alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Joel F.
Gemunder, President and Chief Executive Officer of Omnicare, Inc. (the
Company), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | 1. | The
  Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended March 31,
  2006 (the Periodic Report) fully complies with the requirements of section
  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
  78o(d)); and
| |    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
| | 2. | The
  information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material
  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                        

|                     |                                         | 
|-------------------- | --------------------------------------- | 
|Date: May
  10, 2006 |                                        
|                     | /s/ Joel F.
  Gemunder                  | 
|                     |                                         | 
|                     | Joel F.
  Gemunder                     
|                     | President
  and Chief Executive Officer

---
Order entered November 30, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00034-CR

ANTUAN SPENCER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F14-53001-Y

ORDER

On November 7, 2016, we entered an order that court reporter Vearneas Faggett not sit 

until she filed the reporter’s record in this appeal. Because the reporter’s record has now been 

filed, we VACATE that portion of our November 7, 2016 order that orders Vearneas Faggett not 

to sit. 

We DIRECT the Clerk to transmit copies of this order to the Honorable Elizabeth 

Frizell, Presiding Judge, Criminal District Court No. 7; Vearneas Faggett, Official Court 

Reporter, Criminal District Court No. 7; the Dallas County Auditor’s Office; and to counsel for 

all parties.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 31, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-10954

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANANIAS DEMETRIUS NICKERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

No. 3:99-CR-112-6

--------------------

Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ananias Nickerson pleaded guilty of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base; he was sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. He appeals the threeyear term of imprisonment imposed following the revocation of his

term of supervised release.

Nickerson argues that the district court erred by refusing to

hold his revocation hearing within a reasonable time under FED. R.
No. 05-10954

-2-

CRIM. P. 32.1. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not

applicable to revocation hearings. See United States v. Tippens,

39 F.3d 88, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1994). The right to a revocation hearing accrues once the warrant has been executed and the defendant

has been taken into federal custody. Id. Nevertheless, due process rights may be impeded by a delay in the execution of a warrant

“if the delay undermines [defendant’s] ability to contest the issue

of the violation or to proffer mitigating evidence.” Id. The record does not reflect that Nickerson suffered any specific prejudice

from the delay in executing the warrant. Moreover, the two-month

delay between the execution of the warrant and the revocation hearing was not unreasonable.

Nickerson argues that the sentence is unreasonable. Although

the three-year term of imprisonment imposed on revocation of supervised release exceeded the sentencing range indicated by the policy

statements in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines, it did not

exceed the statutory maximum term of imprisonment the district

court could have imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Accordingly, Nickerson’s revocation sentence was neither “unreasonable” nor

“plainly unreasonable.” See United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114,

120 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1804 (2006).

AFFIRMED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DEANDRE PENNINGTON,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 382 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 29, 2016

No. 04-16-00610-CV

Timothy STEIN,

Appellant

v.

REVCAP, LLC and Revere High Yield Fund, LP,

Appellees

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14288

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

In this accelerated appeal, Appellant’s brief was due to be filed with this court on 

November 17, 2016. One day after the due date, Appellant filed a partially opposed first motion 

for a twenty-day extension of time to file Appellant’s brief until December 7, 2016. 

Appellant’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due on December 7, 2016. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(d). 

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 29th day of November, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Knox vs. Miller.

Service of summons by leaving a copy at tbe usual place of abode of the defendant, is authorized only when he cannot be found so as to be personally served; and the latter fact must appear from the affidavit or return of service, or the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for *Milwaukee*County.

Ejectment. Attached to the summons as filed was an affidavit of the plaintiff’s attorney that, on &c., he served a copy of the summons on the defendant by delivering the same to his wife at his usual place of abode; but it did not appear from said affidavit, or otherwise, that defendant could not be found. Judgment was afterwards taken against the defendant as upon default; from which he appealed.

*F. Fox Cook,*for appellant.

*Thomas M.*Knox, for respondent.

*By the Court,*

Dixon, C. J.

The judgment must be reversed. The record shows no sufficient service of the summons. Service by leaving a copy at the usual place of abode of the defendant is only authorized when he cannot be found so as to be personally served. R. S., ch. 124, sec. 9. It should appear from the affidavit or return of service that the defendant could not be found, otherwise the court acquires no jurisdiction. *Pollard v. Wegener,*13 Wis., 569; *Rape v. Heaton,*9 Wis., 328.

Judgment reversed.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT STEPHEN J. DONELL, Pe rm ane nt R e c e ive r for Le arn W a te rhouse , Inc ., its subsidia rie s a nd a ffilia te s, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. R ANDY TEINER T; C ATHY TEINER T, De fe nda

nts - Appe lla

nts. No. 11-56432

D.C . No. 3:10-c v-01444-W -C AB M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Southe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Thom a s J. W

he la n, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

M ay 14, 2013 ** B e fore : LEAVY, THOM AS, and M UR GUIA, C irc uit Judge s . R andy and C athy

Te i ne rt a ppe a l pro se from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt in an a c tion se e king a

v o ida nc e and re c ove ry of fra

udule nt tra

nsfe rs unde r C a lifornia la w. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re vie wfor an a buse of 

# FIL ED MAY23 2013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).disc re tion thedistric t c ourt’ s de nia l of a m otion to se t a s ide e ntry

of de fa ult. Unite d State s v . Signe d

Pe rsonal C

he c k N o. 730 of Yubran S. Me

s le , 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th C ir. 2010). W e va c a te and re m a nd. In its orde r granting de fa

ult judgm e nt a

nd de ny ing the Te ine rts’ m otion to se t a side de fa

ult, the distric t c ourt “ om itte d a ny m e n tion of the ‘ e xtre m e c irc um s ta nc e s ’ re quire m e nt for judgm e nt by de fa u lt.” Id . at 1091. Its failure to do so wa s a n a buse of disc re tion. S

e e id . at 1091-92 (a

bse nt suc h e xtre m e c irc um s ta nc e s , judgm e nt by

de fa ult is ina ppropria te ); se ealso id . at 1089 (“ Our rule s for de te rm i ning whe n a de fa ult should be se t a side are solic itous towa rds m ova nts, e spe c ia lly

those whose a c tions le a ding to the de fa ult we re ta

ke n without the b e ne fit of le ga l re pre se ntation.” ). Ac c ordingly , we va c a te the e ntry of de fa ult judgm e nt a

nd re m and for re c o nside ra tion in light of Signe d Pe rsonal C he c k N o. 730 . The pa rtie s sha ll be ar the ir own c osts on a ppe a l. V ACAT E D and RE M ANDE D .

1 1 - 5 6 4 3 2 2
Order entered September 23, 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 14
- 00041
- CR
EDGAR JUVENTION BARR IENTOS, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court

Collin County, Tex as Trial Court Cause No. 401
- 80994
- 07



### O RDER
The Court DENIES appellant’s motion for interlocutory.
We ORDER the Clerk of the Court to send a copy of this order to Edgar Juvention Barrientos, TDCJ No. 1907591, Boyd Unit, 200 Spur 113, Teague, Texas, 75860

- 2007.

/s/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

 Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 

November 23, 2016

a1116

Order 

Clerk

November 23, 2016

153723

JEFFREY HAKSLUOTO and

CAROL HAKSLUOTO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v SC: 153723

COA: 323987

Macomb CC: 2014-002556-NH

MT. CLEMENS REGIONAL MEDICAL

CENTER, a/k/a McLAREN MACOMB

GENERAL RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES,

P.C. and ELI SHAPIRO, D.O.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 18, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED. The parties shall 

include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether a notice of intent under MCL 

600.2912b that is mailed on what would otherwise be the last day of the limitations 

period of MCL 600.5805(6) tolls the limitations period, as provided by MCL 

600.5856(c); and (2) if the limitations period was tolled in this case, whether the plaintiffs 

were required to file on the 182nd day of the notice period or the day after the 182nd day in 

order for their Complaint to be timely. See MCR 1.108(1) (“the period runs until the end 

of the . . . day). 

The Michigan Association for Justice, the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc., 

and the Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan are invited to file briefs 

amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues 

presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.
EXHIBIT 21.1

                    SUBSIDIARIES OF HENLEY HEALTHCARE, INC.

The following is a list of all of the domestic subsidiaries of the Company as of
December 31, 1998:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         PERCENTAGE
        DOMESTIC SUBSIDIARIES               STATE OF INCORPORATION       OWNERSHIP
-------------------------------------   ------------------------------   ---------
<S>                                     <C>                              <C>
Garvey Company.......................             Minnesota                  100%
Health Career Learning Systems,
  Inc. ..............................              Michigan                  100%
Henley Acquisition Corp. ............               Texas                    100%
Med-Quip, Inc. ......................              Georgia                   100%
NCI, Inc. ...........................              Michigan                  100%
</TABLE>

The following is a list of all of the foreign subsidiaries of the Company as of
December 31, 1998:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         PERCENTAGE
        FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES            JURISDICTION OF INCORPORATION    OWNERSHIP
-------------------------------------   ------------------------------   ---------
<S>                                     <C>                              <C>
Enraf-Nonius, B.V. ..................          The Netherlands               100%
Enraf-Nonius, N.V. ..................              Belgium                   100%
Enraf-Nonius Medizinelektronik
  GMBH...............................              Germany                   100%
Enraf-Nonius Medical Equipment Co.
  Ltd. ..............................              Thailand                   40%
Stats Doyer Hydrotherapie S. A. .....               France                    25%
Enraf-Nonius S.A.France..............               France                  99.7%
</TABLE>
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 02, 2016.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, November 02, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A17I0050. RYAN ALEXANDER TONEY v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

16C95530
(logo)KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

     2500 Ruan Center
     P.O. Box 772
     Des Moines, IA 50303



                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT

The Board of Directors
Norwest Mortgage, Inc.:



We  have  examined  management's  assertion  about  Norwest  Mortgage  Banking's
compliance  with the minimum  servicing  standards  identified  in the  Mortgage
Bankers Association of America's UNIFORM SINGLE ATTESTATION PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE
BANKERS (USAP) as of and for the year ended  December 31, 1996,  included in the
accompanying  management  assertion.   Management  is  responsible  for  Norwest
Mortgage  Banking's  compliance  with those  minimum  servicing  standards.  Our
responsibility  is to express an opinion  on  management's  assertion  about the
entity's compliance based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining, on a test basis, evidence about Norwest Mortgage Banking's compliance
with the minimum servicing  standards and performing such other procedures as we
considered  necessary  in the  circumstances.  We believe  that our  examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a
legal  determination on Norwest Mortgage  Banking's  compliance with the minimum
servicing standards.

In our opinion,  management's  assertion that Norwest  Mortgage Banking complied
with the aforementioned minimum servicing standards as of and for the year ended
December 31, 1996, is fairly stated, in all material respects. 



                                                        /s/KMPG Peat Marwick LLP


January 15, 1997


     Member Firm of
     KPMG International
Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002


By signing below, the Principal Financial Officer hereby certifies pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, (i) this report on Form 10-QSB fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in this report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Hybrid Fuels Inc.



Signed this 19th day of February 2008:



By: /s/ Douglas Dickie
----------------------
Douglas Dickie
Principal Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Hybrid Fuels Inc. and will be
retained by Hybrid Fuels Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Williams vs. Ely.

The “ act to declare the rights and privileges of such persons as may enrol themselves in the service of the country,” approved May 25, 1861, ivas not intended to apply to oases in which all the rights of the defendant were fixed by a final judgment previous to the application for a stay of proceedings under the act.

*237The enlistment of a defendant in the active militia in the service of the state or of the IT. S., is no ground for staying proce'edings upon a judgment of foreclosure, rendered before the time of such enlistment,

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Bock*County.

*H. K. Whiton*for appellant.

*E. E. Boies,*for respondent.

November 2.

*By the Court,*

DixoN, C. J.

Tbis is an appeal from an order of tbe circuit court of Bock county staying the appellant’s proceedings upon a judgment of foreclosure and sale. It appears that the judgment was rendered on the 1st day of July, 1859, and that the mortgaged premises were advertised to be sold on the 12th of June last. On the 1st day of June, the defendant *Ely,*by Ms attorney, upon affidavit that he had enlisted in the active militia and was then in the service of the state of Wisconsin or of the United States, applied to the court for a stay of proceedings under the “act to declare the rights and privileges of such persons as may enroll themselves in the service of the country,” approved May 25,. 1861, Laws of 1861, p. 334. The order was granted, and the plaintiff brings this appeal.

It is unnecessary for us to consider the constitutional objections which are urged to the act, since we are clearly of opinion that the case does not come within its provisions. It was evidently intended to apply to *pending*actions, where the liability of the defendant is still open to contest and litigation, and where it may be supposed that his interests will be jeopardized by proceedings taken in his absence; and not to a case like this where all his rights are fixed by a final judgment. This is apparent from the efficient words of the 'act, which are, that “ it shall be the duty of every court or judge thereof, and every justice of the peace, whenever it shall be made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, in the *course*of any civil action or proceeding whatever, that any party defendant thereto is a member or officer of any company, regiment, corps or division in the service of the United States, or of this state, *to cause such action or proceeding to he stricken from the calendar,*and to suspend all proceedings in *238such action or proceeding until it shall be made to appear that such party defendant is no longer a member or officer of such company, regiment, corps or division.” The word “course,” in this connection, signifies progressive action in a suit or proceeding not yet determined; and the provision for striking the cause from the calendar seems to place the intention of the legislature beyond doubt.

For these reasons the order is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-16-00413-CV

IN THE INTERST OF D.D.L.R. and D.D.L.R., Children

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015PA01025

Honorable Lisa Jarrett, Judge Presiding1

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE PULLIAM

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order terminating 

E.D.L.R.’s parental rights is AFFIRMED. Because E.D.L.R. is indigent, no costs are taxed in this 

appeal.

SIGNED November 23, 2016.

_____________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

 1 This proceeding arises out of Bexar County trial court cause No. 2015-PA-01025, styled In the Interest of D.D.L.R., 

et al., Children, pending in the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Stephani Walsh 

presiding.