J-S68037-16

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

RYAN PHYLLIP BOWERS,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 388 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 18, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001526-2014 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2016

Ryan Phyllip Bowers (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered February 18, 2016, after he was found guilty of, inter alia, 

robbery, burglary, two counts of second-degree murder, and third-degree 

murder. After careful review, we affirm.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows. Appellant was 

arrested and charged with several crimes stemming from the murder of 

Michael Anthony Johns (Johns). Appellant and Patrick McCamey (McCamey) 

arrived at Johns’ home with the intention of committing a burglary/robbery. 

N.T., 5/14-18/2016, at 170-71. Upon arrival, an altercation ensued, 

ultimately resulting in Johns’ death. Id. 184-86. Both Appellant and 

McCamey were stabbed by Johns during the struggle. Id. at 170. At trial, 

Appellant argued McCamey killed Johns because of a personal vendetta, 
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independent of the burglary and robbery committed by Appellant and his 

cohort. Id. at 240-41.

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion seeking to suppress statements 

he made after he was taken to police barracks and read his Miranda1rights. 

Appellant averred these statements should be suppressed for, inter alia, the 

troopers’ failure to stop the interrogation after Appellant requested counsel. 

N.T., 2/4/2015, at 28-30. Following a hearing, the suppression court issued 

findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the motion.

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial, and on February 18, 2016 was 

found guilty of all charged crimes. On November 25, 2016, Appellant was 

sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for each count of 

second-degree murder and concurrent terms of imprisonment of 10 to 20 

years for third-degree murder and criminal conspiracy respectively. 

Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, properly preserving all 

issues presented on appeal. Following the denial of these motions, Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal.2

Appellant raises the following claims for our review.

1. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress [Appellant’s] 

inculpatory statements made during police custodial 

interrogation after [Appellant] had orally invoked his right to 

assistance of legal counsel during the custodial interrogation?

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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2. Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury at 

[Appellant’s] request that the Commonwealth, to convict 

[Appellant] of murder of the second degree and/or murder of 

the third degree, bore the burden of proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Appellant’s] co-defendant did not kill 

the victim for the co-defendant’s personal reasons 

independent of the charged felonies of burglary and/or 

robbery?

3. Did the trial court err in failing to determine that the 

mandatory sentence of a term of life imprisonment for a 

conviction of murder of the second degree ([i.e.] felony 

murder) is unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the eighth amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution because said punishment is grossly 

disproportional to the crime where the killing is without 

explicit malice and specific intent to kill another person?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (suggested answers and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).

We first address Appellant’s issue that the trial court erred in 

concluding that “Appellant did not validly invoke his right to the assistance of 

counsel before or during the police custodial interrogation[,]” and therefore 

wrongly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress statements made to police

during the interrogation. Appellant’s Brief at 16. 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and 

may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. 
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Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression 

court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s 

legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose 

duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied 

the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the court[] 

below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Perel, 107 A.3d 185, 188 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)). “Moreover, 

appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to 

suppress.” Commonwealth v. Stilo, 138 A.3d 33, 35–36 (Pa. Super. 

2016).

The following principles guide our review if this matter.

In Miranda v. Arizona, [the United States Supreme 

Court] established a number of prophylactic rights designed to 

counteract the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial 

interrogation, including the right to have counsel present. 

Miranda did not hold, however, that those rights could not be 

waived. On the contrary, the opinion recognized that the 

statements elicited during custodial interrogation would be 

admissible if the prosecution could establish that the suspect 

“knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” 

In Edwards v. Arizona, [451 U.S. 477 (1981)], [the 

United States Supreme Court] established a second layer of 

prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel: once a suspect 

asserts the right, not only must the current interrogation cease, 

but he may not be approached “until counsel has been made 

available to him,”—which means, [the High Court has] most 

recently held, that counsel must be present[.] If the police do 

subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel 

(assuming there has been no break in custody), the suspect’s 

statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible 

as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect[] 

executes a waiver and his statements would be considered 
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voluntary under traditional standards. This is “designed to 

prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his 

previously asserted Miranda rights[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Hayes, 755 A.2d 27, 32–33 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(citations omitted). 

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order “[t]o avoid 

difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers 

conducting interrogations,” the determination of whether the 

right to counsel was invoked by the accused is an “objective 

inquiry.” Effective assertion of the Fifth Amendment right to 

counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that can 

reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the 

assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation 

by the police.” However, if the accused makes an ambiguous or 

equivocal reference that would lead an officer, in light of the 

circumstances, to believe “only that the suspect might be 

invoking the right to counsel,” police interrogation need not 

cease. The accused must “articulate his desire to have counsel 

present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 

circumstances would understand the statement to be a request 

for an attorney.”

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 725–26 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted, emphasis in original).

Instantly, there is no dispute that Appellant was in fact subjected to a 

custodial interrogation. What is contested is whether Appellant made an 

affirmative request for counsel. Appellant contends the following statement3

 

3 The audio recording was played at the suppression hearing but per the 

suppression court’s instructions, was not transcribed. A duplicate of the 

recorded interrogation was provided to this Court as part of the reproduced 

record.
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provided sufficient evidence that he invoked his right to counsel after he was 

read his Miranda rights.4

Trooper Morris: But I certainly want you to know that you need 

to tell us the truth through all of this, okay? 

Appellant: I have no problem with telling you the truth. But, 

um, I just don’t know, I mean put yourself in my [inaudible], I 

just don’t know if it’s the best circumstances to say it without a 

lawyer here, you know, I just don’t know, you know what I 

mean, I don’t know, I don’t know, I [want to] tell you guys.

Trooper Morris: Well I’ll tell you this is it, this is your only 

opportunity. I’m not going to come back and talk to you again, 

okay... because I’m giving you one opportunity to man up and 

talk about it. 

Recorded Interview of Ryan Phyllip Bowers, September 29, 2014.5

Appellant avers he “did more than merely think out loud whether he 

should have an attorney. [Appellant] affirmatively told police that he did not 

know whether he should have the assistance and presence of legal counsel 

 

4 At the beginning of the recorded interrogation Trooper Morris stated: 

“[Appellant], you understand you’re being detained right now. We did- we 

read you your rights- do you understand your rights?” Appellant answered 

affirmatively. Trooper Morris continued: “Okay, you understand you start 

talking to us you can stop any time you want to, were not going to make 

you continue, okay, so whenever you think you want to stop, you just tell us 

okay?” Recorded interview of Ryan Phyllip Bowers, September 29, 2014. 

5 After Appellant made inculpatory statements, he explained: “I just didn’t 

know if [] telling you this without a lawyer was going to hurt me or help me 

or.” Recorded interview of Ryan Phyllip Bowers, September 29, 2014. At 

the end of the interview Appellant reiterated that he was “going to be honest 

with you guys- I mean, I wasn’t trying to play hardball, I just didn’t know if 

it’s better just to talk to you guys now or wait [until] I had a lawyer 

present.” Id. In response, Trooper Morris stated, “well, ultimately that is 

your decision...” Id.
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for and with him before and/or during the custodial interrogation by the 

police.” Appellant’s Brief at 17.

Following a hearing on Appellant’s motion, the trial court issued a 

finding of fact and conclusion of law, wherein the court stated the following: 

Notably, [Appellant] was advised as part of his rights that 

he had the right to stop the interview at any time. When the 

troopers began the recording of the statement, they first 

explained to [Appellant] why he was there, which included a 

statement that [McCamey] was in the barracks and that they 

had been talking to him and that he had told them the story and 

that they wanted to give [Appellant] an opportunity to tell the 

truth so that he could paint the incident with his version rather 

than the version that the evidence was showing which was this 

was a cold-blooded murder. Initially in the interview [Appellant] 

stated that he wanted to tell them the truth but he wasn’t sure 

that he should be doing it without an attorney. The troopers 

indicated that this was his first and only chance to tell them the 

truth if it is contrary to the physical evidence they claimed they 

had at the time.

[Appellant] then went on to give various versions of what 

occurred, and after each version the police challenged 

[Appellant] by indicating that his version was inconsistent with 

the evidence and that he was not telling them the full truth. 

They also reiterated that he will be given this chance only once 

to tell the truth and that it could be the difference between life 

imprisonment as the evidence seemed to point to, versus 

perhaps a 10 to 20 year sentence. [Appellant] continued to talk 

freely with the troopers during the recorded interview refining 

the story as he went along until he ultimately appeared to give a 

full version of what occurred. At no time during the recorded 

interview did [Appellant] unequivocally ask for an attorney 

and/or exercise any of his rights. “[T]he Fifth Amendment right 

to counsel must be specifically invoked.” 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 3/13/2015, at 7-8 

(unnumbered, citation removed). 
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Upon review, we find the trial court’s conclusions are supported by the 

record. Specifically, we conclude Appellant’s pondering aloud “if it’s the best 

circumstances to say it without a lawyer here” did not affirmatively invoke 

his right to counsel. Not only do Appellant’s words fail to express sufficiently 

a desire for the assistance of counsel, we find his statements did not include 

the affirmative language that would make an officer objectively believe 

Appellant was requesting a lawyer. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 

452, 453 (1994) (holding “that [defendant’s] remark—‘[m]aybe I should talk 

to a lawyer’—was not a request for counsel.”).6 No relief is due. 

Next, Appellant asserts the trial court erred when it refused to issue a 

specific jury instruction requested by defense counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 

21. While deliberating, the jury submitted a question to clarify the 

Commonwealth’s burden in disproving Appellant’s defense theory that 

McCamey had murdered Johns for personal reasons. 5/14-18/2016 at 326. 

The trial court provided the jury with a supplemental instruction, and 

defense counsel objected. Specifically, counsel sought to have the trial court 

reissue an instruction given before deliberation, and requested the court 

clarify the Commonwealth’s burden with respect to the third-degree murder 

 

6

Furthermore, we reject Appellant’s argument that after his inquiry 

regarding an attorney, the troopers were obligated to ask clarifying 

questions to determine if Appellant was asserting his right to counsel. See 

Martin, 101 A.3d at 726 (finding that while “stating that it would be ‘good 

practice’ for police to further question the accused to clarify ambiguous 

references to counsel, the [United States Supreme Court] specifically 

declined to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions”).
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charge. Id. at 330-31. The trial court denied Appellant’s request, relying on 

the court’s supplemental instruction and the prior general instructions given 

to the jury before deliberation began. In arguing that the supplemental 

instruction given by the trial court was inadequate, Appellant contends the 

instruction “did not tell the jury expressly, specifically[,] and directly that the 

Commonwealth did bear such a burden of proof on the charge of [seconddegree murder].” Appellant’s Brief at 29. 

[I]n reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s refusal to give a 

specific jury instruction, it is the function of this [C]ourt to 

determine whether the record supports the trial court’s decision. 

In examining the propriety of the instructions a trial court 

presents to a jury, our scope of review is to determine whether 

the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error 

of law which controlled the outcome of the case.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citations omitted).

The record reflects that prior to the commencement of their 

deliberations, the trial court provided lengthy instructions to the jury and 

specifically set forth the Commonwealth’s burden. See N.T., 5/14-18/2016, 

at 272-75. While discussing the elements needed to prove second and thirddegree murder, the trial court stated, in part, the following: 

[S]o to find [Appellant] guilty of second[-]degree murder, 

that is felony murder, you must find that the following four 

elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. First, 

that [McCamey] killed [Johns]; second that he did so while he 

and [Appellant] were partners in committing or attempting to 

commit robbery and/or burglary; third, that [McCamey] did the 

act that killed [Johns] in furtherance of the robbery and/or 

burglary; and fourth that the defendant was acting with malice.
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* * *

You heard me mention the phrase of “in furtherance of the 

crime of burglary or robbery.” The phrase “in furtherance of”; in 

furtherance of does not include all acts committed by a 

partner. A partner’s act that kills is not in furtherance of 

the felony if the partner does the act for his own personal 

reasons that are independent of the felony. Therefore, you 

must find [Appellant], not guilty of second[-]degree 

murder if you find that [McCamey] killed [Johns] for 

personal reasons independent of any felony as the 

defense argues.

* * *

And last, we have third degree murder ... To find 

[Appellant] guilty of this offense, you must find the following 

three elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

First that [Johns] is dead; second, that [Appellant and/or] his 

accomplice intentionally and knowingly or recklessly engaged in 

conduct that caused the death of [] Johns; and third, that 

[Appellant] and/or his accomplice did so with malice.

* * *

If you were to find that [McCamey] was acting in the killing of

[Johns] for his own personal reasons independent of what else 

was going on, based upon all of the totality of the circumstances, 

that may also [] not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

that [Appellant] was an accomplice to murder of the third 

degree. You would have to examine all of the facts and 

circumstances and see if that’s even in the case or how it fits in.

Id. at 307, 318 (emphasis in original).

While deliberating, the jury asked the following question: “Regarding 

both or either [second or third-degree murder], is there a burden of proof on 

the part of the prosecution to prove that McCamey did not kill for personal 
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reasons independent of the burglary/robbery?” Id. at 326. In response, the 

trial court gave the following supplemental instruction:

That’s a good question, that’s a tricky question. I have to 

start out by telling you, of course, that the burden of proof is 

always on the government, and what they have to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt is each and every element of the offenses for 

which he’s charged. On the second[-]degree murder charge, 

we’re talking about a killing that occurs while felonies are going 

on or just after it. So, it’s in the course of committing or 

during the commission of that I think you’re concerned 

with. The government has that burden to prove that the 

killing occurred in furtherance of the burglary and 

furtherance of the robbery. The fact that there may be other 

evidence or explanations that [may be] given somewhere in the 

evidence is for you, first of all, to decide what, if any, there is, 

what weight to give it, and do that within the circumstances of 

all of the evidence physical and testimony that you’ve received, 

applying the weight and the credibility to it and decide whether 

they met the burden of proving whether the killing was in 

furtherance beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to murder of the third[-]degree, the in furtherance of 

language is not in there because that has nothing to do with 

committing another felony, that’s just murder based upon the 

elements of third[-]degree murder, it’s every other intentional 

killing other than first[-]degree murder and felony murder.. So, 

on that degree you would have to find that [Appellant], if you’re 

thinking that McCamey is the actual person who committed the 

act, and did the killing, then the only way you can convict him of 

murder three is by accomplice liability and the burden of proof is 

on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that [Appellant] was acting as an accomplice in a third[-

]degree murder, and of course, if your conclusions are 

that they have not met that burden of proof whether it’s 

because you accept an alternate version, that perhaps it 

may have occurred by somebody else going off on his own 

independent killing, then unless he’s an accomplice to 

that he can’t be guilty of murder of the third[-]degree. 

So, the government has to prove whatever you find the facts are 

that he was an accomplice to assist in murder of the third 

degree. 
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So you have to examine their evidence based on their 

burden as to the elements of that offense, and the element here 

is accomplice liability. What, if anything, did he do as an 

accomplice to assist, aid, abet in murder of the third[-]degree if 

you’re finding that [McCamey] did it.

Id.at 326-29 (emphasis added).

In response to Appellant’s contention that the court’s supplemental 

instruction failed to set forth adequately the Commonwealth’s burden, the 

trial court stated the following: 

Defense counsel took exception to this instruction at 

sidebar, arguing essentially that the [trial court’s] instruction 

should be worded differently, i.e., that the Commonwealth bears 

the burden of proving that the killing was not for personal 

reasons independent of the robbery and/or burglary. Notably, 

defense counsel was not arguing that the instruction was wrong; 

he simply wanted it to go further and to tell the jury directly that 

the government must prove the killing was not for an 

independent reason. The trial court did not give any such 

further instructions regarding this question.

Defense counsel’s exception, [deals] with semantics. The 

trial court instructed the jury throughout the general instructions 

and again in response to [the jury’s question, that] the 

government always bore the burden of proof. The jury was 

given general instructions (without objection) of what elements 

the government had to prove. The [trial court] also made it 

clear in response to [the question] that the prosecution has the 

“burden to prove that the killing occurred in furtherance of the 

burglary and furtherance of the robbery.” The jury would only 

be left with a single directive on the law, i.e., that only the 

prosecution bore any burden of proof as to the elements of each 

offense and if the co-defendant committed the killing outside of 

the felony acts or for personal reasons, then it did not meet its 

burden and they must find defendant not guilty of felony 

murder. . .

In addition, as to third[-]degree murder, the jury was 

instructed during the final instructions and in response to its [] 

question, that the Commonwealth had to prove that [Appellant] 
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was an accomplice to find him guilty. But they must find him 

not guilty if “somebody else [was] going off on his own 

independent killing, then unless he’s an accomplice to that he 

can’t be guilty of murder of the third degree.”

Thus, the [trial court] finds that defense counsel’s 

suggested language is simply a different way to express the law, 

and that the instructions by the [trial court] left no room for the 

jury to be confused that they could find [Appellant] not guilty of 

either murder if it was either an independent act of the 

codefendant or the prosecution did not prove that [Appellant[ 

was acting as an accomplice to third degree murder, or the 

killing did not occur in furtherance of the alleged robbery or 

burglary.

Memorandum and Order, 2/18/2016, at 12-13.

We agree that the trial court adequately answered the jury’s inquiry 

and concisely set forth the Commonwealth’s burden. In concluding that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion, we note that

[w]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court 

will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated 

portions, to determine if the instructions were improper. We 

further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this 

Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing 

its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the 

law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury 

for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion 

or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). Here, without addressing Appellant’s proposed 

alternative language, we find the trial court clearly, adequately, and 

accurately presented the law and provided ample instruction in response to 

the question asked by the jury. No relief is due. 
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Lastly, we address Appellant’s issue regarding the constitutionality of 

his sentence to life in prison for second-degree murder. Appellant contends 

that 

[i]t is grossly disproportional to legislate a mandatory sentence 

of [] life imprisonment without parole for a conviction of murder 

of the second[-]degree committed during certain felonies but 

which is not an intentional killing of another, in which there is no 

specific intent to kill another, there is no actual malice towards 

the other, and in which there is no willful, deliberate, and 

premediated killing of another, when the same mandatory 

sentence of a term of life imprisonment is the legislated default 

sentence for a conviction for a criminal homicide of another 

which is committed by intentional killing[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 34-35. Additionally, Appellant cites Miller v. Alabama

132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), arguing that even though he was 23 years old at 

the time of the offenses outlined supra, the findings in Miller concerning 

“the incomplete development of the human brain and its judgmental 

reasoning capabilities and capacities in young persons” are also applicable to 

a 23 year old male. Appellant’s Brief at 32-33. “[T]he mandatory life 

sentence without the possibility of parole completely ignores these biological 

and physiological realties[.]” Id. at 33. 

Appellant’s issue challenges the legality of his sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Henkel, 938 A.2d 433, n. 14 (Pa. Super. 2007).

[T]he selection of the penalty of life imprisonment, being a 

legislative determination, carries a strong presumption of 

validity, and of constitutionality. “Therefore, in assessing a 

punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature 

against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. [A] 

heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of 

the representatives of the people.”
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Commonwealth v. Middleton, 467 A.2d 841, 846 (Pa. Super. 1983) 

(citations omitted).

In concluding Appellant’s final issue does not entitle him to relief by 

this Court, we our guided by our holding in Henkel, which addressed the 

same issue presently raised by Appellant, “that the imposition of a life 

sentence for second-degree murder constituted cruel and unusual 

punishment under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.”7 

Henkel, 938 A.2d at 446.

Nearly 25 years ago, in Commonwealth v. Middleton, []

this Court dismissed a constitutional challenge identical to the 

one presented by [appellants] and stated:

The offense of felony-murder is undoubtedly one of 

the gravest and most serious which can be 

committed. The taking of a life during the 

commission of an enumerated felony demonstrates a 

disregard for the property, safety, sanctity, integrity, 

and especially, the life of the victim. It is a crime of 

archviolence. Clearly, such an offense merits a 

severe penalty.

Id. at 446–47.

As in Henkel, we too find Appellant has provided no reason for us to 

revisit our well-established precedent.8 Furthermore, Appellant’s attempt to 

implicate Miller is likewise unavailing. The Supreme Court in Miller held 

that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of eighteen at 

 

7 See Pa. Const., Art. I, § 13 and U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

8 Our Supreme Court, in dictum, harshly criticized the felony-murder rule in 

Commonwealth ex rel Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d. 550 (Pa. 1970). 

Appellant does not argue the issues raised therein. 
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the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 

‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. Appellant was 

not a juvenile at the time of the offense, and is therefore unable to benefit 

from the holdings in Miller.

Thus, after a thorough review of the record and briefs in this case, we 

are unconvinced that any of Appellant’s arguments entitles him to relief.9

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2016

 

9 There appears to be a question as to the legality of Appellant’s sentence, 

considering he was found guilty and sentenced to three counts of murder 

arising from the death of one victim. However, this issue has not been 

raised by Appellant on appeal. Given the apparent complexity of this issue, 

we decline to consider it sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 

A.3d 800, 801 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“We begin by noting that a challenge to 

the legality of the sentence can never be waived and may be raised by this 

Court sua sponte.”) (emphasis added).