[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Smith v. Erie Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7742.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-7742 

SMITH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Smith v. Erie Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7742.] 

Uninsured-motorist insurance—Unidentified vehicle in no-contact accident—

Independent corroborative evidence—R.C. 3937.18(B)—Contract’s 

requirement of independent corroborative evidence can be met using 

evidence derived from the insured’s testimony. 

 (No. 2015-1419—Submitted June 1, 2016—Decided November 16, 2016.) 

CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Ottawa County, No. OT-15-005, 

2015-Ohio-3078. 

_________________ 

PFEIFER, J. 

{¶ 1} In this case, we resolve a certified conflict regarding how uninsuredmotorist-contract language applies when an unidentified vehicle allegedly causes a 

no-contact accident that results in an injury to an insured. Specifically, we address 

the contract’s requirement that the insured present “independent corroborative 
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2

evidence” that an unidentified vehicle caused the accident. We hold that the 

contract’s requirement of independent corroborative evidence can be met using 

evidence derived from the insured’s testimony. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} This action began with the filing of an insurance claim by appellees, 

Scott L. Smith and Dawn M. Smith, with their insurer, appellant, Erie Insurance 

Company (“Erie”), as the result of injuries suffered by Scott in an automobile 

accident. Scott claimed that while he was driving his pickup truck south on 

Plasterbed Road in Ottawa County, Ohio, late in the evening of July 25, 2011, a 

northbound vehicle crossed left of center, causing Scott to swerve his truck off the 

road into several trees. Scott said that the vehicles did not make physical contact 

and that the other driver fled the scene. 

{¶ 3} Scott called 9-1-1 and reported that a “dark colored SUV” had caused 

the accident. There were no other witnesses to the accident. The other driver and 

vehicle were never identified, and no physical evidence confirmed the presence of 

another vehicle in Scott’s lane of travel. 

{¶ 4} An Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper responded to Scott’s call. The 

trooper took photos of the accident scene and completed an accident report. 

Relying solely upon Scott’s statement, the trooper’s report stated that Scott’s 

vehicle “was southbound on Plasterbed Road” when it “swerved to avoid an 

unknown northbound vehicle that was left of center. [Scott’s vehicle] went off the 

right side of the road and struck several small trees.” The pictures that were taken 

by the trooper and attached to the accident report depicted a red pickup truck that 

appeared to have crashed into some trees. The report, including the diagram that 

the trooper drew of the roadway, stated that Smith was driving on a flat, dry stretch 

of road and was approaching a T-intersection with Schiewe Road. 

{¶ 5} Scott was treated for injuries from the crash at an emergency room 

and later received physical therapy. The medical and therapy reports describing 
January Term, 2016 

3

Scott’s injuries as resulting from an accident caused by another vehicle’s forcing 

him off the road were based solely upon Scott’s statements to that effect. 

{¶ 6} Scott filed a claim seeking uninsured-motorists (“UM”) coverage 

under the policy that he and his wife had with Erie. Erie denied the claim. 

{¶ 7} The Smiths filed a lawsuit against Erie seeking a declaration that they 

were entitled to UM coverage from Erie for the accident, and both parties moved 

for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Erie, holding 

that a provision in the policy requiring the insureds to provide “independent 

corroborative evidence” that the unknown driver caused the injury meant that the 

Smiths had to submit evidence, independent of Scott Smith’s own testimony, 

corroborating that the accident was caused by an unknown motorist, which they 

failed to do. The particular policy provision states: 

“Uninsured motor vehicle” means a “motor vehicle:” 

* * * 

 3. which is a hit-and-run “motor vehicle.” The identity 

of the driver and owner of the hit-and-run vehicle must be 

unknown and there must be independent corroborative evidence 

that the negligence or intentional acts of the driver of the hit-andrun vehicle caused the bodily injury. Testimony of [the insured] 

seeking recovery does not constitute independent corroborative 

evidence, unless the testimony is supported by additional 

evidence. 

(Boldface sic; emphasis added.) There is no dispute that the term “hitand-run” applies to situations in which there is no “hit”—that is, where 

there is no contact between the vehicles. 

{¶ 8} The policy does not define the term “additional evidence.” 
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{¶ 9} The Smiths appealed. The appellate court held that the policy 

language 

is susceptible of at least two interpretations; one in which the 

“additional evidence” must be independent, third party evidence not 

derived from the insured (Erie's interpretation), and another in which 

the “additional evidence” may consist of items of evidence, such as 

medical records and police reports, that are based on the testimony 

of the insured (appellants’ interpretation). 

Smith v. Erie Ins. Co., 2015-Ohio-3078, 36 N.E.3d 214, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.). 

{¶ 10} Because the policy language was susceptible of more than one 

interpretation, the court found it “ambiguous regarding the evidentiary 

requirements for uninsured motorist benefits”; since it was ambiguous, the court 

construed the provision strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the 

insured. Id. at ¶ 32, citing King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 

N.E.2d 1380 (1988), syllabus. 

{¶ 11} In construing the ambiguity in favor of the Smiths, the court of 

appeals concluded that the “additional evidence” required by the policy may consist 

of items of evidence, such as medical records and police reports, that are based on 

the testimony of the insured. The court reversed the trial court’s summary 

judgment. The court noted that its decision conflicted with the decision of the 

Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Brown v. Philadelphia Indemn. Ins. Co., 12th 

Dist. Warren No. CA2010-10-094, 2011-Ohio-2217. In Brown, similar contract 

language was at issue, but the court held that the insured did not present the requisite 

“additional evidence” that his injuries were caused by an unidentified vehicle. 
January Term, 2016 

5

Instead, the evidence he presented merely repackaged the 

statements he made to the police who investigated the incident or to 

his treating physician. Since the police and Brown’s physician were 

merely relying on Brown's account of the incident, the evidence 

Brown presented in opposition to Philadelphia’s summary judgment 

motion cannot constitute additional evidence. 

Id. at ¶ 28. 

{¶ 12} The court of appeals sua sponte certified a conflict with Brown. On 

review, this court determined that a conflict exists and ordered the parties to brief 

the following issue: 

The subject of the conflict is the uninsured motorist 

provision in an auto insurance policy, which states that the 

testimony of an insured seeking recovery of uninsured motorist 

benefits does not constitute independent corroborative evidence as 

required by the policy, unless the testimony is supported by 

additional evidence. The question to be resolved is whether the 

policy language is ambiguous leading to an interpretation in favor 

of the insured that any evidence apart from the insured’s testimony, 

either derived from the insured’s testimony or not, is sufficient to 

constitute “additional evidence” under the policy, or whether the 

policy is unambiguous and the “additional evidence” must be 

independent of, and not derived from, the insured’s testimony. 

144 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2015-Ohio-4947, 41 N.E.3d 445. 

 
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6

LAW AND ANALYSIS 

{¶ 13} In Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 302, 662 

N.E.2d 280 (1996), paragraph one of the syllabus, this court declared that public 

policy precluded contract provisions in insurance policies that required physical 

contact between an insured’s vehicle and the uninsured vehicle as a prerequisite to 

UM coverage for an accident. 

{¶ 14} In Girgis, an unidentified driver swerved into the insured’s lane, 

causing the insured to swerve off the road and crash. The insured filed a claim with 

her insurer, State Farm, seeking UM coverage for the hit-and-run accident. State 

Farm refused coverage based on its determination that there had been no physical 

contact between the insured’s vehicle and any other vehicle; the policy required 

such contact as a prerequisite to recovery. 

{¶ 15} This court held that it was against public policy to require the insured 

to prove physical contact in order for the insured to proceed with a UM claim for 

such an accident. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. This court stated that 

“[w]hile objective standards [such as the physical-contact requirement] have the 

advantage of being easy to apply, their application does not always do justice to 

injured claimants.” Id. at 306. 

{¶ 16} Although Girgis did away with the physical-contact requirement and 

replaced it with the corroborative-evidence test, that test also created a difficult 

burden for insureds to overcome in order to recover benefits pursuant to the 

uninsured-motorist provisions of their automobile-insurance policies for 

noncontact accidents caused by unknown drivers. This court held: 

The test to be applied in cases where an unidentified driver’s 

negligence causes injury is the corroborative evidence test, which 

allows the claim to go forward if there is independent third-party 
January Term, 2016 

7

testimony that the negligence of an unidentified vehicle was a 

proximate cause of the accident. 

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 17} After Girgis, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3937.18, the 

uninsured-motorist statute, recognizing that an insured could gain coverage under 

a UM policy even in a no-contact unidentified-vehicle accident case. 2001 

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 779, 780-781. R.C. 3937.18(B) 

contains the definition of uninsured motorist. Notably, R.C. 3937.18(B) does not 

track Girgis; rather, the statute requires independent corroborative evidence, but 

states that the insured’s own testimony supported by additional evidence can 

constitute independent corroborative evidence. R.C. 3927.18(B) states: 

For purposes of any uninsured motorist coverage included in a 

policy of insurance, an “uninsured motorist” is the owner or operator 

of a motor vehicle if any of the following conditions applies: 

* * * 

(3) The identity of the owner or operator cannot be determined, but 

independent corroborative evidence exists to prove that the bodily 

injury, sickness, disease, or death of the insured was proximately 

caused by the negligence or intentional actions of the unidentified 

operator of the motor vehicle. For purposes of division (B)(3) of 

this section, the testimony of any insured seeking recovery from the 

insurer shall not constitute independent corroborative evidence, 

unless the testimony is supported by additional evidence. 

(Emphasis added.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

{¶ 18} Like the Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company policy 

analyzed by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Brown, 2011-Ohio-2217, the 

policy at issue here tracks the language of R.C. 3937.18(B)(3). In interpreting the 

policy language, we keep in mind that “[a]n insurance policy is a contract; in 

interpreting contracts, courts must give effect to the intent of the parties, and that 

intent is presumed to be reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract 

language.” Granger v. Auto-Owners Ins., 144 Ohio St. 3d 57, 2015-Ohio-3279, 40 

N.E.3d 1110, ¶ 20. 

{¶ 19} The policy language in this case is less restrictive to insureds than 

this court was in Girgis. The policy at issue states that there can be recovery of 

UM benefits in the following circumstances: 

The identity of the driver and owner of the hit-and-run vehicle must 

be unknown and there must be independent corroborative evidence 

that the negligence or intentional acts of the driver of the hit-andrun vehicle caused the bodily injury. 

But the policy language immediately following makes clear that third-party 

testimony on causation is not required: 

Testimony of [the insured] seeking recovery does not constitute 

independent corroborative evidence, unless the testimony is 

supported by additional evidence. 

{¶ 20} The policy thus states that the insured’s testimony can constitute 

“independent corroborative evidence.” The insured’s own testimony constitutes 

independent corroborative evidence if that testimony is supported by additional 

evidence. That is a big difference from Girgis. Unlike Girgis, this insurance policy 
January Term, 2016 

9

does not require “third-party testimony that the negligence of an unidentified 

vehicle was a proximate cause of the accident,” 75 Ohio St.3d 302, 662 N.E.2d 280, 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 21} Instead, the policy requires only additional evidence—not 

necessarily third-party testimony—supporting the causation testimony of the 

insured. The policy does not say “additional testimony” and it certainly does not 

say “independent third-party testimony.” The evidence need be only additional and 

supportive. A police report that describes a straight, dry roadway and that 

references no impairment of the driver and no finding of excessive speed could 

provide additional evidence that supports the insured’s testimony. A transcript of 

insured’s conversation with a 9-1-1 operator immediately following the accident—

when the insured was in peril—could provide additional evidence supporting the 

insured’s testimony. Statements made to a police officer—for which an insured 

could face criminal liability if they were knowingly false, see R.C. 2917.32(A)(3) 

and (C)—could constitute additional evidence that supports the testimony of the 

insured. 

{¶ 22} The additional evidence need not go to proximate cause. It must 

support the insured’s testimony regarding proximate cause. Support is an 

exceedingly broad concept. 

{¶ 23} The insurer included the insured’s own testimony—as long as it is 

supported by additional evidence—within the definition of “independent 

corroborative evidence.” That was more generous language than this court set forth 

in Girgis, and the insurer may now wish it had not included it in the policy; but 

policy language controls this case, and it allows the insured to move past summary 

judgment and present this matter to the trier of fact. 

{¶ 24} We hold that the language at issue is certainly susceptible of the 

interpretation that any evidence apart from the insured’s testimony, either derived 

from the insured's testimony or not, is sufficient to constitute “additional evidence” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

under the policy. Even if the policy language can also be interpreted to mean that 

the “additional evidence” must be independent of, and not derived from, the 

insured’s testimony, “[w]here provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably 

susceptible of more than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against 

the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.” King, 35 Ohio St. 3d 208, 519 

N.E.2d 1380, syllabus. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶ 25} Accordingly, we resolve the conflict in favor of the interpretation of 

the Sixth District Court of Appeals. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court 

of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court. 

Judgment affirmed 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’DONNELL and FRENCH, 

JJ. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 26} Because the contract at issue here is not susceptible of more than one 

reasonable interpretation, I dissent. The contract prohibits the use of the insured’s 

testimony as “independent corroborative evidence” of a no-contact accident, 

permitting only independent evidence as the “additional evidence” necessary for 

coverage for a no-contact accident under the insured’s uninsured-motorist (“UM”) 

insurance provisions. Just as clearly, the contract does not permit the insured’s 

repackaged testimony in another medium to serve as independent additional 

evidence of such an accident. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the court 

of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

appellant, Erie Insurance Company. 
January Term, 2016 

11 

{¶ 27} Insurance policies are contracts governed by the agreement of the 

parties and contract law. However, “insurance policies cannot be read in an overly 

circumscribed fashion.” Sauer v. Crews, 140 Ohio St.3d 314, 2014-Ohio-3655, 18 

N.E.3d 410, ¶ 13, citing Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166,

172, 436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982). Contract language alleged to be ambiguous must be 

examined in context: 

Although ambiguous provisions in an insurance policy 

must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in 

favor of the insured, it is equally well settled that a court cannot 

create ambiguity in a contract where there is none. Ambiguity 

exists only when a provision at issue is susceptible of more than 

one reasonable interpretation. 

(Citations omitted and emphasis added.) Lager v. Miller-Gonzalez, 120 Ohio St.3d 

47, 2008-Ohio-4838, 896 N.E.2d 666, ¶ 16. 

{¶ 28} Prior to our decision in Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. in 

1996, insurance contracts did not provide UM coverage for no-contact accidents 

because policies required insureds to submit proof that their vehicles had made 

contact with another vehicle before the insureds could file a claim for UM coverage 

(“the contact rule”). 75 Ohio St.3d 302, 662 N.E.2d 280 (1996), syllabus. In 

Girgis, we considered the validity of this rule. We recognized that “ ‘[t]he purpose 

of the [the contact rule was] to provide an objective standard of corroboration of 

the existence of [another vehicle] to prevent the filing of fraudulent claims.’ ” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 306, quoting Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Reddick, 37 Ohio 

St.2d 119, 124, 308 N.E.2d 454 (1974). But we determined that “[a]dherence to 

the physical contact requirement effectively deprives insured individuals of any 

recovery under uninsured motorist coverage even when independent third-party 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

testimony is available. It strikes us that this is precisely the sort of situation against 

which uninsured motorist coverage was designed to protect.” Id. Therefore, we 

supplanted the contact rule with another form of objective evidence—“independent 

third-party testimony”—to corroborate that an unknown person who had fled the 

accident was the proximate cause of the insured’s accident. Id. at 305. We 

reasoned, “This will ameliorate the harsh effect of an irrebuttable presumption and 

allow an insured to prove through independent third-party testimony that an 

unidentified vehicle was a proximate cause of the accident for which the insured 

seeks recovery.” Id. at 307. The upshot of Girgis was that an insured could seek 

UM coverage for a no-contact accident caused by an unknown driver, but only if 

there was third-party testimony that the unknown driver’s negligence caused the 

insured’s accident. 

{¶ 29} Not long after Girgis, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3937.18. 

R.C. 3937.18(B) now states: 

For purposes of any uninsured motorist coverage included in a 

policy of insurance, an “uninsured motorist” is the owner or 

operator of a motor vehicle if any of the following conditions 

applies: 

* * * 

(3) The identity of the owner or operator cannot be determined, 

but independent corroborative evidence exists to prove that the 

bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of the insured was 

proximately caused by the negligence or intentional actions of 

the unidentified operator of the motor vehicle. For purposes of 

division (B) (3) of this section, the testimony of any insured 

seeking recovery from the insurer shall not constitute 
January Term, 2016 

13 

independent corroborative evidence, unless the testimony is 

supported by additional evidence. 

(Emphasis added.) Echoing Girgis at 306, R.C. 3937.18(B) declared that the 

insured’s testimony alone was not independent corroborative evidence that could 

support an uninsured motorist’s claim that his or her accident was caused by a noncontact accident. While R.C. 3937.18(B) expanded what could be counted as 

additional evidence to include “independent corroborative evidence” besides thirdparty testimony, the statute nevertheless still requires objective evidence. 

{¶ 30} The Erie policy at issue here essentially tracks the statutory 

language: 

“Uninsured motor vehicle” means a “motor vehicle:” 

* * * 

3. which is a hit-and-run “motor vehicle.” The identity 

of the driver and owner of the hit-and-run vehicle must be 

unknown and there must be independent corroborative evidence

that the negligence or intentional acts of the driver of the hit-andrun vehicle caused the bodily injury. Testimony of [the insured] 

seeking recovery does not constitute independent corroborative 

evidence, unless the testimony is supported by additional 

evidence. 

(Boldface sic and emphasis added.) 

{¶ 31} The two sentences quoted above should be analyzed separately. The 

first sentence requires an insured to provide “independent corroborative evidence” 

that an unknown driver’s negligence or intentional act caused the accident. The 

next sentence declares that the insured’s testimony does not by itself constitute 

independent corroborative evidence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

{¶ 32} Because an insured’s testimony can never be “independent 

corroborative evidence,” it is a truism that the insured’s testimony repackaged in a 

police or medical record cannot be “independent corroborative evidence.” 

{¶ 33} The second sentence provides the qualifier. Only if “additional 

evidence” exists—i.e., evidence in addition to the insured’s testimony—will the 

insured have the “independent corroborative evidence” needed to support a claim 

for UM coverage under the policy. The only reasonable interpretation of the second 

sentence when considered in conjunction with the first is that “additional evidence” 

cannot include the insured’s testimony. 

{¶ 34} The majority does not define “additional evidence.” Instead, it 

declares that “additional evidence” is evidence that “need only be additional and 

supportive,” concluding that the insured’s repackaged testimony is sufficient. 

However, that interpretation is unreasonable when the provision of the Erie policy 

is construed as a whole. 

{¶ 35} “Additional” means “existing or coming by way of addition,” and 

“addition” means “something added that improves or increases value.” Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary 24 (1986). “Additional evidence” therefore 

must be evidence that supplements, rather than repeats, the insured’s testimony. 

Consequently, “additional evidence” can only mean evidence that is distinct from 

the insured’s testimony. To hold otherwise ignores the meaning of the policy 

provision and R.C. 3937.18(B). See Brown v. Philadelphia Indemn. Ins. Co., 12th 

Dist. Warren No. CA2010-10-094, 2011-Ohio-2217, ¶ 21-22. 

{¶ 36} In support of his UM claim for a no-contact accident, Smith 

submitted a transcript of his 9-1-1 call, the trooper’s accident report, and medical 

reports. All these documents described Smith’s injuries as resulting from an 

accident caused by another vehicle’s forcing him off the road. However, in each 

case, the conclusion is based solely upon Smith’s statements to that effect. 

Therefore, these reports were merely a repackaging of Smith’s testimony, not 
January Term, 2016 

15 

additional evidence independent of his testimony. See Brown at ¶ 27-28 (accident 

report and affidavit from an officer that relied solely on the statement of the insured 

is not additional evidence, because the officer did not witness the accident and there 

was no other evidence to support the insured’s assertion); compare Jackson v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 4th Dist. Pike No. 14CA850, 2015-Ohio-1131, ¶ 28 

(testimony of passenger who corroborated insured’s testimony about a red truck 

was sufficient “additional evidence” to defeat insurance company’s summaryjudgment motion on issue whether the insured was involved in a no-contact 

accident). 

{¶ 37} Here, there were no other witnesses to the accident, the other driver 

and vehicle were never identified, and there was no physical evidence such as 

debris or skid marks that would tend to corroborate Smith’s version of events. 

Accordingly, Smith did not submit “additional evidence” that was independent of, 

and not derived from, his own assertions. 

{¶ 38} Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 

reinstate the summary judgment in favor of Erie Insurance Company. 

O’DONNELL and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Connelly & Collier, L.L.P., Steven R. Smith, Steven P. Collier, and Janine 

T. Avila, for appellees. 

Eastman & Smith Ltd., D. Casey Talbott, Mark W. Sandretto, and Lindsey 

K. Ohlman, for appellant. 

Freund, Freeze & Arnold, Kevin C. Connell, and Margaret A. Lennen, 

urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Thomas E. Szykowny, and Michael 

Thomas, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Insurance Institute. 

Cubbon & Associates Co., L.P.A., and James E. Yavorcik, urging 

affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Justice. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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_________________