[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2016-Ohio-7891.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104108

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

JIMMIE M. JACKSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-15-596651-A 

BEFORE: Laster Mays, J., Keough, P.J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 23, 2016

-i- 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Rick L. Ferrara 

2077 East 4th Street 

Second Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

Timothy McGinty 

County Prosecutor 

By: Denise J. Salerno 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jimmie M. Jackson (“Jackson”), appeals his conviction 

and asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court for new 

proceedings. We affirm. 

{¶2} Jackson was indicted on eight counts. The first four counts are related to 

victim one, and Counts 5 through 8 are related to victim two. They are as follows: 

Counts 1 and 2: Rape, a first-degree felony, in violation of 

R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) with sexually violent predator 

specification under R.C. 2941.148(A); 

Count 3: Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony, in violation 

of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1); 

Count 4: Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony, in violation 

of R.C.2911.11(A)(2); 

Count 5: Kidnapping, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(A)(4); 

Count 6: Rape, a first-degree felony, in violation of 

R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) with sexually violent predator 

specification under R.C. 2941.148(A); 

Count 7: Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony, in violation 

of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1); and 

Count 8 : Kidnapping, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(A)(4). 

{¶3} As part of a plea agreement, Jackson pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 6. 

During this proceeding, the trial court informed Jackson of his constitutional rights and 
the minimum and maximum sentence he could receive. At sentencing, the court 

sentenced Jackson to 41-years-to-life imprisonment. As a result, Jackson has filed this 

timely appeal assigning one error for our review: 

I. The trial court committed plain error in failing to inform appellant of 

the possible maximum term of imprisonment in compliance with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). 

I. Standard of Review 

{¶4} “An appellate court reviews de novo whether the trial court accepted a plea in 

compliance with Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102710, 

2015-Ohio-4907, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Schmick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95210, 

2011-Ohio-2263, ¶ 6. “We are required to review the totality of the circumstances and 

determine whether the plea hearing was in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. 

“Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process by which a trial court must inform a defendant of 

certain constitutional and nonconstitutional rights before accepting a felony plea of guilty 

or no contest.” Id. “The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey certain 

information to a defendant so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision 

regarding whether to plead guilty.” Id. 

II. Law and Analysis

{¶5} In Jackson’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court committed 

plain error in failing to inform him of the possible maximum term of imprisonment in 

compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). 

Under Crim.R. 11(C), prior to accepting a guilty plea in a felony case, the 

trial court must conduct an oral dialogue with the defendant to ensure that 
the plea is voluntary, that the defendant understands the nature of the 

charges and the maximum penalty involved, and that the defendant 

understands the constitutional right[s] he or she waives by pleading guilty, 

including the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to 

have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, 

and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against 

himself or herself. 

Id. at ¶ 21. 

{¶6} Jackson argues that his nonconstitutional right to have the judge explain the 

maximum penalty involved was violated. 

When the appellant raises a violation of a nonconstitutional right found in 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), however, we look for substantial compliance. 

Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is 

permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that the 

defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the 

rights he is waiving, the plea may be upheld. 

Id. at ¶ 23. 

When the trial court does not substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 with 

regard to a nonconstitutional right, reviewing courts must determine 

whether the trial court partially complied or completely failed to comply 

with the rule. If the trial court partially complied, the plea may be vacated 

only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect. Prejudice in this 

context requires that the defendant demonstrate that but for the error, there 

is a reasonable probability that he or she would not have pleaded guilty. 

Id. at ¶ 24. 

{¶7} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), which outline the nonconstitutional 

notifications, state: 

In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no 

contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the 

defendant personally and doing all of the following: 
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty 

involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation * 

* *. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. 

{¶8} The trial court informed Jackson of the maximum penalty involved with 

pleading guilty. 

COURT: Based upon the statements of the prosecuting attorney as 

well as your lawyer I believe it’s your intention for you to 

plead guilty to the amended Count 1, rape, with a sexually 

violent predator specification attached, that is a felony of the 

first-degree in violation of 2907.02(A)(2) and 

2941.14(A)(8)(a). That carries a possible time from ten 

years in prison up to life in prison; do you understand that? 

JACKSON: Yes. 

COURT: And a fine of up to $20,000. I also believe it’s your 

intention to plead guilty to Count 6, the amended Count 6 

rape, that is a felony of the first-degree in violation of 

2907.02(A)(2). That carries a possible penalty from three 

to 11 years in prison and a fine of up to $20,000. Do you 

understand that? 

JACKSON: Yes. 

COURT: If I were to run these counts one after the other or 

consecutively, you are looking at anywhere from 21 years 

— I’m sorry — anywhere from 13 years — hold on. Let 

me say that again. Just make sure. Anywhere from 13 

years up to life, and a fine, again, of up to $40,000; do you 

understand that? 

JACKSON: Yes. 

COURT: If this court imposes a prison term upon the completion of 

your prison term the State of Ohio Adult Parole Authority 
and not this court shall have a mandatory five-year 

supervision under what is called postrelease control. * * * 

(Tr. 15-17.) 

{¶9} The court sentenced Jackson to 41 years in prison. As shown previously, the 

court informed Jackson that he could receive 13 years to life. “The defendant’s right to 

be informed of the maximum possible penalty is a nonconstitutional right. Therefore, a 

substantial-compliance rule applies.” State v. Thomas, 197 Ohio App.3d 176, 

2011-Ohio-6073, 966 N.E.2d 939, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). 

If the trial judge partially complied with its duty to inform the defendant of 

the maximum penalty involved, the plea may be vacated only if the 

defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect. Prejudicial effect is established 

if the defendant can demonstrate that he would not have entered the plea 

had the trial court literally complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). 

Id. at ¶ 34. 

{¶10} However, the trial judge fully complied with the law by stating clearly the 

maximum penalty Jackson could receive. So there is no prejudicial effect. His 

sentence of 41 years falls within the range of 13 years to life. See State v. Scott, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103696, 2016-Ohio-5929, ¶ 6 (“a sentence is authorized by law if it is 

within the statutory range of available sentences.”) Therefore, Jackson’s sole 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶11} Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

__________________________________________ 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR