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SIDNEY PARKER v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 37796)

DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Pellegrino, Js.

Argued October 19—officially released November 22, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Bright, J.)

Cheryl A. Juniewic, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were David S. Shepack, state’s

attorney, and Kelly A. Masi and Angela R. Macchiarulo,

senior assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee

(respondent).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Sidney Parker, appeals

following the denial of his petition for certification to

appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the

petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its

discretion by denying certification to appeal from the

judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and (2) improperly concluded that his criminal

counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by

advising him to plead guilty. We dismiss the appeal.

On August 9, 2010, in the judicial district of Litchfield,

the petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford

doctrine1to one count of sexual assault in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and

53a-70 for crimes he committed in Torrington on

December 20, 2009.2 On September 3, 2010, the petitioner was sentenced to eight years of incarceration

followed by seven years of special parole. On September 7, 2012, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. He amended his petition on July 1, 2014,

alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance with respect to his Alford plea.3 Following a trial

held on September 10, 2014, the habeas court denied the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus and subsequently

denied the petition for certification to appeal.

We first set forth the standard of review we apply to

a claim that the habeas court abused its discretion by

denying certification to appeal from a judgment denying

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ‘‘Faced with a

habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to

appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the

dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme

Court in Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d

601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn.

608, 612, 646A.2d 126 (1994). First, he must demonstrate

that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, he must then

prove that the decision of the habeas court should be

reversed on the merits. . . .

‘‘To prove an abuse of discretion, the petition must

demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim

involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of

reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . In

determining whetherthe habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification,

we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas

court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s

appeal was frivolous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Moye v. Commissioner of Correction, 168 Conn. App. 207, 214–15, A.3d (2016).

We have examined the record and the briefs, considered the arguments of the parties, and are persuaded

that the habeas court properly denied certification to

appeal. The habeas court’s thoughtful memorandum of

decision fully addresses the arguments raised in this

appeal, and we adopt it as a proper statement of the

facts and the applicable law on those issues. See Parker

v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 424,

A.3d (2015) (appendix). ‘‘It would serve no useful

purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained

therein.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torrice v.

Commissioner of Correction, 55 Conn. App. 1, 2, 739

A.2d 270 (1999).

The appeal is dismissed.

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970).

2 At approximately the same time, a number of drug related charges and

violation of probation charges were pending against the petitioner in the

judicial district of Waterbury.

3 The petitioner alleged a second count of ineffective assistance by different counsel with respect to charges to which he pleaded guilty in the judicial

district of Waterbury. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The sentences on the

Litchfield conviction and the Waterbury conviction are running concurrently.

The petitioner withdrew the second count of his amended petition for a

writ of habeas corpus prior to the habeas trial.