The recor d in this case is seale d beca use of its sensitive nature , so we refe r t o the appe llant 1 by her initials rathe r than he r full name. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 055 -CV

L.C . , A ppe lla nt
v. The Texas Departm ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0004 84 , HO NORAB LE STEP HEN Y ELENOSK Y , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
L .C. appea ls the g rant of a plea to the jurisdiction f

iled by the Texas Depa

rtment of 1 F amil y and Pr ote c tiv e Se rv ic e s ( “th e Dep art me nt” ). A s ub div isi on of the De pa

rtme nt, Chi ld Protective Service s (“CPS”), investigated child abuse alleg ations ag ainst L .C. I t de termi n ed that the re wa s re a so n to bel ie ve L .C. ha d ab us e d he r c hil dr e n, and it p la c e d L .C. ’s name in a c on fi de nti a l, State -m a int a ine d r e g istry

of re po rt e d c hil d- a

bu se c a se s. L .C. so ug ht re vie w of CPS’ s a c tio ns wi thi n the Depa rtment. The De partmenta l review ers uphe ld CP S’s child abu s e d e te r mi n a ti o n , a n d L .C. then soug ht judicial reviewin Travis County District Court. The De partment fil ed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that CP S’s det er m i n ati on was not subject to judicial re view. The trial court g ra nte d th e De pa

rtme nt’ s p le a , a

nd L .C. a pp e a le d. We w ill a ff

ir m.2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND I n 2004, CPS beg an investig ating an alleg ation that L .C.’s husband abuse d one of the couple’ s children. As pa rt of its investigation, CP S interviewed L .C.’s hu s b an d. Duringthe interview, L .C.’s husband produc ed evide nce that appea red to implicate L .C. in the children’ s abuse. B a se d o n that e vid e nc e , CPS b e g an inve sti g a tin g L .C. CPS d id n ot n oti fy L .C. that sh e ha d b e c ome the targ et of its investigation. L .C. w as not inter viewed during the investigation, wa s not allowed to comment on the evidenc e produce d by her husband, and was not allowed to produc e evide nce of h e r o w n . C P S e v e n tu a l l y m a d e an a dm i n i s t r a t i v e “ s u m m ar y f i n d i n g ” o f

“ r e a s o n - t o - b e l i e v e , ” b y a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e , that L .C. wa s a “ de sig nate d p e rp e tr a tor ” re sp on sib le fo r t he “ a bu se of a c hild.” See 4 0 T e x . A dm i n . C o d e A n n . § § 7 0 0
. 5 1 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) , . 5 1 2 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( W e s t2 0 0 9 )
. A c c o r d i n g l y, CPS place d L .C.’s name in a c onfidential re g istry of re ported c hild-abuse c ases. SeeTex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.002(a) (West 2008) (De partment shall establish and maintain centr al reg istry of re ported
case s of child abuse and neg lect).

Upon lear ning of CPS ’s abuse de termination and the pla ceme nt of her na me in the abuse r eg istry , L .C. sought and obta ined a ty pe of informal revie w within the Depa rtment known as an Administrative Reviewof Investig ative F indings (“ ARI F” ). See 4 0 T ex . Admin. Code § 7 00 .5 16 (f

). Th e re c or d d oe s n ot r e ve a l th e e xten t to wh ic h L .C. pa rt ic ipate d in the AR I F , b ut L .C. does not c omplain that she was denied her rig ht to “appe ar, make statements, provi d e r elevant written mater ials, . . . ask questions . . . [, or] be repr esente d by another individual” at the ARI F. Id
. The r eviewe r who c onducted the A RI F uphe ld CP S’s determination that a pr eponder ance of the evidenc e indicated that L .C. had abused he r childre n. Se e id . § 700.516(h). L .C. then sought a nd obtained fur

ther re view fr om the Depa rtment’s Off

ice of Consumer Aff

airs. Se e id . §§ 702
. 8 4 1
- . 8 4 9.3

L .C. contends that she re quested a nd was de nied the opportunity to b e int ervie wed a

nd prese nt
ne w e vid e nc e a s p art

of that r e vie w. Th e Of

fi c e of Con sumer

Af fa ir s e ve ntu a lly

up he ld CPS ’s deter

mination. L .C. subsequently

filed a motion with the Depa rtmen t re q u es ting a

rehe aringor
reve rsal of the abuse de termination. Alternatively , L .C. requeste d a re fer ral to the State O ffice of Administrative Hea

ring s (“SOAH” ) for

independe nt review . The De partment re sponded to L .C.’s
mo t i o n by

telling L .C. that none of her reque sted reme dies was pr ocedur ally authorized. Specifica lly , t h e Depa

rtment told L .C. that (1) she ha d exhausted all of her revie w opportunities wi thi n th e De pa

rtme nt a nd (2 ) S OA H h a d n o ju

ri sd ic tio n to r e vie w C PS’ s a bu se de te rm inatio n unti l CPS so ug ht t o a c t on

it ( e .g ., by inf

or min g a thi rd pa

rt y of it o r d e nyingL .C. a

lic e ns e to e ng a g e in
an ac tivity

within CP S’s purview). L .C. subsequently

sued the De partment in Travis County District Court. She alleg ed that she had exhausted all of her administrative re medies and w as entitled to judicial revie w under both the Administrative Procedur es Ac t (“the A PA”), Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 20 0 1
. 0 0 1 -. 9 02 (West 2008), and the Te x as and U nited States Consti tutions. As grounds f or re lief, L .C. alleg ed that the Depa rtment had violated its est ab l i s hed proc edure s, rea ched a deter mination that was not
su pp or te d b y su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e , a

bu se d it s d isc re tio n, and

vio late d L .C. ’s du e pr oc e ss r ig hts
. The De partment filed a

plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that judicial revie w was not authorized bec ause CPS’s abuse de termination was not a “ final dec ision” re s u ltingfrom a “ contested
case ” as the APA require s. Se e id . §§ 2001.171 (judicial re view author ized only for “ [a] person who has exhausted all administrative re medies ava ilable within a st ate ag ency and who is ag g rieve d by a fina l decision i n a contested ca se”) , 2001.003(1) ( defining“conte sted ca se” a s “a pr ocee ding . . .4

in which the leg al rig hts, duties, or privileg es of a party are to be deter

mined by a state a g ency

afte r
an opportunity for adjudicative hear ing” ). The Depa rtment’s plea did not ad d re s s L .C.’s
c on sti tut ion a l du e pr oc e ss a rgume nts
. The trial c ourt g rante d the Depa rtment’s plea
. I n a l et t er a ccompa nying its orde r, the cour t expl ained that the D epar tment’s proce dures ne ither qualifie d as a “conte sted ca se”
un de r t he APAno r v iol a te d L .C. ’s du e pr oc e ss r ig hts , s o L .C. ha d no ri g ht to jud ic ia l re vie w. L .C. tim e ly fi le d th is a

pp e a l.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW We r e v ie w d e n o v o th e g r an t o f a p le a to th e ju r is d ic ti o n . T

ex a s De p ’t of Parks & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 2 2 6 (T ex. 2004). Our task is to determine whether the plaintiff has a lleg ed fa cts that aff irmatively demonstrate the trial court’s subject matter jur isdiction. Id
. We also revie w de novo questions of st atutory and constitutional interpre tation. Ha rri s Co un ty Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp. , 283 S.W .3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009).
DI SCU SSIO N L .C. raises thre e issues on appe al. We will address them in turn.
Iss ue On e: Wh ether T

he De pa rtme nt’

s P ro c e dures Q ual

if y as a “ Cont

este d Ca se ” U

nde r the APA L .C. first arg ues that the trial court err ed in holding hers was not a “conte sted ca se” entitled to judicial reviewunder the APA.

“In Texas, a per son may

obtain judicial revie w of a n administrative ac tion only if a statute provi d es a right to judicial re view, or the action . . . violates a constitutional right.”We look to federa l authority wh en co n struing r ights that implicate due proce ss. See 2 NCAA v. Y

eo , 171 S.W .3d 863, 867 n.14 (Tex. 2005). 5 Texas De p’t of Protective& Regulatory Serv s. v. Me ga Chil d Care, Inc. , 145 S.W .3d 170, 172 (Tex. 2004). As L .C. acknowle dg es, the only statute that arguably

provides a r ight to judicial revie w here is the APA. The APA provide s a r i gh t t o j u d i cial re view only in “conteste d case s.” See Te x. Go v’ t Co de § 2 00 1. 17 1 ( “ A p e rs on wh o h a s e xha

us te d a ll a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s ava ila ble wi thi n a state a g e nc y

and wh o is a g g ri e ve d b y a fi nal deci si on in a c on te ste d c a se is e nti tle d to judicial revie w under

this chapter.” ). The A PA defines a “conte sted case ” as a procee ding “in which the l ega l ri gh t s , duties, or privileg es of a party are to be deter

mined by a state a g ency

afte r an opportunity

for a djudicative hea

ring .” Id . § 2001.003(1). L .C. argues that the De partment’s pr ocedur es we re a djudicativ e in nature a nd that they deter mined her le g al rig hts, duties, and privileg es. We disag ree ; the Depa rtment’s proc edure s did not determine a

ny of L .C.’s leg al rig hts, duties, or privileg es . T h e o n l y leg al ef fec t of the De pa rtme nt’ s p ro c e dure s w a s th e pla c e me nt o f L .C. ’s name in a c on fi de nti a l r e g ist

ry purs ua nt t o Family Code section 261.002. L .C. does not expl ain what r ights, duti es , o r p ri v i leg es we re deter mined by this action; she simply asser ts that her “rig hts, duties, and privil eg es as a parent have be e n f or e ve r t arn ish e d. ” Whil e having one ’s name pla c e d in a c hil d- a bu se re g ist

ry is a lmo st
cer tainly upsetting f

or par ents who believe they are innocent, ther e is n o l ega l rig ht not to be “tar nished” in such a

manner . Child-abuse re g istries are co n s t i t u t i o nal. Se e Mi lle r v . Ca lif or nia De p’ t of So c . S e rv s. , 355 F.3d 1172, 1177- 79 (9th Cir. 2004) (c i t i n g, i n t er alia, Pa ul v . D av is , 42 4 U .S. 69 3 ( 19 76 )) ; Smith v. Siegelman , 322 F.3d 1290, 1296- 97 (11th Cir. 2003) (same ). 2 Second, L .C.’s relationship with her c hildren wa s not impacted in a lega lly cog nizable way

by the6

place ment of L .C.’s name in the reg istry ; L .C. did not l ose custody or visitation of her c hildren or oth e rw ise have he r pa

re nta l ri g hts a ff

e c te d in any wa y . T hu s, in a

le g a l se ns e , n on e of

L .C. ’s “ ri g hts , duties, and privileg es as a pare nt” were determined by the Department’s procedur es. As a r esult, we
mus t c on c lud e tha

t L .C. ha s n ot b e e n “ a g g ri e ved by a fi na l de c isi on in a c on te ste d c a se ” and

is there fore not entitled to judicial review unde r the APA. Te x . Gov’t Code § 2001.171.
Iss ue s T wo a nd T hre e : W he the r the

De pa rtme nt’

s P ro c e dures D e

priv e d L .C. of

Due Proc ess L .C. nex t argue s that she wa s entitled to judicial review of the Depa

rtment’s pr oc e dure s b e c a

us e the y violate d h e r d

ue pr oc e ss r ig hts . Sp e c if ic a lly , s he argue s th a t “ CPS’ [s] fa ilure to p ro vid e a de qu a te no tic e to A pp e lla nt t hat sh e be c ame the fo c us of the c hil d a

bu se
a lle g a tio ns ” did tw o thin g s: it (1 ) “i mpa ir e d th e fu nd ame nta l and

c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d inte re st possessed by

Appellant, as a

pare nt, in the car e, custody , and contr ol of h er ch i l d ren” and (2) “hinder ed the liberty interest and proper ty interest which the [Tex as] a nd United S t at es Constit ution[ s] gra

nt to appellant to pursue he r chose n profe ssion.” We must di smiss t he first of th es e argume nts beca use, as noted a

bove, L .C.’s relationship wit h her children was not leg ally aff ecte d by the Depa

rtment’s ac tions. L .C. states that her pa renta l rig hts were “cle arly infring ed” by

CPS ’s abuse finding , but she does not provi de an argument to support this st atem en t. Wi thout such argument, L .C. does not establish that infring ement of her pare ntal rig hts w as a basis for judicial revie w. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226 (plaintiff be ars bur den of a lleg ing f acts that a ffirmatively

demonstrate tr ial court jurisdiction). L .C.’s second due p ro cess a rgument—namely , that CPS ’s abuse deter mination hinders her

ability to pursue her

chosen pr ofession—turns on the a lleg ation that potential employ ers wi ll l e arn of CPS’ s a

bu se de te rm inatio n. L .C. is a he a lth -c are pr ov ide r, and

sh e a lle g e s th a t ho sp ita ls7

and ins ur anc e c omp anie s w ill no t w or k w it h he r o nc e the y

le arn that he r n ame ha s b e e n p la c e d in
a re g istry of re ported ch i l d -abuse case s. She also alleg es that she will have to self-re port CPS ’s abuse de termination on the Texas Standardized Credentialing Application, a f orm that hea lth care providers ha

ve to s ubmit to car

riers with whom they want to become cre dentialed. L .C. alleg es that the form r equire s her to authoriz e the Depa rtment to rele ase its abuse finding to those car riers, a nd
as a r esult her e mploy

ment prospec ts will suffer. We believe that L .C.’s second argument is not ripe for adjudication, because as of the time she filed suit L
. C
. h ad n ev er self-re ported he r abuse deter mination, authorized its release, or oth er wi s e h ad h er e mploy ment adver sely

aff ecte d by it. See W

aco Inde p. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 22 S.W. 3d

84 9, 85 2 ( Te x. 20 00 ) ( “ A c a se is no t ri pe wh e n de te rm ini ng wh e the r the pla int if f ha s a
c on c re te inj ur

y de pe nd s on contin g e nt or hy po the tic a l fa c ts, or up on

e ve nts that ha

ve no t y e t c ome to pass.”). Tr ial courts have no subject matter jur isdiction over unripe c laims. Id . at 851. B ut even if we a ssume that L .C.’s claim is ripe, it still does not demonstrate that the Depa rtment’s proc edure s deprive d L .C. of due proc ess.

First, L .C. p ro v i d es no leg al basis for he r cla im that due proce ss require d the Depa rtment to inform h er s h e h ad b ecome the targ et of its investigation. L .C. claims that the Depa rtment violated its internal proc edure s in failing so to infor m her, but that is not evidenc e of a due proc ess depr ivation. See A lford v. City of Dallas , 738 S.W .2d 312, 316 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (“ [T] o have a proce dural due proce ss cause of ac tion, the p l aintiff must establish a p r o t e c t a b l e p r o p e rt y i n t e r e s t s e p ar a t e an d a p artf r o mt h e r u l e s t h e m s e l v e s . ” )
. L
. C
. c i t e s n o a u t h o r i t y,
nor ar e we awa

re of any , holding that tar g ets of administrative investiga tions have a due proc ess rig ht8

to know they

are beinginvestigated. The ta rg ets of cr iminal investigatio n s ce rt ainly have no due proce ss rig ht to know they are beinginvestigated. Se c on d, the e mpl oy

me nt d if fi c ult ie s that may re su lt fr om be ingsti g matize d a s a c hil d abuser do not by themselves im plicate due proce ss. See Sie gelman , 322 F.3d at 1298 (“de leterious eff ects that flow dir ectly

from a sullied reputation, such a s the adve rse impac t on job prospects, ar e normally insufficient” to show due process deprivation). To show that CPS ’s abuse deter mination implicated her due proce ss r ights, L .C. must “show that the [Department’s] conduct ‘de prived [her] of a pr eviously rec og nized pr operty or liberty interest in addition to damag ing [her] reputation.’” Id
. (q u o t i n g Cy

pr ess I ns . Co . v . Clar

k, 144 F.3d 1435, 1436-37 (11th Cir. 1998) ). L .C. doe s not identify
a “ pr e vio us ly

re c og nize d p ro pe rt

y or lib e rt y int e re st” ; sh e sim

ply a lle g e s that she wi ll h ave tr ou ble g e tti ngwo rk

a s a re su lt of the dama g e to he r r e putatio n. Whil e it m ay be c or re c t, t his a lle g a tio n is insufficient to establish a c onstitut ional basis for tria l court jurisdiction. See Sie gert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991) (da mag e to re putatio n an d resulting impairment of future employ ment pr os pe c ts i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o est a

bli sh du e pr oc e ss v iol a tio n) ; Vander Zee v . Reno , 73 F.3d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1996) (“ Neither harm to r eputation nor the conseque nt impairment of future employ ment op po rt un iti e s are c on sti tut ion a lly c og niza ble inj ur ie s. ” ); see also In reM.A.H. , 20 S.W .3d 860, 865 (T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 0, no pe t.) (p la c inga pp e lla nt o n sex off

e nd e r re g ist

ry did no t im pli c a te du e pr oc e ss whe re re su lti ngimp a ir me nt o f e du c a tio na l and

e mpl oy me nt o pp or

tun iti e s w a s “ pure ly sp e c ulativ e ” ); Ex parte M ercado , N o . 1 4
- 0 2
- 0 0 7 5 0
- CR , 2 0 0 3 T e x. Ap p . L E X I S 2 8 8 6 , a t * 1 2-13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] Apr. 3, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated f or publication) (i mpa ir me nt o f e mpl oy

me nt o pp or

tun iti e s r e su lti ng fr om ha

rm to r e putatio n in su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh due proc ess violation).9 Third, the child-abuse reg istry is c onfidential. Unless L .C. consents, the De partment cannot r elea se information about her inclusion in the re g istry without first givingher a

hear ing be fore an adminis trative lawjudge
. See 40 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 700.602-.605. Thoug h we have found no authority

on the matter, w e pre sume that the hear ing would qualify as a “ contested c ase” under the APA and would c onsequently entitle L .C. t o j u d icial re view of a n unfavor able r esult. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.171. I n other words, L .C.’s abuser status should not bec ome known to a third party

unless L
. C . consents or is af forde d all the proc ess she pre sently seeks. This re inforce s
our conc lusion that the Depa rtment has not y et deprived L .C. of due proc ess. Se e Blac k bu rn v . Ci ty of M ar sh all , 4 2 F .3 d 9 25 , 9 36 n. 10 (5 th Cir
. 19 95 ) (“ A pr e re qu isi te to ra isi nga lib e rt y int e re st c la im based on stig ma is that the statement be ma de public by the def endant.” ).
CO NC LU SION L .C. had no rig ht to judicial review of the pl ac em ent of he r name in the State’s confide ntial child-abuse r eg istry , as that pl ace ment did not arise throug h a “contested case” under the APA and did not implicate any constitutional li berty

or prope rty

interest. Thus, we aff

irm the order g rantingthe State’s plea

to the jurisdiction.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice B e fo re Justi c e s Purye ar, Pe mbe rt on and Wal dr op ; Con c ur ri ngOp ini on

by Justi c e Pe mbe rt on ; ConcurringOpinion by J ustice Waldrop Affir med Filed: Nove mber 13, 2009