IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward Chaney, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2736 C.D. 2015

: Argued: October 17, 2016

Fairmount Park Real Estate :

Corporation and HCFD Real Estate :

Corporation (Amended by Stipulation :

and Order to "HCFD Auctioneering :

Corporation") and Terry Crockett :

(Dismissed by Agreement) and :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

State Real Estate Commission, as :

Administrator of the Real Estate :

Recovery Fund :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: December 1, 2016

Edward Chaney (Chaney) appeals from the October 2015 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying Chaney’s 

Petition for Order Directing Payment from the Real Estate Recovery Fund (Fund)1

(Petition), and the trial court’s December 2015 order denying Chaney’s motion for

 

1

The Real Estate Recovery Fund (Fund), established by the Act of February 19, 1980, 

P.L. 15, as amended, 63 P.S. §§455.101-455.902, provides recovery for any aggrieved person 

who is the victim of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit in a real estate transaction involving an 

individual licensed as a real estate broker in Pennsylvania. Like other such funds in 

Pennsylvania protecting the public from professional fraud or misconduct, it is funded by the 

licensing renewal fees paid by each licensee. D.J. Malatesta Assocs., Inc. v. Century 21 Reuter,

Inc., 739 A.2d 1076 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
2

post-trial relief. Concluding that Chaney’s appeal from the trial court’s October 

2015 order denying the Petition is untimely, and Chaney’s improperly filed posttrial motion did not stay the appeal period, we quash Chaney’s appeal.

I. Background

Terry Crockett (Crockett) owned the property located at 6742 Old 

York Road in Philadelphia (property), which was improved with a three-story 

building containing a store on the first floor and apartments on the upper floors. 

See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 56a, 72a, 566a.

In June 2006, Crockett entered into a listing agreement (listing 

agreement) with Fairmount Park Real Estate Corporation (Fairmount) to sell the 

property as is through either a traditional real estate process or by auction

conducted by HCFD Auctioneering Corporation (HCFD). See R.R. at 32a-44a. 

Joel Harden (Harden) owns Fairmount and HCFD.2

Fairmount listed the property for “[Fairmount]/Pre-Sheriff Sale 

Auction” on July 1, 2006. R.R. 53a, 73a. Chaney obtained the listing and the 

auction terms and conditions a few days before the auction. See Stipulations of 

Chaney and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Real Estate Commission 

(Commission) at ¶10, R.R. at 519a; see also R.R. at 471a-75a (Stipulations). 

 

2

Joel Harden is Fairmount’s President, chairman and chief executive officer (CEO). See

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 14a, 53a, 525a-29a. He also held Real Estate Broker License No. 

RM419623 from October 22, 2004 until May 31, 2012. See R.R. at 518a, 524a.

In addition, Harden is HCFD’s President and CEO. See R.R. at 518a, 535a-39a. Harden 

is also HCFD’s record auctioneer, holding Auctioneer License No. AU005302 from January 11, 

2006 through February 28, 2015. See R.R. at 518a, 523a.
3

Fairmount’s auction listing brochure represented that 100% financing was 

available, and Diversified Mortgage Services Corporation (Diversified)3could 

offer mortgage “[p]rograms for every credit situation.” R.R. at 58a.

Robert Kist (Kist) conducted the July 1, 2006 auction, at the 

commencement of which he read the sale’s terms and conditions to the audience.

Stipulations at ¶ 11, R.R. at 519a. Chaney purchased the property that day for 

$172,000, and, after reviewing the property’s conditions of sale (conditions) with 

Harden, he signed the conditions and made a $1,000 down payment. See

Stipulations at ¶12, R.R. at 519a; R.R. at 51a, 483a-84a, 486a-90a, 493a. Pursuant 

to the conditions, Chaney agreed to pay 10% of the sale price or $5,000 within five

calendar days, and then pay the balance due by August 1, 2006. See R.R. at 45a51a. The conditions specified that deposits were non-refundable upon default. See

R.R. at 48a, 498a-99a.

After the auction, Chaney informed Harden he needed a mortgage, 

and Harden applied to Diversified for a mortgage for Chaney. See R.R. at 491a93a. Chaney worked with Harden and another individual to obtain a mortgage 

with Diversified. R.R. at 490a, 494a. While his mortgage application was 

pending, on September 5, 2006, Chaney paid $17,000 to HCFD in accordance with 

 

3 Diversified held First Mortgage Broker License No. 4104 and Second Mortgage Broker 

License No. 1582, valid from February 2, 1999 to July 1, 2008. See R.R. at 557a. Harden is 

Diversified’s owner, President and CEO. See Br. of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Real 

Estate Commission as Administrator of the Real Estate Recovery Fund at 5; see also R.R. at 58a, 

550a-57a.
4

the conditions. See Stipulations at ¶14, R.R. at 519a; see also R.R. at 74a, 488a89a, 496a, 498a, 500a-01a.

Sometime later in September 2006, Chaney was notified that he 

would not receive a Diversified mortgage, and he was unsuccessful in obtaining a 

mortgage for the property on his own. See Stipulations at ¶15, R.R. at 519a; see

also R.R. at 491a, 494a-96a, 498a. As a result, Chaney’s purchase of the property 

was cancelled and his $18,000 was forfeited. See Stipulations at ¶¶15-16, R.R. at 

519a; see also R.R. at 502a.

In 2008, Chaney filed an amended complaint against Crockett, 

Fairmount and HCFD (collectively, defendants) seeking: rescission of the 

conditions and a refund of his $18,000 deposit plus interest and costs based on the 

defendants’ acts and omissions (Count I); judgment against Fairmount and HCFD 

for three times Chaney’s actual damages plus interest, costs and counsel fees for 

violating the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL)4

(Count II); judgment against Fairmount and HCFD for $18,000, plus interest, costs 

and counsel fees for violating the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act5

(Act) (Count III); and judgment against the defendants for $18,000, plus punitive 

damages, interest and costs, based on the defendants’ fraud (Count IV). The 

defendants filed answers with new matter.

 

4 Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, as amended, 73 P.S. §§201-1-201-9.3.

5 Act of February 19, 1980, P.L. 15, as amended, 63 P.S. §§455.101-455.902.
5

The trial court held a hearing in November 2009, at which Chaney 

and Harden testified. The trial court subsequently ordered Fairmount and HCFD, 

jointly and severally, to pay Chaney $64,382.71. Judgment was entered against 

Fairmount and HCFD on March 9, 2010.6 Because Fairmount and HCFD did not 

pay the judgment, Chaney attempted to execute on it, but he was unsuccessful.7

In February 2011, Chaney filed with the trial court his Petition for the 

Fund to satisfy the judgment on behalf of Fairmount and HCFD pursuant to 

Section 803 of the Act.

8

 

6

Fairmount and HCFD appealed to the Superior Court, which dismissed their appeal.

7 Chaney also made a claim to Merchant’s Bonding Company for payment of Harden’s 

$5,000 auction bond, which paid Chaney $5,000 from Harden’s auction bond.

8

Section 803 states, as pertinent:

(a) When any aggrieved person obtains a final judgment in any 

court of competent jurisdiction against any person licensed under 

this [A]ct, upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit with 

reference to any transaction for which a license or registration 

certificate is required under this [A]ct ... the aggrieved person 

may, upon termination of all proceedings, including reviews and 

appeals, file an application in the court in which the judgment was 

entered for an order directing payment out of the [Fund] of the 

amount unpaid upon the judgment.

(b) The aggrieved person shall be required to show:

(1) That he is not a spouse of the debtor, or the personal 

representative of said spouse.

(2) That he has obtained a final judgment as set out in this section.

(3) That all reasonable personal acts, rights of discovery and such 

other remedies at law and in equity as exist have been exhausted in 

the collection thereof.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

The Commission filed an answer and new matter opposing Chaney’s 

Petition. It averred that Chaney did not establish that the Act regulated the 

underlying transaction, or that he was entitled to the requested damages. The trial 

court denied the Petition based solely on the Petition and the answer and new 

matter.

Chaney filed a motion for reconsideration; however, the trial court did 

not act on the motion prior to the expiration of the appeal period. Chaney also

appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the matter to this Court. The 

trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) in which it stated it 

properly denied the Petition because it only contained bald allegations of 

compliance without attached proof that Chaney met all of Section 803’s

prerequisites.

In June 2012, this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded 

because the trial court erred in denying the Petition without affording Chaney an

opportunity to develop a record. Chaney v. Fairmount Park Real Estate Corp. (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 2388 C.D. 2011, filed June 25, 2012), 2012 WL 8704658 (Chaney I)

(unreported). This Court directed the trial court to issue a rule to show cause and 

 

(continued...)

(4) That he is making said application no more than one year after 

the termination of the proceedings, including reviews and appeals 

in connection with the judgment.

63 P.S. §455.803(a), (b).
7

“proceed as outlined in Pa. R.C.P. No. 206.7(c).” Chaney I, slip op. at 16, 2012 

WL 8704658 at *7. Rule 206.7(c) provides:

If an answer is filed raising disputed issues of material 

fact, the petitioner may take depositions on those issues, 

or such other discovery as the court allows, within the 

time set forth in the order of the court. If the petitioner 

does not do so, the petition shall be decided on [the] 

petition and answer and all averments of fact responsive 

to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer shall be 

deemed admitted for the purpose of this subdivision.

Id.

In February 2015,9the trial court issued a rule to show cause, which 

was returnable on March 3, 2015. In April 2015, Chaney and the Commission 

executed the Stipulations and agreed to a joint list of exhibits. Before the trial 

court, the primary issue was whether the Act regulated the real estate transaction

underlying the Petition and, if so, what damages Chaney would be entitled to 

recover.

In April 2015, Chaney and the Commission presented Chaney’s and 

Harden’s 2009 hearing testimony, Chaney’s and Crockett’s 2012 deposition 

 

9 Obviously, a lengthy period elapsed between this Court’s June 2012 opinion and the 

trial court’s issuance of the rule to show cause. Our review of the trial court’s docket sheet 

reveals an arbitration occurred in 2013. R.R. at 646a. Additionally, discovery was conducted. 

In particular, Crockett’s and Chaney’s depositions were taken in August 2012. R.R. at 402a459a, 460a-504a. Requests for admissions were subsequently propounded and answered. R.R. 

at 505a-513a. And, in December 2014, Chaney filed a summary judgment motion, which the 

Commission opposed. In February 2015, the trial court denied summary judgment because 

factual disputes existed.
8

testimony, the parties’ admissions, the Stipulations and the joint exhibits to the trial 

court. Thereafter, Chaney and the Commission filed briefs and proposed findings 

of fact and conclusions of law. In October 2015, the trial court again denied 

Chaney’s request for recovery from the Fund.

Instead of appealing the October 2015 order, Chaney filed a post-trial

motion, through which he asked the trial court to “[a]mend the [o]rder of October 

22, 2015,” based on 97 purported errors the trial court made in reaching its 

decision. Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 77 at 1-30. The Commission filed an 

answer in opposition to the motion.

The trial court did not issue an order setting a briefing schedule or 

scheduling oral argument on Chaney’s post-trial motion. Additionally, no briefs in 

support of or opposition to Chaney’s post-trial motion were filed.

The trial court did not rule on the merits of Chaney’s post-trial 

motion. Instead, in December 2015, the trial court issued an order dismissing

Chaney’s post-trial motion. In late-December 2015, Chaney appealed both the 

October and December 2015 orders to this Court.

The trial court subsequently ordered Chaney to file a concise 

statement of the errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b), 

which he did. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a), in 

which it concluded that Chaney’s appeal was untimely, explaining (with emphasis 

added):
9

[Chaney’s] appeal is untimely and thus, he has 

waived his issues on appeal.

A notice of appeal should be filed within thirty 

(30) days after the entry of the order from which the 

appeal is taken. [Pa. R.A.P.] 903. [Chaney’s] notice of 

appeal purports to appeal from this court’s orders of 

October 22, 2015, denying his [Petition], and December 

4, 2015, denying his Motion for Post Trial Relief. The 

notes to [Pa. R.C.P. No.] 227.1(c) state that a motion for 

post-trial relief ‘may be filed following trial by jury, a 

trial by a judge without a jury in an action at law 

pursuant to Rule 1038 or a trial by a judge without a jury 

in an action in equity.’ See [Pa. R.C.P. No.] 227.1. In the 

instant case, [Chaney] did not have a trial as a result of a 

civil action and this was not an action in equity; the 

instant case was a Petition for Payment from the [Fund], 

and this [c]ourt did not permit exceptions or post[-]trial 

relief. See Appeal of Borough of Churchill [575 A.2d 

550, 555 (Pa. 1990)].

[Chaney’s] ‘post-trial motion’ effectively 

requested reconsideration of this court’s order of October 

22, 2015. Such an order is not appealable. See 

Commonwealth v. Rachau, 670 A.2d 731 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1996) (trial court order denying motion for 

reconsideration dismissed as unreviewable); Thorn v. 

Newman, [538 A.2d 105 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)] (order 

denying reconsideration is not reviewable on appeal). 

Further, such a post-trial motion was inappropriate. 

Where there is no provision in the Rules of Civil 

Procedure for the filing of post-trial motions it is 

improper to do so, and the filing of such a motion does 

not extend the time in which to file an appeal; if the order 

is an appealable order, there is no need to file post-trial 

motions and an appeal cannot lie from [the] denial of said 

motions. See City of Philadelphia v. Frempong, 865 

A.2d 314, 317-18 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)].
10

Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 3/4/16, at 5. This matter is now before us for disposition.10

II. Discussion

With regard to the timing of his appeal,

11 Chaney argues that, because

the trial court’s April 2015 proceeding was a non-jury trial, Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.1 

required that he file a post-trial motion in response to the trial court’s October 2015 

order and await its disposition before appealing to this Court. Specifically, he 

asserts that because “this case is governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure, a hearing was held from which post-trial motions were appropriate and 

required.” Appellant’s Br. at 12 (emphasis in original).

The Commission, which serves as the Fund’s administrator, counters 

that Chaney’s appeal was untimely because his Petition was governed by the rules 

of petition practice, Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 206.1-206.7, which do not provide for posttrial relief. Therefore, the Commission maintains, the trial court’s October 22, 

2015 order denying the Petition was a final order from which Chaney did not 

appeal within 30 days, as required by Pa. R.A.P. 903. Because Chaney’s appeal 

was untimely, the Commission argues, it must be quashed.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(c) (“Post-Trial Relief”) 

states:

 

10 Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law, or whether the trial court’s findings of facts were supported by 

substantial evidence. Smith v. I.W. Levin and Co., Inc., 800 A.2d 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

11 In March 2016, this Court ordered the parties to “address in their principal briefs on the 

merits the timeliness of [Chaney’s] notice of appeal.” Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 3/22/16.
11

(c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after

(1) verdict, discharge of the jury because of inability to 

agree, or nonsuit in the case of a jury trial; or

(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the 

case of a trial without jury.

Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.1(c) (emphasis added). “‘The purpose for Rule 227.1 is to 

provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct errors in its ruling and avert 

the need for appellate review.’” M.C. & E.K. Lees, Inc. v. Capenos, 119 A.3d 

1092, 1098 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Chalkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 494 

(Pa. 2002)).

Further, “where a trial has taken place and timely post-trial motions

have been filed pursuant to Rule 227.1, the appeal period does not begin to run 

until the trial court has issued a decision on the post-trial motions.” Oak Tree 

Condo. Ass’n v. Greene, 133 A.3d 113, 116 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Otherwise, Pa.

R.A.P. 903(a) requires that a “notice of appeal ... be filed within 30 days after the 

entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Id. This “[C]ourt may not 

enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal[.]” Pa. R.A.P. 105(b).

Our decision on the timeliness of Chaney’s appeal centers on whether 

Chaney was required to file post-trial motions after the trial court issued its 

October 22, 2015 order denying the Petition. If post-trial motions were required, 

because Chaney filed his post-trial motion within 10 days of the trial court’s 

October 2015 order, and he appealed to this Court within 30 days of the trial 

court’s order disposing of his post-trial motion, his December 30, 2015 appeal is 

timely. If, however, post-trial motions were not required, Chaney’s failure to 
12

appeal from the trial court’s October 22, 2015 order within 30 days renders his 

appeal untimely and “divests [this Court] of its jurisdiction to hear [it].”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014).

To that end, the Note to Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.1(c) states, as relevant:

A motion for post-trial relief may be filed following a 

trial by jury or a trial by a judge without a jury pursuant 

to Rule 1038. A motion for post-trial relief may not be 

filed to orders disposing of preliminary objections, 

motions for judgment on the pleadings or for summary 

judgment, motions relating to discovery or other

proceedings which do not constitute a trial. See U.S. 

National Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 487 A.2d 809 

(Pa. 1985).

A motion for post-trial relief may not be filed to 

matters governed exclusively by the rules of petition 

practice.

Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.1(c), Note (emphasis added).12

In Coco Brothers, Inc. v. Board of Public Education of School District 

of Pittsburgh, 608 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 1992), judgment creditor Coco Brothers, Inc. 

(Coco) filed an action to enforce a judgment obtained against a school board 

pursuant to Section 611 of the Public School Code of 1949.

13 Section 611 states

 

12 “[A]lthough the notes and explanatory comments which are issued with the rules of 

civil procedure do not constitute rules themselves, they do, however, indicate the spirit and 

motivation behind the drafting of the rules and, therefore, they serve as guidelines for 

understanding the purpose(s) of those rules. See Pa. R.C.P. [No.] 129(e) Construction of 

Rules.” Katz v. St. Mary Hosp., 816 A.2d 1125, 1128 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing 

Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 436 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1981)).

13 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §6-611.
13

that a judgment plaintiff “shall petition the court of common pleas in which such 

judgment was obtained,” for a writ directing payment from the school district’s 

unappropriated funds. 24 P.S. §6-611. The common pleas court denied Coco’s 

request based solely on the petition and the school district’s answer and new 

matter. Coco appealed. This Court quashed the appeal because Coco did not file 

post-trial motions pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.1(c), which this Court held were 

required under that Rule. On further appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and 

remanded to the common pleas court for a decision on the merits, concluding posttrial motions were not required to perfect the appeal. The Supreme Court stated,

because the statutory procedure was governed by rules of petition practice and did 

not constitute a trial, “post-trial motions were not required, or even permissible.” 

Coco Bros., 608 A.2d at 1037 (emphasis added); see also Porreco v. Maleno 

Developers, Inc., 761 A.2d 629 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (post-trial motions not 

required or even permissible following trial court’s order disposing of landowner’s 

petition to enforce settlement, even after lengthy evidentiary hearing, as such

disposition was governed by rules of petition practice).

Akin to Coco Brothers, this appeal arises from Chaney’s filing of the 

Petition in accordance with Section 803(a) of the Act seeking to recover from the 

Fund what Fairmount and HCFD owed him and he was unable to collect. Like

Coco Brothers, Fund recovery involves an application for recovery from a 

statutory compensation source, which will be granted if the specified prerequisites 

are met. Because as in Coco Brothers the statutory procedure for Fund recovery is 
14

governed by the rules of petition practice, Chaney I, post-trial motions were neither 

required nor even permissible here.14

In remanding for the trial court to allow Chaney to develop a record in 

Chaney I, this Court determined, because Chaney sought relief through his

application to the Fund under the Act, his petition was a “statutory petition” under 

Philadelphia Civil Rule 206.1(a)(1)(viii). Thus, its disposition was “governed by 

the procedures set forth in Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 206.1-206.7.” Chaney I, slip op. at 6, 

2012 WL 8704658 at *3. Thus, the law of the case doctrine15 also supports our 

determination that the trial court’s disposition of the Petition did not entail a civil 

bench trial, but rather was “governed exclusively by the rules of petition practice.” 

Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.1(c), Note.

16

 

14 In further support of his claim that post-trial motions were appropriate here, Chaney 

points out that he filed his Petition seeking Fund recovery on the same docket as the underlying 

civil suit against Crockett, Fairmount and HCFD. He asserts that, because his Petition was “part 

and parcel of” that civil action, post-trial motions were appropriate. Appellant’s Br. at 9. We 

reject this assertion.

While Chaney filed his Petition on the same docket as the underlying civil suit, the two 

matters are clearly distinct in nature: the first involved a civil suit against three defendants, and 

the second, directly at issue here, involved a petition under the Act seeking recovery from a 

statutory compensation source, a matter governed by the rules relating to petition practice, and in

which the three defendants in the civil suit did not participate as parties.

15 The law of the case doctrine sets forth various rules that embody 

the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated 

matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of 

that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the 

matter.

Ario v. Reliance Ins. Co., 980 A.2d 588, 597 (Pa. 2009).

16 This determination is also consistent with the procedure followed in other cases in 

which Fund recovery was sought. Thus, in D.J. Malatesta Associates, after obtaining a judgment 

based on a civil suit in common pleas court, the claimants filed a motion seeking recovery from 

the Fund. After the common pleas court disposed of the claims against the Fund, an appeal was 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
15

Nevertheless, as we recognized in In re PP&L, Inc., 838 A.2d 1 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003), this Court continues to permit post-trial practice in those cases 

where the trial court finds it helpful. As we stated in PP&L, the evolution of this

position was fully discussed in Upset Price Tax Sale for Springfield Township, 700 

A.2d 607, 610 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) in which this Court concluded (with emphasis 

added):

In each case where a trial court ruled upon 

the merits of post-trial motions and this Court 

quashed the appeal, the Supreme Court reversed

and remanded. Accordingly, the Court expressly 

concludes from a close reading of Appeal of 

Borough of Churchill, [575 A.2d 550 (Pa. 

1990)],[

17] Shapiro [v. Center Twp., Butler 

 

(continued...)

taken to this Court. There is no indication that post-trial practice was pursued prior to the filing 

of the appeal.

Further, in Smith, after obtaining a judgment based on a civil suit in common pleas court, 

a claimant filed a petition seeking Fund recovery. The common pleas court granted the petition, 

and the Commission appealed to this Court. There is no indication the Commission filed posttrial motions before taking the appeal.

In addition, in Murphy v. Today’s Properties, Ltd., 673 A.2d 6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), after 

obtaining a judgment in a civil suit in common pleas court, the claimants petitioned for recovery 

from the Fund. Hearings were held, after which the common pleas court ordered the Fund to 

reimburse the claimants. The Commission appealed. Prior to filing its appeal, the Commission 

filed a motion for post-trial relief and sought reconsideration. The common pleas court denied 

the Commission’s motion, and the Commission filed a timely appeal to this Court from the trial 

court’s initial order granting the petition seeking Fund recovery. Ultimately, this Court affirmed 

the trial court’s order granting the claimants’ petition.

Here, unlike in Murphy, and as explained throughout this opinion, Chaney did not timely

appeal the trial court’s October 2015 order denying his Petition.

17 In Appeal of Borough of Churchill, 575 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1990), exceptions were filed to a 

common pleas court’s order in an assessment appeal. Ultimately, the common pleas court 

disposed of the exceptions, and a further appeal was taken to this Court. In the absence of 

statutory authority or statewide procedural rule, this Court quashed the appeal taken from the 

order disposing of exceptions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even in the absence of 

rules governing statutory appeals, when the trial court accepts post-trial motions it may complete 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
16

County, 632 A.2d 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)], and In 

re Appeal of Sheetz, Inc.[,657 A.2d 1011 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1995)] that, absent some local rule 

prohibiting the filing of post-trial motions in a 

particular type of proceeding, where a trial court 

has ruled upon the merits of post-trial motions, that 

ruling is the order from which an appeal may be 

taken. ...

In PP&L, we gleaned several lessons from the Borough of ChurchillSpringfield Township line of cases. In particular, all of the cases addressed 

appeals taken from the orders disposing of post-trial motions. In all cases, posttrial practice was permitted where the trial court found it helpful. Also, our 

Supreme Court expressed a pronounced preference for disposition of statutory 

appeals on the merits. Ultimately, we concluded,

where the trial court accepts and prepares to resolve post-trial 

motions, the ruling resolving post-trial motions is an order from

which an appeal may be taken. Further, where the trial court 

accepts post-trial motions and schedules written argument on 

them, the initial order entered after trial is not the appealable 

order.

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).

Here, after the trial court entered its October 22, 2015 order denying 

the Petition, Chaney filed a post-trial motion. The Commission filed an answer in 

opposition. However, the trial court did not schedule written or oral argument on 

 

(continued...)

the process. The Supreme Court remanded to this Court for consideration of the appeals on the 

merits.
17

the post-trial motions. And, our review of the docket reveals no indication that 

briefs were, in fact, filed. Additionally, the trial court did not rule on the merits of 

Chaney’s post-trial motion. Rather, it entered an order, which stated, “the 

Plaintiff/Petitioner’s Motion for Post-Trial Relief is hereby DISMISSED.” C.R., 

Item No. 79. Thus, the trial court did not invite the filing of post-trial motions or 

rule upon the merits of the post-trial motions so as to excuse Chaney from timely 

appealing the trial court’s October 22, 2015 order denying the Petition.

Consequently, like the appellant in Frempong,

[Chaney’s] ‘post-trial motion’ was improper, and did not 

stay the appeal period. Johnson v. Johnson, 515 A.2d 

960 (Pa. Super. 1986) (where there is no provision in the 

rules of civil procedure for filing post-trial motions it was 

improper to do so, and filing such motions did not extend 

time in which to appeal); 1 Pennsylvania Appellate 

Practice, 2d Ed. (G. Ronald Darlington, Kevin J. 

McKeon, Daniel R. Schuckers, Kristen W. Brown) § 

302:28 at 3-51 (2002) (improper filing of post-trial 

motion to immediately appealable order treated as motion 

for reconsideration which does not stay appeal period).

In addition, [Chaney’s] subsequent appeal of the order 

denying his improperly filed post-trial motion was not 

appropriate. See Ostrowski v. Pethick, 590 A.2d 1290 

(Pa. Super. 1991) (since trial court’s refusal to strike 

judgment is appealable order, there is no need to file 

post-trial motions and appeal cannot lie from denial of 

such motions).

Moreover, if, as the trial court stated, [Chaney’s] 

‘post-trial motion sought reconsideration of the trial 

court’s order[,] [Chaney’s] appeal of the order denying 

reconsideration is not reviewable on appeal. See

[Rachau] (where Commonwealth sought to appeal a trial 

court order denying its motion for reconsideration, the 

Court dismissed the appeal as unreviewable); [Thorn]
18

(order denying reconsideration is not reviewable on 

appeal).

Thorn is instructive. There, the plaintiff, a 

discharged police officer, sued various borough officials. 

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, 

which the trial court granted. However, the trial court 

subsequently vacated its order. Rather than appealing the 

order vacating the summary judgment, the defendants 

sought reconsideration. After the trial court denied 

reconsideration, the defendants appealed the order 

denying reconsideration. Several months later, the 

defendants filed an ‘amended notice of appeal,’ stating 

they were appealing the order vacating the summary 

judgment. On appeal, this Court quashed the defendants’ 

appeal of the order vacating summary judgment as 

untimely. In addition, we determined the defendants’ 

appeal from the order denying reconsideration was not 

reviewable, stating:

[Defendants have] appealed from the order 

denying [their] petition for reconsideration. 

Pennsylvania case law is absolutely clear that the 

refusal of a trial court to reconsider, rehear, or 

permit reargument of a final decree is not 

reviewable on appeal. We will not permit 

[defendants] to do indirectly that which [they] 

cannot do directly.

Id. at 108 (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. Rooklin, 378 

A.2d 893, 897 (Pa. Super. 1977)). We further stated,

As the Superior Court noted in Rooklin and as the 

comment to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) expressly 

states, a party seeking reconsideration of an 

appealable order may file a notice of appeal as 

well as the application for reconsideration, in 

view of the point that the mere filing of an 

application for reconsideration has no effect on 

the running of the appeal period. If the trial court 

denies the application (or fails to rule on it during 

the appeal period), then the notice of appeal will 

nevertheless be timely.
19

Thorn, 538 A.2d at 108 n.4 (emphasis added).

Here, as in Thorn, the only order from which a 

timely appeal was taken was the trial court’s [December 

7, 2015] order denying [Chaney’s improper post-trial 

motion]. Because that order is not reviewable, we cannot

consider it. As such, [Chaney’s] appeal from the denial 

of [his post-trial motion] must be quashed.

In short, this appeal involves either an untimely 

appeal of an appealable order . . . , an appeal following 

denial of an improperly filed post-trial motion or an 

attempted appeal of a non-appealable order denying 

reconsideration. By any description, the appeal is not 

properly before us and must be quashed.

Frempong, 865 A.2d at 317-19; see also Oak Tree Condo. Ass’n.

18

 

18 Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, 

[Chaney] was required to appeal the [t]rial [c]ourt’s [October 22, 

2015] order within 30 days or file a motion for reconsideration, 

which if granted, would result in an appealable order. [Chaney] 

did not appeal the [t]rial [c]ourt’s [October 22, 2015] order and ...

did not file a motion for reconsideration that was expressly granted 

by the [t]rial [c]ourt. Instead, [Chaney] has appealed to this Court 

from the [t]rial [c]ourt’s [December 7, 2015] ... order .... The 

[t]rial [c]ourt’s [December 7], 2015 order is a non-appealable 

order. See, e.g., In re Merrick’s Estate, 247 A.2d [786,] 787-788 

[(Pa. 1968)]; Frempong, [865 A.2d at 318-319.] Accordingly, we 

quash [Chaney’s] appeal.

Oak Tree Condo. Ass’n v. Greene, 133 A.3d 113, 117-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
20

In sum, because Chaney’s appeal from the trial court’s October 2015 

order denying the Petition is untimely and because Chaney’s improperly filed posttrial motions did not stay the appeal period, we quash Chaney’s appeal.19

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

 

19 In light of our holding, we need not address Chaney’s substantive issues.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward Chaney, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2736 C.D. 2015

:

Fairmount Park Real Estate :

Corporation and HCFD Real Estate :

Corporation (Amended by Stipulation :

and Order to "HCFD Auctioneering :

Corporation") and Terry Crockett :

(Dismissed by Agreement) and :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

State Real Estate Commission, as :

Administrator of the Real Estate :

Recovery Fund :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1

st day of December, 2016, this appeal relating to

orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is QUASHED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge