[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-12113

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cr-00004-DHB-BKE-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

NATHAN E. GUNDY, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

________________________

(November 23, 2016)

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Before HULL and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,

* District Judge.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Nathan E. Gundy appeals his conviction and 288-month sentence

for being a convicted felon in possession of firearms. The district court determined 

that Gundy was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because he had at least three prior Georgia 

burglary convictions, each of which qualified as a predicate “violent felony” under 

the enumerated crimes provision of the ACCA. On appeal, Gundy challenges his

designation as an armed career criminal under § 924(e). 

After review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm 

Gundy’s conviction and sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2013, a jury found Gundy guilty on one count of being a 

convicted felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2), and 924(e).

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) recommended a base offense 

level of 24, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. The PSI recommended (1) a 2-level 

increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because the offense involved three 

 

*

Honorable Anne C. Conway, United States District Judge, for the Middle District of 

Florida, sitting by designation.

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firearms,1 (2) a 2-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because the 

firearms Gundy possessed were stolen, and (3) a 4-level increase under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because Gundy possessed the firearms in connection with 

another felony offense. These increases yielded an adjusted offense level of 32.

Gundy had numerous prior felony convictions, 17 criminal history points,

and a criminal history category of VI, even without a § 924(e) enhancement.

Gundy’s offense level of 32 and criminal history category of VI would have 

yielded an advisory guidelines range of 210 to 262 months. Without a § 924(e) 

enhancement, Gundy’s statutory maximum penalty would have been 120 months’ 

imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 

The PSI, however, reported that Gundy was an armed career criminal under 

§ 924(e) because he was previously convicted of seven burglary offenses in 

Georgia, namely: (1) a 2001 conviction for one count of burglary, (2) another 2001 

conviction for four counts of burglary, each of which occurred on a separate 

occasion, (3) a 2005 conviction for one count of burglary, and (4) a 2006 

conviction for one count of burglary. Gundy had pled guilty to each of those

Georgia burglary offenses. The PSI provided that Gundy had other Georgia 

convictions for forgery, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, entering 

an automobile, and theft by taking.

 1

The three firearms were: (1) an FIE, Model E22, .22 caliber pistol, (2) a Smith and 

Wesson, Model 36, .38 caliber revolver, and (3) a Jimenez, Model J.A. Nine, 9mm caliber pistol. 

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Due to his status as an armed career criminal under § 924(e), Gundy’s 

offense level increased from 32 to 34 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). With a

total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, Gundy’s advisory 

guidelines range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.

Gundy’s status as an armed career criminal under § 924(e) raised his 

statutory range of imprisonment to 15 years to life, rather than zero to 10 years.

As to the PSI, Gundy objected to the 2-level increase for possessing stolen 

firearms and the 4-level increase for possessing firearms in connection with 

another felony. He also objected to his designation as an armed career criminal on 

the ground that only two of his burglary convictions involved the burglary of a 

residence. According to Gundy, only “burglary of a residence” qualifies as a 

“violent felony” under the ACCA, and, therefore, he did not have the requisite 

three violent felony convictions to qualify as an armed career criminal.

At the April 2014 sentencing hearing, the district court overruled Gundy’s 

objection to the 2-level increase for possessing stolen firearms, but sustained 

Gundy’s objection to the 4-level increase for possessing the firearms in connection 

with another felony.

The district court also overruled Gundy’s objection to his designation as an 

armed career criminal. The district court expressly deferred to the reasoning of the 

probation officer set forth in an addendum to the PSI. In that addendum, the 

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probation officer concluded that Gundy was an armed career criminal because the 

charging documents in each of Gundy’s burglary convictions “reveal[ed] that each 

of those offenses [met] the elements of generic burglary (i.e., [Gundy] unlawfully 

entered a building or structure with the intent to commit a theft”).

Because the district court sustained Gundy’s objection to the 4-level 

increase, Gundy’s total offense level became 33 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b). With 

a total offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of VI, Gundy’s advisory 

guidelines range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. After considering the 

advisory guidelines range and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 

district court sentenced Gundy to 288 months’ imprisonment. Gundy appealed his 

conviction and sentence.

Gundy makes several arguments challenging the validity of his § 922(g) 

conviction. After our review of the record, we find that all of Gundy’s arguments 

are without merit and affirm Gundy’s conviction. The only remaining issue is a 

sentencing one—whether the district court erred in concluding that Gundy’s prior 

Georgia burglary convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. 

Whether a particular conviction is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA is a 

question of law we consider de novo. United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251, 1254 

(11th Cir. 2009).

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II. THE ACCA

A felon in possession of a firearm who has at least three prior convictions 

“for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions 

different from one another,” is subject to an enhanced statutory penalty under the 

ACCA. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines the term “violent felony” as 

any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that:

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk 

of physical injury to another.

Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). The first prong of this definition is sometimes referred to as the 

“elements clause,” while the second prong contains the “enumerated crimes” and, 

finally, what is commonly called the “residual clause.” 2 United States v. Owens, 

672 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 2012). 

This case involves the enumerated crimes clause, which defines “violent 

felony,” in part, as “burglary, arson, or extortion” and crimes that “involve[] use of 

explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In listing these crimes in § 924(e)(2), 

Congress referred only to the “generic” versions of those enumerated crimes. See

 2

On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the 

ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 

2551, 2557-58, 2563 (2015). Accordingly, we do not consider whether Gundy’s Georgia 

burglary convictions would alternatively qualify as violent felonies under the residual clause.

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Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2158 (1990). Further, 

an enumerated crime counts as an ACCA violent felony if its elements are the 

same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense. See id. at 599, 110 S. Ct. 

at 2158. 

 III. DISCUSSION

A. Elements-Based Analysis of a Prior Crime

The United States Supreme Court most recently articulated how to interpret 

and apply the ACCA’s enumerated crimes provision in Mathis v. United States, 

579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). In Mathis, the Supreme Court recognized 

that its opinion in Taylor “set out the essential rule governing ACCA cases more 

than a quarter century ago,” which is that “[a]ll that counts under the [ACCA] . . . 

are the elements of the statute of conviction.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. 

at 2251 (quotation marks omitted). “That simple point became a mantra” in the 

Supreme Court’s subsequent ACCA decisions. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court in 

Mathis pointed out that this “essential rule” has governed all of its ACCA 

decisions since Taylor:

At the risk of repetition (perhaps downright tedium), here are some 

examples. In Shepard : ACCA “refers to predicate offenses in terms 

not of prior conduct but of prior ‘convictions’ and the ‘element[s]’ of 

crimes.” 544 U.S., at 19, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (alteration in original). In 

James v. United States : “[W]e have avoided any inquiry into the 

underlying facts of [the defendant’s] particular offense, and have 

looked solely to the elements of [burglary] as defined by [state] law.” 

550 U.S. 192, 214, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). In Sykes 

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v. United States : “[W]e consider [only] the elements of the offense [,] 

without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.” 

564 U.S. 1, 7, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (quoting James, 

550 U.S., at 202, 127 S.Ct. 1586; emphasis in original). And most 

recently (and tersely) in Descamps: “The key [under ACCA] is 

elements, not facts.” 570 U.S., at ___, 133 S.Ct., at 2283.

Id. at 2251-52. 

Mathis thus drove home the point that focusing on the elements of the statute 

of conviction is, and always has been, the essential principle governing ACCA 

cases: “For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of 

ACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements.” Id. at 2257. 

Mathis also instructs that “[t]he comparison of elements . . . is 

straightforward when a statute sets out a single (or ‘indivisible’) set of elements to 

define a single crime.” Id. at 2248. In such cases, the court simply “lines up that 

crime’s elements alongside those of the generic offense and sees if they match.” 

Id. This is known as the “categorical approach.” See id. at 2248. 

Mathis notes, however, that some criminal statutes do not set out a single 

crime but “have a more complicated (sometimes called ‘divisible’) structure.” Id. 

In fact, “[a] single statute may list elements in the alternative, and thereby define

multiple crimes.” Id. at 2249. If the statute sets out multiple crimes, it is 

“divisible.” See id. Faced with a “divisible” statute, courts must identify which 

crime in the statute formed the basis of the defendant’s conviction. See id. The 

Mathis Court stressed that “[t]o address that need, this Court approved the 

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‘modified categorical approach’ for use with statutes having multiple alternative 

elements.” Id. Under the modified categorical approach, “a sentencing court looks 

to a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or 

plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a 

defendant was convicted of.” Id. Courts must then compare the elements of that 

identified crime to the elements of the relevant generic offense. See id.

B. Disjunctive Phrasing

Notably, the Supreme Court in Mathis explained more fully how courts 

should evaluate criminal statutes with “disjunctive phrasing.” Id. at 2249, 2253. 

Specifically, a state’s criminal statute may use terms like “or” that can signal either 

(1) the listing of alternative elements, thus creating multiple crimes, or (2) the 

listing of alternative means of committing a single offense with an indivisible set 

of elements. See id. at 2249. 

If the statute lists alternative “elements,” it is considered “divisible,” and 

courts may employ the modified categorical approach to determine the elements of 

the defendant’s conviction. Id. But if a statute merely lists “various factual 

means” of committing a single offense, then the statute is considered “indivisible,” 

and that indivisible set of elements will be the basis of the defendant’s conviction. 

See id. And if that indivisible statute “sweeps more broadly than the generic 

crime, a conviction under that law cannot count as an ACCA predicate, even if the 

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defendant actually committed the offense in its generic form.” Descamps v. 

United States, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013).

In Mathis, the Supreme Court also instructed that “[t]he first task for a 

sentencing court faced with an alternatively phrased statute is . . . to determine 

whether its listed items are elements or means.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at ___, 136 S. 

Ct. at 2256. This determination—“elements or means?”—is a “threshold inquiry.” 

Id. Thus, in an enumerated crimes ACCA case involving a statute with disjunctive 

or alternative phrasing, courts must first determine (1) whether that statutory 

alternative phrasing lists multiple alternative elements, thereby creating multiple 

offenses in a divisible statutory structure, or (2) whether that statutory alternative 

phrasing merely lists various factual means of satisfying one or more of the 

statute’s otherwise indivisible set of elements. 

C. Elements or Means?

More significantly though, the Supreme Court in Mathis added to its ACCA 

precedent by instructing courts how to discern “elements” from “means.” 

“Elements are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal definition—the things the 

prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 2248 (quotation marks 

omitted). “At a trial, they are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to 

convict the defendant; and at a plea hearing, they are what the defendant 

necessarily admits when he pleads guilty.” Id. at 2248. Facts and means, on the 

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other hand, “are mere real-world things—extraneous to the crime’s legal 

requirements.” Id. “They are circumstances or events having no legal effect or

consequence . . . [and] need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a 

defendant.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

The Supreme Court in Mathis enumerated several tools courts may use to

determine whether a statute’s “listed items are elements or means” or, put another 

way, whether a statute is “divisible.” Id. at 2256. In doing so, the Supreme Court 

clarified when and how courts may look beyond the language of the statute, and 

may even go to parts of the state court record, to determine whether a statute lists 

alternative elements or alternative means. Id. at 2256-57. 

As one tool, the Supreme Court explained that “the statute on its face may 

resolve the issue.” Id. For example, “[i]f statutory alternatives carry different 

punishments, then under Apprendi they must be elements.” Id. “Conversely, if a 

statutory list is drafted to offer ‘illustrative examples,’ then it includes only a 

crime’s means of commission.” Id. (citing United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 

1334, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014)). Additionally, “a statute may itself identify which 

things must be charged (and so are elements) and which need not be (and so are 

means).” Id.

As another tool, the Supreme Court stated that in conducting the elementsversus-means inquiry, federal sentencing courts can look to state court decisions 

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interpreting an alternatively phrased statute for guidance. Id. If a precedential 

state court decision makes clear that a statute’s alternative phrasing simply lists 

“alternative methods of committing one offense,” such that “a jury need not agree” 

on which alternative method the defendant committed in order to sustain a 

conviction, then the statute is not divisible. Id. (quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). “Armed with such authoritative sources of state law, federal sentencing 

courts can readily determine the nature of an alternatively phrased list.” Id.

As a third tool, the Supreme Court stated that “if state law fails to provide 

clear answers, federal judges have another place to look: the record of a prior 

conviction itself.” Id. The Supreme Court explained that this “peek” at the record 

documents “is for the sole and limited purpose of determining whether the listed 

items are elements of the offense.” Id. at 2256-57 (quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). This is a “peek” to answer the threshold means-or-elements question (i.e. 

the divisibility issue) and is not the full-blown modified categorical approach. 

In explaining this “peek,” the Supreme Court in Mathis said, (1) “Descamps

previously recognized just this way of discerning whether a statutory list contains 

means or elements,” and (2) that the Descamps Court “noted that indictments, jury 

instructions, plea colloquies and plea agreements will often reflect the crime’s 

elements and so can reveal—in some cases better than state law itself—whether a 

statutory list is of elements or means.” Id. at 2257 n.7 (quotation marks omitted). 

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The Supreme Court then instructed: “Accordingly, when state law does not resolve 

the means-or-elements question, courts should resort to the record documents for 

help in making that determination.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Most helpfully though, the Supreme Court in Mathis gave contrasting

examples of how to implement this third tool for answering the elements-versusmeans inquiry. In its first example, the Supreme Court noted that “an indictment 

and correlative jury instructions [could] charge a defendant with burgling a 

‘building, structure, or vehicle.’” Id. Those documents might also use “a single 

umbrella term like ‘premises.’” Id. Either situation “is as clear an indication as 

any that each alternative is only a possible means of commission, not an element 

that the prosecutor must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

Moreover, in each situation, “the record would . . . reveal what the prosecutor has 

to (and does not have to) demonstrate to prevail.” Id. In a contrasting example, 

the Supreme Court noted that “[c]onversely, an indictment and jury instructions 

could indicate, by referencing one alternative term to the exclusion of all others,

that the statute contains a list of elements, each one of which goes toward a 

separate crime.” Id. Again, this “peek” at the record is for answering the meansor-elements question, also called the divisibility question. 

Finally, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “such record materials will 

not in every case speak plainly, and if they do not, a sentencing judge will not be 

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able to satisfy Taylor’s demand for certainty when determining whether a 

defendant was convicted of a generic offense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

However, the Supreme Court concluded that “between those documents and state 

law, that kind of indeterminacy should prove more the exception than the rule.” Id. 

This makes good sense because state court indictments often will charge only one

of the alternative terms, thereby indicating that a statute is divisible.

We now apply the principles and tools outlined in Mathis to this case.

D. Georgia’s Burglary Statute is Broader than Generic Burglary

We first identify the elements of generic burglary. The generic, 

contemporary definition of burglary consists of these elements: (1) an unlawful or 

unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, (2) a building or other structure, (3) with 

intent to commit a crime therein. See Howard, 742 F.3d at 1342; Mathis, 579 U.S. 

at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. 

Next, we examine whether Georgia’s burglary statute has these elements. At 

the time of Gundy’s seven prior felony burglary offenses in 2001, 2005, and 2006, 

Georgia’s burglary statute provided as follows: 

A person commits the offense of burglary when, without authority and 

with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he enters or 

remains within the dwelling house of another or any building, vehicle, 

railroad car, watercraft, or other such structure designed for use as the 

dwelling of another or enters or remains within any other building, 

railroad car, aircraft, or any room or any part thereof. . . .

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Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1(a) (2011).3 Section 16-7-1 criminalizes the following 

conduct: (1) entry into a dwelling house, a building, or other structures (2) 

“without authority,” and (3) with “intent to commit a felony or theft therein.” Id. 

Section 16-7-1 thus criminalizes conduct that would satisfy all the elements of a 

generic burglary. 

However, at the time of Gundy’s prior convictions, § 16-7-1 also 

criminalized conduct broader than the ACCA’s generic definition of burglary. 

Specifically, § 16-7-1 encompassed not only unlawful entry into buildings or other 

structures, but also into vehicles, railroad cars, watercraft, or aircraft. See United 

States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 832 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Howard, 742 F.3d 

at 1342. Thus, § 16-7-1 is non-generic. See Bennett, 472 F.3d at 832. 

The salient question, then, is whether § 16-7-1’s alternative phrasing of the 

locational element—(1) dwelling house, or (2) building, vehicle, railroad car, 

watercraft, or other such structure designed for use as a dwelling, or (3) any other 

building, railroad car, aircraft, or any room or any part thereof—lists multiple 

alternative locational “elements” or various “means” of satisfying a single,

indivisible set of elements. 

 3

Georgia’s burglary statute was amended on July 1, 2012, and had not been amended 

prior to that since 1980. See 2012 Ga. Laws 899; 1980 Ga. Laws 770. Accordingly, the 2011 

version of Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1 was the statute under which Gundy was previously convicted. 

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Before examining the Georgia burglary statute, it is also helpful to review 

the Iowa burglary statute discussed in Mathis and the Alabama burglary statute 

discussed in Howard.

E. Iowa and Alabama Burglary Statutes

At issue in Mathis was the Iowa Code, which defines burglary in § 713.1 as 

“[a]ny person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who, 

having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure.” Iowa 

Code § 713.1 (emphasis added). The Iowa statute employs a “single locational 

element,” which is “occupied structure.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 

2250; Iowa Code § 713.1.

Then, in a separate statute, § 702.12, the Iowa Code defines the term 

“occupied structure” as “any building, structure, appurtenances to buildings and 

structures, land, water or air vehicle, or similar place adapted for overnight 

accommodation of persons.” Iowa Code § 702.12.

In Mathis, the Supreme Court concluded that the Iowa burglary statute in 

§ 713.1 defined “one crime, with one set of elements” with a single locational 

element of “occupied structure.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2250. The 

Supreme Court explained that the listed locations in the separate § 702.12 

definition were not “alternative elements” but were “alternative ways of satisfying 

the single locational element” in § 713.1. Id. In addition to the clear statutory text 

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of a single locational element in § 713.1, the Supreme Court also pointed out that 

the Iowa Supreme Court had held that the alternative premises in the § 702.12

definition were “alternative method[s]” of committing the offense, “so that the jury 

need not agree” whether the burgled location was a building, other structure, or

vehicle. Id. (citing State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 532 (Iowa 1981)).

Similarly, in Howard, the Alabama statute that created the crime of burglary

used a single locational element of “building.”4 Section 13A-7-7 provides that “[a] 

person commits the crime of burglary in the third degree if he knowingly enters or 

remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.” Ala. 

Code § 13A-7-7(a) (2014) (emphasis added).

Then, in a separate statute in § 13A-7-1(2), the Alabama Code defines the 

term “building” as “[a]ny structure which may be entered and utilized by persons 

for business, public use, lodging or the storage of goods, and such term includes

any vehicle, aircraft or watercraft used for the lodging of persons or carrying on 

business therein, and such term includes any railroad box car or other rail 

equipment or trailer or tractor trailer or combination thereof.” Id. § 13A-7-1(2)

(2014) (emphasis added).

 4

In 2015, Alabama changed the wording of the burglary statute in § 13A-7-7. 2015 Ala. 

Laws Act 2015-185. Then in 2016, the state also amended the definitional provision in § 13A-7-

1. 2016 Ala. Laws 2016-402. Howard, which was decided in 2014, construed the pre-2015 

versions of these provisions.

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In Howard, this Court explained why the Alabama burglary statute was not 

divisible. The Alabama statute did not “set[] out one or more elements of the 

offense in the alternative—for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a 

building or an automobile.” Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348. “Instead, Alabama Code 

§ 13A-7-1(2) provides one definition of building and then includes a nonexhaustive list of things that fall under that definition.” Id. In Howard, this Court 

further pointed out that the word “includes” in § 13A-7-1(2) showed that the 

drafters “intended to provide a non-exhaustive list of examples to clarify the 

meaning of the term.” Id. (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 777 (11th Cir. 

1988)).5

 5

Similar to the Iowa and Alabama statutes, the South Carolina Code uses a single

locational element. The South Carolina statute that creates the crime is § 16-11-312(A), which

provides that “[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if the person enters a dwelling

without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein.” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-312(A)

(emphasis added).

South Carolina then has two other separate statutes that define “dwelling” and “dwelling 

house.” In a separate statute, § 16-11-310, the South Carolina Code defines “dwelling,” stating 

that “ʻ[d]welling’ means its definition found in Section 16-11-10 and also means the living 

quarters of a building which is used or normally used for sleeping, living, or lodging by a 

person.” Id. § 16-11-310. In turn, § 16-11-10 provided that “a dwelling house, any house, 

outhouse, apartment, building, erection, shed or box in which there sleeps a proprietor, tenant, 

watchman, clerk, laborer or person who lodges there with a view to the protection of property 

shall be deemed a dwelling house.” Id. § 16-11-10. Additionally, the word “building,” as used 

in § 16-11-310, “means any structure, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft.” Id. § 16-11-310(1). 

Georgia’s burglary statute is not at all like South Carolina’s. See United States v. Lockett, 810 

F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (outlining this complex statute and holding that the South Carolina 

burglary statute is not divisible).

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F. Georgia’s Burglary Statute

We now turn to the text of Georgia’s burglary statute. “[S]entencing courts 

should usually be able to determine whether a statute is divisible by simply reading 

its text . . . .” Howard, 742 F.3d at 1346.

In contrast to Iowa’s statute in Mathis and the Alabama statute in Howard, 

the text of the Georgia burglary statute in § 16-7-1, that creates the crime, does not 

use a single locational element (like “occupied structure” or “building”). The 

Georgia law also does not contain a definition elsewhere that provides a nonexhaustive laundry list of other places or locations. The Georgia statute also does 

not use the term “includes.”

Rather, the Georgia burglary statute, that creates the crime of burglary, uses

alternative locational elements. Section 16-7-1 provides that “[a] person commits 

the offense of burglary when, without authority and with the intent to commit a 

felony or theft therein, he enters or remains within”:

the dwelling house of another or

any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, or other such structure 

designed for use as the dwelling of another or

within any other building, railroad car, aircraft, or any room or any 

part thereof.

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Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1(a) (2011) (emphasis added).

6

 Rather than a single 

locational element, the plain text of the Georgia statute has three subsets of

different locational elements, stated in the alternative and in the disjunctive. 

Each of the three subsets enumerates a finite list of specific structures in 

which the unlawful entry must occur to constitute the crime of burglary. In 

doing so, the burglary statute has multiple locational elements effectively 

creating several different crimes. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at __, 133 S. Ct. 

at 2281 (explaining that an example of a divisible statute is one “stating that 

burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile”).

This is why under Georgia law a prosecutor must select, identify, and 

charge the specific place or location that was burgled. For example, the 

Georgia Court of Appeals has held that a burglary indictment must charge 

the particular place or premises burgled and the specific location of that 

place or premises. See Morris v. State, 303 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1983) (stating that “where the defendant is charged with burglary, the 

indictment must specify the location of the burglary” and concluding that the 

indictment was sufficient where it charged a “building,” identified as “the 

Financial Aid Office and Alumni Office, located at Fort Valley State 

 6

This was the text of the Georgia burglary statute from 1980 to 2011. Prior to1968, the 

burglary statute also had this provision, which is no longer in the statute: “All out-houses 

contiguous to or within the curtilage or protection of the mansion or dwelling-house, shall be 

considered as part of the same.” Compare Ga. Code 1933, § 26-2401 with Ga. Laws 1968, § 26-

2401, p. 1249.

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21

College, Fort Valley, Peach County, Georgia”); State v. Ramos, 243 S.E.2d 

693, 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (stating it is not necessary to prove “the 

specific place” to obtain a theft-by-taking conviction, but it is necessary to 

prove the “specific location” to obtain a burglary conviction); State v. Green, 

218 S.E.2d. 456, 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Chester v. State, 140 S.E.2d 52, 

53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) (“It must be alleged and proved in an indictment for 

burglary that there was a breaking and entering of one of the classes of 

buildings set out in the statute.”); Kidd v. State, 146 S.E. 35, 35 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 1928) (holding that the indictment was sufficient where it identified the 

location burgled as the protected structure of “railroad cars”).

The U.S. Supreme Court has told us that “[a] prosecutor charging a violation 

of a divisible statute must generally select the relevant element from the list of 

alternatives.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 2290. That the Georgia 

prosecutor must select and identify the locational element of the place burgled—

whether the place burgled was a dwelling, building, railroad car, vehicle, or 

watercraft—is the hallmark of a divisible statute. Indeed, in every case cited by 

Gundy and the government, the indictment specified the type of place or premises 

burgled. See, e.g., Weeks, 616 S.E.2d at 852 (a “dwelling house”); Davis v. State, 

706 S.E.2d 710, 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (a “dwelling house”); Smarr v. State, 732 

S.E.2d 110, 114-15 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (a “building” that served as a gas station); 

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22

Morris, 303 S.E.2d. at 494 (a “building” used as a “Financial Aid Office and 

Alumni Office”).

That the prosecutor must select and identify the relevant statutory locational 

element is well illustrated by the Georgia court’s decision in DeFrancis v. 

Manning, 246 Ga. 307 (1980). As quoted above, one of the alternative locational 

elements in the Georgia statute is a “vehicle . . . designed for use as the dwelling of 

another.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1(a) (2011). The indictment in DeFrancis

charged that the defendant “unlawfully without authority and with intent to commit 

a theft therein entered that certain vehicle, same being a gray Ford truck, being the 

property of and owned by McKesson Wine and Spirits Company, a division of 

Foremost-McKesson, Inc., said truck being located on 10th Avenue West in the 

City of Cordele, Crisp County, Georgia, at the time of said entry therein by the said 

accused.” 246 Ga. at 307. The Georgia Supreme Court set aside the defendant’s 

burglary conviction because the indictment did not charge that the vehicle was 

“designed for use as a dwelling.” Id. at 308. The Georgia Supreme Court held, 

“that the vehicle was designed as a dwelling was an essential element of the 

offense which must be alleged.” Id. (emphasis added). The fact that under Georgia 

law the indictment must charge the type of place or location with such specificity 

further demonstrates that § 16-7-1’s statutory listing of alternative locations for 

committing a burglary constitutes an enumeration of alternative elements.

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23

For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the alternative locational 

elements in the Georgia statute are divisible. See United States v. MartinezGarcia, 625 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Georgia burglary 

statute in § 16-7-1(a) is divisible and that the defendant’s Georgia conviction for 

burglary of a dwelling house was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2). 7

G. The Elements of Gundy’s Prior Burglary Convictions are Generic

Our final task is to determine which of the alternative elements in Georgia’s 

burglary statute formed the basis of Gundy’s prior burglary convictions and 

whether those elements match the generic definition of burglary. Having 

concluded that Georgia’s burglary statute is divisible, we may use the modified 

categorical approach. Mathis, 579 U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. Under that 

approach, we look to “a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, 

jury instructions or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with 

what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Id. These are known as Shepard

 7

The dissent has found and cites Mobley v. State. 296 S.E.2d 617, 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1982) (describing where the burglary occurred as the “Social Circle Drug Store, the property of 

Billy Snipes, located in the City of Social Circle, Walton County, Georgia”) (emphasis added). 

The dissent faults our analysis because this decision did not use the word “building.” We are 

confident that the term “drug store” sensibly means a building, not a vehicle, railroad car, or 

watercraft. While one could theoretically operate a drug store out of a vehicle, we are not 

required to engage in such farfetched hypotheticals, especially given DeFrancis and other 

Georgia decisions discussed above. If anything, the Mobley decision supports our conclusion 

that the prosecutor must charge and identify as an element the type of place that was burgled and 

its location.

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24

documents. Id.; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 

(2005).

The indictment for each one of Gundy’s prior Georgia burglary convictions 

charged the type of place and the address of each burgled location.8

 Two 

indictments charged that Gundy unlawfully, and with the intent to commit theft 

therein, entered a “dwelling house”: (1) “the dwelling house of another, to wit:

Chiffon Jones, located at 403 Grand Street; Sandersville, Georgia;” and (2) “the 

dwelling house of another, to wit: McArthur Jordan, located at 321 Tybee Street, 

Sandersville, Georgia.” Two other indictments charged that Gundy “unlawfully, 

without authority, and with intent to commit a theft therein” entered a “business 

house” described as: (1) “the business house of another, to wit: David Bernice 

Hartley d/b/a E-Z Coin Laundry, located at East McCarty Street, Sandersville, 

Georgia;”9

 and (2) “the business house of another, to wit: Bill Murphy d/b/a 

Murphy & Palmer Feed & Seed Company, located at 232 North Smith Street, 

Sandersville, Georgia.” Thus, all of the burgled locations were either dwelling 

houses or buildings housing a business, which are generic burglaries. Importantly, 

 8

Certified copies of all of Gundy’s state court indictments and Gundy’s guilty pleas 

thereto are in the record and are attached as an appendix to this opinion.

9

Two other indictments charged that Gundy burgled this same E-Z Coin Laundry on East 

McCarty Street in Sandersville, Georgia but on separate occasions during the year 2000: July 

12; August 23; December 12; and December 14. The December 12 and December 14 incidents 

were charged as two separate counts of burglary in the same indictment. All told, Gundy was 

charged with and pled guilty to seven separate burglaries in six different indictments.

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25

none were vehicles, railroad cars, watercrafts, or aircrafts, which are not generic 

burglaries.10

Accordingly, Gundy’s state court indictments make clear that Gundy’s 

Georgia burglary convictions involved these three elements: (1) an unlawful entry 

(2) into a dwelling house or building (3) with intent to commit a crime therein. See

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1(a) (2011). These elements substantially conform to the 

generic definition of burglary. See Howard, 742 F.3d at 1342. Therefore, Gundy’s 

prior Georgia burglary convictions qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA’s 

enumerated crimes clause. The district court did not err in sentencing Gundy as an 

armed career criminal.

H. Dissent’s Discussion of Divisibility

The dissent relies heavily on Lloyd v. State, 308 S.E.2d 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1983), but that case had nothing to do with the locational element, which the 

Georgia Supreme Court in DeFrancis told us is an “essential element.” 246 Ga. at 

308. The sole issue in Lloyd was whether the evidence was sufficient to prove 

“lack of authority on the defendant’s part to enter the building.” Lloyd, 308 S.E.2d

at 25. The officer testified that “[t]he front door of the warehouse had been pried 

 10While the dissent focuses on jury instructions, Gundy did not proceed to trial but pled 

guilty. Here, we rely on the indictments, not pattern jury instructions never given. Indeed, the 

Supreme Court has told us that, in cases where the defendant pled guilty, we can look at the 

“closest analogs to the jury instructions,” and that they are the indictments or charging 

information. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20, 125 S. Ct. at 1249; see also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 

S. Ct. at 2160.

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open.” Id. The Lloyd court stated: “there are two essential elements which must 

be established by the State: 1) lack of authority to enter the dwelling or building; 

2) intent to commit a felony or theft.” Id. (emphasis added). The Lloyd court 

concluded that the evidence in the officer’s testimony “was sufficient to show the 

defendant’s lack of authority to enter the building.” Id. at 26. When placed in 

context, the two-element statement in Lloyd is about two elements of “lack of 

authority to enter” and “intent.” See id. at 25. There was no issue in Lloyd about 

the location burgled or the essential locational element required under the Georgia 

statute.

Rather, the Georgia Supreme Court in DeFrancis tells us that the location 

burgled is a third “essential element” and that the locational element must be 

identified and charged with particularity in the indictment. See 246 Ga. at 308.

In any event, as to its divisibility analysis, the dissent acknowledges that “if 

state law fails to provide clear answers [about a statute’s divisibility], federal 

judges have another place to look: the record of a prior conviction itself.” If 

nothing else, perhaps the discussions in the majority opinion and the dissent 

arguably suggest that Georgia law may not be as clear as either concludes. So if 

the Georgia law is not clear as to elements or means, what happens next? We 

agree with the dissent’s divisibility analysis that the next step would be Mathis’s 

“peek at the record.” The dissent, in its divisibility analysis, peeks at the record 

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27

and points out that two indictments specified a “dwelling house” and three 

specified a “business house.” Where we differ is this. Those terms do not “speak 

plainly” enough for the dissent. We, however, conclude that the terms “dwelling 

house” and “business house” satisfy Taylor’s demand for certainty that Gundy’s 

convictions were for burglary of a building or other structure, which is a generic 

burglary.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we affirm Gundy’s conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 27 of 73 
JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The question we confront today is whether Nathan Gundy’s prior burglary 

convictions in Georgia provide a basis for the enhanced federal sentence he 

currently serves. The majority and I agree on the basic framework for answering 

this question and even on how that framework applies here, up to a point. But we 

differ sharply in our views of Georgia law regarding the elements of the crime of 

burglary. 

The majority and I agree that the Georgia burglary statute under which Mr. 

Gundy previously was convicted sweeps more broadly than the generic crime of 

burglary that can serve as a basis for an enhanced sentence. I cannot agree, 

though, with the balance of the majority’s analysis. I dissent because we cannot, 

consistent with Supreme Court and our own precedent, divide and narrow the 

Georgia statute in a way that would permit us to construe Mr. Gundy’s burglary 

convictions as authorizing the term of incarceration he now serves. And I dissent 

because the majority’s analysis affirming Mr. Gundy’s enhanced sentence has 

serious implications far beyond this case. The majority’s misinterpretation of 

Georgia law will decide the fate of countless individuals who stand to serve 

unjustly expanded prison terms as a result.

The district court ruled that Mr. Gundy’s prior Georgia burglary convictions

28

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each constituted a “violent felony” and thus support an enhanced sentence under 

the Armed Career Criminal Act, (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). As relevant here, 

the term “violent felony” includes the crime of burglary. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

But the crime of burglary’s inclusion among ACCA’s violent felonies does not 

mean that a conviction under Georgia’s burglary statute qualifies as a violent 

felony. For Georgia burglary to qualify, all or part of the statute must criminalize 

what the Supreme Court has termed “generic” burglary; that is, it must “contain[] 

at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 

remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor 

v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). If the statute in its entirety criminalizes 

generic burglary, then our analysis is easy: a violation of the statute can support an 

ACCA enhancement. But if it doesn’t, we have to decide whether we can divide 

the statute up into elements that make up generic burglary. This task is not as easy, 

as state statutes can be complex, but the Supreme Court has on several occasions 

given us guidance, most recently in United States v. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243 

(2016). There, the Court reiterated that the key question is whether the state statute 

sets forth alternative elements, which means that the statute is divisible, or merely 

alternative factual means of committing the offense, which means that the statute is 

not divisible, and therefore a conviction under it cannot serve as a predicate 

offense for an ACCA enhancement. See id. at 2249.

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The majority and I agree that with its inclusion of vehicles, railroad cars, 

watercraft, and aircraft as types of locations that can be burglarized, Georgia’s 

burglary statute is broader than the generic crime of burglary, which applies only 

to structures. Indeed, in considering a similarly broad state statute, Mathis held 

that “vehicles” are not structures and thus fall outside the scope of generic 

burglary. See 136 S. Ct. at 2250. But turning to the question of whether these 

alternative types of locations are elements of the crime of burglary in Georgia or 

merely means of committing it, the majority and I part ways. I disagree that the 

burglary statute’s text and structure support the majority’s conclusion that the types 

of locations the statute lists are elements rather than means. This conclusion 

ignores the Supreme Court’s guidance and the plain meaning of the Georgia 

statute. I also disagree that Georgia case law supports the majority’s conclusion. 

To the contrary, this case law unambiguously defines the elements of the crime of 

burglary, and the different types of locations that can be burglarized are not 

separate elements. The majority errs in determining that “burglary of a dwelling” 

and “burglary of a building” are separate crimes in Georgia.

Even if I were to accept, for the sake of argument, that Georgia law is

ambiguous on whether the different types of locations that can be burglarized are 

elements or means of committing the offense, the inquiry would not end there. 

Mathis instructs courts considering statutes that are ambiguous in this respect to 

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“peek” at the record documents of prior convictions “for the sole and limited 

purpose of determining whether the [statute’s] listed items are elements of the 

offense.” 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

But in this case, those documents leave us unable to “satisfy [the] demand for 

certainty when determining whether a defendant was convicted of a generic 

offense” that can serve as an ACCA predicate. Id. at 2257 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). After all, of the two locational terms listed in Mr. Gundy’s 

indictments, one does not even appear in Georgia’s burglary statute and thus 

cannot constitute an element. Mr. Gundy’s indictments therefore fail to 

demonstrate that the different types of locations where the burglaries occurred 

were elements that the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt. In my view, 

these points lead to only one possible conclusion: Georgia’s burglary statute is 

broader than generic burglary, and is indivisible; it cannot be a violent felony 

under ACCA. I would reverse and remand for the district court to resentence Mr. 

Gundy without an ACCA enhancement.

I. DISCUSSION

The analytical framework on which the majority and I agree compels the 

conclusion that the Georgia burglary statute under which Mr. Gundy was convicted 

is indivisible. The statute defines burglary as follows:

A person commits the offense of burglary when, without authority and 

with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he enters or 

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remains within the dwelling house of another or any building, vehicle, 

railroad car, watercraft, or other such structure designed for use as 

the dwelling of another or enters or remains within any other building, 

railroad car, aircraft, or any room or any part thereof. . . .

O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) (2011) (emphasis added).1

 Below, I demonstrate this 

statute’s indivisibility in two parts. First, I review Georgia law, which tells us the 

elements of burglary. This is where I would end our inquiry, as we are not free to 

contradict Georgia’s courts on matters of state law. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 

624, 636 (1991).

Second, because the majority reads Georgia law to reach the opposite 

conclusion, I assume for the sake of argument that state law is ambiguous on the 

elements-versus-means question and, as Mathis instructs, look beyond it to the 

record of Mr. Gundy’s convictions for the answer. But the record, too, is 

inconclusive. Thus, even assuming Georgia law is ambiguous such that we can 

look to Mr. Gundy’s record at all, we would still lack the “certainty” required to 

determine that the various types of locations listed in Georgia’s statute are 

elements rather than means. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Without that certainty, a conviction under the statute cannot qualify as a 

violent felony under ACCA.

 

1 This version of the statute, which has since been amended, is the relevant one for our 

purposes because it was in effect at the time of Mr. Gundy’s burglary convictions. When I refer 

to the Georgia burglary statute, I refer to this version.

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A. Georgia Law Establishes the Georgia Burglary Statute’s Indivisibility.

Georgia’s courts have set forth the elements of burglary, making it clear that 

the state’s burglary statute is indivisible. The Georgia Court of Appeals declared 

in a precedential decision that it is “readily apparent there are two essential 

elements [of the crime of burglary] which must be established by the State: 1) lack 

of authority to enter the dwelling or building; 2) intent to commit a felony or 

theft.” Lloyd v. State, 308 S.E.2d 25, 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). 

Entering without authority either a “dwelling or building” is part of the same 

“essential element[],” a single element encompassing the types of locations that 

can be burglarized.2

 Id.

So why does the Georgia courts’ grouping of “dwelling” and “building” into 

a single element necessarily answer the elements-versus-means question with 

respect to vehicles, railroad cars, and watercraft? It does so for two reasons. First, 

the statute’s use of the term “dwelling” itself includes locations other than the type 

of structures that generic burglary encompasses. In Georgia, a person commits the 

crime of burglary when, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony

 

2 Other Georgia decisions have framed the location element in slightly different terms, 

substituting “dwelling place” or “dwelling house” for “dwelling.” See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 710 

S.E.2d 878, 881 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding validity of jury instructions where court charged 

jury on the burglary statute’s “requirement of proof that a defendant entered ‘the building or 

dwelling place of another’”); Hart v. State, 517 S.E.2d 790, 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding, 

as “sufficient to inform the jury of the essential elements of the offense” of burglary, jury 

instruction that stated, in part, a defendant “enters in a building or dwelling house of another”). 

But these slight variations make no difference to the elements-versus-means analysis.

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34

or theft therein, he enters or remains within “. . . any building, vehicle, railroad car, 

watercraft, or other such structure designed for use as the dwelling of 

another . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) (emphasis added). By using the restrictive 

clause “or other such structure designed for use as the dwelling of another,” the 

statute unambiguously defines vehicles, railroad cars, and watercraft as possible 

dwellings. Id. So a defendant may be convicted of burglarizing a “dwelling” 

whether he has entered unlawfully an apartment, which would be a structure falling 

within the purview of generic burglary structure, or a motorhome or a houseboat, 

which would not. 

Second, in the statute “building” appears twice, both times as part of a 

series. Both series include types of locations that generic burglary excludes. As a 

matter of syntax and logic, if one item in the series, “building,” is not a separate 

element because the Georgia courts tells us it is part of the same element as 

“dwelling,” then the others in the series are not separate elements either. For these 

reasons, Lloyd’s statement of burglary’s elements, which groups “building” and 

“dwelling” together, compels the conclusion that the location types listed in the 

Georgia burglary statute are alternate means rather than elements.

An examination of Georgia jury instructions confirms Lloyd’s statement of 

burglary’s elements. The language used in jury instructions is significant because 

it must always include the crime’s elements, that is, “what the jury must find 

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35

beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. 

Georgia courts consistently have upheld jury instructions listing “building or 

dwelling” as part of a single element. See, e.g., Dukes v. State, 592 S.E.2d 473, 

477 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding against unspecified claim of error jury 

instruction that “it’s only necessary to prove burglary in Georgia that . . . the 

accused did, without authority, enter a building or dwelling house of another with 

the intent to commit the alleged felony”); Hart v. State, 517 S.E.2d 790, 792–93 

(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (deeming “sufficient to inform the jury of the essential 

elements of” burglary a jury instruction that included “enters in a building or 

dwelling house of another”); see also, e.g., Long v. State, 705 S.E.2d 889, 674–75 

(Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (calling “complete and correct” a jury instruction that included 

“enters any building or dwelling place of another”). Indeed, Georgia’s pattern jury 

instructions for burglary state that a person commits burglary when “without 

authority, that person enters . . . any building or dwelling place of another . . . with 

the intent” to commit theft or another felony. GAJICRIM 2.62.10 (4th ed. 2016); 

id. 2.62.20 (4th ed. 2016).3

 Georgia jury instructions and the cases approving them 

thus confirm Lloyd’s statement of the burglary elements. That is, burglary of a 

dwelling and burglary of a building are not separate crimes.

 

3 Although dated 2016, these instructions apply to cases “where the offense is alleged to 

have occurred before July 1, 2012” because they reference the pre-2012 statute that we interpret 

today. See GAJICRIM 2.62.10.

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The majority dismisses Lloyd’s clear statement of law, asserting that the case 

“had nothing to do with the locational element” at issue here. Maj. Op. at 26. 

True, the types of places that could be burglarized were not at issue in Lloyd. But 

accepting the majority’s position requires us to assume that the Georgia Court of 

Appeals meant something other than what it said when it described the elements of 

the crime. And the numerous cases approving jury instructions with language like 

Lloyd’s confirm that it correctly stated burglary’s elements.

Rejecting these clear statements by Georgia courts of the elements of 

Georgia burglary, the majority argues that the text and structure of the burglary 

statute unambiguously establish its divisibility and that case law confirms this 

interpretation. First, the majority contends that the statute’s disjunctive phrasing 

and lack of a single locational term with a separate definition section make it 

divisible. But Mathis and persuasive authority counsel otherwise. Second, it 

asserts that Georgia’s burglary statute “enumerates a finite list of specific 

structures,” as a divisible statute must. The statute’s plain text contradicts this 

assertion, however. Third, the majority points to Georgia cases about the 

requirements for an indictment as confirming its textual interpretation. In fact, 

though, these cases concern notice to the defendant and double jeopardy, not the 

elements of the crime. I address each of the majority’s points in turn.

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First, the majority contends that the statute’s use of the disjunctive and lack 

of a single locational term with a separate definition section establish its 

divisibility. Relying solely on the word “or,” and making creative use of spacing 

to amplify its point, the majority determines that the statute “has three subsets of 

different locational elements, stated in the alternative and in the disjunctive.” See

Maj. Op. at 20. The majority then contrasts this structure with those of the state 

burglary statutes held to be indivisible in Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250 (Iowa), United 

States v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 2016) (South Carolina), and 

United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014) (Alabama). See

Maj. Op. at 19–20, 19 n.5. The majority notes that each of these other statutes 

included “a single locational element” and then in a separate section or statute 

defined that term with a list of alternative means of committing the crime. Id. 

Georgia’s burglary statute, however, contains no single locational element with a 

separate definitions section, and so the majority posits its list of alternate locations 

must be elements rather than means. Maj. Op. at 20. 

As the majority acknowledges, Maj. Op. at 9–10, Mathis makes clear that 

alternative phrasing is a necessary—but by no means sufficient—condition to read 

a statute as setting out alternative elements. See 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (“The first task 

for a sentencing court faced with an alternatively phrased statute is thus to 

determine whether its listed items are elements or means.”). Mathis then lists two 

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38

attributes of an alternatively phrased statute that would confirm its divisibility. 

First, “[i]f statutory alternatives carry different punishments, then under Apprendi4

they must be elements.” Id. Second, “a statute may itself identify which things 

must be charged (and so are elements) and which need not be (and so are means).” 

Id. Neither is present in this case, however. Absent these attributes, or something 

equally compelling, alternate phrasing is neutral with respect to the elementsversus-means inquiry.

Although state statutes with a single locational element defined separately 

have been held to be indivisible in Mathis, Lockett, and Howard, there is no truth 

to the converse, that the lack of a single locational element with a separate 

definition section means a disjunctively phrased statute is divisible. Indeed, one of 

our sister circuits recently held a statute with disjunctive language and without a 

separate definition section to be indivisible. See United States v. Barcenas-Yanez, 

826 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding Texas aggravated assault statute was 

indivisible as to intent element where assault required “intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another”). Quite simply, the fact that the 

Georgia statute has a different structure proves nothing.

Second, the majority asserts as supporting its textual interpretation that the 

burglary statute sets out a “finite list of specific structures.” Maj. Op. at 20. This 

 

4

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, (2000).

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39

finite list—along with the disjunctive phrasing and lack of a single locational term 

with a separate definition section discussed above—leads the majority to the 

conclusion that Georgia’s burglary statute sets out “multiple locational elements 

effectively creating several different crimes.” Maj. Op. at 20.

The wording of Georgia’s burglary statute, however, contradicts the 

majority’s assertion. The statute includes among its list of locations that can be 

burglarized “other such structure[s] designed for use as the dwelling of another.” 

O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) (2011). The phrase “other such structure[s]” cannot be part 

of a finite list because it is necessarily expansive: Any type of structure that is 

designed for use as a dwelling would qualify. For example, a travel trailer,5

although absent from the list, undoubtedly qualifies as “such [a] structure designed 

for use as the dwelling of another” that is capable of being burglarized in Georgia. 

While Georgia’s statute does not use the word “includes,” see Maj. Op. at 18–19 

(noting that the Georgia statute does not use the term “includes,” unlike the 

Alabama statute held indivisible in Howard), the phrase “other such” serves 

essentially the same function. The statute lays out no finite list of structures; thus 

it cannot “effectively creat[e] several different crimes.” Maj. Op. at 20.

 

5 “A travel trailer is a non-motorized RV designed to be towed by a pickup truck, SUV 

or, for smaller units, even a car.” “What is a travel trailer,” RVNetLinx, http://rvnetlinx.com/

wprvtypes.php?cat=tt [https://perma.cc/KR2P-YRH4] (last visited Nov. 18, 2016); see also

United States v. Guerrero-Navarro, 737 F.3d 976, 979 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Consider, for example . 

. . travel trailers. These are not buildings, but they may nevertheless be dwellings in the ordinary 

sense. So although a certain venue may not qualify as a Taylor-approved building or structure, it 

may still . . . constitute a dwelling.” (citations omitted)).

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 39 of 73 
40

Third, the majority argues that Georgia case law concerning the adequacy of 

indictments confirms its interpretation. It contends that because Georgia 

prosecutors must specify the location of a burglary in the indictment, the different 

locations must be elements. This argument confuses location (e.g., “the Financial 

Aid Office and Alumni Office, located at Fort Valley State College, Fort Valley, 

Peach County, Georgia”), Morris v. State, 303 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1983), with type of location (e.g., a “building”). Id. It is true that an indictment 

charging burglary must identify the specific location and ownership of the 

allegedly burglarized place. See id. But Georgia law imposes no requirement that 

an indictment include the type of location burglarized. Oftentimes, as in the case 

of the Financial Aid Office building in Morris, an indictment will identify both. 

But it need not do so.6

 For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals approved of 

“Social Circle Drug Store, the property of Billy Snipes, located in the City of 

Social Circle, Walton County, Georgia” as a sufficient description of a burglarized 

location in an indictment. Mobley v. State, 296 S.E.2d 617, 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 

1982). This indictment specified the location of the burglary, but not the type of 

 

6 The majority cites two cases, Chester v. State, 140 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964), and 

Kidd v. State, 146 S.E. 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928), that predate the 1968 enactment of the burglary 

statute at issue in this case. The previous statute contained entirely different elements—as the 

majority’s quotation of Chester, which includes “breaking and entering” among these elements, 

demonstrates—so cases interpreting it are irrelevant to our analysis. Maj. Op. at 21 (quoting 

Chester, 140 S.E.2d at 53).

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 40 of 73 
41

location that was burglarized. Was Billy Snipes’s drug store in a building?7 

Almost certainly. But the indictment itself neglects to say so and was nevertheless 

upheld—meaning that the type of location the defendant allegedly entered need not 

be specified in the indictment. 

More fundamentally, the majority misapprehends the purpose of requiring 

the burglary’s location to be included in indictments. The majority speculates that 

the multiple types of locations listed in the Georgia burglary statute must be “why 

under Georgia law a prosecutor must select, identify, and charge the specific place 

or location that was burgled.” Maj. Op. at 21. This speculation lacks support. 

Rather, as a case the majority cites makes clear, an indictment must include the 

location burglarized in order “to give the defendant ample opportunity to prepare a 

defense.” Morris, 303 S.E.2d at 494. The many indictment cases on which the 

majority relies never considered whether the types of locations listed in Georgia’s 

burglary statute are alternative elements or means of committing the crime because 

these cases were concerned only with the need to “inform the accused as to the 

 

7 The majority critiques my reliance on Mobley because it is “confident that the term 

‘drug store’ sensibly means a building, not a vehicle, railroad car, or watercraft.” Maj. Op. at 23 

n.7. Perhaps. But what if an indictment stated that the defendant burglarized “the Orient 

Express Restaurant, 2921 Paces Ferry Rd SE, Cobb County, Georgia”? Certainly this would 

provide a location sufficient to satisfy Morris. See 303 S.E.2d at 494. And we might feel 

confident that the term “restaurant” sensibly means a building. Further research would reveal, 

however, that the Orient Express Restaurant is housed in a railroad car. See Marisa Roman, This 

Train in Georgia is Actually a Restaurant and You Need to Visit, OnlyInYourState (Aug. 27, 

2016), http://www.onlyinyourstate.com/georgia/restaurant-train-in-ga/ [https://perma.cc/4UJTUMHP].

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 41 of 73 
42

charges against him so that he may present his defense and not . . . be taken by 

surprise” and to “protect the accused against another prosecution for the same 

offense.” Smarr v. State, 732 S.E.2d 110, 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).

One of these cases deserves particular attention. The majority argues that 

DeFrancis v. Manning, 271 S.E.2d 209 (Ga. 1980), demonstrates “[t]hat the 

prosecutor must select and identify the relevant statutory locational element” when 

charging Georgia burglary. Maj. Op. at 22. I take it that by this the majority 

means that the prosecutor must specify whether the store, restaurant, or dwelling 

burglarized was in a building or a railroad car. But DeFrancis demonstrates no 

such thing. In DeFrancis, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s 

decision overturning a defendant’s conviction for burglarizing a truck. 271 S.E.2d 

at 210. The appellate court held the conviction was invalid because Georgia law 

only criminalized entering without authority “any . . . vehicle . . . designed for use 

as the dwelling of another,” id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 26-1601 (1968)), and “no 

proof was offered at trial that the truck was ‘designed for the use as the dwelling of 

another.’” Id. For the same reason, the DeFrancis court held that the indictment 

was flawed because it failed to allege that the truck was designed as a dwelling. 

See id. This omission was not error because—as the majority incorrectly 

surmises—Georgia burglary indictments must always include a single type of 

location. The question in DeFrancis was not whether the burglary occurred in a 

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 42 of 73 
43

truck versus a building, but rather whether the truck met the statute’s requirement 

that it be designed for use as a dwelling. Thus, the indictment in DeFrancis was 

flawed because it did not allege a crime at all.8

 In other words, DeFrancis did not 

bar a burglary indictment from listing “building, dwelling, truck, or railroad car 

designed for use as a dwelling.” It merely said that an indictment must specify a 

location that the statute makes it a crime to enter.

The majority’s many indictment cases are unhelpful because they offer no 

answer to the determinative question: at trial, what must a Georgia jury find 

beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant of burglary? See Mathis, 136 

S. Ct. at 2248. Lloyd and the many cases approving jury instructions similarly 

listing burglary’s elements, by contrast, answer that very question: the jury must 

find that the defendant entered a building or dwelling, but not whether it was a 

building or a dwelling or what type of dwelling. The Georgia burglary statute thus 

is indivisible as between buildings and all types of dwellings, including vehicles, 

boats, and railroad cars.

B. The Record of Mr. Gundy’s Convictions Fails to Prove Georgia 

Burglary Is Divisible.

We need not (indeed, may not) look past clear Georgia law, which should 

end our inquiry. But given our disagreement about the import of the cases it cites 

 

8 Burglary did not cover non-dwelling automobiles, and the crime of illegally entering an 

automobile was not enacted until two years after Mr. DeFrancis’s conviction. See O.C.G.A. § 

16-8-18; see also Ga. L. 1976, p. 186, § 1.

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 43 of 73 
44

and the cases I cite above, the majority and I can agree that perhaps Georgia law is 

at least ambiguous on the elements-versus-means question. The Supreme Court 

advised us in Mathis that “if state law fails to provide clear answers [about a 

statute’s divisibility], federal judges have another place to look: the record of a 

prior conviction itself.”9

 136 S. Ct. at 2256. Unfortunately, though, the language 

 9 While I undertake this analysis for the sake of argument, I am skeptical that the 

language in one person’s indictment alone could ever establish that a statute is divisible. Mathis

dictates that courts “may look only to the elements of the offense, not to the facts of the 

defendant’s conduct.” 136 S. Ct. at 2251 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). If 

we were to conclude that Georgia’s burglary statute is divisible solely on the language in Mr. 

Gundy’s indictments, I fear we would be violating this foundational precept.

Didn’t Mathis expressly authorize inquiry into the language of a defendant’s indictments? 

Yes and no. Yes, Mathis allowed recourse to record documents like indictments, but not, in my 

view, in a way that would allow a defendant’s indictments alone to prove conclusively that a 

statute is divisible. To be sure, Mathis provided relatively little guidance to courts taking the 

“peek” it authorized into record documents. Id. at 2256. The opinion included three examples of 

situations where such documents could help answer the divisibility question. The first two 

examples described circumstances demonstrating conclusively that a statute is indivisible. In 

contrast, the third example outlined a scenario indicating that a statute could be divisible: “[A]n

indictment and jury instructions could indicate, by referencing one alternative term to the 

exclusion of all others, that the statute contains a list of elements, each one of which goes toward 

a separate crime.” Id. at 2257. 

This third example is quite different from the first two—both of which employed

deductive methods to determine that a statute was indivisible—because it relies on reasoning by 

induction. Just because the indictment in one case lists a particular statutory term to the 

exclusion of others does not necessarily mean that term is an element. If any jury in the state 

validly could convict a defendant without deciding among multiple statutory terms, then those 

terms are means, not elements. By the same token, a prosecutor’s decision to include only one of 

those terms in a given indictment does not necessarily mean that term is an element. Indeed, 

Mathis instructed us on the relative strength of the conclusions to be drawn from its three 

examples. Where the first two examples provided “as clear an indication as any” that a statute 

was indivisible, the third example “could indicate” that a statute is divisible. Id. (emphasis 

added).

What’s more, the meager record we have in this case would render this third example 

even more equivocal if we found it applied here. Mathis’s third example concerns “an 

indictment and jury instructions.” Id. (emphasis added). The inclusion of jury instructions is 

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 44 of 73 
45

in Mr. Gundy’s indictments—the only record documents we have available—is 

itself too ambiguous to “satisfy Taylor’s demand for certainty when determining 

whether a defendant was convicted of a generic offense.” Id. at 2257 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Gundy’s burglary indictments charge him with burglarizing either a 

“dwelling house” or a “business house.” The two indictments charging Mr. Gundy 

with burglarizing a “dwelling house” cohere with the majority’s hypothesis that 

“dwelling house” is one of several alternative locational elements in the statute, 

meaning that the statute is divisible among the types of locations that can be 

burglarized. The term “dwelling house” does, after all, appear in the list of 

alternative locations in the statute. See O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) (2011).

But the other indictments charging Mr. Gundy with burglarizing a “business 

house” seem to contradict the majority’s hypothesis. Nowhere does § 16-7-1 

reference a “business house.” See id. We can probably safely assume that these 

 

significant because they must always include the crime’s elements, that is, “what the jury must 

find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant.” Id. at 2248. Here, because Mr. Gundy 

pled guilty to each of his prior burglary offenses, “the closest analogs to jury instructions would 

be . . . the statement of factual basis for the charge, shown by a transcript of plea colloquy or by 

written plea agreement presented to the court, or by a record of comparable findings of fact 

adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea.” United States v. Shepard, 544 U.S. 13, 20 

(2005). Unfortunately, though, the only records we have of Mr. Gundy’s guilty pleas are his 

signatures on the various indictments charging him. The record before us includes neither jury 

instructions nor plea colloquies. Mathis in no way suggests that indictments alone could be 

enough to indicate with sufficient “certainty” to satisfy Taylor that the statute is divisible. 

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257 (internal quotation marks omitted). In my view, one person’s

indictments, standing alone, are simply too inconclusive to prove a statute divisible.

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 45 of 73 
46

business houses were buildings, but because “business house” appears nowhere in 

the text of the statute, that the burglary occurs in a business house cannot be an 

element of the crime.10 And if some of Mr. Gundy’s indictments did not charge 

the location of the burglary as an element, why should we assume that the others—

referencing “dwelling house[s]”—did? We cannot make this unfounded 

assumption. Thus, even taking Mathis’s “peek at the record,” Mr. Gundy’s 

indictments point in opposite directions and therefore fail to answer the question 

whether the types of locations listed in Georgia’s burglary statute are elements or 

means.

Mathis instructs courts what to do when state law and the records of a 

conviction are inconclusive regarding a statute’s divisibility. When these sources 

do not “speak plainly,” courts “will not be able to satisfy Taylor’s demand for 

certainty when determining whether a defendant was convicted of a generic 

offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Maj. Op. at 14 (recognizing this limitation). In my view, state law does speak 

plainly in this case, and as a result, I would hold Georgia’s burglary statute to be 

 

10 Georgia law confirms the general proposition that the elements of a crime are derived 

from the text of the statute creating that crime. The state’s criminal code provides that “[n]o 

conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in [the code] or in another statute of 

this state.” O.C.G.A. § 16-1-4. The code further provides that one of its “general purposes” is 

“[t]o define that which constitutes each crime. . . .” Id. § 16-1-2(3). Taken together, these 

portions of the code mean that all Georgia crimes are statutory and that the criminal code itself 

defines each crime. Because the term “business house” does not appear in the text of Georgia’s 

burglary statute, it cannot be part of that crime’s definition, so it cannot be an element. See id.

§ 16-7-1(a). 

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 46 of 73 
47

indivisible. But even rejecting clear Georgia case law, the majority acknowledges 

that perhaps Georgia law is at least ambiguous. See Maj. Op. at 27. It then argues 

that the terms “dwelling house” and “business house” in Mr. Gundy’s indictments 

satisfy Taylor’s demand for certainty that his convictions were for generic 

burglary. Maj. Op. at 27. This conclusion misconceives the appropriate inquiry 

under Mathis at this stage of the analysis: whether the indictments demonstrate 

that Georgia’s burglary statute lists elements not means. 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57. 

The majority should acknowledge that the two terms found in Mr. Gundy’s 

indictments—one of which cannot be found in the text of the statute and therefore 

cannot be an element—provide insufficient clarity to conclude that Georgia’s 

burglary statute is divisible.

II. CONCLUSION

Today, contrary to state case law by which we are bound, the majority 

declares Georgia’s burglary statute divisible and therefore capable of qualifying as 

a violent felony under ACCA. Not only is the decision the majority makes today 

wrong in Mr. Gundy’s case, but it likely will also substantially increase the prison 

terms of scores of future defendants. In recent years, around 700 defendants each 

year have been convicted in this Circuit of being a felon in possession of a 

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 47 of 73 
48

firearm.11 Such a conviction ordinarily carries “a 10-year maximum penalty.” See 

id. at 2248. But ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence where a 

defendant has been convicted of three violent felonies, including generic burglary. 

See id. In the 32 years that the version of Georgia’s burglary statute we interpret 

today was in effect, tens of thousands of defendants were imprisoned for 

committing burglary in Georgia.12 In fact, burglary is the most common crime for 

which people are imprisoned in Georgia.13 These numbers, when considered 

together, mean that thousands of defendants stand to have their sentences increased 

by at least five years each based on the majority’s decision today. This ruling, 

which I believe is contrary to Georgia law, will have a monumental impact and, in 

my view, result in the unlawful incarceration of scores of inmates. I would hold 

Georgia’s burglary statute indivisible, vacate Mr. Gundy’s sentence, and remand 

for resentencing without an ACCA enhancement. I respectfully dissent.

 

11 From 2011 through 2015, 3,398 defendants in the Eleventh Circuit were convicted of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Number of Offenders 

Convicted of Felon in Possession, 11th Circuit, Fiscal Years 1996 through 2015 (generated Oct. 

24, 2016) (on file with the Clerk).

12 From 2005 through 2011, 17,077 defendants were imprisoned for burglary, an average 

of over 2,400 a year. See Ga. Dept’t of Corrections, Inmate Statistical Profile, Inmates Admitted 

During CYs 2005–2011, available at http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/Research/Annual_CY_profile_

inmate_admissions [https://perma.cc/6L8R-UPH4].

13 Burglary was the most common crime for which people were imprisoned every year 

between 2005 and 2011 except 2006 and 2007. See id.

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 48 of 73 
Appendix

Case: 14-12113 Date Filed: 11/23/2016 Page: 49 of 73 
NATHAN EDWIRD GUNDY

Charge: BurgJ.ary

ACCUSATION

Filed in office, this

_____ day of Th11-L , 2OL.

• &M(AJ

SUPERIOR COURT

The defendant, NAI'H.N EDWARD GUNDY, waives being formally

arraigred, waives copy of accusation, and p1eds r)iI

This _____ day of Ji-cL_ , 20 J. 7

DEFENDANT (::1

i 7f/t1'

DEFENDANT' S A"TOPEY

/ /)í'ñ/

DISTRId' ATTORNE?

WITNESSES FOR TRE ST7tT:

Erad enn8dy, .3PD

...avid Erni: J!aty __ .•,• ,.' • a

Al

•! t1: ' :':.

I _7 ,

Wi'i' C.c_Y/

'I

jL

I. - USAO-000 17
v.

NATHJ..N EDWARD GtJNDY

.i

* Dece-Inber erin, 2000

*

*

*

* Eu.rglary

ACCUSATION

On behalf of the people of the State of Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney or duly appointed ssistant District: Attorney for the Middle Judicial Circuit of Gecrgia, as prosecuting attorney for the county and state aforesaid, •3es hereby charge and accuse NATHAN EDWARD Gt7ND'( with the offense of EtTRGtARY (O.C.G.A. 16-7-1); for that the said accused on tYUly 12, 2000, in the county aforesaid, did then and there unlawfull.', without authority, and with the intent to c•nit a theft therein, enter the business house of another, to wit: David Bernice :-artiey d/b/a E-Z Coin Laundry, located at East NcCartv Street, Sandersville, Georgia, contrary to the laws of the state of Georgia, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof. - /7

This

__________ dcv of

____________

____

Assistant bistrict Attorney

Office of the District Attorney ?ost Office Drawer J

Swainsboro, Georcia 30401

p178) 237-Th46

USO -000 174
g 

over t the superior court of said county or being confined in jail erding coimiitment trial or being in jail, having waived commitment trial, does hereby expressly waive indictment by grand jury in accordan:e with the appropriate Drovisjons of law; and

The aforenared accused expressly consents to the filing of the foregoing accusation by the istrict Attorney; and

The afcrened accused expressly consents that the judge of said superior court may open the court at this tiic without the presence of either grand jury or traverse jury to receive and act upon the plea of the aforenamed accused; and

The aforenamed accused expressly waives trial by jury arid consents to trial by the judge alone without the intervention of a jury upon the foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforenaxnc-d accused acknowledges that, before any action herein indicated, the accused has been fully advised as to a.l of his rights in connection with all of the rat:rs here concerted, and all of the actiori herein taken by him has been taken by him with full knowledge of all such legal rights; and

The aforenamed accused acknowledges that, prior to any of the actions taken by the accused in this matter, the accused has been fully advised as to his rights to the services of an attorney at law in all stages of the proceeding against the accused; and accused has been advised that in the event he is unable to employ an attorr.ey the court will aPPoint an attortey to represent the accused; and the accused acknowledges that the court in this instance expressly offered to appoint an attorney to advise and reDresent the accused.

Upon the foregoing accusation, including each arid every charge and count therein contained, the aforenarra. accused waives formal arraigruient, waives copy and list cf witnesses, and pleads guilty.

Thiz

_______ day o ________________________. 20

.4-,-

- 'i jJJ.j-

_______________

ccused

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vs.

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FINAL DISPOSITTc::

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CT TJ LTY OW 0 D!AD DOCKET ORDIP 0W

_______________________ LNT()

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iEREAS, th above-named deferdazt has been foucz :uicy o: thc above-statEd

offense(s) , it is hereby ORDERED X.ND ADJUDGED bt c'e CCUrC chat the said

defndan is hereby sente:ced to coirer.t or a period of - c r - P , r

)Lv_ )-Ia-i

n the State Penal ocher ins:ictiC:.. s the Comrn,ssoner of the St.te eartrrent of Cor o:cns or the C::: ra; direct, to be corncitd as provided by law.

ATI'OR!TEY LLW. C_____ 7r_.-/ CO(JNY .:-:i:-qv (A?OThTM1fl.

DEJifl - _// - 1t

IS SO ORDERED, :h: /

;çî LF) '('f//I NANT

34TEOPIATED

C-UILri OW COT3NT(S) _________ o NOLO CONTEtITDE E

CCL'NT3}

____________________ J TO .EsER £NCLUDED

ON COtWr(S} - 1r Offi:e

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USAO-OCU17
vs. Charge: Burglary

NATB.AN EDWARD GUNDY

ACCUSAT IOM

Filed in office, this

_____ day of _________________ 2QL.

(?it4

CL-R!L SUPERIOR COURT

The defendant, NATH2.N EDWARD GUNDY, iaives beir formally arraig-ned, waives copy 9€ accusation, and p1ads 62i/h. This j day of

, 20 0! 1

(IjAfCLJ

DEFEIDANT ,j )i) DEFENDANT S ATTNE

DISTR±CT ATTNY

WITNESSES FOR THE STATE:

ra3 SPE

Dvi•. r':c

ErtcT?

ti-, _.--- :: _L;

---- r"

USJL)-O00 77
vs -

NATH.AM EDWARD GUHDY

Accusation No. OOC2 * Decanther Term, 2000

*

*

*

* Burglary

ACCUSATION

On behalf of the eople of the State of Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney or duly apoinced Assistant District Attorney for the Middle Judicial Circuit of Georgia, as prosecuting attorney for the county and state aforesaid, does hereby cbarge and. accuse MATfl EDWA?D GtYNDY ,ith the offense of BURGLARY (O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1); for that the said accused on August 23, 2000, in the county aforesaid, dId then and there unlawfully, without authority1 and with the intent to cormit a theft therein, enter the business house of another, to wjt David Bernice Hartley d/b/a S-Z Coin Laundry, located at Sast i.cCarty Street, Sandersvi1l, Georgia, contrary to the laws of the state of Georgia, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof.

This

___________ dcv o

____________________, 20 _1/

/,6f Ass.stanc D?strct kttorney

Office of the District Attorney Post Office Drawer J

Swainshoro, Georgia 30401 (478) 237-7846

CC'017
uperior court of said county or being c fined in jail er.ding coninitinant trial or being in jail, having waiied comznitrnent trial, does hereby expressly waive indictment by grand jury in accordance with the appropriate rovisior.s of law; and

The aforenainad accused expressly consents to the filing of the foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforenaried accused expressly consents that the judge of said superior court may open the court at this time without the presence of either grand jury or traverse jury to receive d act uoon the ilea of the aforenamed accused; and

The aforenained accused expressly waives trial by jury and consents to trial by the judge alone without the in:ervention of a jury upon the foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforena.med accused acknowledges that, before any action herein indicated, the accused has been fully advised as to all of his rights in connection with all of the matters here concerned arid all of the action herein taken by him has been taken by him with full knowledge of all such legal rights; and

The aforenamed accused acknowledges hac, prior t any of the actions taken by the accused in this matter, the accused has been fully advised as to his rights to the services of an attorney at law in all stages of the P:c.ceeding against the accused; and accused has been advised that in the event he is unable to employ an attorney the cour: will apcoint an attornc-y to represent the accused; and the accused acknowledges that the court in this instance expressly offered to appoint an ac:crney to advise and represent the accsd.

Upon the ±oregong accusation, includina each and every charge and count therein contained, the aforeneed accused waives fornal arraigriient, waives cony and list of wi:nsses, and pleads guilty.

This

_______ day of _________________________, 20_0/

- Accused

'

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-:•'

- USAO-1itJ 79
OFFENSE(S) _________________________ V3.

/VL. '/J 2.#4/

0 y j '?fff7 FEIDANT -

FINAL DISPOSITION

OrEER DISPOSITIC

J !OLE ROSEQU OPDER ON COLT

______________________ COUNT(S)

_______________ NO? GUILTY ON U D!D OCXET ORDER ON

:OJNrS) _____________________

______________ F INCLUDED

OFFE (1 OF ___________

N CNT(5)

__________________

WHEREAS, the above-arnd dferant has been found cuilty of the above-stated offensa(s) , i is herez ORDER AND JUflGED v the Ccr ha che said

defndanz is h.rby ntnced, to con ie for a eriod of

-y Cr) Cv,ett j.,4 J/t.'c

-t-Lt' ic- e-.t ..e,-id

in th State ?na1 yst or su ohr ins::::ca t: ComrnissiDr.er of

the State epartnent cf C rcions or the Ccur: y direct, to be computed as orovde by law.

ThE DEDANT 'S RE?RESENT E -I (_/ 1/ £J4 c.

ATTOPJEY AT LAW OF_____________________ COUNTY, ;R;:.:. s•!: (?.PpOflT1EWt.

-i-I--

IT IS SO ODERED chi

_____

DyEGOT IATD

cUiiry ON COUTS) _________ 0 NOt0 CCNTENDERE ODUNT S) ___________________ 0 TO LESSER INCLUDED

OFFENSE(S) ___________________

O COUNT(S)

_________________

Filed I:'. Cf±ce Thi.

7) .2?.

USAO-000 180
v.

NATFL7LN EDWARD GUNDY

Charge: Burglary Cl

ACCUSATION

Filed in office, chis 1' day o YY1aJ 0.QL.

u, 9/. (!i

CLP, SUPERIOR COURT

The defendant, NATHAN EDWARD GtINDY, waives bei.ng formal1y arraigned, waives coov of accusation, and peads This J7L - // day of /rCL-

, 20 Q,L.

&&J^T

DEFENDANT L-)

WITNESSES FOR TE STATE:

Brad Kenned-i, 5D

Michael Joel ' 'hran, EFC 111 24urpLriv

?irby Hal!

rnpv rr r-r '1 £ r :.

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LIJOO-OVEfl Z
g 

over to he superior court of said county or being confined in jail pending corthcinent trial or being in jail, having waived coinmitmet trial, does hereby expressly waive indictm.nt by grand jury in accordance with the appropriate provisions of law; and

The aforenamed accused exnresslv consents to the filing of the foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforenamed accused expressly consents that the judge of said superior court may onen the court at this tine without the presence of either grand jury or traverse jury to receive and act upon the plea of the aforenamed accused; and

The aforenained accused expressly waives trial by jury and consents to trial by the judge alone without the intervention of a jury upon the foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforenarned accused acknowledges thatr before any action herein indicated, the accused has been fuly. advised as to all of his rights in connection with all of the matters here concerned, and all of the action herein taken by hin has been taken by him with full knowledge of all such legal :ights; and

The aforenarned accused acknowledges that, orior to any of the actions taken by the accused in this matter, the accused has been fully advised as to his rights to the se.rices of an attorney at law in all stages of the proceeding against the accused; and accused has been advised that in the event he is unable to employ an attorney the court will aoooint an attorney to represent the accused; and the accused acknowledges that the court in this instance expressly offered t appoint an attorney to advise and reoresent the accsei.

Upon the foregoing accusation, including each and every charge and count therein cnr.ained. the aforenamed accused waives formal arraigmrnent, weivs v ard list of witnesses, and pleads guilty.

This

_______ nay of

___________________________, 20

c cused

-

'7

p'

A

-

r, :ccs ,'

_/

Distrir :-'-:ne

7)

USAO-000 183
OFFEQS(S) ______________________

vs.

A4 /' E I , , - TERM,

gf/7 2. jf' DEFEflDANT

FINAL DISPOSITION

:V1JtLTy o COUNT(S) _________

O NOLO CO ZNDE C

COtET (S) ___________________

O TO LESSER tNCLtJ!f3

FENsE(S) __________________

o •E?.O!CT: 0 OTR DS?O5IT:QN

o -'t / 0 i.JtJy

C-UXLTY ON 0 OLLI ?R0SEt7i •DPJER

COUNT(S) - COJNT(S) ______________

0 NOT GUILY ON 0 D!A DCT ORDEP. ON

___________________ COtTS) _____________

0 GUILT OF I!CLUDED

E(5} o__________________ CW 2OJ(S)

O COUNT(S) _______________

tj rL.v1 Y-Z.LJ

-- Ni'4i_.

WHEREAS, the above-naaed defendant been found gi1ty of the above-stated

of fense(), it is hereby OP-DERED D IJUDGED by the Court that che said

defndant is hereby sentenced1 to confin.een for a Deriod of

Cr) (4r'C ,t- re/ec - C--J T*- .c

in the State Penal Sy ouch ocher in icuion as the Conrnissioner of

th State Deoartrnent of Corrections or the Cotirt y direct, to be computed

as orovided by law.

TE DEFEND14T R!P SNTE CCA3LE c-.ii

ATTO?.NEY .T LAW, Q? _ ? ,.I CO(NT1, C-SCA (A?OTMNT1.

/ -1- T IS SO ORDERED, this I

Filed In Office This

I- Day of 2-4_L'

i

Cr:-z uperior Ccu::

day of _____

Jt!d, Sejcr

tidd1e Jd..a1

7

C.urc of LL3 County

Circui: of

7

USAO-000i 4
vs. Charges: 8urglaty (Two Counts)

NATEAN EDWARD GUNDY

ACCUSATION

Filed in office, this ji_ day of iaa_Ji , 20L.

CLRd. SUFERIOR COURT c2i.

The defendant, AThAU EDWAPD GUND, waives beinc formally arraigied, waives cofly of accusation, and Dicads _______ This day of _______________, 20 L.

/Lftfr4 a

DFFENflNT __)

DISTRICT ATTO?.1Ey

ITNSSES FOR THE STATE:

rd s

!rk A. 3ac, S?

Cavid rr.i :-

auli -s::

çuncoi :r:s

Rashaci :s

Lur ' - 
vs.

NATEAN EDWARD GUNDY

Accusation No. QczQ..t3I * December Term, 2000

*

*

*

* urg1ary (Two Counts)

ACCUSAT I ON

Count 1: On behalf of the people of the State of Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney or duly appointed Assistant District Attorney for the Niddle Judicial Circuit of Georgia, as prosecuting attorney for the county and state aforesaid, does hereby charge and accuse kTRAN EDARD GUDY with the offense f BURGL.A.RY (O.C.G.A. 16-7-1).; for that the said accused on December 12, 2000, in the county aforesaid, dLd then and there unlawfully, without authority, and with the intent to corrrnit a theft therein, enter the business house of another, to wit: David ernice :azoley d!b/a. E-Z Coin Laundry, located at East McCarty Street, Sanderevilla, Georgia, contrary to the laws of the state of Georgia, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof.

count 2: The undersigned, as orosecuting attorney for the county and state aforesaid, does further charge and accuse NTRAN EDWARD GUNDY with the offense of BtJRLARY (O.CG.A. § 16-7- 1); for that the said accused on December 14, 2000, in the county aforesaid, dId then and there unlawfully, without authority, and with the intent to commit a theft therein, enter the business house of another, to wit: David Earnice Hartley dib(a E-Z Coin L.aundry, located at East Mccarty Street, Sandereville, Georgia, contrary to the laws of the state of Georgia, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof.

/ This / - day of ______________________,

/ / //6" ,w'- ssomi::t tr:ev

Oifi:e of t:: t:i:t A-ev

?csc Off:ce Drr J

Swansb,rc, Gc;j.

(47 237-7.4E

LrSAO-COO O
said county or being confined in jail pending cortnitment trial or being in jail, having waived commitnent trial, does hereby expressly waive indictment by grand jury in cccrdance t,qj the appropriate provisions of law; and

The aforenarned accused ecpressly consents to the filing of the foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforenamed accused expressly consents that the judge of said suDerior court may ooen the court at this time without the presence of either grand jury or traverse jiry to receive and act upon the plea of the aforenamed accused; arid

The aforenamed accused expressly waives trial by jury and consents to trial by the judge alone without the intervention of a jury upon the foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforenamed accused ackrowledges that, before any action herein indicated, the accused has been fully advised as to all of his rights in connection with all o the matters here concerned, and all of the action herein taken by him has been taken by him with full knowledge of all such legal rights; arid

The aforer.aned accused acknowledges that, prior to any of the actions taken by the accused in this matter, the accused has bean fully advised as to his rights to the serv,ces of an attorney at law in all stages of the proceeding against the accused; and accused has been advised that in the event he is unable to employ an attorney the court will aPpoint an attorney to represent the accused; and the accused acknowledges thc the court in this instance exoresslv offered t appoint an attorney to advise and represent the accused.

Upon the foregoing accusation, including each and every charge and count therein contained, the aforenamed accused waives formal arra rent, waives cov.r nc list of 'icnesses, and pleads guilty.

This

_______ day of 20

_1txt. ;4 - Accused (1

)

;tcorn-, fc.r J.ccuseI. .•

, ,,

$ /, _..7

----

i.tri:
vs.

CFFENBE(Sj -// J-2 L1rJ.,7

IJL44 Jijfr,d __________________TERM, O$C74 7)(/'J DEFENDANT

FINAL DISPOSITION

0 a DT3EF. DIS?OITIC•N

a / a NCN-JTJa C NOL1LE PROSEQIJI OROE ON

C0tJNT( _____________________ CCUNT(S) ______________ 0 NOT c: c 0 DE.D DOc:ET OP.DRCCtN(3j _____________________ CGJNTSJ ______________ a um CF :NcLuDE1O5!S) CF________________

O!ñ CCLT(S ___________________ WHERE?S, the above-named defendant has been found ui1tv of the above-stated

off2nse(s), it is hereby ORDERED ?D ADJEYDGED by th Court that Lhe said

defendant is hereby sentenced to confinement for a period of

,'yr Cr _Ji ,i i J

1.t J•

ç,-i1( . -1

in the State Penal 5ystern or such other istitutica as the Commissioner of

the State DeDartment of Correctior.s r the Cur y direct, to be computeda provided by law.

TFE DEEEiDkT W.S RPESZNTE.) Y CR.LE -_' i/ _/frf/

tTTO?.NEY Ji L.34, OF 7 1 CUNT'. 3: {XPP0IW1EN;)

Jr p-i /

T I SO ORDERED, this / day of ____ _____________ >I1(

cr'NEGOTIATED

GUILTY 014 COUNT(S)

O NOLO CON NtE ON

COUNT(S) __________ o TO LZSSR INCLUDEDOFFENSE(S) __________________ ON CC4JNT(S) _________________ :-. Office T:s

j_' ___________ r:r u:.r?

uS-ong2
ye. Charge: Burglary

iATHA.N E7tBD GtflDY

Returned in open court by the grand jury bai1if, announced

the court, and !iled in office, this day of

_______________ 20 O-'

$2i L1/

CLER., £UERIOR CJ1J.? - The deenden, ______________________________ waives being

forna11y araigned1 waives cooy of indicjnen, and oleads

6z..-,j This '' dy r -

20'5, /

r TI-l:t;vI )F •i GL.TY

?.EA CF u1rYs r^Y CF - 4'? .-L_--A

h ' ,Ii-!. k -

v .i

I / '-.<_____

usi'o-oouioi

INDI CTMENT

7

¶'ITNESSS OR THE STATES

'c

'C

.::i, 3?2

rr.n Yr:ar -,F.)
INDICTMENT

NO.

The grand jurors selected, chosen, and sworn for said county,

to-;d.t:

Lewis N. West, ForeoersonEvelyn J. Huntley, .ASSista.flt

Pendry W. Braswell, Clerk

Michelle R. ClarPatricia E. Rountree

Robert L. JenkinsDenise B. DixonBrenda W. T4ilscn

DanieL G. May

Mainie L. MilesVictor Royal

Daniel L. Jones

Kevin S. Morris

Foreperson Geraldine S. White

Judith A. ?ate

Sandy L. Stric)ciandLeon E. Anthony 11Clarence Hodges

Sandra Martin

lizabech Lenar

Benjan.in A. l1en

Judy H. PeaDavid Ir'zin

in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge and

accuse NATE1 DWRD GTThDY with the offense f BURGLkRY (O.C.G.A.

16-7-1) for the said NATH.A EWA.RD GUNDY On

Decether 9, 2003, in the cnty aforesaid, did then and there

unlawfully, without authority, and with the intent to commit a

theft therein, a th delliz-g house o another, to wit:

Ci-tifon Jones, 1cated at 403 Grand Street, Sandrsv±lle. Georgia,

tontrary to th la.:s of the s:e of Gecria. the oo order,

eace, and r.rereof.

WASHINGTON SIJPERIOR COURT STEVE ASREWDECE19ER TERIl, 2004 DISTRICT AT'rOR.NY

USAO.0U02ü2
LEA: - 4)NEooruTEo 0 J1RY

ZUILTY ON COUNT(S) I flNONJLiRY

oNOLO CONTENDERE tN

COUNT(S) __________ - OTO LESSER RCLL;DED

OFFENSE(S) _____________

WHEREAS, the abo-named dcIendni has hen found vhy of th: k c-statel oiTcte, W1iEP.EUPON. it is ordered and wJjuded by the

Court that: me said dcfcndan shhvsncd I .-incncrtt foT a period

in the tht/i'enaI Sy5tcrn or suth other insthution as the Coot nisskinecolthe S:n Department ci Cornaiions or Court may direct, ti

computed as pm'ridcd by law, I1OWVER, ii is ñirthcr orere hvthe Court:

I) TILAT the abore sentcnx msy be scrved on poba inn

02) THAT upon scricc or ________________________ olihe bo%c cuune. th rmndec 01 ___________________- rnybc served on probation PROVIDED that the .aid detenant comp1s With th co:feig cn:raI 3nd other nditions herein imposed by the Court as part of ibis sentence.

E.ERAL CONDITiONS OF PROBATION

The defend,t. having hcn iat,d the pri'.1ee of icvinaJt or part of the abac.stted Ientene on pri.tion. hereby is entend to th

following general conditions of prohtkin:

) Det nt 1Iatc ihe crimir.al b of ait tmrtceul unit.

2) Avoid injurious end v3ciou hits - epeial3y acahoIic I catiot and necc-tict ed other dengeous dus unlcst preseribed

United Staics,

'5 COflIER CONDITIONS OF PRORATiON

ii iS FuRTHER ORDERED rhi the detbndwi pay a ine in tire onmunt of_______________ - pus O or 1 (, hiehcer is less puruent to O.C.Ci.A. t5.2l-O. and pey rcstirumJon in ih; anlour.t of ____________:____________ Probation fce

______________

Court CoiLs

A1ttirnc' feeL Peyracr.ts arc: ________--

IT IS THE FLRTi-IER ORDER of the Court, and the JIfn:unt is nereby adisei that ti-c C'urt ry, .tt any time, rcvoke wiyoondidons oftHs :obaton and!or di lmare .ir mS:f:n±i:it from prohaihr. •Fh ..... ,i:r::r sIiLdt be rri i-n armc5t fOr i.tiurt of any erntition ofpbtinn herein granted. l(stih probation Is r: kd, the Court nay order the ectutior. oite r.men.a w1ii1m was erieinal!v impos'J or mny portion thzmmeufln th. m.ulflcr prr jed mw 1.w citer dcJuctn tr:-e:.'-1 th a'rur.m nI:mme rme enant has served on m-ohatjon. The defermnt aas rcrosemicd by ti-c Forrorehi: . ttiorncv ci l.aw, P3St/47)'J Count', b:1 ( '..(Apr;mrirtr.i t,fl- 'Pt

Uv.djC&.n (44j7 __ 

ON COUNT(S) ______ iiIt, RIiiritT,i.E i:fl VrJ, ILrzi i1t.1II Z.t)I. JFELONY SENTENCE 0 MtSDEME&iCR SENTEI\CE 

C \RDiCi 0 GL'IL'rYDN COUNTS) ____________ Ci '.OTG1flL1Y ON COL1I(S) ___________- o GULTY Oi INCLUDED OFFENSE(S) OF -_______ ON COUNTIS _________ 0 OIlIER I)ISIOSrnON: ONOLLE PROSEQUI ORDER ON COUNT(S) ______________ o DEAD DOCKET ORDER ON COLN1() ________- (SEE SE1ARME ORDER) i) Prøhk,rtcr shall, from time to time upon oral or written rcqucsL y arty P;ctbacioo OhYir. prrJue a brith, uriui. and/or blood sccimert for anahis for the prssible presence of a suhttsnce rohibhed or cAlIolied by any law of the State of Gearitia or of the j3) lawfully. Avoid persons or p!acs oIdisrcpuiab!c t ianitjj1 diarsacr. Report to the Prob ioa-Psrole Supcrisu; as dir: ed and permit suh Sepervisor IC' vitit him(h:r) at home or clsuwhere. Worl fhlthfully at suitcbl employment insofar as may be poscib!c. Do not charte hisiher) pccscnI place of abci. nove tttidc the jurisdiction of the Court. or Icate the State for any pcriod of lime without prior pcrmssion oldie Proaiion Supervisor. Support his(hcr) egal dependents to thu best of hisher) ability.

_r.

____- jfude Suprcr Courts

Middle .Judi iitllt OFSER\ ICE

I'it i.t mc' _errI. ir .u4 .rr;el co' f i:. S. m. i:omr:.ri i:er "- -: i to t.: neant ar. imi: m a.in:(_ tTLi r: chose

.-_. C_-

p r4rLje-i rr inti Cc'n-i.rIn!.

.

- ..- .:.ct4 tLIVTXStV..t

rss,c: 1.

'US-O- ")Ct2[13
*

*

* Case Uo. rz-

*

*

ADDITION GENEL CONDITION OF PROEATION

The orobainer sa11 subnit to eva!eaicns ar.d testinG

:eLating to r.habiiitaton and carticiocta in and successfully complete rehabili:st:v. progrettiing as directed b' the deoartrnent.

Ordered at WA^H-i?JE,TM1 Ci%Wfl/

:Er1AAJ:r: , 20

udge of the Su3eri.or Courts

tidd1e Judicial Circuit

Walter C. McMifla Jr.

Chief Judge, Superior Courts

Middle Judicial Circuit

has bee- iei -arad a cc; :.. du.v inst:ucted regarding this cnd!ticn cf pohacior r3 sane is sckiowledged by

vs.

pJ ?-th-V VA-i

Geora, this

_____

Ur sgr.tures - USA O.O0O2
v.

NATRP.N EDWARD GUNDY

CharGe: 3urg1ay

ACCUSATION

Filed in office, this 2O d _______________, 2O.

(t' II W. L-J

CL'RK' SUPERIOR COURT

The deendanc. ZATHAN EDWARD Gr.TN]DY ive beina fora1ly ., I

arraigred, waives copy o accusation, nd p1ads Ui I7

This 2O day f rI , 20 .

DISTRICT kT'CPY

WI'rNESSES OR T STATE:

r -' 'Op

ifw 2vl

SL

Lç.

(1bi -'

U S Ci-0C0205

rad Zennedy1 SFD

!:-

(-p L

l ' ,'

r

:

----.--

-.-.---

rrr
vs.

NAT SAN EDWARD GUND

i'arch Tern, 2006

*

*

*

Burglary

ACCUSATIOW

On behalf of the ecp1e of the State of Georgia, the

undersigned District Attorney or duly aoointed Assistant District

Attorney for the Middle Judicial Circuit of Gecrg±a, as prosecuting

attorney for the county and state aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse NATFi EW.D UDY with the offense of BURGLARY (O.C.G.A.

§ 16-7-1.); for that the said accused on anu&ry 8, 2006, in the

county aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully, without authority,

and with the intent to ccr-nit a theft therein, enter the dwelling

house of another, to wit: McArthur oxdan, located at

321 Tybee Street, S ervi1le, Gergie, :cntrary to the laws of

the state of Georoja, the coed order, peace, and dianity thereof,

This ___________ day of / 20 1

?.ssistant District t:orney

Office of the District Attorney

Post Office Drawer

Swainsboro, Georgia 30401

(473) 237-7846

USAO-000206
being in jail, having waived cc itmtr.t trial, dces hereby

exoressly waive indictment by grand :ury in accordance with the

apprøpriate provision. of law: and

The afcrenamed accused exprassly ccrsen:s to the filing of the

foregoing accusation by the District Attorney; and

The aforenamed accused expressly c•sents that the judge of

said superior court ay ornen the court at this time iithout the

presence of either grand jury or traverse jury to receive and actupon the plea of the aforena'ed accused; and

The aforenamed accused expressly waives trial by jury and

consents to trial by the jude alone with the intervention of a

jury uoon the foregoing accusation by the D:strict Attorney; and

The aforcnamed accused acknowledges that, before any action

herein indicated, the accused hs bei fully advised as to all ofhis rights .n connectcn with all of the 'r.atters iere concerned,

and all of the action herein taken by him has been aken by hin

with full knowledge of all such legal rights; and

The aforena,ied accused acknowledges that, prior to ar.y of the

actions taken by the accused in this matter, The accused has been

fully advised as to his rights to the sevices o: an attorney atlaw in all stages of the proceeding against the accused; and

accusod has been advised that in the event he is unable to employ

an attorney the court will apoint an attorney to represent theaccused; and the accused acknowledges that the court in this

instance expressly offered o appont an attorney to advise and

represent the accused.

Jpon the foregoing accusation, incluin each and every charge

and COunt therein concaine, the aforenaed accused waives formalarr2r_'nh, 3reS cnoy and ist i:esas, ar pleads guilty.

Tis - ' day of /Z7,-./ , 20

_L?-.'L,2c

E€' il/)

±1

LI

V ,-r---

'-

_________ --

-. Accsea

I

/

,./

, A

I-I ../ /I'.

USAO-000207
vs

,AM17+ Di14i i1ALc

DT:

ji/12-tr TERM, 20

FINAL DS?OSITION

coTIATFTh

GUILTY O) COtJT(S /

0 )OLO CO ZD!RZ O1

COhT1S ___________________ 0 TO L1S51 I:CLLDD

O C&TIS) _______________

0 QTh I5?CSITION

0 !OLL ?OSQUI O

c3t5rZfS ____________________ _____________ !;OT Gt3ILTY C 0 L-.) 0OCT CDZ O1

couis ____________________ _____________ C? Z7CLLTD

CZC) o____________O7 CU1TS) ___________________ 000

.:=: ;i!_.

BERES, th defn it hs bn fcn -1tv cf th av-stat

offnoe(s), it !s hrby ORRD 1D AJOD:-Efl b a court thac t saiddeendat is hrby sennd to con imnt r a oriod of

Ife- / !J m- U 47J / Jfr 5W7/V 7-1 9(12.4/

4v I & fc5 rfli^ 7

in th Stat Pna1 Syte or sci ot.hr inst:z:i3n as :h Cornrissioner of

Sta: patret o Corr:tions or :b Ccuz: av direct, to ccrnput

as tcwided by 1a.

?ODNT 'U P flESD TH i1'rfl!- L.ii,i-r2.S

r:ur v'. _____________________ - :'r".- 1Ti.

:'r :s ' ::i:s _______ _________________________-

2 C

1.- - ,--- / /-_._;•

I..

'_J_1J- '. --Tce •.e::: :: c

W&ter C. McMiUan Jr

Chief Judge, Supe.ror CC'irt

{dd Judicja Crcur

(JSAO-000203