5876 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Curtis Rich, Agency Clearance Officer, 

(202) 205–7030 curtis.rich@sba.gov. A 

copy of the Form OMB 83–1, supporting 

statement, and other documents 

submitted to OMB for review may be 

obtained from the Agency Clearance 

Officer. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Governor of the State, U.S. territory or 

possession affected by a disaster 

submits this information collection to 

request that SBA issue a disaster 

declaration. The information identifies 

the time, place and nature of the 

incident and helps SBA to determine 

whether the regulatory criteria for a 

disaster declaration have been met, and 

disaster assistance can be made 

available to the affected region. 

Solicitation of Public Comments: 

Comments may be submitted on (a) 

whether the collection of information is 

necessary for the agency to properly 

perform its functions; (b) whether the 

burden estimates are accurate; (c) 

whether there are ways to minimize the 

burden, including through the use of 

automated techniques or other forms of 

information technology; and (d) whether 

there are ways to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information. 

Summary of Information Collections: 

(1) Title: Disaster Business 

Application. 

Description of Respondents: Governs 

Request for Disaster Declaration. 

Form Number: N/A. 

Estimated Annual Respondents: 31. 

Estimated Annual Responses: 58. 

Estimated Annual Hour Burden: 

1,160. 

Curtis B. Rich, 

Management Analyst. 

[FR Doc. 2015–01993 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025–01–P 

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 

[Eagle Fund III–A, L.P.; License No. 07/07– 

0117] 

Notice Seeking Exemption Under 

Section 312 of the Small Business 

Investment Act, Conflicts of Interest 

Notice is hereby given that Eagle 

Fund III–A, L.P., 101 S. Hanley Road, 

Suite 1250, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, a 

Federal Licensee under the Small 

Business Investment Act of 1958, as 

amended (the ‘‘Act’’), in connection 

with the financing of a small concern, 

has sought an exemption under Section 

312 of the Act and 13 CFR 107.730, 

Financings which Constitute Conflicts 

of Interest, of the Small Business 

Administration (‘‘SBA’’) Rules and 

Regulations. Eagle Fund III–A, L.P., 

provided a loan to Net Direct Merchants 

LLC, (‘‘Net Direct’’), 217 North 

Seminary Street, Florence AL, 35630. 

The financing was contemplated to 

provide capital that contributes to the 

growth and overall sound financing of 

Net Direct. 

The financing is brought within the 

purview of § 107.730(a)(1) because Eagle 

Fund II, L.P., an Associate of Eagle Fund 

III–A, L.P. as defined in § 107.50, owns 

a ten percent or greater equity interest 

in Net Direct. Accordingly, Net Direct is 

considered an Associate of Eagle Fund 

III–A, L.P. 

Notice is hereby given that any 

interested person may submit written 

comments on the transaction to the 

Associate Administrator, Office of 

Investment and Innovation, U.S. Small 

Business Administration, 409 Third 

Street SW., Washington, DC 20416. 

Javier E. Saade, 

Associate Administrator, Office of Investment 

and Innovation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–02028 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025–01–P 

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 

[Eagle Fund III, L.P.; License No. 07/07– 

0116] 

Notice Seeking Exemption Under 

Section 312 of the Small Business 

Investment Act, Conflicts of Interest 

Notice is hereby given that Eagle 

Fund III, L.P., 101 S. Hanley Road, Suite 

1250, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, a 

Federal Licensee under the Small 

Business Investment Act of 1958, as 

amended (the ‘‘Act’’), in connection 

with the financing of a small concern, 

has sought an exemption under Section 

312 of the Act and 13 CFR 107.730, 

Financings which Constitute Conflicts 

of Interest, of the Small Business 

Administration (‘‘SBA’’) Rules and 

Regulations. Eagle Fund III, L.P., 

provided a loan to Net Direct Merchants 

LLC, (‘‘Net Direct’’), 217 North 

Seminary Street, Florence AL, 35630. 

The financing was contemplated to 

provide capital that contributes to the 

growth and overall sound financing of 

Net Direct. 

The financing is brought within the 

purview of § 107.730(a)(1) because Eagle 

Fund II, L.P., an Associate of Eagle Fund 

III, L.P. as defined in § 107.50, owns a 

ten percent or greater equity interest in 

Net Direct. Accordingly, Net Direct is 

considered an Associate of Eagle Fund 

III, L.P. 

Notice is hereby given that any 

interested person may submit written 

comments on the transaction to the 

Associate Administrator, Office of 

Investment and Innovation, U.S. Small 

Business Administration, 409 Third 

Street SW., Washington, DC 20416. 

Javier E. Saade, 

Associate Administrator, Office of Investment 

and Innovation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–02030 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025–01–P 

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 

Surrender of License of Small 

Business Investment Company 

Pursuant to the authority granted to 

the United States Small Business 

Administration under the Small 

Business Investment Act of 1958, as 

amended, under Section 309 of the Act 

and Section 107.1900 of the Small 

Business Administration Rules and 

Regulations (13 CFR 107.1900) to 

function as a small business investment 

company under the Small Business 

Investment Company License No. 03/

73–0214 issued to Virginia Capital SBIC, 

LP, said license is hereby declared null 

and void. 

United States Small Business 

Administration. 

Dated: January 22, 2015. 

Javier E. Saade, 

Associate Administrator for Investment and 

Innovation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–01992 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Office of the Assistant Secretary for 

Research and Technology 

[Docket Number: OST–2014–0112] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activity; Response to Comments on 

Notice of Request for Approval To 

Collect New Information: Voluntary 

Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas 

Operations on the Outer Continental 

Shelf 

AGENCY: Bureau of Transportation 

Statistics (BTS), Office of the Assistant 

Secretary for Research and Technology 

(OST–R), U.S. Department of 

Transportation. 

ACTION: Notice; response to comments. 

SUMMARY: On July 2, 2014, the Bureau 

of Transportation Statistics (BTS) 

announced its intention in a Federal 

Register Notice (79 FR 37837) to request 

that the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) approve the following 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices 5877 

information collection: Voluntary Near 

Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas 

Operations on the Outer Continental 

Shelf (OCS). At that time, BTS also 

encouraged interested parties to submit 

comments to docket number DOT–OST– 

2014–0112, allowing for a 60-day 

comment period. The comment period 

closed on September 2, 2014. BTS 

received three public comments from: 

LLOG Exploration (DOT–OST–2014– 

0112–0004), the American Petroleum 

Institute (API) and the Center for 

Offshore Safety (COS) (DOT–OST– 

2014–0112–0003), and the Offshore 

Operators Committee (OOC) (DOT– 

OST–2014–0112–0002). The purpose of 

this Notice is to respond to the 

comments received on the July 2, 2014 

announcement and allow 30 days for 

public comment to OMB on this 

collection from all interested 

individuals and organizations. 

DATES: Written comments should be 

submitted by March 5, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: BTS seeks public comments 

on its proposed information collection. 

Comments should address whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

the accuracy of the estimated burden 

hours of the proposed information 

collection; ways to enhance the quality, 

utility and clarity of the information to 

be collected; and ways to minimize the 

burden of the collection of information 

on respondents, including the use of 

automated collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology. 

Send comments to the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Office of Management and Budget, 725 

17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20503, 

Attention: BTS Desk Officer. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Demetra V. Collia, Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary for Research and 

Technology, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, RTS–31, E36–302, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590–0001; Phone No. (202) 366– 

1610; Fax No. (202) 366–3383; email: 

demetra.collia@dot.gov. Office hours are 

from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., EST, Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Data Confidentiality Provisions: The 

confidentiality of near miss data is 

protected under the BTS confidentiality 

statute (49 U.S.C. 6307) and the 

Confidential Information Protection and 

Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA) of 

2002 (Pub. L. 107–347, Title V). In 

accordance with these confidentiality 

statutes, only statistical and nonidentifying data will be made publicly 

available through reports. BTS will not 

release to the Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), or 

to any other public or private entity, any 

information that might reveal the 

identity of individuals or organizations 

mentioned in near miss reports without 

explicit consent of the respondent. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. The Data Collection 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. chapter 35; as amended) and 

5 CFR part 1320 require each Federal 

agency to obtain OMB approval to 

initiate an information collection 

activity. BTS is seeking OMB approval 

for the following BTS information 

collection activity: 

Title: Voluntary Confidential Near 

Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas 

Operations on the Outer Continental 

Shelf. 

OMB Control Number: TBD. 

Type of Review: Approval of data 

collection. 

Respondents: Employees working in 

the oil and gas industry on the OCS. 

Number of Potential Responses: Based 

on near miss reporting trends in other 

industries, BTS expects to receive no 

more than two responses per calendar 

day during the first three years of the 

program (approximately 730 responses 

per year). 

Estimated Time per Response: Not to 

exceed 60 minutes (this includes 

estimated time for a follow up 

interview, if needed). 

Frequency: Intermittent for 3 years. 

(Reports are submitted when there is a 

qualifying event, i.e., when a near miss 

occurs in oil and gas operations on the 

OCS.) 

Total Annual Burden: 730 hours. 

II. Public Participation and Request for 

Public Comments 

On July 2, 2014, BTS published a 

notice (70 FR 37837) encouraging 

interested parties to submit comments 

to docket number DOT–OST–2014–0112 

and allowing for a 60-day comment 

period. The comment period closed on 

September 2, 2014. To view comments, 

go to http://www.regulations.gov and 

insert the docket number, ‘‘DOT–OST– 

2014–0112’’ in the ‘‘Search’’ box and 

click ‘‘Search.’’ Next, click ‘‘Open 

Docket Folder’’ button and choose 

document listed to review. If you do not 

have access to the Internet, you may 

view the docket by visiting the Docket 

Management Facility in Room W12–140 

on the ground floor of the DOT West 

Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

Privacy Act 

All comments the BTS received were 

posted without change to http://

www.regulations.gov. Anyone may 

search the electronic form of all 

comments received into any of our 

dockets by the name of the individual 

submitting the comment (or of the 

person signing the comment, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on January 17, 2008 (73 FR 

3316), or you may visit http://

edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8- 

785.pdf. 

III. Discussion of Public Comments and 

BTS Responses 

A. General Discussion 

BTS announced on July 2, 2014, in a 

Federal Register Notice (79 FR 37837), 

its intention to request that OMB 

approve the following information 

collection: Voluntary Near Miss 

Reporting in Oil and Gas Operations on 

the OCS. BTS received three comments 

during the 60-day public comment 

period. Comments from LLOG 

Exploration, API/COS, and the OOC 

covered various topics including the 

definition of a near miss reporting (i.e., 

the reporting of conditions, root cause 

analysis, duplicative reporting, 

information-sharing, the scope of 

reporting, and the potential for reporting 

to multiple systems), the estimated 

number of burden hours, notification of 

near misses at their respective facilities, 

evaluation of the program, and the 

intent of the 2011 report by the National 

Commission on the Deepwater Horizon 

Oil Spill (the National Commission 

Report). 

B. Definition of a Near Miss 

All three of the commenters had 

questions about the description of a near 

miss used by BTS in the July 2, 2014 

notice. BTS appreciates the 

commenters’ concerns. BTS intends the 

term ‘‘near miss’’ to encompass a variety 

of safety conditions, since a narrow 

operational definition of the term may 

unduly inhibit reporting of events or 

conditions that, regardless of potential 

severity, would limit the program’s 

effectiveness in preventing and 

minimizing safety risks. In addition, the 

BTS’ description of the term is 

consistent with the International 

Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 

definition of a ‘‘near miss’’ and is 

therefore widely recognized around the 

world.’’ 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
5878 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices 

C. Reporting 

1. Reporting of Conditions 

Two of the three commenters were 

concerned that any hazard could be 

deemed a ‘‘condition’’ and be reported 

as a near miss. BTS’s experience with 

the railroad and aviation industry close 

call/near miss reporting programs 

indicates that the reporting of 

‘‘conditions’ may be very valuable to 

causal analysis of potential safety risks 

and the prevention of safety incidents. 

By learning more about potentially 

unsafe conditions, the public, 

government, and industry will be better 

able to identify hazards, hazardous 

conditions, and potential design and 

operational improvements that could 

reduce risks on the OCS. 

2. Root Cause Analysis 

All three of the commenters sought 

additional information on whether and 

how BTS would conduct root cause 

analyses of near miss reports. In 

addition, one commenter had questions 

about the background and experience of 

those individuals that would review and 

analyze the near miss reports. BTS 

agrees that causal analysis of near miss 

information reported under this 

program will be very important and 

should be conducted by experienced 

personnel. For this program, BTS 

intends to employ subject matter experts 

(SMEs) in oil and gas operations and 

trained in investigative techniques to 

conduct follow-up interviews with 

individuals who report near misses. 

Further, SMEs, using well-established 

causal analysis tools similar to those 

widely used by industry and research 

organizations, will collect additional 

information about potential contributing 

factors to reported near misses and 

unsafe conditions as well as help 

conduct causal analyses of reported near 

misses. 

3. Duplicative Reporting 

Two of the three commenters 

expressed concern about how multiple 

reports for the same near miss event 

would be handled. BTS has experience, 

through its other reporting programs, 

with identifying duplicate reports for 

the same event; e.g., through comparing 

event location, event description, event 

time, and other factors. In addition, 

assessment and follow-up of near miss 

reports by experienced SMEs acting on 

behalf of BTS will help identify 

duplicative reports. However, 

occasional multiple reports to BTS of a 

single near miss event by more than one 

source is not necessarily a problem. 

Reports on the same event from 

different sources can provide different 

and useful perspectives, and thus may 

help BTS obtain a more complete 

picture of the event. 

4. Information-sharing 

One of the three commenters 

expressed some concern over how long 

it might take for a hazard to go 

uncorrected if it is only reported 

through this reporting system; the 

commenter indicated that such reports 

should be made directly to the facility 

or company involved so that the hazard 

can be promptly corrected. If BTS 

receives a near miss report indicating a 

significant hazard or condition exists 

that poses an imminent risk, BTS will 

take action, consistent with CIPSEA, to 

share that information with an affected 

facility or facilities, or with the industry 

as a whole, as quickly as possible. 

Under CIPSEA, BTS may disclose such 

reported information, as appropriate, if 

the reporter consents to BTS doing so 

and in cases of potentially imminent 

risks, BTS would seek such consent 

expeditiously. In addition, assuming a 

reporter does not consent to share 

information from an individual report, 

BTS may be able to aggregate data in a 

way that protects the anonymity of the 

reporter and the confidentiality of the 

specific report and share information 

about the potential risks in near real 

time. 

5. Scope of Reporting 

All three commenters had questions 

about the scope of reporting near misses 

by individuals to the Voluntary Near 

Miss Reporting System and advocated 

that near miss information should be 

reported by OCS companies or industry 

associations. BTS recognizes the 

potential value of the near miss 

reporting systems operated by 

individual companies and other entities. 

The near misses reported to company or 

other industry systems undoubtedly 

provide important safety information to 

the individual companies and could 

provide valuable information to the 

industry, government, and public, if 

shared. BTS looks forward to discussing 

with industry groups and companies 

their potential participation in a near 

miss reporting system. 

However, BTS does not agree that an 

offshore oil and gas near miss reporting 

system should be limited to 

participation by companies or other 

industry organizations that collect nearmiss information. This Voluntary Near 

Miss Reporting System provides strict 

protection, under CIPSEA, of the 

reporters’ identities and of the 

confidentiality of the information, 

which is typically not afforded by 

company or other industry organization 

reporting systems. Thus, this system 

will afford individuals—including 

company and contractor employees—an 

opportunity to report near misses that 

they otherwise might not feel safe to 

report to their employers. Accordingly, 

this near miss reporting system could, 

through BTS’ aggregate reports, provide 

information to industry, the workforce, 

the government, and the public about 

potential hazards and unsafe conditions 

that would not be reported (or shared) 

under company or other industry 

programs. 

Moreover, if participation in this 

voluntary program were limited to 

companies, or other industry 

organizations, the information provided 

to BTS would be circumscribed by 

whatever definitions or other limitations 

each company or entity places on its 

reporting programs. For example, as 

indicated by some of the commenters, 

existing industry programs appear to 

focus on high impact or high potential 

events, to the exclusion of lower 

potential events or conditions. By 

contrast, this near miss reporting system 

extends to what industry might consider 

‘‘low severity’’ near misses that could, 

depending upon other factors, indicate 

the potential for more severe events to 

occur or demonstrate a lack of safety 

culture or awareness about specific 

hazards with industry-wide 

implications. 

Similarly, if this voluntary near miss 

reporting system were restricted to 

participation only by companies or 

other industry entities, the information 

submitted to BTS would also be subject 

to whatever limits the specific company 

or entity places on the information it 

chooses to share. For example, the 

company or entity might decide to 

submit only information that it 

considered ‘‘legitimate’’ or significant, 

instead of providing the initial or ‘‘raw’’ 

information that the company/entity 

had received. BTS believes there is 

potential value to be gained from near 

miss information that companies/

entities may think is of low severity or 

importance or of uncertain validity, but 

that reflects the individual reporters’ 

unique perspectives on the event or 

condition. 

In addition, BTS disagrees with the 

suggestion made by two commenters 

that individuals should not be allowed 

to participate in this system because 

they would not understand 

‘contributing factors’ or root causes. 

That concern is academic since 

individual reporters would not 

participate in the causal analysis 

process; BTS, with help from 

appropriately qualified SMEs, would 

perform causal analyses. 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices 5879 

Finally, based on its experience with 

other industry reporting programs, BTS 

does not agree with the comment made 

by two commenters suggesting that BTS 

limit participation in the program to 

companies/entities in order to reduce 

the estimated time for responses. For the 

reasons stated elsewhere in this notice, 

BTS believes there will be substantial 

potential benefits from individual 

reporting and that, even assuming a 

company could submit reports in less 

time than an individual, the suggested 

efficiency of company reporting does 

not warrant precluding individuals from 

filing reports offering their own 

perspectives on the same events. 

Moreover, as discussed previously, if 

reporting were limited only to 

companies, BTS likely would not 

receive reports on all of the near-misses 

that could be reported by individuals. 

In addition, BTS does not agree with 

the two commenters who asserted that 

the estimated time (60 minutes) for 

individual responses is excessive. The 

estimated time needed to complete an 

initial report is approximately 15 

minutes, which is short enough to 

encourage widespread participation. 

The remainder of the estimated 60 

minutes would be used for a 

confidential follow-up interview, as 

warranted by the initial report. It is 

important to point out that follow-up 

interviews are voluntary and not every 

respondent will consent to be 

interviewed. Although, a respondent 

who feels it is worthwhile to voluntarily 

submit an initial report is likely to be 

willing to participate in a confidential 

interview in order to ensure that the 

reported information is clearly 

understood and correctly evaluated by 

BTS. 

6. Potential for Reporting to Multiple 

Systems 

Two commenters asserted that this 

near miss reporting system may create 

redundant reporting with other private 

and governmental reporting programs or 

near miss initiatives. In particular, the 

commenters suggested that individuals 

may submit reports under BSEE’s 

regulation allowing voluntary reporting 

of hazardous or unsafe working 

conditions on OCS facilities (30 CFR 

250.193). BTS disagrees with these 

comments. The BTS Voluntary Near 

Miss Reporting System is strictly 

voluntary and is not intended to replace 

or interfere with industry, BSEE, or 

other agency reporting programs, 

whether voluntary or mandatory. 

Instead, the BTS Voluntary Near Miss 

Reporting System will provide another 

opportunity for reporting a wide range 

of potential hazard and risk information 

related to OCS oil and gas operations. 

As one commenter recognized, in 

some cases an individual may feel 

inhibited about reporting a near miss to 

a company or other industry reporting 

program and thus may choose to report 

the event or condition to BTS under the 

protections afforded by CIPSEA. In such 

cases, there would be no duplication of 

reporting. 

Similarly, an individual may prefer 

reporting to CIPSEA under the 

guarantees of anonymity and 

confidentiality provided by CIPSEA 

rather than reporting voluntarily to 

BSEE under 30 CFR 250.193. Although 

section 250.193 of BSEE’s rules allows 

an individual to report hazardous or 

unsafe working conditions 

anonymously, BSEE is subject to FOIA 

and cannot guarantee the anonymity or 

confidentiality of the information to the 

same degree BTS can protect 

information collected under CIPSEA. 

Thus, individuals concerned with 

protecting their anonymity or with 

confidentiality may choose to submit 

near miss information to BTS under 

CIPSEA rather than to BSEE. Moreover, 

the types of issues that may be reported 

under § 250.193 (potential violations of 

BSEE rules and hazardous or unsafe 

working conditions) are potentially not 

as inclusive as the issues that may be 

reported under this near-miss reporting 

system. 

BTS also does not agree with the two 

commenters who suggested that BTS 

should not accept reports for near 

misses that have been reported to 

industry. The reports submitted to BTS 

will serve an important purpose even if 

some of the near misses were also 

submitted to industry. For example, the 

aggregated results of BTS analysis of 

near miss reports will be widely 

disseminated to government agencies, 

the industry, and the public. By 

contrast, information from existing 

industry near-miss systems, to date, is 

generally not shared within the industry 

or with the government and the public. 

In any event, at present BTS has no way 

of knowing which specific near misses 

have been reported to industry, and thus 

no basis for rejecting individual reports 

submitted under this near miss 

reporting system. 

API/COS noted in their joint 

comments, the implementation of the 

COS Learning from Incidents (LFI) 

program, which COS believes could 

inform BTS’s Voluntary Near Miss 

Reporting System but also demonstrates 

a potential overlap between the two 

programs. BTS is aware of the potential 

benefits of the COS LFI program, for 

COS’ members, and looks forward to 

discussing with COS the potential 

sharing of that information with BTS, 

and potential sharing of lessons learned 

from that information with all 

stakeholders. However, it is evident that 

the LFI program is limited in scope to 

only information from COS member 

companies regarding specificallydefined incidents and ‘‘High Value 

Leaning Events.’’ Moreover, as API/COS 

also notes in their joint comments, the 

aggregated information from that 

program is only shared with COS 

members. For that reason, BTS does not 

agree that the proposed near miss 

reporting system should be delayed 

pending the outcome of further 

consideration of the LFI program. 

D. Estimated Burden Hours 

Two of the three commenters 

questioned BTS’s estimated number of 

near miss reports that would be 

submitted. In particular, OOC claimed 

that the number of potential 

respondents submitting reports could be 

up to 4 or 5 times higher than BTS’s 

estimate, ‘‘if a reporting compliance 

level of 10–15% is reached,’’ primarily 

because the broad scope of ‘‘near miss’’ 

in this system will result in a large 

number of reports on ‘‘low potential’’ 

events. In the absence of actual near 

miss reporting rates in offshore oil and 

gas operations, BTS’s estimates were 

based upon BTS’ experience with near 

miss reporting in other industry sectors. 

This estimate will be revised, as 

appropriate, once BTS can establish an 

expected annual reporting rate based on 

‘‘actual’’ reporting statistics of near 

misses collected during the initial phase 

of this program (i.e., first 3 years). 

E. Notification of Near Misses 

Two of the three commenters asked 

that facilities be notified when a near 

miss has been reported for their 

installation or unit. BTS, however, 

cannot notify an owner or operator of a 

near-miss reported which is reported in 

confidence without jeopardizing the 

anonymity of the individual making the 

report or the confidentiality of the 

information provided, and thus 

violating the statutory protections 

afforded by CIPSEA, unless the reporter 

consents to sharing that information. 

Moreover, if the reporter’s identity were 

discovered, it would open the 

individual up to potential sanctions or 

retaliation by the company. The 

National Commission Report which 

recommended that BSEE develop a 

near-miss reporting system for OCS oil 

and gas operations, also specifically 

recommended that whistleblowers who 

notify authorities about lapses in safety 

be provided protection: ‘‘All offshore 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
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workers have a duty to ensure safe 

operating practices to prevent accidents. 

To ensure all workers, regardless of 

employer, will take appropriate action 

whenever necessary, Congress should 

amend the Outer Continental Shelf 

Lands Act or specific safety statutes to 

provide the same whistleblower 

protection that workers are guaranteed 

in other comparable settings.’’ 

F. Program Evaluation 

One commenter requested that BTS 

report the results of the program to 

stakeholders at least once a year and 

that the program be evaluated after two 

years of operation. The frequency of 

public reports will depend on how 

many near miss reports are reported to 

the system. To comply with CIPSEA, 

reports of aggregated data must be 

prepared in such a way that no third 

party could determine the identity of a 

reporter, directly or indirectly. BTS 

expects to issue public reports at least 

once per year and potentially more 

often, as appropriate. 

With regard to re-evaluating the 

program after two years, as 

demonstrated by near miss reporting in 

the aviation industry, it took a 

commitment of several years before 

employee reporting increased 

sufficiently to allow for a robust 

program evaluation. BTS agrees that 

‘‘formative evaluation’’ is essential in 

developing a successful data collection 

program and will conduct such 

evaluation as soon as there is sufficient 

quantitative information in the near 

miss data system to allow for such 

analysis. However, the potential value 

of sharing data in a confidential manner 

is worth the investment of time and 

effort because the continuation of 

environmental and human losses is an 

unacceptable alternative to the public 

and the government. 

G. Intent of the National Commission 

Report 

One commenter correctly noted that 

the National Commission Report on the 

BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill was 

issued in 2011, not 2013 as the 60-day 

notice inadvertently stated. BTS, 

however, does not agree with the 

commenter’s suggestions that the 

National Commission Report did not 

envision a government-managed system 

for near miss reporting, or that the 

Commission’s recommendation for an 

industry ‘‘self-policing institute that 

would gather incident and performance 

data’’ would satisfy the 

recommendation for a near miss 

reporting program. In fact, the two 

recommendations are contained in 

different parts of the 2011 report, and it 

was in that part of the report directed to 

the Department of the Interior (DOI) that 

the National Commission recommended 

that DOI: ‘‘Develop more detailed 

requirements for incident reporting and 

data concerning offshore incidents and 

‘near misses.’ Such data collection 

would allow for better tracking of 

incidents and stronger risk assessments 

and analysis.’’ 

Issued On: January 28, 2015. 

Rolf Schmitt, 

Deputy Director, Bureau of Transportation 

Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary 

for Research and Technology. 

[FR Doc. 2015–02053 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–9X–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 

Committee—New Task 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of new task assignment 

for the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 

Committee (ARAC). 

SUMMARY: The FAA assigned the 

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 

Committee (ARAC) a new task to 

provide recommendations regarding 

Aircraft Systems Information Security/

Protection (ASISP) rulemaking, policy, 

and guidance on best practices for 

airplanes and rotorcraft, including both 

certification and continued 

airworthiness. The issue is that without 

updates to regulations, policy, and 

guidance to address ASISP, aircraft 

vulnerabilities may not be identified 

and mitigated, thus increasing exposure 

times to security threats. In addition, a 

lack of ASISP-specific regulations, 

policy, and guidance could result in 

security related certification criteria that 

are not standardized and harmonized 

between domestic and international 

regulatory authorities. 

This notice informs the public of the 

new ARAC activity and solicits 

membership for the new ASISP Working 

Group. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Steven C. Paasch, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 1601 Lind Ave. SW., 

Renton, WA 98057–3356, Email: 

steven.c.paasch@faa.gov, Phone: (425) 

227–2549, Fax (425) 227–1100. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

ARAC Acceptance of Task 

As a result of the December 18, 2014, 

ARAC meeting, the FAA assigned and 

ARAC accepted this task establishing 

the ASISP Working Group. The working 

group will serve as staff to the ARAC 

and provide advice and 

recommendations on the assigned task. 

The ARAC will review and approve the 

recommendation report and will submit 

it to the FAA. 

Background 

The FAA established the ARAC to 

provide information, advice, and 

recommendations on aviation related 

issues that could result in rulemaking to 

the FAA Administrator, through the 

Associate Administrator of Aviation 

Safety. 

The ASISP Working Group will 

provide advice and recommendations to 

the ARAC on ASISP-related rulemaking, 

policy, and guidance, including both 

initial certification and continued 

airworthiness. Without updates to 

regulations, policy, and guidance to 

address ASISP, aircraft vulnerabilities 

may not be identified and mitigated, 

thus increasing exposure times to 

security threats. Unauthorized access to 

aircraft systems and networks could 

result in the malicious use of networks, 

and loss or corruption of data (e.g., 

software applications, databases, and 

configuration files) brought about by 

software worms, viruses, or other 

malicious entities. In addition, a lack of 

ASISP-specific regulations, policy, and 

guidance could result in security related 

certification criteria that are not 

standardized and harmonized between 

domestic and international regulatory 

authorities. 

There are many different types of 

aircraft operating in the United States 

National Air Space (NAS), including 

transport category airplanes, small 

airplanes, and rotorcraft. The 

regulations, system architectures, and 

security vulnerabilities are different 

across these aircraft types. The current 

regulations do not specifically address 

ASISP for any aircraft operating in the 

NAS. To address this issue, the FAA has 

published special conditions for 

particular make and model aircraft 

designs. The FAA issues Special 

Conditions when the current 

airworthiness regulations for an aircraft 

do not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for certain novel or 

unusual design features including 

ASISP. Even though the FAA published 

special conditions for ASISP, an update 

to the current regulations should be 

considered. International civil aviation 

authorities are also considering 

rulemaking for ASISP and the ASISP 

Working Group could be used as input 

into harmonization of these activities. 

The FAA has issued policy statement, 

PS–AIR–21.16–02, Establishment of 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES