Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 16579 

CAPTA Amendments of 1996, section 

107 of CAPTA authorized funding for 

two State grant programs: (1) To assist 

States to develop, strengthen and carry 

out child abuse and neglect prevention 

and treatment programs; and (2) to assist 

States in responding to reports of 

medical neglect (including the 

withholding of medically indicated 

treatment from disabled infants with 

life-threatening conditions), and 

improving the provision of services to 

disabled infants with life-threatening 

conditions and their families. Sections 

1340.10 through 1340.14 applied to the 

former and 1340.15 to the latter and are 

not applicable to the current CAPTA 

State grant program in section 106. 

The CAPTA Amendments of 1996 and 

later amendments significantly revised 

the State grant requirements in law prior 

to 1996. Now, States must submit a 

State plan in order to be eligible to 

receive a grant, including extensive 

State plan assurances. There is no 

longer the grant application and 

approval process specified in the 

regulations and States now provide 

assurances in their State plans that 

certain activities will be carried out 

using the grant funds to achieve the 

objectives of the law. 

The protections for disabled infants 

(commonly known as ‘‘Baby Doe’’) are 

now included in the statute in the form 

of a State plan assurance. Specifically, 

States are required under section 

106(b)(2)(C) of CAPTA to have 

procedures to respond to reports of 

withholding medically indicated 

treatment from disabled infants with 

life-threatening conditions. In addition 

‘‘withholding of medically indicated 

treatment’’ is defined in section 111 of 

CAPTA. No longer is there a specific 

State grant program and funding for 

improving the provision of services to 

disabled infants with life-threatening 

conditions and their families. 

Subpart C—Discretionary Grants and 

Contracts 

Section 1340.20 Confidentiality 

We are deleting section 1340.20 

because section 106 of CAPTA 

addresses requirements for state 

grantees for confidentiality of records, 

and confidentiality requirements for 

other grantees can be addressed in the 

terms and conditions of the grant. 

Appendix to Part 1340—Interpretive 

Guidelines Regarding CFR 1340.15— 

Services and Treatment for Disabled 

Infants 

We are deleting the appendix to Part 

1340. The appendix was added through 

a Final Rule (50 FR 14878) in 1985 to 

implement a grant program made 

available through the Child Abuse 

Amendments of 1984 (Pub. L. 98–457). 

This grant program is no longer in effect 

as it was at the time the appendix was 

added (Child Abuse Prevention and 

Treatment Act Amendments of 1996 

(Pub. L. 104–235)). 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act 

(Pub. L. 104–13), all Departments are 

required to submit to OMB for review 

and approval any reporting or 

recordkeeping requirements inherent in 

a proposed or final rule. There are no 

new requirements as a result of this 

regulation. 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

The Secretary certifies, under 5 U.S.C. 

605(b), and enacted by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96–354), that 

this regulation will not result in a 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. 

Regulatory Impact Analysis 

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

direct agencies to assess all costs and 

benefits of available regulatory 

alternatives and, if the regulation is 

necessary, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits 

(including potential economic, 

environmental, public health and safety 

effects, distributive impacts, and 

equity.) Executive Order 13563 

emphasizes the importance of 

quantifying both costs and benefits, of 

reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and 

of promoting flexibility. The regulations 

we are removing are obsolete and no 

longer applicable to the current law. By 

removing these outdated regulations, we 

are ending potential confusion in regard 

to the status of the regulations among 

states, grantees and other affected 

groups seeking information on the 

CAPTA program rules. There are no 

budget implications associated with 

removing the CAPTA regulations from 

the Code of Federal Regulations. 

Congressional Review 

This final rule is not a major rule as 

defined in 5 U.S.C. Chapter 8. 

Assessment of Federal Regulation and 

Policies on Families 

Section 654 of the Treasury and 

General Government Appropriations 

Act of 1999 requires Federal agencies to 

determine whether a policy or 

regulation may negatively affect family 

well-being. If the agency’s 

determination is affirmative, then the 

agency must prepare an impact 

assessment addressing seven criteria 

specified in the law. The required 

review of the regulations and policies to 

determine their effect on family wellbeing has been completed, and this rule 

will have a neutral impact on family 

well-being as defined in the legislation. 

Executive Order 13132 

Executive Order 13132 prohibits an 

agency from publishing any rule that 

has federalism implications if the rule 

either imposes substantial direct 

compliance costs on State and local 

governments and is not required by 

statute, or the rule preempts State law, 

unless the agency meets the 

consultation and funding requirements 

of section 6 of the Executive Order. The 

regulation has no federalism impact as 

defined in the Executive Order. 

List of Subjects in 45 CFR Part 1340 

Child welfare, Grant programs— 

health, Grant programs—social 

programs, Individuals with disabilities, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Research, Technical 

assistance, Youth. 

Dated: August 18, 2014. 

Mark Greenberg, 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Children and 

Families. 

Approved: February 27, 2015. 

Sylvia M. Burwell, 

Secretary. 

Editorial note: This document was 

received for publication by the Office of 

Federal Register on March 25, 2015. 

Subchapter E—[Removed and Reserved] 

■ For the reasons discussed above, 

under the authority at 42 U.S.C. 5101 et 

seq. the Administration for Children 

and Families amends Title 45, Subtitle 

B, Chapter XIII, by removing and 

reserving Subchapter E, consisting of 

part 1340. 

[FR Doc. 2015–07238 Filed 3–27–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

49 CFR Part 175 

[Docket No. PHMSA–2009–0126, Notice No. 

15–3] 

Hazardous Materials: Spare Fuel Cell 

Cartridges Containing Flammable Gas 

Transported by Aircraft in Passenger 

and Crew Member Checked Baggage 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), DOT. 


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16580 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

1 741 F.3d 1314. 

2http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/

Advisory_Circular/AC25.1309-1A.pdf. 

3PHMSA’s Administrator is charged with 

carrying out all duties and powers vested in the 

Secretary of Transportation under chapter 51 of 

Title 49 of the U.S. Code, which governs the 

transportation of hazardous materials. 49 U.S.C. 

108(f)(1). 

ACTION: Notification of a More Definitive 

Statement. 

SUMMARY: PHMSA issued a 2011 final 

rule in which we did not harmonize 

with international regulations regarding 

the carriage of spare fuel cell cartridges 

in passenger and crew member checked 

baggage. Lilliputian Systems, Inc. 

(Lilliputian) contested this final rule, 

first by filing an administrative appeal, 

then challenging the final rule in the 

United States Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit. On January 

31, 2014, the Court remanded the rule 

and ordered PHMSA to provide further 

explanation for the prohibition on 

airline passengers and crew carrying 

flammable gas fuel cell cartridges in 

their checked baggage, including its 

response to Lilliputian’s comments. 741 

F.3d 1309, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014). As a 

result, we are issuing this document 

which provides a more thorough 

explanation and substantial evidence to 

support PHMSA’s decision to prohibit 

the carriage of spare fuel cell cartridges 

in passenger and crew member checked 

baggage. 

DATES: March 30, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Michael Stevens, Transportation 

Specialist (Regulations), Standards and 

Rulemaking Division, Office of 

Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline 

and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

Telephone: (202) 366–8553 or, via 

email: michael.stevens@dot.gov or 

Shawn Wolsey, Senior Attorney, Office 

of the Chief Counsel, Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

(202) 366–4400 or, via email: 

shawn.wolsey@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

In 2009, the International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO) voted and 

reissued its Technical Instructions for 

the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods 

by Air (ICAO Technical Instructions), 

which lifted the previous restriction of 

spare fuel cell cartridges for all but 

Division 4.3 chemistries from passenger 

and crew member checked baggage. In 

response, on August 24, 2010, the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration (PHMSA) issued a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

to harmonize U.S. Hazardous Materials 

Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171– 

180) with updated international 

standards. These changes included 

updates to packaging, labeling, and 

testing requirements to increase 

harmony with the international rules 

and promote the flow of goods (75 FR 

52070, HM–215K, 8/24/2010). PHMSA 

stated its goal was ‘‘. . . to harmonize 

without diminishing the level of safety 

currently provided by the HMR and 

without imposing undue burdens on the 

regulated public’’ and that we ‘‘. . . 

evaluate[d] each amendment on its own 

merit.’’ [75 FR 52071] 

Ultimately, PHMSA did not adopt 

every provision of every set of the 

international regulations. In the final 

rule published January 19, 2011 [76 FR 

3308], PHMSA revised the 49 CFR 

175.10 passenger exceptions to allow 

passengers and crew members to place 

certain spare fuel cell cartridges 

containing a flammable liquid (Class 3) 

or corrosive material (Class 8) in 

checked baggage. PHMSA stated, ‘‘fuel 

cell cartridges themselves are subject to 

much more stringent construction, 

testing, and packaging requirements 

than for similar articles (e.g., aerosols).’’ 

However, PHMSA limited the scope of 

spare fuel cell cartridge chemistries 

allowed in checked baggage by 

excluding fuel cell cartridges containing 

Division 2.1 (flammable gas) and 

Division 4.3 (dangerous when wet) 

material. In the interest of safety, 

PHMSA elected to continue the 

longstanding limitations in the HMR for 

Division 2.1 (flammable gas) on 

passenger-carrying aircraft and thus 

maintained the existing prohibition on 

the transport of spare fuel cells 

containing Division 2.1 (flammable gas) 

in checked baggage. PHMSA and the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

explained their expressed concern ‘‘due 

to the questionable integrity of [fuel 

cells] when packed in a passenger’s 

checked baggage’’ [76 FR 3337]. 

As a result of PHMSA’s rulemaking, 

Lilliputian filed an administrative 

appeal in accordance with 49 CFR 

106.110. It requested PHMSA to revise 

49 CFR 175.10(a)(19) to align with the 

ICAO Technical Instructions and allow 

spare fuel cell cartridges containing 

Division 2.1 (flammable gas) to be 

carried in checked baggage. PHMSA 

granted the administrative appeal by 

providing Lilliputian and the public 

additional opportunity for comment in 

a May 25, 2012 NPRM [77 FR 31274]. 

The subsequent final rule issued on 

January 7, 2013 [78 FR 1101] denied the 

placement of spare Division 2.1 fuel cell 

cartridges in checked baggage but 

continued to allow two spare Division 

2.1 fuel cell cartridges in carry-on 

baggage. 

Lilliputian filed a Petition for Review 

of the Final Order in the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit on March 8, 2013. In 

a January 31, 2014, (731 F.3d 1309) 

decision, the Court remanded the rule 

and ordered PHMSA to ‘‘provide further 

explanation for the prohibition on 

airline passengers and crew carrying 

flammable-gas fuel cell cartridges in 

their checked baggage, including its 

response to Lilliputian’s comments.’’ 1

Justification for Denial of the 

Administrative Appeal 

When PHMSA decides whether to 

allow an item on a passenger-carrying 

aircraft, the Department only tolerates 

extraordinarily low levels of risk. For 

example, when failure of a component 

in an airplane could interfere with 

continued flight and safe landing, the 

risk of failure must be less than one 

billion to one.2 This low level of 

tolerance for risk makes sense because, 

due to the high volume of air transport, 

even a very improbable event may 

eventually occur, and with catastrophic 

results. Additionally, PHMSA is 

required by 49 U.S.C. 5108(b) to pursue 

the ‘‘highest degree of safety in pipeline 

transportation and hazardous materials 

transportation.’’ 3 Under 49 U.S.C. 

5103(b), PHMSA is authorized to issue 

regulations for the safe and secure 

transportation of hazardous materials in 

commerce, including transportation by 

air. 

The risks presented by flammable gas 

on airplanes are clear. Flammable gases 

will burn if mixed with an appropriate 

amount of air, and an ignition source is 

present, and confined burning of a 

flammable gas can lead to detonation. 

As a result, PHMSA remains concerned 

with the hazards posed by flammable 

gases (such as the butane contained in 

some fuel cells) contributing to a fire in 

the cargo compartment of a passengercarrying aircraft. This concern is 

particularly relevant to carriage in 

checked baggage, where damage to the 

fuel cell cartridge and the release of a 

flammable gas may occur if the baggage 

is mishandled. 

PHMSA denied Lilliputian’s appeal 

due to the uncertainty of the safety risks 

posed when combining (1) the 

uncertainty of how the baggage handling 

would affect the durability and stability 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 16581 

4With regard to the allowance of fuel cell 

cartridges in carry-on baggage or on one’s person, 

the risk is mitigated because the fuel cells are 

contained in a supervised environment. Thus, a 

flight attendant would be able to extinguish any 

fires that might occur in a carry-on bag in the event 

of a fuel cell cartridge inadvertently coming into 

contact with an ignition source. 

5http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/

DGP%2022%20Working%20Papers/DGP.22.WP.

100.en.pdf at 2.9.4. 

6http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/

DGP%2022%20Working%20Papers/DGP.22.WP.

100.en.pdf. 

7See Document PHMSA–2009–0126–2366 in this 

docket. 

of these products, (2) the possible oversight of hazmat communication and 

packaging requirements because the 

regulations do not apply to passengers, 

and (3) the limitations of aircraft’s fire 

suppression systems. PHMSA was 

particularly concerned by the allowance 

for passengers to transport flammablegas fuel cells because passengers ‘‘are 

not trained to recognize potential 

hazards’’ and ‘‘are unlikely to be aware 

of the safety implications’’ of improper 

packaging or handling. Considering 

those factors combined with the 

limitations of the aircraft’s suppression 

system, (fire suppression systems ‘‘do 

not prevent fires’’ and are not ‘‘designed 

to completely extinguish fires’’) the 

safety risks were too great to authorize 

this exemption. PHMSA further 

explained that the authorization of any 

additional flammable gas on an 

airplane, in addition to the gases 

contained in the toiletry and medicinal 

items already allowed, would need to 

take into account ‘‘the cumulative risk 

of the new authorization combined with 

existing authorizations.’’ [78 FR 1104] 

PHMSA expressed willingness, 

however, to consider allowing certain 

fuel cells models on a case-by-case 

basis. For example, portable oxygen 

concentrators may be allowed at some 

point in the future, when experience 

and testing prove that safe designs exist. 

Because of the risks presented by 

flammable gases, a number of safety 

requirements apply to shipments of 

flammable gas on passenger-carrying 

aircraft. PHMSA believes there is 

sufficient basis for its decision because, 

as previously stated, in the area of 

aviation safety, there is a very low 

tolerance for risk. In its decision, 

PHMSA considered the known risks of 

flammable gases, coupled with the 

uncertainties relating to the safety of 

new fuel cell technology, added to the 

already high volume of air travel and 

the catastrophic consequences of any 

failure. 

Cumulative Risk 

PHMSA’s approach to aviation safety 

is not to permit items merely because 

they are similar to items already 

permitted. The authorization of any 

additional flammable gas on an aircraft, 

in addition to the toiletry and medicinal 

items already allowed, needs to take 

into account the cumulative risk of the 

new authorization combined with 

existing authorizations. A limited 

exception has existed since 1972 for 

small quantities of such gases in 

personal medicinal and toiletry items, 

such as the butane used as a propellant 

in a small aerosol can or a butanepowered curling iron (49 CFR 

175.10(a)(1)(i). However, most Division 

2.1 (flammable gas) substances and 

articles are forbidden from 

transportation as cargo aboard 

passenger-carrying aircraft, and thus 

prohibiting the carriage of spare fuel cell 

cartridges containing flammable gas in 

checked baggage is consistent with the 

agency’s longstanding position with 

regard to flammable gases. 

Checked Baggage 

The exceptions in 49 CFR 175.10 have 

not been expanded to permit additional 

flammable gases in checked baggage. As 

previously noted, allowing 

transportation of flammable gas in 

airline passengers’ checked baggage 

would be inconsistent with the 

exceptions in 49 CFR 175.10. Airline 

passengers do not comply with the 

important packaging, labeling, and 

hazard communication requirements 

when they put items in their checked 

baggage, and they may not even be 

aware of such requirements. Without 

hazard communication and other 

notifications to handlers that the 

passenger’s baggage contains flammable 

gas, checked baggage could be 

mishandled, damaging the integrity of 

an improperly packaged container of 

flammable gas. Negligent packing and 

excessive handling increases the 

potential that a container of flammable 

gas in checked baggage could rupture, 

creating conditions for an explosion. 76 

FR 3337. 

Beginning in 2009, the ICAO began 

considering whether to change its 

regulations to allow transport of fuel 

cells in checked baggage. Prior to that 

time, fuel cells had been allowed only 

in carry-on baggage or on one’s person, 

in order to mitigate the risk of the fuel 

cell cartridge inadvertently coming into 

contact with an ignition source.4

Although members of the ICAO 

Dangerous Goods Panel were generally 

supportive of permitting most fuel cells 

containing flammable liquids in 

checked baggage, ‘‘many were wary of 

permitting fuel cartridges containing 

substances of other classes.’’ In 

particular, ‘‘[s]ome felt further 

consideration was needed with respect 

to fuel cell cartridges containing 

flammable gases.’’ Some participants 

suggested that changes not be adopted 

to allow these new technologies until 

‘‘experience based on a longer 

timeframe could be demonstrated.’’ 5 In 

the end, ICAO included in its Technical 

Instructions a provision to allow two 

spare fuel cell cartridges containing 

flammable gas in checked baggage. It 

should be noted that the ICAO 

Dangerous Goods Panel does not operate 

solely on a consensus basis and that 

some delegates, including the U.S. Panel 

Member, were not in agreement with 

this decision. The U.S. Panel member 

spoke against the adoption of this 

provision when the amendment was 

discussed and agreed to by majority vote 

during the Dangerous Goods Panel’s 

22nd meeting (held in Montreal, Canada 

from October 5–16, 2009).6

FAA Technical Report 

In Lilliputian’s comments posted to 

the docket of the August 24, 2010 NPRM 

(PHMSA–2009–0126–2027), they posed 

five recommendations for conducting a 

proper risk analysis: 

• Any analysis should begin with the 

risk of ignition or sparking. 

• The analysis should examine the 

risk of catching fire as a result of an 

external fire. 

• The analysis should examine 

whether a fuel cell fire, once ignited, 

can be effectively extinguished in a 

timely manner. 

• The analysis should look to any 

experience involving similar materials. 

• The analysis should evaluate 

whether the volume of the material is 

relevant in terms of the risk and 

managing that risk. 

We believe that the Preliminary 

Investigation of the Fire Hazard 

Inherent in Micro Fuel Cell Cartridges 

(Final Report) 7 prepared by the FAA 

Technical Center did address these 

recommendations posed by Lilliputian. 

The report examined the fire risk 

presented by fuel cells, including cells 

powered by flammable solids, liquids, 

and gas, including a test that exposed 

single, small fuel cells of various types 

to a low-intensity flame in a controlled 

environment. Only a few varieties of 

fuel cells were tested, because the 

technology was still developing; 

however, one of the fuel cells tested was 

a butane fuel cell manufactured by 

Lilliputian. The test results showed that, 

of the fuel types tested, ‘‘[b]utane 

produced the most vigorous fire.’’ The 

plastic cartridge used by Lilliputian was 

breached only 45 seconds after exposure 


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16582 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

8See Document PHMSA–2009–0126–2366 in this 

docket. 

9http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/aerosol/ 

qa.html. 

to flame and the ‘‘butane ignition was 

rapid, almost explosive’’ 8 (emphasis 

added). It produced an approximately 

1,000-degree Fahrenheit flame, by far 

the hottest flame produced by any of the 

materials in the study. While some of 

the other fuel cell fires were ‘‘easily 

extinguished using Halon 1211,’’ a fire 

suppression system commonly used in 

an aircraft, the butane fire burned so 

rapidly that the fire suppression system 

did not activate until after all the butane 

fuel had been consumed by the fire. 

A Halon 1211 system is not designed 

to detect fires. The pilot must first see 

that there is an alert from the fire 

detection system. Once that happens, 

the pilot will engage the Halon 1211 

system, which will attempt to suppress, 

but not extinguish, the fire. While 

airplanes are equipped with fire 

detection systems, such as Halon 1211, 

there are no systems on board to detect 

a gas leak. Thus, if a fuel cell cartridge 

placed in checked baggage is damaged 

and allows butane gas to leak into the 

cargo compartment, there is no way for 

the pilot to be aware of this. The 

accumulation of the butane gas, if 

exposed to a spark, would then cause an 

explosion and would lead to a 

catastrophic failure of the airplane. 

The FAA Technical Center tests were 

designed to determine the flammability 

characteristics of fuel cell cartridges. 

The tests were conducted on single 

cartridges exposed to a controlled fire. 

The tests did not take into account the 

interaction of one or more cartridges 

and any adjacent combustible material 

(i.e., clothing, electronic devices, etc.) or 

the effect of fuel cell cartridges in 

propagating a fire. We do know from the 

test results that butane produced the 

most vigorous fire, the cartridge 

provided the least amount of protection 

from an external fire and, once 

penetrated, the liquid butane burned 

rapidly and filled the test chamber with 

fire. The butane fire also registered the 

highest temperature (1000 degrees 

Fahrenheit) and heat flux measurements 

of all tests conducted. The plastic 

cartridge used by Lilliputian was 

breached only 45 seconds after exposure 

to flame, and the butane ignition was 

rapid, almost explosive. Thus, the test 

results from the Final Report support 

our concern that the inherent hazards of 

compressed flammable gases, as 

demonstrated by exposure to a fire 

involving a fuel cell cartridge containing 

an estimated volume of only 50 cc or 

less of butane, would pose an 

unacceptable risk in air transportation. 

As PHMSA stated in the preamble to 

the January 19, 2011 final rule, Federal 

hazmat law (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) and 

policy encourages the harmonization of 

domestic and international standards for 

hazardous materials transportation to 

the extent practicable, but the law also 

permits PHMSA to depart from 

international standards in order to 

promote public safety. When 

considering the adoption of 

international standards under the HMR, 

PHMSA reviews and evaluates each 

amendment on its own merit, on the 

basis of its overall impact on 

transportation safety, and on the 

economic implications associated with 

its adoption. Our goal is to harmonize 

without diminishing the level of safety 

and without imposing undue burdens 

on the regulated public. In this instance, 

we believe that restricting the carriage of 

flammable gas fuel cell cartridges to be 

a necessary variation to the ICAO 

Technical Instructions that enhances the 

safety of aircraft passengers without 

imposing an unreasonable regulatory 

burden. Under Federal hazmat law, we 

are tasked with balancing the needs of 

public safety with economic burdens 

when considering harmonization with 

international standards. Consequently, 

because we elected not to revise the 

HMR to align with the ICAO Technical 

Instructions, we believe we did strike a 

balance by continuing to permit 

flammable gas fuel cell cartridges in 

carry-on baggage. 

Disparate Treatment of Aerosols and 

Butane-Powered Articles 

The Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit also was concerned 

that PHMSA did not provide a reasoned 

explanation and substantial evidence for 

the disparate treatment of fuel cell 

cartridges as opposed to other products, 

particularly medicinal and toiletry items 

that contain flammable gases (i.e. 

aerosols). 

Aerosols 

In order to determine if a hazardous 

material is permitted in checked 

baggage, PHMSA must take into account 

the cumulative risk of any new 

authorizations combined with any 

existing authorizations. Under certain 

conditions, 49 CFR 175.10 permits the 

carriage of aerosols in checked baggage 

on a passenger-carrying aircraft. This 

limited exception has existed since 1972 

for aerosol containers in small 

quantities in personal medicinal and 

toiletry items. Such items include hair 

spray, deodorant, and certain medicinal 

products. 

To comply with the ban on 

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that became 

effective January 1, 1994, 9 the aerosol 

industry changed the type of propellant 

used in their products. Unfortunately, 

this new type of propellant is flammable 

and, because of its widespread use, 

there was concern of a risk-risk tradeoff 

(ozone layer damage versus cargo 

compartment safety on passengercarrying aircraft). PHMSA and FAA 

were concerned that static electricity 

inherent in cargo compartments could 

ignite a leaking flammable aerosol 

container in passenger baggage. 

Based on its concerns, PHMSA 

reviewed incident reports in the 

Hazardous Materials Identification 

System (HMIS) database and specific 

incidents that occurred during baggage 

handling provided by the FAA. 

Accordingly, PHMSA and FAA agreed 

to work together in certain areas to 

improve the safe transportation of 

flammable aerosols by adopting 

regulatory and non-regulatory solutions. 

For example, each agency agreed to: (1) 

Actively participate in the ICAO 

Dangerous Goods Panel that reviews the 

items that passengers are permitted to 

carry in the cabin and in checked 

baggage; (2) partner with the Consumer 

Specialty Products Association to 

enhance the design of aerosol products; 

and (3) amend the HMR to require or 

clarify that any release of hazmat in 

passenger baggage must be reported. 

Further, in a final rule published on 

December 20, 2004, PHMSA amended 

the HMR by requiring that release 

devices on aerosols be protected by a 

cap or other suitable means to prevent 

the inadvertent release of contents when 

placed in passenger or crew member 

baggage. [69 FR 76179; (HM–215G)] 

Because of the prevalence of aerosols in 

everyday travel, these adopted safety 

measures were deemed sufficient while 

not being overly burdensome to the 

traveling public. However, PHMSA 

continues to monitor this issue very 

closely and will respond to any negative 

trends accordingly. 

While PHMSA and FAA adopted 

safety measures to address the risks 

associated with permitting aerosols in 

checked baggage, the amount of butane 

in a fuel cartridge (200 mL) is 

approximately twice as much as the 

amount utilized in a typical 16 ounce 

aerosol can. Given the amount of 

electronic devices that passengers 

typically travel with, the cumulative 

volume of butane from fuel cell 

cartridges that passengers could bring 

aboard an aircraft is a concern. As a 

result, PHMSA has determined there is 

too much risk in allowing fuel cell 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 16583 

cartridges in checked baggage in 

addition to the currently authorized 

flammable aerosols when stowed in 

inaccessible cargo compartments on 

passenger-carrying aircraft. 

Butane-Powered Curling Iron Articles 

As previously stated, 49 CFR 175.10 

prescribes certain conditional 

exceptions to the HMR for passengers, 

crewmembers, and air operators for 

hazardous materials contained in their 

carry-on (including on one’s person) 

and checked baggage. In paragraph 

(a)(6), hair curlers (curling irons), 

containing a hydrocarbon gas such as 

butane, are excepted from the 

requirements of the HMR in checked 

baggage. Flammable gas refills for such 

curlers are not permitted in carry-on or 

checked baggage. (emphasis added). 

In an NPRM published January 23, 

2015 (80 FR 3836; [HM–218H]), PHMSA 

is considering prohibiting butanepowered curling iron articles in checked 

baggage. We believe the risk posed by 

flammable gases in an inaccessible 

compartment on a passenger-carrying 

aircraft is clear. Flammable gases will 

burn if mixed with an appropriate 

amount of air and confined burning of 

a flammable gas can lead to detonation. 

As a result, we remain concerned with 

the flammability hazard posed by 

butane and other flammable gases and 

the ability of such gases to propagate or 

contribute to a fire in the cargo 

compartment of an aircraft. This 

concern is particularly relevant to 

carriage in checked baggage, where 

damage to the curling iron and the 

subsequent release of a flammable gas 

may occur if the baggage is mishandled 

or the article itself is compromised. 

Conclusion 

Because of the risks posed by 

flammable gas, a number of safety 

requirements apply to cargo shipments 

of flammable gas on passenger-carrying 

aircraft. As previously stated, most 

Division 2.1 (flammable gas) substances 

and articles are generally forbidden 

from transportation as cargo aboard 

passenger-carrying aircraft, and 

PHMSA’s proposal to prohibit the 

carriage of butane-powered curling irons 

in checked baggage is consistent with 

this provision. In the area of aviation 

safety, where the high volume of travel 

and the catastrophic consequences of 

failure lead to a very low tolerance for 

risk, we firmly believe the known risks 

of flammable gas are sufficient basis for 

our decision. 

We remain concerned with the 

flammability hazard posed by butane 

and other flammable gases and the 

ability of such gases to propagate or 

contribute to a fire in an inaccessible 

cargo compartment of a passengercarrying aircraft. Moreover, in light of 

the well-established risks related to 

flammable gas and the long-standing 

prohibition of most flammable gas on 

passenger-carrying aircraft, PHMSA will 

continue to prohibit fuel cell cartridges 

that contain a class 2.1 flammable gas 

from being placed in checked baggage. 

Magdy El-Sibaie, 

Associate Administrator for Hazardous 

Materials Safety. 

[FR Doc. 2015–07109 Filed 3–27–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 622 

[Docket No. 140501394–5279–02] 

RIN 0648–BE20 

Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of 

Mexico, and South Atlantic; SnapperGrouper Fishery Off the Southern 

Atlantic States; Amendment 32 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: NMFS issues regulations to 

implement Amendment 32 to the 

Fishery Management Plan for the 

Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South 

Atlantic Region (FMP), as prepared by 

the South Atlantic Fishery Management 

Council (Council). This rule removes 

blueline tilefish from the deep-water 

complex; establishes blueline tilefish 

commercial and recreational sector 

annual catch limits (ACLs) and 

accountability measures (AMs); revises 

the deep-water complex ACLs and AMs; 

establishes a blueline tilefish 

commercial trip limit; and revises the 

blueline tilefish recreational bag limit. 

The purpose of this rule is to specify 

ACLs and AMs for blueline tilefish to 

end overfishing of the stock and 

maintain catch levels consistent with 

achieving optimum yield (OY) for the 

blueline tilefish resource. 

DATES: This rule is effective March 30, 

2015. 

ADDRESSES: Electronic copies of 

Amendment 32, which includes an 

environmental assessment, a Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (RFA) analysis, and a 

regulatory impact review, may be 

obtained from the Southeast Regional 

Office Web site at http://sero.nmfs.noaa

.gov/sustainable_fisheries/s_atl/sg/

2014/am32/index.html. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rick 

DeVictor, telephone: 727–824–5305, or 

email: rick.devictor@noaa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

blueline tilefish is a species included in 

the snapper-grouper fishery of the South 

Atlantic, and the fishery is managed 

under the FMP. The FMP was prepared 

by the Council and is implemented 

through regulations at 50 CFR part 622 

under the authority of the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens 

Act). 

On December 19, 2014, NMFS 

published a notice of availability for 

Amendment 32 and requested public 

comment (79 FR 75780). On January 22, 

2015, NMFS published a proposed rule 

for Amendment 32 and requested public 

comment (80 FR 3207). The proposed 

rule and Amendment 32 outline the 

rationale for the actions contained in 

this final rule. A summary of the actions 

implemented by Amendment 32 and 

this final rule is provided below. 

A benchmark assessment for the 

blueline tilefish stock in the South 

Atlantic was conducted through the 

Southeast, Data, Assessment, and 

Review (SEDAR) process in 2013 

(SEDAR 32). The assessment 

determined that the blueline tilefish 

stock is undergoing overfishing in the 

South Atlantic. NMFS published an 

emergency rule on April 17, 2014 (79 FR 

21636), that implemented temporary 

measures to reduce overfishing of 

blueline tilefish while Amendment 32 

was under development. Those 

measures were extended through a 

temporary rule (79 FR 61262, October 

10, 2014), and are effective through 

April 18, 2015. The temporary measures 

of the emergency action include the 

following: Removal of blueline tilefish 

from the deep-water complex, 

specification of sector ACLs and AMs 

for blueline tilefish, and revision to the 

deep-water complex ACL to reflect the 

removal of blueline tilefish from the 

complex. Unless otherwise noted, all 

weights in this rule are expressed in 

round weight. 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with RULES