J-A20026-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JERON BROWN

Appellant No. 1679 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0004313-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016

Appellant Jeron Brown appeals from the September 24, 2015 

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 

County (“trial court”), following his bench conviction for flight to avoid 

apprehension under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126. Upon review, we affirm. 

The facts and procedural history underlying this case are undisputed. 

As recounted by the trial court:

On March 27, 2015, City of McKeesport police officer Bryan 

Easter was on routine patrol on Fifth Avenue near the business 

district of the City of McKeesport. At 8:55 a.m., a civilian 

approached his marked vehicle and informed Officer Easter that 

there was an individual attempting to open doors and windows 

at the vacant BMW Motorcycle Shop, located in the 1600 block of 

Ly[s]le Boulevard. The civilian witness provided a description of 

the actor: a black male, dressed all in blue, on an orange 

bicycle.

With that information, Offer Easter proceeded to the 1600 

block of Ly[s]le Boulevard and encountered Appellant, who 

matched the description provided by the civilian: a black male, 

dressed in all blue, on an orange bicycle, riding westbound long 
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Ly[s]le Boulevard.1 Officer Easter pulled into a gravel lot ahead 

of Appellant and exited his vehicle to ask Appellant about what 

the civilian had reported. Upon seeing Officer Easter and his 

marked police vehicle, Appellant changed directions to avoid 

Officer Easter, and crossed Ly[s]le Boulevard, traveling in the 

opposite direction toward Fifth Avenue.

Officer Easter reentered his vehicle and followed Appellant 

on Fifth Avenue. Appellant jumped off his bicycle, then jump 

back on. Officer Easter wanted to talk to Appellant about what 

had occurred at the BMW Motorcycle Shop, so he called out to 

Appellant to “hold up a minute.” Appellant ignored Officer Easter 

and rode away on his bicycle. Officer Easter continued to follow 

Appellant and told Appellant to stop. Appellant eventually 

complied by riding his bicycle over to the driver’s side of Officer 

Easter’s vehicle. Appellant remained on his bicycle in the street.

Officer Easter exited his vehicle and directed Appellant to 

the rear of the police vehicle to conduct a pat-down for officer 

safety before speaking further with Appellant. Officer Easter felt 

a wallet, which he asked Appellant to remove, and Appellant 

complied. Officer Easter asked Appellant his name and date of 

birth, which Appellant provided. Officer Easter entered 

Appellant’s information into his vehicle’s computer system, at 

which point Officer Easter discovered there was a warrant for 

Appellant from the state of Delaware. Officer Easter verified that 

the warrant was still active.

Once it was confirmed that the warrant was still active, 

Officer Easter informed Appellant that he was under arrest, and 

approached him to place him in handcuffs. Appellant nervously 

fidgeted with his bicycle handlebars, breathed heavily, and 

looked around. When Officer Easter grabbed Appellant’s left arm 

to place it in a handcuff, Appellant pushed his bicycle into Officer 

Easter. Appellant jumped over the bicycle and fled on foot 

towards the entrance of UMPC McKeesport Hospital. Officer 

Easter radioed for backup, and with Officer Herr and Sergeant 

Rydzak, the three officers pursued Appellant into the hospital. A 

chase ensued through the hospital hallways and up two flights of 

stairs. Officer Herr was eventually able to catch and attempt to 

detain Appellant. However, Appellant again resisted, refusing to 

produce his hands, and Officer Herr had to forcibly restrain and 

handcuff Appellant.

____________________________________________

1 Officer Easter encountered Appellant within a block and a half. N.T. 

Suppression, 9/24/15, at 11. 
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/15, at 3-6 (footnote and internal record citations 

omitted). On the same day, Appellant was charged with, inter alia, flight to 

avoid apprehension. On September 21, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to 

suppress the discovery of his identity, claiming that Officer Easter’s 

investigative detention of Appellant was bereft of reasonable suspicion and 

therefore, constitutionally infirm. On September 24, 2015, following a 

hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion. Shortly 

thereafter, Appellant agreed to proceed immediately to a stipulated nonjury 

trial. The trial court found Appellant guilty of flight to avoid apprehension, 

among other things, and sentenced him to three to six months’ 

incarceration, and a concurrent period of six months’ probation. Appellant 

timely appealed to this Court. Following Appellant’s filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, the trial court issued a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

On appeal,2 Appellant raises only a single issue for our review, namely 

whether “the trial court err[ed] when it determined Officer Easter possessed 

____________________________________________

2 To the extent Appellant argues that Officer’s Easter’s pat-down search was 

illegal, such argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised 

in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.”). Here, as the Commonwealth notes and as is confirmed by our 

review of the record, Appellant limited his argument in the trial court to 

whether Officer Easter had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory 

detention. See N.T. Suppression, 9/24/15, at 3. In other words, Appellant 

did not argue the propriety of the pat-down search under Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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reasonable suspicion to detain [Appellant] following an anonymous tip[.]” 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

In reviewing appeals from an order denying suppression, our standard 

of review is limited to determining 

whether [the trial court’s] factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether [its] legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a [trial] court, 

the appellate court considers only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. When the record supports the findings of the [trial] 

court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the 

legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2015). Our 

scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression 

hearing. In the interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1088-89 (Pa. 2013).

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution protect the people from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 

298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). The Lyles Court explained:

Jurisprudence arising under both charters has led to the 

development of three categories of interactions between citizens 

and police. The first, a “mere encounter,” does not require any 

level of suspicion or carry any official compulsion to stop and 

respond. The second, an “investigatory detention,” permits the 

temporary detention of an individual if supported by reasonable 

suspicion. The third is an arrest or custodial detention, which 

must be supported by probable cause.

In evaluating the level of interaction, courts conduct an 

objective examination of the totality of the surrounding 

circumstances. . . . The totality-of-the-circumstances test is 

ultimately centered on whether the suspect has in some way 

been restrained by physical force or show of coercive authority. 

Under this test, no single factor controls the ultimate conclusion 

as to whether a seizure occurred—to guide the inquiry, the 

United States Supreme Court and [our Supreme] Court have 
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employed an objective test entailing a determination of whether 

a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or otherwise 

terminate the encounter. What constitutes a restraint on liberty 

prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to leave will 

vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but 

also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.

[Our Supreme] Court and the United States Supreme 

Court have repeatedly held a seizure does not occur where 

officers merely approach a person in public and question the 

individual or request to see identification. Officers may request 

identification or question an individual so long as the officers do 

not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 

required. Although police may request a person’s identification, 

such individual still maintains the right to ignore the police and 

go about his business.

Id. at 302-03 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Instantly, 

the parties do not dispute that Officer Easton’s interaction with Appellant 

rose to the level of investigative detention, requiring reasonable suspicion.3

It is settled that reasonable suspicion necessary for investigative 

detentions 

is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the 

sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with 

information that is different in quantity or content than that 

required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that 

reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less 

reliable than that required to show probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted). “In order to justify an investigative detention, the police must 

have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable 

____________________________________________

3 The law governing Terry stops, i.e., stops and searches based on 

reasonable suspicion, is the same under both the federal and Pennsylvania 

constitutions. See In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001) (D.M. II) 

(noting that “Pennsylvania courts have consistently followed Terry in stop 

and frisk cases, including those in which the appellants allege protections 

pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”).
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suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts, and it must be 

assessed based upon the totality of the circumstances viewed through the 

eyes of a trained police officer.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 

667, 672 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 990 A.2d 

730 (Pa. 2010). Thus, “[t]he determination of whether an officer had 

reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an 

investigatory detention is an objective one, which must be considered in 

light of the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 

A.3d 89, 96 (Pa. 2011) (emphasis added). In assessing the totality of the 

circumstances, a court must give weight to the inferences that a police 

officer may draw through training and experience. Id. at 95. Reasonable 

suspicion does not require that the activity in question must be 

unquestionably criminal before an officer may investigate further. Davis, 

102 A.3d at 1000 (citations omitted). “Rather, the test is what it purports to 

be—it requires a suspicion of criminal conduct that is reasonable based upon 

facts of the matter.” Id. (citation and emphasis omitted). 

Instantly, we find instructive D.M. II and Commonwealth v. Walls, 

53 A.3d 889 (Pa. Super. 2012), in deciding whether Officer Easter possessed 

reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant. 

In D.M. II, a police officer received a radio call regarding a man with a 

gun at 28th Street and Cecil B. Moore Avenue in Philadelphia. D.M. II, 781 

A.2d at 1162. The officer was only one block from the location at the time 

of the call. The anonymous tip described the man as a “black male, wearing 
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a white t-shirt, blue jeans and white sneakers.” Id. The officer arrived at 

the scene and saw the appellant, who matched the description given by the 

anonymous tip. Id. The officer exited his vehicle and told the appellant “to 

come over.” Id. The appellant, however, took off running instead. Id. 

Eventually, backup arrived and the appellant found himself cornered 

between two police cars. Id. The officer ordered the appellant to put his 

hands on the hood of the car in front of him and proceeded to pat the 

appellant down for officer safety. Id. The officer recovered a .32 caliber 

handgun that fell out of the appellant’s pant leg. Id. Given the facts, our 

Supreme Court determined that the officer had the reasonable suspicion 

necessary to stop the appellant. Id. at 1164-65. In so doing, the Supreme 

Court noted that under Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), 

“unprovoked flight could be considered among the relevant contextual 

considerations, since ‘nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 

determining reasonable suspicion’ and ‘headlong flight—whenever it occurs—

is the consummate act of evasion.’” D.M. II, 781 A.2d at 1164 (citing 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124).

In Walls, a police officer received information over his radio that a 

black male wearing a black coat and black jeans was observed at an 

intersection carrying a gun. The officer stopped an individual, who matched 

the description of the suspect with regard to gender, race, and clothing onehalf block away from the identified location. After seeing the officer, the 

individual fled. Walls, 53 A.3d at 894. Relying upon D.M. II and 
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Wardlow, the Walls Court concluded that an unprovoked flight, even 

when not in a high crime area, combined with an individual’s proximity to 

the subject location and his match to the description of the suspect, gave 

“rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” Id. at 894 

(emphasis added).

As recited earlier, Officer Easter received an in-person, face-to-face, 

tip from a civilian that a black male attired in blue and on an orange bicycle 

was attempting to open doors and windows at a vacant BMW Motorcycle 

Shop. As the suppression transcript reveals, Officer Easter testified that the 

shop “has been unoccupied for a long period of time.” N.T. Suppression, 

9/24/15, at 6. With this information in hand, Officer Easter proceeded to 

investigate the tip. Within close proximity of the vacant shop, Officer Easter 

spotted Appellant who matched the description provided by the in-person 

tipster. Specifically, when Officer Easter spotted Appellant, a black male, he 

was dressed in blue and rode an orange bicycle. Upon seeing Officer Easter, 

Appellant exhibited evasive behavior in that he crossed Lysle Boulevard to 

travel in the opposite direction toward Fifth Avenue. When Officer Easter 

directed Appellant to stop, he initially disregarded Officer’s Easter’s direction 

and continued to ride away on bicycle. Eventually, Appellant complied with 

Officer Easter’s command by riding his bicycle over to the driver’s side of 

Officer’s Easter’s vehicle.

Based on these facts, this case is distinguishable from D.M. II and 

Walls only in one respect. Here, unlike the anonymous telephone calls in 
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D.M. and Walls, Officer Easter received an in-person, face-to-face tip from 

a citizen who conveyed his first-hand account of what he had witnessed at 

the vacant BMW Motorcycle Shop.4 Because of the in-person, face-to-face 

nature of the tip, we conclude that it carried a greater indicia of reliability 

than anonymous tips received over the telephone. See United States v. 

Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354, 357 (3d. Cir. 2000) (noting that an in-person 

tip based on first-hand account is more reliable than an anonymous 

telephone call). Officer Easter here could assess the informant’s credibility 

as he spoke, likely knew what the informant looked like, and had some 

opportunity to find the informant if the tip did not pan out. Id. 

In all other respects, we discern no difference between this case and 

D.M. II and Walls. Like the anonymous tip in D.M. II and Walls, the tip 

here was corroborated by Officer Easter to the extent that Officer Easter 

located Appellant, who matched the physical description, clothing and the 

orange bicycle, in the vicinity of the vacant BMW Motorcycle Shop. As 

stated, Officer Easter received a first-hand account that a black male attired 

in blue with an orange bicycle was attempting to open doors and windows at 

the vacant shop. Potential innocent explanations for Appellant’s conduct at 

the vacant BMW Motorcycle Shop do not negate the reasonableness of 

Officer Easter’s suspicion of criminal activity. See Davis, supra, at 1000. 

____________________________________________

4

Like in D.M. II, here the record is silent as to whether Officer Easter 

encountered Appellant in a high-crime area.
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When Officer Easter spotted Appellant who matched the specific description 

of the individual provided face-to-face by the tipster, Appellant evaded 

Officer Easter by crossing the street to travel in the opposite direction. 

Thereafter, when Officer Easter demanded that Appellant stop, Appellant 

initially disregarded his command and rode away on his bicycle. Given the 

totality of the circumstances here, and consistent with our holdings in D.M. 

II and Walls, we are constrained to agree with the trial court that Officer 

Easter possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s suppression 

motion. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2016