IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-20555

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RAMOLA KAYE BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CR-336-6

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ramola Kay Brown was convicted by a jury of conspiring to possess with 

intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and less than 50 

kilograms of marijuana. She was sentenced to 145 months of imprisonment. 

On appeal, Brown claims that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury 

to conclude that she had the requisite knowledge, intent, and voluntariness to 

support a guilty verdict. We review her sufficiency challenge de novo and will 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 17, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-20555

2

uphold the verdict if a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the 

evidence established her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 

Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 600-01 (5th Cir. 2013).

To establish a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the Government must 

prove “(1) an agreement existed between two or more persons to violate federal 

narcotics law, (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the agreement, and 

(3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States 

v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 366 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ochoa, 

667 F.3d 643, 648 (5th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

elements of a conspiracy offense may be established solely by circumstantial 

evidence. United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d 526, 537 (5th Cir. 1988).

The evidence adduced at trial showed that a vehicle driven by Brown 

was stopped and over 20 pounds of marijuana was found in the trunk. There 

was testimony that Brown admitted that she had coordinated with a 

marijuana supplier and that she was to be paid $250 for transporting the 

contraband. Recordings of telephone calls, along with testimony regarding 

surveillance of Brown and the marijuana supplier, allowed the jury to 

reasonably infer that there was an agreement to traffic marijuana and that 

Brown was acting as the driver of the contraband. There was also testimony 

that Brown admitted to a law enforcement officer that she had transported 

money and marijuana for an individual identified as the leader of the drug 

trafficking organization. In view of the foregoing, the evidence is sufficient to 

establish Brown’s participation in the charged marijuana trafficking 

conspiracy. See Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 600-01.

The evidence is likewise sufficient to support the guilty verdict on the 

charge of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more 

of cocaine. See id. The trial evidence showed the existence of a conspiracy to 

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No. 15-20555

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traffic cocaine; it further established that Brown, working for the leader of the 

drug trafficking organization, on several occasions exchanged money for 

cocaine, which she then transported from one city to another. In view of the 

foregoing, we affirm Brown’s conviction.

Brown also argues that the district court clearly erred by denying her 

request for a minor role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. We review the 

district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual 

findings, including reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, for clear 

error. United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013). Whether 

a defendant played a minor role in a criminal offense is a finding of fact. United 

States v. Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 305 (5th Cir. 1999).

We have long held that a defendant’s function as transporter of drugs 

does not, without more, entitle her to a minor role reduction. See United States 

v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1485 (5th Cir. 1993). Here, however, Brown was not 

merely a transporter of contraband. As discussed above, Brown coordinated 

with a supplier to pick up a load of marijuana and exchanged money for loads 

of cocaine, which she transported from one city to another. Brown also helped 

count currency for the leader of the drug trafficking organization. Further, the 

trial evidence showed that Brown participated in a telephone call in an attempt 

to recover five kilograms of cocaine that had been stolen from the drug 

trafficking organization. In view of the foregoing, the district court did not 

clearly err in denying a minor role adjustment. See Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 146.

AFFIRMED.

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