IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

 Assigned on Briefs September 4, 2018

IN RE LARRY P. ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Wilson County

No. 16JT9 Charles B. Tatum, Judge

No. M2018-00466-COA-R3-PT

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother on grounds of 

abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and 

persistence of conditions and found that termination was in the best interest of the two 

children. On appeal, we find that clear and convincing evidence supports all three 

grounds as well as the trial court’s best interest determination. We, therefore, affirm the 

trial court’s decision. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,

P.J., W.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

W. Michael Kilgore, Mount Juliet, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tara A.P.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Erin A. Shackelford, 

Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s 

Services.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tara A.P. (“Mother”) is the mother of Larry W.P., III, born in September 2007, 

and Kimberly A.P., born in July 2009. The father of these two children, Larry W.P., Jr. 

(“Father”), died in December 2009. 

The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS” or “the Department”) first became 

involved with Mother and the two children in July 2014 based on allegations that Mother 

and her boyfriend, Bryan L., were exposing the children to the manufacture and use of 

10/15/2018
- 2 -

methamphetamines in the family residence. Mother submitted to a drug screen, which 

was negative for all substances. Bryan L. refused to submit to a drug screen. The 

Department discovered that Bryan L. had an open case with DCS and was concerned 

about his refusal to complete a drug screen. Mother agreed to work with the Department 

to develop a safety plan for the children. The Department filed a petition for a restraining 

order in Wilson County juvenile court, alleging that the children were dependent and 

neglected and asking the court to restrain all contact between Bryan L. and the children.

At the time of the preliminary hearing on September 8, 2014, Mother was in jail in 

Rutherford County. The children were placed in the temporary custody of their maternal 

grandfather, James K., and the hearing was reset for September 15, 2014. When the 

parties appeared in court again on November 10, 2014, Mother waived the adjudicatory 

hearing and stipulated to a finding of dependency and neglect based upon her failure to 

protect the children as alleged in the Department’s petition and her subsequent 

incarceration. In an order entered on January 9, 2015, the court determined that the 

children would remain in the protective custody of the court, but full legal and physical 

custody was restored to Mother. The court further ordered that there be no contact 

between Bryan L. and the children. 

On April 15, 2015, DCS received a referral alleging that Mother and Bryan L.

were using methamphetamines in the family residence and that multiple people came in 

and out of the residence to use methamphetamines. Mother eventually admitted that 

Bryan L. had been in the home. She agreed to submit to a drug screen, but was unable to 

produce a urine sample despite having several hours to do so. Mother agreed to sign a 

document for the children to be cared for by her father, James K. As a result of its 

investigation, DCS filed a petition on April 24, 2015, to transfer temporary legal custody 

of the children to James K. based upon dependency and neglect and severe abuse. At a 

hearing on April 27, 2015, the court ordered Mother to pay $60.00 per week in child 

support, beginning May 4, 2015, to the Central Child Support Unit.

At a hearing on June 15, 2015, the court found the children dependent and 

neglected and determined that there was no less drastic alternative to removal. James K. 

was no longer a viable placement, partly because of Mother’s failure to pay court-ordered 

support, and the children were placed in the legal and physical custody of DCS. All 

contact between Mother and the children was suspended until she completed the required 

alcohol and drug assessments and resulting recommendations and had three consecutive 

clean drug screens. A guardian ad litem represented the children. 

The Department developed a permanency plan for Mother and the children on 

June 30, 2015, and the court ratified the plan on July 27, 2015. Under the plan, Mother’s 

responsibilities, in addition to paying child support, included completing an alcohol and 

drug (“A&D”) assessment and following all recommendations; completing a clinical 

intake and following all recommendations; completing a parenting assessment and 
- 3 -

following all recommendations; ensuring that there was no contact between Bryan L. and 

the children; obeying all laws; complying with all rules of probation, if applicable; 

succeeding in not incurring any new charges but, if she did incur new charges, notifying 

the Department immediately; maintaining steady, verifiable employment for at least four 

consecutive months, and providing verification (pay stubs) to the Department; and 

maintaining a residence for four consecutive months, and providing verification (proof of 

residence) to the Department. 

The Department filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on June 29, 

2016. According to the petition, Mother was “presently residing in hotels.” The 

Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights on the following grounds: (1) 

abandonment by failure to visit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) 

abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(g)(1); (3) abandonment by failure to support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(g)(1); (4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and (5) persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-1-113(g)(3). The petition further alleges that termination is in the children’s best 

interests. 

On August 16, 2017, the guardian ad litem filed a motion to restrict Mother’s 

visitation. According to the motion, Mother had been exercising therapeutic visitation 

with the children for several months.1 However, she tested positive for 

methamphetamines on August 3, 2017, and for suboxone on August 8, 2017. She had 

been dismissed from her rehabilitation program and halfway house in July 2017 for 

alcohol use. On August 16, 2017, the juvenile court entered an ex parte restraining order 

prohibiting Mother from having any contact with the children until further order of the 

court. A hearing was set for August 23, 2017.2

Termination hearing

The termination petition was heard by the juvenile court on October 25 and 

December 21, 2017. The trial court heard testimony from both children in chambers. 

Kimberly was in third grade; Larry was in fifth grade. They were living with foster 

parents Michelle and Shane J.

Mother testified that, when DCS investigated in April 2015, Bryan L. was living 

with her again. On June 15, 2015, the children were placed in DCS legal and physical 

custody. Mother testified that she was still using drugs—opiates and 

 

1 Mother was unable to see the children for over a year due to the juvenile court’s order prohibiting her 

from contact until she went through drug and alcohol assessment and had three clean drug screens.

2 The record contains no other orders on this matter.
- 4 -

methamphetamines—at that time, and that she was living with Bryan L. She 

acknowledged that Bryan L. was the father of another of her children, Evelyn, about 

whom there was a separate DCS case in Rutherford County. She testified that her 

children had been in DCS custody continuously since April 2015 and that she knew she 

had an obligation to support her children while they were in the Department’s custody.

 

Mother admitted that, during the year and seven months that she was using drugs, 

it would not have been a good thing for her children to be with her. After she got her 

visits back, she was allowed to see the children for eight hours each month. Then, she 

failed a drug screen and lost her visits for a period of time. 

Mother testified that she believed a DCS caseworker suggested rehab when she 

first lost custody of her children, but she did not go at first. She felt that she was “in 

shock” after losing her children in April 2015; she went to rehab in July 2015. Mother 

further testified that, after her most recent relapse, another caseworker asked if she 

wanted to go to rehab, but Mother “told her that I didn’t because I’d been recently, and I 

was—rehab isn’t what I needed.” Mother testified that she completed frequent drug 

screens in Rutherford County and that she had not failed a drug screen since the hair 

follicle test in July 2017. 

Mother testified that she recalled being told that she had an obligation to support 

her children while they were in DCS custody and that her rights could be terminated if 

she did not fulfill that obligation. She stated that she was ordered to pay $60.00 a week 

for the two children at issue in this case. Mother stated that she had worked at several 

jobs since the children had been in custody. From November 2016 to January 2017, she 

worked for UPS. In February 2017, she worked for about a month for ASDT doing hotel 

jobs. From March to July 2017, Mother worked at Universal, a company that contracted 

with Nissan. In September 2017, she began working for Fairfield Inn as a housekeeper, 

and she was still working in that job at the time of the hearing. Before these jobs, Mother 

testified, she was using drugs and sold drugs to make money. 

According to Mother, once she started working at Fairfield Inn, she called both 

counties to let them know they could have child support automatically deducted from her 

pay checks. The automatic deductions had not started at the time of the hearing. Mother 

estimated that she last paid child support for Kimberly and Larry in June and July 2017, 

when it was automatically deducted from her paycheck. She did not believe she paid any 

child support in 2015.3 Mother admitted that, during the four months preceding the filing 

of the termination petition in June 2016, she had not paid any child support. She further 

admitted that, during that time period, there was nothing physically preventing her from 

working. 

 

3 Records from the State of Tennessee Child Support Division show that Mother made payments on child 

support in November 2016 and in January, February, May, June, and July 2017. 
- 5 -

At the time of the hearing, Mother was living at Doors of Hope, a halfway house 

for recovering addicts, where children were not allowed to live. She testified that she 

was just beginning to look for permanent housing. She and her caseworker had prepared 

a budget, and she was working on lowering her child support obligation on Evelyn, 

lowering her probation and driver’s license fees, and obtaining a driver’s license. 

According to Mother, she attended intensive outpatient programs (“IOPs”) on Monday, 

Tuesday, and Thursday. She had to attend twenty IOPs because she was required to redo 

a drug and alcohol reassessment. On Friday nights, Mother went to Celebrate Recovery, 

where she had recently completed all twelve steps. On Wednesday nights, she 

participated in Last Call 4 Grace, a service program. Mother testified about her small 

church and all of her activities there, including leading a new Celebrate Recovery 

program for youth. 

Mother acknowledged that she was participating in Celebrate Recovery at Right 

Road before her relapse, but she explained that she had not been going very often. At 

that time, she was working at night. Mother testified: “It wasn’t until like that relapse 

that I actually started working the program.” Now, she was going seven days a week and 

actually participating. Mother stated that this would be “a lifelong thing.” 

Asked about her progress on the permanency plan, Mother testified that she 

completed the A&D assessment and parenting assessment. She stated that she did not 

recall receiving any help with housing from her DCS caseworker. 

Mother testified about her history with drugs and alcohol. She estimated that she 

started drinking occasionally when she was thirteen and that her husband introduced her 

to opiates. After her mother passed away, she started drinking “quite a bit.” After her 

husband died, “it just, like, progressively got way worse.” Mother’s husband died from 

drug use. Mother gave the following testimony regarding what she had learned to expect 

about recovery:

They say that insanity is doing the same things over and over again 

expecting different results. Well, if that were true, then what would the 

definition of sanity be? Sanity is making sound decisions in a stable mind. 

I love looking words up. So insanity is making unstable decisions that do 

not make sense. My mind had been trained to, I feel this pain, let me make 

it better. And it even got to a point where, I feel this pain, I know this is not 

going to make it better, it’s going to make it worse, but I’m still going to do 

it anyways. That is insanity.

And, man, the things I’ve learned. And especially this last—these 

last few months have been beautiful. It’s been hard, but it’s been beautiful. 

But I have—everything is God, the reliance I have on him, the trust. I can 

feel my emotions again. I cry happy tears now, which is crazy. And I hate 
- 6 -

that it has taken me this long to finally get it. But through every relapse, 

I’ve learned something. And if getting clean was the hard part—and it is 

hard to get clean, to actually stop—there wouldn’t be many addicts in the 

world. But it’s staying clean. And I did drugs, but drugs was not my

problem. I had a problem underneath all of that, and that is—I’ve been able 

to let it go, and I’m working through it. I see a therapist once a week, and 

I’m able to get through that. 

My kids was like a Band-Aid to me. Like they was all I had, and I 

knew I had to maintain because I had them. And so when I lost them, it 

didn’t make sense to me, but I got worse. I got worse, way worse, because 

I didn’t have—I didn’t have anything. I couldn’t see it. I couldn’t see far 

enough ahead to stop. I just knew my reason to take a breath was gone.

Mother testified that she felt that she had “been delivered” from her addiction and 

that she was capable of being a good mother. She stated that she continued to have a 

strong bond with the children. When she was asked how long it would be before she 

would be in a position to provide a stable home for them, Mother testified that she 

thought she could find a place to live in a few months. 

On cross-examination, Mother stated that she obtained the suboxone and 

methamphetamines that caused her relapse from her sister, Tabitha Williams. She was 

living with her sister at that time. According to Mother, she ended her relationship with 

Bryan L. the day they were arrested in August 2016. She had been convicted for 

aggravated assault and sentenced to six years of probation as a result of that arrest. 

Mother stated that she entered a rehab program with Buffalo Valley in 2015, and 

then entered a halfway house in Lebanon for two months. But, when she left the rehab,

she started using drugs again. She also went to rehab programs at Right Road several 

times and The Next Door. She was working the third shift seven days a week, was 

feeling a lot of stress, and could not see her children. Mother testified that, “I think it just 

started getting overwhelming, and I eventually gave in to it.” Using drugs was her way 

of coping with stress. 

Mother admitted to the court that she was not currently in a position to have her 

children live with her. She stated that she had gotten her sobriety three months earlier 

and that she could not “imagine sticking a needle in [her] arm again.”

The Department’s next witness was Elizabeth Brown, a DCS family service 

worker in Rutherford County. Ms. Brown was Mother’s case manager for Evelyn, the 

child in custody in Rutherford County. She had been in communication with the Wilson 

County case worker regarding Mother’s progress in her case regarding Larry and 

Kimberly. 
- 7 -

Ms. Brown testified that she was assigned to Mother’s case on February 22, 2017. 

She first performed a random drug screen on Mother on March 15, 2017, and Mother 

passed. Ms. Brown testified that, since she began screening Mother, Mother had not 

failed a drug screen. Mother was living at a re-entry home, which was not a place where 

children were permitted to live. As part of her permanency plan, the Department required 

Mother to submit to random drug screens, visit consistently with Evelyn, follow 

probation rules, attend counseling, complete an A&D assessment and follow 

recommendations. According to Ms. Brown, Mother had either completed all of these 

requirements or was in the process of doing so. 

Ms. Brown verified that Mother’s case in Rutherford County was for severe abuse 

and also involved Bryan L., Evelyn’s father. The Department was working with Bryan 

L., as well as with Mother, and Ms. Brown was aware that there was a no-contact order 

between Bryan L. and Mother. She was aware that Bryan L. and Mother had some 

contact while he was incarcerated (during DCS parent visits at the jail), and she believed 

that Bryan L. contacted Mother several times after his release. Mother and Bryan L. were 

no longer in a relationship, according to Ms. Brown. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Brown testified that Mother had been cooperative with 

her throughout the permanency plan process. Ms. Brown stated that she assisted Mother 

with housing and other items on the permanency plan. With respect to housing, Ms. 

Brown had called different apartments on Mother’s behalf, “[b]ut because she has a 

felony on her record, it’s hard to find her housing.” Ms. Brown also helped Mother 

develop a budget. She acknowledged that, paying child support for three children, 

Mother did not have adequate income to pay rent and other expenses. On redirect, Ms. 

Brown responded in the affirmative to a question suggesting that Mother would be short 

about $500 if she were to pay all of her monthly expenses with her current income. 

Then, on recross, Mother’s attorney asked: “And don’t you imagine [the children’s 

benefits from their father’s social security account] would probably take her out of the 

negative real quick?” Ms. Brown answered in the affirmative.

Duwana B., Mother’s older sister, testified on Mother’s behalf. She had seen the 

children every other weekend when they were at James K.’s house. Duwana lived across 

the street from her and Mother’s father, James K. Asked about the foster parents, she 

stated that “they have a pretty loving home.” Although Duwana was not happy with the 

circumstances and was bitter when Kimberly and Larry were first placed in foster care, 

she testified that “Shane and Michelle have been very good providers for them, not only 

with material things but, you know, emotionally as well.” She had observed that the 

children had “a pretty close relationship with [their foster parents].” Duwana felt that the 

children were “doing very well under the circumstances.”

As to the children’s relationship with their grandfather, Duwana observed that 

“Kimberly likes to pick a lot on him,” and that “Larry can be a little more trying 
- 8 -

sometimes . . . I mean, just a typical boy . . . .” Overall, she felt “they do have a good 

relationship with my dad.” She had not seen anything that caused her concern.

When Mother was caring for the children in the past, Duwana did have concerns. 

She felt that Mother “had a lot of hurt that she didn’t know how to express, and she 

turned to drugs to just, I guess, basically survive her hurt.” Mother’s husband died of a 

drug overdose, and Evelyn’s father was a drug user. 

The second day of the trial began with the testimony of James K., the children’s 

maternal grandfather. Before the children were in DCS custody, they were in James K.’s 

care for about six months on two separate occasions. Mr. K. described Larry’s 

behavioral problems. He stated that, when Mother first came to court, she was not 

disciplining the children. It was Mr. K.’s opinion that Larry’s behavior had not 

improved. Larry had received between 72 and 74 write-ups at school that year alone. He 

had been suspended for a day. 

Mr. K. testified that Mother “has done so much better in the past few months.” 

She still did not have a place for the children to stay, but she worked every day and Mr. 

K. thought that things were getting better. He admitted that she had done meth again 

once, but he was proud of her; she had “come a long ways and she’s proven a lot.” James

K. stated: “She’s doing a lot better, but there’s still more to go.” 

Mr. K. opined that Larry was not as happy with the foster family as Kimberly was. 

He suspected that Larry’s reticence regarding Shane, the foster father, stemmed from an 

incident early in the children’s time in the foster home when the foster father allegedly 

raised his voice at Larry and used profane language. The Department was informed of 

the incident, and someone from the Department spoke with the foster father about it. Mr. 

K. stated that he had never seen any actions on the part of the foster parents to make him 

think they did not love the children. 

On cross-examination, Mr. K. was asked what changes he had seen in Mother 

since she first began coming to court. He stated that she now admitted she had a drug 

problem, had a job, and paid child support for Evelyn. As to potential problems, Mr. K. 

stated that a place to live and transportation could be difficult. Mother was probably not 

going to have a job making a lot of money. But she could be a mother. 

Foster mother Michelle J. testified that Kimberly and Larry had been living with 

her and her husband since July of 2015. She stated that, when the children first came to 

live with them, they were quiet and subdued. Larry was “more physically aggressive” in 

the first few months, whereas it was hard for Kimberly to open up. The children fought 

frequently in the beginning. When Larry acted out physically, it was usually against 

Kimberly. Michelle testified that Larry’s physical acting out had improved, and 

Kimberly had learned some karate defensive moves to get Larry off of her. The family 
- 9 -

would have discussions around the dinner table about daily activities and things to work 

on. After about a year, she and her husband noticed significant improvements regarding 

Larry’s physical treatment of Kimberly; but he was still “pretty negative” verbally and 

emotionally. The foster parents worked with Larry about how to speak to his sister and 

how to treat other people.

Michelle testified that the children received weekly therapy services through 

LifeCare. She and her husband also talked to the therapists individually before or after 

the therapy sessions and were sometimes involved in the sessions. There had been times 

when Larry was verbally or emotionally abusive toward his foster parents. A few weeks

earlier, he had gotten in trouble at school for being disrespectful to a couple of teachers, 

and then to the principal. He was suspended from school for a day. After several days, 

Larry admitted to Michelle that a child at school had made him mad. Instead of talking to 

the teachers, he acted out. 

Michelle stated that she and her husband loved the children “completely and 

utterly.” They told Kimberly and Larry that they did not always like the choices that the 

children made, but “[w]e’re going to love you anyway.” 

According to Michelle, once the children resumed contact with Mother, “Larry 

really started with the disrespect.” She thought that Larry was afraid of being disloyal to 

Mother so he felt he needed to put the foster parents “in their place.” Kimberly started 

having nightmares after the visits with Mother started; she was also “extra clingy” after 

the visits. Michelle added that the family was about to begin receiving family counseling 

services through Youth Villages. The focus of the counseling would be on Larry’s 

disrespect and anger issues. If the court decided to terminate Mother’s parental rights

and permit the foster parents to adopt them, Michelle and Shane intended to allow the 

children to maintain contact with Mother, Mr. K., and their other biological family 

members.

The foster father, Shane J., testified that the children had lived with him and his 

wife for about two-and-a-half years. He stated that it was “really rough” with Larry for 

the first six or seven months, but things had gotten better over time. When asked to 

describe the problems exhibited by Larry, Shane stated: “Insubordination, kind of; 

disrespect; and some fighting, mainly with his sister.” The techniques employed by 

Shane and his wife included trying to be consistent and rational with him and talking 

about consequences. They did “the write-off”4 when Larry got into trouble at school 

and told Larry that there were open lines of communication between the teachers and the 

foster parents. 

 

4 The write-off is part of the disciplinary system used at Larry’s school.
- 10 -

As to the children’s behavior in the foster home currently, Shane stated that some 

of the same issues persisted. Both children told lies at times. They had gotten better with 

regard to fighting with each other over the past six months. Both children attended 

weekly individual therapy. The family was about to begin at-home intensive therapy, 

which came about mainly as a result of Larry’s disrespect toward teachers and others at 

school. Shane thought that Larry had shown more issues with disrespect at school that 

year than in previous years. Shane testified that he and Michelle continued to use writeoffs and taking electronics away to discipline the children. 

Shane testified that he and Michelle were committed to parenting the children and 

were “completely in.” They love the children and have taken them to visit their families. 

If possible, Shane and Michelle intend to adopt Larry and Kimberly. 

The next witness was Jessica Reese, a DCS family service worker who had been 

the children’s caseworker since June 2, 2017. As part of her duties as the children’s 

caseworker, Ms. Reese maintained their records in “TFACTS” (Tennessee Family and 

Child Tracking System) and was familiar with the records concerning their case prior to 

becoming their caseworker. She stated that Mother failed a hair follicle drug test on 

August 3, 2017, and thereafter admitted to using methamphetamines. Mother had been 

suspended from a halfway house for alcohol consumption and was living with her sister 

at the time. She admitted getting the drugs from her sister, Tabitha Williams. 

When Ms. Reese took over the children’s case, DCS had already filed a petition 

for termination against Mother. She testified that Mother still needed to complete tasks 

required by the permanency plan: “[H]aving employment was still an issue, housing was 

still an issue.” At the time of the hearing, Ms. Reese stated, Mother was living in another 

halfway house where the children could not live; the hope was that Mother “will have 

housing, possibly the springtime.” There was no definite date when Mother would be 

able to transition to independent housing. Ms. Reese stated:

From my understanding, there are houses that the City of Murfreesboro has 

purchased for this program and women are able—once they complete 

Doors of Hope, they can move into the home for a period of two years. 

They still have rent and other responsibilities, but it’s lower than what your 

average three-bedroom house would be to rent.

According to Ms. Reese, the rent for these houses would be $500 a month. 

Ms. Reese testified that the Murfreesboro DCS office helped Mother complete a 

budget, which included a rent of $400. Mother was in the red on the budget, even with a 

rent of $400. The cost of having Larry and Kimberly in her household was not included 

in that budget, but it did include child support payments for Evelyn of $120 a month. 
- 11 -

The deficit in the budget was over $600, according to Ms. Reese, so taking out the child 

support payments would not be enough to balance the budget. 

As to employment, Ms. Reese stated that she had received verbal confirmation that 

Mother worked at Fairfield Inn in Murfreesboro. Ms. Reese had requested pay stubs 

from Fairfield Inn but the hotel said it did not have pay stubs. The budget showed 

Mother’s income to be $650 plus $100 for food stamps. 

Asked whether there were other tasks that Mother needed to complete, Ms. Reese 

testified that, when Mother relapsed, Ms. Reese had arranged an A&D assessment, which 

then recommended that she complete IOPs. Mother received authorization for twenty

sessions through HealthConnect America, but only five were completed. A second 

authorization was provided, and Mother completed only seven sessions. Mother told Ms. 

Reese that she had attended sessions on three days of the month of the hearing and that 

she had a certificate of completion form. There had been no authorization, however, so 

Ms. Reese needed to follow up on the IOPs. Otherwise, there were no other assessments 

outstanding for Mother to complete. 

Ms. Reese verified that Mother had started therapeutic visitation in January 2017, 

which usually consisted of eight hours a month. For the most part, Mother had been 

seeing the children for six to eight hours a month, with the exception of the months after 

she had a positive drug screen. As to child support, Mother paid child support for Larry 

and Kimberly in June and July 2017, but Ms. Reese did not think she paid anything after 

that. 

According to Ms. Reese, the foster parents were loving people. They had fun with 

the children, “but they’ll be stern with them when they have to be. They seem happy.” 

She noted that Larry had caused more tension in the household, especially around 

September 2017. She had talked to the foster parents about additional services, and they 

had agreed to have comprehensive child and family treatment in the home three times a 

week to “work with Larry individually on issues with disrespect, abiding by the rules” 

and to “work with the family as a whole to try to repair some of that relationship between 

Kim and Larry.” Ms. Reese opined that the foster children were bonded with the foster 

parents.

Ms. Reese stated that it was not confirmed that there would be space available for 

Mother to live in the housing provided by the City of Murfreesboro in the spring of 2018, 

and it was not known if she would be able to afford the housing. Ms. Reese did not know 

what would happen if Mother was not able to afford moving to the transitional 

apartments. 
- 12 -

As to other concerns regarding Mother, Ms. Reese testified as follows:

[W]e all have to recognize that she’s come a long way. But at this point, 

we’re four months out from a relapse. Housing is still – I mean, that 

potential is there but we don’t know what that’s going to look like when the 

time actually comes. The kids have just been in limbo for so long and I 

realize there’s really no winning situation here, because those kids have lost 

a thousand times over at this point. . . . [N]ot being able to see mom and 

just all the ups and downs, they’ve really been through the ringer. And 

that’s – actually my concern is for that not to continue in any amount.

She stated that the children had received counseling services regarding the adoption 

process and would continue to receive such services if Mother’s rights were terminated.

Mother’s HealthConnect certificate showed twenty sessions between October 9 

and December 20, 2017, which was the number of sessions required, but the sessions did 

not take place within the required time frame. Ms. Reese would have to verify that 

Mother met the IOP requirement with this certificate. If so, the only outstanding 

permanency plan requirements would be the provisions of pay stubs for employment and 

satisfactory housing. 

Ms. Reese testified that Larry’s issues with disrespect and defiance began in 

January 2017 and “really kind of exploded” in September. The children began having 

visits with Mother in January 2017. In September 2017, the termination trial was about 

to start. 

Mother took the stand again on her own behalf at the end of the trial. She 

explained the problems she had experienced scheduling IOP sessions through 

HealthConnect around her work schedule. She brought with her to the hearing copies of 

her pay stubs from Fairfield Inn, where she worked as a housekeeper. Child support was 

taken out of her pay check. Mother stated that she typically worked six days a week. 

She had not yet figured out childcare. Now that she had completed her IOPs, Mother 

planned to work on a schedule and look for options for childcare as well as other job 

opportunities. 

Mother was asked about her multiple stints in rehab and relapses. She testified 

that, when she went to trial in Rutherford County on charges of severe child abuse (for 

taking drugs while pregnant with Evelyn), she did not contest the findings. She stated: “I 

know I was wrong; I’m taking responsibility for my mistakes.” She admitted, when 

asked by the court, that she was not in a position that day to take custody of her children. 

Furthermore, Mother testified that, when the termination petition was filed, she was not 

in a position to take custody of the children because she was still struggling with drugs.
- 13 -

Trial court’s decision

In an order entered on February 12, 2018, the trial court concluded that Mother’s 

parental rights should be terminated and that termination was in the children’s best 

interest. The court determined that the following grounds were established by clear and 

convincing evidence: abandonment by willful failure to visit during the statutorily 

relevant period, abandonment by willful failure to support during the statutorily relevant 

period, and persistence of conditions. The court found there was not clear and 

convincing evidence to prove the other two grounds alleged by the Department:

abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and substantial noncompliance with a 

permanency plan. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law will be 

discussed below as relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 

STANDARDS GOVERNING PARENTAL TERMINATION TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 

AND APPELLATE REVIEW

The Tennessee Supreme Court has described the appellate review of parental 

termination cases as follows:

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in termination 

proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Under 

Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on the record 

and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence 

preponderates otherwise. In light of the heightened burden of proof in 

termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own 

determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and 

convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. 

The trial court’s ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination 

of parental rights is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. Additionally, all other questions 

of law in parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de 

novo with no presumption of correctness.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 523-24 (Tenn. 2016) (citations omitted); see also

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 680 (Tenn. 2017).

The termination of a parent’s rights is one of the most serious decisions courts 

make. As the United States Supreme Court has said, “[f]ew consequences of judicial 

action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 

745, 787 (1982). “Terminating parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent 

to the role of a complete stranger,” In re W.B., IV, Nos. M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, 

M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005), 
- 14 -

and of “severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1). 

A parent has a fundamental right, based in both the federal and state constitutions, 

to the care, custody, and control of his or her own child. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 

651 (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); Nash-Putnam v. 

McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 

674, 678 (Tenn. 1994)); In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 

1995) (citing Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993)). This right “is among 

the oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due 

Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 

at 521 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 8). Although this right 

is fundamental, it is not absolute. Id. at 522. The State may interfere with parental rights 

only in certain circumstances. Id. at 522-23; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250-51. Our 

legislature has listed the grounds upon which termination proceedings may be brought. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g). Termination proceedings are statutory, In re Angela 

E., 303 S.W.3d at 250; Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn. 2004), and a 

parent’s rights may be terminated only where a statutory basis exists, Jones v. Garrett, 92 

S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002); In re M.W.A., Jr., 980 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1998).

To terminate parental rights, a court must determine by clear and convincing 

evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination and that 

termination is in the child’s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Kaliyah 

S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 552 (Tenn. 2015); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). 

“‘Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief or 

conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt 

about the correctness of these factual findings.’” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522 

(quoting In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted)). 

“Evidence satisfying the clear and convincing evidence standard establishes that the truth 

of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2005). As a reviewing court, we “must ‘distinguish between the specific facts 

found by the trial court and the combined weight of those facts.’” In re Keri C., 384 

S.W.3d 731, 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 156 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). Then, we must determine “whether the combined weight of the 

facts . . . clearly and convincingly establishes all of the elements required to terminate” a 

party’s parental rights. Id. (citing In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d at 156, and In re S.M., 149 

S.W.3d 632, 640 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). “When a trial court has seen and heard 

witnesses, considerable deference must be accorded to the trial court’s findings as to 

witnesses’ credibility.” Id. (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 

S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)).
- 15 -

Once a ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence, the 

trial court or the reviewing court conducts a best interest analysis. In re Angela E., 303 

S.W.3d at 251 (citing In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), and White 

v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). “The best interests analysis is 

separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear and convincing 

evidence of grounds for termination.” Id. at 254. The existence of a ground for 

termination “does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that termination of a parent’s 

rights is in the best interest of the child.” In re C.B.W., No. M2005-01817-COA-R3-PT, 

2006 WL 1749534, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2006).

ANALYSIS

The only issue raised by Mother on appeal is whether the trial court erred in 

finding that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. Our 

Supreme Court has ruled, however, that, “in an appeal from an order terminating parental 

rights the Court of Appeals must review the trial court’s findings as to each ground for 

termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s best interests, regardless of 

whether the parent challenges these findings on appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 

S.W.3d at 525-26. We will, therefore, determine whether each ground upon which the 

trial court based its decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence and whether 

terminating Mother’s rights is in the children’s best interest.

I. Grounds for Termination

A. Abandonment by Willful Failure to Visit

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (June 2016)

5

defines 

abandonment as follows:

For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the 

filing of a proceeding or pleading to terminate the parental rights of the 

parent or parents or the guardian or guardians of the child who is the 

subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption, that the 

parent or parents or the guardian or guardians either have willfully failed to 

visit or have willfully failed to support or have willfully failed to make

reasonable payments toward the support of the child;

The Department alleges that Mother abandoned the children by failing to visit them 

during the four months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate on June 29, 2016.

 

 

5 We reference the versions of the statutes in effect at the time when the Department’s petition was filed 

on June 29, 2016.
- 16 -

As to this ground, the trial court made the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law:

The Department filed its Petition for Termination of Parental Rights 

on June 29, 2016. During the preceding four (4) months, the mother 

willfully failed to visit with the children, despite visitation being available 

to the mother and DCS attempting to contact the parents to set up visitation. 

The Department made diligent attempts to explain the consequences of the 

mother’s failure to visit with the children and to apprise them of their 

access to visitation. The Respondents knew that their children were in DCS 

custody as the mother had attended previous court hearings in the 

underlying dependency and neglect case, mother was given paperwork 

which stated the Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental 

Rights, as well as other court orders and documents that contained language 

indicating the consequences of a parent’s failure to visit and/or support his 

or her children. Mother was approved to have therapeutic visitation with 

the children contingent upon passing three consecutive drug screens and 

she either did not make herself available for drug screens or did not pass 

drug screens during this time frame, which prohibited her from having 

contact with the children.

. . . .

During the relevant statutory time period of February, 2016, to June, 

2016, the mother had no visitation with the children. Mother’s visitation 

was to be therapeutic and contingent upon her ability to pass three 

consecutive, random drug screens. Mother was aware of this requirement, 

however, she did not make herself available for the visits and was unable to 

pass the necessary drug screens. DCS had set up the therapeutic visits, so 

mother only needed to pass her drug screens in order to exercise her visits. 

Additionally, mother was aware or should have been aware of the 

consequences of her failure to visit with the children as she was provided 

with numerous documents explaining these consequences. Mother did not 

visit the children during the requisite period, knew or should have known 

the consequences of failing to visit, and was made aware of the 

requirements before she could have visits, however, as she did not comply 

with the requirements, with good reason, and did not have visits with the 

children during the four month period.

Accordingly, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

the Respondent abandoned the children by willfully failing to visit with the 

children during the statutorily relevant period.

This Court has previously held that, “A parent’s choice to continue to use drugs 

when the parent is prohibited from visiting a child until passage of a drug test constitutes 
- 17 -

a willful failure to visit the child.” In re Morgan S., No. E2009-00318-COA-R3-PT,

2010 WL 520972, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2010). Mother does not contest the trial 

court’s findings or conclusions of law with regard to this ground. We have determined 

that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact and that 

those facts constitute clear and convincing evidence to support the ground of 

abandonment by willful failure to visit by Mother in this case.

B. Abandonment by Willful Failure to Support

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(a)(i), quoted above, also defines 

abandonment to mean that a parent has “failed to support or [has] failed to make

reasonable payments toward the support of the child” during the four months preceding 

the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights. The Department alleges that 

Mother abandoned the children by failing to pay child support for them during the four 

months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate on June 29, 2016. 

As to this ground, the trial court made the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law:

During the preceding four (4) months prior to the filing of the 

Termination Petition, mother also willfully failed to support the children. 

Mother testified that she was not disabled, that she was aware that she was 

ordered to pay child support, and that she either was working or had the 

ability to work when she was not working, however, she failed to give an 

adequate reason as to why she did not financially support the children 

during that period. Mother did testify that she had made some child support 

payments after the four (4) month period, however, she admitted she did 

not make any payments during the requisite period. Mother knew or should 

have known of the consequences of her failure to support the children 

financially as she was provided information that informed her of the 

consequences of her failure to financially support the children. Mother also 

admitted that she was aware of her duty to pay support for the children.

. . . .

During the relevant statutory time period of February, 2016, to June, 

2016, the mother did not financially support the children. As evidenced by 

the records from the child support office as well as mother’s own 

admissions, she did not pay any support for the children during that time 

period. Mother testified that she was working during some of that period 

and when she was not working, it was not due to any disability or 

incarceration. Additionally, mother was aware or should have been aware 

of the consequences of her failure to support the children as she was 

provided with numerous documents explaining these consequences. 

Mother did [not] support the children during the requisite period, knew or 
- 18 -

should have known the consequences of failing [to] support them, and was 

not incarcerated nor disabled during the four month period to prevent her 

from supporting the children.

Accordingly, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

the Respondent abandoned the children by willfully failing to support the 

children during the statutorily relevant period.

The Department must prove that Mother’s failure to pay was “willful.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). Failure to support is willful “when a person is aware of 

his or her duty to . . . support, has the capacity to do so, makes no attempt to do so, and 

has no justifiable excuse for not doing so.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 864. Mother 

testified that she was aware of her duty to pay child support for her children. She further 

stated that she worked during part of the relevant time period and that, when she was not 

working, it was not because she was disabled or unable to work. Furthermore, Mother 

admitted that she failed to pay child support during the four months prior to the filing of 

the termination petition. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s 

findings of fact, and we conclude that those facts constitute clear and convincing 

evidence to support the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support by Mother in 

this case.

C. Persistence of Conditions

The requirements for termination of a parent’s rights under the ground referred to 

as “persistence of conditions” are found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(June 

2016):

The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by 

order of a court for a period of six (6) months and:

(A) The conditions that led to the child’s removal or other conditions that in 

all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further 

abuse or neglect and that, therefore, prevent the child’s safe return to the 

care of the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians, still persist;

(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an 

early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or parents or 

the guardian or guardians in the near future; and

(C) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship 

greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable 

and permanent home;

The Department argues that the conditions that led to the children’s removal from 

Mother’s home in April 2015 still exist, and that other conditions have arisen that prevent 

the children’s safe return to her home. The Department further asserts that these 
- 19 -

conditions are not likely to be remedied at an early date, and that the continuation of 

Mother’s relationship with the children prevents them from integrating into a safe and 

permanent home.

The trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of 

law regarding this ground for termination:

The children were removed from the mother’s home due to issues 

with her drug use. The mother had an extensive period throughout this case 

where she continued to abuse drugs and admitted that she refused help from 

DCS and others for an extensive period of time. DCS made reasonable 

efforts in assisting the mother in rectifying the conditions that led to the 

removal of the children from the home, however, during a majority of this 

case, mother was still using drugs, used drugs to the point where she had 

another child that was born who was removed from mother’s custody in 

Rutherford County, Tennessee, due to this child being born with drugs in 

her system from mother using drugs while pregnant, and mother’s 

admission that she had relapsed since the TPR had been filed, including her 

use of methamphetamine. Mother has stated that she is sober since 

relapsing and that relapsing is part of recovery and that she is very involved 

in recovery-based groups, however, she has used drugs for a majority of 

this case to the point where these conditions have persisted throughout the 

case and are not likely to be resolved any time soon.

The children have been in the custody of DCS since June, 2015, and 

before that, were living with their grandfather. The children were removed 

from their mother’s home due to concerns that the mother was abusing 

drugs.

The conditions that led to removal still persist as to the mother. 

Before this Termination Petition was filed, mother was not passing drug 

screens and not availing herself to the Department to consistently take drug 

screens. By mother’s own testimony, she was actively using drugs 

throughout this case. After this Petition was filed, mother began to live a 

more sober lifestyle, however, she had recently relapsed before this hearing 

and was discharged from a drug treatment program due to her relapse. 

DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist mother in curbing her drug use, 

however, until recently, she was consistently abusing drugs. There is little 

chance that mother will be able to rectify her conditions in the immediate 

future as mother has not consistently shown she can stay sober and even 

after a period of sobriety, she has relapsed. Due to this patterned drug use, 

the Court finds it is unlikely that these conditions will be likely remedied 

soon. Additionally, the relationship between the mother and the children is 
- 20 -

diminished and suffers as a result of mother’s inconsistent ability to remain 

sober.

Accordingly, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

the conditions that led to the removal of the children from the mother still 

[persist] and that this ground has been satisfied for the purposes of 

termination of parental rights.

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, and 

we have determined that those facts constitute clear and convincing evidence to support 

the ground of persistence of conditions as a ground for termination of Mother’s parental 

rights in this case.

II. Best Interest

Having determined that clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory 

ground exists to terminate Mother’s parental rights, we must next consider whether the 

trial court properly determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best 

interest of the children. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2); In re Audrey S., 182 

S.W.3d at 860. After a court finds that clear and convincing evidence exists to support a 

ground for termination, the child’s interests diverge from those of the parent and the court 

focuses on the child’s best interests. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 877. A court must 

view the child’s best interest from the perspective of the child, not that of the parent. Id.

at 878. A finding that at least one ground for termination of parental rights exists does not 

necessarily require that a parent’s rights be terminated. Id. at 877. Because some parental 

misconduct is redeemable, our termination of parental rights statutes recognize that 

“terminating an unfit parent’s parental rights is not always in the child’s best interests.” 

Id. The facts a court considers in its best interest analysis must be proven by “a 

preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 

455 S.W.3d at 555. Once a court makes the underlying factual findings, it should 

“consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they amount to clear 

and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.” Id.

When considering whether terminating a parent’s rights to a child is in the child’s 

best interest, a trial court is to consider the following non-exclusive factors:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s 

best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment 

after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such 

duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear 

possible;
- 21 -

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or 

other contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established 

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to 

have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent 

or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or 

psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult 

in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is 

healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or whether 

there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance 

analogues as may render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care 

for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status 

would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from 

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with 

the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 

36-5-101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). A trial court is not required to find that each of the 

enumerated factors exists before concluding that it is in the best interest of the child to 

terminate a parent’s rights. In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 

Although in some circumstances “the consideration of one factor may very well dictate 

the outcome of the analysis,” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878, a court is still obligated 

to consider “all the factors and all the proof.” In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d at 682.

The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law 

regarding the best interest of the children:

The mother testified at lengths about how she loves the children and 

the children did state that they love their mother. The children’s 

grandfather also testified that he loves the children and that the mother 

loves the children, however, he also stated that he would not allow mother’s 

other child, whom he cares for, [to] live with the mother. The children’s 

foster parents testified that they have encouraged and allowed the children 

to visit with their biological family, whom they have deemed appropriate. 

Additionally, the foster parents supported and cared for the children 

throughout all of the turmoil they have experienced in [this] case. The 

children have found stability in the [foster] home, who have indicated their 

desire to care for these children in perpetuity. The testimony from the 
- 22 -

[foster] family has shown that the children have become an integral part of 

their family and the [foster family has] provided safe, stable, and loving 

care for these children.

. . . .

The children are in a loving, stable home that they have been in for 

years with the [foster parents], who have expressed their desire to adopt the 

children, if they are available to be adopted. The [foster] family has made 

the children an integral part of their family and has continued to develop 

the relationships between the children and their biological family in a 

manner that is safe and appropriate. Due to the mother’s instability and 

patterned drug use, she is not a stable nor safe option for the children at this 

time and is likely not going to be that option any time soon. The children 

have been in the custody of DCS for years and need permanency. The 

children’s only realistic option for said permanency is through adoption.

 

The Court therefore finds that termination of [Mother’s] parental 

rights is in the best interest of the children.

In its findings, the trial court did not specifically address each of the factors listed 

in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). As to factors one and two, Mother has failed to make 

an adjustment of circumstances to make it safe for the children to return to the home, and 

it remains unclear whether she will be able to make a lasting adjustment in the near 

future. As recently as August 2017, Mother had a relapse into drug use. Regarding 

factor three, the record shows that Mother was unable to see her children for over a year 

because of her drug use. In January 2017, she began having therapeutic visitation, but 

these visits were interrupted due to a drug relapse. While the testimony shows that 

Mother and the children love one another, they have not lived together or had overnight 

visits for over two-and-a-half years. Nevertheless, under factor four, they do have a 

meaningful relationship. 

Factor five addresses the effect of a change in the children’s caretakers and living 

environment. The children have lived with the foster family for over two years, in a safe 

and stable environment. Mother is not currently able to offer the children a stable home 

and, under factor six, she pled guilty to aggravated assault for her actions in taking drugs 

during her pregnancy with Evelyn. With respect to factors seven and eight, the evidence 

reveals that Mother has not maintained sobriety consistently enough to establish that she 

can provide a stable home for the children. As to factor eight, Mother has been providing 

child support for Evelyn, but has not provided child support for Larry and Kimberly on a 

consistent basis. According to the child support division records, Mother made only one 

child support payment in 2016 and five child support payments in 2017 for these two 

children.
- 23 -

As Mother argues, she has made positive steps towards making a lasting 

adjustment in her conduct. She has taken responsibility for her sobriety, and she has been 

attending therapeutic visits with her children. She has a job. Mother is not, however, 

ready to care for her children. She had a relapse as recently as August 2017. She lives in 

a halfway house where children are not permitted to live, and she is not prepared to 

provide housing and other necessities for her children. The evidence does not 

preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, and those facts constitute clear and 

convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded with costs 

of appeal assessed against the appellant, Tara A.P.

________________________________

 ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE