J-S77006-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LIBBY ANN SAMANTHA BELGRAVE

Appellant No. 390 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 19, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001890-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016

Appellant, Libby Ann Samantha Belgrave, appeals from the judgment 

of sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal 

Division, following her jury trial conviction for criminal trespass.1 We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:

In August [2012], [the c]ourt, by the Honorable Bruce Bratton, 

awarded Mr. Belgrave [(Appellant’s former husband)] sole 

custody of their two children. Mr. Belgrave resides with the 

children and his companion, Ms. Tasha Gillis in an apartment at 

1417 Market Street, Harrisburg. Judge Bratton’s [o]rder directed 

that [Appellant] exercise visitation under supervision at the 

Harrisburg YWCA. 

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). 
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On the morning of March 3, 2014, [Appellant] appeared at Mr. 

Belgrave’s apartment. [Appellant] banged on the door, cursed, 

and demanded to see the children and accused Mr. Belgrave of 

kidnapping them. Mr. Belgrave told [Appellant] to stay away. Mr. 

Belgrave closed the door and called the police. Police arrived and 

ordered [Appellant] to leave and not return to the apartment 

building. Police gave Mr. Belgrave a card which documented the 

warning to [Appellant]. [The police] instructed Mr. Belgrave to 

[give] the card to police should [Appellant] return. Even after 

police ordered her to leave, [Appellant] lingered on the sidewalk.

Later that day, [Appellant] returned to the apartment and 

knocked on the door. As Ms. Gillis opened the door, [Appellant] 

began screaming about the children. Ms. Gillis told [Appellant] to 

leave. [Appellant] grabbed Ms. Gillis by the neck and scratched 

her with either keys or her nails and inflicted a mark near Ms. 

Gillis’ eye. A neighbor intervened. Ms. Gillis called police as 

[Appellant] drove away in a U-Haul. The U-Haul hit a school 

vehicle then pulled away without stopping. 

Officer Brandon Yeager of the Harrisburg City Police responded 

to the apartment while other officers located [Appellant]. Officer 

Yeager observed a scratch and minor swelling on Ms. Gillis.

Officer Yeager met with [Appellant] at 6th and Woodbine Streets 

where other officers located her. He observed no injuries on 

[Appellant].

Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/26/16, at 2-3 (internal citations to the record 

omitted).

Procedurally, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with simple 

assault and criminal trespass.2Following Appellant’s failure to appear for her 

preliminary hearing and the issuance of a bench warrant for her arrest, 

Appellant entered a plea of “not guilty.” The court held a jury trial and the 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 3503(b)(1)(i), respectively.
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jury convicted Appellant of criminal trespass, but was hung as to whether 

Appellant committed simple assault. The court sentenced Appellant to 12 

months of probation, to pay a fine of $250.00, to complete a psychological 

examination and 6 classes of an anger management program, and to avoid 

contact with Ms. Gillis and Mr. Belgrave’s residence. 

Appellant filed a post sentence motion arguing the jury’s verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence. The court denied Appellant relief. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Appellant raises two issues for our review:

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 

INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF [] APPELLANT 

FOR DEFIANT TRESPASS?

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 

DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON 

THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE OFFENSE [OF] 

DEFIANT TRESPASS BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS SO CONTRARY 

TO THE EVIDENCE TO SHOCK ONE’S SENSE OF JUSTICE?

Appellant’s Brief, at 8.

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. A challenge 

to the sufficiency of evidence implicates the following principles: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 
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evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). 

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides the following definition for 

criminal trespass: 

§ 3503. Criminal trespass 

* * *

(b) Defiant trespasser.―

(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing 

that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, 

he enters or remains in any place as to which 

notice against trespass is given by: 

(i) actual communication to the actor; 

* * *

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i).3

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3 We recognize that subsections (b.1)(1)(iv) and (b.1)(2) of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3503 Criminal trespass were recently declared unconstitutional in Leach 

v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016) (holding that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3503(b.1)(1)(iv), (b.1)(2) violates the single-subject rule of Article III, 

Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution). However, we note the holding in 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to establish the elements 

of criminal trespass because the Commonwealth did not present evidence 

that Appellant entered Mr. Belgrave’s residence. Instead, Appellant 

emphasizes that she stood on the sidewalk while requesting to see her 

children and the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that Appellant could 

not be standing on the sidewalk while requesting to see her children. 

Appellant further maintains the Commonwealth failed to produce a court 

order indicating Appellant was prohibited from visiting her children at Mr. 

Belgrave’s residence. Thus, Appellant claims insufficient evidence supports 

her conviction for criminal trespass because she was permitted to be at Mr. 

Belgrave’s residence. 

Instantly, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:

[Appellant] received actual notice of the prohibition from 

returning. Earlier that day, Mr. Belgrave told [Appellant] to leave 

and not return. Police also told [Appellant] to stay away and 

provided Mr. Belgrave with a note evidencing their warning to 

her. [Appellant] acted in defiance of such actual communication 

by returning to the premises later the same day.

[Appellant] having received notice against trespass by actual 

communication, the Commonwealth was not required to prove, 

as [Appellant] suggests, that a [c]ourt [o]rder barred her from 

the premises. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/26/16, at 4 (internal citations to the record 

omitted). 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Leach does not affect our disposition in the instant case because Appellant 

was sentenced under subsection (b)(1)(i).
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The record supports the trial court’s reasoning. Appellant’s claim that 

she was permitted to be at Mr. Belgrave’s residence was obviously rejected 

by the members of the jury who were the sole judges of credibility at trial. 

See Hansley, 24 A.3d at 416.

Appellant next contends the court improperly instructed the jury to 

consider that the police contacted Appellant, stated she was prohibited from 

returning to Mr. Belgrave’s residence, and gave a card to Mr. Belgrave 

documenting Appellant’s notice of prohibition as a basis for the charge of 

criminal trespass. Appellant complains the court did not state the jury should 

first determine Mr. Belgrave’s credibility and then determine whether to 

believe the police contacted Appellant. Appellant further complains the 

Commonwealth failed to question Mr. Belgrave regarding whether the police 

actually contacted Appellant and failed to introduce an incident report 

detailing these events. Based on the foregoing and in light of the fact that 

the jury was hung regarding Appellant’s simple assault charge, Appellant 

asserts her criminal trespass verdict shocks one’s sense of justice.4 Appellant 

concludes this Court should vacate Appellant’s sentence and order her a new 

trial. We disagree.

____________________________________________

4 We note Appellant objects to the trial court’s issuance of an instruction in 

the context of a weight-of-the-evidence claim, which we observe has been 

properly preserved for appellate review. However, to the extent Appellant’s 

argument may be construed as an objection to the trial court’s instruction in 

and of itself, that claim is waived for Appellant’s failure to object to the jury 

instructions. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(b).
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The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact 

who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court 

cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. 

Thus, we may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim 

below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial 

court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. 

Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Here, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:

[Attorney DeStefano (counsel for Appellant)]: Thank you, Judge. 

May we approach briefly?

[The court]: Yes.

* * *

(A discussion was held off the record at sidebar.)

* * *

(The following discussion was held on the record at sidebar:)

[The court]: All right. Counsel has raised the issue that there 

was prior police contact discussed in the opening. I’m going to 

briefly clarify—It would be objectionable; however, what he was 

referring to, [Attorney] Wilson [(counsel for the 

Commonwealth)], was that she in prior times was told not to be 

there, which is the basis for the charge of defiant trespass 

because you can’t be defiant if you haven’t been told, so I’m 

going to indicate to the jury that—and cure what could be a 

defect here. I’m going to tell the jury that the prior contact [has] 

nothing to do with the other charges and so one but that has 

simply to do with the fact that she was told to stay away from 

the property and by coming this time she allegedly, she may 
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have violated that and that forms the basis for the charge of 

defiant trespass. 

[Attorney DeStefano]: Thank you. 

(Discussion at sidebar was concluded.)

* * *

[The court]: Ladies and gentlemen, during the [opening], 

[Attorney] Wilson indicated there was a prior police contact. It 

did not involve other charges. It is the contact of don’t come to 

this house again that forms the basis for the defiant trespass 

because a defiant trespass is you’ve been told stay away and 

you defy that, you come back, allegedly. That’s all we are 

saying. So we want you to understand it’s not because she 

committed other acts. It only is the basis of the defiant trespass, 

being told to stay away, and then allegedly coming back in 

defiance of that warning. 

N.T., Trial, 10/8/15, at 11-13. The court addressed Appellant’s issue in its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion as follows:

The [c]ourt properly articulated in its cautionary instruction the 

purpose for which the jury could consider evidence [of the] prior 

police contact, that is, whether [Appellant] received a warning 

which she disregarded. The instruction cured the potential that 

the jury would consider the evidence for an improper purpose. . . 

. Counsel did not object to the adequacy of the cautionary 

instruction.

* * *

The weight of the evidence supports the jury’s findings. [T]he 

evidence demonstrated that police and Mr. Belgrave instructed 

[Appellant] to stay away from the premises. The jury could 

easily conclude that she defied that instruction by returning to 

the premises that afternoon.

Finally, the jury’s inability to reach a verdict charge of [s]imple 

[a]ssault does not call into question the verdict on the charge of 

[d]efiant trespass. It was within the province of the jury to 
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evaluate the credibility of each witness as [his or her] testimony 

related to the two charges. . . . 

Trial Court Opinion, at 6-7 (internal citations omitted). 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s claim 

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See Champney, 

832 A.2d at 408.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s issues are without 

merit. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016