* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40171

Summary Calendar

TIMMIE PARKS

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GOVERNOR RICK PERRY; CHRISTINA MELTON CRAIN, Executive Director

of the TBCJ in Dallas, TX; BRAD LIVINGSTON, Executive Director of TDCJ in

Austin, TX; NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, TDCJ in Huntsville, TX

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:06-CV-255

Before STEWART, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Timmie Parks, Texas prisoner # 697966, appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

We review a § 1915A dismissal de novo. Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275

(5th Cir. 1998).

Parks argues that several Texas statutes governing the earning of,

revocation of, and purpose of good-time credits have created a liberty and

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 10, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-40171

2

property interestin accrued good-time credits. In particular, he cites TEX.GOV’T

CODE ANN. §§ 498.003(b) and (d), 498.004, 498.0042, 498.0045, and TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 4(a). Texas Government Code § 498.003 provides

for the accrual of good-conduct time, and sections 498.004, 498.0042, and

498.0045 provide for the forfeiture of good-conduct time for various reasons.

Section 498.003(a) specifically states that good-conduct time is a privilege, not

a right, and applies only to eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision.

Parks cites no authority and makes no persuasive argument for why these

statutes should be held to create a liberty or property interest in good-conduct

time. We hold that these statutes do not create a liberty or property interest in

good-time credits. See Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707, 708, 711-12 (5th Cir.1991)

(holding that there is no constitutional expectancy of parole in Texas). Parks’s

essential claim is that because he is not eligible for mandatory supervision and

his parole eligibility date is set by statute due to his § 3g conviction, his goodtime credits have been rendered of no value to him. Parks’s good-time credits

are valuable because they will be considered by the Parole Board when he

becomes eligible for parole. See Espinosa v. Texas, 29 S.W.3d 257, 261 (Tex. Ct.

App.2000).

Parks argues that Texas Government Code section 498.003 is

unconstitutional as applied to him. He argues that this statute creates a right

to earn good time. He argues that if he has a property or liberty interest in his

accrued good time, then it is unconstitutional to apply section 498.003’s

limitation on the use of the credits to eligibility for parole and mandatory

supervision to him because he is not eligible for mandatory supervision and his

parole eligibility date is set by statute. Section 498.003(a) specifically states that

good-conduct time is a privilege, not a right. We have already held that this

statute does not create a liberty or property interest in good-conduct time, and

so its application to Parks deprives him of no constitutional right.
No. 07-40171

3

Parks argues that his accrued good-time credits were property taken

withoutjust compensation in violation ofthe Takings Clause. Parks’s argument

is without merit based on the lack of a property interest.

Parks argues that the distinction made by Texas law between prisoners

who are eligible for mandatory supervision and those who are not eligible by

virtue of being convicted of violent crimes violates equal protection. Parks also

argues that the statutes creating that distinction are illegal Bills of Attainder.

Parks raised the equal protection claim for the first time in his motion to alter

or amend the judgment. Parks did not raise the Bill of Attainder argument in

the district court. We do not consider these arguments. See Leverette v.

Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that we will not

consider an issue that has not been raised at all in the district court absent

extraordinary circumstances and will not consider an issue raised for the first

time in a motion for reconsideration); Trust Co. Bank v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 950

F.2d 1144, 1152 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that claim raised for the first time in a

FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion was waived on appeal).

Parks has not shown that he has been denied a state-created property or

liberty interest in good-time credits or that the Texas laws governing good-time

credits result in a constitutional violation on any other basis. The district court

did not err in dismissing the complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a

claim. See Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 275. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. Parks’s motions for the appointment of counsel and the

certification of a class action are DENIED.

Parks is informed that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), this court’s

affirmance of the district court’s dismissal as frivolous and for failure to state a

claim of his § 1983 complaint counts as a strike. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103

F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that affirmance of a district court dismissal

as frivolous counts as a single strike). Parks is cautioned that once he

accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil
No. 07-40171

4

action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless

he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).