Filed 11/22/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL GRANT QUICK,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B268751

(Super. Ct. No. 15F-03787)

(San Luis Obispo County)

The interaction between a peace officer and a person 

suspected of committing a crime is not a game. It is serious 

business. Knowing that his “goose was cooked” if the officer 

conducted a search, appellant attempted what was tantamount to 

a “do it yourself” suppression motion. During the course of his 

detention, he took off his coat and threw it into his car. Then he 

threw the car keys into his car. Then he locked the car thinking 

that the police would not be able to lawfully gain entry and 

search. This was a game of “hide and seek” which he was bound 

to lose. It was a sophomoric attempt to thwart the lawful seizure 

of evidence and a crime itself, i.e., a willful obstructing of a peace 

officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) A person detained for 

investigation has no constitutional right to dispose of evidence. 
2

(People v. Bracamonte (1975) 15 Cal.3d 394, 405, fn. 6; People v. 

Maddox (1956) 46 Cal.2d 301, 306.) 

Daniel Grant Quick appeals his conviction by plea to 

possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 11378), entered after the trial court denied his motion to 

suppress evidence made pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. 

Pursuant to a negotiated plea, appellant admitted suffering a 

prior strike conviction and was sentenced to four years state 

prison. He contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the 

vehicle inventory search was reasonable and incident to a lawful 

arrest for driving under the influence. He argues that the police 

detained and arrested him as a ruse to conduct a narcotics 

investigation. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Atascadero Police Officer Matthew Chesson received 

a call from a narcotics detective that appellant had just left his 

residence in a black Mercury. Earlier that day, Officer Chesson 

was advised that appellant was involved in narcotics activity and 

had multiple firearms. 

Officer Chesson followed appellant, saw him commit

three Vehicle Code violations and stopped him. He explained to 

appellant that his brake lights were not working properly. 

Appellant said that he had recently rewired the car and may 

have incorrectly connected the wires. Officer Chesson noticed 

that appellant‟s pupils were constricted, he was exhibiting facial 

tremors, and open sores on his face. These were symptoms of a 

person under the influence of a controlled substance. Appellant 

admitted using Percocet and marijuana earlier in the day. 

Appellant was asked to step out of the car for a field 

sobriety test. He refused. Officer Chesson knew that appellant 
3

was a convicted felon with access to firearms. For officer safety 

purposes, he called for back-up. Appellant eventually got out of 

the car, removed his jacket and tossed it on the driver‟s seat.

Appellant then rolled up the car window, tossed his keys inside 

the car, and locked and shut the car door. 

Officer Chesson conducted field sobriety tests, 

determined that appellant was under the influence of a controlled 

substance, and arrested appellant for driving under the 

influence. 

Sergeant Jason Carr assisted in the arrest and 

ordered that appellant‟s vehicle be towed because it was blocking 

a driveway. The driveway owner, a friend of appellant, said that 

the vehicle could stay parked where it was. However, it was 

parked 24 inches into the roadway creating a traffic hazard. 

Officers conducted a vehicle inventory search, finding 

25.9 grams of methaphetamine (259 to 518 single doses) in the 

jacket pocket, two methamphetamine pipes, and a Taser. 

Denying the motion, the trial court found that Officer 

Chesson had a rational suspicion to effectuate the traffic stop and 

probable cause to arrest appellant for driving under the influence 

of a controlled substance. It also said that appellant “took 

steps . . . which made it difficult or impossible for the police to do 

a simple search incident to the arrest when he locked the car and 

threw the keys in it.” Officer Chesson “had legal authority to 

search the interior of the car since he was arresting [appellant] 

for [being] under the influence of a controlled substance or

driving under the influence.” Finally, it found that the inventory 
4

search was conducted pursuant to standard vehicle impound 

procedures and not for investigatory purposes.1 

Standard of Review

In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress 

evidence, we defer to the trial court‟s factual findings, express or 

implied, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Lenart 

(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.) “We exercise our independent 

judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the 

search . . . was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.) 

“If there is conflicting testimony, we must accept the trial court‟s 

resolution of disputed facts and inferences, its evaluations of 

credibility, and the version of events most favorable to the 

People, to the extent the record supports them. [Citations.]” 

(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.) 

Inventory Search

Appellant contends that the search was an unlawful

ruse to facilitate a narcotics investigation. This contention is 

refuted by the record and the trial court‟s factual findings. 

Vehicle inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the 

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. (Colorado v. Bertine 

(1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371.) Under the community caretaking 

doctrine, police may, without a warrant, impound and search a 

vehicle so long as they do so in conformance with the 

standardized procedures of the local police department and in 

furtherance of a community caretaking purpose. (People v. 

Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761-762.) “The authority of 

 

1 We commend the trial court for a well articulated ruling. 

Such a ruling not only tells parties why the court has ruled, but 

also aids the appellate court in its duties. (See also People v. 

Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 952.)
5

police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding 

traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond 

challenge.” (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 

369.) A vehicle impound search will be upheld if it is reasonable 

under all the circumstances. (People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 

Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) 

Sergeant Carr impounded the vehicle because it was 

blocking a driveway and parked two feet out in the roadway. He 

said that it was a narrow road and that “two cars [would] have a 

difficult time passing” one another “[e]ven if that vehicle wasn‟t 

there.” Officer Chesson did not believe appellant‟s vehicle was in 

immediate danger of being hit, but agreed it could have led to a 

collision if another car tried to drive by or an inattentive driver 

did not see the vehicle sticking out. 

Appellant argues that the vehicle was “hovering”

between the dirt and road pavement and not a traffic hazard. 

Sergeant Carr‟s testimony was clear: the vehicle was blocking a 

driveway and parked far enough out in the roadway to create a 

traffic hazard. The sergeant‟s testimony was corroborated by 

Officer Chesson and photos of the parked vehicle. 

The vehicle was impounded pursuant to Vehicle Code 

section 22651, subdivisions (b) and (h) and subject to an 

inventory search pursuant to established police policy. Vehicle 

Code section 22651, subdivision (b), provides that a peace officer 

may remove a vehicle: “When a vehicle is parked or left standing 

upon a highway in a position so as to obstruct the normal 

movement of traffic or in a condition so as to create a hazard to 

other traffic upon the highway”; and (h)(1) “When an officer 

arrests a person driving or in control of a vehicle for an alleged 
6

offense and the officer is, by this code or other law, required or 

permitted to take, and does take, the person into custody.”

Sergeant Carr explained that the inventory search 

was required to document what was in the vehicle and to protect 

the tow company and the police department. Although Sergeant 

Carr was aware of the narcotics investigation, he testified that 

the sole purpose of the impound search was to inventory what 

was in the vehicle and to verify that nothing was missing when 

the vehicle was returned to appellant. Vehicle Code section 

22651 authorized the vehicle impound. (See People v. Aguilar 

(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1053 [court focuses on the purpose of 

the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory].) When a 

vehicle is lawfully impounded, an inventory search pursuant to 

an established, standardized procedure does not violate the 

Fourth Amendment. (South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, 428 

U.S. at pp. 371-375; People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 

545-546; People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 743, fn. 5.) 

The trial court reasonably concluded that it was a lawful 

inventory search aimed at securing the car and its contents. 

(South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 373; People v. 

Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1056.) 

Search Incident to Arrest

In the alternative, the trial court found that the 

search was incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment. Citing Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 

(Gant), appellant argues that the search was unreasonable 

because the officers had no reason to believe that evidence 

relevant to the arrest for driving under the influence of a 

controlled substance would be found in the vehicle. In Gant the 

defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, 
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handcuffed, and locked in a patrol car before officers searched his 

car and found cocaine. The Supreme Court determined that the 

search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment‟s 

warrant requirement did not justify the search because the police 

could not reasonably have believed that evidence of the offense 

for which defendant was arrested (i.e., driving with a suspended 

license) might be found in the car. (Id., at p. 344.) “Police may 

search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant‟s arrest only if the 

arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 

compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to 

believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. 

When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee‟s 

vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or 

show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.” 

(Id., at p. 351.) 

In People v. Nottoli, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 

defendant was arrested for driving with an expired license and 

for being under the influence of a controlled substance. (Id., at p. 

540.) A deputy searched Nottoli‟s vehicle and found drug 

paraphernalia, a firearm, and a cell phone photo of Nottoli posing 

with firearms. (Id., at p. 541.) The Court of Appeal held that the 

search was valid pursuant to Gant. Although it was 

unreasonable to believe evidence of the expired license offense 

would be found in the car, defendant‟s “arrest for „being under the 

influence of a controlled substance‟ supplied a reasonable basis 

for believing that evidence „relevant‟ to that type of offense might 

be in his vehicle. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 553.) “The presence of 

some amount of the controlled substance or drug paraphernalia 

in the interior of the vehicle would be circumstantial evidence 

tending to corroborate that a driver was in fact under the 
8

influence of the controlled substance.” (Id., at p. 554, fn. 

omitted.) The court rejected the argument that some showing of 

particularized facts, in addition to or in place of analysis of the 

nature of the offense, was required. (Id., at p. 556.) “Gant

indicated that the nature of the crime of arrest was 

determinative . . . .” (Id., at p. 553.) “[N]othing in Gant suggests 

that the Supreme Court was adopting a fact-intensive test 

similar to the reasonable suspicion standard established by Terry 

v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868] . . . .”

(Ibid.)

Appellant admitted using Percocet and marijuana 

earlier in the day and was under the influence of a controlled 

substance when driving. When he stepped out of the vehicle to 

perform the field sobriety tests, he threw his jacket and keys into 

the car, rolled up the window, and locked and shut the door.

Officer Chesson thought it was “odd” behavior but consistent with 

what someone driving under the influence would do if trying to 

hide drugs. In accordance with Gant, “the focus of the inquiry is 

entirely upon the nature of the offense of arrest, rather than the 

particular facts of the case. [Citation.]” (People v. Evans, supra,

200 Cal.App.4th at p. 748.) “[W]hen a driver is arrested for 

driving under the influence, or being under the influence, it will 

generally be reasonable for an officer to believe evidence related 

to that crime might be found in the vehicle. [Citations.] It is 

certainly logical and reasonable to expect that items related to 

alcohol or drug consumption, such as alcoholic beverage bottles or 

drug paraphernalia, might readily be contained in the intoxicated 

driver‟s car.” (Id., at p. 750.) The trial court did not err in 

finding that the search was reasonable and incident to the arrest 

for driving under the influence of a controlled substance. (Ibid.; 
9

People v. Nottoli, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 553.) A person 

arrested for driving under the influence may not defeat a “search 

incident to arrest” by locking incriminating evidence inside his 

vehicle. As indicated, it is a crime to do so.

The judgment (order denying motion to suppress 

evidence) is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, J., Acting P. J.

We concur:

PERREN, J.

TANGEMAN, J.
Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Christina Alvarez Barnes, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. 

Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David W. Williams, 

Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.