1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAHBOUBEH YAZDANPANAHDERAV, et al. , Plaintiffs ,

v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al. , Defendants

. Case No. 1:23-cv-3688 (ACR)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In 2022, Plaintiff Mahboubeh Yazdanpanahderav applied for an immigra nt visa to join her husband (and fellow Plaintiff) Sa jjad Mousavi in the United States. Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi have not yet scheduled he r for a consular interview—a necessary step toward acquiring a visa. Plaintiffs have sued the U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and Attorney General Merric k Garland, alleging th at Defendants have unreasonably delayed their processing of Yazdan panahderav’s application. Although the Court sympathizes with Plaintiffs’ situ ation, their Complaint does not pl ausibly show that the delay is unreasonable. The Court therefore di smisses this case without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND A. Legal Background A U.S. citizen who wants to help a noncitizen spouse obtain lawful permanent resident status must file an I-130 Petit ion for Alien Relative with U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a subagency of th e Department of Homeland Security. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154; 8 C. F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). If USCIS approves the petition and the2 beneficiary spouse is outside the United States , the agency forwards the case to the State Department’s National Visa Center (NVC) fo r processing. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(3). The beneficiary spouse must then submit additional pa perwork, including a visa application, and fees.
See 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.62-.63; 9 Foreign Affs. Manu al § 504.1-2(b), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/ 09FAM/09FAM050401.html [https://perma.cc/R6U4-R8 DX]. Once the applicant (that is, the beneficiary spouse) meets thos e requirements, the NVC designa tes the case “documentarily complete” and coordinates with the appropriate consulate or em bassy to schedul e the applicant for a required consular interview. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.62; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b)- (d). “Appointments are generally scheduled in the chronological order of the documentarily complete applicants.” 9 Fo reign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(d). Following the interview, the consular officer “must” generally either “issue the visa” or “refuse the visa.” 1 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). B. Factual Background The Court takes the facts from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC , 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Yazdanpanahderav is an Iranian c itizen who resides in Iran. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 1. Her husband, Plaintiff Mousavi, is a U.S. citizen who lives in New York. Id. at 1; id. ¶ 2. Mousavi filed an I-130 petition on Yazdanpanahderav’s behalf in April 2022. Id. ¶ 2. USCIS approved the petition on June 23, 2022, and forwar ded it to the NVC for further processing. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Yazdanpanahderav submitted the required application, documents, and fees on August 4,

1 The consular officer must instead “discontinue granting the visa” if the applicant’s country is subject to visa sanctions under 8 U. S.C. § 1253(d). 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a).3 2022. Id. ¶ 3. The NVC designated her case docu mentarily complete on October 1, 2022. Id. ¶ 4. The next step toward Yazdanpanahderav’s obta ining a visa is a cons ular interview at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Id. at 2; id. ¶ 6; see supra Section I.A. But, “[d]espite Plaintiffs’ repeated attempts to seek cl arification and resolution,” Yazd anpanahderav has not received an interview slot. Compl. ¶ 7. “This delay ha s caused significant dist ress and hardship for [Plaintiffs], who await their re union in the United States.” Id. C. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed this cas e in December 2023. Compl. The Complaint asserts that Defendants have unreasonably dela yed in scheduling Yazdanpanahderav for a consular interview and adjudicating her vi sa application. Id. ¶¶ 8-19. Citing both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to sc hedule an interview and decide th e application. Compl. at 4-6. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complain t in February 2024. Dkt. 5 (Mot.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and unde r Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintif f bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. E.g. , Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as here, “the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations,” Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola , 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material fact ual allegations in the complaint and construe[s]4 the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. , 642 F.3d at 1139 (cleaned up). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contai n sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). To meet that standard, a pl aintiff’s allegations must support a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but itasks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up). “Where a co mplaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitl ement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up).
III. ANALYSIS Defendants argue both that Plai ntiffs lack standing and that the Complaint does not state any plausible claims. The Court agrees in pa rt on the first point and in full on the second.
A. Plaintiffs Have Established Standing to Sue the State Department but Not Secretary Blinken or Attorney General Garland
Defendants first assert that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Mot. at 8-14, 23-25. To establish standing at this stage, “Plaintiffs must state a plausible claim that they have suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to [Defendants’] actions . . . that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack , 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Defendants make two arguments: First, they contend that Plaintiffs have suffered no injury in fact because visa-processing delay is a procedural injury that cannot confer standing unless tied to some concrete interest, see Summers v. Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 496-97 (2009), which Plaintiffs pur portedly lack because Yazdanpanahderav has no constitutional right to enter the United States, Mot. at 7-15; see Trump v. Hawaii , 585 U.S.5 667, 703 (2018). Second, they assert that Secr etary Blinken and Attorney General Garland cannot redress Plaintiffs’ injuries because they play no role in pro cessing Yazdanpanahderav’s application. Mot. at 5-7. The Court rejects the first argument but concludes that Plaintiffs have forfeited any respons e to the second. Defendants’ first argument fails because it too narrowly defines the set of concrete injuries that can confer standi ng. “While Defendants are correct that [Yazdanpanahderav] ha[s] no constitutional right to enter th is country, concrete interests sufficient to support standing are not limited to those specified by the Constitution itself.” Rashidian v. Garland , No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (cleaned up). “[I]ntangible harms . . . with a close relationship to harms tradi tionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts” also suffice. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021). At minimum, Plaintiffs have alleged such a harm with respect to Mousavi, as the Supreme Court has held that a U.S. citizen’s “interest in being united w ith his relatives is su fficiently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III injury in fact.” 2 Trump , 585 U.S. at 698; see also Pourabdollah v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1603, 2024 WL 474523, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024) (applying this injury in the visa-delay context) . Since at least Mousav i has standing under this theory, the Court need not decide whether Y azdanpanahderav, who seeks identical relief on the

2 Defendants, citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Colindres v. U.S. Department of State , 71 F.4th 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2023), emphasize that “citizen s have no fundamental [constitutional] right to live in America w ith their spouses.” Mot. at 13 n.5 (quoting Colindres , 71 F.4th at 1023). True, and problematic for the merits of any constitutional claim Mousavi might bring to challenge the delay in adjudicating hi s wife’s visa application. But Colindres and the Supreme Court decision it relied on, Kerry v. Din , 576 U.S. 86 (2015), both examined the merits of constitutional claims—neither questioned whethe r the plaintiffs had st anding to bring those claims, and Trump explicitly approved a family- unification theory of standing. See Trump , 576 U.S. at 698 (discussing Din ); Colindres , 71 F.4th at 1021 (affirming dism issal for failure to state a claim, rather than lack of subject matter jurisdiction).6 same claims, does too. See Trump , 585 U.S. at 698 (requiring standing for only at least one plaintiff seeking each form of relief); see also Pourabdollah , 2024 WL 474523, at *3 (extending this theory of standing to a noncitizen). The Court will not dismiss on this basis. 3 Defendants’ second argument—t hat Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Secretary Blinken or Attorney General Garland—meets with more succ ess because Plaintiffs have forfeited any counterargument. The Court may treat an argument to which a party fails to respond as conceded. See, e.g. , Gandhi v. Ctrs. for Medi care & Medicaid Servs. , 665 F. Supp. 3d 49, 58 (D.D.C. 2023). Neither Plaint iffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion nor their (unauthorized) Sur-Reply in support of that Opposition offers any meaningful response to Defendants’ second standing argument. See Dkt. 8 (Opp.) at 2-6; Dkt. 10 (Su r-Reply) at 1-2. Plaintiffs have therefore forfeited the issue, and the Court dism isses the claims against Secretary Blinken and Attorney General Garland for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Stated Plausible Unreasonable-Delay Claims The Court turns to the merits of Plaintiffs ’ unreasonable-delay clai ms under the APA and the Mandamus Act. Under both statutes, “‘the central question’ is ‘whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.’” Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv-1581, 2024 WL 341166, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024) (cleaned up) (quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc. , 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). To answer that question, courts in this Circuit consider the six “ TRAC ” factors, drawn from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v.

3 At times, Defendants’ briefing on this argument gestures toward the consular nonreviewability doctrine (without referencing it by name). See Mot. at 13-14. The Court has previously explained why it need not address this nonjurisdi ctional issue before r eaching the merits of a visa-delay case, see Rashidian , 2024 WL 1076810, at *5, and it sticks to that approach here.7 FCC , 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984): (1) “[T]he time ag encies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason”; (2) “where Congre ss has provided a timeta ble or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason”; (3) “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human hea lth and welfare are at stake”; (4) “the court should consider the effect of e xpediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority ”; (5) “the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by de lay”; and (6) “the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold th at agency action is unreasonably delayed.” Id. at 80 (cleaned up). “These considerations are of ten grouped into four basic inquiries”: First, is there any rhyme or reas on—congressionally prescribed or otherwise—for an agency’s delay (factors one and two)? Second, what are the consequences of delay if the Court does not compel the agency to act (factors three and fi ve)? Third, how might forcing the agency to act thwart its ability to address other priorities (factor four)? Finally, is the delay intent ional or due to a ny impropriety on the part of the agency (factor six)?
Khazaei v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs do not address any of these factors in detail. See Opp. at 4-5. Instead, they primarily argue that the TRAC analysis is too fact-intensive to conduct at this stage. See id. But binding precedent from the D.C. Circuit—not to mention a caval cade of case law from this District—shows otherwise. See Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off. , 80 F.4th 330, 340-46 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of visa-d elay case for failure to state claim based on TRAC8 factors). 4 Unsurprisingly so, since the Court ha s ample facts to which to apply the TRAC factors—those alleged in the Complaint, with all reasonable inferences draw n in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. Conducting that analysis , the Court conclude s that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not plausibly show that the dela y in adjudicating Yazdanpanahderav’s application is unreasonable.
1. TRAC factors one and two The first two factors, which consider whethe r the agency is following a “rule of reason,” “congressionally prescribed or otherwise,” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up), cut Defendants’ way. The D.C. Circuit has concluded that an agency “employs a rule of reason” when it processes immigration applications or petitions on a “first-i n, first-out” basis. Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 340-41. Here, the State Department represents in published materials that it

4 See also, e.g. , Vafaei v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. , No. 22-cv-1608, 2024 WL 1213394, at *3-7 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2024) (applying TRAC factors when analyzing motion to dismiss); Arabzada v. Donis , No. 23-cv-6555, 2024 WL 1175802, at *5-10 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2024) (same); Fakhimi v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv-1127, 2023 WL 6976073, at *7-11 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023) (same); Krihely v. Mayorkas , No. 22-cv-2973, 2023 WL 6215360, at *2-7 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2023) (same); Khoshrou v. Blinken , No. 22-cv-2859, 2023 WL 4930086, at *5- 9 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2023) (same); Punt v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. , No. 22-cv-1218, 2023 WL 157320, at *2-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2023) (same); Zandieh v. Pompeo , No. 20-cv-919, 2020 WL 4346915, at *4-6 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022) (same); Mokkapati v. Mayorkas , No. 21-cv1195, 2022 WL 2817840, at *4-7 (D.D.C. July 19, 2022) (same); Telles v. Mayorkas , No. 21-cv395, 2022 WL 2713349, at *3-5 (D.D.C. July 13, 2022) (same); Arab v. Blinken , 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 69-72 (D.D.C. 2022) (same); Mahmood v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 21-cv-1262, 2021 WL 5998385, at *7-9 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021) (same); Brzezinski v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 21-cv-376, 2021 WL 4191958, at *4-6 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (same); Thakker v. Renaud , No. 20-cv-1133, 2021 WL 1092269, at *5-8 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2021) (same); Desai v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. , No. 20-cv-1005, 2021 WL 1110737, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2021) (same); Mirbaha v. Pompeo , 513 F. Supp. 3d 179, 184-87 (D.D.C. 2021) (same); Dastagir v. Blinken , 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164-69 (D.D.C. 2021) (same); Palakuru v. Renaud , 521 F. Supp. 3d 46, 49-53 (D.D.C. 2021) (same); Ghadami v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 19-cv397, 2020 WL 1308376, at *7-9 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2020) (same); Sarlak v. Pompeo , No. 20-cv35, 2020 WL 3082018, at *5 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020) (same); Didban v. Pompeo , 435 F. Supp. 3d 168, 175-77 (D.D.C. 2020) (same); Bagherian v. Pompeo , 442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 94-96 (D.D.C. 2020) (same); Skalka v. Kelly , 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152-55 (D.D.C. 2017) (same).9 “generally schedule[s interviews] in the chronological order of the documentarily complete applicants,” with some considera tion for “mailing delays or travel time by applicants.” 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(d); see also Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 336-37, 340-41 (relying on similar representations in agency public ation). Plaintiffs offer no reason to doubt that the State Department follows such a system or that, if it does, the approach qualifies as a rule of reason for purposes of the first two TRAC factors. Nor do Plaintiffs argue that “C ongress has provided a[ny] . . . indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed.” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80. The closest Plaintiffs come is citing language from the State Department’s we bsite: “Although [the] NVC strives to schedule appointments within three months of [the] NVC’s acceptance of all requested documentation, this timeframe is subject to the operating status and capacity of the consul ar section.” Compl. ¶ 14 (quoting Appointment , U.S. Dep’t of State, https://tr avel.state.gov/content/travel/en/usvisas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process/step- 10-prepare-for-the-interview/appointment.html [https://perma.cc/Y25H-K749]). Plaintiffs assert that this language shows that the agency has established a mandatory timeline for scheduling intervie ws, even if Congress has not. See id. ¶¶ 14-15. But, even assuming a binding agency-c reated timeline would be relevant to the TRAC analysis, the web page creates no such thing—it st ates a general goal of se tting interviews within three months but expressly warns that this timeline is not bind ing and that the agency may not meet it. Indeed, the next se ntence—not included in Plaint iffs’ Complaint—underlines the nonbinding nature of the three-month timeline: “Currently, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, most consular posts ar e operating at a limited capacity as they work through a backlog of immigrant visa applica tions and scheduling may take significantly longer.” Appointment , supra . If anything, the web page rea ffirms that the State Department does its best to process10 applications promptly and in an orderly fashion (for exampl e, by dealing with the existing backlog first). It does not show th at the agency has acted unreasonably. Without “a congressionally suppl ied yardstick, [the C]ourt . . . turn[s] to case law as a guide,” Armah v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 22-cv-1714, 2024 WL 2721634, at *6 (D.D.C. May 28, 2024) (cleaned up), and that case la w confirms that the delay here is not unusual or inconsistent with a rule of reason. Visa processing inevitab ly “takes a baseline amoun t of time,” and “courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6. The delay here—roughly 24 months since USCIS transferred the case to the NVC, 22 months since Yazdanpanahderav submitted the required materials to the NVC, and 20 months since the NVC designated Yazd anpanahderav’s application documentarily complete 5 —is shorter than those that courts ha ve found reasonable in similar cases. See, e.g. , Armah , 2024 WL 2721634, at *4 & n.4, *9 (dismissing unreasonable-delay claim based on roughly 24-month delay in schedu ling interview after applica tion designated documentarily complete); Akrayi v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 22-cv-1289, 2023 WL 2424600, at *1, *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2023) (same with roughly 36-month delay after application designated documentarily complete); Rahimian v. Blinken , No. 22-cv-785, 2023 WL 143644, at *2, *6 n.6, *6-9 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2023) (same with roughly 41-month dela y after USCIS approved I-130 petition); Logan v. Blinken , No. 21-cv-2275, 2022 WL 3715798, at *4- 7, *5 n.2 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022)

5 Courts disagree as to the deta ils of how to calculate delay in visa-delay cases—for example, whether the relevant period begins when USCI S approves the I-130 petition (here, June 2022), when the applicant submits the re quired materials (August 2022), or at the time of the last action by the agency (October 2022), and whether it ends when the case is filed (December 2023) or on the date of the decision (today). See, e.g. , Dehkordi v. Bitter , No. 22-cv-2470, 2023 WL 5651845, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2023). The Court need not decide the issue because, no matter which start date applies and even a ssuming the delay runs through t oday, Plaintiffs’ claims fail.11 (same with roughly 25-month delay after USCIS approved I-130 petition). While Plaintiffs assert that the delays in those cases were products of the COVID-19 pandemic and are no longer informative, several deci sions are quite recent, see, e.g. , Armah , 2024 WL 2721634, at *5-7; Plaintiffs provide no reason to think that the State Department’s pro cessing capacity has fully recovered from any pandemic-created backlog, see id. at *7; and, as discussed above, the record otherwise shows that the agency takes a reason able, largely first-in, first-out approach to processing applications. In sum, Plaintiffs have not plausibly allege d that the State Depart ment does not follow a rule of reason in processing vi sa applications. The first two TRAC factors support dismissal.
2. TRAC factor four The fourth factor, “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority,” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80, “carries significant weight,” Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *9, and strongly favors Defendants. Th e D.C. Circuit has “ref used to grant relief, even though all the other factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a ju dicial order putting [a party] at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no net gain.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton , 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs s eek exactly this type of relief. Since “[c]onsular processing capacity is . . . a zero-sum game,” an orde r expediting processing of Yazdanpanahderav’s application “would necessarily mean additional delays for ot her applicants—many of whom undoubtedly face hardships of their own,” Ahmadi v. Scharpf , No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2024) (cleaned up); accord Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 343-44. As a result, the fourth factor cuts heavily in favor of dismissal.12 3. TRAC factors three and five
TRAC factors three and five, which examine “t he interests prejudiced by the delay,” including the effect on “hum an health and welfare,” Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344 (quoting TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80), arguably favor Plaintiffs. Plaintif fs allege that the de lay “has caused [them] significant distress and hardship,” Compl. ¶ 7, and courts in this District have concluded that similar allegations tilted these factors in other plaintiffs’ favor, if only narrowly, see, e.g. , Siddiqui v. Blinken , 646 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77 (D.D.C. 2022) (finding that the third and fifth TRAC factors “slightly” favored a visa-delay plaintif f based on an allegation that the delay “‘had a profound and negative im pact’ on his life”). But see Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344-45 (concluding that these factors did not favor visa-delay plaintiffs absent ha rms beyond “the uncertainty that results any time an individual must con tinue to wait to secure a benefit”). But, while it is entirely understandable that the delay—and the re sulting separation—has distressed Plaintiffs, “many ot hers facing similar circumstan ces” could say the same. Siddiqui , 646 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (cleaned up) . Without more sp ecific, unique harm, the third and fifth
TRAC factors are not enough to save Plaintiffs’ case. See Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344-45.
4. TRAC factor six Both sides think the sixth TRAC factor—whether “any impropr iety lurk[s] behind agency lassitude,” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80 (cleaned up)—hel ps their cause. Neither is right; this factor is neutral. See Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 345-46. Although Plaint iffs accuse Defendants of “simply disguising willful visa delays . . . under the pr etext of an emergency situation [(the COVID-19 pandemic)] that no longer exists,” Sur-Reply at 4, Plai ntiffs cite (and the Court can find) nothing in the Complaint to support th at conclusion. Defendants, mean while, assert that their “good faith . . . in addressing the delay” means this factor favors dismissa l. Mot. at 23-24 (cleaned up).13 But, even assuming Defendants have shown such good faith, the D.C. Circuit has held that, without bad faith, this factor is neutral. See Afghan & Iraqi Allies v. Blinken , No. 23-5025, 2024 WL 2872951, at *8 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2024) (citing Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 345-46); see also
TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80 (“[T]he court need not find any impropriety lu rking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delaye d.” (cleaned up)). This factor does not move the needle.
* * * Taken together, the TRAC factors do not plausibly point toward unreasonable delay. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER As Defendants acknowledge, Plaintiffs’ “ frustration [with the] delay[] . . . is understandable.” Mot. at 25. But the Complaint doe s not plausibly allege th at the delay here is unreasonable, and so the Cour t must dismiss this case. For these reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 5;
DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Dkt. 1, a nd this case without prejudice; and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED. This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Date: June 14, 2024 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge