the

NASD. The NASD generally defines the term “customer” as anyone who is not a 2

broker or a dealer. NASD Rule 0120(g). Although it concedes that King was

Micciche’s “customer,” as that term is used in the Code, IFG argues that King was

notits customer. Rules 10101(c) and 10301(a), however, unambiguously provide that

the King is a customer as long as she is not a broker or dealer; nothing in the Code

directs otherwise or requires more. Enforcing the limitation IFG seeks would be 3

tantamount to reading language into the Code that is conspicuously absent. Other

inapplicable NASD rules do make a distinction between customers generally and

customers of the member. The NASD rule pertaining to disclosure of financial

condition to customers, for example, defines “customer” as “any person who, in the

regular course of such member’s business, has cash or securities in the possession of

such member.” NASDRule 2270(b). The NASDrule regardingmargin requirements

similarly provides that “customer” means

any person for whom securities are purchased or sold or to whom

securities are purchased or sold whether on a regular way, when issued,
10

delayed or future delivery basis. It will also include any person for

whom securities are held or carried and to or for whom a member

organization extends, arranges or maintains any credit. NASD Rule

2520(a)(3). 

Rules 2270(b) and 2520(a)(3) show that the NASD could limit the term “customer”

specifically to those with whom the member has a direct relationship. Its clear and

unambiguous choice to leave the term as defined generally immediately leads to the

conclusion that King satisfies the “customer” requirement because she is not a broker

or a dealer, even though she may not have been a direct customer of IFG.

Our interpretation of the Code’s unambiguous language finds support in almost

every other decision on this issue. In John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d

48 (2d Cir. 2001), for example, the Second Circuit held that investors could compel

arbitration against a member notwithstanding the lack of a direct transactional

relationship. See id. at 58-60. There, the court held that the plain language of Rule

10301(a) supports the view that the term “customer” refers to either a member’s or

an associated person’s customer, affording customers of an associated person a right

to compel arbitration against a member. Id. Numerous other courts have interpreted

the Code similarly. See, e.g., California Fina Group, Inc. v. Herrin, 379 F. 3d 311,

318 (5th Cir. 2004) (“‘[C]ustomer’ as used in Rule 10301(a) is plainly broad enough

to include persons who purchased securities from a registered representative of an
11

NASD-member firm, a.k.a. an ‘associated person,’ and who are not themselves

brokers or dealers.”); Vestax Secs. Corp. v. McWood, 280 F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir.

2002) (rejecting the argument that the Code requires the defendant-investors be direct

customers of the NASD member firm in order to compel arbitration against the

member); Daugherty v. Washington Square Secs., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 681, 690

(W.D. Pa. 2003) (“The majority of federal courts faced with interpreting NASD Rule

10301(a) concluded that NASD members must arbitrate disputes raised by customers

of their associated persons.”); Washington Square Secs., Inc. v. Aune, 253 F. Supp.

2d 839, 841 n.1 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (“The majority view is stated in the John Hancock

opinion . . . holding that customers of the NASD member firm’s

representative/associated person can require the NASD member to submit to

arbitration.”); BMA Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Guin, 164 F. Supp. 2d 813, 820 (W.D. La.

2001) (“Rule 10301(a) does not require the Defendant-Investors to be direct

customers of [the member]. Instead, they fit within the confines of the Rule--and

therefore may require [the member] to arbitrate--even if they are only customers of

[the member’s] ‘associated person’ and not [the member].”); Fin. Network Inv. Corp.

v. Becker, 762 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (“NASD’s definition of

‘customer’ is broad, excluding only a broker or dealer, and plainly including

customers of an associated person as well as of the member itself.”).
12

The case law is not unanimous. At least one federal court has taken an

opposite view. In Investors Capital Corp. v. Brown, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (M.D. Fla.

2001), the Middle District of Florida, from which the instant matter arises, held that

“being a customer of an associated person is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for

compelling arbitration with a member.” Id. at 1307. That court required some indicia

of a direct customer relationship between the NASD member firm and the investor.

Id. at 1308 (“[I]n joining the NASD, [the member] agreed to arbitrate disputes with

its customers, rather than the customers of every person associated with [the

member]. The opposite construction of Rule 10301(a), the Court concludes, would

do significant injustice to the reasonable expectations of NASD members” (quotation

marks and citations omitted)). Another case in that district followed the Investors

Capital holding. Mony Secs. Corp. v. Vasquez, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1306-08 (M.D.

Fla. 2002). The reasoning of these decisionsis not persuasive, however, because they

read a limitation into the Code that is absent from its language. The NASD,

moreover, has been on notice at least since 2001 -- when the Second Circuit issued

John Hancock -- of the broad meaning the courts would attribute to the language

used. The NASD could have prevented any purported “significant injustice” merely

by including simple limiting language, as it did with Rules 2270(b) and 2520(a)(3).

The NASD has not done so, and this Court only can conclude that the John Hancock
13

interpretation is consistent with the NASD members’ reasonable expectations.

Finally, the Code’s second requirement, that the dispute arise in connection with the

business of the member, provides for the general connection between the customer’s

dispute and the member’s conduct that these decisions impose upon the customermember requirement.

Even if the Code were not written so broadly and a member could only be

compelled into arbitration by its own customers, King still could have compelled IFG

into arbitration. When an investor deals with a member’s agent or representative, the

investor deals with the member. Vestax, 280 F.3d at 1081; Oppenheimer & Co. Inc.

v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Washington Square Secs. Inc. v.

Sowers, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1116 (D. Minn. 2002) (“Federal case law plainly states

that when the investor deals with an agent or representative [of a member], the

investor deals with the member, and on that basis the investor is entitled to have

resolved in arbitration any dispute that arises out of that relationship” (quotation

marks and citation omitted)); Summit Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Cooksley, No. CA

02-11137 AO, 2002 WL 31478190 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2002) (“[B]y dealing with

[the firm’s] registered representative, [the investor] became a customer of that firm

for purposes of NASD arbitration obligations.”). The parties agree that King dealt

with Micciche,so King, in turn, dealt with IFG. TheCourt, therefore, holds that King
14

has satisfied the first requirement of Rules 10101(c) and 10301(a) by demonstrating

that she is a customer and that IFG is a member.

B. Member’s Business

Rule 10101(c) only applies to disputes “arising out of or in connection with the

business of any member” and 10301(a) only applies to disputes “arising in connection

with the business of such member.” Unlike the Code’s broad “member” and

“customer” requirements, the “in connection with” element focuses Rules 10101(c)

and 10301(a) on particular types of disputes. Otherwise stated, in the universe of

member-customer disputes, only a portion will arise in connection with the member’s

business and only those satisfy the Code’s arbitration provisions. King’s cause of

action, for example, arises from the actions of Micciche in giving advice regarding

investments at a time when he was a person associated with IFG, a brokerage firm in

the business of providing investment advice through its representatives. King’s

primary claim,specifically, is that IFG negligently supervised Micciche, resulting in

the troubled Evergreen investment. The NASD requires that its members supervise

the activities of their associated persons, as part of their business. NASD Code of

Conduct Rule 3010. We conclude that King’s claimof negligent supervision satisfies

the Code’s second arbitration condition. See Vestax, 280 F.3d at 1082 (holding that

a dispute that arises from a member’s lack of supervision over its associated persons
15

arises “in connection with its business”); John Hancock, 254 F.3d at 58-59 (same);

MONY Secs. Corp. v. Bornstein, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1357 (M.D. Fla. 2003)

(same); Hornor, Townsend & Kent, Inc. v. Hamilton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1384

(N.D. Ga. 2002) (same); First Montauk Secs. Corp. v. Four Mile Ranch Dev. Co.,

Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (same); see also 1 Thomas H.

Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 28:14 (2003) (“A dispute that arises from a

securities brokerage firm’s lack of supervision over its brokers arises in connection

with its business (for purposes of NASD rules compelling arbitration of disputes).”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that IFG is a “member,” that

Micciche is an “associate person,” and that King is a “customer,” as those terms are

used in the Code, and that King’s dispute arises in connection with IFG’s business.

Rules 10101(c) and 10301(a) of the Code, a valid written agreement to arbitration,

therefore, provide that King may demand arbitration for its dispute with IFG.

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.