Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A04-1602-CR-295 | November 10, 2016 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Yvette M. LaPlante 

Keating & LaPlante, LLP 

Evansville, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Chandra K. Hein 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William C. Williams, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

November 10, 2016 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

82A04-1602-CR-295 

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court 

The Honorable Leslie C. Shively, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

82D01-1308-FB-1047 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 

 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A04-1602-CR-295 | November 10, 2016 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary 

[1] William C. Williams was charged with two counts of Class B felony operating a 

vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in his blood causing death. 

One count was based on having marijuana in his blood, and the other count 

was based on having methamphetamine in his blood. The jury convicted 

Williams of both counts. Williams now appeals his methamphetamine-related 

conviction only. Specifically, Williams contends that the State failed to 

establish a chain of custody for his blood sample so as to allow the admission of 

the results showing that his blood sample tested positive for methamphetamine. 

In order to establish the chain of custody for Williams’ blood sample, the State 

relied heavily on Exhibit 65, which the trial court admitted under the businessrecords exception to the hearsay rule. Williams, however, claims that the trial 

court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 65 because the State did not 

properly authenticate it. 

[2] We agree that the State did not properly authenticate Exhibit 65 either by a 

certification that complied with Indiana Evidence Rule 902(11) or by a records 

custodian who testified that the records were made at or near the time by—or 

from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge and that they were 

kept by the lab in the ordinary course of business. Without Exhibit 65, the State 

cannot establish the chain of custody for the sample of Williams’ blood that 

tested positive for methamphetamine. We therefore reverse Williams’ 

conviction based on having methamphetamine in his blood. 
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Facts and Procedural History 

[3] Around 8:00 p.m. on August 6, 2013, Williams was driving his motorcycle with 

his girlfriend, Nancy Parsons, as his passenger. They had been at a funeral 

home in Evansville for Williams’ sister’s viewing and were on their way to go 

line dancing when Williams ran into the back of a van that was stopped at an 

intersection. Nancy was ejected from the motorcycle and later died from her 

injuries. Williams was transported to the hospital, where he consented to a 

blood draw. The Indiana State Department of Toxicology tested Williams’ 

blood, and it tested positive for THC. The Department of Toxicology sent a 

sample of Williams’ blood to NMS Labs in Pennsylvania for additional testing. 

NMS Labs issued a toxicology report showing that Williams’ blood sample 

tested positive for methamphetamine.1

 See Ex. 65. 

[4] The State charged Williams with Count I: Class B felony operating a vehicle 

with a Schedule I or II controlled substance (marijuana) in his blood causing 

death and Count II: Class B felony operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II 

controlled substance (methamphetamine) in his blood causing death.2

 At trial, 

Williams testified that he did not know how methamphetamine could have 

been in his blood and objected to the admission of State’s Exhibit 65, which is a 

192-page “Litigation Support Package” from NMS Labs containing, among 

 

1

 This testing also showed the presence of amphetamine, but only methamphetamine is relevant to this case. 

2

 The State also charged Williams with operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death, but the trial court 

granted Williams’ motion for a directed verdict on this count after the State’s case in chief. 
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other documents, the toxicology report that shows his blood sample tested 

positive for methamphetamine and the chain of custody for his blood sample. 

Tr. p. 233-247, 307. Although all 192 pages were admitted into evidence, only 

two pages—the actual toxicology report—were submitted to the jury.3

 

Williams, however, admitted smoking marijuana two days before the accident 

and did not object to the toxicology report from the Department of Toxicology 

showing that his blood tested positive for THC. Id. at 132, 300; Ex. 63. The 

jury convicted Williams of both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to 

eight years with two years suspended to probation on each count, to be served 

concurrently. 

[5] Williams now appeals his methamphetamine-related conviction only.4

Discussion and Decision 

[6] Williams contends that the State failed to establish a chain of custody for his 

blood sample “so as to allow the admission of the results of tests showing it 

contained methamphetamine.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. Regarding the chain of 

custody for fungible evidence, including blood samples, the State bears the 

burden of giving reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an 

undisturbed condition as it passed through various hands. Troxell v. State, 778 

 

3

 All 192 pages are labeled Exhibit 65(B), while the two pages are labeled Exhibit 65(A). 

4

 Williams says he is challenging both convictions; however, Exhibit 65 concerns only methamphetamine 

(Count II). Williams does not challenge Exhibit 63, which concerns only marijuana (Count I). 
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N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. 2002). The State need not establish a perfect chain of 

custody, and once the State strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the 

evidence, any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. 

Id. 

[7] In order to establish the chain of custody for Williams’ blood sample, the State 

relied heavily on Exhibit 65, see Appellee’s Br. p. 16, which the trial court 

admitted under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule, see Tr. p. 

233-47. Williams argues, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting Exhibit 65 because the State did not properly authenticate it. 

[8] Indiana Evidence Rule 902(11) allows the self-authentication of business 

records that meet the requirements of Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6), the 

business-records exception to the hearsay rule, as shown by a certification under 

oath from a business records custodian or another qualified person. Evidence 

Rule 902(11) provides: 

The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they 

require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be 

admitted: 

* * * * * 

(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted 

Activity. Unless the source of information or the circumstances 

of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness, the original or a 

copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 

803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification under oath of the custodian or 

another qualified person. 
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(Emphasis added). The certification should set forth the signer’s qualifications 

and be notarized in order to avoid any issues concerning the identity of the 

person who signed it. See 13B Robert L. Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice, Courtroom 

Handbook on Indiana Evidence, Rule 902 (2015-16 ed.). 

[9] Thus, for a document to be self-authenticated under Evidence Rule 902(11), the 

proponent must show that the requirements of the business-records exception to 

the hearsay rule are met. Those requirements are: 

(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from 

information transmitted by—someone with knowledge; 

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted 

activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, 

whether or not for profit; 

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 

another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 

902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and 

(E) neither the source of information nor the method or 

circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 

Ind. Evidence Rule 803(6).

[10] Here, the Certification of Authenticity for Exhibit 65 submitted by the State 

provides in relevant part: 
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[11] The Certification of Authenticity is deficient because it contains only a notary 

signature as “witness.” There is no signature by a records custodian or another 

qualified person,5

 and the certification does not set forth the qualifications of the 

purported records custodian or other qualified person. Moreover, the 

certification does not show that the records meet the requirements of Evidence 

Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), that is, that they were made at or near the time by—or from 

information transmitted by—someone with knowledge and that they were 

made and kept by the lab in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the 

Certification of Authenticity is insufficient to authenticate Exhibit 65 pursuant 

to Evidence Rule 902(11). 

 

5

 In addition, the Certification of Authenticity was not made under the penalties of perjury. See Speybroeck v. 

State, 875 N.E.2d 813, 820 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), reh’g denied; In re Paternity of H.R.M., 864 N.E.2d 442, 

448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
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[12] Alternatively, the State argues that it properly authenticated Exhibit 65 by the 

testimony of NMS Labs analyst Jennifer Turri. To admit business records this 

way, the proponent of the exhibit may call a witness who has a functional 

understanding of the record-keeping process of the business with respect to the 

specific entry, transaction, or declaration contained in the document. Rolland v. 

State, 851 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The sponsor of an exhibit 

need not have personally made it, filed it, or have firsthand knowledge of the 

transaction represented by it; rather, the sponsor need only show that the 

exhibit was part of certain records kept in the routine course of business and 

placed in the records by one who was authorized to do so and who had 

personal knowledge of the transaction represented at the time of entry. Embrey 

v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1260, 1264-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); see also Sandleben v. 

State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“[A] sponsor must still testify 

about how the record was made, who filed it, and that the person who filed it 

was both authorized to do so and had personal knowledge of the transaction.”), 

trans. denied. 

[13] Here, Turri—an analyst at NMS Labs, not a records custodian—testified that 

she was the analyst who tested Williams’ blood, that she came up with a 

finding, and that it is common to log findings in a report. She then identified 

Williams’ toxicology report, which comprises only two pages of the 192-page 

Exhibit 65. Turri explained that she did not prepare Williams’ toxicology 

report. Rather, toxicology reports are computer generated after results are 

submitted through NMS’s laboratory information system. Tr. p. 233; see also id. 
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at 234 (“How it works is after we generate our results . . ., it’s all electronic. . . . 

I don’t physically make this report. But this is how the company does it.”). 

[14] Turri’s testimony, however, only partially explains how the two-page 

toxicology report was created (that is, by computer) and does not show that the 

record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—

someone with knowledge and that it was kept by the lab in the ordinary course 

of business. See Evid. R. 803(6) (“all these conditions [must be] shown by the 

testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness . . . .”). In addition, 

Turri’s testimony does not address the other 190 pages of Exhibit 65, which 

include the critical chain-of-custody evidence for Williams’ blood sample. 

Turri’s testimony, therefore, does not authenticate Exhibit 65. Without Exhibit 

65, the State cannot establish the chain of custody for Williams’ blood sample. 

[15] Anticipating our conclusion that the State failed to establish the chain of 

custody for Williams’ blood sample, the State “requests that [we] affirm 

Williams’ conviction on count I, causing death when operating a motor vehicle 

with” marijuana in his blood. Appellee’s Br. p. 20 n.9. Accordingly, we 

reverse Williams’ conviction on Count II, which is based on the 

methamphetamine evidence, and affirm Williams’ conviction on Count I, 

which is based on the unchallenged marijuana evidence.6

 

6

 In light of this result, we do not address Williams’ argument that he could be sentenced on only Count I or 

Count II because “only one accident and one death was involved.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16. 
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[16] Reversed in part. 

Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.