UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1408

CISSY SEGUJJA MAZZI,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals. 

Argued: October 26, 2016 Decided: December 1, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Petition for review granted in part and case remanded by 

unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Davis wrote the opinion, in 

which Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Lori Beth Schoenberg, LAW OFFICES OF LORI B. SCHOENBERG, 

Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner. Lance Lomond Jolley, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 

Respondent. ON BRIEF: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Jesse M. Bless, Senior 

Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:

Cissy Segujja Mazzi (“Mazzi”), a native and citizen of Uganda, 

petitions for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) regarding her asylum and withholding of removal 

claims. For the reasons that follow, we grant in part Mazzi’s 

petition and remand the case to the BIA for further proceedings. 

I.

Mazzi is a native and citizen of Uganda. When Mazzi was 

eleven years old, she moved with her family to a village in Bukwo, 

a district in eastern Uganda, where her maternal grandparents 

lived. Mazzi’s mother and maternal grandparents belonged to the 

Sabiny tribe, an ethnic group that practiced female genital 

mutilation (“FGM”).1 Mazzi’s mother passed away in 1990, the year 

 1 We provide the following description of the underlying act:

Female genital mutilation, commonly called FGM, is the 

designation generally given to a class of surgical 

procedures involving the removal of some or all of the 

external genitalia, performed primarily on girls and 

young women in Africa and Asia. Often performed under 

unsanitary conditions with highly rudimentary 

instruments, FGM is extremely painful, permanently 

disfigures the female genitalia, [and] exposes the girl 

or woman to the risk of serious, potentially lifethreatening complications, including bleeding, 

infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological 

trauma, and damage to the urethra and anus. FGM can 

result in the permanent loss of genital sensation in the 

victim and can adversely affect sexual function. 

Haoua v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 227, 230 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations 
3

that Mazzi’s sister turned sixteen. Some months later, Mazzi’s 

grandmother arranged for her sister to undergo FGM so she could 

marry a village elder. Fearing she would be next to forcibly 

undergo FGM, Mazzi began to save money to purchase a bus ticket to 

Kampala, where her father lived. 

When Mazzi was fifteen years old, she was taken by her sister

to the village elders to undergo circumcision. Mazzi was able to 

escape with the assistance of a friend, who gave her enough money 

to purchase a bus ticket to Kampala. When she found her father, 

he allowed her to live with him and his new family. Her father’s 

tribe, the Baganda, did not practice FGM, and none of her halfsiblings living with her father were forced to undergo the 

procedure. Mazzi enrolled in a nearby secondary school and was 

later admitted to Makerere University. 

During her orientation at Makerere University, Mazzi 

encountered a girl from her Bukwo village, Lumonya, who recognized 

Mazzi. Upon returning from class one day, Mazzi found her sister 

and her brother-in-law waiting for her in her dorm room. Lumonya 

had informed her mother where Mazzi lived, and Mazzi’s sister used 

 

omitted). FGM has also been described as genital circumcision or 

cutting. See Gomis v. Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); 

Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 2009). We have 

long recognized that FGM constitutes persecution within the 

meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Haoura, 472 F.3d 

at 231-32 (citations omitted). 
4

this information to find Mazzi. Although the visit was short, 

Mazzi’s sister promised to come back and visit soon. Mazzi 

believed it was no longer safe to live in the campus dorms, and 

she moved off-campus and commuted during her four years at the 

university. Believing that her village elders were afraid of 

challenging her father, Mazzi rented a two-room house close to her 

father’s home. 

In 2003, Mazzi obtained a job at Kyambogo University. After 

Mazzi’s father promised to check up on her, Mazzi moved to a new 

house closer to her work. Three months later, Mazzi learned that 

her neighbor recognized her as a Sabiny woman who had escaped 

circumcision. This neighbor threatened to reveal Mazzi’s identity 

and location to Sabiny elders, and she extorted goods and services 

from Mazzi in exchange for her silence. In 2004, Mazzi moved in 

the middle of the night to escape this neighbor. After she fled, 

Mazzi kept to herself and did not talk to others. However, six 

months later, she boarded a taxi whose conductor was a man from 

her Bukwo village. The conductor told the taxi driver that Mazzi 

was the girl from the Sentambule family, her brother-in-law’s 

family, who had escaped FGM. Mazzi left the taxi at the next stop; 

thereafter, she avoided public transportation. Mazzi testified 

that she could not travel freely in Uganda due to fear she would 

be recognized and turned over to the Sabiny or her sister’s family. 

She also explained that FGM was considered a rite of passage for 
5

girls in the Sabiny tribe, and uncircumcised girls and women were 

often blamed for any misfortunes that befell their families. 

Mazzi’s sister suffers from chronic back pain and an inability to 

conceive, and these misfortunes are blamed on Mazzi’s refusal to 

undergo the knife. Mazzi testified that her brother and her 

friend, John Cabonga, told her over the phone that she will be 

forcibly cut if she returns to Uganda. 

In September 2003, Mazzi entered the United States before 

returning to Uganda after a few weeks. On or about August 28, 

2005, Mazzi entered the United States on a valid student visa. 

She later sought to adjust her status to a legal permanent resident 

based on her marriage to a U.S. citizen, but her application was 

denied due to a finding of fraud. Mazzi subsequently fell out of 

status. On August 18, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security 

served Mazzi with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). The NTA charged 

Mazzi with removability under § 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act as someone who remained beyond the period 

authorized by her visa. Mazzi admitted she was removable as 

charged, but she requested time to apply for adjustment of status. 

Mazzi filed an I-360 Petition as a self-petitioning spouse of an 

abusive U.S. citizen, which was denied for insufficient evidence. 

Mazzi then sought a continuance to apply for adjustment of status 

in light of her second marriage. The IJ denied this request given 

the earlier finding of fraud, which would prohibit any future 
6

adjustment applications on the basis of marriage. Subsequently, 

Mazzi applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). This application 

was filed, at the earliest, on February 25, 2013. In 2010, before 

the filing of this application, Mazzi’s father passed away. 

Mazzi submitted country reports and articles in support of 

her claims for relief. Her reports explained the significance of 

FGM within Sabiny culture, and one report indicated that the 

practice of FGM was estimated at approximately 50% among the 

Sabiny. Other reports indicated that after the Ugandan government 

prohibited genital cutting in 2010, the Sabiny have continued —

and may have increased — their practice of FGM. Mazzi also 

provided testimony of her experiences in Uganda, including her 

encounters with members of the Sabiny community, her sister, and 

her brother-in-law while living 300 miles away from her Bukwo

village. Given her father’s passing in 2010, Mazzi believes there 

is now no one in Uganda who can protect her from the Sabiny tribe 

if she were forced to return. 

Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied all 

requested relief. The IJ first determined that Mazzi’s application 

for asylum was time-barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Turning 

to the merits, the IJ ruled that Mazzi’s claimed fear of future 

persecution was not objectively reasonable. The IJ found this 

claimed fear was inconsistent with evidence proffered by both Mazzi 
7

and the Government, which demonstrated that only 1% of the female 

population in Uganda is subjected to FGM, the practice of FGM is 

targeted at unmarried girls under the age of 18, and FGM is now 

prohibited by the Ugandan government. At the time of the hearing, 

Mazzi was 37 years old. The IJ further opined that Mazzi’s own 

experiences in Uganda undermined the objective reasonableness of 

her fear of future persecution. The IJ noted that Mazzi was never 

kidnapped or taken for the procedure after she fled her Bukwo 

village, and the IJ concluded that Mazzi can avoid persecution by 

relocating to a different part of the country. Thus, having 

determined that Mazzi’s claimed fear of persecution was not 

objectively credible, the IJ denied Mazzi’s requests for asylum 

and withholding of removal. Then, finding that Mazzi failed to 

demonstrate a clear probability of torture at the instigation of 

or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official, the IJ 

also denied Mazzi’s request for protection under CAT. 

The BIA dismissed Mazzi’s appeal in a two-page opinion. At 

the outset, the BIA found Mazzi’s claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel to be unsupported by documentation. Turning to the 

IJ’s denial of relief, the BIA provided two grounds for dismissing 

Mazzi’s remaining claims. First, the BIA stated that Mazzi “ha[d] 

not meaningfully challenged the Immigration Judge’s decision, or 

its underlying reasoning, as it pertains to the timeliness of her 

application, the credibility of her claim, or the basis of her 
8

fear.” J.A. 3. “In any event,” however, the BIA provided a second 

ground for dismissal: it “f[ound] no clear error in the Immigration 

Judge’s findings of fact and otherwise adopt[ed] and affirm[ed] 

h[er] decision” to deny Mazzi’s requests for relief. Id. 

Mazzi timely filed a petition for review as to her asylum and 

withholding of removal claims,2 and we possess jurisdiction 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 

II.

Where, as here, the BIA adopts and supplements an IJ decision, 

we review both decisions. Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 

(4th Cir. 2014) (citing Ai Hua Chen v. Holder, 742 F.3d 171, 177 

(4th Cir. 2014)). We must uphold the BIA’s determinations unless 

they are “manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of 

discretion.” Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011). 

Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Cordova, 759 F.3d at 337. 

We review the agency’s credibility and factual findings for 

substantial evidence, and we are obligated to treat them as 

conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled 

 2 Because Mazzi did not raise any arguments regarding the 

dismissal of her CAT claim, she has waived any issues regarding 

this form of relief. See Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 565 n.2 

(4th Cir. 2013). In a mere footnote, the Government argues that

Mazzi also waived her withholding of removal claim by failing to 

address this issue in her opening brief. This contention is 

unavailing. Throughout her opening brief, Mazzi repeatedly argues 

that the IJ and BIA erred when denying both her claims for asylum 

and withholding of removal.
9

to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Chen, 742 F.3d at 178). 

However, the agency abuses its discretion where it “fail[s] to 

offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] 

or disregard[s] important aspects of the applicant’s claim.” 

Tassi, 660 F.3d at 719 (citing Jian Tao Lin v. Holder, 611 F.3d 

228, 235 (4th Cir. 2010)). In reviewing the agency’s decisions, 

it is “our responsibility to ensure that unrebutted, legally 

significant evidence is not arbitrarily ignored by the 

factfinder.” Baharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted). 

A.

Mazzi first contends that the BIA erred when it summarily 

concluded that Mazzi “ha[d] not meaningfully challenged the [IJ]’s 

decision, or its underlying reasoning, as it pertains to the 

timeliness of her application, the credibility of her claim, or 

the basis for her fear.” Pet’r’s Br. 34 (quoting J.A. 3). Mazzi 

argues that this failure warrants a remand for further explanation. 

The Supreme Court has instructed that “the process of review 

requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency 

acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.” SEC v. 

Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). We “cannot review the BIA’s 

decision [when] the BIA has given us nothing to review.” Nken v. 

Holder, 585 F.3d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 693-94 (4th Cir.
10

2008)). Where, as we conclude occurred here, “a BIA order does 

not demonstrate that the agency has considered an issue, ‘the 

proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the 

agency for additional investigation or explanation.’” Id.

(quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)). In 

its order, the BIA did not define what constitutes a “meaningful 

challenge” to an order of removal, nor did it explain why Mazzi’s 

challenges were deemed inadequate. Moreover, from this conclusory 

assertion, it is impossible to identify which specific challenges, 

if any, were considered by the BIA when it found Mazzi’s appeal 

lacking. Well-established precedent dictates that a court must 

“restrict itself to what the agency actually did say” rather than 

“guess[ing] at what the agency meant to say,” id., and the BIA’s 

“cursory statement . . . does not provide us enough information to 

conduct a meaningful review of the BIA’s conclusion,” Fang Lin, 

517 F.3d at 693. 

If this were the only ground for the BIA’s denial order, “the 

proper course . . . [would be] to remand to the agency for 

additional investigation or explanation.” Cordova, 759 F.3d at

338 (citation omitted). However, the BIA provided an alternative 

basis for its decision: it reached the merits of the IJ’s decision 

and found no clear error in her findings. J.A. 3. No remand is 

necessary if the BIA correctly found no clear error in the IJ’s 
11

findings and denial order. Accordingly, we turn to Mazzi’s 

arguments challenging the IJ’s denial of relief. 

B.

Mazzi argues that the IJ’s findings were not supported by 

substantial evidence. In assessing this contention, we must note 

an important distinction between Mazzi’s claims for asylum and 

withholding of removal. An individual applying for asylum must 

show “by clear and convincing evidence that the application has 

been filed within one year after the date of [her] arrival in the 

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Withholding of removal, 

on the other hand, is not subject to the one-year limitation bar. 

Accordingly, given that Mazzi filed her application for asylum 

years after she entered the United States in 2005, she may pursue 

asylum only if she “qualifies for an exception to the one-year 

deadline.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(B). 

The IJ rejected Mazzi’s contentions that she could identify 

changed or extraordinary circumstances under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(a)(2)(D) that would excuse her untimely filing. The IJ 

determined that Mazzi’s “asylum application is late by any 

analysis,” and she concluded Mazzi is thereby “barred from asylum.” 

J.A. 101. The BIA found no clear error in any of the IJ’s 

determinations, and it adopted and affirmed her denial of asylum. 

Absent a colorable constitutional claim or question of law, “we 

lack jurisdiction to review the [IJ]’s discretionary 
12

determination, as affirmed by the BIA, that [Mazzi] had not 

demonstrated changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse her 

untimely filing.” Gomis v. Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 

2009). Mazzi contends that the BIA’s “refusal” to review the IJ’s 

assessment of her asylum claim was “prejudicial,” given this 

Court’s inability to consider “questions concerning the timeliness 

of [her] asylum application.” Pet’r’s Br. 38. In making this 

assertion, however, Mazzi mischaracterizes the BIA’s order; the 

BIA reached the findings of fact articulated in the IJ’s decision 

and expressly adopted the IJ’s reasoning. Mazzi then challenges 

the conclusory nature with which the BIA affirmed and adopted the 

IJ’s order, arguing that the BIA “effectively insulated” the IJ’s 

determinations from review. Id. at 39. This argument is without 

merit. In Gomis, despite the BIA’s conclusory assertion that there 

was “no error in the [IJ]’s decision” regarding timeliness, we

held we lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s determination. 

Gomis, 571 F.3d at 358-59. 

Here, too, we are without jurisdiction to review the 

timeliness basis for the denial of Mazzi’s application for asylum. 

Accordingly, we need not reach Mazzi’s remaining arguments 

regarding her eligibility for asylum, and her Petition for Review 

is denied as it relates to her asylum claim.
13

C.

We now turn to Mazzi’s withholding of removal claim. To 

qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must show a clear 

probability that her life or freedom would be threatened in the 

country of removal because of her “race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). Withholding of 

removal is mandatory if the applicant satisfies her burden of 

proof. Gomis, 571 F.3d at 359 (citation omitted). Whereas an 

applicant must prove her “removal would create a ‘reasonable 

possibility’ — as low as a ten percent chance — of persecution” 

for asylum purposes, Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 

126 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 

431 (1987)), an applicant must prove it is more likely than not 

she will suffer persecution to qualify for withholding of removal, 

Gomis, 571 F.3d at 359. 

Here, Mazzi asserts she is a member of a particular social 

group: women in the Sabiny tribal group in Uganda that, due to 

their gender and kinship ties, are subjected to the practice of 

FGM. The IJ found that Mazzi’s fear of persecution was not 

objectively reasonable, and it found her testimony to be not 

credible exclusively on this basis. Mazzi argues that the IJ and 

BIA erred by relying exclusively on general country conditions and 

failing to consider compelling, contradictory evidence specific to 
14

Mazzi’s individual experiences. We find that this failure warrants 

remand for further explanation. 

Although our task as the “reviewing court is not to reweigh 

the evidence,” we must nonetheless “ensure that unrebutted, 

legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily ignored by the 

factfinder.” Chen, 742 F.3d at 179 (quoting Baharon, 588 F.3d at

233). The agency may not “base [its] decision on only isolated 

snippets of [the] record while disregarding the rest,” Baharon, 

588 F.3d at 233, and the agency may not “selectively consider 

evidence, ignoring that evidence that corroborates an alien’s 

claims and calls into question the conclusion the judge is 

attempting to reach,” Chen, 742 F.3d at 179 (quoting Tang v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009)). Here, Mazzi 

offered numerous pieces of compelling evidence, including, most 

tellingly, evidence specific to her individual experiences, for 

which the BIA and IJ failed to adequately account. 

First, the IJ failed to analyze Mazzi’s proposed social group 

without explanation. Failure to analyze an immigrant’s proposed 

social group is an abuse of discretion requiring remand. See

Cordova, 759 F.3d at 338 (4th Cir. 2014). Mazzi testified that 

she is considered Sabiny due to her kinship and family ties, and 

thus her proposed social group was Sabiny women who had not yet 

been subjected to FGM. Yet the IJ asserted that Mazzi’s protected 

ground was as a “wom[an] fearing FGM,” and she subsequently
15

analyzed Mazzi’s claim in light of general statistics regarding a 

different proposed social group: Ugandan women fearing FGM. J.A. 

101, 103. The IJ either failed to analyze Mazzi’s proposed social 

group completely, or the IJ disregarded Mazzi’s proposed social 

group and failed to account for Mazzi’s compelling evidence that 

she is a Sabiny woman subject to the practice of FGM. The IJ may 

have had reason to disregard Mazzi’s proposed social group or her 

testimony about her Sabiny ties, but the IJ failed to address 

either element in her analysis. 

Second, the IJ relied heavily on the evidence that only 1% of 

all Ugandan girls and women are subjected to FGM. However, at 

least one article submitted by Mazzi indicates that approximately

50% of Sabiny girls and women undergo FGM. J.A. 277. Evidence 

that Mazzi, as a Sabiny woman, faces a higher risk of FGM than 

others outside her specific ethnic group is not inconsistent with 

country reports documenting a low rate of FGM across all ethnic 

groups. Yet the IJ did not account for this higher, relevant risk 

in her analysis of the evidence, nor did she explain why she 

dismissed this evidence in favor of general statistics. Base rates 

matter.

Third, although the IJ emphasizes that the Ugandan government 

has prohibited the use of FGM, reports also acknowledge that the 

Sabiny have continued to practice FGM despite this ban. J.A. 310-

11. Indeed, at least one report acknowledged an increase in the 
16

prevalence of FGM among Sabiny communities arising from defiance 

to the new law. J.A. 282, 286. The IJ did not discuss or 

acknowledge this defiance to, if not failure of, enforcement and 

instead, relied only on evidence that FGM was outlawed in Uganda. 

Fourth, the IJ emphasized that “not one single article”

indicates a previously married woman, or a woman over the age of 

18, has been subjected to FGM in Uganda. J.A. 102. According to 

the IJ, Mazzi’s age and marital status likely save her from 

circumcision. However, at least one article submitted by Mazzi 

states: as it has “often [been] reported, married women who had 

avoided FGM as girls are swelling the ranks of those being cut in 

Kapchorwa today[.]” J.A. 273 (emphasis added). Moreover, Mazzi 

testified that uncircumcised women continue to be blamed for the 

misfortunes of their family, no matter their age or marital status. 

Mazzi’s sister suffers from chronic back pain and an inability to 

conceive, which she blames on Mazzi’s refusal to undergo the knife. 

An article submitted by Mazzi corroborates her testimony that 

“uncircumcised women were seen by the Sabiny as the source of 

disasters — including food shortages in the community and 

infertility in the household.” J.A. 273. According to Mazzi’s 

testimony, multiple individuals have informed her that, due to 

this cultural belief, she will be forcibly cut if she returns to 

Uganda. Although these reasons for enforcing circumcision on Mazzi 

appear pressing and relevant despite her age and marital status, 
17

the above evidence was not identified or discussed in the IJ’s 

analysis regarding Mazzi’s objective fear or credibility. 

Fifth, the IJ made two observations regarding Mazzi’s 

individual experiences in Uganda: she noted it was “interesting” 

that Mazzi lived with her mother’s Sabiny family until she was 

fifteen years old and was never taken for FGM during this time, 

and she noted that when Mazzi moved away from her mother’s family, 

“[n]o one came after her and stole her into this ritual.” J.A. 

104. However salient they may be, these assertions comprise an 

incomplete narrative insofar as they fail to acknowledge other 

compelling aspects of Mazzi’s testimony. That is, Mazzi was able 

to escape circumcision when living with her mother’s family 

precisely because she fled her home at the moment she was taken 

for FGM. Moreover, even when Mazzi lived 300 miles away from her 

Sabiny community, she was identified on at least three separate 

occasions as the girl who had escaped circumcision from her 

village. On one occasion, she was extorted with threats of 

revealing her identity and location to Sabiny elders. On another 

occasion, her sister and brother-in-law successfully tracked down 

Mazzi’s location and visited her with promises to return, despite 

her distance from her home village. The threat of persecution is 

especially troubling now that her father, the only person Mazzi 

believed could protect her from her Sabiny family and elders, has 

since passed away. Mazzi’s testimony that she continued to be 
18

recognized and threatened by the Sabiny community, even when living 

300 miles away from her Bukwo village, further call into question 

the thoroughness of the IJ’s conclusion that Mazzi could 

“reasonably relocate within the country of Uganda to avoid any 

persecution.” J.A. 105.

We have determined that country conditions reports should not 

be viewed “‘as Holy Writ’ immune to contradiction,” and Mazzi is 

“entitled to have the expert agency, the BIA, evaluate in a 

transparent way the evidence that [she has] presented.” Chen, 742 

F.3d at 179, 181 (citations omitted). The evidence identified 

above significantly rebuts or challenges the IJ’s reasoning 

regarding an objective likelihood of persecution and credibility 

as it relates to Mazzi’s specific circumstances, and we believe it 

is “strong enough that it requires the agency to account for it in 

a meaningful way.” Id. at 181. We are persuaded that the IJ and 

BIA failed to adequately “offer a specific, cogent reason for 

rejecting [the significant] evidence” identified above in favor of 

general statistics, Tassi, 660 F.3d at 720, and they failed to 

“announce their decision[s] in terms sufficient to enable a 

reviewing court to perceive that they have heard and thought and 

not merely reacted,” Chen, 742 F.3d at 179 (quoting Ayala v. U.S.

Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010)). We are restricted 

by this silence; even if the IJ or BIA had sound reasons for 

favoring general statistics over Mazzi’s situation-specific 
19

evidence, we are not permitted to “guess at what an agency meant

to say.” Nken, 585 F.3d at 822 (emphasis added). To the extent 

boilerplate language was used to discount any of the above

evidence, it was plainly “insufficient to demonstrate that the 

agency gave it more than perfunctory consideration.” Chen, 742 

F.3d at 181. 

We take seriously “our responsibility to ensure that 

unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily 

ignored by the factfinder.” Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233 (citation 

omitted). Thus, given the deficiencies identified above, we remand 

this case for further explanation. See Chen, 742 F.3d at 179-81 

(remanding where the BIA and IJ failed to adequately account for 

petitioners’ “powerful contradictory evidence”); Nken, 585 F.3d at 

822 (remanding where the BIA failed to explain why a strong piece 

of evidence provided insufficient justification for reopening the 

proceedings).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Petition for Review 

as it relates to the denial of withholding of removal, and we 

remand for the agency to reevaluate it in accordance with this 

opinion. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW

GRANTED IN PART AND CASE REMANDED