Filed 5/3/18

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

LA MIRADA AVENUE 

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION

OF HOLLYWOOD et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants;

TARGET CORPORATION,

Real Party in Interest and 

Appellant.

 B282137

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. Nos. BS140889,

 BS140930)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Terry Kaufman Macias, 

Assistant City Attorney, Kenneth Tom Fong and Kimberly Ai-

 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 

8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception 

of Part II of the Discussion section.
2

Hua Huangfu, Deputy City Attorneys; Burke, Williams 

& Sorensen and Anna Corinne Shimko for Defendants and 

Appellants City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles City Council.

Morrison & Foerster, Miriam A. Vogel; Shoreline Law 

Corporation, Andrew S. Pauly and Damon A. Thayer for Real 

Party in Interest and Appellant Target Corporation.

The Silverstein Law Firm, Robert P. Silverstein and David 

E. Wright for Plaintiff and Respondent La Mirada Avenue 

Neighborhood Association of Hollywood.

The Law Offices of David Lawrence Bell and David Bell for 

Plaintiff and Respondent Citizens Coalition Los Angeles.

* * * * * *

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,1 a trial court 

may award attorney’s fees to the “successful party” in a lawsuit 

that “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right 

affecting the public interest” if, among other things, the lawsuit 

confers “a significant benefit” upon “the general public or a large 

class of persons.” If a party is “successful” and has conferred a 

“significant benefit” by prevailing at trial and obtaining a 

judgment that a construction project violates the zoning laws in 

existence at the time, is that party precluded from obtaining 

attorney’s fees under section 1021.5 because the losing party gets 

the zoning laws changed and the project’s validity under the 

changed law has yet to be finally determined? We conclude that 

the answer is “no.” Consequently, and because we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of 

attorney’s fees, we affirm the awards of attorney’s fees.

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Real party in interest Target Corporation (Target) wants to 

build a retail store on the corner of Western Avenue and Sunset 

Boulevard in Hollywood, California.

For purposes of zoning, that location is subject to the Los 

Angeles Municipal Code as well as to a more specific Station 

Neighborhood Area Plan (SNAP), which for this location is the 

Vermont/Western Transit Oriented District Specific Plan. Within 

the geographic area covered by the SNAP, the location falls 

within Subarea C. Under the law in effect at the time, 

commercial buildings in Subarea C (other than hospitals and 

“mixed use” buildings (that is, part commercial and part 

residential)) (1) could not exceed 35 feet in height, (2) were 

required to incorporate certain aesthetic design elements aimed 

at avoiding the look of a “big box” store, (3) could not have more 

than 390 parking spaces, (4) were required to limit the hours 

during which they accept deliveries, and (5) if the square footage 

exceeds 40,000 square feet, were required to offer free delivery to 

local residents.

Target submitted two plans to defendant the City Council 

of the City of Los Angeles (the City or City Council). Initially, 

Target sought to build a retail store that complied with the above 

stated requirements of the Municipal Code and the SNAP. 

Subsequently, however, Target submitted a new proposal to build 

a Super Target retail store. The Super Target store would be 

nearly 75 feet in height, complete with a transit plaza, an above 

ground parking lot with 458 parking spaces, and 163,862 square 

feet of retail space (the Project).
4

Because the Project did not comply with the SNAP, the 

City Council granted eight variances (called “exceptions”) from 

the SNAP pursuant to Los Angeles Municipal Code section 

11.5.7.F.2. These variances excepted the Project from the SNAP’s 

height restrictions, many of its design element requirements, its 

parking space limit, its delivery time restrictions, and its free 

delivery requirements.

II. Procedural Background

A. Writ Petitions

Plaintiffs La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Association of 

Hollywood (La Mirada) and Citizens Coalition Los Angeles 

(Citizens) (collectively, plaintiffs), both of which are “community 

association[s]” that “advocate for residential quality of life 

issues,” filed separate petitions for a writ of mandate against the 

City (and naming Target as the real party in interest). In their 

operative first amended petitions, plaintiffs generally alleged “a 

substantial interest in ensuring that the City’s decisions are in 

conformity with the requirements of the law.” More specifically, 

one or both of those petitions alleged: (1) the Project violated the 

California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources

Code, § 21000 et seq.) because the Project’s environmental impact 

report was deficient; (2) the Project violated the Los Angeles 

Municipal Code because the eight variances from the SNAP were 

not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the City Council 

denied plaintiffs a fair hearing; and (4) the City did not comply 

with the laws governing open meetings. With respect to the 

alleged violation of the Municipal Code, plaintiffs sought (1) “to 

vacate and set aside the actions approving the [SNAP] exceptions 

for the Project, and [to have] the Court invalidate the exceptions”; 

(2) to “enjoin the City . . . from granting any authority, permits or 
5

entitlements . . . pursuant to the [SNAP] exceptions”; and (3) to 

“enjoin . . . any activities or construction pursuant to the [SNAP] 

exceptions.”

B. Trial Court’s Partial Grant of the Writ Petitions

Following full briefing, the trial court issued a 28-page 

order partly granting and partly denying plaintiffs’ writ petitions. 

The court denied the writs insofar as they alleged violations of 

CEQA and the denial of a fair hearing. And plaintiffs had by that 

time already abandoned their claim that the City Council had 

violated the open meeting laws. However, the court concluded 

that six of the eight SNAP variances violated the Los Angeles 

Municipal Code because they were not supported by substantial 

evidence; of the variances alleged to be invalid, the court only 

upheld the variance for the number of parking spaces and the 

waiver of the home delivery requirement. In July 2014, the trial 

court entered judgment for plaintiffs on the writs invalidating six 

of the eight Municipal Code variances, enjoining any actions “in 

furtherance of” those variances, and “immediately . . . 

restrain[ing] . . . all construction activities.” The judgment also 

authorized plaintiffs to seek attorney’s fees.

C. Appeals of Writ Petitions (La Mirada I)

Both Target and La Mirada appealed the judgment.

While the appeals were pending, and at Target’s urging, 

the City Council amended the SNAP to create a new Subarea F, 

to delineate Subarea F’s geographical boundaries to include the 

Project, and to define Subarea F’s zoning rules to allow for big 

retail stores like the Project.

Target asked this Court to hold the pending appeals in 

abeyance and consolidate them with the anticipated appeals in 

the next round of litigation challenging the SNAP amendments. 
6

In a published ruling, this Court dismissed the appeals as moot 

but left the judgment intact. (La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood 

Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 

586, 588-592 (La Mirada I).)

D. Challenges Under New Zoning Laws

Plaintiffs filed new petitions for a writ of mandate in 

separate cases, challenging the Project’s validity under the newly 

amended SNAP. After a trial held on March 30, 2017, the court 

vacated the City’s approval of the Project. Target’s appeal of that 

challenge is pending before us in Citizens Coalition Los Angeles v. 

City of Los Angeles, B282142.

E. Litigation over Attorney’s Fees

After the La Mirada I appeal was dismissed, plaintiffs 

moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 1021.5 for 

prevailing on their challenges to the SNAP variances. After full

briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted La Mirada 

attorney’s fees totaling $793,817.50 and Citizens attorney’s fees 

of $180,320. The court concluded that plaintiffs had “been 

successful at each stage of the litigation,” and that the lawsuit 

had conferred a “significant benefit . . . on [City] residents” 

because it “upheld the building limitations specified in [the 

SNAP] against the City’s approval of exceptions that did not meet 

the legal requirements for variances.” The court rejected the 

argument that “recent amending of the” SNAP undermined the 

propriety of a fee award. The court went on to calculate the fee 

amount by evaluating the reasonableness of the time spent and 

the hourly rate, adjusting down a few of the hours and rates, and 

using a multiplier of 1.4.
7

F. Appeals of Attorney’s Fees Awards

Target and the City filed timely notices of appeal from each 

of the attorney’s fees orders. We consolidated these appeals.

DISCUSSION

As a general rule, parties in litigation pay their own 

attorney’s fees. (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat., Inc. (2016) 

1 Cal.5th 480, 488.) Section 1021.5 is an exception to that rule. 

(Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire 

Protection (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 (Ebbetts Pass).) 

Derived from the judicially crafted “private attorney general 

doctrine” (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 917 (Woodland Hills)), section 1021.5 is aimed 

at encouraging litigants to pursue meritorious public interest 

litigation vindicating important rights and benefitting a broad 

swath of citizens, and it achieves this aim by compensating

successful litigants with an award of attorney’s fees. (Id.

at pp. 924-925; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 43, 47.)

Target argues that that the trial court’s attorney’s fees 

orders must be overturned because (1) plaintiffs have not 

established their eligibility for such fees under section 1021.5, 

and (2) the amount of fees awarded is excessive. We review the 

first question with a mixed standard of review: To the extent we 

construe and define the statutory requirements for an award of 

attorney’s fees, our review is de novo; to the extent we assess 

whether those requirements were properly applied, our review is 

for an abuse of discretion. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. 

(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175; Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering 

Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018, 1025-1026.) We review the 

second question for an abuse of discretion. (Graham 

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 578 (Graham).)
8

I. Eligibility for Attorney’s Fees Under Section 1021.5

To obtain an order requiring the losing party to pay 

attorney’s fees under section 1021.5, the movant must establish 

that (1) it is “a successful party” in an “action,” (2) the action “has 

resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the 

public interest,” (3) the action has “conferred” “a significant 

benefit” “on the general public or a large class of persons,” and

(4) an award of attorney’s fees is “appropriate” in light of “the 

necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of 

enforcement by one public entity against another public entity.” 

(§ 1021.5; Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 317-

318 (Press); Ebbetts Pass, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 381 

[movant bears burden of proof].) And if the successful party 

obtained damages, the party must also establish that the 

attorney’s fees “should not in the interest of justice be paid out of 

the recovery.” (§ 1021.5.)

Target contends that the trial court erred in ruling that 

plaintiffs were successful (the first requirement) and that 

plaintiffs’ action conferred a significant benefit on the general 

public or a large class of persons (the third requirement). 

Target’s attack on these two requirements boils down to the same 

basic premise—namely, plaintiffs have yet to be successful or to 

confer any significant benefit because Target may yet prevail in 

getting the Project approved under the new zoning laws. As we 

explain below, this premise is invalid.

A. Success

What does it mean to be “successful”?

When it comes to section 1021.5, the successful party is 

“the party to litigation that achieves its objectives.” (Graham, 

supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 571; Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of 
9

Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 686 (Folsom) [looking to 

“litigation aim”]; Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 

1103 (Harbor) [successful party is the one who “vindicate[s] the 

principle upon which [it] brought th[e] action”].)

This definition is both “pragmatic” and “broad.” (Graham, 

supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 565.) To be the successful party, a party 

need not obtain final judgment in its favor. (Ibid.; Maria P. 

v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290-1291.) It need not succeed on 

all of its claims. (RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Depart. of 

Environmental Health (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 768, 782-783 

(RiverWatch).) And it need not “personally benefit[]” from its 

success. (Harbor, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1089-1103 [party 

“succeeded” when court invalidated Governor’s authority to make 

line-item veto, even though ruling would not be retroactively 

applied to benefit that party]; accord, Ebbetts Pass, supra, 

187 Cal.App.4th at p. 382.) Indeed, because the “critical fact” to 

success “is the impact of the action, not the manner of its 

resolution” (Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 685), the party need 

not “win” the lawsuit at all: It is enough to show that the lawsuit 

was a “catalyst” that motivated the defendant to alter its 

behavior, be it through voluntary action growing out of a 

settlement or otherwise. (Graham, at p. 567; Maria P., at pp. 

1291-1292 [emphasizing need for “causal connection” between 

lawsuit and defendant’s subsequent conduct].)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

that plaintiffs were a successful party for two distinct but 

interlocking reasons. First, plaintiffs sought a writ that would 

“vacate and set aside” the City Council’s grant of eight variances 

from the SNAP, and it did so as a way to vindicate their “interest 

in ensuring that the City’s decisions are in conformity with the 
10

requirements of the [Municipal Code].” Plaintiffs achieved this 

objective when the trial court invalidated six of the eight 

variances for noncompliance with the Municipal Code. Second, 

plaintiffs’ lawsuit served as a catalyst that motivated the City—a 

defendant in this action—to amend the SNAP to create a new 

Subarea F specifically to make the Project lawful under the 

Municipal Code. A party is successful when, as here, its lawsuit 

directly prompts a “legislative fix.” (See Sagaser v. McCarthy

(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 288, 314 [noting that the “impact” of a

lawsuit “might include legislative changes . . . or amendments in 

policy”].)

B. Significant Benefit

Whether a successful party’s lawsuit confers a “significant 

benefit” on the general public or a large class of persons is a 

function of (1) “the significance of the benefit,” and (2) “the size of 

the class receiving [the] benefit.” (Woodland Hills, supra, 

23 Cal.3d at pp. 939-940.) In evaluating these factors, courts are 

to “realistic[ally] assess[]” the lawsuit’s “gains” “in light of all the 

pertinent circumstances.” (Id. at p. 940.)

A benefit need not be monetary to be significant. (§ 1021.5 

[defining “a significant benefit” as either “pecuniary or 

nonpecuinary”].) Where, as here, the nonpecuniary benefit to the 

public is the proper enforcement of the law, the successful party 

must show that the law being enforced furthers a significant 

policy. (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 939-940 [so 

holding because “the Legislature did not intend to authorize an 

award of attorney fees in every case involving a statutory 

violation”].) In such instances, the significant benefit and 

important right requirements of section 1021.5 to some extent 

dovetail. (Id. at p. 935 [noting that courts must exercise “some 
11

selectivity” when deciding which rights are “important”]; accord, 

Marini v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 829, 836 

(Marini) [noting that an “important” right “cannot be based on 

trivial or peripheral public policies”].)

The “extent of the public benefit” from the lawsuit must be 

“substantial,” but “need not be great.” (RiverWatch, supra, 

175 Cal.App.4th at p. 781; Center for Biological Diversity 

v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 894; 

cf. Concerned Citizens of La Habra v. City of La Habra (2005) 

131 Cal.App.4th 329, 335-336 [lawsuit resulted in correction of a 

“minute blemish” in environmental impact report; no significant 

benefit]; Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California 

Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 

183 Cal.App.4th 330, 336 [lawsuit resulted in remand for reasons 

articulated by the appellate court but not by the successful party; 

no significant benefit]; United States v. Eastern Municipal Water 

Dist. (C.D.Cal. Jan. 3, 2011, No. CV 04-8182 CBM (RNBx)) 2011 

U.S.Dist. Lexis 161674 [lawsuit secured procedural victory 

wholly duplicated by another suit brought by United States; no 

significant benefit]; Marini, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at pp. 837-838 

[lawsuit preserved municipal court’s discretion to implement a 

pretrial diversion program for drunk drivers, brought by drunk 

driver; no significant benefit].)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that 

plaintiffs’ lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on the general 

public or a large class of persons. The chief benefit identified by 

the trial court—requiring the City to adhere to the Municipal 

Code’s “legal requirements” for granting variances from the 

SNAP—furthers a significant public policy. Our Supreme Court 

has consistently recognized the importance of “preserv[ing] the 
12

integrity of” a “locality’s governing general plan” for zoning 

(Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 936), including through 

judicial oversight that “prevent[s] unjustified variance awards” 

that threaten to “subver[t] . . . the critical reciprocity upon which 

zoning regulation rests” (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community 

v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 517-518).2 (Accord, 

Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1263 

[“Zoning laws concern ‘a vital public interest’”].) What is more, 

the vindication of this significant policy benefits not only the 

persons living near the Project and the persons living within the 

geographical boundaries of the SNAP at issue in this case, but 

also all residents of the City of Los Angeles who benefit from the 

trial court’s ruling that holds the City Council’s zoning decisions 

to the letter and spirit of the Municipal Code.

C. Impact of New Zoning Law

Target contends that plaintiffs were not successful parties

and that they have not conferred any significant benefit because 

the validity of the Project under the new zoning law is still 

pending and has yet to be finally adjudicated. In support of this 

“wait and see” approach, Target makes what boils down to two 

arguments.

First, Target asserts that plaintiffs’ objective was to stop 

the Target store from ever being built and that they have not yet 

achieved that objective because Target may still prevail in its 

position that the Project is valid under the new zoning law.

 

2 In light of the significance of this public policy, we need not 

decide whether another of the interests served by the zoning 

laws—namely, preserving adequate housing—is itself 

independently significant.
13

This assertion is both factually inaccurate and legally 

untenable.

It is factually inaccurate because the stated objective of 

plaintiffs’ writ petitions, with respect to the SNAP variances, was

to set aside and invalidate the eight variances initially granted 

by the City Council as well as to enjoin any further construction 

contingent upon their validity. At no point did plaintiffs allege 

that their writ petitions were aimed at stopping the Project 

forevermore. 

Target’s assertion is also legally untenable because success

for purposes of section 1021.5 does not require a showing that the 

successful party put the entire dispute to rest for once and all. To 

the contrary, section 1021.5 contemplates “interim attorney fee 

awards” for successes conferring a significant benefit before the 

matter is finally litigated. (Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2001) 

87 Cal.App.4th 805, 832-833.) As long as an interim benefit is 

“complete regardless of subsequent proceedings,” a court may 

recognize that benefit by an award of attorney’s fees. (Ciani 

v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 563, 

576; Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino,

supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 895 [“the ‘substantial benefit’ 

criterion” is to be considered “in the context of the outcome of the 

current litigation, and not on speculative future events”].)

In this case, the trial court’s ruling that the SNAP 

variances violated the Municipal Code as it existed at that time 

was reduced to a judgment, a judgment that was left intact after 

La Mirada I. For that reason, the rulings underlying the fee 

awards in this case are more final than the typical “interim” 

ruling handed down before judgment. Indeed, the judgments in 

this case are interim only against the backdrop of the broader 
14

litigation between the parties, which continues only because the 

City amended the zoning law and thereby prompted a new round 

of petitions challenging the Project under the new zoning law. 

That the City by amending the zoning law is just trying to “get it 

right,” as Target urges, is beside the point; the proper focus is on 

the “litigation objectives” of the prevailing plaintiff (Graham,

supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 571-572), not the motives of the losing 

defendant.

What is more, Target’s assertion leads to an absurd result. 

A court may only grant writ relief after applying “‘the law in 

existence at the time of its decision.’” (Atlantic Richfield Co. 

v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1059, 1065, italics 

omitted.) Consequently, a writ petitioner can, at most, seek to 

invalidate a “final administrative order or decision” under the 

law then in existence. (§ 1094.5, subd. (a).) Target, however, 

invites us to deny attorney’s fees to a writ petitioner who 

succeeds under the law in existence at the time because it has yet 

to succeed under the law as it might be amended in the future, 

even though that petitioner cannot seek (and a court cannot 

award) such “now-and-forevermore” relief. We decline to define 

success as requiring one to achieve the impossible.

Second, Target cites cases holding that a party may not 

obtain attorney’s fees under section 1021.5 “until the benefit is 

secure.” (Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 679; Urbaniak v. Newton

(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1837, 1844.) Applying this standard, 

courts have held that a party’s success in overturning a grant of 

summary judgment against it is not “secure” because the victory 

merely sets the matter for trial, where the merits will be 

determined for the first time. (Urbaniak, at p. 1844; Miller 

v. California Com. on Status of Women (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 
15

454, 458-459.) These cases are distinguishable where, as here, 

the party has obtained a final judgment in its favor on the merits 

under the law in existence at the time and where what remains 

to be finally adjudicated is the validity of a project under the law 

as subsequently amended.3

II. Amount of Fees

In fixing the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded under 

section 1021.5, a trial court must: (1) calculate a “lodestar” 

amount of fees, which is defined as the product of (a) the 

reasonable number of hours spent litigating the matter, and 

(b) the reasonable rate of hourly compensation; (2) decide 

whether to allocate those fees between claims on which the 

successful party prevailed and those on which it did not; and 

(3) determine whether to apply a “multiplier” that either 

increases or decreases the amount of fees. (Graham, supra, 

34 Cal.4th at p. 579; Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 322; Woodland 

Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 942.) Target attacks the trial court’s 

rulings on each of these three steps.

A. Calculation of Lodestar

In calculating the lodestar figure, the trial court “‘must 

carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended’” and 

examine the “‘prevailing hourly rates.’” (Graham, supra, 

34 Cal.4th at p. 579.) In this case, the trial court examined the 

declarations and billing records submitted by each plaintiff and 

 

3 In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in finding that plaintiffs were successful and 

conferred a significant benefit in obtaining a judgment

invalidating the SNAP variances under the prior law, we need 

not decide whether plaintiffs independently succeeded and 

conferred a significant benefit for the litigation that resulted in 

the published opinion in La Mirada I.
16

ultimately discounted all of the time spent by one of La Mirada’s 

attorneys and reduced the hourly rate of Citizens’ attorney.

Target assails the trial court’s calculation of the lodestar by 

complaining generally that plaintiffs used too many lawyers and 

“impermissibly high [hourly] rates.” As the appellant, Target has 

the burden to affirmatively show error in this calculation 

(Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 601); Target’s 

generalized, broadside attack does not do so. Target further 

asserts that the trial court “ignored” its expert’s contrary 

opinions regarding the reasonableness of the time spent and the 

hourly rates, but the court did no such thing; instead, it 

considered, but ultimately “disagree[d]” with those opinions.

B. Allocation

A trial court has the discretion to reduce the lodestar 

“based on the plaintiff’s degree of success.” (Save Our Uniquely 

Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino

(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185; Chavez v. City of Los Angeles

(2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989.) However, this discretion must be 

exercised against the backdrop policy that fee awards under 

section 1021.5 “ordinarily include compensation for all hours 

reasonably spent.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 624, 

639; Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 (Ketchum).) 

This background presumption acknowledges that attorneys will 

not know in advance which of many potentially meritorious legal 

theories a court will adopt and that the reduction of “attorneys’

fees of a successful party because he did not prevail on all [of 

those theories], makes it the attorney, and not the defendant, 

who pays the cost of enforcing th[e] public right.” (Sundance 

v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 273, italics added; 
17

Guardians of Turlock’s Integrity v. Turlock City Council (1983) 

149 Cal.App.3d 584, 601.)

Target argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

not reducing the lodestar amount to account for plaintiffs’ failure 

to prevail on their CEQA challenge, their due process challenge, 

their open meeting law challenge, and their challenges to two of 

the eight SNAP variances. Contrary to what Target asserts, the 

trial court was not required to allocate the attorney’s fees 

between the successful and unsuccessful claims. Because Target 

makes no further argument as to why the trial court abused its 

discretion in declining to depart from the baseline presumption 

favoring an award for “all hours reasonably spent,” we have no 

basis to disturb the court’s decision not to do so.

C. Multiplier

A trial court also has the discretion to adjust the attorney’s 

fees award upwards or downwards by applying a multiplier to the 

lodestar. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1131-1132.) In 

deciding whether to exercise this discretion, courts typically 

examine “‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 

(2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which 

the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the 

attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.’” 

(Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 579, quoting Ketchum,

at p. 1132.) In this case, the trial court elected to apply a 

multiplier because plaintiffs’ counsel “worked on a contingency,” 

“received no compensation for four years” other than $17,000 in 

costs, “had to decline other non-contingent engagements” and 

“accomplished a significant public benefit.” The court 

nonetheless noted that “[t]hese circumstances are, to some 

extent, offset by the certainty [plaintiffs] will be able to collect the 
18

full amount of the attorney’s fees award.” Thus, the court 

rejected La Mirada’s request for a multiplier of 2 and Citizens’ 

request for a multiplier of 1.75, and instead applied one of 1.4 to 

both fee awards.

Target does not appear to attack the trial court’s 

examination of the factors relevant to applying the multiplier, 

but instead asserts that the multiplier renders the fee awards

excessive in light of the “high base fees” already included in the 

lodestar. This argument fails because we have already rejected 

its premise: The court did not fix the lodestar at an unreasonably 

high level. Moreover, the court’s ultimate fee awards are not 

unreasonably high for the duration, complexity, and intensity of 

litigation that underlies the fee awards in this case.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to their 

costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J. 

CHAVEZ