SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

393 

KA 10-01086 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JACK LUKENS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (BRADLEY E. KEEM OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

GREGORY S. OAKES, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OSWEGO (COURTNEY E. PETITT OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Walter W.

Hafner, Jr., J.), rendered February 4, 2010. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of grand larceny in the fourth degree

and petit larceny. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by reducing the conviction of grand

larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 155.30 [1]) to petit larceny

(§ 155.25) and vacating the sentence imposed on count one of the

indictment and as modified the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is

remitted to Oswego County Court for sentencing on the conviction of

petit larceny. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him of grand

larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 155.30 [1]) and petit

larceny (§ 155.25), defendant contends that County Court’s Sandoval

ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. We reject that contention. 

The court permitted the prosecutor to ask defendant whether he had

been convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the

seventh degree and identity theft in the third degree. The court also

permitted the prosecutor to ask defendant whether he had two prior

felony convictions and 15 prior misdemeanor convictions without

revealing the underlying nature of those offenses, all of which were

larcenies or related to larceny. We conclude that the court’s

determination was not an abuse of discretion inasmuch as it “reflects

sensitivity to the particular prejudice that may result when a jury is

made aware of the fact that the defendant has previously committed

crimes that are similar to the charged crime” (People v Walker, 83

NY2d 455, 459).

We also reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in

allowing the People to introduce evidence of his prior involvement as
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KA 10-01086 

an accomplice in an uncharged larceny. The evidence of an uncharged

larceny committed by defendant and his codefendent was properly

admitted under the intent, common scheme or plan, and identity

exceptions to the Molineux rule (see generally People v Ingram, 71

NY2d 474, 479-480; People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293-294; People v

Arguinzoni, 48 AD3d 1239, 1240, lv denied 10 NY3d 859). 

We reject the further contention of defendant that the court

erred in denying his motion to sever the two counts of the indictment

and to sever his trial from that of his codefendant. “Defendant’s

motion was untimely, and defendant failed to show good cause for

bringing his motion [eight] months after [his arraignment]” (People v

Wilburn, 50 AD3d 1617, 1618, lv denied 11 NY3d 742; see CPL

255.20 [1], [3]). In any event, defendant’s contention is without

merit. The court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to sever

the counts of the indictment because “[d]efendant failed to establish

that there was ‘[s]ubstantially more proof on one . . . [of the]

joinable offenses than on [the] other[] and there [was] a substantial

likelihood that the jury would be unable to consider separately the

proof as it relate[d] to each offense’ ” (People v Davis, 19 AD3d

1007, 1007, quoting CPL 200.20 [3] [a]; see People v Dozier, 32 AD3d

1346, 1346-1347, lv denied 8 NY3d 880). Additionally, the court did

not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to sever his

trial from that of his codefendant. “The evidence against defendant

and his codefendant[] was essentially identical, and the respective

defenses were not in irreconcilable conflict” (People v Buccina, 62

AD3d 1252, 1253, lv denied 12 NY3d 913). 

We agree with defendant that his conviction of grand larceny in

the fourth degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence that

the value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000 (see People v

Pallagi, 91 AD3d 1266, 1269-1270). At trial, the People presented a

surveillance video showing a male pushing a shopping cart containing

merchandise out of a Tractor Supply Company store, and that video

provided legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could

reasonably conclude that defendant was the male in the video (see

generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). The only items

clearly visible in the cart, however, were two bags of dog food, and

the People presented no evidence regarding the value of those items. 

Although the People did present evidence that $1,899 in “pet

containment” merchandise was missing from the store on the date in

question, no pet containment items are visible in the surveillance

video, and there is no other evidence connecting defendant to those

missing items. Thus, we cannot on this record conclude “ ‘that the

jury ha[d] a reasonable basis for inferring, rather than speculating,

that the value of the property exceeded the statutory threshold’ of

$1,000” (People v Brink, 78 AD3d 1483, 1484, lv denied 16 NY3d 742,

reconsideration denied 16 NY3d 828). Nevertheless, we conclude that

the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that defendant

committed the lesser included offense of petit larceny (see Pallagi,

91 AD3d at 1270; see generally Brink, 78 AD3d at 1484). We therefore

modify the judgment by reducing the conviction of grand larceny in the

fourth degree to petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25) and vacating the
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KA 10-01086 

sentence imposed on count one of the indictment (see CPL 470.15 [2]

[a]), and we remit the matter to County Court for sentencing on the

conviction of petit larceny (see CPL 470.20 [4]).

Defendant’s contention that his conviction of petit larceny is

based upon legally insufficient evidence is not preserved for our

review because defendant did not move for a trial order of dismissal

with respect to that count of the indictment (see People v Gray, 86

NY2d 10, 19). In any event, that contention is without merit (see

generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Furthermore, viewing the

evidence in light of the elements of the crime of petit larceny as

charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we

reject defendant’s contention that the verdict with respect to that

crime is against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley,

69 NY2d at 495). 

Although defendant further contends that he was denied a fair

trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during summation, that

contention is not preserved for our review because defendant failed to

object to the allegedly improper comments during summation (see People

v Balls, 69 NY2d 641, 642; People v Sulli, 81 AD3d 1309, 1311, lv

denied 17 NY3d 802). We decline to exercise our power to review that

contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see

CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

Defendant’s contention that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel because counsel failed to make a timely motion to sever the

indictment is without merit. “Any motion to sever . . . the

indictment would have had ‘ “little or no chance of success,” ’ and

thus counsel’s failure to make such a [timely] motion . . . does not

indicate ineffectiveness of counsel” (Dozier, 32 AD3d at 1347, quoting

People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152). Moreover, we conclude that the

evidence, the law and the circumstances of this case, viewed in

totality and as of the time of representation, establish that

defendant received meaningful representation (see generally People v

Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147). In light of our determination, we do not

address defendant’s remaining contention.

Entered: June 7, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court