IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DANIEL ROSS GILES,

Appellant.

DIVISION ONE

No. 72726-5-1

PUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: November 28, 2016

Dwyer, J. —Danny Giles appeals from thejudgment entered on a jury's

verdict finding him guilty of murder in the first degree, committed while armed

with a deadly weapon. He asserts that, by excluding evidence of three other

suspects who purportedly committed the murder, the trial court deprived him of

his right to present a defense. He also asserts that, by contravening a ruling in

limine, a witness's testimony denied him his right to a fair trial, notwithstanding

that the trial court struck the offending testimony from the record and issued a

curative instruction, approved by his counsel, and notwithstanding that his

counsel requested no other remedy. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

Patti Berry, a nude dancer at a nightclub, went missing after leaving work

sometime after 1:30 a.m. on July 31,1995. Her car wasfound the next day,

parked between two moving vans ata nearby car wash. There was a significant
No. 72726-5-1/2

amount of blood inside of the car. A search of the surrounding area uncovered a

blood-stained pair of jeans and a handbag, both appearing to belong to Berry.

The police processed her car, removing, for the purpose of forensic testing, its

steering wheel, driver's seat headrest, and a piece of the front passenger seat's

fabric containing a bloody handprint.

Nine days after she went missing, Berry's body was found in a wooded

area a few miles from the car wash. An autopsy of the body revealed that the

cause of her death was blood loss from 16 to 18 stab wounds. A forensic

pathologist's analysis concluded that the rate of decomposition of her body was

consistent with death occurring on July 31.

The police investigation identified several suspects, none ofwhom were

Danny Giles. The police made no arrests. This remained so for manyyears.

Periodically, over the next many years, investigators conducted in-depth

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing ofthe evidence seized. The testing

identified a partial match between the DNA of Danny Giles and the DNA samples

taken from Berry's jeans and handbag and her car's steering wheel and driver's

seat headrest.1 These matches indicated that Giles could not be excluded as a

suspect and, thus, were consistent with a theory that Giles had murdered Berry.

The DNA profile matches led the police to investigate Giles, uncovering

additional evidence that he may have been the killer: he had visited the nightclub

where Berry worked on previous occasions, he had pooropinions of sex workers,

1The testing excluded Giles as a contributor to both male DNA found on fingernail

clippings taken during Berry's autopsy and male DNA found in the bloody handprint on the

passenger seat of Berry's car.

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No. 72726-5-1/3

he sometimes carried a knife, and he lived and worked in the area, frequenting a

bar near the car wash where Berry's car was discovered and working for a

landscaper near the wooded lot where Berry's body was found.

During a police interview, Giles initially denied knowing Berry. However,

after being confronted with the DNA profile partial matches, he said that it was

possible that he had engaged in intercourse with her but could not explain why

his DNA would be in Berry's car. In addition, in 2012, a witness, Todd Horton,

came forth to claim that in the early morning in question he had seen a man who

looked like Giles washing out a car's floor mats, backseat, and trunk, and that the

substance being washed out looked murky, like blood.

Giles was charged with murder in the first degree, committed while armed

with a deadly weapon, arising from the death of Patti Berry. Based on a separate

investigation, Giles was also charged with murder in the first degree arising from

the death of Tracey Brazzel. Prior to trial, Giles moved to sever the murder

charges for trial. The trial court granted Giles' motion.

As part of his defense, Giles sought to present evidence that someone

other than him had killed Berry.2 In so doing, Gilesidentified 11 other individuals

and sought permission to present to the jury the "other suspect" evidence for

each individual. The trial court held hearings over the course of five days

regarding the admissibility ofthis evidence. At the first such hearing, evidence

pertaining to five ofthe individuals identified by Giles was excluded by the trial

court when Giles' counsel admitted that he did not have sufficient evidence to

2 For ease of reference, we refer to such evidence as "other suspect" evidence.

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No. 72726-5-1/4

warrant presenting any of those individuals to the jury as the true killer.

Thereafter, the trial court permitted Giles to introduce evidence of one individual,

Bryan Petitclerc, as the perpetrator and excluded evidence pertaining to the

remaining five.

At trial, on the 12th day of the State's case in chief, Giles' attorneys filed a

motion in limine regarding the upcoming testimony of Kristopher Kern, the State's

expert witness. The State indicated that Kern would testify that he had

familiarized himself with the facts of the case and had reviewed the DNA

analyses regarding Giles' DNA found inside Berry's car and on Berry's

possessions. Based on his expertise and hisfamiliarity with the facts, the State

planned to have Kern testify regarding conclusions he had drawn as to the

likelihood that Giles had been inside Berry's car and touched those of her

possessions found nearby. Giles' motion requested that Kern be limited to

testifying that the DNA evidence was "consistent with" the postulation that Giles

touched Berry's car and her belongings, not that it was "likely" that Giles did so.

The court granted the motion, stating, "I guess I'm a little bit bothered bythe term

likely. [Kern] could say his opinion, based on everything he reviewed, isthis, but

Idon't think he can quantify it as likely, but you can ask him his opinion, based on

what he's reviewed."

During histestimony, however, Kern, in response to the prosecutor's

questions, testified that the DNA evidence established that itwas "likely" that

Giles was in Berry's car and that itwas "likely" that Giles touched some of her

belongings. Before the jury, defense counsel objected to each statement, citing

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No. 72726-5-1/5

a lack of foundation but not referencing the trial court's prior ruling. The trial

court overruled each objection.

Immediately after Kern's second answer, a recess was taken. At this time,

defense counsel informed the court that her objections had been based on the

trial court's previous ruling. The trial court left the bench to review its notes.

Upon returning to the bench, the trial court ruled that Kern's testimony violated its

prior ruling. Defense counsel requested that a curative instruction be given to the

jury. Defense counsel deferred to the trial court to draft the curative instruction

and approved of the curative instruction composed by the court. The trial court

inquired as to whether any other matters remained for decision. Defense

counsel requested nothing further from the court.

The jury was brought into the courtroom. The trial courtordered the

offending testimony stricken from the record. The curative instruction was then

read to the jury.

After a 15-day trial, the juryfound Giles guilty of Berry's murder.

II

A

Over the course of nearly a century and an intervening United States

Supreme Court decision, Washington's "other suspect" evidence rule—applicable

to proffered evidence that a specific person other than the defendant committed

the charged crime—has developed from a broad common law rule to a specific

and focused application of well established principles of materiality and probative

value.
No. 72726-5-1/6

In State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 13 P.2d 1 (1932), our Supreme Court

acknowledged the common law rule. The issue in Downs was whether the trial

court improperly excluded evidence that a specific person other than Downs or

his codefendant committed the burglary at issue. The defendants sought to

present evidence that "Madison Jimmy," a well known safe burglar, was in town

on the night in question and planned to argue to the jury that he, notthe

defendants, stole from the safe. Downs, 168 Wash, at 666. Upon the State's

objection, the trial court excluded the evidence. Downs, 168 Wash, at 666.

Our SupremeCourt found no errorin the trial court's ruling. Noting that

the defendants had failed to adduce evidence pointing to "Madison Jimmy" as the

burglar, the court cited tothe "general rule" of other jurisdictions, requiring that

"[bjefore such testimony can be received, there must be such proof of connection

with the crime, such a train offacts or circumstances as tend clearly to point out

someone besides the accused as the guilty party." Downs, 168Wash, at 667

(citing State v. Caviness, 40 Idaho 500, 235 P. 890 (1925)). The court concluded

that "[t]he fact that the so-called 'Madison Jimmy' was present in Seattle on the

night ofthe burglary and may have had the opportunity to commit it, does not

amount to even a justifiable suspicion that he did so." Downs, 168 Wash, at 667-

68. The proffered evidence, the court observed, "would not create a reasonable

inference as to the innocence of appellants." Downs, 168 Wash, at 668.

Nearly 70 years later, the United States Supreme Court examined whether

a recent modification to South Carolina's common law "other suspect" evidence

rule deprived a defendant of his right to present a defense. Holmes v. South
No. 72726-5-1/7

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006).3 The

modified South Carolina rule excluded more evidence than did the common law

rule, permitting a trial court to exclude a defendant's "other suspect" evidence

when there was sufficiently strong evidence of the defendant's guilt.

Under this rule, the trial judge does not focus on the

probative value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the

defense evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the critical inquiry

concerns the strength of the prosecution's case: If the prosecution's

case is strong enough, the evidence ofthird-party guilt is excluded

even ifthat evidence, if viewed independently, would have great

probative value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of

harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 329.

The Supreme Court noted the manner in which the common law"other

suspect" rule was consistent with constitutional mandates.

While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of

defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or

that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to

promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to

exclude evidence ifits probative value is outweighed by certain

other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

potential to mislead the jury. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403;

Uniform Rule of Evid. 45 (1953); ALI, Model Code of Evidence Rule

303 (1942); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1863, 1904 (1904). Plainly

referring to rules ofthis type, we have stated that the Constitution

permits judges "to exclude evidence that is'repetitive . . . , only

marginally relevant' or poses an undue risk of 'harassment,

prejudice, [or] confusion ofthe issues.'" Cranef v. Kentucky], 476

U.S.[ 683,] 689-690[, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986)]

(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679[, 106 S. Ct.

1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674] (1986); ellipsis and brackets in original).

See also Montana v. Eqelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42[, 116 S. Ct. 2013,

135 L. Ed. 2d 361] (1996) (plurality opinion) (terming such rules

"familiar and unquestionably constitutional").

3South Carolina's prior "widely accepted" common law rule was the same rule discussed

in Downs and followed in subsequent Washington cases. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327 n.* (citing

State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 856-58, 83 P.3d 970 (2004)); see Downs, 168 Wash, at 667.
No. 72726-5-1/8

A specific application of this principle is found in rules

regulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal

defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with

which they are charged. See, e.g., 41 C.J.S., Homicide § 216, pp.

56-58 (1991) ("Evidence tending to show the commission by

another person of the crime charged may be introduced by accused

when it is inconsistent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his

own guilt; but frequently matters offered in evidence for this

purpose are so remote and lack such connection with the crime that

they are excluded"); 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide § 286, pp. 136-138

(1999) ("[T]he accused may introduce any legal evidence tending to

prove that another person may have committed the crime with

which the defendant is charged .... [Such evidence] may be

excluded where it does not sufficiently connect the other person to

the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or

remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in

issue at the defendant's trial" (footnotes omitted)).

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326-27 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court held that the South Carolina rule was

unconstitutionally arbitrary because it assumed that the prosecution's evidence

should be credited rather than focusing on whether the proffered evidence, if

credited, might tend to support a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt

without being repetitive, harassing, or confusing. Thus, the Court ruled, the

application at trial ofthe South Carolina rule violated Holmes' "right to have '"a

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."'" Holmes, 547 U.S. at

331 (quoting Crane, 476 U.S. at 690) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.

479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L Ed. 2d 413 (1984)).

Our Supreme Court recently explained that, since Downs and in light of

Holmes, Washington has developed a more "restrained interpretation" of its

"other suspect" evidence test. State v. Franklin, 180Wn.2d 371, 381, 325 P.3d

159 (2014). At issue therein was whetherWashington's "other suspect" case law

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No. 72726-5-1/9

barred Franklin from presenting circumstantial evidence pointing to another

suspect who had the requisite motive, ability, opportunity, and character to have

been the perpetrator. Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 379-81. The trial court had

interpreted Downs and subsequent cases as requiring—in order to admit the

proffered evidence—specific facts showing that the other suspect actually

committed the crime. Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 379-81. The trial court excluded

the evidence. Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 379.

Our Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, explaining that it

had "never adopted a per se rule against admitting circumstantial evidence of

another person's motive, ability, or opportunity. Instead, our cases hold that if

there is an adequate nexus between the alleged other suspect and the crime,

such evidence should be admitted." Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 373.

As in Holmes, our Supreme Court explained that "other suspect" case law

simply evidences specific applications of well established evidentiary principles.

Referencing its "other suspect" jurisprudence as a limitation on collateral

evidence, the Franklin court continued:

In effect, this limitation on collateral evidence was similar to the

requirement that evidence must have sufficient "probative value" to

be relevant and admissible under ER 403. Evidence establishing

nothing more than suspicion that another person might have

committed the crime was inadmissible because its probative value

was greatly outweighed by its burden on the judicial system. Other

suspect evidence that establishes only such suspicion is

inadmissible.

In contrast, we held in State v. Maupin that eyewitness

testimony that a kidnapping victim was seen after the kidnapping

with a person other than the defendant was both relevant and

sufficiently probative to pass the Downs test. 128 Wn.2d 918, 928,

913 P.2d 808 (1996). Such evidence links the other suspect to the

specific crime charged, either as the true perpetrator or as an

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No. 72726-5-1/10

accomplice or associate of the defendant. Evidence of this sort

differs from evidence of motive, ability, opportunity, or character in

that the proffered evidence alone is sufficient under the

circumstances to establish the necessary connection. However,

neither Maupin nor the earlier cases stand for the proposition that

motive, ability, opportunity, and/or character evidence together can

never establish such a connection. The Downs test in essence has

not changed: some combination of facts or circumstances must

point to a nonspeculative link between the other suspect and the

charged crime.

The trial court was thus incorrect to suggest that direct

evidence rather than circumstantial evidence is required under our

cases. The standard for relevance of other suspect evidence is

whether there is evidence "'tending to connect'" someone other

than the defendant with the crime. Downs, 168 Wash, at 667

(quoting 16 C.J. Criminal Law% 1085, at 560 (1918)), quoted in

Maupin, 128 Wn.2d at 925. Further, other jurisdictions have

pointed out that this inquiry, properly conducted, "focusefs] upon

whether the evidence offered tends to create a reasonable doubt as

to the defendant's guilt, not whether itestablishes the guilt of the

third party beyond a reasonable doubt." Smithart v. State. 988 P.2d

583, 588 & n.21 (Alaska 1999).

180 Wn.2d at 380-81.

Thus, the threshold analysis for "other suspect" evidence involves a

straightforward, but focused, relevance inquiry, reviewing the evidence's

materiality and probative value for "whether the evidence has a logical

connection to the crime." Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 381-82 (citing Holmes, 547

U.S. at 330).

B

Trial court decisions on the admission of evidence are reviewed for abuse

of discretion. State v. Perez-Valdez, 172 Wn.2d 808, 814, 265 P.3d 853 (2011).

"Such abuse occurs when, considering the purposes of the trial court's discretion,

it is exercised on untenable grounds orfor untenable reasons." State v. Clark, 78

Wn. App. 471, 477, 898 P.2d 854 (1995).

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No. 72726-5-1/11

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,

section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant a

meaningful opportunity to present a defense.4 State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713,

720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010). This right, however, is not absolute. It may, "in

appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal

trial process," Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L.

Ed. 2d 297 (1973), including the exclusion of evidence considered irrelevant or

otherwise inadmissible. State v. Strizheus, 163 Wn. App. 820, 830, 262 P.3d

100 (2011); accord Jones, 168Wn.2d at 720 ("Defendants have a right to

present only relevant evidence, with no constitutional right to present irrelevant

evidence."); State v. Aquirre, 168 Wn.2d 350, 363, 229 P.3d 669 (2010) ("[T]he

scope of that right does not extend to the introduction of otherwise inadmissible

evidence.").

As with all evidence, the proponent bears the burden of establishing the

admissibility of "other suspect" evidence. State v. Starbuck, 189 Wn. App. 740,

752, 355 P.3d 1167 (2015), review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1008 (2016). Because

the premise underlying the introduction of "other suspect" evidence isto show

that someone other than the defendant committed the charged crime, the

standard for admission is whether the proffered evidence tends to indicate a

reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 381.

4"The Constitution guaranteesa fair trial through the Due ProcessClauses, but it

defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth

Amendment.'" Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).

11 -
No. 72726-5-1/12

Evidence is relevant when it is both material—the fact to be proved '"is of

consequence in the context of the other facts and the applicable substantive

law'"—and probative—the evidence has a "tendency to prove or disprove a fact."

State v. Sargent, 40 Wn. App. 340, 348 n.3, 698 P.2d 598 (1985) (quoting 5 K.

Tegland, Washington Practice: Evidence § 82, at 168 (2d ed.1982)).

C

On appeal, Giles asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

excluding evidence pointing to Frank Colacurcio Jr., Michael Beatie, and James

Leslie as the actual slayer of Patti Berry. We discuss the trial court's rulings as to

each of these "other suspects" in turn.5

1

Giles first asserts that the evidence he sought to introduce regarding

Frank Colacurcio Jr. tended to establish that Colacurcio was the murderer and

thus the trial court abused its discretion by ruling the evidence inadmissible. We

disagree.

In his pretrial motion, Giles set forth the evidence that he would present, if

allowed, thatsupported identifying Colacurcio as the true killer: (1) Colacurcio

was a co-owner ofthe nightclub at which Berry worked, (2) Berry once said that

5Giles, in his appellate briefing, omitted that the trial court allowed him to introduce

evidence pointing to Bryan Petitclerc as the actual killer. Before trial, Giles offered the following

proof in support ofintroducing evidence of Petitclerc as the true killer: (1) In 1999, contrary to his

testimony in 2012, witness Horton had identified Petitclerc in a photomontage with "99 percent

confidence" as the individual he saw at the car wash on the night in question, (2) the composite

drawing from 1999 that was generated with Horton's input resembled Petitclerc, and (3) Petitclerc

lived in the area during the time in question.

The trial court permitted Giles to introduce evidence pointing to Petitclerc as the true

killer. Giles' counsel availed themselves of this opportunity. The evidence did not, apparently,

have its desired effect on the jurors.

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No. 72726-5-1/13

Colacurcio was a "mafia type," (3) Berry owed Colacurcio several thousand

dollars for a loan that financed her breast augmentation surgery and for unpaid

rental fees (amounts charged to women for the right to dance at his clubs), (4)

Berry was a sex worker who had been blackmailing her customers, including one

of Colacurcio's "associates," (5) Berry's mother claimed that Berry had once

slapped Colacurcio after he touched her rear end, (6) Colacurcio had sent Berry

to work at a strip club in Texas earlierthat month and, while in Texas, Berry

stated that she was afraid of going back to Washington, (7) a black car of the

same color and model as a car owned by Colacurcio was seen driving away from

the nightclub around the same time that Berry was last seen and in the same

direction as Berry had been seen driving, (8) the nightclub's surveillance tapes

requested by the police were not turned over tothe police in a timely fashion, and

(9) the nightclub's surveillance tape recorded on the night that Berry

disappeared—unlike the videotapes for different nights—was blank.

The trial court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Colacurcio,

inviting defense counsel to seek to obtain additional evidence concerning

Colacurcio's car and its possible connection to the crime.

Giles laterfiled a supplemental motion offering proof that Colacurcio had

been present at the nightclub on the night in question.

Nevertheless, the trial court adhered to its ruling, excluding evidence

pointing to Colacurcio as the murderer. The trial court reasoned that Berry's

financial debt to Colacurcio weighed against him having a motive to kill her,

stating, "I mean, if she owes him money, he's probably going towant his money

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No. 72726-5-1/14

back." The trial court further reasoned that the evidence of blackmail was

insufficient because it did not tend to show that Berry was blackmailing

Colacurcio himself. Furthermore, the trial court explained that, with regard to

Berry's reluctance to return to Washington, no proof was offered that Berry had a

specific fear of Colacurcio.

The trial court's analysis was tenable. While the evidence tied Colacurcio

to Berry, it did not tie him to her killing. Thus, the trial court properly ruled that

the proposed testimony seeking to identify Colacurcio as the true killer was not of

a type that would cause to exist a reasonable doubt as to Giles' guilt. Hence, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Giles' request to identify

Colacurcio to the jury as Berry's true killer.6

6Giles also sought to introduce evidence thatColacurcio had threatened to kill Berry and

that Colacurcio was behind her murder. Giles derived this information from an investigating

officer who was told of it by another police officer, who, in turn, received the information from an

anonymous tip. The State argued thatthe evidence was hearsay and lacked a basisfor

establishing personal knowledge thereof. The trial judge did not specifically addressthis

evidence in its ruling when it excluded all ofGiles' proffered evidence pointing toColacurcio as

the actual killer.

When the motion before the trial court is one to exclude evidence, an offer of proof by the

proponent is required by rule.

Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which . . . excludes evidence unless a

substantial right of the party is affected, and

(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the

substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent

from the context within which questions were asked.

ER 103(a).

Such an offer serves three purposes.

[I]t informs the courtofthe legal theory underwhich the offered evidenceis

admissible; it informs the judge of the specific nature of the offered evidence so

that the court can assess its admissibility; and it creates a record adequate for

review.

State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d531, 538, 806 P.2d 1220(1991). An offerof proof is unnecessary only

when "the substance of the excluded evidence is apparent from the record." Ray, 116 Wn.2d at

539.

When we review a trial court decision to exclude evidence, we evaluate the court's

analysis ofthe proof offered in light ofgeneral evidentiary admissibility principles. Thus, we

ordinarily assume that the trial court ismaking its admissibility evaluation in response to only the

ground stated, ER 103(a), that matters discussed by counsel are within the contemplation ofthe

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No. 72726-5-1/15

Giles next asserts that his proffer of circumstantial evidence concerning

Deputy Sheriff Michael Beatie—his frequent association with the crime scenes

and his bad character—was sufficient to connect Beatie to the murder and, as a

result, the trial court erred in excluding the evidence. We disagree.

In his pretrial motion in support of the introduction of "other suspect"

evidence, Giles made the following offer of proof concerning his request to

identify Beatie to the jury as the true killer: (1) Beatie worked and lived in the

area, (2) Beatie was under investigation for "abuse of power and taking

advantage ofwomen" and the letter terminating his employment with the Sheriff's

Office indicated that he had maintained a pattern of abusing his power for his

social and sexual needs, (3) Beatie was not on duty the night of Berry's

disappearance, (4) Beatie was the first officer on the scene when Berry's car was

found, (5) two officers noted in their reports that Beatie made suspicious

comments about the murder investigation, (6) the day after Berry's vehicle was

found, Beatie told Berry's sister that, while looking for Berry's body, he had

judge, State v. Johnson. 48 Wn. App. 531, 537, 740 P.2d 337 (1987), that the judge "considered

all pertinent arguments made by counsel," Johnson, 48Wn. App at 538, and that thejudge ruled

in relation to the circumstances of the case as it then existed. Johnson, 48 Wn. App at 537.

However, we also remain aware that a trial judge may deem excluded inadmissible evidence

even in the absence of an objection, In re Estate of Haves, 185Wn. App. 567, 591-92, 342 P.3d

1161 (2015), and that, generally, a ruling properly excluding evidence will be upheld if the record

reveals a sound basis for that result, even ifthe court did not articulate that basis (or any basis)

for its ruling. See State v. Markle, 118 Wn.2d 424, 438, 823 P.2d 1101 (1992): State v. Jones, 71

Wn. App. 798, 824, 863 P.2d 85 (1993); Statev. Rivas, 49Wn. App. 677, 688, 746 P.2d 312

(1987).

Here, the challenged evidence was hearsay upon hearsay with no showing of any

personal knowledge ofany identifiable person. As such, it was plainly inadmissible for reasons

apart from the "other suspect" analysis. Accordingly, the trial judge properly gave this proffered

evidence no credit in evaluating the merits of Giles' "other suspect" request.

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No. 72726-5-1/16

received scratches from falling down an embankment into some blackberry

bushes, (7) when Berry's body was found, Beatie went to the body recovery site,

(8) Berry's body was found in blackberry bushes, and (9) Beatie called Berry's

mother to offer condolences.

At the hearing, the trial court expressed interest in the scratches that

Beatie had received and offered that, if Giles could establish that Beatie had not

been officially responsible for searching for Berry's body, Giles could introduce

evidence that Beatie was a suspect in the murder.

Three weeks later, still prior to trial, Giles offered additional evidence

pointing to Beatie as the true killer: (1) Beatie's knowledge and experience as a

sheriff's deputy would enable him to commit and cover-up a murder, (2) at the

car recovery site, Beatie placed one foot on the fender ofthe Berry's car, pressed

hisfoot down on the fender to gauge the response ofthe car's suspension, and

remarked that Berry was not in the trunk, (3) no embankment existed at the site

where Beatie claimed he had fallen while searching for Berry's body, (4) a police

report indicated that another officer, not Beatie, wassearching for Berry's body in

blackberry bushes, (5) Beatie commented that Berry's body would be found in

the woods, and Berry's bodywas laterfound in a wooded lot, (6) Berry's sister

and mother both said that Beatie told them that he knew Berry, (7) Berry may

have been blackmailing Beatie because Beatiewas purportedly the type of

person who would be susceptible to blackmail attempts, and (8) Beatie was

viewed as a viable suspect long into the State's investigation because, in 2007,

the State compared Beatie's DNA with the steering wheel DNA sample.

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No. 72726-5-1/17

At a hearing a week later, Giles asserted that this additional evidence

justified the introduction ofevidence pointing to Beatie as the actual killer

because it contradicted Beatie's statements about the circumstances under

which he was scratched by blackberry bushes. In response, the State pointed to

a report indicating that Beatie was responsible for searching for the body at the

time in question. After asking if Giles' counsel had gathered any other evidence,

the court stated,

So I'm going to stick with my ruling in my previousruling. I'm not

going to find that Mr. Beatie can be named as an other suspect.

Thatspecifically indicates in the report that he was responsible for

searching for the body. There is reference in the report to him

checking the area, and it did reference there were blackberry

bushes. Frankly, the fact that he didn't know he was scratched by

them is insignificant to me, in relation to that particular issue. So

I'm not going to permit him to be called as an other suspect.

As recognized by the trial court, the evidence sought to be introduced

concerning Beatie lacked relevance. Although the circumstantial evidence

proffered might have tended to create a certain suspicion that Beatie may have

been the true killer, otherfacts in the record undercut this connection. See State

v. Wade, 186 Wn. App. 749, 767-68, 346 P.3d 838, review denied, 184 Wn.2d

1004 (2015) (video surveillance recording undercut "other suspect" evidence's

relevance). As noted by the trial court, because Beatie was a sheriff's deputy

who was responsible for investigating the murder, the proffered evidence

showing his interest in the criminal investigation failed to logically connect Beatie

to the crime in a nefarious way. Similarly, because the remaining proffered

evidence seeking to identify Beatie as the true killer required the pyramiding of

speculation upon inferences in order to connect him to Berry's murder, the

17
No. 72726-5-1/18

evidence lacked probative value, failing to have a tendency to establish that he

murdered Berry. The evidence thus did not have a tendency to support a

reasonable doubt as to whether Giles committed the crime. Accordingly, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence.7

3

Giles' next contention is that the trial court should have admitted "other

suspect" evidence pointing to James Leslie as the true killer and that it abused its

discretion by not so ruling. We disagree.

In his initial "other suspect" motion, Giles made the following offer of proof

in support of introducing evidence pointing to Leslie as Berry's murderer: (1)

Leslie lived near the nightclub and was at the nightclub the night that Berry

disappeared, (2) Leslie sat with a known drug dealer during Berry's lastshift, (3)

7In his appellate briefing, Giles also cites to certain "other suspect" evidence regarding

Beatie, without indicating that this proffered evidence was not before the trial court until Giles

moved for a newtrial following the jury's verdict—long after the trial court's "othersuspect"

rulings. We review the trial court's evidentiary decisions based onthe evidence before the court

at the time of its ruling.

Giles' appellate briefing does notmention the motion for a newtrial and the evidence

tendered in support thereof. As a corollary of thisfailure, Giles does not present a separate

argument regarding the grounds for a new trial request, addressthe applicable standard of

review, or cite to any authority demonstrating that he was entitled to a new trial.

Even so, were we to entertain an assertion that the trial court erred by denying Giles'

motion, we would conclude that such an assertion has no merit. Giles' motion for a new trial was

premised on information gleaned from Beatie's testimony during a pretrial hearing, testimony

which, Giles claimed, was not supported byother witnesses' subsequent testimony at trial. Giles

indicated that, during the pretrial hearing, Beatie, for the first time, testified that he approached

Berry's body onthe night that her body wasfound and identified her by a tattoo on herhip thathe

knew she possessed from a prior conversation with Berry's mother. Giles' motion contrasted this

testimony with thatofthe police officers who testified at trial. The police officers testified tothe

sanctity ofthe body site, that only detectives trained in crime scene investigation (which Beatie

was not) were allowed nearthe body, and thatthose detectives who investigated Berry's body did

not approach her body until the morning after her body wasfound and thatthey could not identify

the tattoo until they were directly above her body.

Nonetheless, because Beatie was responsible for investigating Berry's murder, the

motion's supporting circumstantial evidence fails to connect Beatie to the murder, thusrendering

the evidence inadmissible. Accordingly, the trial courtwas unquestionably correct in denying the

request for a new trial.

-18-
No. 72726-5-1/19

Berry danced for Leslie several times that night, (4) an individual who looked like

Leslie was seen carrying a duffel bag near the car recovery site before Berry's

car was recovered, (5) Leslie provided conflicting statements to the police after

the murder, and (6) Leslie burned his diary when the police asked him to turn it

over to them.

At the hearing, the trial court denied Giles' request, questioning how Leslie

sitting with a drug dealer and hiring Berry to dance for him tended to prove that

Leslie killed Berry, explaining that "there's nothing here that's admissible that lays

a sufficient nexus."

As the trial court indicated, the evidence relating Leslie to Berry is merely

that Leslie was a patron ofthe nightclub. The remaining evidence lacks

probative value because, without more, it fails to have a tendency to establish

that Leslie murdered Berry. Thus, it was notevidence ofa type that would give

rise to a reason to doubtGiles' guilt ofthe charged crime. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence seeking to blame Leslie for the

murder.

As to all three of the trial court's determinations, its reasoning was sound.

There was no error.

Ill

Giles next contends, for the first time on appeal, that witness Kern's

testimony in violation of the ruling in limine deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

This argument is advanced notwithstanding that the trial court struck the

offending testimony and issued a curative instruction that was approved by Giles'

19
No. 72726-5-1/20

counsel and notwithstanding that Giles' counsel requested no other remedy.

Because Giles received all of the relief that was requested by his attorney at trial,

his present claim is without merit.

Witness Kern twice testified to his opinion that itwas "likely" that Giles had

been in Berry's car at or around the time of her murder. Thistestimony violated a

prior ruling limiting Kern's testimony to an opinion that the DNA evidence was

"consistent with" this conclusion—as opposed to it being "likely." Giles'

objections to this evidence were ultimately sustained. Kern's offending testimony

was stricken from the record in the presence of the jury. And the jury was given

a curative instruction that had been approved of by Giles' attorney. No other

remedy was sought by Giles' counsel.

On appeal, Giles contends that—notwithstanding the remedies imposed

by the trial judge—a new trial must be awarded. This is another way ofsaying

thatthe trial judge erred by not declaring a mistrial—even though Giles never

requested a mistrial. Giles is wrong.

The testimony at issue was as follows:

[Prosecutor]: Based upon the blood evidence in the vehicle

and the evidence from the body-recovery site, is this scene

consistent with Patti being driven to where she was ultimately

found, in her own car?

[Kern]: Ithink that's a strong possibility.

[Prosecutor]: You also reviewed the various DNA reports?

[Kern]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: You reviewed the report byJean Johnston?

[Kern]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: And you reviewed the report by William

Stubbs?

[Kern]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: Based on that, is it likely that the defendant,

Danny Giles, was inside ofthat car, touching the steering wheel?

20
No. 72726-5-1/21

[Kern]: At some point -

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Foundation.

[Court]: Overruled.

[Kern]: At some point prior to the vehicle being recovered,

yes.

[Prosecutor]: You also reviewed the DNA reports from

Orchid Cellmark, from Aimee Rogers and Barbara Leal?

[Kern]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: After review of those reports, do you have an

opinion whether it was likely that Mr. Giles touched those items,[8]

prior to their recovery?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Foundation. This expert is

not qualified to testify as to what Aimee Rogers and Barbara Leal

testified to. They can testify to what their reports indicate, not this

witness.

[Court]: Overruled.

[Kern]: Yes, prior to them being discovered.

(Emphasis added.)

Immediately after this testimony, the court recessed. During the recess,

Giles' counsel for the first time alerted the judge that her objections were based

on a violation of the court's prior ruling.

[Defense Counsel]:.. . When we had our motionsin limine

argument regarding Mr. Kern's testimony, you granted defense

motion No. 9-E, which specifically was prohibiting Mr. Kern to testify

that Danny Giles was likely inside the Honda Prelude, prior to its

recovery. You said that, in fact, if you wanted to ask is it consistent

with that, that would be okay, but he is not to testify that it's likely.

And that's exactly what happened, and that's why I objected, and

you overruled me.

Now oriented to the actual basis of the defendant's objection, the trial judge

promptly left the bench to review his notes in chambers.

After returning to the bench, the trial judge ruled that Kern's "likelihood"

testimony violated the court's prior ruling:

8The items that Kern referenced were Berry's belongings found near the car recovery

site, including her handbag and jeans.

-21 -
No. 72726-5-1/22

[Court]: ... I did review the motions in limine, it's been some

time since Iwent through them. Specifically, the motion in limine

did ask that this witness be precluded from stating that it was likely

that Danny Giles was inside the Honda Prelude, prior to its

recovery, and likely that he had contact with some of Ms. Berry's

belongings, prior to recovery. That was the motion in limine.

I don't find that the violation was intentional by the State. It

is a violation, though, of the motions in limine.

What I indicated previously was that the question that could

be asked was based upon the review and his analysis of the case,

if it was consistent, and that was the difference. Isaid that the

question could be phrased in relation to whether itwas consistent,

not whether it was likely.

At this point it would be my position that I would advise the

jurors that they would disregard the opinions that were provided, in

relation to whether or not it was likely the defendant either was

inside of the car and touched the steering wheel or if itwas likely

that he touched items, prior to recovery. I don't believe that the

difference in the questions is such that any other additional relief is

necessary or appropriate.

If the State wants to reopen after I advise the jurors they

need to disregard that, to ask the questions consistent with what

my ruling was, I'll permit them to do so.

[Prosecutor]: I guess that would be my request then.

[Court]: Ms. Coburn, anything else?

[Defense Counsel]: No.

[Court]: Any other issues we need to address, before we

bring back the jurors?

Iguess Iwould like to go over, with the parties, exactly how

you want me to advise the jurors, in relation to they have to

disregard that testimony, and I'm looking more from the standpoint

of the defense suggestion because I understand that part of the

issue might be a concern then that we're highlighting it.

Iwould indicate, though, that these jurors have been

excellent, in relation to following the instructions of the Court

throughout this proceeding, and Idon't anticipate any issues, and

they will completely disregard it, as they are required to.

[Defense Counsel]: I don't know ifI'm being very articulate,

but perhaps you could just read out what you plan to instruct, Your

Honor.

[Court]: Let me configure itfirst, and then I'll read it.

(Pause.)

Okay. Here's what I propose. The jurors are instructed to

disregard the testimony from Mr. Kern that it is likely Mr. Giles was

22
No. 72726-5-1/23

inside the car, touching the steering wheel. The jurors are also

instructed to disregard the testimony of Mr. Kern based on review

of the reports of Barbara Leal and Aimee Rogers, related to his

opinion that itwas likely Mr. Giles touched the belongings of Patti

Berry, prior to their recovery.

[Defense Counsel]: That's fine.

[Court]: Okay. The State?

[Prosecutor]: That's fine. And just so we're clear, my intent

then is to ask a question to Mr. Kern, essentially, that based on a

review of various reports, is it consistent with the defendant being

inside the vehicle? Yes. Consistent with him touching the various

belongings prior to recovery? Yes.

[Court]: Yes. That's what I indicated.

[Prosecutor]: Okay.

[Court]: Any other issues, before we bring out the jurors?

Let's get the jury.

The court then struck the offending testimony from the record and

instructed the jury as proposed. The prosecutor subsequently questioned Kern

consistent with the trial court's ruling.

Giles now argues that Kern's testimony using the "likely" language violated

his right to a fair trial and requires a new trial, notwithstanding the remedies

imposed by the trial court and notwithstanding that Giles did not request a

mistrial.

He is wrong. Giles received the remedies he requested. The law

presumes thatthese remedies are effective. State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 28,

195 P.3d 940 (2008) (curative instruction); State v. Swan, 114Wn.2d 613, 661-

64, 790 P.2d 610 (1990) (objection sustained, evidence stricken, curative

instruction given). Giles does not demonstrate that any trial court error occurred.

Giles' argument is—at its core—that the trial courterred by not declaring a

mistrial, even though Giles did not request a mistrial. This argument ignores that

23
No. 72726-5-1/24

jeopardy had attached and that Giles had a right to proceed to verdict with the

jurors then empaneled.

Had the trial judge declared a mistrial without Giles' assent, the double

jeopardy bar might well have prevented his retrial. Giles does not address this

concern in his briefing.

It is for this and other reasons that a mistrial should be granted only when

nothing that the trial court could have said or done would have remedied the

harm done by the trial misconduct. State v. Gilcrist, 91 Wn.2d 603, 612, 590

P.2d 809 (1979). This was not such a case. Indeed, the trial judge imposed

appropriate remedial measures.

It is a principle oflongstanding that a trial attorney who does not requesta

remedy forfeits the claim that the trial judge should have imposed that remedy.

"'Counsel may not remain silent, speculating upon a favorable verdict, and then,

when it is adverse, use the claimed misconduct as a life preserver on a motion

for a new trial or on appeal.'" State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 93, 882 P.2d 747

(1994) (quoting Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wn.2d 23, 27, 351 P.2d 153 (1960)).

To accede to Giles' appellate request would be to put trial judges in

untenable positions. We will not take such action.9

9Giles submitted a pro se statement ofadditional grounds in which he advanced several

arguments. None call for appellate relief. Giles first contends that the prosecutor improperly

vouched for a witness and conducted an improper closing argument. Applicable authority is to

the contrary. State v. Coleman, 155 Wn. App. 951, 957, 231 P.3d 212 (2010); State v. Anderson,

153 Wn. App. 417, 430-31, 220 P.3d 1273 (2009).

Giles also essentially repeats hisattorneys' "other suspect" contentions. These

assertions were raised and well argued by counsel. No further discussion iswarranted. State v.

Meneses. 149 Wn. App. 707, 715-16, 205 P.3d 916 (2009), affd, 169 Wn.2d 586, 238 P.3d 495

(2010). Giles next contends that his attorneys' decision notto employ a witnessidentification

expert constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Because this decision constituted legitimate

-24-
No. 72726-5-1/25

Affirmed.

We concur:

f^\ey^ {/j2~OL*^ l

trial strategy, he fails toestablish the first part ofthetestfor ineffective assistance ofcounselthat his attorneys' representation was deficient. Statev. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101

P. 3d 80 (2004).

Lastly, Giles asserts thatthe number oferrors in the case warrant reversal pursuant to

the cumulative error doctrine. Because Giles has not shown error, the cumulative error doctrine

does not apply.

-25-