In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-3068

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTWON D. JENKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:13-cr-30125-DRH-11 — David R. Herndon, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2017

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. A two-year investigation into a drugtrafficking operation commenced in Spring 2011, when the

Drug Enforcement Administration received a tip that Tyrone

Carraway was distributing narcotics in East St. Louis, Illinois.

Agents enlisted a confidential source to make controlled

purchases of crack cocaine from Cortez Yarbrough, one of
2 No. 15-3068

Carraway’s distributors. In December 2011, DEA agents

received authorization to wiretap Carraway’s phone. They

learned from the wiretapped conversations that Carraway was

obtaining cocaine from a barbershop in St. Louis, Missouri,

operated by one Ernest Lyons; Richard Graham, Carraway’s

cousin, acted as an intermediary between Carraway and

Lyons. Carraway distributed cocaine from his father’s tire shop

in East St. Louis, Illinois, referred to as “the Gate.”

On January 14, 2012, intercepted calls from Carraway’s

phone revealed that he and Graham were going to retrieve

narcotics from Lyons’ barbershop; surveillance teams near the

barbershop observed Carraway and Graham enter the barbershop and exit a short time later. Next, Carraway’s vehicle

headed toward the Gate in East St. Louis. During this trip, a

surveillance team intercepted three calls between Carraway

and Jenkins, using the phone number (618) XXX-4062.

During the first call, using coded language, Carraway told

Jenkins that cocaine had arrived and that he would save some

for him. In the second call, Carraway told Jenkins that he was

in East St. Louis; Jenkins responded that he would meet

Carraway in fifteen minutes. The last call was made as surveillance teams were monitoring the Gate. Jenkins told Carraway

that he was “finna pull up.” A short time later, a black GMC

Yukon with an Illinois temporary license plate number

244N250 pulled onto the lot. The car was registered to a

Devontae Jenkins. Agents were unable to confirm who was

driving the Yukon or observe what transpired inside the Gate

because it was dark outside. The Yukon left after approximately five minutes. 
No. 15-3068 3

On January 28, 2012, agents intercepted phone calls

between Carraway and Graham indicating that they planned

to make another trip to the barbershop for cocaine. Surveillance teams at the barbershop observed Carraway and Graham

arrive. The two went inside and stayed for about twenty

minutes. Afterward, they ate at a nearby diner. While they

were at the diner, agents intercepted a call between Jenkins

and Carraway. Carraway told Jenkins that he would be

heading to East St. Louis soon, and that he would call Jenkins

when he was on his way so that they could meet. 

Surveillance teams followed Carraway and Graham to the

Gate. Suspecting that Carraway would be distributing narcotics from the Gate, Special Agent Matthew McKnight contacted

Jarrod Leckrone, an Illinois State Trooper, and instructed him

to make a traffic stop near the Gate at the agent’s direction.

While monitoring the Gate, agents intercepted another call

between Carraway and Jenkins; Carraway told Jenkins that he

could “come on this way.” A short time thereafter, agents

observed the same Yukon from their January 14, 2012, surveillance arrive at the Gate. The Yukon left about five minutes

later. Agents provided Leckrone with a description of the

Yukon and its direction of travel. Leckrone noted that the

vehicle had illegally tinted windows, the temporary registration was obscured, and the driver was not wearing a seat belt.

He pulled the Yukon over eight blocks from the Gate. 

Leckrone advised Jenkins, the driver of the vehicle, why he

had been stopped. Jenkins admitted that he had not been

wearing a seat belt. Leckrone observed that Jenkins acted

nervous and excited; he also noticed an odor of burnt cannabis
4 No. 15-3068

emanating from the vehicle. Leckrone asked Jenkins if he had

any cannabis or other contraband in the car; Jenkins said no.

At this point, an assisting officer arrived and Leckrone asked

Jenkins to exit his vehicle so that it could be searched. Jenkins

stood at the front of Leckrone’s squad car during the search.1

Leckrone searched the area of the dashboard and center

console and found a plastic panel, behind which was a cellophane bag containing cocaine. He also found three cell phones

which were “ringing one after another.” The phones were

seized as part of the search. 

Leckrone transported Jenkins to the Illinois State Police

headquarters in Collinsville, Illinois. McKnight also went to the

headquarters, at which time Leckrone gave him the cocaine

and cellular phones. McKnight searched the settings on one of

the phones; he determined that its number was (618) XXX4062, the same number from which agents had intercepted

calls on January 14 and 28, 2012. Moreover, the call log showed

recent calls to Carraway and Yarbrough. Leckrone read Jenkins

his Miranda rights. Jenkins stated that the truck belonged to his

cousin, and that he did not know anything about the cocaine

recovered during the search. He refused to provide any further

information.

1

 In Jenkins’ opening brief, he alleges that at the time the search was

executed he had already been placed in Leckrone’s squad car. However,

Jenkins cannot marshal any evidence to support this claim, and it is belied

by the record. Jenkins appears to abandon this factual dispute in his reply

brief. Therefore, we will disregard Jenkins’ factual challenge and view the

facts in accordance with the trial testimony.
No. 15-3068 5

On June 18, 2013, a grand jury charged Jenkins with

conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2. Jenkins filed a motion to suppress evidence to exclude: the

cocaine found in his car, evidence from the search of his phone,

and any statements that he made. 

On June 30, 2014, the district court denied in part and

granted in part the motion to suppress. The court denied the

motion as to the search of Jenkins’ vehicle and subsequent

statements made by Jenkins. The court found that the vehicle

search was invalid under the search incident to arrest exception, but permissible under the collective knowledge doctrine.

The court found that the evidence was admissible because

Leckrone had established independent probable cause, and

normal police investigation would have inevitably led to the

discovery of the evidence. The court granted the motion to

suppress the results of the cell phone search, relying on Riley

v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014), which held that a

warrant must generally be obtained prior to searching an

arrestee’s cell phone data.

The Government filed a motion to reconsider the motion to

suppress. It argued that the evidence obtained from the cell

phone search should be admitted, based on United States v.

Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012), which held that

searching a cell phone found on an arrestee’s person to identify

its telephone number was a valid warrantless search incident
6 No. 15-3068

to arrest. 670 F.3d at 809–10. The court granted the Government’s motion and permitted use of the cell phone evidence. 

A three-day jury trial concluded on March 18, 2015, and

Jenkins was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute

cocaine. The court declared a mistrial on the conspiracy count

and dismissed it.

 The United States Probation Office prepared Jenkins’

Presentence Investigation Report, which concluded that

Jenkins’ Sentencing Guidelines range was 27-33 months’

imprisonment. The PSR noted that Jenkins’ sentence could run

concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to his

308-month term of imprisonment on an unrelated conviction

for kidnaping and using or carrying a firearm to commit a

federal crime of violence. At sentencing, the court adopted the

PSR as its own factual findings. The court sentenced Jenkins to

27 months’ imprisonment, and a term of 3 years’ supervised

release. The court ordered Jenkins’ sentence to run consecutive

to his sentence for kidnaping and using or carrying a firearm.2

This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Jenkins challenges the district court’s denial of

his motion to suppress, as well as the imposition of a consecu2

 During the pendency of this appeal, Jenkins’ conviction for using or

carrying a firearm to commit a federal crime of violence was reversed by

this Court. See United States v. Jenkins, No. 14-2898, 2017 WL 727154, *5, ---

F.3d---- (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2017). Jenkins was sentenced to 120 months for

using or carrying a firearm, to run consecutively to a 188-month sentence

for kidnaping. The case has been remanded for further proceedings. 
No. 15-3068 7

tive rather than concurrent sentence. We address each of these

arguments in turn.

I. Motion to Suppress

A. Constitutionality of Warrantless Cell Phone Search

Jenkins argues that the evidence derived from his cell

phone should have been suppressed. “When reviewing a

district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we review

findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.”

United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d 997, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016)

(citation omitted).

“Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials

to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing ... reasonableness

generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant ... .”

Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (citation

omitted). Thus, “searches conducted outside the judicial

process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are

per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). One exception to

the warrant requirement is for a search incident to a lawful

arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The justification for this exception is the protection of the arresting officer

and the preservation of evidence. Id. at 762–63. 

In Riley, the Supreme Court grappled with how the search

incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones. The

Court declined to extend the categorical rule for searches

incident to arrest to searches of data on cell phones. Riley,
8 No. 15-3068

134 S. Ct. at 2495. The Court unequivocally held: “Our answer

to the question of what police must do before searching a cell

phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get

a warrant.” Id. The Court noted that “other case-specific

exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular

phone[,]” such as the exigent circumstances exception. Id. at

2494. However, such exigencies, including the need to prevent

the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to

pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are

seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury, are

not at issue here. See id.

Though the search took place before Riley was decided, we

apply the new constitutional rule announced in Riley because

this is the direct appeal of a criminal conviction. See Griffith v.

Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). The Government concedes

that the warrantless search of Jenkins’ cell phone was unlawful

in light of Riley. However, this finding is not the end of the

inquiry. 

The Supreme Court has held that unlawfully obtained

evidence should not be suppressed “when the police act with

an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct

is lawful.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011)

(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). The

Court instructed that “[p]olice practices trigger the harsh

sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to

yield ‘meaningful’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be

‘worth the price paid by the justice system.’” Id. at 240 (alteration omitted) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,

144 (2009)). Davis held that when “binding appellate precedent
No. 15-3068 9

specifically authorizes a particular police practice,” officers

should be able to employ such a practice without facing later

suppression of evidence if that precedent is later overruled by

the Supreme Court. Id. at 241.

Here, the Government argued before the district court that

our decision in Flores-Lopez specifically authorized the search

of Jenkins’ cell phone, and thus Agent McKnight reasonably

relied on binding appellate precedent in conducting the search. 

The district court agreed, and thus declined to suppress the

evidence. The Government was correct that Flores-Lopez

authorized the warrantless search of a cell phone seized

incident to arrest until Riley upended it. However, because

Flores-Lopez was decided after Jenkins’ cell phone was

searched, Agent McKnight could not have reasonably relied

upon it in conducting the search.

Undeterred, the Government argues that United States v.

Gary, 790 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2015), and the cases cited therein,

demonstrate that at the time of the search in this case, binding

precedent permitted the search of cell phones seized incident

to arrest. In Gary, police officers pulled over a vehicle in which

the defendant was a passenger as part of an undercover drug

operation. 790 F.3d at 706. Officers recovered two cell phones

from the defendant’s pockets that were seized incident to his

arrest. Id. Officers transported defendant to the police station

where he spoke with his parole officer. Id. At the station, his

cell phones were placed on a table. Id. at 708. Later, a detective

searched the phones, finding that the number of one of the

phones matched the number that an undercover officer had

called to set up the drug transaction. Id. The detective checked
10 No. 15-3068

the call log of the cell phone and verified that it had received

calls from the officer’s phone. Id.

The defendant, relying on Riley, argued that the warrantless

search of the cell phones violated his Fourth Amendment

rights and that the evidence adduced from the cell phone

search should be suppressed. Id. Gary found that a Fourth

Amendment violation had occurred, but it refused to apply the

exclusionary rule because the officer had reasonably relied on

binding appellate precedent in effect in 2009 when the search

was conducted. Id.

Gary noted that in 2009, prior to Riley, the Supreme Court

had recognized a categorical rule that permitted the police to

conduct a search of a person incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at

709. Gary relied in part on United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.

800, 805 (1974), which upheld the search of an arrestee’s clothes

taken from him while he was in custody and the seizure of

incriminating evidence that was found. 

Furthermore, Gary found the facts of United States v. Ortiz,

84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996), “remarkably similar” and its

holding persuasive. 790 F.3d at 710. In Ortiz, federal agents,

acting on the tip of a cooperating codefendant, contacted the

pager number of the defendant. 84 F.3d at 982. At the agents’

request, the codefendant arranged a meeting with the defendant to obtain heroin. Id. When the defendant arrived, police

officers arrested him. Id. Officers seized an electronic pager

found on the defendant during a search. Id. While still at the

scene of the arrest, officers retrieved its numeric messages to

confirm that it was the same pager that agents had called

earlier that day. Id. at 983. The defendant filed a motion to
No. 15-3068 11

suppress evidence from the search of his pager. Id. at 984. Ortiz

affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress,

finding that “the information from the pager was admissible

because the officers conducted the search of its contents

incident to the arrest.” Id.

Gary held that “the force of Ortiz was strong enough” to

authorize the warrantless search of a cell phone in Flores-Lopez. 

790 F.3d at 710. Gary continued that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on Ortiz as binding precedent when

conducting the search. Id. at 710–11. Therefore, the Government concludes that Agent McKnight could rely on Ortiz and

Gary as binding appellate precedent to search Jenkins’ cell

phones incident to his arrest. The Government recognizes that

Gary was decided in 2015, after the search of Jenkins’ cell

phone transpired. However, it argues that Gary establishes that

prior to Riley’s announcement in 2014, the binding appellate

precedent in this circuit permitted the warrantless search of

Jenkins’ cell phone.

Jenkins argues that Gary and Ortiz are distinguishable

because in those cases, the cell phones and pager were found

on the arrestee’s person rather than in a vehicle. Jenkins relies

on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), abrogated on other

grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). In Chadwick, police conducted a warrantless search of a footlocker

found in the arrestee’s trunk over an hour after his arrest. 433

U.S. at 4. Chadwick held that a warrant is required for searches

“remote in time or place from the arrest” and precluded the

police from searching “luggage or other personal property not

immediately associated with the person of the arrestee[.]” Id.
12 No. 15-3068

at 15 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

Court found that “[u]nlike searches of the person ... searches

of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot

be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by

the arrest.” Id. at 16 n.10. Both Gary and Ortiz acknowledged

the holding from Chadwick, and are properly understood to

address the search of an arrestee’s person rather than his

vehicle. See Gary, 790 F.3d at 710–11; Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984.

In response, the Government argues that it is “immaterial”

that Jenkins’ cell phones were found in his vehicle as opposed

to on his person. The Government cites Gant, which expounds

upon the search incident to arrest doctrine. In Gant, the Court

held that the search of a vehicle’s compartments and any

containers therein is justified as a search incident to a lawful

arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the

crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” 556 U.S. at 343

(quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)).3

But Gant specifically cabined its holding to instances in

which “the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance

of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Id.

This limitation “ensures that the scope of a search incident to

arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arrest3

 The Government argues that a cell phone fits into the definition of

“container” as the term is used in Gant because a cell phone “contains data.”

We recognize that Flores-Lopez found that this was a plausible interpretation

of the word container. See 670 F.3d at 805. But again, Flores-Lopez had not

been decided at the time of the search in this case. Therefore, the Government may not rely upon it as binding appellate precedent. In any event, the

Supreme Court rejected this argument in Riley. 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
No. 15-3068 13

ing officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of

arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.” Id. at 339.

While we recognize that Jenkins was not handcuffed or

secured inside Leckrone’s squad car at the time the search was

executed, he was at the front of the squad car and in the

company of another officer. Therefore, it seems implausible,

and the Government does not argue, that he was within

reaching distance of the center console. As a result, the safety

and evidentiary concerns that undergird the reaching-distance

rule are not present here.

We do not believe that Gary, Ortiz, or Gant “specifically

authorize[d]” the search of Jenkins’ cell phones. See Davis, 564

U.S. at 241. The Government is essentially requesting that we

extend the applicability of Ortiz from the search of an arrestee’s

person to the search of the arrestee’s vehicle and electronic

devices found therein; or conversely, that we ignore the

limiting principle in Gant to permit the search of a compartment and its objects even when a defendant is not in reaching

distance. But Davis requires a more exacting analysis. As we

have recognized, “[t]he Davis exception for good faith reliance

on controlling precedent does not reach so far as to excuse

mistaken efforts to extend controlling precedents.” United States

v. Rivera, 817 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgments).

We conclude that McKnight’s search of Jenkins’ cell phone

was not objectively reasonable, and therefore the Davis

exception does not apply. 
14 No. 15-3068

B. Harmless Error

When the Government seeks to introduce evidence that is

the fruit of an unconstitutional search, the traditional remedy

is exclusion. However, constitutional error that is harmless

will not cause an otherwise valid conviction to be set aside.

Mendoza v. United States, 755 F.3d 821, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2014)

(citations omitted). The court must ask: “[i]s it clear beyond a

reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the

defendant guilty absent the error?” Kamlager v. Pollard, 715

F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). 

Jenkins argues that without McKnight’s cell phone search,

the Government could not prove that he was using the (618)

XXX-4062 number to arrange the drug transactions. He

contends that the information obtained through McKnight’s

search was necessary to his conviction. We disagree. Even if

the evidence from Jenkins’ cell phone had been suppressed, the

jury heard ample evidence demonstrating Jenkins’ guilt.

Specifically, it heard the three phone calls between Carraway’s

phone and (618) XXX-4062 on January 14, 2012, revealing that

a drug transaction was to take place at the Gate. The jury was

presented with details of the agents’ surveillance of the

Gate—that a male using the (618) XXX-4062 number called

Carraway to tell him that he was about to arrive, and that a

black GMC Yukon registered to Devontae Jenkins arrived and

left five minutes later.

Further, the jury heard the details of the drug transaction

on January 28, 2012, including another call between Carraway

and (618) XXX-4062 to arrange the transaction at the Gate. The
No. 15-3068 15

jury also heard that agents observed the same black GMC

Yukon arrive at the Gate, and leave shortly thereafter. The jury

heard that from there, Leckrone pulled over the Yukon’s driver

and sole occupant, Jenkins, who had over 81 grams of cocaine

in his possession. The jury heard the additional details of the

traffic stop. In addition, the jury heard testimony from Carraway identifying Jenkins as the individual that he spoke and

messaged with at the (618) XXX-4062 number on January 14

and 28, 2012. Carraway also confirmed that he sold Jenkins

drugs two or three times beginning in Winter 2011 and into

2012.

Moreover, in our view, the surveillance evidence, in

conjunction with Carraway’s testimony, provided the jury with

substantial evidence tying Jenkins to the cell phone. Jenkins

counters that Carraway’s testimony should not be given

weight because he had credibility issues resulting from the fact

that he was testifying in exchange for a reduced sentence.

Jenkins assumes the jury would not have given weight to his

testimony because he was “untrustworthy.” The Government

routinely puts on witnesses at trial who are testifying in

exchange for reduced sentences. If the jury has been properly

instructed—that they should consider such testimony with

caution and great care—the testimony is just something else for

the jury to consider.

We find that the testimony of Carraway, along with the

other witnesses and corroborating evidence, overwhelmingly

demonstrates Jenkins’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and

renders the jury’s exposure to the cell phone search harmless.

Accordingly, we will not reverse Jenkins’ conviction.
16 No. 15-3068

II. Sentencing Error

Next, Jenkins argues that the district court erred in imposing a sentence consecutive to rather than concurrent with his

sentence for kidnaping. Specifically, Jenkins argues that the

court improperly relied on conduct related to the conspiracy

charge, for which the court declared a mistrial, as a basis for

imposing a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence. We

review Jenkins’ criminal sentence in two steps: first for

procedural error, then for substantive reasonableness. United

States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

Because Jenkins did not object to the alleged error at

the sentencing hearing, plain error is the standard of review.

United States v. Chatman, 805 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2015).

To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that

(1) there was in fact an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the

error affected the defendant’s “substantial rights”; and (4) “the

court ‘should exercise its discretion to correct the error because

it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of the judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 843–44 (quoting United

States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 890 (7th Cir. 2011)). 

Jenkins’ argument fails upon consideration of the first

factor. At the sentencing hearing, the district court judge

adopted the facts as set forth in the PSR. The district court

judge noted that Jenkins’ case involved “a very large conspiracy,” but that Jenkins was not heavily involved. He also found

that there was sufficient evidence to convict on the conspiracy

count, but never stated that he was sentencing Jenkins on the

basis of the conspiracy count. In fact, he observed that there
No. 15-3068 17

was ample, credible evidence to support Jenkins’ conviction

for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Jenkins argues that the district court judge’s comments

about the conspiracy imply that he impermissibly considered

the conspiracy count when fashioning his sentence. First, this

is a misreading of the district court judge’s comments. While

he believed there was sufficient evidence to sustain the

conspiracy count, it is clear that he relied on the possession

count, which he appropriately described as a “significant

crime,” as the basis for his sentence. The comments simply do

not convey that the court actually relied on the conspiracy

charge in determining Jenkins’ sentence. Further, the court

made it clear that it was imposing a consecutive sentence as a

result of Jenkins’ criminal history, the seriousness of the

offense, and the need for just punishment, not on the basis of

any conspiracy-related conduct.

However, we note that “a wide range of conduct is relevant

at sentencing—including uncharged conduct and charges of

which the defendant was acquitted—so long as that conduct is

established by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States

v. Heckel, 570 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United States

v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661; U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.4. The district court judge found that the Government’s

evidence was credible and largely uncontested. We agree. For

his part, Jenkins does not seriously dispute the accuracy of any

information in the PSR or evidence adduced at trial. Therefore,

even if the district court judge had considered evidence related

to the conspiracy charge, he would have been entitled to do so.

Accordingly, Jenkins’ procedural challenge fails.
18 No. 15-3068

Having concluded the district court followed sound

procedure, we will now determine whether that procedure led

to its intended outcome: substantively reasonable punishment.

We conduct this review for abuse of discretion. Because

Jenkins’ Guidelines range was correctly calculated and the

district court sentenced him within that range, the sentence is

presumed reasonable on appeal. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.

338, 347 (2007). 

“We will uphold [a] sentence so long as the district court

offered an adequate statement of its reasons, consistent with 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), for imposing such a sentence.” United States

v. Abebe, 651 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Although the district judge is not

required to make factual findings as to each of the [§ 3553(a)]

factors, the record on appeal should reveal that the district

judge considered the factors.” United States v. Collins, 640 F.3d

265, 270 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “It is simply not

required that the sentencing judge tick off every possible

sentencing factor or detail and discuss, separately, every

nuance of every argument raised for this court to find that the

sentence was proper.” Id. at 271.

As discussed above, the court clearly identified the

§ 3553(a) factors that it believed warranted the imposition of a

consecutive sentence: Jenkins’ “substantial” criminal history;

the seriousness of the offense; the need for just punishment;

and to promote respect for the law. The court remarked that

Jenkins “thumbs his nose at the rules” and believes that “the

rules and laws don’t apply to him.” As a result, the court

believed that a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence
No. 15-3068 19

was most appropriate. We have held that “undoubtedly a

sentencing court enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether

to run concurrent or consecutive terms.” United States v. Bour,

804 F.3d 880, 885 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). We do not find Jenkins’ sentence to be an abuse of

that broad discretion. Consequently, Jenkins’ sentence is

substantively reasonable.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Jenkins’ conviction

and sentence.