J-S75045-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

TERRENCE SELDON, :

:

Appellant : No. 49 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 27, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0012826-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016

Terrence Seldon (“Seldon”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his negotiated guilty plea to two counts of murder of the 

third degree, and one count each of criminal conspiracy, robbery, and 

possessing an instrument of crime. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c); 903(c); 

3701(a)(1)(ii); 907(a). We affirm.

On July 24, 2012, Seldon and two other men, John Gonce (“Gonce”) 

and Michael Holmes (“Holmes”), conspired to commit a home invasion of 

1357 Westbury Drive in Philadelphia. On that date, Seldon, Gonce and 

Holmes drove to the residence, which they believed was used to sell drugs. 

While Seldon waited in the car as the getaway driver, Gonce approached the 

residence dressed as a salesman and knocked on the door. Seventeen-yearold Christopher Malcolm (“Malcolm”) answered the door, and Gonce opened 

fire, hitting Malcolm in the chest. Gonce also shot thirteen-year-old Rohan 
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Bennett in the chest and back. Both victims died as a result of the gunshot 

wounds. Gonce ran back the car, and Seldon drove the car away from the 

scene. Seldon was subsequently arrested.

Seldon was charged with numerous crimes. Seldon entered into a 

negotiated guilty plea wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the abovementioned crimes, in exchange for a prison sentence of 35 to 70 years. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the remaining charges were to be nol 

prossed. On July 27, 2015, the trial court accepted the negotiated plea, and 

sentenced Seldon to the agreed-upon sentence. On August 5, 2015, Seldon, 

pro se, filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Thereafter, Seldon’s plea 

counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. The trial court granted the 

Motion and appointed Seldon new counsel. The trial court subsequently 

denied the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Seldon filed a timely Notice of 

Appeal.

On appeal, Seldon raises the following question for our review:

Did the [] trial court err when it failed to permit [Seldon] to 

withdraw his guilty plea even though [Seldon] filed his [Motion 

to Withdraw] guilty plea very soon after the plea was entered 

and where [Seldon’s] testimony at an evidentiary hearing clearly 

demonstrated that his plea was not made in a knowing, 

intelligent and voluntary fashion?

Brief for Appellant at 3 (some capitalization omitted).

Seldon contends that the trial court should have allowed him to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 9, 14-15. Seldon argues that he did not 

knowingly and voluntarily enter the plea due to a lack of discussion about 
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the plea with his plea counsel; he was surprised by the plea; he initially did 

not want to accept the plea and intended to go to trial; and he was 

pressured by plea counsel, the district attorney and his mother into 

accepting the plea deal. Id. at 10-11, 13, 14. Seldon asserts that his plea 

counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw shortly after the entry of the guilty plea 

due to Seldon’s dissatisfaction with counsel’s representation. Id. at 11-12. 

Seldon also claims that his plea was unknowingly entered because he did not 

receive a great bargain in the sentence. Id. at 12-13; see also id. at 12 

(wherein Seldon argues that he was 29-years-old at the time of the entry of 

the plea and that his sentence was the equivalent of a life in prison 

sentence). Seldon contends that the Commonwealth would not have 

suffered any prejudice if he withdrew his plea because he filed his Motion to 

Withdraw immediately after he entered the plea, and witnesses were still 

available. Id. at 14.

Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be 

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. There is no 

absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to 

whether to allow a defendant to do so is a matter within the 

sound discretion of the trial court. To withdraw a plea after 

sentencing, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice 

amounting to “manifest injustice.” A plea rises to the level of 

manifest injustice when it was entered into involuntarily, 

unknowingly, or unintelligently. A defendant’s disappointment in 

the sentence imposed does not constitute “manifest injustice.”

Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2008). In 

order to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea, trial courts are 

required to ask the following questions in the guilty plea colloquy:
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1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to 

which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?

2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?

3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to 

a trial by jury?

4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed 

innocent until found guilty?

5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of sentences 

and/or fines for the offenses charged?

6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the 

terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge 

accepts such agreement?

Id.; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. “Once a defendant has entered a plea 

of guilty, it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the 

burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.” Commonwealth v. Stork, 

737 A.2d 789, 790 (Pa. Super. 1999). “In determining whether a guilty plea 

was entered knowingly and voluntarily, ... a court is free to consider the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Commonwealth v. 

Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 513 (Pa. 2004). 

During the oral guilty plea colloquy, Seldon indicated that at the time 

of his plea, he understood the English language, that he was not under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs, and that he did not suffer from any mental 

illnesses. See N.T., 7/27/15, at 19-21. Seldon confirmed that he knew and 

understood the nature of the charges, the factual basis for the plea, the 

permissible range of sentences and fines, the negotiated sentence, and that 
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the judge was not bound by the terms of the plea agreement. See id. at 

30, 37-38, 40-53. Seldon also acknowledged that by pleading guilty, he 

understood that he was foregoing certain rights, including, inter alia, the 

presumption of innocence, the right to file pretrial motions and the right to a 

jury trial. Id. at 21-30, 35-37, 38. Seldon additionally stated that while he 

was not satisfied by counsel’s representation, he was not forced or 

threatened to plead guilty and was satisfied with the deal. Id. at 30, 34.

Although Seldon now argues that he was coerced into entering his 

plea, Seldon’s own statements during the colloquy demonstrate that he 

tendered his guilty plea under his own volition. Indeed, Seldon does not 

contest that he fully understood the implications of his guilty plea. See 

Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 382 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating 

that “[a] defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea 

colloquy, and may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that 

contradict statements made when he pled.”) (citation omitted). Based on 

the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Seldon knowingly and 

voluntarily entered his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Munson, 615 

A.2d 343, 349 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that appellant’s guilty plea was 

entered voluntarily where a full and complete guilty plea colloquy was 

conducted); see also Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that appellant cannot claim that he involuntarily 
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entered a guilty plea where he stated that no one threatened him to plead 

guilty). Thus, Seldon’s claim is without merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2016