If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re C. C. BRADFORD, Minor. October 20, 2022

No. 360884 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 2017

- 001358

- NA

Before : L ETICA

, P

. J., and S ERVITTO and H OOD

, JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court ’ s order terminating her parental rights to her child, CB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ) ( child abandoned and parent unidentifiable ), 1 (a)( ii ) ( desertion for 91 or more days without seeking custody ), (c)( i ) ( conditions that led to adjudication

continue to exist ), (c)( ii ) ( failure to rectify other conditions ), (g) ( failure to provide care and custody ), and (j) ( reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned to the parent )

. W e affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In early February 2021 , Children ’ s Protective Services (CPS) specialist Mariah Taylor filed a petition for temporary wardship on behalf of petitioner, the Michigan Department of Health and

Human Services ( M DHHS)

. The petition request ed that the trial court take jurisdiction over CB

and make him a temporary court ward. The petition stated that CB had no legal father, but he had at least two putative fathers

. It also alleged that it was contrary to the welfare of CB to live in respondent ’ s home because of her substance abuse issues, untreated mental health issues, and

1 There is some ambiguity regarding whether MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ) applied to respondent or CB’s biological father . Although the supplemental petition and the order terminating respondent’s parental rights listed MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ) a s an applicable statutory ground, the referee’s statements on the record were unclear on whether this statutory ground applied to respondent, or just CB’s biological father, whose parental rights to CB were also terminated. CB’s biological

father is not a t issue in this appeal. We will address the issue regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i )

below.- 2

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improper supervision. Specifically, it alleged that in mid

- December 2020, she left CB in the care of her cousin. At some point, r espondent saw that CB “appeared groggy” and “his eyes were dilated.” When respondent asked CB if he was okay, “he stated he was okay, but that [respondent’s

cousin ] hit him.” It also alleged that respondent allowed CB to return to her cousin’s care after this incident, despite knowledge of the incident and the fact that her cousin’s boyfriend “use[d] [controlled] substances

. . . .” The petition alleged that on Christmas Eve in 2020, CB fell down

the stairs and was taken to the hospital. It asserted tha t, about a week later , CPS received information from the hospital that treated CB on Christmas Eve that CB tested positive for cocaine. The petition alleged that respondent tested positive for cocaine and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in early January 2020

. And it alleged that CB was previously removed from respondent ’ s care in

2017 because of her untreated mental health and substance abuse issues

. Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition, and placed CB with M DHHS. 2

MDHHS l ater filed an amended petition for temporary wardship. The amended petition added new allegations, including that respondent admitted to using cocaine . It appears that at the time she used cocaine, respondent was crying and had CB in her lap. She believ ed that CB may have ingested cocaine after he wiped respondent ’ s face when she was crying . Following a hearing

, the court ordered that CB be made a temporary court ward and it took jurisdiction over him

.

MDHHS placed CB in foster care, and the court gran ted respondent supervised visitation

. After respondent failed to visit CB or complete services over the course of several months,

MDHHS filed a supplemental petition for permanent custody. Th e petition requested the termination of respondent ’ s parental r ights to CB under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ), (a)( ii ), (c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j). The petition alleged that the court ordered respondent to comply with a treatment plan and required her to complete several services, but she failed to do so

.

2 At the preliminary hearing in February 2021 , respondent expressed a belief that she may be registered with the Cherokee Indian Tribe. The preliminary hearing was adjourned at least two times because of this potential issue with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et

seq

. At a continuation of the preliminary hearing, MDHHS apparently presented documents to the trial court demonstrating that it had sent the required notices to the relevant tribes but had not received a response from any of the three tribes. As far as we can tell, these documents are not in

the lower court record. When asked at the continued preliminary hearing whether she wished to

add ress any ICWA issues, respondent’s attorney stated, “No, I’m satisfied.” Thereafter, the trial court found that MDHHS had complied with the ICWA notice requirements and that, as of the preliminary hearing, “no Tribe has confirmed that the child in this ma tter, in fact, is an Indian child. Therefore, the matter will go forward.” The parties do not raise any issue regarding ICWA

. It, therefore, is unnecessary for this Court to address the adequacy of the trial court’s findings or how its findings affect t he trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights. See In re

Morris , 491 Mich 81, 123; 815 NW2d 62 (2012) (remanding to the trial court and stating that if the court conclusively determines that ICWA did not apply because either the children are not Indian children or because “the properly noticed tribes do not respond within the allotted time,” the trial court’s order terminating parental rights would be reinstated).- 3

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Following a hearing on MDHHS’s supplemental petition for termination, the court found that, because of respondent ’ s failure to comply with her service plan, there were statutory grounds

to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ), (a)( ii ), (c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j). 3
The court highlighted the testimony of Abigail Camann

, a foster care supervisor

, who stated that respondent claimed that she had done nothing wrong. The court noted that respondent “ hasn ’ t done anything ” with regard to re unification. The court also noted that respondent had only participated in one visit since June 2021. The court stated that CB needed permanency, and had been in foster care multiple times despite being only four years old. The court found that responde nt did not have suitable housing, and she had no reported source of income.

The court also found that it was in CB ’ s best interests to terminate respondent ’ s parental rights. The court noted that respondent ’ s bond with CB had diminished and that respond ent failed to recognize the issues that brought CB into care. The court found that CB was doing well in a

pre

- adoptive home, his needs were being met, and he had stability

. It then entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights

. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF RE VIEW

“ This Court reviews for clear error the trial court ’ s factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination. ” In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “ The trial court ’ s factual findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence supports them, but we are definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake. ” Id . at 709

- 710.

“ To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the stat utory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. ” In re

Keillor , 325 Mich App 80, 85; 923 NW2d 617 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court must give “ due regard to the trial court ’ s spec ial opportunity to observe the witnesses. ” In

re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding best interests for clear error. In re

Keillor , 325 Mich App at 93

. “Once a statutory basis for termination has been shown by clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests.”

Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Best interests are determined on th e basis of the preponderance of the evidence.” Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted).

I I I. LAW AND A

NALYSIS

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that MDHHS presented clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3) (a) ( i ), (a) ( ii ), ( c )( i ) , (c)( ii ), (g) and (j)

, and when it found that termination was in CB’s best interests. We agree in part, disagree in part.

3 The trial court also found statutory grounds to terminate the father of C B’s parental rights because no man had come forward to establish paternity for CB, and the father’s identity could not be

ascertained . Further, the trial court found that termination of the father of CB’s parental rights was

in CB’s best interests. As no ted earlier, CB’s father is not a party to this appeal.- 4

- A. STATUTORY GROUNDS

1. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED I N TERMINATING RESPON DENT’S

PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDE R MCL 712A.19B(3)(A) ( I ) AND (G)

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it terminated her parental rights to CB under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i )

. I t is somewhat unclear whether the trial court a pplied MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ) to both respondent and CB ’ s biological father

. But to the extent it applied this statutory ground to respondent , we agree with respondent

.

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)( a ) ( i ) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that

( a ) The child has been deserted under either of the following circumstances:

( i ) The child ’ s parent is unidentifiable, has deserted the child for 28 or more days, and has not sought custody of the child during that period. For the purposes of this section, a parent is unidentifiable if the parent ’ s identity cannot be ascertained after reasonable efforts have been made to locate and identify the

parent.

Respondent, CB ’ s mother

, is identifiable , and her id entity is known

. There is no indication in the record that respondent was ever unidentifiable. This statutory ground , therefore, plainly does not apply to respondent. Accordingly , t he trial court clearly erred to the extent it terminated respondent ’ s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( i ).

Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred when it terminated her parental rights to CB under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We agree.

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)( g ) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he parent, although, in the court ’ s discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to pr ovide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering

the child ’ s age. ”

The trial court did not make an explicit finding with respect to the requirement in MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) that respondent, though financially able to do so, failed to provid e proper care or custody for CB. It did, however, find that respondent did not have suitable housing or a source of

income at the time of the termination hearing. The evidence presented demonstrated that respondent was not financially able to provide pro per care and custody for CB. Although respondent informed Camann that she was starting a business, she did not provide any verification of this business or proof of income at the time of the termination hearing. Respondent stated that

she had been homele ss for a period of time in 2021. Respondent also stated that she started a cleaning business in September 2021, but she became sick after this date. It is unclear whether respondent had a source of income at the time of the termination hearing. Camann a lso testified that she did not believe that respondent received any public welfare assistance. Accordingly, the- 5

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trial court clearly erred when it concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was justi fied under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)

.

Neverthe less, only one statutory ground must be established to support the termination of parental rights

. In re Ellis , 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). As will be discussed below, b ecause the t rial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was justified under other statutory grounds, any error committed by the trial court

as it relates to MCL 712A.19b(3) (a)( i ) and (g) was harmless.

2

. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN T ERMINATING RESPONDEN T’S

PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDE R MCL 712A.19 B (3)( C )( I )

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in determining that MDHHS presented clear and convincing evidence to support the termination o f respondent ’ s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ). We disagree.

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)( c ) ( i ) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought un der this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age.

“ This statutory ground exists when the conditions that brought the children into foster care

continue to exist despite the time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services .

. . . ” In re White , 303 Mich App at 710 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that MDHHS had presented clear and

convi ncing evidence supporting termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ). The trial court entered a n initial dispositional order on July 9, 2021. The trial court ordered respondent to complete and benefit from services

, including parenting classes or infant mental health services, a substance abuse assessment, and substance abuse services . She was also ordered to complete weekly random drug screens, individual therapy, psychological and psychiatric evaluations ( if recommended )

, a nd a parent

- partner service. T he court also ordered

th at respondent maintain suitable housing, maintain a legal source of income, maintain contact

with the M DHHS worker, and attend all court hearings. The February 2021 petition for temporary wardship all eged that “ respondent ’ s substance abuse and improper supervision affects her ability to properly parent ” CB, who was previously removed from respondent ’ s care in 2017 because of

her substance abuse and untreated mental health issues

. The February 2021 petition also alleged

that it was contrary to the welfare of CB to live in respondent ’ s home because of her substance

abuse and untreated mental health issues, and improper supervision. M ore than eight months

— more than the required 182 days under MCL 712A .19b(3)(c)( i )

— passed between July 9, 2021

, and the termination hearing on March 17, 2022

. And a t the time of the termination hearing,- 6

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respondent had failed to comply with all aspects of her treatment plan

. S he did not have suitable housing at th at time

, did not provide proof of income, lost contact with foster care workers for long periods of time, and was terminated from all services . She also failed to resolve the issues that led

to CB ’ s removal from her care. It is, therefore, clear that the “conditi ons that led to the adjudication

continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child ’ s age. ” MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ).

Regarding respondent ’ s substance abuse, Camann stated that respondent was referred for

substance abuse services on two occasions

. R espondent never attended those services . W hen

Camann asked why she did not attend those services, respondent stated that she did not have a substance abuse problem. Taylor Holmes , another foster care worker assigned to CB ’ s case
, testified that respondent had not completed any drug screens as of February 3, 2022, and her therapy , which included a substance abuse component

, was in the pr ocess of being terminated.

Rega rding respondent ’ s untreated mental health issues, Camann stated that referrals were provided for individual counseling on July 19, 2021, and January 5, 2022, but respondent never

enrolled in those services. Although respondent reported that she planned t o contact a service provider for mental health services, she had not provided any documentation of these services. Respondent also had not provided Camann with information regarding prescribed medication s she was taking , if any

. Additionally , respondent failed to complete a psychological evaluation despite multiple referrals. Her failure to treat her mental health conditions is notable given that she had previously been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and schizophrenia.

Respondent also failed to res olve the issues related to her improper supervision of CB. She failed to complete parenting classes despite three referrals made for those classes

. R espondent

also acted inappropriately with CB during some of the supervised visits. She spoke about the

t ermination case with CB and yelled at a foster care worker in front of CB. Respondent was also inconsistent with her visitation with CB. Specifically, f rom the beginning of the case until June 2021, missed 20% of her possible visits . But between June 2, 2021, and March 9, 2022, she did

not visit CB at all

. Her failure to attend parenting classes, her inappropriate behavior in front of CB, and her failure to consistently visit CB demonstrate that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ).

For these reasons, the trial court did not clearly err in determining by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist at the time of the

termina tion hearing. Nor did the trial court err when it found by clear and convincing evidence

that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the CB ’ s age

. 4

4 Respondent also argues on appeal that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ), (c)( ii ), and (j). As noted earlier, however, only one statutory ground need be established to terminate a respondent’s parental rights. In re Ellis , 294 Mich App at 32. Given our conclusion that the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), we need not ad dress these remaining statutory- 7

- B . BEST INTERESTS

Finally, respond ent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that termination of her parental rights was in CB’s best interests. We disagree.

“ The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children ’ s best

interests. ” In r e White , 303 Mich App at 713 (citation omitted)

. “ To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child ’ s best interests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child ’ s bond to the parent, the parent ’ s parenti ng ability, the child ’ s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent ’ s home. ” Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ T he trial court may also consider a parent ’ s history of domestic violence, the parent ’ s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent ’ s visitation history with the child, the children ’ s well

- being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. ” Id . at 714 (citation omitted)

. A parent ’ s mental health is also relevant to whether

termination is in the child ’ s best interests. In re AH , 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001).

“The focus at the best

- interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson , 311 Mich App 49, 63; 874 NW2d 20 5 (2015) (quotation marks

, citation , and alteration omitted).

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in CB’s best interests. Regarding the bond between respondent and CB, t he trial court found that respondent’s “lack of

visit ation for over 6 months has diminished any bond that she and [CB] once had.” Camann stated

that there was evidence of a bond between respondent and CB before June 2021 . Between June 2021 and March 2022, however, respondent did not visit CB. Camann indic ated that when visits restarted in early March 2022, there seemed to be “ less of a bond ” between respondent and CB

. Accordingly, the factor related to respondent ’ s bond with CB weighs in favor of termination.

Regarding respondent ’ s parenting ability, there was testimony that respondent admitted in June 2021 that she wanted to release her parental rights to CB. R espondent also failed to contact

the foster care agency between June 2021 and October 2021. R espondent demonstrated little or

no desire to improve her parenting ability because she informed Camann that she would not participat e in services, and claimed that she had done nothing wrong. Further, respondent ’ s inappropriate behavior during visits and in CB’s presence casts doubt on her parenting ability

. Respondent talked about the foster care case , and yelled a t a foster care worker, in front of CB.

R espondent ’ s improper supervision of CB also led to CB falling down the stairs and being exposed to cocaine. She also failed to complete services to rectify her parenting issues. Accordingly, the factor regarding respondent’s parenting ability weighs in favor of termination

.

The factor regarding respondent ’ s visitation history also weighs in favor of termination. From the beginning of the case u ntil June 2021, respondent attended 44 out of a possible 55 visits

with CB . Between June 2, 2021, and March 9, 2022, however, respondent did not visit CB. Camann stated that the visits were generally appropriate . As noted earlier, however, respondent

grounds. Even so, after review, we are convinced that the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ), (c)( ii ), or (j).- 8

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ta lked about the case , and yelled at a foster care worker, in front of CB during visits

. In addition, Camann indicated that there appeared to be “less of a bond” between respondent and CB when visits restarted in early March 2022. This was likely the resul t of respondent ’ s failure to visit CB

between June 2021 and March 2022

. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of termination of respondent ’ s parental rights.

CB ’ s need for permanence and stability also weighs in favor of termination. Camann noted

that CB ne eded permanency, and he had been placed in foster care for one year at the time of the termination hearing. Camann stated that CB appeared to be bonded to his foster parent s , and his needs were being met in his foster home, which was a pre

- adoptive home

. Conversely, respondent did not have suitable housing and did not provide proof of a source of income at the time of the termination hearing. R espondent ’ s inconsistent visitation with CB, his 2017 removal from respondent ’ s care as a result of her drug use and untreated mental illness , and her failure to rectify her substance abuse issues or complete services all demonstrate that CB would not receive permanency and stability in respondent ’ s care, and would be at a high risk of removal from her

care in the future

. Accordingly, CB’s need for permanence and stability weighs in favor of

termination.

Finally, the factor regarding respondent ’ s mental health weighs in favor of termination. CB was removed from respondent ’s care in 2017, in part, because of her u ntreated mental health

issues

. Respondent admitted to a history of untreated mental health issues , and was previously diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and schizophrenia. Respondent informed Taylor that she had

contacted a mental health service provide r to enroll in services, but respondent did not complete

these services. When asked whether respondent ever admitted to her that she was taking any medication to address her mental health diagnoses, Taylor said , “No.” Despite her prior diagnoses, respond ent informed Camann that she did not have any mental health problems and would not participate in services. Camann testified that, at the time of the termination hearing, respondent had failed to enroll in services for individual counseling, had not provi ded her any information regarding prescribed medications, and had never completed a psychological evaluation. Thus, respondent seemingly took no steps to rectify her mental health issues despite the February 2021 petition noting that it was contrary to CB ’ s welfare to live in respondent ’ s home, in part, because of her untreated mental health issues. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent ’ s parental rights was in CB’s

best interest s

.

Affirmed.

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Noah P. Hood