COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION

Appellate case name: Fernando Haffid Camero v. Samantha Jo Camero

Appellate case number: 01-15-00860-CV

Trial court case number: 76468-F

Trial court: 300th District Court of Brazoria County

On October 1, 2015, appellant, Fernando Haffid Camero, proceeding pro se and 

incarcerated, mistakenly filed a notice of appeal in this Court, from the August 10, 2015 

final decree of divorce, but it is deemed filed in the trial court on October 1, 2015. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(a). On September 8, 2016, this Court’s Order on Motions, among 

other things, granted appellant’s motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal 

and ordered appellee’s brief to be filed within 30 days of that Order. That Order further

granted appellant’s request for a copy of this Court’s local rules, local procedure, and 

evidence for a reply brief, and directed the Clerk of this Court to mail those to appellant.

On November 7, 2016, after receiving an extension of time, appellee’s brief was 

timely filed in this Court, which set the deadline for appellant to file any reply brief 

within 20 days, or by November 28, 2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a), 38.6(c). On 

November 18, 2016, appellant filed a letter in this Court noting that he had received 

appellee’s brief, but requested an attorney because he had “no idea what any of this stuff 

means or what [he] [is] suppose[d] to do next.”

Because this Court lacks authority to appoint counsel, the Court construes this 

letter-motion to seek abatement of this appeal for the trial court to consider whether to 

appoint appellate counsel. See Reed v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Instit. Div., No. 01–

02–00734–CV, 2003 WL 21545122, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 10, 

2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (construing motion for appointment of counsel as request to 

abate for trial court to appoint appellate counsel). With rare exceptions not present here, 

there is no statutory requirement for a Texas trial court to appoint counsel in civil cases. 

See Gibson v. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex. 2003) (providing for appointed 

counsel in “juvenile delinquency cases, in parental termination cases, and in cases in 
which application for court-ordered mental health services has been made.”). However, 

the clerk’s record, filed in this Court on January 4, 2016, does not show that any of the 

applicable statutory exceptions apply here for the trial court to appoint counsel to 

appellant.

In addition, only the trial court has the discretion to appoint counsel for an 

indigent civil litigant, but only upon a proper request. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 

24.016 (West Supp. 2016) (stating that “[a] district judge may appoint counsel to attend 

to the cause of a party who makes an affidavit that he is too poor to employ counsel to 

attend to the cause.”). Here, while appellant previously filed a “Request for Appointment 

of an Attorney Ad Litem to Represent Respondent” in the trial court on August 20, 2015, 

that was filed after the trial court had signed the final decree of divorce on August 10, 

2015. In any event, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s request for counsel on 

August 26, 2015.

Furthermore, appellant has not shown the “exceptional circumstances” necessary 

in this divorce case, which was decided by the trial court’s signing the final decree of 

divorce on August 10, 2015, after appellant failed to appear, that would warrant abating 

this case for the trial court to consider whether to appoint appellate counsel. See Wigfall 

v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 137 S.W.3d 268, 274–75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2004, no pet.) (citations omitted). Accordingly, appellant’s letter-motion to abate for the 

appointment of appellate counsel is denied. See Gibson, 102 S.W.3d at 712.

However, because appellant is a pro se inmate and his reply brief, if any, was due 

by November 28, 2016, the Court construes the pro se appellant’s letter-motion to include 

a request for a thirty-day extension of time and grants it. Appellant is notified that his 

reply brief, responding to the appellee’s brief, is not required because he already filed his 

pro se and supplemental appellant’s briefs in this Court on August 26 and September 1, 

2016, respectively. Appellant is warned that if he wants to file a reply brief and fails to 

timely file it within 30 days of the date of this order, the Clerk of this Court may set 

this case for submission without his reply brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(c), (d).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura Carter Higley

  Acting individually 

Date: November 29, 2016