UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1115

NANCY MORRIS, as personal representative of the Estate of 

David Allan Woods,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANDREW J. BLAND; RICHARD T. BURKHOLDER, SGT, officially and 

individually; LEEMON E. CARNER, PFC, officially and 

individually; JERRY SPEISSEGGER, JR., PFC, officially and 

individually; PRISCILLA GARRETT, SGT, officially and 

individually,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

THE HOPE CLINIC, LLC; TEMISAN ETIKERENTSE; SUE BRABHAM, 

R.N., officially and individually; H. WAYNE DEWITT, Berkeley 

County Sheriff, officially and individually; JAMES M. 

BROPHY, PFC, officially and individually; PATRICIA D. 

COLLINS, SGT, officially and individually; CHARLES A. 

DESANTO, CPL, officially and individually; ASHLEY A. HARBER, 

PFC, officially and individually; KANSAS DAAB, PFC, 

officially and individually; JOHN DOES, officially and 

individually; CLIFFORD L. MCELVOGUE, Director, officially 

and individually; BERKELEY COUNTY; BERKELEY COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT; KENDRA MOORE, Staff SGT, officially and 

individually,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Richard M. Gergel, District 

Judge. (5:12-cv-03177-RMG)
2

Argued: September 20, 2016 Decided: November 16, 2016

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Harold C. Staley, Jr., ELROD POPE LAW FIRM, Rock Hill, 

South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Eugene P. Corrigan, 

III, Amanda K. Dudgeon, CORRIGAN & CHANDLER LLC, Charleston, 

South Carolina; James A. Stuckey, Jr., Alissa C. Lietzow, 

STUCKEY LAW OFFICES, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for 

Appellants. Garrett B. Johnson, ELROD POPE LAW FIRM, Rock Hill, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

This appeal arises from a plaintiffs’ verdict in connection 

with the death of David Allan Woods during his incarceration at 

the Hill-Finklea Detention Center (“HFDC”) in South Carolina. 

The jury awarded substantial damages based on its finding that 

Andrew J. Bland, Richard T. Burkholder, Leemon Carner, Priscilla 

Garrett, and Jerry Speissegger, Jr. (collectively, 

“Appellants”), five HFDC employees present during the final 

weekend of Woods’s incarceration, had been deliberately 

indifferent to Woods’s serious medical needs, and thereby 

deprived him of rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. On appeal, Appellants challenge various evidentiary 

rulings, the punitive damages award, the setoff calculation, and 

the denial of several post-trial motions. Finding no error, we 

affirm.*

I.

We detail the facts in the light most favorable to the 

jury’s findings and conclusions. David Allan Woods, then 50

years old, was incarcerated at HFDC from October 12 to November 

8, 2010. At the time of Woods’s incarceration, HFDC had 

contracted with Hope Clinic, LLC to provide medical services to 

 * Although counsel for Appellants did not appear for oral 

argument in this case, we have fully considered the arguments 

set forth in the brief filed on their behalf.
4

inmates. Medical personnel did not generally work onsite after 

5 p.m., before 9 a.m., or over the weekend. Accordingly, if a 

medical issue arose after hours, a shift sergeant was 

responsible for alerting on-call medical staff. 

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on Friday, November 5, 2010, in 

response to a call from the central tower, Shift Sergeant 

Garrett found Woods shaking on the floor of his cell. Garrett 

asked Woods what was wrong, if he could walk, and if he could 

stand up. Woods responded “I don’t know” to each question. 

J.A. 487-88. Garrett helped Woods to his feet and directed him 

to a cell in M-Pod, a medical observation unit with cameras that 

fed to the front control station. Privates were assigned to the 

front desk and were responsible for monitoring the video feed 

during four-hour shifts. 

Once in his M-Pod cell, Woods was unsteady on his feet and 

needed assistance from his new cell mate, Freeman Ingraham, when 

taking off his uniform, sitting on the toilet, and drinking 

water from a cup. On several occasions, Ingraham attempted to 

contact the front desk through the intercom system. When 

Garrett returned to the cell, Ingraham informed her that he 

believed he saw blood in Woods’s stool. Because Woods and 

Ingraham had flushed the toilet, Garrett was unable to verify 

the presence of blood.
5

At 4:28 a.m. on Saturday, November 6, Speissegger entered 

the cell to administer Woods’s medication. Woods did not 

respond when asked if he would take his medication. Woods’s

hands were visibly shaking and, despite instructions from both 

Speissegger and Ingraham, Woods was unable to cup his hand to 

accept the medication. After the medication fell to the ground, 

Speissegger left and noted in his log that Woods had refused the 

medication. 

At 5:30 a.m., Burkholder relieved Garrett as shift 

sergeant. Garrett notified Burkholder of Ingraham’s report of 

blood in Woods’s stool, but Burkholder did not call the nurse or 

attempt to observe any continued presence of blood. Burkholder 

testified that he visited Woods once during this shift, during 

which he “saw [Woods] walking” and believed Woods “was fine.” 

J.A. 634.

The record contains several clips of Woods taken during 

Burkholder’s shift. In one, Woods stands swaying in the middle 

of his cell before falling backward onto his bunk. In another, 

Woods is lying on his bunk with a dark substance covering the 

lower half of his uniform and bed. Burkholder noted in his log 

that Woods was “lying in his own feces and refused to shower.” 

J.A. 650, 1165-66. Garrett returned to duty at 5:30 p.m., and 

she received and read the above log entry. Another video clip 
6

from approximately 12:20 a.m. on Sunday, November 7, shows that 

Woods’s condition remained unchanged. 

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on November 7, Garrett arranged 

for a work crew, including Carner and Speissegger, to clean 

Woods’s cell and escort Woods to the showers. Carner testified 

that Woods stood, walked, undressed, and bathed without 

assistance. However, Garrett observed that Woods’s uniform was 

soiled with a dark, black, and hardened substance, and she 

noticed he was shaking, disoriented, and unsteady. 

Approximately 30 minutes after he returned to his cell, Woods 

appeared disoriented and struggled to put on his uniform. Three 

hours later, when Carner brought Woods his breakfast, Woods was 

lying naked on the floor. Woods was disoriented, shivering, and 

barely able to stand, and he required assistance when putting on 

his uniform. Carner believed that Woods’s symptoms were the 

result of waking up on the cold floor, not from any need for 

medical attention. 

Garrett and Burkholder changed shifts at approximately 5:30 

a.m., at which point Garrett told Burkholder he may want to call 

the nurse to treat Woods. Burkholder responded that he would 

contact the nurse later on in his shift, but he did not do so. 

At approximately 6:00 a.m., another HFDC employee, James Brophy, 

interacted with Woods. Brophy noticed that Woods had wet 

himself, and he and another officer assisted Woods in changing 
7

his uniform. Brophy prepared a written incident report wherein 

he noted that Woods was disoriented, was “not able to stand but 

for a short period of time,” “did not respond to any question 

asked [of] him,” and “didn’t know where he was or why he was 

here.” J.A. 597-98, 1171. The incident report was ultimately 

passed to Burkholder. Burkholder testified that when he checked 

on Woods, Woods “was up walking around, coherent, [and] 

talking,” and Burkholder believed “[t]here was nothing wrong 

with Mr. Woods at that time.” J.A. 659. Burkholder did not 

call the nurse, but he copied the incident report and left it 

for superior officers and medical staff to receive on Monday 

morning. 

At 5:30 p.m. on Sunday, November 7, Burkholder and Garrett 

again changed shifts. Garrett checked on Woods shortly after 6 

p.m. and found him sitting naked in his cell. She asked Woods 

to put on his uniform to avoid the cold, and she asked if Woods 

was in pain or had any complaints. Woods responded to all her 

questions with grunts. Garrett testified that she believed 

Woods was being “defiant,” though she admitted having no 

knowledge of any past, uncooperative behavior from Woods. J.A. 

504-05.

At 10:19 p.m., Bland was at the front desk and observed 

Woods lying naked on the cell floor. Through the intercom, 

Bland instructed Woods to get dressed. Woods stood up, walked 
8

to the uniform lying on his bunk, and urinated onto it. Woods 

then stood, trembling violently, as he held onto the wall for 

support. At 2:15 a.m. on Monday, November 8, Bland entered 

Woods’s cell to give him his medication. Woods was again unable 

to properly cup his hand, and Bland noted in his log that Woods 

had refused his medication. Bland testified that he believed 

Woods was being “difficult.” J.A. 729, 737.

After a new sergeant came on duty on Monday, November 8, 

the staff nurse was called to examine Woods. Woods was then 

released with his sentence time-served and was transported to 

Trident Medical Center, where he was found to be “stuporous” and 

“hypotensive” with “a hemoglobin of 4.” J.A. 450-51, 1257. 

Woods’s “prognosis was felt to be bleak” when he was admitted. 

J.A. 1258. Woods then underwent several procedures to address 

bleeding ulcers in his duodenum. Woods suffered a cardiac 

arrest during the first procedure, but he was resuscitated. On 

November 11, 2010, Woods suffered another major intestinal bleed 

above his stomach. Woods passed away at 4:50 p.m. on November 

11, 2010. An autopsy revealed his cause of death as 

gastrointestinal bleeding from a duodenal ulcer, bleeding 

esophageal ulcers, cirrhosis of the liver with esophageal 

varices, and cardiac arrest secondary to gastrointestinal 

bleeding. 
9

Appellee Nancy Morris, as personal representative of 

Woods’s estate, filed this survival and wrongful death action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Morris filed the action against 

eighteen defendants: the Hope Clinic and two of its employees 

(collectively, the “Hope Defendants”), as well as Appellants, 

Berkeley County, its Sheriff’s Office, and eight other county 

employees (collectively, the “County Defendants”). Prior to 

trial, the district court approved a settlement reached by 

Morris and the Hope Defendants. Ten of the County Defendants 

were also dismissed voluntarily or by summary judgment. The 

case then proceeded to trial only on Morris’s deliberate 

indifference claim against Appellants. During trial, the 

parties were limited to presenting evidence that related to the 

period between November 5 and 8, 2010, when Appellants’ 

deliberate indifference allegedly occurred. The district court 

also prohibited Appellants from introducing evidence regarding 

the Hope Defendants, the settlement, their prior treatment of 

Woods, or Woods’s history of alcohol use. 

The jury determined that Appellants had been deliberately 

indifferent to Woods’s serious medical needs during his last 

weekend of incarceration. The jury awarded compensatory damages 

of $500,000 jointly, punitive damages of $150,000 each against 

Bland, Carner, and Speissegger, and punitive damages of 

$1,000,000 each against Burkholder and Garrett. The district 
10

court then resolved a number of post-trial motions filed by 

Appellants. The district court denied Appellants’ motions for 

judgment as a matter of law, new trial, and remittitur. 

However, it granted in part Appellants’ motion for setoff and, 

upon applying portions of the Hope settlement proceeds, reduced 

the compensatory damages award to $171,875. Appellants timely 

appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

II.

We begin by addressing Appellants’ various evidentiary 

challenges. This Court reviews the district court’s rulings on 

the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Minter 

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 349 (4th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted). 

Appellants first argue that the district court improperly 

excluded evidence related to the Hope Defendants, the 

settlement, and their treatment of Woods before November 5, 

2010. Appellants contend this evidence is relevant to 

determining causation and the subjective state of mind required 

for deliberate indifference. However, the district court 

correctly noted that the central dispute at trial was whether 

Woods’s need for medical treatment over his last weekend of 

incarceration was obvious to a layperson such that Appellants 

should have reported his symptoms to medical personnel.
11

Appellants repeatedly testified they had no knowledge of Woods’s

medical history. Nor did they provide any evidence to suggest 

they relied on the Hope Defendants’ treatment history when they 

observed and failed to adequately respond to Woods’s

deteriorating health over the November 5-8 period. Given these 

considerations, we agree that the Hope Defendants’ role or 

alleged negligence in treating Woods before this period was 

irrelevant to the deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., 

Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that 

the paramedics’ negligence “could not have constituted an 

‘intervening’ cause” where the plaintiff’s “claim was based on 

defendants’ deliberate indifference to his . . . suffering after

the time of the initial paramedic exam.”). Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 

aforementioned evidence.

Appellants also contend that the district court improperly 

excluded evidence of Woods’s alcohol and drug use as well as its 

impact on his medical condition. However, Appellants provide 

nothing but mere speculation when they argue that Woods’s use of 

alcohol and drugs “accelerat[ed]” the deterioration of his 

health such that “no act or omission by Appellants proximately 

caused his death.” Appellants’ Br. 48. Given the likely 

prejudicial effect of such evidence, and given Appellants’ 

failure to articulate the relevance or probative value of this 
12

evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in its exclusion under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 

Finally, Appellants argue that the district court erred 

when it “prohibited” Appellants from soliciting expert testimony 

from Morris’s qualified medical expert, Dr. Jack Raba, as well 

as Appellants’ two fact witnesses. Appellants’ Br. 44. 

Contrary to their assertion, Appellants were permitted wide 

latitude to vigorously cross-examine Dr. Raba regarding his 

testimony, especially as it pertained to causation. We 

therefore discern no abuse of discretion as to this expert 

testimony. 

We similarly find no abuse of discretion as to the 

examination of Appellants’ two fact witnesses, Dr. John Sanders 

and Dr. Ellen Reimers. Dr. Sanders was Woods’s treating 

physician before and after his incarceration at HFDC, and Dr. 

Reimers was the pathologist who conducted Woods’s autopsy. 

Notably, however, neither witness prepared an expert report 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). 

Numerous courts have held that a physician is exempt from this 

written report requirement only as to opinions formed during the 

course of treatment. See, e.g., Goodman v. Staples The Office 

Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 824-26 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(collecting cases). Here, both Dr. Sanders and Dr. Reimers were 

fully permitted to discuss their examination of Woods and their 
13

diagnoses or findings. Their testimony was disallowed only to 

the extent Appellants sought to “offer [expert] opinions as to 

proximate cause” that were not formed during the course of 

treatment and thereby fell outside the scope of their opinions 

as mere fact witnesses. J.A. 380; see Fed. R. Evid. 701. Under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), a party who fails to 

provide information as required by Rule 26(a), including a Rule 

26(A)(2)(B) expert report, is subsequently “not allowed to use 

that information . . . at a trial” and may be sanctioned for 

this failure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 

above testimony from Dr. Sanders and Dr. Reimers. 

III.

Appellants next contend that Morris failed to provide 

adequate evidence to support the jury’s finding of deliberate 

indifference and, as a result, the district court erred in 

denying their Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law 

and their Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial. We review de novo

the denial of a Rule 50(b) motion. Durham v. Jones, 737 F.3d 

291, 298 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “If, viewing the 

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there 

is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found in 

[the non-moving party’s] favor, we are constrained to affirm the 

jury verdict.” First Union Commercial Corp. v. GATX Capital 
14

Corp., 411 F.3d 551, 556 (4th Cir. 2005) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, 240 F.3d 255, 259 

(4th Cir. 2001)). The denial of a Rule 59(a) motion is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion, and it “will not be reversed ‘save in 

the most exceptional circumstances.’” FDIC v. Bakkebo, 506 F.3d 

286, 294 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 

625, 641 (4th Cir. 2002)). 

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate 

medical care, a plaintiff must establish both a subjective and 

an objective component to her claim. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 

225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). “The plaintiff must demonstrate that 

the [prison] officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ 

(subjective) to the inmate’s ‘serious medical needs’ 

(objective).” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976)). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed 

by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious 

that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for 

a doctor’s attention.” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 

F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)). To satisfy the subjective 

component, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer had 

“actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate” and that 

the officer “recognized that his actions were insufficient to 

mitigate the risk of harm . . . arising from [the inmate’s] 

medical needs.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
15

emphasis omitted). Whether an officer “had the requisite 

knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to 

demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from 

circumstantial evidence.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 

(1994) (citations omitted). 

Upon viewing the trial testimony and evidence provided by 

the parties, we find that the evidence supports the jury’s 

finding of a serious medical need. The videos of Woods’s

conditions, Ingraham’s recognition of Woods’s need for medical 

attention, and Brophy’s testimony and incident report suggest 

that Woods’s medical need was “so obvious that even a lay person 

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 

Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (citation omitted). There is also ample 

circumstantial evidence to support the subjective component of 

this claim. Based on the obviousness of an inmate’s medical 

need, a jury is permitted to conclude that the prison officers 

knew of the risk of harm to the inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

842. Moreover, “a factfinder may conclude that the official’s 

response . . . was so patently inadequate as to justify an 

inference that the official actually recognized that his 

response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.” 

Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 

2004). As described, testified to, and captured in the record, 

the obviousness of Woods’s medical need and Appellants’ 
16

inadequate reactions to Woods’s symptoms amply support the 

jury’s finding of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, we 

discern no error in the district court’s denial of Appellants’ 

motions for relief under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(a). 

IV.

Appellants next challenge the jury’s punitive damages 

award. Appellants contend that the evidence did not support a 

finding of punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the 

punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive, and 

that the awards against Garrett and Burkholder — which were 

almost seven times the awards against the remaining Appellants —

indicate the jury erred by holding the shift sergeants liable 

for the conduct of their subordinates. Appellants seek review 

of the denials of their 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of 

law, motion for remittitur, and 59(a) motion for new trial on 

the above bases. 

We review de novo the denial of a 50(b) motion on a 

punitive damages award, and we review de novo the denial of a 

motion for remittitur on a punitive damages award alleged to be 

constitutionally excessive. EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 513 

F.3d 360, 370-71 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). We review 

the denial of a 59(a) motion for abuse of discretion. Gregg v. 

Ham, 678 F.3d 333, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
17

Punitive damages are available in § 1983 actions “for 

conduct that involves ‘reckless or callous indifference to the 

federally protected rights of others,’ as well as for conduct 

motivated by evil intent.” Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 

(4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). 

Based on the record before us, we conclude that Appellants’ 

deliberate indifference to Woods’s serious medical needs 

satisfies the requirement that their conduct involve reckless or 

callous indifference to Woods’s federally-protected rights. See

id. (finding that the “callous indifference required for 

punitive damages is essentially the same as the deliberate 

indifference required for a finding of liability on the § 1983 

claim” for inadequate medical care).

Moreover, we do not find the punitive damages award to be 

constitutionally excessive. Contrary to Appellants’ 

contentions, the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in BMW 

of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and State 

Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003),

support the jury’s punitive damages award. First, given 

Appellants’ repeated and deliberate indifference over a threeday period, Woods’s physical vulnerability, and Woods’s

resulting physical harm, we find that Appellants’ misconduct was 

sufficiently “reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of 

further sanctions [beyond compensatory damages] to achieve 
18

punishment or deterrence.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (citation 

omitted). Second, the total punitive damages award is 

approximately five times the compensatory damages award, and 

single digit ratios generally do not present a constitutional 

issue. Id. at 425. Appellants emphasize that the individual 

punitive awards against Burkholder and Garrett reflect a 10-to-1 

ratio, but a high ratio may nonetheless “comport with due 

process where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in only 

a small amount of economic damages.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the compensatory damages award was deflated due to Woods’s

lack of lost wages. Based on the facts of this case, we “will 

not use the low economic damages award to limit a punitive 

damages award that was otherwise justified by the 

reprehensibility of [Appellants’] behavior.” Siggers-El v. 

Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Third, we 

note that the punitive damages award in this case is not 

inconsistent with similar deliberate indifference cases. See, 

e.g., Murphy v. Gilman, 551 F. Supp. 2d 677, 685-86 (W.D. Mich. 

2008) (upholding a punitive damages award of $1.25 million 

against each prison officer defendant for deliberate 

indifference over a five-day period during which an inmate 

received no medical care and little food and water, resulting in 

his death).
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Finally, we find Appellants’ argument regarding supervisory 

liability to be without merit. The evidence supports a finding 

that Burkholder and Garrett were more culpable than Bland, 

Speissegger, and Carner in their deliberate indifference to 

Woods’s serious medical needs. Thus, the record in this case 

supports Burkholder and Garrett’s larger share of the punitive 

damages award. We therefore discern no error in the punitive 

damages award or in the district court’s denial of Appellants’ 

post-trial motions. 

V.

Finally, Appellants challenge the district court’s 

calculation of the setoff amount. A district court’s decision 

to set off a damage award is reviewed for clear error. Atlas 

Food Sys. and Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 

587, 596 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

“[S]tate law governs the substantive right to setoff.” Id. 

Under South Carolina law, “[a] non-settling defendant is 

entitled to credit for the amount paid by another defendant who 

settles for the same cause of action.” Rutland v. S.C. Dep’t of 

Transp., 734 S.E.2d 142, 145 (S.C. 2012) (citation omitted). 

Here, given that Morris’s settlement with the Hope Defendants 

divided the settlement proceeds 50/50 between the survival and 

wrongful death claims, the district court applied the same 

division with respect to the jury’s § 1983 verdict. Because 
20

Woods could experience only one wrongful death, the court fully 

offset the $250,000 of the jury verdict attributable to wrongful 

death. The district court then considered the survival portion 

of Morris’s claims. The court observed that the Hope Defendants 

interacted with Woods over 29 days whereas Appellants’ 

interactions were limited to Woods’s last four days of 

incarceration, which amounted to only 14% of the settlement time 

period. However, the district court also noted that Woods 

experienced more pain and suffering during his last weekend of 

incarceration. Accordingly, the court allocated 25% of the 

survival settlement proceeds to the survival portion of the jury 

verdict. This determination resulted in a total setoff of 

$328,125. 

The above calculation is reasonably based on the evidence 

and fairly advances the policy of preventing double recovery. 

Accordingly, we discern no clear error or abuse of discretion in 

the district court’s calculation. 

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.