This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 35,345 4 BRIAN L. STOTTS, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 7 Angie K. Schneider, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 13 Will O’Connell, Assistan t Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 GARCIA, Judge. 18 {1} Defendant is appealing from a district court judgment entered after he pled no 192 contest to false imprisonment, robbery, and tampering with evidence. We issued a 1 second calendar notice proposing to revers e the denial of Defendant’s motion to 2 withdraw his plea. The State has resp onded with a memorandum in opposition. Not 3 persuaded, we reverse the district court. 4 {2} In this appeal, Defendant is arguing thatthe district court should have permitted 5 him to withdraw his plea because he belie ved the terms of his plea agreement did not 6 permit the district court to enhance hi s sentence with a disclosed prior felony 7 conviction. 8 {3} “A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the 9 trial court, and we review the trial court’s denial of such a motion only for abuse of 10 discretion.” State v. Paredez , 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 5, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d). We will not re-weigh the evidence on 12 appeal. See State v. Slade , 2014-NMCA-088, ¶ 13, 331 P.3d 930 (“The appellate 13 courts do not search for inferences supporting a contrary [ruling] or re-weigh the 14 evidence because this type of analysis would substitute anappellate court’s judgment 15 for that of the [fact finder].” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 16 {4} Here, Defendant’s plea agreement noted a total basic sentence of seven and one17 half years for three offenses to which hepled no contest. [RP 96] The agreement also 18 contains an admission of identity with re spect to a prior felony conviction. [RP 95] 193 The agreement thereafter states that his basi c sentence is subject to habitual offender 1 enhancement “if [D]efendant has any undisc losed prior felony c onvictions.” [RP 96] 2 The record does not reflect, and the State ha s not advised us of, any felony convictions 3 that had not been disclosed. The district court nevertheless s ubsequently enhanced 4 Defendant’s sentence based on the one prior felony convicti on (a residential burglary 5 in Texas) that had been di sclosed by adding one year to each of the sentences for the 6 three felonies to which he pled guilty, for a total of ten and half years. [RP 110-12] In 7 other words, Defendant was given the maximum period of imprisonment to which he 8 could have been sentenced if he had not pled guilty and instead was tried and 9 convicted. [RP 95, 111] 10 {5} Our case law is clear thatplea agreements should be construed as a defendant 11 would reasonably understand them. See State v. Fairbanks , 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 15, 12 134 N.M. 783, 82 P.3d 954 (“Upon review, [appellate courts] construe the terms of 13 the plea agreement according to what [the d]efendant reasonably understood when he 14 entered the plea.” (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted)). Because the terms 15 of the plea agreement in this case state th at Defendant will be subject to habitual 16 enhancement for any “undisclosed” prio rs, our second calendar notice proposed to 17 hold that Defendant’s sentence could not be enhanced by the prior felony that had 18 been disclosed. 194 {6} In its memorandum in opposition, the State relies on language in the 1 “Admission of Identity” section stating th at Defendant agrees “that there are no 2 substantial and compelling reasons for su spending or deferring the enhancement of 3 the Robbery count[.]” [RP 94] However, the language limiting enhancement to 4 “undisclosed” prior felonies is located in the section of the plea agreement that 5 addresses sentencing. [RP 96] Therefore it would be reasonable for Defendant to 6 believe that, notwithstanding his acknowledgment of the prior felony conviction, the 7 State was agreeing to waive the senten cing enhancement in exchange for his 8 agreement to plead guilty to the three felonies. To the extent the language in the 9 “Admission of Identity” section created an ambiguity, the ambiguity would be 10 construed against the State, as drafter of the contract. See Heye v. Am. Golf Corp ., 11 2003-NMCA-138, ¶ 14, 134 N.M. 558, 80 P. 3d 495. Finally, we note that the 12 enhancement language relied on by the State only refers to the Robbery charge, and 13 does not refer to the other two felonies to which Defendant pledno contest. [RP 95] 14 Notwithstanding this limitation, the district court enhanced all three felonies. [RP 111] 15 {7} For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the denial of Defendant’s motion, 16 and we remand with instruction to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea. 17 {8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 18

__________________ ______________ 19 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 205 WE CONCUR: 1

_______________________________ 2 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 3

_______________________________ 4 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 5