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### OPIN ION No . 0 4- 08 -0 03 95 -C V Be n MCCU LL OU GH and Cy ndi McCullough, Ap pe lla nts
v . CI TY OF P EA RSA LL , Appellee Fr om the 218th J udicial District Court, Fr io County , Texas

Trial Court No. 07-09- 00316-CVF Honora ble Stella Sax on, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Marialy nn Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Fe bruar y 11, 2009 AFF I RMED I n the under ly ing w rongfu l d ea t h lawsuit, Be n and Cy ndi McCullough sued the City of Pearsa ll and the City

of Pear sall I ndustrial Deve lopment Corp. (collec tively , “the City ”), a s well as Union Pacific Corp., U nion Pacific Railroa d Company , and other i n d i v i duals (collec tively , “the Railroad De fenda

nts”) following the death of the McCulloughs’ daug hter, who was killed whe n she was struc k by a train on proper ty owned and operated by

the Railroad De fenda

nts. The McCulloughs0 4
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non-suited the Railroad D efe ndants. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d. Th is a

pp e a l by the Mc Cul lou g hs e ns ue d. We a ff ir m. BACK GR OUND Prior to J anuar

y 1, 1970, the City owned a vaca nt lot of land pa

rallel to which r an the Union Pacific r ailroad a

nd on which the City

constructe d a pave d sid ew al k
. The paved sidewa lk on the City ’s prope rty

eventua lly become s a trail that leads up to the Railroad De fenda nts’ proper

ty . Fr om at least 1969 to September 21, 2005, there had bee n no war n i n g s i gn s , lights, cr ossing a rms, or fenc es provided on e ither the City ’s prope rt y or the Railroa d Def endants’ pr operty

war ning the pu bli c , o r p re ve nti ngsc ho ol c hil dr e n, fr om uti lizin g and fo llo wi ngthe pave d s ide wa lk a nd tr a il i nto the path of onc oming trains. On September 21, 2005, the McCulloughs’ daug hter, while w alking home from school, walked down the C ity ’s paved sidewalk, and enter ed the proper ty owned by

the Railroad De fenda

nts where she wa s struck and killed by an oncomingtrain. STATUT ORY AND P RE-1970 COMM ON LAW The McCulloug hs first asser t that, beca

use t he Tex as Tort Claims Act (“ the Act” ) does not
a pp ly to ac ts or omi ssi on s occ ur ri ng be fo re Janu ary 1, 19 70 , c omm on -l aw c on tr ols wh e the r t he City is entitled to im munity
. The Ac t provides: “This cha pter doe s not apply

to a claim base d on an ac t or omission t hat
occur red be fore J anuar

y 1, 1970.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 101.061 (Ve rnon 2005). Common l aw thus dete rmines the existence and extent of gove rnmental immunity and liability

based on acts oc curr ing be fore J anuar y 1, 1970. City of Tyler v. Likes , 962 S.W .2d 489, 501 (Tex. 1997). The McCulloug hs assert the City had a r esponsibility

to ere ct bar

riers for sc hoolchildren using the0 4
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onto the railroa d crossing . Acc ording to the McCulloughs, the City constructe d the pave d w a lkw ay , p ri or

to 1 97 0, le a din g sc ho olc hil dr e n o nto the ra ilr oa d c ro ssi ng and int o th e path of a p p r o a c h in g tr a in s w h e nit kn e w th e r a il r o a d

c r o s s in g p o s e d

a d an g e r o u s an d

u lt r a -hazardous
c on dit ion . T he Mc Cul lou g hs a lso a sse rt that, a lth ou g h th e City

ha d n o g ov e rnme nta l r e sp on sib ili ty or leg al dut y to assume control of the ra ilroad cr ossing, it in fac t assumed such c ontrol by cre ating a crosswalk over the ra ilroad trac ks; theref ore, the City

had a duty

to protect the c hildren fr om injury and death. The McCulloug hs’ ar g ument is premised on the common l aw r equire ment that “[w]hen a municipal cor

poration opens a street and invites public trave l, it mus t be made r easona bly safe for
su c h u se ; and

if the re is a da ng e ro us pla c e , s uc h as a de c liv ity or e xcavatio n, so c los e to t he str e e t, or the traveled pa

rt there of, as to re nder it unsaf e for trave l in the absenc e of a railing or bar rier, the wanting of such r ailing or barr ier c onstitut es a de fec t in the hi g hway itself, for injuries f rom which the municipality is liable.” City of San Antonio v. Porter , 24 Tex. Ci v. App. 444, 59 S.W. 922, 924 (San Antonio 1900, writ ref’d). H ere , there is no dispute the McCulloughs’ da ug hter wa s not struck wh ile a t a ra ilr oa d tr a c k th a t c ro sse d a pu bli c str e e t in te rsec tio n o r w hil e sh e wa s w a lki ngon City proper ty . I nstead, the c hild was killed when she w as s t ru ck b y a train on property owned a nd maintained by

the Railroad De fenda

nts. The McCulloughs’ pleading s descr ib e t h e wa lkway
c on str uc te d b y the City a s “ a bla c kto p pave d sid e wa lk
. . . on the [City ’s ] r e a l pr op e rt y . . . . [th a t] eventua lly

become s a trail that lea ds up to and crosse s o ver the railroa d trac ks . . . .” The McCulloughs did not dispute the City ’s contention, in its plea to the jurisdiction, that their daug hter
was killed w hen she “cr ossed a field and followed a path onto the rea l pr operty of the ra i l road including its trac ks where she wa s hit by a train.” Thus, it is clea r i t was the child’s stepping of f “a0 4
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ty , and not the co n dition of the City ’s pave d sidewalk, that led to the child’s death
. T h er efore, the Mc Culloughs fa iled to establish that the City ’s pave d
s i d e w a l k , w h i c h e v e n tu a l l y b e c a m e a t r a i l a c r o s s a

v a c an tl o to f

l an d , w a s d e f

e c t i v e . A c c o r d i n g l y, the City is imm une fr om liabilit y

under c ommon law. P ROP RIETARY OR G OVERNMENTAL F UNCTIONS Th e Mc Cul lou g hs ne xt as se rt the City ’s a c tio n in

c on str uc tin g the pave d c ro ssw a lk w a s a proprieta ry function; there fore , the City is not im mun e. Cities perfor ming pr oprietar

y functions have
no immunit y for their actions. See Texas River Barge s v. City of San Antonio, 21 S.W .3d 347, 356 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. d en i ed). Cit ies reta in immuni ty for g overnme ntal functions unless t h e L egi s l at ure ha s expressly waived that immuni ty . See id. Gover nmental func tions are those functions that are enjoined on a muni cipality by law and are g iven it by the State as pa

rt of the State’s sovere ignty , to be exercised by the municipality in the interest of the g ener al public. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 10 1. 02 15 (a ). Pr op ri e tary fu nc tio ns are tho se fu

nc tio ns that a
m u n i c i p a l i t y m ay, i ni t s d i s c r e t i o n , p e r f o r m i nt h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e i n h a b i t an t s o f t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 101.0215(b). The Act sets for th a nonexclusive list of functions that th e L egi s lature de ems g overnme ntal. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . §101.0215(a)
. The McCulloug hs argue the City ’s construc tion of i t s s idewalk wa s a propr ietary function beca use the Ci ty assumed a responsibility to provide safe passag e for children c rossing over an ultrahazardous condition (the r ailroad tra cks) whe n the City voluntarily undertook a course of ac tion for the be ne fi t of

its inh a bit ants (b uil din g the sid e wa lk) . T he re fo re , th e Mc Cul lou g hs c on c lud e , th e City0 4
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rec lassified many previous proprieta ry functions as g overnme ntal throug h section 101.0215 of the Ac t . M an y

o f t h e l i s t e d fu n ct i o n s i n v o l v e a ct i o n s t h at a c i t y h as d i s cr et i o ni nu n d er t ak i n g; never theless, the L eg islature has de fined those a ctions as g overnmen t al functions. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 10 1. 02 15 ; se e als o Ci ty of S an An ton io v . B utl e r, 131 S.W .3d 170, 178 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (noting city has di scre tion to perf orm or not perf

orm many a c ti v it ie s in c o n n e c ti o n w it h it s g o v e r

n me n ta l f u n c ti o n s )
. I n c lu d e d in th e A c t’ s list of g overnme ntal functions ar e stree t construction and de sign a nd street maint enance. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 10 1. 02 15 (a )( 3) & (4 ). Th e Te xas T ra ns po rt a tio n Code define s a “sidewa lk” as the por

tion of the s tree t betwee n a curb or l ater al l ane of a roadway and the a djace nt proper ty line that is intended for pe destrian use . T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 541.302(16) ( Ver non 1999). Ther efore, t h e c o n s t ru ct i o n , d es i gn , an d m ai n t en an ce o f s i d ew al k s i s a go v ern m en t al func tion. See H ur v. Ci t y o f Mesquite, 893 S.W .2d 227, 235 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied)
. There fore , the City ’s ac tions in constructing the sidewalk c onstitut ed a g overnme ntal function. Havingdeter

mi n e d th e Ci ty ’ s a c ti o n

h e r e c o n s titutes a g overnme ntal function, we next decide whether immunit y is w aived. Immunity is waived for

g overnme ntal functions for “ persona l injury and death so cause d by a condition or use of . . . rea l property if the g overnme ntal unit would, were it a private person, be liable t o the claimant acc ording to Texas law.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE § 101.021(2). The Tex as S upreme Court has consistently require d a nexus betwee n the condition or use of the prope rty

and a pla intiff’s injuries. See D all as Area Rapid Transit v. W hitley, 104 S.W .3d 540, 543 (Tex. 2003). “This nexus means more than me re involveme nt of proper ty .” Id.0 4
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use injury if it does no more than f

urnish the condition that makes the injury possible.” Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Bossley , 968 S.W .2d 339, 343 (T e x. 19 98 ). He re , at most , th e Ci ty ’s pave d s ide wa lk t hat e ve ntu a lly

be c a me a

tr a il that le d to pr op e rt y ow ne d a nd ma int a in e d b y

the Ra ilr oa d D e fe nd ants , a nd on wh ic h th e Mc Cul lou g hs ’ daug hter wa s killed, did no “more than f urnish the condition t h at [ m ad e] t he injury possible.” There fore , under the Act, the City reta ined immunity for its gove rnmental func tion of constructing the sidewa lk. Also, the dec ision not t o install gua rd ra ils or post wa

rning signs is a discr etionary function, and the Act does not waive g overnme ntal immunit y for suc h decisions. Fr e nc h v . J oh ns on Cou nty , 92 9 S.W.2 d 6 14 , 6 17 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 1 99 6, no wr it) ; T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 101.056. There fore , under the Act, the City reta ined immunity

for its discre tionary

decision to not
ere ct a guard r ail or plac e sig ns at the end of the trail leadingfrom the paved sidewa lk to the Railroad D e f e n d an t s ’ p r o p e rt y. Finally , the McCulloughs’ argument focuse s on the City ’s alleg ed motive fo r b u i l d ing the sidewalk, whic h they

contend wa s to “safe ly cr o s s children ove r the ra ilroad trac ks.” Howe ver, a city ’s motive in undertakingan ac tion is not rele vant to whether the func tion is gover n m en t al or proprieta ry . Se e Te x as Ri v e r B ar

ge s, 21 S.W .3d at 357. P REMISE DEFECT L astly , the McCulloughs a ssert the sidewalk and unmarke d crossing leading to the railroa d trac ks was a pr emise def

ect a nd/or a spec ial defe ct for which the City had a duty to warn. The Act waives immunity

for “ claims arising out of a c ondition of real pr operty , in other words, a premises0 4
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o f s omething ne cessa

ry for c ompletion.” Id. Thus, to make a c laim based on a condition of rea l proper ty , a plaintiff must complain of something defe ctive or ina dequate about the prope rty itself. Id. For the reasons stated above, the McCulloug hs failed to esta blish that the paved sidewa lk was defe ctive. Also, the fa ilure to do s o m e ac t i s n o t considere d a use or misuse of proper

ty . Id. As st ate d ab ov e , at mo st the City ’s pave d s ide wa lk t hat e ve ntu a lly

be c a me a tr a il that le d to pr op e rt

y owned a nd maintained by

the Railroad De fenda

nts, and on which the Mc Culloughs’ da ug hter wa s killed, did no “more than f urnish the condition that [m ade] the injury possible.” Finally , as to the Mc Cul lou g hs ’ a sse rt ion

that th e sid e wa lk w a s a “ sp e c ia l de fe c t,” no thi ng in the Mc Cul lou g hs ’ ple a din g s or the re c or d su pp or ts the ir c on te nti on that the sid e wa lk wa s “ of the same kin d o r cl ass as [ex cavations or obstructions] .” County of Harris v. Eaton , 573 S.W .2d 177, 179 (Tex. 1978). Th e re fo re , th e Mc Cul lou g hs fa ile d to state a c la im f or e ith e r a pr e mis e s d e fe c t or

a sp e c ia l de fe c t. CO NC LU SION We o ve rr ule the Mc Cul lou g hs ’ i ssu e s o n a pp e a l and a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice