alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.1 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

The Board of Directors

Deltic Timber Corporation: 

Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-34317, No. 333-76294, and No. 333-90026) on Form S-8 of Deltic Timber Corporation of our reports dated March 5, 2010, with respect to the consolidatedbalance sheets of Deltic Timber Corporation and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 2009 and 2008, and the related consolidated statements of income, cash flows, stockholders’ equity, and comprehensive income for each of the years in thethree-year period ended December 31, 2009, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2009, which reports appear in the December 31, 2009 annual report on Form 10-K of Deltic TimberCorporation. 

Our report refers to changes in accounting for uncertain tax positions in 2007, and to changes in the measurement date fordefined benefit pension and other postretirement plans in 2008. Our report also refers to a retroactive change in the method of classifying cash outflows associated with real estate development activities within cash flow from operations.

/s/ KPMG LLP 

KPMG LLP 

Shreveport, Louisiana 

March 5, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Petitioner

v.

CHARLES NASE,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 922 MAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 6th day of December, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### Stewart Maxwell, Resp’t, *v.*Horace Inman, Appl’t.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,*

*Filed November,*1886.)

Chattel moetgage — acknowledgment — cebtified copies of — hot evidence OF'EXECUTION — CODE ClV. *FBO., § 934.*

The defendant offered in evidence a paper certified by the town clerk to be copy of originals on file. The originals of which a copy was thus certified, were an alleged chattel mortgage, and an alleged acknowledgment thereof. *Held,*that a copy of a chattel mortgage certified by the town clerk, is no proof of the execution of the mortgage, because no proof of such execution need be on the instrument in order to require the town clerk to file it.

*101
      *Held,*also that there is nothing in the statutes authorizing the filing of the acknowledgment of a chatttel mortgage or the certifying a copy of such acknowledgment.

*Stover &*Nesbit, for resp’t; *F. J.*Maxwell, for appl’t.

Learned, P. J.

—

To maintain Ms case tbe defendant offered in evidence a paper certified by tbe town clerk to be a copy of originals on file. Tbe originals (of wMcli a copy was thus certified) were an alleged chattel mortgage and an alleged acknowledgment thereof. Tbe defendants objected that tMs was not evidence of tbe execution of the instrument.

Sect. 934 of the Code Civ. Pro. is to tbe same effect as 1 R. S. m. p. 350, sect. 16 (1 Edm. 323). There is no change. And this provision of the Revised Statutes was in force when *Bissell*v. *Pierce,*28 N.Y. 252 was decided.

It, therefore, did not modify or give greater effect to the provisions of Chap. 279, Laws 1833, Sect. 4. See 7th. Ed. Rev. Stat. p. 2250.

Now it was held in that case and again in *Sunderlin,*v. *Hyman*17 Sup. Co. (10 Hun) 493, and in *Fellows*v. Hyring, 23 How. 231, that a copy of a chattel mortgage certified by the town clerk was no proof of the execution of the mortgage. And this is necessarily so, because no proof of such execution need be on the instrument in order to require the town clerk to file it. Thus the case is different from that of conveyances of land.

Nor is there anything in the statutes authorizing the filing of the acknowledgment of a chattel mortgage, or the certifying a copy of such acknowledgment. It is otherwise as to deeds, 1 R. S. m. p. 760, sect. 263, 7th. Ed., Rev. Stat. p. 2220.

The town clerk has only to file any paper which appears to be a copy of a mortgage. If his certificate of a copy thereof is evidence, then the copy filed has more effect than the mortgage itself. Of course the *Original*of wMch the town clerk certifies a copy, is the paper in his office. And tins itself may be a pretended copy.

Sect. 934 of the Code Civ. Pro. is a general provision as to all papers, just as the corresponding provision was. 1 R. S. m. p. 350, Sect. 16. But the Stat. of 1833 specially provided as to the effect of certified copies of chattel mortgages, or of copies of chattel mortgages. That statute has. been construed, and construed correctly, and should be followed.

For this error. — Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event.

LANDON, J., concurs.
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  
    
    The Form 10-Q of the Company for the three months ended September 30, 2010 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
 
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Corey RinkerCorey RinkerChief Financial Officer, Treasurer and
Assistant Secretary
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

The Board of Directors and Stockholders 

Tumbleweed Communications Corp.: 

We consent to theincorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-84683, 333-43194, 333-48636, 333-49492, 333-61076, 333-101018, 333-103043, 333-106913, 333-114340, and 333-114780) of Tumbleweed Communications Corp. of our reportsdated March 16, 2006, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Tumbleweed Communications Corp. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2005 and 2004, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity andcomprehensive loss, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2005, management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2005, and theeffectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2005, which reports appear in the December 31, 2005 annual report on Form 10-K of Tumbleweed Communications Corp. 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

Mountain View, California 

March 16, 2006
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF 18 U.S.C.

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Cardima, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Gabriel B. Vegh, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to § 1350 of Chapter 63 of 18 U.S.C., as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/    GABRIEL B. VEGH 
|Gabriel B. Vegh        
|Chief Executive Officer
|March 31, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1997
<CASH>                                       3,922,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,754,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   389,000
<INVENTORY>                                  1,407,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,513,000
<PP&E>                                      19,256,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              17,405,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,559,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,403,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        20,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,709,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,559,000
<SALES>                                     20,452,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            20,452,000
<CGS>                                        9,932,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,932,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            16,715,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (5,979,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (5,979,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (5,979,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.94)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.94)
        

</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 2, 2016

No. 04-16-00725-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.S.R., JR., A CHILD,

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015-PA-02014

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant attempts to appeal the trial court’s order of termination. An appeal from such

an order is accelerated. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002 (West 2014). The trial court signed the

order of termination on June 23, 2016. Because this is an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal

was due July 13, 2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). A motion for extension of time to file the

notice of appeal was due on July 28, 2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file the notice of

appeal on November 3, 2016. It thus appears that neither document was filed within the time

allowed for filing a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal.

A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good

faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1 but within the fifteen-day

grace period provided by Rule 26.3 for filing a motion for extension of time. See Verburgt v.

Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (construing the predecessor to Rule 26). But Aonce

the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Rule [26.3] has passed, a party can

no longer invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction.@ Id. 

It is therefore ORDERED that appellant show cause in writing within fifteen days from

the date of this order why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The briefing schedule is suspended pending determination whether this Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal. 

_________________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice

FILE COPY
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 2nd day of December, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

FILE COPY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE :

: Case No: 1601016740

: In and For Kent County

v. :

:

QUAYSHAUN JOHNSON, :

:

Defendant. :

O R D E R

Defendant Johnson has Moved to Suppress evidence obtained in an

Administrative Search.

Essentially, the parties agree that 11 Del. Code § 4321(d) and DOC Procedure

7.19 control the resolution of this Motion. That is, did Officer Porter successfully

navigate the requirements of the foregoing to justify his search of Room 106, where

the critical evidence was found, as well as Defendant’s vehicle and Defendant.

The findings of the hearing on this Motion established the following:

(1) Officer Porter received information, from a person whom he knew to be a

past proven, reliable informant, which indicated that “Q” (identified by Officer Porter

as Defendant) had been seen by the informant to be in possession of heroin; was to

be located at Room 106 of the Dover Inn; and was operating a green SUV. Officer

Porter confirmed the accuracy of Defendant’s location and vehicle. Additionally,

Officer Porter conducted substantial surveillance, providing further corroboration of

the informant’s information.

(2) Officer Porter, a probation officer, was aware that Defendant was a

probationer at the time of the foregoing.

(3) Given the reliability of the information received, and the source from which
State v. Johnson 

Case No. 1601016740

December 5, 2016

it came, as well as his own observations, Officer Porter had a well informed telephone

discussion with his Supervisor. As a result, a search was justified and authorized for

Defendant’s person, his vehicle and Room 106.

Based on the totality of all of the foregoing, all conforming to Probation and

Parole Rule 7.19, 11 Del. Code § 4321(d), and relevant case law requirements, the

searches here were valid. Defendant’s Motion, therefore, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 5

th day of December, 2016.

/s/ Robert B. Young

J.

RBY/lmc

oc: Prothonotary

cc: D. Benjamin Snyder, Esquire

Alexander W. Funk, Esquire

Opinion Distribution

2
From: "Susan Thorsell" <SThorsell@astburyenviro.com>

To: Rochelle Boyd/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA

Date: 11/01/2010 01:03 PM

Subject: Superior Aluminum Alloys Report

Ms Boyd,

Please find attached a scanned copy of the Superior Aluminum Alloys Report. If you have difficulty reading this 

copy I will be happy to send you a hard copy.

Thank you,

Susan 

Susan Thorsell

Project Manager

Air Analysis Division

Astbury Environmental Engineering

5757 West 74th Street

Indianapolis, Indiana 46278

317.472.0999 office

877.683.8378 toll free

317.472.0993 fax
SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

LINDSEY LICARI, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

NIKKI SIKALIS BOTT; NATIONAL 

TITLE CO.; LINDA NAW-PERDUE; 

ERA BROKERS; VALLEY WEST 

MORTGAGE; DREW LEVY; ONE 

REALTY GROUP; MELISSA PARKER; 

MELANIE TREANOR; GREATER LAS 

VEGAS ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS; 

THE STATE OF NEVADA 

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND 

INDUSTRY, REAL ESTATE DIVISION; 

LINDA STRATTON; INGRID 

TRUJILLO; DARYL MCCLOSKY; 

VATCHE SAJIDIAN; CLARK COUNTY 

RECORDER'S OFFICE; THE STATE OF 

NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE; LAS 

VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; JENNINGS AND 

FULTON, LTD.; AND SHUMWAY VAN 

LTD., 

Res ondents. 

No. 82568 

J ï D 

SEP 2 1 2021 

ELiZABE1 ciar-AVN 

CLERK OF S • EWE COURT 

1319.4CV—PUTY CLEO.K. 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order dismissing 

claims and declaring appellant to be a vexatious litigant. Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Clark County; David M. Jones, Judge. 

On March 18, 2021, the clerk of this court issued a notice 

directing appellant, who is proceeding pro se, to file and serve, by July 16, 

2021, either (1) a brief that complies with NRAP 28(a) and NRAP 32 or (2) 

an informal brief for pro se parties on the form provided by the clerk. The 

notice cautioned that failure to timely file a brief or an informal brief could 

'-14M 
result in the dismissal of this appeal. 

Appellant did not file a brief or an informal brief or otherwise 

communicate with this court. Accordingly, on August 11, 2021, this court 

entered an order directing appellant to file and serve, by August 25, 2021, 

either (1) an opening brief that complies with NRAP 28(a) and NRAP 32 or 

(2) an informal brief for pro•se parties on the form provided by the clerk of 

this court. The order cautioned that failure to timely file and serve an 

opening brief or an informal brief could result in the imposition of sanctions, 

including the dismissal of this appeal as abandoned. See NRAP 31(d). 

To date, appellant has not filed an opening brief or an informal 

brief or otherwise communicated with this court. Accordingly, it appears 

that appellant has abandoned this appeal, and this court 

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED. 

•2§. 

Cadish 

Herndon 

2 

C, 44-aw- 
cc: Hon. David M. Jones, District Judge 

Lindsey Licari 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Lipson Neilson P.C. 

Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara, LLP/Las Vegas 

Clarkson & Associates, LLC 

Marquis Aurbach Coffing 

Drew Levy 

Linda Stratton 

Murchison & Cumming, LLC/Las Vegas 

Shumway Van 

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP/Las Vegas 

Clark County District Attorney 

Resnick & Louis, P.C./Las Vegas 

Vatche Sajidian 

Valley West Mortgage 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 1947A Olagto 3 

• vtrijri :f - -
Exhibit
32.01




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Sangui Biotech International, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2006 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
I, Thomas Striepe, Chief Executive Officer, and I, Joachim Fleing, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:




(1)        The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)        The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.








Dated: June 6,
2008   /s/
Thomas Striepe


__________________________________________


By:
Thomas Striepe


Chief
Executive Officer






Dated: June 6,
2008   /s/
Joachim Fleing
 __________________________________________
 By:
Joachim Fleing
 Chief
Financial Officer








A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### People *ex rel.*Elizabeth Van Riper, Plff., v. The New York Catholic Protectory, Deft.

*(Supreme Court, Chambers*— New *York County*

Filed, *January*5, 1887.)

Parent AND Child — Rights of parents to custody of Child — Poweb of Legislature.

The Legislature has no power to enact that merely because a child under sixteen years of age is found in the street without attendance, and because a magistrate should choose to characterize this as an improper exposure, a parent could.be deprived of his child ; neither is there any power to deprive a parent of the custody of his child without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

*Habeas corpus*and *certiorari*in respect to custody of Florence Van Riper.

*Dennis*McMahon, for petitioner; *Denis Quinn*and *John £.*Pine, for respondents.

Van Brunt, J.

The child referred to in the 'proceedings in this matter is detained because of a commitment by a police magistrate alleging that the child was improperly exposed and neglected and wandering in the public park without any proper guardianship, and that the child was found in the company of one Mary Ryan, who is a reputed prostitute, in yiolation of the provisions of the Penal Code.

, No evidence is returned, and the demurrer to the traverse admits that the father of the child, with whom the child lived and under whose guardianship she was, had no notice of the proceedings affecting his child.

. The respondents claim that in the commitment reciting jurisdictional facts, there is no power to review the action of the committing magistrate, although a parent may be thereby deprived of the custody of his child without an opportunity to be heard and without there having been any evidence produced to justify the findings in the commitment.

It is true that the, acts of the Legislature which have been passed seem so to read, but as there is no power in the Legislature to deprive a person of one dollar of his property without *318his having an opportunity to be heard and without due process of law, neither is there any power to deprive a parent of the custody of his child without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

It would be a monstrous doctrine to hold that under any legislation, merely because a child under sixteen years of age is found in the street without attendance, and because a magistrate should choose to characterize this as an improper exposure, a parent could be deprived of his child, and that, too, without being afforded an opportunity to offer any defense. This is what seems to be claimed in the case at bar. It does not seem to me that such a construction of the statute can possibly be upheld.

Petition granted, and prisoner discharged.
Filed 12/5/16 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2016 ND 221

Billy Owens, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20160214

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable David W. Nelson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Monty G. Mertz, Fargo Public Defender Office, 912 Third Ave. S., Fargo, ND 58103-1707, for petitioner and appellant; on brief.

Nathan K. Madden, Williams County State’s Attorney Office, P.O. Box 2047, Williston, ND 58802; on brief.

Owens v. State

No. 20160214

Per Curiam.

[¶1]Billy Owens appeals from a judgment entered after a district court summarily dismissed his application for post-conviction relief.  Owens argues the district court erred in concluding his claims regarding the introduction of money transfers were barred by res judicata, it erred in concluding Owens’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims were barred by misuse of process and genuine issues of material facts exist.  We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(6). 

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Carol Ronning Kapsner

Lisa Fair McEvers

Dale V. Sandstrom
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


         In connection  with the  accompanying  Annual Report of Radale Imports,
Inc.  (the  "Company")  on Form  10-KSB for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2006
(the "Report"), I, Lee D. Dodson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify that to my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ss.78o(d)); and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  June 27, 2006

                                                      /s/ Lee D. Dodson
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Lee D. Dodson
                                                     Chief Executive Officer


         The above  certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.  ss.1350)  and is not being filed as
part of the Form 10-KSB or as a separate disclosure document.