NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER ROBLES, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0504

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-120223-001

The Honorable Roland J. Steinle, III, Judge (retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. ROBLES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Robles (Defendant) appeals his convictions and 

sentences for two counts of aggravated assault and one count of resisting 

arrest. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Phoenix motorcycle police officer Kanavel conducted a traffic 

stop on a vehicle that Defendant was driving. Using the information on

Defendant’s identification card, Kanavel conducted a records check and 

learned Defendant had outstanding arrest warrants. Kanavel requested a 

patrol unit to transport Defendant to jail, and he returned to Defendant’s 

vehicle. Defendant then exited the vehicle and fled on foot. Kanavel ran 

after Defendant. 

¶3 Kanavel eventually apprehended Defendant and “took him 

down to the ground.” Defendant physically resisted Kanavel’s attempts to

restrain him, and the two began scuffling on the ground. Defendant rose 

to his feet and grabbed Kanavel’s holstered handgun. Defendant began 

“tugging on both the holster and the pistol trying to gain control of it.” 

Kanavel feared Defendant would get the gun out of the holster and “use it 

on [him].”

¶4 After dislodging Defendant’s hand from the pistol grip, 

Kanavel drew his firearm and shot Defendant in the leg. Defendant 

grabbed the gun barrel with both hands and pulled Kanavel to his feet. 

Defendant continued pulling the barrel, and Kanavel, holding his firearm 

with only one hand, again feared Defendant would get control of the 

weapon and shoot him. Unable to “pull it back out of [Defendant’s] hand,” 

 

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” State 

v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996)).
STATE v. ROBLES

Decision of the Court

3

Kanavel “went forward with [Defendant’s] motion and pressed the weapon 

into his chest and pulled the trigger.” The gun did not fire, and Defendant 

fled. Police officers responding to Kanavel’s call for transportation 

apprehended Defendant and took him into custody. Kanavel received 

multiple scrapes, abrasions, and bruises from the struggle with Defendant. 

¶5 The State charged Defendant with two counts of aggravated 

assault, one a class 2 dangerous felony (Count 1), the other a class 3 

dangerous felony (Count 3), and resisting arrest, a class 6 felony (Count 2).

The State also alleged prior felony convictions, historical prior convictions, 

and other aggravating circumstances. The jury found Defendant guilty as 

charged, determined Counts 1 and 3 were dangerous offenses and, as an 

aggravating factor regarding those counts, found the State proved the 

offenses involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical 

injury. The court imposed concurrent sentences of imprisonment, the 

longest being aggravated 13-year terms for Counts 1 and 3. Defendant filed 

a delayed notice of appeal after the court permitted him to do so. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, 

and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21.A.1, and

13-4033.A.1. (West 2016).2

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of Evidence: Aggravated Assault Count 1

¶6 Defendant argues that evidence of his attempt to gain control 

over Kanavel’s weapon was insufficient to show he “used” a handgun as 

required to support his conviction on Count 1.

¶7 We review a claim of insufficient evidence de novo. State v. 

West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). Sufficient evidence may be direct or

circumstantial and “is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” State v. Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, 487, ¶ 9 (App. 2013)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “To set aside a jury verdict for 

insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis

whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by 

the jury.” State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316 (1987).

 

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.
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¶8 As charged in Count 1, a person commits aggravated assault 

by using a deadly weapon to intentionally place another person in 

reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury. A.R.S. §§ 

13-1203.A.2, -1204.A.2. By definition, a firearm is a deadly weapon. A.R.S. 

§ 13-105.15. If the victim is a peace officer, the offense is a class 2 felony. 

A.R.S. § 13-1204.E. At trial, the State referred to Defendant’s grabbing and 

pulling the barrel of Kanavel’s gun as evidence of Defendant’s use of the 

weapon to warrant a conviction on Count 1.3

¶9 Defendant contends that, because he never gained exclusive 

control over Kanavel’s firearm, he was unable to “use” it as contemplated 

by A.R.S. § 13-1204.A.2. 

¶10 We interpret statutes de novo. State v. Neese, 239 Ariz. 84, 86, 

¶ 8 (App. 2016). When the language of a statute is clear, “we need not look 

further to determine the statute’s meaning and apply its terms as written.” 

State v. Lee, 236 Ariz. 377, 383, ¶ 16 (App. 2014).

¶11 To the extent Defendant contends he was required to shoot 

the weapon to satisfy the use requirement, we reject that contention. 

Arizona law does not require a person to fire a gun to be guilty of 

aggravated assault. Indeed, an unloaded gun, if used in an assault can 

elevate the offense to aggravated assault. A.R.S. § 13-105.19 (a “Firearm” 

means “any loaded or unloaded handgun”).

¶12 We find sufficient evidence in the record of Defendant’s use 

of a deadly weapon. Kanavel testified that Defendant grabbed and pulled 

his gun barrel, and Kanavel “was thinking that [Defendant] was going to 

be able to get the weapon from my hand.” Kanavel further testified that he 

was afraid of Defendant “us[ing] it on me once he got it away from me.”

By intentionally grabbing and pulling on the holster and barrel of Kanavel’s 

gun, Defendant used the gun to place the officer in reasonable 

apprehension of being shot and sustaining a serious physical injury. See

State v. Morgan, 128 Ariz. 362, 368 (App. 1981) (holding that a defendant 

 

3 Count 3 alleged that Defendant “knowing or having reason to know 

that . . . Kanavel was a peace officer . . . and is engaged in the execution of 

any official duties intentionally placed . . . Kanavel in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury by knowingly taking or 

attempting to exercise control over a peace officer’s firearm[.]” At trial, the 

State argued for a conviction on Count 3 based on Defendant’s attempt to 

take Kanavel’s gun out of the holster when the two began struggling. 
STATE v. ROBLES

Decision of the Court

5

“need only intentionally act using a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument so that the victim is placed in reasonable apprehension of 

imminent physical injury” to be convicted of aggravated assault).

¶13 Moreover, although Defendant did not have exclusive use of 

the weapon, nothing in § 13-1204.A.2 requires a defendant to have exclusive 

control or possession of a gun for an aggravated assault to occur. We will 

not create a limitation in the statute that the legislature did not write. See 

Hart v. Hart, 220 Ariz. 183, 187, ¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“[S]tandard principles of 

statutory construction require that we do not judicially impose a 

requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.”). 

¶14 Finally, Defendant’s reliance on State v. Befford, 148 Ariz. 508 

(1986) and State v. Romero, 135 Ariz. 102 (App. 1982) is misplaced. In those 

cases, the supreme court and this court did not construe “use” in the context 

of deadly weapon aggravated assault; rather, the courts addressed the 

first-degree burglary statute, A.R.S. § 13-1508.A, which at the time required 

the State to prove a defendant was “armed with . . . a deadly weapon.” 

Befford, 148 Ariz. at 509; Romero, 135 Ariz. at 104. Befford and Romero are, 

therefore, inapplicable. Additionally, the legislature amended § 13-1508.A

in 1988 to its present form by replacing “armed with” to “knowingly 

possess,” eliminating the “armed with” language. 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws, 

ch. 241 (2nd Reg. Sess.).

¶15 Substantial evidence established Defendant used a deadly 

weapon to commit an assault on officer Kanavel. Accordingly, sufficient 

evidence supports Defendant’s conviction on Count 1.4

II. Sentencing

¶16 Defendant argues his sentences for Counts 1 and 3 are 

unlawful because the court used the jury’s finding of dangerousness based 

on infliction of serious injury to enhance the sentences pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 13-704 and as an aggravating factor pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-701. 

 

4 We summarily reject Defendant’s argument that, because he 

attempted to take Kanavel’s firearm—which is another form of assault 

under A.R.S. § 13-1204.A.9(a)—Defendant did not use it to commit 

aggravated assault. Defendant’s attempt to take the officer’s gun from its 

holster during the initial struggle formed the basis for his conviction on 

Count 3, not Count 1. See supra note 3, at ¶ 8. That is, Defendant committed 

two different criminal offenses, each stemming from a separate act. 
STATE v. ROBLES

Decision of the Court

6

¶17 However, the State alleged Defendant committed several 

prior felonies as an aggravating factor. At trial, Defendant admitted to two 

prior felonies. At sentencing, the trial court relied on Defendant’s prior 

felonies as a “substantial aggravator.” After considering mitigating and 

aggravating factors, the court sentenced Defendant to a slightly aggravated 

term of thirteen years’ incarceration. Based on Defendant’s admission, the 

trial court had authority to find his prior felony convictions as aggravating 

circumstances to increase the sentence. See A.R.S. § 13-701.D.11. By 

admission, Defendant exposed himself to the maximum term permitted 

under A.R.S. § 13-704. See A.R.S. § 13-701.C; State v. Estrada, 210 Ariz. 111, 

120-21, ¶ 25 (App. 2005) (“[T]he existence of a single aggravator authorizes 

a judge (in his or her discretion) to impose a sentence up to the statutory 

maximum.”). The trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly.

CONCLUSION

¶18 Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.