J-S70005-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM HARRIS

Appellant No. 799 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 10, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0101751-2002

BEFORE: OLSON, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016

Appellant, William Harris, appeals pro se from the order entered on 

February 10, 2016, which dismissed his second petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On November 12, 2003, a jury found Appellant guilty of robbery and 

possession of an instrument of crime.1 On February 2, 2004, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 25 to 50 years in prison, followed by 

five years of probation. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence on November 16, 2005 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on August 30, 2007. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701 and 907, respectively.
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Commonwealth v. Harris, 888 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. 2005) (unpublished 

memorandum) at 1-20, appeal denied, 931 A.2d 656 (Pa. 2007).

On January 30, 2008, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition and the 

PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant in the proceedings. 

The PCRA court finally dismissed Appellant’s first PCRA petition on June 15, 

2012;2 Appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal from this order.

On April 8, 2013, Appellant filed the current petition, which constitutes 

Appellant’s second petition for post-conviction collateral relief under the 

PCRA. Within this petition, Appellant did not acknowledge that the petition 

was untimely under the PCRA and Appellant did not plead any exception to 

the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. See Appellant’s Second PCRA Petition, 

4/8/13, at 1-7 & Supplement. 

On November 10, 2015, the PCRA court notified Appellant that it 

intended to dismiss the PCRA petition in 20 days without holding a hearing, 

as the petition was untimely. PCRA Court Order, 11/10/15, at 1; see also 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not file a timely response to the PCRA 

court’s order and, on February 10, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this 

____________________________________________

2 The PCRA court entered an order on September 4, 2009, which dismissed 

Appellant’s first PCRA petition. However, on December 8, 2010, this Court 

vacated the PCRA court’s order and remanded the case for further 

proceedings. Commonwealth v. Harris, 23 A.3d 572 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(unpublished memorandum) at 1-3. Thereafter, on June 15, 2012, the PCRA 

court finally dismissed Appellant’s first PCRA petition. 
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Court. We now affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s patently untimely, serial 

PCRA petition.

The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited 

statutory exceptions. This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition, 

including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the 

date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the] 

petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the 

timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever, 

947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further, 

since the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts, 

we are required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are 

able to consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 

731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained:

the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from 

considering untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000)

(stating that “given the fact that the PCRA's timeliness 

requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no 

court may properly disregard or alter them in order to reach 

the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is 

filed in an untimely manner”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 

737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (holding that where a 

petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA time requirements, this 

Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition). [The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] also held that even where 

the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the 

PCRA timing mandate, th[e court would] consider the issue 

sua sponte, as it is a threshold question implicating our 

subject matter jurisdiction and ability to grant the requested 

relief.
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Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 475-476 (Pa. 2003).

In the case at bar, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

November 29, 2007, which was 91 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal and the time for 

filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court 

expired. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“A judgment becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States . . . , or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review”); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. The PCRA explicitly requires that 

a petition be filed “within one year of the date the judgment becomes 

final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Therefore, Appellant had until 

November 29, 2008 to file a timely PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). As Appellant did not file his current petition until April 8, 

2013, the current petition is manifestly untimely and the burden thus fell 

upon Appellant to plead and prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to 

the one-year time-bar applied to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); 

Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to 

properly invoke a statutory exception to the one-year time-bar, the PCRA 

demands that the petitioner properly plead and prove all required elements 

of the relied-upon exception).

Appellant did not attempt to plead any exception to the PCRA’s oneyear time-bar. Thus, Appellant’s petition is time-barred and our “courts are 
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without jurisdiction to offer [Appellant] any form of relief.” Commonwealth 

v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). Therefore, we affirm the 

PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s second PCRA petition.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016