[J-29A-C-2015] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ. 

DENTAL BENEFIT PROVIDERS, INC. 

AND UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF 

PENNSYLVANIA, INC. D/B/A 

UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMUNITY 

PLAN AND HEALTHAMERICA 

PENNSYLVANIA, INC., D/B/A 

COVENTRYCARES, 

Appellees 

v. 

JAMES EISEMAN, JR., AND THE PUBLIC 

INTEREST LAW CENTER OF 

PHILADELPHIA, 

Appellants 

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No. 48 EAP 2014 

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court entered 2/19/14 

at No. 945 CD 2013 reversing the 

determination entered on 5/7/13 of the 

Office of Open Records at No. AP2012-

2017 

ARGUED: May 5, 2015 

AETNA BETTER HEALTH INC., HEALTH 

PARTNERS OF PHILADELPHIA, INC., 

KEYSTONE MERCY HEALTH PLAN, 

AND DENTAQUEST, LLC, 

Appellees 

v. 

JAMES EISEMAN, JR., AND THE PUBLIC 

INTEREST LAW CENTER OF 

PHILADELPHIA, 

Appellants 

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No. 49 EAP 2014 

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court entered 2/19/14 

at No. 957 CD 2013 reversing the 

determination entered on 5/7/13 of the 

Office of Open Records at No. AP2012-

2017 

ARGUED: May 5, 2015 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, 

Appellee 

v. 

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No. 50 EAP 2014 

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court entered 2/19/14 

at No. 958 CD 2013 reversing the 

determination entered on 5/7/13 of the 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 2 

JAMES EISEMAN, JR., AND THE PUBLIC 

INTEREST LAW CENTER OF 

PHILADELPHIA, 

Appellants 

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Office of Open Records at No. AP2012-

2017 

ARGUED: May 5, 2015 

OPINION 

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: October 27, 2015 

This is the second of companion sets of appeals in which we are asked to 

evaluate the breadth of the public’s statutory right of access to discrete information 

about the implementation of the Medical Assistance Program. 

The general background for these appeals is set forth in this Court’s opinion in 

the related case, DPW v. Eiseman, ___ Pa. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2015), and that context, 

as well as the conventions utilized there, are incorporated here by reference. The 

present appeals primarily concern rates of payments made by Subcontractors to 

providers of dental health services to Medicaid enrollees in the HealthChoices 

Southeastern Zone from July 1, 2008, through July 30, 2012 (the “Provider Rates”). 

The pertinent RTKL request lodged by the Public Interest Law Center of 

Philadelphia (“Requester”) sought documents, including contracts, rate schedules, and 

correspondence in DPW’s possession, custody, or control evidencing the Provider 

Rates. Requester recognized, at least tacitly, that the Law is directed primarily to the 

disclosure of records “of a Commonwealth agency,” 65 P.S. §67.102 (setting for the 

definition for a “public record”), and that the statutory presumption that records are 

public ones is directed to records “in the possession of a Commonwealth agency,” id.

§67.305(a). Requester thus contended that, even if the Department did not physically 

maintain custody of the requested records (since the relevant agreements were 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 3 

downstream contracts between Subcontractors and dental-health-services providers), 

DPW should be deemed to maintain constructive possession of them. 

In support of this proposition, Requester highlighted a requirement contained 

within the standard written contract between the Department and managed care 

organizations designed to ensure DPW’s expedient access to information about 

services ultimately provided using Medicaid funds. Specifically, this ready-access 

provision is framed as follows: 

all contracts or Subcontracts that cover the provision of 

medical services to the [MCOs] Members must include . . . 

[a] requirement that ensures that the Department has ready 

access to any and all documents and records of transactions 

pertaining to the provision of services to Recipients. 

HealthChoices Physical Health Agreement at 163 (version effective July 1, 2010). 

Alternatively -- and to the degree that responsive information was not in DPW’s 

possession, but rather, was contained in records of non-public entities -- Requester 

invoked a provision of the Law which recasts certain third-party records bearing a 

requisite connection with the government as public records “of [a Commonwealth] 

agency.” 65 P.S. §67.506(d)(1). See generally SWB Yankees LLC v. Wintermantel, 

615 Pa. 640, 665, 45 A.3d 1029, 1044 (2012). In this regard, the statute prescribes 

that: 

[a] public record that is not in the possession of an agency 

but is in the possession of a party with whom the agency has 

contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of 

the agency, and which directly relates to the governmental 

function and is not exempt under this act, shall be 

considered a public record of the agency for purposes of this 

act. 

65 P.S. §67.506(d)(1). 

First, Requester noted that “implementing the Medicaid program is a 

governmental function,” while positing that payments to providers -- and, hence, the 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 4 

Provider Rates -- were an integral aspect of such administration. Letter Brief for 

Requester, Eiseman v. DPW, Dkt. No. AP 2012-2017 (Pa. OOR), at 11. Next, 

Requester set out to address Section 506(d)(1)’s directed focus upon records “in the 

possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted.” 65 P.S. §67.506(d)(1) 

(emphasis added). Given that the Department simply had not contracted with 

Subcontractors or dental-health-services professionals within Subcontractors’ provider 

networks, Requester advanced the following policy-oriented rationale: 

[I]f MCOs could shield their expenditures of public funds 

from public scrutiny under the Right-to-Know Law simply by 

delegating some or all of their functions to subcontractors, it 

would be trivial for any entity contracting with a public 

agency to do so. Surely, the Right-to-Know Law and the 

meaning of “agency possession” therein may not be read so 

narrowly and must be read to encompass any subcontractor 

as well as contractor to a government agency. 

Letter Brief for Requester, Eiseman v. DPW, Dkt. No. AP-2012-2017, at 11-12. 

DPW denied the request, citing, inter alia, the RTKL exception permitting the 

withholding of a “record that constitutes or reveals a trade secret or confidential 

proprietary information,” 65 P.S. §67.708(b)(11), along with the Pennsylvania Uniform 

Trade Secrets Act.1

Requesters lodged an appeal in the OOR, and the MCOs and Subcontractors 

obtained leave to appear as direct-interest participants and submitted position 

statements accompanied by supportive materials.2 DBP, et al., succinctly summarized 

the relevant argument as follows: 

 

1

 Act of Feb. 19, 2004, P.L. 143, No. 14 (as amended, 12 Pa.C.S. §§5301-5308). 

2

 The third parties in interest have appeared throughout in two groups: the first 

comprised of Dental Benefits Providers, Inc., United Healthcare of Pennsylvania, d/b/a 

United Healthcare Community Plan, and HealthAmerica Pennsylvania, Inc., d/b/a 

(Lcontinued) 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 5 

Under [Section 506(d)(1)], agency “possession” is satisfied

respecting materials that are actually held by third parties 

only where: (1) the materials are in the hands of a third party 

with whom the agency has contracted, and (2) the materials 

pertain to a governmental function that the third party has 

contracted to carry out. . . . DPW[, however,] has contracted 

with the MCOs to carry out the HealthChoices program, not

the dental subcontractors. DPW has no direct contractual 

relationship with the dental subcontractors. Accordingly, the 

first essential element is missing such that agency 

“possession” is not satisfied here. As such, the OOR cannot 

compel disclosure of any materials in the hands of the dental 

subcontractors. 

Letter of DBP, et al., dated Jan. 14, 2013, in Eiseman v. DPW, Dkt. No. AP 2012-2017, 

at 8 (emphasis in original); accord Letter of Aetna, et al., dated January 14, 2013, in 

Eiseman, No. AP 2012-2017, at 9-10. 

Based on these submissions, the OOR subsequently issued a final determination 

granting the request for records in full. Initially, the appeals officer highlighted the public 

policy underlying the RTKL. Eiseman v. DPW, Dkt. No. AP 2012-2017, 2013 WL 

1950593, at *2 (Pa. OOR May 7, 2013) (explaining that the Law is “designed to promote 

access to official government information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize the 

actions of public officials and make public officials accountable for their actions.” 

(quoting Bowling v. OOR, 990 A.2d 813, 824 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), aff’d, 621 Pa. 133, 75 

A.3d 453 (2013))). Furthermore, he explained, the RTKL places the burden of proof 

upon a public body to demonstrate exemptions pertaining to public records. See 65 

P.S. §67.708(a). 

 

(continuedL) 

CoventryCares (collectively, DBP, et al.); the second group has entailed Aetna Better 

Health Inc., Health Partners of Philadelphia, Inc., and Vista Health Plan, Inc., through 

Keystone Mercy Health Plan, and DentaQuest, LLC (collectively, “Aetna, et al.”). 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 6 

 The appeals officer proceeded to discuss Section 506(d)(1) of the RTKL in a 

subsection of his opinion encaptioned: “The Department is required to obtain records in 

the possession of the dental subcontractors related to the payment rates paid to 

dentists.” Eiseman, Dkt. No. AP 2012-2017, 2013 WL 1950593, at *4. In this regard, 

the appeals officer pointed to the ready-access provision of the standard agreement 

between DPW and managed care organizations, apparently equating (without further 

explanation) the requirement of ready access with a mandate to affirmatively obtain 

records. See id. at 5 (“The fact that the MCOs would . . . hire subcontractors is clearly 

contemplated by the agreements between the Department and the MCOs, wherein the 

Department ‘has ready access to any and all documents and records of transactions 

pertaining to the provision of services to Recipients,’ including those records in the 

possession of the dental subcontractors.” (quoting HealthChoices Physical Health 

Agreement at 163)). The analysis by the appeals officer then segued into a crediting of 

the policy-oriented rationale advanced by Requester: 

The OOR finds that Section 506(d) is applicable to records in 

the possession of the dental subcontractors. While the 

Department does not contract directly with the dental 

subcontractors, the dental subcontractors contract with the 

MCOs to perform services for the Department. Because the 

records sought directly relate to a governmental function 

being performed by the dental subcontractors, these records 

should be subject to public access. The OOR finds that any 

other interpretation would frustrate the intent of Section 

506(d) by making records showing how public monies are 

spent unavailable to the public even though they directly 

relate to a governmental function and a contract with a 

governmental agency. 

Id.3 

 

3

 A substantial portion of the balance of the appeals officer’s opinion was dedicated to 

discussion of the Law’s exception for trade secrets, which served as a pillar of DPW’s 

(Lcontinued) 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 7 

 A divided, en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed in a published 

opinion. See Dental Benefit Providers, Inc. v. Eiseman, 86 A.3d 932 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014). Referencing the statutory presumption of openness as to records in an agency’s 

possession, see 65 P.S. §67.305(a), the Commonwealth Court majority initially 

considered whether the requested records were within DPW’s possession, custody, or 

control, such that the presumption might apply in the first instance. See Eiseman, 86 

A.3d at 936.4 In this regard, the majority reverted to the definition of “records,” for 

purposes of the Law, which encompasses information that documents a transaction “of 

an agency” which is “received or retained” in connection with a transaction, business, or 

activity of the agency. Id. at 936-37 (quoting 65 P.S. §67.102). 

 The Commonwealth Court majority recognized that, for documents to be “of” a 

Commonwealth agency, they need not necessarily originate with or be created by the 

agency. See id. at 937. Nevertheless, it found that the Department lacks any 

possession whatsoever of the Provider Rates, a proposition which seems to be 

otherwise undisputed in this appeal (at least upon any affirmative production of 

evidence). See id. 

 Further, the majority acknowledged that the intermediate court previously had 

applied the concept of constructive possession in the RTKL context. See id. at 938 

 

(continuedL) 

initial basis for denying the records request. The Commonwealth Court, however, did 

not address this consideration, and based upon our analysis infra, this aspect is also 

immaterial to our present decision. 

4

 The MCOs and Subcontractors appear to dispute that the term “possession,” as it 

appears in Section 305(a) of the Law, also encompasses custody and control. Accord

Office of Budget v. OOR, 11 A.3d 618, 622 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (“Had the Legislature 

wanted to create the presumption that records in an agency’s custody and control, but 

not in its possession, were public records, it would have included those terms in Section 

305.”). 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 8 

(“We recognize constructive possession under Section 901 as a means of access so 

agencies cannot frustrate the purposes of the RTKL by placing their records in the 

hands of third parties to avoid disclosure.” (citing, inter alia, Office of the Budget, 11 

A.3d at 622)). The majority nonetheless differed with the position of Requester and the 

OOR that the ready-access provision of the standard contract between DPW and 

managed care organizations supported a finding of constructive possession in the 

present circumstances. Rather, the majority regarded such provision as reflecting only 

“the mere availability of the records to an agency upon request.” Id. (“That DPW has 

the contractual right and ability to request records from a private contractor does not 

convert private contractor records into records ‘of’ DPW.”).5 

 

5

 The majority also highlighted that the definition of “Subcontract” in the standard 

agreement between DPW and managed care organizations exempts “Provider 

Agreements,” such that these “are not considered Subcontracts for the purpose of this 

Agreement and, unless otherwise specified . . ., are not subject to the provisions 

governing Subcontracts.” HealthChoices Physical Health Agreement at 29-30 

(definition of “Subcontract”). The majority reasoned that such “contract language 

supports DPW’s disclaimer of possession and access to Provider Rates.” Eiseman, 86 

A.3d at 938. 

The majority, however, failed to appreciate that the noted advance-written-approval and 

ready-access provisions of the standard agreement are couched in materially different 

terms – while the advance-written-approval term does indeed pertain to “Subcontracts,” 

see HealthChoices Physical Health Agreement at 87, the ready-access term pertains 

more broadly to “contracts or Subcontracts that cover the provision of medical services 

to the [MCO’s] Members,” id. at 163. See generally Brief for Requester at 18 (“The 

Ready Access requirement applies to ‘all contracts or Subcontracts,’ . . . but the 

Commonwealth Court’s analysis elided the crucial words ‘contracts or.’” (emphasis 

adjusted)). 

Parenthetically, Requester develops that the Commonwealth Court majority also failed 

to apprehend the standard contract’s definition of “Provider Agreement,” which simply 

does not encompass remote agreements between Subcontractors and dental-healthservices providers. See Brief for Requester at 20. Moreover, Requester observes, 

were these remote agreements actually “Provider Agreements” under the standard 

(Lcontinued) 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 9 

 In conjunction with this analysis, the Commonwealth Court majority referenced 

Section 910 of the RTKL, which tasks an agency receiving a written request for access 

to a record with “mak[ing] a good faith effort to determine if the record requested is a 

public record . . . and whether the agency has possession, custody or control[.]” 65 P.S. 

§67.901. Apparently synthesizing this provision with the Law’s definition of a “record,” 

see id. §67.102 (defining such term, in relevant part, as information which “documents a 

transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or retained pursuant to 

the law or in connection with [such] a transaction, business or activity”), the majority 

discerned that “[t]he litmus test under Section 901 remains whether the records 

document a transaction of the agency to which the request was directed, not whether 

they document a transaction of a private contractor.” Eiseman, 86 A.3d at 938. 

Additionally, harkening back to the MCOs’ and the Subcontractors’ initial position 

statements before the OOR, the Commonwealth Court majority reasoned: 

[T]he Provider Rates are not “records” of DPW as that term 

is defined in the RTKL . . .. There is no evidence DPW 

sought to circumvent the RTKL by placing records of its 

activities into the hands of a third party. Rather, the Provider 

Rates are negotiated between Subcontractors and providers, 

and do not involve DPW. They are not in DPW’s 

possession. Also, there is no indication that they were 

created or received by DPW, or that they evidence any 

transaction of DPW. At most, the Provider Rates evince a 

transaction of Subcontractors of the MCOs, with which DPW 

has no contractual relationship. 

 

(continuedL) 

contract, they would be subject to a discrete provision of the standard contract – 

abjectly overlooked by the Commonwealth Court majority – explicitly requiring advance 

written approval by DPW of Provider Agreements. See HealthChoices Physical Health 

Agreement at 27 (definition of “Provider Agreement”), 119. 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 10 

Id. at 939 (footnote omitted).6

 The Commonwealth Court majority proceeded to consider Section 506(d)(1)’s 

expanded concept of “public records” extending to certain records of non-public 

individuals and entities. From the outset, it agreed with the MCOs and Subcontractors 

that one of the statute’s core elements – namely, the requirement for there to be a 

contractual relationship between a government agency and the third party whose 

records are in question, see 65 P.S. §67.506(d)(1) – simply was not met. The majority 

explained that the intermediate court had enforced, and would enforce, such 

requirement on its terms. See Eiseman, 86 A.3d at 939-40 (citing Honaman v. Lower 

Merion Twp., 13 A.3d 1014, 1022 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)).7

 

6

 To the extent that the Commonwealth Court’s previous decision in Lukes v. DPW, 976 

A.2d 609 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), supported the application of a policy-oriented rationale 

focused on openness, the majority declined to extend this decision, which arose under 

the predecessor open-records regime, into the context of the RTKL. See Eiseman, 86 

A.3d at 941-42. 

We have touched upon the Lukes decision further in the companion appeals. See 

Eiseman, ___ Pa. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___. 

7

 Although the above reasoning would seem dispositive, the intermediate court majority 

did not conclude its analysis at this juncture. Rather, it proceeded to consider whether 

Subcontractor records should be made available “through the MCOs’ contractual 

relationship with DPW.” Id. at 940. The majority, however, did not anchor this line of 

inquiry to any of the terms of Section 506(d)(1), other than that it proceeded to consider 

whether there was a direct relationship between a governmental function (here, the 

administration of the HealthChoices Program), and the Provider Rates. See id. at 940-

41. Ultimately, the majority found no such direct relationship on these terms: 

There is no question that the quality of the dental services 

rendered by providers directly relates to the performance of 

the government function formalized in the DPW/MCO 

contracts. The same may be true as to the availability of the 

services and the manner in which the services are delivered. 

However, the cost of obtaining those services . . . does not 

(Lcontinued) 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 11 

 Judge McCullough authored the dissenting opinion, concluding, inter alia, that 

the Subcontractors’ agreements with dental-health-services providers should be 

deemed to be in DPW’s possession. See Eiseman, 86 A.3d at 943. Construing the 

Law very liberally, and reasoning that the MCOs contracted with the Subcontractors as 

DPW’s agents, she took the position that “the Subcontractors have directly contracted

with DPW as principal.” See id. at 945 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Judge 

McCullough found that Section 506(d)(1)’s contractual-relationship element was 

satisfied.8

 

(continuedL) 

directly relate to the performance of the government 

function. 

Id. at 940. 

While expressing substantial misgivings with such reasoning and conclusion pertaining 

to the asserted lack of a direct relationship, cf. infra note 8, we decline to consider this 

line of inquiry further. Instead, we merely observe that Section 506(d)(1) requires both

possession by “a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a 

governmental function” and that the requested record “directly relates to the 

governmental function.” 65 P.S. §67.506(d)(1). Thus, and as further discussed below, 

the statute simply does not serve as a basis for disclosure where the contract element is 

absent in the first instance. Accord Brief for DBP, et al., at 14 (“Because of the 

conjunctive ‘and’ in the statute, if either of the two required elements is missing, then the 

Law will not deem the agency to constructively possess records actually held by a nongovernmental third party.” (emphasis in original)). 

8

 Judge McCullough also took issue with the majority’s determination that a direct 

relationship between the Provider Rates and the administration of the HealthChoices 

Program was lacking. She developed her point of view on this subject as follows: 

[T]he request for Provider Agreements and Provider Rates 

falls squarely within the terms of the Subcontractors’ 

contractual duties and explicit governmental undertakings. 

Via sub-contractual arrangements, the Subcontractors 

assume DPW’s governmental obligation to implement 

Medicaid and ensure that dental care is available for 

Medicaid recipients. Pursuant to their governmental and 

(Lcontinued) 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 12 

The present arguments closely align with the presentations before the OOR and 

the Commonwealth Court. In substance, Requester and its amici hew most closely to a 

policy-oriented position. See, e.g., Brief for Requester at 14 (“Under the RTKL, when 

an agency channels taxpayer dollars through middlemen in the administration of a 

public program, the contracts documenting that flow of public funds ‘directly relate’ to 

the performance of a governmental function.”). In this regard, they invoke the policy of 

liberal construction, see Levy v. Senate of Pa., 619 Pa. 586, 619, 65 A.3d 361, 381 

(2013) (quoting Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. A Second Chance, Inc., 13 

A.3d 1025, 1034 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)), as well as the presumption that the General 

Assembly “intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest,” 1 Pa.C.S. 

§1922(5). 

 Requester also maintains that disclosure is required per Section 506(d)(1). It 

characterizes the prerequisite of a direct contract between a government agency and a 

third-party in possession of salient records as a “cramped interpretation,” yielding 

circumstances in which “any governmental contractor could shield from disclosure – 

either deliberately or incidentally – otherwise publicly available records[.]” Brief for 

Requester at 27. 

 

(continuedL) 

contractual duties, the Subcontractors are not only obligated 

to secure dental services through Provider Agreements, but 

are also required to negotiate Provider Rates with the dental 

providers. On these facts, I would conclude that the 

Provider Agreements and Provider Rates directly relate to 

the Subcontractors’ performance of a government function. 

These agreements and rates are indispensably necessary to 

effectuate Medicaid and represent the very thing the 

Subcontractors contractually agreed to do for and on behalf 

of DPW. 

Id. at 945. 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 13 

Furthermore, Requester contends that the Commonwealth Court majority’s 

“litmus test” for constructive possession “is without foundation and should be rejected as 

substantially curbing access to documents pertaining to the conduct of public business.” 

Brief for Requester at 22. Citing Sapp Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ 

International Association, Local Union No. 12, 552 Pa. 105, 109, 713 A.2d 627, 629 

(1998) (plurality) (determining that payroll records of a private roofing contractor in the 

custody of a local agency were public records, because they evidenced a disbursement 

by a governmental unit),9 Requester urges that the understanding of public records 

within the possession, custody, or control of an agency cannot be so closely 

constrained. See Brief for Requester at 22 (“Even though such records may be in 

agencies’ possession precisely so the agencies can assess whether contractors are 

complying with a law, this ‘litmus test’ will broadly exclude these records from public 

review.”). Requester particularly stresses the “custody or control” aspect, analogizing 

these terms to custody or control for purposes of civil discovery. See id. (citing TribuneReview Publ’g Co. v. Westmoreland Cnty. Hous. Auth., 574 Pa. 661, 672, 833 A.2d 

112, 118 (2003) for the proposition that, in construing the terms “possession, custody or 

control,” in the context of civil discovery, this Court had determined that “the courts of 

this Commonwealth reject a narrow ‘physical possession’ test, focusing instead on 

whether the subpoenaed party has a legal right to custody or control of the documents 

in question.”)). 

According to Requester: 

 

9

 Although Sapp Roofing was a plurality decision, three of the five Justices participating 

in the decision agreed that the payroll records were public records for purposes of the 

former open-records law. See Sapp Roofing, 552 Pa. at 109, 713 A.2d at 629; id. at 

112, 713 A.2d at 630 (Zappala, J., concurring). 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 14 

[I]f DPW has not been exercising its “Ready Access” power 

to review contracts setting forth Provider Rates, that would 

represent a troubling abrogation of its responsibilities to 

ensure that Pennsylvania’s Medicaid program is effective 

and in compliance with federal and state law. Under the 

Medicaid Act, “a state must ensure that its state plan 

incorporates adequate reimbursement rates to enlist a 

sufficient number of dentists to assure that dental care is 

available to [Medical Assistance] recipients to the same 

extent and quality of care as dental care available to the 

general population in certain geographic areas.” Clark v. 

Richman, 339 F. Supp. 2d 631, 643 (M.D. Pa. 2004). The 

Ready Access requirement is a key tool for DPW to 

accomplish this objective. . . . If DPW has not been 

reviewing such records [encompassing the Provider Rates], 

it has failed to track the flow of billions of dollars in taxpayer 

funds that were expended for the benefit of the neediest 

Pennsylvanians. 

Brief for Requester at 23-24. Requester also argues that the implication, by the 

Commonwealth Court majority, that a citizen requesting records should be required to 

present evidence that an agency is “attempting to play some sort of shell game by 

shifting these records to a non-governmental body,” Eiseman, 86 A.3d at 938 (quoting 

Office of Budget, 11 A.3d at 621), improperly shifts the burden of proof to requesters 

instead of agencies as required by the Law, see 65 P.S. §67.708(a)(1), and turns upon 

an analysis which is entirely absent from the RTKL. 

 On the other hand, a core proposition of the MCOs and Subcontractors is that 

Section 506(d)(1) establishes the only appropriate test for access to third-party records 

which are not in the possession, custody, or control of a Commonwealth agency, and 

the Commonwealth Court’s determination that the element of a contractual relationship 

between DPW and Subcontractors is lacking is eminently correct. See Brief for DBP, et 

al., at 19 (asserting that Requester’s argument “is nothing more than a complaint about 

how the General Assembly drafted section 506”). The MCOs and Subcontractors deny 

that the standard agreement between the Department and MCOs permits DPW access 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 15 

to “sensitive and proprietary contractual rates that are confidentially negotiated between 

the subcontractors and the dental providers.” Brief for DBP, et al., at 17.10 The MCOs, 

their subcontractors, and their amici also touch upon policy considerations in tension 

with those developed by Requester. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus America’s Health Ins. 

Plans at 4-5 (asserting that “[a]s in the private health insurance marketplace, 

maintaining the confidentiality of negotiated price terms is critical to realizing the 

benefits of a competitive Medicaid managed care market” and that “confidential rate 

terms keep Medicaid costs down”); Brief for Amicus Pa. Coalition of Med. Assistance 

Managed Care Orgs. at 3 (“A reversal of the Commonwealth Court’s decisions will 

cause substantial and widespread harm to Pennsylvania’s current system of providing 

dental care for Medicaid beneficiaries, decreasing quality of care and access to care 

and increasing the total cost for taxpayers of the Commonwealth.”) 

DPW, for its part, merely adopts the MCOs’ and Subcontractors’ arguments. 

 We deem the issues presented to be matters of statutory construction, over 

which our review is plenary. Upon consideration, we agree with the MCOs and 

Subcontractors on the essential points that the Law channels access to third-party 

records through Section 506(d)(1), and that such provision contemplates an actual 

contract with a third party in possession of salient records. 

 

10 The MCOs and Subcontractors also endorse the Commonwealth Court’s position, in 

other cases, that “[b]y its plain language, Section 901 describes the actions that an 

agency is obligated to take when it receives a request for a record; it does not define 

what records are subject to disclosure under the RTKL.” Brief for Aetna, et al. at 11 

(citing Office of the Budget, 11 A.3d at 619-20). We agree. Notably, Section 901’s 

discussion of “possession, custody or control” in no way supplants the initial 

understanding that it is “public records” which are the subject of disclosure. See 65 P.S. 

§67.901 (prescribing that when an agency receives a records request, it “shall make a 

good faith effort to determine if the record requested is a public record . . . and whether 

the agency has possession, custody or control” (emphasis added)). 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 16 

 The Commonwealth Court’s decision expressly recognized this essential point, 

see Eiseman, 86 A.3d at 939-40, and we will affirm its order upon such basis. It is only 

because the intermediate court’s opinion took several turns with which we either 

disagree or would consider more closely were it necessary to do so, see supra notes 5 

and 7, that we are unable to credit the opinion fully. 

 With regard to records in the possession of third parties, we differ with 

suggestions from Requester’s camp that the General Assembly has provided for the 

“maximum access to financial records and contractor records.” Brief of Amici Pa. 

NewsMedia Ass’n & Pa. Freedom of Information Coalition at 6 (emphasis added). 

Rather, as in SWB Yankees, albeit that the policy of liberal access is acknowledged,

this Court also appreciates that the General Assembly had tempered such policy with 

explicit limiting terms delineated in the Law, “presumably on account of the burden, 

expense, and other impositions attending wholesale disclosure” by non-public entities. 

SWB Yankees, 615 Pa. at 662, 45 A.3d at 1042. 

 Certainly, Requester and its amici have identified salient policy considerations 

favoring public access to downstream Provider Rates. Nevertheless, there are 

countervailing factors, including the benefit of cost efficiencies associated with the 

government’s accessing of complex private systems of administering health care. 

Although given the importance of the discrete subject matter – encompassing the 

essential provision of health care services as well as the immense associated expense 

– particularized legislative consideration would seem to be in order relative to the 

openness or secrecy of third-party records downstream from actual Commonwealth 

agency contracts, we are left here only to apply the highly generalized principles 

established under Section 506(d)(1). 
[J-29A-C-2015] - 17 

 We appreciate Requester’s concern with the Commonwealth Court’s “litmus test” 

for constructive possession under Section 901 of the Law. Nevertheless, Section 901 

explicitly harkens back to the essential concept of a “public record,” 65 P.S. §67.901, 

and the incorporated definition of a “record” does encompass the notion of a 

“transaction or activity of an agency” to which the intermediate court majority has 

rightfully afforded meaning, id. §67.102. While in light of the policy of liberal 

construction of the instant remedial statute these terms should be construed broadly, cf.

Sapp Roofing, 552 Pa. at 109, 713 A.2d at 629, they simply cannot be ignored, since, at 

bottom, our present task is one of statutory construction, not independent judicial 

policymaking. 

 The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed, albeit on narrower grounds 

than those developed in the intermediate court’s opinion. 

 Messrs. Justice Eakin and Baer and Madame Justice Todd join the opinion. 

 Mr. Justice Stevens files a dissenting opinion.