MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Debra S. Andry

Lawrence County Public Defender 

Agency

Bedford, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Paula J. Beller

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brandon D. Godsey,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

47A01-1603-CR-547

Appeal from the Lawrence 

Superior Court

The Honorable Michael Robbins, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

47D01-1308-FA-1017

Crone, Judge.

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Case Summary

[1] Brandon D. Godsey appeals his convictions for two counts of class A felony 

child molesting following his guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. His sole 

argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion to withdraw guilty plea. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Between May 2010 and March 2013, Godsey, who was at least twenty-one 

years old, had sexual intercourse with A.M.G., a child that Godsey knew was 

under twelve years old. Godsey also engaged in deviate sexual conduct with 

A.M.G. by touching her sex organ with his mouth. In August 2013, the State 

charged Godsey with three counts of class A felony child molesting. Godsey 

entered a plea of not guilty.

[3] On August 25, 2015, Godsey entered into a plea agreement with the State in 

which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of class A felony child molesting 

and the State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences of twenty-four years 

on each count and dismiss the third count. At the change of plea hearing,

Godsey acknowledged that he understood that by pleading guilty he was 

admitting the truth of the allegations against him and that he was giving up 

certain rights. Tr. at 13. He also acknowledged that his plea was freely and 

voluntarily given. Id. at 14. Godsey testified under oath that he committed the 

acts that constituted the charges against him. Id. at 16-18. The trial court found 

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that there was a factual basis for the charged crimes, took Godsey’s guilty plea 

and the State’s motion to dismiss under advisement, and set the matter for 

sentencing.

[4] On August 28, 2015, the State submitted supplemental discovery to Godsey

consisting of a police report (“the Police Report”) from an unrelated 

investigation in which A.M.G. had recanted an allegation that she was the 

victim of a sex crime by a different man. On September 22, 2015, Godsey filed 

a motion to withdraw guilty plea, alleging that the Police Report contained 

exculpatory evidence and that withdrawal of the plea was necessary to correct a 

manifest injustice. On October 7, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on 

Godsey’s motion and requested that the parties provide the court with a copy of 

the Police Report and submit memorandums of law. In his memorandum of 

law, Godsey argued that A.M.G.’s false allegations of sexual abuse against a 

different man were admissible evidence and that he was “entitled to withdraw 

his plea at this time in order to more fully develop this new information [and] 

be afforded the opportunity to weigh this evidence as he considers whether or 

not to proceed to trial.” Appellant’s App. at 51. On November 10, 2015, the 

trial court denied Godsey’s motion on the ground that Godsey, after being fully 

apprised of his rights both in writing and by the trial court “did, by his 

voluntary admissions under oath, testify” that when he was over the age of 

twenty-one, he had sexual intercourse and engaged in oral sex with the twelveyear-old victim. Id. at 56. 

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[5] On December 21, 2015, the same day as the sentencing hearing, Godsey filed a 

motion to reconsider, arguing that the Police Report contained evidence that 

“clearly impeaches the credibility of the alleged victim” and that the State 

violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process by failing to 

provide him with exculpatory evidence. Id. at 59. The trial court denied the 

motion to reconsider and sentenced Godsey to twenty-four years on each count, 

with four years suspended to probation, to be served concurrently. 

[6] On January 20, 2016, Godsey filed a motion to correct error, arguing for the 

first time that the State violated Lawrence County Local Rules of Court by 

failing to provide him with the Police Report before he entered into the plea 

agreement with the State. On February 9, 2016, following a hearing, the trial 

court denied Godsey’s motion. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Godsey challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Withdrawals of pleas are governed by Indiana Code Section 35-35-1-4(b), 

which provides,

After entry of a plea of guilty ... but before imposition of 

sentence, the court may allow the defendant by motion to 

withdraw his plea of guilty ... for any fair and just reason unless 

the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the 

defendant’s plea. .... The ruling of the court on the motion shall 

be reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. 

However, the court shall allow the defendant to withdraw his plea 

of guilty ... whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of 

the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

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(Emphasis added.) 

[8] Our supreme court has explained that

[t]he court is required to grant [a motion to withdraw guilty plea]

only if the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is 

necessary to correct a manifest injustice. The court must deny a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the withdrawal would result 

in substantial prejudice to the State. Except under these polar 

circumstances, disposition of the petition is at the discretion of 

the court.

Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 61-62 (Ind. 1995) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). The defendant “has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by 

a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(e). The defendant is 

“required to demonstrate (1) a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the guilty 

plea and (2) no reliance by the State that resulted in substantial prejudice.” 

Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 327 (Ind. 2002). “Trial court rulings on 

[motions to withdraw guilty plea] are presumptively valid, and parties 

appealing an adverse decision must prove that a court has abused its 

discretion.” Id. at 326. “A trial court abuses its discretion only ‘when the 

failure of the trial court to grant the motion would result in ... a manifest 

injustice.’” Id. (quoting Weatherford v. State, 697 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ind. 1998)).

[9] Godsey argues that the Police Report contained exculpatory evidence and that 

the State’s failure to disclose that evidence prior to the entry of his plea 

agreement violated his due process rights under Article 1, Section 13 of the 

Indiana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

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Constitution. However, at the hearing on his motion to correct error, Godsey 

acknowledged that in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002), the

Supreme Court held that federal due process guarantees do not require the 

government to disclose impeachment information prior to entering a plea 

agreement with the defendant, and Godsey conceded that Ruiz “directly 

contradict[s] our position in the motion to correct error with regard to the 

arguments on the Federal Constitutional issue.” Tr. at 50. Godsey also 

conceded that Ruiz was dispositive of his state constitutional claim. Id. at 50-

51. By abandoning his constitutional arguments, Godsey invited any error 

with respect to those claims. See Chem. Waste Mgmt. of Indiana, L.L.C. v. City of 

New Haven, 755 N.E.2d 624, 631 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that 

because appellant abandoned argument at the trial level, appellant invited any 

error as to that issue). Invited error is not subject to appellate review. Id.

[10] Godsey also argues that the State violated Lawrence County Local Rules LR47-

TR26-111(C)(1)(g) and -(h). However, Godsey raised this argument for the first 

time in his motion to correct error, and therefore it is waived. See Shepherd 

Props. Co. v. Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades, 972 N.E.2d 845, 849 n.3 (Ind.

2012) (“It is well established that a party may not raise issues for the first time 

in a motion to correct error.”). 

[11] Waiver notwithstanding, Godsey’s argument is unavailing. LR47-TR26-

111(C)(1)(g) requires the State to disclose “any record or prior criminal 

convictions that may be used for impeachment of the persons [whom] the State 

intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or trial.” Godsey conceded at the 

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hearing on his motion to correct error that Ruiz was controlling and contrary to 

his position that the State’s noncompliance with this rule justified his 

withdrawal of his guilty plea. Tr. at 51. As with his constitutional claims, 

Godsey invited any error with regard to this rule, and therefore any error is not 

subject to our review. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., 755 N.E.2d at 631 n.4.

[12] LR47-TR26-111(C)(1)(h) requires the State to disclose “any material or 

information within its possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the 

accused as to the offenses charged or would tend to reduce the punishment for 

such offenses.” Godsey argues that the evidence of A.M.G.’s false allegation is 

material because it calls into question her credibility. However, impeachment 

evidence is not information that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, and 

therefore LR47-TR26-111(C)(1)(h) does not apply to the Police Report. 

[13] We conclude that Godsey has failed to carry his burden to show that the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea. See 

Coomer, 652 N.E.2d at 63 (concluding that denial of motion to withdraw guilty 

plea was within trial court’s discretion and did not constitute manifest 

injustice). Therefore, we affirm his convictions.

[14] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.

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