NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3054-14T3

ANIL K. LALL,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MONISHA SHIVANI,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted October 13, 2016 - Decided 

Before Judges Lihotz, O'Connor and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson 

County, Docket No. FM-09-1722-09.

Monisha Shivani, appellant pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

LIHOTZ, P.J.A.D.

Defendant Monisha Shivani challenges the Family Part's 

exercise of continuing exclusive jurisdiction, implicating 

provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the 

Act), now codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.124 to - 30.201. 

Defendant appeals from a January 5, 2015 post-judgment order, 

which denied reconsideration of orders modifying her child 

December 6, 2016

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

December 6, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-3054-14T3

support obligation. Defendant maintains the orders must be 

vacated because her relocation to North Carolina, the child's 

home state, deprives the Family Part of jurisdiction to consider 

the issues. 

As we discuss in our opinion, the Act was recently amended, 

including provisions regarding a New Jersey tribunal's authority 

to modify a controlling child support order when parents and 

child no longer reside in New Jersey. See L. 2016, c. 1, eff. 

April 1, 2016. When the orders under review were entered, the 

prior version of the Act, now repealed, was in effect. 

Following our review, we conclude the facts support the Family 

Part's authority to exercise continuing exclusive jurisdiction, 

permitting the modification of the previously issued child 

support order. We further conclude the amendments to the Act 

have no impact on the instant matter. Consequently, we affirm. 

However, we are compelled to observe the amendments have altered 

the jurisdictional foundations when the parents or guardians and 

the child no longer reside in New Jersey.

The parties are divorced and have one child. Plaintiff 

Anil Lall was awarded sole legal and residential custody on 

November 19, 2010, subject to defendant's limited parenting 

time. The custody order survived entry of the final judgment of 
3 A-3054-14T3

divorce. Various post-judgment proceedings were conducted to 

modify defendant's parenting time. 

Plaintiff secured employment in North Carolina and sought 

to remove the child from New Jersey. His application was 

granted and the June 28, 2013 order delineated defendant's 

parenting time in New Jersey and North Carolina. The judge also 

ordered a reduction in defendant's child support obligation, 

based on the costs of exercising parenting time in North 

Carolina.

Additional post-judgment motions filed by defendant led to 

a June 23, 2014 plenary hearing, after which defendant's 

parenting time was increased. In the course of the hearing, 

defendant disclosed she moved to North Carolina.1 The order 

described defendant's regular parenting time and the parties' 

designated holidays and vacation parenting time. 

The parties' filed motions for reconsideration. Following 

review, the judge agreed to correct certain provisions, denied 

challenges to others, and modified child support based on 

defendant's increased parenting time. Because inter-state 

visitation was no longer an issue, the calculation no longer 

 

1 The record does not include the transcript of this 

proceeding. The facts are taken from the Statement of Reasons 

accompanying the judge's order.
4 A-3054-14T3

included a parenting-time expense reduction. The effect was 

defendant's obligation increased. 

Included in the October 15, 2014 order was a determination 

the litigation in New Jersey had concluded and Judge William F. 

Helms, III, of the District Court of North Carolina, accepted 

jurisdiction because North Carolina was now the home state of 

the child and the residence of both parties. On October 17, 

2014, the judge entered a second form order, which memorialized 

the child support related terms stated in the October 15, 2014 

order, provided an effective date for the modified child support 

amount and, citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-53 to 2A:34-95, stated "the 

District Court of North Carolina accepts jurisdiction of this 

case . . . ." 

Defendant filed a letter, objecting to the October 15, 2014 

order "under the Five-Day Rule." See R. 4:42-1(c) (requiring 

generally that written objections to the form of an order be 

submitted within five days after service). She challenged the 

child support calculation and, for the first time, the Family 

Part's jurisdiction. Defendant asserted she consented to North 

Carolina as the child's home state and "waived New Jersey's 

jurisdiction." Moreover, since jurisdiction rested in North 
5 A-3054-14T3

Carolina, she maintained the October 15 and 17 orders must be 

vacated.

Defendant followed her letter by filing a motion for 

reconsideration. The motion included her newly raised 

jurisdictional challenge. The motion was denied on January 5, 

2015, and this appeal followed. 

Defendant does not challenge New Jersey as the state that

established child support when both parties were New Jersey 

residents. The Family Part had both personal and subject matter 

jurisdiction when it entered the establishment order. Instead, 

citing the Act, defendant's argument suggests her move to North 

Carolina, which was also the child's home state and plaintiff's 

residence, stripped the Family Part of subject matter 

jurisdiction to modify the child support order, making 

subsequent orders unenforceable.

There are procedural problems regarding the presentation of 

defendant's argument, including the timeliness of her challenge 

to the October 15, 2014 order, which she filed on February 11, 

2015.2 Nevertheless, because no opposition to her appeal was 

 

2 Even were we to consider the date of the final order as 

October 17, 2014, after accounting for the period of stay 

pending reconsideration filed on November 5, 2014, the notice of 

appeal was filed on February 11, 2015, thirty-two days following 

denial of reconsideration, fifty-six days following entry of the 

(continued)
6 A-3054-14T3

advanced, we will address the merits. The necessary context and 

understanding of the issue presented by defendant's appeal

require we first recite the current and prior statutory 

provisions of the Act directed to this issue.

The Act, both in its prior and current form, advances 

"unity and structure in each state's approach to the 

modification and enforcement of child support orders." Sharp v. 

Sharp, 336 N.J. Super. 492, 503 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting 

Youssefi v. Youssefi, 328 N.J. Super. 12, 20 (App. Div. 2000) 

(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f))). The Act resolves potential 

jurisdictional conflicts regarding the enforcement of child 

support orders across state lines by designating one order as 

the controlling child support order and provides for interstate 

jurisdiction to modify child support orders when parents and the 

children do not all reside in the same state. See Ibid. ("[The 

Act,] governing the interstate establishment, modification, and 

enforcement of child support . . . 'provides a comprehensive 

framework for dealing with the jurisdictional problems at 

hand.'" (quoting Peace v. Peace, 325 N.J. Super. 122, 127 (Ch. 

Div. 1999))).

 

(continued)

final order. The appeal should have been filed by or on January 

31, 2015. R. 2:4-1.
7 A-3054-14T3

The 2016 amendments to the Act did not deviate from the 

scheme effectuated by the prior version. Rather, the 2016 

amendments abide provisions of the federal Preventing Sex 

Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, P.L. No.113-183 

(2014), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 675, 675(a), whose

amendments incorporate the provisions 

required by the Hague Convention on the 

International Recovery of Child Support and 

Other Forms of Family Maintenance . . . to 

which the United States is a signatory. The 

amendments to the Uniform Act were developed 

and approved by the Uniform Law Commission 

for adoption in all jurisdictions. 

[Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to 

Senate, No. 995 (February 8, 2016).] 

Furthermore,

The bill repeals New Jersey's 1998 

version of UIFSA [the Act], sections 1 

through 58 of P.L. 1998, c.2 (C.2A:4-30.65 

through C.2A:4-30.123), and implements a new 

UIFSA which encompasses those amendments 

promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission. 

The bill provides guidelines and procedures 

for the registration, enforcement and 

modification of foreign support orders. It 

also establishes basic jurisdictional 

standards including continuing, exclusive 

jurisdiction, rules for determining which 

state issues the controlling order in the 

event of proceedings in multiple 

jurisdictions, and rules for modifying 

support orders. 

The most notable change is the addition 

of a new Article 7 to UIFSA. This article 

establishes guidelines and procedures for 

the registration, recognition, enforcement, 

and modification of foreign support orders 
8 A-3054-14T3

of countries that are parties to the 

Convention. Article 7 provides that a party 

seeking recognition of a support order must 

register. Once registered, the tribunal 

notifies the parties and an opportunity to 

challenge the order is provided. Unless 

grounds for denying recognition of the order 

are established, the order is enforced. 

Another change between the old and new UIFSA 

is the addition of a section concerning the 

conditions under which a tribunal has the 

authority to modify a spousal support order.

[Ibid.]

Critical to the jurisdictional uniformity intended under 

the Act's interstate system of modifying and enforcing child 

support orders is identification of the controlling child 

support order and the tribunal authorized to exercise 

"continuing exclusive jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133. In 

short, a court that enters an order establishing child support 

retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order, 

and that court's orders remain the controlling child support 

orders for purposes of enforcement, until continuing exclusive 

jurisdiction is conferred on another state's tribunal by 

operation of the Act. 

The new statutory provisions preserve concepts regarding 

continuing exclusive jurisdiction as the foundation governing 

modification of a controlling child support order. When a New 

Jersey tribunal enters a child support order, so long as one 

party remains in the state, the Act still directs: 
9 A-3054-14T3

a. A tribunal of this State that has issued 

a child support order consistent with the 

law of this State has and shall exercise 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify 

its child support order if the order is the 

controlling order and: 

(1) at the time of the filing of a request 

for modification this State is the residence 

of the obligor, the individual obligee, or 

the child for whose benefit the support 

order is issued . . . . 

[N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(a).]

The amendments change procedures followed when all parties 

have moved from New Jersey. Now N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(a)(2)

permits the state to exercise continuing exclusive jurisdiction 

even if this State is not the residence of 

the obligor, the individual obligee, or the 

child for whose benefit the support order is 

issued, the parties consent in a record or 

in open court that the tribunal of this 

State may continue to exercise jurisdiction 

to modify its order.

Therefore, parties who initiate a child support proceeding in 

New Jersey, who subsequently leave New Jersey, may decide our 

courts should modify the order by consenting orally or in 

writing to the Family Part's jurisdiction.

However, 

A tribunal of this State that has issued a 

child support order consistent with the law 

of this State may not exercise continuing, 

exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order 

if:
10 A-3054-14T3

(1) all . . . parties who are individuals 

file consent in a record with the tribunal 

of this State that a tribunal of another 

state that has jurisdiction over at least 

one of the parties who is an individual or 

that is located in the state of residence of 

the child may modify the order and assume 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction . . . . 

[N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(b) (emphasis added).] 

Accordingly, when all parties have left the state, New 

Jersey may not modify a child support order, even though it 

issued the controlling order, if all individual parties file 

written consent in New Jersey stating another tribunal, with 

personal jurisdiction over one party or which is the child's 

home state, should modify the controlling order. N.J.S.A. 2A:4-

30.133(b)(1).3 

 

3 Importantly, we alert the Legislature to a perceived gap 

between these separate jurisdictional provisions. For example, 

if New Jersey issued the controlling order, but all individual 

parties and the child no longer reside in the state, N.J.S.A.

2A:4-30.133(a)(2) requires consent on the record to allow New 

Jersey's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction to modify the 

child support order. If one party declines to do so, and, 

further, all individuals do not file written consents in New 

Jersey for another tribunal to exercise jurisdiction as mandated 

by N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(b)(1), the proper tribunal with 

authority to grant relief remains unclear. Because litigation 

surrounding the enforcement of child support orders is often 

contentious, requiring consent in order to proceed invites 

obstinate parties to withhold consent and delay enforcement. As 

noted in our opinion, this question is not triggered by the 

facts under review, as the prior statute did not create a 

similar gap. 
11 A-3054-14T3

This differs from the repealed provisions, which provided 

New Jersey retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify 

the controlling child support order it issued "until all of the 

parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the 

tribunal of this State for a tribunal of another state to modify 

the order and assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction." 

N.J.S.A. 2A:30.72(a)(2) (emphasis added) (repealed by L. 2016, 

c. 1, eff. April 1, 2016). The former Act designates New Jersey 

as the tribunal to modify an order until all parties agree 

otherwise. Ibid.

We turn to the matter at hand. Defendant argues New Jersey 

lost jurisdiction to modify its prior order. She argues the 

Family Part lacked personal jurisdiction. This argument is 

rejected because both parties appeared and participated in the 

post-judgment proceedings. Nevertheless, we recognize 

defendant's intended challenge is directed to subject matter 

jurisdiction.

Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at 

any time. Macysyn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476, 481 (App. 

Div. 2000). See also R. 4:6-7 ("Whenever it appears by 

suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 

jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 

matter . . . "). 
12 A-3054-14T3

When these post-judgment proceedings commenced, defendant 

resided in New Jersey. New Jersey issued the controlling child 

support order in November 2010, conferring continuing exclusive 

jurisdiction to modify the child support order as long as one of 

the parties remained in the state. N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133; 

N.J.S.A. 2A:30.72(a)(1) (repealed by L. 2016, c. 1, eff. April 

1, 2016). 

During her plenary hearing testimony to consider her 

request for additional visitation, defendant revealed she 

relocated to North Carolina. Both parties appeared and 

participated in this proceeding. When defendant successfully 

secured additional parenting time, as set forth in the August 

28, 2014 order, she filed a request for reconsideration, raising 

other matters, particularly the amount of ordered child support, 

which culminated in the October 15, 2014 order. The October 17, 

2014 order merely placed the terms ordered on October 15, in a

Uniform Summary Support Order because this form order is 

necessary to utilize the New Jersey Automated Child Support 

System and automated payment center that is supervised by 

Probation Services. R. 5:7-4(b). 

Accepting the factual findings accompanying the judge's 

order regarding defendant's challenge to the court's 

jurisdiction, we note by filing motions regarding parenting time 
13 A-3054-14T3

and child support, and appearing at the hearing, both parties 

consented to New Jersey's continued exercise of jurisdiction, as 

no new action was initiated in North Carolina. The judge was 

guided by the provisions of the now repealed statute, and 

properly exercised jurisdiction as the parties had not filed the 

required consents to allow North Carolina to consider issues in 

dispute as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:30.72(a)(2) (repealed by L.

2016, c. 1, eff. April 1, 2016).

4 The Act as modified was not 

effective until April 16, 2016. The orders issued prior to that 

date must be reviewed under the provisions of the prior statute. 

Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 578 (2014) ("[C]ourts generally 

will enforce newly enacted substantive statutes prospectively, 

unless it clearly expresses a contrary intent."). We conclude 

our task is to apply the provisions of the now repealed Act. 

Under the statute then in effect, defendant's jurisdictional 

challenges are unavailing.5 

 

4 Incidentally, jurisdiction would also be proper pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(a), were the new Act then in effect, 

because the parties consented to allow the judge to proceed on 

finalizing all issues raised in the parenting time proceeding 

and had not filed consents in New Jersey that another tribunal 

had acquired jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(b)(1). 

5 Were the new statute in effect, the facts evinced in this 

limited record also support jurisdiction in New Jersey because 

all parties filed pleadings and participated in the proceedings. 

N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(a)(2) requires only a consent on the record 

to allow the continuation of jurisdiction.
14 A-3054-14T3

Also, we reject as unfounded defendant's substantive 

attacks on the modified child support order. Defendant urges we 

determine the judge failed to consider plaintiff's wife's income

as part of plaintiff's gross income for purposes of fixing child 

support. This is not the law and plaintiff's spouse has no 

legal obligation to contribute to the support of the parties' 

child. Hudson v. Hudson, 315 N.J. Super. 577, 582-83 (App. Div. 

1998). 

Defendant next challenges the amount of income imputed to 

her as "unrealistic." Although we have not been provided a 

transcript, the statement of reasons included with the order

denying this argument raised on reconsideration, included the 

judge's factual findings on this issue. We determine these 

findings are supported by the record and conclude the judge did 

not abuse her reasoned discretion. Tash v. Tash, 353 N.J. 

Super. 94, 99 (App. Div. 2002) (providing when imputing income, 

a trial judge retains the discretion to realistically appraise 

capacity to earn and job availability).

"'Imputation of income is a discretionary 

matter not capable of precise or exact 

determination[,] but rather require[es] a 

trial judge to realistically appraise 

capacity to earn and job availability.'" 

Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 158 

(App. Div. 2013) (quoting Storey v. Storey, 

373 N.J. Super. 464, 474 (App. Div. 2004)), 

[rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 222 

N.J. 414 (2015)]. While an "abuse of 
15 A-3054-14T3

discretion . . . defies precise definition," 

we will not reverse the decision absent a 

finding the judge's decision "rested on an 

impermissible basis," considered "irrelevant 

or inappropriate factors," Flagg v. Essex 

Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) 

(citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted), "failed to consider controlling 

legal principles or made findings 

inconsistent with or unsupported by 

competent evidence." Storey, supra, 373 N.J. 

Super. at 479.

[Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 

(App. Div. 2015).]

Here, the judge based the level of income imputed upon

defendant's past demonstrated earning ability. Id. at 435. A 

judge may realistically review a parent's "potential earning 

capacity" rather than actual income, when imputing the ability 

to pay support. Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 

448 (App. Div. 1999).

The judge also found defendant had not sufficiently 

demonstrated she had a lower earning capacity or rebutted the 

charge she was underemployed, fully justifying the use of her 

last documented salary to compute child support. See Storey, 

supra, 373 N.J. Super. at 474 (holding an obligor bears the 

burden to establish earnings received match his or her earning 

capacity "in order to avoid imputation"). Defendant worked as a 

financial analyst for a major banking organization yet, in North 

Carolina she accepted the position of clerk in a retail 
16 A-3054-14T3

department store. She provided no evidential support she 

underwent "extensive" job searches for similar employment when 

she moved to North Carolina or that she was unable to work in 

any greater capacity. 

We also conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion in 

denying defendant's requested parenting time credits for (1) 

time that reduced plaintiff's parenting time to allow defendant 

to visit family in India; (2) possible days she may be off and 

might have visitation, which remained uncertain; (3) days

included by defendant's "double counting" weekends occurring 

during summer parenting time. 

Shared-parenting adjustments or awards are not presumptive, 

but are factually sensitive. Child Support Guidelines, Pressler 

& Verniero, Current New Jersey Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R.

5:6A at www.gannlaw.com (2016). Our review determines the 

judge's findings are supported by credible evidence in the 

record and will not be disturbed. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super.

102, 111 (App. Div. 2007) (stating "we do not second-guess . . . 

findings and the exercise of . . . sound discretion" by our 

Family Part judges). 

Finally, defendant claims the judge erroneously denied her 

request for judicial notice of the fact North Carolina has a 

lower cost of living than New Jersey. Despite defendant's 
17 A-3054-14T3

insistence on this point, such facts are not "propositions of 

generalized knowledge as are so universally known that they 

cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute," which are 

prerequisites to judicial notice pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201(b).

Affirmed.