MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2017	ME 210 Docket: Yor

- 16

- 570 Argued: October	11 ,	2017 Decided: October	31,	2017
Panel: SAUFLEY	C.J., * and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.
WAYNE	I.	HALL

ALEXANDER,	J. [¶1] Wayne	 I.	 Hall	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 for	 two counts	of	criminal	threatening	with	a	dangerous	weapon	(Class	C), 17

- A M.R.S. §§ 209 , 1252(4)	 (2016) , entered by	 the	 trial	 court (York	 County, O’Neil,	 J. ) following	 a	 two

- day	 jury	 trial. On	 appeal,	 Hall	 argues	 that	 the	 trial	 court abused	 its	 discretion	 by	 allowing	 testimony	 about statements	 of	 an
unavail able	 witness,	 thereby violating his constitutional	 right	 to	 confront
witnesses. 1 Hall	 also	 argues	 that there was	insufficient	 evidence	 to	 support

* Although	not	available	at	oral	argument,	Chief	Justice	Saufley	participated	in	the	development of	 this	 opinion. See M.R.	 App.	 P.	 12(a)	 (Tower	 2016)	 (“A	 qualified	 justice	 may	 participate	 in	 a decision	even	though	not	present	at	oral	argument.”) , replaced	with M.R.	App.	P.	12(a)(1)	(restyled M.R.	App.	P.)	(effective	for	appeals	commenced	on	or	after	Sept.	1,	2017)

.

1 Th e	 Sixth	 Amendment	 to	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution	 states,	 in	 pertinent	 part:	 “In	 all criminal	 prosecutions,	 the	accused shall	enjoy	 the	 right	 .	 .	 .	 . to	 be	 confronted	with	 t he	witnesses against	 him

. .	 . . ”	 	 Article	 1,	 §	 6	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 provi des	 similarly:	 “In	 all	 criminal2 the	guilty	verdicts	on	the	two	counts	of	criminal	threatening	with	a	dangerous weapon.		We	affirm	the	judgment.
I.		CASE	HISTORY [¶2 ] Viewing	 the	evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	State,	 the jury	 could	 rationally	 have	 found	 the	 following	 facts	 beyond	 a	 reasonable
doubt. See State	v.	Morrison ,	2016	ME	47,	¶	2,	135	A.3d	343

. [¶3 ]	 	On	December	 26,	 2015,	 the two	me n who	were the complaining
witnesses in	this	matter went	to	Beech	Ridge	Road	in North	Ber wick for	one	of
the	men to	remove his tree	stand	from	his	father

- in

- law’s	property. The	men parked	their pickup	truck	and	trailer

— which	had	their	four	wheelers	on it

— in	 the cul

- de

- sac	 between	 the father

- in

- law’s	 driveway	 and	 a neighbor’s driveway. [¶4 ]		After	 retrieving	 the tree	stand,	 the	men rode	 their	 four	wheelers on	 the	property	 for	a	 few	hours.		When	 they	ret urned	 to	 the	cul

- de

- sac,	 they saw	 a	 green	 van	 bloc king	 access to	 the	 ramps	 for	 their trailer. One	 man gestured to the	driver	 to	make	contact,	at	which	point	 the	driver	opened	 the
door	and	stated , “I ’m	going	to	fucking	kill	you.” H all	was	the	driver	of	the	van.

prosecutions,	 the	 accused	 shall	 have	 a	 right	 .	 .	 . .	 [t] o	 be	 confronted	 by	 the	witnesses	 agai nst	 the accused

. .	.	. ”3 [¶ 5 ]	 	 Hall	 stepped	 out	 of	 the	 van and	 appeared	 dishev eled	 and
intoxicated. He	then	got	back	in	the	van	and	began	slowly	driving	out	of	the
cul

- de

- sac stating	to	the	men again,	“I’m	going	to	kill	you,	I’m	going	to	fucking kill	 you.”		As	Hall drove away , the	men observed	a	handgun	come	out	of	 the
driver’s	side	window , and	shots were	fired at	them. The	men were	afraid	for
their	lives	 and	 feared that they	might	 be	 shot

. They	 called	 9

- 1

- 1,	 and,	 after meeting	with	a	law	enforcement	officer, began	looking	for	the	va n
. They then saw	Hall	stumbling	into a	residence. [¶6 ] Shortly	thereafter, o fficers	of	the	North	Berwick	Police	Department

arr ested	 Hall	 at	 that	 residence,	 which	 was	 his	 mother’s	 home.	 	 They	 then
searched for	 the	 green	 van	 and the firearm.	 	 The	 officers located	 the van parked	behind	a garage. The	driver’s	side	window	was	still	rolled	down,	and
the	 officers observed a	 gun	 holster	 and	 ammunition	 inside the	 van .	 	 The officers	eventually	located the	firearm in	an other	vehicle	on	the	property. [¶7 ]	 	 On December	 28,	 2015,	 the	 State	 filed	 a	 four

- count	 complaint charging	 Hall	 with	 two	 counts	 of	 criminal	 threatening	 with	 a	 dangerous
weapon (Class	 C),	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 209 ,	 1252(4);	 and	 two	 counts	 of reckless conduct	 with	 a	 dangerous	 weapon (Class	 C), 17

- A	 M.R. S. § §	 211 ,	 1252(4) (2016)

. A	York	County	grand	jury	returned	an	indictment	reflecting	the	same4 four	 counts,	 and	 adding	 a	 fifth	 count	 for	 criminal	OUI	 (Class	D), 29

- A	M.R.S. § 2411(1

- A)(A) ,	(5) (2016)

. [¶8 ]		A	two

- day	jury	trial	was	held	on	November	28

- 29 ,	2016.		Prior	to trial, the	 S tate	 filed	 a	 motion	 in	 limine	 seeking the	 admission	 of statements made	by	Hall’s	former girlfriend, who	w as not	available	to	testify	at	trial. 2 In
an	interview , the	former	girlfriend	had told	officers	that	Hall appeared	to have
his

. 357	Magnum revolver	when	 he	left	 the	 home ,	 that	 she	 hea rd	 about	 five gun	shots	shortly after he	left ,	and	that	Hall	returned	home	without	that	gun. 3
The court	denied	the	State’s	motion , concluding that	the	statements	would	be

“ extremely	incrimin atory ” without Hall having	the	ability	to	cross

- examine his former	 girlfriend

. The court warned	 counsel	 that	 questioning	 law enforcement	witnesses	as	to	why	they	decided	to	act	in	a	certain	way in	their investigation could	 open	 the	 door	 t o	 the introduction	 of	 the excluded
evidence

. [¶9 ] At	 trial , during	 the	 State’s direct	 examination, one	 of	 the investigating	 officers testified	 that	 the	 firearm	 recovered from	 the	 scene

2 The	 State	 noted	 that	 Hall’s	 former	 girlfriend was	 in	 “parts	 unknown,	 California	 and	 then Hawaii,”	and	t hat it had	been	unable	to locate	her	to	bring	her	back.

3 Th e	State	also	asserted	that	the	former	girlfriend had informed	officers	that	Hall had	initially co me	 to	 her	 with	 his	 gun	 and	 asked	 her	 for	 a	 ride	 down	 the	 road	 to	 go	 kill	 someone,	 before ultimatel y	leaving	on	his	own	in	his	green	van. The	S tate	did	not	seek	admission	o f	these	additional statements.5 contained five	spent	shell	casings	and	one	loaded	shell.		He	also	testified	that the	 bullets	 located	 in	 the	 green	 van	 were of the	 same	 type	 found	 in	 the
firearm. During cross - examination

— on	 an	 issue not raised on	 direct

— Hall
asked the	 officer about	 his	 “understand ing”	 of	 the	 number	 of	 shots	 fired during	the	incident. The following	exchange	occurred : Hall:	 The

— the	 evidence	 in	 this	 case,	 as	 I	 understand	 it,	 is	 that there	were	three	shots	fired. Is	that	your	understanding	also?
Officer :	 My	 understanding	 is	 it	 was probably	 more	 than	 three shots	fired. Hall:	Okay. And	is	that	from

— is	that	based	upon	the	fact	that	you found	four	empty	casings	in	the	gun?
Officer :	It	was	based	upon	people	that	we	spoke	with. Hall:	 Okay. We ll,	 the	 testimony	 of	 [one	 victim] was	 that	 there were	thr ee	shots	fired	and	I	believe	[the	other	victim] as	well.		Is that

— did	 they	 say	 something	 different	 from	 that	 that	 you	 are aware	of?
Officer :	Not	to	me,	no.
Hall :	But	you’re	under	 the	impression	 that	 there	were	 four	shots fired?
O fficer : At	least,	yes.
Hall :	Possibly	more?
Officer :	Four	to	five maybe,	yes.6 [¶1 0 ]	 	 Following	 cross

- examination,	 the	 State	 requested	 a	 sidebar	 to
discuss the	 officer ’s	 testimony.	 	 The	 State	 noted	 that the	 officer was	 asked several	questions	about	his “understandin g”	of	the	number	of	shots	fired and
asserted	 that	 the	 officer’s knowledge	 of	 the	 number	 of	 shots	 fired	 “ [came]
from his speaking	to	[ the	former	girlfriend ] ,	who	told	him	that [Hall] left	with a	gun,	she	heard	two	or	three	shots	and	then	a	short	period	of	ti me	two	more
shots	after	that.” [¶1 1 ]		The	court	 found	 that Hall’s	questions	on	cross

- examination had opened	the	door	to reference	to the	former	girlfriend’s	statements .		The	court explained that	 the	 “[S] tate	 is	 entitled	 to	 get	 the	 explanation	 before	 the	 jury about	why	he	thinks	there	were	five	shots	being	fired”	to	avoid	the	impression
that the	officer simply	“made	up”	th e	number	of	shots	fired. [¶1 2 ]	 	 On	 redirect,	 the	 following	 exc hange	 between the	 State	 and	 the
officer occurred:
State :	 [Officer] , I	 just	 want	 to	 ask	 yo u	 a	 couple	 of	 questions.	 	 So on — on	 cr oss	 you	were	asked	about	 your

— understanding	 of	 the number	of	shots	fired?
Officer :	Yes.
State :	All	right. And

— and at	that	point	you	indicated	that	it	might have	been	four	or	five?
Officer :	Yes.7

State :	 All	 right. And	 was

— was	 your	 understanding	 of	 that,	 was that	based	upon	speaking	to	the	defendant’s	girlfriend?
Officer :	Yes.

.	.	. . State :	All	 righ t.	 	And	 did she	 tell	 you	 that

— that	 on	 that	 day	 that she	saw	the	defendant	with	a	gun?
Officer :	Yes.
State : A nd	did	she	tell	you	that	she	saw	him	leave?
Officer :	Yes.
State :	And	did	she	tell	you	that	she	heard	two	shots	followed	by	a couple	minutes	later	two	to	thr ee	more	shots?
Officer :	Yes.
State :	And	did	she	 tell	you	 that	when	he	returned	 that	 there	was no	gun?
Officer :	Yes.
State :	So	that	would	have	been	maybe	five	shots?
Officer :	Yes.
State :	How	many	casings	were	in	the	revolver	when	you	checked?
Officer :	There	was	five	empty	and	one	full. Hall	did	not	object	to any	of these	questions.8 [¶1 3 ]		Following	redirect,	the	court	immediately	instructed	the	jury	that
it	 could	 not	 consider	 the former	 girlfriend’s	 statements for	 their	 truth

— whether	 there	were	actua lly	 four	or	 five	shots	 fired

— but	could	consider	 the statements	in	assessing	the	weight	to	give the	officer ’s	testimony.		Hall	did	not object	to	this	instruction	and	did	not	request	that	any further	instructions	be given. [¶1 4 ] The	 jury found	 Hall guilty	 on	 the	 two	 counts	 of	 criminal
threateni ng	 with	 a	 dangerous	 weapon	 and not	 guilty	 on	 the	 two	 counts	 of
reckless	conduct	with	a	firearm	and the one	count	of	criminal	OUI. The	court entered	a	judgment	in	accordance	with	the	jury	verdict	and	sentenced Hall	to four	years’	incarceration	with	all	but	ten	months	suspended	and	two	years	of probation. Hall	timely	appealed.
II.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS [¶1 5 ] We	review	a	trial	court’s	decision	to	admit	evid ence	for	an	abuse
of	discretion or	clear	error , see State	v. Mooney ,	2012	ME	69,	¶	9,	43	A.3d	972 , and	 review	 wh ether	 a	 defendant	 was	 denied	 the right	 of	 confrontation
de novo, see State v.	Abdi ,	2015	ME	23,	¶	23,	112	A.3d	360

. Hall	contends	that
the	 trial	 court	 abused	 its	 discretio n	 and violated	 his	 constitutional	 right	 to
confront witness es	presented	against	him	by allowing	the	officer	to	reference9 Hall’s	 former	 girlfriend’s	 statements	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 officer’s	 belief	 that
more	than	three	shots	were	fired

. A. Confrontation	Clause [¶1 6 ]		“ In	all	criminal	prosecutions,	the	accused	shall	enjoy	the	right

.	.	. to	be	confronted	with	the	witnesses	against	him

. .	.	. ” U.S.	Const.	amend.	VI ;

s ee also Me. Const. art. I, § 6 (“In all criminal prosecutions , the accused shall
have a right

. . . . [t]o be confronted by the witnesses against the accused

. . . . ”).
When a testimonial statement ,	such	as	a	respon se	to	a	police	interrogation, is
offered	at	a	trial	in	which the	declarant of	the	statement does	not	appear,	“the
Sixth	 Amendment demands	 what	 the	 common	 law	 required:	 unavailability and	 a	 prior	 opportunity	 for	 cross

- examination.” Crawford	 v.	 Washington , 541 U.S.	 36,	 68	 (2004) ; see also State v. Gorman, 2004 ME 90, ¶ 50,
854 A.2d 1164

. [¶1 7 ]	 	 Th e	 Confrontation	 Clause is	 not	 implicated	 by	 non

- hearsay statements	 of	 an	 unavailable	 witness	 admitted	 for	 a	 purpose	 other	 than	 to prove	 the	 truth	of	 the	matter	asserted. See Tennessee	v.	Street ,	471	U.S.	409, 414	 (1985) .	 	 Thus,	 a statement	 offered	 to	 show	 the	 state	 of	 mind	 of the
listener ,	 not	 the	 declarant, or	 to	 show	 the	 cause	 of	 some	 other	 act	 by	 the10 listener,	is	not	hearsay. State	v.	Gifford ,	595	A.2d	1049,	10 52

- 53	(Me.	1991) ; see	also M.R.	Evid.	801(c)

. B. Opening	Door	to Admission	of	Excluded	Evidence [¶1 8 ] A court does not abuse its discretion in admitting previously
excluded evidence to rebut suggestions in defense questioning that are
inconsistent with the excluded evidence or attack the credibility of properly
admitted testimony that was based on the exclud ed evidence

. State v. Ifill , 574 A.2d 889, 891 (Me. 1990) ; 4 see also State	 v.	 Anglin, 2000	 ME	 89,	 ¶	 7

- 8,
751 A.2d	1007 ; State v. Donovan , 1997 ME 181, ¶ 8, 698 A.2d 1045

. [¶1 9 ] When a defendant elicits	 testimony related	 to previously
excluded evidence during	 cross

- examination	 or through presentation	 of the

4 In State	v. Ifill , 574	A.2d	889 (Me

. 1990 ) ( Ifill	 II ) , the	results	of	a	chemical	 field sobriety	test had	 been	 determined inadmissible by	 a	 prior	 Law	 Court	 opinion, State	 v.	 Ifill ,	 560	 A.2d	 1075 (Me. 1989) ( Ifill	I )

. In	the Ifill	II trial,	the trial	court warned	defense	counsel	that	cross

- examination of	law	enforcement	witnesses	on	the	extent	and	adequacy	of	their	sobriety	testing	and	ev aluation prior	 to	 Ifill’s	 arrest	 could	 open	 the	 door	 to	 allowing	 the	 State	 to	 introduce	 evidence that the excluded sobriety	test	had	been	used	in	making	the	decision	to	arrest	Ifill. Ifill	II ,	574 A.2d	at	891. “Despite	that	warning,	Ifill’s	counsel	exten sively	cross

- examined	[a	law	enforcement	officer]	on	his failure	to	administer	to	Ifill	what	were	referred	to	as	objective	field	sobriety	tests.” Id

. On	redirect examination,	the	trial	court	allowed	the	State	to	present	evidence	that	the excluded	test	ha d	been given,	but	without	reference	to	the	test	results. Id .		On	appeal,	we	affirmed. Id

. The	 facts	 here	 are similar:	 evidence was excluded; the	 trial	 court	 warned that	 defense questioning	 on	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 excluded	 evidence	 could	 open	 the	 door	 to	 admission	 of	 the evidence	 or	 part	 of	 it ;	 defense	 cross

- examination opened	 the	 door	 to	 the	 excluded	 evidence	 by suggesting	a	lack	of	basis	for	the	officer’s	statemen t	that	more	than	three	shots	were	fired ; and	the court	allowed reference	 to	 the	 former	girlfriend’s	 statement	 that	 she	heard	 five	 shots but	limited the	jury	 to	considering that	evidence	 to determine the	credibility	 of	 the	 officer’s	 statement	about the	numb er	of	shots	fired

.11 defense case, and	 the	 testimony,	 as	 delivered , is	 inconsistent	 with the
excluded	evidence	or affects	the	credibility	of	the	State’s	case, a court	does	not abuse	its	discretion	in	finding	that	the	def endant	has	“opened	the	door”	to	the excluded	evidence	and	permitting the	State	to	conduct limited	questioning for
the purpose	of	responding	to	the	defendant’s	challenge

. See Ifill, 574	A.2d	at 891; see	 also State	 v.	 Ruest ,	 506 A.2d	 576,	 577	 (Me.	 1986) ; State	 v.	 Terrio , 442 A.2d	537 ,	541 (Me. 1982)

. [¶20 ] Here, the trial court	 appropriately excluded law	 enforcement testimony	 about	 the	 former	 girlfriend’s statements but warned	 both	 parties
that questioning	law	enforcement	witnesses	as	to	why	they	decided	to	act	in	a certain	 way	 could	 open	 the	 door	 to	 excluded	 evidence. Despite	 the	 court’s warning, Hall cross - examined the	officer on	his understandin g of	the	number of	shots	fired,	an	understanding based	on	the	former	girlfriend’s statements. [¶ 2 1]	 	 The	 court	 properly	 found that	Hall had opened	 the	 door	 to	 the previously	excluded	statements	and allowed	the	State , in	its	redirect , to	clear up	 any	 false	 impression	 created	 by Hall’s questioning	 that	 the	 officer just “made	 up”	 that	 number. See Ifill , 574	A.2d	 at	 891. The	 court appropriately
limit ed the S tate	 to	 only	 those	 statements	 clarifying the	 officer ’s understanding	of	the	number	of	shots	fired,	the	issue	that	Hall	had	opened	t he12 door	 to,	 and	 exclude d all	 other	 incrim inatory	 statements	 made	 by	 Hall’s former	girlfriend

. [¶ 22 ] T he	 court’s limiting	instruction to	 the	 jury specifically	 directed
that	 the	 statements	 could	 not	 be	 considered	 fo r	 their	 truth

— whether	 Hall actually fired four	 or	 five	 shots

— but	 could	 be	 considered	 in	 assessing	 the weight	 to	 give	 to the	 officer’s testimony. See State	 v.	 Dolloff ,	 2012	 ME	 130, ¶ 55, 58	A.3d	1032 (“Juries	are	presumed	 to	have	 followed	jury	instructions, including	 curative	 instructions.” )

. U nder	 thes e	 circumstances , the	 court	 did
not	 abuse its	 discretion	 by	 admitting	 the	 statements indicating	 that	 Hall’s former	 girlfriend	was	 aware	 that	Hall	 had left	with a	 gun	 and	 that	 she	 then
heard four	or	five shots	fired

. C. Obvious	Error	Review [¶ 23 ] H all	 argues	 that , by allowing	 the	 statements that	 his former girlfriend saw	him leave	the	home	with	a	gun and	then	saw	Hall	return	home without	 a	 gun , after	 hearing	 shots	 fired , the	 court went beyond	 what	 was necessary	 to	address	 the	credibility	 of	 the	 officer’s	 statements regarding the
offic er’s understanding	 of	 the	 number	 of	 shots	 fired. Hall	asserts	 that	 these

statements ,	 referencing	 his	 leaving	 the	 home	 with	 a	 gun	 and	 returning without	a	g un, violated	his	confrontation	clause	rights.13 [¶24 ] We	agree	 that the former girlfriend’s statements reporting that Hall	left	the	home	with	a	gun	and	returned	without	a	gun were	not	relevant	to
the	issue	of	the	number	of	shots he	was	believed	to	have fired .		However, Hall failed	to	preserve	the	issue. [¶ 25 ] At	 the	 trial,	when	 the	court	could	have	addressed	any	problem,
Hall d id	not	object	to	the	officer’s	testimony	regarding	the	former	girlfriend’s statements,	and	he	did	not	object	to	or	suggest any a mendment	to	the limiting
instruction given	by	the	court promptly after	the	officer’s	rebuttal	testimony

. Accordingly,	 Hall’s arguments	 about these	 statements,	 first	 presented	 on appeal,	must	be considered by applying the	obvious	error	standard	of	review.
M.R.U.	Cr im.	P.	52(b) ; M.R.	Evid.	103(e) ; see	also State	v.	Pabon ,	2011 ME	100, ¶	18,	28	A.3d	1147

. [¶26 ] In State	v.	Fahnley ,	2015	ME	82,	¶	15,	119	A.3d	727 ,	we stated:
“For	us	to	vacate	a	conviction	based	on	the	obv ious	error	standard	of	review,

‘ there must	 be	 (1)	an	error,	 (2)	 that	is	 plain,	and	 (3)	 that	affects	 substantial rights

. If	these	conditions	are	met,	we	will	exercise	our	discretion	to	notice	an unpreserved	error	only	if	we	also	conclude	that	(4)	the	error	seriously	affects
the	 fairness	 and	 i ntegrity	 or	 public	 reputation	 of	 judicial	 proceedings. ’ ” Id. (quoting State	v.	Lovejoy ,	2014	ME	48,	¶	19,	89	A.3d	1066 ).14 [¶27 ] We	 are	 particularly	 cautious	 in	 our	 r eview for error	 that	 is unpreserved	in	appeals	from	jury	verdicts.		“The	judicial	deference	owed	jury decisions	 demands	 an	 appellate	 standard	 of	 review	more	 rigorous	 than	 one narrowly	 focused	on	whether	it	was	reasonably	possible	 that	 the	jury	would
have	returned	a different	verdict.” Pabon , 2011	ME	100, ¶	24 ,	28	A.3d	1147

. [¶28 ] When	obvious	error	is	alleged ,	the	party asserting	error	bears	the burden	 of	 demonstrating	 to	 us a	 reasonable	 probability	 that,	 but	 for	 the claimed	 error,	 the	 result	 of	 the	 proceeding	 would	 have	 been	 different. Id. ¶¶ 34

- 35. The	 evidence	 at	 trial	 was	 that the	 two	 complaining	 witnesses
identified	 Hall	 as	 the	 individual	 wh o	 had	 fired	 shots	 at	 them, t hey	 later identified	 Hall	 entering	 the	 home where	 Hall	 was	 found,	 and the	 green	 van and	 the	gun	containin g	 five	spent	shells	were found	on	 that	property

. Given this	evidence,	Hall	has	not	demonstrated	a	reasonable	probability	that,	but	for the	unpreserved error	in	admitting	the	rebuttal	testimony,	the	verdict	would have	 been	 different,	 or	 that	 the unpreserved	 error	 was	 plain,	 a ffected	 his substantial	 rights,	 or	 seriously	 affected	 the	 fairness,	 integrity,	 or	 public reputation	 of	 his	 trial. Fahnley ,	 2015	 ME 82,	 ¶	 15,	 119	 A.3d	 727; Pabon , 2011 ME 100,	¶ ¶	29,	34

- 35 ,	28	A.3d 1147.15
D. Sufficiency	of	the Evidence [¶29 ] Hall	also	contends	that	there	was	insufficient	evidence	to	sustain a	guilty	verdict	on the two	charges	of	criminal	 threatening	with a	dangerous
weapon, 17

- A M.R.S. §§ 209 ,	1252(4). To decide whether	the record contains
sufficient evidence	to	support	a	criminal	defendant’ s	conviction,	we	view the evidence	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 the	 State	 to	 determine	 whether	 the
fact

- fi nder could	rationally	 find	each element	of	the	offense proved beyond	a
reasonable	 doubt. State	 v.	 Sanchez ,	 2014 ME 50,	 ¶	 8,	 89	 A.3d	 1084 ; State	 v.
Woodard ,	2013 ME	36,	¶	19,	68	A.3d 1250

. [¶30 ] G iv en that both	complaining	witnesses testified that Hall	pointed a	firearm	at	them, that	he fired	shots	in	their	direction, and	that	as	a	result	the

men feared that they	would	be	shot , the	jury	could	have	rationally	found	every element	of	both	counts	of	criminal	threating	with	a	dangerous	weapon proved beyo nd	 a	 reasonable	 doubt. Because there	 was	 sufficient	 evidence	 in	 the record	supporting	the jury verdict ,	we	affirm	the	judgment. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.16 Amy	 McNally,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Woodman	 Edmands	 Danylik	 Austin	 Smith	 & Jacques,	P.A.,	Biddeford,	for	appellant	Wayne	I.	Hall Kathryn	 L.	 Slattery,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Susan	 J.	 Pope,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty. (orally) ,	Prosecutorial	District # 1,	Alfred,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

York	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket number	CR

- 2015

- 662 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY