alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS D IVISION O NE

S TATE OF ARIZONA , Respondent ,

v.

J OSE TERRAZAS , Petitioner

.
No. 1 CA- CR 21-0350 PRPC

P etition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No s. CR2005-034221-001 CR2006-127957-001 CR2007-171066-001 The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL
Maricopa County Attorney ’ s Office , Phoenix By Amanda M. Parker Counsel for Respondent

J ose Terrazas, Florence Petitioner FILED 12-2-2021STATE v. TERRAZAS Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey, Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court.

PER CURIAM :
¶1 Petitioner Jose Luis Terrazas seeks review of the superior court’s order denying his petition for post

- conviction relief

. This is petitioner’s second successive petition.
¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post

- conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez , 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19, 278 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2012). It is petitioner’s burden to show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post

- conviction relief. See State v. Poblete , 227 Ariz. 537, ¶ 1, 260 P.3d 1102, 1103 (App. 2011) (petitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review).
¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior court’s order denying the petition for post

- conviction relief, and the petition for review. We find that petitioner has not established an abuse of discretion.
¶4 We grant review and deny relief.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 6946** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. CHANEL ELEASE FAISON, a/k/a Chanel Faison Faison , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Newport News
. Rebecca Beach Smith , Chief District Judge. ( 4:12

- cr - 00004

- RBS

- TEM

- 2; 4:13

- cv - 00093

- RBS )

Submitte d : December 22, 2014 Decided: January 7, 2015

Before DUNCAN and WYNN , Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Chanel Elease Faison, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Edward Bradenham, II , Howard Jacob Zlotnick, Assistant United States Attorneys, Andr ew Lamont Creighton , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia; Kelly Kathleen Pearson , UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; John Curtis Hanley, Kevin Louis Rosenberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Ma ryland, for Appellee.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: Chanel Elease Faison seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on h er 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 47 3, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debata ble claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Faison has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the app eal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal4 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JOSE LUIS GARCIA-ARAMBULO, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-1389 

(D.C. No. 1:16-CR-00062-PAB-1) 

(D. Colo.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HOLMES and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Jose Luis Garcia-Arambulo pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1), 

illegal reentry of a previously deported alien following a felony conviction, and was 

sentenced to 18 months in prison. As part of his plea agreement, Garcia-Arambulo 

waived his right to appeal his sentence unless it exceeded the maximum penalty provided 

by statute or the guideline range for an offense level of 9, or unless the government 

 

* This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment 

is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 29, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
- 2 - 

appealed the sentence. None of these happened, but Garcia-Arambulo appealed his 

sentence anyway. 

 The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. 

Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). This requires us to 

determine “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of 

appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of 

justice.” Id. at 1325. In response to the government’s motion, Garcia-Arambulo, through 

counsel, “concedes that, under the standard announced in [Hahn], the plea agreement’s 

appeal waiver is enforceable with respect to this direct appeal.” Resp. to Mot. to Enforce 

Appeal Waiver at 1 (Nov. 17, 2016). 

Based on this concession and our independent review of the record, we conclude 

Garcia-Arambulo’s appeal waiver is enforceable. We therefore grant the government’s 

motion and dismiss this appeal. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Per Curiam
Filed 12/5/16 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2016 ND 223

Garron William Gonzalez, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20160174

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central  Judicial District, the Honorable James S. Hill, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Garron Gonzalez, self-represented, P.O. Box 5521, Bismarck, ND 58506, petitioner and appellant; on brief.

Julie A. Lawyer, Burleigh County Assistant State’s Attorney, 514 E. Thayer Ave., Bismarck, ND 58501, for respondent and appellee; on brief.

Gonzalez v. State

No. 20160174

Per Curiam.

[¶1]Garron Gonzalez appeals a district court order denying his motion for  an order to show cause and dismissing his application for post-conviction relief.  Gonzalez applied for post-conviction relief arguing his prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective.  Gonzalez argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his application.  Section 29-32.1-09(2), N.D.C.C., bars an applicant from claiming  ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.  We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(6).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Dale V. Sandstrom

Carol Ronning Kapsner

Lisa Fair McEvers
INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS’ REPORT





To
the Shareholders of


CARTHEW
BAY TECHNOLOGIES INC.


(Formerly
Astris Energi Inc.)





We have
audited the consolidated balance sheets of CARTHEW BAY TECHNOLOGIES INC.
(Formerly Astris Energi Inc.) as at December 31, 2007 and 2006 and the
consolidated statements of operations and deficit and cash flows for the years
ended December 31, 2007 and 2006.  These financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company’s management.  Our responsibility is to
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our
audits.





We
conducted our audits in accordance with Canadian generally accepted auditing
standards and the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(United States).  Those standards require that we plan and perform the
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are
free of material misstatement.  The Company is not required to have,
nor were we engaged to perform, an audit of its internal control over financial
reporting.  Our audit included consideration of internal control over
financial reporting as a basis for designing audit procedures that are
appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an
opinion on the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial
reporting.  Accordingly, we express no such opinion.  An
audit also includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts
and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting principles
used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the
overall financial statement presentation.  We believe that our audits
provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.





In our
opinion, these consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material
respects, the financial position of the Company as at December 31, 2007 and
2006, and the results of its operations and cash flows for the years ended
December 31, 2007 and 2006 in accordance with Canadian generally accepted
accounting principles.





/s/
Danziger Hochman Partners LLP





Chartered
Accountants, Licensed Public Accountants


Toronto,
Canada


April
24, 2008
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1581

In re: CHARLES JEROME ADAMS,

 Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

(1:91-cr-00291-PMD-2)

Submitted: November 17, 2016 Decided: November 21, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit 

Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Jerome Adams, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Charles Jerome Adams petitions for a writ of mandamus 

seeking an order directing the district court to resentence him. 

We conclude that Adams is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only 

in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 

U.S. 394, 402 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 

516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available 

only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. 

In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 

1988).

The relief sought by Adams is not available by way of 

mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
NO. 07-08-0091-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL B

	MAY 5, 2008

	______________________________

	MANUEL GUTIERREZ TORRES,

				Appellant

	v.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

				Appellee

								_________________________________

	FROM THE 121st DISTRICT COURT OF TERRY COUNTY;

	NO. 5729; HON. KELLY G. MOORE, PRESIDING

	_______________________________

	ON ABATEMENT AND REMAND

	_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

	Appellant appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault.  The clerk’s record was due on April 21, 2008.  No extension motion or record was filed.  On April 28, 2008, this court directed the clerk by letter “to advise the Court of the status of the clerk’s record no later than May 08, 2008."  In response, the clerk corresponded by letter that on “March 19, 2008, a bill of costs was forwarded to David Martinez, attorney for defendant.  As of April 30, 2008, the costs have not been received” by the district clerk.

	Accordingly, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the 121st District Court of Terry County (trial court) for further proceedings.  Upon remand, the trial court shall immediately cause notice of a hearing to be given and, thereafter, conduct a hearing to determine the following:

	1.  whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal; 

	2.  whether appellant is indigent;  

	3.  whether counsel has been appointed to prosecute this appeal;

	4. if counsel has not been appointed, whether appellant is entitled to appointed counsel; and

	5. whether the appellant is entitled to the preparation of a free appellate record. 

	The trial court shall cause the hearing to be transcribed.  So too shall it 1) execute findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the foregoing issues, 2) cause to be developed a supplemental clerk’s record containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law and all orders it may issue as a result of its hearing in this matter, and 3) cause to be developed a reporter’s record transcribing the evidence and arguments presented at the aforementioned hearing, if any.  Additionally, the district court shall then file the supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s records transcribing the hearing with the clerk of this court on or before June 5, 2008.  Should further time be needed by the trial court to perform these tasks, then same must be requested before June 5, 2008.

	It is so ordered.

							Per Curiam

Do not publish.
**EXHIBIT 3.5          **

**ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT  OF  HIGH SPEED NET SOLUTIONS, INC.**

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 607.1006 of the Florida Business  Corporation Act, High Speed Net Solutions, Inc. (the “Corporation”), a  corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida  hereby certifies as follows:

1.            The  name of the Corporation is High Speed Net Solutions, Inc.

2.            The  Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation shall be  amended by replacing Article IV in its entirety as follows:

“Article IV

The capital stock of the Corporation shall consist of 100,000,000 shares of  common stock, $.001 par value, and 5,000,000 shares of preferred stock, $.001  par value.”

** **3.             This amendment was approved by the shareholders of the Corporation at a duly  called and convened special meeting held on February 27, 2002.  This  amendment required (1) the vote of the holders of shares of the Corporation’s  common stock voting as a separate class, as required by Section 607.1004 of  the Florida Business Corporation Act and (2) the vote of the holders of shares  of common stock and the holders of shares of the Corporation’s Series B  Convertible Preferred Stock, voting together as a single class.  The  number of votes cast for the amendment identified in Section 2 above by both  (1) the holders of shares of common stock, voting as a separate class, and (2)  the holders of  shares of common stock and Series B Convertible Preferred  Stock, voting together as a single class, was sufficient for the approval of  such amendment.

----

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused these Articles of Amendment  to be executed in its name and on its behalf by its Chief Operating Officer  and attested by its Corporate Secretary on this 27th day of  February, 2002, hereby declaring and certifying that this is the act and deed  of the Corporation and that the statements contained herein are affirmed as  true under penalties of perjury.

 

                                                                                                             HIGH SPEED NET SOLUTIONS, INC

                                                                                                             By: /s/ Gary E.  Ban                                                                                                                                Gary E. Ban                                                                                  Chief Operating Officer

ATTEST:

By: /s/ Robert S. Lowrey      Robert S. Lowrey     Assistant Corporate  Secretary
Order entered July 23, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-17-01343-CV

MATT MALOUF, Appellant

V.

STERQUELL PSF SETTLEMENT, L.C., Appellee

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-02371

ORDER

Before the Court is court reporter Vielica Dobbins’s request for a final extension of time 

to file the record. She explains the additional time is needed so she can “finish proofing.” We 

GRANT the request and ORDER the reporter’s record be filed no later than July 24, 2018. 

/s/ DAVID EVANS 

JUSTICE
#### Time Warner City Cable, Respondent, v Tri State Auto, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[772 NYS2d 512]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Sherry Klein Heitler, J.), entered August 30, 2002, which denied defendant Tri State Auto’s motion to vacate a default judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

By waiving its equitable claims and retaining only its contract cause of action, plaintiff met the sum-certain requirement for default judgment under CPLR 3215 (a) *(cf. Geer, Du Bois & Co. v Scott & Sons Co.,*25 AD2d 423 [1966]). Plaintiff had acquired jurisdiction over Tri State by service pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306, and Tri State failed to raise a nonconclusory factual issue warranting a traverse hearing *(see Chinese Consol. Benevolent Assn. v Tsang,*254 AD2d 222 [1998]). With the insufficiency of its jurisdictional challenge, Tri State was required to set forth both a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense *(Perez v Villa Josefa Realty Corp.,*293 AD2d 306 [2002]). Tri State’s failure to set forth a reasonable excuse rendered it unnecessary for the court to consider whether there was a meritorious defense *(see Ortiz v Santiago,*303 AD2d 1, 6 [2003]). Denial of vacatur was a provident exercise of the court’s discretion.

*154We have considered Tri State’s other contentions, several of which are improperly raised for the first time on appeal, and find them to be without merit. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Friedman, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.
1 

### Deneen, Donna

From: Donna Deneen <Deneen.Donna@epamail.epa.gov> on behalf of R10-Public Comments

<R10-Public_Comments@epa.gov>

Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2014 11:16 AM

To: Deneen, Donna

Subject: Fw: ADEC Comment Letter on Do cket ID No. EPA-R10-OAR-2011-0916

Attachments: EPA-R10-OAR-2011-0916 AK SIP Letter 060414.pdf

----- Forwarded by Donna Dene en/R10/USEPA/US on 06/05 /2014 11:15 AM -----

From: "Smith, Rebecca T (DEC)" <rebecca.smith@alaska.gov>

To: R10-Public Comments@EPA,

Cc: "Edwards, Alice L S (DEC)" <alice.edwards@alaska.gov>, Kate Kelly/R10/USEPA/US@MSO365, Debra Suzuki/R10/USEPA/US@MSO365, "Harti g, Lawrence L (DEC)" <larry.hartig@alaska.gov>, "Kent, Lynn J T (DEC)" <lynn.kent@alaska.gov>, "Kuterbach, John F (DEC)" <john.kut erbach@alaska.gov>, "Heil,

Cynthia L (DEC)" <cindy.heil@alaska.gov>, "Turner, Thomas E (DEC)" <tom.turner@alaska.gov>

Date: 06/04/2014 12:46 PM

Subject: ADEC Comment Letter on Docket ID No. EPA-R10-OAR-2011-0916

Ms. Deneen,

Attached please find the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation’s comment letter on EPA

‐ R10

‐ OAR

‐ 2011

‐ 0916,



### Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Alaska

.

Sent on behalf of Alice Edwards, Director, Division of Air Quality, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Thank you,

Rebecca Tyson Smith 

### (See attached file: EPA-R10-O AR-2011-0916 AK SIP Letter 060414.pdf)
Sea Ranch homes west ofCA51 showing typical placement among trees
Exhibit
 31



CERTIFICATION
 OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED, AS
 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I,
 Ruairidh Campbell certify that:   1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q (Report) of Montana Mining
 Corp.;

2.
 Based on my knowledge, this Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
 necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
 respect to the period covered by this Report;    3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
 information included in this Report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
 flows of the registrant as of, and for, the period presented in this Report;    4. I am responsible for establishing and
 maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) for the registrant and
 have:

a)Designed
 such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to
 ensure that material information relating to the registrant is made known to me by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this Report is being prepared;



b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
 controls and procedures and presented in this Report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this Report based on such evaluation;and



c)
 Disclosed in this Report any
 change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent
 fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
 reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. I
 have disclosed based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the
 audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)All
 significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
 other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.



Date:
 August 6, 2008



/s/
 Ruairidh Campbell

Ruairidh
 Campbell

Chief
 Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

20