This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0084

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Frank Henry Stanhope,

Appellant.

Filed November 21, 2016

Affirmed

Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-14-13370

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and 

Rodenberg, Judge. 
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree controlled-substance crime, 

arguing that the district court erred by denying his presentence request for plea withdrawal. 

We affirm. 

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Frank Henry Stanhope with firstdegree controlled-substance crime. On December 17, 2014, Stanhope appeared before the 

district court and rejected a plea offer from the state. On May 4, 2015, Stanhope once again 

rejected a plea offer from the state. On July 20, Stanhope rejected another plea offer from 

the state. 

Stanhope requested a pretrial hearing seeking to suppress the evidence against him. 

The district court granted the request, held an evidentiary hearing, and denied Stanhope’s

motion to suppress. 

Stanhope ultimately pleaded guilty to first-degree possession of methamphetamine. 

Stanhope submitted a plea petition in support of his guilty plea. The section of the petition 

describing the “substance of the agreement” between Stanhope and the prosecutor states: 

“Straight plea to Judge, set sentencing off, order PSI, Defense to argue for Downward 

Departure.” Stanhope confirmed he understood that his attorney and the state could “make 

argument[s] as to what the sentence should be,” that there was no guarantee of a downward 

departure and no one had promised otherwise, and that by pleading guilty, he was giving 

up his “right to challenge the admissibility of evidence that the prosecution has.” 
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Prior to sentencing, Stanhope retained a new attorney and moved to withdraw his 

guilty plea. He argued that he “should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to correct a 

manifest injustice,” that “[i]t would be fair and just to allow [him] to withdraw his guilty 

plea,” and that his “former defense counsel’s actions and inactions in this case amount to 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” He submitted an affidavit in support of his motion, 

which included an e-mail from his first attorney. In the e-mail, the attorney advised 

Stanhope: “I believe you have a strong case at being eligible for a departure.” 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied Stanhope’s motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea, denied his motion for a downward sentencing departure, and sentenced him 

to serve 120 months in prison. This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

Stanhope contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for plea 

withdrawal. “A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a valid guilty plea.” 

State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). Guilty pleas may be withdrawn only 

if one of two standards is met. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05 (setting forth the manifestinjustice and fair-and-just standards for plea withdrawal). 

The district court must allow plea withdrawal at any time “upon a timely motion 

and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest 

injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea 

is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “[T]he manifest injustice 

standard . . . requires withdrawal where a plea is invalid.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646. To 

be valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Perkins v. State, 559 
4

N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was 

invalid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that 

this court reviews de novo. Id. 

The district court may allow plea withdrawal before sentencing “if it is fair and just 

to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. “The court must give due consideration to the 

reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting 

of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the 

defendant’s plea.” Id. A defendant has the burden of advancing reasons to support 

withdrawal. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989). The state has the burden 

of proving prejudice caused by withdrawal. State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 527 

(Minn. 2003). 

Although it is a lower burden, the fair-and-just standard “does not allow a defendant 

to withdraw a guilty plea for simply any reason.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646 (quotation 

omitted). Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “for any reason or without good 

reason” would “undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.” Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 

266. This court reviews a district court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare 

case.” Id. 

In denying Stanhope’s plea-withdrawal motion, the district court reasoned that 

withdrawal was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice because Stanhope’s plea was 

voluntary and intelligent. The district court also reasoned that Stanhope failed to meet his 

burden under the fair-and-just standard because “there was nothing objectively in the 
5

record suggesting that [Stanhope] failed to comprehend the nature, purpose and 

consequences of the plea.” 

On appeal, Stanhope argues that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent, and 

therefore invalid. He further argues that because his plea was invalid, he meets both the 

manifest-injustice and fair-and-just standards for plea withdrawal, stating that “[i]f the 

arguments put forth . . . amount to a manifest injustice, they certainly meet the less stringent 

‘fair and just’ standard.” Because Stanhope’s sole argument for plea withdrawal under 

both standards is that his plea was invalid, we focus our analysis on that issue.

I.

Stanhope contends that “he was tricked into pleading guilty with an illusory idea 

that he had a chance at probation and could appeal the Rasmussen ruling.” He argues that 

his lawyer assured him that he could argue for a downward dispositional departure and 

appeal the district court’s pretrial evidentiary ruling “based upon a premise, an illusory 

promise that a probationary sentence and an appeal were possible when they were not, 

effectively rendering Stanhope’s guilty plea . . . invalid.” We address each aspect of the 

alleged illusory promise in turn.

Illusory Promise: Possibility of a Probationary Sentence

Stanhope argues that the state and his first lawyer “coerced [his] guilty plea with an 

illusory possibility of sentence outcome.” Stanhope’s argument that the state coerced his 

guilty plea with an illusory sentencing promise is unavailing because the record shows that 

the state did not make Stanhope any promises regarding sentencing. In fact, Stanhope 

rejected the state’s plea offers and pleaded guilty to the charge without the benefit of a
6

sentencing agreement. Stanhope’s attempt to categorize the circumstances here as a 

“promise” by the state that he could argue for a downward dispositional departure is not 

persuasive because he does not cite authority showing that he needed the state’s approval 

to argue for a dispositional departure. Nor does he allege that he was misled to believe that 

he needed the state’s approval to argue for a dispositional departure. 

As to the alleged illusory sentencing promise by Stanhope’s first lawyer, Stanhope 

argues that a “defense counsel’s promise to his or her client that they can argue for a 

departure is also premised on a promise that the defendant’s argument could be successful.” 

Stanhope further argues that if there is not a reasonable chance of receiving the departure, 

then the promise to argue for a departure is illusory and the defendant’s plea is involuntary.

As support for his position, Stanhope asserts that the e-mail advice from his first 

lawyer, which advised that he had “a strong case at being eligible for a departure,” was 

unreasonable. But Stanhope does not claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, 

which would have invited consideration of the reasonableness of his attorney’s 

performance. Cf. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (stating that when 

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a claimant “must demonstrate that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that a reasonable 

probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors” 

(quotation omitted)). 

In the absence of such a claim, there is no basis for this court to second guess the 

reasonableness of the attorney’s sentencing advice. Nonetheless, we note that the 

attorney’s e-mail explained his opinion regarding the likelihood of a departure and the 
7

reasons for his opinion, including the sentencing judge’s “reputation of handing down 

tough sentences after trial, but being very fair in cases that resolve prior to trial.” And as 

the district court noted, the attorney “could not have known that Mr. Stanhope would admit 

to [the probation officer conducting the PSI] that he used methamphetamine the night 

before the meeting, and that he would deny wanting to live a sober lifestyle and viewed 

treatment as ‘a waste of time.’” 

In sum, the record does not support Stanhope’s argument that the state and his first 

lawyer “coerced [his] guilty plea with an illusory possibility of a sentence outcome.” 

Illusory Promise: Ability to Appeal Pretrial Evidentiary Ruling

Stanhope also argues that his first attorney improperly induced his plea with an 

illusory promise “that regardless of whether he received a departure, [he] still had the 

ability to appeal a ruled-on evidentiary issue after pleading guilty.” He argues that he was 

“given the idea that if he pleaded guilty, he could still challenge the [district court’s pretrial 

evidentiary] ruling” and that his lawyer told him “that he could appeal [the ruling], and he 

should enter a straight plea and argue for a departure.” Stanhope asserts that the alleged 

misinformation regarding his ability to appeal the pretrial ruling renders his plea 

unintelligent because he did not understand the direct consequences of his plea. 

“A guilty plea by a counseled defendant has traditionally operated . . . as a waiver 

of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 
8

N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). Thus, a defendant generally is not allowed to challenge 

the district court’s pretrial rulings on appeal after pleading guilty.

1

 

If Stanhope’s attorney advised him that he could challenge the district court’s 

pretrial ruling despite pleading guilty, that advice might call into question the intelligence 

of Stanhope’s plea. Cf. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96-97 (explaining that for a plea to be valid 

the defendant must understand the “plea’s direct consequences”). However, Stanhope’s 

affidavit in support of plea withdrawal does not assert that his first attorney advised him 

that he could plead guilty and nonetheless challenge the pretrial ruling on appeal. And the 

e-mail that Stanhope submitted from his first attorney does not provide that advice. 

The only support for Stanhope’s assertion that his first attorney misinformed him 

regarding his ability to appeal the pretrial ruling is his second attorney’s on-the-record 

assertion that “Mr. Stanhope was flat out told that he could appeal that issue.” That 

unsworn, hearsay assertion is contradicted by Stanhope’s guilty plea petition, which states:

My attorney has told me and I understand . . . . [t]hat whether 

or not I have had [a pretrial hearing] I will not be able to object 

tomorrow or any other time to the evidence that the prosecutor 

has.

It is also contradicted by the following acknowledgment at the time of his plea:

STANHOPE’S ATTORNEY: You also understand that at this 

time you would give up your right, although we actually had 

the pretrial hearing yesterday afternoon, specifically by 

entering a guilty plea you give up your right to challenge the 

 

1 A defendant may preserve the right to appeal a dispositive pretrial ruling by pleading not 

guilty and stipulating to the prosecution’s case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. See 

State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 2016) (“Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, 

replaced Lothenbach as the method for preserving a dispositive pretrial issue for appellate 

review in a criminal case.”). 
9

admissibility of the evidence that the prosecution has. Do you 

understand that? 

STANHOPE: Yes. 

In sum, the record does not contain evidence showing that Stanhope’s first attorney 

misinformed him regarding his ability to appeal the pretrial ruling. Thus, there is no basis 

for this court to conclude that his plea was unintelligent on this ground. 

Conclusion

Lastly, we address Stanhope’s argument that his “claim of manifest injustice is not 

simply waived by his acknowledgements at the time he pleaded guilty, but requires an 

analysis of what the parties reasonably understood the nature of the plea agreement to be.” 

This argument misses the mark for several reasons. First and foremost, there was not a 

plea agreement in this case. Second, the state does not argue that Stanhope’s statements at 

the time of his plea constitute a waiver. And third, Stanhope’s statements in support of his 

plea are properly considered when determining whether the plea was valid. 

Appellate courts routinely rely on statements made by defendants at the time of their 

guilty pleas, both on the record and in their plea petitions, when assessing the validity of 

the pleas. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (relying on an on-the-record exchange between 

defendant and his attorney to conclude that defendant’s plea was voluntary); State v. Ecker, 

524 N.W.2d 712, 718-19 (Minn. 1994) (relying on “[t]he record of the guilty plea” to reject 

a claim that a plea was not voluntary); State v. Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d 523, 526-27 

(Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997) (relying on the plea petition and 

testimony at the plea hearing to conclude that defendant’s plea was intelligent). Moreover, 

when a defendant makes inconsistent statements regarding the validity of his guilty plea, 
10

“credibility determinations are crucial, [and] a reviewing court will give deference to the 

primary observations and trustworthiness assessments made by the district court.” AvilesAlvarez, 561 N.W.2d at 527. 

When Stanhope tendered his guilty plea, he acknowledged that there were no 

guarantees or promises regarding sentencing. 

THE COURT: Okay. And so I think your attorney has 

indicated that he would be requesting at the time of sentencing 

that I would depart from the guidelines and either give less or 

do a dispositional departure, which means probation instead of 

prison. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: But you also understand there’s been no 

guarantee —

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: — no one’s made any promises of that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Because it entirely depends on what is 

in the pre-sentence investigation and whether or not I have

substantial and compelling reasons to depart.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. I understand. 

In denying Stanhope’s plea-withdrawal request, the district court noted that 

Stanhope’s statements in support of his plea were inconsistent with his statements in 

support of plea withdrawal. The district court noted that on one hand, “[m]ultiple times, 

Mr. Stanhope stated that he understood” that “there were no guarantees or promises 

[regarding sentencing] and that the PSI would give the Court the information needed to 

either depart or not.” The district court also noted that on the other hand “Mr. Stanhope 

claimed that he was induced to plead guilty by the promise of a reduced sentence.” In the 

context of these inconsistent statements, the district court’s finding that Stanhope’s plea 

was voluntary encompasses a credibility determination to which we defer. 
11

In conclusion, Stanhope has not met his burden to show that his guilty plea was 

involuntary or unintelligent and therefore invalid. The district court therefore did not err 

by refusing to allow plea withdrawal under the manifest-injustice standard. Although 

Stanhope does not argue that he is entitled to relief under the fair-and-just standard if his 

manifest-injustice claim fails, we nonetheless note that on this record, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion by denying plea withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard. 

Affirmed.