In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-1877

ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

GREG GOSSETT, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois

No 3:10-cv-00077-DRH-SCW — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 23, 2016

____________________

Before ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and WOOD,

District Judge.*

WOOD, District Judge. Anthony Rodriguez was convicted 

of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child 

following a jury trial in the State of Illinois in 1997. Rodriguez 

 * Hon. Andrea R. Wood of the Northern District of Illinois sitting by 

designation.
2 No. 13-1877

has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that he 

was deprived of effective assistance of counsel under the 

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 

S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and now appeals the 

district court’s denial of his petition. Because we conclude 

that the Illinois Appellate Court did not unreasonably apply 

the Strickland standard, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

Rodriguez’s habeas petition.

I.

In late 1997, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of 

Randolph County, Illinois, Rodriguez was convicted of two 

counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 60 years in prison. The charges stemmed from an 

allegation by K.O., an 11-year-old girl, that Rodriguez had 

sexually assaulted her on two occasions. At the time of the 

incidents, K.O. and her mother, D.O., lived with Rodriguez in 

a home in Chester, Illinois. 

At the trial, K.O. testified that D.O. left her in Rodriguez’s 

care from early on Friday, May 9, 1997 until Monday, May 12, 

1997 while D.O. attended a wedding in Chicago. K.O. further 

testified that, on the evening of May 9, she went to sleep in 

D.O.’s bed. She later woke up to find that Rodriguez had gotten into bed with her. Rodriguez then anally penetrated K.O. 

with his penis. Afterwards, Rodriguez got out of bed and K.O. 

felt a liquid substance by her underwear. The next evening, 

May 10, K.O. slept in her own bed. According to K.O., Rodriguez once again got into bed with her, pulled down the bed 

covers and K.O.’s underwear, and anally penetrated her with 

his penis. As before, K.O. felt a liquid substance. When D.O. 

returned home on May 12, K.O. did not immediately tell her 
No. 13-1877 3

what had happened. Instead, K.O. waited about five days because Rodriguez “was always by [her]” and she never had a 

chance to be alone with D.O. K.O. testified that she was afraid 

of Rodriguez. Eventually, however, when K.O. was at the 

store where D.O. worked, K.O. told D.O. what had happened 

while D.O. was away. 

D.O. also testified at trial. She testified that she left K.O. in 

Rodriguez’s care early on the morning of Friday, May 9, and 

that she returned on Monday, May 12. On the night of May 

11, while she was away, D.O. spoke to Rodriguez and asked 

him what he was doing. Rodriguez responded that he had 

been “up all night doing laundry.” According to D.O., however, they had both done laundry before she left and they usually did laundry only once or twice per week. D.O. further 

testified that on May 20, 1997, K.O. told her what Rodriguez 

had done over the May 9 weekend. Like K.O., D.O. testified 

that K.O. had not had any opportunity to tell D.O. about the 

assaults before May 20 because Rodriguez “was always 

around.” After K.O. told D.O. about the assaults on May 20, 

D.O. contacted the police and took K.O. to the hospital. She 

also testified that K.O. had attempted suicide in 1993 or 1994 

because she was “broke apart” when D.O.’s fiancé was sent to 

prison.

The State also presented testimony from Jim Nesler, an investigator with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. Nesler testified that he interviewed K.O. on May 

21, 1997 and that K.O. recounted to him the same two alleged 

incidents of abuse about which she testified at trial. Nessler 

further testified that he conducted an interview with Rodriguez on May 21, 1997, at which time Rodriguez acknowl-
4 No. 13-1877

edged that he looked after K.O. during the weekend in question but denied that he had any inappropriate contact with 

her. 

The State’s final witness was Dr. Deanna St. Germain, a 

physician trained in the medical examination of children alleged to have been sexually abused. Dr. St. Germain examined K.O. on July 23, 1997. She observed several injuries to 

K.O.’s rectal area that, as she explained at trial, are not typically found on children who have not been abused. Based on 

the types of injuries she observed, Dr. St. Germain opined that 

K.O. “suffered some type of an abnormal penetrating injury 

to her anus.” On cross-examination, Dr. St. Germain testified 

that K.O. had a history of having been sexually abused 

around the age of two, but she “was not aware of what the 

sexual abuse was.” Dr. St. Germain admitted that, assuming 

there was anal penetration at some point prior to the alleged 

sexual abuse on May 9 or 10, 1997, she would not be able to 

separate injuries sustained on those dates from the previous 

sexual abuse. Dr. St. Germain further explained, “[w]hen I do 

my examination, I am going to make an opinion of the physical findings and not of who did it when.” After Dr. St. Germain finished her testimony, the State rested its case. 

Rodriguez testified in his own defense and denied having 

sexually assaulted K.O. In addition, Rodriguez testified that 

he had personally observed K.O. tell lies in the past. Rodriguez also called as a defense witness Timothy James Lochhead, an administrative assistant in charge of discipline at 

K.O.’s grade school. Lochhead testified that, “like other children, [K.O.] has fabricated things from time to time, such as 

she didn’t want to take a test or she didn’t want to do this or 

that. Maybe her arm hurt or she had a stomach ache or was 
No. 13-1877 5

tired, those types of things.” On cross-examination, Lochhead 

conceded that “[i]t is not unusual” for children to engage in 

such fabrications, but he believed that K.O. “was quite frequent with her fabrications.” 

Finally, after the defense rested, the State introduced into 

evidence a certified copy of Rodriguez’s prior conviction for 

theft. The jury was instructed that the prior conviction could 

be considered only for purposes of impeaching Rodriguez’s 

veracity when testifying and not as proof of guilt. 

Central to the present appeal, but not presented by either 

side during the trial, are two reports from the Illinois State 

Police’s Division of Forensic Services analyzing four semen 

stains on a blanket from K.O.’s bed and comparing them to 

blood standards taken from Rodriguez and K.O. The first report concluded that no comparisons were possible due to the 

limited amounts of DNA found in the samples. The second 

report was issued on October 28, 1997, one day before Rodriguez’s trial began. That report analyzed 12 samples taken 

from the four semen stains and concluded that eleven of the 

samples could not have come from Rodriguez, several reflected that they came from K.O. and several others were from 

a third, unknown donor. Neither Rodriguez nor K.O. could 

be excluded as having contributed to the mixture of DNA profiles detected in the twelfth sample; however, the report notes 

that this sample could have come from “approximately 1 in 2 

Caucasians, 1 in 4 Blacks, and 1 in 2 Hispanics ... .” Additionally, an unidentified profile was present in this mixture. 

The sperm samples came up at trial for the first time during closing arguments. Approximately halfway through the 

State’s closing argument, the prosecutor referenced D.O.’s 

testimony that, during a phone call with Rodriguez on May 
6 No. 13-1877

11, he told her that he had been up all night doing laundry. 

The prosecutor then asked rhetorically: “Why would you 

wash clothes on a Sunday like that if you had washed them 

all night [sic]? It is a good reason [sic] to get rid of the evidence 

that way.”

After the prosecutor concluded his closing argument and 

before defense counsel began his closing argument, the following exchange occurred in the presence of the jury:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, one 

thing, and I am sure the [sic] counsel did not do 

this intentionally, but I would strongly object to 

his argument about washing the clothes, getting 

rid of the evidence. There was no evidence 

whatsoever as to the reason for washing those 

clothes and getting rid of evidence. In fact, 

counsel knows that there was sperm on various 

items that was not presented.

PROSCUTOR: Objection, Your Honor. [Defense counsel] is testifying.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, he 

opened the door.

THE COURT: If you want to make an argument, make it to the jury.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That — you know, I 

—

THE COURT: I already informed the jury 

that anything said by either attorney in final argument [that] is not based on the evidence or 
No. 13-1877 7

the testimony, you are to disregard. With that 

said, go ahead, [defense counsel].

Defense counsel then delivered his closing argument, in 

which he made no further mention of the sperm samples, 

DNA reports, or prosecutor’s argument about Rodriguez

staying up all night to do laundry. 

The trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that they 

were to consider only the evidence presented at trial and disregard any attorney comments during opening statements or 

closing arguments that were not based on that evidence. Before opening statements, the trial judge further explained to 

the jury that “opening statement is not evidence,” and that 

“[t]he evidence will be the testimony you hear from the witness stand and any exhibits that are admitted into evidence.”

The trial judge returned to the subject before closing arguments, this time specifically instructing the jury that:

Final argument is not evidence. You have 

heard the evidence, the testimony from the witnesses and the exhibits that are admitted into 

evidence. You are not to consider any statement 

made by either attorney that is not backed up by 

the evidence you heard here in the courtroom.

As noted above, the trial judge reminded the jury of this 

instruction after defense counsel mentioned the sperm evidence. And again, during jury instructions, the court reminded the jury, “[i]t [was] [their] duty to determine the facts, 

and to determine them only from the evidence in this case,”

and that “[t]he evidence which [they] should consider consists only of the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits 

which the Court has received.” The judge then delivered the 
8 No. 13-1877

standard pattern instruction on opening statements and closing argument, which reads as follows:

Opening statements are made by the attorneys to acquaint you with the facts they expect 

to prove. Closing arguments are made by the attorneys to discuss the facts and circumstances in 

the case and should be confined to the evidence 

and to reasonable inferences to be drawn from 

the evidence. Neither opening statement nor 

closing arguments are evidence, and any statement or argument made by the attorneys which 

is not based on the evidence should be disregarded.

The jury reached its verdict quickly: it retired to deliberate 

at 3:07 p.m. and at 3:55 p.m. returned a verdict finding Rodriguez guilty of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault 

of a child. The trial judge subsequently sentenced Rodriguez

to serve consecutive prison terms of 40 years and 20 years.

II.

On direct appeal, Rodriguez argued, among other things, 

that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his 

trial counsel “mistakenly divulging highly damaging information”—specifically, the comment about evidence of sperm 

being found on “various items”—that the jury otherwise 

would not have heard.

The Illinois Appellate Court evaluated Rodriguez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland. The appellate court first found that counsel’s impetuous comment 

regarding the sperm samples amounted to deficient perfor-
No. 13-1877 9

mance, because “without explanation it permit[ted] an inference that more physical evidence supporting [Rodriguez’s] 

guilt exist[ed]” than what the jury heard. The appellate court 

nevertheless denied relief, concluding that Rodriguez had not 

been prejudiced because there was no reasonable probability 

that the result of his trial would have been different absent the 

comment. According to the appellate court, “the evidence of 

[Rodriguez’s] guilt was not close,” as K.O.’s testimony regarding the sexual assault was “corroborat[ed]” and “bolstered” by the testimony of Nesler, who “testified that his 

May 21, 1997, interview with [K.O.] reflected the same account described by her trial testimony,” and the testimony of 

Dr. St. Germain, who “confirmed that her examination of 

[K.O.] revealed that she suffered an abnormal penetrating injury to her anus” consistent with K.O.’s allegations. The appellate court further found that any harm caused by defense 

counsel’s comment was mitigated by the trial judge’s response to the remark. As the appellate court explained, “immediately after defense counsel’s remark, the [trial] court reiterated that the jury was instructed to disregard closing-argument comments not based on the evidence presented.” 

Thus, “a different outcome absent counsel’s comments is not 

a reasonable probability.” The Illinois Appellate Court thus 

affirmed Rodriguez’s convictions. 1

 

1 The Illinois Appellate Court nonetheless vacated Rodriguez’s sentences

because the trial court entered them under the mistaken belief that consecutive sentences were mandatory. On remand, the trial court reimposed 

consecutive sentences totaling 60 years of imprisonment. Those sentences 

were affirmed in a subsequent direct appeal.
10 No. 13-1877

Rodriguez subsequently filed a petition for leave to appeal 

with the Illinois Supreme Court, raising the same ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, which was denied. Then, on December 10, 2001, Rodriguez, through appointed counsel, filed 

a petition for postconviction relief. Among other issues, the 

petition asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for referencing the unpresented sperm evidence before the jury and 

that Rodriguez suffered prejudice as a result. On April 16, 

2002, the circuit court denied Rodriguez’s postconviction petition without opinion. On October 1, 2003, Rodriguez, 

through appointed counsel, filed his opening brief appealing 

the circuit court’s denial of his postconviction petition, but the 

brief did not raise the issue of whether defense counsel was 

ineffective for referencing the unpresented sperm evidence in 

the presence of the jury. 

Rodriguez’s pro se federal habeas petition presented seven 

separate claims, including that his trial counsel was ineffective for divulging the sperm evidence to the jury. The district 

court denied relief on all claims. The district court denied relief on the basis of trial counsel’s reference to the sperm sample evidence, holding that this claim did not meet the standards set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The district court 

also denied a number of Rodriguez’s claims as procedurally 

defaulted because they were not presented in state court; the 

procedurally-defaulted claims included assertions that counsel was ineffective for “[f]ailing generally to investigate the 

case properly” and “[s]uppressing evidence from the jury.” 

The district court granted a certificate of appealability for Rodriguez’s claim regarding his trial counsel’s reference to the 

sperm evidence; however, it did not grant a certificate of appealability as to any of the procedurally-defaulted claims.
No. 13-1877 11

III. 

We review the district court’s decision to deny Rodriguez’s habeas petition de novo, subject to the limitations of the 

AEDPA. Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 934–35 (7th Cir. 2009).

We assume the state court’s factual determinations are correct 

unless the petitioner rebuts them with clear and convincing 

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 

492 (7th Cir. 2007).

Under the AEDPA, we may grant Rodriguez’s habeas petition only if (1) the state court’s adjudication of his claim was 

either contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

given the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–03, 120 

S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). A state court decision 

contradicts clearly established law if it applies a legal standard inconsistent with governing Supreme Court precedent or 

contradicts the Supreme Court’s treatment of a materially 

identical set of facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 

1843, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002); Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 

1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 2006). A state court unreasonably applies 

Supreme Court precedent if it identifies the correct legal rule 

but applies it in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5, 124 S. Ct. 1, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1 

(2003); Gilbert v. Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 790 (7th Cir. 2007).

Rodriguez seeks habeas relief due to the purported ineffective assistance of his counsel. In Strickland, the Supreme 

Court established a two-part test for adjudicating ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims that requires a petitioner to show 
12 No. 13-1877

(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the 

deficiency prejudiced his defense. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 

510, 521, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d. 471 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish deficiency, the petitioner 

must show that “counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Id. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner 

“‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.’” Id. at 534 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694).

In the present case, the Illinois Appellate Court found that 

trial counsel’s impetuous reference to the unpresented sperm 

evidence demonstrated that his performance was constitutionally deficient and thus the first requirement of the Strickland test was met. The State has not challenged that finding. 

Thus, in reviewing Rodriguez’s habeas petition, we consider 

only the question of whether the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that he suffered 

no prejudice. 

On this point, Rodriguez has a high hurdle to clear. An 

“unreasonable application” under the AEDPA is one that is 

“not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5. In other words, it must be “’something 

like lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.’” Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.

2003) (quoting Hardaway v. Young, 320 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 

2002)). A habeas petitioner “must show that the state court’s 

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well under-
No. 13-1877 13

stood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 103, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011). Furthermore, “because the Strickland standard is a general standard, 

a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine 

that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 173 L. Ed. 2d 251 

(2009) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.

Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004)).

Under this highly-deferential standard of review, we cannot find that the Illinois Appellate Court erred in concluding 

that Rodriguez failed to establish a reasonable probability 

that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

his proceeding would have been different. As recognized by 

that court, the jury heard testimony from K.O. describing how 

Rodriguez twice got into bed with her and placed his penis in 

her anus. The State corroborated this testimony with Nesler’s 

testimony regarding the victim’s prior consistent statements, 

as well as Dr. St. Germain’s testimony regarding injuries to 

K.O.’s anus. Rodriguez nonetheless attacks the strength of the 

State’s case, describing it as resting on “a troubled child’s testimony and a medical report detailing that there had been an 

injury to her anus at some unknown point in her life.” This

argument at its core presents a credibility challenge. But the 

jury was able to observe the demeanors of both K.O. and Rodriguez while they testified—and also was entitled to draw 

negative conclusions concerning Rodriguez’s credibility 

based on his theft conviction—in deciding which version of 

events to believe. Given the sum total of the evidence against 

him, the Illinois Appellate Court was not unreasonable to find 

that Rodriguez would have been convicted notwithstanding 

his counsel’s outburst.
14 No. 13-1877

This conclusion is further supported by the several limiting instructions given by the trial judge. The trial judge instructed the jury before closing arguments that it should not

consider in its deliberations any statement made by either attorney that was not supported by the evidence. The trial judge 

then reminded the jury of this instruction after defense counsel made reference to the sperm evidence that had not been 

admitted, and repeated the admonition twice during jury instructions. The multiple warnings to the jury not to consider 

any statement by the attorneys that was not supported by record evidence bolster our view that the Illinois Appellate Court 

was not unreasonable in finding that counsel’s reference to 

the sperm evidence did not prejudice Rodriguez. After all, 

“[w]e normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction 

to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented 

to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury 

will be unable to follow the court’s instructions ... and a 

strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S 756, 766 n.8, 

107 S. Ct. 3102, 97 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1987) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Rodriguez contends that his trial counsel’s improper reference to the sperm evidence is precisely the type of occurrence that should be excepted from the general rule discussed 

in Greer, and he cites various cases in which we evinced skepticism that limiting instructions were sufficient to ameliorate 

prejudicial evidence or statements. But the isolated and indirect nature of Rodriguez’s counsel’s blunder, taken together 

with the trial judge’s curative instructions, distinguishes this 

case from those upon which Rodriguez relies.
No. 13-1877 15

For example, in Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014),

we reversed a jury verdict against an imprisoned plaintiff in 

a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the district court forced 

the plaintiff to appear in front of the jury in shackles and his 

prisoner uniform while the defendants were allowed to wear 

their law enforcement uniforms. Id. at 926–27. Notably, the 

trial judge in Maus did not give a limiting instruction; we 

nonetheless acknowledged that a limiting instruction might 

not have been enough under those circumstances to remedy 

the potential for prejudice. Id. at 928 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 

425 U.S. 501, 504–05, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976)). In 

United States v. Ciesiolka, 614 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2010), we reversed the conviction of a criminal defendant where we found 

that a single pro forma limiting instruction might not have 

been sufficient to ameliorate the prejudice from evidence of 

other bad acts that the government used to prove intent—specifically, over 100 images of child pornography belonging to 

the defendant, as well as testimony of a woman who had sex 

with the defendant when she was 15 years old. Id. at 358. In

United States v. Vance, 764 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2014), we expressed the view that “there are grounds for skepticism about 

[the] efficacy [of limiting instructions] in preventing juries”

from making improper inferences. Id. at 671. But the appellant 

in Vance did not challenge the limiting instructions given by 

the trial judge and the objectionable evidence adduced in that 

case—evidence of the criminal defendant’s participation in 

three restaurant robberies to establish his identity in a subsequent bank robbery—was directly presented to the jury and 

had the potential to be extremely prejudicial. Id. at 669. Finally, in Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2014), we

ordered a retrial on petitioner’s excessive force and willful-
16 No. 13-1877

and-wanton battery claims where defense counsel made comments in their closing statement that “overwhelmingly misled” the jury, thus creating substantial prejudice and “the 

court did not intervene specifically with regard to those 

[statements].” Id.

In Maus, Ciesiolka, and Vance, we acknowledged that some 

subject matter presented to the jury may be too self-evidently 

prejudicial for a limiting instruction to cure; in Hawkins, we 

concluded that misleading arguments to the jury should have 

been cured with a specific limiting instruction. Neither of 

those situations is before us here. In contrast with the inflammatory evidence addressed in Maus, Ciesiolka, and Vance, Rodriguez’s counsel’s reference to the unadmitted sperm evidence was brief in nature—a few words during an objection 

to the State’s closing argument. Furthermore, it was ambiguous—as the Illinois Appellate Court noted, the statement permitted an inference that there was physical evidence supporting Rodriguez’s guilt but did not mandate such an inference. 

Counsel’s brief allusion to evidence that the jury had not otherwise seen or heard did not create an overwhelming probability that the jury would disobey the trial court’s instructions; 

and trial counsel’s statement, referring to evidence of unclear

origin and import, is not of the sort that would irremediably 

prejudice the jury. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n.8. Furthermore, 

here, unlike in Hawkins, the curative instruction was repeated

multiple times after defense counsel misspoke. Thus, we must 

presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction 

while deliberating. 

Finally, Rodriguez makes various arguments to the effect 

that the DNA reports associated with the sperm samples were 
No. 13-1877 17

actually exculpatory in nature, and thus, once his counsel divulged their existence to the jury, he provided ineffective assistance by not seeking to introduce them into evidence. However, Rodriguez did not raise that argument before the district 

court and thus it has been waived. See Estremera v. United 

States, 442 F.3d 580, 587 (7th Cir. 2006). (“It is well settled that 

‘arguments not raised in the district court are waived on appeal.’”) (quoting Belom v. Nat’l Futures Ass'n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 

(7th Cir. 2002)). Furthermore, the district court found that Rodriguez’s claims that his trial lawyer was ineffective for 

“[f]ailing generally to investigate the case properly” and 

“[s]uppressing evidence from the jury” were procedurally defaulted. The district court did not issue a certificate of appealability from those findings, and Rodriguez did not appeal that 

decision. Accordingly, to the extent those claims may be construed as raising the issue of whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to introduce into evidence purportedly exculpatory DNA reports, that issue has not been 

properly raised before us.

IV.

In light of the evidence against Rodriguez and the trial 

judge’s curative instructions, it was not unreasonable for the 

Illinois Appellate Court to conclude that Rodriguez had not 

shown that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s errant remark

in front of the jury. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of 

Rodriguez’s habeas petition.