J-S86043-16

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: J.F.K.

APPEAL OF: E.F., NATURAL FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1153 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 20A-2016 O.C.

IN RE: B.R.K.

APPEAL OF: E.F., NATURAL FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1154 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 21A-2016 O.C.

IN RE: K.J.K.

APPEAL OF: E.F., NATURAL FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1155 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 22A-2016 O.C.

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016

Appellant, E.F. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the 
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Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily 

terminated his parental rights to his minor children, J.F.K., B.R.K., and 

K.J.K. (“Children”). Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm. 

In its opinion, the Orphans’ court fully and correctly sets forth the 

relevant facts of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them. 

Procedurally, on April 11, 2016, Jefferson County Children and Youth 

Services (“CYS”) filed a petition for involuntary termination of Father’s and 

Mother’s parental rights to Children. The parties proceeded to a termination 

hearing on June 8, 2016, where Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental 

rights. CYS then presented the testimony of Dr. Allen Ryen, a licensed 

psychologist, who performed a bonding assessment with Children and Father 

in March 2016. Dr. Ryen stated that Father exhibited some good parenting 

skills; however, Dr. Ryen opined that a primary bond did not exist between 

Father and Children. Dr. Ryen also expressed concern with Children’s 

negative behavioral reactions after Father’s visits. CYS next presented the 

testimony of Danielle Smith, the Children’s CYS caseworker. Ms. Smith 

testified that Father had visited J.F.K. and B.R.K. nine times since the court 

adjudicated the Children dependent in April 2014. Ms. Smith also stated 

Father had visited K.J.K. even less frequently during the same period 

because K.J.K. resides in a residential treatment facility. Ms. Smith further 

explained that Father had not obtained stable housing or demonstrated his 

ability to handle the needs of Children. Ms. Smith testified that Children 
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were in placement with prospective adoptive families. Ms. Smith ultimately 

opined that grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights existed under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(a)(2), and termination was in the best 

interests of Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Father testified on 

his own behalf at the hearing. Father expressed his love and desire to 

regain custody of Children. Father also explained that he had recently 

obtained stable employment and continued to look for a stable housing 

option. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under 

advisement. 

On June 22, 2016, the court terminated Father’s parental rights to 

Children. On July 5, 2016, Father filed a motion for reconsideration, in light 

of the fact that both J.F.K. and B.R.K.’s foster parents had withdrawn as 

prospective adoptive families. The court denied Father’s motion on July 7, 

2016. On July 21, 2016, Father timely filed a notice of appeal and concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i). 

Father raises the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE [ORPHANS’] COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR 

AND/OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN TERMINATING 

FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(A)(1) WHEN FATHER TOOK AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 

TO ASSERT PARENTAL RIGHTS BY RELOCATING FROM 

LOUISIANA TO PENNSYLVANIA, WHEN HE MADE ALL 

POSSIBLE SCHEDULED VISITATION WITH HIS CHILDREN, 

AND WHEN HE DEMONSTRATED A SERIOUS INTENT TO 

REESTABLISH AND CONTINUE THE PARENT-CHILD 

RELATIONSHIP[?]
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WHETHER THE [ORPHANS’] COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR 

AND/OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN TERMINATING 

FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER 23 PA.C.S.A. § 

2511(A)(2) WHEN [CYS] FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND 

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT FATHER CANNOT REMEDY 

ANY CURRENT PARENTAL INCAPACITY[?]

WHETHER THE [ORPHANS’] COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR 

AND/OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE 

TERMINATION OF FATHER’S RIGHTS WAS IN THE BEST 

INTEREST OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL, PHYSICAL, AND 

EMOTIONAL NEEDS AND WELFARE OF THE [CHILDREN?] 

(Father’s Brief at 3-4). 

The standard and scope of review applicable in a termination of

parental rights case is as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of 

fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses 

and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the] 

finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

the existence of grounds for doing so. 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 
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We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis 

exists for the result reached. If the trial court’s findings 

are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even if the record could support an 

opposite result. 

In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 

See also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (Pa.Super. 

2008) (en banc). 

DHS sought the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights on 

the following grounds: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 
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terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).

“Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the 

subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 

(Pa.Super. 2010). 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of his...parental rights does 

the court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence 

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to 

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a 

settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a 

refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 
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perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if 

the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties. 

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, 

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the 

parent’s explanation for his...conduct; (2) the postabandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) 

consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights 

on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination 

petition:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations 

offered by the parent facing termination of his...parental 

rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality 

of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005).

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re 

A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make 

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 
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responsibilities.” Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of 

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of 

In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the 

petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 

719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998). 

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 

will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The 

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, 

paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

bond.” Id. at 520. Significantly: 

In this context, the court must take into account whether a 

bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. When conducting a bonding 

analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony. 

Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a 

formal bonding evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
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“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and have his...parental rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 

787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation 

is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental 

duty requires that a parent exert [himself] to take and 

maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his...ability, even in difficult circumstances. 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical 

and emotional needs.

In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic 
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constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his...child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill his...parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of his...potential in a permanent, healthy, 

safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

Importantly, neither Section 2511(a) nor Section 2511(b) requires a 

court to consider at the termination stage, whether an agency provided a 

parent with reasonable efforts aimed at reunifying the parent with his 

children prior to the agency petitioning for termination of parental rights. In 

re D.C.D., 629 Pa. 325, 342, 105 A.3d 662, 672 (2014). An agency’s failure 

to provide reasonable efforts to a parent does not prohibit the court from 

granting a petition to terminate parental rights under Section 2511. Id. at 

346, 105 A.3d at 675. 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable John Henry 

Foradora, we conclude Father’s issues on appeal merit no relief. The 

Orphans’ court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of 

the questions presented. (See Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed June 22, 2016, 

at 5-9) (finding: between April 14, 2014 and April 11, 2016, Father saw 

J.F.K. and B.R.K. only nine times, once in June 2015, and eight times 

between January 2016 and March 2016; Father saw K.J.K. even less during 

this period due to K.J.K.’s placement in residential treatment facility; 

significantly, Father declined to visit K.J.K. at residential treatment facility; 
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Father’s decision to forego visits with K.J.K., despite availability and offers of 

transportation assistance from CYS, demonstrated Father’s lack of fortitude 

to put K.J.K.’s needs ahead of his own; while Father did take advantage of 

visits with J.F.K. and B.R.K., these visits do not evidence Father’s willingness 

and ability to perform parental duties because visits did not require Father to 

make any real effort to spend time with Children; similarly, Father’s decision 

to relocate from Louisiana to Pennsylvania does not weigh in Father’s favor; 

Father made decision to move without preparation and without employment 

or housing arrangements in place; in fact, Father’s move served only to 

exacerbate instability that had led to denial of Father’s two previous 

Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (“ICPC”) requests; after almost 

six months in Pennsylvania, Father continues to live in shelter, has recently 

obtained part-time employment, and does not have identifiable plan to 

achieve reunification with Children; Father has known unstable housing and 

employment are obstacles to reunification for significant period of time; 

nevertheless, Father has repeatedly failed to rectify any of these concerns;

Father has continually taken path of least resistance in parenting Children, 

as exhibited by Father’s failure to protect his custody rights when Mother 

moved to Pennsylvania in 2012, do anything to remove Children from 

violence between Mother and stepfather, and exert himself to change 

Children’s circumstances, despite their placement in foster care for twenty 

months; notwithstanding his own failures, Father blames foster care for 
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Children’s behavioral problems; under these circumstances, termination is 

warranted under Section 2511(a)(1) and (a)(2) due to unlikelihood that 

Father will remedy causes of parental incapacity within reasonable period of 

time; moreover, termination of Father’s parental rights will serve best 

interests of Children; J.F.K. and B.R.K. live with foster parents who meet 

their needs and intend to confirm love and commitment to J.F.K. and B.R.K. 

through adoption; both J.F.K. and B.R.K. have expressed desire for 

permanent homes with people they know as “Mom” and Dad”; while K.J.K.’s 

preferences are less clear, she has foster family who cares for her and 

intends to welcome her back upon discharge from residential treatment 

facility; Father’s reintroduction in Children’s lives has only intensified 

Children’s behavioral issues; in fact, Children’s behavioral issues improved 

after court discontinued Father’s visits in March 2016; termination of 

Father’s parental rights will not destroy important emotional bond between 

Father and Children; Dr. Ryen testified that bond between Father and 

Children is weak at best, while Children have identifiable bonds with foster 

parents; termination of Father’s parental rights will serve to ensure 

permanency of Children’s bonds with their foster parents; because CYS 

demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that termination is 

appropriate pursuant to 2511(a)(1) and (a)(2), and is in best interests of 

Children under 2511(b), court properly terminated Father’s parental rights). 

With respect to these issues, we affirm on the basis of the Orphans’ court 
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opinion. 

To the extent Father claims the court erred when it denied his motion 

for reconsideration in light of the withdrawal of J.F.K. and B.R.K.’s foster 

families as prospective adoptive parents, Father failed to separately identify 

this issue in his Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statement. See Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 51 A.3d 237 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 701, 63 

A.3d 1245 (2013) (explaining failure to specify issues raised on appeal in 

Rule 1925(b) statement constitutes waiver for purposes of review). Thus, 

Father’s challenge to the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration is 

arguably waived. 

Moreover, the Orphans’ court explained its denial of Father’s motion 

for reconsideration as follows: 

Ms. Smith did indeed testify at the most recent 

permanency review hearing that [J.F.K. and B.R.K.’s foster 

families] had withdrawn as [J.F.K.] and [B.R.K.’s] 

prospective adoptive parents. That development, though 

unfortunate, does not change the [c]ourt’s conclusion that 

termination of Father’s parental rights is in [the Children’s] 

best interests. As the testimony indicated, the [Children’s] 

contact with Father was actually a detriment to their 

emotion well-being, which is why the [c]ourt terminated 

visitation over three months ago. 

Will the [c]ourt’s decision leave the [C]hildren without an 

immediate plan for a permanent home? Unless [J.F.K. and 

B.R.K.’s foster families] again change their minds, the 

answer is yes. As things stand, though, permanency with 

Father is also a distant prospect. Given his mottled work 

history, it is still too early to call a few months with 

Walmart “stable employment,” while [Father] frankly 

admits that he does not yet have an appropriate residence. 
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In addition, the [C]hildren barely know Father. They were 

all very young when Mother moved to Pennsylvania, and 

since then, [J.F.K.] and [B.R.K.] have only spent about 12 

hours with him, [K.J.K] even less, and that includes the 

time all four were together for Dr. Ryen’s bonding 

assessment. Thus, Father’s concern that it would take 

time for [C]hildren to form relationships with “effective 

strangers” even if CYS identified new prospective adoptive 

parents in the near future rings hollow, as he, too, falls 

within that category. 

Furthermore, [the decision of J.F.K. and B.R.K.’s foster 

families] not to adopt does not suddenly qualify Father to 

raise three children with varied behavioral and disciplinary 

problems. As the [c]ourt previously observed, [Father] 

does not demonstrate a realistic perception of what may 

have precipitated [Children’s] issues, let alone the capacity 

to appropriately deal with them, and his averred 

willingness to “get training” in that regard is no guarantee 

from a man who is still homeless after nearly seven 

months in [Pennsylvania]. 

In short, Father’s parental deficiencies and his [Children’s] 

unfavorable reactions to his reintroduction into their lives 

leads the [c]ourt to believe that [K.J.K.], [J.F.K.], and 

[B.R.K.’s] needs and welfare will be best served by 

terminating Father’s parental rights and making them 

available for adoption, even if that result is not 

immediately foreseeable. 

(Opinion in Support of Denial of Father’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed 

July 7, 2016, at 1-2). The record supports the court’s sound reasoning. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016
Circulated 11/22/2016 01:54 PM