J-S58028-16

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRUCE WAYNE MILLER

Appellant No. 1984 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 22, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0000425-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES AND PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2016

Bruce Wayne Miller appeals pro se1from the judgment of sentence of 

one to three years imprisonment that was imposed after he violated a 

technical condition of his special probation.2 We affirm. 

____________________________________________

1 On April 4, 2016, we remanded this matter for a hearing pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), to determine whether 

Appellant voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Following an on-the-record 

colloquy, the trial court accepted Appellant’s waiver of counsel as knowing 

and voluntary. 

2

 As opposed to typical “state” probation, special probation is an order of 

probation entered by the trial court that directs the Pennsylvania Board of 

Probation and Parole to supervise the probationary term of a state sentence 

but permits the trial court to retain the power to revoke probation under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9771 and impose a new sentence. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6133(a) 

(“The board shall have exclusive power to supervise any person placed on 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S58028-16

- 2 -

On July 11, 2011, Appellant pled guilty to possession with intent to 

deliver (oxycodone). On May 31, 2013, the trial court imposed thirteen to 

thirty-six months imprisonment followed by two years of special probation to 

be supervised by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole

(“the Board”).3 We dismissed the ensuing appeal due to Appellant’s failure 

to file a brief. 

As it relates to the issues addressed herein, one of the conditions of 

special probation proscribed Appellant from traveling outside of the fivecounty supervisory district governed by the Board’s Allentown office.4

 

Appellant began serving the special probation on May 15, 2014. On January 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

probation by any judge of a court having criminal jurisdiction, when the 

court by special order directs supervision by the board.”); Commonwealth 

v. Mitchell, 955 A.2d 433 (Pa.Super. 2008). As Judge Klein explained in 

the concurring statement he authored in Mitchell, supra at 441, “by using 

special probation[,] . . . the [state] agent handling the parole will also 

handle the probation. At the same time, the trial judge retains his or her 

authority to resentence if there is a violation. This scheme is logical and 

maintains judicial discretion without duplicating effort.” 

3 The trial court initially imposed the thirteen to thirty-six month judgment of 

sentence on February 28, 2012. On March 12, 2013, we vacated that 

sentence and remanded for further proceedings to supplement the record. 

See Commonwealth v. Miller, 69 A.3d 1289 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(unpublished memorandum). On May 31, 2013, the trial court 

supplemented the record and re-imposed the original sentence. 

4 The Allentown District comprised Bucks, Berks, Schuylkill, Lehigh, and 

Northampton Counties. N.T., 4/22/15, at 3. Appellant admitted to the 

supervising agent that he traveled outside the five-county district without 

authorization on approximately five occasions. Id. at 4, 6, 8. 
J-S58028-16

- 3 -

22, 2015, Appellant’s probation agent filed a notice of technical violation 

alleging that Appellant had traveled outside the district without permission. 

Appellant waived his Gagnon I hearing.5 

On March 24, 2015, Appellant filed a petition to vacate the Gagnon II

violation of probation (“VOP”) proceeding because the travel restriction was 

not imposed by the trial court and due to the approximately three-month 

delay between the date of the underlying traffic citation and the date that 

the Commonwealth issued notice of the violation of probation proceeding. 

The trial court denied the motion, and following the VOP hearing on April 22, 

2015, it found Appellant in technical violation of the conditions of his 

probation. The court revoked special probation and imposed one to three 

years imprisonment. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion for 

reconsideration6and within thirty-days of the date the motion was denied by 

____________________________________________

5 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (defendant accused of violating 

probation is entitled to two hearings: 1) a pre-revocation hearing to 

determine probable cause of a violation; and 2) a revocation hearing to 

establish violation and determine whether revocation is warranted). 

6 The motion for reconsideration noted that Appellant secured employment, 

abstained from criminal activity, and desired to “continue working on his 

rehabilitation with community-based supervision.” Motion for 

Reconsideration, 5/1/15, at unnumbered 2. Appellant requested that the 

trial court either suspend the imposition of total confinement, reduce the 

judgment of sentence to two months time served, or impose six months to 

three years confinement. Id. Appellant did not challenge a discretionary 

aspect of sentence beyond the imposition of total confinement for a technical 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S58028-16

- 4 -

operation of law, he filed a notice of appeal. The ensuing Rule 1925(b) 

statement raised thirty-one enumerated issues. The trial court entered an 

opinion that addressed several of Appellant’s claims and deemed the 

remaining issues waived.7 

First, we must determine whether the appeal is timely. Pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E), a post-sentence motion for reconsideration does not 

toll the thirty-day appeal period after a VOP hearing. Herein, Appellant’s 

notice of appeal, which he filed following the denial of his post-sentence 

motion by operation of law is obviously untimely. Nevertheless, we find a 

breakdown in the court machinery because the trial court inaccurately 

advised Appellant of his appeal rights. Specifically, in a post-sentence rights 

form issued at the close of the VOP hearing, the trial court informed 

Appellant that if he filed a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal 

had to be filed within thirty-days of the order denying the motion. See

Verification of Post Sentence Rights, 4/22/15, at 1. This is a patent 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

violation nor did he assail the trial court’s impartiality or assert that the 

condition of probation infringed upon his religious freedom. 

7

 One month after the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion, Appellant 

filed an amended concise statement that rehashed assertions that he had 

included in the prior statement and purported to assert a novel claim 

arguing that the trial court failed to craft an individualized sentence. As 

discussed in the body of this memorandum, that sentencing issue is waived 

because it was not asserted during sentencing or in the post-sentence 

motion. 
J-S58028-16

- 5 -

misstatement of the law that is tantamount to a breakdown of the court’s 

operations. See Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 929 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (declining to quash appeal because untimely filing resulted 

from trial court's misstatement of appeal period under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(E), 

which operated as breakdown in court's operation). Accordingly, we treat 

the notice of appeal as timely filed and address the merits of Appellant’s

issues that were raised before the trial court and presented in the Rule 

1925(b) statement. 

Appellant enumerates thirteen issues for our review, which we have 

condensed into seven broad complaints: (1) Whether the trial court erred in 

revoking his probation based upon a purported condition of probation that 

the probation agent lacked authority to enforce; (2) Whether the 

Commonwealth adduced sufficient evidence to establish the probation 

violation; (3) Whether the condition of probation that restricted his ability to 

travel infringed upon his freedom to exercise religion when he attended 

services at a church that was located outside of the travel area and the 

probation agent refused to ease the condition to permit him to attend the 

services he desired; (4) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to recuse 

from the VOP hearing after exhibiting bias, prejudice, and ill will; (5) 

Whether the trial court considered facts that were outside of the record; (6) 

Whether the trial court erred in failing to hold a timely VOP hearing; and (7) 

Whether the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of total confinement for 
J-S58028-16

- 6 -

a technical violation of the conditions of probation. See Appellant’s brief at 

3-6. 

The aggregate complaints that compiled Appellant’s third, fourth, and 

fifth questions are waived pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), due his failure to 

raise them in the trial court. Specifically, Appellant failed to assert before 

the trial court any issues regarding the restriction of his freedom of religion, 

the trial court’s bias, failure to recuse, or its consideration of extra-judicial 

facts. Thus, we do not address the merits of those claims. 

Our standard of review follows. We review the trial court’s decision to 

revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 

MacGregor, 912 A.2d 315, 317 (Pa.Super. 2006). “Generally, in reviewing 

an appeal from a judgment of sentence imposed after the revocation of 

probation, this Court's scope of review includes the validity of the hearing, 

the legality of the final sentence, and if properly raised, the discretionary 

aspects of the appellant's sentence.” Commonwealth v. Kuykendall, 2 

A.3d 559 (Pa.Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 

1033 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (Superior Court’s scope of review 

includes claim challenging discretionary aspects of sentence following 

revocation of probation). 

Appellant’s first preserved legal argument challenges the propriety of 

the court’s finding of a probation violation. Essentially, he argues that, since 

the travel restriction that he was found to have violated was not imposed by 
J-S58028-16

- 7 -

a court, it could not be considered grounds to revoke his probation. We 

reject Appellant’s characterization of the probation condition and his legal 

argument. 

Appellant invokes MacGregor, supra, for the legal proposition that 

conditions of probation that are not imposed by the sentencing court cannot 

be grounds for violation. In MacGregor, we vacated a judgment of

sentence that was imposed after a probation revocation based on a 

condition of parole that was recited on a preprinted form applicable to 

parole rather than the sentencing court. We first observed that “the 

legislature . . . has specifically empowered the court, not the probation 

offices and not any individual probation officers, to impose the terms of 

probation.” Id. at 317. Then, noting that the pertinent condition had been 

“drafted by, and signed by a parole agent as the issuing authority,” we 

reasoned that the record could not sustain the trial court’s finding that the 

appellant violated the terms of his probation. Id. at 318. 

However, in Commonwealth v. Elliott, 50 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2012), our 

Supreme Court addressed our holding in MacGregor and held that, while 

neither probation agencies nor probation agents may impose conditions of 

probation, “the Board and its agents may impose conditions of supervision 

that are germane to, elaborate on, or interpret any conditions of probation 

that are imposed by the trial court.” Elliott, 50 A.3d at 1292. It 

summarized its holding as follows: “a trial court may impose conditions of 
J-S58028-16

- 8 -

probation in a generalized manner, and the Board or its agents may impose 

more specific conditions of supervision pertaining to that probation, so long 

as those supervision conditions are in furtherance of the trial court's 

conditions of probation.” Id. Thus, despite Appellant’s protestations to the 

contrary, the Board and its agents may, in fact, fashion a specific condition 

of supervision insofar as it advances the conditions imposed by the trial 

court. Id. 

Preliminarily, we observe that MacGregor is distinguishable insofar as 

that case did not involve special probation under § 6133(a). The appellant 

in that case had served his full term of confinement and was released to a 

consecutive term of probation. He subsequently violated probation based 

upon the probation supervisor’s imposition of a condition that was listed on a 

preprinted form outlining the “Special Conditions of Parole.” See 

MacGregor, supra at 316. Unlike the rote parole condition that was 

misapplied to the probationer in MacGregor, however, Appellant violated a 

condition that governed his special probation, a restriction that he 

specifically acknowledged at the outset of the Board’s supervision. 

Moreover, the travel restriction was not reflexively imposed by the probation 

agent. In reality, as the trial court highlighted in rejecting Appellant’s 

position, the Pennsylvania Code expressly directed the Board to subject 

Appellant to travel restrictions in this case. Specifically, the Code provides, 

“A special probationer . . . is subject to the following conditions: (1) Be 
J-S58028-16

- 9 -

under the supervision of a district office or suboffice and not leave that 

district without prior written permission of the . . . supervision staff.” 73 

Pa.Code § 65.4. Hence, MacGregor, which involves the Board’s authority to 

impose mechanical parole conditions to people on probation following a state 

sentence, is not dispositive of the case at bar. 

The facts of this case align with the relevant facts the High Court 

addressed in Elliot, supra, which, like the present case, involved the 

Board’s supervision of a probationer serving special probation under § 

6133(a). Instantly, the court-ordered terms of probation included the 

requirement that Appellant complete all of the conditions of special probation 

imposed by the Board in its supervisory capacity. Those conditions of 

supervision, including the express requirement that Appellant remain within 

the supervising district, were in keeping with the trial court’s order that 

Appellant satisfy all of the responsibilities that probation entailed. Thus, as 

the High Court recognized in Elliot, the Board’s supervisory condition was 

germane to and in furtherance of the general conditions of probation 

imposed by the trial court. See Elliott, supra at 1292. Accordingly, no 

relief is due. See Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31 (Pa.Super. 

2011) (noting that probationer’s refusal to comply with supervisory 

conditions was basis to sustain revocation due to unwillingness to cooperate 

with the probation office).
J-S58028-16

- 10 -

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court adduced insufficient 

evidence to establish that he violated the terms of his probation. While 

Appellant did not level this objection during the VOP proceedings, a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence may be raised for the first time 

on appeal. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(7) (defendant may challenge 

sufficiency of evidence by leveling challenge on appeal). Thus, we address 

the merits of this argument.

The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving a probation violation 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Shimonvich, 858 

A.2d 132, 134 (Pa.Super. 2004). We outlined the pertinent legal precepts in

Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa.Super. 2007). “The 

Commonwealth establishes a probation violation meriting revocation when it 

shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer’s conduct 

violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and that probation has 

proven an ineffective rehabilitation tool incapable of deterring [the] 

probationer from future antisocial conduct.” 

Appellant contends that the evidence adduced during the VOP hearing 

did not demonstrate that probation was an ineffective means to achieve his 

rehabilitation. He posits that he, in fact, has been rehabilitated for the 

underlying drug offense that is the basis of his sentence of probation. Thus, 

he opines that, since probation has ceased to serve its original purpose, he 

should not have been deemed in violation. We disagree.
J-S58028-16

- 11 -

Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the certified record confirms both 

the trial court’s finding that Appellant violated the terms of probation and its 

determination that probation has proven ineffective. During the VOP 

hearing, Probation Agent Anthony Mondello testified that he was the 

designated agent for sex offenders within the Allentown District. N.T., 

4/22/15, at 3. Since Appellant had been convicted of a sex offense in an 

unrelated case, Agent Mondello was also assigned to supervise his probation 

in the present case. Id. Agent Mondello explained that one of the 

conditions of Appellant’s probation was that he remain within the five-county 

supervision district. Id. at 3. On November 30, 2014, Appellant received a 

traffic citation in Carbon County, which is outside the Allentown District. Id. 

at 4. Thereafter, on January 15, 2015, Appellant admitted to Agent 

Mondello that he had violated this specific condition on five separate 

occasions. Id. at 4, 5. Agent Mondello filed the notice of violation one week 

later. During the VOP hearing, Appellant again acknowledged that he 

violated this condition of probation, although he attempted to justify the 

violations as necessary to attend church services. Id. at 8-9. 

As it relates to whether the probation has proven ineffective, Appellant 

testified during the VOP hearing that he requested permission to attend 

religious services outside of the supervision district but Agent Mondello 

refused consent. Id. Specifically, in response to the trial court’s inquiry, 

Appellant recalled, “there was a time [when] Mondello said, ‘I’m not allowing 
J-S58028-16

- 12 -

you to go to religious services at all.’” Id. at 9. In contrast to Appellant, 

Agent Mondello denied that Appellant requested to travel outside the district. 

Id. In fact, he declared, “I have no idea why he was traveling outside the 

district.” Id. at 6. 

In finding that the Commonwealth established by a preponderance of 

evidence that Appellant violated the conditions of probation and that 

probation has proven ineffective, the trial court concluded, “To me it’s a very 

clear violation, [Appellant] admitted leaving [the district], he received a 

citation outside of it. . . . I believe factually the agent’s statement that he 

did not allow [Appellant] to leave, therefore, I find [a] violation.” Id. at 10. 

In the Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court expounded, 

This Court was not satisfied with Appellant's conduct while on 

probation. His uncooperative attitude, disregard for the rules and 

conditions of supervision, and disrespect of this Court's authority 

were all indications that probation was not serving its 

rehabilitative purposes or deterring antisocial conduct. The 

Appellant is under court supervision for a set period of time as 

an alternative to incarceration. Whether or not he has been 

rehabilitated is not his judgment to make. Appellant cannot bend 

or choose which rules apply to him while under supervision.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/16, at 16-17. 

Thus, reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, it is clear that Appellant disregarded 

the condition of probation that limited his travel outside of the district and 

then lied to the trial court about having entreated Agent Mondello for 

permission, only to be arbitrarily denied. Appellant’s repeated defiance of 
J-S58028-16

- 13 -

the travel constraints evince his aversion to the Board’s supervision. All of 

the foregoing evidence supports both the trial court’s determination that a 

violation existed and its finding that Appellant’s attempt to obscure his 

malfeasance demonstrates that probation has been ineffective. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s claim fails. 

Appellant’s third preserved argument asserts that the trial court erred 

in failing to hold a timely VOP hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(b)(1), 

governing the administration of VOP proceedings. That rule provides in 

pertinent part as follows:

(B) Whenever a defendant has been sentenced to probation or 

intermediate punishment, or placed on parole, the judge shall 

not revoke such probation, intermediate punishment, or parole 

as allowed by law unless there has been:

(1) a hearing held as speedily as possible at which the defendant 

is present and represented by counsel; and

(2) a finding of record that the defendant violated a condition of 

probation, intermediate punishment, or parole.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(B). 

This Court has interpreted “speedily as possible” as requiring a hearing 

within a reasonable time. Commonwealth v. Christmas, 995 A.2d 1259, 

1262 (Pa.Super. 2010). There is no presumptive reasonable period in which 

the Commonwealth must revoke probation. Id. at 1263. Instead, courts 

must consider whether the delay was reasonable under the circumstances of 

the specific case and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. 
J-S58028-16

- 14 -

Id. “In evaluating the reasonableness of a delay, the court examines three 

factors: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; and the prejudice 

resulting to the defendant from the delay.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Woods, 965 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009)). 

Appellant complains that Agent Mondello did not file a notice of 

violation in this case until three months after Appellant was issued a traffic 

citation outside of the Allentown District, and the VOP hearing was not 

conducted until the following month. Thus, Appellant posits that the four 

month delay between the technical violation and the VOP hearing was not 

only unreasonable but also prejudicial to his defense. As to the latter 

assertion, he argues that the delay “caused loss of witnesses that could have 

testified [about] the nature of his travel [to Carbon County]” and refuted the 

Agent Mondello’s testimony that Appellant failed to request permission to 

leave the area to attend religious services. Appellant’s brief at 27. Neither 

of these assertions has merit.

First, the four-month delay is not unreasonable. As we stated in 

Christmas, supra at 1263, “When examining the reasons for the delay, the 

court looks at the circumstances surrounding the delay to determine whether 

the Commonwealth acted with due diligence in scheduling the revocation 

hearing.” Agent Mondello explained that, while Appellant received a traffic 

violation in Carbon County on November 30, 2014, the Board did not 

discover Appellant’s violations until January 15, 2015, when Appellant 
J-S58028-16

- 15 -

admitted to Agent Mondello and a member of his staff that he had traveled 

to Carbon County on approximately five occasions while under the Board’s 

supervision. Agent Mondello issued notice of the probation violation seven 

days later, and the VOP hearing occurred within one month. As the notice 

was issued within seven days of the date the Board discovered the violation, 

we reject Appellant’s claim that the delay was unreasonable. Moreover, 

starting with the date that the Commonwealth received notice of Appellant’s 

traffic violation in Carbon County and Appellant’s acknowledged violations of 

the travel restrictions, all of the events leading to the VOP hearing one 

month later proceeded in a timely fashion. Appellant’s assertion of 

unreasonable delay is meritless.

Furthermore, Appellant’s claim of prejudice is specious. While 

Appellant makes vague references to witnesses who would have testified on 

his behalf but for the purported delay, he neglected to identify the 

witnesses, assert their unavailability during the VOP hearing, or explain how 

the purported delay caused their absence. No relief is due. 

Finally, Appellant levels several challenges to the discretionary aspect 

of his sentence. Our standard of review when an appeal challenges the 

discretionary aspect of sentencing requires that this Court conduct a fourpart analysis to determine: (1) whether Appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal; (2) whether the issue was preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

modify the sentence; (3) whether the brief contains a statement of the 
J-S58028-16

- 16 -

reasons relied upon for the appeal in compliance with Pa.R.A.P 2119(f), and; 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the sentencing code. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 

948 A.2d 818, 825-826 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Instantly, we have judged Appellant’s notice of appeal timely. 

However, only one of the litany of challenges that Appellant raised pursuant 

to Rule 1925(b) and Rule 2119(f) were actually asserted in the trial court, 

i.e., the trial court erred in imposing total confinement for violating a 

technical condition of probation. While Appellant raised several challenges 

for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement, those claims are not 

reviewable. See Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. 2009) 

(including issue in Rule 1925(b) statement will not cure failure to raise issue 

below). Accordingly, we limit our review to the isolated issue regarding the 

imposition of total confinement, which we find raises a substantial question 

that the sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code. See 

Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2010) (“The 

imposition of a sentence of total confinement after the revocation of 

probation for a technical violation, and not a new criminal offense, implicates 

the ‘fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.’”). 

In Crump, we reiterated the following pertinent principles:

When imposing a sentence of total confinement after a 

probation revocation, the sentencing court is to consider the 

factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771. Commonwealth v. 
J-S58028-16

- 17 -

Ferguson, [893 A.2d 735 (Pa.Super. 2006)]. Under 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9771(c), a court may sentence a defendant to total 

confinement subsequent to revocation of probation if any of the 

following conditions exist:

1. the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or

2. the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely 

that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; 

or

3. such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority 

of the court.

Crump, supra, at 1282-1283. “Sentencing is a matter vested within the 

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse 

of discretion.” Id. at 1282. The trial court does not have to engage in a 

lengthy discourse of its reasons for imposing a given sentence or specifically 

identify the statute in question. Id. at 1283. However, “the record as a 

whole must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the 

crime and character of the offender.” Id.

Herein, the trial court indicated that confinement was necessary to 

vindicate its authority. It justified the sentence of confinement as follows:

In the present case, prior to imposing sentence, this Court 

had the benefit of recommendations from the Lackawanna 

County Adult Probation and Parole Department, as well as the 

presentence investigation report from the sentence that 

Appellant violated, which were reviewed in their entirety. This 

Court considered the underlying sentence imposed, the 

guidelines ranges the Appellant was facing, and the fact that 

Appellant was given a sentence in the mitigated range, and the 

fact that Appellant did not abide by this Court's sentence. 

. . . .
J-S58028-16

- 18 -

As discussed throughout this opinion, Appellant has 

failed to follow the sentence imposed and blatantly 

disrespects the authority and supervision of this Court. As 

such, this Court imposed an appropriate sentence, which 

considered all facts and circumstances, the guidelines, and the 

purposes of sentencing. Therefore, since no abuse of discretion 

occurred, this Court's April 22, 2015 sentence should be 

affirmed.

Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 

In sum, the court concluded that total confinement was warranted 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) (2) and (3). Appellant’s course of conduct 

while he was on special probation demonstrated his disdain for the Board’s 

supervision, the trial court’s directions, and the need for total confinement. 

Appellant knowingly disregarded the conditions of special probation and 

traveled outside of the designated area without permission on several 

occasions. Indeed, but for the isolated traffic citation he received in Carbon 

County during November 2014, the trial court would never have discovered 

that Appellant was openly flaunting the conditions of special probation. Even 

after being discovered, however, Appellant attempted to deflect 

accountability by alleging that Agent Mondello arbitrarily refused his request 

to attend church services outside the district. Moreover, the court observed 

that, while Appellant was serving probation, he had been discharged from 

his sex offender treatment due to his “failure to complete assignments, 

dishonesty, and manipulative behaviors,” including an attempt to circumvent 

social media restrictions by instructing a third party to open a Facebook 
J-S58028-16

- 19 -

account on his behalf and post photos of Appellant at his direction. Trial 

Court Order, 4/22/15, at 1-2. 

In light of Appellant’s disregard for the conditions governing his 

probation and his attempt to avoid responsibility for his transgressions, we 

do not disturb the trial court’s determination that confinement was 

warranted to vindicate its authority. 

Judgement of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2016