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(~). ~elation~hip be"t"~een Cor.imunic· ticns intellibenc~ and 

Cr:.1ptogr~~hic Security 

20. Successf'ul communication intelligence operations cannot he conducted 

without adequate cryptoe;raphic security. Cryptographio security processes and 

activities e.r~ camplenentary to com11u."'lication intelligence processes and acti-.rities., 

and. the adequacy and ef~iciency of the former exe enhanced by the successes achieved 

the latter. :Jaine n:.ade in the latter providl'! eafer;uards to be applied to the 

former. Similar ta.!ent;, and activities are reqlrl:red in 'IJoth. &f'!'icie11cy- in the 

Federal Government requires coordination ia.n:l supervision within each field., but 

it is not essential that this coordination and supervision be exercised 'Y the 

same agency. 

DISCDSSION 

21. Although cryptographic security policy ~eterminations and proc,sses 

are to some de6ree related to communications intelligence ac":;ivi~ie.11., thny are 

~ inseparable • It is true that information is furnished from cOJ11n1wricn.tions 

intelligence sources which leads to enhanced security of our cr.:,rptograph:.c 

systems. It is also true that intelligence from other sources., such af' naptured 

documents e.!l.Cl prison~r of vnr repor"ts., leads to enhanced security or our cryptographic systems. 'fm•;ever., the degree or security attained. in our cryptoi.;raphic 

systems doe~ not de~end entirely upon intelligence sources. In~orti~tion derived 

from purely technical crJI>tanalytic studies made by the or~rptosre.phic sec..urity 

personnel themselves is much more il'l'lportant. In fact., secure orypt.,grap} ic 

l!ly&tezr..s can be ar.rl in the Army and the Wavy have been erlablished by an entirely 

theoretical_.. approach not involvinz co11munioati:ms intelligence or other :i.ntelligcnce 

activities. 

22. In ostablishing and maintaining cryptographic security th" ~pproao~ is 

from the comr1.u.~ications point of vielv, whereas the approach to the production of 

COl'llllunication intelligence is from the intelligence point or vi~w. Althcugh., 

in c~neral, simi 1e.r -t-.alents are required of' the personnel en.gaged in certain or 

the purely technical operations involved in both cryptographic and cryptanalytic 

activities,. nevertheless, beca.UBe of the di.fferin;; point3 of' view noted above and 

because or differine procedures for handlin.:; the f'inal products of these two 

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activities. sepe.rRte staffs hav~ bean deemed necessary. Hence, althouer in both 

the War D9 partment and the Navy Department r~spomibility for crn>tograi:hic 

seourity activities and for cryptanalytical activities are v~sted withir. single 

organizations in each ot those Departments, the actual work involved in carrying 

on these ti.••o activities is peri'orr.ed by separ"l.te staffs therein. 

23. For Fecurity re"l.sons, secregation or theee tvro fw::i.otions end F~rsonnel 

is advisable. The danger or drying up communication intelligence at the source, 

unless the activities and results are safeguarded by rigid restrictions End 

unless a curb ie put upon the desire of r.i.a.ny agencies to ~ngage in such activities, 

has been adequately recognized by the fact that by Presidential directive 

cryptanaJi1;ical activi-l;ies of the Government he.Ve been limited to the Army, Navy, 

and FBI. 

24. Studies having as their e.im the protection oi' our ovm corrJ11unications 

arc ai'i'ected by crj-ptanalytio studies on foreign cryptographic systems, and 

techniques deriven from t~e latter provlde valuable information for the iraprovement in the security of our cr.vn communications. Hence, e.ny cOJT.municatioo. intelligence relating to the s~curity or our a:m commumincations should be made availab1' 

l:;o ,t;f the personnel responsible :ror connnunication security. A permanent supervisory 

agency to insure the security or cr~'Ptographic systems and rela".;ed proo:e1lures 

throughout the :r."ederal ·:Zovernmcnt should• if properly oonstitut"d• include members 

havine; access to communication intelligence in order to insure that s11ch intelligence \'.rould be Me.de g,vailable to the persori ... "'181 responsible for cryptographic 

. 

security. 

25. Cr;;:ptograpliic socurity activities should not be so closely int~1grated 

with communication int~lli6ence activities as to preclude independent ruuctioning 

of any supervisory cryptographic security policy board which mi.:;ht be es"t.ablished 

for the purpose of establishing and maintaining se~urity of Governmental oomm.unications. Cryptogrephic security should and nust be prepared to stand on its own 

solid technical foun.iation, wit!1out 11id of oOll!Munication intelligence, be cause the 

existence of the latter depends upon rather slender threads which may be cut at 

any time e.nd without notice. Hence• if e~curi ty or our own comr.u.."lice.tior.s is to 

be assured under possible fu:.Cure oo~ti~enices involving our in~bility to dorive 

intelligence relati?l(. to our own. 

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communications from the study of foreign traffic, either 

because the c~;ptographjc syster.is encountered cannot be 

solved or because communications intelligence activities as 

a whole are su:r-pressed, it is obvious thr1t r£lia.nce should be 

rlaced not,uion the quectionable continu€d availability of 

communications intElligtnce but ratr..cr upon setting up crj'}itographic 

security staffs and activitiec independently of communications 

intelligence staffs and activities. 

26. If a Board having jurisdiction over policies aprlicable 

to cryptographic security and related procedures is established it does not follo~ 

that the functions of such a Bos.rd should be expnnded to include jtirisdiction over communication intelligEnce ne.tters. A sin.;lc Board fc1r 

these tv;o related activities is not nece::;sc-ry for tr...c most efficient 

functioning of either actiYit~~, nor f<:·r security reasons, is it ad•risable. 

27. It shculd be notEd that despite the fact that in the Bri·~iah 

Government there is a com1)lete integrc.tion of cryptographic compil ltion, 

cryptographic security, and communication intelligence ~ctivitiea qithin 

a single organization {GC and CS), nevertheless that Goverm:ient hes recognized the nece~sity or desirability of sepe.ratin{; the control of 

cryrtofraphic seou-r·ity activities from that of comr.n.mication int~lligence 

activities. •rv.o scrarate boe-.rC.s have been established fer this pt.rpose, 

(1) the Sicnal Intelligence Board and (2) the Ci:rb.er Policy Board. One 

interlocking membership to coordinate the functionine of the tVJo f.oards 

is provided. 

28. If a t:ermanent board is found to be necessary or desirahle for 

controlJ ing the communicction intelligence activities of the Gove:•nment, 

the informal Army-Navy Communications Inttlligence Coordinating G•lmmittee, 

nov1 1n existence for the purpose of coordinating comnrunications i 1telligence 

activities of the .Army end the !Tavy, is th£' proper aeency to r.iake re-

' comnendaticns, at an approrriate time, for the eDtablishment of eny such 

permanent bee.rd. 

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