IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 8, 2016

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JASON LARRY RUSSO

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 18035 F. Lee Russell, Judge

No. M2016-00052-CCA-R3-CD

In the Bedford County Circuit Court, the defendant, Jason Larry Russo, pled guilty to 

second offense driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor, and was found 

guilty by a jury of promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony. 

He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the driving offense and 

twelve years for the drug offense, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant 

argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we 

affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T. WOODALL,

P.J., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.

M. Wesley Hall, IV, Unionville, Tennessee (on appeal); and Brian Belden, Shelbyville, 

Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Jason Larry Russo.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clark B. Thornton, Senior 

Counsel; Robert J. Carter, District Attorney General; and Michael D. Randles, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

02/15/2017
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OPINION

FACTS

The State’s evidence at trial showed that Agent Shane George of the 17th Judicial 

District Drug Task Force was investigating suspicious purchases of pseudoephedrine 

from a Walmart in Shelbyville, Tennessee, on August 26, 2014. Based on this 

investigation, Agent George followed a vehicle driven by the defendant whose passenger 

had just bought pseudoephedrine at Walmart. Agent George recognized the defendant 

and knew that his driver’s license was revoked or suspended. The defendant stopped at a 

Rite Aid pharmacy, and another passenger went into the pharmacy but emerged “empty 

handed” and appeared to be agitated. Agent George made a traffic stop of the 

defendant’s vehicle after it pulled into the driveway of a residence that was a suspected 

site of methamphetamine manufacturing. 

The defendant immediately informed Agent George that he did not have a valid 

driver’s license. With the defendant’s consent, Agent George searched the defendant’s 

vehicle, during which he found a box of pseudoephedrine tablets and a quart-sized 

container of lighter fluid. Pseudoephedrine is the chief precursor of methamphetamine, 

and lighter fluid is used along with other chemicals, such as lye and ammonium nitrate, to 

make the drug. Agent George apprised the defendant of his rights, which the defendant 

waived and agreed to answer questions. The defendant told Agent George that he also 

had ammonium nitrate in his bedroom in the house and planned to use the chemicals to 

manufacture methamphetamine in the near future. 

Based on these facts, the defendant was indicted in count one for second offense 

driving on a revoked license and in count two for promotion of the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. The defendant pled guilty to count one and, after a trial, was 

convicted by a jury of count two.

The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing at which the defendant’s 

presentence report was first entered into evidence. Agent George then testified that 

methamphetamine investigations were the main focus of the drug task force. These 

investigations involved both “one-pot shake and bake labs” such as in the defendant’s 

case, as well as seizures of large quantities of cartel-supplied “ICE methamphetamine” 

that resulted in prosecution in federal court. He explained that the “home brew labs” took 

a backseat when the “ICE epidemic” hit but then had a resurgence whenever the task 

force took a major “ICE” source off the streets. Both home brew labs and imported 

methamphetamine were major issues in the judicial district. The methamphetamine 

epidemic was increasing and had crossed racial and economic boundaries. Agent George 
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believed that incarceration was a deterrent and that the judicial district’s reputation for 

extended sentences “seems to have a very visible impact.” 

After making extensive findings on the record, the trial court imposed a sentence 

of twelve years at 60% as a career offender for the Class D felony drug conviction and a 

consecutive eleven-month-and-twenty-nine-day sentence at 75% for the Class A 

misdemeanor driving conviction.

ANALYSIS

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences 

“where there was no support for the conclusion that the defendant was a dangerous 

offender, and there was no significant time span of undetected activity.” He also asserts 

that “consecutive sentencing was excessive considering the nature of the charges and the 

[defendant].” 

In sentencing the defendant, the trial court found, based on disposition dates, that 

the defendant had at least six separate prior felony convictions, as well as numerous 

misdemeanor convictions, which were beyond that necessary to classify him as a career 

offender. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1). The defendant also had a history of 

thirteen probation, parole or community corrections revocations. See id. § 40-35-114(8). 

The court found that the defendant had been released to parole supervision on January 17, 

2014 from a ten-year sentence imposed on March 24, 2010 and was therefore on parole 

when he committed the present offenses on August 26, 2014. See id. § 40-35-114(13). 

The court considered the proffered mitigating factors that the defendant’s conduct did not 

cause or threaten serious bodily injury and he cooperated with law enforcement, but the 

court gave the factors minimal, if any, weight. See id. § 40-35-113(1), (9). The court 

accordingly imposed sentences of twelve years and eleven months and twenty-nine days 

for the offenses, which the defendant does not contest. 

With regard to consecutive sentencing, the court found that there was strong 

evidence in the record to consider the defendant a professional criminal given his almost 

non-existent work history. See id. § 40-35-115(b)(1). In particular, the court observed 

that the defendant had self-reported only one month of work history for “his entire life,” 

and “he’s got to be supporting himself somehow, and it’s certainly not by working every 

day.” The court also found that the defendant had “an extremely extensive criminal 

record,” consisting of at least six felony convictions and numerous misdemeanors. See

id. § 40-35-115(b)(2). Based on such, the court ordered that the defendant’s sentences be 

served consecutively, and the record amply supports the trial court’s determination. The 

defendant suggests that consecutive sentencing was improper because he was not a 
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“dangerous offender.” See id. § 40-35-115(b)(4). However, the trial court did not 

impose consecutive sentences based on this factor. 

The record shows that the defendant is a prolific offender with a consistent record 

of criminal activity since adulthood who has had a complete lack of success with 

alternative sentencing. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing consecutive sentences based either on the defendant’s being a professional 

criminal or his extensive record of criminal activity. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgments of the 

trial court. 

_________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE