Filed 8/3/22 P. v. Randolph CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has 

not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAYMOND CHARLES

RANDOLPH,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B317519

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA027017)

THE COURT:

Defendant and appellant Raymond Charles Randolph 

(defendant) appeals from an order denying his pro se petition for 

clarification of his restitution fine obligation and to stop the 

collection of funds from his prison trust account. Appointed 

counsel filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to 

follow the procedures set forth in People v. Serrano (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 496. Where appointed counsel finds no arguable 

issues in an appeal seeking postjudgment relief, the appellate 
2

court is not required to conduct an independent review of the 

record for arguable issues. (People v. Cole (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 

1023, 1039-1040, review granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264278; see

People v. Serrano, supra, at p. 503.) Instead, the defendant is 

given the opportunity to file his or her own supplemental brief or 

letter, and we review the defendant’s contentions or arguments 

set forth in any such supplemental brief or letter that may be 

filed. (People v. Cole, supra, at p. 1039.) Here, defendant was 

notified of his counsel’s brief, and he filed a supplemental brief. 

We have reviewed the contentions or arguments set forth therein, 

and we agree with the trial court that defendant has failed to 

make a prima facie case for relief. We thus affirm the court’s 

order.

BACKGROUND

In 2004, defendant was convicted of second degree murder, 

assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and unlawful possession of 

a firearm. He was sentenced to life in prison with a minimum 

parole period of 80 years. In addition, defendant was ordered to 

pay a restitution fine of $750. In 2020, prior to filing the current 

petition, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the superior court, which the court construed as requesting that 

the amount of his restitution fine in superior court case

No. MA027017 be reduced or discharged due to COVID-19.

1 The 

court denied the habeas petition on August 28, 2020.

In December 2021, defendant filed a “Petition for 

Clarification of Restitution Order,” which is the subject of this 

1 As the habeas petition is not the subject of this appeal and 

has not been included in the appellate record, we are unaware of 

the allegations.
3

appeal. Defendant’s appointed counsel construes it as a request 

for clarification of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition 

for writ of habeas corpus; and as the denial of a habeas petition is 

not appealable, counsel asks this court to deem the current 

petition to be one for writ of mandate. We do not agree that the 

current petition was one for clarification of the trial court’s 

habeas order, as the petition does not ask for clarification, but 

purports to provide clarification to the trial court that

misconstrued defendant’s claim. Defendant’s petition appears to 

be seeking mandamus without expressly so stating. “A writ of 

mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, 

corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act 

which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an 

office, trust, or station . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).)

The petition attaches copies of the payment history of the 

$750 restitution fine imposed in superior court case

No. MA027017, kept by the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR). It is alleged that the $750 

restitution fine was paid in full by 2015, and the CDCR 

unlawfully continued to collect payments from defendant’s trust 

account in 2020. After the trial court denied the habeas petition, 

defendant sought relief through a claim and appeal to the CDCR, 

which was denied. The petition further alleges that defendant 

had three prior cases, superior court case Nos. MA007794, 

MA012133, and MA017730, for which he was “Discharge Parole 

[sic]” on February 28, 2002, causing the trial court to lose 

jurisdiction to collect restitution fines imposed in those prior 

cases. The petition seeks the following relief: that the court’s 

understanding be clarified; that the court stops the unlawful 

collection of restitution; and for any further relief deemed proper.
4

On December 4, 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s 

petition, ruling that defendant had not made a prima facie case 

for relief due to the absence of documentary evidence supporting 

his claim. In addition, the court explained:

“The court records reveal that Petitioner has been 

incarcerated . . . pursuant to four separated cases. 

(Case numbers MA027017, MA017730, MA012133, 

and MA007794.) In each of those cases, he was 

ordered to pay a mandatory restitution fund fine.[2] 

Petitioner has provided documents, showing that 

CDCR is garnishing his account, in order to pay his 

outstanding restitution obligations in case numbers 

MA017730 and MA012133, notwithstanding the fact 

that he has paid his restitution fine in full in case 

number MA027017. [¶] The California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation had the authority, 

under Penal Code section 2085.5(a), to resume 

garnishing an inmate’s prison wages whenever he is 

returned to prison, even if the defendant has 

completed the sentence for the prior crime on which 

the restitution fine is based. (See People v. Ellis

(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1090.)”3

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order.

2 Those records have not been included here in the record on 

appeal.

3 In Ellis, the defendant was in prison at the time of the 

deduction by the CDCR, although he had fully served his 

sentence to which the fine as attached. (People v. Ellis, supra, 31 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1093-1094.)
5

DISCUSSION

In his supplemental brief defendant argues that People v. 

Ellis, cited by the trial court, is distinguishable because, there, 

the CDCR still had all of the collection records. Defendant 

asserts that he has been discharged from parole in the prior 

cases, that the CDCR gave up jurisdiction to collect the prior 

fines to the Franchise Tax Board, and now only that agency has 

jurisdiction to collect them. Defendant further asserts that the 

records of the CDCR and Franchise Tax Board do not match; 

however, as the trial court observed, defendant presented no 

documentary evidence in support of his contentions.4 Nor has 

defendant provided authority for his contentions.

A restitution fine survives parole, and any portion that 

remains unsatisfied when a defendant is no longer on parole 

remains enforceable. (Pen. Code, § 1214, subd. (a).) Restitution 

fines may be collected in myriad ways. (See generally, Estate of 

Casserley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 824, 836-838.) Under certain 

conditions, the CDCR may refer the defendant’s outstanding 

obligation to the Franchise Tax Board. (Rev. & Tax. Code, 

§ 19280.) Defendant has cited no authority suggesting that the 

CDCR loses jurisdiction to collect the debt from a prisoner if 

there had been a previous referral, and we have found none. The 

CDCR has the authority to garnish an inmate’s prison wages 

whenever he is in prison, even if he has completed the sentence 

for the prior crime on which the restitution fine is based. (People 

v. Ellis, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1093-1094.) Indeed, the 

CDCR is required to deduct specified amounts owing on a 

4 In particular, defendant has not provided any evidence of

how, when, or even if the Franchise Tax Board came to collect 

defendant’s restitution fine obligation.
6

restitution fine from the wages and trust account deposits of a 

prisoner. (Pen. Code, § 2085.5, subd. (a).) It follows that the 

CDCR has the authority to resume garnishing an inmate’s prison 

wages whenever he is returned to prison, as the trial court 

concluded here.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court understood 

defendant’s clarification of his claim and correctly found that 

defendant had not made a prima facie case for ordering the 

CDCR to stop collecting amounts owed on any previous 

restitution fines.

DISPOSITION

The order of the superior court denying defendant’s petition 

for clarification of restitution order is affirmed.

____________________________________________________________

ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT, J.