Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Wall, 2016 IL App (5th) 140596

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

ROBERT KEVIN WALL, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fifth District

Docket No. 5-14-0596

Filed October 12, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Williamson County, No. 12-CF-40; 

the Hon. John Speroni, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Mark A. Kochan, of Kochan & Kochan, of Herrin, for appellant.

Brandon Zanotti, State’s Attorney, of Marion (Patrick Delfino, David 

J. Robinson, and Jennifer Camden, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Schwarm and Justice Welch concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 After a stipulated bench trial in the circuit court of Williamson County, defendant, Robert 

Wall, was found guilty of production of cannabis sativa plants (720 ILCS 550/8(c) (West 

2010)) and sentenced to 24 months’ intensive probation as agreed upon by the parties and 

ordered to pay costs, including fines and fees. In this appeal, we find the trial court erred when 

it denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and statements based upon 

involuntary consent to search his residence. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction must be 

reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On November 16, 2011, at approximately 4:30 p.m. Officer Jeff Gill, a Carbondale police 

officer who was working with the Southern Illinois Enforcement Group (SEIG), went to 

defendant’s home in Johnston City without a warrant because he suspected defendant might be 

involved in growing cannabis. No one was home at the house, so he called defendant, a 

mechanic, who was at work. Gill falsely represented to defendant that he was a member of the 

Illinois State Police and that someone tried to break into defendant’s house. Gill told defendant 

there were broken windows in the back of his house, and while he did not believe anyone 

entered into his house, the police had a suspect. Those representations were also false. Gill 

instructed defendant to come home immediately. 

¶ 4 When defendant arrived home, he saw a large sports utility vehicle (SUV) parked in his 

driveway, a large cargo trailer in his front yard parked behind another vehicle, and 

approximately six people he did not know walking on his property and looking toward his 

windows. The people on his property were SEIG officers, all of whom were wearing casual 

clothes with badges hanging around their necks or clipped to their belts. All the officers were 

armed. Officer Gill, who is 6 feet 6 inches tall and weighs 390 pounds, approached defendant, 

who is 6 feet 2 inches tall and weighs 180 pounds, and correctly identified himself as a 

Carbondale police officer affiliated with SEIG. Gill told defendant his house had not been 

broken into and the police did not have any suspects, but the police were there because they 

had information that defendant was growing marijuana in his home. Defendant asked Gill why 

he thought there was a growing operation in his house, and Gill told him he was “on a list” and 

it was “good information.” Gill asked defendant for permission to enter the house. Defendant 

asked Gill if he had a warrant. 

¶ 5 Defendant described Gill as “a big individual” and said Gill was close to his face when he 

was talking to him. According to defendant, Gill was initially “calm, business like,” but after 

defendant asked about a warrant, Gill became agitated and told defendant if he made him get a 

warrant defendant was going to jail and “it’s going to go hard on you.” Gill denied telling 

defendant he would go hard on him. However, according to defendant, Gill told him he knew 

he had a growing operation, and if he would consent for the police to search without a warrant, 

he would not have to go to jail. On the other hand, Gill testified that all he told defendant was if 

he cooperated and consented to the search, he would not go to jail that day. 

¶ 6 Gill asked defendant to sign a voluntary consent form. The form was already filled out with 

defendant’s name and address when Gill handed it to defendant. Defendant said he signed the 

form “to keep from going to jail.” The form specifically states:
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“I understand that I have the right to refuse to consent to the search described above and 

to refuse to sign this form. 

 I further state that no promises, threats, force, or physical or mental coercion of any 

kind whatsoever have been used to cause me to consent to the search described above 

or to sign this form.”

Gill could not remember if he read the form to defendant or let defendant read it himself. 

Defendant testified he did not read the form but merely glanced at it prior to signing it. 

¶ 7 After defendant signed the form, Gill and the other officers entered defendant’s residence, 

searched the home, and found both cannabis and cannabis plants. Defendant was arrested, and 

Gill read him his rights. Defendant gave a statement and was released. He was not transported 

to jail at that time. 

¶ 8 On February 3, 2012, the State filed its two-count complaint against defendant. On 

February 8, 2012, a judge signed an arrest warrant and set bail at $10,000. On February 21, 

2012, defense counsel filed a motion for discovery and production of documents. Defense 

counsel later filed a motion to disclose confidential informant and a motion to quash arrest and 

suppress evidence and defendant’s statement on the basis that the consent to search was 

involuntary. 

¶ 9 After hearing arguments, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to disclose confidential 

informant. The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress 

evidence and statement. After the State presented its evidence, defendant moved for a directed 

finding, which the trial court denied. Defendant then testified on his own behalf. Ultimately, 

the trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and statement 

based upon involuntary consent to search. 

¶ 10 Several months later, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and 

statement on the basis he was improperly placed in custody. The State filed a motion to strike. 

The trial court denied the State’s motion to strike and called the motion for hearing. The parties 

adopted all earlier arguments, case law, and testimony presented in connection with the 

previous motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and statement based upon involuntary 

consent to search. Ultimately, the trial court denied defendant’s second motion to quash arrest 

and suppress evidence and statement. 

¶ 11 On August 11, 2014, a stipulated bench trial was conducted after which defendant was 

found guilty on count I. Count II was dismissed. The trial court ordered a sentence based upon 

an agreed disposition between the parties. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 Defendant raises numerous issues on appeal. We first address defendant’s contention that 

the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and statements 

on the basis that consent to search was involuntary, as we find this issue dispositive. Defendant 

contends his consent was involuntary since Officer Gill led him to believe his only choice was 

to consent or be hauled off to jail. The State replies the trial court’s finding that defendant 

voluntarily consented to the search of his home was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. After careful consideration, we agree with defendant that the ends did not justify the 

means and here the police officer’s actions resulted in an unlawful search and seizure.
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¶ 14 Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect an individual from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Within this context, 

reasonableness generally means a warrant, supported by probable cause, is required. Katz v. 

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Voluntary consent to search is an exception to the 

fourth amendment’s warrant requirement. People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030, 815 

N.E.2d 78, 86 (2004). To be effective, however, the consent must be voluntary, meaning that it 

was given “absent any coercion, express or implied,” and was not “the result of official 

coercion, intimidation, or deception.” Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 815 N.E.2d at 86. The 

voluntariness of the consent depends on the totality of the circumstances, and the State bears 

the burden of demonstrating consent was given voluntarily. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 

815 N.E.2d at 86. 

¶ 15 Initial refusal to consent to search is an important factor in assessing whether later consent 

is voluntary. People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584, 588, 604 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1992). The 

fact that a written consent form was signed is not dispositive in determining whether consent to 

search was voluntary when circumstances show the signature was obtained through coercion. 

Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 604 N.E.2d at 956. Voluntariness is a question of fact, and 

the trial court’s finding that consent to search was voluntary will be reversed if it is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 426, 466 N.E.2d 228, 234 

(1984). 

¶ 16 A police officer’s giving false or misleading information can vitiate the voluntariness of 

the consent. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 604 N.E.2d at 956. An officer making a 

groundless threat and presenting the occupant of the home with the choice of either consenting 

or suffering the consequences of the threatened course of conduct can also vitiate consent. 

People v. Graf, 265 Ill. App. 3d 746, 750-51, 638 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (1994). Both 

transgressions occurred here. 

¶ 17 In the instant case, police were acting on a tip from an unidentified confidential source that 

defendant was growing marijuana in his home. While we cannot say the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant, 

we can say the record is devoid of any evidence of exigent circumstances which precluded the 

State from obtaining a warrant. Instead of obtaining a warrant to search defendant’s home, it is 

undisputed that Officer Gill used deliberate misstatements to get defendant to leave his job 

during working hours and return home. 

¶ 18 Gill told defendant he was a trooper and he was at defendant’s home investigating a 

possible break-in. When defendant arrived at his home, he was greeted by at least six armed 

SEIG agents. A large SUV and police trailer were parked on his property, and officers were 

looking toward defendant’s windows. By all accounts, Officer Gill is an imposing figure at 6 

feet 6 inches tall and 390 pounds. Defendant initially asked Gill if he had a warrant, meaning 

defendant initially refused to consent. After using deliberate misstatements to get him to come 

home, Gill made a veiled threat to defendant by telling him that if he did not sign the consent 

form he would go to jail. In addition to this veiled threat to defendant, Gill also made a promise 

to defendant that defendant would not go to jail if he signed the consent form. Gill, on the other 

hand, testified he only told defendant he would not go to jail on that particular day. Under 

either scenario, however, it is clear that Gill made a promise to defendant in order to obtain his 

consent. 
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¶ 19 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966), the Supreme Court stated, “[A]ny 

evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver [of the fifth 

amendment privilege against self-incrimination] will, of course, show that the defendant did 

not voluntarily waive his privilege.” While the instant case concerns consent to search rather 

than Miranda warnings, the same principle applies. Here, the evidence shows the police 

tricked, intimidated, and threatened defendant into signing a voluntary consent form. Thus, 

defendant’s consent to search was involuntary, and all items seized and all statements 

subsequently made by defendant must be suppressed. In support of our finding, we rely on 

People v. Casazza, 144 Ill. 2d 414, 581 N.E.2d 651 (1991). 

¶ 20 In Casazza, the police received information that shortly before a drowning incident, the 

victim consumed beer and drugs on a yacht with two older women. The police found a yacht 

matching the description they received. The yacht owner signed a consent to search form after 

police officers told him if he did not consent, they would obtain a warrant and require everyone 

on board to leave the yacht while the officers sought the warrant. Despite the fact the officers 

informed the owner of his right not to consent to the search, our supreme court upheld the 

suppression of evidence seized in the search, finding that the police officer’s illegal 

representation that police possessed the authority to seize the yacht vitiated the owner’s 

consent. Casazza, 144 Ill. 2d at 424, 581 N.E.2d at 656. 

¶ 21 Here, the facts are much more egregious than Casazza. Officer Gill gave false information 

to get defendant to come home and sign a consent to search form that was previously prepared. 

We agree with defendant that the fact Officer Gill could not remember whether he read the 

consent form to defendant or let defendant read it himself is important. The fact that Gill could 

not testify under oath as to how the consent form was presented to defendant should be 

construed in favor of defendant. Defendant was adamant he never read the consent form, he 

merely glanced at it. Officer Gill used both intimidation and deceit to get defendant to 

“voluntarily” consent. 

“This court, long prior to Miranda, held that confessions ‘acquired by trick, promises, 

or threats’ are inadmissible. People v. Stevens (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 21, 27. 

 There is no difference in principle between the withholding of evidence favorable 

to a defendant and the wilful, knowing falsehood which tricked defendant into making 

the statement. *** The majority offers no explanation how, in the face of the falsehood, 

the waiver here could have been knowingly and voluntarily made. The reason, I 

submit, is obvious—because there is none.” Martin, 102 Ill. 2d at 430, 466 N.E.2d at 

236 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting, joined by Ward and Simon, JJ.). 

Under the circumstances presented here, we find the trial court erred in determining defendant 

voluntarily consented to a search of his home. 

¶ 22 CONCLUSION 

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to 

quash arrest and suppress evidence and statements on the basis of voluntary consent. 

Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

¶ 24 Reversed and remanded.