This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-1953

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Gordon Ranniger,

Appellant.

Filed December 5, 2016

Affirmed

Hooten, Judge

Waseca County District Court

File No. 81-CR-14-725

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brenda Miller, Waseca County Attorney, Rachel V. Cornelius, Assistant County Attorney, 

Waseca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, John, 

Judge.



 

 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HOOTEN, Judge

Appellant argues that his Alford plea is invalid and must be withdrawn because the 

factual basis for the plea was insufficient, and appellant did not agree that there was 

sufficient evidence to convict him. We affirm.

FACTS

On July 7, 2015, appellant Joseph Gordon Ranniger entered an Alford plea1to one 

count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The complaint alleged that appellant

committed multiple acts of sexual penetration and sexual contact against his minor 

stepdaughter between January 2000 and June 2011. During the plea colloquy, Ranniger’s 

defense counsel informed him that he was presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt and that he had a right to a jury trial on the charges. Ranniger 

acknowledged that he understood what an Alford plea was. He also acknowledged that he 

had seen all of the evidence against him and that based upon his review of the evidence

and the testimony and statements he made to police and others, there was a “substantial 

likelihood” he could be convicted. Ranniger acknowledged several of the elements of the 

crime to which he was pleading guilty, but, consistent with an Alford plea, maintained his 

innocence. 

 

1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty, while maintaining innocence of the 

charged offense, in order to take advantage of a plea bargain because there is sufficient 

evidence for a jury to find him guilty at trial. N. Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. 

Ct. 160, 167 (1970). Minnesota formally recognized the validity of Alford pleas in State 

v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977). In subsequent Minnesota cases, the terms 

Alford plea and Goulette plea are used interchangeably.
3

The district court then questioned Ranniger, confirming that Ranniger understood 

his rights, had read the plea agreement, understood the nature of an Alford plea, had seen 

all of the evidence, and fully understood the type of evidence that would be presented at 

trial. Upon further questioning, Ranniger agreed with the district court that the criminal 

complaint “substantially outlines the type of evidence that would be presented if there was 

trial to a judge or jury.” Based upon Ranniger’s plea colloquy, as well as its reading of the 

criminal complaint and the evidence contained therein, the district court accepted 

Ranniger’s Alford plea. 

At the sentencing hearing, Ranniger moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that 

he did not feel he was guilty. The district court denied the motion, and sentenced Ranniger 

to 144 months in prison. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

A court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time if “withdrawal 

is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “[M]anifest 

injustice exists where a guilty plea is invalid.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 

2007). Absent manifest injustice, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw 

a valid guilty plea. State v. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Minn. 2007). However, 

the district court may allow a defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentencing 

if it is “fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. 

The district court refused to grant Ranniger’s motion to withdraw his plea under the 

fair and just standard of rule 15.05, subd. 2. Ranniger does not challenge the district court’s 

reasoning in denying his motion under rule 15.05, subd. 2. Instead, Ranniger argues that
4

his guilty plea was invalid and therefore the district court was compelled to grant his motion 

to withdraw his Alford plea in order to correct a manifest injustice under rule 15.05, subd. 1. 

A guilty plea is invalid if it is not “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Perkins v. State, 

559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). The validity of a plea presents a question of law which 

an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).

While a defendant may plead guilty despite maintaining innocence, because of the 

tension between a defendant pleading guilty to a crime while simultaneously professing 

innocence, a district court has the “responsibility to determine whether an adequate factual 

basis has been established” in support of an Alford plea. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 

716 (Minn. 1994). In discharging its duty to ensure factual adequacy, the district court has 

two obligations. First, the district court must carefully scrutinize the record and 

independently determine that a strong factual basis for the plea exists. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 

at 648–49. Second, the district court must ensure that the defendant agrees that the 

evidence the state is likely to introduce at trial is sufficient to convict. Id. at 649. A key 

consideration in this analysis is whether the plea “represents a knowing and intelligent 

choice of the alternative courses of action available.” Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761.

The Minnesota Supreme Court mandates no specific procedure in performing these 

obligations. However, the supreme court recommends discussing the evidence with the 

defendant on the record as a means to establish a strong factual basis, and procuring a 

specific verbal acknowledgement from the defendant that the evidence likely to be 

presented by the state is sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of the crime for which he is 

pleading guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.
5

In challenging the district court’s performance of both obligations in determining 

the validity of his plea, Ranniger first argues that the state introduced no evidence to 

support his guilt. We disagree. The record contains a criminal complaint, outlining the 

likely testimony of the investigating officer and the victim. Ranniger contends that this 

evidence must be entered into the record at the plea hearing and was not. Yet, Ranniger 

acknowledges that the district court may establish a factual basis for the plea by “stipulation 

by both parties to a factual statement in one or more documents submitted to the court.” 

Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. 

During the plea colloquy, Ranniger stipulated to the facts in the criminal complaint 

as representative of the evidence the state would likely produce at trial:

COURT: And you agree with [defense counsel] and [the 

prosecutor] that the complaint that was filed substantially 

outlines the type of evidence that would be presented if there 

was a trial to a judge or jury?

RANNIGER: Yes.

Ranniger’s stipulation that the contents of the criminal complaint outlined the state’s 

evidence allowed the district court to consider the complaint in determining the accuracy 

of his Alford plea, which the district court did: “It’s my finding that, if the jury or a judge 

[was] presented with the evidence that’s contained in the complaint, that there would be a 

substantial likelihood, based on that evidence, that there would be a conviction beyond a 

reasonable doubt in [c]ount [n]umber 2 of the complaint.” We conclude that the criminal 

complaint, when viewed as an outline of the state’s evidence, contains an adequate factual 

basis to support Ranniger’s plea.
6

Next, Ranniger argues that he did not agree on the record that the state’s evidence 

was sufficient to convict him of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. We disagree.

During the plea colloquy, Ranniger acknowledged his right to a trial by jury and chose to 

accept the benefit of a plea bargain in light of the strength of the state’s evidence:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Ranniger, you understand that in 

this matter you are presumed innocent until proven guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt?

RANNIGER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You understand that you’ve got a 

right to a trial to either a judge or a jury of 12 people; all 12 

people would have to find you guilty before you could be 

convicted?

RANNIGER: Yes.

. . . . 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You’ve heard me explain the plea 

agreement to the [c]ourt wherein we’re doing an Alford plea. 

An Alford plea is where you’re maintaining your innocence but 

you believe that, if we went to trial, there’s a substantial 

likelihood that we could lose and you want to take the benefit 

of this bargain of knowing what your sentence would be of 144 

months, is that correct?

RANNIGER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, you’ve reviewed all the 

evidence in this case, correct?

RANNIGER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And do you agree that if we took it to 

trial and a jury heard the testimony and the statements you 

made to police and others, there is a substantial likelihood that 

you could lose?

RANNIGER: Yes.

Ranniger focuses on his acknowledgment of a “substantial likelihood that you could 

lose” and attempts to draw a parallel between that language and the language “a risk to you 

that you would be found guilty,” which the Minnesota Supreme Court found to be an 

inadequate admission in Theis. Id. at 650. Yet, there is a difference between “risk” and 
7

“substantial likelihood.” While “risk” does not meet the threshold for what is adequate for 

Alford plea accuracy purposes, this court has previously found that “substantial likelihood” 

is adequate. Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. 

Apr. 21, 2009).

2

Given Ranniger’s acknowledgement of the “substantial likelihood” that he would 

be convicted based on the state’s evidence, and his acknowledgement that he wished to 

take advantage of having 14 charges dismissed, his plea represented “a knowing and 

intelligent choice of the alternative courses of action available.” See Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 

at 761. We conclude that Ranniger agreed on the record that the state’s evidence was 

sufficient to convict him of the charge to which he pled guilty.

Because an adequate factual basis existed in the record to support his plea, and 

Ranniger agreed on the record that the state’s evidence was sufficient to convict, 

Ranniger’s Alford plea was valid. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err 

in denying his motion to withdraw his plea under the manifest injustice standard under 

Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.1. As Ranniger does not challenge the district court’s 

analysis under the fair and just standard of Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2, we need not 

address it on appeal. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).

Affirmed.

 

2 The plea in Williams was a Norgaard plea. 760 N.W.2d at 10. Minnesota recognizes the 

validity of an Alford-type plea when a defendant professes a lack of ability to remember 

the conduct at issue, commonly known as a Norgaard plea. See State ex rel. Norgaard v. 

Tahash, 261 Minn. 106, 110 N.W.2d 867 (1961). However, there is no difference in the

plea accuracy requirements for Alford and Norgaard pleas. See Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 

12–13.