(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED 

STATES EX REL. RIGSBY ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 15–513. Argued November 1, 2016—Decided December 6, 2016 

The False Claims Act (FCA) authorizes private parties (known as relators) to seek recovery from persons who make false or fraudulent 

payment claims to the Federal Government, 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3730,

and permits the Attorney General to intervene in a relator’s action or 

bring an FCA suit in the first instance, §§3730(a)–(b). This system is

designed to benefit both the relator and the Government. A relator 

who initiates a meritorious qui tam suit receives, inter alia, a percentage of the ultimate damages award, §3730(d), while “ ‘encourag[ing] more private enforcement suits’” serves “‘to strengthen the 

Government’s hand in fighting false claims,’ ” Graham County Soil 

and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 

U. S. 280, 298. The FCA establishes specific procedures for relators

to follow, including the requirement relevant here: “The complaint

shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days,

and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.” 

§3730(b)(2).

In the years before Hurricane Katrina, petitioner State Farm issued, as pertinent here, both Federal Government-backed flood insurance policies and petitioner’s own general homeowner policies.

Respondents Cori and Kerri Rigsby, former claims adjusters for one 

of petitioner’s contractors, E. A. Renfroe & Co., filed a complaint under seal in April 2006, claiming that petitioner instructed them and

other adjusters to misclassify wind damage as flood damage in order

to shift petitioner’s insurance liability to the Government. The District Court extended the length of the seal several times at the Government’s request, but lifted the seal in part in January 2007, allowing disclosure of the action to another District Court hearing a suit by 
 

 

 

 

2 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES 

EX REL. RIGSBY 

Syllabus
 

E. A. Renfroe against respondents. In August 2007, the District 

Court lifted the seal in full. The Government subsequently declined 

to intervene. 

Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that respondents had violated the seal requirement. Specifically, it alleged, respondents’ former attorney had disclosed the complaint’s existence to

several news outlets, which issued stories about the fraud allegations, but did not mention the existence of the FCA complaint; and

respondents had met with a Congressman who later spoke out 

against the purported fraud. The District Court applied the test for 

dismissal set out in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft 

Co., 67 F. 3d 242, 245–247. Balancing three factors—actual harm to

the Government, severity of the violations, and evidence of bad

faith—the court decided against dismissal. Petitioner did not request

a lesser sanction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It first concluded that 

a seal violation does not require mandatory dismissal of a relator’s 

complaint. It then considered the same factors weighed by the District Court and reached a similar conclusion. 

Held: 

1. A seal violation does not mandate dismissal of a relator’s complaint. Pp. 6–9.

(a) The FCA does not enact so harsh a rule. Section 3730(b)(2)’s

requirement that a complaint “shall” be kept under seal is a mandatory rule for relators. But the statute says nothing about the remedy

for violating that rule; and absent congressional guidance regarding a 

remedy, “the sanction for breach [of a mandatory duty] is not loss of

all later powers to act.” United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 

711, 718. The FCA’s structure supports this result. The FCA has a 

number of provisions requiring, in express terms, the dismissal of a 

relator’s action. E.g., §§3730(b)(5), (e)(1)–(2). It is thus proper to infer that Congress did not intend to require dismissal for a violation of

the seal requirement. See Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 

___, ___. This result is also consistent with the general purpose of 

§3730(b)(2), which was enacted as part of a set of reforms meant to

“encourage more private enforcement suits,” S. Rep. No. 99–345,

pp. 23–24, and which was intended to protect the Government’s interests, allaying its concern that a relator filing a civil complaint 

would alert defendants to a pending federal criminal investigation. It 

would thus make little sense to adopt a rigid interpretation that

prejudices the Government by depriving it of needed assistance from 

private parties. Pp. 6–7.

(b) Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. There 

is no textual indication that Congress conditioned the authority to 

file a private right of action on compliance with the seal requirement 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Syllabus 

or that the relator’s ability to bring suit depends on adherence to the

seal requirement. And the Senate Committee Report’s recitation of 

the FCA’s general purpose is best understood to support respondents 

rather than a mandatory dismissal rule. Moreover, because the 

FCA’s text and structure are clear, there is no need to accept petitioner’s invitation to consider a few stray sentences from the legislative history. Pp. 8–9.

2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The question whether dismissal is appropriate should be left to the sound discretion of the district court. 

While the Hughes Aircraft factors appear to be appropriate, it is unnecessary to explore these and other relevant considerations, which 

can be discussed in the course of later cases. Pp. 9–10.

3. On this record, where petitioner requested no sanction other 

than dismissal, the question whether a lesser sanction—such as 

monetary penalties—is warranted is not preserved. P. 10. 

794 F. 3d 457, affirmed. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 15–513 

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, 

PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES, EX REL. 

CORI RIGSBY, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

[December 6, 2016]

 JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case addresses the question of the proper remedy 

when there is a violation of the False Claims Act (FCA)

requirement that certain complaints must be sealed for a 

limited time period. See 31 U. S. C. §3730(b)(2). There 

are two questions presented before this Court. First, do 

any and all violations of the seal requirement mandate 

dismissal of a private party’s complaint with prejudice? 

Second, if dismissal is not mandatory, did the District

Court here abuse its discretion by declining to dismiss 

respondents’ complaint? 

I 

A 

The FCA imposes civil liability on an individual who, 

inter alia, “knowingly presents . . . a false or fraudulent 

claim for payment or approval” to the Federal Government. §3729(a)(1)(A). Almost unique to the FCA are its 

qui tam enforcement provisions, which allow a private

party known as a “relator” to bring an FCA action on

behalf of the Government. §3730(b)(1); Vermont Agency of 
2 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES 

EX REL. RIGSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 

U. S. 765, 768, n. 1 (2000) (listing three other qui tam

statutes). The Attorney General retains the authority to

intervene in a relator’s ongoing action or to bring an FCA

suit in the first instance. §§3730(a)–(b). 

This system is designed to benefit both the relator and

the Government. A relator who initiates a meritorious 

qui tam suit receives a percentage of the ultimate damages award, plus attorney’s fees and costs. §3730(d). In 

turn, “‘encourag[ing] more private enforcement suits’” 

serves “‘to strengthen the Government’s hand in fighting

false claims.’” Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. 280, 

298 (2010).

The FCA places a number of restrictions on suits by

relators. For example, under the provision known as the

“first-to-file bar,” a relator may not “‘bring a related action

based on the facts underlying [a] pending action.’” Kellogg 

Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 

575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 11) (quoting

§3730(b)(5); emphasis deleted). Other FCA provisions

require compliance with statutory requirements as express conditions on the relators’ ability to bring suit. The 

paragraph known as the “public disclosure bar,” for instance, provided at the time this suit was filed that “‘[n]o

court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this

section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or

transactions . . . unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or . . . an original source of the information.’” 

Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. 

United States ex rel. Wilson, supra, at 283, n. 1, 285–286 

(quoting 31 U. S. C. §3730(e)(4)(A) (2006 ed.); footnote

omitted).

The FCA also establishes specific procedures for the 

relator to follow when filing the complaint. Among other

things, the relator must serve on the Government “[a] copy 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all

material evidence and information the [relator] possesses.” 

§3730(b)(2). Most relevant here, the FCA provides: “The

complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal

for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.” Ibid. 

B 

Petitioner State Farm is an insurance company. In the 

years before Hurricane Katrina, petitioner issued two 

types of homeowner-insurance policies that are relevant in 

this case: (1) Federal Government-backed flood insurance 

policies and (2) petitioner’s own general homeowner insurance policies. The practical effect for homeowners who

were affected by Hurricane Katrina and who purchased 

both policies was that petitioner would be responsible for

paying for wind damage, while the Government would pay

for flood damage. As the Court of Appeals noted, this 

arrangement created a potential conflict of interest: Petitioner had “an incentive to classify hurricane damage as

flood-related to limit its economic exposure.” 794 F. 3d 

457, 462 (CA5 2015).

Respondents Cori and Kerri Rigsby are former claims

adjusters for one of petitioner’s contractors, E. A. Renfroe 

& Co. Together with other adjusters, they were responsible for visiting the damaged homes of petitioner’s customers to determine the extent to which a homeowner was 

entitled to an insurance payout. According to respondents, petitioner instructed them and other adjusters to

misclassify wind damage as flood damage in order to shift 

petitioner’s insurance liability to the Government. See id., 

at 463–464 (summarizing trial evidence).

In April 2006, respondents filed their qui tam complaint

under seal. At the Government’s request, the District

Court extended the length of the seal a number of times. 

In January 2007, the court lifted the seal in part, allowing 
4 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES 

EX REL. RIGSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

disclosure of the qui tam action to another District Court 

hearing a suit by E. A. Renfroe against respondents for 

purported misappropriation of documents related to petitioner’s alleged fraud. See E. A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, 

No. 2:06–cv–1752 (ND Ala.). In August 2007, the District 

Court lifted the seal in full. In January 2008, the Government declined to intervene. 

In January 2011, petitioner moved to dismiss respondents’ suit on the grounds that they had violated the seal 

requirement. The parties do not dispute the essential 

background. In the months before the seal was lifted in 

part, respondents’ then-attorney, one Dickie Scruggs, emailed a sealed evidentiary filing that disclosed the complaint’s existence to journalists at ABC, the Associated 

Press, and the New York Times. All three outlets issued 

stories discussing the fraud allegations, but none revealed

the existence of the FCA complaint. Respondents themselves met with Mississippi Congressman Gene Taylor, 

who later spoke out in public against petitioner’s purported 

fraud, although he did not mention the existence of the 

FCA suit at that time. After the seal was lifted in part,

Scruggs disclosed the existence of the suit to various others, including a public relations firm and CBS News. 

At the time of the motion to dismiss in 2011, respondents were represented neither by Scruggs nor by any of

the attorneys who had worked with him. In March 2008, 

Scruggs withdrew from respondents’ case after he was

indicted for attempting to bribe a state-court judge. Two 

months later, the District Court removed the remaining

Scruggs-affiliated attorneys from the case, based on their

alleged involvement in improper payments made from

Scruggs to respondents. The District Court did not punish

respondents themselves for the payments because they 

were not made “aware of the ethical implications” and, as 

laypersons, “are not bound by the rules of professional 

conduct that apply to” attorneys. App. 21. 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

In deciding petitioner’s motion the District Court considered only the seal violations that occurred before the 

seal was lifted in part, reasoning the partial lifting in 

effect had mooted the seal. Applying the test for dismissal 

set out in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft 

Co., 67 F. 3d 242, 245–247 (CA9 1995), the District Court 

balanced three factors: (1) the actual harm to the Government, (2) the severity of the violations, and (3) the evidence of bad faith. The court decided against dismissal. 

Petitioner did not request some lesser sanction. The case 

went to trial, resulting in a victory for respondents on

what the Court of Appeals referred to as a “bellwether”

claim regarding a single damaged home. 794 F. 3d, at 

462. 

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the

denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The court recognized that the case presented two related issues of the 

first impression under its case law: (1) whether a seal

violation requires mandatory dismissal of a relator’s complaint and, if not, (2) what standard governs a district 

court’s decision to dismiss. The court noted that the 

Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits had 

held that the FCA does not require automatic dismissal 

for a seal violation, while the Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit had held that dismissal is mandatory. See 

United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 

F. 3d 995, 998 (CA2 1995); United States ex rel. Lujan v. 

Hughes Aircraft Co., supra, at 245; United States ex rel. 

Summers v. LHC Group Inc., 623 F. 3d 287, 296 (CA6 

2010); see also United States ex rel. Smith v. 

Clark/Smoot/Russell, 796 F. 3d 424, 430 (CA4 2015) 

(following Pilon).

After a careful analysis, the Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit held automatic dismissal is not required by 

the FCA. 794 F. 3d, at 470–471. It then considered the 

same factors the District Court had weighed and came to a 
6 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES 

EX REL. RIGSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

similar conclusion. Id., at 471–472. First, the Court of 

Appeals held the Government was in all likelihood not 

harmed by the disclosures because none of them led to the

publication of the pendency of the suit before the seal was 

lifted in part. Second, the Court of Appeals determined 

the violations were not severe in their repercussions because respondents had complied with the seal requirement

when they first filed their suit. Third, the Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that the bad behavior of

respondents’ then-attorney could be imputed to respondents; but it held that, even presuming the attribution of

bad faith, the other factors favored respondents. 

This Court granted certiorari, 578 U. S. ___ (2016), and 

now affirms. 

II
 

A 

Petitioner’s primary contention is that a violation of the 

seal provision necessarily requires a relator’s complaint to

be dismissed. The FCA does not enact so harsh a rule. 

Section 3730(b)(2)’s text provides that a complaint 

“shall” be kept under seal. True, this language creates a

mandatory rule the relator must follow. See Rockwell Int’l 

Corp. v. United States, 549 U. S. 457, 464 (2007) (“As 

required under the Act, [the relator] filed his complaint

under seal . . . ”); see also Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. 

v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9) 

(“[T]he word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement”). The 

statute says nothing, however, about the remedy for a

violation of that rule. In the absence of congressional

guidance regarding a remedy, “[a]lthough the duty is

mandatory, the sanction for breach is not loss of all later

powers to act.” United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 

U. S. 711, 718 (1990).

The FCA’s structure is itself an indication that violating 

the seal requirement does not mandate dismissal. This 
 

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Court adheres to the general principle that Congress’ use 

of “explicit language” in one provision “cautions against 

inferring” the same limitation in another provision. Marx 

v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) 

(slip op., at 12). And the FCA has a number of provisions

that do require, in express terms, the dismissal of a relator’s action. Supra, at 2 (citing §3730(b)(5)); see also

§§3730(e)(1)–(2) (“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction” over 

certain FCA claims by relators against a member of the

military or of the judicial, legislative, or executive branches).

It is proper to infer that, had Congress intended to require

dismissal for a violation of the seal requirement, it would 

have said so. 

The Court’s conclusion is consistent with the general

purpose of §3730(b)(2). The seal provision was enacted in

the 1980’s as part of a set of reforms that were meant to 

“encourage more private enforcement suits.” S. Rep. No. 

99–345, pp. 23–24 (1986). At the time, “perhaps the most

serious problem plaguing effective enforcement” of the 

FCA was “a lack of resources on the part of Federal enforcement agencies.” Id., at 7. The Senate Committee 

Report indicates that the seal provision was meant to 

allay the Government’s concern that a relator filing a civil 

complaint would alert defendants to a pending federal 

criminal investigation. Id., at 24. Because the seal requirement was intended in main to protect the Government’s interests, it would make little sense to adopt a rigid 

interpretation of the seal provision that prejudices the 

Government by depriving it of needed assistance from

private parties. The Federal Government agrees with this 

interpretation. It informs the Court that petitioner’s test 

“would undermine the very governmental interests that

the seal provision is meant to protect.” Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae 10. 
 

8 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES
 

EX REL. RIGSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

First, petitioner urges that because the seal provision

appears in the subsection of the FCA creating the relator’s

private right of action, Congress intended to condition the 

right to bring suit on compliance with the seal requirement. It is true that, as discussed further below, the 

Court sometimes has concluded that Congress conditioned 

the authority to file a private right of action on compliance

with a statutory mandate. E.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook 

County, 493 U. S. 20, 25–26 (1989). There is no textual 

indication, however, that Congress did so here. 

Section 3730(b)(2) does not tie the seal requirement to 

the right to bring the qui tam suit in conditional terms. 

As noted above, the statute just provides: “The complaint 

shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at 

least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant 

until the court so orders.” 

The text at issue in Hallstrom, by contrast, was quite

different than the statutory language that controls here.

The Hallstrom statute, part of the Resource Conservation 

and Recovery Act of 1976, provided: “‘No action may be

commenced . . . prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has

given notice of the violation’” to the Government. 493 

U. S., at 25. 

Petitioner cites two additional cases to support its argument, but those decisions concerned statutes that used

even clearer conditional words, like “if ” and “unless.” See 

United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. 

McCord, 233 U. S. 157, 161 (1914) (statute allowed creditors of Government contractors to bring suit “‘if no suit 

should be brought by the United States within six months 

from the completion and final settlement of said contract’”); McNeil v. United States, 508 U. S. 106, 107, n. 1 

(1993) (statute provided that “‘[a]n action shall not be 

instituted upon a claim against the United States for 
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2016) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

money damages . . . unless the claimant shall have first 

presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency’”).

Again, the FCA’s structure shows that Congress knew

how to draft the kind of statutory language that petitioner 

seeks to read into §3730(b)(2). The applicable version of

the public disclosure bar, for example, requires a district

court to dismiss an action when the underlying information has already been made available to the public, 

“‘unless’” the plaintiff is the Attorney General or an original source. Graham County Soil and Water Conservation 

Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S., at 286. 

Second, petitioner contends that because this Court has

described the FCA’s qui tam provisions as “effecting a

partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim,” 

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex 

rel. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 773, adherence to all of the 

FCA’s mandatory requirements—no matter how small—is

a condition of the assignment. This argument fails for the

same reason as the one discussed above: Petitioner can 

show no textual indication in the statute suggesting that 

the relator’s ability to bring suit depends on adherence to 

the seal requirement. 

Third, petitioner points to a few stray sentences in the

Senate Committee Report that it claims support the mandatory dismissal rule. As explained above, however, the 

Report’s recitation of the general purpose of the statute is

best understood to support respondents. Supra, at 7. 

And, furthermore, because the meaning of the FCA’s text 

and structure is “plain and unambiguous, we need not

accept petitioner[’s] invitation to consider the legislative 

history.” Whitfield v. United States, 543 U. S. 209, 215 

(2005). 

III 

Petitioner’s secondary argument is that the District 

Court did not consider the proper factors when declining 
 

 

 

10 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES 

EX REL. RIGSBY 

Opinion of the Court 

to dismiss respondents’ complaint or, at a minimum, that

it was plain error not to consider respondents’ conduct

after the seal was lifted in part. This Court holds the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

petitioner’s motion, much less commit plain error. In light

of the questionable conduct of respondents’ prior attorney,

it well may not have been reversible error had the District

Court granted the motion; that possibility, however, need

not be considered here. 

In general, the question whether dismissal is appropriate should be left to the sound discretion of the district 

court. While the factors articulated in United States 

ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co. appear to be appropriate, it is unnecessary to explore these and other relevant 

considerations. These standards can be discussed in the 

course of later cases. 

IV 

 Petitioner and its amici place great emphasis on the

reputational harm FCA defendants may suffer when the

seal requirement is violated. But even if every seal violation does not mandate dismissal, that sanction remains a 

possible form of relief. District courts have inherent 

power, moreover, to impose sanctions short of dismissal for 

violations of court orders. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 

501 U. S. 32, 43–46 (1991). Remedial tools like monetary

penalties or attorney discipline remain available to punish 

and deter seal violations even when dismissal is not 

appropriate.

Of note in this case, petitioner did not request any

sanction other than dismissal. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3–4, 17. 

Had petitioner sought some lesser sanctions, the District

Court might have taken a different course. Yet petitioner

failed to do so. On this record, the question whether a

lesser sanction is warranted is not preserved.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit is 

Affirmed.