1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: 3 Fi lin g D at e: A pr il 5, 201 8 4 N o. A -1 -C A -3 6304 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 STEVE N VANDERDUSSEN, 9 D ef

en da nt- Appe llant.
10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF CU RR Y C OUN TY 11 F re d T. V an S oe le n, D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 San ta Fe, NM 14 John Kloss, A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 16 for Appellee 17 Lindsey

Law F irm , L .L .C. 18 Daniel R. L indsey 19 Clovis, NM 20 fo r Appe llant1 OPIN ION

2 KIEHN E, Judge. 3 { 1} D ef

en da nt a ppe al s f ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r de ny ing dis m iss al of the 4 ch ar ge s a ga ins t hi m

on d oubl e j eo pa rdy

gr ound s. The di stri ct

c ourt r ule d th at the 5 m agistrate court properly declare d a m istrial b as ed on m anifest necessity , w here a 6 j uror wa s discharged f

or stating that she could not be im partial afte r deliberations had 7 begun and the alternate j urors we re dism issed f rom the courtroom . D efendant argues 8 tha t th e m ag istrate c ourt f ai le d to c onsi de r le ss s ev er e al te rn at ive s to a 9 m istri al —nam el y , the m ag istrate c ourt r ef use d to ca ll ba ck the al te rn at e j ur or s w ho 10 re m ai ne d inthe c ourtho use —and, the re fo re , the m istri al w as not ba se d onm an if

es t 11 ne ce ssi ty . W e hol d th at the m istri al w as j ust if

ie d by m an if

es t ne ce ssi ty

a nd a ff irm the 12 dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of D ef en da nt’ s m oti on t o di sm iss
. 13 PROCEDURAL BACKGRO UND 14 { 2} T o f

ram e our e xa m ina tio n of

the m istri al, we fir st a ddr es s th e lim its of the 15 reco rd be fo re us and the r ole s of the c ourts thr oughw hic h th is c as e ha s tr av el ed
. 16 Beca use charges w ere originally filed against Def endant in m agistrate court, which 17 is not a court of record, there i s n o re co rd of the events that occurred there
. 18 See N MS A 197 8, § 35 -1 -1 ( 1968 ) (e sta bli shi ng m ag istra te c ourts a s c ourts not of 19 re co rd ); Black’

s Law D ictiona ry 431 (10t h ed. 201 4) (definin g “ court of rec ord” as2

1 “ [a ] c ourt tha t i s r equir ed to ke ep a re co rd of it s pr oc ee din gs” ). A ft er

the m ag istrate 2 court declare d a m istrial, the State refiled th e sam e charges in district court. I n district 3 co ur t, p ro ceed in gs are h el d d e n ov o. Cf

. N MS A 197 8, § 35- 13- 2( A ) (1 996) ( “ Appe al s 4 fr om the m ag istrate c ourts s ha ll be tr ie d de nov o inthe dis tr ic t c ourt. ”) ; see State ex 5 re l. B ev ac qua- Young v. Ste el e , 2017 -N MC A -0 81, ¶ 9, 406 P. 3d 547 (“ Inade nov o 6 ap pe al to the dis tr ict c ourt, the re is a ne w tr ia l onthe e nti re c as e— tha t i s, on b oth 7 que sti ons of

f ac t and issu es of law—c ondu ct ed as if the re ha d bee n no tr ia l i n th e fi rs t 8 ins tanc e. ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ark s and c ita tio n om itt ed ))
. I n th e de nov o 9 pr oc ee din gs he re , D ef

en da nt fi le d num er ous m oti ons inc lud ing a m oti on to d ism iss 10 fo r viol at ion of

the D oubl e Je opardy

Cl au se , the sub

j ec t of thi s a ppe al
. Be ca

use the 11 dis tr ic t co urt w as not

sittin g inaty

pic al appe lla te c ap ac ity , the dis tr ic t c ourt w as not 12 boun d by

the m ag istrate co urt’ s de ci sio ns an d w as re qui re d to m ak e anind ep en de nt 1 3 d et er m i n at i o n o f w h et h er m an i fe s tn ec es s i t y s up p o rt ed t h e mag i s t r a t e co u rt ’s 14 de cl arat io n o f a m is tri al
. See State v. F oster , 2003-NMC A- 099, ¶¶ 9, 19, 134 N. M. 15 224, 75 P
. 3d 8 24 ( hol din g th at be ca use the m ag istra te co urt is not a court of r ec or d, 16 appeals from

there are heard de novo i n d i s t ri ct court, which required the district 17 court to decide anew, without deference to the m agistrate court, whether a m istrial 18 w as w ar

rante d)
. T he dis tr ic t co urt, how ev er , w as bou nd b y e ve nts tha t transpi re d in 19 m ag istrate co urt an d the re fo re w as r equir ed to ba se it s in de pe nde nt j udgm en t onthe3

1 lim ite d r ec or d br ough t be fo re it an d the ar gum en ts m ad e by c ouns el in dis tr ic t c ourt. 2 Se e id. ¶

¶ 19- 20; Ci tyof F

arm ing ton v . P iño n- Garc ia , 201 3- N MS C- 046, ¶ 12, 311 3 P. 3d 44 6 (stating th at the history of a c ase in a court no t of rec ord is not disregarded 4 when appealed to the district court for a trial de novo). 5 { 3} T he St at e ra ise s ar gum en ts in this c as e ab out D ef en da nt’ s f ai lur e to m or e fu lly 6 dev el o p the rec ord to establish err or. I t appears that, at least in the context of a 7 ch al le nge in dis tr ic t c ourt t o aple a ag re em en t e nte re d in to i n m ag istra te co urt, the 8 dis tr ic t cour

t i s pe rm itt ed

to ta ke e vid en ce to cl ar if y the li m ite d r ec or d f

ro m 9 m ag is tra te co ur t. See Sta te v . G all eg os , 2007 -N MC A -1 12, ¶¶ 16, 18, 142 N
. M. 447 , 10 166 P.3d 110 1 (explaining that the district court properly conducted an evident iary 11 he ar ing to re co nstru ct the m ag istrate pr oc ee din gs to a llo w it to fu lf ill it s “ obl iga tio n 1 2 to det e rm i n e t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e p l e ai n o r d e r

t o d e t e rm i n e i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r the 13 appeal”). Our Suprem e Court has also explained that it is per m issib le for the district 1 4 c o u rt t o h o l d a h e a r i n g t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e m a g i s t r a t e p r o c e e d i n g s w h e n a s ke d to 15 de ci de w he the r the m ag istrate c ourt a cquit te d th e de fe ndant o n th e m er its or 16 d i sm is se d t he co m

pl ai nt fora pr oc edur al vi ol at io n. See State v. Baca , 17 20 15 -NMSC -0 21 , ¶¶ 2, 2 7, 3 52 P.3d 11 51
. 18 { 4} Inthi s c as e, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld a he ar ing on D ef

en da nt’ s m oti on t o di sm iss 19 an d r el ie d onthe li m ite d m ag istrate c ourt re co rd an d the pa rt ie s’ sti pul at ionto fa ct s,4

1 inc lud ing the sti pul at ionto the de fe nse ’ s of fe r of pr oof , in or de r to c lari fy

e ve nts in 2 m ag istrate c ourt. T he re w as no obj ec tio n to thi s pr oc es s. A lso , ne ith er the part ie s no r 3 the dis tr ic t c ourt a ske d th at the r ecord be sup ple m en te d w ithte sti m ony f ro m the 4 m agistrate j udge to d eterm ine whether the m ag istrate j udge cons idered less severe 5 al te rn at ive s to a m istri al
. W e the re fo re de cl ine the S ta te ’ s r eque st t o ho ld tha t i t i s a 6 de fe ndant’ s burd ento r e - c r e at e a c o m p le te r ec or d of

the m ag istra te c ourt pr oc ee din gs. 7 See Ru le 12- 321( A ) N MR A (“ T o pre se rv e an iss ue fo r re vie w , it m ust appe ar tha t a 8 ru lin g or

de ci sio n by

the tr ia l cour

t wa s fa ir ly inv oke d. ”)
. In thi s a ppe al , w e sim

ply 9 rely on the facts as they we re presented to, and found by , the district court to review 10 whe th er t h e d e c l arat io n o f a m is tri al was a n a bu se of d is cret io n. See State v. Baca , 11 2015 -N MS C- 021, ¶ 25 (st at ing tha t w e re vie w dou ble j eo pa rdy

c la im s de nov o and 12 defer to the f

acts found bythe district court, not the m agistrate court, “ because it w as 13 the dis tr ic t c ourt tha t ha d to f ind the f ac ts o n w hic h to appl y

the law in ru lin g onthe 14 m oti on to d ism iss ”) ; see a lso State v. Gutierrez , 201 4- N MS C- 031, ¶ 21, 333 P
. 3d 2 47 15 (n ot in g th at

“ m an if es t ne ce ssi ty

m istri al r

uli ngs ar e re vie w ed

f or abuse of 16 di sc ret io n” ). 17 FACTUAL BACKGRO UND 18 { 5} D ef

en da nt was c ha rg edan d t rie d i n m ag is tra te co ur t fo r m is de m ean orDW I and 19 failure to m aintain his lane. The case wa s tried before eight j urors—six re gular j urors5

1 an d t wo al te rn at es . Afterth e tri al co nc lu de d and th e jury w as in st ru ct edon th e la w, 2 the m ag istrate c ourt di sm iss ed the tw o a lt ern ate j ur or s and e xc use d th e six -p er son 3 j ur y fr om the co urtr oom to del ibe rate . Appr oxi m at el y f ive m inu te s in to d el ibe ra tio ns, 4 a j uror inform ed the m agistrate j udge by note that she could not be im p ar t i al b ased 5 on h er pe rs ona l and b usi ne ss d ea lin gs wi th D ef en da nt’ s fa m ily
. T he m ag istra te j udge 6 w al ke d in to the co urtr oom , show ed the not e to t he part ie s, a nd d ir ec te d th e pa rt ie s to 7 discuss the note in cham bers. De fense counsel im m edia t el y t urned to his legal 8 as si st an t an d i ns tru ct edhe r to lea ve th e co ur t r o o m to s ee i f sh e co ul d fi nd th e two 9 al te rn at e juro rs . Defen se co un se l ac co m pa ni edhi s l eg al ass is ta nt an d saw tha t t he two 10 al te rn at e j ur or s w er e sti ll in the c ourtho use , standi ng in the lob by at a co unt er , doi ng 11 pa pe rw ork or

w ai tin g to do pa

pe rw ork. D ef

en se co unse l im

m ed ia te ly w al ke d ba ck

to 12 ch am be rs a nd a ske d th e m ag istrate j udge to ca ll the al te rn at e j ur or s ba ck to de te rm ine 13 w he the r the y

c oul d st ill se rv e as im

pa rt ia l j ur or s and r ep la ce the bia se d jur or . T he 14 St at e as ke d f

or am ist ri al , an d the de fe nse obj ec te d. T he m ag istra te j udge r ej ec te d th e 15 de fe nse ’ s pr opos al w ith out at te m pti ng to loc at e an d que sti on the a lte rn at e j ur or s, a nd 16 de cl ar ed

am istri al
. T he re af

te r, the m ag istra te c ourt e nte re d a w ri tte n orde r de cl ar ing 1 7 ami s t r i a l du e t o man i f e s tn e c e s s i t y. 18 { 6} A ft er

he ar ing the part ie s’ pr es en ta tio n of the f ac ts and l eg al ar gum en t onthe 19 ev en ts i n m ag istrate c ourt, the dis trict co ur t t ook the m at te r unde r advis em en t. T he6

1 district court also cons idered the parties’ briefs on the m atter and entered a detailed 2 letter decision. T he district court observed a lack of dispute th at good cause existed 3 to d ism iss the j ur or

w ho exp re sse d bias re ga rd ing D ef en da nt and f

ram ed the que sti on 4 as w he the r the m ag istrate co urt ade qua te ly inquir ed int o a lte rn at ive s to am istri al
. T he 5 dis tr ic t c ourt f

urthe r obse rv ed

tha t the abse nc e of

ar ec or d m ad e it dif

ficult to 6 de te rm ine w he the r al te rn at ive s to am istri al w er e co nsi de re d and ac know le dge d th e 7 parties’ stipul ation that t he m agistrate j udge did not qu estion th e alter nate j urors 8 ab out the ir ab ili ty

to se rv e af

te r the y w er e re le as ed
. O n th e fa ct s pr es en te d to it , the 9 dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed tha t m an ife st n ec es sity

j ust if ie d am istri al , ba se d onthe 10 dis tr ic t c ourt r

ule gov er nin g a lte rn at e j ur or s, i. e. Ru le 5- 605( B) a nd ( C) N MR A , a nd 11 on a S upr em e Co urt opi nio n hol din g tha t Ru le 5- 605 doe s not pe rm it subs tit uti on o f 12 an alt ern at e juro r af

t e rjury de li be rat io ns ha ve be gu n. See State v. Sanchez , 200 0- 13 N MS C- 021, ¶

¶ 1, 23, 129 N
. M. 284, 6 P. 3d 486. D ef en da nt ap pe al s f

ro m thi s r uli ng. 14 DISC US SION 15 { 7} T he D oubl e Je opardy Cl au se guarante es tha t no pe rs on s ha ll be “ tw ic e put in 16 j eo pa rdy ” fo r the sa m e of fe nse . U
. S. Co nst . a m en d. V ; N
. M. Co nst . a rt . I I, § 15
. 17 “ H ow ev er , the pr inc ipl es of double j eo pa rdy

do n ot p ro hib it re tr

y ing ade fe ndant, 18 ev enove r the de fe ndant’ s ob jectio ns, a ft er

am istri al tha t w as j ust if ie d by m an if es t 19 necessity .” Sta te v . D es noy er s , 200 2- N MS C- 031, ¶

33, 132 N
. M. 756 , 55 P
. 3d 9 687

1 (in te rn a l q u ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) , abro gat ed on o the r gr ound

s as 2 re co gni

ze d bySta te v . R iv as , 201 7- N MS C- 022, ¶ 47 , 3 98 P. 3d 2 99. T he bur de n of 3 proving “ m anifest necessity ” fa lls on th e prosecutor, and th e m a gn i tude of that burden 4 is ap pr op ria te ly chara ct eri zed by its ve ry ter m s. A riz ona v. W

ashi ngt on , 434 U
. S. 497 , 5 505 (197 8). T wo re quirem ents m ust be m et for an appellate court to upho ld a m istrial 6 fo r m an ife st nec es sity . “ Fi rs t, the c ir cu m stanc es ne ce ssi ta tin g th e m istri al m ust be 7 ex tr ao rd inary one s, suf fi ci en t t o ov er

ri de the de fe ndant’ s do ubl e j eo pa rdy int er es ts. 8 Se co nd, the tr ia l j udge m ust de te rm ine w he the r ana lte rn at ive m ea sur e— le ss dra sti c 9 than a m istrial—can allevi ate th e p roblem so that the trial can continu e to an im partial 10 verdict.” Sta te v . Yazzi e , 201 0- N MC A -0 28, ¶ 13, 147 N
. M. 768, 228 P
. 3d 1 188 11 (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d)
. 12 { 8} A s in dic at ed

above , w e re vie w the tr ial c ourt’ s de cl ar at ionof am istri al f

or 1 3 ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o n , wh i ch i n t h i s ca s e i s t h e s t an d ar d we ap p l y t o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 14 de no vo rul in g. Se e B aca , 2 01 5- N MS C- 021, ¶ 25. T he de gr ee of

de fe re nc e an d 15 scrutiny

we accor d the declaration of a m istrial under the abuse of discretion standard 16 de pe nd s o n t he reas on forth e m is tri al
. See W ashi ngt on , 434 U
. S. a t 50 8- 10 17 (p ro vid ing e xa m

ple s th at fal l w ith in the c ont inuum of appe lla te sc ru tin y

a nd 18 de fe re nc e ac co rd ed

to m istri al s) ; Gutierrez , 201 4- N MS C- 031, ¶ 22 ( ac know le dgi ng8

1 tha t w hil e ab use of dis cr et ion is the appr opr ia te standard of r ev ie w f or m istri al s, the 2 strictest scrutiny

is applied to m istrials o rd ered f or m issin g prosecution witnesses). 3 { 9} T he part ie s inthi s c as e do n ot d isp ut e tha t i t w as appr opr ia te to re m ove the 4 de lib er at ing j ur or w ho sa id s he c oul d no t be im pa rt ia l f ro m the j ur y , w hic h le ft

onl y 5 five jurors. There also is no di spute that a jury in m agistrate court m

ust be com

prised 6 of si x ju ro rs . See N MS A 197 8, § 35 -8 -3 (A ) (1 974) ; Rul e 6- 605( A ). T hus, the dis put e 7 is f oc used en ti rely

on the se co nd r equir em en t f or af ind ing of

m an if es t 8 ne ce ssi ty

—wh et her the re w as ale ss dra sti c al te rn at ive to a m istri al tha t w oul d 9 “ al le vi at e th e p ro bl em so th a t t h e tri al [co ul d] co nt in ue to an im pa rti al ve rd ic t.” 10 Yazzi e , 2010-NMC A- 028, ¶ 13 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 11 { 10} D ef

en da nt arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r

uli ng, r el y ing on d istri ct

c ourt R ule 12 5- 605, ove rl ooks the f ac t tha t pr oc ed

ur es in m ag istra te c ourt di ff er f ro m tho se in 13 district c ourt. As De fendant poin ts out, Rule 5-605(C) m andates that in a noncapital 14 ca se be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt, “ ana lte rn at e j ur or w ho doe s not r ep la ce ar eg ular j ur or 15 shall be discharged before the j ury retire s to c onsid er its verdict.” Id

. T he m ag istrate 16 co urt r

ule s have no suc h re qui re m en t for the dis ch ar ge of

a lte rn at e j ur or s. D ef

en da nt 17 inf orm s us tha t, unl ike in dis tr ic t cour t, it is co m m on p ra ct ic e in the Cl ovi s M ag istrate 18 Court fo r t he j udge to askcounsel whether they wish to retain the alter

nate j urors 19 during d eliberations or re l ea s e them . D efendant contends th at the m agistrate court9

1 shou ld h av e ex pl ored

the pos sib ili ty

of r ep la ci ng the bia se d j ur or w ithone of

the 2 al te rn at es a nd r ef

er s th is C ourt t o seve ra l fe de ra l ca se s that pe rm it, in the abse nc e of 3 prej udice to the defendant, the substit ution of an alter nate ju ror w ho had been 4 dis m iss ed

w he n th e ca se w as subm itt ed to the j ur y f or de lib er at ion

—the pr ac tic e is 5 cal le d “ po st -s ub m is si on su bs ti tu ti on .” 6 { 11} W e ag re e w ith D ef en da nt tha t ge ne ra lly

the m ag istra te c ourt i s no t r equir ed to 7 fo ll ow a d is tri ctco ur t ru le in th e a b s e n c e of a si m il ar m ag is tra te co ur t ru le , and we 8 furthe r ac know le dge tha t, ty pic al ly , the dis tr ic t c ourt i s r equir ed to ap ply the r ule s of 9 th e m ag is tra te co ur t wh en co ns id eri n g is su es in de no vo pro ceed in gs . See State v. 10 Shar p , 201 2- N MC A -0 42, ¶ 8, 27 6 P. 3d 9 69 ( em pha siz ing tha t, in de nov o 11 proceedings, the district court is required to apply the rules of the lowe r, non-record 12 co urt i n it s in de pendentc onsi de ra tio n of a n is sue de ci de d be low ). U nde r the 13 ci rc um stanc es , how ev er , w e ar e not pe rs ua de d th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by r el y ing 14 on the dis tr ic t c ourt r ule a nd N ewMe xic o c as e la w g ov er nin g th e dis ch ar ge of 15 al te rn at e juro rs . 16 { 12} E ve n a ssu m ing tha t the m ag istra te c ourt us ua lly giv es the part ie s th e opt ionof 17 re ta ini ng a lte rn at e j ur or s duri ng d el ibe ra tio ns, a nd a ssu m ing tha t this is pe rm itt ed in 18 N ew Me xic o, the part ie s inthe c ur re nt c as e ag re ed

tha t the a lte rn at e j ur or s c oul d be 19 excused. Ther e is no indication that the m agistrate court advised the alternate j urors10

1 that they continu ed to be boun d by their oath and obli gations as alternate j urors when 2 it dis ch ar ge d th em . T hus, the a lte rn at e j ur or s we re dis ch ar ge d f ro m j ur y duty , le ft the 3 co ur tro om , and were p res en t i n t he co ur th ou se lo bb y . See Stat e v . Ro d r iguez , 4 2006 -N MS C- 018, ¶

7, 139 N
. M. 450 , 1 34 P. 3d 7 37 ( re co gni zi ng a pr es um pti on o f 5 prej udice “ o n ce a ju ror has left the pr esence and control of the court into an area 6 oc cu pie d by the ge ne ra l publ ic ”)
. T he m ag istra te co urt ru le s co nta in no pr ovi sio ns f or 7 the use of

a lte rn at e j ur or s or the dis ch ar ge of j ur or s. Whil e nothin g inthe m ag istrate 8 co urt rul es m an da te s the use of dis tr ic t cour t rul es , w e cannot sa y it w as er ro r fo r the 9 m agistrate court to use the rules adopt ed for district courts in NewMexico as 10 gu id an ce i n t hi s s it ua ti on . Cf

. State v. Rom er o , 201 4- N MC A -0 63, ¶ ¶ 6- 8, 327 P
. 3d 11 525 (finding guid ance, wher e logical, in civil procedure on a m atter w here the Rules 12 of Cri m in al Pro ced ur e were s il en t). 13 { 13} Furthe rm or e, our S upr em e Co urt has de cl ared b y r ule a nd c as e law tha t the 14 N ewMe xic o po lic y

gov er nin g a lte rn at e j ur or s do es not auth or iz e post -s ubm is si on 15 su bs ti tu ti on of ju ro rs . Sanchez , 2 00 0-N MS C- 021, ¶ 21 ( “ Inthe abse nc e of

ar ule 16 au tho ri zi ng p ost -s ubm iss ionsub sti tut ion , how ev er , w e int er pr et our rule a s no t 17 au tho ri zi ng p ost -s ubm iss ionsub sti tut ion
. ”)
. O ur S upr em e Co urt c onsi de re d th e 18 approach De fendant advocates in this case and determ ined that such an approach w as 19 reject ed in ou r st at e by the ab se nc e o f a ru le au th or iz in g i t. Id

. ¶ ¶ 21- 23. A lth oughour11

1 Suprem e Court fe lt bou nd bythe restrictive language of Rule 5-605, it a cknowledged 2 that som e changes to the rule m ay be constitu tionally perm issib le and invited futu re 3 co ns id erat io n o f ch an ge s t o i t. Id

. ¶ 21 (“ W e ar e not at lib er ty , in a de ci sio na l c ont ex t, 4 to change the language of o ur rul e. If there i s to be a change in the rule or the policy 5 unde rl y ing the ru le , it m us t co m e th ro ug h t he no rm al rule- m ak ing 6 pr oc es s. ”( al te ratio n, om iss ion s, int er na l quot at ion m ar

ks, an d ci ta tio n om itt ed ))
. O ur 7 Su pr em e Co urt, how ev er , ha s no t a lte re d R ule 5- 605 si nc e th e opin ionin Sanchez 8 was pu bl is he d i n 2 00 0. Sanchez then states the prevailing view in N ewMexico that 9 a “ post -s ubm iss ionsub sti tu ti on is er ro r unde r Ru le 5- 605; it

is er ro r tha t c re at es a 10 pr es um

pt io n of pr ej udi ce ; the state m

ust sho w und er

the c ir cu m stanc es . . . tha t the 11 trial court took adequate steps to ensure the integrity of the j ury

process.” Id

. ¶ 23
. 12 { 14} W e have no case lawdeciding whether, u n d er an y circum stances, it w as an 13 ab use of dis cr et ionto de cl ar e a m istri al ba se d onar ef usa l t o m ak e a post -s ubm iss ion 14 su bs ti tu ti on in th e jury aft er th e al te rn at e juro rs were d is m is se d. Cf

. State v. Sanchez , 15 1995 -N MSC- 053, ¶ 16, 120 N. M. 247, 901 P. 2d 178 (holdin g that the dist rict court 1 6 did not ab u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y d e n y i n g t h e d e f

e n d a n t s ’ m o t i o n f

o r ar e t r i a l a nd 17 re fu sin g th e de fe ndants ’ req ue st t o r ep la ce aj ur or “ w itha n a lte rn at e j ur or

a ft er the 18 j ury had retired t o d el i b erate , and the alternate j urors had been dism issed for m ore 1 9 t h an o n e d ay[, ]” wh er e t h e d ef en d an t s we re aw ar e f

ro m v o i r d i re o f t h e ju ro r’s12

1 re la tio nshi p to an em

plo y ee f or the pr ose cu tio n)
. W e co nc lud e tha t a hig he r de gr ee of 2 de fe re nc e is a

ppr opr ia te w he n th e co urt’s re fu sa l t o m ak e a post -s ubm iss ion 3 subs titutio n, af

ter alternate j urors we re alrea dy dism issed, resulted in a m istrial given 4 our Suprem e Court’ s prevailing vi ewthat a post-subm issio n subs titutio n is error that 5 crea te s a p res um

pt io n o f pr ejud ic e. 6 { 15} Inthi s c as e, not onl y w er e the a lte rn at e j ur ors di sc ha rg ed a nd p re se nt i n a 7 publ ic pla ce , the de lib er at ing j ur or D ef en da nt s ough t t o r ep la ce w as r em ove d, not f or 8 il ln e s s o r an ot he r cas e-n eu tra l em erg en cy , bu t fo r a l at e d is cl os ur e o f bi as . See 9 W ashi ngt on , 434 U
. S. a t 51 3 ( “ T he re a re c om pe lli ng instit

uti ona l c onsi de ratio ns 10 m ili ta tin g inf

av or of appe lla te de fe re nc e to the tr ia l j udge ’ s e valu at io n of the 11 sig nif ic an ce of pos sib le j ur or

bia s. ”) ; Sta te v . Saa ve dra , 1988 -N MS C- 100, ¶ 9, 108 12 N
. M. 38, 766 P
. 2d 2 98 ( sta tin g th at w he re “ the und er ly ing iss ue inv olv es a 13 deadlocked jury

or p ossib le j ury

bias, the tria l j udge sho uld be allowed broad 14 dis cr et ion w he the r to d ec lare am istri al ”) ; cf. Sanchez , 200 0- N MS C- 021, ¶ ¶ 4, 9, 15 13, 16 ( ca ta log ing c as es a cr oss the c ountry inv olv ing pos t- subm iss ionsub sti tu tion 16 w he re ade lib er at ing j ur or be cam e dis ab le d, ill , or

inc ap ac ita te d, a nd h old ing tha t the 17 district court erre d by

m aking a pos t-subm issio n subs titutio n where the district court 18 failed to take adequate prec autions to protect the deliberative pro ce s s , w here a 19 deliberating juror w as discharged for illness).13

1 { 16} A lth ough the tim ing of the bia se d j ur or ’ s dis cl osur e w as onl y f ive m inu te s in to 2 de lib er at ion s, D ef

en da nt’ s ownpr of

fe r in d istri ct

c ourt t o pr es en t t es tim ony f ro m one 3 of the oth er de lib er at ing j ur or s de m onstrate s th at f ive m inu te s is not

a n in sig nif

ic an t 4 tim e to d el ibe rate ; ra th er , it c anbe a de qua te ti m e fo r j ur or s to r ea chc er ta in 5 co nc lus ion s. I nde ed , D ef en da nt ass er

te d in the dis tr ic t c ourt tha t “ [t ] he j ur y w as f ive 6 (5 ) to o ne ( 1) f

or a cquit ta l. ” O ur

c as e law ha s lon g r ec ogni ze d th at , ge ne ra lly , “ a lon e 7 biased juror underm ines the im partiality of an entire j ury [. ] ” Sta te v. G all eg os , 200 9- 8 N MS C- 017, ¶ 22, 146 N
. M. 88, 206 P
. 3d 9 93 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c ita tio n 9 om itt ed ). W e agree wit h th e St at e tha t the ti m ing of the j ur or ’ s c onf

es sio n of 10 bias—after hearing the entire trial and havin g been excused to delib erate with the j ury 11 fo r ev enf

ive m inu te s—g ive s ri se to gr av e co nc er ns tha t the j ur or ’ s bi as c oul d have 12 ta in te d or con ta m in at edth e rem ai ni ng juro rs . Se e Sta te v . M ann , 200 2- N MS C- 001, 13 ¶ 27, 131 N
. M. 459 , 39 P
. 3d 124 (“ Jur y ta m pe ri ng an d j ur or bia s pr es en t the c le ar es t 14 exam ples of potenti ally

im p ro p er influences upon a j ury [. ] ”); c f. G all eg os , 15 2009 -N MS C- 017, ¶

23 (ho ld ing tha t a

m istri al w as not

w ar rante d gi ve n th e earl y 16 sta ge of

the tr ia l, the a

bse nc e of ac la im tha t the re w er e im

pr ope r co m

m uni ca tio ns 17 am ong the j ur or s su gge sti ng b ia s, the dis cr ee t m an ne r in whic h th e bia se d j ur or 1 8 al e rt e d t h e j u d g e , a n d t h e e a r l y r e p l a c e m e n t o f t h e j u r o r w i t h a n a l t e rna te ). T he 19 Su pr em e Co urt of the U nit ed St at es ha s st at ed tha t “ [n ] ei the r pa rty

ha s ar igh t t o have14

1 his c as e de ci de d by a j ur y w hic h m ay be ta int ed by bia s; i n th es e ci rc um stanc es , the 2 publ ic ’ s in te re st i n f

ai r tr ia ls d es ign ed

to en d inj ust

j udge m en ts m

ust pr ev ai l ove r the 3 de fen da nt ’s val ue d ri gh t t o h av e h is tri al co nc lu de d b efo re the fir st jury im pa ne le d.” 4 W ashi ngt on , 434 U
. S. a t 51 6 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c ita tio n om itt ed ). T his 5 Co urt a lso ha s a cknow le dge d th at “ w he re the ir

re gul ar ity inv olv es pos sib le part ia lity 6 w ith in the j ur

y , it ha s be en m or e of

te n he ld t ha t the pub lic int er es t i n f ai r ve rd ic ts 7 ou twei gh s [t he ] de fen da nt ’s in te res t i n o bt ai ni ng a ve rd ic t by h is fir st ch oi ce of jury. ” 8 State v. C. De Baca , 197 5- N MC A -1 20, ¶ 8, 88 N
. M. 454 , 541 P
. 2d 6 34. 9 { 17} W e re co gni ze tha t the li m ite d r ec or d a va ila ble doe s no t dis cl ose the ex te nt t o 10 w hic h th e m ag istrate c ourt c onsi de re d le ss dra sti c al te rn at ive m ea sur es to a m istri al , 11 an d w e re co gni ze tha t our ca se la w r eq ui re s so m e duty to inquir e int o th ose 12 al te rn at ive s, but

it is “ ‘ not c le ar a s to w ha t ki nd o r howm uc h of a n in qui ry

int o 13 alternatives is necessary .’ ” Sta te v . Salazar , 199 7- N MC A -0 88, ¶ 14, 124 N
. M. 23, 14 946 P. 2d 2 27 ( al te ratio n om itt ed ) (q uot ing C. De Baca , 1975-NMC A- 120, ¶ 10). 15 Nonethe l e ss , w e a r e n ot p e r su a de d t hat , w he r e f a c e d w i t h t hi s r i sk

o f j ury 16 co ntam ina tio n, the tr ia l c ourt w as required to ex plo re the pr opos ed

a lte rn at ive to a 17 m istri al —apos t- subm iss ionsub stitu ti on— w hic h it se lf

w oul d have c re at ed

a 18 pr es um

pti on o f pr ej udi ce a nd w oul d no t have a lle via te d or e ve n a ddress ed the 19 po te nt ia l tai nt to th e rem ai ni ng juro rs . See Yazzi e , 201 0- N MC A -0 28, ¶ 13 ( ex pla ini ng15

1 tha t the se co nd r eq

uir em en t f

or m an if es t ne ce ssi ty

r equir es the tr ia l j udge to 2 “ determ ine whether an alternative m easure—less drastic than a m istrial—can 3 alleviate the problem

so that the trial can continue to an im partial verdict” ( internal 4 quot ation m arks and citation om itted)). W e have said that the proposed alternatives 5 to a m is tri al m

us t be feas ib le or r eas on ab le
. See State v. Messier , 198 4- N MC A -0 85, 6 ¶¶ 13-14 , 101 N. M. 582, 686 P. 2d 27 2. Where the proposed alternative to a m istrial 7 carr ie s a l ik el ih oo d o f rev ers al , th atalt ern at iv e wou ld no t b e rea so na bl e. 8 { 18} W e w ill not h old th at it wa s an abuse of discretion, a fter the disclosure of a 9 de lib er at ing j ur or ’ s bi as , f or the m ag istra te c ourt t o r ef use am ea sur e tha t w oul d 10 vio la te our

onl y ru le gove rn ing the dis ch ar ge of al te rn at e j ur or s inc ri m ina l tri al s and 11 wou ld als o re su lt in pr es um pt iv e p reju di ce. Se e W

ashi ngt on , 434 U
. S. a t 50 0- 02, 513 12 (explaining that the absence of an express finding from the trial court that alter

natives 13 to a m istrial we re c onsid ered does not prevent a court from affor ding great defe rence 14 to a tr ia l j udge ’ s as se ssm en t of the pot en tia l bi as of aj ur y ); Sanchez , 2000-NMS C15 021, ¶¶ 21-23. W e agre e w ith the dis trict court and hold that the m istrial wa s justified 16 by m an ife st ne ces si ty. Se e Saav ed ra , 198 8-NMS C-100, ¶ 16 (concluding that wher e 17 there ar e “ sufficient reasons presented to j ustify declara tion o f a m istrial, .
. . the f act 18 that the judge w ould have been in a better position to assess the situatio n had he taken16

1 the ste ps s ugge ste d by

the de fend an t” doe s no t pr ec lud e ana ff irm an ce of

m an if es t 2 necessity

for a m istrial). 3 CON CLU SION 4 { 19} Ba s ed o n t h e f

o re g o i n g , we af

fi rm t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s d en i al o f D ef en d an t ’s 5 m otion to dism iss for violatio n of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6 { 20} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 8 EM IL J. KI EH N E, Ju dg e

9 WE CO NCUR:

10

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 11 MIC HAE L E. VIGIL, Judge

12

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 13 HEN RYM. BOHN HOF F, Judge