[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Snavely, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7829.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-7829

GEAUGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. SNAVELY.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Snavely, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-7829.] 

(No. 2016-0854—Submitted July 13, 2016—Decided November 22, 2016.) 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Twoyear suspension with final 18 months stayed on conditions. 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2015-034. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Carly L. Snavely of Chagrin Falls, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0081569, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2007. 

Relator, Geauga County Bar Association, charged her with violating the Rules of 

Professional Conduct based on her actions in two client matters and for her own 

illegal activity. The parties entered into a consent-to-discipline agreement, in which 
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they stipulate that Snavely engaged in the charged misconduct and recommend that 

we suspend her for two years, with 18 months stayed. The Board of Professional 

Conduct determined that the agreement conforms to the requirements of Gov.Bar 

R. V(16) and recommends that we adopt it in its entirety. 

{¶ 2} Upon review of the record, we accept the board’s recommendation 

and adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 3} The parties stipulate that after graduating from law school, Snavely 

worked as a public defender in Florida from 2007 to 2008 and then as an assistant 

prosecuting attorney in the Geauga County prosecutor’s office from 2008 to 2011. 

Since then, she has worked as a solo practitioner. 

{¶ 4} In February 2013, William Russell hired Snavely to defend him in a 

criminal case and later paid her a retainer pursuant to a written fee agreement. At 

that time, however, Snavely did not maintain a client trust account or know how to 

properly use one. Nor did she have professional liability insurance or obtain written 

notification from Russell acknowledging that he was aware that she lacked 

malpractice insurance. In March 2013, Alex Fisher retained her to defend him in a 

criminal case, but Snavely also failed to notify him that she lacked malpractice 

insurance. Fisher’s mother paid Snavely a portion of an agreed-upon flat fee, but 

Snavely failed to deposit the money into a client trust account or inform her client 

that he might be entitled to a refund of all or a part of the flat fee if she did not 

complete the representation. 

{¶ 5} In June 2013, Snavely was involved in an incident that led to the filing 

of criminal drug charges against her. In July 2013, she was admitted to an inpatient 

treatment program for a heroin addiction, and after completing the inpatient 

program, she underwent several weeks of intensive outpatient treatment. In 

November 2013, she pled guilty to a fifth-degree felony for heroin possession 

relating to the June incident. The trial judge granted intervention in lieu of 
January Term, 2016 

3

conviction and placed her on community-control sanctions for two years. Nearly 

one year early, in December 2014, the judge found that she had complied with the 

conditions of her community control and dismissed the case. 

{¶ 6} In the meantime, Russell filed a grievance against Snavely, claiming 

that because of her drug addiction and treatment, he had been forced to retain other 

counsel to represent him. Snavely later acknowledged that although both Russell 

and Fisher ultimately obtained substitute counsel, she was unaware of—and 

therefore failed to comply with—the appropriate procedures for withdrawing from 

representation of a client. 

{¶ 7} The parties stipulate that Snavely has not used illegal drugs since 

January 11, 2014, that she is in full compliance with her contract with the Ohio 

Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), and that she has actively participated in 

recovery programs. Additionally, after becoming clean, she made restitution to 

Russell in the amount of $3,500 and to Fisher’s mother in the amount of $2,650. 

{¶ 8} The parties also stipulate that although Snavely has no memory of 

doing so, she forged Russell’s signature on a legal-malpractice-waiver form. As a 

result, Snavely was charged with forgery in May 2015. She ultimately pled guilty 

to a first-degree misdemeanor for attempted forgery and served three days in jail. 

{¶ 9} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulate that Snavely violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client on a separate written 

form that the lawyer does not maintain professional liability insurance and requiring 

the client to sign the form), 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a flat fee 

without simultaneously advising the client in writing that the client may be entitled 

to a refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer does not complete the 

representation), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interestbearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(c) 

(requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into a client trust 

account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses 
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incurred), 1.15(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly distribute all portions of client 

funds that are held in trust), 1.16(a) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from 

representation when the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs 

the lawyer’s ability to represent the client), 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from 

committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or 

trustworthiness), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that 

adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 

{¶ 10} We agree that Snavely engaged in this misconduct. 

Sanction 

{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 

aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. See 

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A). 

Aggravating and mitigating factors

{¶ 12} As an aggravating factor, the parties stipulate that Snavely acted with 

a selfish or dishonest motive in falsifying Russell’s name on a legal document. See 

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2). 

{¶ 13} In mitigation, the parties agree that Snavely has no prior discipline, 

made timely and good-faith restitution, and is well respected in the local legal and 

drug-recovery communities. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (3), and (5). In addition, 

the parties agree that Snavely has served other penalties for her misconduct—

namely, community control for the drug-possession charge and the jail sentence for 

her attempted-forgery conviction—and that she has made other attempts at interim 

rehabilitation, including hiring a legal-ethics expert to provide her one-on-one 

training in the areas of fee agreements, client trust accounts, and withdrawing from 

client matters. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(6) and (8). Indeed, the parties stipulate 

that with the assistance of her counsel, she is compliant with the dictates of 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c), 1.5, 1.15, and 1.16. 
January Term, 2016 

5

{¶ 14} Finally, the parties stipulate that Snavely’s addiction qualifies as a 

mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). A chemical-dependency 

counselor diagnosed Snavely with a severe substance-abuse disorder; the disorder 

contributed to her professional misconduct; she has successfully completed 

inpatient, outpatient, and aftercare treatment and continues to be monitored by 

OLAP; and her counselor concludes that she is currently capable of engaging in the 

competent and ethical practice of law. 

Applicable precedent

{¶ 15} To support their recommended sanction, the parties cite a series of 

cases in which we imposed two-year suspensions with 18 months conditionally 

stayed on attorneys who engaged in misconduct while impaired by an addiction but 

who ultimately demonstrated a sustained period of sobriety after treatment. 

{¶ 16} For example, in Toledo Bar Assn. v. Shousher, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 

2007-Ohio-611, 861 N.E.2d 536, the attorney accepted retainers and then failed to 

perform the work in numerous cases, failed to deposit the retainers into his client 

trust account, and failed to notify his clients that he lacked malpractice insurance. 

In addition, he pled guilty to forgery and identity theft for completing credit-card 

applications in his ex-wife’s name without her authorization, and he admitted to 

writing a series of dishonored checks. In mitigation, he had no prior discipline, 

made full restitution to each former client, and cooperated in the disciplinary 

process. In addition, he participated in various treatment and recovery programs 

for addictions to alcohol and prescription drugs and had remained sober for over 

two years. We suspended him for two years but stayed 18 months on conditions, 

including that he maintain compliance with his OLAP contract. Id. at ¶ 36. See 

also Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 2011-Ohio-2672, 950 

N.E.2d 171 (attorney suspended for two years with 18 months stayed for, among 

other things, accepting over $14,000 from clients to represent them but failing to 

perform the work and instead spending their money on his cocaine addiction; 
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mitigating factors included full restitution to each client, a cooperative attitude in 

the disciplinary process, successful completion of inpatient and outpatient 

treatment programs for his chemical dependency, and a one-and-a-half-year period 

of sobriety); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006-Ohio2423, 847 N.E.2d 435 (attorney suspended for two years with 18 months stayed on 

conditions for similar misconduct emanating from a diagnosed cocaine and alcohol 

dependency; mitigating factors included successful completion of treatment 

programs and a sustained period of sobriety). 

{¶ 17} The board reviewed the cases cited by the parties and agreed with 

their recommended sanction. We also agree that Shousher, Hoppel, and 

Washington are relevant precedents and that a similar sanction is therefore 

warranted in this case. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 18} For the reasons explained above, we accept the parties’ consent-todiscipline agreement. Carly L. Snavely is hereby suspended from the practice of 

law for two years, with the final 18 months stayed on the conditions that she 

continue to comply with her OLAP contract and refrain from engaging in any 

further misconduct. If Snavely fails to comply with these conditions, the stay will 

be lifted and she will serve the entire two-year suspension. It is further ordered that 

as a condition of reinstatement, she must demonstrate compliance with her OLAP 

contract. Costs are taxed to Snavely. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 

concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J. 

_________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 19} Respectfully, I dissent. 
January Term, 2016 

7

{¶ 20} When imposing discipline on members of the bar, our responsibility 

is to protect the public from attorneys who are unable to demonstrate the ability to 

engage in the practice of law with the highest moral and ethical standards and to 

display the highest degree of professionalism in their personal life and professional 

engagements. 

{¶ 21} Here, the parties stipulated that Snavely’s heroin addiction 

contributed to her misconduct, including forging her client’s signature on a notice 

that she lacked malpractice insurance, and that she has not used drugs since January 

11, 2014. 

{¶ 22} But when a Geauga County Grand Jury indicted her for two counts 

of forgery, it alleged that those offenses occurred between June 1, 2014, and July 

31, 2014—after she had attained sobriety. And when the trial court accepted her 

guilty plea to attempted forgery (as the lesser included offense of the forgery 

charged in the indictment), it granted the state’s motion to amend that count to 

reflect that the offense occurred “on or between February 25, 2013 – July 31, 2014 

instead of June 1, 2014 – July 31, 2014.” (Emphasis sic.) 

{¶ 23} Based on Snavely’s admission of guilt and the dates referenced in 

the amended indictment, it is possible that she committed this offense after she last 

used drugs in January 2014; if so, her addiction did not contribute to or mitigate her 

misconduct, and therefore, a more severe sanction may be appropriate. 

{¶ 24} The stipulations do not address whether Snavely cooperated with the 

disciplinary counsel’s investigation. But when relator filed the complaint against 

her, it alleged that Snavely had “stated that, on February 25, 2013, [she] provided 

Mr. Russell with a written notice stating that [she] does not carry professional 

liability insurance,” that she had “stated that Mr. Russell signed the written notice 

in [Snavely’s] presence,” and that she had “provided relator a photocopy of the 

written notice.” These statements are inconsistent with her current claim to have 

“no active, working memory of the forgery.” And in her answer, Snavely only 
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denied the allegations against her for want of knowledge, similarly claiming, for 

example, that she “cannot recall stating that Mr. Russell signed the written notice 

in [her] presence.” 

{¶ 25} Thus, the scant facts in the record before us—including the 

allegations in the indictment and in the complaint—suggest that the attempted 

forgery occurred after Snavely had stopped using heroin in January 2014 and after

the investigation into her misconduct commenced. Relator received Russell’s 

grievance in April 2014, and it was during the investigation that followed that 

Snavely apparently presented the forged document to relator as authentic. 

{¶ 26} In each of the cases cited by the parties as supporting the 

recommended suspension of two years with 18 months stayed—Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 2011-Ohio-2672, 950 N.E.2d 171; Toledo 

Bar Assn. v. Shousher, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 2007-Ohio-611, 861 N.E.2d 536; and 

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006-Ohio-2423, 847 

N.E.2d 435—the respective attorneys committed the misconduct before attaining 

sobriety. Hoppel at ¶ 11; Shousher at ¶ 30-31; Washington at ¶ 3, 7. As we 

explained in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Toohig, 133 Ohio St.3d 548, 2012-

Ohio-5202, 979 N.E.2d 332, an addiction is not a contributing cause to misconduct 

or a significant mitigating factor when “much of the charged misconduct occurred 

after [the] period of sobriety commenced.” Id. at ¶ 50, 53-54. Further, in Hoppel, 

Shouster, and Washington, the attorneys had taken responsibility for their 

misconduct and fully cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings. Hoppel at ¶ 10; 

Shousher at ¶ 32; Washington at ¶ 6. None claimed to lack memory of committing 

the misconduct. 

{¶ 27} In contrast, the stipulations here do not establish that Snavely’s 

misconduct occurred before she attained sobriety or that there was a causal 

connection between her addiction and the attempted forgery offense, nor do the 

stipulations reflect that Snavely gave full and free disclosure to the Board of 
January Term, 2016 

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Professional Conduct or had a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 

proceedings, which is significant because she has claimed not to remember 

committing the attempted forgery offense and appears to have made untrue 

statements to relator during the investigation. 

{¶ 28} Accordingly, I would remand this matter to the board to determine 

whether Snavely committed the attempted forgery offense before attaining sobriety 

and whether she cooperated with the disciplinary investigation and to consider 

whether a more severe sanction is warranted. 

 KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Michael T. Judy Co., L.P.A., and Michael T. Judy, for relator. 

Dunson Law, L.L.C., and Joseph P. Dunson, for respondent. 

_________________