IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 10, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RICHARD CALDWELL

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. F-85154 Howard W. Wilson, Chancellor

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No. M2023-00343-CCA-R3-CD

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Following a trial, a jury found Defendant, Richard Caldwell, guilty of felony evading 

arrest, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, for which 

Defendant received an effective two-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that 

the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction regarding the State’s duty 

to preserve evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we 

affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L.

EASTER and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Jessica F. Butler (on appeal), Assistant Public Defender—Appellate Division; Gerald 

Melton, District Public Defender; and Billie I. Zimmermann and Katie Ladefoged (at trial), 

Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Richard Caldwell.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Brooke A. Huppenthal, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Sarah N. Davis and 

Jerry Blythe, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In April 2021, the Rutherford County Grand Jury issued an indictment charging 

Defendant with the following offenses: 

07/22/2024
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Count Offense Classification

1 Evading Arrest Class D felony

2 Reckless Driving Class B misdemeanor

3 Resisting Arrest Class B misdemeanor

4 Driving on a Revoked/Suspended License Class B misdemeanor

The case proceeded to trial in May 2022. At the start of proof, the State announced 

the parties stipulated that, on January l, 2021, Defendant’s driver’s license “was suspended 

or revoked, and he was not allowed to drive on the roadways of Tennessee.” 

Deputy Clarence Christopher Hyder of the Williamson County Sheriff’s Office 

(WCSO) testified that, around 9:00 a.m. on January 1, 2021, he was on routine patrol

traveling northbound on Columbia Pike in Williamson County when he observed 

Defendant, who was driving a silver Chevy Tahoe southbound on Columbia Pike, “swerve 

into the left turning lane -- halfway in, swerve out, swerve back in, and just stop.” Deputy 

Hyder made a U-turn at the light and then observed Defendant stopped at a red light,

waiting to turn onto the ramp to Interstate 840. Deputy Hyder noted, however, that 

Defendant stopped about 100 yards short of the light and was between the turning lane and 

the lane beside it. 

Deputy Hyder testified that he followed Defendant onto the ramp to I-840 and for 

“about another mile or so” after they entered the interstate. Deputy Hyder said that, while 

following Defendant, he observed Defendant failing to maintain his lane of travel several

times. At mile marker 34, Deputy Hyder initiated his patrol car’s blue lights and sirens

and “hit . . . [his] air horn to initiate a traffic stop.” Deputy Hyder stated that failure to 

maintain a lane was a citable offense and grounds for an investigatory stop; additionally, 

based upon Defendant’s driving, he suspected Defendant was driving under the influence. 

Deputy Hyder testified that Defendant refused to stop and continued traveling down 

the interstate. As he followed Defendant, Deputy Hyder observed Defendant’s driving

“back and forth[,] continuously crossing lines.” Deputy Hyder obtained the tag number to 

Defendant’s vehicle and provided it to dispatch. Deputy Hyder continued to pursue 

Defendant for more than twenty miles, but Defendant never stopped his vehicle. 

Deputy Hyder testified that, around mile marker 50, a Rutherford County officer set 

up a spike strip in the left-hand lane but that Defendant “swerved right into the emergency 

lane, completely off there; came back in, dodging the spike strip[.]” Then, around mile 

marker 52, a trooper with the Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) set a spike strip in the righthand lane. Deputy Hyder said that Defendant avoided the spike strip by driving 

“completely off into the grass on the right side” and that Defendant then got back on the 
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road and kept going. Deputy Hyder testified that he was instructed by his supervisor that, 

once THP became involved, he should terminate his pursuit. He said that, after Defendant 

avoided the second spike strip, he terminated his pursuit, with the THP taking over the 

pursuit “just east of Almaville,” outside of Williamson County. 

Deputy Hyder explained that the patrol car he was driving was equipped with a dash 

camera that was activated when he turned on his emergency equipment and was 

programmed to “go back 30 seconds” and begin recording. He said that his camera 

recorded his pursuit of Defendant and that he attempted to preserve the video by marking 

it as a “pursuit” in the WCSO computer system. He said that, when he attempted to obtain 

a copy of his video for trial, he learned that it had not been preserved. He testified, “In our 

system, you have to mark it a certain way. It keeps it for so long. I marked it as pursuit. I 

spoke to the lady that does the video stuff. She has no idea why it wasn’t preserved. I have 

no control over it.”

Corporal George Barrett with the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department (RCSD) 

testified that, anytime a police pursuit crossed over into Rutherford County, the sheriff’s 

department decided whether to intervene “based off of their reason for the stop” and that 

the department would then “choose whether to continue the pursuit, assist in terminating 

the pursuit, or assist them while they are proceeding through our county in pursuit.” 

Corporal Barrett explained that, if he saw someone commit additional traffic offenses in 

Rutherford County, he could stop the driver for that reason, even if a pursuit from another 

county had been terminated.

Corporal Barrett stated that, on January 1, 2021, there were additional officers on 

patrol because it was New Year’s Day. He stated that, at approximately 9:20 a.m., he was 

on Florence Road near I-840 “when dispatch came over the radio advising that Williamson 

County had a vehicle failing to stop, and they were in pursuit.” Corporal Barrett proceeded 

to mile marker 52 on I-840, intending to deploy a spike strip to disable the fleeing vehicle. 

While waiting, Corporal Barrett heard Deputy Jason Brown announce over the radio that 

Defendant’s vehicle had missed Deputy Brown’s spike strip at mile marker 50 and that 

Defendant was continuing eastbound on I-840. As Defendant drove toward Corporal 

Barrett’s location, Corporal Barrett saw multiple police officers in pursuit behind 

Defendant. 

Corporal Barrett testified that it was raining as he moved into the roadway and 

deployed his spike strip. He said that Defendant “drove off the right shoulder of the 

roadway, avoiding the deployment.” He estimated that Defendant was driving between 

twenty to thirty miles an hour when he drove “all the way off the roadway” and then came 

back up onto the roadway while continuing to be pursued. Corporal Barrett retracted and 

collected the spike strip and then joined the pursuit. Corporal Barrett testified that another 
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deputy set up a spike strip at Exit 57. After Defendant avoided that spike strip, THP

discontinued their pursuit, and RCSD Sergeant Kyle Frazier instructed all Rutherford 

County deputies that were in pursuit of Defendant to terminate their pursuit as well. 

Corporal Barrett said that, after terminating his pursuit, he continued down I-840 

and took Exit 61 onto Jefferson Pike. He turned right and started toward Walter Hill and 

then observed Defendant in front of him. There was traffic on the roadway. Corporal 

Barrett followed Defendant on Jefferson Pike and saw him cross “left of center several 

times” into the oncoming lane of traffic. Defendant also crossed over the fog line one time. 

Corporal Barrett testified that, as they approached the intersection of Jefferson Pike 

and Old Lascassas Road, another deputy was at the intersection ready to deploy a spike 

strip at a stop sign there. After the deputy deployed the spike strip, however, Defendant 

turned left, prior to the stop sign, and drove around the spike strip and through a church 

parking lot. At that point, Corporal Barrett activated his emergency equipment and 

attempted to stop Defendant’s vehicle. Defendant refused to stop for Corporal Barrett; he 

exited the parking lot onto Lascassas Pike and picked up speed, going between fifty-five 

and sixty-five miles per hour. Corporal Barrett testified that the posted speed limit on 

Lascassas Pike was fifty-five miles per hour.

Corporal Barrett testified that, as they proceeded inbound toward Murfreesboro, 

they went through several intersections, and as they approached Northfield Boulevard, 

Defendant turned into a parking lot of a Subway and Family Dollar where there were other 

vehicles. Defendant drove through that parking lot and into the parking lot of an abandoned 

Food Lion. Corporal Barrett pulled across an exit to the Food Lion parking lot in an attempt 

to block it; Defendant drove right at him, but “at the last moment, [Defendant] turned right 

-- went in front of [his] patrol car; and turned right onto Northfield Boulevard.” Defendant 

then ran a red light at Pitts Lane. At that time, Sergeant Frazier terminated the pursuit 

because traffic “was starting to pick up” and they were “entering the city.” Corporal Barrett 

explained that it was continuing to rain and that the conditions were not safe for a pursuit. 

Corporal Barrett testified that he later heard from dispatch that officers from the

Murfreesboro Police Department had observed Defendant’s vehicle at the intersection of

Northfield Boulevard and Memorial Boulevard. Corporal Barrett drove in that direction 

and saw Defendant turn left into another parking lot by Walter Hill Baptist Church. 

Sergeant Frazier, who was also in the area, attempted to block the exit of the parking lot. 

Corporal Barrett testified that he saw Defendant attempting to exit the parking lot through 

the driveway that Sergeant Frazier was occupying. He explained, “I observed Sergeant 

Frazier open his driver’s side door, and start to give commands to the driver.” Defendant 

then drove forward into Sergeant Frazier’s patrol car. At that time, Deputy Aaron Price 

made contact with Defendant’s vehicle in an attempt to disable it. Corporal Barrett
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testified, “Sergeant Frazier had started to use his patrol car to push the . . . suspect vehicle 

backwards at the same time that Deputy Price was trying to push the vehicle sideways . . . 

and push it back into the parking lot. Again, in an attempt to disable it.” 

Corporal Barrett said that he parked behind Defendant’s vehicle. He then 

approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, giving verbal commands for Defendant to exit 

the car. He had to reach through the open driver’s side window, put the vehicle in park, 

and turn off the vehicle because Defendant was not complying with the officers’ 

commands. He said that officers pulled Defendant out of the vehicle and that Deputy Price 

conducted a leg sweep on Defendant to get him to the ground and in handcuffs. Officers 

then called for an ambulance to check Defendant for any injuries. 

Corporal Barrett said that Defendant “was acting confused wondering why we were

trying to stop him.” Corporal Barrett later determined that Defendant did not have a valid 

driver’s license; he said that a computer check revealed that Defendant’s license was 

suspended. The following exchange then occurred regarding Corporal Barrett’s

observations of Defendant after officers removed him from the vehicle: 

Q. And did you have reason to suspect [Defendant] might have 

originally been driving under the influence?

A. His driving, yes, ma’am. I . . . was able to smell, you know, 

whether there was an odor of intoxicant. There was not. I was able to tell 

by his general demeanor; the way he was talking. He wasn’t slurring his

words or anything like that. So I was not looking further into driving under 

the influence.

 

Dash camera video of the pursuit from Corporal Barrett’s patrol car was introduced

as an exhibit to his testimony. He explained that the video first showed his attempt to stop 

Defendant using the spike strip. He said that, after the pursuit was terminated and he turned 

off his emergency equipment, his dash camera stopped recording. Corporal Barrett stated 

that he turned on his emergency equipment again prior to Lascassas Pike, so the video 

showed that pursuit as well. He said that the dash camera was again turned off when he 

terminated the pursuit at Pitts Lane and that it was reactivated “just after the intersection 

of Highway 231 North and Pearcy Street.” 

On cross-examination, Corporal Barrett testified that his dash camera video did not 

capture the moment Defendant’s vehicle hit Sergeant Frazier’s patrol car. He explained 

that he did not have his camera on at that time because he had not activated his emergency 

equipment.
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Deputy Aaron Price of the RCSD testified that, on the morning of January 1, 2021,

he heard the call of a pursuit from Williamson County in which they were requesting 

assistance. He responded to the area and saw Defendant on Jefferson Pike, as Defendant 

was driving toward Lascassas Pike. Deputy Price followed behind Corporal Barrett after 

Corporal Barrett gave instructions to another deputy to set up a spike strip ahead. Deputy 

Price testified that, when Defendant came to the intersection at Lascassas Pike, the other

deputy deployed the spike strip and that he and Corporal Barrett activated their lights and 

sirens. Defendant drove around the spike strip, around a stop sign and off the road, and 

then back onto the road. Defendant then fled into a church parking lot before turning back 

onto Lascassas Pike “going inbound toward the City of Murfreesboro.” Deputy Price 

recalled that it was raining and that he took the lead during this pursuit. He said that there 

were other vehicles on the road on Lascassas Pike that had to pull over to the side “real

fast.” He testified that Defendant was driving “slightly above the speed limit” and that 

Defendant refused to pull over “all the way until we got to the city limits . . . and continued 

once we pulled into another parking lot in the city.” This parking lot contained three open

businesses, and there were other vehicles in the parking lot. Deputy Price testified:

And as we exited that parking lot, we then went into the larger parking lot of 

Food Lion, where I remember seeing a large box truck and one other vehicle. 

And as we exited that parking lot, there was a vehicle pulling in that had to 

pull over due to the fact that they saw us coming[.]

Deputy Price testified that Sergeant Frazier terminated the pursuit when they entered 

Murfreesboro city limits. Deputy Price turned off his emergency equipment but continued 

following Defendant at a safe distance. Deputy Price said that, when Defendant pulled into 

another parking lot, he followed Defendant into the parking lot, and Sergeant Frazier 

blocked the other parking lot exit. Deputy Price testified that Defendant tried to exit the 

parking lot but hit Sergeant Frazier’s patrol car “head-on.” Using the push bar on the front 

of his patrol car, Deputy Price pushed into the passenger side of Defendant’s vehicle to 

keep Defendant from fleeing any farther. Defendant attempted to back out, but other patrol 

vehicles were able to pin in Defendant’s vehicle. Deputy Price said that he gave Defendant 

commands to get out of his vehicle and that, when Defendant did not respond to his 

commands to “get down,” he used a leg sweep “to assist [Defendant] down.” Deputy Price 

testified that, after they handcuffed Defendant, Defendant was “pretty hyper” and said 

multiple times, “I didn’t do anything.” 

THP Sergeant Shawn Boyd testified that, on January 1, 2021, he received a call 

from dispatch that Williamson County was in pursuit of a vehicle and was requesting 

assistance from the THP. Sergeant Boyd observed Defendant’s vehicle traveling outbound

on Highway 231, and he got behind Defendant. Sergeant Boyd said that, when Defendant 

noticed that Sergeant Boyd and additional county units were following him, Defendant 
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passed three cars, going over the double yellow line into oncoming traffic to do so. 

Sergeant Boyd said that Defendant then suddenly turned into a church parking lot off

Highway 231 where officers were able to pin in Defendant’s vehicle and disable it. 

Sergeant Boyd said that he saw Defendant’s vehicle hit Sergeant Frazier’s patrol vehicle, 

stating that Defendant “went nose-to-nose with Sergeant Frazier.” He said that Defendant 

had to be extracted from his vehicle and taken to the ground to be placed in handcuffs. 

On cross-examination, Sergeant Boyd testified that, based upon Defendant’s 

driving, someone could have been injured; he testified that he saw Defendant commit 

traffic offenses, including improperly passing three vehicles on a double yellow line. 

Sergeant Boyd agreed that, in addition to Defendant’s charges in Rutherford County, 

Defendant was charged with evading arrest in Williamson County. 

Sergeant Kyle Frazier of the RCSD testified that dispatch initially received a 

“BOLO” or be on the lookout for a silver Chevy Tahoe that was on I-840 in a pursuit with 

Williamson County. He said that he was supervising Rutherford County’s response to the 

pursuit but that he was not a part of it. Sergeant Frazier stated, “So I was aware, listening, 

and tracking throughout the whole 40-minute interaction or whatever that interaction was.” 

He said that, after the failed attempts with the spike strips, he “disallowed the pursuit 

because it was evident that [Defendant] wasn’t going to stop.” He terminated the pursuit 

when Defendant exited I-840 onto Jefferson Pike. Sergeant Frazier explained that, after 

Defendant went around the spike strip, through a parking lot, and back onto Lascassas Pike, 

he again allowed a pursuit “for a short period of time.” When Defendant turned onto 

Northfield Boulevard, however, he discontinued the pursuit because Defendant was 

refusing to stop. 

Sergeant Frazier said that, after he discontinued the pursuit, he saw the suspect 

vehicle on Memorial Boulevard. Sergeant Frazier and Sergeant Boyd followed behind 

Defendant and, at 10:04 a.m., Sergeant Frazier “radio’ed out that [Defendant] . . . was

passing vehicles in the head-on lane of travel.” Sergeant Frazier testified that, when

Defendant turned into a parking lot by a church, he drove around to the other entrance of 

the parking lot and positioned his patrol car to block it. Sergeant Frazier testified that his 

patrol vehicle was “going like 0.3 miles per hour when it was struck in the front” by 

Defendant’s vehicle. Deputy Price then struck Defendant’s vehicle in the side, and 

Corporal Barrett got behind the vehicle to pin in Defendant. Sergeant Frazier said that 

there was only minor damage to the front push bar of his patrol car. 

Sergeant Frazier testified that Defendant did not comply with officers’ commands

and had to be removed from his vehicle. Sergeant Frazier testified that officers were 

concerned that Defendant was driving under the influence because Defendant was “not 
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acting what we would call ‘normal’ in any sense.” As such, Sergeant Frazier called for 

EMS to evaluate Defendant. 

Sergeant Frazier said that there was a dash camera video from his patrol car and that 

he attempted to preserve the video. He testified, “So we mark videos for evidentiary value 

with a case number and . . . then it gets stored into the cloud on our evidence management 

database system.” He explained, however, that the video was “discarded after six months” 

even though he had requested that it be saved. 

Defendant testified that he was fifty-eight years old at the time of the incident. 

Defendant testified that he had been diagnosed with Covid and secondary pneumonia and 

hospitalized from December 17-25, 2020. He said that, after getting out of the hospital, he 

stayed with his brother in Jackson on New Year’s Eve. He stated that, on New Year’s Day,

he had planned to return some equipment to a lady in Fairview and that he had been driving 

his brother’s silver Chevy Tahoe. Defendant testified that, while on I-840, he missed a 

turn and “got turned around[,]” so he got off the interstate. He said that he was going to 

get back on the interstate but got caught at a red light before he could turn onto the ramp. 

He denied that he stopped in the middle of the road. Defendant said that he saw Deputy 

Hyder drive past him before he turned onto the ramp to I-840. 

During Defendant’s testimony, the following exchange occurred: 

Q. Were you going the direction you intended to go?

A. At the time, I thought I was, but I was not.

Q. Do you believe your illness had affected you?

A. Yes.

Q. In what way?

A. I was out of character. 

Defendant continued:

[W]hen I got ready to get on the freeway, I pulled over and got myself on 

because I seen the officer look. I felt like he was going to turn around. I got 

my cell phone. It was on airplane mode. I entered onto the expressway. And 

there was a little white Nissan trailing behind me. 
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Defendant said that, eventually, Deputy Hyder turned “his signal light on to get behind 

me.” Defendant stated that they drove another fifteen minutes or more before the “little 

white Nissan” exited the interstate. At that point, Deputy Hyder turned on his blue lights 

and sirens. Defendant testified that Deputy Hyder’s attempted stop was “just out of the 

blue[.]” He said, “My first thought I said, Lord, . . . what do I do? And the first thing that 

came in my mind is: Don’t pull over until I see a witness.” 

Defendant admitted that he drove around the first spike strip but said that he slowed 

down before doing so. He testified that he finally decided to stop once he realized he was 

in Murfreesboro and saw officers from the Murfreesboro Police Department; he said,

“[T]hat’s when I pulled into that church lot and gave up. I realized that I had other officers, 

instead of [the] Williamson County officer that was behind me. And I felt a little more 

secure.”

Defendant denied hitting Sergeant Frazier’s patrol vehicle, stating that the video did 

not show “when we connected[.]” Defendant said that he was wearing his seat belt and 

that the officer who pulled him out of the vehicle had to disconnect it. Defendant recalled 

that he told the officers that his “oxygen level had dropped” and that he asked the officers 

to “give [him] a minute” to get his oxygen level back up before exiting his vehicle. When

asked how it would make him feel when his oxygen level got low, Defendant responded, 

“You’re -- you can’t hardly breathe. You’re tense. Just weird.” Defendant admitted that 

he ran one red light during the pursuit. 

Defendant said that he did not stop for Deputy Hyder because he was afraid. 

Defendant testified:

The way he stayed behind me so long; and once I seen the last vehicle pull 

off the expressway, I looked around, and I [saw] nobody else on the 

expressway, but me and him. I felt like he had plenty of time to run . . . tags, 

and anything else to put his lights on. And he didn’t to it until that last car . 

. . exited off.

On cross-examination, Defendant testified that his brother had not wanted him to 

leave that day because he thought Defendant was “acting funny.” Defendant testified, “He 

said I was out of character. I was not myself.” When asked if he was driving “a little

strangely” because he did not know where he was, Defendant said that it was possible. 

Defendant agreed that he should not have been driving and that he was confused. 

Defendant denied that Deputy Hyder activated his lights and sirens shortly after they 

got onto I-840. He said that the deputy followed him for almost fifteen minutes. When 

asked why he did not stop at mile marker 50 when he encountered the first spike strip, 
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Defendant replied, “I slowed down. I hollered out my window, I don’t know why they 

charge -- why they are trailing me. Nobody pulled up to try to block me in. I put my signal 

light on and went around it.” Defendant also acknowledged driving off the road at the 

second spike strip at mile marker 52; he said that he saw THP vehicles but did not notice 

any Rutherford County vehicles at that time. When asked if he was paying attention to the 

road, Defendant responded, “I was not coherent. I was out of character.” Defendant said 

that he was speeding because he was “forced to speed” and claimed that an officer tried to 

hit the back of his vehicle while Defendant was on the interstate. Defendant said that he 

knew what he was doing was dangerous and that, after he avoided the second spike strip, 

he exited the interstate. 

 

Defendant testified that, when he came to the last spike strip, he came to a complete 

stop and then went around them; he agreed that he went into the oncoming lane of traffic. 

He acknowledged that he drove through a parking lot, where there were several businesses,

and then onto Lascassas Pike, where officers again turned on their lights and sirens. 

Defendant agreed that he should have stopped and admitted that he did not do so. He said 

that he intended to stop in the first parking lot he entered but that “[t]here was not a person 

out there.” 

At the close of proof, the trial court held a charge conference, during which the court 

addressed Defendant’s written request for specific jury instructions. As relevant here, 

Defendant contended that the video of traffic violations he allegedly committed in 

Williamson County was not preserved by the State and that, as such, the court should 

instruct the jury with Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 42.23, Duty to Preserve 

Evidence.

1

 In response, the State argued that, pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 

915-16 (Tenn. 1999), it did not have a duty to preserve the dash camera video from 

Williamson County Deputy Hyder’s patrol car. The State asserted that Deputy Hyder’s

dash camera video was not constitutionally material to the Rutherford County case and

 

1 Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 42.23 provides as follows:

The State has a duty to gather, preserve, and produce at trial evidence which may 

possess exculpatory value. Such evidence must be of such a nature that the defendant 

would be unable to obtain comparable evidence through reasonably available means. The 

State has no duty to gather or indefinitely preserve evidence considered by a qualified 

person to have no exculpatory value, so that an as yet unknown defendant may later 

examine the evidence. 

If, after considering all of the proof, you find that the State failed to gather or 

preserve evidence, the contents or qualities of which are at issue and the production of 

which would more probably than not be of benefit to the defendant, you may infer that the 

absent evidence would be favorable to the defendant.
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argued that dash camera video from Rutherford County showed Defendant committing 

multiple traffic infractions and evading law enforcement in Rutherford County, thereby 

negating the relevance of Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video from Williamson County. 

The trial court found the State did not have a duty to preserve Deputy Hyder’s dash 

camera video. The court found that this lost video would be relevant and may possess 

exculpatory value “if . . . Defendant was on trial in Williamson County for his conduct 

there”; however, the court found no apparent exculpatory value in Deputy Hyder’s dash 

camera video as to the instant Rutherford County case. Accordingly, the trial court 

declined to provide the jury with Defendant’s requested instruction regarding the State’s 

duty to preserve evidence.

Following deliberations, the jury found Defendant guilty of evading arrest, reckless 

driving, and driving on a revoked or suspended license. The jury found Defendant not 

guilty of resisting arrest. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant, as 

a Range I standard offender, to two years for evading arrest; six months for reckless 

driving; and six months for driving on a revoked or suspended license. The court

suspended Defendant’s sentences following the service of sixty days in jail and ordered 

that all counts run concurrently. 

Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial and amended motion for new trial. 

Following a hearing, the trial court entered a written order denying the motion for new 

trial. This timely appeal follows. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the State 

did not have a duty to preserve Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video and by denying his

request for a jury instruction regarding the State’s duty to preserve evidence. Defendant 

asserts that the testimony regarding the basis for Deputy Hyder’s attempted stop in 

Williamson County “differed widely” and that the variation between Defendant’s 

testimony and Deputy Hyder’s testimony highlighted “the need for the dashcam video as 

an objective account” of the basis for Deputy Hyder’s initiating of his lights and sirens. 

Defendant contends that the trial court should have viewed the pursuit in Williamson 

County and the pursuit in Rutherford County as “one continuous event.” He maintains that 

Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video was “critically important” to the defense, asserting that 

Deputy Hyder “had no legitimate basis for initiating a stop” and that the dash camera video 

“would have put to rest any questions about which narrative was to be believed.” 

Defendant further argues that the trial court did not properly weigh the Ferguson factors 

and that “a proper weighing” demonstrates the need for the requested jury instruction. 
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The State responds that the trial court properly concluded that it had no duty to 

preserve Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video and that the court acted within its discretion 

by declining to provide the jury with Defendant’s requested instruction.

The question of “[w]hether a trial, conducted without the destroyed evidence, would 

be fundamentally fair” concerns a constitutional issue, which appellate courts review de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 914; State v. Crass, 660 

S.W.3d 506, 514 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022). Where fundamental unfairness results, 

appellate courts will review the trial court’s remedial action for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d 779, 791-92 (Tenn. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs 

when the trial court applies “an incorrect legal standard, reaching an illogical conclusion, 

or basing a decision on an erroneous assessment of the evidence.” State v. Rimmer, 623 

S.W.3d 235, 260 (Tenn. 2021). Appellate courts will not overrule a trial court’s decision 

“when the chosen remedy is consistent with the findings made by the trial court utilizing 

the Ferguson considerations.” Merriman, 410 S.W.3d at 791-92; see Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 

at 917. 

The Due Process Clause, pursuant to the Federal and Tennessee Constitutions, 

guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair trial. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 

TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8; see id. § 9. To facilitate this right, the prosecution must provide 

exculpatory evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, United 

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 (1976), or, upon request, provide evidence “material either 

to guilt or to punishment,” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

In Ferguson, our supreme court “explained that the loss or destruction of potentially 

exculpatory evidence may violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Merriman, 410 

S.W.3d at 784 (citing Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 915-16). The court determined that the due 

process required under the Tennessee Constitution was broader than that required under 

the United States Constitution and rejected the “bad faith” analysis adopted by the United 

States Supreme Court. Id. at 784-85 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 

(1988)). Instead, the court in Ferguson adopted a balancing approach in which a trial court 

must determine “[w]hether a trial, conducted without the [lost or] destroyed evidence, 

would be fundamentally fair.” Id. at 785 (quoting Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 914).

When a defendant raises a Ferguson claim, a trial court must first “determine 

whether the State had a duty to preserve the evidence.” Merriman, 410 S.W.3d at 785.

“[T]he State’s duty to preserve evidence is limited to constitutionally material evidence 

described as ‘evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s 

defense.’” Id. (quoting Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917). To meet this constitutional materiality 

standard, “the evidence must potentially possess exculpatory value and be of such a nature 
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that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 

available means.” Id. (footnote omitted).

If the proof demonstrates the existence of a duty to preserve evidence and further 

shows that the State has failed in that duty, a court must proceed with a balancing analysis 

involving consideration of the following factors:

1. The degree of negligence involved;

2. The significance of the destroyed evidence, considered in light of the 

probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that 

remains available; and

3. The sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the 

conviction.

Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917 (footnote omitted). The trial court is required to balance these 

factors to determine whether conducting a trial without the missing evidence would be 

fundamentally fair. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d at 785. “If the trial court concludes that a trial 

would be fundamentally unfair without the missing evidence, the trial court may then 

impose an appropriate remedy to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, including, but 

not limited to, dismissing the charges or providing a jury instruction.” Id. at 785-86.

In this case, the trial court found that the State did not have a duty to preserve Deputy 

Hyder’s dash camera video for the purposes of Defendant’s trial for offenses committed in 

Rutherford County. The trial court found that, although Defendant could not obtain 

comparable evidence, Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video lacked exculpatory value and, 

therefore, was not constitutionally material. We agree with the trial court’s determination.

Defendant was on trial in Rutherford County for actions that took place in

Rutherford County, and dash camera video of the Rutherford County offenses from 

Corporal Barrett’s patrol car was played to the jury, which found Defendant guilty of felony 

evading arrest, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked or suspended license. Deputy 

Hyder testified that he attempted to stop Defendant at mile marker 34 in Williamson 

County and that he terminated his pursuit of Defendant soon after crossing into Rutherford 

County. Under these facts, we cannot conclude that Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video 

was “evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in [the] defense” during 

Defendant’s trial for offenses committed in Rutherford County. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 
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917. Thus, the State had no duty to preserve Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video for 

Defendant’s trial in the instant case.2 See Merriman, 410 S.W.3d at 785.

Furthermore, even if the State had a duty to preserve Deputy Hyder’s dash camera 

video, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s requested jury 

instruction. In its analysis, the trial court considered the Ferguson factors and found that 

the failure to preserve the dash camera video was the result of simple negligence, and this 

finding is supported by the record. Deputy Hyder testified that he marked the recording as 

a “pursuit” to ensure that the computer system in Williamson County would save and 

maintain the video. After discovering that the video was missing, Deputy Hyder spoke to 

an employee in charge of video record-keeping, who said she had “no idea why it wasn’t 

preserved.” Thus, we agree that the failure to preserve Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video

was the result of simple negligence.

Regarding the second Ferguson factor, the trial court found that Deputy Hyder’s 

dash camera video would have had little significance in the case. The court noted that 

Defendant was on trial based on his actions in Rutherford County rather than for his 

behavior in Williamson County and that the instant case was “not a case like Merriman

where a video’s significance would have been increased because of a lack of other

evidence.” The court found that there was “plenty of other evidence . . . introduced at trial, 

including video evidence from Rutherford County.” Again, the record supports this 

determination by the trial court. Deputy Hyder testified that he attempted to stop Defendant 

because he suspected Defendant was “driving under the influence,” and Defendant 

admitted that he “was not coherent” and possibly “driving strangely” that morning. Three

other officers involved in the pursuit also testified that they suspected Defendant was 

driving under the influence, as reflected in video evidence introduced at trial. The video

evidence from Rutherford County showed Defendant’s attempts to evade police, his 

swerving off the road, and his overall poor driving. We thus agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that the dash camera video from Deputy Hyder’s patrol car would have little 

significance in the instant case. 

In considering the third Ferguson factor, the trial court found that the other evidence 

presented at trial was more than sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions in this case. 

We agree. As noted by the trial court, the jury heard testimony from five law enforcement 

 

2 Although Defendant asserts that the dash camera video would have shown whether Deputy Hyder 

had a valid basis to stop him, we note that Deputy Hyder testified the dash camera was only programmed 

to go back and record thirty seconds prior to his turning on his lights and sirens. It is unclear from Deputy 

Hyder’s testimony whether Defendant’s alleged traffic violations or other suspicious driving occurred 

within the thirty seconds prior to Deputy Hyder’s activating his lights and sirens and would have been 

caught on the recording. In other words, if Defendant’s alleged conduct occurred outside of the thirtysecond window, the video may not have served to clarify the circumstances of the attempted stop. 
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officers who pursued Defendant in Rutherford County, and the jury viewed dash camera

video from Rutherford County. Additionally, Defendant admitted under crossexamination that he committed traffic violations in Rutherford County and did not pull 

over when Rutherford County officers attempted to stop him, and Defendant stipulated that 

his license was revoked or suspended on January 1, 2021, when he was driving in 

Rutherford County. The evidence was clearly sufficient to support Defendant’s 

convictions. 

Because the degree of negligence involved in the loss or destruction of Deputy 

Hyder’s dash camera video was minimal, the probative value and reliability of other 

evidence outweighed the significance of Deputy Hyder’s dash camera video, and the 

evidence at trial overwhelmingly supported Defendant’s convictions, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request to instruct the jury regarding the State’s 

duty to preserve evidence. Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

____________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE