[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-15305

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00821-SRW

DESSIE ANTONYA BROWN-GAUDET-EVANS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(December 8, 2016)

Before HULL, WILSON, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

In January 2011, Dessie Brown-Gaudet-Evans applied for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied 

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her claim after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The 

district court affirmed the denial, and this is Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s appeal. She 

argues that the ALJ erred by according “little weight” to the Department of 

Veterans Affairs’s (“VA”) determination that she was disabled and that the ALJ’s 

finding she still had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full 

range of light work was not supported by substantial evidence. After careful 

review, we reverse and remand.

I.

We review SSA decisions to determine if they are supported by substantial 

evidence, but review de novo the legal principles upon which the decisions rest. 

Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

“Substantial evidence is less than preponderance, but rather [is] such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. This review is limited and does not involve finding new facts, 

determining credibility, or reweighing the evidence. Id. The person claiming 

Social Security benefits bears the burden of proving an eligible disability. Id.; 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).

II.

Brown-Gaudet-Evans first argues that the ALJ erred in according “little 

weight” to the VA’s disability determination, because disability determinations by 

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other agencies are entitled to “great weight.” Because this argument is about the 

legal principles upon which the ALJ based his decision, we review it de novo. See

Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211.

The VA determined in 2003 that Brown-Gaudet-Evans was rated at 80% for

a military-service-connected disability and 100% for unemployability. On that 

basis, the VA granted her “Individual Unemployability.” The ALJ stated: “The 

undersigned has considered this [VA] opinion, noting that such program has 

different criteria for deciding whether an individual is ‘disabled’ or 

‘unemployable’, and, therefore, gives this opinion little weight.” 

The ALJ erred. It is the law of this Circuit that “[a]lthough the V.A.’s 

disability rating is not binding on the [SSA], it is evidence that should be given 

great weight.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)

(quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (providing that other 

government agency decisions about a person’s disability status based on that 

agency’s own rules are not binding on the SSA). It is not disputed that the VA’s 

“disability” determination relies on different criteria than the SSA’s determination. 

But that does not mean that the ALJ can summarily ignore the VA’s determination 

nor give it “little weight.” Therefore, the ALJ erred. 

On remand, the ALJ is not required to give the VA’s disability determination 

controlling weight. In making his own determination of whether Brown-GaudetCase: 15-15305 Date Filed: 12/08/2016 Page: 3 of 8 
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Evans is disabled, however, the ALJ must seriously consider and closely scrutinize 

the VA’s disability determination and must give specific reasons if the ALJ 

discounts that determination. See Rodrgiuez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th 

Cir. Unit A Mar. 25, 1981) (“A VA rating of 100% disability should have been 

more closely scrutinized by the ALJ.”).

III.

Brown-Gaudet-Evans next argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination, that 

she could perform the full range of light work, was not supported by substantial 

evidence. She says that the ALJ selectively cited to records about the effects of her 

carpal tunnel syndrome and recurrent ganglion cysts in her wrists. She also asserts 

that the ALJ erred when he failed to include limitations caused by fibromyalgia in 

his RFC determination. We review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence. 

Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211.

SSA regulations outline a five-step process used to determine whether a 

claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Part of this process required the 

ALJ to perform an RFC assessment based on all the relevant evidence in a 

claimant’s record. Id. § 416.945(a). The fourth step of the process required the 

ALJ to use the RFC assessment to determine whether Brown-Gaudet-Evans could 

perform past relevant work, which in her case was “light work.” See id.; id. § 

404.1567(b). “Light work” is defined as involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds 

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at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 

Id. § 404.1567(b). A job in this category may require “a good deal of walking or 

standing, or . . . sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or 

leg controls.” Id. A claimant “must have the ability to do substantially all of these 

activities” to be deemed capable of “light work.” Id. The claimant bears the 

burden of showing that she cannot perform past relevant work. Moore, 405 F.3d at 

1211.

Claims to establish disability based on pain or other subjective symptoms 

must meet a “pain standard” that requires: “(1) evidence of an underlying medical 

condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of 

the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can 

reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 

F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Under SSA regulations, if the ALJ 

determines a claimed impairment could reasonably produce the pain or other 

symptoms, then the ALJ must evaluate the extent to which the intensity and 

persistence of those symptoms limit the ability to do work. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1529(a). The ALJ considers the claimant’s history, the medical signs and 

laboratory findings, the claimant’s statements, statements made by medical 

sources, and other evidence of how the pain affects the claimant’s daily activities 

and ability to work. Id. § 404.1529(c). Testimony supported by medical evidence 

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that satisfies the pain standard is sufficient to support a finding of disability. Foote 

v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). If the ALJ decides to 

discredit a claimant’s testimony about her symptoms, the ALJ must adequately 

explain the reason for doing so. Id. at 1561–62.

A.

Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Brown-GaudetEvans’s impairments of carpal tunnel and ganglion cysts still permitted her to 

perform light work during the relevant time period. The ALJ fully reviewed the 

evidence of Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s recurrent ganglion cysts. He found that the 

surgeries to remove them relieved her pain, that she was noted to be “doing well” 

in her post-operation appointments, and that X-rays in 2003 indicated no problems. 

As a result, the ALJ determined that no manipulative limitations were necessary 

and Brown-Gaudet-Evans could perform the full range of light work.

Brown-Gaudet-Evans points to a physical therapy intake evaluation and 

supports her argument by pointing to an injury she suffered while using hedge 

clippers, which she says shows her low hand strength. However, Brown-GaudetEvans asks us to reweigh the evidence, which the scope of our review does not 

permit. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. The ALJ’s decision was based on relevant 

evidence that was adequate to support his conclusion, and that is as far as our 

review may go. See id.

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B.

On the other hand, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding at 

step four that the intensity and persistence of Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia

symptoms did not limit her ability to do light work. The ALJ based his findings

that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s statements about the severity of her fibromyalgia 

symptoms were not credible and that she could perform a full range of light work 

on the absence of records from the rheumatologist Brown-Gaudet-Evans was 

referred to; the evidence that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia “has been 

treated conservatively with medication;” and his conclusion that “[n]othing in the 

record” suggested that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s symptoms could not be alleviated 

with the use of medication.

The record contradicts these findings. First, the record shows there were 

some notes from the rheumatologist. And there were also notes from other doctors 

repeatedly diagnosing Brown-Gaudet-Evans with fibromyalgia and prescribing 

various medications to treat its symptoms. Second, the record contained evidence 

to suggest Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s symptoms could not be alleviated with the use 

of medication. Indeed it was the ineffectiveness of at least seven different 

medications that resulted in Brown-Gaudet-Evans being referred to a 

rheumatologist. 

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This Court has recognized that fibromyalgia, a chronic pain illness, is 

usually diagnosed based on an individual’s described symptoms because the 

“hallmark” of the disease is “a lack of objective evidence.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 

1211. This Court has also said that a claimant’s testimony supported by medical 

evidence that satisfies the pain standard is sufficient to find a disability unless the 

ALJ adequately explains otherwise. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561–62. In light of the 

contradictions in the record, the ALJ failed to adequately explain why he did not

credit Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s testimony as to her pain. See id. On this record, the 

ALJ’s determination that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia symptoms did not 

prevent her from performing the full range of light work was not supported by 

substantial evidence.

IV.

The ALJ erred by giving the VA’s determination “little weight,” and his 

findings about Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia symptoms were not supported 

by substantial evidence. We therefore reverse and remand for the ALJ to 

reconsider at steps four and five whether Brown-Gaudet-Evans has the RFC to 

perform her past relevant work or other available work.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

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