United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-1580

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Ger Lee

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner

v.

Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent

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Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

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 Submitted: November 13, 2017

Filed: November 16, 2017

[Unpublished]

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Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Ger Lee, a native of Thailand and a citizen of Laos, petitions for review of an

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the

decision of an immigration judge (IJ), which denied him asylum, withholding of

removal, cancellation of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(CAT). In his pro se brief, Lee asserts that (1) he was erroneously denied review by
a three-memberBIA panel;(2) delays in the removal proceedings violated the Speedy

Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161; (3) the IJ relied on unreliable government information

regarding his father; (4) he will be tortured in Thailand or Laos due to his “stateless

person” status; and (5) his due-process and constitutional rights were violated

because (a) the IJ abandoned her neutral fact-finder role by according more weight

to country reports than to his testimony, and (b) his hearing was not fundamentally

fair.1

To the extent that Lee’s brief can be read to claim a due-process violation, we

conclude that the BIA did not deprive Lee of fundamental fairness by referring his

appeal to a single member, see Loulou v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 706, 708-09 (8th Cir.

2003). We further conclude that Lee’s speedy-trial contentions are precluded by a

prior district court dismissal with prejudice of an identical claim in his 28 U. S. C.

§ 2241 petition. See Lee v. Immigration Enforcement Customs, 2017 WL 4174426

(D. Minn. July 21, 2017) (slip copy); see also Pohlmann v. Bil-Jax, Inc., 176 F.3d

1110, 1112 (8th Cir. 1999) (issue actually decided in non merits dismissal is given

preclusive effect in subsequent action between same parties).

Likewise, we conclude that Lee’s various remaining due-process claims are

baseless and fail to identify any fundamental procedural error or resulting actual

prejudice. See Muiruri v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 2015).

Finally, construing them as challenges to the IJ’s denial of CAT relief, we find

Lee’s assertions that he is a “stateless person” and that the government information

was unreliable, unavailing. Any inaccuracies in the government’s information

regarding Lee’s father were not necessary to the IJ’s findings, as she based her denial

1Lee does not meaningfully contest his (1) his removability; or (2) the IJ’s

findings that he was statutorily ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and

cancellation of removal; thus, those issues are waived. See Chay-Velasquez v.

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004).

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on the lack of evidence showing that Lee would be tortured if he were returned to

Laos or Thailand. The evidence was not so compelling that any reasonable factfinder

would have found Lee had met his burden of proof, and Lee’s status as a “stateless

person” did not excuse his burden to show why he would be tortured if he were

returned to either country. See Osonowo v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir.

2008) (standard of review; alien must establish that it is more likely than not that he

would be tortured in country of removal); cf. Agha v. Holder, 743 F.3d 609, 618 (8th

Cir. 2014) (rejecting alien’s argument that, as stateless person, he was entitled to

asylum because no government would accept him; plain language of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(a) required stateless person to show same well-founded fear of

persecution as individual with nationality). The petition is denied. See 8th Cir. R.

47B.

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