IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 4, 2016

BRYAN R. HANLEY v. TURNEY CENTER DISCIPLINARY BOARD, ET 

AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hickman County

No. 15-CV-5637 Joseph Woodruff, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2016-01223-COA-R3-CV – Filed November 30, 2016

___________________________________

An inmate was found guilty of possession of a deadly weapon when two knives were 

found in the door of his cell. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the inmate 

petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari asserting several issues relating to 

violations of due process and the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. The trial court 

granted his petition, denied his discovery request, and dismissed the writ of certiorari. 

The inmate now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., joined. RICHARD H. DINKINS, JJ., filed a dissenting opinion.

Bryan R. Hanley, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor 

General; Madeline Bertasi Brough, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellees, Turney 

Center Disciplinary Board, D. Epley, Johnny Qualls, Louanne Dickson, Debra Johnson, 

Derrick D. Schofield.

OPINION

BACKGROUND

On August 4, 2015, Corporal Robert Story (“Corporal Story”) and Officer Clint 

Zyla (“Officer Zyla”) found two homemade knives in the door of cell 230 of Unit 2A 
- 2 -

located at the Turney Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX” or “the prison”).1 The prison 

is a division of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On the same day, 

Petitioner/Appellant Bryan Hanley (“Mr. Hanley”), an inmate of the prison and resident 

of the cell at issue since 2012, was served with a disciplinary write-up for the offense of 

possession of a deadly weapon.2 The incident report describes the offense as follows:

ON 08/04/15 AT 12:15PM A SEARCH OF 2A 230 WAS PERFORMED 

BY CORPORAL ROBERT STORY AND OFFICER CLINT ZYLA. 

TWO HOMEMADE KNIVES WERE REMOVED FROM INSIDE THE 

DOOR. ONE ICEPICK STYLE 5′′ LONG AND ONE FLAT METAL 

SHARPENED TO A POINT 9′′ LONG. INMATES GREGORY SNOW . . 

. AND INMATE BR[Y]AN HANLEY . . . ARE ASSIGNED TO THIS 

CELL AND ARE BEING CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF A 

DEADLY WEAPON AND MOVED TO UNIT FIVE PENDING 

HEARING. . . . .

Mr. Hanley‟s disciplinary hearing was held on August 12, 2015, before the 

Respondent/Appellee Turney Center Disciplinary Board (“disciplinary board”). A 

disciplinary hearing report included in the record indicates that Mr. Hanley agreed to 

waive the right to have the reporting official, Corporal Story, present, that the case had 

been previously continued at Mr. Hanley‟s request, that Mr. Hanley was assisted by an 

inmate advisor, and that the “inmate or inmate advisor had adequate time to prepare 

defense.” Further, the hearing report indicated that Mr. Hanley called one witness: 

Duane Brooks. According to the hearing report, Mr. Hanley asserted that he had not been 

the subject of a disciplinary action in twenty-one years and that the knives belonged to a 

previous occupant of his cell. The disciplinary board found Mr. Hanley guilty of the 

charged offense based on “report” and “evidence presented of [two] knives found in the 

door of [Mr.] Hanley‟s cell.” The disciplinary board imposed a $5.00 fine, a twelve 

month package restriction, ten days of punitive segregation to serve beyond the time 

already served while awaiting the hearing, and a three month reduction in prisoner 

sentence reduction credits. 

On August 16, 2015, Mr. Hanley filed an appeal to the Warden, arguing that the 

knives found inside his cell door were not his. Mr. Hanley contended the following: (1) 

that “numerous staff members [spoke] on [his] behalf and his character”; (2) that he had 

never been the subject of a disciplinary action in his twenty-one years of incarceration; 

(3) that the cell doors were not inspected prior to his occupation; (4) that the only cell 

 

1 Although Mr. Hanley alleges in his brief that Corporal Story and Officer Zyla received 

confidential information that there were knives located in the door of his cell, the incident report mentions 

no such informant.

2 Mr. Hanley‟s cell mate, Gregory Snow, was also charged.
- 3 -

searched was his, based on a confidential informant who could have been the one 

responsible; and (5) that inmate Brooks testified that he “heard the [knives] found in the 

door belonged to the previous occupants of the cell.” On August 20, 2015, the Warden 

affirmed the ruling of the disciplinary board, finding that “[n]o violations of disciplinary 

procedures were cited or ascertained,” “[i]nmate has been assigned to the cell for multiple 

number [of] years,” and “[t]he knives wer[e] relativ[e]ly new.” 

On August 27, 2015, Mr. Hanley filed an appeal to the Commissioner of TDOC, 

arguing that “Section I(J)(7)”3of TCIX Policy 506.06 requires all vacant cells to be 

searched prior to its occupation by a new inmate. Mr. Hanley asserted that during Mr. 

Snow‟s hearing on the same issue, Corporal Story admitted that this policy is not 

typically carried out. Mr. Hanley further asserted that the knives were not “new”; rather, 

one was slightly rusted and the other was made of stainless steel which “would never rust 

in a h[u]ndred years.” According to Mr. Hanley, the stainless steel knife was made out of 

the “old dust mop frames” which had been removed from the prison before he moved 

into cell 230. Finally, Mr. Hanley contended that he did not possess a special tool to 

access the inside of the door but that a previous occupant of the cell, who was a 

maintenance worker, did have access to such a tool. On September 17, 2015, the 

Commissioner affirmed the ruling of the Warden, concluding that Mr. Hanley failed to 

support his allegations that the Warden reached an incorrect decision. The Commissioner 

further found no due process violations in the disciplinary proceedings. 

On November 16, 2015, Mr. Hanley filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 

Hickman County Chancery Court, naming the disciplinary board, the Warden of the 

prison, the Commissioner of TDOC, and numerous other individuals in their official 

capacities. In his petition, Mr. Hanley alleged several issues relating to the disciplinary 

board‟s decision, including violations of due process and deviations from the Uniform 

Disciplinary Procedures (“UDP”). On January 13, 2016, the disciplinary board filed a 

notice that it did not oppose the petition. The trial court granted Mr. Hanley‟s petition for 

a writ of certiorari on January 19, 2016, and ordered the record of the disciplinary 

proceedings be transmitted to the trial court. The notice of the filing of the certified 

disciplinary record was filed on February 19, 2016. TDOC subsequently filed a brief on 

March 21, 2016.4 On April 4, Mr. Hanley filed a response brief and a specific request for 

production of documents. On May 12, 2016, the disciplinary board filed a response 

opposing Mr. Hanley‟s specific request for production of documents. On May 18, 2016, 

the trial court denied Mr. Hanley‟s discovery request because the requests were “either 

 

3

In his appellate brief, however, Mr. Hanley indicates that the it is section VI(J)(7) in addition to 

the concurrent TDOC Policy 506.06, §VI(I)(3)(b)–(c). However, these sections are not part of the 

Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, as discussed infra.

4

The filings for the “Respondent” were either filed in the disciplinary board‟s or TDOC‟s name. 

Regardless, both are represented by the Tennessee Attorney General.
- 4 -

not permissible, not possible, or not needed.” On the same day, the trial court entered a 

memorandum and order dismissing Mr. Hanley‟s common law writ of certiorari, finding 

that the disciplinary board “did not act illegally, arbitrarily, or exceed its jurisdiction” and 

that no due process rights were violated. 

ISSUES

As we perceive it, Mr. Hanley essentially makes several arguments under the 

umbrella of five broad issues,5 which we have restated as follows:

1. Whether the trial court addressed all of the issues raised by Mr. Hanley, which 

implicates this Court‟s subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his discovery requests.

3. Whether material evidence supports the disciplinary board‟s decision.

4. Whether his due process rights were violated.

5. Whether the disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in failing to 

follow the UDP.

 

5 The actual issues listed in Mr. Hanley‟s brief are:

1. The trial court erred when it denied [Mr. Hanley] the opportunity to 

support his allegations through discovery.

2. The trial court erred when it denied [Mr. Hanley] relief on his Writ of 

Certiorari.

3. The disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in rendering its 

decision to find [Mr. Hanley] guilty of the charged offense by relying on 

pure supposition. The disciplinary board determined that the shanks 

“looked relatively new” and therefore[] were placed in the door relatively 

recently.

4. The disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in rendering its 

decision to find [Mr. Hanley] guilty of the offense when the board heard 

and received uncontradicted testimony from C[orporal] Robert Story that 

the doors are not searched when cell changes are accomplished, even 

though TDOC Policy 506.06, VI, I, 3, (b) & (c), and the concurrent 

TCIX Policy 506.06-1, J, 7 both require cells to be searched and 

inspected before they are occupied by a new inmate.

5. The [disciplinary b]oard acted arbitrarily and illegally in rendering its 

decision to find [Mr. Hanley] guilty while ignoring the admitted failure 

of institutional staff to follow applicable policies which are mandatory in 

nature, thus denying [Mr. Hanley] due process of law and a fair hearing.

6. The [disciplinary b]oard acted arbitrarily and illegally when: 1.) they 

did not follow the basic requirements of Due Process during the hearing, 

2.) when making a finding of facts and entering those findings into the 

record, and 3.) when entering the reasons for their decision.
- 5 -

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues in this case involve the review of a decision by a prison disciplinary 

board. As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court:

The common-law writ of certiorari serves as the proper procedural 

vehicle through which prisoners may seek review of decisions by prison 

disciplinary boards, parole eligibility review boards, and other similar 

administrative tribunals. See Rhoden v. State Dep’t of Corr., 984 S.W.2d 

955, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bishop v. Conley, 894 S.W.2d 294 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). By granting the writ, the reviewing court orders 

the lower tribunal to file its record so that the court can determine whether 

the petitioner is entitled to relief.

Willis v. Tenn. Dept. of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003). The Tennessee 

Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing principal that the standard of review in a 

writ of certiorari case is extremely limited:

The judicial review available under a common-law writ of certiorari 

is limited to determining whether the entity whose decision is being 

reviewed (1) exceeded its jurisdiction, (2) followed an unlawful procedure, 

(3) acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or (4) acted without material 

evidence to support its decision. Harding Acad. v. Metro[.] Gov’t of 

Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 222 S.W.3d at 363; see also Stewart v. 

Schofield, 368 S.W.3d 457, 463 (Tenn. 2012). We have explicitly approved 

the use of the common-law writ of certiorari to provide judicial relief from 

(1) fundamentally illegal rulings, (2) proceedings inconsistent with 

essential legal requirements, (3) proceedings that effectively deny parties 

their day in court, (4) decisions that are beyond the decision-maker‟s 

authority, and (5) decisions that involve plain and palpable abuses of 

discretion. State v. Lane, 254 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting Willis v. Tenn[.] 

Dep’t of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003)). However, we have also 

held that:

the common law[]writ [of certiorari] . . . may not be resorted to for 

the correction of technical or formal errors, not affecting jurisdiction 

or power, or for the correction of defects that are not radical, 

amounting to an illegality that is fundamental, as distinguished from 

an irregularity.

State ex rel. McMorrow v. Hunt, 137 Tenn. 243, 249, 192 S.W. 931, 933 

(1917).
- 6 -

A common-law writ of certiorari proceeding does not empower the 

courts to redetermine the facts found by the entity whose decision is being 

reviewed. Tenn[.] Waste Movers, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty., 160 S.W.3d 517, 

520 n.2 (Tenn. 2005); Cooper v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 746 

S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 1987). Accordingly, we have repeatedly cautioned 

that a common-law writ of certiorari does not authorize a reviewing court to 

evaluate the intrinsic correctness of a governmental entity‟s decision. See, 

e.g., Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.W.3d at 465; Arnold v. Tenn[.] Bd. of 

Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997). Similarly, we have noted that 

reviewing courts may not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment 

for the judgment of the entity whose decision is being reviewed. See, e.g., 

State v. Lane, 254 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting Robinson v. Clement, 65 

S.W.3d at 635); Harding Acad. v. Metro[.] Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 

Cnty., 222 S.W.3d at 363.

Heyne v. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., 380 S.W.3d 715, 729 (Tenn. 2012). “In certiorari 

proceedings, judicial review is generally limited to the record developed by the tribunal 

below.” Jeffries v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 108 S.W.3d 862, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 

As succinctly stated by this Court:

At the risk of oversimplification, one may say that it is not the correctness 

of the decision that is subject to judicial review, but the manner in which 

the decision is reached. If the agency or board has reached its decision in a 

constitutional or lawful manner, then the decision would not be subject to 

judicial review.

Powell v. Parole Eligibility Rev. Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). 

Accordingly, we consider Mr. Hanley‟s arguments with these limitations in mind.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Hanley is proceeding pro se in this appeal as 

he did throughout the proceedings before the disciplinary board and in the trial court. “It 

is well settled that pro se litigants must comply with the same standards to which lawyers 

must adhere.” Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). 

As explained by this Court:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal 

treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro 

se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial 

system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between 

fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant‟s adversary. 
- 7 -

Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the 

same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected 

to observe.

Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2003)). 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We first address whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter. Mr. 

Hanley argues that the trial court failed to “address all of the issues presented” by him; 

instead, the trial court “only peripherally addressed the issues presented” in his trial court 

brief. Because Mr. Hanley‟s argument questions whether all of the claims raised in the 

trial court were actually adjudicated, it implicates this Court‟s subject matter jurisdiction. 

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(b) requires appellate courts to “consider 

whether the . . . appellate court ha[s] jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether or not 

presented for review.” See Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Tenn. 2003) (“Appellate 

courts must address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction even if the issue is not raised . 

. . .”). Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court‟s authority to hear a particular 

controversy. Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn. 2004). “Subject matter 

jurisdiction must be conferred by statute or by the Tennessee Constitution; „the parties 

cannot confer it by appearance, plea, consent, silence, or waiver.‟” Fed. Nat’l Mortg. 

Ass’n v. Quarles, No. M2015-01620-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 5723957, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Sept. 30, 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 843–44 (Tenn. 

2013)). Rule 12.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure states that lack of 

jurisdiction over subject matter is grounds for dismissal. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1). 

Appellate courts review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction de novo without a 

presumption of correctness. See Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 712–13 

(Tenn. 2012).

Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure states that “every final 

judgment entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the . . . Court of Appeals is 

appealable as of right.” Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). “To constitute a final judgment, the 

judgment must adjudicate all of the claims between the parties.” Irwin v. Tenn. Dep’t of 

Corr., 244 S.W.3d 832, 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Rector v. Halliburton, No. 

M1999-02802-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 535924, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2003)). 

Therefore, if “multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, any order that 

adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . is not enforceable or appealable.” Tenn. R. App. 

P. 3(a). Where a trial court order dismissing an inmate‟s petition for a writ of certiorari 

fails to address all of the inmate‟s claims, the order is not a final appealable order. See 

Irwin, 244 S.W.3d 837 (holding that trial court‟s order dismissing inmate‟s petition for a 

writ of certiorari did not adjudicate all claims and thus was not a final, appealable 
- 8 -

judgment when it failed to address all of the inmate‟s claims). However, this Court may 

also acquire appellate jurisdiction even where the trial court does not adjudicate all 

claims raised if the trial court makes the order final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 (“[T]he [trial c]ourt . . . may 

direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 

parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon 

an express direction for the entry of judgment.”). Where the trial court fails to either 

address all of the inmate‟s claims or make the order final pursuant to Rule 54.02, the 

proper remedy is to dismiss the appeal under Rule 3 for lack of appellate jurisdiction and 

remand, directing the trial court to address the claims raised by the inmate. 

We will not tax the length of this Opinion with an examination of each argument 

raised by Mr. Hanley and the trial court‟s corresponding decision either in favor of or 

against that argument. Suffice it to say, we have reviewed the claims raised in this case as 

well as the trial court‟s order and find no claims left outstanding that would deprive this 

Court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. In this case, Mr. Hanley 

sought a writ of certiorari regarding the decision of the disciplinary board. As discussed 

supra, the only avenues of relief from such a decision require that Mr. Hanley show that 

the decision was illegal, without authority, or based on a palpable abuse of discretion. 

Here, the trial court found that none of these avenues of relief had been shown and 

dismissed Mr. Hanley‟s writ of certiorari. Accordingly, the trial court fully adjudicated 

all of the claims in this case.

Discovery Requests

Mr. Hanley next takes issue with the trial court‟s denial of his discovery requests. 

As previously discussed, judicial review under a common-law writ of certiorari is 

typically limited to the record made before the board or agency. See Jeffries, 108 

S.W.3d 862 at 873. However, “the trial court may permit the introduction of additional 

evidence on the issue of whether the board or agency exceeded its jurisdiction[] or acted 

illegally, capriciously, or arbitrarily.” Adams v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2013-00370-

COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 4536557, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2014) (emphasis 

added) (citing Hunter v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. M2002-00752-COA-R3-

CV, 2004 WL 315060, *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004)); see also Cooper v. 

Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 746 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 1987); Davison v. Carr, 

659 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1983). Thus, we review the trial court‟s discovery decisions 

on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Johnston v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 

Cnty., 320 S.W.3d 299, 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Frye v. St. Thomas Health 

Servs., 227 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). 

The disciplinary board does not deny that discovery may be permitted in certain 

circumstances but maintains that the trial court properly denied Mr. Hanley‟s discovery 
- 9 -

requests because the documents were not relevant to the issue of whether the disciplinary 

board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted arbitrarily, illegally, or capriciously.6 We agree.

In this case, the trial court by order of May 18, 2016, denied Mr. Hanley‟s specific 

requests for production of documents because the requests “are either not permissible, not 

possible, or not needed.” Mr. Hanley, however, argues that the additional evidence he 

sought through discovery would be relevant to the issue of whether the disciplinary board 

“denied [him] the opportunity to present a defense, refused to consider relevant and 

germane evidence, refused to address the violations of its own policies by its agents 

which resulted in the disciplinary proceedings, and otherwise acted illegally, 

capriciously, and arbitrarily.” The documents that Mr. Hanley requested include: (1) 

records documenting all cell changes conducted on May 29–31, 2013, at the prison; (2) 

records documenting searches conducted on any cells in several prison units on May 31, 

2013; (3) a copy of the minutes from the prison inmate council meeting for August 2015; 

(4) records listing the names and TDOC numbers of all inmates assigned to cell 230 of 

unit 2A from January 2010 through May 31, 2012; (5) inmate disciplinary records 

generated for the inmates assigned to cell 230 of unit 2A from January 2010 through May 

31, 2012; (6) the gang status of the inmates assigned to cell 230 of unit 2A from January 

2010 through May 31, 2012; (7) a copy of memoranda issued by the prison 

administrative staff which directed prison employees to gather and remove all stainless 

steel dust mop heads; (8) a copy of documentation regarding all of the information that 

Corporal Story received prior to searching Mr. Hanley‟s cell. Essentially, Mr. Hanley 

sought to prove that the disciplinary board‟s decision was in error because the discovery 

requests would reveal that the knives found in his cell belonged to a prior occupant.

After a thorough review the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Mr. Hanley‟s discovery requests. In the first place, “[t]he rights of 

 

6 Mr. Hanley cites and quotes several cases to support his broad generalization that discovery is 

allowed in writ of certiorari cases. See Adams v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corrections, No. M2013-00370-COAR3-CV, 2014 WL 4536557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2014); Sadler v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 

M2001-02341-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1386090 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2001); Johnston v. Metro. 

Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 320 S.W.3d 299 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Although this is generally 

true, no prior Tennessee cases have held that discovery is allowed as of right in writ of certiorari cases. 

Indeed, the cited cases do not purport to grant inmates an unqualified right to discovery; rather, the cases 

resolved issues not directly presented before this Court. See Adams, 2014 WL 4536557, at *3 (reversing

the trial court‟s dismissal of petitioner‟s writ of certiorari while a motion to compel discovery was 

pending because its “failure to rule on the pending motion possibly affected the outcome of the 

litigation”); Sadler, 2001 WL 1386090, at *1 (recounting the procedural posture of the case wherein the 

trial court denied petitioner‟s motion to compel when petitioner never made a proper discovery request 

and noted that “petitions for writ of certiorari usually proceed on the record, and that typically, discovery 

is not permitted”); Johnston, 320 S.W.3d at 308, 315 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing limited discovery while refusing appellants‟ additional discovery requests). Thus, 

the cases cited by Appellant do not necessarily support his contention that he should have been allowed 

discovery under the circumstances of this case.
- 10 -

an inmate who has pled „not guilty‟ to the offense which is the subject of the disciplinary 

hearing are set forth at TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c) and do not include the 

right to discovery.” Jenkins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2014-02210-COA-R3-CV, 

2016 WL 792423, at *4 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016). In light of the fact that Mr. 

Hanley pled not guilty, he is permitted only the following rights at his hearing:

(1) The right to decline to testify. It shall be the burden of the reporting 

employee to prove guilt by a preponderance of the evidence.

(2) To have the evidence against him/her presented first. The board/hearing 

officer shall consider all evidence which it finds to be reliable, whether or 

not such evidence would be admissible in a court of law.

(3) To cross-examine any witness (except a confidential source) who 

testified against him/her and to review all adverse documentary evidence 

(except confidential information).

(4) To have the reporting official to the alleged infraction present and 

testifying at the hearing. The chairperson/hearing officer may allow the 

testimony from the reporting official by speakerphone if they are not on the 

premises of the facility at the time of the hearing unless this requirement is 

waived by the inmate in writing . . . . By waiving the presence of the 

reporting official, the inmate is agreeing to have the statements in the 

disciplinary report accepted at the hearing in lieu of testimony. The 

chairperson/hearing officer shall advise the inmate of this fact. Even if such 

an appearance is waived by the inmate, the employee may appear and 

testify at the hearing.

(5) The right to testify in his/her own behalf after all evidence has been 

presented.

(6) The right to present the testimony of relevant witness(es), unless 

allowing the witness to appear would pose a threat to institutional safety or 

order.

TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c) (emphasis added). Because Mr. Hanley was not 

permitted discovery during his disciplinary hearing, his only recourse would have been to 

develop the administrative record through witness testimony.7 Mr. Hanley not only chose 

to present only a single witness (Mr. Brooks) but also chose to waive his right to have 

Corporal Story present to testify against him. Thus, Mr. Hanley also waived any right to 

cross-examine Corporal Story on the issue of prison searches. 

 

7 Mr. Hanley‟s only statement in the disciplinary report hearing summary states: “I‟ve never had 

a disciplinary in [twenty-one] years. I don‟t know why this came about. I feel like they have been in there 

since the previous occupant.” The statement by Mr. Brooks, the only witness Mr. Hanley called on his

own behalf, states: “I don‟t know who the previous occupants were and I heard it was the ones who lived 

there before. He‟s been here a long time. He was my celly and I know he didn‟t do this.” 
- 11 -

Additionally, it is well-settled that in a writ of certiorari case, the reviewing court 

is “generally limited to the record developed by the tribunal below.” Jeffries, 108 S.W.3d 

at 873 n.12. The record before us, as in the trial court, contains no indication that the 

disciplinary board was presented with any allegations or evidence of prison employees‟ 

failure to search cells before housing a new inmate.8 Mr. Hanley‟s discovery requests 

appear to be an attempt to supplement the record with additional evidence to show: (1) 

that the prison did not follow policies concerning searches of cells when inmates are 

relocated; and (2) in the absence of such a search, the knives found in Mr. Hanley‟s cell 

may have been left by its previous occupants. Even if Mr. Hanley were permitted the 

documents he requested, however, he simply cannot establish that the disciplinary board 

“refused” to consider relevant evidence or to address violations of its own policies, where 

no evidence to that effect was in any way presented to the disciplinary board. 

Furthermore, even where extrinsic evidence is permissible, its only purpose is to show 

procedural irregularities not reflected in the record, showing “fraud, corruption, or 

whether the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.” Id. Here, the 

documents requested do not relate to the propriety of the disciplinary proceedings but, 

rather, to the intrinsic correctness of the disciplinary board‟s decision based on what Mr. 

Hanley asserts was a flawed investigation. Because this issue was in no way raised in the 

disciplinary proceedings and the documents are simply not admissible to contradict the 

disciplinary board‟s factual findings, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Mr. Hanley‟s discovery requests. 

Material Evidence to Support the Disciplinary Board’s Decision

We next consider whether the Mr. Hanley‟s conviction on the charge of

possession of a deadly weapon was supported by sufficient evidence. As previously 

discussed, review under a writ of certiorari is limited to whether the lower board 

exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, and whether there 

is any material evidence to support the board‟s findings. Walton v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 

No. W2015-01336-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 3078838, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 

2016) (citing Watts v. Civ. Serv. Bd. of Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 276–77 (Tenn. 

1980)). As noted by the Tennessee Supreme Court:

Ascertaining whether a record contains material evidence to support 

a board‟s decision is a question of law. Leonard Plating Co. v. Metro[.] 

Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 213 S.W.3d [898,] 904 [Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2006]. For the purpose of this inquiry, “material evidence” is relevant 

evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

rational conclusion. Hedgepath v. Norton, 839 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1992) (quoting Pace v. Garbage Disposal Dist., 54 Tenn. App. 263, 

 

8

Instead, this evidence appears to have been presented in a separate disciplinary proceeding 

involving Mr. Snow, Mr. Hanley‟s roommate.
- 12 -

267, 390 S.W.2d 461, 463 (1965)). The amount of material evidence 

required to support an agency‟s decision “must exceed a scintilla of 

evidence but may be less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Leonard 

Plating Co. v. Metro[.] Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 213 S.W.3d 

at 904. Because the sufficiency of the material evidence in a common-law 

writ of certiorari proceeding is a question of law, the courts must review the 

record de novo without presuming that the findings are correct. Lafferty v. 

City of Winchester, 46 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., 380 S.W.3d 715, 738–39 (Tenn. 2012).

A disciplinary charge against an inmate must be proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence, which is “[t]he degree of proof which best accords with reason and probability 

and is more probable than not.” TDOC Policy No. 502.01(IV)(I). Here, Mr. Hanley‟s 

disciplinary conviction for possession of a deadly weapon was based on the two knives 

found in his cell door and Corporal Story‟s report. Mr. Hanley called one witness, Mr. 

Brooks, to testify on his behalf. He was also afforded the opportunity to have Corporal 

Story present at the hearing but waived this right.

As previously discussed, however, this Court cannot weigh the evidence that was 

adduced at the disciplinary hearing nor can the reviewing court “re-determine the facts 

found by the entity whose decision is being reviewed.” Tenn. Waste Movers, 160 S.W.3d 

at 520 n.2; Cooper v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 746 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 1987). 

“It is the function of the prison disciplinary board in the first instance to evaluate the 

credibility of the witnesses who testify at the hearing.” Dobbins v. Tenn. Dep’t of 

Correction, No. M2010-00009-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4225822, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Oct. 25, 2010) (citing State v. Brazelton, No. M1999-02477-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 

1717560, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)). Thus, this Court is required to defer to the 

disciplinary board‟s determinations of witness credibility. Id.

We conclude that the disciplinary board had material evidence from which to find 

Mr. Hanley guilty of possession of weapons. At Mr. Hanley‟s disciplinary hearing, the 

disciplinary board had before it the two knives found in Mr. Hanley‟s cell door, Corporal 

Story‟s incident report, Mr. Hanley‟s statement, and Mr. Brooks‟s statement. The 

disciplinary board was able to observe the knives first-hand and chose to credit Corporal 

Story‟s report over the testimony of Mr. Hanley and Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. Hanley‟s argument that the Warden erred in relying on the “relativ[e] 

new[ness]” of the knives is also unavailing in this appeal. Here, the two knives 

undisputedly found during the August 2015 search were presented both to the 

disciplinary board and the Warden. Based upon their appearance, the Warden specifically 

found that the knives could not have been placed in the cell door prior to 2012 when Mr. 

Hanley began residing in the cell. First, we note that Mr. Hanley‟s argument regarding 
- 13 -

the disciplinary board‟s and the Warden‟s findings about the condition of the knives 

relative to the timing of their likely placement is an attack on the intrinsic correctness of 

the underlying ruling. As previously discussed, however, we have no authority to inquire 

into the intrinsic correctness of the agency‟s decision. See Seals v. Bowlen, No. M1999-

00997-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 840271, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2001). Even if we 

were permitted to consider this argument, Mr. Hanley has presented no evidence from 

which we could conclude that the Warden erred on this issue. The record on appeal 

contains no pictures of the knives or descriptions thereof to contradict the Warden‟s 

finding other than Mr. Hanley‟s unsubstantiated assertions. It is well-settled, however, 

that unsupported, unsworn statements are not evidence. See, e.g., Dayhoff v. Cathey, No. 

W2011-02498-COA-R3-JV, 2012 WL 5378090, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2012); In 

re D.M.H., No. W2006-00270-COA-R3-JV, 2006 WL 3216306, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Nov. 8, 2006). Accordingly, this argument is, respectfully, without merit. 

Still, Mr. Hanley argues that the disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in 

rendering its decision to find him guilty of the offense when the disciplinary board 

purportedly heard and received uncontradicted testimony from Corporal Story that the 

doors are not searched when cell changes are accomplished in violation of TDOC Policy 

and TCIX policy. This argument is, respectfully, unavailing. As discussed supra, the 

record is devoid of any evidence that Corporal Story actually testified at Mr. Hanley‟s 

hearing before the disciplinary board. Indeed, the hearing summary contains a statement 

purported to be signed by Mr. Hanley waiving the right to have the reporting official 

present. There is no indication at all that this piece of evidence was presented to the 

disciplinary board at the August 12, 2015 disciplinary hearing. The first mention of it in 

the record can be found in Mr. Hanley‟s disciplinary report appeal to the Commissioner 

on August 27, 2015, in which he alleged that “[d]uring the hearing of [Mr.] Snow [Mr. 

Hanley’s cellmate] on this issue, C[orporal] Story was asked specifically if [the prison 

employees] search inside the [cells‟] doors and when a cell becomes empty before a new 

inmate is assigned and his testimony was „[w]e do NOT typically do this.‟” 

Under the UDP, “[b]y waiving the presence of the reporting official, the inmate is 

agreeing to have the statements in the disciplinary report accepted at the hearing in lieu of 

testimony.” TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(L)(4)(c)(4). Because Mr. Hanley waived his 

right to have Corporal Story present to testify against him, Mr. Hanley also waived the 

right to cross-examine Corporal Story and thereby develop the record in his case. 

Despite Mr. Hanley‟s contention otherwise, the record before us simply contains no such 

testimony.9 Even assuming arguendo that the disciplinary board did hear this testimony 

 

9

Thus, we pretermit any other issues raised based on Mr. Hanley‟s allegations of the disciplinary 

board‟s failure to consider Corporal Story‟s testimony that prison employees failed to search cell doors 

prior to the occupation of a new inmate, including any violations of due process and deviations from the 

UDP. 
- 14 -

during Mr. Snow‟s hearing, the board is entitled to consider only the evidence presented 

during Mr. Hanley‟s hearing for purposes of sanctioning him.10 See TDOC Policy No. 

502.01(VI)(L)(4)(k) (“The disciplinary board . . . shall base the decision solely on the 

information obtained during the hearing process, including staff reports, the statements of 

the inmate charged as well as his/her advisor, and any other evidence derived from 

witnesses and documents.”). Thus, we cannot say that the disciplinary board acted 

arbitrarily and illegally by only considering the evidence presented to it at the hearing. 

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence of the two knives found in Mr. Hanley‟s 

cell door and Corporal Story‟s report stating that the knives were found in Mr. Hanley‟s 

cell door constitute material evidence to support the conviction of possession of a deadly 

weapon.

Due Process

Mr. Hanley next alleges denial of due process rights. Prisoners are entitled to the 

protections of due process, depending on the circumstances:

The Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause protects 

individuals by guaranteeing fair procedure. Littles v. Campbell, 97 S.W.3d 

568, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 

110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)). “„In procedural due process 

claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected 

interest in „life, liberty, or property‟ is not itself unconstitutional; what is 

unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process 

of law.‟” Id. (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125). A claim is not 

actionable unless the State fails to provide due process; thus, we must first 

determine what process is due, if any, and whether such process has been 

afforded. Id. (citation omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has stated that only those 

restraints to a prisoner‟s liberty interest which impose an “atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life” are actionable under the Due Process clause. Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995). “Once a 

court determines that the restraints imposed upon the prisoner's liberty are 

indeed „atypical‟ and a „significant hardship,‟ the court must next determine 

what type of process is constitutionally required.” Littles, 97 S.W.3d at 572. 

Pursuant to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 

 

10 We note that Mr. Hanley never argued res judicata, collateral estoppel, or any other related 

theories entitling him to use evidence presented and established at another inmate‟s hearing. We also 

decline to consider whether he would have succeeded on these theories.
- 15 -

2d 935 (1974), the Due Process Clause requires that inmates subject to 

disciplinary proceedings be afforded: “(1) written notice of any charges 

made against the prisoner at least twenty-four (24) hours before a hearing is 

held; (2) the opportunity to present witnesses; (3) an impartial tribunal; and 

(4) a written statement from the tribunal indicating what evidence the 

factfinder relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken.” 

[Littles, 97 S.W.3d at 573–74] (citing Nevills v. S. Cent. Corr. Disciplinary 

Bd., No. M2000-02324-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1117066, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Sept. 25, 2001)).

Patterson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. W2009-01733-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1565535, 

at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2010). 

In this case, Mr. Hanley was found guilty of the charge of possession of a deadly 

weapon. Among the penalties the disciplinary board imposed was the loss of three 

months of Mr. Hanley‟s prisoner sentence reduction credits. “[T]he loss of previously 

earned sentence reduction credits has been found to implicate an interest sufficient to 

invoke due process.” Seals v. Bowlen, No. M1999-00997-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 

840271, at *6 (Tenn. Ct .App. July 26, 2001) (citing Greene v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 

01A01-9608-CH-00370, 1998 WL 382204, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 1998) 

(footnote omitted)); see also Garrard v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2013-01525-COAR3-CV, 2014 WL 1887298, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2014) (concluding that the loss 

of three months of prisoner sentence reduction credits entitled appellant to due process 

protections). Because Mr. Hanley‟s liberty interests have been implicated in this case, he 

was entitled to the due process protections outlined above. See Himes v. Tenn. Dep’t of 

Corr., No. M2011-02546-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 7170480, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 

2012) (finding that the loss of sentence reduction credits was sufficient to implicate due 

process).

Mr. Hanley argues that his due process rights were violated because the 

disciplinary board failed to include in its hearing report “a written statement from the 

tribunal indicating what evidence the factfinder relied upon and the reasons for the 

disciplinary actions taken.” Littles, 97 S.W.3d at 573–74. As explained by the United 

States Supreme Court:

[T]here must be a “written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence 

relied on and reasons” for the disciplinary action . . . . Written records of 

proceedings will thus protect the inmate against collateral consequences 

based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original proceeding. 

Further, as to the disciplinary action itself, the provision for a written record 

helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state 

officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental 

constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly. Without 
- 16 -

written records, the inmate will be at a severe disadvantage in propounding 

his own cause to or defending himself from others. It may be that there will 

be occasions when personal or institutional safety is so implicated that the 

statement may properly exclude certain items of evidence, but in that event 

the statement should indicate the fact of the omission. Otherwise, we 

perceive no conceivable rehabilitative objective or prospect of prison 

disruption that can flow from the requirement of these statements.

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565–65 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S. Ct. 

2593, 2604 (1972)).

The disciplinary record contains a summary of the disciplinary hearing. This 

summary includes a section wherein the disciplinary hearing members are to include such 

a written statement. In the portion of the form in which the disciplinary hearing panel is 

to state its “findings of fact and specific evidence relied on to support those findings,” the 

summary states “[g]uilty based on report + evidence presented of [two] knives found in 

the door of [Mr.] Hanley‟s cell.” Further, in the portion of the form in which the 

disciplinary board is to state its “disposition and a statement of the reasons which 

support[] that decision” the summary states the penalty that will be assessed to Mr. Mr. 

Hanley. Although succinct, the hearing summary does contain some basis for the 

disciplinary board‟s decision to convict Mr. Hanley. Compare Garrard, 2014 WL 

1887298, at *10 (holding that petitioner‟s due process rights were violated when 

“[n]othing in the summary indicates that the disciplinary hearing panel made any findings 

of fact or offered any of its reasons for its decision”), with Williams v. Little, No. M2010-

02241-COA-R3CV, 2011 WL 4058897, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2011) (finding 

that the contents of the hearing summary was adequate when it indicated that the 

disciplinary board‟s decision was based on information obtained during an investigation 

of a state employee who brought contraband into the prison and identified petitioner as 

the prisoner to whom he brought the contraband) and Schaffer v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 

No. M2010-01742-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1842971, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 

2011) (concluding that due process requirements were satisfied when the disciplinary 

board provided only “findings of fact and specific evidence relied upon to support those 

findings” in its completed disciplinary report hearing summary). Accordingly, although 

we do not encourage the practice utilized in this case as it provides only a skeletal basis 

for the disciplinary board‟s decision, the procedure utilized by the disciplinary board did 

not violate Mr. Hanley‟s due process rights. 

Uniform Disciplinary Procedures

Finally, we will consider Mr. Hanley‟s argument relating to whether the 

disciplinary board otherwise acted arbitrarily or illegally in failing to follow TDOC‟s 

UDP. According to this Court:
- 17 -

[E]ven if a state prisoner is not entitled to due process protections in a 

disciplinary proceeding, the inmate may nevertheless assert a claim under a 

common-law writ of certiorari that the prison disciplinary board otherwise 

acted illegally or arbitrarily in failing to follow TDOC‟s [UDP]. Irwin v. 

Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 244 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) 

(citing Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 713).

Patterson, 2010 WL 1565535, at *2. “A prisoner seeking judicial review of a disciplinary 

proceeding has the burden to prove „that the disciplinary board failed to follow the [UDP] 

and this failure substantially prejudiced the petitioner.‟” Walton, 2016 WL 3078838, at 

*6 (quoting Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 713). The UDP exists “[t]o provide for the fair and 

impartial determination and resolution of all disciplinary charges placed against inmates.” 

TDOC Policy No. 502.01(II); Meeks v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M-2007-01116-COAR3-CV, 2008 WL 2078054, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May, 15, 2008). Minor deviations from 

the procedures will not warrant dismissal of the disciplinary action unless the prisoner 

demonstrates “substantial prejudice as a result and the error would have affected the 

disposition of the case.” TDOC Policy No. 502.01(V); Meeks, 2008 WL 2078054, at *3. 

“To trigger judicial relief, a departure from the [UDP] must effectively deny the prisoner 

a fair hearing.” Jeffries, 108 S.W.3d at 873. Thus, an inmate may be entitled to relief 

under a common law writ of certiorari if he demonstrates that the disciplinary board 

failed to adhere to the UDP and that its failure to do so resulted in substantial prejudice to 

the inmate. Irwin v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 244 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

Mr. Hanley mainly takes issue with the disciplinary board‟s failure to verify the 

informant‟s reliability as required by the UDP.11 Under the UDP:

Whenever confidential information or confidential security sensitive 

evidence is utilized by the disciplinary hearing officer/chairperson as a 

basis for its decision, the TDOC Contemporaneous Record of Confidential 

Informant Reliability, CR-3510, shall be completed to document the factual 

basis for the disciplinary hearing officer‟s/chairperson‟s finding that the 

informant and/or security sensitive evidence was reliable. At privately 

managed facilities, the Commissioner‟s designee shall also review the 

confidential information and initial the form. This form shall be considered 

confidential and kept as a non-public access record in an area designated by 

the Warden.

TDOC Policy 502.01, § VI, L, (4)(g). 

 

11 Mr. Hanley also takes issue with the prison‟s failure to conduct searches pursuant to TDOC 

Policy 506.06 and the prison‟s local policy 506.06-1. However, because these policies are not part of the

UDP, as previously discussed, any deviations from those policies are not grounds for reversal. 
- 18 -

In this case, the record contains no indication that a confidential informant was 

ever involved. Even assuming arguendo that Corporal Story did receive confidential 

information, as Mr. Hanley suggests, we fail to see how the disciplinary board deviated

from the UDP when the disciplinary board based its decision to convict Mr. Hanley, not 

on the report of a confidential informant, but instead only on Corporal Story‟s report and 

the two knives found in the cell door. The UDP requires the completion of a CR-3510 

form only when the disciplinary board used the confidential information as a basis for its 

decision. As previously discussed, Mr. Hanley‟s conviction was “[b]ased on report + 

evidence presented of [two] knives found in the door of [Mr.] Hanley‟s cell.” Thus, we 

conclude that the disciplinary board did not act arbitrarily and illegally because it was 

under no obligation to complete a CR-3510 form in this case.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Hickman County Chancery Court is affirmed and remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to 

Appellant, Bryan Hanley, for which execution may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE