[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-12817

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:14-cr-00123-CEH-MAP-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

JAMES LEE COBB, III, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(November 30, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Defendant James Lee Cobb, III, appeals his 324-month sentence, imposed 

after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, aggravated 

identity theft, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, 

Defendant challenges his sentence on numerous grounds. He argues that: (1) the 

district court clearly erred in estimating the loss amount and the number of victims 

for sentencing enhancement purposes, and in calculating the amount of restitution; 

(2) the district court erred by applying the vulnerable-victim enhancement, and 

(3) the district court plainly erred by imposing an enhancement for production of 

an unauthorized access device and by designating Defendant an armed career 

criminal. After careful review, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background1

Beginning in approximately 2011, and continuing until 2013, Defendant and 

his wife Eneshia Carlyle, stole identities from patients at the Department of 

Veterans’ Affairs (“VA”), ambulance services, hospitals, and clinics, to 

electronically file fraudulent tax returns. Defendant and his wife used prepaid 

debit cards to access the refunds produced by these fraudulent tax returns. 

 1

 This background is taken from the facts Defendant admitted during the guilty plea colloquy 

and those facts presented through witness testimony at the sentencing hearing. See United States 

v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that district court may support a 

sentencing enhancement with facts defendant admitted at the guilty plea colloquy); United States 

v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that the district court may rely on 

evidence produced at trial, undisputed facts in the presentence investigation report, and 

testimony presented at the sentencing hearing to support its loss determination).

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The investigation into Defendant began in August 2012, following a routine 

traffic stop by the Tampa Police Department. Defendant consented to a search of 

his vehicle, and officers found receipts and debit cards imprinted with names other 

than Defendant’s. 

Following a trash pull at Defendant’s residence—which revealed several 

debit cards with various names on them, a sheet containing personal identifying 

information, and a receipt for a cash-back transaction—officers executed a search 

warrant at the residence. Officers found over 300 debit cards, as well as medical 

records from the VA, ambulance services, and hospitals. These records contained 

approximately 7,000 pieces of personal identifying information. The search also 

revealed two firearms. In addition, officers found three keys to storage units inside 

of Defendant’s wife’s purse. A subsequent search of those storage units revealed 

trash bags filled with medical records containing personal identifying information, 

prepaid debit cards, and a Mercedes. 

B. Procedural History 

A federal grand jury subsequently issued a superseding indictment against 

Defendant, charging him with: (1) conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (“Count 1”); (2) wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1343 (“Counts 2 through 5”); (3) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1028A (“Counts 6 through 9”); and (4) being a felon in possession of a 

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firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (“Count 10”). Defendant initially 

pleaded not guilty, but before trial was set to begin, he pled guilty to Counts 1 

through 10. 

Using the 2014 Sentencing Guidelines, the probation officer prepared a 

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), the 

PSR grouped Counts 1 through 5 (mail and wire fraud offenses) and assigned 

Defendant a base offense level of 7. Defendant received the following 

enhancements: (1) an 18-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J), 

because the intended loss was more than $2,500,000; (2) a 6-level enhancement 

under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), because the offense involved 250 or more victims; (3) a 2-

level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(10), because the offense involved 

sophisticated means; (4) a 2-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B), because 

Defendant produced an unauthorized access device; (5) a 2-level enhancement 

under § 3A1.1(b)(1), because Defendant knew or should have known that a victim 

of the offense was a vulnerable victim; (6) a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(a), because Defendant was an organizer or leader of the conspiracy; and 

(7) a 2-level enhancement under § 3C1.1, for obstruction of justice. Defendant’s 

resulting adjusted offense level was 43. 

As to Count 10 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon offense), the 

PSR assigned Defendant a base offense level of 26, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. 

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The PSR also noted that Defendant faced a mandatory minimum of 24 months’ 

imprisonment for Counts 6 through 9 (aggravated identity theft offenses). Because 

Defendant’s offense level of 43 was greater than 26, the PSR determined that 

Defendant’s combined total offense level was 43. 

The PSR also determined that Defendant qualified as an armed career 

criminal for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, based on his three prior Florida 

convictions for serious drug offenses: (1) a 2008 conviction for trafficking in 

cocaine; (2) a 2008 conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell/deliver; 

and (3) a 2008 conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute and to 

possess with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana within 1,000 

feet of a school. Nevertheless, Defendant’s offense level remained at 43, as it was 

greater than his offense level pursuant to the armed-career-criminal enhancement. 

With a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Defendant’s 

total offense was 41. Based on a total offense level of 41 and a criminal history 

category of VI, Defendant’s guideline range was 360 months to life imprisonment. 

In addition, Defendant faced a mandatory minimum of 24 months’ imprisonment 

for Counts 6 through 9, to be imposed consecutively to any other sentence. The 

PSR also noted that Defendant owed restitution in the amount of $1,820,759. 

Of relevance to this appeal, Defendant objected to the PSR’s calculation of 

restitution, as well as the enhancements corresponding to the loss amount and the 

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number of victims. He further objected to the imposition of the vulnerable-victim 

enhancement, the production-of-an-unauthorized-access-device enhancement, and 

the armed-career-criminal enhancement. 

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant withdrew his objections to the 

enhancements for production of an unauthorized access device, as well as to his 

designation as an armed career criminal. In light of Defendant’s numerous factual 

objections to the PSR, the Government called several witnesses to testify about the 

traffic stop and the trash pull. 

Tampa Police Department Detective Sharla Canfield testified that she 

examined the evidence recovered from the trash pull and the search of Defendant’s 

residence. She stated that approximately 7,000 means of identification were found 

in Defendant’s residence, some of which were taken from patient medical records. 

The records included handwritten notations, such as “not good” or “zero.” Based

on her experience investigating tax fraud, Detective Canfield interpreted these 

notations to mean that an attempt to do a fraudulent tax return was unsuccessful. 

She stated that Defendant used the means of identification in these records to file 

fraudulent tax returns for individuals between the ages of 28 days and 108 years 

old. Defendant knew the ages, and in some cases serious medical conditions, of 

the individuals whose identities he was stealing. 

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The Government also called Glenn Hayag, an Internal Revenue Service 

(“IRS”) Special Agent, to testify about a spreadsheet he prepared for purposes of 

calculating the loss amount, the number of victims, and the amount of restitution 

owed. Special Agent Hayag explained that officers recovered more than 7,000 

pieces of personal identifying information from the search warrant executed at 

Defendant’s residence. The investigation revealed that a total of 5,811 tax returns 

were fraudulently filed based on that personal identifying information during the 

years 2010, 2011, and 2012. The IRS paid out $12,407,679 in refunds based on 

those 5,811 tax returns. 

While reviewing the evidence collected during the investigation of 

Defendant and his wife, Special Agent Hayag noticed a pattern of similar 

addresses, e-mail addresses, Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses, and characteristics 

on the tax returns, related to interest income, dividend income, withholdings, and 

wages. He examined the 5,811 filings, looking for the factors he found common to 

Defendant’s scheme, and narrowed the filings to 805 victims. In doing so, he 

excluded any refunds that went to a regular bank or were prepared by paid tax 

preparers, given that Defendant’s scheme involved refunds deposited to debit 

cards. Based on the claimed and paid amounts for only those 805 tax returns, 

Special Agent Hayag calculated an intended loss amount of $5,613,514 and an 

actual loss amount of $1,822,759. He admitted that only about 60 or 70 

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electronically-filed tax returns were linked to the wireless hot spot device 

recovered from Defendant’s residence on the day of the search. However, the hot

spot device was dynamic, meaning that the device assigns a new IP address each 

time it signs off the internet. Stated another way, all 5,811 of the tax returns could 

have come from the same device. 

Following Special Agent Hayag’s testimony, the district court overruled 

Defendant’s objections to the calculation of the loss amount and the number of 

victims, concluding that ample evidence, including Special Agent Hayag’s 

testimony, showed that there were more than 250 victims who had their personal 

identifying information stolen and that $5,613,549 was a reasonable estimate of the 

intended loss. The district court also overruled Defendant’s objection to the PSR’s 

calculation of restitution, concluding that Defendant owed restitution in the amount 

of $1,820,759, as this was the amount actually paid out by the IRS on the 805 tax 

returns attributed to Defendant. 

As to the vulnerable-victim enhancement, the district court stated that:

The provision does provide if the defendant knew or should have 

known the victim of the offense was vulnerable as a result of the 

medical records. It’s clear from a review of the medical records that a 

number of them were vulnerable individuals just by virtue of the 

information and the source of the medical records. 

Based on the district court’s determination regarding two enhancements not 

relevant to this appeal, the district court concluded that Defendant’s total offense 

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level was 35, resulting in a guideline range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. 

After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced 

Defendant to a total of 324 months’ imprisonment. The district court also ordered 

Defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $1,820,759. This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Loss determination, calculation of the number of victims, and the 

amount of restitution

Defendant argues that the district court clearly erred by adopting Special 

Agent Hayag’s actual- and intended-loss determination and the calculation of the 

number of victims. In particular, Defendant argues that Special Agent Hayag’s 

calculations were speculative and did not reflect a reasonable estimate of the loss 

or the number of victims. 

We review the district court’s loss determination, calculation of the number 

of victims, and the factual finding regarding the amount of restitution for clear

error. United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013) (numberof-victims calculation); United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 632 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(restitution); United States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 667–68 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(loss determination). “Although review for clear error is deferential, a finding of 

fact must be supported by substantial evidence.” United States v. Robertson, 493 

F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007). 

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1. Loss Amount 

Defendant first challenges the district court’s imposition of an 18-level 

enhancement based on its determination that the loss exceeded $2,500,000. 

Section 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that a

defendant is subject to an 18-level enhancement if the loss attributable to the 

defendant is more than $2,500,000. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) (2014). The 

commentary states that “loss is the greater of actual or intended loss.” Id. § 2B1.1, 

comment. (n.3(A)). More specifically, “actual loss” is the “reasonably foreseeable 

pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense” and “intended loss” is the 

“pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense.” Id. § 2B1.1, 

comment. (n.3(A)(i)-(ii)). 

The district court is only required to make a reasonable estimate of the loss, 

and we defer appropriately to its determination. See id. § 2B1.1, comment. 

(n.3(C)). To make the loss determination, the district court is permitted to use 

evidence from trial, undisputed PSR facts, and evidence from the sentencing 

hearing. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Although reasonable estimates are permissible, speculation is not. Id. The 

Government must establish the facts by a preponderance of the evidence and 

support the loss calculation with reliable and specific evidence. Id. 

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Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Government 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the intended loss was more than

$2,500,000. The Government provided reliable and specific evidence of the loss

calculation and the district court made a reasonable estimate after reviewing the 

spreadsheet prepared by Special Agent Hayag and hearing his testimony at the 

sentencing hearing. See United States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“A reasonable estimate of the loss amount is appropriate because often the 

amount of loss caused by fraud is difficult to determine accurately.” (quotations 

omitted)).

Special Agent Hayag explained that the IRS determined that the 7,000 

pieces of personal identifying information found during the execution of the search 

warrant were used to file 5,811 fraudulent tax returns during the three-year period 

between 2010 and 2012. While reviewing the evidence obtained during the 

investigation of Defendant’s tax-fraud scheme, Special Agent Hayag noticed a 

pattern of common addresses, IP addresses, and e-mail addresses, as well as 

similarities on the returns related to wages, interest income, and dividends. Based 

on the patterns associated with Defendant’s tax-fraud scheme, Special Agent 

Hayag attributed 805 of the 5,811 tax returns to Defendant. In arriving at this 

number, Special Agent Hayag also excluded any tax returns that were filed by a tax 

preparer, as well as returns that had a refund distributed to a bank, not a debit card. 

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The intended loss (or amounts claimed) on those 805 tax returns was $5,613,549. 

Based on this testimony, the district court reasonably estimated the intended loss in 

the amount of $5,613,549. Cf. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1304–05 (concluding that 

the Government did not support the sentencing enhancement with reliable and 

specific evidence because no witness testified to authenticate the summaries of 

evidence presented at sentencing). 

Defendant’s contention that Special Agent Hayag’s analysis was flawed 

because it used the 7,000 pieces of personal identifying information as a starting 

point misses the mark. Special Agent Hayag testified that the IRS determined that 

the 7,000 pieces of personal identifying information were associated with 5,811 

fraudulent tax returns filed from 2010 to 2012. While Special Agent Hayag used 

those 5,811 tax returns as a starting point, he only attributed 805 of those returns to 

Defendant based on the patterns he uncovered during his investigation of

Defendant’s scheme. Defendant’s argument that it was unreasonable for Special 

Agent Hayag to use these common characteristics to attribute fraudulent tax returns 

to Defendant is without merit. See United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1396–97 

(11th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s loss calculation based on an IRS agent’s 

testimony that he narrowed the total number of tax returns attributable to the 

defendant using certain addresses linked to the defendant). Further, although 

Defendant asserts that Special Agent Hayag did not provide sufficient explanation 

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regarding certain aspects of his analysis, Defendant had the opportunity to crossexamine Special Agent Hayag on these points at the sentencing hearing. 

We are also not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that he should only be 

held accountable for the loss amounts associated with the 60 to 70 tax returns 

linked to the IP address recovered from the hot spot device at his residence. As 

Special Agent Hayag testified, the hot spot device recovered from Defendant’s 

residence was dynamic, meaning that it generated a new IP address each time that 

it disconnected from the internet. In other words, the fact that the IP address could 

only be linked to 60 or 70 tax returns does not mean that the device was not used to 

file other tax returns. 

Finally, we reject Defendant’s argument that the Government failed to 

establish that he had the ability to “rapid-file” tax returns, as he has pointed to no 

authority requiring the Government to submit proof that he had the ability to 

“rapid-file” tax returns. And indeed, the evidence put forth at the sentencing 

hearing showed that Defendant possessed 7,000 pieces of personal identifying 

information, in addition to over 300 debit cards. Because the Government 

presented reliable and specific evidence establishing by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the intended loss exceeded $2,500,000, the district court did not err 

in applying the 18-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). 

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2. Number of Victims

Defendant further asserts that the district court’s finding that the offense 

involved more than 250 victims was speculative and unreasonable. 

We do not agree. A defendant is subject to a 6-level enhancement when an 

offense involves 250 or more victims. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) (2014). A 

victim is defined as “any person who sustained any part of the actual loss” of the 

scheme or “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or 

without authority.” Id. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.1 & n.4(E)). 

The district court did not clearly err when it determined that Defendant’s 

offense involved more than 250 victims. The district court based its determination 

on Special Agent Hayag’s testimony that 805 fraudulently-filed tax returns could 

be attributed to Defendant. For the same reasons explained above, the Government 

provided specific and reliable evidence to support the finding that the offense 

involved more than 250 victims, and thus warranted the six-level enhancement 

under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). 

3. Restitution

Defendant likewise challenges the district court’s calculation of restitution in 

the amount of $1,820,759. 

“The amount of restitution must be based on the amount of loss actually 

caused by the defendant’s conduct.” United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 728 

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(11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). The Government must establish the amount 

of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. “Because the determination 

of the restitution amount is by nature an inexact science, where difficulties arise, a 

district court may accept a reasonable estimate of the loss based on the evidence 

presented.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 

The district court did not clearly err in determining that Defendant owed 

restitution in the amount of $1,820,759. Again, the Government established by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Defendant was accountable for 805 

fraudulently-filed tax returns. The actual loss, or amount paid out by the IRS, on 

those 805 tax returns was $1,820,759. See id., 774 F.3d at 728. To the extent 

Defendant also challenges the forfeiture money judgment in the amount of 

$1,820,759, he does so for the first time on appeal. But regardless, for the reasons 

already explained, the forfeiture money judgment was based on the actual loss to 

the IRS as a result of the 805 fraudulently-filed tax returns attributed to Defendant. 

B. Vulnerable-Victim Enhancement

Defendant next argues that the district court erred by applying the two-level 

vulnerable-victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). 

While the application of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b) is a mixed question of law and 

fact that we review de novo, the district court’s determination that a victim is 

vulnerable is a factual finding to which we accord “due deference.” United States 

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v. Frank, 247 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). We will reverse this factual 

finding only if we conclude that it is clearly erroneous. Id.

Section 3A1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level 

increase in a defendant’s offense level if “the defendant knew or should have 

known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 3A1.1(b)(1). The term “‘vulnerable victim’ means a person . . . who is unusually 

vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise 

particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” Id. § 3A1.1, comment. (n.2). 

Defendant argues that the Government did not establish that he targeted his 

victims based on their vulnerability. However, we recently determined that 

§ 3A1.1(b)(1) does not require a defendant to have targeted his victims based on 

their vulnerability, as it requires only that the defendant knew or should have 

known that a victim of the offense was vulnerable. See United States v. Birge, 830 

F.3d 1229, 1232–34 (11th Cir. 2016) (referring to language in our previous 

decisions stating that § 3A1.1 requires “targeting” a vulnerable victim as dicta). 

The district court found that Defendant knew or should have known that at least 

one of the victims of the offense was vulnerable, and Defendant does not appear to 

challenge that finding on appeal. 

Instead, Defendant argues that the district court applied the vulnerablevictim enhancement based on the mere possession of medical records, but did not 

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require proof that any personal identifying information from those records had 

actually been used. Because Defendant raises this argument for the first time on 

appeal, our review is for plain error.2

 See United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 

819 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a defendant fails to preserve an objection 

where he asserts the factual basis for the objection before the district court but 

asserts a different legal theory on appeal). Regardless, Defendant has failed to 

show error, plainly or otherwise, because Defendant admitted at the guilty plea 

colloquy that he had used the information in the medical records to file fraudulent

tax returns. 

C. Production-of Unauthorized-Access-Device Enhancement

Defendant argues that the district court plainly erred by imposing a two-level 

enhancement for the production of an unauthorized access device under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). In particular, he asserts that the use of personal identifying 

information to file fraudulent tax returns does not constitute production of an 

unauthorized access device. 

Under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i), a defendant is subject to a two-level increase in 

his offense level if the offense involved the production of an unauthorized access 

device. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). The commentary defines “production” to 

 2

 We will only notice plain error if “(1) there is an error in the district court’s determination; 

(2) the error is plain or obvious; (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights in that it 

was prejudicial and not harmless; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Clark, 274 F.3d 1325, 1326 (11th 

Cir. 2001). 

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mean “manufacture, design, alteration, authentication, duplication, or assembly.” 

Id. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.10(A)). 

Defendant initially objected to the PSR’s application of this enhancement, 

but subsequently withdrew the objection at the beginning of the sentencing 

hearing. As a result, the Government contends that the doctrine of invited error 

precludes appellate review of Defendant’s argument challenging this enhancement. 

“The doctrine of invited error is implicated when a party induces or invites the 

district court into making an error. Where invited error exists, it precludes a court 

from invoking the plain error rule and reversing.” United States v. Silvestri, 409 

F.3d 1311, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotations omitted). In a similar 

vein, we have held that a defendant waives a sentencing objection where he 

expressly withdraws the objection before the district court. See United States v. 

Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. 

Masters, 118 F.3d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that plain-error review 

did not apply where a defendant withdrew his objection, despite knowing that the 

district court would commit error). 

Based on the record before us, we conclude that Defendant waived any 

argument he may have had challenging the district court’s imposition of the twolevel enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). See Horsfall, 552 F.3d at 1283–84; 

Masters, 118 F.3d at 1526. Because Defendant expressly withdrew his objection 

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to the enhancement at the sentencing hearing, we are precluded from addressing 

his arguments challenging the enhancement on appeal. See Horsfall, 552 F.3d at 

1283–84. 

In any event, even if Defendant had not waived this argument, it would still

fail under plain-error review. Defendant has not pointed to any on-point precedent, 

in which our Court or the Supreme Court has concluded that duplicating stolen 

Social Security numbers on tax returns for the purpose of obtaining fraudulent 

refunds loaded onto debit cards does not qualify as production of unauthorized 

access devices. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 

2003) (“It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a 

statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error 

where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly 

resolving it.”). 

D. Armed-Career-Criminal Enhancement

Finally, Defendant asserts that his 2008 Florida conviction for possession of 

cocaine with intent to sell or deliver does not qualify as a serious drug offense for 

purposes of the armed-career-criminal enhancement. 

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant withdrew his objection to the armedcareer-criminal enhancement. Defense counsel stated that he had reviewed 

Defendant’s underlying convictions and believed the enhancement applied. When 

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the district court asked Defendant to confirm that he did not contest his designation 

as an armed career criminal, Defendant responded: “That’s what the record states, 

yes.” 

Based on Defendant’s express and voluntary withdrawal of his objection to 

the armed-career-criminal enhancement, Defendant has waived any challenge he 

may have had to this enhancement. See Horsfall, 552 F.3d at 1283–84. But even 

if we determined that Defendant had not waived this challenge, his argument 

would likewise fail under plain-error review. As Defendant readily concedes, his 

argument that his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver 

under Florida Statute § 893.13(1) does not qualify as a serious drug offense is 

foreclosed by United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1264–68 (11th Cir. 2014). 

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, Defendant’s 324-month sentence is 

AFFIRMED. 

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