Ba sed on plaintiff’s Stipulations of Dismissal [ Dkt. #20-21], the Court gr ants as 1 c on c e de d th e mot ion s to dis mis s f ile d o n b e ha lf

of the Was hin g ton

Me tr op oli tan A re a

Tr ans it A u th o r it y [D kt. # 1 0 ] an d

o nb e h a lf o f A n th o n y Wi ll ia ms an d Ch ar le s Ra

ms e y [D kt. # 1 3 ]. -1- UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

JOH N B AR

NH AR DT , P la in t if f, v. Ci vilAc ti on N o. 08 -1 32 7 ( JD B) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, e t al . , De fend ant s.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION Th is m atte r i s b e fo re the Court on the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia ’s Am e nd e d M oti on to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary J udg ment. For

the re asons discussed 1 below, the motion will be g rante d. I . BA CKGROUND On May 5, 2005, L ennar d Smit h and other Metro Tra

nsit P olice De partment off icer s
arr e ste d p la int if

f i n o r n e ar t

he 35 00 blo c k o f Jay

Str e e t in No rt he a st, Was hin g ton , D .C. Com pl. ¶ 16. “A t the time of [the] arr est, [Officer ] S mith seiz ed fr om plaintiff’s vehicle , and fr om [p] laintiff’s per son, sever al items of prope rty ,” id. ¶ 20, amongwhich alleg edly wer e the fo llo wi ng : (1) U.S. Currenc y ; (2) Two Nextel Phones; (3) Money Orde rs (two @

$500 ea.) ; (4) personal papers and eff ects; and (5) Jewelry , consisting of two g ol ddiamond ring s (valued at $15,000) and one g old barlinked diamond chain ( valued at $5,000).-2-

Id. Of fi c e r S mith tr ans po rt e d p la int if f f ro m th e sc e ne of

the arr e st t o th e Gr e ate r S outhe a st Communi ty

Hospital, id. ¶ 17, and upon his discha rg e at 12:45 a.m., id. , Metro Tra nsit P olice office rs transpor

ted plaintiff to the Metropolitan Police De partment’s “ Central Cellblock on Indiana Ave nue, N.W. for pr ocessingand pre sentment in [t he] Superior Court [of the District of Columbi a].” Id. ¶ 18. “A t no time on the date of his ar rest[] was plaintiff e ver taken to the MPD’s 6 District for a

ny rea son.” Id. ¶ 23 (e mphasis in origina l). th After plaintiff’s re lease from custody , he “w ent immediately to the Metro Tra

nsit P olice Depa rtment to inquire about the r eturn of the proper ty (includingthe jewe lry

) which ha d been taken dur ing the arr est.” Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff was informe d that his property could not be returne d beca

use it “may

be used a s evidenc e in the cr iminal case pe nding be fore the Gra nd J ury .” Id. When the criminal proc eeding s conclude d, plaintiff filed a motion in t he Superior Court fo r r eturn o f t h e p ro p erty

s ei z edatth e t i m e o f h i s arre s t
. C o mp l
. ¶ 2 2
. T h e p re s i d i n g j u d ge g rante d the motion on September 10, 2007, id. , and, ar med with the Superior Court’s Or der, plaintiff went to the Me tro Tra nsit P olice De partment’s Prope rty Offic e on September

20, 2007. Id. ¶ 23. Metro Tr ansit Poli ce “ turned ove r . . . most of the items . . . but could not locate the Plaintiff’s jewelr

y , money order s and miscellane ous other items.” Id. ( e mp h a s i s i no r i g i n a l )
. In an Oc tober 2007 filing , the Tra nsit P olice “inf

ormed the [Superior] Court that: (1) Plainti ff’ s jewelr y had bee n left in the custody of the Six th District of the Metropolitan Police De partment afte r his arr est; and (2) the jewe lry had bee n ‘destroyed’ by

the Six th District Property Offic e on May 4, 2006.” Id.Plaintiff “conc edes that the case should not procee d direc tly based on the 2 Four teenth Amendme nt,” Mem. in Opp’n to De f.’s Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summ. J. ( “ Pl. ’s Op p’ n” ) at 2, and the Cou rt wi ll d ism iss that c la im. Be cause plaintiff “would not oppose dismissal of his claim for intentional a nd/or 3 neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress under the f acts in this case ,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, the Court will dism iss Count7.

In r e le va nt p art , Se c tio n 1 98 3 p ro vid e s: 4 Every person who, unde r color of any statu t e, o rd i nance , regulation, custom, or usag e, of a

ny State or Ter

ritory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or c auses to be subjected, a

ny citizen of the United States or other pe rson within the jurisdiction there of to the depr ivation of any rig hts, privilege s, or immuniti es sec ure d by the Con sti tut ion

and laws , s ha ll b e lia

ble to the pa

rt y inj ur e d in

an a c tio n at la

w, su it i n equity , or other pr oper pr ocee ding f or re dress[.] (continued...) -3- Plaintiff bring s this action ag ainst the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the a lle g e d v iol atio n o f h is F if th A me ndme nt r ig ht t o d

ue pr oc e ss. Com

pl. ¶¶ 32 , 3 4 ( Counts 4 2 and 5). In addition, plaintiff bring s common law tort claims for neg lige nce ( Count 6), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7), and c onversion (Count 8). Id. ¶¶ 37, 40, 43. He 3 demands a

decla ratory judgme nt and an a

war d of ac tual, compensatory , specia l, ge nera l and punitive damag es. Id. at 13-14 (Re quest for Relief ) (pa g e number s desig nated by the Court). I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Plain tif

f’ s Co ns tituti on al C

lai ms Ag ain st t heDi str ic t of Colum bia The District of Columbia moves to dismiss pl aintiff’s F ifth Amendment cla im on the g round that the c omplaint fails to state a cla im upon which the Court may g rant re lief. See D i s tr i c to f

C o l u mb i a ’ s A m e n d e d

M o t
. t o D i s m i s s o r , i nth e A l t e r n at i v e , M o t
. f

o r S u m m . J. (“D ef.’ s Mot.”) at 5-6. Spec ifically , the District ar g ues that plaintiff doe s not properly alleg e municipal liability

under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). Id. 4(...continued) 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a cla im under Section 1983, a c omplaint mustalleg e fa cts sufficie nt to show that the conduc t of which a plaintiff complains (1) was c ommitt ed by a per son acting un de r c olo r o f s tate law, and (2 ) d e pr ive d th e pla int if

f o f a c on sti tut ion a lly -p ro te c te d r ig ht. See, e.g., W est v. Atkins , 4 87 U. S. 4 2, 48 (1 98 8) . T he Di str ic t of Col umb ia

is a mun ic ipa lity

and is considere d a “pe rson” f

or purpose s of Section 1983. Se e, e .g., Be st v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 743 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D .C. 1990). The District doe s not address in its motion whether plaintiff adequately

alleg es the de privation of a c onstitut ional right. The Court presume s without de c idi ngthat he do e s. -4- Th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure re qu ir e that a c omp la int

c on ta in “ ‘a

sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘ g ive the defe ndant fa ir notice of what the . . . cla im is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.’” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. __, __, 127 S.C t. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quotingConley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Amotion under Rule 12(b)( 6) does not test a pla intiff’s likelihood of
succe ss on the merits; rather , it tests whether a plaintiff prope rly

has stated a

claim. See Sc heuer v. Rhode s , 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A c ourt consider ing suc h a motion presumes the f actua l alleg ations of the complaint to be true and construe s them liberally in the plaintiff’s fa

vor. See, e.g., United States v . Phillip Morris , Inc., 1 1 6 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 3 1 , 1 3 5 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 1 ). Al th o u gh “deta iled fac tual alleg ations” ar e not re quired to withstand a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, a plaintiff must offer “ more than la

bels and c onclusions” to provide “ g rounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief.” Be ll A tl. Cor

p. v . Two mb ly , 127 S.Ct . at 1964-65. Thus, the c omplaint’s “[f] actua l alleg ations must be enoug h to raise a rig ht to relief a

bove the spe culative leve l, on the assumption that all the alleg ations in the complaint are true (e ven if doubtful in fa ct).” Id . at 1965 (c itations omi tted).

“ [A] munic ipa lity

c an b e fo un d li a

ble un de r [Se c tio n] 19 83 on ly wh e re the mun ic ipa lity its e lf cause s the constitutional violation at is sue.” City of C an ton , O hio v . H

arris , 489 U.S. 378, 3 8 5 (1 9 8 9 ) ( ci t i n g Mo ne ll v . D e p’ t of So c . S e rv . o f th e City of N e w York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-5-

(1978) ( emphasis in orig inal)). “ Re sp on de at s up e rio r or vica rious liability

will not attach under [S ection] 1983.” Id. The District of Columbia, then, is subject to liability under Sec tion 1983 only “whe n an off

icial policy

or custom ca

uses the complaina

nt to suffer a

deprivation of a constitutional right.” Car te r v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 795 F.2d 116, 122 ( D.C. Cir. 1986). The policy or custom itself must be the moving forc e behind the c onstitut ional violation. Id. (citing Mo ne ll , 4 36 U. S. at 69 4) ; se e als o P e mb au e r v . Ci ty of Cinc inn ati , 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (“ [M]un ic ipa l li a

bil ity un de r § 19 83 atta c he s w he re – a nd on ly wh e re – a

de lib e ra te c ho ic e to fo llo w a c ours e of a c tio n is ma de fr om a

mon gva ri ou s a lte rn ativ e s b y

the of fi c ia l or of fi c ia ls
re sp on sib le fo r e sta

bli sh ingfi na l po lic y

wi th r e sp e c t to the su

bje c t matte r i n q

ue sti on .” ); Ok lah om a Ci ty

v . Tu ttle , 4 71 U. S. 8 08 , 8 17 (1 98 5) (r e qu ir inga pla int if f t o s ho w a

c ours e deliberately

pursued by

the city establishing a

n aff irmative link betwee n the city ’s policy and the alleg ed constitutional violation). The Court libera lly

construes a

complaint filed by

a pr o s e lit ig ant, and

ho lds it t o a

le ss stringe nt standard than is a pplied to a forma l pleadingdraf ted by a lawyer. See H

aines v. Kerne r , 40 4 U .S. 51 9, 52 0 ( 19 72 ). Th e re is n o h e ig hte ne d p le a din gsta nd ard in a c ivi l r ig hts c a se alleg ing municipa l liabilit y for c ivil rights violations, se e Le ath e rm an v . Ta rra nt C ou nty Narc oti cs I

nte lli ge nc e an d Co or

din ati on Un it , 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993), and a complaint “nee d not plead law or

match fa cts to ever

y element of

a leg al theory ,” Sp arro w v . U nite d A ir Li ne

s, Inc ., 216 F.3d 1111, 1115 ( D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “Ne verthe less, [a] Complaint must ‘include some fa ctual basis for the alleg ation of a municipa l policy or custom.’” Hinson ex
re l. N .H . v . M e rri tt E du c . Ct r. , 5 2 1 F. S u

p p . 2 d 2 2 , 2 9 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Atchinson v. Di str ic t of Colum bia , 73 F.3d 418, 422 ( D.C. Cir. 1996)).-6-

Plaintiff’s Complaint barely hints at the exi stence of a municipa l policy , custom, or prac tice. It alleg es that MPD personne l acted “ under c olor of law, a nd pursuant to offic ial policy
and c us tom ,” and

that th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

“ kn ow ing ly , o r n e g lig e ntl y , f a ile d to pr op e rl y instruct, supervise, c ontrol, and discipline employ ees in the 6 District Property Offic e in the th perf ormanc e of the ir duties.” Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff pleads his way out of court on his Section 1983 claim, howeve r, by

alleg ing that the sole basis for the District’s liability “for the ac tions of the Property

Clerk [is] under the doctrine of Respondeat Super ior.” Id. (empha sis in original).

“Re sp on de at s up e rio r or vica rious liability

will not attach under

[S ection] 1983.” Ha rri

s , 489 U.S. at 385. Henc e, the Complaint fails to state a c laim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ag ainst the District of Columbia.

B. Plain tif

f’ s Co mm on Law C

lai ms Ag ain st t heDi str ic t of Colum bia Wit h respe ct to the common law c laims, the District moves for summary judgme nt on the g round that plaintiff fa iled to comply with the mandatory

notice re quirements of D .C. Code § 12- 309. SeeDe f. ’s Mo t. at 7- 10 . In r e le va nt p art , D .C. Cod e § 1 2- 30 9 p ro vid e s: An action may not be maintained ag ainst the District of Columbia for unliquidated damag es to person or proper ty unless, within six months afte r t he inj ury or damag e was sustained, t he claimant, his ag ent, or attorney has g iven notice in wr iting to the May or of the D istrict of Columbi a of the approximate time, place, cause , and cir cumstance s of the injury

or dama g e. D.C. Code § 12-309. The statutory purpose is “to g ive the District off icials rea sonable notice of [an incident] s o that the fa cts may be asc erta ined and, if possible, de servingclaims adjusted and meritless claims re sisted.” Pi tts v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1987). Pot e nti a l c la ima

nts , th e n, mus t “ pr ov ide an e arl y wa rn ingto D istri c t of

Col umb ia

of fi c ia ls-7-

reg ardinglitigation likely to occur in the future.” Id. Compli ance with the terms of D.C. Code § 12-309 is a mandatory

prer equisite to filing a

tort action ag ainst the District of Columbia. See,
e .g., Di str ic t of Colum bia v . D un mo re , 6 62 A. 2d 13 56 , 1 35 9 ( D. C. 1 99 5) ; Gwinn v. District of Colum bia , 4 34 A. 2d

13 76 , 1 37 8 ( D. C. 1 98 1) ; Hi ll v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 345 A.2d 867, 869 (D.C. 1975). B eca

use D.C. Code § 12-309 “ constitutes a depa rture f rom the common law
conce pt of sovere ign immunity ,” it “is to be strictly construed,” Gwinn , 4 34 A. 2d at 13 78 , e ve n if the re sult precludes a

claimant’s de mand for c ompensation, se e Hi ll , 345 A.2d at 869 (c oncurr ing wi th t ri a l ju dg e ’s a sse ssm e nt t

hat ma nd ator y c omp lia nc e wi th S e c tio n 1 2- 30 9 ma y have a “ ha rs h result”)
. On or a bout March 17, 2008, pla intiff sent by cer tified mail a “N otice of Intent to Bring Claim for Dama g es” stemmingfrom “the destruction of c erta in items of . . . personal pr operty by the Metropolitan Police De partment’s . . . Six th District Property Offic e on May

4, 2006.” De f.’s Mot., Ex . A at 1. The Mayor’s Corre spondence Unit rec eived the le tter on Mar ch 25, 2008. See id. (date stamp). The N otice re counts plaintiff’s May 5, 2005 arr est, the seizure of pr operty by Metro Tra

nsit officer s, the Superior Court Orde r g rantinghis moti on for r eturn of pr operty , and his discovery

in October

2007 that his jewelry

had bee n destroy ed. Id . H e e xpla ine d th at MPD office rs wer e not involved in his arre st and that he wa s never taken to the Six th District, id. at 2,
su c h th at he wa s “ put on

no tic e fo r t

he fi rs t ti me that Me tr o T ra ns it o ff ic e rs le ft [his ] je we lr

y in the custody

of the Proper

ty Offic e at MPD’s Six th District” in October 2007. Id. at 1. The District of Columbia ar g ues that plaintiff’s c ause of action ar ose either

on May 5, 2005, the date on which his proper ty was seized, or on Ma

y 4, 2006, the date on which the je we lr y wa s d e str oye d. De f. ’s Mo t. at 8, 10 . In it s v ie w, pla int if f’ s Ma rc h 1 7, 20 08 No tic e is-8-

untimely in either c ircumstance
. Id. at 8. Pla int if f c ounte rs that, “ wh e re [he ] ha s n o r e a so n to believe that an injury

exis ts, the better inter

pretation is t o require [hi m] to file his notice within 6 month[ s] of learningthat an injury was sustained.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 (pa g e number s desig nated by the Court ). He argue s th at hi s Ma rc h 1 7, 20 08 No tic e wa s ti me ly fi le d b e c a

us e he su bmi tte d it within six months of October 2007, when plaintiff le arne d that his jewelry had bee n destroy ed. Id. ; seePl.’s Aff. ¶¶

2-4. “Unlike a statute of limitations, which can be tolled throug h the discover y rule, [Section] 12-309 starts the c lock at the instant an injury or dama g e is sustained.” Brown v. District of Colum bia , 8 53 A. 2d

73 3, 73 6- 37 (D .C. 20 04 ); Di str ic t of Colum bia v . D un mo re , 662 A.2d 1356, 1360 (D.C. 1995) (“ To rea d the discover y rule into [S ]ection 12-309 would make [S] ection 12- 30 9 a nu lli ty in a size a ble numbe r o f c a se s . . . .” ). Gi ve n th e purp os e s o f t he no tic e re qu ir e me nt, “any doubt as to the proper

timing for the g iving of

notice should be re solved in favor of ea rlier notice.” Di

str ic t of Colum bia v . R os s , 6 97 A. 2d 14 , 1 9 ( D. C. 1 99 7) . Pl a int if f d id n ot s us ta in h is inj ur y in O c tob e r 2 00 7 whe n h e le arn e d th at hi s p ro pe rt y ha d b e e n d e str oye d. Rathe r, on the se fac ts, his inj ury

occur red on Ma

y 4, 2006, the date on which his proper ty was de stroy ed. See De Kin e v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 422 A.2d 981, 986 (D.C. 1980) ( concludingthat the 12-309 clock be g an to run on the da y that District officia ls impounded horses owned by the oper ators of a horse -dra

wn ca rriag e business, not on the day of the horse s’ re lease ). The Court c annot “r ead a discovery rule into § 12-309.” Georgev. Dade , 769 A.2d 760, 766 (D.C. 2001). The Court there fore conclude s that plaintiff’s Notice under D .C. Code § 12-309 was
un t i m e l y b e c a

u s e i tw a s f

i l e d m o r e th ans i x m o n th s a f

t e r th e d at e o f

h i s i n j ur y.-9- I I I . CONCLUSI ON The Court g rants as c oncede d the motions to di smiss filed on behalf of the Washington Metropolitan Are a Tra

nsit Authority

and the District of

Columbi a’s Ma

y or and Chief

of Police. Ba sed on plaintiff’s c oncessions, his Four teenth Amendme nt claim and his tort claim for int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss w ill be dis mis se d. B e c a us e pla int if

f n e ith e r s tate s a
c ivi l r ig hts c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia

un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 no r h a s c omp lie d w ith the mandator

y notice re quirements of D .C. Code § 12-309 with respe ct to the tort claims of
n egl i gen ce an d

co n v er s i o n , th e C o urtgra n t s th e D i s tri cto f C o l u m b i a’ s m o t i o n . T h es e r

u l i n gs resolve a ll of the issues prese nted in this action, and this action ac cording ly will be dismiss ed. A sepa rate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.

J OHN D. B ATES Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: Mar ch 11, 2009