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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 113,368

In the Matter of TED E. KNOPP,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed December 2, 2016. Ninety-day suspension 

stayed, and respondent placed on 6 months' probation. 

Deborah L. Hughes, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 

Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner.

Monte A. Vines, of Adams Jones Law Firm, P.A., of Wichita, argued the cause, and Ted E. 

Knopp, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 

Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Ted E. Knopp, of Wichita, an attorney 

admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1982.

On May 15, 2014, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 

complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct (KRPC). The respondent timely filed an answer on July 30, 2014, after the 

granting of a motion to continue the date the answer was due. A hearing was held on the 

complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on November 

25, 2014, where the respondent was personally present and was represented by counsel. 

The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 3.1 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. 

Annot. 592) (meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
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601) (candor toward tribunal); 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice); and 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct adversely 

reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court:

"Findings of Fact

. . . .

"11. In 2011, C.K. was living in a mobile home owned by her grandmother, 

D.G. D.G. had been disabled for many years. D.L., C.K.'s mother and D.G.'s daughter 

served as D.G.'s attorney-in-fact. D.L. never lived in the mobile home and D.G. has not 

lived in the mobile home since 2007.

"12. The mobile home sat on a lot in a mobile home park owned by South 

Meridian Park, LLC (hereinafter 'South Meridian'). South Meridian was owned by J.J. 

C.K. leased the lot from South Meridian.

"13. On April 4, 2011, C.K.'s rent was overdue. That day, South Meridian 

posted a 3-day notice to vacate on the door of the mobile home informing C.K. that she 

would be evicted if she did not pay $495 in overdue rent and fees within 3 days.

"14. On April 6, 2011, C.K. left a partial payment of $400 in the park 

manager's deposit box. Unbeknownst to C.K., the park manager returned the partial 

payment to C.K. On April 7, 2011, C.K. delivered $95—the balance of rent and fees 

owed—to the manager's deposit box. When C.K. returned to the mobile home, she 

discovered that the park manager had returned the $400 partial payment with a note that 

provided, 'CHRISTINA HERE IS YOUR MONEY BACK FOR THE LOT RENT. WE 
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DO NOT WANT THE MONEY. WE JUST WANT YOU TO MOVE OUT OF THE 

PARK.'

"15. C.K. did not return the $400 back to the park manager after it was 

returned.

"16. On April 8, 2011, South Meridian filed an eviction petition against C.K. 

in Sedgwick County District Court. C.K. was personally served with the petition. C.K. 

failed to file an answer nor did she appear to defend the petition. On April 14, 2011, the 

district court entered a default judgment against C.K. Also on April 14, 2011, the court 

issued a writ of restitution restoring South Meridian to possession of the lot on which the 

mobile home sat.

"17. After the writ was issued, South Meridian changed the locks on the 

mobile home and posted a notice on the door advising C.K. that she was evicted and that 

the locks had been changed.

"18. Thereafter, C.K. and D.L. hired the respondent. On May 6, 2011, the 

respondent filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on behalf of C.K. and filed a 

motion to intervene in the eviction action on behalf of D.L. In the first motion, the 

respondent made the following representations:

'2. Plaintiff served on Defendant [C.K.] a three-day notice to vacate 

dated April 4, 2011, (Exhibit A). The three-day notice specified an 

amount past due of $495.00.

'3. Within three days ($400 on April 6 and $95 on April 7, 2011), 

Defendant delivered to Plaintiff the amount requested in the three-day 

notice.

'4. On April 7, 2011, after tender of rent, Defendant [C.K.]'s rent 

was returned to her by Plaintiff's Manager, [M.L.] by depositing an 

envelope in Defendant [C.K.]'s door with the money orders enclosed and 
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a letter stating "[C.K.] here is your money back for the lot rent. We do 

not want the money. We just want you to move out of the park." (See 

Exhibit B).

'5. Notwithstanding the tender of the full rent due, Plaintiff filed a 

Petition for Eviction for failure to pay rent on April 8, 2011, and 

obtained judgment on that basis on April 14, 2011.

. . . .

'8. The Journal Entry of Judgment was a fraud on the Court based 

on the original Petition alleging grounds for eviction of [sic] nonpayment of rent based on the tender of the rent and the return [by] the 

Plaintiff of the rent tendered. The eviction petition is an attempt to avoid 

the statutory provisions for terminating a manufactured home rental 

arrangement.'

"19. On May 16, 2011, the court held a hearing on the respondent's motions. 

The court addressed the status of the mobile home at that hearing. Kurt Holmes, counsel 

for South Meridian, repeatedly stated that his client had no objection to the mobile home 

being moved out of the park and that was what his client had wanted from the beginning. 

Mr. Holmes stated:

'[My] client has never wanted the mobile home, has been all along telling 

whoever the owner of it is, which has been in question, please move it 

and get it out of our park;

'[Defendants] have told her from day one that she can make any 

arrangements to move all of her personal property that's in the home out, 

and to date, she's not done that, and, so far, there's been no arrangements 

made to move the home;
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'[M]y clients are here to give her every opportunity to move anything that 

she wants out of the house, and to make any—whoever owns the home to 

make any steps toward moving that home;

'And, again, we're not making any claim on the mobile home. We don't 

want the mobile home; and 

'[M]y client and the manager are both here to make any arrangements 

with her. And to date, she has made no request to get anything out of that 

home, and they are both here to make whatever arrangements we can to 

get all personal property back to her.'

"20. Initially, the respondent took the position that his clients only wanted to 

get the mobile home. The district court granted a 2-week continuance so the respondent 

and Mr. Holmes could arrange for the respondent's clients to have access to the mobile 

home to retrieve personal belongings and to move it out of the park.

"21. After the 2-week continuance, the respondent changed his position and 

argued that D.G., the owner of the mobile home, was not a party to the eviction action, 

the mobile home should remain in South Meridian's mobile home park and that C.K. 

should be allowed to reside in it until South Meridian properly evicted D.G.

"22. The district court denied the respondent's motion to set aside the default 

judgment. The district court granted the motion to intervene, but held that the respondent 

should have to establish that the intervener had a landlord-tenant relationship with South 

Meridian before she would be allowed unlimited access to the mobile home. The district 

court set that issue for a hearing to be held on May 19, 2011. The district court made it 

clear that neither C.K. nor D.L. had the right to access the mobile home or its contents 

without obtaining South Meridian's consent.

"23. On May 18, 2011, the day before the hearing, D.L., acting on advice 

from the respondent, entered South Meridian's mobile home park without notice to or 

prior to approval from South Meridian. D.L. was accompanied by a locksmith, who 
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changed the locks on the mobile home. D.L. entered the mobile home and then called the 

police because she believed certain items of property were missing. C.K. arrived at the 

property and the police threatened to arrest her for trespass because she had been evicted. 

J.J. arrived and allowed D.L. 15 minutes to remove whatever she wanted from the mobile 

home.

"24. At the May 19, 2011, hearing, the district court held that neither D.L. nor 

D.G. had a landlord-tenant relationship with South Meridian. Also, at that hearing, the 

respondent presented the testimony of the park manager, who testified that after the 

eviction case had been filed, she let C.K. into the mobile home to get some of her 

belongings.

"25. After the district court issued its decision from the bench, the respondent 

proposed that he and Mr. Holmes get together to arrange for C.K. to get her personal 

belongings and to coordinate a time for D.L. to move the trailer out of the park. Mr. 

Holmes told the district court:

'We've been waiting for this to happen. I mean, I never have been 

communicated to once, as far as moving anything out, and [the 

manager]—she testified that after the eviction, she did let her in to go get 

clothes and personal property, and so we've never held any of this stuff 

up and—from day one, and that was from April 14th.'

"26. Following the May 19, 2011, hearing, the respondent and Mr. Holmes 

agreed that C.K. and D.L. would have access to the mobile home on May 28, 2011, May 

29, 2011, and May 30, 2011. In an order dated May 27, 2011, and filed at 10:59 a.m., the 

Court entered an order which memorialized the agreement between the parties.

'1. That pursuant to K.S.A. 58-35-103(l), the Court FINDS that 

[D.L.] and [D.G.] are not "Tenants", and the only tenant is the defendant, 

[C.K.].
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'2. The Court, in response to counsel's remarks that there was fraud 

on the Court, specifically FINDS that [neither] Plaintiff, nor Plaintiff's 

counsel presented any fraud to the Court and any allegations of such 

fraud are without merit.

'3. The Court further FINDS that [C.K.] should make arrangements 

through Plaintiff or Plaintiff's counsel for purposes of removing any 

remaining personal property not already taken by Defendant after 

entering the home on 5/18/2011, or taken earlier with the consent of 

Plaintiff's manager.

'4. The Court further FINDS that Defendant, [C.K.], and Intervener, 

[D.L.], have requested, and shall be allowed to enter the property 

between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on May 28, 29, and 30, 

2001 [sic], for purposes of removing the personal property from the 

manufactured home . . . . Said entry will be coordinated by Plaintiff to 

allow Defendant and [D.L.] access during those times.

'5. The Court further FINDS that Defendant, [C.K.], has no further 

tenancy rights and Plaintiff shall proceed with giving appropriate notice 

to have the mobile home removed.'

"27. That same day, at 3:29 p.m., 4 1/2 hours after the Court entered the 

agreed order in the eviction case, the respondent filed a conversion action against J.J. and 

South Meridian on behalf of D.L., as D.G.'s attorney-in-fact. In the petition, the 

respondent alleged:

'9. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's ownership of the mobile 

home, Defendants wrongfully denied Plaintiff entry to the home and 

have at all times denied Plaintiff access and entry to the mobile home. 

Plaintiff was denied access on May 18, 2011, and Defendant thereafter 

once more caused the locks on Plaintiff's mobile home to be changed, 

thereby reasserting Defendants' control and dominion over Plaintiff's 
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mobile home and preventing free entry to, and dominion of, the mobile 

home [by Plaintiff. On May 21, 2011, Plaintiff attempted to enter the 

mobile home,] with prior notice to Defendants, and again was turned 

away by the police under color of court order. At all times since April 15, 

2011, Defendants have deprived Plaintiff access, control and dominion 

of her mobile home while obtaining control for Defendant, thereby 

converting the mobile home and its contents to the Defendants' own use.

'10. Plaintiff has been denied the use of the mobile home 

from April 15, 2001 [sic] through the date of judgment at a reasonable 

value of $250.00 per month.

'11. Defendants denied Plaintiff access to clothing, 

household items and personal property, thereby converting the same to 

Defendants' ownership and use. The value of personal property converted 

is in excess of $5,000.00.

'12. In the event Defendants have not converted Plaintiff's 

personal property in the mobile home, then Plaintiff asserts that during 

Defendant's dominion of the mobile home, Defendants negligently failed 

to secure the mobile home resulting in loss and theft of Plaintiff's 

property.'

"28. The petition made no reference to the order entered earlier that day.

"29. On June 15, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 

conversion action. The court heard the motion on June 24, 2011. At that hearing, the 

district court denied the motion, finding that because the motion referenced matters 

outside the pleadings, the motion should have been filed as a motion for summary 

judgment. At the conclusion of the June 24, 2011, hearing, the district court also put the 

respondent on notice that there appeared to be no factual basis for the cause of action. 

The court warned the respondent that if no factual basis for the cause of action existed, 

the court would entertain a motion for sanctions under K.S.A. 60-211.
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"30. On July 1, 2011, the respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. 

On August 24, 2011, the court heard the respondent's motion for summary judgment. 

During the hearing, the respondent was unable to provide any legal authority that would 

support recovery of fair market value for the mobile home and its contents when that 

property was available to D.L. The court denied the respondent's motion for summary 

judgment, stating:

'I will, again, reiterate that it appears to me that the purpose of this 

lawsuit is not to recover personal property belonging to [D.G.]. It appears 

to be uncontroverted that that property remains on the real estate owned 

by the defendants, that the defendants do not want that property on their

real estate, and it appears uncontroverted that the plaintiff apparently 

doesn't want possession of that stuff, either. What the plaintiff is trying to 

accomplish by way of this conversion action, apparently, is to force the 

defendants to buy, through some claim of conversion, the personal 

property that, for all intents and purposes, appears to be abandon[ed] on 

their property. And, as I mentioned before, I've not been provided with 

any law that stands for that proposition. And it sure seems to me, in the 

absence of any law or in the absence of some theory that the plaintiff can 

get from point A to point B on that issue, that this lawsuit has not been 

brought for a proper purpose. I referenced that earlier, and I'm 

referencing it again. It seems to me that this whole thing can be solved 

today—today if [D.G.] would hire somebody to move that mobile home 

off the defendants' property.'

"31. After the ruling the from the bench, counsel for South Meridian 

reiterated that his client had no objection to the respondent's client moving the mobile 

home out of the park. The respondent told the district court that his client could not move 

the mobile home right away because she did not have a truck or the necessary permits. 

The district court told the respondent again that without some law to the contrary, a 

conversion claim cannot be made where it is the plaintiff's own inability to move the 

mobile home that is preventing her from taking possession of it.
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"32. On September 14, 2011, South Meridian filed a motion for summary 

judgment. On October 5, 2011, the court heard and granted South Meridian's motion for 

summary judgment. That same day, the respondent filed a notice that D.L. would move 

the mobile home from the park on the following day.

"33. On October 26, 2011, South Meridian filed a motion for sanctions, under 

K.S.A. 60-211. In a memorandum decision filed January 5, 2012, the court granted the 

motion for sanctions, finding that the respondent violated K.S.A. 60-211(b) by filing the 

petition in the conversion action. The memorandum decision included the following:

'I. Summary of the Court's Decision:

'Mr. Knopp violated K.S.A. 60-211(b) by filing the Petition in 

the instant case. The Court assesses a monetary sanction in the amount of 

$5,990.25. 

. . . .

'IV. Discussion: 

'Analysis of the issue presented begins with a review of K.S.A. 

60-211. K.S.A. 60-211(b) states:

'Representation to the court. By presenting to the court a 

pleading, written motion or other paper, whether by signing, filing, 

submitting or later advocating it, an attorney or unrepresented party 

certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information and belief 

formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) It is not being presented for any improper 

purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay or 

needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
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(2) the claims, defenses and other legal contentions 

are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 

argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing 

law or for establishing new law; 

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support 

or, if specifically so identified, will likely have 

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 

further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted 

on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are 

reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

When K.S.A. 60-211(b) is violated, the Court may impose a sanction 

pursuant to K.S.A. 60-211(c) on the offending attorney or litigant. That 

sanction "may include an order to pay to the other party or parties that 

[sic] reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred because of 

the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper." K.S.A. 60-211(c).

'Under K.S.A. 60-211, the claims of the party subject to 

sanctions must be in '[a] pleading, motion or other paper.'" In re 

Marriage of Stockham, 23 Kan. App. 2d 197, Syl. ¶ 2, 928 P.2d 104 

(1997). "Under these provisions, sanctions are available only with regard 

to papers filed with the court." Id.

'In this case, the Defendants argue in their motion that they are 

entitled to sanctions pursuant to K.S.A. 60-211(c) "because of the 

pleading filed by Plaintiff." Although the Defendants do not specifically 

identify "the pleading filed by the Plaintiff" to which they refer, 

Defendants[] allege that "the action filed by Plaintiff" was brought in 
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violation of K.S.A. 60-211. As such, the Court will confine its focus to 

the Petition filed by the Plaintiff in this case.

'Given the framework outlined above, the Court must look to the 

Petition filed by Mr. Knopp to first determine whether he violated K.S.A. 

60-211(b). If a violation occurred, the Court must then determine what 

sanctions, if any, are appropriate.

'A. Did Mr. Knopp violate K.S.A. 60-211(b)?

'In the present case, the Court finds that the Petition filed by Mr. 

Knopp violated K.S.A. 60-211(b). Specifically, the Court finds: (1) that 

the Plaintiff's claim for conversion was neither supported by facts, nor 

was such claim warranted by existing law; (2) that most of the damages 

Plaintiff claimed in the Petition were neither supported by the facts, nor 

were the recovery of such damages warranted by existing law; and (3) 

that the conversion lawsuit was not presented for any proper purpose. 

Each of these findings will be more fully addressed in turn.

'1. Plaintiff's conversion claim was not supported 

by facts, nor was such claim warranted by 

existing law; 

'In the Petition filed in the conversion case, Plaintiff alleges, 

among other things: (1) "Defendants wrongfully denied Plaintiff entry to 

the home and have at all times denied Plaintiff access and entry to the 

mobile home"; (2) "At all times since April 15, 2011, Defendants have 

deprived Plaintiff access, control and dominion of her mobile home 

while obtaining control for Defendant, thereby converting the mobile 

home and its contents to the Defendants' own use"; and (3) Defendants 

denied Plaintiff access to clothing, household items and personal 

property, thereby converting the same to Defendants' ownership and 
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use.[] These allegations are without a basis in fact, and have absolutely 

no evidentiary support.

'On the same day that Mr. Knopp filed the conversion case, he 

had obtained a court order in the forcible detainer case granting access 

for his client to the mobile home, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on May 28, 

29, and 30, 2011, for the express purpose of moving her property off the 

Defendants' mobile home park. The allegation in the Petition that 

Plaintiff was denied access and entry to the mobile home at all times 

since April 15, 2011, is unequivocally false. Not only does this allegation 

lack evidentiary support, but the uncontroverted evidence was the 

opposite of what Mr. Knopp alleged—the Plaintiff had Court ordered 

access to her property.

'Moreover, at every court hearing in the forcible detainer case, 

the Defendants specifically stated through their attorney that they wanted 

Plaintiff to make arrangements to move the mobile home off the mobile 

home park. At the hearing on May 16, 2011, Mr. Holmes repeatedly 

stated that his clients had no objection to Plaintiff moving the mobile 

home out of its mobile home park, and indicated that such had been the 

position of his clients from the beginning. . . . 

. . . .

'The numerous statements made by Defendants through their 

counsel that they wanted Plaintiff to move the mobile home out of the 

South Meridian mobile home park was known to Mr. Knopp before the 

conversion case was filed. In the face of these numerous statements, Mr. 

Knopp still alleged in the conversion Petition that the Plaintiff had at all 

times since April 15, 2011, been denied access and entry to the mobile 

home, that Plaintiff had been denied the use of the mobile home, and that 

Plaintiff had been denied access to clothing and household items. These 
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allegations were without any basis in fact and lack evidentiary support, 

and were made in violation of K.S.A. 60-211(b)(3). [citations omitted]

'Finally, nowhere in any of the pleadings in either the forcible 

detainer case or in the conversion case, nor at any hearing in either case, 

did Mr. Knopp identify a single instance where his client made a demand 

for return of the property. Further, no effort was made to coordinate the 

removal of Plaintiff's property from the mobile home park until after the 

conversion case was filed. The simple fact is that the Plaintiff was either 

unable or unwilling to move her property that was left at the mobile 

home park. By her failure to take any action whatever [sic] to remove 

this property, the Plaintiff put the Defendant in the position of being the 

unwilling custodian of the same.

'Not only was the Plaintiff's conversion claim wholly lacking any 

factual basis, but her claim was also not warranted by existing law. The 

Court permitted the Plaintiff to intervene in the forcible detainer action 

for the express purpose of allowing her the opportunity to prove that she 

has some kind of right to be on the South Meridian mobile home park by 

virtue of her ownership of the mobile home in question. The Court 

concluded at the end of the trial on that issue that Plaintiff had not 

established that she had any tenancy right which would entitle her to be 

at the mobile home park. The Plaintiff chose not to appeal this decision.

. . . .

'There is no legal authority to support the proposition that just 

because Plaintiff's mobile home is located on Defendants' private 

property the Plaintiff is entitled to enter on the property of the 

Defendants whenever she pleases without notice or prior consent of the 

Defendants. Likewise, there is no legal authority to support the 

proposition that just because the Defendants required the Plaintiff to get 

prior consent to enter their property that they were exercising or 
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assuming the right of ownership over the mobile home and its contents. 

The Plaintiff's conversion claim was not warranted by existing law, and 

was made in violation of K.S.A. 60-211(b)(2).

'2. The damages sought by Plaintiff were neither 

supported by the facts nor were the recovery of 

such damages warranted by existing law: 

'The damages that Plaintiff sought in the conversion action were 

itemized in the Petition as follows: (1) fair market value of the mobile 

home as of April 15, 2011; (2) fair market value of the personal property 

in the mobile home as of April 15, 2011, in an amount in excess of 

$5,000; (3) the costs of changing the locks in the amount of $300; (4) 

loss of the use of the mobile home in the amount of $500 per month from 

April 15, 2011, until the day of the judgment; and (5) a set-off against 

any lot rent claimed by the Defendants from and after April 15, 2011. 

Other than the damages for the changing of the locks and the request for 

set off, all other damages claimed by the Plaintiff lacked any factual 

basis or evidentiary support, and were not warranted by existing law. 

[footnote omitted]

'As noted above, all of this property was available to the 

Plaintiff—all she had to do was remove the property from the 

Defendants' mobile home park. As further noted above, the Plaintiff had 

a court order which granted her access to the Defendants' property for the 

express purpose of removing her property. At the time the Petition for 

conversion was filed, the property was available to the Plaintiff, and 

could have been retrieved by the Plaintiff on the dates provided in the 

court's order. The Plaintiff's damage claim for the fair market value of 

property that was available to be pick [sic] up lacked any basis in fact 

and was unsupported by any evidence, in violation of K.S.A. 60-

211(b)(3).
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'With regard to the damages for loss of use of the mobile home, 

Mr. Knopp admitted at the hearing on August 24, 2011, that his client did 

not have a truck large enough to move the mobile home, and did not 

have the requisite permits to move the mobile home. When pressed by 

the Court for a time frame within which the Plaintiff could remove the 

mobile home from the South Meridian mobile home park, Mr. Knopp 

stated: "I wouldn't know, You [sic] Honor. I just am not in a position to 

say."

'Accordingly, at the time the conversion action was filed seeking 

damages in the amount of $500 per month for loss of use of the mobile 

home, the Plaintiff had been told by the Court in the forcible detainer 

action that she had no rights of tenancy that would permit her to reside at 

the mobile home park. As such, the Plaintiff was unable to make use of 

the mobile home as a residence until after she moved it off the South 

Meridian mobile home park, but she lacked the means of removing the 

mobile home. The fact that Plaintiff was unable to make use of the 

mobile home as a residence is completely unrelated to any action that the 

Defendants took towards the mobile home.

'Moreover, it is important to note that the Plaintiff did, in fact, 

make use of the mobile home—since she refused to remove her personal 

property from the mobile home, the mobile home served as a storage 

facility for her personal property, for which Plaintiff paid Defendants no 

lot rent. The Plaintiff's damage claim for loss of use of the mobile home 

had no basis in fact and did not have evidentiary support, and was in 

violation of K.S.A. 60-211(b)(3).

'Finally, in light of the fact that Plaintiff had a court order 

permitting her access to the South Meridian mobile home park to remove 

her property, the Court specifically asked Mr. Knopp to articulate the 

damages that Plaintiff had suffered on the date she filed her conversion 

Petition. The only damages that Mr. Knopp could articulate were 
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nominal damages associated with the changing of the locks on the 

mobile home. The fact that Mr. Knopp was unable to articulate damages 

beyond nominal damages after he prepared and filed a Petition, after he 

prepared and filed a motion for summary judgment, and after he prepared 

and filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for 

summary judgment indicates that the damages claimed by Plaintiff 

would not likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 

for discovery. [footnote omitted]

'Not only were the damage claims discussed above without any 

basis in fact, but they were also not warranted by existing law in 

violation of K.S.A. 60-211([b])(2). In each case cited by the Plaintiff 

where the fair market value of converted property was recovered, it was 

in circumstances where the converted property had either been sold or 

disposed of. Plaintiff's counsel cited no legal authority that would permit 

his client to recover the fair market value of the mobile home and its 

contents when that property had not been disposed of and was available 

to the Plaintiff.

'3. The conversion lawsuit was not brought for any 

proper purpose:

'As shown above, this conversion lawsuit was not brought by the 

Plaintiff in order to recover her property from the South Meridian mobile 

home park. The Plaintiff had a court order in hand granting her access to 

the mobile home park to recover her property, but she did not have the 

means available to move her mobile home from the mobile home park. 

The purpose of this action was an effort by the Plaintiff to force the 

Defendants to purchase her mobile home and its contents—property that, 

for all intents and purposes, had been abandoned by the Plaintiff. As a 

result, despite the fact that the tenant of the mobile home had been 

evicted in April of 2011, the removal of the mobile home from 

Defendants' mobile home park was unnecessarily delayed until October 
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of 2011. In the meantime, the Defendants not only incurred the loss of lot 

rent, but also incurred significant legal costs to defend against a frivolous 

lawsuit.

'Mr. Knopp was advised early in the litigation of the conversion 

claim—at the hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss—that the Court 

was of the opinion that there appeared to be no factual basis for the 

Plaintiff's claim and that he risked sanctions pursuant to K.S.A. 60-

211(c). At that point, rather than simply making arrangements to retrieve 

Plaintiff's property and dismiss the case, Mr. Knopp responded by filing 

a motion for summary judgment, which accomplished nothing except to 

increase the costs of defense to the Defendants.

'At the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Mr. 

Knopp was again advised by the Court "that this lawsuit has not been 

brought for a proper purpose." Mr. Knopp was advised by Mr. Holmes 

that there was no objection by the Defendants to the removal of 

Plaintiff's property from their mobile home park. Mr. Knopp was further 

advised by the Court that if the Plaintiff "wants to maintain this action 

for conversion, whether or not she goes and gets that mobile home, she 

does it at her own risk." Again, Mr. Knopp elected to continue on with 

the lawsuit, forcing the Defendants to incur costs preparing their own 

summary judgment motion.

'This lawsuit was not brought for any proper purpose. Mr. Knopp 

was given numerous opportunities to end the lawsuit while at the same 

time securing the return of his client's property from the mobile home 

park. The dogged pursuit by Mr. Knopp of a claim that had no merit in 

order to recover damages that have no merit needlessly increased the 

costs of litigation for the Defendants. The initiation and pursuit of the 

conversion claim was in violation of K.S.A. 60-211(b)(1).
19

'B. What sanctions are appropriate: 

. . . .

'Mr. Knopp's conduct was willful. At the conclusion of the trial 

in the forcible detainer action on May 19, 2011, Mr. Knopp stated to the 

Court: "I would propose we coordinate with [Mr. Holmes] to—for 

[Plaintiff's] presence, if she intends to be [at the mobile home park] 

without living there. And, other than that, we'll also coordinate when a 

trailer or tractor is getting ready to move that trailer out of the park." Mr. 

Knopp then signed and approved the court order in the forcible detainer 

action granting Plaintiff access to South Meridian mobile home park, 

which was filed with the court on May 27, 2011, at 10:59 a.m. Four and 

a half hours later, at 3:29 p.m., Mr. Knopp filed the conversion Petition 

alleging that his client had been denied access and entry to the mobile 

home.

'It is obvious from this time line that Mr. Knopp was negotiating 

arrangements for his client to remove her property from the Defendants' 

mobile home park at the same time he was preparing a lawsuit accusing 

the Defendants of denying his client access to this same property. That is 

not negligent conduct. There is no way that Mr. Knopp could have been 

mistaken about whether or not his client had access to her property when 

he filed the conversion Petition.

. . . .

'Mr. Knopp's conduct at issue here was not an isolated event. It 

was part of a pattern of activity that began in the forcible detainer action 

in which Mr. Knopp filed a pleading with the Court that was 

intentionally deceptive. In the forcible detainer action, Mr. Knopp filed a 

motion on behalf of the tenant [C.K.] to set aside the default judgment 

that had been entered against her. In that motion, he asserted that [C.K.] 
20

had, in fact paid the back rent in full within the three day period of the 

notice to quit, and accused Mr. Holmes of committing a fraud on the 

Court. [footnote omitted] Eventually, [C.K.] would testify that she 

delivered a partial payment of the back rent ($400) on April 6th, and that 

when she delivered the balance of the back rent on April 7th she 

discovered that the previous partial rent payment had already been 

returned by the landlord. [footnote omitted] [C.K.] testified that she did 

not tender the $400 back to the landlord after it had been returned. 

Consequently, the uncontroverted facts were that at no time was the 

landlord ever in receipt of the full amount of the rent.

'In regards to the allegations of fraud on the court, Mr. Knopp 

omitted from the allegations [sic] his motion to set aside the default 

judgment that the initial $400 partial payment had been returned by the 

Defendant before the second partial payment was made. As such, the 

motion filed by Mr. Knopp left the Court with the false impression that: 

(1) a three day notice was served specifying back rent due of $495; (2) 

the tenant paid the rent in full within that three day period in two 

payments made on April 6 and 7; (3) that the full tender of rent was 

returned by the landlord on April 7; and (4) that despite full tender of 

rent within the 3 day period, a Petition was filed by Mr. Holmes which 

fraudulently alleged non-payment of rent by the tenant in order to "avoid 

the statutory provisions for terminating a manufactured home rental 

arrangement."

'Intentionally omitting material facts from a motion which 

accuses another attorney of fraud on the court is no small matter. Fraud 

on the court is a serious allegation.

. . . .
21

'An allegation of fraud on the court directed at another attorney 

not only calls into question the integrity of the judicial process, but also 

the ethical fitness of the attorney subject to the allegation. . . . 

'In the forcible detainer case, the Court expressly found that no 

fraud on the court had been committed by Mr. Holmes:

. . . .

'Separate and apart from the baseless allegation of fraud on the 

court, Mr. Knopp exhibited a general pattern of acting in bad faith 

throughout the forcible detainer action. At the conclusion of the hearing 

on May 16, 2011, the Court stated to Mr. Knopp:

"I'm going to leave it to you and Mr. Holmes to 

work out the details on access to the mobile home, to 

move personal property, access to the mobile home for 

purposes of, you know, disconnecting utilities and 

making sure that any assets that are subject to dissipation 

and waste . . . are preserved, and so forth?"

'Despite this admonition from the Court, Mr. Knopp advised his 

client to go out to the mobile home park on May 18, 2011, and access the

mobile home without notifying Mr. Holmes or the Defendants. . . .

. . . .

'Consequently, as a result of Mr. Knopp's failure [sic] act in a 

[sic] good faith with Mr. Holmes to coordinate access to the mobile 

home park, a public disturbance occurred, the police were called and 

were at the property for four hours, and the tenant who had previously 

been evicted from the property was back on the property. To add insult to 

injury, Mr. Knopp alleged in the conversion Petition that the incident on 
22

May 18 was an example of his client being wrongfully denied access and 

entry to the mobile home. At the conclusion of the hearing on May 19, 

the Court [again] admonished the parties to coordinate a time for the 

removal of Plaintiff's property from the mobile home park:

. . . .

'Despite this admonition, for whatever reason Mr. Knopp refused 

to work with Mr. Holmes to arrange for a time to have property removed 

from the mobile home park. Mr. Knopp's client again went to the mobile 

home park on May 21, 2011, without making a reasonable effort to 

coordinate her presence at the mobile home park with the Defendants. 

[footnote omitted] As the Court predicted, the police were again called 

(apparently by neighbors), and once again the simple act of removing 

property from the mobile home turned into a public disturbance. . . .

. . . .

'The amount necessary to deter similar activity in future 

litigation requires, at a minimum, that the Defendants be made whole for 

the economic loss occasioned by this lawsuit. As noted above, this action 

delayed removal of the mobile home from the South Meridian mobile 

home park. Defendants should recover $860 for lot rent from June 

through September. Further, Defendants should recover $5,130.25 for the 

attorney fees and expenses incurred in the defense of this case. The total 

amount necessary to deter similar conduct in future cases is $5,990.25.

. . . .

'The Petition filed by Mr. Knopp in this case violated K.S.A. 60-

211(b). Based upon the relevant factors addressed above, the Court 

sanctions Mr. Knopp in the amount of $5,990.25. This Memorandum 

Opinion shall serve as the Journal Entry of Judgment.'
23

"34. On January 12, 2012, the respondent self-reported his misconduct by 

providing the disciplinary administrator's office with a copy of the memorandum 

decision.

"35. On behalf of D.G. and D.L., the respondent appealed the district court's 

orders denying their motion for summary judgment, granting South Meridian's motion for 

summary judgment, and granting South Meridian's motion for sanctions.

"36. In an unpublished opinion dated February 15, 2013, the Kansas Court of 

Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment, including the imposition of sanctions.

[D.L.], et al. v. South Meridian Park, LLC, et al., No. 107,586. South Meridian filed a 

motion for attorney fees on appeal. Initially, the Kansas Court of Appeals denied the 

motion. Upon reconsideration, the Kansas Court of Appeals granted South Meridian's 

motion for attorney fees and ordered the respondent to pay an additional $7,367.50 for 

attorney fees rendered by South Meridian's attorneys on appeal.

"Conclusions of Law

"37. Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 

of law that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1, KRPC 3.3(a)(1), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 

8.4(d), and KRPC 8.4(g), as detailed below.

"KRPC 3.1

"38. Attorneys shall not file frivolous cases. In that regard, KRPC 3.1 

specifically provides:

'A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 

controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 

frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 

modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a 

criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result 
24

in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require 

that every element of the case be established.'

The respondent filed a frivolous case when he filed the conversion action. Accordingly, 

the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1.

"KRPC 3.3(a)(1)

"39. KRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides that '[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a 

false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.' The respondent made false 

statements of material fact to the Court when he asserted in his motion to set aside default 

judgment that C.K. had paid the back rent in full within the 3-day period of the notice to 

quit. The uncontroverted facts were that at no time was the landlord ever in receipt of the 

full amount of the rent. Further, the respondent made false statements of material fact to 

the court in the conversion petition when he included statements that D.L. did not have 

access to her property. The respondent knew that D.L. had court ordered access. Because 

the respondent provided false information to the Court, the hearing panel concludes that 

the respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1).

"KRPC 8.4(c)

"40. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). The respondent 

engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he provided false information to the 

court in the motion to set aside default judgment in the forcible detainer case that C.K. 

had timely tendered full payment of the back rent and in the conversion petition that D.L. 

did not have access to her property. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c).

"KRPC 8.4(d)

"41. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 

is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
25

conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he filed a frivolous 

lawsuit and later, a frivolous appeal. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).

"KRPC 8.4(g)

"42. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other 

conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(g). The 

respondent engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law when 

he advised D.L. to enter South Meridian mobile home park on May 18, 2011, without 

authorization. As a result, a public disturbance resulted, necessitating the presence of law 

enforcement for a period of 4 hours. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent 

violated KRPC 8.4(g).

"American Bar Association

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

"43. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 

considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 

to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 

injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 

factors.

"44. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to the public to 

maintain his personal integrity. Further, the respondent violated his duty to the legal 

system to refrain from abusing the legal process.

"45. Mental State. The respondent knowingly and intentionally violated his 

duties. However, the evidence indicates that the respondent was motivated by a genuine 

desire to assist his client and his desire was complicated by his narcissism and obsessivecompulsive personality as described in paragraphs 54 and 58 below.
26

"46. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 

actual injury to the legal system, to South Meridian, and to the legal profession.

"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

"47. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

aggravating factors present:

"48. Dishonest Motive. The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct when 

he included false statements in the motion to set aside the default judgment and in the 

conversion petition. While the conduct appears to be motivated by dishonesty, again, the 

evidence indicates that the respondent was motivated in part by a genuine desire to assist 

his client and this desire was complicated by his narcissism and obsessive-compulsive 

personality to be right as described in paragraphs 54 and 58 below.

"49. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of bad 

faith and conduct which was intentionally deceptive, as thoroughly addressed by the 

district court in its memorandum decision. The respondent included false statements of 

material fact in the motion to set aside the default judgment in the forcible detainer case. 

The respondent advised his client to go to the mobile home without first obtaining 

permission from South Meridian, resulting in a public disturbance. The respondent filed a 

frivolous lawsuit which included false statements of material fact that his client was 

denied access to her property, less than 5 hours after an agreed order was entered granting 

his client court ordered access to her property. The respondent's pattern of misconduct in 

this case resulted in serious prejudice to the administration of justice for an extended 

period of time.

"50. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 

The respondent violated KRPC 3.1, KRPC 3.3, KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d), and KRPC 

8.4(g). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed multiple 

offenses.
27

"51. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme 

Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1982. At the time 

of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for nearly 30 years.

"52. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

mitigating circumstances present:

"53. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 

previously been disciplined.

"54. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed 

to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent has relevant 

personality traits of narcissism, obsessive-compulsive personality, and histrionic features. 

The respondent's psychologist stated that although the personality traits are 'pronounced, 

none are diagnosed as severe and no mental disorder is indicated.' The psychologist also 

stated that the 'characteristics [] likely provoke his bull headedness and need to be right, 

even with opposition from an authority.' Thus, it appears to the hearing panel that the 

respondent's personality traits contributed to the misconduct. The respondent's 

personality traits have also led to difficulties in his personal life for which he has sought 

and obtained counseling.

"55. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 

Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 

Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. 

Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the violations.

"56. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 

Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 

Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive member of the 

bar of Wichita, Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally 
28

possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by several letters received by the 

hearing panel.

"57. Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The district court ordered 

the respondent to pay nearly $6,000 and the Kansas Court of Appeals ordered the 

respondent to pay over $7,000. The respondent has satisfied the sanctions ordered by 

both courts.

"58. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 

examined and considered the following Standards:

'6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that 

false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or 

that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes 

no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a 

party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially 

adverse effect on the legal proceeding.'

"Recommendation

"59. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 

suspended for a period of 90 days. The disciplinary administrator further recommended 

that the suspension be stayed and that the respondent be placed on probation for a period 

of 2 years. Despite the fact that the respondent provided a timely plan of probation and 

despite the disciplinary administrator's recommendation that the respondent be placed on 

probation, counsel for the respondent recommended that the respondent be censured by 

the Kansas Supreme Court.

"60. In the disciplinary administrator's closing argument, she commented that 

she questioned whether the respondent, 'gets it.' The hearing panel shares her concern that 

the respondent does not appear to fully understand and appreciate the seriousness of his 

misconduct. In the underlying case, the respondent let his tunnel vision get in the way of 

a reasoned response to the eviction matter.
29

"61. Interestingly, one of the respondent's supporters, W. Thomas Gilman, 

noted conduct of a similar, but less extreme, nature:

'In the thirty years that I have practiced law, I have had several 

cases against Mr. Knopp. I have seen him do good work for his clients. I 

have, however, observed that he has a tendency to over-complicate cases, 

sometimes taking an overly technical or impractical tact when a simple 

solution seemed apparent to me. He has never been untruthful with me 

and I have never seen him be untruthful to any court in which we 

appeared. I believe Ted has good intentions and wants to be a zealous 

advocate for his clients, but sometimes gets muddled up over-evaluating 

a case. I believe he is an asset to our bar here in Wichita and southcentral Kansas.'

The hearing panel observed the truth of these remarks and agrees with much of what Mr. 

Gilman stated, including the statement that the respondent is an asset to the bar. In this 

case, also, he certainly over-complicated a simple case. Unlike the circumstances that Mr. 

Gilman referenced, the respondent crossed the line of zealous advocacy and made 

dishonest statements to the court in the motion to set aside the default judgment and in 

the conversion petition. During this testimony, the respondent sincerely acknowledged 

the truth of the criticisms noted by Mr. Gilman. Mr. Gilman's letter appears to have 

positively motivated the respondent to self-examine what he had done and accept the fact 

that his own personality led him to engage in unacceptable behavior. The hearing panel is 

troubled by the respondent's dishonest conduct, but is encouraged by his self-examination 

and willingness to seek and accept help.

"62. That aside, because the respondent timely filed a request for probation, 

the hearing panel must first consider whether probation is appropriate in this case. The 

hearing panel turns to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g), which provides, in pertinent part, as 

follows:
30

'Requirements of Probation

'(1) If the Respondent intends to request that the Respondent 

be placed on probation for violating the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct or the Kansas Supreme Court Rules, the Respondent shall 

provide each member of the Hearing Panel and the Disciplinary 

Administrator with a workable, substantial, and detailed plan of 

probation at least fourteen days prior to the hearing on the Formal 

Complaint. The plan of probation must contain adequate safeguards that 

will protect the public and ensure the Respondent's full compliance with 

the disciplinary rules and orders of the Supreme Court.

'(2) If the Respondent provides each member of the Hearing 

Panel and the Disciplinary Administrator with a plan of probation, the 

Respondent shall immediately and prior to the hearing on the Formal 

Complaint put the plan of probation into effect by complying with each 

of the terms and conditions of the probation plan.

'(3) The Hearing Panel shall not recommend that the 

Respondent be placed on probation unless:

(i) the Respondent develops a workable, 

substantial, and detailed plan of probation and 

provides a copy of the proposed plan of 

probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and 

each member of the Hearing Panel at least 

fourteen days prior to the hearing on the Formal 

Complaint;

(ii) the Respondent puts the proposed plan of 

probation into effect prior to the hearing on the 

Formal Complaint by complying with each of 

the terms and conditions of the probation plan;
31

(iii) the misconduct can be corrected by probation; 

and

(iv) placing the Respondent on probation is in the 

best interests of the legal profession and the 

citizens of the State of Kansas.'

Thus, in order for the hearing panel to consider recommending to the Supreme Court that 

the respondent be placed on probation, the hearing panel must first find each of the 

elements in Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(3).

"63. In this case, the respondent developed a workable, substantial, and 

detailed plan of probation and provided a copy of the proposed plan of probation to the 

disciplinary administrator and each member of the hearing panel at least fourteen days 

prior to the hearing on the Formal Complaint. Further, the respondent put the proposed 

plan of probation into effect prior to the hearing on the formal complaint by complying 

with each of the terms and conditions of the probation plan. With the supervision 

proposed, it appears that the misconduct can be corrected by probation. The hearing panel 

believes that supervision of the respondent's practice is necessary. Finally, at this time, it 

appears that it is in the best interest of the legal profession and the citizens of the State of 

Kansas to recommend probation at this time. The hearing panel is confident that Joseph 

Knopp, as the respondent's proposed practice supervisor, will assist the respondent in 

determining simple solutions for the respondent's cases.

"64. Thus, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the Supreme 

Court suspend the respondent's license to practice law for a period of 90 days. But, the 

hearing panel further recommends that the Supreme Court suspend the imposition of the 

suspension and place the respondent on probation for a period of two years, subject to the 

terms and conditions detailed below:

'1. Practice Supervision. Joseph Knopp shall serve as the 

respondent's practice supervisor. For the first 18 months of probation, the 
32

respondent shall meet with the practice supervisor on a monthly basis. 

For the final 6 months of probation, the respondent shall meet with the 

practice supervisor as directed by the practice supervisor. During each 

meeting, the respondent shall inform the practice supervisor of all cases 

opened since their last meeting and the status of each case. The 

respondent shall inform the practice supervisor of any events, issues, and 

problems experienced or expected in the pending cases, to include any 

warnings by courts that the respondent's case appears to lack factual or 

legal support. Further, the respondent shall provide the practice 

supervisor with an updated copy of the inventory of cases and clients, as 

detailed below, on a monthly basis. The respondent shall allow the 

practice supervisor access to his client files, computer, calendar, and trust 

account records. The respondent shall comply with any requests made by 

the practice supervisor. During the first 18 months of probation, the 

practice supervisor shall provide the disciplinary administrator and the 

respondent a monthly report regarding the respondent's status on 

probation. During the final 6 months of probation, the practice supervisor 

shall provide the disciplinary administrator and the respondent with 

quarterly reports. The respondent shall follow all recommendations and 

correct all deficiencies noted in the practice supervisor's periodic reports. 

The practice supervisor will be acting as an officer and an agent of the 

court while supervising the probation and monitoring the respondent's 

legal practice. As supervising attorney, the practice supervisor shall be 

afforded all immunities granted by Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 223 during the 

course of his supervising activities.

'2. Inventory of Cases and Clients. Within 10 days of this 

report, the respondent shall make an inventory of all open cases and 

clients. The respondent shall update the inventory on a daily basis. The 

inventory shall include the client's name, the client's contact information, 

the client's goal, the tasks that remain to be completed, all pending 

deadlines, and the forum (if any) in which the matter is pending. 
33

'3. Audits. Within 30 days of the date of this report, the 

practice supervisor shall conduct an initial audit of the respondent's files 

to confirm the factual and legal basis for claims and defenses asserted. 

Then, 60 days later, the practice supervisor shall conduct a second audit 

of the respondent's files. Thereafter, the practice supervisor shall conduct 

additional audits every 90 days. At the conclusion of the period of 

probation, the practice supervisor shall conduct a final audit of the 

respondent's files. If the practice supervisor discovers any violations of 

the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, the practice supervisor shall 

include such information in his report. The practice supervisor shall 

provide the disciplinary administrator and the respondent with a copy of 

each audit report. The respondent shall follow all recommendations and 

correct all deficiencies noted in the practice supervisor's periodic audit 

reports. 

'4. Pro Bono Cases. The respondent shall not provide pro 

bono services without prior approval of the practice supervisor and after 

a thorough discussion of the means of attempting to reach the client's 

goal. 

'5. Nature of Cases. The respondent shall not accept cases 

that have a low probability of success and are without a clearly 

established means of attempting to reach the client's goal.

'6. Psychological Treatment. The respondent shall continue 

his regular treatment with Thomas T. Graff, Ph.D., throughout the period 

of supervised probation, unless the psychologist determines that 

continued treatment is no longer necessary. The psychologist shall notify 

the practice supervisor and the disciplinary administrator in the event that 

the respondent discontinues treatment against the recommendation of the 

psychologist during the probationary period. The respondent shall 

forthwith provide the psychologist with an appropriate release of 
34

information to allow the psychologist to provide such information to the 

practice supervisor and the disciplinary administrator. 

'7. Continued Cooperation. The respondent shall continue 

to cooperate with the disciplinary administrator. If the disciplinary 

administrator requests any additional information, the respondent shall 

timely provide such information. 

'8. Additional Violations. The respondent shall not violate 

the terms of his probation or the provisions of the Kansas Rules of 

Professional Conduct. In the event that the respondent violates any of the 

terms of probation or any of the provisions of the Kansas Rules of 

Professional Conduct at any time during the probationary period, the 

respondent shall immediately report such violation to the practice 

supervisor and the disciplinary administrator. The disciplinary 

administrator shall take immediate action directing the respondent to 

show cause why the probation should not be revoked.

'9. Release from Probation. The respondent will remain on 

probation until the respondent seeks and obtains a release from probation 

by the Supreme Court, pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(7).'

"65. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 

the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator."

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 

disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 

KRPC exist and, if they do, the discipline that should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 

must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 

258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). 
35

Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 

truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 

610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 

an answer. Respondent was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel 

and the hearing before this court. He filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final 

hearing report. With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are deemed 

admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369). Further, the 

evidence before the hearing panel establishes the charged misconduct in violation of 

KRPC 3.1 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 592) (meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) 

(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 601) (candor toward tribunal); 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 

672) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 

8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and 8.4(g) 

(engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law) by clear and 

convincing evidence, which supports the panel's conclusions of law. We therefore adopt 

the panel's findings and conclusions.

The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 

violations. At the panel hearing, at which the respondent appeared, the office of the 

Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the respondent be suspended for a period 

of 90 days, that imposition of the suspension be stayed, and that respondent be placed on 

probation for a period of 2 years. Respondent recommended published censure; 

alternatively, respondent submitted a proposed probation plan. The hearing panel

recommended that the respondent be suspended for 90 days, that imposition of the 

suspension be stayed, and that the respondent be placed on probation for a period of 2 

years subject to the following terms and conditions:
36

1. Practice Supervision. Joseph Knopp shall serve as the 

respondent's practice supervisor. For the first 18 months of probation, the 

respondent shall meet with the practice supervisor on a monthly basis. For 

the final 6 months of probation, the respondent shall meet with the practice 

supervisor as directed by the practice supervisor. During each meeting, the 

respondent shall inform the practice supervisor of all cases opened since

their last meeting and the status of each case. The respondent shall inform 

the practice supervisor of any events, issues, and problems experienced or 

expected in the pending cases, to include any warnings by courts that the 

respondent's case appears to lack factual or legal support. Further, the 

respondent shall provide the practice supervisor with an updated copy of 

the inventory of cases and clients, as detailed below, on a monthly basis. 

The respondent shall allow the practice supervisor access to his client files, 

computer, calendar, and trust account records. The respondent shall 

comply with any requests made by the practice supervisor. During the first 

18 months of probation, the practice supervisor shall provide the 

Disciplinary Administrator and the respondent a monthly report regarding 

the respondent's status on probation. During the final 6 months of 

probation, the practice supervisor shall provide the Disciplinary 

Administrator and the respondent with quarterly reports. The respondent 

shall follow all recommendations and correct all deficiencies noted in the 

practice supervisor's periodic reports. The practice supervisor will be 

acting as an officer and an agent of the court while supervising the 

probation and monitoring the respondent's legal practice. As supervising 

attorney, the practice supervisor shall be afforded all immunities granted 

by Rule 223 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 420) during the course of his 

supervising activities.
37

2. Inventory of Cases and Clients. Within 10 days of this 

report, the respondent shall make an inventory of all open cases and 

clients. The respondent shall update the inventory on a daily basis. The 

inventory shall include the client's name, the client's contact information, 

the client's goal, the tasks that remain to be completed, all pending 

deadlines, and the forum (if any) in which the matter is pending. 

3. Audits. Within 30 days of the date of this report, the practice 

supervisor shall conduct an initial audit of the respondent's files to confirm 

the factual and legal basis for claims and defenses asserted. Then, 60 days 

later, the practice supervisor shall conduct a second audit of the 

respondent's files. Thereafter, the practice supervisor shall conduct 

additional audits every 90 days. At the conclusion of the period of 

probation, the practice supervisor shall conduct a final audit of the 

respondent's files. If the practice supervisor discovers any violations of the 

Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, the practice supervisor shall 

include such information in his report. The practice supervisor shall 

provide the Disciplinary Administrator and the respondent with a copy of 

each audit report. The respondent shall follow all recommendations and 

correct all deficiencies noted in the practice supervisor's periodic audit

reports. 

4. Pro Bono Cases. The respondent shall not provide pro bono 

services without prior approval of the practice supervisor and after a 

thorough discussion of the means of attempting to reach the client's goal. 
38

5. Nature of Cases. The respondent shall not accept cases that 

have a low probability of success and are without a clearly established 

means of attempting to reach the client's goal.

6. Psychological Treatment. The respondent shall continue his 

regular treatment with Thomas T. Graff, Ph.D., throughout the period of 

supervised probation, unless the psychologist determines that continued 

treatment is no longer necessary. The psychologist shall notify the practice 

supervisor and the Disciplinary Administrator in the event that the 

respondent discontinues treatment against the recommendation of the 

psychologist during the probationary period. The respondent shall 

forthwith provide the psychologist with an appropriate release of 

information to allow the psychologist to provide such information to the 

practice supervisor and the Disciplinary Administrator. 

7. Continued Cooperation. The respondent shall continue to 

cooperate with the Disciplinary Administrator. If the Disciplinary 

Administrator requests any additional information, the respondent shall 

timely provide such information. 

8. Additional Violations. The respondent shall not violate the 

terms of his probation or the provisions of the Kansas Rules of 

Professional Conduct. In the event that the respondent violates any of the 

terms of probation or any of the provisions of the Kansas Rules of 

Professional Conduct at any time during the probationary period, the 

respondent shall immediately report such violation to the practice 

supervisor and the Disciplinary Administrator. The Disciplinary 
39

Administrator shall take immediate action directing the respondent to 

show cause why the probation should not be revoked.

9. Release from Probation. The respondent will remain on 

probation until the respondent seeks and obtains a release from probation 

by the Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 211(g)(7) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. 

Annot. 350).

At the hearing before this court, the Deputy Disciplinary Administrator stated that 

the respondent had completed nearly 2 years of probation successfully, including 

obtaining the required psychological treatment. She also emphasized that respondent had 

fully cooperated with the disciplinary process, had paid the sanctions levied by the court 

promptly, and had an excellent reputation. Although the applicable ABA standards called 

for suspension, she said, she believed that mitigating factors and respondent's success on 

probation so far meant that a 90-day suspension, whose imposition would be stayed, with 

continued probation on the panel's terms for 6 months would be enough to punish the 

uncontested violations and protect the public.

Counsel for respondent argued that the ABA standards calling for suspension 

should not apply, given the low probability that any of respondent's misstatements to the 

court would ever have been relied upon to support a ruling, and sought to limit discipline 

to a published censure. In the event the court disagreed with this analysis, counsel said 

that probation, particularly consultation with respondent's practice adviser, had been 

helpful to the respondent in assessing the strength of his legal positions in cases.

The court appreciates respondent's counsel's point that not all misrepresentations 

to courts are created equal. Some turn out to be more consequential than others. That 

said, the exact degree of harm cannot be gauged with 100 percent accuracy when a 
40

misrepresentation is made. And each is, in itself, a serious matter that undercuts the

overall reliability of our justice system. For this reason, the court believes that a 90-day 

period of suspension is an appropriate sanction in this case; however, imposition of the 

suspension will be stayed, pending respondent's successful completion of an additional 6 

months of probation under all of the remaining applicable terms set out by the hearing 

panel.

A minority of the court would impose a lesser sanction. 

As set forth in the panel's probation conditions and acknowledged by the Deputy 

Disciplinary Administrator in her remarks at the hearing before this court, at the 

conclusion of the 6 months, respondent must file a motion for release from probation. 

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Ted E. Knopp be and is hereby disciplined by a 

90-day suspension from the practice of law, with imposition of the suspension stayed 

pending successful completion of 6 months of probation under all of the remaining 

applicable terms set out by the hearing panel. See Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2), (5) 

(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 

respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.