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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

JUAN CARLOS OCASIO, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 13-cv-0921 (TSC)

)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this case brought under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), the court 

previously granted in part and denied in part Defendant U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) 

first motion for summary judgment against pro se Plaintiff Juan Carlos Ocasio. (ECF No. 24). 

Before the court is Defendant’s second motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 45). Upon 

consideration of the motion, supplemental declaration, and Vaughn index, and Plaintiff’s 

opposition, the court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed a FOIA request with the DOJ Office of Inspector 

General (“DOJ-OIG”). (ECF No. 4 at 3). The request sought several documents relating to the 

investigation of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) complaint Plaintiff had filed in March 

1994. (Id.; Compl. ¶¶ 5–6). In that complaint, Ocasio alleged that an individual—referenced 

herein as “C.G.”—had illegally impersonated a federal officer and violated the Stolen Valor Act

by falsely claiming the receipt of military honors. (Compl. ¶¶ 5–9; ECF No. 10 at 2–5). On 

November 19, 2012, DOJ-OIG denied the FOIA request, stating that the documents had been 

destroyed, and DOJ-OIG subsequently denied Ocasio’s appeal on May 29, 2013, reaffirming that 
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the documents had been destroyed and noting that had they not been, they would be categorically 

exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). (ECF No. 4 at 11, 17–18). 

After Plaintiff filed his Complaint in June 2013, a DOJ-OIG FOIA Officer again searched 

for the requested files and found that they had not been destroyed, as had previously been 

reported to Plaintiff. (Waller Decl. ¶ 10 (ECF No. 8-1); Waller Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4 (ECF No. 18-

2)). The FOIA officer reviewed all 296 pages of the responsive file and “determined that the

entire file constitute[d] law enforcement records of an individual that are exempt from disclosure 

under FOIA exemption 7(C),” and that “[t]he exemption applie[d] to the entire file.” (Waller 

Supp. Decl. ¶ 5). 

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment in August 2013 (ECF 

No. 8), which the court denied in part and granted in part in its September 2014 Opinion. (ECF 

No. 22). The court found that DOJ had conducted an adequate search (id. at 11), that the 

requested records are law enforcement records, and that C.G. has a privacy interest in 

nondisclosure of the records (id. at 12–14). Moreover, the court held that while there is no 

public interest under FOIA in identifying those who falsely claim military honors or who 

impersonate officers, or in disclosing documents that may be used to cast doubt on the credibility 

of witnesses in past federal proceedings, there is a public interest in knowing “what the 

government is up to” (id. at 15–16). Specifically, the court held:

There is therefore some public interest in “what the government is up to” in this 

case with respect to the substantive law enforcement policy DOJ employed in 

handling its investigation: how DOJ investigated an individual accused of 

making arrests under the guise of federal legal authority, and why DOJ failed to 

prosecute such an individual. Contrary to DOJ’s assertion, the investigation file 

might reveal something about the agency’s own conduct.

(Id. at 18). The court declined to rule on the strength of this asserted public interest, 

stating that while it could not “conclude that there is no public interest in the disclosure of 
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the records[,] . . . Ocasio may have not alleged enough to require disclosure[.]” (Id. at 

17–18). 

Finally, the court denied summary judgment as to the adequacy of Defendant’s 

balancing of the privacy interest and the public interest in disclosure. (Id. at 23). While 

the court noted that it may be appropriate to apply Exemption 7(c) categorically—i.e., to 

withhold the documents in their entirety because they are of a type such that the privacy 

interest always outweighs the public interest in disclosure—the court determined that 

Defendant did not sufficiently explain why applying this exemption categorically was 

appropriate in this case. The court further found that, if Defendant did not apply the 

exemption categorically, then it also failed to show through a Vaughn index whether it 

appropriately determined, record-by-record, which documents should be withheld. The 

court therefore ordered Defendant to produce a Vaughn index explaining the reasoning 

for each withholding. (Id. at 23–24).

Defendant filed its Vaughn index on November 14, 2014 (ECF No. 28), and 

moved for summary judgment on October 14, 2015 (ECF No. 45). It also provided 

Plaintiff with fifty-four pages of responsive documents, “all of which Plaintiff had 

provided to the OIG” originally. (Waller Second Suppl. Decl. ¶ 3 (ECF No. 45-2)). 

Defendant states that the “remaining documents within the investigative file are all 

inextricably intertwined with [] witness statements, affidavits, and memoranda,” and 

“redaction or segregation of these documents is [] not possible because even with 

thorough redactions, a reader would be able to ascertain that each of these documents 

concern the investigation of criminal charges against C.G.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6–7). 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 

F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, 

the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Adickes v. 

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). A fact is material if “a dispute over it might affect 

the outcome of a suit under governing law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ 

do not affect the summary judgment determination.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue 

is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The party seeking summary 

judgment “bears the heavy burden of establishing that the merits of his case are so clear that

expedited action is justified.” Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc., v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987). 

FOIA cases are “typically and appropriately” decided on motions for summary judgment. 

Gold Anti-Trust Action Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 762 F. Supp. 

2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2011). Upon an agency’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds 

that it has fully discharged its FOIA obligations, all underlying facts and inferences are analyzed 

in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester; only after an agency proves that it has fully 

discharged its FOIA obligations is summary judgment appropriate. Moore v. Aspin, 916 F. 

Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1996). 
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In cases concerning the applicability of exemptions, summary judgment may be based 

solely on information provided in the agency’s supporting declarations. See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 

257 F.3d 828, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2001). “If an agency’s affidavit describes the justifications for 

withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld 

logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the 

record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the 

basis of the affidavit alone.” ACLU, 628 F.3d at 619. “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for 

invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 

However, a motion for summary judgment should be granted in favor of the FOIA requester 

where “an agency seeks to protect material which, even on the agency’s version of the facts, falls 

outside the proffered exemption.” Coldiron v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 310 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 

(D.D.C. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Petroleum Info. Corp. v. Dep’t of 

Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 

III. DISCUSSION

In considering Defendant’s second motion for summary judgment, the court is again 

tasked with assessing the applicability of the law enforcement FOIA exemption, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(C) (“Exemption 7(C)”), to the facts of this case. Under this exemption, FOIA “does 

not apply” to “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” to the extent that 

their disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). As noted above, the court previously held that the requested 

files are law enforcement records, that C.G. has a privacy interest in nondisclosure, and that there 
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is at least a minimal public interest in disclosing how DOJ investigated the accused individual. 

The court must now determine if Defendant properly balanced these private and public interests 

when it withheld the responsive records.

Under Exemption 7(C), the agency (and the court) must balance the privacy and public 

interests to determine whether disclosure of the responsive records would result in an 

“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). If this balancing 

“characteristically tips in one direction,” then the records may be categorically exempt from 

disclosure. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 746 F.3d 1082, 1095 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014) (“CREW”) (emphasis omitted). Such a categorical withholding of records is 

appropriate when “a third party’s request for law enforcement records or information about a 

private citizen” is balanced against a request that “seeks no ‘official information’ about a 

Government agency, but merely records that the Government happens to be storing.” DOJ v. 

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989). Moreover, if the asserted 

public interest “is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in 

the performance of their duties, the requester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order 

to obtain disclosure. Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by 

a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Nat’l 

Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004). 

In its previous Opinion, the court held that “DOJ [did] not clearly explain into what 

‘genus’ the disputed records fall such that they characteristically tip in favor of non-disclosure[,] 

. . . [and] [t]he Court [could not] assess on the record before it whether DOJ actually engaged in 

a balancing test to determine what portions of the file were exempt under 7(C).” (ECF No. 22 at 

21). Defendant now argues that it has properly applied Exemption 7(C) to all of the responsive 
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documents because “it will ‘always [be] true that the damage to a private citizen’s privacy 

interest’ from disclosure of any responsive document in the category ‘outweighs the FOIA-based 

public value of such disclosure’” when the public interest is based on unsupported allegations of 

impropriety. (Def. Br. at 12 (ECF No. 45-1) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 779)). 

After a careful review of the Waller Declaration and Plaintiff’s description of the public interest 

here, the court agrees that in this case, Defendant has properly applied Exemption 7(C). 

As already determined, the target of the requested FBI investigation records, C.G., has a 

strong privacy interest in nondisclosure of the records, which Plaintiff does not dispute. (ECF 

No. 22 at 14); see also SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (“There is little question that disclosing the identity of targets 

of law-enforcement investigations can subject those identified to embarrassment and potentially 

more serious reputational harm.”). Defendant’s position is that there is no possible way to 

segregate the responsive records “because each page within the investigative report related to 

Plaintiff’s unproven allegations of criminal conduct against C.G.” (Waller Second Supp. Decl. ¶ 

5). 

Plaintiff’s asserted public interest in disclosure stems from his allegation of “government 

impropriety.” (ECF No. 52 at 7). While Plaintiff explains at length why he believes that C.G. is 

guilty of several criminal offenses, it bears reiterating that the court’s role here is not to 

determine the credibility or veracity of these allegations, or pass judgment on the appropriateness 

of the decision to not prosecute C.G. Instead, the court must only evaluate whether the public 

interest here may overcome C.G.’s privacy interest in order to require disclosure. As noted 

above, Plaintiff was obligated to “produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable 

person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Boyd v. Crim. Div. of 
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DOJ, 475 F.3d 381, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174). Plaintiff did not 

produce such evidence. Moreover, in light of the lack of evidence of impropriety, the court 

agrees with Defendant’s arguments distinguishing the facts here with the significantly higher

profile investigations in CREW, involving the investigation of former House Majority Leader 

Tom Delay, and Kimberlin v. DOJ, 139 F.3d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1998), involving the improper 

release of information concerning the Vice President. Unlike those cases, in which a record-byrecord approach was deemed necessary, here there is little likelihood that the documents would

“shed light on how the agencies are performing their statutory duties.” CREW, 746 F.3d at 1096. 

Therefore, the court now finds that Plaintiff has not established a sufficient public interest 

to outweigh C.G.’s strong privacy interest, and furthermore that, given these investigative files 

involved a low-level government employee and there is no public interest, the responsive records 

are of a type that may be categorically exempt under Exemption 7(C). The Defendant’s second 

motion for summary judgment is therefore granted as to the appropriateness of its categorical 

withholding of responsive records.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Date: December 1, 2016

Tanya S. Chutkan 

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge