NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 15-1392

CATHERINE BECKWITH,

 Appellant

v.

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, d/b/a PENNSYLVANIA 

STATE UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF MEDICINE

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(District Case No. 4-12-cv-00108)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 7, 2016

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 30, 2016)
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O P I N I O N*

RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 

Dr. Catherine Beckwith brought suit against Pennsylvania State University

alleging that Penn State breached a six-year employment agreement and violated her right 

to procedural and substantive due process when it terminated her after little more than 

two years of employment. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary 

judgment on all three counts. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report 

over Beckwith’s objections and entered summary judgment for Penn State, from which 

Beckwith appeals. We will affirm.

Background

Beckwith began employment as an Associate Professor, a tenure-track faculty 

position in the Department of Comparative Medicine, on May 1, 2007. Her offer letter 

stated that the department expected her to devote 75% of her effort to research and the 

remaining 25% between teaching and administrative activities. It described her position 

as “tenure-eligible,” with tenure being “a six-year process,” although “consideration for 

earlier tenure [was] possible based on [her] performance.” A80. Her appointment was 

also subject to Penn State’s policies regarding faculty appointments, including HR23 

(which governs tenure review). 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
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Beckwith’s tenure review process began in November 2008 when Dr. Ronald 

Wilson, the chair of her department, asked her to submit paperwork for her promotion 

and tenure dossier. The dossier included, among other things, a percentage breakout of 

how Beckwith allocated her time and a narrative statement by Wilson. Beckwith 

reviewed the dossier for accuracy and signed it, although in her signature statement she 

wrote, “I do not agree with the Chair’s narrative.”1 A222. Then, after successive, 

independent reviews, the department’s Promotion and Tenure Committee recommended

that Beckwith continue on tenure track, while Wilson and Dr. Harold Paz, the Dean of the 

College of Medicine, recommended that she not. Ultimately, the College of Medicine 

Promotion and Tenure committee agreed with Wilson and Paz and also recommended 

that she should not continue on tenure track. On April 24, 2009, Paz informed Beckwith 

that on June 30, 2010 she would be terminated.

Beckwith challenged this review process by filing a petition with Penn State’s 

Faculty Senate Committee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities (“CFRR”). The CFRR 

found that Beckwith’s review suffered from procedural unfairness and recommended that 

the dossier “be revised to include statements of the specific expectations within the 

allocated effort for research consistent with those expectations communicated to 

 

1 Wilson opined that Beckwith had not met expectations. Beckwith was hired as part of 

the department’s effort to produce more research and scholarship. Wilson recognized that 

some delays beyond Beckwith’s control had contributed to her lack of publications after 

her first year at Penn State. But at the time of her second-year tenure review, he noted 

that still “no demonstrable work product ha[d] resulted from her research.” A209. 

Moreover, Wilson reported that Beckwith had shown a “pattern of interpersonal conflict 

with [him] and others,” A211, something he believed would “greatly hinder her progress 

and future performance,” A214.
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[Beckwith] through her letter of offer and the HR-40 review letter.” A281. The dossier 

was then to be recirculated to her reviewers.

In response to the recommendation, a one-page document was added to the dossier

that generally set forth how the allocation of effort numbers had been calculated in her 

original dossier. That document also communicated the expectation that Beckwith was to 

allocate 75% of her time to research. Beckwith again reviewed the dossier for accuracy, 

this time adding a lengthier signing statement that challenged “inaccurate content about 

expectations, reviews, and % effort,” and included two direct quotes from Wilson’s 2008 

annual departmental review (the HR40 review) that had set forth his expectations of 

Beckwith for the coming year. A294. After recirculation, however, the decisions at all 

levels of tenure review remained unchanged, and Paz notified Beckwith on January 20, 

2010 that she would be terminated on June 30, 2011. Beckwith subsequently filed two 

unsuccessful petitions with the CFRR challenging this second review. 

Discussion2

A. Procedural Due Process

Beckwith first claims that Penn State did not afford her meaningful due process 

during her termination. A party who seeks to establish a procedural due process claim 

must demonstrate that “(1) [she] was deprived of an individual interest that is

encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property,

 

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over 

a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 

660, 665 (3d Cir. 2016).
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and (2) the procedures available to [her] did not provide due process of law.” Hill v. 

Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). While pre-termination procedures “need not be elaborate” to satisfy the 

requirements of due process, at a minimum they must grant the employee “[t]he 

opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should 

not be taken.” Biliski v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 220 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 

532, 545-46 (1985)). This means the “tenured public employee is entitled to oral or 

written notice of the charges against [her], an explanation of the employer’s evidence, 

and an opportunity to present [her] side of the story.” Id. (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 

546). 

We find that Beckwith received adequate pre- and post-termination process in this 

case. Before her termination, Beckwith had notice of the contents of her dossier, the file 

that contained the materials on which her peer reviewers would base their decisions.

Before the dossier was circulated, Wilson made corrections to the dossier and clarified 

certain other portions, all at Beckwith’s request. Beckwith then had a final opportunity to 

object to Wilson’s narrative in her signing statement. After the initial termination notice, 

Beckwith successfully challenged this first tenure review, secured additional 

clarifications, and, after the second review yielded the same result, raised two additional 

post-deprivation petitions before the CFRR. There is no dispute that Beckwith utilized 

these opportunities to voice her concerns, nor is there any evidence in the record that 

Penn State either failed to consider her claims or otherwise violated HR23. Thus, the
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District Court properly found Beckwith “ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to 

overcome Penn State’s assertion that Beckwith was afforded adequate due process.” A23.

Beckwith urges on appeal, however, that the dossier clarification did not provide 

“meaningful” due process because it failed to address some of the CFRR’s concerns 

explicitly. Appellant’s Opening Br. 23. Although the CFRR’s letter recognized five 

instances of inconsistent communication of expectations, the District Court found that the 

“record is . . . clear that Penn State revised Beckwith’s dossier in accordance with the 

[CFRR’s] single recommendation.” A21. Indeed, the revised dossier quoted expectations

regarding required effort directly from her offer letter. Our independent review of the 

record, moreover, reveals that Beckwith had the opportunity to, and did actually, register 

her objections to the quality of this revision in her dossier signing statement before this 

revised dossier was recirculated to her reviewers. By quoting language directly from 

Wilson’s HR40 review statement, she added to the dossier some of the expectations she 

now claims Penn State failed to add itself. This opportunity to “present [her] side of the 

story” before recirculation, among the many others afforded Beckwith during her tenure 

review, satisfied the requirements of due process in this case. See Biliski, 574 F.3d at 

222.

3

 

3 Like the District Court, we do not decide whether Beckwith had a protectable due 

process interest in her employment because, even if she did, we find that she received 

adequate due process in this case. 
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B. Breach of Contract

Beckwith also argues that Penn State breached her employment agreement by 

terminating her after little more than two years of employment. In Pennsylvania, there is 

a presumption of at-will employment. Murray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. 

(Commercial), 782 F.2d 432, 435 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 

Pa. 171 (1974)). This presumption can be overcome if, among other things, the plaintiff 

can show that there was an express contract between the parties for a definite duration or 

an explicit statement that an employee can only be terminated “for cause.” See Luteran v. 

Loral Fairchild Corp., 688 A.2d 211, 214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). The District Court found 

that Beckwith failed to show the existence of any agreement of definite duration, and 

even if she did, that Beckwith could not show Penn State breached this agreement. We 

agree. 

Neither Beckwith’s offer letter nor any other document incorporated by reference

established a term of years for the agreement. Her offer letter merely noted that Beckwith 

would be hired in a “tenure-eligible” position. This process of securing tenure would take 

six years. But HR23, which is incorporated by reference in Beckwith’s offer letter and 

which governs the tenure decision process at Penn State, provides a process a dean must 

follow if she is “considering termination of a faculty member after any provisional 

reviews.” A107. HR23 also contemplates that this dismissal may occur as early as the 

“first academic year.” A75. In any event, Beckwith has not shown Penn State failed to 

follow HR23 in discharging her. She was terminated on June 30, 2011 and received 
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notice of termination on January 20, 2010, more than 12 months in advance. Thus, 

Beckwith has not met her burden on her contract claim.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the District Court’s order 

granting summary judgment to Penn State.