J-S79032-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: J.L.M.-C., a Minor

APPEAL OF: J.M.M. A/K/A J.M.C., 

Mother

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1425 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree entered May 4, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2015-9020

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R.M., a 

Minor

APPEAL OF: J.M.M. A/K/A J.M.C., 

Mother

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1548 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree entered May 4, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2015-9021

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2016

J.M.M. a/k/a J.M.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decrees granting the 

Petitions filed by the Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services 

Agency (“BCCYSS” or the “Agency”) for the involuntary termination of her 

parental rights to her two minor daughters: J.L.M.-C., born in August 2012, 

and A.R.M., born in September 2010 (collectively “the Children”), pursuant 
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to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We 

affirm. 

The Children came into the care of BCCYSS in July 2013, when A.R.M. 

was approximately three years old, and J.L.M.-C. was approximately one 

year old. On August 12, 2013, the trial court adjudicated the Children 

dependent, and granted temporary legal and physical custody to BCCYSS. 

On February 27, 2015, BCCYSS filed Petitions to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the Petitions on July 8-9, 

2015, September 17, 2015, October 7, 2015, and April 15, 2016.

The trial court set forth in its Opinion the relevant underlying facts and 

evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearings. See Trial Court Opinion, 

6/13/16, at 6-8. We adopt the trial court’s recitation as though fully set 

forth herein. See id. 

In the Decrees entered on May 4, 2016, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother timely filed Notices of Appeal, along 

with Concise Statements of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Thereafter, this Court, sua sponte, 

consolidated the appeals.

____________________________________________

1

In separate Decrees entered on May 4, 2016, the trial court also 

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the Children’s biological 

father, S.C., Sr. (hereinafter “Father”). Father did not file an appeal, nor is 

he a party to the instant appeal. 
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On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Where Mother denied sexually abusing a minor and there was 

no adjudication of her as a sexual offender of a minor, did the 

trial court err as matter of law and abuse its discretion when it

made inferences or deductions that Mother is an untreated 

sexual offender who can[]not adequately parent [the C]hildren 

based solely on Mother’s failure to timely appeal the “indicated” 

finding of child sexual abuse or complete sexual offender 

[treatment]?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse [its] 

discretion in finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

is warranted pursuant to [section] 2511(a)(2)[,] (5) and (8) due 

to the [court’s] underlying inference that Mother’s indicated 

[sexual abuse] finding [was] untimely appealed[,] and [she] 

fail[ed] to complete sexual offender treatment[, and in] 

determin[ing that] she was unable to adequately parent [the 

C]hildren?

3. Did the trial court’s improper inference and deduction in 

finding [that] Mother could not adequately parent [the 

C]hildren[,] due to her failure to undo her indicated finding or 

complete sexual offender [treatment,] taint the Section 2511(b) 

analysis?

Mother’s Brief at 5.2

In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

____________________________________________

2 Mother did not raise her first issue in her Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement; 

therefore, she failed to preserve this issue for our review. See 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (holding that 

“[a]ny issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”); 

see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that “[i]ssues not included in 

the Statement ... are waived.”). Though Mother stated her second and third 

issues somewhat differently in her Concise Statement, we deem them 

nevertheless preserved for our review. 
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[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re] R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567, 572 

(Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an 

abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing 

court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also 

Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [] 34 A.3d 1, 

51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [] 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 

2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As [the Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are 

clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of 

review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, 

appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and 

parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the 

facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its 

own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must 

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not 

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re 

Adoption of Atencio, [] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[T]he 

standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 
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clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

This Court may affirm a trial court’s decision regarding the termination 

of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), 

along with a consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, we will focus on 

section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.-- The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To satisfy the requirements of subsection 2511(a)(2), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental 

rights under subsection 2511(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as 

well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa. Super. 2002); see also In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827

(stating that “[a] decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can seldom be more 

difficult than when termination is based upon parental incapacity. The 

legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a 

parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as parentally 

unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”). 

Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining 

that the requirements of subsection 2511(a)(2) were met. See Mother’s 

Brief at 13, 15. Mother complains that the trial court’s “inference” that she 
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was a sexual offender who had not completed sexual offender treatment, 

and could not adequately parent the Children, was the only “pertinent 

evidence” for the determination that BCCYSS had satisfied its burden with 

regard to subsection 2511(a)(2). Id. at 15. Relying on In re Matsock, 611 

A.2d 737 (Pa. Super. 1992), Mother contends that we are not bound by the 

trial court’s inference that she cannot adequately parent the Children based 

on the “indicated” sexual abuse finding against her, and her non-completion 

of sex offender treatment. See Mother’s Brief at 13-14. Mother urges us to 

reverse the termination of her parental rights “due to the lack of an 

adjudication of Mother as a sexual offender[; the] lack of expert witness 

testimony that Mother was in need of sexual offender treatment or unable to 

parent[;] and [the] failure of BCCYS[S] to develop a trial record of 

competent evidence.” Id. at 13-14. 

Here, the trial court set forth in its Opinion its reasons for determining 

that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was proper under subsection 2511(a)(2). See Trial 

Court Opinion, 6/13/16, at 9-12; see also id. at 6-8 (setting forth the 

evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearings). The record supports the trial 

court’s factual findings, and the court’s conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 

at 826-27. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s recitation as though fully 
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stated herein, see Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/16, at 6-12, and affirm on this 

basis as to Mother’s second issue, with the following addendum.

In Matsock, the primary case upon which Mother relies, the trial court 

terminated the parental rights of a father to his minor daughter, who had 

lacerations on her vulva, as well as to the child’s siblings, pursuant to 

subsection 2511(a)(5). Matsock, 611 A.2d at 739-40. The father denied 

sexually abusing his daughter, and continued his denial while he was 

attending court-ordered sexual abuse therapy programs. Id. at 739. This 

Court pointed out that there had never been any criminal charges brought 

against father for sexually abusing the child, nor was he ever adjudicated a 

sexual offender. Id. at 741; see also id. (stating that “[a]s a result of his 

steadfast denial of the alleged abuse, [father] was terminated from two 

different court-ordered sexual abuse therapy programs. ... Thus, since he 

did not complete the therapy programs, [father] is considered an ‘untreated 

sexual offender.’”). The panel reversed, concluding that termination of 

father’s parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(5) was not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence, stating as follows:

[W]hile we are bound by the trial court’s finding, supported by 

competent evidence in the record, that [father] did not 

“successfully complete” the sexual abuse therapy programs, we 

are not bound by the court’s inference or deduction that [the 

father] is an untreated sexual offender who poses a danger to 

his children. We also conclude [that] the trial court misapplied 

the law in failing to consider whether the needs and welfare of 

[father’s children] would be advanced by the termination of their 

father’s parental rights. 
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Id. (internal citations omitted).

We find Mother’s reliance on Matsock to be unavailing. Here, unlike 

the circumstances in Matsock, the record belies Mother’s contention that 

the indicated sexual abuse finding against her, and her failure to avail 

herself of sexual offender treatment, was the “only pertinent evidence” upon 

which the trial court relied in terminating her parental rights.3 Rather, the 

trial court also considered the evidence of Mother’s repeated absences from 

the home for prolonged periods of time; “mental health concerns” regarding 

Mother; Mother’s dependence on Father and maternal grandmother, who 

previously was a trigger for Mother’s drug abuse; domestic violence between 

Mother and Father; and Mother’s lack of stability and independence with 

regard to housing, employment, finances, and childcare. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/13/16, at 6, 10-12. Accordingly, Mother’s second issue fails.

Next, we review the termination of Mother’s parental rights under 

section 2511(b), which Mother challenges in her third issue. Mother argues 

that the trial court’s “inference that [she] was a sexual offender who did not 

complete sexual offender treatment” tainted its determination that the 

____________________________________________

3 Moreover, unlike the father in Matsock, criminal charges were brought 

against Mother, and she failed to pursue sexual offender treatment. Further, 

contrary to the trial court in Matsock, the trial court here considered 

“whether the needs and welfare of [the Children] would be advanced by the 

termination of [Mother’s] parental rights[,]” Matsock, supra, which we 

discuss below.
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requirements of section 2511(b) were satisfied by clear and convincing 

evidence. Mother’s Brief at 18.

We have explained that the focus in terminating parental rights under 

section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 

2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc).

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the 

child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 

A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 

485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the 

child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the 

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 

791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2010); see also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating 

that although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it part 

of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances ... where direct 

observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not 

necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.”). There is no bond 
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worth preserving between a child and a natural parent where the child has 

been in foster care for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with 

the natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. It is 

appropriate to consider a child’s bond with his or her foster parent(s). See 

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

“[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of ... 

her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill ... her parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential 

in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 

856 (Pa. Super. 2004). “[W]e will not toll the well-being and permanency of 

[a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life 

“simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)).

The trial court set forth in its Opinion its reasons for determining that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was warranted under section 

2511(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/16, at 12-14. The record supports 

the trial court’s factual findings, and its conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 

826-27. We adopt the trial court’s recitation as though fully stated herein, 

and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s third issue. See Trial Court Opinion, 

6/13/16, at 12-14; see also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763-64 (affirming 
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the involuntary termination of the mother’s parental rights, despite the 

existence of some bond, where placement with the mother would have been 

contrary to the child’s best interests, and any bond with the mother would 

have been fairly attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost 

constantly, for four years).

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2016
I Father has not appealed our Decree of April 20, 2016 which terminated his parental rights as to A.R.M. and 

J.L.M.-C. 

custody of the Agency was established. On February 27, 2015, the Agency filed its 

2013, the Children were adjudicated dependent and the temporary legal and physical 

2012. The Children came into the care of the Agency on July 12, 2013. On August 12, 

born to Mother on September 15, 2010 and J.L.M.-C. was born to Mother on August 24, 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows: A.RM. was 

II. BACKGROUND 

and 9, 2015, September 17, 2015, October 7, 2015 and April 15, 2016. 

Terminate her Parental Rights.1 Multiple evidentiary hearings were conducted on July 8 

Youth Social Services Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency") to Involuntarily 

our April 20, 2016 Decree granting the Petition filed by the Bucks County Children and 

J.L.M.-C., (hereinafter the "Children"). Mother has appealed to the Superior Court from 

J.M.M.-C. (hereinafter "Appellant" or "Mother") is the natural mother of A.RM. and 

I. INTRODUCTION 

OPINION 

NO.: 2015-A9020 

INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 2015-A9021 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF 

J.M.M. a/k/a J.M.C. 

INRE: J.L.M.-C. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

Circulated 11/16/2016 10:15 AM
2 

2 The Notice of Appeal filed regarding each child is identical. No distinguishing facts were elicited during the hearings 

which warrant separate Opinions by this Court. Therefore, we provide one Opinion regarding the Termination of 

Mother's Parental Rights as to both children. A copy of this Opinion shall be provided to the Superior Court pursuant 

to each assigned appellate docket. [Mother's appeal regarding J.L.M.-C. is docketed in the Superior Court at 1425 

EDA 2016 and Mother's appeal regarding A.R.M. is docketed in the Superior Court at 1548 EDA 2016]. 

5. The trial court erroneously found that the needs and welfare of 

the child as contemplated under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 (b) were best 

met by terminating the parental rights of Appellant. 

4. The trial court erroneously moved its inquiry to the needs and 

welfare of the children pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. 2511 (b) and 

erroneously found that termination would best meet said needs and 

welfare when the Agency had failed to prove grounds for 

involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to the grounds 

alleged under 23 Pa. C.S. 2511 (a)(2), (5) and (8) by clear and 

convincing evidence. 

3. The trial court erroneously granted the Agency's petition to 

involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Appellant pursuant to 

23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a)(8) when the Agency failed to prove grounds 

thereunder by clear and convincing evidence. 

2. The trial court erroneously granted the Agency's petition to 

involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Appellant pursuant to 

23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a)(5) when the Agency failed to prove grounds 

thereunder by clear and convincing evidence. 

1. The trial court erroneously granted Bucks County Children and 

Youth Social Services Agency's '(hereinafter referred to as 

"Agency") petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of 

Appellant pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a)(2) when the Agency 

failed to prove grounds thereunder by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

to Pa. R.A.P. 1925 (a) (2), which we repeat, verbatim, as follows: 

were accompanied by Concise Statements of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant 

..... Appellant filed timely Notices of Appeal on May 4, 2016.2 The Notices of Appeal 

(5), and (8). 

Ill. APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL 

Petition to Terminate Parental Rights as to Mother pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a) (2), 
3 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking 

termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511 (a). Only if the court determines that the 

parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights 

does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant 

to Section 2511 (b): determination of the needs and welfare of the 

child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis, as follows: 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 

V. DISCUSSION 

opposite result. In re AR., 125 A.3d at 422. 

court's findings, the Superior Court will affirm even if the record could also support the 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Sllper.2004). If competent evidence supports the trial 

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence." 

"The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and 

422 (Pa.Super. 2015)(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence. In re A.R., 125 A.3d 420, 

must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether 

decision the same deference that would be given to a jury verdict. The Superior Court 

involuntarily terminate parental rights, the Superior Court must accord the hearing judge's 

trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the 

determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

the trial court, the standard of review employed by the appellate courts is limited to 

In cases involving termination of parental rights and an appeal from a decree of 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
4 

rights. Clear and convincing evidence means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, 

clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed for terminating Mother's parental 

As the party seeking termination, the Agency bore the burden of establishing by 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or 

more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue 

to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of 

at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the 

services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely 

to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

(a) General rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after 

a petition filed on any of the following grounds: 

provides in pertinent part as follows: 

A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super.2007) (citations omitted). 

Here the Agency pursued termination under §2511 (a) (2), (5), and (8), which 

In re Adoption of C.O.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa.Super. 2015) citing In re L.M., 923 

aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any 

such bond. 
5 

and welfare of the child. lg_, 

will best serve the child, focusing on the developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

the court's paramount consideration, and the court must reflect on whether termination 

termination are established, pursuant to §2511 (a), does the welfare of the child become 

999, 1004 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Only if the statutory grounds for 

of parental rights pursuant to the pertinent statutory provisions. In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

focus is on the conduct of the parent and whether his or her conduct justifies termination 

In reaching a decision following a termination proceeding, the trial court's initial 

In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 977 (Pa. Super.2004) (internal citations omitted). 

be measured "in light of what would be expected of someone in similar circumstances." 

performance or non-performance of parental obligations. A parent's performance must 

family. In addition, all circumstances must be considered when analyzing a parent's 

' ' 

is necessary to protect the children, every possible effort must be made to reunite the 

circumstances," and "only upon a showing of clear necessity." Even when such intrusion 

disruption of the parent-child relationship, is warranted only in exceptional 

importance placed on the family unit, governmental intrusion into the family, and 

parent and the child." In re C.P. 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006). "Because of the 

serious and severe steps a court can take, carrying with it great emotional impact for the 

"[T]he complete and irrevocable termination of parental rights is one of the most 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 

hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re Z.P. 994 A.2d 1108, 1115-1116. 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 
6 

Mother. A significant reason for the Agency's continuing concern as to Mother's parenting 

of the Agency's concerns, the Agency did not recommend the return of the Children to 

Mr. Rush testified that although Mother had taken recent steps to address some 

and that Mother is presently twenty-four (24) years of age. 

that the subject Children are presently five (5) and three (3) years of age, respectively, 

situations, along with domestic violence concerns. (N.T. 9/17/15, pp. 58-59). We note 

54-56). Mr. Rush also explained the Agency's concerns regarding the parents' financial 

May 2013 when Mother got a job with a carnival. (N.T. 7/8/15, p. 22) (N.T. 9/17/15, pp. 

and the fact that Mother had left the home on multiple occasions, including a brief time in 

usage, mental health concerns regarding both parents, sexual abuse indicated findings, 

which initially prompted the Agency's involvement included Mother's drug and alcohol 

plan that existed for this family, he had worked with the family prior to the Children coming 

under the Agency's care. (N.T. 9/17/15, p. 54). Mr. Rush explained that some of the issues 

2013. (N.T. 9/17/15, p. 3). Mr. Rush explained that due to a general protective services 

unit of the Agency, testified that he has been involved with this case since September 

At the evidentiary hearings, Shawn Rush, a caseworker in the intensive services 

Mother's failure to address or timely appeal the "indicated" finding of child I 

sexual abuse evidences inability to adequately parent the Children. . A. 

hearings held in this matter. 

The following pertinent facts were developed during the extensive evidentiary 

parental rights. 

demonstrating clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Mother's 

testimony and evidence presented, we determined that the Agency met its burden of 

Following five (5) days of hearings and upon carefully considering all of the 
7 

ability was that following an investigation in Philadelphia, Mother had been determined to 

be an "indicated" perpetrator of sexual abuse against a thirteen (13) year old minor child 

in 2013. (N.T. 9/17/15, pp. 5, 19, 30), Exhibit CY-13. 

Mr. Rush noted that when the Agency became aware of the "indicated" finding, he 

provided Mother with written and verbal statements informing her of the finding. (N.T. 

9/17/15, p. 31). He explained to Mother that she either needed to appeal the finding or 

seek sexual offender treatment. (N.T. 9/17/15, pp 18-20). Mr. Rush testified that on many 

occasions he explained to Mother that in order to essentially "undo" the finding and the 

consequences, she needed to provide the Agency with a favorable report from an 

evaluator, or other professional services provider, which documented that she was not a 

risk to children. (N.T. 9/17/15, pp. 20-22). Mother, however, testified that she could not 

recall whether Mr. Rush had advised her about appealing the finding, which she admitted 

she became aware of in 2013. Mother did recall that Mr. Rush advised her of the need 

to receive treatment and the need for the professional provider to document that she was 

not a risk to children. (N.T. 7/9/15, pp. 4-8). 

Mr. Rush testified that on many occasions he explained to Mother the difference 

between the "indicated" finding and what was required of her to remedy that finding; as 

opposed to the fact that related criminal charges had been dismissed in Philadelphia 

County after the alleged victim failed on three (3) occasions to appear in court. (N.T. 

7/9/15, pp. 5-6). Mr. Rush testified that Mother acknowledged that she understood the 

difference between the two circumstances (N.T. 9/17/15, pp. 22, 33- 35), and that the 

Agency required her to undergo a sexual offender evaluation and treatment if warranted, 

despite the dismissal of the criminal charges on procedural grounds. 
8 

Mother testified that she was told by the Philadelphia and Bucks County Children 

and Youth Agencies that she had a right to appeal the "indicated" finding, but that she 

never received "any appeal paper." (N.T. 7/9/15, p. 8). Mr. Rush testified that at a prior 

hearing in 2015 the Agency was provided with a copy of a letter written on behalf of 

Mother, and directed to Childline in Harrisburg, requesting a nune pro tune appeal of the 

"indicated"finding. (N.T. 9/17/15, p. 21). He noted that the Agency had not been apprised 

of any further development from Child line regarding Mother's letter, that she has not been 

granted a hearing by Child line on her request for a nune pro tune appeal, and that to this 

day she remains an "indicated" perpetrator of sexual abuse. (N.T. 9/17 /15, p. 21 ). Indeed, 

it was noted at a later hearing that Mother's nune pro tune appeal had been denied. 

Mr. Rush explained that as a result of the "indicated" finding and what the Agency 

required of Mother, she was evaluated on March 24, 2014 by Dr. Erica Williams of 

Assessment and Treatment Alternatives ("ATA"). (N.T. 9/17/15, p. 16). Mr. Rush testified 

that despite Mother's understanding of the Agency's position, Mother never pursued 

treatment with ATA, nor did she pursue any other satisfactory treatment as a perpetrator 

of sexual abuse. (N.T. 7/9/15, p. 22)(N.T. 9/17/15, p. 22)(N.T. 4/15/16, p. 32). 

Mr. Rush testified that the "indicated" finding itself was not the obstacle which 

prevented the reunification of the Children with Mother. Rather, the lack of sexual offender 

treatment or reversal of the "indicated" finding were the circumstances which continued 

to concern the Agency. (N.T. 9/17/15, p. 47). Given the existence of the "indicated" 

finding, the lack of sexual offender treatment continues to concern the Court as well, as 

we evaluate Mother's parental capacity. 
9 

3 Mr. Rush testified that although the subsequent PPP's were prepared in an abbreviated version of the original, the 

findings and objectives relevant to Mother had not changed. (N .T. 4/ 15/ 16, pp. 21, 28-29). 

4 Mother confirmed that she did not pursue the treatment and testified that she did not need treatment as a sexual abuse 

perpetrator because she did not engage in sexually inappropriate behavior with the alleged victim. (N.T. 7/9/15, p. 

21) (N.T. 4/15/16, p. 55) 

convincingly establishes that the Children have lacked proper parental care and control 

and in accordance with the pertinent statutory law, we found that the record clearly and 

Based on the evidence and testimony provided regarding Mother's circumstances, 

567, 572 (Pa. 2011); In re B.N.M. 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 

872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005). 

circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination. In re R.I.S. & A.I.S., 36 A.3d 

her parental rights when determining if the evidence, in light of the totality of the 

a case, and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or 

Decisional law mandates that this Court evaluate the individual circumstances of 

C. Termination of Mother's Parental Rights is Warranted Pursuant to §2511 (a) 

"indicated" finding remains. (N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 31-32).4 

and treatment by ATA but did not avail herself of those opportunities, and the issue of the 

testified that Mother was afforded the opportunity for further sexual offender assessment 

has not attended treatment to address this issue."3 (N.T. 4/15/16, p. 31 ). Mr. Rush 

indicated as a perpetrator of sexual abuse due to having sex with a 13-year-old child. She 

the objectives outlined in the PPP stated that "After an investigation [Mother] was 

period from August 12, 2013 through January 12, 2014. (N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 26-27). One of 

July 12, 2013 and that the initial Permanency Placement Plan ("PPP") covered the time 

Mr. Rush testified that the placement of the Children with the Agency began on 

B. Mother's inability to meet the Agency's Permanency Placement Plan 

Objectives render her unable to adequately parent the Children 
10 

5 As of the time of the final hearing on April 15, 2016, the Children had been in the Agency's care for thirty-three (33) 

months. 

6 Pursuant to subsection (a)(8) of §2511, the Agency need not prove that the conditions demonstrating Jack of parental 

care and control cannot be remedied within a reasonable period of time. 

7 We commend Mother for apparently making substantial progress as to drug abuse issues which had plagued her in 

the past, during the initial time period when the Children were taken into care by the Agency. She continues to be on 

methadone maintenance as of the present time, and also continues to undergo mental health counseling. 

could afford the cost of daycare and housing for the Children, but she lacked any credible 

assistance, was uncertain, inconsistent and unconvincing. Mother suggested that she 

Mother's testimony as to her income, along with government assistance and family 

52). 

Mart does not employ newly hired employees on a full-time basis. (N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 51- 

that she was offered full-time employment despite the Agency's representation that Walbeing performed, Mother insisted that she was assured employment. Mother also insisted 

having no supporting documentation and acknowledging that a background check was 

testified that she had interviewed the previous day for a position with Wal-Mart. Despite 

housing, employment and childcare.7 At the last hearing on April 15, 2016, Mother 

The record does not adequately support Mother's assertions as to appropriate 

Children with the Agency commenced on July 12, 2013.6 

the Children have been in its care for at least twelve (12) months, as placement of the 

Finally, pursuant to §2511 (a)(8), the Agency met its burden of demonstrating that 

a reasonable time. 

placement continue to exist, and that those reasons are not likely to be remedied within 

that the Children have been in care for six (6) months or more,5 that the reasons for such 

The Agency was able to prove clearly and convincingly, pursuant to §2511 (a)(5), 

has not, cannot, and will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable time period. 

necessary for their well-being pursuant to §2511 (a)(2). We also determined that Mother 
11 

8 Mr. Rush testified that in October 2015 Mother gave birth to another child for whom the Agency had a general 

protective services role, given the Agency's history with Mother. (N.T. 4/15/16, p. 36). Beginning in March 2016, 

Mother and her grandmother denied access to their present home when the Agency attempted to visit and observe the 

environment for the new baby. Mother asserted that she was now situated in Montgomery County, and was therefore 

outside of the Agency's authority. The Agency has since referred that matter to the Montgomery County Children and 

Youth Agency. (N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 33-34). 

(N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 44-45). 

testified that she has attended individual counseling intermittently since August 2014. 

testified that both she and her mother are now sober. (N .T. 4/15/16, pp. 59-60). Mother 

Pennsylvania which indicated that her mother was a "trigger" for her drug usage, Mother 

Mother's 2014 substance abuse evaluation performed by the Council of Southeast 

was sixteen (16) years old. (N.T. 7/9/15, pp. 48-49). Despite the counselor's notes from 

working with her mother as an "escort" at fourteen (14) years of age and did so until she 

grandmother. Mother also confirmed, as she had reported to Dr. Williams, that she began 

Mother's testimony confirmed that she presently lived with her mother and 

would be returned to her. (N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 39-40). 

Montgomery County, and anticipated having her own housing by the time the Children 

Children could share her bedroom. She stated that she was on a housing list in 

stated anything about not being able to accommodate the Children, and testified that the 

housing could not accommodate the Children. (N.T. 4/15/16, p. 33). Mother denied having 

2016. (N.T. 4/15/16, p. 33)8. He testified that Mother admitted at the meeting that her 

been living with her mother and grandmother since separating from Father in January 

Mr. Rush stated that he met with Mother in Montgomery County, where she has 

Mother had no income other than government assistance and food stamps. 

or informed plan in support of her claims. (N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 33, 40, 53). As of April, 2016, 
12 

9 The Superior Court need only agree with the trial court's conclusions regarding any one subsection of§ 2511 (a) in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights. lo re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 770 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

10 Mr. Rush testified that both Mother and Father had on occasion agreed to have their respective parental rights 

terminated on the contingency that they could choose the adoptive resource, and that Mother and Father had proposed 

p. 25)10. 

affectionate with the foster parents, who are an adoptive resource for them. (N.T. 9/17/15, 

Mr. Rush also observed that the Children appear to be very comfortable and 

(N.T. 9/17/15, p. 25). 

create a learning environment and are actively involved with the education of the Children. 

along with many toys and games. Testimony revealed that the foster parents want to 

devote their attention to the two subject Children. There is adequate bedroom space, 

2015. The foster parents are a married couple with no other children, and they fully 

Mr. Rush testified that the children have been in the same foster home since March 

criteria. 

best interests. We concluded that the Agency dearly and convincingly established these 

needs and welfare of the Children, the termination of Mother's parental rights served their 

§2511 (b), whether upon consideration of the developmental, physical, and emotional 

Pa.C.S.§2511 (a),(2),(5), and (8) for termination9, this Court next examined, pursuant to 

As the Agency clearly and convincingly established the criteria as set forth in 23 

D. Termination of Mother's Parental Rights is Warranted Pursuant to §2511 (b) 

4/15/16, p. 34). 

relationship only to resume it again, followed by the January, 2016 separation. (N.T. 

Father's long and volatile relationship history, during which time they broke-off their 

she planned to file for a divorce. There was extensive testimony regarding Mother and 

Finally, Mother testified that she and Father were no longer living together and that 
13 

two kinship resources to the Agency. (N.T. 9/17/15, pp. 26-27). One of those kinship resources declined to be 

considered before the Agency had the opportunity to assess the potential of that individual, and after the second kinship 

resource was assessed, the Agency determined that she was not an appropriate foster care resource. (N.T. 9/17/15, p. 

27). 

(N.T. 4/15/16, pp. 42-43) was undisputed, the record is devoid of any testimony or 

Mother's testimony that she has maintained her scheduled visitation with the Children 

In this matter, this Court determined that termination was warranted. While 

Id. (internal citations omitted) 

Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is 

imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible 

dimension of the needs and welfare of a child-. the love, comfort, 

security, and closeness-entailed in a parent-child relationship, as 

well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of relationships is also 

important to a child, for whom severance of close parental ties is 

usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what 

situation would best serve the child[ren]'s needs and welfare, must 

examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether 

terminating the natural parents' rights would destroy something in 

existence that is necessary and beneficial. 

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to 

use expert testimony ... Social workers and caseworkers can offer 

evaluations as well ... Additionally, Section 2511 (b) does not require 

a formal bonding evaluation... "Above all else ... adequate 

consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the 

child." ... A parent's own feelings of love and affection for a child, 

alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights ... 

the trial court as follows: 

A.2dat 1121. The Superior Court has described the bonding analysis required of 

trial court must examine the status of the natural parental bond. In re Z.P., supra., 994 

When considering what situation would best serve a child's needs and welfare, the 

the foster family to be clear and convincing. 

Based on the above, we found the evidence of the Childrens' substantial bond with 
i•: • '14 I' i 

J. 

N.B. It is your responsibility 

to notify all interested parties 

of the above action. 

Rights as to the Children, should be affirmed. 

20, 2016, granting the Agency's Petition to Involuntarily Terminate Mother's Parental 

For all of the reasons noted above, we respectfully submit that our Decree of April 

VI. CONCLUSION 

entitled to relief. 

1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2015)(internal citations omitted). Regrettably, then, Mother is not 

day be able to appropriately act as their parent. See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 

best interest for their lives to remain on hold indefinitely, with hopes that Mother will one 

and stability, this Court is constrained to conclude that it would not be in the Childrens' 

remedy her parental incapacity is balanced against the Childrens' need for permanence. 

We do not doubt that Mother loves her Children, but when her repeated failure to 

(Pa. Super. 2006). 

claims of progress and hope for the future." In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 

not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's 

was particularly sensitive to the Superior Court's mandate that "[t]he court cannot and will 

incapable of adequately parenting the Children. In making its decision here, this Court 

be terminated. The record contains clear and convincing evidence that Mother is 

Children, which would result in a negative effect on the Children should Mother's rights 

evidence of the existence of a substantial bonded relationship between Mother and the