J-S29040-23

2023 PA Super 228

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TERRY ALLEN PATTERSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 376 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0004889-2021

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 7, 2023

Appellant, Terry Allen Patterson, appeals from the judgments of 

sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County after it

found him guilty of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver, 

knowingly possessing a controlled substance, driving under the influence

(DUI), and of violating the Motor Vehicle Code prohibition against driving with 

a suspended license for a prior DUI.

1 The sole issue on appeal is the trial 

court’s ruling that the initial seizure was lawful under the public servant 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); 75 Pa.C.S. § 

3802(d)(2); and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1)(i), respectively.
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exception to the warrant requirement where appellant’s car partially blocked 

the left lane of a limited access highway. After careful review, we affirm.

The suppression hearing was held on June 13, 2022, with a single 

witness, Sergeant Adam Shope, a nine-year veteran of the Northwest Regional 

Police Department with specialized training and ample experience in 

recognizing when motorists are DUI. Trial Court Opinion, 2. In its written 

opinion, the trial court summarized its factual findings with respect to the 

initial stop as follows:

At approximately 8:18 p.m. on November 15, 2021, Sergeant 

Shope was on patrol traveling eastbound on Route 283 when he 

observed vehicles in the left lane merging into the right lane to 

avoid a vehicle stopped on the left shoulder of the highway. 

Sergeant Shope observed a white Nissan Rogue parked on the left

shoulder of Route 283 East, at mile marker 16.8 (referred to as 

the “Snyder’s Road overpass” at the evidentiary hearing and in 

memoranda), in a sixty-five miles-per-hour speed limited zone. 

The Nissan was parked with its left tires near the edge of the

highway's asphalt abutting the grass median and with its right 

tires well into the left lane of Route 283 East, blocking a significant 

portion of the lane. In response, Sergeant Shope activated his 

emergency lights, pulled up behind the vehicle, exited his vehicle, 

and approached the driver. Sergeant Shope both attested and 

testified that the basis for his initiating contact with the Defendant 

was to ascertain the Defendant’s well-being and render any 

necessary aid.

Trial Court Opinion, 2 (footnote omitted).

The Sergeant was not sure whether the car was disabled or why it was 

otherwise stopped in traffic. N.T. Suppression 6/13/23, 6, 35. Notably, he 

activated his emergency lights for both the safety of the stopped car and 

himself. Id. at 6-7. The trial court’s finding that the car blocked “a significant 
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portion” of the left travel lane was fully supported by the video evidence 

introduced at the suppression hearing:

Exhibit CW#1, In-Car-Video (Front): time 1:10.

Immediately upon speaking with Appellant, who was in the driver’s seat 

alone in the car, Sergeant Shope recognized the blank stare, confusion, 

disorientation, and sluggish movements of a person under the influence. 

Appellant was unable to answer simple questions, including why he had 

parked the car as he had. Sergeant Shope directed him to exit and stand by 

the front of the patrol car. The officer ran Appellant’s information, and learned 

he was driving with a suspended license from a prior DUI. While continuing to 

speak with him, Sergeant Shope made additional observations that supported 

his belief Appellant was operating the car while impaired. A second officer 

arrived at the scene, and saw a wet cigarette inside the car, which he 
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recognized to be consistent with the use of phencyclidine (PCP). Upon a search

of Appellant incident to arrest, Sergeant Shope discovered a large amount of 

cash and a baggie containing 11 separate packets of crack cocaine and 

another baggie of cocaine powder. A subsequent blood test revealed there 

was PCP in Appellant’s system. Trial Court Opinion, 3-4.

Appellant moved to suppress the physical evidence recovered. He

specifically alleged that the initial detention, when the officer pulled in behind 

his stopped car with emergency lights activated, was without reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause. In addition to Sergeant Shope’s testimony, video 

evidence from the patrol car and body cameras was introduced at the 

suppression hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted 

Appellant’s request to file a brief. On November 2, 2022, the court denied 

suppression, and listed the matter for trial.

The trial court filed its opinion addressing the suppression claim 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I) on November 7, 2022. It held that Sergeant 

Shope initiated a detention when he pulled his patrol car behind Appellant’s 

parked car on the highway with the emergency lights activated. It agreed with 

appellant that Sergeant Shope neither had probable cause of a Motor Vehicle 

Code violation nor reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at that point in 

time. Trial Court Opinion, 7.

2 Nonetheless, the court ruled that under the 

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2 The trial court declined to consider whether Sergeant Shope had probable 

cause of a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code prohibition on standing or 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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public servant exception of the community caretaking doctrine the seizure was 

lawful. Relying on Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017), 

the trial court held that “Sergeant Shope was able to articulate specific 

objective facts that reasonably suggested his assistance was needed to 

mitigate peril.” Trial Court Opinion, 11.

On February 6, 2023, after a colloquy, Appellant waived a jury trial. The 

bench trial was conducted by the same judge who ruled on the suppression 

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parking a car on “a limited access highway unless authorized by official trafficcontrol devices.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3353(a)(2)(vii). It ruled that the 

Commonwealth’s reliance on a violation of that section was an “after-the-fact

justification [...] for the stop rather than its genesis.” Trial Court Opinion, 7.

Because we have determined that the stop was lawful under the public servant 

exception of the community caretaking doctrine, we will not address the 

Commonwealth’s argument that probable cause for a Motor Vehicle Code

violation also existed at the moment of seizure (see Brief for Appellee, 15-

18). We note that, in general, probable cause exists where the totality of the 

circumstances shows that “the facts and circumstances within the police 

officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy 

information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable 

caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be 

arrested.” Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 817 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

The officer’s subjective intent “play[s] no role in ordinary, probable-cause 

Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 

(1996). All that matters is that the officer’s conduct was objectively 

reasonable, i.e., a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have 

believed that he had probable cause. Id. “[T]he fact that the officer does not 

have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide 

the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action 

taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
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motion. Trial was based on stipulated facts supported by documentary 

evidence and incorporated suppression hearing testimony. The trial court 

found defendant guilty of the four counts charged. Appellant waived a 

presentence investigation and proceeded immediately to sentencing. The 

court imposed an aggregate term of two to six years’ imprisonment.

3

Appellant filed a timely appeal.

4

In his Rule 1925(b) Statement, he

asserted it was error to deny suppression, “where the stop and seizure of 

[Appellant’s] vehicle was not justified under the public servant exception to 

the warrant requirement in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and 

therefore, any contraband or items found on his person, property or in the 

vehicle searched should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal 

seizure.” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement. The trial court issued an order

on April 3, 2023, specifically relying on its previously filed opinion in response

to Appellant’s claim.

On appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, we apply the

following standard of review:

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3 The trial court also terminated probation under a separate docket number. 

See CP-36-CR-0006650-2019.

4 The notice of appeal contained a typographical error noting two dates (one 

of which was correct) for the judgement of sentence. The caption of the appeal 

reflects that it is taken from the February 6, 2023 judgment of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(en banc) (correcting caption when appellant misstates where appeal lies).
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[We are] limited to determining whether the suppression court’s

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the

Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read

in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression

court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound

by those findings and may reverse only if the [suppression] court’s

legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on the allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not 

binding on the appellate court, ‘whose duty it is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.’ Thus, 

the conclusions of law of the [suppression court] are subject to 

our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 195 A.3d 269, 275 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)).

At the suppression hearing, Appellant challenged only the “stop and 

detention” that initiated the confrontation between him and Sergeant Shope,

and declined to otherwise contest the officer’s conduct during the traffic stop 

or the probable cause for arrest. N.T. Suppression 6/13/22, 3-4, 12-13. The 

trial court recognized in its opinion that Appellant’s suppression claims “focus 

solely on his initial stop and detention.” Trial Court Opinion, 4. And, in his 

brief, Appellant challenged only the trial court’s application of the public 

servant exception to the warrant requirement for the initial stop and 

detention. Brief for Appellant, 4. We will, therefore, limit our analysis to the 

lawfulness of the initial seizure.

There was no dispute at the suppression hearing that Sergeant Shope 

seized Appellant when he initiated an investigative detention by pulling in 
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behind the stopped car with the emergency lights activated. Indeed, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that “a reasonable person, innocent of 

any crime, would ... interpret the activation of emergency lights on a police 

vehicle as a signal that he or she is not free to leave.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d 

at 621. It held that even when the citizen’s car was already parked on the 

shoulder of a highway, the “Appellant was seized and subjected to an 

investigative detention.” Id. At 625; see also Commonwealth v. Gindraw, 

297 A.3d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2023).

The question, therefore, is whether the public servant exception of the 

community caretaking doctrine justified that seizure. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court explained that the community caretaking doctrine:

... has been characterized as encompassing three specific 

exceptions [to the warrant requirement]: the emergency aid 

exception, the automobile/inventory exception, and the public 

servant exception, also sometimes referred to as the public safety 

exception.

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 626-627; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 851.

“Each of the exceptions contemplates that the police officer’s actions be 

motivated by a desire to render aid or assistance, rather than the investigation 

of criminal activity.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 627. 

With respect to the public servant exception under Pennsylvania law, 

the Livingstone Court recognized that “the role of police is not limited to the 

detection, investigation, and prevention of criminal activity,” in that “officers 

engage in a myriad of activities that ensure the safety and welfare of our 
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Commonwealth’s citizens.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 629; see also 

Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 569 (Pa. 2018) (noting the “wide 

variety” of community caretaking “laudable endeavors” expected of police 

officers relating to the health and safety of the citizenry in applying the 

emergency aid exception).

In recognition of the many different tasks assigned to police officers, the 

Livingstone Court adopted a test of “reasonableness” to evaluate the officer’s 

motivation under the exception, because “it is not realistic or wise to expect 

an officer to ignore the nature of his or her role in law enforcement—or its 

inherent dangers—in order for the public servant exception ... to apply.” 

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637. 

Thus, so long as a police officer is able to point to specific, 

objective, and articulable facts which, standing alone reasonably 

would suggest that his assistance is necessary, a coinciding 

subjective law enforcement concern by the officer will not negate 

the validity of that search under the public servant exception.

Id.; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 853 (“Livingstone specifically rejected 

that ... an investigation must be ‘totally divorced’ from the detection of criminal 

activity”).

The Court set forth a three-element test for determining when the public 

servant exception to the warrant requirement under the community 

caretaking doctrine may properly be invoked:

the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts 

which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that 

assistance was needed; the police action must be independent 

from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal 
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evidence; and, based on a consideration of the surrounding 

circumstances, the action taken by police must be tailored to 

rendering assistance or mitigating the peril. Once assistance 

has been provided or the peril mitigated, further police action will 

be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (emphasis supplied).

The trial court applied Livingstone to the facts of this case and found 

that all three elements were satisfied. First, it held that the officer “was able 

to articulate specific and objective facts that reasonably suggested his 

assistance was needed to mitigate peril” because “essentially half” of 

Appellant’s car was parked “in the left lane of a limited access highway,” 

thereby putting Appellant “at risk of injury or death from a rear end collision.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 11. The court noted further that the officer’s observation 

of several cars being “forced to change lanes in order to avoid such a collision”

with Appellant’s car supported the officer’s intervention to minimize the peril 

presented. Id. Second, it found that the officer’s “actions were independent 

from detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence,” based on

the officer’s written reports and credited testimony that his “sole objective in 

initiating the traffic stop was to check on the well-being of the occupant, who 

was not visible to him until making contact.” Id. Third, the court found that 

the “only reasonable and narrowly tailored means available to Sergeant Shope 

to render assistance and mitigate peril was to initiate a traffic stop with his 

emergency lights activated to ward off other drivers.” Id. (distinguishing this 

case from the facts presented in Livingstone).
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Appellant argues on appeal only that the trial court’s finding with respect 

to the first element of the Livingstone test was erroneous. He contends that 

the fact that his car “was partially in the left lane of travel of the two[-]lane

road was not sufficient by itself to justify the seizure.” Brief for Appellant, 18

(emphasis in original). According to Appellant, in light of the officer’s stated 

aim to check “on the welfare of the motorist when he pulled in behind

[Appellant’s car,]” the officer “was unable to articulate thereafter any specific 

and objective facts what would reasonably suggest that [Appellant] was in

need of assistance at the time of the seizure.” Brief for Appellant, 17.

We have no difficulty concluding, as did the trial court, that any 

reasonable officer would believe her assistance is needed upon finding a car 

stopped and blocking the left travel lane of a high-speed portion of a limited 

access highway. These are “specific and articulable facts which, viewed 

objectively and independent of any law enforcement concerns” fully 

support the public servant exception. Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 636

(emphasis supplied). Indeed, absent extraordinary reasons, it would have 

been a dereliction of duty for a police officer to ignore such an apparent and 

immediate safety hazard on a highway. It also was reasonable to assume that 

either the car or motorist was in distress from the fact that the car was stopped 

in such a precarious position.

Appellant’s argument focuses exclusively on his own supposed need for 

caretaking. It skips over what is obvious. The stopped car, fully half of which 

was in the left lane of a highway in a 65 mile-per-hour speed zone and blocking 
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a “significant portion” (at least a third) of that lane, thereby forcing other cars 

to move from the left to the right lane to avoid a collision, was the peril the 

officer needed to address. That peril, and the risk of serious accident and 

injury presented, was to the other motorists on the highway as much as it was 

to the motorist of the stopped car. By pulling in behind the car stopped in the 

driving lane of the highway and activating his emergency lights for the “safety”

of the stopped car and himself “because [they] were pretty much blocking the 

left lane of travel,” N.T. Suppression, 6/13/22, 6-7, the officer manifested his 

duty to “ensure the safety and welfare of our Commonwealth’s citizens.”

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 629; see also Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 849 (noting 

that, even where the stopped car is “legally parked on the shoulder of the 

roadway,” the activation of emergency lights serves the purpose of “providing 

greater visibility to both the Troopers and the vehicle they were pulling behind

... [and] also signal to other vehicles in the surrounding area to either slow 

down or move over”).

This concern for the safety of other motorists on a highway, in addition 

to the motorist of the stopped car, is encompassed within the community 

caretaking doctrine. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-448

(1973) (adopting community caretaking doctrine and ruling that police 

“concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an 

intruder removed a revolver from the trunk” of a car that had been in single 

car accident warranted entry into the trunk); State v. McCormick, 494 

S.W.3d 673, 687 (Tenn. 2016) (quoted in Livingstone: community 
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caretaking encompasses “the possibility of a person in need of assistance or 

the existence of a potential threat to public safety”); Ullom v. Miller, 705 

S.E.2d 111, 121 (W.Va. 2010) (cited in Livingstone: community caretaking 

“encompasses a non-investigatory, non-criminal role of police officers to help 

to ensure the safety and welfare of our citizens”);Williams v. State, 962 A.2d

210, 217 (Del. 2008) (cited in Livingstone: community caretaking doctrine 

“permits police officers to investigate situations in which a citizen may be in 

peril”).

Appellant relies on the particular circumstances of Livingstone and an

unpublished memorandum of this Court to provide a laundry list of factors not 

present here, which he argues undermines the trial court’s conclusion there 

was a need for action by the officer: no inclement weather; no signs of 

accident; no indication that the car was not parked as close as practicable to 

the grass of the median; no hazard lights activated; and no calls or complaints 

about a car in need of assistance or “disrupting the flow of traffic.” Brief for 

Appellant, 17-18. Appellant’s argument challenges only the weight given by 

the trial court to salient factors. Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 852; see also 

Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 2021 WL 3702577, *5 (Pa. Super. 2021) (nonprecedential decision) (“The crux of Appellant’s argument . . . that there were 

no objective facts indicating she was in need of assistance . . . goes to the 

weight of the evidence presented”). As such, it is contrary to the standard of 

review obligating this Court to consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence 

and so much of the defense evidence that remains uncontradicted. 
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Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 619. “[I]t is within the suppression court’s sole 

province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 

be given to their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 

1117, 1123 & 1126 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (deferring to suppression 

court’s weighing of testimony given on direct- and cross-examination).

In Livingstone, the Supreme Court found the circumstances presented 

were insufficient to warrant an intrusion under the public servant exception: 

a car “pulled over onto the right shoulder of the road; the engine running, but 

hazard lights not activated” on an interstate highway. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 

at 614. Although not stated by the Court, it is a fair inference that the car 

“pulled over onto the right shoulder” was not blocking traffic. These 

observations by the state trooper did not rise to “specific and objective facts 

that would reasonably suggest that Appellant needed assistance.” Id. at 638.

Similarly, we have ruled that a trooper’s observation of a car “legally parked 

on the shoulder” where “the driver appeared to be looking at her phone or 

digging through her purse and was slumped over towards the passenger seat” 

was insufficient to warrant an intrusion. Commonwealth v. Savino, 2021 

WL 4171450, *1 & *6 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision). In both

cases, the cars were safely stopped on the side of a highway, engine running

– indicating the stop could be temporary – and with no other sign of distress.

In direct contrast, Appellant’s car was not safely stopped, and, instead, was 

blocking a significant portion of the left lane of a highway in a 65 mile-per-
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hour zone. The salient factor here, not present in either Livingstone or 

Savino, was that the stopped car presented a real hazard to other drivers. 

As the Supreme Court observed:

there are many reasons why a driver might pull to the side of a

highway: the driver may need to look at a map, answer or make

a telephone call, send a text message, pick something up off the

floor, clean up a spill, locate something in her purse or in his

wallet, retrieve something from the glove compartment, attend to

someone in the back seat, or, . . . enter an address into the

vehicle’s navigation system.

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634-35 (footnote omitted). We agree that “pulling

to the side of the road to perform any of these activities is encouraged, as a

momentary distraction while driving may result in catastrophic

consequences,” when the car is safely pulled over and out of the way of traffic. 

Id. However, we can think of no reason, and Appellant has offered none, that 

should give a reasonable officer a moment’s hesitation to stop and investigate 

why this car was blocking the left travel lane.

By weighing the testimony elicited on cross-examination in isolation of 

the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s argument both violates the 

standard of review and fails to give any weight to the peril presented by his 

stopped car. Certainly, there is nothing in Livingstone that requires the 

existence of activated hazard lights, inclement weather or the like to warrant 

an intrusion under the public servant exception. The question to be answered 

is not whether specific circumstances were present but whether the officer can 

“point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably
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suggest to an experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance.” 

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634. Rote reliance on a check list would undermine

the Supreme Court’s stated belief that “[r]equiring an officer to articulate 

specific and objective facts ... will cabin reliance on the exception and enable 

courts to properly assess its employment.” Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 635. As

the Supreme Court recognized the public servant exception could arise in a 

“myriad of [police] activities” and not just those limited to a few factors. Id. 

at 629.

Examining the specific factors cited by Appellant, moreover,

demonstrates that each must be reviewed within the totality of the 

circumstances to be properly weighed. For example, Appellant cites the lack 

of calls or complaints about a car disrupting traffic. But no calls were needed 

for the officer to reasonably assess the situation here, because he personally 

saw that the stopped car was “disrupting the flow of traffic” from the fact that

several cars had to move from the left lane to the right to safely pass by it.

The presence of inclement weather may be significant in certain situations, 

particularly where an officer’s concern includes the possibility of a prior 

accident or of a motorist seeking help by wandering away from the car, but, 

here, the officer’s reasonable concern was directed at a future accident. 

Inclement weather might make that concern even greater, but the lack of it 

did not render the situation safe.

We agree that activated hazard lights in many circumstances would 

support an officer’s belief that a citizen required assistance (and likely 
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welcomed it). See Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 853 (“the presence of Gindraw’s 

vehicle on the side of the road after midnight in a dark area with its hazard 

lights flashing provided the experienced trooper with specific, objective, and 

articulable facts to suggest he might require assistance”). The absence of 

activated hazard lights should not automatically preclude application of the 

public servant exception where other signs of distress are present. Similarly, 

the fact that Appellant’s car was stopped on a narrow shoulder, seemingly 

parallel to, and “as close as possible to the median,” Brief for Appellant, 18, 

might indicate that the motorist possessed all of his faculties when he stopped 

his car on a highway, but certainly was outweighed (and undermined) by the 

fact that the car “was blocking a significant portion of” the driving lane. Trial 

Court Opinion, 2.

We therefore agree with the trial court that Sergeant Shope “was able 

to articulate specific and objective facts that reasonably suggested his 

assistance was needed to mitigate peril.” Trial Court Opinion, 11. The record 

amply supports the trial court’s finding that the first element of the 

Livingstone test for the public servant exception was satisfied.

Appellant has not challenged the trial court’s rulings with respect to the 

remaining two elements. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and find 

the trial court’s rulings are supported by the record evidence at the 

suppression hearing. As Sergeant Shope testified, and the trial court found, 

his actions were motivated by concern for the motorist and the peril presented 

by the stopped car blocking the travel lane, which “were independent from 
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detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence” and “would have 

been a dereliction of duty” for him to ignore. Trial Court Opinion, 11. Finally, 

Sergeant Shope’s interaction with Appellant constituted a minimal intrusion, 

as it was limited to an approach to the driver’s side window to inquire on 

Appellant’s reasons for having parked the car as he had.

5 There was no show 

of force by the officer, and the initial confrontation was brief, approximately a 

minute, and a proper way to confirm whether assistance was needed to move 

the car out of the way of traffic. Trial Court Opinion, 11. This level of 

interaction was “commensurate with the perceived need for assistance.”

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637; Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 854 (where car was 

stopped on shoulder of road and not blocking travel, the “intrusion was 

minimal” because it was short and not conducted for the purpose of detecting 

crime).

Appellant did not contest that the officer acquired reasonable suspicion 

and then probable cause of DUI after the initial confrontation. See 

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (“Once assistance has been provided or the 

peril mitigated, further police action will be evaluated under traditional Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudence”). Accordingly, we affirm the order denying 

____________________________________________

5 Sergeant Shope testified that when he first made contact with Appellant, he 

tried “to ask some information about his trip, what was going on, things like 

that. [Appellant] was very dazed and confused, seemed very disoriented. I 

had a very tough time getting simple answers from him.” N.T. Suppression 

6/13/22, 8-9. Appellant did not provide an answer to the officer’s inquiries 

with respect to his welfare or why he had stopped his car “where he did” and 

his movements were “very sluggish.” Officer Shope believed at that time that 

Appellant “was showing clues of impairment.” Id., 9.
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suppression of physical evidence following Sergeant Shope’s investigative 

detention of Appellant.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2023