IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Luis G. Rosa, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

State Civil Service Commission, : No. 111 C.D. 2021

Respondent : Submitted: June 3, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: December 5, 2022

Luis G. Rosa (Rosa) petitions for review of the January 25, 2021 order 

of the State Civil Service Commission (Commission) denying his request for a

hearing on the basis that his appeal request form contained insufficient allegations 

of discrimination. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background

In December 2017, while serving as Director of Reentry and Quality 

Assurance with the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board), Rosa attended sexual 

harassment training provided for employees of the Board and the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections (Department). See Appeal Request Form at 3, 
2

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 4a. Rosa alleged that John Wetzel, Secretary of the 

Department (Secretary Wetzel), authorized the use of “vile and inappropriate” 

examples of sexual assault in the prison setting, causing certain employees to leave 

the training. Id. Rosa subsequently confronted Secretary Wetzel at a meeting 

regarding the assertedly inappropriate training. Id. 

In February 2018, Rosa was promoted to the position of Deputy 

Secretary for Reentry. Appeal Request Form at 3, R.R. at 4a. Rosa was

subsequently terminated, learning of his discharge on April 25, 2018 by means of 

correspondence signed by Ty Stanton, Public Safety Human Relations Manager.1 

Id. at 4, R.R. at 5a. 

In December 2018, Rosa submitted an application for a parole hearing 

officer position with the Board. Id. at 4, R.R. at 5a. In June 2019, Rosa received 

notice of the Board’s decision not to fill the posted position. See id. at 4, R.R. at 5a. 

In August 2019, Rosa applied for two additional positions with the 

Board.

2

 Id. In November 2019, the Board informed Rosa of its intention not to fill 

the two positions. Id. 

Rosa also unsuccessfully applied for a parole hearing officer position 

in October 2020. Id. at 3, R.R. at 4a. Rosa alleged that he received near perfect 

1 Confusingly, despite alleging that he was promoted to the position of Deputy Secretary 

for Reentry in February 2018, Rosa stated that he worked “most recently” as Director of Reentry 

and Quality Assurance for the Board until March 29, 2018, prior to his April 2018 termination. 

See Appeal Request Form at 3, R.R. at 4a. However, Rosa listed the position of Regional 

Institutional Parole Director in Part I(G) of the appeal request form, titled ‘What is/was your latest 

civil service job title?’. Id. at 1, R.R. at 2a. Rosa also avers in his appellate brief that he was 

terminated by Secretary Wetzel, thereby suggesting that the Department was his most recent 

employer. See Rosa’s Br. at 9. 

2 These positions were presumably also parole hearing officer positions. See Appeal 

Request Form at 4, R.R. at 5a.
3

scores on all relevant examinations in connection with his applications. See id. at 4, 

R.R. at 5a.

On November 30, 2020, Rosa learned that four positions had been 

posted, internally only, for employees of the Board and the Department. Appeal 

Request Form at 4, R.R. at 5a. Rosa’s appeal request form provided the position 

numbers utilized in the posting but did not otherwise describe the nature of these 

positions, nor did it otherwise explain their relevance to Rosa’s claim. See id. at 3, 

R.R. at 4a.

On December 10, 2020, Rosa submitted the appeal request form with

the Commission. See id. at 1, R.R. at 2a. Rosa alleged racial discrimination, 

retaliation, disparate treatment and a “[v]iolation of Act 71 of 2018 (Civil Service 

Reform)3 or Rules.”4 Id. Rosa checked boxes indicating that the challenged 

personnel actions involved “eligibility,” “list removal,” and “reinstatement,” and 

requested remedies of reinstatement, lost wages and benefits, and “repeat hiring 

process.” Id. at 1-2, R.R. at 2a-3a.

Rosa alleged that the following four individuals discriminated against 

him: Theodore Johnson, Chairman of the Board (Chairman Johnson); Secretary 

3 Act of June 28, 2018, P.L. 460, No. 71, § 1 (Act 71), 71 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-3304.

4

In alleging a violation of Act 71 or the Commission’s Rules, Rosa likely intended to assert 

a claim of technical discrimination. This Court has explained technical discrimination as follows:

Technical discrimination involves a violation of procedures required 

pursuant to [Act 71] or related Rules. In order to obtain relief, an 

employee must show that he was, in fact, harmed because of the 

technical non-compliance with [Act 71] or evidence that because of 

the peculiar nature of the procedural impropriety he could have been 

harmed but there is no way to prove that for certain.

Reck v. State Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 992 A.2d 977, 980 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citation omitted).
4

Wetzel; James Barnacle, Director of Investigations and Intelligence for the 

Department; and Ty Stanton, for whom Rosa did not specify the agency or other 

Commonwealth entity served. See Appeal Request Form at 3, R.R. at 4a. Rosa 

asserted that although Chairman Johnson informed him that “OA”5 had not 

submitted his name for “some” of the civil service positions, he nevertheless 

discovered that his name had been submitted. Id. at 3, R.R. at 4a. Further, Rosa 

maintained that even though Chairman Johnson stated that certain of these positions 

were not filled, at least two candidates were in fact hired. Id. Rosa also alleged that 

Secretary Wetzel’s stated reason for his termination, i.e., pursuing a “change in 

leadership,” was pretextual, and that his removal was in fact motivated by 

discrimination on the basis of race and national origin, as well as retaliation for his 

complaints regarding the 2017 sexual harassment training. Id. at 4, R.R. at 5a. 

Rosa maintained that despite informing him it was not filling two of the 

parole hearing officer positions for which he had applied, the Board had in fact hired 

two parole hearing officers in March and April of 2019. Appeal Request Form at 4, 

R.R. at 5a. According to Rosa, this decision followed shortly after a March 2019

meeting at which Chairman Johnson requested from Mr. Barnacle a privileged and 

confidential “internal file” pertaining to Rosa without first obtaining authorization 

from Rosa, the Office of Administration, the Commission, or legal counsel for either 

the Board or the Department. Id. Rosa also alleged that Mr. Barnacle shared “a

verbal statement on his thoughts/beliefs [regarding] Rosa with [] Chairman 

Johnson.” Id. Further, Rosa asserted that the March 2019 meeting took place 

without the requisite pre-authorization. Id. Rosa also alleged that following the 

5 Rosa presumably refers to Pennsylvania’s Office of Administration. See Appeal Request 

Form at 3, R.R. at 4a.
5

March 2019 meeting, he was treated as an “outside” hire rather than an “internal” 

hire, even though the Office of Administration had previously prioritized the 

reinstatement of former employees. Id. Rosa contended that his “opportunity was 

tainted once a negative reference was provided,” and that “[t]his defamation was 

intentional, discriminatory, and retaliatory.” Id. at 4, R.R. at 5a.

Further, Rosa asserted that the Board’s decision in 2020 to restrict the 

four job postings to “internal” applicants constituted “another attempt [by the Board] 

to go around the system and deny [him] a fair opportunity to gain Commonwealth 

employment” in retaliation for confronting Secretary Wetzel regarding the allegedly 

inappropriate sexual harassment training. Appeal Request Form at 3, R.R. at 4a. 

Thus, Rosa maintained that the Board “thwarted [his] efforts to seek employment” 

by “act[ing] in concert with the [Department] to attempt to retaliate and deny [him] 

Commonwealth employment after his [April 2018] termination,” even though he had 

been informed that reinstatement was possible as long as he was qualified for the 

position he sought. Id. at 4, R.R. at 5a.

By order dated January 20, 2021, and mailed on January 25, 2021, the 

Commission declined to grant Rosa a hearing on the basis that he failed to aver acts 

which, if proven, would constitute discrimination. Commission Order, 1/25/21, R.R. 

at 14a. Rosa petitioned this Court for review.6

6 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been 

violated, an error of law has been committed, or necessary findings of fact are unsupported by 

substantial evidence. Williams v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 811 A.2d 1090, 1092 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2002); see also Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
6

II. Issues

Before this Court, Rosa argues that the Commission erred in denying 

his request for a hearing, because the allegations of discrimination set forth in his 

appeal request form were sufficiently specific. See Rosa’s Br. at 10-12. Rosa 

contends that he “alleged various forms of discrimination including, inter alia, 

retaliation and violations of civil service rules when he applied for multiple open 

[p]arole [h]earing [o]fficer positions with the [Board] but [] was not even 

interviewed for the openings despite the fact he had scored excellently on the 

[Commission’s] tests[.]” Id. at 9. Further, Rosa asserts Secretary Wetzel’s statement

that Rosa was terminated in the interest of pursuing a change in leadership was 

merely pretextual, and he was in fact dismissed in retaliation for complaining about

the allegedly inappropriate sexual harassment training authorized by Secretary 

Wetzel.7 Id. at 10. Rosa also maintains that his termination was motivated by racial 

discrimination. Id. at 9-10. Moreover, Rosa contends that representatives of the 

Board and the Department shared privileged and confidential information pertaining 

to him without first obtaining his consent, in violation of Management Directive 

505.18.8 Id. at 10. Rosa contends that his “quite lengthy averments and explanations 

7 Although Rosa alleges that Secretary Wetzel influenced his termination, we note that 

Rosa was employed by the Board at the time of his termination. See Appeal Request Form at 3-4, 

R.R. at 4a-5a.

8 Presumably, Rosa is referencing Management Directive 505.18 of the Pennsylvania 

Governor’s Office, available at https://www.oa.pa.gov/Policies/md/Documents/505_18.pdf (last 

visited Dec. 2, 2022).
7

as to the basis for his [] appeal . . . more than sufficiently alleged acts of 

discrimination (specifically retaliation).” Id. at 11.

9

 

III. Discussion

Pursuant to Section 105.12(a) of the Commission’s Rules, 

“[r]equests for hearings shall be . . . [r]eceived or postmarked not more than 20 

calendar days after the employee receives notice of the challenged personnel action.” 

4 Pa. Code § 105.12(a)(3). A person alleging discrimination under Act 7110 “shall 

appeal within 20 calendar days of the alleged discrimination.”

11

 Id. Rosa filed his 

appeal request form with the Commission on December 10, 2020. See Appeal 

Request Form at 1, R.R. at 2a. Thus, Rosa’s appeal is timely only with respect to 

9 Rosa also asserted in his petition for review that the Commission violated his due process 

rights by failing to advise him of his ability to amend his appeal request form. See Pet. for Rev. at 

2, ¶ 5. However, Rosa waived this argument by failing to include it in his appellate brief. See 

Dubaskas v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 81 A.3d 167, 171 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (noting that petitioner’s 

failure to brief assertion raised in petition for review resulted in waiver); see also Van Duser v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 642 A.2d 544, 548 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (stating that 

“[i]ssues not briefed are waived”).

10 We note that Section 105.12(a) of the Commission’s rules has not been updated and still 

cites the former Civil Service Act, Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, as amended, formerly 71 P.S. 

§§ 741.1-741.1005, rather than the current Act 71.

11 Although Section 105.12(a) of the Commission’s Rules states that a person alleging 

discrimination “shall appeal within 20 calendar days of the alleged discrimination,” as opposed to 

20 days after the person “receives notice” of the alleged discrimination, this Court has observed 

that an appeal to the Commission is timely where it is received or postmarked within 20 days of 

the date of the discovery of the allegedly discriminatory personnel action. See Seddon v. Pa.

Liquor Control Bd., 609 A.2d 619, 621 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (citing 4 Pa. Code § 105.12(a)(3) 

(stating that petitioners had “twenty days from the date of discovering that their non-selections for 

promotion were allegedly discriminatory to appeal to the Commission”)).
8

his claim of retaliation premised on the restriction of four job postings to “internal”

applicants, as Rosa alleged that he received notice of the “internal” posting on 

November 30, 2020. However, this claim is waived due to omission from Rosa’s 

appellate brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that the argument section of the brief 

shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued, followed by 

such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent); see also

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (stating, “where an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant 

authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of 

review, that claim is waived”); Rapid Pallet v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 

707 A.2d 636, 638 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (“Arguments not properly developed in a 

brief will be deemed waived by this Court.”).12

Moreover, even if there were no waiver, we observe that Rosa failed to 

state a claim of retaliation. Section 105.12 of the Commission’s Rules further 

provides:

(b) The person appealing shall state clearly and concisely 

the:

(1) Grounds of the interest of the person in the subject 

matter.

12 Further, we question whether the allegedly retaliatory “internal” job postings constitute 

a “personnel action” for purposes of Section 105.12(a)(3) of the Commission’s Rules, 4 Pa. Code 

§ 105.12(a)(3). See, e.g., Tempero v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 403 A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1979) (noting that “loss of supervisory authority, without more, is not a personnel action” for 

purposes of a discrimination claim by a civil service employee); O’Peil v. Pa. State Civ. Serv. 

Comm’n, 332 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975) (“The adoption of or change in a compensation 

plan does not constitute a personnel action.”). “Where there is no personnel action cognizable 

under [applicable civil service law], there can be no discrimination over which the Commission 

has jurisdiction. Not every occurrence is a personnel action.” Aurand v. State Civ. Serv. Comm’n 

(Dep’t of Env’t Prot.), 768 A.2d 353, 356 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (quoting Behm v. State Civ. Serv. 

Comm’n, 494 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985)).
9

(2) Facts relied upon.

(3) Relief sought.

(c) Appeals alleging discrimination which do not include 

specific facts relating to discrimination may be dismissed. 

Specific facts which should appear on the appeal form 

include:

(1) The acts complained of.

(2) How the treatment differs from treatment of others 

similarly situated.

(3) When the acts occurred.

(4) When and how the appellant first became aware of 

the alleged discrimination.

4 Pa. Code § 105.12(b), (c). “The Commission may dismiss, sua sponte, an appeal 

for what is, in effect, a failure to state a cause of action for discrimination under 

[Section 2704 of Act 71, 71 Pa.C.S. § 2704].” Craig v. State Civ. Serv. Comm’n

(Dep’t of Env’t Prot.), 800 A.2d 364, 365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). This Court has 

explained further:

The burden of prosecuting such an appeal [(i.e., an appeal

based on discrimination)] rests with the employee. The

underlying factual basis of the claimed discrimination

must be enumerated specifically. Discrimination cannot

be inferred; there must be affirmative factual support to 

sustain the allegations. . . . [This Court] must determine

whether [an a]ppellant’s appeal[] state[s] sufficient facts

to establish a claim.

Keim v. Dep’t of Health, 543 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (citations 

omitted) (citing Section 105.12(c) of the Commission’s Rules, 4 Pa. Code § 

105.12(c)); see also Pa. Game Comm’n v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 2308 C.D. 2007, filed May 7, 2008), slip op. at 5-6 (holding that where a civil 

service employee alleges discrimination in the form of retaliation, “the employee 
10

bears the initial burden to show that the employer has acted in a discriminatory 

manner”). Thus, assuming Rosa had not waived his claim, the question sub judice

would be whether he stated facts sufficient to establish a discrimination claim on the 

basis that restricting the 2020 job postings to “internal” applicants constituted 

retaliation. 

Act 71 does not provide for a separate statutory claim of retaliation, 

independent of a discrimination claim under Section 2704, 71 Pa.C.S. § 2704. 

Rather, proving retaliation is one mode of establishing that an appointing authority 

engaged in discrimination by basing a personnel action on “nonmerit factors.” See

id.; see also Beaver Cnty. v. Funk, 492 A.2d 118, 121 & 121 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) 

(explaining that evidence regarding the financial state of the county at the time the 

employer furloughed a probationary status caseworker, coupled with testimony as 

to a witness’s belief that the furlough was imposed in retaliation for the bargaining 

unit’s refusal to accept a wage freeze, satisfied a caseworker’s burden of establishing 

that the furlough was based on nonmerit factors and thus was discriminatory under 

Section 905.1 of the former Civil Service Act, 71 P.S. § 741.905(a)).

A complainant may establish a prima facie case of retaliation by 

demonstrating:

(1) that the complainant engaged in a protected activity;

(2) that [the e]mployer was aware of the protected activity;

(3) that subsequent to participation of the protected

activity [the] complainant was subjected to an adverse

action by [the e]mployer; and

(4) that there is a causal connection between participation

of the protected activity and the adverse employment

action.
11

Robert Wholey Co. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 606 A.2d 982, 983 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1992). “Once the complainant makes this initial case, the burden then shifts to the 

employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory motive for its action. If 

the employer does so, the complainant is then given the opportunity to demonstrate 

that the proffered reasons were pretextual.” Spanish Council of York, Incorp. v. Pa.

Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 879 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

13

Here, Rosa failed to plead a causal connection between his complaint 

regarding the allegedly inappropriate sexual harassment training and the alleged 

adverse employment action (restricting certain job postings to “internal” applicants 

following his termination). Although Rosa does not specify when he allegedly 

confronted Secretary Wetzel regarding the training, presumably he did so sometime 

between the December 2017 training and his termination in the spring of 2018. See 

Appeal Request Form at 4, R.R. at 5a. Rosa averred that he learned of the 

purportedly retaliatory “internal” job postings on November 30, 2020. See id. This 

delay of roughly three years does not support an inference of causation, and Rosa 

failed to allege any other facts evidencing the requisite causal connection. Cf. Circle 

Bolt & Nut Co., Inc. v. Pa. Hum. Rel. Comm’n, 954 A.2d 1265, 1269 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2008) (determining that complainant established prima facie case of retaliation, 

13 This Court has previously applied cases involving discrimination claims brought under 

the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§§ 951-963, to decide discrimination claims brought by current or former civil service employees. 

See Pa. Game Comm’n, slip op. at 9-10 (applying the four-prong test articulated in Robert Wholey 

Co. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 606 A.2d 982, 983 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (reasoning that “[b]ecause 

of the similarity in subject matter, the analysis from a Human Relations Commission case provides 

valued guidance” regarding a claim of discrimination in the form of retaliation under the former 

Civil Service Act); cf. Henderson v. Pa. Off. of the Budget, 560 A.2d 859, 863 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) 

(adopting for the resolution of traditional discrimination claims brought under the former Civil 

Service Act the standard applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to decide such claims under 

the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act) (citing Allegheny Housing Rehab. Corp. v. Pa. Hum. Rel. 

Comm’n, 532 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1987)).
12

where employer transferred complainant less than 24 hours following her criticism 

of a co-worker’s sexually offensive conduct and terminated her several weeks later); 

Robert Wholey Co., 606 A.2d at 984 (holding that complainant established prima 

facie case of retaliation where employer issued suspension within three months of 

the withdrawal of complainant’s initial complaint, reasoning that “[w]hen 

participation in a protected activity and the occurrence of an adverse employment 

action occur within close proximity in time, causation is inferred”).

14

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

_________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

14 We note that Rosa’s appeal request form reflects that he was promoted to the position of 

Deputy Secretary for Reentry after complaining to Secretary Wetzel regarding the allegedly 

inappropriate sexual harassment training. See Appeal Request Form at 3, R.R. at 4a. Assuming 

his is correct, Rosa’s promotion further undercuts any causal connection between his complaint 

and the alleged retaliation. 

Moreover, we observe that Rosa failed to establish that he “was subjected to an adverse 

action by [the e]mployer” when certain job postings were restricted to “internal” applicants 

following his termination, because neither the Board nor the Department was his employer at that 

time. See Robert Wholey Co., 606 A.2d at 983.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Luis G. Rosa, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

State Civil Service Commission, : No. 111 C.D. 2021

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 5th day of December, 2022, the January 25, 2021 

order of the State Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge