In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐3574

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

KENNETH J. RANEY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 12‐cr‐00100 — William M. Conley, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 1, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Kenneth Raney appeals for the sec‐

ond time the district court’s decision to impose an additional

two‐year term of supervised release after revoking his previ‐

ous release term. We vacated Raney’s initial sentence because

the district court did not provide any justification for the

length of the supervised release term. On remand, the court

has adequately explained its decision. Raney has also waived
2 No. 15‐3574

his challenge to the supervised release condition to which he

objects. Therefore, we affirm.

I. Background1

In 2001, Kenneth Raney was convicted of transportation of

a minor with intent to engage in a sexual act and attempt to

manufacture child pornography. The district court sentenced

him to a term of 145 months’ imprisonment, which ended on

February 10, 2012. Thereafter, he began serving three years of

supervised release.  

However, midway through his release term, the district

court found that he had violated the terms of that release by

possessing a memory stick and maintaining contact with a

convicted felon without his probation officer’s consent. The

court warned Raney that any future violations would result

in revocation of his supervised release.  

Raney was back in court a year later. At this revocation

hearing, the district court found that he had violated his su‐

pervised release conditions in several ways. These included

taking several unauthorized day trips with a female acquaint‐

ance and her two minor children. All told, Raney had about

four months of access to minors without the knowledge of his

probation officer. This time, the district court revoked his su‐

pervised release and sentenced him to nine months’ impris‐

onment followed by another two years of supervised release.  

On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s revocation de‐

cision, but vacated the sentence. Because the district court did

                                                  1 We provided a more detailed recitation of the facts of Raney’s case

in his first appeal. See United States v. Raney, 797 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2015)

(Raney I).
No. 15‐3574 3

not explain its decision to impose two years of supervised re‐

lease, we were “unable to review the propriety of the district

court’s decision.” Raney I, 797 F.3d at 467. Although we found

that the district court had “arguably justified its selection of

the nine month term of imprisonment,” we vacated the entire

sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of our opin‐

ion. Id.

On remand, the district court imposed the same sentence.

Because Raney’s term of imprisonment had already ended by

the time of his resentencing hearing, the sole effect of the re‐

sentencing was to reinstate the two years of supervised re‐

lease under the same conditions as before. Raney once again

challenges the procedural soundness of his sentence. He also

appeals the imposition of a condition of supervised release

that requires him to “notify third parties of risks that may be

occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or

characteristics.”

II. Discussion

A. Procedural Soundness

“Our review of a sentence for violating a term of super‐

vised release is highly deferential, and we will uphold that

term unless it is ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Jones,

774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Ki‐

zeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007)). We require only that

the district court “say something that enables [us] to infer that

[it] considered” the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines policy state‐

ments and the 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3583(e) sentencing fac‐

tors. United States v. Ford, 798 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting United States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858, 859‐60 (7th

Cir. 2011)). The district court “need not consider the Section
4 No. 15‐3574

3553 factors in check‐list form.” Id. (quoting Jones, 774 F.3d at

404). Nor must it make specific factual findings on each sen‐

tencing factor, as long as the overall record reveals that the

court considered the factors. United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d

852, 854 (7th Cir. 2005).

The statutory sentencing factors are: (1) the nature and cir‐

cumstances of the offense; (2) the defendant’s history and

characteristics; (3) the need to deter future crime, protect the

public, and provide the criminal with necessary services such

as education and medical treatment; (4) Sentencing Commis‐

sion recommendations regarding sentencing range; (5) Sen‐

tencing Commission policy; and (6) sentence consistency for

similar violations. See id. The policy statements provide rec‐

ommended sentencing ranges for supervised release viola‐

tions that are non‐binding and meant to “inform[] rather than

cabin[] the exercise of the judge’s discretion.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir. 2004)).

The sentencing transcript indicates that the district court

considered the heinous nature of Raney’s initial offenses; his

history and characteristics (particularly his status as a sex of‐

fender); the need for deterrence; the need to protect the pub‐

lic; and the need to provide for Raney’s rehabilitation. The

court further noted that two years of supervised release was

appropriate because Raney had failed to heed the terms of his

release before and had not shown he was not a threat to do so

again. It also hoped that the two‐year term would help reduce

his risk of recidivism. Finally, the court confirmed that it had

considered the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.

Simply put, the district court said more than enough to make

it certain that it considered the relevant factors. We will not

disturb the supervised release term.
No. 15‐3574 5

B. Supervised Release Condition    

Raney also challenges Supervised Release Condition 11.

As noted above, the condition requires him to “notify third

parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his] criminal rec‐

ord or personal history or characteristics.” The government

concedes that under our decision in United States v. Bickart, 825

F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2016), the condition is impermissibly

vague. However, the government argues that Raney waived

any objection to this condition by failing to raise it at the re‐

sentencing hearing.

As we recently explained, a purposeful decision to object

to some conditions but not challenge others is the “touchstone

of waiver” because it indicates “a knowing and intentional

decision.” United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir.

2016) (quoting United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 865 (7th

Cir. 2015)). When the district court allows the defendant an

opportunity to challenge conditions of supervised release, the

defendant waives any objection to conditions to which he fails

to object. See United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.

2016). Waiver “works to ‘extinguish[] any error and precludes

appellate review.’” Bloch, 825 F.3d at 873 (quoting Armour, 804

F.3d at 865).

That is precisely what happened here. The sentencing

transcript shows that the district court considered objections

to several proposed conditions of supervised release. But

Raney never raised an objection to the third‐party notification

condition. If he had concerns about that condition, “he should

have brought them to the district court’s attention rather than

waiting until appeal to complain for the first time.” Gabriel,

831 F.3d at 814. We hold that Raney waived his objection to

Supervised Release Condition 11.
6 No. 15‐3574

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the dis‐

trict court adequately explained its choice of a two‐year term

of supervised release and that Raney waived his challenge to

the third‐party notification condition by not raising it at his

resentencing.  

AFFIRMED.