### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 22
- 00058
- CV

Ali Mahrou and Gypsie Mahrou , Appellant s

v. Alan White, Steve Drake, and Byrd Ranch Property Owners Association , Appellee s

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF BLANCO COUNTY NO. CV00669 , HON ORABLE BRETT BRAY , JUD GE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
This is a dispute concerning Ali Mahrou and Gypsie Mahrou ’ s obl igations regarding the cost of maintenance of a road the Mahrou s use to access th e ir property

. The Mahrou s initiate d proc eedings in justice court complaining of an assessment imposed by the Byrd Ran ch Property Owners As soc iation (the As sociation) pursuant to a Grant and Declaration of E a s ement that the Associa tion maintained burdened the Mahrou s ’ property. Th e Mahrou s ’
p rincipal compla int was th at the assessment was calculated using a cost

- sharing formula contained in an invalid amendment to the easement. The Association fi led a counter

- claim in justice court as serting that the am e ndment to the easement wa s valid a nd s e e king a jud g ment against the Mahrous for t he mai ntenance costs i t assess ed using the cost

- sharing formula in the amended easement. The justice court determined that it l acked jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the amendment to the easement and d i sm i ssed the Mahrou s ’ claim with prejudice.2

Despite declini ng to adjudicat e the validit y of the amended easement and its cost

- s haring for mula, the justice cour t order ed the Mahrous to pay the amount assessed b y the Association for road ma intenan ce. The Ma hr ous then sought review of the justice court ’ s judgment in the Blanco County Court at Law. On the Association ’ s motion, the county court fou nd tha t the Mah rous failed to timely p erfect the ir appeal from the justice court ’ s judgment , ordered that the just ic e court order was “ final , ” and di smissed the case. T he Mahrous ap pealed the county
court ’ s judgment, asserting that the j ustice c our t ’ s judgment was void because it lacked jurisdiction over the dispute about the validity of the easement a nd that the cou nt y court erred by ref us ing to vacate that v oid ju dgment and by denying its plea to the jurisdic tion

. We wi ll vacate the county court ’ s judgment and di smiss for want of jurisdiction.

BACK GROUND In 1973, Reba Byrd and her la te husband L. Tonnet acquired a 1,502

- acre cattle ranch near Jo hnson City (the “ Ranch ” ). In 2000, Byrd began to develop the northern por tion of th e Ranch in to the “ Byrd Ranch Estates , ” filing the Byrd Ranch Estate s Declarations of
Coven ants, Co nditions, and Rest rictions (the “ Declar a tion ” ) in the B lanco County property records and ultimately completing a survey of a 22

- tra ct subdivision. The no rthernmost p ortion of the Ranch

—

referre d to as “ Section 1 ” in surv eys of the land, advertis ements, and the deeds for the in dividual tracts lo c ated wi thin the section

— consi sts of appro ximately 4 40 acres and
cont ains tracts 1 through 5 of the Byrd Ranch Estates. The ce ntra l portion of the Ranch, referred
to as “ Section 2 , ” cons ists of approximately 498 acr e s and contains tracts 6 th rough 22 of t h e Byrd Ranch Estates. Byrd retained ownership of the remaining portion of the Ranch, which is referred to as the “ southern po rtion , ” and includes the entrance to the Ra nch from old U.S.3

Highway 290. Residents of the Byrd Ranch Esta tes must travel from t h e Ranch entrance off old U.S. Highway 290 through the southern portion of the Ranch to reach the tracts in S ection 1 and
2. T o provide a right of ingress and egress to and fr om the Ranch entrance, the B yrd s, defined as

“ Grantors , ” gr anted the owners of t h e tracts in Section 1 of B yrd Ran ch Estates two easements set forth in a “ Grant & Declarat ion o f Easement ” ( the “ Easement Grant ” ). The easement , referred to as “ the Byrd Easement , ” is over a road running from the entrance of the Ranch through the souther n portion o f the ranc h , through Section 2 , and term inating at the boundary between Section 2 and S ec tion 1. The easement referred to as “ t he Pro perty Easement ” is over a road running from the boundar y between S e ction 2 and Section 1 and terminating in Sec t ion 1. 1
The Easement Grant included a formula for sharing the cost of re pair and maintenance of the road. All costs of r epair and maintenance of the Property Easement was to be shared by the
O wners o f Tracts 1 through 5 in Section 1 in p roportion to the percentage of the acreage the individual owner ’ s t ract bore to the total acreage of Tracts 1 through 5. Additionally, the Owners of Tracts 1 through 5 in Section 1 would share , in the same proportion as for the Property Easement, five

- sixths of the cos t o f re pa ir and main tena nce of the Byrd Easement . The B yrd s, as the G rantor s of the easement, w ere responsible for one

- sixth of the cost of repa ir an d maintenance of the Byrd Easement.

The Eas ement Gra nt provided that its t erms “ shall run with the land ” an d that all references to Grantors and Owners “ shall mean and in clude the re spective successors and a ssigns of such parti es who be come Owners o r have a beneficial interes t in the P roperty or the Tracts. ”

1 When the e asements were granted, the Byrds still o wned the property that subsequently beca me S ection 2 of B yrd Ranch Estates. The Eas ement Gran t makes no re ference to Sec ti on 2 and the def

initio n of t he “ O wners ” to whom the ease ment w as granted is limit ed to the owners of Tracts 1 through 5 in Section 1 , which is defined as “ the Property

. ”4

In 2005, the Mahrous purchased Tract 18 in S e ctio n 2 from Byrd. In 2007, they purchased Tract 17 in Section 2 from Byrd. The general warranty deed s from Byrd to the Mahrous convey ed
Tra ct 17 a nd 18 toge ther with “ the Gran t an d Declaration of Easement. ” As Byrd ’ s success ors in interest to Tracts 17 and 18 , t he Mah rous succe e ded to Byrd ’ s obligation , as set forth in the c ost

sharing provision of the Easement Grant, to share in payme nt of one - six th of the cost of repair

an d maintenance of the Byrd Easement.

In January 2015, Byrd and the Association soug ht t o amend the Easement Grant. The reason for the amendment, as stated in an Amended Grant & Declaration of E asemen t ( “ the Amende d Easement Grant ” ) , was that:
[I]t has come to the attention of Grantor and owners of [ Tracts 1 through 22 of the Byrd Ranch Est at es] that (1) the Ori ginal Eas e ment was created be fore Phase T wo was developed and therefo re does not include Phase II [sic]; ( 2) that the Cost

Sharing Formula of the Property E asement and the Byrd Easement as described in the Original Easement is inco nsi st ent with the road maintenance formula contained in the Ori gin al Restrictions and which is currently being utiliz ed by the [own ers of Tract s 1 t hrough 22 of the Byrd Ranc h Estate s]; and (3 ) tha t the legal description of the Property Eas ement and the By rd Ea sement as described in the Original Eas ement is incomplete.

The Amended Easement Gra nt provided a cost

- sharing formula wh ereby owners of trac ts 6 through 22 in Section 2 , as well as those of Tracts 1 throu gh 5 in S e ction 1, sha red in both the total co st of repair and mainten ance of the easement over Sections 1 and 2, now referred to as the
BRE Roadway , a nd five

- sixth s of the cos t of re pair and maint enance of t he easement over the southern portion of the Ranch, now referred to as the Byrd Roadway

. T he Mah ro u s assert th at the change to the cost

- sharing for m ula in the Amended Eas ement Grant resulted in a si x - fold increase in the Ma hrous ’ share of the road re pair and main tenance costs.5 The Mahrous, who did not participate in the Association meeting at wh ich t he
vote to amend the Easement Grant was taken, filed a “ N otice to Void the Amended Grant & Declaratio ns of Easement ” in the B lanco County property recor ds. After the Association demanded that the Mahrous pay road repair and maintenance charges calc ul ate d under the
Am end ed E asement Grant ’ s cost

- sharing formula, t he Mahrou s sued the Association and two of its officers in Bla nco Cou nty Justice Court. 2 T he Mahrous asserted that the Association dues assessed for Tracts 17 and 18 were “ incorrectly assessed ” a nd were excessive. The Mahrous

s ought discovery rega rding the Associa tion ’ s claim in its demand letter that “ [t]he Amended
Easem e n t Grant w as duly approve d, signed, notariz ed and filed in September 2015 ” and “ w as legally binding upon all [Asso ci ation] mem be rs, including [ the Mahrous]. ” The Association filed a n answer stating that it ha d “ properly assessed and collected ” the Mahrous ’ dues. Afte r filing a mo tion for summary judgment in which it argued that the dues assessment was correct because the ass ess me nt conformed to the cost

- sh aring formula in the Amend ed Easement Grant, the Association filed a counterclaim seeking to recover the dues it ha d assessed the Mahrou s fo r road repair and maintenance

. The Mahrou s fi led a response to the Association ’ s su mma ry judgment motion in which they argued that the Amended Easement Grant was “ illegally drafted ” and “ not a l egitimate amend ment , ” in part bec ause it was not approved by the requ ired percentage of Associ ation m emb er votes.

The justice court granted the As so ciation ’ s motion for summary jud gment and ordered the Mahrous to pay the dues assessed. The justice court deleted from the jud gment proposed language addressi ng whether the Mahrous ’ property was burd ened by the Amen d ed

2 The Mahrous filed an amended peti tion to add a third Ass ociation member as a defe ndant based on his being “ a si gnatory to the questionable [Amended Easemen t Grant] which is currently is dis pute

. ”6

Easement Grant , and the judgmen t r ec ited that “ [a]ll claims and causes of action brought by [the Mahrous] against [the Associa tion] are dism issed with prejudice. ” 3 The Mahrous then filed a motion to vacate the justice court ’ s judgment , arguing that becau se the justice court h ad

“ inform ed [t he Association ] that Small Claims Court does not have juris diction ” to d etermine whether the Mahrous ’ p roperty was bound by the Am en ded Ease ment Gran t, the court did
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Association ’ s road repair and mainten anc e
assessment was prop er. The Mahrous a sserted that the only court with auth ority to adjudicate and dispose of the parties ’ cl aims was the B lanco County District Court, and tha t because the justice court lacked subj ect

- matter jurisdic tion over the case it s hould vacate its judgment and d ism iss the case without prejudice

. The justice court denied the mo ti on.

The Ma hrous then fi led a “ Plaintiff ’ s Appeal by Cash Depos it ” to appeal the justice court ’ s judgment to the Blanco County Court and deposit ed $500 .00 w ith the justice
court. The Blanco County Court Clerk signed a “ Letter Acknowledging Receipt of Appeal f rom Justice of Peace Court ” and info rmed the Mahrous that the appeal would be deem ed perfected if they paid the $222.00 filing fee within tw enty da y s o f the date of the acknowledgement letter. The Mahrous timely pa id the fili ng fee.

I n the county court, the Mahrous contend ed that the justice court lacked jurisdiction over the claims they brough t against the Associati on and that its j udgment was th ere fo re void. The Mahrous requested that the county court vacate the justice court ’ s judgment

. The Mahrous also asserted that t he only court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the iss ues presen ted,

3 The justice court also denied the Association ’ s requ est for an awar d of attorneys ’ fees based on its being the prevailing party in “ an ac tion b ased on breach of a restr ictive coven ant pertaining to real property. ” See T ex. Prop. Code §5.006 (providing that in action based on breach of rest ri c tive covenant pertaining to real property, court “ shall all ow to a prevailing party who assert ed th e acti on reasonable atto rne y ’ s fees ” ).7

which turned o n the vali dity of the Amen ded Easement Grant , wa s t he Blanco County District
Cou rt and requested th at the county court transfer the case to the dist rict court. The county co urt dismissed the Mahrous ’ appeal on the ground that the Mahrous f ailed to perfect the appeal by
po st ing a cas h deposit or bond f o r t wice the amount the justice court ordered them to pay the Association . The county court signed an order dismissing the Mah rous ’ appeal and stated in the order that “ the jud gement [sic] of the J.P. court below is final. ” The Mahrous the n perfected th is
ap peal. On appeal, the Mahrous contend that their appeal to the county court w a s perfected

w hen they filed their appeal by cash d eposit , deposi te d $500 with the justice court, and paid the $22 2.00 county co u rt filing fee. The Mahrous also assert that th e c ounty court erred by declaring the justice court ’ s judgment to be “ fi nal ” when it should have vacated the justice court ’ s void judgment and dism issed the ir appeal without pre j ud ice for lack of s ubject

- matter jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION
W e first consid er wh ether the Mahrous perfected their appeal of the jus tice c o urt ’ s judgment to the county court , which presents a question of law that we review de n ovo. See Pichini v. Federal Nat ’ l Mor t g . Ass ’ n , 569 S.W.3d 192, 193 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [1st Dist.]
201 8, no p et.)

. Ap peals fro m justice court to county court ar e governed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 506.1

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.1 . Th is rule imposes two requi rements on a pla int iff seeking to ap peal an adverse j ustice court judgment to county court . Firs t, the ru le re quires that a plain tiff seeking to appeal the judgment post a n appeal bond wi thin 21 days after judgment is signed b y the justice court. Id. R. 506. 1(a)

. T he rule further p rovides that an appe al is

“ perfected ” upon the filing of the bond. Id. R. 50 6 .1(h) . Second, the rule requires th at a plain tiff8

seeking to appeal the judgment pay the costs on appeal to the county cou rt in accordance with Rule 143 a. Id. ; Tex. R. Civ. P. 143a

. Rule 143a provides that:
If the appellant fails to pay the co sts on ap p eal from a judgment of a justice of the pea ce or small claims court within twenty (20) days after being notified to do so by the county c lerk, the appeal shall be deemed not perfected and th e county clerk shall return all papers in said ca use to the justi c e of the peace having original jurisdiction and the justice of the peace shall proceed as though no appeal had been att empted.

Id. R . 143a

. Compl iance w ith both requirement s is jurisdictional, and a county court lack s jurisdiction to hear an app eal if th e requir ements are not met. See Pichini , 569 S.W.3d at 193

.

Here, it is un disputed that the Mahrous timely p osted an ap peal bond of $500.00
with the justice court and timely paid the county court appeal costs of $222.00 as directed by th e
count y court c l erk. Neverth e less , t he Association argued, and the county court agreed, that the Mahrous were required t o post a bond “ in an amount equal to twice the amount ” the justice court ordered the Mahrous to pay the Association as dues for road r epair a nd ma inte na nc e. The Association reasons that the Mahro us are def endants seeking to appeal the justice court judgment and , conseq uently, are required by Rule 506.1 to pay an amount equal to twi ce the amount of the judgm ent. See Te x. R. Civ. P. 50 6. 1(b) ( “ A plainti ff must file a $500 bond. A d efendant must file a bond in an amount equal to twi ce the amount of the judgment. ” ). The record belies the Association ’ s assertion. The Mah rous initi ated the proceedings in justice court as plaintiffs seeking a judg ment that t he Association had improperly calculated the road repair and mai ntenance assess m ent because the assessment was based on a cost

- sharing formula c ontained in an invalid amendment to the Easement Grant. The justice court dismissed their cla im with prejudic e. The Mahrous appealed the justice court ’ s order and requ ested that the county court vacate it and di smiss their claim without prejudice so that they could pursue it in the only court9

with su bject

- matter juris diction to determine the vali dity of the Amen de d Easement Grant. A s plaintiff s challenging the trial court ’ s dismissal of their cl aim, the Mahrous were re quired to file a $500 bond, which they did. The trial court ’ s having ordered the Mahrous to pay the amount the Associat ion assess ed purs uant to t he challenged amendment does not con vert the Mahrous from plaintiffs to def end ants. The c rux of the Mahrou s ’ appea l is th e ir argument th at the ju stice cour t, having determined that it lacked su bject

- matter jurisdiction over the ir challenge to the validity o f the Amended Eas ement Grant , should have dismissed their claims without prejud ice instead of with p rejudice. See Mossler v. Shield s , 818 S.W. 2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) ( “ [I]t is well established that a di sm issal with prejudice fu nct ions as a fi nal determination on the merits. ” ). That an appeal of the trial court ’ s rulin g on its claims for relief would have the collateral consequence of vacating the justice court ’ s judgment , including its order that the Mahrous pay th e assessment , se e Praise D el iverance Church v. Jelinis, LLC , 5 36 S.W.3d 849, 854 (T ex. App.

— Ho uston [ 1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied ) ( perfection of appeal to county court effectively vacat es justice court judgment), does not alter the Mahrous ’ status as plai ntiff s appeal ing an advers e justice court judgment. The Mahrous complied with both
requ irements to p erfect the appeal of the justice court j udgment to the county cour t and , therefore , timely perfe cted the ir appeal. The county court erred by dismissing th e Mah rous ’
ap pea l on the g rou nd that i t was not timely perfected.

I n th eir brief to this Court, the Mah rous argue th at the county court should have

“ decl ared the justice court ’ s judgment to be v oid and vacated that judgment. ” This argument presumes that the county c our t had juri sdi ction to rev iew t he justice court ’ s alleged legal errors. The Mahrous ’ appea l from the justice c ourt judgment was an appeal de n ovo, meaning that the entire case is presented to the county court “ as if there had been no previou s trial. ” Te x. R. Civ.10

P

. 51 0.10(c)

. Because of the de novo nature of the proceedings, a county cour t d oes not sit as a true appellate court and does not review the justic e court ’ s decision for legal error ; inst ead, it
t ries the case for itself as if no ruling had ev e r been made in the justice court. S e e Villalon v. Bank One , 176 S.W.3d 66, 69

- 70 ( Tex. App

. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)

. Thus, when the Mahrous filed an d perfected their appeal, the justice court ’ s ju dgment was i n effect vacated

. Trip le C row n M oving & S tora ge, LLC v. Ackerman , 632 S.W.3d 626, 636 (T ex . Ap p.

— El Paso 2020, no pet.)

. T here was , therefore, no ne ed for the county court to take any action to va cate the justice court ’ s judgment

.

The Mahrous also a rgue on appe al that the county co urt should h ave grante d their plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case bec ause the case i nvolved issues of t itle to real
p roperty

. See Chambers v. Pruitt , 241 S.W.3d 679, 684 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2007, no pet.) ( “ District courts generally have exclusi ve jurisdict ion to determine title to real property. ” ). The Mahrous assert that the county court should have dismi ssed the case without prejudice “ so the title issues could be determined by the only court with the origina l su bject

- matter juri sdiction

— the dis trict cou rt o f Blanco County. ” Thus, the principal issue before us is whether the county court had subject

- matt er jur isdiction over the dispute between t he Mahrous and the Assoc iation over the dues as sessment or whether that dispute involv ed issues of tit le to rea l pr operty which the county court did not have jurisdiction to address. Wheth e r a trial cour t has subj ect

- matter jurisdiction is a question of law we revie w de no vo. Texas Nat. Res. Conser vation Comm ’ n v. IT Davy , 74 S .W.3d 849, 855 ( Tex. 2002) . If w e de termine the trial court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, we must rever se the trial court ’ s judgme nt and dismiss the case. See City of Garland v. Louton , 691 S.W.2d 603 , 605 Tex. 1985 ).11 Blanco Count y Court is a constitutional co unty court. See Tex

. Go v ’ t Cod e § 26.116 . It does not have jur isdiction in “ a suit for the recovery of lan d. ” Id. § 26.0 43(8)

. Thus, if this lawsuit constitutes a suit for the recovery of land, the county court did not have subject

- ma tter jurisdiction t o adjudicate the cl aims . A suit “ for the r ecovery of land is a suit tha t determine s title. ” See, e.g. , Doggett v. Ni tschke , 498 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1973) ( “ A county court does not have jurisdiction to tr y questions of title to land. ” ) ; Chambers v. Pruitt , 241 S.W.3d 67 9, 684 (Tex . App.

— Dallas 2007, no pet.) ( “ District cour t s generally have exclusive jurisdiction to de termine t itle to real prope rty. ” ). Suits for the recover y of land include more than simply dis putes over the identity of t he fee simple owner

. See, e.g. , Coug hr an v . Nune z , 1 27 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. 1939) (exp ressing “ no doubt ” tha t easements “ consti tute an interest in real estat e, ” a dispute over the existence of which “ necessarily involved the trial of title to real estate ” ); State v. R eece , 374 S.W.2d 6 86, 688 (Te x. App.

— Houston 1964, no writ) ( validity of deed restrict ions is question of title).

In the present case, the Mahrous argue that the Amended Easem ent Grant rel ied on by the Association to assess the road repair and ma intenance due s is invalid and doe s no t bind their tr acts in Section 2. The Mah rous maintain that beca use the existence of rights under the Amended Easement Grant are the basis of its claims, the case involves a d etermination of title to real propert y . The Association do es not dis pute th at r esolving disputes about rights under an easement involve s a determination of title to real p roperty

. However, the Association asserts that the parties ’ relative rights under the Amended Easement Grant are “ merely incidental ” to the issues in th e suit, w hi ch they chara cterize as w het her the Mahrous are r equired to pay the road repair and maintenance assessment. The Associati on relies on authority holding that if a question of title is present but aris es only incid entally , the title ques tion does not de priv e the12

cou nty court of jurisdiction. See Merit Management Partners 1, L.P. v. Noelke , 266 S.W.3d 637 , 646 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2008, no pet.) ( county court retains jurisdiction if title to real p roperty is only incid entally involved).

We ar e info rmed by th i s Court ’ s opinion in Noelke . I n that case, we explained that “ a county court does not have jurisdiction over a law suit if the gist of the suit is a titl e dispute. ” I

d. at 649 . We described the test for making t he determination as follows: “ T o deter mine the extent to which title and possession are i nvolved, we loo k to ‘ the nature of the suit, the injur y complained of, and the relief sought. ’ ” Id. (quoting Dauenhauer v. Devine , 51 Tex. 480, 487 (1879) ). “ If the r ight of re c overy in a suit dep end s, a t le as t in part, upon title to land, but there is no real dispute between the partie s over questions of title, the question of title is incidental. ” Id. at 648

. When the question of title is incidental, the county c ourt is not deprive d of jurisdic tion

. Id. ; see also In re Elamex, S.A. d e C. V. , 367 S.W.3d 891, 898 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding ) ( “ A lawsuit involves the adjudicati on of title to real property if title is not involved in a merely incidental or collateral way, bu t is actual ly invo lve d as the basis, as well as t he mea sure of right of any recovery. ” (citing Noelke , 266 S.W.3d at 646

- 47 ) )

.

H ere, the exist ence and validity of the Amended Eas ement Grant is at the heart of the Mahrous ’ cl aim for r eli ef. The Assoc ia tion argues t hat the Mah rous ’ plea ding never direct ly challenged the validity of the Amended Easement Gra nt but, rather, argued merely that the dues had been “ i ncorrectly as sessed and c ollected ” by the Assoc iation

. While we disagree tha t the Mahrous did n ot put the va lidity of t he Amended E a sement Grant at issue in the case, even

a ccepting the Associa tion ’ s argument, the case is stil l one to which title to real pro perty is more than inc identally involved. Th e Association ’ s right to coll ect the amoun t of d ues it has as sessed
requ ires the court to determine wh ich cost

- s harin g formula is applicable, that is, whether the13

Amended Easem ent Grant ’ s cost

- sharing formula is the correct for mula to apply. This, in turn, requires that the court det ermine whether the Amended Easem ent Gra nt i s enforceable. There is , th erefore, a real dispute between the parti es over the validity of the Amende d Easement Grant

— a ques tion of title. The Amended Easement Gra nt is the basi s for , as well as the mea sure of, the Association ’ s ri ght to asse ss and coll ect from the Mahrous the road repair and ma in ten ance costs they have sued to recover. To adjudicate whether the Mahrous owe the du es asses sed b y the Association , the court must determine the valid ity of the Amen d ed Easement Grant. The compet in g cla im s at issue in thi s case present a dispute with respect to title to real p roperty over which the county court d id not have jurisdiction

.
CON CLUSION The issue of title to p roperty presented by the Mah rous an d the Ass ociation in their c l aims is n eit her inc idental n or collater al. The question of title lies at the heart of both parties ’ claims, and, there fo re, the county cour t did not have jurisd iction over the lawsu it. “ If the trial court lacks subject matter juris dic tion , the appellate court can ma ke no o rder othe r th an reversing the judgment of the court belo w and dismissing the cause. ” L outon , 691 S.W.2d
at 605 . The county court lacked s ubject

- matter jurisdiction over this cause. C o nsequently, we vacate the judgment of the county court and d is m iss this c ause.

___________________________ _______________ Chari L. Kell y , Ju stice Befo re Justices Baker, Kelly, and T heo fa nis Vacated and Di smiss ed for Wa nt of Jurisd iction
F iled: August 4 , 2023