Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stacy R. Uliana

Bargersville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Danielle E. Woolley,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 26, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

83A04-1608-CR-1765

Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bruce V. Stengel, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

83C01-1510-F3-8

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Danielle Woolley appeals her sixty-four-year sentence for four counts of Level 3 

felony neglect of a dependent. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Woolley raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. whether her four consecutive sentences were limited to twenty 

years because her crimes constituted a single episode of criminal 

conduct; and

II. whether her sixty-four-year sentence was inappropriate.

Facts

[3] Woolley and her husband, John Woolley, have four children, J.W., C.W., 

S.W., and A.W. At the time this case commenced, the children were eight, 

five, four, and two years old, respectively. The Woolleys lived with John’s 

parents. In October 2015, the Vermillion County Office of the Department of 

Child Services (“DCS”) investigated a report involving the Woolley children. 

Two DCS workers and a police officer discovered the children locked in squalid 

bedrooms on the second floor of the Woolleys’ house.

[4] J.W., the oldest child, was locked alone in his room. At the time the DCS 

workers and police officer first observed J.W., he was naked. His hands and 

feet were covered in feces, and fecal matter was caked under his fingernails. He 

did not speak, and he sucked on his hands. The windows in J.W.’s room were 

boarded up, and there was no air conditioning in his room. The floor, walls, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 3 of 10

and ceiling of J.W.’s bedroom were smeared or spattered with fecal matter. 

The floor of J.W.’s room was completely covered in fecal matter that had been 

worn smooth by people walking on it. Instead of a proper bed, J.W.’s room 

contained a wooden frame, but no mattress. J.W. covered himself with a pile 

of rags or blankets, which were also covered in feces. J.W.’s room also 

contained a cup, bowl, and paper plates, all of which were crusted with fecal 

matter. 

[5] C.W. was also naked, filthy, and locked alone in a room. C.W. screamed and 

did not want to be touched when Woolley picked her up to dress her. The 

guardian ad litem assigned to the Woolley children testified that C.W. “looked 

like some of the children that you see on the commercials on television of 

children that are starving. She was hollow.” July 21, 2016, Tr. p. 38. S.W. 

and A.W., the youngest children, lived in cribs in the Woolleys’ master 

bedroom. They, too, were soiled with feces. 

[6] All four of the children had lice and/or fleas. All of the children were nonverbal, and none appeared to recognize their names. None of the children were 

toilet trained. J.W. was the only child who could eat solid food; the others did 

not know how to chew or swallow solids and ate only baby food. The children 

did not appear to recognize each other. Following their removal, all four 

children were admitted to Riley Hospital for Children in Indianapolis for 

treatment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 4 of 10

[7] The following is merely an overview of the children’s diagnoses and challenges. 

All of the children were diagnosed with developmental delays or significant 

developmental delays. Eight-year-old J.W., for example, was found to be at a 

young toddler’s age developmentally. All of the children were also diagnosed 

with lack of medical care and feeding dysfunction or problems. C.W., S.W., 

and A.W. were diagnosed with failure to thrive and/or signs of malnutrition. 

C.W. and A.W. were diagnosed with abnormal or poor dentation. The 

children’s guardian ad litem stated in her victim impact statement that, “The 

impact of the crimes and abuse of these parents is impossible to put into 

words.” Confidential App. Vol. III, p. 38. 

[8] The police officers who searched the Woolleys’ home after the children were 

removed described the condition of the home in their affidavits for probable 

cause. One stated that the odor inside the residence “took his breath away.” 

Id. at 16. Another stated, “The smell was so over whelming [sic] that you could 

not stay very long in the home before your eyes and nose began to burn and 

made you sick.” Id. Another described needing to wear a respirator inside the 

house. Shortly after the children were removed, the house was condemned. 

[9] The State charged Woolley with four counts of Level 3 felony neglect of a 

dependent resulting in serious bodily injury. On March 22, 2016, without the 

benefit of a plea agreement, she pled guilty to the four Level 3 felonies with 

which she was charged. On July 21, 2016, the trial court sentenced Woolley to 

sixteen years for each conviction and ordered her to serve her sentences 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 5 of 10

consecutively. Woolley’s aggregate sentence is sixty-four years. Woolley now 

appeals.

Analysis

I. Single Episode of Criminal Conduct

[10] Woolley first contends that her four convictions represent a single episode of 

criminal conduct and that, as such, her aggregate sentence was limited to 

twenty years. 

In general, a trial court cannot order consecutive sentences in the 

absence of express statutory authority. A sentence that is 

contrary to or violative of a penalty mandated by statute is illegal 

in the sense that it is without statutory authorization. An 

appellate claim of sentencing error is subject to review for abuse 

of trial court discretion; reversal results only if there has been a 

manifest abuse of discretion.

Slone v. State, 11 N.E.3d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quotations omitted) 

(citations omitted). 

[11] Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2 provides that, except for crimes of violence, the 

aggregate of one’s consecutive terms of imprisonment for multiple felony 

convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the 

sentences set out by Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(d).

1

 “Episode of criminal 

 

1

Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(d)(4) provides, “If the most serious crime for which the defendant is 

sentenced is a Level 3 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed twenty (20) 

years.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 6 of 10

conduct” means “offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely 

related in time, place, and circumstance.” Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b). Woolley 

was convicted of Level 3 felonies and contends her aggregate sentence may not 

exceed twenty years. 

[12] In determining whether multiple offenses constitute an episode of 

criminal conduct, the focus is on the timing of the offenses and 

the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature, if any, of the 

crimes. Additional guidance on the question can be obtained by 

considering whether the alleged conduct was so closely related in 

time, place, and circumstance that a complete account of one 

charge cannot be related without referring to the details of the 

other charge. Whether certain offenses constitute a single 

episode of criminal conduct is a fact-intensive inquiry to be 

determined by the trial court.

Slone, 11 N.E.3d at 972 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). 

[13] With regard to ordering consecutive sentences, the trial court stated:

The Court feels that this situation is not an episode of criminal 

conduct. The charging information for all four counts says, 

“Prior to and including October 21, 2015—” so it’s just not the 

date of October 21, 2015, but it’s prior to. And I will look at this 

a little bit more as I talk about this, but the information contained 

in the probable cause affidavit from Mrs. Woolley and her 

husband was that they had been living at the address at 604 Vine 

Street for the prior three years, approximately three years or 

more, and there is evidence that this conduct occurred daily for 

years. That it’s not a single event. That it’s not closely related in 

time at all. It involves four individuals . . . So I think this is a 

series of conduct that happened over a long, long period of time 

and so the episode of criminal conduct does not apply in this 

situation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 7 of 10

July 21, 2016, Tr., pp. 69-70. 

[14] We agree that the lengthy period of time over which Woolley neglected the

children is critical to deciding this issue. We also conclude that the number of 

victims, while not dispositive, is helpful here in addressing this issue. We 

acknowledge that the nature of the neglect of each child was similar. However, 

the simple fact that all four children were neglected necessarily means that 

Woolley made the decision to neglect each of them individually. More 

importantly, Woolley’s abuse of the children was not a spree resulting in a 

connected series of offenses closely connected in time, place, and circumstance 

as required by Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(b). Cf. Harris v. State, 861 

N.E.2d 1182 (Ind. 2007) (Holding that convictions for sexual misconduct with 

a minor constituted one episode of criminal conduct because the acts, involving 

two victims, took place in the same bed, five minutes apart, and for the same

reason—that the girls must have intercourse in order to stay the night with the 

defendant.) Instead, the neglect here was sustained over several years. 

Woolley’s earliest acts of neglect—which may well have taken place before 

some of the children were born—simply are not closely connected in time or 

circumstance to those that took place years later and do not constitute a single 

episode of criminal conduct. 

[15] The parties seem to disagree regarding the significance of the idea that crimes 

constitute an episode of criminal conduct when they are so closely connected in 

time, place, and circumstance that a complete account of each offense cannot be 

related without referring to the details of another. See Tedlock v. State, 656 N.E.2d 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 8 of 10

273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). We note that our supreme court has referred to 

this test as,

a bit of an overstatement. We are of the view that although the 

ability to recount each charge without referring to the other can 

provide additional guidance on the question of whether a 

defendant’s conduct constitutes an episode of criminal conduct, it 

is not a critical ingredient in resolving the question. Rather, the 

statute speaks in less absolute terms . . . .

Harris v. State, 861 N.E.2d at 1188 (citing Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 

(Ind. 2006). We therefore do not apply that test in this case. 

[16] The extended period of time over which Woolley neglected her children, and 

the fact that four different children were victims is sufficient to support our 

conclusion that her crimes were not an episode of criminal conduct. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Woolley to serve her four 

sentences consecutively for an aggregate sentence of sixty-four years.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[17] Woolley argues that her sixty-four-year sentence is inappropriate under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a 

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and the character of the offender. When considering whether a 

sentence is inappropriate, we need not be “extremely” deferential to a trial 

court’s sentencing decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 9 of 10

App. 2007). Still, we must give due consideration to that decision. Id. We also 

understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its 

sentencing decisions. Id. Under this rule, the burden is on the defendant to 

persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress 

v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[18] The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the 

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged 

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 

‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). We “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than 

the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the 

sentence on any individual count.” Id. When reviewing the appropriateness of 

a sentence under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal 

consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including 

whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 

1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).

[19] We acknowledge that Woolley’s character is notable in that she has no criminal 

history and that she plead guilty in this matter without the benefit of a plea 

agreement. The nature of her offenses however, reflects poorly on her character 

and more than justifies the lengthy sentence she received. 

[20] In its sentencing statement, the trial court described the pictures of the children 

as “hard to describe” and “horrific,” and stated, “[t]his brutal callous lifelong 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A04-1608-CR-1765 | April 26, 2017 Page 10 of 10

torture of her children was so heinous and horrific in nature to be beyond 

description or complete understanding.” July 21, 2016, Tr. pp. 74-75. We 

agree with that assessment. The conditions in which Woolley kept the children 

were so deplorable and unsanitary that the police officers and others who 

entered the house felt physically ill and required respirators to complete their 

work. The children were so neglected that they suffered physically, 

emotionally, cognitively, medically, and socially. J.W., for example, has been 

placed in a residential program, and, according to his medical records, may 

require life-long care in an assisted living facility. While the children suffered 

inside the house, Woolley, the trial court noted, was frequently observed by 

neighbors “in the back yard with her husband lounging around a pool . . . .” Id.

at 75. Woolley’s neighbor stated she was unaware that any children lived in 

Woolley’s house. The nature of these offenses is nothing short of heinous. 

Woolley’s sixty-four-year sentence is not inappropriate.

Conclusion

[21] Woolley’s crimes did not constitute an episode of criminal conduct, and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering her to serve an aggregate 

sentence of sixty-four years. The sixty-four-year sentence is not inappropriate. 

We affirm.

Affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.