REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1361

September Term, 2015

______________________________________

ROBERT ANTOINE WEATHERS

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Woodward,

Graeff,

Thieme, Raymond G., Jr.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Thieme, J.

Concurring opinion by Graeff, J.

______________________________________

Filed: December 1, 2016
As Judge Moylan, writing for this Court, has stated: “The law could not be more 

clear that a wide discretion is vested in the trial judge to control the course of the trial and 

the exercise of such discretion will not be reversed on appellate review except on those rare 

cases where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.” Thrifty Diversified, Inc. v. 

Thomas R. Searles, 48 Md. App. 605, 615 (1981). This is one of those rare cases. 

Appellant, Robert Antoine Weathers, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court 

for Baltimore County, Maryland of theft of property with a value of at least $10,000 but 

less than $100,000. After he was sentenced to fifteen years and ordered to pay $40,000 in 

restitution, appellant timely appealed. Summarily rephrased, appellant presents the 

following question for our review:

Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in finding that there was no 

meritorious reason for appellant’s request to discharge counsel and in 

denying his request for a postponement?

For the following reasons, we agree that the court abused its discretion in this case 

and shall vacate the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged with numerous thefts from jewelry and liquor stores in 

Baltimore County, Maryland during the spring and early summer of 2014. Because of 

potential conflicts with the Office of the Public Defender involving a codefendant, 

Spencer K. Gordon was assigned to represent appellant in this case as well as three other 

cases that were charged in the Baltimore County Circuit Court. Ultimately, resolution of 

this appeal depends on our review of the June 8, 2014, denials of appellant’s requests to 
2

discharge Gordon. However, we shall first include a brief discussion of the background of 

this issue for context.1

On December 8, 2014, at a pretrial postponement hearing involving three of 

appellant’s cases, as well as several cases for the codefendant, Robin Tracy Nelson, 

appellant expressed his dissatisfaction with Gordon by informing the Chief Administrative 

Judge as follows:

I don’t think I’m going to use Mr. Gordon, Your Honor, because he’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel as of right now. I haven’t talked to him or 

nothing. He’s trying to move the case forward, and I’m going to have a paid 

attorney, Roland Brown, represent me on the rest of these cases.

Appellant maintained that he not only wanted to be tried by a jury, but he also 

wanted all of his cases tried separately. He further informed the court that “I don’t have 

nothing to say to Mr. Gordon. That’s not my attorney. That’s Mr. Brown, Your Honor –

[.]” After earlier acknowledging that Gordon was not present during the beginning of this 

hearing, having gone to another courtroom, the court remarked “[i]f you wish to get new 

counsel or if you’re dissatisfied with counsel in any way, you need to take care of that 

before you come back here.” 

 

1 Because of the issue raised, it is unnecessary to discuss the underlying facts of this 

case in detail. See Kennedy v. State, 436 Md. 686, 688 (2014). Suffice it to say that a 

witness identified appellant as being involved in the robbery of several diamond rings from 

a Baltimore County jewelry store on New Year’s Eve, December 31, 2013. Surveillance 

video of the robbery was played for the jury at trial. 
3

After the cases were postponed, and following a short recess, Gordon appeared in 

court and the court then turned to appellant’s request to discharge counsel. Appellant 

explained why he wanted to discharge Gordon:

[APPELLANT]: Like I said, he was ready to go to trial on this case 

up here right here, and he hasn’t done any type of investigating or any type 

of homework whatsoever; so how can we move forward when he don’t even 

know anything about the case?

The court asked Gordon if it was his understanding that the cases would be 

postponed and Gordon replied:

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Well, it was my understanding 

– I told the State that because there was so much discovery in so many cases 

that I did not feel in a position to go to trial and that I would be asking for a 

postponement. [The prosecutor] sort of extended me the courtesy of agreeing 

that if my postponement request was denied that he would put the simplest, 

what he viewed as the simplest case, and I would concur on first.

So my understanding was I was going to be asking for a 

postponement, but if it were denied, that’s the case that would be tried. I was 

trying to discuss this with Mr. Weathers back there, and the next thing I knew 

he was screaming at me; and I just sort of terminated the conversation.

The court asked Gordon if he was prepared to go forward if the case were not 

postponed, and Gordon answered:

Your Honor, if push had come to shove, I think I could have gone 

forward on it. I know that Mr. Weathers hired Mr. Brown on another case. 

From talking to him at the jail, I think his preference would be for the case 

to be postponed so that he could try to get Mr. Brown in on that – whatever 

case is going to go to trial, I think he wants Mr. Brown in on that.

The court then denied appellant’s request to discharge Gordon, stating:

[THE COURT]: I don’t find meritorious cause to discharge him, but 

I understand that may be your preference to hire another attorney. I need you 
4

to understand that we postponed this case until March, all right? Anything 

you’re going to do in terms of a change in counsel needs to be done before 

that date because otherwise if Mr. Gordon is here and saying he’s ready to 

go to that date, you may if you choose to discharge him at that point, you 

may not get another postponement. So whatever you need to do or whatever 

you wish to do in terms of counsel, please make sure it’s done well in advance 

of that trial date, all right?

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Approximately three months later, on March 3, 2015, appellant and Gordon 

appeared before the Administrative Judge Designee (hereinafter “Administrative Judge”).

At that time, the Administrative Judge was informed that appellant had four theft cases 

where he was represented by Gordon, and another case where he was represented by 

Roland Brown. After being informed that appellant had expressed dissatisfaction with 

Gordon, the Administrative Judge inquired whether Gordon was prepared for trial and 

Gordon replied:

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Well, in all candor, Your 

Honor, the answer to that would be no, and the reason for that is because the 

last time the cases were in, [the prosecutor] intended to try one in particular. 

That’s the one that I prepared for on that date, and I did not have any reason 

to think that that would not be the one to be tried first this time until yesterday 

when he told me that, in fact, it was one of the other ones that he is going to 

try first which is why my paralegal now has the files and is organizing 

materials so that I can prepare properly for that one.

The State informed the court that this case was originally scheduled to be tried a 

week later, but that, because the attorney for appellant’s co-defendant was unavailable, the 

case would need to be postponed. Gordon informed the Administrative Judge that he could 
5

be prepared to proceed in this case, but that it was possible that he would ask for a 

postponement. Gordon then continued:

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Yes. And for the record, just 

one additional thing. Obviously, Mr. Weathers wanted to be represented by 

Mr. Brown. I mean, they did – his family did retain Mr. Brown. I guess only 

had the money to retain him on one case. Obviously, the State can’t be forced 

to try any particular case, but I did speak with his mother this morning; and 

she has been trying to get in touch with Mr. Brown to make arrangements to 

retain him on some or all of the remaining cases, so I hope to get confirmation 

one way or the other on that within the next couple of days.

The court then asked appellant to give his reasons for wanting to discharge Gordon, 

and the following ensued:

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. First of all, Your Honor, this is the second 

time I’ve seen him considering this whole situation, and as far as the cases 

that I’m being tried on, I only seen him about one case. The other three cases 

that the prosecutor had mentioned, me and him have never talked about 

anything. I have received my motion of discovery, right. I’m in the process 

of paying Mr. Brown, but I haven’t finished paying him yet; so I do want him 

to represent me as a lawyer in court.

THE COURT: Well, why are you dissatisfied with the representation 

of Mr. Gordon?

THE DEFENDANT: Because I mean –

THE COURT: That’s the question.

THE DEFENDANT: He hasn’t done anything for my case, Your 

Honor, nothing whatsoever. I mean, he hadn’t been to see me but once. That 

was, like, about four months ago.

After Gordon again assured the Administrative Judge that there was no reason why 

he could not be prepared, the court found there was no meritorious reason to discharge 

Gordon, as follows:
6

THE COURT: All right. I find that there’s no meritorious reason for 

the discharge of Mr. Gordon at this time. Now, since I’ve reached that 

conclusion, I cannot – I must advise you now that I cannot legally prevent 

you from discharging or firing Mr. Gordon if that’s what you want to do.

You have the right to represent yourself in – come next Tuesday, but 

if you fire your attorney right now, make no mistake about it. This trial, one 

of these two trials will proceed as scheduled. You’ll be representing yourself 

if you have not hired another attorney and if that other attorney is not 

prepared to represent you.

So under the circumstances, is it – do you – so here’s the way it is. If 

you fire him right now, you’re going to be without any attorney, and I’m not 

making a postponement decision in this case based on the March 10th trial 

date nor would I postpone the case. Has it been postponed before?

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Yes, Your Honor.

[PROSECUTOR]: Numerous times.

THE COURT: So I don’t believe that the law requires me to give 

Defendants these endless opportunities to make decisions about who to hire. 

I think that this is not the first time this issue’s been raised before the Court, 

and under the circumstances, if I’m the postponement judge, you can count 

on not getting a postponement. So at that point in time, you’ll be representing 

yourself. Do you wish to fire Mr. Gordon today with the idea that you will 

be left representing yourself come March 10th, 2015? Yes or no?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

The Administrative Judge then conducted a waiver inquiry and informed appellant 

about what would be required if appellant decided to represent himself at trial. Ultimately, 

the court concluded that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 

The court then asked appellant if he was firing Gordon in all of his cases and appellant 

replied, “I didn’t know I had him on all of my cases, Your Honor.” At that point, the State 

informed the court that it was not sure which case it would try first and that it “would 
7

choose a case where [Gordon] would adequately be prepared.” The Administrative Judge 

then directed the parties to resolve which case was being tried first in order to ensure that 

appellant’s decision to waive counsel was made “on a knowing basis.”

After a recess, the State informed the court that it would proceed on two different 

cases, other than the case under consideration, and Gordon responded that he was prepared 

in those other cases. Based on this clarification of the trial schedule, the Administrative 

Judge again gave appellant a chance to discharge Gordon, but, before appellant could 

respond, Gordon suggested that the State and the court consider first trying appellant in the 

case where he was represented by Roland Brown. Although the court noted that depended 

entirely on attorney Brown’s schedule, appellant indicated his agreement with this 

suggestion. 

Thereafter, and without a firm decision which of the numerous theft cases against 

appellant would be tried first, the court and the appellant engaged in the following 

colloquy:

THE COURT: That’s all fine. The question here is, do you want to 

fire Mr. Gordon in these other cases, yes or no? You’ve heard my 

explanations and you’ve given your responses. Do you want to fire him in 

these cases? I firmly recommend against it, but you do what you want.

THE DEFENDANT: No. I will keep him, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So noted. Thank you.

Six days later, on March 9, 2015, the Administrative Judge granted another 

postponement for appellant in this case. Notably during the course of that hearing, which 
8

also included requests for postponement from appellant’s co-defendant, Nelson, Gordon 

proffered that, since the last hearing, Roland Brown secured an acquittal for appellant in 

another similar case in a neighboring jurisdiction. Based on that, appellant requested that 

a different case, where he was also represented by Brown, be tried first. However, the 

Administrative Judge denied further postponement in that case. 

Returning to the case under consideration here, the following colloquy at this March 

9

th hearing occurred:

THE COURT: Again, Mr. Weathers, is it your desire to engage the 

services of new counsel for this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, all the cases that Roland 

Brown represents –

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Somebody’s stepping on something. 

Everybody, check your feet. All right. It appears to have been cured. So 

I’m sorry. What did you say, Mr. Weathers?

THE DEFENDANT: I said the cases that Roland Brown is not 

representing me, the cases that he hasn’t stood in yet to represent me on, I’m 

asking can I require [sic] counsel for those cases? I’ve already hired counsel 

for those cases.

THE COURT: Oh, aside from the one where you just said you’ve 

hired Mr. Rosenberg?2

THE DEFENDANT: Right. On all the cases that he’s been filed on –

THE COURT: That what?

 

2 During the hearing, appellant informed the court, for the first time, that he was 

attempting to secure the services of another attorney, Lawrence Rosenberg, for some of his 

cases other than the one under consideration. 
9

THE DEFENDANT: All the cases that he’s been filing on, I have 

counsel that’s representing me.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don’t think I permitted the – you to 

discharge Mr. Gordon the last time you were here, did I?

THE DEFENDANT: But I can still hire counsel. I’m still allowed to 

hire counsel, can’t I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I’m sorry?

THE DEFENDANT: I said I’m still allowed to hire my own counsel?

THE COURT: You’re not allowed to play games which is what you’re 

doing –

THE DEFENDANT: I’m not playing any games, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I’m not permitting the discharge of Mr. Gordon 

unless and until other attorneys enter their appearance on his behalf.

THE DEFENDANT: No problem. I don’t have no problem with that.

Turning now to the events that occurred three months later, on June 8, 2015, the 

morning set for trial, the Administrative Judge heard another request for a postponement 

in this case. Defense attorney Gordon informed the court that, since the last hearing, 

appellant was acquitted in the separate case where he was represented by Roland Brown. 

However, appellant also had been convicted in another case in Washington County, for 

which he received a ten year sentence.3 Gordon had not spoken with or seen appellant in 

the meantime. Gordon continued:

 

3 The record does not reveal if appellant was represented in the Washington County case 

and, if so, by whom.
10

He comes here today – I’ve received no indication whatsoever that he 

still has intentions or the ability to retain private counsel to represent him on 

any of the remaining cases including the one today. However, when I went 

to see him in the lockup, the first thing he said to me was where’s Mr. Brown? 

You’re not my attorney.

I want Mr. Brown to represent me. And he believes that that is 

something that is in the works. I then came and saw [the prosecutor] next to 

the courtroom, and he tells me that he had seen Mr. Brown today and said 

oh, are you going to be on this case and Mr. Brown said no.

So Mr. Weathers would like Mr. Brown to represent – he has 

successfully represented him and obtained two acquittals for him on two 

separate charges, one in Montgomery, one in Baltimore County. I can 

understand why he would want Mr. Brown to be his attorney, but Mr. Brown 

is not here. A case is scheduled today. I’m the one here, but he doesn’t want 

me to represent him. He would like this case postponed so that he can 

continue to try and make arrangements with Mr. Brown.

The prosecutor confirmed that it was his understanding that, after speaking to 

attorney Brown, that Brown was not prepared to enter this case. But, the prosecutor 

informed the court that he was ready to call this case for trial.

At that point, the Administrative Judge summarized the history of this case, similar 

to that set forth herein. He then verified that appellant had a copy of the charging 

document, informed him of his right to counsel and the importance of having an attorney 

represent him, and confirmed that appellant understood the nature of the charges in this 

case. 

The court then asked if defense attorney Gordon was prepared to proceed and 

Gordon replied in the affirmative, “[e]xcept for one thing, Your Honor.” Gordon then 

stated:
11

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: . . . [T]here apparently is a 

surveillance video and among different bits of discovery that I got, I do not 

see that I obtained that. I did notify [the prosecutor] of that, and he does have 

that with him. So I’ve not seen the surveillance video and would like an 

opportunity to see that, but.

THE COURT: All right. What’s on the surveillance video?

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, it’s the Defendant and a coDefendant at a – in the jewelry shop at a display counter and then leaving 

after they were both seen on the video getting very close to the – and the 

State’s allegation is putting their hands in the display case.

THE COURT: And so how long does it take? How long is this video?

[PROSECUTOR]: Five –, ten-minute video.

The court asked appellant if he wanted to explain why he still wanted to discharge 

Gordon, and appellant replied:

. . . While Mr. Gordon, he came to see me twice, right, during this 

whole process, and when he came to see me, he talked about the case that 

he’s supposed to represent me on today. He never talked about that.

He talked about two other cases that he was supposed to represent me 

on, you know, so this case right here, how can he be familiar with the case 

when we never even talked about it? We never discussed this case. He never 

gave me the motion of discovery or anything, Your Honor, you know.

After Gordon agreed with that statement, appellant continued:

[THE DEFENDANT]: So what happened, Your Honor, is you know, 

I’m in the process now like you told me before, you said, you know, try to 

get Mr. Brown. I got Mr. Brown for the other case where I got an acquittal, 

right, and I’m in the process of getting him on this case. Your Honor, you 

know. Like I say, Mr. Gordon is not familiar with this case at all whatsoever. 

You know, he hasn’t studied this case?

He hasn’t told me anything about the case, you know. All he’s saying 

is we’re going in front of this case and give me the case number and that was 

it. You know, I haven’t talked to him in, like, three months, so how can he 
12

be familiar with this case whatsoever? You know, the other two cases that 

you told me to represent me on if Mr. Brown wouldn’t be available, these are 

none of the two cases that you told me to represent me on.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: It is true, Your Honor, that I 

have not discussed this case with him, that’s true, but I am familiar with it 

from reviewing it.

(emphasis added).

Despite this acknowledgment from appellant’s assigned defense attorney, the 

Administrative Judge denied the renewed motion to discharge Gordon, stating:

[THE COURT]: Okay. The Court concludes that the Defendant has 

not established a meritorious reason to discharge Mr. Gordon, but I cannot 

legally prevent you from discharging or firing him. You have the right to 

represent yourself, but if you fire Mr. Gordon right now, make no mistake 

about it, this trial will proceed as scheduled. You will be representing 

yourself if you have not hired another attorney. It sounds like you have not 

hired another attorney. So do you wish to discharge Mr. Gordon or keep Mr. 

Gordon?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I’m going to have to keep him to represent 

– you know, to help represent me –

THE COURT: So ordered. Next case.

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, can we go – can I approach for the 

file to go back down to Judge Purpura?

THE COURT: Yes. And any postponement request is denied.

The case was then sent to the trial judge for a jury trial. Before jury selection, 

appellant asked to speak to the court. Appellant was sworn in and stated that Gordon told 

him “he’s just getting into this case . . .” Appellant questioned how Gordon could “know 

anything about this case within a couple hours, Your Honor?” The trial judge confirmed 
13

that this same issue was heard earlier that day by the Administrative Judge. The court then 

asked for further explanation from attorney Gordon and Gordon stated as follows:

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Mr. Weathers, as you know, 

has a number of cases in Baltimore County, so there have been global 

discussions between Mr. Weathers and I. The cases were all staggered two 

weeks apart. What I told [the Administrative Judge] was that it is true that I 

had not had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Weathers about this particular 

case.

I have had all the discovery in all of the cases, and so I have had an 

opportunity to review the discovery in all of the cases; but I had not had an 

opportunity prior to today to speak to Mr. Weathers. He’s been – he’s had 

cases in multiple jurisdictions. His location has changed as a result of a 

conviction in another county.

I had a telephone interview scheduled with him that I couldn’t make 

because I got caught up in court way later than I anticipated. He’s on lockup 

which is a conflict. So it is true that I did not have an opportunity between 

the date that the last trial was scheduled two weeks ago and today to discuss 

these particular allegations in this particular case with him. That is true.

THE DEFENDANT: So you don’t know anything about this case?

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Well, I wouldn’t say I don’t 

know anything about this case. Discovery is not voluminous. I know the

facts of the case, but I haven’t discussed them with Mr. Weathers, but those 

were among the reasons why I requested of you the opportunity to do motions 

today and then have an opportunity to then talk to Mr. Weathers during the 

recess between today and tomorrow and also spend some time this evening 

going through it.

(emphasis added).

After speaking with the prosecutor, the trial judge clarified that the Administrative 

Judge had found no meritorious reason for appellant to discharge attorney Gordon. 

Appellant then stated that he did not want to fire Gordon but wanted to be able to “help 
14

him as the trial go[es] on[.]” The court confirmed that appellant could consult with Gordon 

during trial. 

The trial judge then inquired whether the Administrative Judge knew that Gordon 

had not spoken to appellant before trial and was assured that information was presented to 

him. The trial judge also asked whether the Administrative Judge knew that Gordon had 

all the discovery in the case, and Gordon replied that he told the Administrative Judge “that 

I had had an opportunity to review this case is what I said.” At that point, appellant 

interjected as follows:

THE DEFENDANT: But even you told me that you didn’t want to be 

part of this case. You told me that in the bullpen. You told me that, so you 

told me to let the judge know we’re not going there. Didn’t you say that?

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: I think I can put my personal 

feelings aside and try this case, Mr. Weathers.

Gordon continued:

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: I understand. Your Honor, if 

I could just say, the relationship between myself and Mr. Weathers has been 

somewhat acrimonious from the start. And you know, part of the problem is 

that he – his family obviously has had the funds to retain private counsel to 

represent him on two separate cases and in both of those cases, he was 

acquitted. So he sort of comes to court wishing he could have that attorney 

who has already successfully defended two cases continue to be his attorney. 

I’m saying you wish – you would like Mr. Brown to be your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: We tried to get Mr. Brown. He didn’t, you 

know, return the calls and my family was still in contact trying to get in touch 

with him.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Right. So that is the source 

of Mr. Weathers’ frustration, and as a result of that frustration, there has been 
15

some acrimony directed at me; and I would admit that there’s probably been 

some acrimony directed at him –

4

THE COURT: And this is all again – this was all presumably 

addressed in front of [the Administrative Judge]?

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY GORDON]: Well, maybe not this part of it, 

but yes.

The trial judge then decided to conduct “a 4-215 hearing just to keep the record clear 

because it sounds like more issues are coming up.” Appellant was then formally called to 

the witness stand and testified that he was innocent of the charges and had told this to 

Gordon. Appellant testified:

I told him that today. I told him that almost two months ago, the last 

time I seen him, right, and I told him if he was to represent me that he would 

have to get into the cases. He couldn’t come see me like once a month and 

just say what we going to do?

You know, he didn’t go over none of the cases with me. He didn’t go 

over the motion of discovery. He don’t have all the motion of discovery for 

this case, for this case right here, so how can he prepare for a jury trial? And 

he didn’t have the motion of discovery prepared, you know?

According to appellant, Gordon also conceded to him, apparently at some point 

prior to trial, that Gordon had not reviewed the surveillance video in this case. 

Nevertheless, Gordon simply told appellant to go ahead “and take a plea and get it out the 

way because he [has] other charges in different jurisdictions . . .” Therefore, appellant 

stated that he was “uncomfortable” with Gordon. To that, the court replied, “[w]ell, being 

 

4 The transcript states that these comments were made by the court, but in context it 

is clear that this paragraph was actually spoken by Gordon.
16

uncomfortable isn’t enough. What has he done wrong?” Appellant replied, “I haven’t 

seen him to tell him to do anything.” (emphasis added). Appellant agreed that he spoke to 

Gordon about different cases, but maintained that they did not speak about the details of 

this case. 

The court then turned to how Gordon was originally appointed and then noted that 

Gordon had been filing papers on appellant’s behalf in this case, including motions for 

discovery and an omnibus motion to suppress. Gordon then informed the court that he was 

eventually provided the surveillance video in this case, had reviewed it, and “certainly 

would like to discuss it with Mr. Weathers.” But, Gordon continued: 

There’s nothing based on that view of that DVD that makes me feel like I 

need a continuance to get witnesses or be further prepared for the case. I 

certainly could have done a better job of communicating with Mr. Weathers, 

but I am prepared to try the case.

After appellant agreed that he had not communicated with Gordon about this case 

and questioned whether Gordon was prepared, the trial judge denied appellant’s motion to

discharge, finding as follows:

Okay. Well, Mr. Weathers, based on what you’ve told me which is 

simply that you’re uncomfortable and that you haven’t had a chance to talk 

to him, but also based on my review of the file indicating that Mr. Gordon 

has filed all the necessary motions timely, very quickly within two weeks of 

his being appointed to the case, I don’t see that you do have a meritorious 

reason to discharge him.

So I can’t – I won’t discharge him because I don’t find a meritorious 

reason. You – on the other hand, if you want to do so, you still have that 

right to discharge him, but you would have to try the case without a lawyer. 

So it’s going to be – it’s going to start today, so what do you want to do?
17

After briefly changing his mind and temporarily withdrawing his request to 

discharge counsel, appellant ultimately asked that Gordon remain on as a “standby” 

attorney. After voir dire, jury selection and a hearing on a motion to suppress were 

conducted, this issue of the nature of Gordon’s continued representation/relationship to this 

case reared up once more, notably prior to opening statements and the reception of 

evidence. Ultimately, the trial judge found that appellant “freely, voluntarily, knowingly, 

and intelligently” waived his right to counsel, that Gordon would remain on as standby 

counsel and would be available to answer questions, but would not participate in the trial 

itself unless so directed by appellant. The court then struck Gordon’s appearance, but also 

told appellant that he could change his mind and Gordon could be reappointed to represent 

appellant if appellant so desired.5

 

5 We note that Gordon’s participation was not limited to mere consultation with the 

appellant throughout the course of the proceedings. Instead, at appellant’s express request, 

defense attorney Gordon actually conducted voir dire and was very involved in selecting 

the jury. He also argued the motion to suppress an identification, examining the majority 

of the witnesses on the record. And the next day, Gordon continued to argue motions prior 

to and during trial, made opening statements, objected to witness’s testimony, crossexamined and recross-examined the victim, responded to the State’s objections during 

bench conferences, argued the motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s 

case-in-chief, participated with appellant in discussing the instructions with the court, and, 

after appellant was convicted by the jury, argued for mitigation prior to sentencing. As 

stated, Gordon’s participation in this manner was made at appellant’s express, on-therecord, request. But, the record also shows that appellant did, to a certain degree, assume 

the mantle of self-representation. He asked a number of questions during the motions 

hearing. He also cross-examined and recross-examined three witnesses during trial. And, 

appellant made his own closing argument. 

The prosecutor objected to Gordon’s participation in this manner, suggesting that 

this “does rise to representation” and “is not in the purview of standby counsel.” The Court 
18

DISCUSSION

On appeal, appellant contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding 

that there was no meritorious reason for appellant’s request to discharge defense counsel 

Gordon and in denying appellant’s request for a postponement. Appellant’s primary 

argument is based on Gordon’s concession that, prior to trial, he did not discuss this case 

with appellant. 

The State responds that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying 

the motion to discharge Gordon. The State’s argument is premised on the ground that, 

although he had not yet spoken to appellant about this case on the morning set for a jury 

trial, defense counsel knew the facts of the case and was prepared to proceed to represent 

appellant at trial. 

We shall hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court abused its 

discretion in finding no meritorious reason for appellant’s request to discharge counsel 

pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-215 (e).

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Gideon v. 

 

of Appeals has held that hybrid representation is not allowed in Maryland. See Harris v. 

State, 344 Md. 497, 511 (1997) (“[T]here are only two types of representation 

constitutionally guaranteed – representation by counsel and representation pro se – and 

they are mutually exclusive.”) (quoting Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 265 (1987)). 

However, no issue with respect to hybrid representation is presented in this appeal.
19

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).6 “If the defendant cannot afford private 

representation, then he or she is entitled to an effective defense from a public defender or 

court appointed attorney.” Gonzales v. State, 408 Md. 515, 529-30 (2009); see also Dykes 

v. State, 444 Md. 642, 648 (2015) (“[T]he defendant has a right to counsel appointed at 

government expense” (citing Gideon, supra)). “If the defendant can afford private 

representation, however, then the defendant has a right to the attorney of his or her choice.” 

Gonzales, 408 Md. at 530. 

In addition, a defendant in a criminal prosecution also has a constitutional right to 

have effective assistance of counsel and the corresponding right to reject that assistance 

and represent himself. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (recognition of the 

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel); see also Dykes, 444 Md. at 648 

(“The right to counsel ‘guarantee[s] an effective advocate for each criminal defendant 

rather than . . . ensur[ing] that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer 

whom he prefers.’”) (quoting Alexis v. State, 437 Md. 457, 475 (2014), in turn quoting 

Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).

As part of the implementation and protection of this fundamental right to counsel, 

the Court of Appeals adopted Maryland Rule 4-215, “which explicates the method by 

which the right to counsel may be waived by those defendants wishing to represent 

 

6 The right to counsel provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 21 

and the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution are generally held to be coextensive 

and there is no argument presented here that they should be interpreted differently. Parren 

v. State, 309 Md. 260, 262-3 n.1 (1987).
20

themselves . . . .” Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 180 (2007); accord Dykes, 444 Md. 

at 651. “The purpose of Rule 4-215 is to ‘protect that most important fundamental right to 

the effective assistance of counsel, which is basic to our adversary system of criminal 

justice.’” Williams v. State, 435 Md. 474, 485 (2013) (quoting Parren v. State, 309 Md. 

260, 281 (1987)). Further, the Rule “provides an orderly procedure to insure that each 

criminal defendant appearing before the court be represented by counsel, or, if he is not, 

that he be advised of the Sixth Amendment constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, 

as well as his correlative constitutional right to self-representation. Broadwater, 401 Md. 

at 180-81 (citation omitted). The requirements of the Rule are “mandatory,” require “strict 

compliance,” and “a trial court’s departure from the requirements of Rule 4-215 constitutes 

reversible error.” Pinkney v. State, 427 Md. 77, 87-88 (2012) (citations omitted). 

“We review de novo whether the circuit court complied with Rule 4-215.” Gutloff 

v. State, 207 Md. App. 176, 180 (2012). However, so long as the court has strictly complied 

with Rule 4-215(e), we review the court’s decision regarding whether to grant or deny a 

defendant’s request to discharge counsel for abuse of discretion. State v. Taylor, 431 Md. 

615, 630 (2013). “‘Abuse of discretion’ . . . has been said to occur ‘where no reasonable 

person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,’ or when the court acts ‘without 

reference to any guiding rules or principles.’” Nash v. State, 439 Md. 53, 67 (quoting North 

v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13 (1994)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 284 (2014). Further:

“ ‘[A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not 

be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same 

ruling.’ ” Alexis v. State, 437 Md. 457, 478, 87 A.3d 1243 (2014) (emphasis 
21

omitted) (quoting North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14, 648 A.2d 1025 

(1994)). “Rather, ‘[a] court’s decision is an abuse of discretion when it is 

‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and 

beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’ ” Id. 

(quoting Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 383, 879 A.2d 1064 (2005) (quoting 

Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 606, 628, 865 A.2d 603 (2005)) (some internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

Norwood v. State, 222 Md. App. 620, 643, cert. denied, 444 Md. 640 (2015).

Pertinent to our discussion, Maryland Rule 4-215 (e) provides as follows:

If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose 

appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain 

the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason 

for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; 

continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel 

does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will 

proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court 

finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not 

permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the 

trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel 

if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel. If the 

court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with 

subsections (a)(1)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior 

compliance.

This Court of Appeals has explained that this rule:

[C]reates a three-step process for discharge of counsel. First, when the 

defendant indicates a desire to dismiss counsel, the court must provide an 

opportunity for the defendant to explain the reason for dismissal. Second, 

the court must evaluate the reason to determine if it is meritorious. If the 

reason is meritorious, the court must permit dismissal, continue the case if 

necessary, and warn the defendant that he or she may be required to proceed 

pro se if new counsel is not engaged by the next trial date. If the reason for 

dismissal is not meritorious, however, the court must engage in a third-level 

inquiry. The court may still permit dismissal of counsel, but only after 

warning the defendant of the possibility he or she will proceed pro se if 

substitute counsel is not secured. The court may also reject the defendant’s 

request to dismiss counsel if the reason is not meritorious.
22

State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 425 (1996); accord Gonzales, 408 Md. at 531-32; see also 

Williams v. State, 321 Md. 266, 273 (1990) (“Where the trial judge finds a defendant’s 

reasons to be meritorious, he must grant the request and, if necessary, give the defendant 

an opportunity to retain new counsel”).

There is no claim in this case that the circuit court failed to comply with the technical 

requirements of Maryland Rule 4-215 (e). Indeed, the record shows that the various judges 

in the circuit court gave appellant ample opportunity to air his grievances against defense 

counsel. Instead, the issue before this Court is limited to whether the circuit court abused 

its discretion in finding that there was no meritorious reason for appellant’s request to 

discharge counsel. On that issue, the parties agree there is little guidance for our 

consideration. The Court of Appeals has observed:

The rule does not define “meritorious.” This Court has equated the 

term with “good cause.” See Gonzales v. State, 408 Md. 515, 531-33, 970 

A.2d 908 (2009); [State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 627 (2005)]; State v. 

Brown, 342 Md. 404, 413, 676 A.2d 513 (1996). This determination –

whether there is “good cause” for discharge of counsel – is “an indispensable 

part of subsection (e)” and controls what happens in the third step. Williams, 

321 Md. at 273, 582 A.2d 803.

Dykes, 444 Md. at 652.

There are few examples of what constitutes a “meritorious” reason in Maryland case 

law. In Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 (1995), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 

court’s finding that the defendant did not have a meritorious reason to discharge counsel, 

where the defendant, Grandison, wanted to present a different defense than did his attorney. 

This did not constitute meritorious grounds because counsel never expressly refused to 
23

present Grandison’s preferred defense and because the two defenses were not 

incompatible. Id. at 202.

The Court of Appeals also affirmed a finding of no merit in Fowlkes v. State, 311 

Md. 586 (1988). The relevant facts of the case and the Court’s conclusion, were 

summarized as follows:

In this case, the defendant at various points advanced several different 

reasons for his request. He claimed that his attorney did not have “the true 

facts,” that she could not represent him “on behalf of honesty,” and that she 

had not diligently sought to obtain the appearance of his witnesses. The trial 

judge found these reasons unmeritorious. She stated that the defendant’s 

attorney “was highly competent” and had “had plenty of time to prepare.” 

Moreover, she noted that the absent witness had failed to appear only because 

the defendant had supplied an incorrect address.

The record fully supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the 

defendant’s request was unmeritorious. The judge had an opportunity to 

assess [defense counsel’s] competence and dedication during pretrial 

proceedings and the circumstances thereafter. The eight months that elapsed 

between the defendant’s indictment and the trial date surely afforded more 

than enough time for preparation and for the defendant to find an attorney 

more to his liking. The judge was entitled to credit [defense counsel’s] 

statements concerning her efforts to summon the missing witness. Moreover, 

from the defendant’s own statements, the judge could have concluded that 

the defendant was motivated less by dissatisfaction with his attorney than by 

an unjustified desire for delay. . . . [T]he defendant objected not only to 

representation by the Office of the Public Defender but also to the trial going 

forward under any circumstances. In addition, after the defendant discharged 

his attorneys, he admitted, “I ain’t trying to get tried.”

Id. at 607. See Alford v. State, 202 Md. App. 582, 609 (2011) (upholding trial court’s 

findings that reasons for request for discharge were unmeritorious, including appellant’s 

claim of inadequate communication with defense counsel, where “defense counsel was 

credible when she stated that she reasonably responded to appellant’s requests for 
24

communication, as she responded to all three written requests and visited appellant twice 

before trial”); see also United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 93 (1st. Cir. 1986) (appellant’s

“loss of confidence in his attorney” does not constitute good cause to assign new counsel) 

(cited in State v. Brown, supra, 342 Md. at 413 & n.3). 

Here, the primary reason cited for appellant’s request to discharge his attorney was 

defense counsel’s concession, on the record, on the day of trial, that he had not yet spoken 

to appellant about this case. Appellant directs our attention to In re Shawn P., 172 Md. 

App. 569 (2007). There, Shawn appeared for his adjudicatory hearing without an attorney, 

though he stated that he desired representation. In re Shawn P., 172 Md. App. at 572. The 

court found that, by appearing without counsel, he waived his right to an attorney by 

inaction. Id. at 573. However, an assistant public defender, who happened to be in the 

courtroom, agreed to enter an appearance on Shawn’s behalf, even though he had never 

spoken with him and was completely unfamiliar with the facts of the case. Id. at 574. 

Defense counsel then requested a continuance to prepare for the hearing, which was denied. 

Id. Instead, the court ordered the case to proceed immediately to trial and Shawn was found 

involved in the offense of second degree assault and adjudicated a delinquent. Id. at 571. 

On appeal, this Court held that the trial judge “abused his discretion by denying

counsel’s request for a continuance or, in the alternative and at the very least, by refusing

to afford counsel an opportunity to confer with appellant.” In re Shawn P., 172 Md. App. 

at 588. In addressing whether Shawn was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we 

explained:
25

[T]he effectiveness and unreasonableness of counsel’s performance may be 

determined or substantially influenced by his client’s own statements and 

actions. Informed strategic choices by counsel based on information supplied 

by the defendant and, in particular, decisions as to what investigative 

strategies will bear fruit depend on information uniquely within the 

knowledge of the client. Where, as in the case at hand, there has been 

absolutely no communication between counsel and appellant, and counsel 

has been denied an opportunity for even a brief consultation with appellant, 

it can hardly be said that appellant had effective assistance of counsel.

In re Shawn P., 172 Md. App. at 584.

Much of this stems from a lawyer’s duty to communicate with his or her client. The 

Rules of Professional Conduct provide:

(a) An attorney shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with 

respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (f), is 

required by these Rules;

(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 

attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance 

not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or 

other law.

(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 

permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 1.4 (Md. Rule 19-301.4).

Generally, “a lawyer representing a criminal defendant has a duty under Rule 1.4 to 

promptly inform and consult with the client about issues over which a client has decisionmaking authority. The obligation is also a function of the defendant’s constitutional 
26

rights.” Bennett et al., Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, at 63 (8th

ed. 2015) (collecting cases); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gelb, 440 

Md. 312, 321 (2014) (“Respondent’s lack of communication denied the complainants the 

opportunity to make informed decisions regarding their representation, in violation of 

MLRPC 1.4(b)”); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Monfried, 368 Md. 

373, 385-90 (2002) (concluding attorney violated MARPC 1.4 in one case by failing to 

interview client and by failing to keep client informed of status of case, and in another case 

by failing to meet with client or to meet with him prior to a parole revocation hearing). 

Indeed:

“[T]he defendant ordinarily has the ultimate decision when the issue at hand 

involves a choice that will inevitably have important personal consequences 

for him or her, and when the choice is one a competent defendant is capable 

of making.” Examples of that type of decision include whether to testify on 

one’s own behalf, whether to forego trial by way of a guilty plea, and waiver 

of right to trial by jury.

Grandison, 341 Md. at 261-62 (quoting Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 674 (1988)); see also 

Fortune, et al., Modern Litigation and Professional Responsibility Handbook, §14.2.3 at 

502 (2d ed. 2001) (“The conscientious criminal lawyer must keep the client fully informed 

and advise him ‘with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid 

estimate of the probable outcome.’ After consultation, it is for the client to decide how to 

plead, whether to waive jury, and whether to testify.”) (footnotes and citation omitted). As

one commentator has explained:

An attorney has an obligation to communicate with the client, and failure to 

discharge this duty is a proper ground for disciplinary action. It is the duty 
27

of the attorney to inform clients of relevant considerations and factors in the 

decision-making process and of their rights and interests in the subject 

matter, and to give the clients the opportunity to make decisions. Failure to 

do so renders the lawyer subject to disciplinary action.

Hall, Professional Responsibility in Criminal Defense Practice, § 32.14 at 1206 (3d ed. 

2005) (footnotes omitted).

Here, although he had entered an appearance in this case some nine months earlier, 

defense counsel admitted that, on the morning of trial, he had not yet discussed this case 

with appellant. Instead, Gordon planned on discussing the case with appellant after the 

first day of trial, which, in this case, did not occur until after the jury had been selected and 

after testimony was received on a motion to suppress the identification of appellant by the 

victim in this case. This anticipated communication would come too late as it is well 

established that voir dire is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. See State v. Hardy, 

415 Md. 612, 628 (2010) (holding that, for purposes of claims under Maryland Rule 4-215, 

“meaningful trial proceedings” began with the voir dire process in a criminal trial). 

Certainly, communication about the details and nature of the case at hand would have 

informed the jury selection process. And, there is no doubt that any discussion at all also 

could have helped with the motion to suppress the victim’s identification. 

Additionally, Gordon conceded that he had not yet discussed the surveillance video 

with appellant. Indisputably, the video was a key piece of the evidence against appellant. 

Contrary to any suggestion otherwise, we question whether defense counsel could truly be 

prepared when he or she did not discuss the primary evidence in the case with the client 
28

prior to the commencement of trial. We would be presented with a much different case 

had the court simply granted a brief postponement, or perhaps simply continued the case 

until the next day, so that these communications could take place.

We recognize that appellant informed the trial judge that he and counsel had 

apparently discussed a plea in this case. Nevertheless, appellant maintained that they did 

not discuss the discovery or the facts of this case. And, at minimum, there is nothing in 

this record showing that the failure to communicate was caused by or somehow due to 

appellant’s refusal to talk to counsel.

Accordingly, we conclude that counsel’s admitted failure to discuss this case with 

appellant, under the circumstances, was a meritorious reason for discharge of counsel. 

Because the court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise, we shall vacate the 

judgment and remand for further proceedings.

JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED 

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE 

COUNTY.
REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1361

September Term, 2015

______________________________________

ROBERT ANTOINE WEATHERS

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Woodward,

Graeff,

Thieme, Raymond G., Jr.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

 Concurring Opinion by Graeff, J.

______________________________________

 Filed: December 1, 2016
I concur in the judgment only. I write separately because, although I agree that 

appellant should not have been required to proceed to trial without first having the 

opportunity to speak with his attorney, I do not agree with the conclusion by the Majority 

that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that appellant had no meritorious 

reason to discharge counsel. 

As the Majority points out, Rule 4-215 does not define “meritorious.” And although 

the Court of Appeals has equated the term with “good cause,” see Dykes v. State, 444 Md. 

642, 652 (2015), there has been limited guidance regarding what constitutes “good cause” 

to discharge counsel. 

Other courts using a “good cause” standard in this context, however, have been more 

specific. Scenarios deemed to constitute “good cause” to replace counsel include “a 

conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict 

which [could] lead . . . to an apparently unjust verdict.’” McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 

931 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (1972)), cert. 

denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982). Accord United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1249 (10th Cir. 

2002); State in Interest of J.F., 317 P.3d 964, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 2013); 3 LAFAVE ET AL.,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.4(b) (4th ed. 2007) (and cases cited therein). These scenarios 

represent situations in which a defendant reasonably could believe that an attorney would 

not competently represent him or her. 

Here, there was no allegation of a conflict of interest. And although there were 

indications of “acrimony” between appellant and Mr. Gordon, there was no allegation that 
‒Unreported Opinion‒

-2-

it rose to the level of an “irreconcilable conflict.”7 The specific allegation here involved a 

“breakdown of communication.” The issue before us is whether there was a “breakdown 

of communication” of such magnitude that it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court 

to deny the motion to discharge counsel.

In determining whether a court abused its discretion in denying a request to 

discharge counsel due to a breakdown of communication, courts have looked to several 

factors. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit lists the following 

factors as relevant: (1) the timeliness of the request; (2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry 

into appellant’s complaint about counsel; and (3) whether appellant and his or her “‘counsel 

experienced a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.’” United States 

v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 

895 (4th Cir.1994)). The Tenth Circuit applies these factors, as well as a fourth factor: 

“[W]hether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the 

communication breakdown.” Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250. I agree that these factors are relevant 

to the analysis whether the court abused its discretion in finding good cause to discharge 

counsel based on a lack of communication. 

Here, application of these factors leads to the conclusion that the circuit court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motions to discharge counsel. The requests 

 

7

“Attorney-client conflicts justify the grant of a substitution motion only when 

counsel and defendant are so at odds as to prevent presentation of an adequate defense. 

The general loss of confidence or trust alone is not sufficient to substitute new counsel.” 

State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1272 (Wash. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008 

(1998).
‒Unreported Opinion‒

-3-

to discharge counsel at issue here were made on the date set for trial, after the case already 

had been postponed three times for appellant to retain counsel. And there is no dispute 

here that the court conducted an adequate inquiry into appellant’s complaint regarding 

counsel. The first two factors weigh against a finding that the court abused its discretion 

in denying appellant’s motion to discharge counsel. 

We thus turn to the third factor, whether appellant and his appointed counsel 

experienced a “total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.” Defense 

counsel advised the circuit court that, although he had not had an opportunity to speak with 

appellant about this specific case, there had been “global discussions” between them about 

similar robbery charges pending against appellant.8 The prosecutor stated that he had 

discussed the case with defense counsel, and defense counsel stated that he was “familiar 

with” the case and prepared to try the case. Although he requested that the court conduct 

motions that day and not start the trial until the next day, giving him the opportunity to 

discuss the specifics of this case with appellant, defense counsel made clear his belief that 

his lack of communication with appellant, up until that time, did not prevent him from 

communicating with appellant going forward or from being able to give appellant an 

adequate defense. Cf. People v. Gibson, 6 N.Y.S.3d 198, 199 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) 

(“Although the mere complaint by a defendant that communications have broken down 

 

8 The prosecutor referred to multiple robberies as “similar schemes,” in which 

appellant “and a co-defendant . . . made off” with merchandise. Defense counsel also stated 

that the cases were “all very similar.” 
‒Unreported Opinion‒

-4-

between him and his lawyer is not, by itself, good cause for a change in counsel,” 

substitution is proper “where a complete breakdown has been established”; in that case 

“both defendant and defense counsel agreed that they were unable to communicate.”). See 

also Mullen, 32 F.3d at 897 (discharge appropriate where counsel and the defendant would 

not be able to communicate effectively during trial, “making an adequate defense 

unlikely”).9 Thus, there was not a showing of a “breakdown of communication” that 

prevented defense counsel, going forward, from adequately defending appellant. 

Finally, with respect to the fourth factor, courts have held that a defendant is not 

entitled to substitute counsel where he or she is the cause of the communication breakdown. 

For example, in United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 289 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 

526 U.S. 1137 (1999), the court upheld the denial of the defendant’s request for substitute 

counsel, noting that the defendant’s “own conduct caused the initial lack of 

communication,” and stating that a “court can properly refuse a request for substitution of 

counsel when the defendant’s own behavior creates the problem.” See also State in Interest 

of J.F., 317 P.3d at 968 (“Mother’s decision to avoid communicating and cooperating with 

Counsel was . . . Mother’s choice to avoid Counsel [and it] did not ‘establish[] that a 

complete breakdown of communication existed.’”); Sekou v. Warden, State Prison, 583 

 

9 Here, as noted by the Majority, appellant and defense counsel appeared to 

communicate during the trial, with defense counsel actively participating in the 

proceedings, despite appellant’s decision to discharge him as counsel. See United States 

v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 288-89 (4th Cir. 1998) (A “total lack of communication simply 

does not exist where the attorney and the client communicate significantly during trial.”), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1137 (1999). 
‒Unreported Opinion‒

-5-

A.2d 1277, 1282 (Conn. 1990) (“Although under some circumstances a complete 

breakdown in communication between a defendant and his counsel may warrant 

appointment of new counsel[,] a defendant is not entitled to demand a reassignment of 

counsel simply on the basis of a ‘breakdown in communication’ which he himself 

induced.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the record reflects that appellant was at least partially responsible for the lack 

of communication with defense counsel. At the December 8, 2014, hearing, defense 

counsel told the court that he had tried to discuss with appellant his intention to ask the 

court for a postponement, but if his request was denied, they would go to trial on the 

simplest of the robbery cases. Counsel noted that appellant, who wanted private counsel 

to represent him, responded by “screaming at” defense counsel, so counsel “just sort of

terminated the conversation.” Similarly, in June 2015, on the morning of trial, defense 

counsel advised the court that he had gone to see appellant in “lockup,” but appellant again 

refused to talk to counsel, stating: “You’re not my attorney.” These facts support the 

conclusion that there was not an inability to communicate or a “breakdown of 

communication,” but rather, an unwillingness by appellant to communicate with defense 

counsel because he wanted to retain private counsel. 

In sum, there was no showing that there was an inability to communicate that would 

interfere with defense counsel’s ability to represent appellant. Instead, the record showed 

a lack of sufficient communication up to that point, which was caused, in part, by 

appellant’s conduct. Given that scenario, and that the request was made the day of trial, 
‒Unreported Opinion‒

-6-

after three postponements for appellant to obtain counsel, I would hold that the circuit court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to discharge counsel.

I do agree, however, that appellant should have had the opportunity to consult his 

attorney prior to the start of trial. In that regard, In re Shawn P., 172 Md. App. 569 (2007), 

is instructive. In that case, a public defender agreed to enter an appearance and represent 

a defendant who appeared with no attorney. Id. at 572. The public defender asked for a 

continuance, which the court denied. Id. at 574. This Court held that the trial judge 

“abused his discretion by denying counsel’s request for a continuance or, in the alternative 

and at the very least, by refusing to afford counsel an opportunity to confer with appellant.” 

Id. at 588.

Here, defense counsel advised the court that he was prepared to represent appellant, 

but he requested that trial not start until the next day, after he had an opportunity to confer 

with appellant. Rather than grant that request, or give defense counsel some time to speak 

with appellant, the court denied the motion and proceeded with jury selection. See State v. 

Hardy, 415 Md. 612, 627 (2010) (characterizing voir dire as a “meaningful trial 

proceeding”). In proceeding to trial, without first giving appellant a chance to speak with

his attorney about the case, the circuit court abused its discretion. Accordingly, I agree that 

appellant is entitled to a new trial.