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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 28, 2017 

v No. 330747 

Muskegon Circuit Court 

TRENT MICH HUMPHREYS-MCPHERSON, LC No. 15-066031-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and SHAPIRO and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of first-degree felony murder, MCL 

750.316(1)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 

769.11, to life imprisonment. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 This case arises from the homicide of Dennis McPherson, defendant’s grandfather, on 

January 9, 2015. According to testimony from defendant’s then-fiancée, Kerri Crawford, she 

and defendant went to Dennis’s home in the early morning hours so that defendant could ask 

Dennis for money to purchase cocaine. Defendant went into Dennis’s home alone and returned 

with a television that they eventually sold for cocaine. Crawford, who was given a plea deal in 

exchange for her testimony, was a significant witness at trial. Over objection, she provided 

testimony after a 404(b) hearing, regarding other breaking and entering crimes committed by 

defendant and herself against her grandfather. Crawford’s grandfather corroborated her 

testimony by both acknowledging the breaking and entry and identifying knives stolen from him 

which were found at defendant’s residence. 

 Numerous other laypersons and law enforcement officers provided testimony. Forensic 

evidence was admitted regarding the victim’s blood being found on a hatchet recovered secreted 

in the residence of defendant. Multiple witness offered testimony regarding a 10-year-old 

conflict between defendant and Dennis over the insurance proceeds from the death of 

defendant’s father. Several of defendant’s jail phone calls and letters were admitted into 

evidence that included admissions against interest. Defendant did not testify. 

 The parties contested the jury instructions. The prosecution requested and was given a 

non-standard jury instruction on the element of malice. Defendant requested but was denied 
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instructions on manslaughter. Both instructional issues were briefed and argued in open court. 

Subsequent to his conviction defendant raises two issues on appeal. 

II. MRE 404(B) 

 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the submission of prior badacts evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court should not have allowed the 

introduction of evidence that he and Crawford committed two home invasions against 

Crawford’s grandfather two weeks before Dennis’s murder. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 “The decision whether evidence is admissible is within the trial court’s discretion and 

should only be reversed where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” People v Starr, 457 Mich 

490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). An abuse of discretion exists if a trial court’s decision falls 

outside the range of principled outcomes. People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 192; 783 NW2d 67 

(2010). “However, where decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence involve preliminary 

questions of law such as whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes admissibility, our review 

is de novo.” People v Layher, 464 Mich 756, 761; 631 NW2d 281 (2001). An evidentiary error

only merits reversal where, after an examination of the entire record, “it is more probable than 

not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 

NW2d 607 (1999); see also MCL 769.26. 

B. ANALYSIS 

 At trial, Crawford’s grandfather testified that, on two occasions, his home was broken 

into and items were stolen. These home invasions occurred approximately two weeks before 

Dennis’s murder. Knives collected from defendant and Crawford’s bedroom after Dennis’s 

death matched those stolen from Crawford’s grandfather. Crawford also testified that she and 

defendant were responsible for the home invasions and that they had stolen the property in order 

to exchange it for cocaine. 

 Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402; People v Roper, 286 Mich App 

77, 91; 777 NW2d 483 (2009). Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. Relevant evidence may be 

excluded, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. MRE 403. “Assessing probative value against prejudicial effect requires a balancing 

of several factors, including the time required to present the evidence and the possibility of 

delay, whether the evidence is needlessly cumulative, how directly the evidence tends to prove 

the fact for which it is offered, how essential the fact sought to be proved is to the case, the 

potential for confusing or misleading the jury, and whether the fact can be proved in another 

manner without as many harmful collateral effects.” People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 

751 NW2d 408 (2008). The determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is 

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect is best left to the trial court’s contemporaneous 

assessment of the evidence. People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 670; 780 NW2d 321 

(2009). 
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 Despite its relevancy, evidence of a person’s character is generally not admissible to 

prove the propensity of a defendant to act accordingly. MRE 404(a). Michigan excludes such 

evidence for substantive purposes “to avoid the danger of conviction based upon a defendant’s 

history of other misconduct.” People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 308; 319 NW2d 518 

(1982). However, MRE 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be 

admissible for other purposes: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 

of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the 

conduct at issue in the case. [MRE 404(b)(1).] 

For evidence of other acts to be admissible under MRE 404(b), it must be (1) offered for a proper 

purpose; (2) be relevant under MRE 402; and (3) not have a probative value substantially 

outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 

NW2d 114 (1993). 

 Evidence of misconduct similar to the charged crimes is relevant to demonstrate that the 

charged crimes occurred so long as the misconduct and charged crimes “are sufficiently similar 

to support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.” 

People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63-64; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). “There must be 

such a concurrence of common features that the charged acts and the other acts are logically seen 

as part of a general plan, scheme, or design.” People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 479; 769 

NW2d 256 (2009). “The evidence of uncharged acts needs only to support the inference that the 

defendant employed the common plan in committing the charged offense.” People v Hine (After 

Remand), 467 Mich 242, 253; 650 NW2d 659 (2002). Although general similarity alone is not 

sufficient to establish a common plan, scheme, or system, “the plan need not be unusual or 

distinctive.” Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich at 66 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 We conclude that the prior acts and the instant case bear sufficient similarity to suggest a 

common plan, scheme, or system. See Hine (After Remand), 467 Mich at 253. In both 

instances, defendant and Crawford broke into a relative’s home to acquire money or property to 

exchange for cocaine. Although the initial home invasions involved an unoccupied home and 

the home invasion involving Dennis’s murder involved an occupied home, it is not required that 

the prior acts and the charged crimes share every detail. Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich at 64, 

66. Given the “concurrence of common features” between the prior acts and the charged crime, 

a logical inference exists that the crimes in this case were part of a common plan or system of 

breaking into relatives’ homes to steal property to sell or exchange for drugs. Steele, 283 Mich 

App at 479. Moreover, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence 

where “reasonable persons could disagree on whether the charged and uncharged acts contained 

sufficient common features to infer the existence of a common system used by defendant in 

committing the acts.” Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich at 67. For these reasons, we conclude 

that the other-acts evidence was admitted for a proper purpose. Moreover, the evidence was 
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logically relevant as to defendant’s intent and motive in entering Dennis’s home, as well as to 

whether defendant committed the charged acts as part of a common plan, scheme, or system. 

 In addition to being offered for a proper purpose and being relevant under MRE 402, the 

testimony must also satisfy the balancing test of MRE 403. See id. All relevant evidence is 

prejudicial; only unfairly prejudicial evidence should be excluded. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 

75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). The fact that defendant was previously involved with breaking and 

entering into a relative’s home in order to steal property to exchange for drugs was highly 

probative because it was relevant to the issue of whether defendant broke into Dennis’s home 

and stole his property as part of a common plan, scheme, or system. The evidence was also 

probative of defendant’s intent and motive in visiting Dennis in order to acquire the means of 

obtaining more cocaine. As to prejudicial effect, Crawford’s and her grandfather’s testimonies 

regarding the December 2014 home invasions were a brief portion of a seven-day trial and were 

not particularly detailed or inflammatory. See Blackston, 481 Mich at 462. Additionally, any 

danger of unfair prejudice was minimized by the trial court’s limiting instruction, in which the 

trial court specified that the evidence could only be considered in determining motive, intent, or 

whether defendant used a plan, system, or characteristic scheme that had been used before or 

since. See VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 74-75. Therefore, the probative value of the evidence was 

not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. As such, the otheracts evidence was properly admitted under MRE 404(b). 

III. INSTRUCTIONAL ISSUES 

 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it declined to issue a jury instruction 

on voluntary manslaughter and, also erred in giving a non-standard instruction defining malice. 

We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Issues of law arising from jury instructions are reviewed de novo on appeal, but a trial 

court’s determination whether an instruction was applicable to the facts of the case is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). Reversal 

based on instructional error is merited only where the defendant demonstrates “that the asserted 

instructional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 702; 

788 NW2d 399 (2010), citing Lukity, 460 Mich at 493-494. A miscarriage of justice occurs 

where “it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the 

error.” Lukity, 460 Mich at 495. 

 “In reviewing a trial court’s jury instructions, this Court examines the instructions as a 

whole, and, even if there are some imperfections, there is no basis for reversal if the instructions 

adequately protected the defendant’s rights by fairly presenting to the jury the issues to be tried.” 

People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 396; 563 NW2d 31 (1997). However, defendant objected only 

to the non-standard second-degree murder instruction, not the non-standard first-degree felony 

murder instruction. As such, defendant’s argument is unpreserved. We review unpreserved jury 

instruction challenges for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. People v 

Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 124-125; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Therefore, defendant may obtain 

relief only if “(1) error . . . occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, (3) and the 
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plain error affected substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 

(1999). 

B. VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 

 “A criminal defendant has the right to have a properly instructed jury consider the 

evidence against him.” People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 472; 620 NW2d 13 (2000) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Jury instructions must include all of the elements of the 

crimes charged and “must not exclude material issues, defenses, and theories if the evidence 

supports them.” People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). Where the 

evidence supports a lesser included offense and a party so requests, an instruction on the lesser 

included offense should be given. People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 387; 471 NW2d 346 

(1991). Because voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, “when a 

defendant is charged with murder, an instruction for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter 

must be given if supported by a rational view of the evidence.” People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 

527, 541; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). 

Voluntary manslaughter occurs where a defendant “act[s] out of a temporary excitement 

induced by an adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the 

crime of murder.” People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). In other 

words, “homicide may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the circumstances . . . 

demonstrate that malice was negated by adequate and reasonable provocation, that the killing 

was done in the heat of passion, and that there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable 

person could control his passions.” People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 55; 492 NW2d 490 

(1992). Provocation, for purposes of voluntary manslaughter, is only “that which would cause 

the reasonable person to lose control.” Pouncey, 437 Mich at 389 (emphasis added). 

The trial court did not err in refraining from instructing the jury as to voluntary 

manslaughter because the evidence does not support a voluntary manslaughter instruction. 

Evidence of a 10-year-old monetary dispute between defendant and Dennis regarding 

defendant’s father’s life insurance is not provocation sufficient to cause a reasonable person to 

lose control and murder. See id. Moreover, even if defendant had presented evidence of 

adequate provocation, a voluntary manslaughter instruction still would have been unsupported by 

the evidence because defendant had a significant amount of time for his passions to cool. See 

Etheridge, 196 Mich App at 55. Defendant was in Dennis’s home for 30 minutes. Further, 

defendant chopped Dennis with a hatchet approximately 30 times in the head, neck, trunk, and 

extremities, and defensive wounds on Dennis’s body indicate that he survived some initial blows 

and attempted to fight defendant. During this extensive struggle, defendant would have had 

sufficient time to reconsider his actions. Because the evidence heard at trial would not support 

finding defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court was correct in refusing the 

requested instruction. See Pouncey, 437 Mich at 387. 

C. NON-STANDARD INSTRUCTION ON MALICE 

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by providing the jury a non-standard 

instruction on the element of malice of first-degree felony murder. We disagree. 
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MCR 2.512(D)(2) requires that pertinent portions of the Michigan Model Criminal Jury 

Instructions must be given if “(a) they are applicable, (b) they accurately state the applicable law, 

and (c) they are requested by a party.” Because defendant failed to specifically request the 

reading of M Crim JI 16.4, the standard jury instruction for first-degree felony murder, the trial 

court was not required to read the standard jury instruction. See MCR 2.512(D)(2)(c). 

Therefore, the non-standard jury instruction is sufficient so long as it fairly presented the issues 

to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights. See Dumas, 454 Mich 396. 

The trial court instructed the jury that it must find that defendant had one of the three 

following states of mind in order to find defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder: “(a) he 

intended to kill Dennis McPherson, or (b) he intended to do great bodily harm to Dennis 

McPherson, or (3) he acted in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural 

tendency of such behavior was to cause death or great bodily harm.” Defendant argues that the 

standard jury instruction should have been given instead. The standard jury instruction defining 

malice states in relevant part: “[he / she] intended to kill, or [he / she] intended to do great 

bodily harm to [name deceased], or [he / she] knowingly created a very high risk of death or 

great bodily harm knowing that death or such harm would be the likely result of [his / her] 

actions.” M Crim JI 16.4(3). The malice element found in M Crim JI 16.4(3) reflects our 

Supreme Court’s statement in People v Dykhouse, 418 Mich 488, 495; 345 NW2d 150 (1984), 

defining the third form of malice as “the intent to create a very high risk of death or great bodily 

harm with the knowledge that death or great bodily harm is the probable result.” The definition 

of malice given by the trial court comports with the definition of malice set forth in People v 

Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), decided four years before Dykhouse. Aaron 

and Dykhouse have both been cited for their respective definitions of malice,

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 and neither has 

been overruled. Because the trial court instructed the jury on the definition of malice as set forth 

in an opinion of our Supreme Court that has not been overruled, we conclude that the trial court 

did not plainly err in declining to use the standard jury instruction. 

Insofar as defendant’s argument implies that the trial court erred by failing to define 

“wanton and willful,” we similarly note that defendant did not request such an instruction and, in 

the absence of a request for such an instruction and in the absence of any dispute as to malice at 

trial, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to define these terms. See Carines, 460 

Mich at 763. Nevertheless, even if this Court were to determine that the trial court improperly 

instructed the jury with a nonstandard jury instruction, defendant is still not entitled to reversal 

because the error was harmless. See MCR 2.613(A) (“An error . . . or defect in anything done or 

omitted by the court or the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a 

verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 

 

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 Using Aaron’s malice definition: People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 14; 715 NW2d 44 (2006); 

People v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 601; 533 NW2d 272 (1995), reh den 449 Mich 1206 (1995);

People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 451; 792 NW2d 712 (2010), lv den 488 Mich 948 (2010); 

People v Bailey, 207 Mich App 8, 9; 523 NW2d 798 (1994), rev’d on other grounds 451 Mich 

657 (1996); People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 650-651; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). 

 Using Dykhouse’s malice definition: People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 154-155; 815 

NW2d 85 (2012); People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 138; 712 NW2d 419 (2006); Mendoza, 468 

Mich at 540; People v Ramsey, 422 Mich 500, 517; 375 NW2d 297 (1985). 
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take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.”) (emphasis added). In 

the present case, defendant chopped Dennis with a hatchet approximately 30 times, and 

defensive wounds on Dennis’s body indicate that Dennis survived some initial blows. The 

extensive violence of this attack is sufficient to demonstrate malice under both the Aaron and 

Dykhouse definitions, as it cannot be seriously contended in this case that defendant was not 

subjectively aware that chopping a person with a hatchet in the head, neck, and torso 30 times 

would cause serious bodily injury or death. Further, defense counsel argued only that defendant 

was not present at the home and did not dispute that the murderer acted with malice. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola