J-A05004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSEPH WESLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1640 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004711-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 26, 2023

Joseph Wesley appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, after a jury convicted him of 

two counts of attempted first-degree murder1 and one count each of criminal 

solicitation to commit first-degree murder2 and criminal conspiracy to commit 

first-degree murder.3 After review, we affirm. 

In April and June 2016, Wesley sold drugs and firearms to Danielle Miller 

who, Wesley later learned, was acting at the direction of law enforcement.4 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). 

2 Id. at § 902(a). 

3 Id. at § 903(a)(1). 

4 Wesley was charged in connection with the drug and firearms sales to Miller 

and, on June 15, 2018, was convicted of, inter alia, the illegal sale or transfer 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On October 14, 2016, authorities were unable to locate Wesley, but served 

his girlfriend, Jennifer Vance, with a warrant for Wesley’s arrest. On October 

21, 2016, Wesley contacted Darelle Bean and asked him to kill Miller in 

exchange for $5,000.00. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/3/21, at 333, 335, 337. That 

same day, Wesley traveled with Bean to Norristown, Montgomery County to 

show him Miller’s home, her vehicle and a nearby trail that Bean could use to 

flee the area after the murder. Bean took pictures of Miller’s residence and 

screenshots of its location on Google Maps. Id. at 335-36, 339. Bean traveled 

to Miller’s residence a few more times before recruiting Ceasar Morales to 

carry out the murder due to Bean’s reservations about killing a woman. Id.

at 341, 346. 

On December 2, 2016, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Miller and her 

friend, Stephen Rowl entered Miller’s vehicle. Immediately after Miller sat 

down in the front passenger seat, Morales fired shots into her car. Miller 

suffered bullet wounds to her right hand and left bicep, resulting in two broken 

bones in her hand and requiring her to wear an arm sling for approximately 

two months. Rowl was shot in the back and in his right leg; he still has a 

bullet in his back, which causes him pain. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Bean 

called Wesley to inform him that “the job was done.” Id. at 356. Wesley

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of firearms and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. On 

appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth 

v. Wesley, 3084 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 12, 2019) (unpublished 

memorandum decision). 
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subsequently fled to Louisiana and was not apprehended until January 17, 

2017. 

During trial, Bean testified regarding lies5 he told to the police 

throughout in his attempt to transfer blame to Morales. Id. at 388-91, id. at 

358 (Bean testifying, “It wasn’t that I lied. It was minimizing my role.”). Bean 

stated that in exchange for testifying he had been hoping for “leniency from 

the court,” but that no specific amount of incarceration had been discussed. 

Id. at 361; id. at 371 (Bean conceding he was testifying for selfish reasons). 

Wesley was arrested and charged with the above-mentioned crimes. He 

proceeded to trial on November 1, 2021. At trial, various people testified, 

including, inter alia: Earnest Reed, Bean’s cousin, who had originally 

introduced Bean and Wesley; Vance, with whom Wesley has a son; Ronald 

Knight, with whom Miller has a child; and Detective Mark Minzola of the 

Montgomery County Police Department, an expert in forensic cell phone data 

analysis. The jury found Welsey guilty of all charges and, on February 2, 

2022, the court imposed an aggregated sentence of 40 to 80 years’ 

imprisonment. On February 9, 2022, Wesley filed a timely post-sentence 

motion, and, on May 5, 2022, he filed a supplemental post-sentence motion. 

On June 6, 2022, the trial court denied the post-sentence motions. Wesley 

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5 Bean had originally told the police that Morales purchased the gun used in 

the shooting, that Morales called Wesley to tell him that the shooting was 

complete, and that Morales negotiated payment for the murder. See N.T. 

Jury Trial, 11/3/21, at 358. However, Bean provided the weapon, called 

Wesley after the shooting, and received a partial payment of $500.00 from 

Wesley. 
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filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Wesley raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence by sentencing 

[Wesley] to 20-40 years’ incarceration to run consecutively for 

both counts of [a]ttempted [m]urder where the maximum 

sentence on the offense actually charged was 20 years’ 

incarceration, the Commonwealth never charged [Wesley] with 

the enhanced offense of [a]ttemped [m]urder – [s]erious 

[b]odily [i]njury [c]aused[—]which would allow a 40[-]year 

incarceration sentence, and imposing such a sentence required 

a constructive amendment to the bills of information which was 

not authorized by the Rules of Criminal Procedure?

2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing and denying [Wesley’s] motion for a new trial based 

on after[-]discovered evidence of a [Brady6] violation where 

the cooperating co-defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea in which he asserted that he was promised a 

“single[-]digit sentence” in exchange for his testimony against 

[Wesley], the Commonwealth never provided that information 

to [Wesley] prior to trial despite having a copy of the motion, 

and the credibility of the cooperating co-defendant was the 

only real issue in the case?

3. Whether the trial court should have granted a new trial because 

the verdict was against the weight of the evidence where the 

only real evidence against [Wesley] was the testimony of the 

cooperating co-defendant who told multiple different stories, 

admitted to lying, [and] received a favorable plea deal[;] where 

the testimony was contradicted by the cell phone records[;]

and where people other than [Wesley] had expressed a desire 

to kill the complainant? 

Appellant’s Brief, at 6-7. 

Wesley first contends that the court imposed an illegal sentence for 

attempted first-degree murder with a serious bodily injury enhancement

without providing notice of its intent to seek the enhancement in the bills of 

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6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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information. Id. at 36. Wesley argues that by permitting a constructive 

amendment of the bill of information during trial, the trial court violated his 

due process right not to be convicted of an offense other than the one charged. 

Id. at 34. 

Section 1102(c) of the Crimes Code provides that the maximum 

sentence for attempted murder is no more than 20 years. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1102(c). However, if serious bodily injury occurs during the attempted 

murder, the maximum sentence increases to no more than 40 years. Id.

(emphasis added). Serious bodily injury is a fact that must be proven by the

Commonwealth, beyond a reasonable doubt, for this sentence enhancement

to apply. See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 117 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (en banc). 

Due process requires the Commonwealth to give a defendant notice if it 

seeks to prove serious bodily injury. Id. Notice must “be sufficiently specific 

so as to allow the defendant to prepare any available defenses should he 

exercise his right to a trial.” Commonwealth v. Sims, 919 A.2d 931 (Pa. 

2007) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(C) (information shall cite 

to statute or provision of law defendant is alleged to have violated). 

In Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549 (Pa. Super. 2020), this Court 

determined that although the defendant’s indictment and criminal information 

were facially inadequate to give notice regarding the Commonwealth’s intent 

to charge the defendant with the serious bodily injury enhancement, this error 

was harmless and, thus, the sentence was not illegal. Id. at 562-63. There, 
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defendant received de facto notice of the Commonwealth’s intent to charge 

him with the enhancement where: factual summaries in the charging 

documents made clear that the victim suffered serious bodily injury; the 

Commonwealth advised the defendant of the minimum sentence that could be 

imposed, which was consistent with serious bodily injury enhancement 

guidelines; and the Commonwealth and defense attorney reviewed and 

agreed to the verdict sheets, which included a special interrogatory regarding 

whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury. Id. at 566. 

However, in Commonwealth v. Bickerstaff, 204 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 

2019),

7 a case that Wesley argues is “directly on point,” Appellant’s Brief, at 

37, the defendant was not given de facto notice of the charge. Rather, this 

Court determined that the Commonwealth “ambushed” the defendant with the 

serious bodily injury charge where it had been mentioned for the first time on 

the verdict sheet’s special interrogatory at the time it was provided to the 

jury. Indeed, the complaint, information, and jury instructions made no 

mention of the enhancement. In rejecting the Commonwealth’s harmless 

error argument, this Court reasoned that the defendant was unable to defend 

against the charge at trial. Id. at 997-98. That is not the case here. 

Here, like in King, Wesley was given de facto notice of the 

Commonwealth’s intent to prove the serious bodily injury enhancement. 

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7

In Bickerstaff, the notice issue was made in the context of an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim on collateral appeal from an order denying a Post 

Conviction Relief Act petition. 
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Wesley’s criminal complaint set forth Miller’s and Rowl’s injuries. See Criminal 

Complaint, 5/9/17 at 2 (“[] Miller suffered bullet wounds to her right hand and 

left bicep. [] Rowl suffered bullet wounds to his right[-]side torso and his right 

leg.”). Further, on October 12, 2021, both parties were sent the proposed 

verdict sheet and proposed criminal charges, which contained an interrogatory 

below each count asking the jury whether the victims suffered serious bodily 

injury as a result of each offense. Additionally, during the October 13, 2021 

status conference, Kelly Lloyd, Esquire, the Assistant District Attorney,

explained, in relevant part, that “Wesley’s maximum exposure . . . and the 

serious bodily injuries established, he’ll be looking at 20 to 40 [years]

on each of those counts, yes, on the attempted murder.” Status Conference, 

10/13/21, 45-46 (emphasis added). Indeed, almost three weeks before 

trial, Wesley knew of the facts alleged in the criminal complaint, that the 

proposed verdict sheet included a serious bodily injury interrogatory, and that 

his maximum exposure was consistent with a serious bodily injury charge. 

Accordingly, unlike in Bickerstaff, Wesley was not “ambushed” regarding the 

enhancement. 

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the Commonwealth gave 

Wesley de facto notice that it intended to charge him with attempted first-
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degree murder with the serious bodily injury enhancement.8 See King, 

supra. Accordingly, Wesley’s first claim is meritless.

Next, Wesley argues that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose Bean’s 

pro se letter to the Commonwealth, in which Bean “insisted that he had been 

promised a single[-]digit prison sentence in exchange for his testimony” 

constituted a Brady violation. Appellant’s Brief, at 45. Wesley contends that 

it is irrelevant whether the Commonwealth actually made or meant to keep a 

promise of a single-digit sentence but that “the fact [] Bean believed he would 

receive [a single-digit] sentence would have shown the jury that his testimony 

was fabricated.” Id. at 46. 

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate 

that: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth, 

either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to 

the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its 

omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. The mere 

possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have 

helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of trial[,]

does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. 

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8 We also note that, Attorney Walker objected, on the final day of trial, to only 

the sufficiency of evidence regarding the serious bodily enhancement, not the 

charge itself. N.T. Jury Trial, 11/4/21, at 595-96 (Attorney Walker stating 

“My argument, I guess, Your Honor, is that there was no evidence that 

suggested that this was serious bodily injury to either one of the parties . . . 

I suggest that the Commonwealth has not made out the elements for serious 

bodily injury.”). Attorney Walker also did not object to the serious bodily 

enhancement jury charge. Id. at 663; see also Pa.SSJI (Crim) § 901D 

(Additional Elements). Inasmuch as Wesley was actually aware that 

Commonwealth intended to charge him with the serious bodily injury 

enhancement, he cannot argue that he was not given notice. 
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Commonwealth v. Robinson, 122 A.3d 367, 373 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

“Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also 

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1127 (Pa. 2008). 

Instantly, Bean conceded that he was testifying for selfish reasons, 

including “leniency from the court,” and that the nature and extent of his 

cooperation would be made known to [his] sentencing judge. N.T. Jury Trial, 

11/3/21, at 360-61. He testified that no specific amount of incarceration 

sentence had been discussed, but that he would be permitted to plead guilty 

to two counts of attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and person 

not to possess a firearm. Id. Bean also admitted that he “tried to put the 

blame away from [him].” Id. at 259. Accordingly, the jury was aware of 

Bean’s involvement in the incident, the extent his cooperation would impact 

his sentence, and that he been untruthful with law enforcement officials 

throughout the investigation. 

Moreover, the trial court highlights that there was no mention of the 

“single[-]digit” sentence agreement at Bean’s own sentencing hearing and 

that Bean was ultimately sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years’ 

incarceration. Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/22, at 29. Inasmuch as Bean’s selfserving pro se letter is the only evidence this agreement existed, the 

Commonwealth had no obligation to inform Wesley of a non-existent 

agreement or to correct Bean’s testimony at trial. See Commonwealth v. 
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Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1194 (Pa. 2014) (no Brady violation where no

credible evidence established Commonwealth promised witness parole in 

exchange for his testimony). 

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there was no Brady violation 

where the only evidence of Bean’s alleged promise from the Commonwealth 

was a self-serving letter written by Bean; nor has Wesley established that

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have 

been different had the evidence been disclosed. Bagley, supra. 

Finally, Wesley claims that his convictions were against the weight of 

the evidence. Specifically, he contends that the Commonwealth’s “entire 

case” relied on Bean’s testimony, which had been “thoroughly impeached.” 

Appellant’s Brief, at 54. Wesley argues that phone data showing him in the 

Norristown area “proved nothing more than [] that [he] traveled to Norristown 

a month and a half before the shooting.” Id. at 55. He also claims that other 

people, including Reed, Vance, and Knight, each had a motive to kill Miller. 

Wesley is afforded no relief. 

This Court reviews weight of the evidence claims for an abuse of 

discretion: 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,] 

who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. [This Court] cannot 

substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we 

may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where 

the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, [this Court’s] 

role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate 
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review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its 

discretion in ruling on the weight claim. 

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 506-07 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Additionally, “[a] motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is 

contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.” 

Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

The trial court’s determination that Wesley’s convictions were not 

against the weight of the evidence where Bean was vigorously cross-examined

by Attorney Walker, instructions informed the jury that Bean’s testimony was 

“from a corrupt and polluted source,” and Bean’s testimony was corroborated 

by Detective Minzola’s cell-phone data analysis, is supported by the record. 

Trial Court Opinion, supra at 10-12; see N.T. Jury Trial, 11/4/21, at 756-60, 

quoting Pa.SSJI (Crim), § 4.01. 

Indeed, the jury was well aware of the various lies Bean told through 

the investigation and the self-serving reasons for which he was testifying. 

Moreover, the jury was carefully instructed by the court regarding how to 

evaluate witness credibility and accomplice testimony. See N.T. Jury Trial, 

11/4/21, at 758-59. The jury also heard Detective Minzola’s cell phone data 

analysis, which substantially corroborated Bean’s testimony. Bean’s 

testimony that he went with Wesley to Miller’s residence on October 21, 2016 

is supported by cell phone tower data. Id., 11/3/21, at 490-92 (Detective 
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Minzola testifying both Bean and Wesley’s phones accessed cell towers in 

Delaware County, Montgomery County, and Norristown area at 7:56 p.m., 

8:01 p.m., and 8:04 p.m., respectively). Bean also testified that, on that day,

he took screenshots of the portion of the block where Miller’s residence was 

located. Id. at 488-90 (Detective Minzola testifying Bean download an image 

on October 21, 2021, at 5:41 p.m., depicting 100 block of Haws Avenue, 

where Miller’s home is located). Phone analysis also confirmed that Bean went 

to Miller’s residence in Norristown a few more times before the shooting. Id.

at 496-98 (Detective Minzola testifying Bean’s phone accessed towers in 

Norristown on October 22, 2016, and October 23, 2016). 

Phone data also shows that after Bean informed Wesley that the 

shooting had occurred, Welsey left Pennsylvania and spent the next three days 

traveling to Louisiana. Id. at 517 (Detective Minzola testifying that on 

December 2, 2016, the day of shooting, at 5:15 p.m., Bean made a 25-second 

phone call to Wesley); id. at 520-22 (Detective Minzola testifying that

between December 2, 2016, and December 4, 2016, Wesley used phone 

towers in Maryland, Virgina, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 

Alabama, Mississippi, and, finally, Louisiana). Indeed, Wesley was later 

apprehended in Louisiana. 

Finally, Wesley’s claim that his conviction is against the weight of the 

evidence because Reed, Vance, and Knight each had a motive to kill Miller 

affords him no relief. Although Reed introduced Bean and Wesley and 

accompanied them on their initial trip to Norristown, Bean’s testimony 
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indicates that Wesley, not Reed, requested Bean’s assistance in murdering 

someone. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/3/21at 329, 333. Additionally, Vance 

testified that although she knows that Miller was involved in Wesley’s arrest 

and that she does not like Miller, Vance “place[s] the blame where it lies, on 

[Wesley].” Id. at 183-84. Further, Knight testified that he has known Miller 

for 12 years, and that although he has verbally threatened Miller in the past, 

he has never and would never follow through on these threats. N.T. Jury Trial, 

11/1/21, at 155, 158-59. Knight stated that he did tell Vance he wanted Miller 

“to pay” but he explained that he meant “through the legal system” and in 

regard to their child custody claims. Id. at 172-74. 

In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its 

determination that Wesley’s conviction is not against the weight of the 

evidence. Hunzer, supra. We, therefore, affirm Wesley’s judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2023