15-2013 

Huang v. Lynch 

BIA 

Nelson, IJ 

A029 103 775 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

1st 4 day of December, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 DENNY CHIN, 

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 BAO LIN HUANG, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-2013 

17 NAC 

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: John Chang, New York, New 

24 York. 

25 

26 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

27 Assistant Attorney General; Anthony 

28 P. Nicastro, Acting Assistant 

29 Director; D. Nicholas Harling, Trial 

30 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

31 Litigation, United States 

32 Department of Justice, Washington, 

33 D.C. 
2 

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Bao Lin Huang, a native and citizen of China, 

6 seeks review of a June 18, 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming 

7 a November 19, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

8 denying Huang’s applications for cancellation of removal and 

9 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Bao Lin Huang, No. A029 103 775 

11 (B.I.A. June 18, 2015), aff’g No. A029 103 775 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. 

12 City Nov. 19, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 

13 the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 We address only cancellation of removal. As the 

15 Government points out, Huang has not challenged the denial of 

16 asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief in this Court. 

17 See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 

18 2005) (holding that claims not sufficiently argued in a brief 

19 are abandoned). 

20 For an applicant, like Huang, who is not a lawful permanent 

21 resident to obtain cancellation of removal, he must establish, 

22 in relevant part, that his “removal would result in exceptional 

23 and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or 
3 

1 child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully 

2 admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). 

3 Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is “'substantially' 

4 beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected” when a 

5 close family member leaves the country, and is limited to “truly 

6 exceptional” situations. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. 

7 Dec. 56, 62 (B.I.A. 2001); accord Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 

8 516 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2008). “[C]onsideration should be 

9 given to the age, health, and circumstances of the qualifying 

10 family members, including how a lower standard of living or 

11 adverse country conditions in the country of return might affect 

12 those relatives.” In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 

13 468 (B.I.A. 2002). 

14 The agency concluded that the hardship to Huang’s 

15 qualifying relative—his 19-year-old U.S.-citizen son—did not 

16 rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual. Our 

17 jurisdiction to review this decision is limited to 

18 “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See 8 U.S.C. 

19 § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); accord Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 

20 38-39. Fact-finding is flawed by an error of law in the 

21 hardship context when “facts important to the subtle 

22 determination of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ 

23 have been totally overlooked and others have been seriously 
4 

1 mischaracterized.” Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d 

2 Cir. 2009). 

3 Huang has not identified any error that rises to the level 

4 of a constitutional claim or question of law. He argues that 

5 the agency ignored medical evidence of his son’s need for 

6 treatment of asthma and a depressive disorder and the testimony 

7 of his son’s psychologist that his son’s depression would be 

8 exacerbated by either returning to China with Huang or remaining 

9 in the United States without Huang. We do not mean to minimize 

10 his son's depression caused apparently in part by the 

11 possibility of Huang's removal, but Huang’s argument is belied 

12 by the record. The agency explicitly acknowledged his son’s 

13 health concerns and medical evidence (although the IJ noted that 

14 many of the medical records were illegible), and discussed the 

15 testimony of the psychologist. Accordingly, Huang has not 

16 shown an error of law, but is challenging the factual findings, 

17 that is, the level of hardship that Huang’s son will suffer. 

18 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 

19 38-39. 

20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

21 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

22 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

23 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 
5 

1 is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this 

2 petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate 

3 Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 

4 FOR THE COURT: 

5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk