MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Barbara J. Simmons

Oldenburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jerry D. Thompson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 5, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1602-CR-400

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Christina R. 

Klineman, Judge.

Cause No. 49G17-1601-CM-48

Friedlander, Senior Judge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-CR-400 | December 5, 2016 Page 1 of 5
[1] Jerry D. Thompson appeals his conviction of battery resulting in bodily injury, 

a Class A misdemeanor.1

 We affirm.

[2] The sole issue Thompson presents for our review is whether the State presented 

sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[3] On December 31, 2015, Thompson engaged in a verbal argument and physical 

altercation with his former girlfriend, A.L. Based upon this incident, 

Thompson was charged with domestic battery

2

and battery resulting in bodily 

injury, both as Class A misdemeanors. A bench trial was held on the charges, 

and Thompson was found guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury. He was 

sentenced to 365 days suspended to probation. This appeal followed.

[4] Thompson contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction

because A.L.’s testimony is incredibly dubious. When we review a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the 

credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2015), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to 

the verdict and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is 

substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable fact-finder 

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1), (c) (2014).

2 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a) (2014).

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could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment

will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[5] Yet, appellate courts may apply the incredible dubiosity rule to impinge upon a 

jury’s function to judge the credibility of a witness when confronted with 

inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated 

testimony of incredible dubiosity. Whatley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009), trans. denied. Application of this rule is rare and is limited to cases 

where a single witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is 

equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial 

evidence of guilt. Id. The standard to be applied for this rule is whether the 

testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable 

person could believe it. Fancher v. State, 918 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[6] At trial, A.L. testified that she did not remember why Thompson was at her 

apartment on December 31, 2015, but that she and Thompson engaged in a 

verbal argument and physical altercation in which Thompson hit her in the 

head and pulled her hair, causing her pain. She stated that bruising appeared 

within a few days. A.L. summarized the event, stating, “I just know that he, 

we, got into an altercation and he just, got to hitting me for, I don’t know why, 

but that’s all I remember.” Tr. pp. 37-38.

[7] The responding police officer testified that when she arrived, A.L. was at the 

door, and Thompson was located at the entrance to the apartment complex. 

The officer noticed that A.L.’s hair “was messed up” but saw no physical 

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injuries. Id. at 43. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the officer 

about the injuries A.L. reported to the officer the night of the incident. The 

officer responded that A.L. reported being pushed in the chest and pulled by the 

hair but that she did not mention being hit in the head.

[8] Under the umbrella of incredibly dubious testimony, Thompson asserts that 

A.L.’s testimony is improbable, uncorroborated and inconsistent. We address 

each contention in turn. First, Thompson claims that A.L.’s version of the 

events is “highly questionable” and “implausible” because, as he stated at trial,

A.L. had previously called the police and/or his parole officer to report him 

and that this time she was jealous about him possibly seeing another woman. 

Appellant’s Br. pp. 12-13. A.L. testified unequivocally at trial that Thompson 

hit her in the head and pulled her hair. This is merely an invitation by 

Thompson for this Court to invade the province of the trier of fact by 

reassessing witness credibility. It is within the factfinder’s province to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses. Brasher v. State, 746 N.E.2d 71 (Ind. 2001). In 

doing so, the trier of fact is entitled to determine which version of the incident 

to credit. Schmid v. State, 804 N.E.2d 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

We decline Thompson’s invitation.

[9] Thompson also argues that A.L.’s testimony is incredibly dubious because it is 

uncorroborated. A.L. testified unambiguously that Thompson hit her in the 

head and pulled her hair, thereby causing her pain. She further testified that she 

had bruises within a few days of the incident. Although the police officer 

testified that she saw no physical injuries, she did notice that A.L.’s hair was 

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messed up. “A conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony 

of a single witness or victim.” Baltimore v. State, 878 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2007), trans. denied. Again, this argument is nothing more than a request 

for this Court to re-evaluate witness credibility. The judge, as factfinder, heard 

the testimony and made her credibility determinations which we will not 

disturb. See Brasher, 746 N.E.2d 71.

[10] Finally, Thompson asserts that A.L.’s testimony is inconsistent with her 

statement to the police officer the night of the incident. A.L. testified that 

Thompson hit her in the head and pulled her hair. The police officer testified 

that A.L. reported to her only that Thompson had pushed A.L. in the chest and 

pulled her hair. The rule of incredible dubiosity concerns courtroom testimony, 

not statements made outside of trial or the courtroom. Reyburn v. State, 737 

N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); see also Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2006) (holding that discrepancies between victim’s statements to 

police and trial testimony go to weight of testimony and witness credibility and 

do not render testimony inherently contradictory). Thus, we cannot say that 

A.L.’s testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no 

reasonable person could believe it.

[11] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[12] Judgment affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.

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