Filed 11/3/16; pub. order 12/1/16 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

CHRISTINE FOXEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JOHN CARPENTER et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B268820

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC576625)

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Elizabeth Allen White, Judge. Affirmed.

The Business Legal Group and Russell M. Frandsen for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Nemecek & Cole, Jonathan B. Cole, Mark Schaeffer and 

Amanda M. Moghaddam for Defendants and Respondents. 

* * * * * * * * * *
2

Plaintiff and appellant Christine Foxen sued her former 

attorneys, defendants and respondents John Carpenter, Paul 

Zuckerman, Nicholas Rowley and Carpenter, Zuckerman & 

Rowley, LLP, who had represented her in a personal injury 

action. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to 

plaintiff’s operative first amended complaint on the basis of the 

statute of limitations. We conclude all of plaintiff’s causes of

action are time-barred as a matter of law, and therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2015, plaintiff filed this action against 

defendants alleging eight causes of action arising from alleged 

misconduct during the course of the parties’ attorney-client 

relationship. Following a demurrer by defendants to the original 

complaint, plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint 

which alleges 10 causes of action: (1) declaratory relief; 

(2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) breach of contract/fee agreement; 

(4) breach of contract/personal injury lien; (5) unfair and 

deceptive business practices; (6) fraud; (7) conversion; (8) breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (9) money 

had and received; and (10) accounting. 

Defendants again demurred, arguing primarily that 

plaintiff’s claims were time-barred. After oral argument, the 

court sustained defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff chose not to amend, and a dismissal of plaintiff’s action 

was entered October 15, 2015. This appeal followed. 

On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after the 

sustaining of a demurrer, our review is de novo. (Aryeh v. Canon 

Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.) For the 

limited purpose of reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s 

ruling, we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the 
3

operative complaint, as well as any facts that may be reasonably 

implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Schifando v. 

City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) We also 

consider the exhibits attached to the pleading. “[T]o the extent 

the factual allegations conflict with the content of the exhibits to 

the complaint, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the 

exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to 

the legal effect of the exhibits.” (See Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund 

Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.) We do not “however, 

assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of 

law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Our factual summary is drawn from the allegations of the 

operative first amended complaint, including the attached 

exhibits, according to this well-established standard. 

In 2009, plaintiff suffered severe injuries in an auto 

accident. Plaintiff hired defendants to represent her in a lawsuit 

against the other driver (hereafter “the personal injury action”). 

Plaintiff signed a one-page retainer and fee agreement with 

defendants (hereafter “the fee agreement”). The fee agreement is 

attached and incorporated by reference as exhibit A to the first 

amended complaint. The fee agreement “does not meet the 

requirements” of Business and Professions Code section 6147. 

The fee agreement provides, in relevant part, that 

defendants would represent plaintiff in the personal injury 

action, their entitlement to fees was contingent on the recovery of 

damages for plaintiff, the amount of the fee would be 40 percent 

of the gross recovery, and litigation costs would be advanced by 

defendants in their discretion, but reimbursed by plaintiff “upon 

recovery and in addition to attorney fees.” The fee agreement 
4

also granted defendants “a lien on any settlement, award or 

judgment” to ensure payment of fees and costs actually incurred. 

The fee agreement further provides that plaintiff 

authorized defendants to deposit the proceeds of any recovery

into their client trust account “and distribute funds in accordance 

with the terms of this agreement.” 

The personal injury action proceeded to trial in January 

2011. During trial, the defendants in that action offered to settle 

with plaintiff for $5 million. Her counsel, defendants here, 

advised plaintiff to reject the settlement offer, because they 

believed the jury would award a larger sum. Plaintiff rejected 

the settlement offer and the jury returned a verdict of 

$2.3 million. 

After the verdict, defendants filed an action on behalf of 

plaintiff’s husband for loss of consortium.

1 The parties to the 

personal injury action then engaged in settlement discussions in 

an attempt to reach a resolution of both plaintiff’s claim and her 

husband’s claim. A settlement conference took place at the 

courthouse and both plaintiff and her spouse attended.

Defendants occasionally spoke with plaintiff and her husband 

during the conference but “never discussed the substance of the 

negotiations.” The claims of both plaintiff and her spouse were 

settled for the combined amount of $3 million. A written 

settlement agreement was executed on February 25, 2011. 

The settlement checks, dated February 23, 2011, were 

tendered to defendants. Defendants did not submit “any kind of 

accounting” to plaintiff regarding the proposed disbursement. 

Instead, on March 2, 2011, defendants “wrongfully paid”

1 Plaintiff’s husband is not a party to this appeal. 
5

themselves fees from the settlement funds as follows: $840,000 

to the firm Carpenter, Zuckerman & Rowley, LLP, and $360,000

to Nicholas Rowley. Plaintiff did not learn of these payments 

until “after April 1, 2011.” 

Defendants further “wrongfully” charged plaintiff 

$934,141.95 in litigation costs. In April 2011, defendants gave

plaintiff a “Proposed Disbursement” outlining those costs. The 

proposed disbursement is attached and incorporated by reference 

as exhibit B to the first amended complaint. The proposed 

disbursement itemizes the “gross settlement” of $3 million, less 

“attorney fees (40%)” of $1.2 million, litigation costs of 

$574,141.95, and “outstanding medical bills” of $360,000. The

proposed disbursement itemizes the “final settlement” to plaintiff 

as $846,000.24, with the “net recovery to client” as $865,858.05 

(which includes earlier advances and “loans” to plaintiff of 

$5,000, $6,000 and $8,857.81). 

The proposed disbursement contains numerous fraudulent 

and improper charges, including, for example, expert fees for 

Ronald Fisk of $95,510 when Mr. Fisk only charged $60,480. 

Plaintiff was unable to discover and verify the false charges until

September through December 2011 when various individuals, 

like Mr. Fisk, responded to plaintiff’s inquiries directly about 

their work and the total amount of their respective charges in the 

personal injury action. 

Defendants further wrongfully “induced” plaintiff to enter 

into and sign a personal injury lien with defendants and one of 

their “business associates” known as Excel Diagnostic Services 

(EDS). The personal injury lien is attached and incorporated by 

reference as exhibit C to the first amended complaint. EDS and 

defendants charged plaintiff for numerous fraudulent, improper 
6

and inflated costs, including for “caregiver resources” and case 

management fees. Defendants also wrongfully charged plaintiff 

in excess of $100,000 for the services of Finlay Boag related to 

pre-trial focus groups, despite the fact that plaintiff never 

authorized the hiring of Finlay Boag either orally or in the fee 

agreement. 

Defendants engaged in deceptive business practices, 

breached their agreements with plaintiff, and wrongfully 

withheld and converted to their own use funds owing to plaintiff 

in the approximate amount of $1,180,287.85. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in concluding that 

the one-year statute of limitations set forth at Code of Civil 

Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 

340.6(a)) operates as a time-bar to her claims against her former 

attorneys for declaratory relief, breach of contract, unfair 

business practices, conversion, breach of the implied covenant,

money had and received, and for an accounting (causes of action 

1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 & 10).2 

As relevant here, section 340.6(a) provides that “[a]n action 

against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for 

2 In her opening brief, plaintiff raises no argument regarding 

her second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or her 

sixth cause of action for fraud. Our review “ ‘is limited to issues 

which have been adequately raised and supported in [appellant’s 

opening] brief.’ [Citations.]” (WA Southwest 2, LLC v. First 

American Title Ins. Co. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 148, 155 (WA 

Southwest); accord, Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 

482, fn. 10; Series AGI West Linn of Appian Group Investors DE, 

LLC v. Eves (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156, 168.) 
7

actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services 

shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, 

or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 

discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or 

four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, 

whichever occurs first.” 

Recently, in Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1233

(Lee), our Supreme Court outlined the legislative history and 

purpose behind the enactment of section 340.6(a). “The

Legislature enacted section 340.6(a) in 1977 amid rising legal 

malpractice insurance premiums.” Before its enactment, “the 

limitations periods for malpractice lawsuits depended on the 

forms of action contained in a plaintiff’s complaint.” (Lee, at p. 

1234.) “Under the old scheme, attorneys could not be certain of 

the applicable limitations period for potential claims of 

malpractice.” (Ibid.) With section 340.6(a), “the Legislature 

intended to establish a limitations period that would apply 

broadly to any claim concerning an attorney’s violation of his or 

her professional obligations in the course of providing professional 

services regardless of how those claims were styled in the 

plaintiff’s complaint.” (Lee, at p. 1235, italics added.) Section

340.6(a) was enacted “to eliminate the former limitations 

scheme’s dependence on the way a plaintiff styled his or her 

complaint.” (Lee, at p. 1236.) 

1. Breach of Contract, Declaratory Relief, Money Had 

and Received, and Breach of the Implied Covenant of 

Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

Plaintiff maintains that her claims for breach of contract,

declaratory relief, money had and received, and breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are not governed 
8

by section 340.6(a), but rather, by the four-year statute of 

limitations codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 337,

applicable generally to claims based on a written instrument. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint contains numerous 

allegations of alleged misconduct by defendants in the handling 

of the personal injury action, including that defendants 

“wrongfully” paid themselves fees and that the fee agreement 

violated Business and Professions Code section 6147. 

Nevertheless, in her arguments before this court, plaintiff 

disavows any claim that the fee agreement was unconscionable or 

that defendants were not entitled to the 40 percent fees set forth 

in the fee agreement. Rather, plaintiff argues that her contractbased claims are based on the “alternative” allegations in her 

pleading that assume the validity of her agreements with 

defendants, and that she has only pled “garden-variety” breach of 

contract claims; claims that are based on defendants’ withholding 

and converting additional funds from the settlement monies 

beyond the fees to which they were entitled under the fee 

agreement. 

Plaintiff argues therefore that section 340.6(a) does not 

apply to her contract claims because they are not based on the 

quality of defendants’ legal services, but on their breach of 

nonprofessional obligations generally owed by all persons who 

enter into contracts. In so arguing, plaintiff relies in large part 

on language in Lee where the Supreme Court explained that 

“[m]isconduct does not ‘aris[e]’ in the performance of professional 

services for purposes of section 340.6(a) merely because it occurs 

during the period of legal representation or because the 

representation brought the parties together and thus provided 

the attorney the opportunity to engage in the misconduct. To 
9

hold otherwise would imply that section 340.6(a) bars claims 

unrelated to the Legislature’s purposes in enacting section 

340.6(a)—for example, claims that an attorney stole from or 

sexually battered a client while the attorney was providing legal 

advice.” (Lee, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1238.) 

We do not agree that Lee requires reversal in this case. 

Plaintiff’s position is directly contradicted by Lee in which the 

court explained that “the attorney-client relationship often 

requires attorneys to provide nonlegal professional services such 

as accounting, bookkeeping, and holding property in trust.

[Citation.] Indeed, the training and regulation that make the 

practice of law a profession, as well as the grounds on which an 

attorney may be disciplined as an attorney, include professional 

obligations that go beyond duties of competence associated with 

dispensing legal advice or advocating for clients in dispute 

resolution. [Citation.] In light of the Legislature’s intent that 

section 340.6(a) cover more than claims for legal malpractice, the 

term ‘professional services’ is best understood to include nonlegal 

services governed by an attorney’s professional obligations.” (Lee, 

supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1237.) Plaintiff’s effort to characterize her 

contract claims as arising from breaches of “ordinary,” “nonlegal” 

duties is unavailing. 

Plaintiff contends that Lee focuses on the “proof” necessary 

to establish a client’s claim against a former attorney as 

determinative of what statute of limitations applies. She 

contends her allegations are sufficient for the pleading stage and 

that she is entitled to demonstrate, on the merits, that her claims 

do not rely on proof that defendants violated professional 

obligations and are therefore not time-barred. 
10

Lee held that “section 340.6(a)’s time bar applies to claims 

whose merits necessarily depend on proof that an attorney 

violated a professional obligation in the course of providing 

professional services. In this context, a ‘professional obligation’ is 

an obligation that an attorney has by virtue of being an attorney, 

such as fiduciary obligations, the obligation to perform 

competently, the obligation to perform the services contemplated 

in a legal services contract into which an attorney has entered, 

and the obligations embodied in the State Bar Rules of 

Professional Conduct.” (Lee, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1237.) 

Plaintiff’s contract claims are based on defendants’ alleged 

misconduct in allocating the settlement funds in the personal 

injury action, either because they incorrectly calculated the

litigation costs, or because they breached their fiduciary duties to 

her by intentionally manipulating those charges in order to 

recover more monies than that to which they were entitled. 

There is no other fair reading of the pleading and the attached 

exhibits. In this case, plaintiff will not be able to establish her 

contract claims against defendants without demonstrating they 

breached professional duties owed to her, or nonlegal services 

closely associated with the performance of their professional 

duties as lawyers. Section 340.6(a) therefore applies.

Plaintiff alleges she discovered the false charges which 

form the basis of her claims no later than December 2011, and 

therefore she was on notice at that time that defendants had 

wrongfully withheld funds from her. Her failure to file this 

action within one year after that discovery is fatal to her claims. 

2. Accounting 

In her opening brief, plaintiff argued generally that her 

claim for an accounting was timely and not governed by section 
11

340.6(a), but she failed to identify what other statute of 

limitations applies or why the accounting claim was timely under 

that statute. In her reply brief, plaintiff briefly states that the 

accounting cause of action is ancillary to the breach of contract 

claims and is therefore governed by the four-year statute at Code 

of Civil Procedure section 337. As we explained in footnote 2 

above, our review “ ‘is limited to issues which have been 

adequately raised and supported in [appellant’s opening] brief.’

[Citation.]” (WA Southwest, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) 

However, even if the argument were properly before us, we would 

reject it on the merits. The claim is untimely for the same 

reasons explained in part 1 above. 

3. Conversion and Fraud 

Plaintiff argues her cause of action for conversion is timely 

and governed by the three-year statute of limitations at Code of 

Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c). Indeed, plaintiff 

argues the statute had not yet expired when she filed this action 

in 2015 because the claim first accrued in 2013. Plaintiff argues 

her case is closely analogous to the facts of Lee in which the court 

concluded the plaintiff’s claim for conversion against her former 

attorney was not necessarily barred by section 340.6(a). We are 

not persuaded. 

In Lee, the plaintiff had retained the defendant attorney in 

a civil matter and had advanced the attorney $110,000 for 

attorney fees, plus another $10,000 for expert costs. The matter 

was settled and the defendant attorney sent the plaintiff a letter 

and a final invoice, expressly stating that the plaintiff had a 

credit balance of unearned fees in excess of $40,000. When the 

plaintiff asked her attorney to return those unearned fees, the 
12

attorney contradicted his earlier letter, denied there was any 

credit balance, and refused to return any funds to the plaintiff.

Lee noted that for a demurrer based on the statute of 

limitations to be successful, the time-bar must “ ‘ “ ‘ “affirmatively 

appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the 

complaint shows that the action may be barred.” ’ ” ’ ” (Lee, 

supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1232.) Given that legal standard and the 

facts alleged, Lee concluded that the plaintiff’s “complaint may be 

construed to allege that [the defendant] is liable for conversion 

for simply refusing to return an identifiable sum of [the 

plaintiff’s] money.” (Id. at p. 1240.) Because the defendant could 

arguably be held liable for simple conversion, similar to ordinary 

theft, section 340.6(a) did not necessarily apply, at the pleading 

stage, to bar the plaintiff’s claim. (Lee, at p. 1240.) The court left 

open the possibility that the defendant attorney may prove the 

time-bar on summary judgment. (Ibid.) 

Under no fair reading of the facts alleged in plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint can it be inferred that defendants wrongfully 

converted an identifiable sum of money which was undisputedly 

owed to plaintiff. In any event, even assuming for the sake of 

argument that plaintiff’s conversion claim is not governed by 

section 340.6(a), her claim is still time-barred under the threeyear statute. Plaintiff’s operative pleading contains express 

allegations that she discovered, no later than December 2011, the 

alleged “wrongful” charges and fraudulent withholding by 

defendants upon which her conversion claim is based. Under the 

three-year statute of limitations, her conversion claim had to be 

filed no later than December 2014. But, plaintiff did not file this 

action until March 25, 2015, over three months too late. 
13

Plaintiff’s delayed accrual argument cannot save her claim. 

Plaintiff argues she pled facts showing her conversion claim did 

not accrue until 2013, citing paragraph 67 which alleges that 

defendants “continued to knowingly, intentionally, and 

deceitfully make these false and fraudulent claims to Plaintiff 

Foxen and to third parties, with the intent of perpetrating a 

fraud on Plaintiff Foxen, in calendar year 2012 and calendar year 

2013. In reliance on these fraudulent claims, Plaintiff Foxen 

deferred filing a lawsuit against [the law firm] until the present 

time with the filing of this complaint.” This allegation, set forth 

in the fraud cause of action, is incorporated by reference into the 

conversion claim.

The allegation at best is a conclusion, contradicted by other 

more specific allegations in the pleading, including her discovery 

of the facts constituting the conversion by December 2011. It 

matters not, for purposes of the accrual of plaintiff’s claims, that 

defendants continued to assert the validity of their distribution of 

the settlement monies. Plaintiff pled facts showing she 

discovered and believed, by December 2011, that defendants had 

wrongfully withheld and converted funds rightfully belonging to 

her. Nothing in paragraph 67 defeats or diminishes the effect of

those admissions. 

Moreover, plaintiff amended the allegations in paragraph 

67 to delete certain facts which belie her claim of delayed accrual. 

In the original complaint, paragraph 67 stated: “Plaintiff Foxen 

has demanded in 2013 and 2014 that [defendants] return to 

Plaintiff Foxen the converted funds. On each occasion, 

[defendants] have refused to return to Plaintiff Foxen funds that 

[defendants] have converted to their own use and that rightfully 

belong to Plaintiff Foxen. On each such occasion in 2013 and
14

2014, [defendants] have falsely, knowingly and fraudulently 

claimed that they are entitled to retain such funds as their own. 

On each such occasion, [defendants] have committed anew a 

conversion of the funds that belong to Plaintiff Foxen.” Plaintiff 

dropped the allegations that the operative conduct in 2013 was

that she made additional demands to defendants to pay her the 

disputed monies, focusing in her amended pleading on the fact 

that defendants continued to make false representations about 

the validity of the disbursement. To repeat, the allegations do 

not diminish the import of her admissions about her knowledge of 

wrongdoing by December 2011.

Generally, an amended pleading supersedes the prior 

pleading. However, a well-established exception to this general 

rule applies “ ‘where an amended complaint attempts to avoid 

defects set forth in a prior complaint by ignoring them. The court 

may examine the prior complaint to ascertain whether the 

amended complaint is merely a sham.’ [Citation.] The rationale 

for this rule is obvious. ‘A pleader may not attempt to breathe 

life into a complaint by omitting relevant facts which made his 

previous complaint defective.’ [Citation.] Moreover, any 

inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the 

pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent 

allegations. [Citation.] Accordingly, a court is ‘not bound to 

accept as true allegations contrary to factual allegations in 

former pleading[s] in the same case.’ [Citation.] [¶] 

Furthermore, as a matter of law, allegations in a complaint must 

yield to contrary allegations contained in exhibits to a complaint.” 

(Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 

Cal.App.4th 929, 946; accord, Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, 
15

Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343-344.) Plaintiff has failed to 

state sufficient facts supporting a theory of delayed accrual. 

As for plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud, she failed to raise 

any argument concerning the claim in her opening brief, as we 

already noted above. (WA Southwest, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 155.) The argument is properly deemed forfeited. However, 

even if we considered the argument, we would deny it on the 

merits. Actions for actual fraud against an attorney are governed 

by the three-year statute of limitations codified at Code of Civil 

Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). (Prakashpalan v. 

Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1122-

1123.) Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud is time-barred for the 

same reasons as her conversion cause of action. Plaintiff 

specifically pled she discovered the facts constituting the fraud no 

later than December 2011 but failed to file her action within 

three years of that discovery.

4. Unfair Business Practices 

Plaintiff also contends her claim for unfair business 

practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 

17200 is timely and not governed by section 340.6(a). However, 

in her opening brief, plaintiff did not identify the statute of 

limitations she contends is applicable, nor raise any argument 

how any such statute applied on the facts here. She first raised, 

in her reply brief, the contention that the four-year statute of 

limitations set forth at Business and Professions Code section 

172083 applies. As we have already explained above, our review “ 

3 Business and Professions Code section 17208 provides in 

relevant part: “Any action to enforce any cause of action 

pursuant to this chapter shall be commenced within four years 

after the cause of action accrued.”
16

‘is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and 

supported in [appellant’s opening] brief.’ [Citation.]” (WA 

Southwest, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) Even if the 

argument were properly before us, we would reject it on the 

merits. 

It is well established that “where more than one statute 

might apply to a particular claim, ‘ “a specific limitations 

provision prevails over a more general provision.” [Citation.]’

[Citation.]” (Yee v. Cheung (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 184, 195; 

accord, Vafi v. McCloskey (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 874, 881 [more 

specific statute of limitations at section 340.6(a) applied to claim 

for malicious prosecution against an attorney, rather than 

general statute applicable to malicious prosecution claims 

generally].) Section 340.6(a) is the more specific statute, 

codifying a statute of limitations for all claims, except actual 

fraud, against attorneys arising from their professional 

obligations. Section 340.6(a) therefore applies to plaintiff’s unfair 

business practices claim. The claim is time-barred for the 

reasons explained in part 1 above.

5. Leave to Amend 

Plaintiff declined the opportunity to amend her pleading 

following the court’s sustaining of defendants’ demurrer to her 

first amended complaint. “ ‘It is the rule that when a plaintiff is 

given the opportunity to amend his complaint and elects not to do 

so, strict construction of the complaint is required and it must be 

presumed that the plaintiff has stated as strong a case as he can.’

[Citations.]” (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1091.) 

Plaintiff has forfeited any right to request leave to amend. (Las 

Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 

Cal.App.4th 837, 861.)
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal entered October 15, 2015 in 

favor of defendants and respondents John Carpenter, Paul 

Zuckerman, Nicholas Rowley, and Carpenter, Zuckerman & 

Rowley, LLP is affirmed. Defendants and respondents shall 

recover costs of appeal. 

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

RUBIN, Acting P. J.

FLIER, J. 
Filed 12/1/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

CHRISTINE FOXEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JOHN CARPENTER et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B268820

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC576625)

ORDER CERTIFYING

OPINION FOR 

PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on 

November 3, 2016, was not certified for publication in the Official 

Reports. For good cause, it now appears that the opinion should 

be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

There is no change in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

RUBIN, Acting P. J. FLIER, J. GRIMES, J.