UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

GENERAL CHARLES E. “CHUCK” 

YEAGER, (retired), an individual, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

FORT KNOX SECURITY PRODUCTS, a 

Utah corporation, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-4192 

(D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00091-TS) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

What’s in a name? For General Chuck Yeager and Fort Knox Security 

Products, the answer is still unclear despite years of litigation. In this case, we must 

decide whether Yeager has standing to continue litigating his claim that Fort Knox 

used his name and image without permission. The answer depends on whether 

Yeager assigned the rights to his name and image to PMN II, LLC,1

 and if so, which 

rights he assigned. Initially, Yeager claimed he had assigned certain pertinent rights 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 “PMN” stands for “Protect My Name.” Yeager and his wife created this 

company at least in part to prevent the unauthorized use of Yeager’s name and image. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 6, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

to PMN II, and Fort Knox argued that the assignment was invalid. But in this second 

appeal, the parties have switched positions. The district court concluded that Yeager 

lacked standing because he had transferred all relevant rights to PMN II and was 

unable to articulate which rights, if any, he retained. Accordingly, the court granted 

Fort Knox summary judgment. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Fort Knox had been using Yeager’s name and likeness in various 

advertisements and promotional materials since 1986, when Yeager and Charles 

James, Fort Knox’s founder, struck up an informal oral agreement allowing this use. 

Fort Knox agreed to stop using Yeager’s name and likeness several years ago, but 

still used each at least once afterwards. In 2011, PMN II and Yeager (“the plaintiffs”) 

filed suit alleging that Fort Knox had used Yeager’s name and likeness in its 

promotional materials and advertisements without permission. In their complaint, the 

plaintiffs stated that “General Yeager has assigned and/or is assigning some or all of 

his rights, title and interest in his name, image and trademarks to PMN [II].” 

Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 20. Fort Knox filed two summary-judgment motions. 

Only one of these motions is relevant to this appeal.2

 In it, Fort Knox moved to 

dismiss PMN II for lack of standing. It argued that Yeager never assigned any of his 

rights to PMN II, so the company had no cognizable interest in the rights at issue. 

The district court denied this motion, finding that factual disputes remained over 

 2

 In Fort Knox’s other summary-judgment motion, it argued that the plaintiffs’ 

claims were barred by laches and the statute of limitations. 
3 

Yeager’s assignment of rights to PMN II. It nevertheless dismissed the plaintiffs’ 

claims, finding them barred by the doctrine of laches per Fort Knox’s other summaryjudgment motion. 

The plaintiffs appealed to this court, but PMN II’s counsel withdrew while the 

appeal was pending. We therefore dismissed PMN II’s appeal for failure to prosecute, 

and Yeager continued pro se. We later affirmed the district court’s order dismissing 

Yeager’s claims except for two claims arising within the four-year limitations period.

Yeager v. Fort Knox Sec. Prods., 602 F. App’x 423, 432 (10th Cir. 2015). We 

remanded for the district court to address the two surviving claims. On remand, Fort 

Knox filed two more summary-judgment motions. The first motion renewed Fort 

Knox’s arguments on laches and the statute of limitations. The second motion 

asserted that it was now General Yeager who lacked standing. It claimed that 

“[e]vidence and statements introduced by [Yeager] . . . demonstrate he conferred a 

valid, clear assignment in both his name and image to PMN II.” Appellant’s App. 

vol. 5 at 725. Thus, Fort Knox argued, Yeager retained no proprietary rights in his 

name or likeness. 

Yeager opposed the motions. In opposing the standing motion, Yeager first 

presented evidence that PMN II had reassigned his rights in his name and likeness 

back to him, effective May 1, 2014—which was before we dismissed PMN II. He 

later abandoned this argument and instead “conced[ed] that no valid assignment from 

General Yeager to PMN II occurred,” thus adopting Fort Knox’s original position. Id.

at 873. In ruling on the summary-judgment motions, the district court noted that it 
4 

had “previously ruled that PMN II had an interest in Yeager’s proprietary rights.” Id.

at 883. It stated that before Yeager filed his surreply, the parties agreed that “Yeager 

had assigned all interests and rights in his image as it relates to safes, safe products, 

and/or filing cabinets to PMN II, and had conferred certain right, title, and interest to 

his name to PMN II with respect to safes.” Id. The court therefore granted Fort 

Knox’s summary-judgment motion based on standing grounds and denied its motion 

based on laches and the statute of limitations as moot. Yeager filed a motion to alter 

or amend the judgment, which the court denied. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “using the 

same standard applied by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).” Cillo v. 

City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir. 2013). Applying this standard, 

“[w]e must ‘view facts in the light most favorable to’ [Yeager] . . . resolving all 

factual disputes and reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Id. (quoting Tabor v. Hilti, 

Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013)). We must grant summary judgment if 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and Fort Knox is “entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if, under the 

governing law, it could [affect] the outcome of the lawsuit.” Cillo, 739 F.3d at 461 

(alteration in original) (quoting EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 

1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000)). “A factual dispute is ‘genuine if a rational jury could 
5 

find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.’” Id. (quoting 

Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1190). 

 If Fort Knox satisfies its burden of showing that the case presents no genuine 

issue of material fact, the burden shifts to Yeager to “make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case in order to survive 

summary judgment.” Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 

2000)). To meet this burden, Yeager must “go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth 

specific facts’ that would be admissible in evidence . . . from which a rational trier of 

fact could find for [him].” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th 

Cir. 1998) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). These 

specific facts must exist in “particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)(1)(A).

II. Standing 

 As a threshold matter, Yeager argues that Fort Knox’s standing argument is 

actually a real-party-in-interest argument under Fed R. Civ. P. 17(a).3

 He claims that 

 3

 Yeager also argues that by declining to resolve whether the doctrine of laches 

barred Yeager’s two surviving challenges to Fort Knox’s use of his name and 

likeness, the district court violated our mandate. This argument fails because in our 

order dismissing all but two of Yeager’s claims, we remanded the case for “further 

proceedings consistent with the analysis herein.” Yeager, 602 F. App’x at 432. And 
6 

Fort Knox waived this argument by failing to raise it immediately after PMN II was 

dismissed, since the grounds for this legal challenge existed at that point. We 

disagree. 

First, standing is jurisdictional, and can be raised at any point in the 

proceedings. Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 492 (10th Cir. 

1998). And if a party lacks standing to bring a particular legal challenge, courts lack 

jurisdiction to resolve the claim’s merits. See id. at 493. Therefore, Fort Knox 

properly raised this argument during Yeager’s second appeal. Second, we reject 

Yeager’s contention that applying a real-party-in-interest analysis would have 

changed the district court’s ruling. In this case, the analyses are identical. “[W]hen 

standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose 

standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular 

issue . . . .” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99–100 (1968). 

Although a party can waive a real-party-in-interest defense, see Fed. Deposit 

Ins. Corp. v. Bachman, 894 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1990), Yeager’s claim that 

Fort Knox waived its right to bring this defense succeeds only if he never assigned 

his rights to PMN II. If he did not assign the rights, PMN II would never have been a 

 

on remand, “unless the district court’s discretion is specifically cabined, it may 

exercise discretion on what may be heard.” Dish Network Corp. v. Arrowood Indem. 

Co., 772 F.3d 856, 864 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. West, 646 F.3d 

745, 749 (10th Cir. 2011)). Because we did not prohibit the district court from 

addressing standing, and because standing is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, the 

district court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing Yeager’s claims for lack 

of standing. 
7 

real party in interest, and its dismissal would not have affected Yeager’s rights. But if 

he did assign those rights, neither party would have the right to bring suit: claim 

preclusion would bar both PMN II and Yeager from continuing with this litigation 

because we dismissed PMN II and its claims in a final judgment on the merits in an 

earlier action. See Campbell v. City of Spencer, 777 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 

2014). 

We evaluate standing to sue by asking “[w]hether a party has a sufficient stake 

in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that 

controversy.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731–32 (1972). If Yeager had 

successfully assigned all relevant rights to his name and likeness to PMN II, he 

would have lost any stake in the matter at hand, and therefore would lose either on 

standing or on real-party-in-interest grounds. Unless Yeager can rebut Fort Knox’s 

summary-judgment showing that he has not retained some rights entitling him to 

continue with this lawsuit, he lacks standing. Therefore, we now consider Yeager’s 

arguments on this point. 

III. Yeager’s Remaining Rights

Yeager makes three arguments as to why he has standing to continue this 

litigation. First, he argues that the district court improperly concluded on remand that 

he assigned all of his rights to PMN II. As part of this argument, Yeager “concedes” 

Fort Knox’s earlier position (which Yeager had earlier denied) that no assignment 

had ever occurred, meaning that PMN II’s dismissal had no impact on Yeager’s 

standing. Second, he claims that even if he assigned some of his rights to PMN II, he 
8 

didn’t assign all of those rights, meaning he has standing to continue with this 

lawsuit. Third, Yeager argues that he presented evidence to the district court that 

PMN II reassigned his rights back to him—the reassignment conveniently backdated 

to before PMN II’s dismissal—but he seems to have abandoned this argument on 

appeal. 

Yeager first argues that he never assigned any of his rights to PMN II. 

According to Yeager, his oral assignment of rights was invalid because it wasn’t 

clear and unequivocal. To support this argument, he cites the district court’s order 

denying Fort Knox’s summary-judgment motion based on PMN II’s standing. Yeager 

claims that the district court declined to decide whether he transferred his proprietary 

rights to PMN II because doing so would have required the court to judge witness 

credibility and weigh evidence, actions that are prohibited on summary judgment. 

But in reality the court simply rejected Fort Knox’s argument that the evidence 

supporting Yeager’s assignment of rights was not credible. In fact, the district court 

actually found that Yeager had assigned at least some of his rights to PMN II. The 

evidence supporting this finding is still before us on appeal, and Yeager has 

presented no new evidence to counter it. 

Yeager attempts to avoid this issue by “conceding” that his assignment of 

rights to PMN II was invalid, as Fort Knox originally argued. He relies on Fort 

Knox’s statements in its first summary-judgment motion, in which Fort Knox 

adopted the position that PMN II lacked standing. Yeager argues that the district 

court improperly rejected his concession because, as the party who advanced the 
9 

claim that he validly assigned his rights to PMN II, he “was entitled to withdraw” it. 

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 13, 15. Yeager seems to believe that if he withdraws this 

claim, we must automatically accept Fort Knox’s original counterclaims and 

conclude that no assignment of rights occurred. 

But the parties having switched positions doesn’t change the underlying 

evidence in the record. And Yeager’s concession—what he describes as his decision 

to stop defending his previous statements—doesn’t change the legal effect of those 

statements. Yeager cannot erase his previously-submitted contradictory testimony by 

changing his mind and agreeing with Fort Knox’s earlier position. As Yeager himself 

admitted, the district court found in its first order that he had presented enough 

evidence in support of his assignment of rights to survive summary judgment. This 

has not changed on appeal.

Alternatively—perhaps recognizing that his own evidence weighs against 

him—Yeager argues that he didn’t assign all of his rights to PMN II. According to 

Yeager, “[a]ny oral assignment of rights to PMN II was never intended to encompass 

all of General Yeager’s rights with respect to his name and likeness.” Id. at 18. 

Though there is some evidence that Yeager didn’t intend to assign all of his rights to 

PMN II, he fails to identify which rights he retained. 

PMN II responded to Fort Knox’s first set of interrogatories by stating that “on 

or around January 13, 2011, General Yeager acted to confer certain right, title and 

interest in his name to PMN II, LLC, with limited regard to Fort Knox’s use of 

General Yeager’s name or likeness in connection with the promotion or marketing of 
10 

its safes.” Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 126. Later, Yeager’s wife—the managing 

member of PMN II—affirmed under penalty of perjury that Yeager “verbally 

assigned and transferred to PMN all interests and rights in his image as it related to 

safes, safe products, and/or filing cabinets.” Appellant’s App. vol. 5 at 878.4

 

To counter this evidence, Yeager now merely states that the assignment “was 

limited and only conferred ‘certain’ rights, with ‘limited’ regard to the promotion or 

marketing of safes. There is no evidence that General Yeager transferred all rights to 

PMN II, Inc.” Id. at 835. Yeager adds no detail to support this claim, but rather, 

simply repeats that he “always retained some of the rights relating to his name and 

likeness.” Id. at 837. To prevent summary judgment, he must go beyond this bare 

assertion and cite actual evidence in the record supporting this statement. Adler, 144 

F.3d at 671. He fails to do so here, and never identifies the rights he claims to retain. 

In fact, when Fort Knox’s counsel asked Yeager during his deposition what 

rights he retained, Yeager repeatedly acknowledged not knowing, instead saying that 

his wife Victoria generally handled those details. He testified that he lacked personal 

knowledge of whether he assigned his rights to his name and likeness to PMN II. The 

only new evidence Yeager provides on appeal is his concession that no assignment to 

PMN II ever occurred. As discussed above, however, this “concession” contradicts 

 4

 Yeager’s wife previously answered one of Fort Knox’s interrogatories by 

stating that Yeager had not assigned his rights in his name, image, and trademark to 

PMN II. She later explained that she had only answered the interrogatory in this 

manner because Yeager had assigned his rights to PMN II “solely as they pertained to 

his image as it related to safes, safe products, and/or filing cabinets.” Appellant’s 

App. vol. 1 at 85. 
11 

specific evidence in the record. Therefore, Yeager has shown no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact. 

Yeager cites Spin Master, LTD v. Zobmondo Entertainment, LLC, Nos. CV 

06–3459 ABC (PLAx), CV 07–0571 ABC (PLAx), 2011 WL 3714772 (C.D. Cal. 

Aug. 22, 2011), to support his argument that he retains sufficient rights to continue 

with this litigation. He argues that under Spin Master, a party has standing to 

continue in a lawsuit so long as that party retains some “cognizable interest[]” in the 

rights at issue. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 18 & n.58. Yeager misinterprets this case. 

In Spin Master, the plaintiffs retained a license to use and exploit the trademark at 

issue, even though they assigned legal title to the trademark to a different party. Spin 

Master, 2011 WL 3714772, at *2, *6. A written agreement memorialized this license. 

Id. at *4. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ interests were clearly defined, and their right to 

remain in the trademark lawsuit derived from these clearly defined interests. Here, 

because no written agreement defined Yeager’s interests and Yeager offers no 

particularized description of the rights he retains, he can’t survive summary 

judgment. 

Similarly, Yeager can’t avoid summary judgment by relying on PMN II’s 

purported reassignment of rights back to him. Perhaps realizing this, he has 

abandoned this argument on appeal.5

 Still, we reaffirm the district court’s conclusion 

 5

 In his brief, Yeager attempts to discount PMN II’s purported reassignment of 

rights by stating that it was “irrelevant” because the initial assignment was invalid. 
12 

here: PMN II’s dismissal for failure to prosecute operated as a final judgment on the 

merits, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995), and claim 

preclusion therefore prohibits PMN II from relitigating these issues, see Campbell, 

777 F.3d at 1077. Because “the common law puts the assignee in the assignor’s 

shoes, whatever the shoe size,” PMN II’s reassignment doesn’t benefit Yeager. 

Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2005). 

In sum, by supposedly reassigning Yeager’s rights back to him with an 

effective date that precedes the claims’ dismissal, PMN II can’t revive claims that we 

dismissed on the merits. The district court properly concluded that “[j]ust as PMN II 

could not attempt to reassert those dismissed claims, Yeager cannot assert those 

claims possessed by PMN II at the time of PMN II’s dismissal.” Appellant’s App. 

vol. 5 at 884.

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s order granting Fort 

Knox’s summary-judgment motion based on standing. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

 

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 15. But as discussed above, the record suggests 

otherwise.