• :QHAFT 

SUBJECT: 

TO: 

1. 

Present Organization tor Research on Ultra 

Material tor Intelligence Concerning Security 

ot Our Own Communications. 

General Corderman 

In the past tev days discussions have been hold 

between myself and various members of Signal Security . Agency concerned with the carrying out of the directive 

contained in the attached memorandum and your recent ver~al 

directlve in cODDection with our evaluatioa of Ultra . ma.terial from the point ot view of discovering weaknesses 

in our own crJPtogn.phic SJ'Stema and procedUl'os and bringing about corrections therein. Careful consideration has 

been given to the matter ot improving OUl' present set-up 

and operations in this field. 

2. a. It is found that the Communications Securit7 

Branch is quite competent to evaluate material having a 

bearing upon our crJPtographic s7stems and requiring a good 

knowledge of the techniques of crJPtanal7sis. However, 

Communications Securit7 Branch and Protective Securit7 Branch 

are not in a good position to evaluate information contained 

tA ,,!Cr in Ultra having a bearing upo~a.nal7sis and requiring a good 

lalowledge or traffic anal7s1s techniques. Without such 

knowledge it is difficult to add together isolated bits of 

information which might tell vbat the Japanese are able to do 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-28-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
- - - - - - - - - - ----

along theae linea. 

b. The present tiles ot Ultra material in the 

Communieations SecuritJ Branch are not pa.rticularl7 well 

suited tor research along traffic anal7ais lines. Moreover, 

there appeara reason to believe that ve ma7 be overlooking 

a good deal or material or potential value in connection with 

traffic anal7sis, because without a knowledge or tratric 

anal7s1s techniques the scanners and translators in B-I 

cannot be expected to be able to recognize scattered or 

isolated bits or information as being ot potential value, 

so that it ma.7 be that messages Yid.ch would be ot value are 

"deadheaded!' 

c. Ro satistactor7 arrangemen'IB have been ~t~' 

Fi ~g, • • collect, analyze and SJ11thesize all the data4and to arrive 

at sound conclusions by means or well-integrated studies by 

a group devoting more or less tull-time attention therlato. 

'· The tiles built up b7 Major Spitzer or MIS tor 

evaluation ot Ultra material connected with aecurity ot our 

communications are more complete and better arranged tor the 

purpose than are the tiles in the Communicationa Security 

Branch. Because it would be a big job, it seems to me 

inadvisable tor us to trJ to duplicate Major Spitzer•s tiles. 

All ot us at Signal Security Agency vho are concerned with 

this operation believe that if Major Spitzer•s tiles were 

tl'&llaterred to Arlington Ball Station and ma.de available to 

a working Sl'QUP under 1f!1' general supervision~ much more 
adequate tacilitiea tar reaea~ch would be provided and 

better integl'ated studies vould result therefrom. 

4. a. It is therefore proposed that Major Spitzer•s 

tiles be transferred to this station and tbat the 1nct1vidual 

he now has on that job continue to be on the MIS payroll and 

to work on •kins up the tiles just as at present. These 

files would then be available to representatives from the 

following units: 

(1) Military Intelligence Service (Major Spitzer) 

(2) Protective Securit7 Branch, Security Division l 

Communications SeoUl'ity Branch (including 

Captain Maass, Liaison Officer between 

Security and Intelligence Divisions} 

(4) Traffic Analysis and Control Branch, 

Intelligence Division. 

(5) Other branches of the Intelligence Division 

having an interest. 

(6) Director of Communications Research 

b. At least one person from each of the first four 

of~the above-DIUlled units would be assigned on a tuli- or nearly 

full-time· basis to work with these files and new material added 

thereto. It is fUl'ther proposed that once a week there be a 

meeting of all concerned to discuss the facts developed b7 

the working group and to establish or outline such reports or 

research projects as might be required. Major Spitzer and 

- &DJ' of his associates who are concerned would be invited to 
- ---------------------------

participate in these weekl7 meetings. The7 would bring to 

the meetings such intOl'JD&tion available at MIS as has a 

bearing on the matters under discussion, as for example, the 

detel'Dli.nation of the aocUl'807 of the infol'lll&tion reported 

b7 the Japanese with respect to order of battle, disposition, 

subordination, and operation of Allied troops. 

5. In brief, while being guided b7 JOUl' directive tbat 

the Signal Securit7 Agenc7 itself ought to evaluate Ultra 

infol'lll&tion having a bearing upon the securit7 of our own 

communications regardless or vbat MIS does along these lines, 

I feel tb&t the establishment of a work1ng group With 

.. participation b7 representatives of MIS in the working group 

would be more practical and conducive of better results 

than if ve tried to O,o it all alone. The availabilit7 of 

.Major Spitzer•s files to such a working group, if the tiles 

were at Arlington Hall Station, would be a big factor in the 

improvement in the results desired. 

6. If the foregoing meets with 7our approval, it is 

requested that the matter be taken up with MIS tor an expression 

ot opinion as to the feasibilit7 ot the proposal contained 

in paragraph 4!, above. 
.' 

' SllHJEOT: 

TO; 

. ~ ~Hltf ~! ~17 1945 

Present Organization for Research. on Ultra 

Material for Intelligence Concerning Security ·of Our OVn Oommun1cat1ons. · 

General Corderman 

1. In the past few days d1acues1ons have been held 

between myself e.nd various members of Slgnal.Seourity 

Agency concerned with_ the carrying out of the directive 

. contained in the attached memorandum and your recent verbal 

directive in connection with our evaluation of Ultra 

material trom the point ot view of discovering weaknesses 1

' 0~ f.N~A/./...v.""-'~"~_;, tA-..;. 

in ~μr own crJPtograph1ensrstems and procedures and bringing about corrections therein. Careful consideration has 

been given to the matter of improving our present _set-up 

and operations in this field. 

2. a. · It is teund that the Oommun1cat1ons Security 

Branch is quite ·competent to evalua~e material having a 

bearing upon our er71>tograpb1c systems ~nd requiring a good 

knowledge of the techniques (If eryptanal7s1e.. However, 

O~cat1ona 5ecur1t7 Branch and Proteot1ve Secur1tf Br~nch 

are not in a .gqod position t~eval~te ~nf~~tion ~pn~1ned 

in Ultra having a bearing upon~sis and requ1r1ns a good . t - . 

knowledge ot t~aff1c analysis techniques. Without sue~ . ~ 

kn~wleage it is difficult to add together isolated bits or 

information which might tell what the Japanese are able to do 

Ded~ified by NSA/CSS 

~',Y·' .:.y ,~!.:;oc.iate Director for Potk:y a"l'd .,r.~~~'-..-~ ,:~: -1 . 

on ;J.tJ/Joerto ··bat~:-~ \l..\l;~~μ,:L~-f..

1 

_.)~Flt~\l\11iil 

~ 
arong·theee lines. 

. REF ID :.A6552 7 . 

l~~ ~t~~~l b. The present files of Ultra material 1n the . . 

~mpnμl1cat1ons Secur1tJ Branch are. not part1cular17 well 

suited tor research along traffic &n&lJsis lines. Moreover, '' ' 

·th~re appears reason to believe that we m&J be overlooking 

a good deal of material of potential value in connection with 0......-~~) . 

traffic analye,is,. because V1thout a knowledge of traffic 

analya1s/\techn1~ues 

~~\ the scanners and translators in B-I 

cannot be expected to be able to recognize scattered or 

isolated bits of 1nf'ormat1on as being of potential value, .. . so that it.may be that messages·w~oh would be of value are •··. 

"deaaheaded!' .. 

c. No satisfactory arrangements~ be!'n ma-1:~ K_,~ 

collect, analyze and synthesize all the datal\~rriv~ ~ 

at eound conclusion$ by means of well-integrated studie~ by 

a·gr~up devoting more or lees full-time attention ther'eto. I• 

3~ The tiles .bu1.lt up by Major Spit~~ ~for . o.ul~. 

evaluation of Ultra mater1ai connected vith/\aeeiatLJ~. · r1\ , ee==umtea,!ons-e.re more complete and better arranged for the 

purpos.e than are the f11ee in the Oommun1cat1ons Security . . . 

Bre.nc:,h. Because it vould be a big job, it seems to me 

inadvisable tor us to tr7 to duplicate Major Spitzer•s files • 

.All of us e.t ~1gnal Se.our1t~: Agency who are concerned ~1th 

this operation believe that 1t llaJor Spitzer•s files were 

tr•sterre(! to Ar11ngton Hall Station and ma.de available tc;, 

· a working group under my. seaere.1 eupervis1on •. much more 
J : 

11 lblblJ u 

adequate tao111t1es for reaearch would be provided an4 

better integrated atu41ee vcnaJ.4 result therefrom. 

4. a. It 1a therefore proposed that Major Sp1tzer•s 

tiles be transferred to this station and t~t the individual 

he aow bas. on that job continue to be on the JIIS payroll and . . 

to work cm nald.ng up the files juat as &t _pre~ent.. These 

tiles would then be availa~le to representative$ from the 

following waits: 

(1) 11111tary Int?e111genoe Service· (tS&Jor'Bp1tzer) 

(2) Protect1ve Security Branch, Security Division 

(') Oommunications Security Branch (including 

O&pta1.D Haase; Liaiaon Officer b~tveen 

security and Intelligence D1v1s1one) 

(4) 'l'J.att10 Anal7aie and. Control Branch, 

·Intelligence Di v1a1on. 

· (5) Other branches or the Intelligence D1v1aion 

bav1ng an 1nterest. · 

(6) Director of COWIJ>1c&t1ona Jlesearch 

.b. At least one person tr6m each of the first tour ..... . .. 'Nl~~ . 

_;;.l:i~_the above~named units would_ be l\aes!g e'! on a tullf or near11 

tull•tW·t>aeia to work with these ·t1les and nev mateial added 

thezieto. It1a turther proposed that oneea week there be a 

iaeeting of all concerned to discuss tbe tacts developed bf 

the working SJ'OUJ> and to eeta~l1sh or outline .such reports or 

reaea•oh projects as mfght be required •. Major Spitzer and 

&Dr ot hie associates who are concerned vouid be 1nv1ted to 
t 

I 

. I 

I 

I , 

Th8J' would briag to 

the meetings euch information availabl~ §t RIS as bBL' a 

bearing on the matters under d1scuss1on, as.tor example, the 

determination· -of the aocurac1. or· the 1nto:mna tion reported 

by the Japanese with.respect to order.or battle, d1spoe1t1on, 

auboi'd1natioil1· and operation ot .Allied troops •. 

5.· In brief·, vh11e being guided by your directive that 

the Signal Secur1t1·Agene7 1taelt ought to evaluate Ultra 

1ntorme.t1cm·bavin8 a bear1Dg upon the secur1t7 ot~ur own 

commun1cat1~ re,a.rdless of what MIS ~oes.e.lons these 11~ee, 

I teel that the establiabment of a vorld.nS group"w1th ' . 

part1o1pat1on by re1)1'esentat1ves of MIS in the working group 

would be.more praot1cal·and c91l4ucive or better res~ts 

than it we tried to do it· all.alone. 'l'hS avaJ.lab111~J' of . . . ' . . . 

Major Spitzer•~ tiles ,to eucli.a working group, 1r· the files ' . . . 

vere at Arlington Hall Stat1oa,. woUld be a big·taotor in the 

improvement 1D tbe·re~U].ts.des1red •. 

6. J;t the foregoing .. ete with 7our approval, it 1s' 

requested that.the matter-be taken .up -witb MIS for an expression 

of op1D1on as to the·teas1b111tr·of.the proposal conta1Jied 

in parfl.paph 4!. above.