[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-13695

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-14194-RLR

EDWARD EUGENE KING, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Respondents-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(November 28, 2016)

Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Edward Eugene King, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition as an unauthorized second or successive 

collateral attack. After review,1 we affirm the district court’s dismissal. 

A state prisoner who wishes to file a second or successive habeas corpus 

petition must move the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the 

district court to consider such a petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). We may 

grant such authorization only if the proposed petition contains claims premised on 

either (1) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” or (2) a “factual 

predicate” that “could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of 

due diligence” and that, “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, 

would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty 

of the underlying offense.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A), (B). Absent such an order, the 

district court is obligated to dismiss a successive petition, as the district court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the motion. Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 

1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).

The district court did not err by denying King’s § 2254 petition as 

impermissibly successive. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (providing, subject to two 

 1 Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is second or successive is a question we 

consider de novo. Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 2011).

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exceptions, that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus 

application under section 2254 . . . shall be dismissed”). Both King’s initial § 2254 

petition and his current § 2254 petition challenged the September 30, 2003, 

judgment pertaining to his Florida convictions for first-degree murder, aggravated 

assault, and armed burglary of a dwelling. See Insignares v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t 

of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating the phrase “second or 

successive” applies to habeas petitions, not to the claims they raise). Though King 

purports to raise new claims, the bar to successive applications is not claimspecific. See id. Lastly, though § 2244 provides an exception for claims that rely 

on newly discovered evidence, such claims may be brought only after this Court 

has granted authorization to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(3)(A). 

Because King failed to obtain authorization from this Court to pursue his claims, 

the district court did not err by dismissing them for want of jurisdiction. See 

Hubbard, 379 F.3d at 1247.

AFFIRMED.

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