J-A08034-23

2023 PA Super 83

T. LEE ROUSE 

Appellant

v.

KIMBERLY ROSENBERG AND 

HOWARD ROSENBERG, HER 

HUSBAND AND MARTHA LAUX

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 828 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at 

No(s): GD-21-014912

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: May 15, 2023

This case involves a cause of action for emotional distress resulting from 

interference with a dead body. Under § 868 of the First Restatement of Torts, 

as adopted by our Supreme Court in Papieves v. Lawrence, 263 A.3d 118, 

120 (Pa. 1970), “one who wantonly mistreats or, acting without privilege, 

intentionally withholds the body of a decedent is liable in tort to the member 

of the decedent’s family who is entitled to the disposition of the body.” The 

issue here is whether a person “intentionally withholds” a missing murder 

victim’s body where they allegedly acted as accessories after the fact but are 

not alleged to have helped hide the body or even know its location.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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The plaintiff, T. Lee Rouse (Rouse), sued Kimberly and Howard 

Rosenberg (the Rosenbergs), and Martha Laux (Laux) (collectively, 

Defendants). The Rosenbergs’ son murdered Rouse’s son and hid his body in

a park where it remained undiscovered for over two months. During that 

time, the Rosenbergs came into possession of the handgun that their son used 

to commit the murder. Rather than take it to the police, the Rosenbergs took 

it to their marriage counselor, Laux. She then took the handgun to the police 

but lied about how she found it. Based on all this, Rouse alleged that 

Defendants delayed the proper disposition of her son’s body. Defendants 

countered that they could not be held liable for interference with a dead body 

because there was no allegation that they ever touched or controlled her son’s 

body, let alone even knew its location. Agreeing with Defendants, the Court 

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) dismissed Rouse’s action 

on preliminary objections.

On appeal, Rouse argues that she pleaded sufficient facts to withstand 

demurrer because (1) this case is analogous to Papieves, and (2) she was 

not required to show that Defendants ever physically touched or hid her son’s 

body. After review, we affirm.

I.

As discussed, this case arises from the tragic murder of Rouse’s son, 

Christian Moore-Rouse (Christian), who was killed by the Rosenbergs’ son, 

Adam Rosenberg (Adam). As alleged in Rouse’s complaint, the facts of which
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we take as true,

1 Christian and Adam attended community college together 

and became friends. The Rosenbergs knew that their son was friends with 

Christian because he would often visit Adam at their home, which is where he

lived. In fact, Kimberly Rosenberg would sometimes drive her son to 

Christian’s home or let him use the Rosenbergs’ credit card to pay for rides

for Christian to come to the house.

In the spring of 2019, Adam began showing signs of severe mental 

illness, eventually escalating into violence. Because of his behavior, the 

Rosenbergs had Adam involuntarily committed five times by the end of the 

summer. Then, in October 2019, he overdosed on heroin and was in a coma 

for a week, then inpatient treatment for three weeks. After Adam returned 

home to live with his parents, Christian was the only person who would come 

visit him, as Kimberly Rosenberg would also still drive Adam to visit Christian.

On December 21, 2019, Adam invited Christian to his parents’ home

and paid for his ride. After Christian arrived, Adam shot him in the back of 

the head with a .9 mm handgun. Adam then dragged Christian’s body across

the roadway in front of his parents’ house and left it in a wooded public park. 

____________________________________________

1 Since we are reviewing rulings on preliminary objections in the nature of 

demurrers, we take as true all material facts pled in the complaint, and any 

reasonable inferences deduced therefrom. See Commonwealth v. 

Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 936 n.1 (Pa. 2021) (citation 

omitted).
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A few days later, Christian’s family reported him missing. Within two weeks,

homicide detectives were assigned to investigate his disappearance.

In the weeks after the murder, the Rosenbergs somehow came into 

possession of the handgun that Adam used to kill Christian. As alleged by 

Rouse, either (1) Adam told his parents what he had done and gave them the 

handgun, or (2) the Rosenbergs found the handgun in their residence and 

knew that it was likely evidence of a crime committed by their son.

In any event, after obtaining the handgun, the Rosenbergs took it to 

Laux and transferred possession of it over to her to prevent or delay Adam’s 

arrest. According to Rouse, the Rosenbergs told Laux about their son’s severe 

mental illness and drug problems, as well as their knowledge or belief that 

Adam was involved in Christian’s disappearance. After being told this, on 

January 20, 2020, Laux took the handgun to the police. When asked how she 

came into possession of the handgun, Laux lied and told the police that she 

had found it while walking her dog in a park. Sadly, it would be over a month 

until Christian’s body was found on March 3, 2020.

On December 14, 2021, Rouse sued Defendants,2 alleging that their 

actions delayed the police investigation and eventual discovery of her son’s 

body. As a result, Rouse averred, she was prevented from making proper 

____________________________________________

2 Rouse also sued a company that she believed was Laux’s employer but later 

dropped them from the suit.
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disposition of her son’s body and suffered severe emotional distress. 

Defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, construing

Rouse’s complaint as attempting to raise claims of intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress. Rouse responded by clarifying that she was 

seeking recovery for the tort of negligent interference with dead bodies under 

§ 868 of the Second Restatement of Torts. However, because no Pennsylvania 

court has recognized that cause of action, she argued in the alternative that 

her cause of action was for wanton or intentional interference with dead bodies 

under Papieves, which, as noted, adopted the definition of the tort under 

§ 868 of the First Restatement of Torts:

A person who wantonly mistreats the body of a dead person or 

who without privilege intentionally removes, withholds or operates 

upon the dead body is liable to the member of the family of such 

person who is entitled to the disposition of the body.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 868 (1939).

In Papieves, the defendant struck a 14-year-old boy with his car and, 

rather than getting medical help, hid the boy's body in his garage for a few 

days before enlisting a friend to help bury the body in a nearby field. After 

the body was found, the boy’s parents brought a claim against the defendant 

and his friend seeking to recover for the “mental anguish, emotional 

disturbance, embarrassment, and humiliation” they had suffered. On appeal 

from dismissal of the action, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, 

concluding that “recovery may be had for serious mental or emotional distress 
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directly caused by the intentional and wanton acts of mishandling a decedent’s

body.” Papieves, 263 A.3d at 121.

As construed by Rouse, Papieves held that a family member can 

recover for emotional distress where a killer intentionally hides the victim’s 

body and others assist, thus preventing proper disposition. Like the parents 

in Papieves, Rouse asserted, she was suing the persons who acted as 

accessories after the fact in withholding the location of her son’s body.

In response to Rouse’s clarification, Defendants noted that Pennsylvania 

courts have declined to adopt § 868 of the Second Restatement of Torts. As 

for intentional interference under Papieves, Defendants asserted that § 868 

of the First Restatement of Torts, by its plain language, requires that a person 

wantonly mistreat or intentionally remove, withhold or operate a dead body. 

Thus, Defendants argued, a person could not be liable unless that person had 

some kind of physical contact or control over the decedent’s body, which 

Rouse was not alleging.

The trial court agreed and sustained the preliminary objections with 

leave for Rouse to amend her complaint. After she declined to do so, 

Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to file an amended complaint. On 

July 11, 2022, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Rouse

timely appealed and now raises these two issues:

1. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by sustaining 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to a Complaint 

in Civil Action averring facts that support a cognizable claim under 

the Restatement (First) of Torts, Section 868, Interference with 
J-A08034-23

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Dead Bodies, which establishes the principle of liability for 

emotional distress damages caused to the member of the family 

of a deceased person who is entitled to the disposition of the body 

against any person who, without privilege, intentionally or 

wantonly withholds the dead body?

2. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by sustaining 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to a Complaint 

in Civil Action averring facts that support a cognizable claim under 

the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 868, Interference with 

Dead Bodies, which establishes the principle of liability for 

emotional distress damages to a member of the family of a 

deceased person who is entitled to the disposition of the body 

against any person who intentionally, recklessly or negligently 

withholds the body of the dead person or prevents its proper 

interment or cremation?

Rouse’s Brief at 3.3

II.

As noted in our introduction, Rouse makes two arguments for why her 

claim of interference with a dead body should have withstood demurrer. First, 

she contends that the facts here are “on all fours” with those in Papieves. 

____________________________________________

3 As noted, the law governing preliminary objections is well-settled:

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should be 

granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. 

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the 

court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no 

testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be 

considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the 

demurrer. All material facts set forth in the pleading and all 

inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as 

true.

Caltagirone v. Cephalon, Inc., 190 A.3d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations omitted). Our standard of review is de novo. Id.
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Second, she asserts that there is no “hands on” requirement for interference 

with a dead body, that is, a person does not need to physically touch the 

decedent’s body to be liable for the tort. For support of this contention, she 

cites our opinion in Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). After review, we find neither Papieves nor Weiley supports 

the novel claim that she is attempting to raise.

A.

In Papieves, the Supreme Court gave the following summary of the 

underlying facts:

... Richard Papieves, the fourteen year old son of Joseph V. and 

Margaret Papieves (plaintiffs-appellants herein), disappeared 

from his home on June 11, 1965. It was subsequently discovered 

that on that day Papieves by had been struck by a motor vehicle 

operated by a minor, one Owen Norman Lawrence (defendant 

herein). Whether Papieves was killed or seriously injured in the 

collision is not of record. Without attempting to obtain medical 

assistance and without notifying either the [] or the boy's parents, 

Lawrence removed Papieve’s body from the scene of the accident, 

took it to his home, and hid it in his garage. Some few days later, 

Lawrence contacted one Joseph J. Kelly, also a minor, and 

requested his assistance in disposing of the body of Papieves. 

Defendant Lawrence and Kelly thereupon took Papieves’ body to 

a field near Darby Creek Road in Marple Township, Delaware 

County, where they dug a grave and interred the decedent. More 

than two months later, the partially decomposed body of young 

Papieves was found, and his remains were returned to his parents.

Thereafter, plaintiffs commenced this suit by filing and having 

served a complaint in trespass against Lawrence and Kelly, 

alleging that defendants’ acts constituted an invasion of, and an 

unlawful interference with, plaintiffs’ right to the possession of the 

decedent’s body; that such acts constituted an unlawful and 

indecent disposal of decedent’s body without the authority or 

consent of the plaintiffs; and that defendants had so acted with 

the intent to prevent the plaintiffs from discovering the fate of 
J-A08034-23

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their son. Plaintiffs averred that as the result of the aforesaid acts 

they had suffered mental anguish, emotional disturbance, 

embarrassment, and humiliation; they sought damages in excess 

of $10,000 against both defendants.

Defendant Kelly filed preliminary objections in the nature of a 

demurrer and a motion for more specific pleadings. [The trial] 

court sustained Kelly’s demurrer and dismissed the complaint.

This appeal followed.

Papieves, supra at 119.

On appeal, while noting that no Pennsylvania court had yet allowed 

recover for emotional distress “resulting from the mishandling of the body of 

a deceased relative,” the Court observed that other jurisdictions have 

“recognized claims for mental suffering caused by the defendant’s wanton or 

intentional mishandling of the body of the decedent,” including “the unlawful 

interment or disinterment of a body, intentional interference with a burial, the 

wanton mutilation or unauthorized embalming of a corpse, and other 

intentional, reckless or wanton acts likely to cause severe emotional distress.” 

Id. at 120 (collecting cases). While some of these jurisdictions emphasized

the next-of-kin’s property rights in the decedent’s body, the Court found that 

“the real[]issue is the right of a decedent’s nearest relatives to protection 

against intentional, outrageous or wanton conduct which is peculiarly 

calculated to cause them serious mental or emotional distress.” Id. at 121.

While thus recognizing that “any extension of legal liability to acts which 

cause emotional distress is not without its problems,” the Papieves Court
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concluded that the parents of the deceased boy could continue with their cause 

of action.

...There can be little doubt that mental or emotional disorders 

brought on by conduct such as that set forth in the complaint at 

bar may be every bit as real, every bit as debilitating as ailments 

which have more obviously physical causes. For this reason, the 

obvious and inherent difficulties of the proof, or disproof, of 

emotional distress and the measurement of damages for such 

injury are not adequate cause, standing alone, to deny recovery. 

We conclude that recovery may be had for serious mental 

or emotional distress directly caused by the intentional and 

wanton acts of mishandling a decedent’s body which are 

here alleged.

Id. at 121 (emphasis added).

First, as a factual matter, we cannot agree with Rouse that, like the 

parents in Papieves, she is also suing “the persons who acted as accessories 

after the fact in order to continue the body’s withholding for a period of over 

two months.” Rouse’s Brief at 15. Under this argument, Rouse analogizes 

Defendants with the defendant Kelly in Papieves who had nothing to do with

decedent’s death but helped hide his body by digging a grave and burying the 

decedent. Here, in contrast, there is no allegation that Defendants helped

Adam hide Christian’s body in the wooded public park near the Rosenbergs’ 

residence. In fact, there is no allegation that Defendants ever even learned

the location of Christian’s body. Thus, we find Rouse’s attempt to analogize 

this case to Papieves unavailing.

Rouse also argues that Papieves “establishes that where a killer hides 

his victim’s body and others subsequently assist in the ongoing concealment, 
J-A08034-23

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that interference with a dead body causing emotional distress to the family 

member entitled to disposition of the body is a viable § 868 cause of action 

against not only the original perpetrator, but also against his after the fact 

accessories.” Id.

4

There are two things wrong with this argument—one factual and one 

legal. Factually, even if we accepted Rouse’s interpretation of Papieves—

which we do not—her complaint does not allege that Defendants assisted in 

the ongoing concealment of the missing victim’s body. Again, there are no 

allegations that Defendants helped hide, move or cover up Christian’s body. 

At most, Rouse’s complaint alleges that the Rosenbergs somehow came into 

possession of the murder weapon and either knew or suspected that Adam 

was responsible for Christian’s disappearance, and that they used their 

marriage counselor to turn the murder weapon into the police under a false 

explanation. While these facts might not paint Defendants in a positive light, 

those facts also do not show that they did anything to conceal the location of 

a murder victim’s body or thwart the police from discovering it, let alone even 

know where it was located.

____________________________________________

4 “Accessory” is defined as “[s]omeone who aids or contributes in the 

commission or concealment of a crime,” while the sub-definition “accessory 

after the fact” is defined as “[a]n accessory who was not at the scene of the 

crime but knows that a crime has been committed and who helps the offender 

try to escape arrest or punishment.” ACCESSORY, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019).
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That brings us to the second problem with Rouse’s argument on 

Papieves: § 868 of the First Restatement of Torts, by its plain language, 

does not apply to Defendants’ alleged conduct. As noted, § 868 allows 

recovery against a person who “wantonly mistreats” the decedent’s body or, 

without privilege, “intentionally removes, withholds or operates upon” the 

dead body. Accordingly, as we recognized in Weiley,

[a] plain reading of section 868 reveals that a party can plead that 

the defendant acted with a wanton state of mind in the 

mistreatment of a body, as per the first portion of section 868, or 

that the defendant acted intentionally, without privilege, to 

remove, withhold or operate on the dead body, as per the 

second portion of section 868, or that the defendant acted with 

both states of mind.

Weiley, supra at 209 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Our focus here is on the second portion, since Rouse’s theory of her 

cause of action under § 868 is that the Defendants acted to intentionally 

“withhold” her son’s dead body. First, for a person to “withhold” something—

in this case, a dead body—would require that the person have possession, 

control, authority or, at the very least, know about the dead body’s existence 

or location. Indeed, the verb “withhold” is defined as: “to hold back from 

action,” “to keep in custody,” or “to refrain from granting, giving, or allowing.” 

Merriam-Webster’ Collegiate Dictionary 1439 (11th ed. 2014). Applying these 

definitions to this case, Defendants could not hold back, keep in custody or 

refrain from granting or giving Christian’s body because there is no allegation 

that they possessed it or controlled it.
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We also note that under the second portion of § 868, “withhold” is 

grouped with “remove” and “operate” as the forms of proscribed intentional 

conduct. Reading these terms together as we would any statute,5 we ascribe 

a meaning to “withhold” a dead body as we would ascribe to “remove” or 

“operate on” a dead body. For a defendant to “remove” a dead body, that 

____________________________________________

5 “The ancient maxim ‘noscitur a sociis’ summarizes the rule that the meaning 

of words may be indicated or controlled by those words with which they are 

associated. Words are known by the company they keep.” Northway Vill.

No. 3, Inc. v. Northway Properties, Inc., 244 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1968). The 

principle of noscitur a sociis is applied to “avoid ascribing to one word a 

meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus 

giving unintended breadth to the Acts of the [General Assembly].” Gustafson

v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (citations and quotations omitted). 

Pursuant to this rule, “the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by 

reference to the meaning of words associated with it.” Ford Motor Co. v.

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 79 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. Super. 1951)

(footnote omitted).

A related concept is that of ejusdem generis. “Under ... [the] doctrine

ejusdem generis (‘of the same kind or class’), where general words follow the 

enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will 

be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general 

nature or class as those enumerated.” McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of

Pa., 686 A.2d 801, 806 (Pa. 1996) (citations omitted). Stated in somewhat 

repetitive yet different language, the rule of ejusdem generis instructs that 

“where general words follow an enumeration of ... words of a particular and 

specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest 

extent, but are to be held as applying only to ... the same general kind or 

class as those specifically mentioned.” Steele v. Statesman Ins. Co., 607

A.2d 742, 743 (Pa. 1992) (citations omitted). This maxim is codified 

conceptually in Section 1903(b) of the Statutory Construction Act, which 

provides, “General words shall be construed to take their meanings and be 

restricted by preceding particular words.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(b). See

generally S.A. by H.O. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Sch. Dist., 160 A.3d 940, 945–

46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
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defendant would need to physically touch it or, at the very least, have some 

kind of custody or authority over the dead body. The same holds true if a 

defendant were to “operate on” a dead body, as the defendant would need to 

physically touch the dead body in some fashion. Consistent with these words, 

we read “withhold” in § 868 as requiring that the person possess, control or 

have some kind of dealing with the body in the same way they would need to 

have if the person were to “remove” or “operate on” a dead body.

That this is the proper reading of § 868 is supported by the comment 

that the drafters of the First Restatement of Torts provided in 1939.

a. A member of the family [citation] of a deceased person who is 

entitled to the disposition of the body has an action of tort against 

one who wantonly maltreats or improperly deals with the body

of such person. This right exists although there has been no harm 

except such harm to the feelings as is inseparable from the 

knowledge of the defendant’s conduct. The right to maintain an 

action for intentional interference with the body exists although 

there was no intent to do a tortious act, as where a body is 

misdelivered by the railroad or where a surgeon performs an 

autopsy mistakenly believing that he is privileged to do so. ...

b. The cause of action is primarily for mental suffering caused by 

the improper dealing with the body. ...

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 868 cmt. a-b (emphasis added).

In Papieves, likewise, our Supreme Court used the same language in

recognizing the tort. Indeed, in adopting § 868 to allow recovery under the 

facts of the case, the Papieves Court clarified that “recovery may be had for 

serious mental or emotional distress directly caused by the intentional and 

wanton acts of mishandling a decedent’s body.” Papieves, 263 A.2d at 
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121 (emphasis added). On this point, we note that Rouse has not pointed us 

to any cases after Papieves interpreting its holding in the way she proposes, 

namely, that § 868 creates a cause of action for a family member of a missing 

person against any person who acts as an accessory after the fact in some 

fashion, regardless of whether that person took any action concerning the 

missing person’s body.

Thus, to recap, we read neither § 868 nor Papieves as allowing for 

recovery in the circumstances involved here where a murder victim is missing 

and the defendant allegedly acts as an accessory after the fact in some 

manner, regardless of whether the defendant knew the dead body’s location. 

Again, the focus of § 868, as adopted in Papieves, is on the mishandling of 

the dead body that causes the family member’s emotional distress. Unless 

there is an allegation that the defendant “wantonly mistreats” the dead body 

or intentionally removes, withholds or operates on it, then there can be no 

liability under § 868 or Papieves.

B.

Next, Rouse argues that there is no “hands on” requirement under 

§ 868, that is, she was not required to plead that Defendants physically 

touched or moved Christian’s body. As noted, for support, she cites this 

Court’s decision Weiley for the proposition that there is no such requirement 

for recovery under § 868 or Papieves. After review, however, we find that 

Weiley does not support her argument.
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In Weiley, without the consent of the plaintiff son, the defendant 

hospital sent the deceased body of the plaintiff’s father, via a funeral home, 

to a medical school for holding. After several days of contacting the school to 

find his father’s body, the son went to the medical school to retrieve his 

father’s body for cremation and discovered that post-mortem procedures had 

been performed on his father’s body. As result, the son sued the hospital for, 

among other causes of action, tortious interference with a dead body.

On appeal from dismissal of the cause of action, this Court reversed the 

trial court’s holding that the plaintiff son failed to state a cause of action 

against the hospital because he failed to allege that the hospital, in 

transferring his father’s body for medical dissection, specifically intended to 

cause him to have serious mental distress. See Weiley, supra at 210.

Turning to what level of intent was required under Papieves, we concluded

that the Papieves Court applied a definition of “intent” that matched that 

given in the Second Restatement of Torts.

References in Papieves to conduct that is “likely to cause” or has 

a high probability of causing serious mental distress comports with 

the definition of “intent” found in the Restatement (Second) of 

Torts: “The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of 

this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause 

consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences 

are substantially certain to result from it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 8A (1965). In Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386

Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403, 407 (1956), our Supreme Court applied 

this definition of intent to conclude that the defendant tortfeasor 

intentionally polluted the plaintiff’s land because it knew its 

operations were the cause of the pollution, yet continued its 

operations unabated despite this knowledge. This is the same 

definition applied in Papieves. Thus, we conclude that this 
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definition of intent, for the purpose of the second portion of section

868, is met by showing either a desire to cause mental distress or 

a belief or knowledge that one’s conduct is substantially certain to 

cause the plaintiff mental distress, as where “the actor knows that 

the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result 

from his act, and still goes ahead” with the conduct anyway.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b.

Weiley, supra at 211.

Applying the correct definition of intent to the cause of action against 

the hospital, we found that plaintiff son pleaded sufficient facts to establish 

that the defendant hospital intentionally interfered with his father’s dead body. 

In so concluding, we have the following summary for why his claim withstood 

demurrer:

... Weiley was the family member entitled to disposition of the 

body. This privilege or authority was not transferred to Hospital. 

Hospital knew that Weiley did not want organ donation or 

dissection. Yet, without trying to contact Weiley or otherwise 

obtain consent, it transferred and/or donated the body to School 

despite this knowledge. School accepted the body as an 

anatomical donation whereupon it was dissected. Hospital’s 

unauthorized conduct caused this result, and, given Hospital’s 

knowledge of Weiley’s contrary wishes and Weiley’s distraught 

feelings and involvement as expressed throughout the time of his 

father’s treatment, a factfinder could conclude that Hospital was 

substantially certain that Weiley would suffer serious emotional 

distress, sufficient for the “intentional” portion of section 868.

Id. at 213.6

____________________________________________

6 We also concluded that the plaintiff son pleaded sufficient facts under a 

“wanton mistreatment” theory of the cause of action. See Weiley, supra at 

213-14.
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Rouse reads Weiley as establishing that there is no “hands on” 

requirement for a claim of interference with a dead body under § 868 because, 

in Weiley, the defendant hospital that transported the father’s body to the 

medical school for dissection “never touched the body.” Rouse’s Brief at 19. 

However, as our review shows, the main issue in Weiley was what definition 

of “intent” should apply to § 868 under Papieves. Whether § 868 requires 

that the defendant physically touch or control the decedent’s dead body was 

not an issue in the case; instead, the issue was whether the defendant hospital 

acted with sufficient intent. In any event, even if we accepted Rouse’s 

strained reading of Weiley, her argument would still not work because the

defendant hospital had possession of and controlled the decedent’s body 

unlike the Defendants here, who are not alleged to have even known the 

location of Christian’s body. Thus, we find Rouse’s reliance on Weiley

misplaced. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we conclude that Rouse failed 

to plead sufficient facts for a cause of action for interference with a dead body 

under Papieves and § 868 of the First Restatement of Torts.

III.

In her second issue, Rouse requests that we expand the tort of 

interference with dead bodies to include negligent conduct under § 868 of the 

Second Restatement of Torts.7 She also recognizes, however, that in Hackett 

____________________________________________

7 Under § 868 of the Second Restatement of Torts:
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v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. 1987), this Court was faced 

with the same request and declined to adopt § 868 under the Second 

Restatement of Torts. As we explained in Weiley:

In Hackett, the plaintiff asserted a negligence claim to recover 

for emotional damages caused by the defendant’s careless 

preparation of the plaintiff’s mother’s body and its mishandling of 

the casket during shipment from Pennsylvania to California, which 

resulted in damage to both the casket and the body. Hackett,

528 A.2d at 972. The Court recognized that the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts contained a revised and expanded section 868

to include negligent conduct. Id. at 973. However, the Hackett

court stated that our Supreme Court had not considered or 

adopted the revised Restatement provision and concluded that 

“any extension of the Papieves rule of recovery to include actions 

for negligent infliction of emotional distress must come from the 

Supreme Court itself, through express adoption of the 1977 

Restatement (Second) revision of Section 868.” Id. at 974.10.

Pennsylvania has not yet adopted the revised version of section

868 to include negligent interference with a body, and we are 

currently restricted to the Papieves Court’s limitation of this tort 

to wanton or intentional conduct in accordance with the First

Restatement of Torts section 868.

Weiley, supra at 214.

Because we are bound by our existing precedent, we will not expand the 

tort of interference with dead bodies to include the definition under the Second 

____________________________________________

One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, 

withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person 

or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability 

to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the 

disposition of the body.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977).
J-A08034-23

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Restatement of Torts. If Rouse seeks such an expansion, it will need to come 

from our Supreme Court.

Order affirmed.

Judge Stabile joins the opinion.

Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/15/2023