RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1678-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

V.E.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted August 1, 2018 – Decided August 8, 2018

Remanded by Supreme Court September 22, 2020

Resubmitted November 4, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 11-07-0653.

Harkavy, Goldman, Goldman & Gerstein, attorneys for 

appellant (Martin S. Goldman, on the brief).

Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Christopher W. Hsieh, Chief 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 24, 2020
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In July 2018, our Supreme Court held that CSAAS1evidence was no 

longer admissible to any extent as it lacked "a sufficiently reliable basis in 

science to be the subject of expert testimony." State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 272 

(2018). Two years later, on August 5, 2020, the Court gave its decision in J.L.G.

pipeline retroactivity – deeming its determination applicable to any cases on 

direct appeal at the time of its ruling. State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 386-89

(2020).

We issued our decision in this case one week after the J.L.G. ruling. We 

acknowledged the J.L.G. decision but concluded the CSAAS testimony 

presented in this case was "harmless in light of the overwhelming proof of 

defendant's guilt." State v. V.E., No. A-1678-16 (App. Div. Aug. 8, 2018) (slip 

op. at 2 n.2).

On September 22, 2020, the Supreme Court granted defendant's petition 

for certification and summarily remanded to this court to "reconsider in light of 

State v. G.E.P." State v. V.E., __ N.J. __ (2020). In our reconsideration, the 

1 Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome "includes five 'preconditions' 

that purportedly explain behaviors exhibited by sexually abused children." State 

v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 369 (2020) (citing State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 568-70 

(1993)).
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Court instructed us to "reevaluate the conclusion in footnote 2, concerning 

harmless error, which predates State v. G.E.P." Ibid.

After reviewing the evidence presented during V.E.'s trial and governed 

by the principles of law adopted in J.L.G. and G.E.P., we conclude the admission 

of CSAAS testimony "was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether 

the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. 

Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 

(1971)). We therefore vacate V.E.'s convictions and remand for a new trial.

We rely on the facts as presented in our prior decision. V.E., slip op. at 

1-3. The State produced the three minor victims and the children's mother and 

grandmother as witnesses. Neither the mother nor the grandmother had 

witnessed the alleged sexual abuse. The State also produced the video-recorded 

statements of the victims. Defendant testified on his own behalf, denying the 

charged conduct.

Pertinent here, the State also produced Dr. Brett Biller, the training 

director at the Child Abuse and Maltreatment Center at St. Peter's University 

Hospital, who testified as an expert on CSAAS. There was no objection to Dr. 

Biller's testimony and defense counsel did not cross-examine the expert on any 

aspect of it. 
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On appeal, defendant argued, in addition to other assertions, that CSAAS 

testimony should not be admitted in any capacity during a criminal trial. We 

concluded it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the testimony because Dr. 

Biller testified in accordance with the narrow parameters established in State v. 

J.R., 227 N.J. 393 (2017), and such limited testimony was still permitted at the 

time of defendant's trial. We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. 

V.E., slip op. at 3.

Today, however, we reconsider our determination on this issue and 

conclude that the Court's decision in G.E.P., and its consolidated cases, compels 

a reversal of defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.

Here, there was no testimony other than the minor victims, the videos of 

the victim's testimony with investigators, and the children's mother and 

grandmother who did not witness the alleged abuse. During her summation, the 

prosecutor referred to Dr. Biller's testimony on multiple occasions. In the jury's 

eyes, therefore, the CSAAS testimony could have bolstered the victims' 

testimonial evidence. 

As there was no objection at trial, we review for plain error. We are 

satisfied that the admission of the CSAAS testimony, now invalidated as 

unreliable, was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
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Without any other corroboration for the victims' allegations, the admission of 

the now-barred CSAAS testimony was an error "sufficient to raise a reasonable 

doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might have not 

reached." Jordan, 147 N.J. at 422. 

We vacate defendant's convictions only for the reasons stated above and 

in accordance with the instructions of the Court in its remand order. The 

remainder of defendant's assertions on the original appeal are without merit, as 

discussed in our first decision.

Vacated and reversed in part. Remanded for a new trial in accordance 

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.