This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-1191

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Yahye Elmi Abdisalan, 

Appellant.

Filed November 28, 2016

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-12-7607

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Hooten, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

In this appeal following a trial to the court, appellant argues that (1) his conviction 

of first-degree burglary must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to show 
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that he committed an assault within the building, and (2) his conviction of fourth-degree 

criminal sexual conduct must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to show 

that the sexual contact was accomplished by force or coercion. We affirm.

FACTS 

I.H., who was 17 years old, and her sister S.H., who was 15 years old, shared a 

bedroom on the second floor of their family’s apartment in Minneapolis. Early on a 

December morning, I.H. awoke when she felt someone touching her thighs. There was 

light coming in from the street, and I.H. could see a man with a beard. The man spoke in 

Somali and English,1and he told I.H. that he was her brother’s friend, but she knew that 

was not true. The man then touched I.H.’s breasts over her clothing and made statements 

that indicated that he wanted to have sex with her. To dissuade the man from further 

actions, I.H. acted “like maybe something was wrong with me mentally [so] that he would 

just leave me alone.” Her strategy worked; the man pulled down his pants, exposed 

himself, and then went and sat on her sister’s bed. While the man was preoccupied with 

her sister, I.H. sneaked out of the room to get help. 

S.H. awoke when she heard a man’s voice in the bedroom. The man sat at the foot 

of her bed. He pulled the sheets off her, touched her leg, and took off her underwear. S.H.

testified that she “tried to hold [her] legs tight, but he is too strong and he eventually takes 

them off.” The man then touched her vagina with his hand and his mouth, and she “was 

 

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I.H. understood both Somali and English.
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scared and terrified for [her] life.” During the assault, S.H. “begged him to stop but he 

wouldn’t.” 

Meanwhile, I.H. went to her parents’ bedroom, but, because she was “wasn’t able 

to breathe,” she could not tell them about the intruder. I.H.’s mother initially thought that 

I.H. was having an allergic reaction, and she went into her daughters’ bedroom to look for 

medicine. She and her husband became aware of the intruder when I.H. was able to say 

the word “man” in Somali. The man ran out of the apartment as the girls’ mother 

approached their bedroom, and he left behind a ski mask and pair of gloves. 

Using physical evidence from the apartment, police linked appellant Yahye Elmi 

Abdisalan to the offenses, and he was charged by indictment with first-degree burglary, 

and first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. At Abdisalan’s bench trial, the state 

introduced DNA evidence that linked Abdisalan to the hat and gloves left at the scene and 

to S.H. There was also evidence that Abdisalan’s fingerprints, which include a distinctive 

mark from a scar, matched prints found at the apartment. 

The district court found Abdisalan guilty of first-degree burglary. But, because the 

district court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that I.H. and S.H. were in 

“reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm,” it found Abdisalan not guilty of first- and 

second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Instead, the district court found Abdisalan guilty 

of the lesser included offenses of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, for the offense 

against S.H., and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, for the offense against I.H. The 

district court sentenced Abdisalan as an engrained offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, 

subd. 3a (2008), and imposed an executed sentence of 88 months for the burglary offense, 
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and sentences of 120 months and 180 months for the criminal-sexual-conduct offenses. 

The sentences for the sex offenses were ordered to be served concurrent to each other and

consecutive to the sentence for the burglary offense. Abdisalan appeals, challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. 

D E C I S I O N

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court

“review[s] the evidence to determine whether, given the facts in the record and the 

legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, [the fact-finder] could reasonably 

conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense[s] charged.” State v. Robertson, 884

N.W.2d 864, 871 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); see State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 

733 (Minn. 2011) (stating that same standard of review applies in bench trials and in jury 

trials when evaluating sufficiency of the evidence). This court will not overturn a guilty 

verdict “if the [fact-finder], acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and 

the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could have reasonably concluded that 

the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Crockson, 854 N.W.2d 244, 247

(Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2014). This court “defer[s] to the factfinder’s credibility determinations and assume[s] that the fact-finder disbelieved any 

evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 

2016) (quotation omitted). 
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I.

Appellant argues that the evidence of first-degree burglary was insufficient because 

it did not prove that he committed an assault within the building. First-degree burglary is 

defined as follows:

Whoever enters a building without consent and with 

intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent 

and commits a crime while in the building, either directly or as 

an accomplice, commits burglary in the first degree . . ., if . . . 

the burglar assaults a person within the building or on the 

building’s appurtenant property.

Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2008). “Assault” is defined as: “(1) an act done with 

intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or (2) the intentional 

infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 

10 (2008); see State v. Holmes, 778 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Minn. 2010) (approving application 

of assault definition under Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10, for first-degree burglary offense 

charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c)). “Bodily harm” is defined as “physical 

pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, 

subd. 7 (2008). “‛With intent’ to . . . means that the actor either has a purpose to do the 

thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that 

result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2008). 

Appellant argues that neither fear assault nor harm assault was proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The district court concluded that, because appellant committed sexual 

assaults within the premises, he was guilty of first-degree burglary. The district court did 

not make a factual finding about appellant’s intent. But, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, 
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subd. 2(e), in a case tried without a jury, “[i]f the court omits a finding on any issue of fact 

essential to sustain the general finding [of guilty], it must be deemed to have made a finding 

consistent with the general finding.” See also State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 562-63 

(Minn. 2008) (stating that district court is “deemed to have made a specific finding of 

premeditation in light of its conclusion of law that appellant acted with premeditation and 

its general finding that appellant is guilty of first-degree premeditated murder”). Therefore, 

because the district court made a general finding that appellant was guilty of first-degree 

burglary, the court must be deemed to have made a finding that appellant (1) acted with 

intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death or (2) intentionally inflicted or 

attempted to inflict bodily harm.

We agree with appellant that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 

intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict any physical pain or injury, illness, or any 

impairment of physical condition on either victim. Both I.H. and S.H. testified that they 

did not suffer any physical injury. But we do not agree that the evidence was insufficient 

to prove that appellant acted with intent to cause fear of immediate physical pain or injury. 

Because intent is a state of mind, it is generally proved circumstantially “by drawing 

inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the 

circumstances.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). A fact-finder “may 

infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions and a 

defendant’s statements as to his intentions are not binding on the [fact-finder] if his acts 

demonstrated a contrary intent.” Id.
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We apply an elevated, two-step process in reviewing a conviction based on 

circumstantial evidence. State v. Nelson, 812 N.W.2d 184, 188 (Minn. App. 2012). “The 

first step is to identify the circumstances proved.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 

598 (Minn. 2013). In doing so, we “defer to the [fact-finder’s] acceptance of the proof of 

these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the 

circumstances proved by the State.” Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). Second, we 

“examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the 

circumstances proved” to “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with 

guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt, not simply whether the 

inferences that point to guilt are reasonable.” Id. at 599 (quotations omitted). “We give 

no deference to the factfinder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Id. (quotation 

omitted).

The circumstances proved are that appellant entered the bedroom of two teenage 

girls who did not know him while the girls slept. He woke one of the girls by touching her 

thighs and then touched her breasts, expressed his desire to have sex with her, and exposed 

himself to her. He then went to the other girl’s bed, touched her leg, removed her 

underwear, and molested her while she begged him to stop. Under these circumstances, a 

natural and probable consequence of appellant’s actions was to cause both girls to fear 

immediate physical pain or injury, and the hypothesis that appellant did not believe that his 

actions would cause such fear is not rational. The evidence of fear assault was sufficient 

to permit the district court to reasonably conclude that appellant was guilty of first-degree 

burglary.
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II.

Appellant next argues that because respondent “failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [a]ppellant used force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact of I.H., his 

conviction for fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct must be reversed.” Fourth-degree 

criminal sexual conduct is committed if “[a] person . . . engages in sexual contact with 

another person” and “the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact.” 

Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c) (2008). 

“Coercion” means the use by the actor of words or 

circumstances that cause the complainant reasonably to fear 

that the actor will inflict bodily harm on the complainant or 

another, or the use by the actor of confinement, or superior size 

or strength, against the complainant that causes the 

complainant to submit to sexual penetration or contact against 

the complainant’s will. Proof of coercion does not require 

proof of a specific act or threat.

Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 14 (2008). 

As we have already discussed, it is not rational to believe that I.H. would not fear 

bodily harm under the circumstances surrounding appellant’s sexual contact with I.H. This 

is true even if we consider only the events that occurred before appellant had sexual contact 

with I.H. And I.H. testified that she was afraid that appellant could harm her by hitting her 

“or something” and that she did not consent to appellant toughing her breasts. We, 

therefore, conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant used 

circumstances that caused I.H. reasonably to fear that appellant would inflict bodily harm 

on I.H. to cause I.H. to submit to sexual contact against her will. Consequently, the district 
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court could reasonably conclude that appellant used coercion to accomplish the sexual 

contact and, therefore, was guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Affirmed.