FOURTH DIVISION

November 23, 2016

2016 IL App (1st) 153094

No. 1-15-3094

JODIE MITCHELL, ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.

)

v. ) 12 CH 34218

)

VILLAGE OF BARRINGTON, an Illinois )

municipal corporation, ) The Honorable

) David B. Atkins,

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices McBride and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff Jodie Mitchell was employed as a paramedic for defendant Village of 

Barrington. In 2007, Mitchell sustained an injury while on the job. The Village eventually

determined that Mitchell’s injury prevented her from being able to perform her duties and 

terminated her from that position. Mitchell later sought health care benefits under the Public 

Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/1 et seq. (West 2012)), and the Village 

denied that request, finding she was not covered under the Act. Mitchell subsequently submitted 

a formal application for benefits under the Act, and her request was again denied. Mitchell filed 

this lawsuit, seeking benefits under the Act. The Village filed a motion for summary judgment 

and the trial court granted that motion finding Mitchell’s claims were barred by the doctrine of 

laches. Mitchell now appeals the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment.
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¶ 2 Background

¶ 3 On January 21, 2007, Mitchell responded to a call-for-service at a residential home in 

Barrington by driving an ambulance. Upon exiting the ambulance, Mitchell slipped on a patch of 

ice and injured her back. Mitchell worked several of her following shift days, but then went on a 

medical leave of absence in April 2007.

¶ 4 The Village terminated Mitchell’s employment in January 2008, issuing her termination 

letter on January 29, 2008. In the letter, the Village explained that “you are at maximum medical 

improvement, and it appears there will be no significant change in your medical condition in the 

foreseeable future.” The letter went on to explain that because of Mitchell’s “ongoing inability to 

perform [her] job duties, the Village of Barrington Board of Trustees at its January 28, 2008 

Board Meeting acted on a motion authorizing and approving [her] separation from employment.”

¶ 5 Mitchell disagreed that there would be no significant change in her medical condition and 

that the Village “jumped the gun” in terminating her, believing that she would have been able to 

come back to work soon. 

¶ 6 After her termination, Mitchell sought health benefits under the Act (820 ILCS 320/1 et 

seq. (West 2012)). The Act provides for health benefits for firefighters who suffer catastrophic 

injuries in the line of duty. Section 10(a) of the Act states:

“An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, 

correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, 

on or after the effective date of this Act suffers a catastrophic 

injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium 

of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, 

the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the 
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injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority or 

until the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age 

of 25 if the child continues to be dependent for support or the child 

is a full-time or part-time student and is dependent for support.” 

820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2012).

¶ 7 To determine whether Mitchell is eligible for benefits under the Act, it is necessary to 

examine the history of Mitchell’s employment with the Village. Mitchell was hired by the 

Village on August 1, 1988 as a “paramedic.” At the time of that hire, Mitchell did not participate 

in any type of testing process administered by the Village’s Board of Fire and Police 

Commissioners as that Board did not exist in 1988. At the time Mitchell was hired, she already 

possessed a “Firefighter II” certification from a prior employer. Mitchell was not required to 

have that certification for her paramedic position with the Village. When hired, Mitchell worked 

a traditional 24-hour on, 48-hour off schedule.

¶ 8 In 1994, the Village decided to convert its paramedic positions to full-time firefighters.

Accordingly, the Village sent Mitchell and other paramedics a letter in March 1994 offering the 

paramedics an opportunity to become sworn full-time “Firefighters/Paramedics” who would be 

subject to appointments and promotions by the Village’s Board of Fire and Police 

Commissioners. Among other things, the letter clarified that any paramedic that declined the 

offer “will continue to be classified as a Civilian Paramedic under the Village’s Pay Plan with 

continuing participation in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund.” For personal reasons, 

Mitchell declined the Village’s offer to become a sworn firefighter/paramedic and thus remained

a civilian paramedic.
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¶ 9 In June 1999, the Village’s Manager sent Mitchell a letter explaining a potential staffing 

concern that had arisen due to the “two-in, two-out” respirator protection standards that had been 

promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor. The letter also confirmed that Mitchell preferred 

to remain a civilian paramedic instead of becoming a full-time firefighter. 

¶ 10 As a result of the Village’s need to comply with the new “two-in, two-out” regulations 

and address Mitchell’s desire to remain a paramedic with her same responsibilities and duties, 

the Village offered Mitchell the following arrangement:

“It has therefore been determined that you may continue as a 

paramedic working a 24/48 hour shift schedule and meet the 

requirements of the standard beyond September 1999 provided you 

are qualified to assist with fire suppression and related duties. The 

Village has determined that in order for you to do so the following 

requirements must be met:

- Maintain certification as Firefighter II.

- Successfully complete a program of annual training, 

defined by the Fire Chief to meet rescue/fire suppression team 

operations requirements. A portion of this training may be 

provided outside of the normal work schedule.

- Successfully demonstrate the ability to meet any standards 

required of a rescuer wearing self-contained breathing apparatus.

- Continue to meet all job requirements for that of paramedic 

including that of rescuing persons within burning structures where 

atmospheres are immediately dangerous to life and health.
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¶ 11 On August 11, 1999, then Fire-Chief Danley sent Mitchell a memo that further clarified 

that the types of standards that she would be expected to satisfy when assisting with fire 

suppression. The memo clarified that “[i]t is intended that you would not normally be assigned as 

part of the initial attack crew.” Only firefighter/paramedics would have been assigned to the 

“initial attack crew.” 

¶ 12 Mitchell ultimately agreed to the arrangement that had been proposed by Village 

Manager Irvin, which allowed her to remain a civilian paramedic, and Mitchell’s agreement was 

expressed by signing the bottom of the Village Manager’s June 1999 letter. 

¶ 13 After 1999, Mitchell remained a civilian paramedic with the Village’s Fire Department.

She was paid in accordance with the wage scales found in the collective bargaining agreements 

negotiated between the Village and International Association of Firefighters (Union). The Union 

was Mitchell’s exclusive bargaining representative for purposes of negotiating wages, hours, and 

other terms and conditions of employment. The Union negotiated hourly rates for Mitchell that 

consistently ranged from 7.5% to 9.6% less than the wages for full-time firefighter/paramedics.

In accordance with the lower pay, Mitchell’s duties were less than those of a full-time sworn 

firefighter. Mitchell presented no evidence that her job title with the Village was ever changed 

from civilian paramedic to full-time firefighter or sworn firefighter/paramedic. 

¶ 14 After her injury, Mitchell was represented by an attorney, Thomas Duda, for purposes of 

a workers’ compensation claim against the Village. On August 31, 2009, Duda wrote a letter to 

the Village’s Human Resources Coordinator, Julie Meyer, regarding “Jodie A. Mitchell v. 

Village of Barrington Fire Department, Demand for Payment of Health Premiums per the Act,

820 ILCS 320/10.” In that letter, Duda stated that he represented Mitchell in the workers’

compensation claim against the Village, and then demanded payment by the Village of 
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Mitchell’s past and future health insurance premiums pursuant to section 10 of the Act (820 

ILCS 320/10 (West 2008)).

¶ 15 In response, on November 3, 2009, the Village’s attorney wrote to Duda, denying the 

request for health care premiums pursuant to section 10 and stated: “Ms. Mitchell is not a 

firefighter covered by the Act, nor was she a sworn member of the Fire Department. Thus, by 

definition, she is not eligible for consideration for this benefit.” The letter went on to state: 

“Should you disagree with this position, you are welcome to submit any and all evidence you 

have that demonstrates Ms. Mitchell should be covered by the Act. If she is covered, the Village 

would of course review her application at that time and determine whether her injury qualifies 

her for benefits.” 

¶ 16 On March 24, 2011, Duda wrote to the Village to again demand Mitchell’s health care 

insurance premiums. Specifically, the letter states: “The undersigned is writing once again now

that the above-captioned claims have been settled to demand payment of health insurance 

premium benefits for Jodie A. Mitchell who suffered a catastrophic injury while responding to an 

actual emergency on January 21, 2007. Attached is a copy of the previous correspondence 

forwarded to your attention with no response. Once again we are demanding for compliance with 

statutory obligations by the Village. To date, no ‘decision’ has been communicated to your 

former employee or this office.”

¶ 17 On April 1, 2011, the Village’s attorney responded that the Village had responded to the 

demand for health premiums back in November 2009, wherein the attorney made it clear that he 

did not believe Mitchell was covered by the Act (820 ILCS 320/1 et seq. (West 2012)), because 

she was never a sworn employee. The letter went on to state: “We invited you and your client to 

submit a response if you disagreed. You never provided a response and, hence, we considered 
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the matter closed. We believe your attempt—over a year later—to revive this claim is untimely.

Without waiving our position on this matter, however, should you disagree and truly believe 

your client is entitled to benefits, your client is welcome to complete the enclosed application 

and submit any and all evidence you have that demonstrates: (i) Ms. Mitchell is covered by the 

Act; (ii) she is eligible for benefits, and (iii) this renewed demand is timely.”

¶ 18 On April 4, 2011, Beverly Zak, a representative from Duda’s law office, forwarded the 

application to Mitchell to fill out so that it could then be submitted to the Village.

¶ 19 On May 3, 2011, Duda wrote to Mitchell and stated that he had been advised that

Mitchell retained a new attorney, Stanley Jakala, to represent her case to recover health care 

premiums pursuant to section 10. The letter then advised that Duda would not be “opening a file 

and not undertaking to represent you in this regard in any fashion.”

¶ 20 On September 2, 2011, Mitchell’s new counsel, Jakala, wrote to the Village, advising that 

he was now representing Mitchell and that Mitchell was renewing her rights to healthcare 

benefits pursuant to the Act. The letter also enclosed Mitchell’s application for Public Safety 

Employee Benefits Act benefits, which she had signed and dated on May 21, 2011.

¶ 21 On April 26, 2012, Mitchell’s amended complaint states the Village’s attorney denied her

health insurance benefits based on her Public Safety Employee Benefits Act application.

¶ 22 On September 10, 2012, Mitchell filed her Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against 

the Village, seeking health insurance benefits under the Act. She filed a first amended complaint 

on April 12, 2013. In the amended complaint, Mitchell alleged that her duties as a licensed 

emergency technician/paramedic “were the same as the paramedic duties performed by sworn 

paramedics/firefighters who were employed by the Village.” The amended complaint also stated 

that Mitchell was “never a sworn firefighter” and that she had been a paramedic for the Village 
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for her entire career “without her being appointed to that position by the Fire and Police 

Commission of Barrington.” 

¶ 23 After the close of discovery, the Village filed a motion for summary judgment on April 7, 

2015. In its motion, the Village argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because: (1) 

Mitchell’s complaint was barred by the five-year statute of limitations, (2) Mitchell’s deposition 

testimony proved that she had not suffered a “catastrophic injury” within the meaning of the Act, 

(3) the undisputed record evidence showed that Mitchell was not a full-time sworn firefighter for 

eligibility purposes under the Act, and (4) Mitchell was guilty of laches. The motion also argued 

that the Village had a rational basis in declining health care benefits to Mitchell, thereby 

defeating Mitchell’s equal protection claim. Following briefing and oral arguments on the 

motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Village 

based on its finding that Mitchell’s claim was barred under the doctrine of laches and its finding 

that Mitchell failed to prove her constitutional equal protection claim. With respect to laches, the 

trial court’s order found that there was a 16-month delay between the time the Village denied 

Mitchell’s request for health care benefits pursuant to the Act and the time she reasserted her 

request for the health care benefits and filed a formal request. The court found that “[b]ecause 

Mitchell inexplicably waited significantly longer than a six month time period to even make an 

attempt to reassert her rights, the court finds that such a delay was unreasonable.” With respect to 

the equal protection claim, the court found that the Village offered several rational reasons why it 

treated civilian paramedics differently than full-time firefighters: “Barrington notes that Mitchell 

did not have the same responsibilities, and thus was not exposed to the same dangers, as those 

that receive PSEBA benefits in that Mitchell could not enter burning buildings as part of a first 

‘attack team’ and she generally did not perform engineer driving and pumping duties on a full-
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time basis.” In granting the Village’s motion for summary judgment on those two grounds, the 

trial court did not consider the other arguments the Village made in support of summary 

judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting summary 

judgment in favor of the Village.

¶ 24 Analysis

¶ 25 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 

file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc.,

224 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2007). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact, but 

to determine if one exists. Id. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court will 

construe the record strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

Summary judgment should not be allowed unless the moving party’s right to judgment is clear 

and free from doubt. Id. If the undisputed facts could lead reasonable observers to divergent 

inferences, or if there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be denied. Id.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Id. We may affirm a grant of summary 

judgment on any basis appearing in the record, “ ‘whether or not the [circuit] court relied on that 

basis or its reasoning was correct.’ ” Urban Sites of Chicago, LLC v. Crown Castle USA, 2012 IL 

App (1st) 111880, ¶ 21 (quoting Freedberg v. Ohio National Insurance Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 

110938, ¶ 26).

¶ 26 In its motion for summary judgment and on appeal, the Village argued that it was entitled 

to summary judgment because: (1) Mitchell’s complaint was barred by the five-year statute of 

limitations, (2) Mitchell’s deposition testimony proved that she had not suffered a “catastrophic 

injury” within the meaning of the Act, (3) the undisputed record evidence showed that Mitchell 
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was not a full-time sworn firefighter for eligibility purposes under the Act, and (4) Mitchell was 

guilty of laches. The motion also argued that the Village had a rational basis in declining health 

care benefits to Mitchell, thereby defeating Mitchell’s equal protection claim. The trial court 

found that Mitchell’s claim was barred under the doctrine of laches. On review, the appellate 

court reviews the judgment of the court and not the reasons given for that judgment (Nelson v. 

Aurora Equipment Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1044 (2009)), and we may affirm the trial court 

based on any reason found in the record. Urban Sites of Chicago, LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 

111880, ¶ 21.

¶ 27 On appeal, Mitchell argues that she is entitled to benefits under the Act because she 

should be considered a “firefighter” within the meaning of the Act. The Village argued in both 

the trial court and on appeal that Mitchell was not eligible for benefits under the Act because she 

was not a full-time firefighter or a sworn firefighter/paramedic. We will first consider the issue 

of Mitchell’s eligibility for benefits under the Act because the resolution of this issue may be

dispositive of all the issues in this case.

¶ 28 The Act provides enhanced healthcare benefits for full-time firefighters and their families 

if the firefighter is killed or suffers a catastrophic injury in the line of duty. Section 10(a) of the 

Act states:

“An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, 

correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, 

on or after the effective date of this Act suffers a catastrophic 

injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium 

of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, 

the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the 
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injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority or 

until the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age 

of 25 if the child continues to be dependent for support or the child 

is a full-time or part-time student and is dependent for support.” 

820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2012).

The legislature modified the Act to add that the definition of a firefighter included licensed

emergency medical technicians (EMTs) who are sworn members of a public fire department.

Specifically, section 3 of the Act provides: “For the purposes of this Act, the term ‘firefighter’

includes, without limitation, a licensed emergency medical technician (EMT) who is a sworn 

member of a public fire department.” 820 ILCS 320/3 (West 2012). We can determine whether 

Mitchell was eligible for health benefits under the Act by interpreting the language of the statute. 

¶ 29 The rule of statutory construction is to give effect to legislative intent. Solich v. George 

and Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc, 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). The 

language of the statute is the best indication of legislative intent. Id. If the language is clear and 

unambiguous, we give the terms their ordinary meaning and interpret the language without 

reference to extrinsic materials. Chestnut Corp. v. Pestine, Brinati, Gamer, Ltd., 281 Ill. App. 3d 

719, 723 (1996). The presence of surplusage should not be presumed in statutory construction 

and each word, clause, or sentence must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning.

Hirschfield v. Barrett, 40 Ill. 2d 224, 230 (1968); Stroger v. Regional Transportation Authority,

201 Ill. 2d 508, 524 (2002) (a statute must be construed as a whole and, if possible, in a manner 

such that no term is rendered meaningless or superfluous).

¶ 30 First, Mitchell presented no evidence that her job classification with the Village was as a 

full-time firefighter or sworn firefighter/paramedic. Instead, Mitchell argues that she should be 
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considered a firefighter within the meaning of the Act because she claims she performed duties

from time to time that were similar to that of a full-time firefighter. Initially, we note the Village 

offered Mitchell the opportunity to become a sworn firefighter/paramedic on at least two 

occasions and Mitchell insisted that she remain a civilian paramedic and was therefore paid at a 

pay rate lower than a full-time firefighter or sworn firefighter/paramedic.

¶ 31 The record demonstrates that Mitchell was trained to perform some limited support roles 

to firefighters, such as locating fire hydrants, laying and connecting the hose, carrying ladders, 

changing air packs, etc. Mitchell was allowed to go into a hazardous atmosphere to rescue one of 

the Village’s firefighters or paramedics, but she was not allowed to rescue a member of the 

public. Mitchell was never trained to be part of an initial attack crew, and only 

firefighters/paramedics would be assigned as part of an initial attack crew. Nonetheless, we note 

the record shows Mitchell’s job title and primary job duty was as a paramedic. Although 

Mitchell had a support role for firefighters, we see no merit to her claim she is a full-time

firefighter. Moreover, Mitchell’s argument that she should be considered a full-time firefighter

instead of a civilian paramedic because of her support role for firefighting fails as a matter of 

law. The argument has been considered by this court before and rejected in the context of 

pension benefits. McLear v. Village of Barrington, 392 Ill. App. 3d 664, 670 (2009). In McLear, 

the plaintiffs claimed that they should be classified as “firefighters” for purposes of transferring 

pension funds because they participated in firefighting activities, in addition to paramedic duties, 

while responding to emergency calls for the Village. McLear, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 670. In finding 

that the plaintiffs could not be considered “firefighters” for purposes of receiving additional 

pension funds, the court reasoned: 
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“[T]he sole authority to issue certificates of appointment must rest 

in the board of fire and police commissioners. Here, the plaintiffs 

were not appointed by the board of fire and police commissioners 

as firefighters until 1995, when they also underwent physical 

agility, polygraph, and psychological exams as part of the process 

of being appointed. See 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-6(h) (West 2006).” 

McLear, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 673.

As such, in McLear, the court recognized that a paramedic cannot be classified as a “firefighter,”

even if he or she participated in firefighter duties, until he or she is appointed a firefighter, i.e. 

becomes a sworn firefighter. Here, Mitchell was never appointed to become a sworn firefighter 

and, in fact, expressed her desire on numerous occasions not to assume those additional 

responsibilities or become a sworn member of the fire department. Although McLear concerned 

pension rights, we see no convincing reason why we should depart from the rationale in McLear.

As such, because Mitchell did not fall within the purview of the Act, she is not entitled to health 

insurance benefits under the Act.

¶ 32 Mitchell also argues that she is a “firefighter” as provided under the amended definition

to the Act, which defines firefighters as including licensed EMTs who are sworn members of a 

fire department. Mitchell argues that because the Act provides that a firefighter under the Act 

“includes, without limitation” “sworn” EMTs, it does not exclude “unsworn” paramedics and 

EMTs. We disagree. The amended statute provides: “For the purposes of this Act, the term 

‘firefighter’ includes, without limitation, a licensed emergency medical technician (EMT) who is 

a sworn member of a public fire department.” 820 ILCS 320/3 (West 2012).
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¶ 33 Mitchell concedes in her complaint and first amended complaint that she “was never a 

sworn firefighter.” The admissions in her pleadings constitute judicial admissions. Konstant 

Products, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 401 Ill. App. 3d 83, 86 (2010) (“A party’s 

admissions contained in an original verified pleading are judicial admissions ***.”); Knauerhaze 

v. Nelson, 361 Ill. App. 3d 538, 557 (2005) (a statement of fact that has been admitted in a 

pleading is a judicial admission and is binding on the party making it). Given the fact that 

Mitchell was never a sworn member of the fire department, she does not fall within the purview 

of the Act, which requires her to be a licensed EMT “who is a sworn member of a public fire 

department.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 320/3 (West 2012); Stroger, 201 Ill. 2d at 524 (a

statute must be construed as a whole and, if possible, in a manner such that no term is rendered 

meaningless or superfluous).

¶ 34 To read the statute as suggested by Mitchell—that both “sworn” and “unsworn” EMTs 

are included in the amended definition of a firefighter—would render the legislature’s use of the 

word “sworn” superfluous. If the legislature had intended to include both “sworn” and 

“unsworn” licensed EMTs in its definition of a firefighter, the legislature could have simply 

eliminated the word “sworn” when it drafted the amendment and simply defined firefighter as to 

include licensed EMTs. However, it did not do this. We cannot interpret a statute to render a 

term or phrase superfluous. Hirschfield v. Barrett, 40 Ill. 2d 224, 230 (1968) (the presence of 

surplusage should not be presumed in statutory construction and each word, clause or sentence 

must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning); Stroger, 201 Ill. 2d at 524 (a statute must 

be construed as a whole and, if possible, in a manner such that no term is rendered meaningless 

or superfluous). Based on principles of statutory construction, we reject Mitchell’s argument that 

the amended definition of a firefighter includes both sworn and unsworn EMTs.
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¶ 35 Further, “it is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the express mention 

of one thing in a statute excludes all other things not mentioned.” Requena v. Cook County 

Officers Electoral Board, 295 Ill. App. 3d 728, 733 (1998); see also People v. Fink, 94 Ill. App.

3d 816 (1981). In this case, the legislature amended the statute so that the term firefighter also 

included licensed EMTs who are sworn members of a public fire department. Under statutory 

construction jurisprudence, the inclusion of “sworn” licensed emergency medical technicians 

excludes other positions not mentioned, including “unsworn” licensed emergency medical 

technicians. Therefore, we reject Mitchell’s argument that unsworn civilian paramedics are 

considered firefighters under the amended definition of a firefighter contained in the Act. 

¶ 36 Finally, we find Mitchell’s equal protection clause claim also fails. Mitchell argues that,

in denying her claim for health insurance benefits under the Act, the Village is impermissibly 

treating civilian paramedics differently than full-time firefighters in violation of her equal 

protection rights. Whether the Act violates constitutional rights is a question of law, which we 

review de novo. Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 323 (1996). We interpret 

a statute as constitutional if “reasonably possible.” In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 79.

The Supreme Court of Illinois routinely recognizes that statutes have a strong presumption of 

constitutionality. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 486-87 (2005). To defeat this presumption 

the party challenging must “clearly establish” the alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 487.

¶ 37 The equal protection analysis is the same under either the Illinois or United States 

Constitution. People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992); U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. The equal protection clause “guarantees that similarly situated 

individuals will be treated in a similar fashion, unless the government can demonstrate an 

appropriate reason to treat them differently.” In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 116. This 
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guarantee allows the legislature to create distinctions between different groups of people as long 

as that distinction avoids “criteria wholly unrelated to the legislation’s purpose.” Id. The rational 

basis test, which the parties concede is that test to be applied here (Majid v. Retirement Board of 

Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2015 IL App (1st) 132182, ¶ 48 (“[t]he deferential rational 

basis test applies to a statutory classification that does not affect fundamental rights or create a 

suspect classification”)), “simply inquires whether the means employed by the statute to achieve 

the stated purpose of the legislation are rationally related to that goal.” People v. Breedlove, 213 

Ill. 2d 509, 518 (2004). The court will not make this rational basis inquiry, however, until the 

movant proves he or she is similarly situated to the comparison group. People v. Masterson,

2011 IL 110072, ¶ 25 (“As a threshold matter, though, it is axiomatic that an equal protection 

claim requires a showing that the individual raising it is similarly situated to the comparison 

group.”). If a movant cannot meet this preliminary threshold, the equal protection claim fails.

People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 51 (2007).

¶ 38 First, Mitchell’s equal protection claim fails because she has presented no evidence to 

show how full-time sworn firefighters are similarly situated to unsworn civilian paramedics like 

her. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d at 513 (if a movant cannot meet this preliminary threshold in showing 

that she is similarly situated to the comparison group, the equal protection claim fails).

¶ 39 Second, assuming Mitchell had properly presented her equal protection argument and 

shown that she is similarly situated to sworn firefighter/paramedics who receive enhanced health 

insurance benefits under the Act, we find that there is a rational basis for the Village to treat 

civilian paramedics like Mitchell differently than full-time firefighters and sworn 

firefighter/paramedics for purposes of providing health care benefits. Majid, 2015 IL App (1st) 

132182, ¶ 48 (“The deferential rational basis test applies to a statutory classification that does not 
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affect fundamental rights or create a suspect classification.”). First, the State legislature has 

enacted laws that require employers to bear the increased costs of enhanced insurance coverage 

for full-time firefighters and sworn EMTs. The legislature did not require employers, such as the 

Village, to bear increased costs to provide enhanced insurance for civilian paramedics.

Furthermore, we note that full-time firefighters and sworn firefighters/paramedics are required to 

perform more tasks—and specifically dangerous, life-threatening tasks—that civilian paramedics 

are not required to perform. In other words, civilian paramedics are not required to perform the 

same dangerous tasks as sworn firefighter/paramedics and full-time firefighters. The employers 

of firefighters and firefighter/paramedics should be able to provide those employees with 

enhanced healthcare benefits as an incentive for them to perform their dangerous jobs without 

the employer also incurring the additional financial burden of providing the enhanced healthcare 

coverage to other employees with less dangerous jobs like civilian paramedics. Sworn 

firefighter/paramedics and full-time firefighters should be able to perform the dangerous work 

required of them with the knowledge that if they suffer a catastrophic injury that prevents them 

from returning to work, they will receive enhanced insurance coverage. “If a court can 

reasonably conceive of circumstances that justify distinguishing the class benefitted by the 

statute from the class outside its scope, the classification is constitutional.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Majid, 2015 IL App (1st) 132182, ¶ 48. Thus, because the Village had a rational 

basis to treat full-time firefighters and sworn firefighters/paramedics differently than civilian 

paramedics, Mitchell’s equal protection claim fails. Based on our finding that Mitchell was not 

eligible for benefits under the Act and our resolution of the equal protection argument, it is not 

necessary to address the other arguments raised by the parties.

¶ 40 Conclusion
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¶ 41 For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment in 

favor of the Village. 

¶ 42 Affirmed.