alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
^WpENT OF 

mmmn j»\i R SUNSHINE ^ ^ -^' UPERATIONS 

PO Box 37698 San Juan, PR 00937 /Ijl tAxj o T r-. • . Jan 21, 2011 

m Ml n P l|: iq 

Proposal to Provide Essential Air Service at Mayaguez, Puerto Rico 

Docket DOT-OST-2004-19622 

Proposing Air Carrier: Air Sunshine, Inc a Puerto Rico based Airline established in 1982 presently operating scheduled 

service between San Juan, Vieques, St.Thomas and British Virgin Islands as well as Fort Lauderdale, Guantanamo bay 

Naval Base and JCingston, Jamaica. 

Proposed Route: Mayaguez - San Juan - Mayaguez 

Proposed Aircraft Type: 9 passenger seat C402 

Proposed number of daily Flights: Four round trips per day 

Requested Subsidy: $980,000 armually derived by number of flights, 4 per day, multiphed by number of days in a year 

which equals to 1460 round trip flights aimually. Our cost for each round trip is $1000 which includes a slight margin of 

profit. Based on historical data of 8000 passengers annually and our proposed one way rate we estimate to collect 

$480,000 atmually from the public and the rest is requested in subsidy. We also believe that our proposed stand by rates 

would fill seats that based on previous data have been empty. 

Proposed Schedule: MAZ - SJU 

Flight Number Departs Mayaguez Arrives San Juan 

701 8:00 am 8:45 am 

705 10:30 am 11:15 am 

709 2:30 pm 3:15 pm 

711 4:30 pm 5:15 pm 

Proposed Schedule: SJU - MAZ 

Flight Number Departs San Juan Arrives Mayaguez 

704 9:30 am 10:15 am 

710 1:30 pm 2:15 pm 

712 3:30 pm 4:15 pm 

714 5:30 pm 6:15 pm 

Proposed Rates to/from: One way Confirmed: $60 Stand By: $30 

Round Trip Confirmed: $120 Stand By: $60 

Points of Contacts : MoeAdih, Director of Operations Moe@Airsunshine.com or 1-800-327-8900 

Luis Irizarry, Agent of service lrizarry@Icenetworks.com or 1-787-752-7621 

Carolina Boya, Reservation Manager Email@Airsunshine.com or 1-800-327-8900
CERTIFICATION



I, Ron Lizee, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this amended quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Acrongenomics Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this amended quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this amended quarterly report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this amended quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this amended quarterly report;



4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:



a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this amended quarterly report is being prepared;



b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this amended quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and



c) presented in this amended quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;



5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and



b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and







Date: August 19, 2004

/s/ Ron Lizee

Ron Lizee

Chief Financial Officer
**Exhibit 31.1**
CERTIFICATION
     I, Bruce D. McMaster, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of DDi Corp.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:
 (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;
 (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter inthe case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and
 (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.        Dated: August 13, 2004 /s/ Bruce D. McMaster   **Bruce D. McMaster**   **Chief Executive Officer**
#### Lansing *against*The Executrix of Lansing.

Where an executor or administrator pleads a false plea, the judgment is *de bonis testatoris, si non de bonis pro-*priis, &c. and, under the statute, if sufficient goods and chattels cannot be found, then of the *lands and tenements,*&c. And where the judgment, in such a case, was entered, *de bonis*only; it was allowed, after return of the *ji. fa., to*be amended, so that the execution might be against (he lands and tenements also.

. THIS was an action of assumpsit. The defendant pleaded *ne unques*executrix, &c. on which a verdict was found against her, and a judgment ivas entered thereon for the plaintiff, for 260 dollars and 45 cents, to be levied of the goods and chattels of the testator, if so much remained in the hands of the defendant, to be administered ; if not sufficient, &c. then to be levied of the proper goods and chattels of the defendant. A *Ji. Ja’.*was issued according to the terms of the judgment, on which the sheriff returned in *Map*last, that he had made 50 dollars and 69 cents, and *nulla bona*as to the residue.

*Chever,*for the plaintiff, moved for leave to amend the record and execution, by adding, in the judgment, the words “ lands and tenements.” He said, that the omission in the record was considered a clerical mistake, and amendable, (1 *Saund.*336. note 10. 5 *Burr.*2730.)

J. *Van*Rensselaer, contra,

said, that the judgment in this *503*tesiatoris, si non,*&c. *de bonis propriis,*it inds and tenements of the executrix. If the defendant plead *ne unques executor,*&c. and it is found against him, the judgment is, as in this case, *de bonis testa-toris, et si non, de bonis propriis. [Toiler’s Law of Executors,*463,464. 1 *Saund.*336. *a.*336.b. note.) But this is a motion to make it a judgment of the proper lands and tenements, as well as of the proper goods and chattels of the executrix»

*Per Curiam.*

It is settled, that where an executor or administrator pleads a false plea, the judgment is *de bonis tes-taioris, si non, de bonis propriis,*&c. The sheriff has returned, that he has made of the goods, &cc. fifty dollars, and *nulla bona*as to the residue. This is, undoubtedly, according to the *English*practice. But our statute (sess. 36. ch. 50. s. 7. 1 JV. *R. L.*509.) subjects the *lands and tenements,*as well as the goods and chattels of the debtor, to execution. We, therefore, grant the motion to amend, on payment of costs, so as to command the sheriff to make the debt of the goods and chattels of the executrix, *si non,*&c. *de bonis propriis,*&c. and if sufficient goods and chattels of the executrix cannot be found, &c. that, then, he cause the debt to be made of the lands and tenements of the executrix; saving, however, the rights of any subsequent incumbrancer.

Motion granted.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DECEMBER 7, 2016

NO. 03-16-00299-CR

The State of Texas, Appellant

v.

Ayoob Akteyarlee, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 390TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PEMBERTON, AND FIELD

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order granting the motion for new trial. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the 

trial court’s order. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s order granting the motion for 

new trial. The State shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court 

below.
#### John Whatling, Resp’t, *v.*William Nash, Appl’t.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,*

*Filed October,*1886).

Complaint — Joinder of — Causes of action — What not impbopebly UNITED IN COMPLAINT.

A complaint set forth, two causes of action, one for wrongful entry upon plaintiff’s land under water, and wrongfully taking and carrying away fish therefrom, the other for a like entry on plaintiff’s land and catching and killing muskrats thereon. Upon demurrer thereto, on the ground that the causes of action were improperly united. *Field,*the allegations of injuries to personal property were not state Lents of separate causes of action, but mere averments in aggravation of the wrongful entry.

Appeal from a judgment of tbe Monroe special term overruling a demurrer to the complaint.

*D. L. Covill,*for appl’t; *W B.*Crittenden, for resp’ts.

Smith, P. J.

Tbe grounds assigned for tbe demurrer are, tbat several causes of action are improperly united, and that tbe complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Tbe latter ground is not argued by the appellant’s counsel in the brief. submitted to us, and it is quite clear tbat there is no foundation for it in tbe complaint.

As to the first ground, it is true that tbe complaint sets forth two distinct causes of action, but they are such as may properly be joined in one complaint, as they are both for alleged injuries to real property. One is for a wrongful entry upon plaintiff’s land under water, about April or May, 1881, and wrongfully taking and carrying away fish therefrom; the other, for a like entry on plaintiff’s land, in the year 1882, and catching and killing muskrats thereon. The allegations of injuries to personal property are not, as the appellant’s counsel seems to suppose, statements of separate causes of action, but are mere averments in aggravation of the wrongful entry. (*Van Leuven*v. Lyke, 1 Comst., 515; *Howe*v. *Willson,*1 Den., 181; *Dunckle*v. *Kocker,*11 Barb., 387; *Clark*v. *Van Vrancken,*20 Barb., 278; *Gilbert*v. *Pritchard,*decided in this department in June, 1886: MSS. op. of Smith, P. J.)

The question whether the two causes of action for trespass *quare clausum,*should be stated in separate counts and separately numbered is not before us.

The judgment should be affirmed with costs, with leave to the defendant to withdraw the demurrer and answer the complaint, within twenty days, etc., on payment of the costs of this appeal and of the demurrer.

Barkee, Haight and Bradley, JJ., concur.

So ordered.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2850 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2850

 To exempt individuals from complying with a Federal COVID-19 vaccine 
   mandate on the basis of a personal belief, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 23, 2021

    Mr. Lee introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To exempt individuals from complying with a Federal COVID-19 vaccine 
   mandate on the basis of a personal belief, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Biden Can't Force Me Act''.

SEC. 2. PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTION FROM COVID-19 VACCINE MANDATES.

    (a) In General.--Any COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by an Act of 
Congress or by an executive agency shall include an exemption for any 
individual who has a sincerely held belief that inclines the individual 
to refuse the receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) COVID-19 vaccine mandate.--The term ``COVID-19 vaccine 
        mandate'' means any requirement that an individual receive a 
        COVID-19 vaccine, including any requirement that an employer 
        require an employee or independent contractor to receive such a 
        vaccine.
            (2) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has 
        the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United 
        States Code.
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to allow for or otherwise authorize a COVID-19 vaccine 
mandate issued by an Act of Congress or by an executive agency.
                                 <all>
```
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001022174
<NAME> CLASS A
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                      30,682,976
<SECURITIES>                                13,616,310
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            48,842,564
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              48,842,564
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,109,771
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  47,732,793
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                48,842,564
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           (1,045,642)
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,361,761
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (8,407,403)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (8,407,403)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (8,407,403)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (196.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (196.68)


</TABLE>
Order entered October 7, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-01347-CR

SANTOS ADRIAN ARMIJO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1354294-J

ORDER

The Court GRANTS appellant’s September 26, 2013 motion to extend time to file his 

notice of appeal. The notice of appeal filed on September 25, 2013 is considered timely for 

jurisdictional purposes. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

-- -- -- --

NO. 16-0492

HSBC BANK USA, N.A.

v.

ESTATE OF JERRY WAYNE

PARKS, DECEASED

§

§

§

§

§

§

Dallas County,

5th District.

October 21, 2016

Petitioner's petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case,

having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.



I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify

that the above and attached is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of

Texas in the case numbered and styled as above, as the same appear of record in the minutes of

said Court under the date shown.

It is further ordered that petitioner, HSBC BANK USA, N.A., pay all costs incurred on

this petition.

WITNESS my hand and seal of the Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of Austin, this

the 2nd day of December, 2016.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

By Monica Zamarripa, Deputy Clerk

FILE COPY
Order entered December 1, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01389-CV

IN RE JOSEPH HENRY BROWN, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 363rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F13-53946-W

ORDER

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY relator’s November 28, 2016 

petition for writ of mandamus.

/s/ DOUGLAS S. LANG 

JUSTICE
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-3
No. 333-132513) of Simon Property Group, L.P. and in the related prospectus of our report dated February 25, 2009, except for the retrospective adjustments described
in Notes 3 and 10, as to which the date is April 29, 2009, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Simon Property Group, L.P. and Subsidiaries, and
our report dated February 25, 2009, with respect to the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Simon Property Group, L.P. and Subsidiaries included in this Annual
Report (Form 10-K/A) for the year ended December 31, 2008.

/s/ERNST & YOUNG LLPIndianapolis, Indiana
May 4, 2009


74

---



QuickLinks
#### Burnham vs. Turner and another.

Dnder the Revised Statutes of 1858, a party who has suffered judgment by *default*before a justice of the peace, has the right of appeal.

There is nothing in the Eev. Stat. of 1858, limiting the right of appeal from a justice of the peace to such parties as have *appeared*before the justice; and appeals from inferior tribunals are favored in the law.

After return made in such case, the court can direct the defendant to serve and file his answer, and allow the issue to be made up, and proceed to trial, as in other cases.

APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for *Jefferson*Countj.

*Burnham*sued Eorbes and *Turner*before a justice of tbe peace on an account. Tbe summons was served on Eorbes personally, and on *Turner*by copy. Neither of tbe defendants appeared, and judgment was rendered against them both on tbe 5th of September, 1860, for $75. On tbe 18th of tbe same month, *Turner*appealed to tbe circuit court; and tbe plaintiff, after giving due notice of tbe motion, moved that court to dismiss tbe appeal, on tbe ground “ that there was no appearance in tbe justice’s court in which tbe judgment was rendered, or issue therein formed upon which a trial could be bad.” Tbe circuit court dismissed the appeal, and *Turner*excepted and appealed.

*L. B. Caswell,*for appellant.

*J. E. Holmes, contra,*cited 1 Wis., 387 ; id., 511.

December 30.

-% *the Court,*

DlXON, C. J".

Tbe statute (R. S., chap. 120, sec. 204) declares that “ any party to a final judgment ren dered by a justice of tbe peace, may appeal therefrom to tbe circuit court, in tbe cases and manner hereinafter provided.” There is nothing in tbe subsequent provisions limiting tbe right of appeal to such parties as shall have appeared before tbe justice, or excluding those who shall not have appeared. Tbe language of tbe statute is not only consistent with an intention on tbe part of tbe legislature to give every party to a final judgment a right to appeal, whether tbe judgment be rendered in one form or another, but seems to us to forbid any other construction. It is that any party, &c., may appeal in tbe manner provided. Appeals from inferior tribunals *623and jurisdictions are favored in tbe law, and we cannot see b.ow a party wbo has suffered judgment by, default is to debarred of the right, unless we can say that the courts have the power to annex conditions which the legislature has seen fit to omit, and that we clearly cannot do. After return in such case, the court can direct the defendant to serve and file his answer and allow the issue to b’e made up and proceed to trial as in other cases.

The order dismissing the appeal must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.