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15-3802-cv 

Kaskel v. Compagnone 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 22nd day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, 

 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

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PETER S. KASKEL, M.D.,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 15-3802-cv 

 

TANYA COMPAGNONE, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: JOHN R. WILLIAMS, ESQ., New Haven, 

CT. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: CARMEL A. MOTHERWAY, Assistant 

Attorney General, for George Jepsen, 

Attorney General for the State of 

Connecticut, Hartford, CT. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Connecticut (Underhill, J.). 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Peter Kaskel appeals from the district court’s October 30, 2015 

judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Tanya 

Compagnone. On October 5, 2011, a pediatrician and mandated reporter, see Conn. Gen. 

Stat. § 17a-101(b), filed a Child Sexual Abuse report with the Department of Children 

and Families, containing allegations of child abuse by Plaintiff against his two young 

children. Officer Compagnone, a Detective with the Connecticut State Police, 

investigated these allegations and subsequently submitted a warrant application for 

Plaintiff’s arrest on three counts of risk of injury to a minor. Plaintiff was arrested and 

prosecuted, but all charges were nolled and eventually dismissed. On January 6, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Detective Compagnone, in her individual capacity, 

alleging malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We assume the 

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the 

issues on appeal. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bryant v. 

Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). “A grant of summary judgment will be 

affirmed only if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 

F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). We view all ambiguities and 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bryant, 923 

F.2d at 982. 

To prove a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the 

defendant initiated or continued a criminal proceeding against him; (2) the proceeding 

terminated in his favor; (3) the defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the 

defendant acted with malice. Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2009) 

(per curiam). At issue here is the third prong: whether Detective Compagnone acted 

without probable cause. Probable cause exists “if the totality of the circumstances, as 

viewed by a reasonable and prudent police officer in light of his training and experience, 

would lead that police officer to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being 

committed.” United States v. Moreno, 897 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other 

grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Generally, a neutral magistrate’s finding of probable cause in issuing a warrant creates a 

presumption that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable 

cause existed. See Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991). Thus, 

“a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on less than probable cause faces a 

heavy burden.” Id. 
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In so arguing, a plaintiff must show that the officer “knowingly and intentionally, 

or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement in his affidavit or omitted 

material information, and that such false or omitted information was necessary to the 

finding of probable cause.” Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We evaluate such a claim by “put[ting] aside 

allegedly false material, supply[ing] any omitted information, and then determin[ing] 

whether the contents of the ‘corrected affidavit’ would have supported a finding of 

probable cause.” Id. If probable cause remains, no constitutional violation occurred. Id. 

At summary judgment, Plaintiff alleged that Detective Compagnone’s affidavit in 

support of the warrant contained a number of false or misleading statements. Upon 

striking those statements from the affidavit, the district court found that probable cause 

nonetheless existed, based on: (1) the pediatrician’s physical examination of the children; 

and (2) allegations by Simi Kaskel, the children’s mother and Plaintiff’s then-wife, that 

Plaintiff masturbated in the children’s presence. Plaintiff challenges both bases on appeal. 

1. The Pediatrician’s Report 

In finding sufficient probable cause, the district court placed great significance on 

the pediatrician’s report, which the court characterized as “report[ing] physical 

examination of the children consistent with child abuse.” J. App’x at 91. Plaintiff takes 

issue with this representation, arguing that at no point did either the pediatrician’s report 

or Detective Compagnone’s affidavit expressly link the children’s medical conditions to 

possible child abuse. Absent such a link, Plaintiff maintains, the pediatrician’s report 

cannot support a finding of probable cause. 

This argument fails. The circumstances of an arrest must be evaluated in light of 

the training and experience of the investigating agent. See Moreno, 897 F.2d at 31; see 

also McColley v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In performing 

the ‘corrected affidavit’ analysis, we examine all of the information the officers 

possessed when they applied for the arrest warrant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Here, Detective Compagnone had extensive training and experience in child-abuse 

investigations. In an affidavit prepared for this litigation, Detective Compagnone stated 

that, based on her training and experience, the children’s medical conditions held 

particular significance: she knew them to be physical indicators of child sexual abuse. 

There is therefore no genuine dispute that the pediatrician’s report, when viewed through 

the lens of Detective Compagnone’s background, reasonably led Detective Compagnone 

to believe that a criminal offense had been or was being committed. See Moreno, 897 

F.2d at 31. 
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2. Simi Kaskel’s Allegations 

Plaintiff next argues that Simi Kaskel’s allegations cannot support a finding of 

probable cause because she lacked credibility as a witness. Relatedly, Plaintiff faults 

Detective Compagnone for failing to investigate the situation further. 

“While probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion[] of wrongdoing, its 

focus is on probabilities, not hard certainties.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 

2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, an arresting officer need not 

“explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an 

arrest.” Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 635 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Indeed, “[o]nce an officer has probable cause, he or she is neither required nor 

allowed to continue investigating, sifting and weighing information.” Panetta v. Crowley, 

460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In sum, probable 

cause does not demand any showing that a good-faith belief be correct or more likely true 

than false.” Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Detective Compagnone’s affidavit in support of the arrest warrant disclosed 

that the Kaskels were in the midst of a divorce proceeding, and that Simi Kaskel had 

sought a restraining order to keep Plaintiff out of the home. The affidavit also indicated 

that one of Simi Kaskel’s allegations—that Plaintiff had been seen watching child 

pornography—was flatly contradicted by Plaintiff’s second wife, Sheryl Marinone. Thus, 

as the district court observed, the affidavit “fairly presented” Simi Kaskel as someone 

motivated to exaggerate. J. App’x at 100. Moreover, Simi Kaskel’s allegations were 

corroborated by the children’s physical symptoms. In light of these circumstances, we 

conclude that there is no genuine dispute that a reasonable officer would have believed 

probable cause existed and that, as such, no further investigation was necessary. See 

Panetta, 460 F.3d at 398. Accordingly, we reject Plaintiff’s arguments. 
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3. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no genuine dispute that 

Detective Compagnone’s “corrected” affidavit supports a finding of probable cause, and 

that summary judgment was properly granted in Detective Compagnone’s favor. We have 

considered Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit.1

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 

 

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 Both Detective Compagnone and the district court interpreted Plaintiff’s complaint as stating a claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. To the extent Plaintiff raised such a claim, he has abandoned it 

on appeal. See United States v. Quiroz, 22 F.3d 489, 490 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“It is well 

established that an argument not raised on appeal is deemed abandoned.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).