-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

December 6, 2016 

9:10 a.m. 

v No. 330853 

Muskegon Circuit Court 

JAMARI MARQUIS WILLIAMS, LC No. 15-066489-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and MARKEY and GLEICHER, JJ. 

GLEICHER, J. 

 The police questioned defendant Jamari Williams after Williams discovered his pregnant 

girlfriend’s murdered body in their shared apartment. Williams revealed that he and two friends 

passed the evening of his girlfriend’s death by riding around in a car. The investigators probed 

Williams’s exact whereabouts and the names of those who rode with him, extracting a timeline 

of the journey. Williams denied making any stops in addition to the several that he revealed. 

The police subsequently learned that the car had parked briefly at Williams’s apartment complex 

during the timeframe in which the homicide likely occurred. They also determined that an 

additional passenger had been present in the car. 

 The prosecution charged Williams under MCL 750.479c, which makes it a felony to 

“[k]nowingly and willfully make any statement to [a] peace office that the person knows is false 

or misleading regarding a material fact in [a] criminal investigation.” Following a preliminary 

examination, the district court bound Williams over to the Muskegon Circuit Court as charged. 

Williams challenged the bind over, contending that his omissions did not fall within the ambit of 

the statute. The circuit court denied Williams’s motion and we granted Williams’s application 

for leave to appeal. We hold that the plain language of the statute permits the prosecution of 

people who deliberately mislead the police by withholding material information and that 

probable cause exists that Williams satisfies this standard. We affirm. 

I 

 The evidence in this case comes to us from Williams’s preliminary examination. Shortly 

after Williams reported his girlfriend’s death, the Muskegon Township police department 

launched a homicide investigation. Officers brought Williams to the police department for 

questioning; he was not in custody, and remained cooperative throughout. Sergeant David Wypa 

interviewed Williams throughout the course of eight to 10 hours, with breaks. Wypa asked 
-2- 

Williams to provide a timeline of his whereabouts before his discovery of the body. According 

to Wypa, the two went over the timeline “several times and he gave me some locations of where 

he was at” during the hours in question. Wypa also questioned Williams about the people with 

him that evening, and Williams “specifically” identified “just” two: Bre Laddie and Manual 

Smith. 

 Wypa did not “specifically” ask Williams if Williams had returned to the apartment 

complex during the evening, instead focusing on “where his locations were throughout the 

night.” Wypa elaborated, “Throughout the interview process I asked him if he had -- did -- was 

there any other stops that they had made other than the ones that he had told me and he said no.” 

Wypa learned from another witness that the car containing Williams had returned to the 

apartment complex’s parking lot several hours before Williams found the body. When 

confronted with this information, Williams admitted that he had neglected to tell the officers 

about this stop. 

 Sergeant Timothy Thielbar questioned Williams six days later. During their 

conversation, Williams volunteered that a third person, Deshannon Redd, had been in the car that 

evening. Williams claimed he had forgotten about Redd when he was first interviewed. 

 Defense counsel opposed a bind over, asserting that Williams had not knowingly and 

willfully made any false statements or representations and had readily admitted to having 

inadvertently omitted certain facts after his memory was refreshed. The district court rejected 

this plea, finding that the language of MCL 750.479c(1)(a) and (1)(b) “contemplate concealing 

information or misleading by way of facts.” These two subsections provide: 

(1) Except as provided in this section, a person who is informed by a peace officer 

that he or she is conducting a criminal investigation shall not do any of the 

following: 

 (a) By any trick, scheme, or device, knowingly and willfully conceal from 

the peace officer any material fact relating to the criminal investigation. 

 (b) Knowingly and willfully make any statement to the peace officer that 

the person knows is false or misleading regarding a material fact in that criminal 

investigation. 

 Williams reframed his argument in the circuit court by contending that the district court 

had conflated the elements of the offense set out in MCL 750.479c(1)(a) with those of subsection 

(1)(b); counsel pointed out that Williams had been charged only under subsection (1)(a). 

Williams urged that subsections MCL 750.479c(1)(a) and (b) are modeled on 18 USC 1001(a)(1) 

and (a)(2), and permit prosecution for a material omission under subsection (1)(a) only on proof 

of willful nondisclosure by means of a “trick, scheme, or device.” The relevant sections of the 

federal statute state: 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the 

jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of 

the United States, knowingly and willfully— 
-3- 

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a 

material fact; 

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 

representation; or 

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to 

contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; 

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense 

involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), 

imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense 

under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of 

imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years 

As to MCL 750.479c(1)(b), Williams insisted that the evidence supported merely an omission, 

and not a false or misleading statement. 

 The prosecution conceded that it had a better argument under MCL 750.479(1)(b) than 

(1)(a), and announced that it would not pursue the charge under the latter subsection. In a 

written opinion and order, Judge Timothy Hicks noted that MCL 750.479c(1)(b) has not been 

interpreted since it was enacted in 2012, and that the Legislature did not define what constituted 

a false or misleading statement for the purposes of that statute. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed) 

defined the adjective “misleading” as “delusive; calculated to be misunderstood,” and the verb 

“mislead” as “[t]o cause (another person) to believe something that is not so, whether by words 

or silence, action or inaction; to deceive,” Judge Hicks observed. (Alteration in original.) He 

ruled that Williams’s omission of relevant information regarding his whereabouts conformed to 

these definitions: 

 Here, Williams knowingly provided his account of events to a peace 

officer with the actual knowledge that the officer was investigating his girlfriend’s 

homicide. His omission of material facts, perhaps not a direct falsehood for the 

purposes of MCL 750.479c, temporarily misled the investigation as it excluded 

him as a suspect. 

Judge Hicks denied Williams’s motion to quash the bind over and dismiss the case, and later 

denied Williams’s motion for reconsideration. We granted leave to appeal. People v Williams, 

unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 11, 2016 (Docket No. 330853). 

II 

 When a witness agrees to speak with a peace office conducting a criminal investigation, 

the witness may not “knowingly and willfully make any statement . . . that the person knows is 

false or misleading regarding a material fact[.]” MCL 750.479c(1)(b). This case presents us 

with the first opportunity to address whether this language embraces passive failures to disclose 

material facts as well as outright lies. We hinge our decision on the Legislature’s use of the term 

“false or misleading.” Statements that omit material information may qualify as false or mislead 

an investigating officer. Evidence that Williams failed to inform Wypa of his stop at his 
-4- 

apartment and the name of his third confederate provides probable cause to believe that Williams 

violated MCL 750.479c(1)(b) and supports the circuit court’s affirmance of the district court’s 

bind over decision. 

 We review de novo a district court’s decision that certain conduct falls within the scope 

of a criminal law. People v Henderson, 282 Mich App 307, 312; 765 NW2d 619 (2009). In so 

doing, “our obligation is to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the 

words of the statute.” Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). 

“When the language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain meaning and apply the 

statute as written.” Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Com’n, 477 Mich 197, 202; 731 NW2d 41 

(2007). 

We agree with Williams that MCL 750.479c(1)(a) and (1)(b) bear some similarities to 18 

USC 1001(a)(1) and (a)(2). The initial subsections of both statutes declare that a person 

divulging information to the government may not employ a “trick, scheme or device” to 

“conceal” material information. But the language of MCL 750.479c(1)(b) diverges significantly 

from that of 18 USC 1001(a)(2). Michigan’s statute prohibits knowingly and willfully making a 

statement regarding a material fact “that the person knows is false or misleading[.]” The federal 

statute punishes statements or representations that are “materially false, fictitious, or 

fraudulent[.]” We need not speculate on why our Legislature selected words differing from 

those chosen by Congress, and we do not profess expertise in the federal courts’ application of 

the phrase “materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent” to information withheld or omitted.1

Rather, we look to common parlance and Michigan case law as our guides to the meaning of the 

words at hand: “false or misleading.” 

According to Sergeant Wypa, Williams “said no” when asked if he had made any stops 

other than the ones he voluntarily revealed. This answer indisputably qualifies as a false 

statement, and brings the charged conduct within the statute’s compass. Further, Williams’s 

failure to reveal the apartment stop and the presence of Redd in the car falls within the reach of 

the statute’s “misleading” aspect. In In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Michigan, 482 Mich 

90, 114; 754 NW2d 259 (2008), our Supreme Court defined the word “mislead” as “1. to lead or 

guide in the wrong direction. 2. to lead into error of conduct, thought, or judgment; lead astray.” 

An affirmatively false statement—a bald-faced lie—may turn an investigator’s attention away 

from the true perpetrator or the source of valuable evidence. In that sense, it misleads. And a 

willful, knowing omission of pertinent information about a crime may lead the police down a 

fruitless path, permit the destruction of evidence while the police look in another direction, 

enable the escape of the actual culprit, or precipitate the arrest of an innocent person. The plain 

meaning of a “misleading statement” surely encompasses statements that leave out key details. 

 

1

 Our abbreviated review of federal law suggests that a person who conceals or withholds 

information from a federal agent is indeed subject to prosecution under 18 USC 1001(a)(2). See 

United States v Manning, 526 F3d 611, 620 (CA 10, 2008) (defendant omitted financial assets 

from a statement to a probation officer).
-5- 

Williams insists that an omission is not a “statement,” and therefore falls outside 

subsection (1)(b)’s prohibition of “any statement . . . that is false or misleading[.]” The statute 

provides no definition of the term “statement.” Once again, we apply the ordinary meaning of 

the word rather than definitions flowing from the law of hearsay. While nonassertive omissions 

may not qualify as “statements” under MRE 801(a), in general parlance “statements” include 

verbal and written expressions of something. An answer to a question necessarily represents an 

expression. It may mislead the listener by omitting relevant information. Suppose an attorney 

unlicensed to practice law in Michigan attempts to argue a motion in a circuit court. When asked 

by the judge whether she is qualified to practice in Michigan, the attorney replies, “Judge I’ve 

been practicing law for 25 years.” The attorney has said something that excluded a material fact: 

she lacks a Michigan license. By making the statement, the attorney attempted to mislead the 

judge. And what about the teenager who when asked how his algebra class went responds “just 

fine,” despite that he failed to attend it? Williams’s answers to Wypa’s questions are akin to 

these examples: statements omitting information that lead the interrogator in a wrong direction. 

At the preliminary examination stage we cannot know whether the prosecutor will be 

able to marshal sufficient proof that a defendant “knowingly and willfully” left out certain 

details. At trial, Williams’s claim that he simply forgot about the stop and Redd’s presence due 

to physical and emotional exhaustion may prevail. And we acknowledge that because the police 

interrogated Williams in a noncustodial setting, he was not informed of his right to remain silent 

or that he could be prosecuted for omitting anything material in his voluntary retelling of the 

evening’s events. The plain language of the statute conveys the Legislature’s intent to hold fully 

responsible for accuracy and candor those who provide information to peace officers in the 

course of a criminal investigation. Because the plain language of MCL 750.479c(1)(b) permits 

Williams’s prosecution for withholding information, we affirm the decision to bind him over for 

trial. 

We affirm. 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Jane E. Markey