[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. BF Goodrich Co., Specialty Chems. Div. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio7988.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-7988

THE STATE EX REL. BF GOODRICH COMPANY, SPECIALTY CHEMICALS 

DIVISION, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL.,

APPELLEES. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. BF Goodrich Co., Specialty Chems. Div. v. Indus. 

Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7988.] 

Workers’ compensation—Working-wage loss—Industrial Commission did not 

abuse discretion in awarding compensation for working-wage loss 

attributed to claimant’s lack of overtime earnings while working in lightduty position—Record contained evidence that claimant was placed in 

light-duty program because of medical restrictions causally related to 

allowed conditions of claim and that claimant’s appeal from initial denial 

of application for wage-loss compensation had been timely filed—Court of 

appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed. 

(No. 2015-1243—Submitted August 16, 2016—Decided December 6, 2016.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 

No. 13AP-1056, 2015-Ohio-2239. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

_______________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, BF Goodrich Company, Specialty Chemicals Division 

(“Goodrich”), appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying 

its request for a writ of mandamus to require appellee Industrial Commission to 

vacate its order awarding appellee Marilynne J. Earles compensation for workingwage loss, as authorized by R.C. 4123.56(B), attributed to Earles’s lack of overtime 

earnings while working in a light-duty position. 

{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

{¶ 3} On August 12, 2011, Earles was injured in the course and scope of 

her employment with Goodrich. She returned to work on February 13, 2012, with 

temporary restrictions on climbing, heavy pushing, lifting and carrying, and 

performing overhead work. There were no restrictions on the number of hours she 

could work. 

{¶ 4} Earles was placed in Goodrich’s light-duty/restricted-employee work 

program. The terms of the work program were set forth in a 2007 collectivebargaining agreement between Goodrich and the United Auto Workers of America, 

Local 128. Its purpose was “to provide medically-restricted employees an 

opportunity to work and make a value-added contribution to the products 

manufactured.” 

{¶ 5} The collective-bargaining agreement provided that employees 

assigned to the program were eligible for overtime only if their medical restrictions 

allowed and “only after all other employees in the classification and shift to which 

they have been borrowed have been given the opportunity to work overtime.” A 

subsequent collective-bargaining agreement, effective February 19, 2012, provided 

that “[e]mployees on light duty outside of their own job classification will not be 

eligible for overtime.” 
January Term, 2016 

3

{¶ 6} Earles filed an application for wage-loss compensation based on a 

reduction in her earnings attributed to the lack of overtime in her light-duty position 

for the following periods: February 13 to March 2, 2012, and March 12 to 18, 2012. 

A district hearing officer denied the application. The order, mailed on November 

23, 2012, notified the parties and their representatives that an appeal could be filed 

within 14 days of receipt of the order. 

{¶ 7} On December 13, 2012, a union representative, William Hannah, filed 

an appeal on behalf of Earles. A staff hearing officer refused the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction after finding that it had not been timely filed. Hannah again appealed 

for Earles, this time with an affidavit in which he attested that he had received the 

previous commission order on November 29, 2012, and had timely filed the appeal 

within 14 days on December 13, 2012. 

{¶ 8} The commission accepted the appeal and awarded wage-loss 

compensation. The commission determined that Earles’s medical restrictions 

resulted from the allowed conditions of her claim, that she had worked overtime 

prior to her work-related injury, and that when she returned to light-duty work, she 

was not eligible for overtime in that position under the 2012 collective-bargaining 

agreement. 

{¶ 9} Goodrich filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the commission 

had abused its discretion. According to Goodrich, there was no evidence that 

Earles’s medical restrictions prevented her from working overtime. Moreover, 

Goodrich argues, the commission failed to apply the “mailbox rule” and therefore 

wrongly determined that Earles’s administrative appeal was timely filed. 

{¶ 10} The court of appeals denied the writ. 

{¶ 11} This matter is before this court on Goodrich’s appeal as of right. 

Working-Wage Loss 

{¶ 12} Working-wage loss is payable to a claimant who suffers a wage loss 

as a result of returning to employment other than the employee’s former position 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

of employment due to an injury or occupational disease. R.C. 4123.56(B)(1). Ohio 

Adm.Code 4125-1-01(A)(15) clarifies that “the extent of the diminishment [in 

wages] must be the direct result of physical and/or psychiatric restriction(s) caused 

by the impairment that is causally related to an industrial injury or occupational 

disease in a claim allowed under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code.” 

{¶ 13} Goodrich contends that for Earles to be entitled to compensation for 

working-wage loss, her lack of overtime earnings must be directly caused by 

medical restrictions that specifically limit overtime work. Goodrich argues that 

because Earles had physical restrictions but no restrictions on the amount of hours 

she could work, her wage loss was the result of the 2012 collective-bargaining 

agreement’s prohibition on overtime. 

{¶ 14} We do not agree. There are two components of a wage-loss claim—

actual wage loss and a causal connection with the workplace injury. State ex rel. 

Jordan v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 153, 2004-Ohio-2115, 807 N.E.2d 351, 

¶ 4; State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 121, 623 

N.E.2d 1202 (1993). There is no dispute that Earles suffered a reduction in wages 

during the periods of time at issue. As to the second component of a wage-loss 

claim, the definition of “working-wage loss” in Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(A)(15) 

states that the diminishment in wages must be the “direct result of physical and/or 

psychiatric restriction(s) caused by the impairment that is causally related to an 

industrial injury.” Stated in other words, the loss of wages must be causally related 

to the allowed conditions of the claim. The record contained evidence that Earles 

was placed in the light-duty program because of her medical restrictions causally 

related to the allowed conditions of her claim. 

{¶ 15} Next, Goodrich maintains that Jordan and State ex rel.

DaimlerChrysler v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-895, 2007-Ohio5093, require evidence that the employer singled out the injured worker because of 

her or his particular work restrictions and denied the opportunity for overtime. 
January Term, 2016 

5

Goodrich argues that there is no evidence that Earles was singled out and denied 

overtime for some sort of punitive reason related specifically to her injury or 

medical restrictions. 

{¶ 16} Jordan involved an ambiguous commission order that was unclear 

as to the causal relationship between the claimant’s decline in wages and lack of 

overtime hours. Based on a lack of evidence explaining why the claimant’s 

overtime had decreased, this court remanded the cause to the commission for it to 

further consider whether the claimant had been offered overtime and if he had not, 

to determine why. Jordan at ¶ 10 and 11. This analysis is not relevant here, where 

overtime was regulated by the express terms of Goodrich’s light-duty program and 

applied to all who participated in it. 

{¶ 17} DaimlerChrysler involved an injured mechanic who transferred to a 

different position because of medical restrictions from a workplace injury. The 

new position offered fewer overtime hours. The court of appeals concluded that 

the fluctuation in the available amount of overtime hours in the new department 

was the reason for the wage difference, not the injury or work restrictions. 

DaimlerChrysler at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 18} The commission contends that Jordan and DaimlerChrysler

examined the proximate cause of a claimant’s wage loss and concluded that if the 

wage loss was due to economic reasons, such as a company-wide reduction in 

overtime, the claimant could not establish a causal link between the workplace 

injury and the wage loss. According to the commission, unlike the claimants in 

Jordan and DaimlerChrysler, Earles was barred from working overtime because 

she had suffered an injury and was in the light-duty program because of her medical 

restrictions. 

{¶ 19} We agree. Here, there was evidence that Earles was placed in the 

light-duty program because of her medical restrictions. The 2012 collectivebargaining agreement prohibited all employees participating in the light-duty 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

program from working overtime hours. There was no evidence that Earles was 

singled out because of her injury. Thus, the commission did not abuse its discretion 

when it concluded that Earles’s wage loss was the direct result of her inability to 

return to her previous position due to the physical restrictions resulting from her 

claim. 

Appeal Was Timely Filed 

{¶ 20} Goodrich contends that Hannah’s appeal from the order of the 

district hearing officer was outside the 14-day statutory appeal period and that the 

commission abused its discretion when it did not apply the “mailbox rule” to 

calculate the appeal time. Goodrich relies on the rebuttable presumption that once 

a notice or order is mailed, it is presumed to have been received in due course, 

Weiss v. Ferro Corp., 44 Ohio St.3d 178, 180, 542 N.E.2d 340 (1989), and argues 

that under a straightforward application of the mailbox rule, the appeal was due by 

December 10, 2012. 

{¶ 21} R.C. 4123.511(C) provides that a party may appeal the decision of a 

district hearing officer within 14 days after receipt of the order. The commission 

considered Hannah’s affidavit to be evidence that he had received the order on 

November 29, 2012, and thus, that the appeal had been timely filed within 14 days 

on December 13, 2012. We agree with the court of appeals that the mailbox rule 

does not apply here. 

{¶ 22} The commission considered the evidence submitted by Hannah to be 

credible. Therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion when it concluded 

that the appeal was timely filed. 

Oral Argument 

{¶ 23} Finally, Goodrich requests oral argument in this matter. Granting 

oral argument in an appeal as of right is subject to this court’s discretion. 

S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A). In exercising that discretion, we consider “whether the case 

involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a 
January Term, 2016 

7

substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts of appeals.” State ex rel. 

Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 

N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural 

Implement Workers of Am. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 108 Ohio St.3d 432, 

2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 25-26. These factors are not present in this 

matter, and we deny Goodrich’s request. 

{¶ 24} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and 

deny the writ. 

 Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 

concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J. 

_________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 25} I respectfully dissent. 

{¶ 26} In my view, the court should have granted oral argument in this case, 

because it involves a matter of great general interest. There are thousands of 

claimants whose employment injuries prevent them from returning to work and 

necessitate medical restrictions and participation in some type of light duty 

employment. The question concerning whether wage-loss compensation is 

permitted in the circumstances of this case is therefore capable of repetition; in fact, 

the majority’s conclusion that this case does not involve a matter of public or great 

general interest is inconsistent with our decision to grant oral argument on the same 

issue in State ex rel. Cleveland v. Indus. Comm., 146 Ohio St.3d 1488, 2016-Ohio5585, 57 N.E.3d 1168. 

{¶ 27} More significant is the fact that the Tenth District Court of Appeals 

followed its own holding in State ex rel. Cleveland, 10th Dist. Franklin 13AP-1069, 

2015-Ohio-2165, when it concluded that Earles, the claimant here, is entitled to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

wage-loss compensation. Whether an injured employee who is prevented from 

working overtime for nonmedical reasons is entitled to wage-loss compensation is 

a question of statewide concern to employers and employees that should have been 

the subject of oral argument. 

{¶ 28} Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(A)(15) provides that any wage loss 

“must be the direct result of physical and/or psychiatric restriction(s) caused by the 

impairment that is causally related to an industrial injury or occupational disease in 

a claim allowed under Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 29} Thus, the administrative rule mandates that the denial of overtime 

and the resulting loss of wages must directly result from medical restrictions that 

prevent the employee from working longer hours, and therefore, wage-loss 

compensation is not available to an employee who is medically able to work 

overtime but who is prevented from doing so for nonmedical reasons. 

{¶ 30} Here, it appears that the loss of wages is not “the direct result” of a 

medical restriction, but rather it seems to emanate from the terms of the collective 

bargaining agreement that prohibit overtime for those assigned to light duty outside 

of their own job classification even if the employee’s medical restrictions allow the 

employee to work additional hours. But for the collective bargaining agreement 

negotiated by her union and but for her assignment to light duty outside her job 

classification, Earles would be permitted to work overtime. Thus, arguably, the 

loss of overtime wages is not the direct result of a restriction caused by a physical 

impairment directly related to an industrial injury; rather, it is the direct result of 

the negotiated terms of the collective bargaining agreement. This is why this case 

should be scheduled for oral argument to allow these issues to be fully analyzed. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., William L.S. Ross, and Christopher M. 

Ward, for appellant. 
January Term, 2016 

9

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 

Stephen E. Mindzak Law Offices, L.L.C., and Stephen E. Mindzak, for 

appellee Marilynne J. Earles. 

_________________