IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

J.P., : SEALED CASE

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Department of Human Services, : No. 720 C.D. 2016

Respondent : Submitted: September 2, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: November 21, 2016

J.P. petitions this Court for review of the Pennsylvania Department of 

Human Services (DHS), Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ (BHA) April 13, 2016

order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) recommendation dismissing 

J.P.’s administrative appeal (Decision). The sole issue before the Court is whether 

BHA erred in holding that J.P. was not entitled to a hearing under Section 6341(a)(2) 

of the Child Protective Services Law (Law), 24 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a)(2). 

On April 17, 2015, the Lycoming County Children and Youth Services 

(CYS) received a report alleging that J.P. physically abused J.E. (Child). From 

approximately April 2015 through February 2016, J.P. was the Child’s father’s 

paramour. On June 10, 2015, CYS completed its child abuse investigation and filed 

an indicated report1of child abuse naming J.P. as a perpetrator of abuse. J.P. filed an 

 

1

Section 6303(a) of the Law defines an “indicated report” as a report issued by DHS or a 

county agency where it is “determine[d] that substantial evidence of the alleged abuse by a 

perpetrator exists based on any of the following: (i) [a]vailable medical evidence[;] (ii) [t]he child 

protective service investigation[; or,] (iii) [a]n admission of the acts of abuse by the perpetrator.” 

23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a); see also Section 3490.4 of DHS’ Regulations, 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.
2

expunction appeal to listing her as a child abuse perpetrator on the ChildLine & 

Abuse Registry (ChildLine Registry).

2

Thereafter, a Lycoming County Juvenile 

Court (Juvenile Court) Master held a hearing, and found that J.P. caused physical 

abuse to the Child based on the same incident alleged in CYS’ indicated report. On 

July 17, 2015, the Lycoming County Common Pleas Court (trial court) affirmed the 

Master’s July 14, 2015 findings. J.P. did not appeal from the Master’s July 14, 2015 

findings or the trial court’s July 17, 2015 order. 

On January 7, 2016, CYS filed a Motion to Dismiss J.P.’s expunction 

appeal (Motion) with BHA because the status of the report was changed from 

“indicated” to “founded”

3

based on a trial court finding. However, BHA denied the 

Motion because CYS failed to provide verification of the trial court’s finding. On 

 

2

Section 3490.4 of the DHS’ Regulations defines “ChildLine” as 

[a]n organizational unit of [DHS] which operates a Statewide toll-free 

system for receiving reports of suspected child abuse established 

under [S]ection 6332 of the [Law] (relating to establishment of 

Statewide toll-free telephone number), refers the reports for 

investigation and maintains the reports in the appropriate file. . . .

55 Pa. Code § 3490.4. “The ChildLine Registry is maintained in accordance with the [Law.]” In 

re: S.H., 96 A.3d 448, 450 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

3

Section 6303(a) of the Law defines a “founded report” as follows:

A child abuse report involving a perpetrator that is made pursuant to 

this chapter, if any of the following applies:

(1) There has been a judicial adjudication based on a finding that a 

child who is a subject of the report has been abused and the 

adjudication involves the same factual circumstances involved in the 

allegation of child abuse. The judicial adjudication may include any 

of the following:

. . . . 

(iii) A finding of dependency under [Section 6341 of the Juvenile

Act,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341 (relating to adjudication)[,] if the court has 

entered a finding that a child who is the subject of the report has been 

abused.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a); see also Section 3490.4 of DHS’ Regulations, 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.
3

January 27, 2016, CYS renewed its Motion. On January 29, 2016, BHA issued a rule 

for J.P. to show cause why the appeal should proceed to a hearing. J.P. responded

that since she was not a party to the Juvenile Court matter, the Juvenile Court’s 

finding of abuse did not apply to her. On February 24, 2016, an ALJ hearing was 

held. On April 12, 2016, the ALJ found that because J.P. read her paramour’s July 

14, 2015 hearing notice prior to the hearing, and understood that CYS’ abuse 

allegation against her would be at issue during the hearing, but she did not attempt to 

take part in the July 14, 2015 Juvenile Court hearing, J.P.’s appeal of the founded 

report should be dismissed. On April 13, 2016, BHA adopted the ALJ’s 

recommendation in its entirety.4 J.P. appealed to this Court.5

J.P. argues that BHA erroneously dismissed her expunction appeal and 

that she is entitled to a hearing with respect to whether she abused the Child. CYS 

rejoins that BHA properly dismissed J.P.’s appeal, and the issues before the Court 

are: (1) whether J.P. had notice and an opportunity to be heard on the allegations that 

she abused the Child; and (2) whether the status of the report was properly changed 

from “indicated” to “founded.”

Initially, 

a founded report of child abuse is an adjudication and that, 

under Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 

Pa.C.S. § 504, ‘[n]o adjudication of a Commonwealth 

agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have 

been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an 

opportunity to be heard.’ Id.

 

4

J.P. filed a Request for Reconsideration which BHA denied.

5 CYS intervened.

“Our ‘scope of review in expunction proceedings is limited to a determination of whether 

constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law were committed, or whether necessary 

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.’” K.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 950 A.2d 

1069, 1073 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting E.D. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 719 A.2d 384, 387 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1998)). 
4

K.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 950 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (emphasis 

added). Here, although the ALJ concluded: “[J.P.] was afforded reasonable notice of 

the July 14, 2015 hearing at the [Juvenile Court,]” ALJ Dec. at 4, this Court 

disagrees.

In an administrative proceeding, the essential elements of 

due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard. Wills 

v. State [Bd.] of Vehicle [Mfrs.], Dealers and Salespersons,

. . . 588 A.2d 572 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1991). ‘Notice, the most 

basic requirement of due process, must ‘be reasonably 

calculated to inform interested parties of the pending 

action, and the information necessary to provide an 

opportunity to present objections. . . .’ ’ Noetzel v. 

Glasgow, Inc., . . . 487 A.2d 1372, 1377 ([Pa. Super.] 1985) 

. . . (quoting [Pa.] Coal Mining Ass[’n] v. Ins[.] [Dep’t], . . . 

370 A.2d 685, 692-693 ([Pa.] 1977)).

Grossman v. State Bd. of Psychology, 825 A.2d 748, 762 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)

(emphasis added). “Due process of law requires notice to be given to the 

respondent so that [s]he may adequately prepare h[er] defense in such cases.” Straw 

v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 308 A.2d 619, 621 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973) (emphasis 

added).

J.P. testified at the ALJ hearing:

JUDGE: How did you learn of the July 14, 2015 hearing in 

front of the Master?

A. When [my paramour] received that piece of paper, the 

court hearing appointment paper that [the trial court] sent 

out court-ordering [my paramour] and [the Child] to both 

attend the hearing, that’s how I found out about it.

JUDGE: Did you receive anything from the [c]ourt 

saying to attend the hearing?

A. No, I did not. I did not receive a separate letter. My 

name was never put on the letter that [my paramour] and 

[his Child] got. We’ve had a couple of hearings. My name 

has never been on the paperwork, and it never mentioned 

that I was able to attend these hearings. If I was allowed to, 
5

you know, I’d be able to. Because nine times out of ten, in 

family court they just want the immediate family.

I myself am not considered a stepmother. I am not 

considered anything to the [C]hild or to [my paramour] in 

the eyes of [CYS] and in the eyes of the [c]ourt. They put 

me down as paramour, which basically, I guess, is a fly-bythe-seat girlfriend. That’s how they look at me, that I’m 

nothing to the [C]hild. So that’s one reason why I never 

attended these hearings, because they’re not looking at me 

as part of the [C]hild’s life.

JUDGE: Did you ever receive an Order from the 

[Juvenile Court] or from the [trial court] in regard to 

this matter, or ---

A. No.

. . . .

JUDGE: Now, when the Master issued her --- after the 

Master issued [her] decision, did she send a copy of her 

decision to you?

A. No. No, I have not received any paperwork from 

[CYS]. I have not received any paperwork from the 

Master. . . . 

Notes of Testimony, February 24, 2016 (N.T.) at 21-24 (emphasis added). Upon 

further inquiry from the ALJ, J.P. continued:

JUDGE: And [J.]P., correct me if I have this wrong. Your 

argument is that you were not at the hearing in front of the 

Master, you did not have --- you did not defend yourself in 

the allegations of abuse committed against the [Child], 

though you were aware of the hearing prior to the Master’s 

decision, and that you did not appeal the Master’s decision; 

is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. I did not know I was allowed to appeal. I 

didn’t know I was allowed to do anything. I was told 

specifically from [CYS] themselves that any matter 

pertaining to anything that has to do with the [C]hild, I am 

not allowed to ask any questions, and the father is the one 

that’s supposed to be doing all of this.
6

And I had no --- we had no idea, that I was allowed to do 

anything to try to get information that I was able to obtain. 

As soon as the caseworker came into the house --- that was 

the last contact that I had with the caseworkers. They were 

always contacting the father. They didn’t want to ---. What 

am I trying to say?

JUDGE: They were primarily sending correspondence or 

information to the parents, and you’re not a parent?

A. Yes. Like, if I had any questions, I wasn’t allowed to 

contact [CYS] or anything like that to ask them a question. 

The father had to do it. Even though the hearing was 

pertaining to --- had to do with me too, I wasn’t allowed to 

ask any questions. I was never ---.

N.T. at 26-28 (emphasis added). Finally at the conclusion of the hearing, J.P. 

reiterated:

JUDGE: I’ll admit, I’ve never had this exact situation come 

up before. I’ve had situations where parties went to the 

dependency hearing and were prohibited from testifying or 

defending themselves of allegations of abuse. But this one, 

[J.]P. didn’t attempt to get into the hearing to defend 

herself.

A. If I knew I was allowed to attend, I would have. I 

wouldn’t have a problem because, I mean, I’d like to testify 

and give my evidence that I have, and I know that we have 

witnesses that would testify on my behalf, and there’s new 

evidence that I can have come up.

N.T. at 31-32 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, it is uncontested that the only notice provided 

regarding the dependency hearing was the notice to J.P.’s paramour. The fact that 

J.P. read his notice, does not transform his notice to her notice. This conclusion is 

especially true here, where J.P. testified that she “was told specifically from [CYS] 

themselves that any matter pertaining to anything that has to do with the [C]hild, I am 

not allowed to ask any questions” and she assumed she would not be permitted to 

participate in the dependency hearing because she was not the Child’s parent. N.T. at
7

27. While we recognize that “[DHS] may rely on the factual findings of the trial 

court in a dependency adjudication to dismiss an appeal for a request for 

expungement[,]” K.R., 950 A.2d at 1078, because J.P. did not receive notice prior to 

the adjudication, she did not receive the requisite due process for a valid adjudication. 

Grossman.

For all of the above reasons, BHA’s order is reversed, and the matter is 

remanded to BHA to provide J.P. a hearing.

 

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

J.P., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Department of Human Services, : No. 720 C.D. 2016

Respondent : 

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2016, the Pennsylvania 

Department of Human Services, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ (BHA) April 13, 

2016 order is reversed and the matter is remanded to BHA to provide J.P a hearing 

consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge