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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 15-BG-699

IN RE KRISTAN L. PETERS, Respondent.

A Suspended Member of the Bar of the 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

(Bar Registration No. 415989) 

On Report and Recommendation 

of the Board on Professional Responsibility

(BDN-113-15)

(Submitted January 6, 2016 Decided November 23, 2016) 

Kristan Peters, pro se.

Wallace E. Shipp, Jr., Disciplinary Counsel, and William R. Ross, Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Before BECKWITH and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and KING, Senior 

Judge.

PER CURIAM: On April 10, 2013, after finding that respondent Kristan 

Peters had violated several professional rules, the Committee on Grievances of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY 

Committee) suspended Ms. Peters from the practice of law for seven years. The 

District of Columbia Office of Disciplinary Counsel now recommends that we 

11/23/16
2

impose reciprocal discipline and suspend Ms. Peters for five years, with 

reinstatement conditioned upon proof of fitness to practice law. Although D.C. 

Bar R. XI, § 11 (e) generally requires this court to impose reciprocal discipline, 

Ms. Peters argues that all five enumerated exceptions to this rule apply in her case. 

Concluding that only one exception applies—namely, that Ms. Peters would be 

subject to substantially different discipline in this jurisdiction—we suspend Ms. 

Peters from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a period of three 

years, nunc pro tunc to July 2, 2015,

1 with reinstatement predicated on a finding of 

fitness. See D.C. Bar R. XI, §§ 3 (a)(2), 11 (e), 14 (h), 16 (a). 

I. Background

At the time the misconduct at issue in this case occurred, Ms. Peters was 

working for the law firm Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (Dorsey).

2

 On behalf of its 

client Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. (Wolters), Dorsey sued four former 

Wolters employees in the Southern District of New York for allegedly divulging 

proprietary information to their new employer. Discovery was conducted under a 

confidentiality order providing that certain materials “shall not be used [in] any 

 

1

 On July 2, 2015, this court ordered Ms. Peters’s interim suspension. 

2

 The facts here are drawn from Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc. v. 

Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2009).
3

other litigation proceeding.” After concerns were raised over personal jurisdiction, 

Dorsey dismissed the suit in New York and refiled it in Massachusetts. Despite 

court orders from the judge in New York, Ms. Peters, the partner in charge, 

delayed returning confidential discovery material (including deposition transcripts) 

and attached 115 pages of that material to a motion for temporary injunctive relief 

filed in the Massachusetts case. 

The judge presiding over the New York case sanctioned Ms. Peters and 

forwarded a copy of the decision to the SDNY Committee, which suspended her 

for seven years backdated to April 10, 2008, the date she had first been temporarily 

suspended pending process. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Scivantage, 525 F. 

Supp. 2d 448, 541, 550-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 564 F.3d 

110 (2d Cir. 2009).

3

Because we see no basis for disturbing the SDNY Committee’s findings, see 

 

3

 The first disciplinary decision by the SDNY Committee after receipt of the 

opinion ordering sanctions was vacated and remanded for lack of appropriate 

process. In re Peters, 543 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 642 F.3d 381 

(2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e do not intend to suggest that the charges against Peters were 

improperly brought, only that certain procedures and findings were inadequate.”). 

Our decision is based only on the subsequent SDNY Committee decision and the 

decision affirming it. In re Peters, 941 F. Supp. 2d 359, as corrected (Apr. 15, 

2013), aff’d sub nom. Peters v. Comm. on Grievances for U.S. Dist. Court, 748 

F.3d 456 (2d Cir. 2014). 
4

part II, infra, we accept the facts as set out in the SDNY Committee’s order and in 

a 118-page report written by a federal magistrate judge and adopted by the 

Committee. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (c); In re Peters, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 360-62, 

366. 

The magistrate’s report canvasses the record and supports the conclusion 

that Ms. Peters: (1) copied and ordered additional deposition transcripts in 

violation of court orders for use in the new but related action in Massachusetts and 

thus knowingly violated a confidentiality order entered by the presiding judge in 

the first case; and (2) instructed a first-year associate at Dorsey to add markings to

deposition transcripts in an attempt to bring them under the protection of the 

attorney work-product privilege and exempt them from the presiding judge’s order

that all discovery be returned, and thereafter misled the court about what she had 

done.

II. Imposition of Reciprocal Discipline

In the District of Columbia, an attorney suspended or disbarred in another 

jurisdiction will have identical reciprocal discipline imposed on her unless she 

demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

(1) The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or 

opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of 

due process; or
5

(2) There was such infirmity of proof establishing the 

misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the 

Court could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final 

the conclusions on that subject; or

(3) The imposition of the same discipline would result in 

grave injustice; or

(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially 

different discipline in the District of Columbia; or

(5) The misconduct elsewhere does not constitute 

misconduct in the District of Columbia.

D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (c).

Here, Ms. Peters argues against the imposition of reciprocal discipline under 

each of the five prongs. Under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (c), “[u]nless there is a 

finding by the Court under (1), (2), or (5),” an attorney will not be permitted to 

relitigate issues settled by another court. Id.; see also In re Richardson, 602 A.2d 

179, 181 (D.C. 1992). Ms. Peters has not satisfied this burden.4 We do conclude, 

however, that her conduct warrants substantially different discipline in the District 

of Columbia, and thus impose non-identical final discipline. See D.C. Bar R. XI, 

 

4

Though Ms. Peters points out that other jurisdictions have declined to 

impose reciprocal discipline against her, we follow our own law in making an 

independent determination whether reciprocal discipline is warranted in any given 

case. 
6

§ 11 (e). 

A. Deprivation of Due Process

Ms. Peters was afforded thirteen prehearing conferences and a thirteen-day

hearing that culminated in the issuance of a 118-page report on January 23, 2013,

which was carefully reviewed and adopted by the SDNY Committee. In re Peters, 

941 F. Supp. 2d at 361. The Second Circuit, affirming her suspension, remarked 

that Ms. Peters had been given “a very great deal of process,” and Ms. Peters 

subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 

Court. Peters v. Comm. on Grievances for U.S. Dist. Court 748 F.3d 456, 462 (2d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 448 (2014). Ms. Peters was afforded at least the 

minimum notice and opportunity to be heard to which she was constitutionally 

entitled and has not been deprived of due process.

B. Infirmity of Proof

The SDNY Committee, in reviewing the 118-page report written by the 

magistrate judge, found it “thorough and well-documented” and found “every 

conclusion . . . amply supported by the evidence.” In re Peters, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 

362. The Committee adopted the magistrate’s report but chose to impose a sevenyear suspension rather than the five years that the magistrate recommended. Id. at 
7

360, 366. 

Ms. Peters has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that there 

“was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear 

conviction that the Court could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final the 

conclusions on that subject.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (c)(2). Ms. Peters’s attacks on 

the factual findings that establish her misconduct implicitly target the magistrate’s 

careful credibility determinations regarding the live testimony before her, 

including a finding that Ms. Peters’s testimony was not credible. “[I]t is axiomatic 

that determinations of credibility and the weighing of evidence are within the 

province of the fact-finder.” In re Kanu, 5 A.3d 1, 10 (D.C. 2010) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Ventura v. United States, 927 A.2d 1090, 1104 (D.C. 2007)). 

Ms. Peters’s filings do not show by clear and convincing evidence that the 

magistrate’s findings, adopted by the SDNY Committee, were unsupported. 

C. Grave Injustice

Ms. Peters highlights the almost eight years that have elapsed since the New 

York disciplinary proceedings began, asking the court to conclude that imposition 

of an identical sanction would be a grave injustice. We have already foreclosed 

such an argument in In re Davy, 25 A.3d 70 (D.C. 2011), where, in response to the 

attorney’s contention that the seven-year delay between the original imposition of 
8

discipline and the reciprocal discipline action constituted a “grave injustice,” we 

held that “when the delay of judicial decision-making is largely a result of the 

respondent’s own actions or inactions, such circumstances are not sufficiently 

unique or compelling to mitigate discipline.” Id. at 73-74 (citing In re Fowler, 642 

A.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. 1994)). We reach the same conclusion here, where Ms. 

Peters failed to notify Bar Counsel that she had been disciplined in another 

jurisdiction until seven years after her first interim suspension in the Southern 

District of New York. See infra Part III.

Ms. Peters’s further argument that punishment serves no purpose because 

her 28-year career is otherwise unblemished and there is no reason to believe she 

will reoffend is also unavailing. The SDNY Committee found that Ms. Peters had 

a “habit of twisting the truth,” that she “continually tried to shift blame to virtually 

every other person who came within arm’s length of the Wolters Kluwer case,” and 

that she had “flagrant[ly] mischaracterize[ed] . . . the record,” and made “meritless 

objections.” In re Peters, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 366. The Committee concluded that 

this behavior “indicate[d] that she ha[d] yet to accept any responsibility for what 

the Committee views as serious professional wrongdoing.” Id. Because Ms. 

Peters continues to deny any responsibility for her actions and has persisted in 

long-rejected characterizations of the record, identical punishment would not 

constitute a grave injustice. 
9

D. Substantially Different Discipline in the District of Columbia

Disciplinary Counsel concedes that a reciprocal seven-year suspension 

would be inappropriate, as this would be a longer period than standard for 

disbarment and far longer than allowed in an ordinary suspension case originating 

in the District of Columbia. See D.C. Bar R. XI, §§ 3 (a)(2), 16 (a); see also In re 

Jacoby, 945 A.2d 1193, 1199-200 (D.C. 2008) (defining exception to reciprocal 

discipline rule when the sanction imposed in the foreign jurisdiction falls 

substantially outside the range of sanctions that would be imposed in the District 

for the same misconduct). Although Disciplinary Counsel proposes a five-year 

suspension with a fitness requirement (and we adopted this language in our July 2, 

2015, show cause order), Ms. Peters makes a convincing case that this too is 

outside the range of sanctions that would be imposed under the circumstances and 

that the difference is substantial.

“The imposition of sanctions in bar discipline, as with criminal punishment, 

is not an exact science but may depend on the facts and circumstances of each 

particular proceeding.” In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 986 A.2d 1191, 1202 (D.C. 

2010) (citing In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458, 463 (D.C. 1994)). In support of its 

request for a five-year suspension, Disciplinary Counsel cites In re Omwenga, 49 

A.3d 1235 (D.C. 2012) (disbarring an attorney for intentional misappropriation of 
10

a client’s funds and continuing dishonesty), and In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 986 A.2d 

at 1200 (disbarring an attorney for attempting to fraudulently obtain public funds 

and continuing dishonesty), as involving roughly equivalent behavior. While these 

cases do involve a campaign of dishonesty, there are also many cases involving 

dishonesty—but not misappropriation—that do not warrant disbarment and have 

resulted in suspension of less than five years. See, e.g., In re Silva, 29 A.3d 924 

(D.C. 2011) (suspending attorney for three years with a fitness requirement for 

forging legal documents and continuing dishonesty); In re Vohra, 68 A.3d 766 

(D.C. 2013) (suspending attorney for three years with a fitness requirement for 

forging client signatures and continuing dishonesty). We also take into 

consideration that Ms. Peters caused no actual harm through her misconduct and 

that her legal career has been otherwise free of disciplinary infractions. See In re

Washington, 541 A.2d 1276, 1277 (D.C. 1988) (holding that, although “occurrence 

of actual harm is by no means a prerequisite for disciplinary action,” the “absence 

of actual harm” and “respondent’s long history of unblemished practice” were 

relevant to the court’s choice of sanctions).

Although the misconduct in this case was serious, we conclude, in light of 

the absence of lasting harm and Ms. Peters’s otherwise unblemished twenty eightyear career, that the relevant actions here are appropriately remedied by a threeyear suspension. See In re Silva, 29 A.3d at 927-28; In re Vohra, 68 A.3d 771-73; 
11

see also D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (e) (allowing imposition of “such discipline as [the 

court] deems appropriate” if the court finds that identical sanction is inapplicable). 

E. Misconduct in the District of Columbia

The SDNY Committee found that when Ms. Peters knowingly disobeyed the 

district court’s confidentiality order and instructed a first-year associate to mark up 

documents, she engaged in conduct violating the following sections of the New 

York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility: 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in 

conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation),1-102(A)(5)

(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 7-102(A)(5)

(knowingly making a false statement of fact or law), and 7-106(A) (disregarding 

the ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding).5 See In re Peters, 941 

F. Supp. 2d at 362. This behavior constitutes misconduct in the District of 

Columbia. See, e.g., Rules of Prof. Conduct 3.3 (requiring candor to a tribunal), 

 

5

 In April 2009, the New York Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the 

New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility. Because of the timing 

of the misconduct, the Southern District of New York referred to the older rules. 

See Roy Simon, Comparing New NY Rules of Professional Conduct to Existing NY 

Code of Professional Responsibility (Part II), New York Legal Ethics Reporter 

(Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/comparing-new-ny-rules-ofprofessional-conduct-to-existing-ny-code-of-professional-responsibility-part-ii/; In 

re Peters, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 362. 
12

3.4 (c) (requiring fulfillment of obligation to tribunal), 8.4 (c) (proscribing conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4 (d) (proscribing 

conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice). 

III. Concurrency of Sanction 

Ms. Peters suggests that any disciplinary sanction be imposed upon her nunc 

pro tunc, as disciplinary authorities in other jurisdictions have found appropriate. 

“[A]n attorney sanctioned by the disciplinary authorities of another jurisdiction 

should ordinarily serve his or her reciprocal District of Columbia suspension 

concurrently with the suspension imposed in the original disciplining jurisdiction.” 

In re Soininen, 853 A.2d 712, 728 (D.C. 2004) (quoting In re Goldberg, 460 A.2d 

982, 985 (D.C. 1983)). However, “if the attorney unreasonably delays in notifying 

Disciplinary Counsel that he or she has been disciplined in another state, or if the 

attorney engages in the practice of law in the District of Columbia while suspended 

elsewhere, then a more severe sanction may be justified.” In re Goldberg, 460 

A.2d at 985.

Ms. Peters contends that she “kept the courts and bars where [she] actually 

practice[s]—the Connecticut Bar and the New York Bar—fully apprised and 

promptly notified at every juncture of this matter.” Disciplinary Counsel in the 

District of Columbia was not notified, however, until April 10, 2015, seven years 
13

after the interim suspension first issued in the Southern District of New York. Ms. 

Peters suggests that because other courts—more promptly notified—stayed their 

proceedings pending the outcome of the SDNY Committee’s decision and 

subsequent appeals, and because she had not recently practiced in the District of 

Columbia, she did not need to notify Disciplinary Counsel until her petition for 

writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court on November 3, 2014. Even 

under this interpretation, Ms. Peters’s notification was delayed five months, and in 

any event, no reading of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (b), the D.C. Bar rule governing 

notice, permitted Ms. Peters to forgo promptly notifying Disciplinary Counsel once 

she was “subjected to professional disciplinary action” in the Southern District of 

New York.6

Given Ms. Peters’s unreasonable delay in providing notice of the 

disciplinary action against her, the ordinary presumption of concurrent sanctions is 

not warranted. Ms. Peters’s suspension is to run from July 2, 2015, and not from 

April 10, 2008. 

 

6 Although Ms. Peters notes that she voluntarily refrained from practicing in 

the District of Columbia during the pendency of her disciplinary case before the 

Committee in the Southern District of New York, this fact does not—by itself—

help her. In re Goldberg, 460 A.2d 982, 985 (D.C. 1983) (looking to both 

voluntary restraint and prompt notice to bar counsel of foreign discipline).
14

IV. Fitness Requirement

To require proof of fitness as a condition of reinstatement after suspension, 

“the record in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and convincing 

evidence that casts a serious doubt upon the attorney’s continuing fitness to 

practice law.” In re De Maio, 893 A.2d at 589 (quoting In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 6

(D.C. 2005)). “[A]n attorney’s lack of remorse, failure to cooperate during the 

disciplinary process, or other evidence of questionable conduct in the course of 

disciplinary proceedings” may tip the balance toward imposition of a fitness 

requirement. In re Guberman, 978 A.2d 200, 211 (D.C. 2009). 

While the misconduct in this case warrants a three-year rather than a fiveyear suspension, Ms. Peters’s pattern of denying culpability causes sufficiently 

serious doubt about her continuing fitness to practice law as to warrant imposition 

of a fitness requirement should Ms. Peters decide she wishes to resume practice in 

the District of Columbia after the expiration of her suspension.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Kristan Peters is suspended from the practice of 

law in the District of Columbia for three years from July 2, 2015, with 

reinstatement conditioned upon proof of fitness to practice law. See D.C. Bar R. 
15

XI, §§ 3 (a)(2), 11 (e), 14 (h), 16 (a).

So ordered.