Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed October 12, 2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-20-00111-CV

PATRICK WALSH, Appellant

V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES, Appellee

On Appeal from the 261st District Court

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-18-000603

MAJORITY OPINION

Appellant Patrick Walsh appeals from a final summary judgment declaring 

that certain death records Walsh sought are protected from disclosure under the

Texas Public Information Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.001 et seq.

Concluding that the trial court did not err when it granted appellee Texas 

Department of State Health Services’ (“DSHS”) motion for summary judgment 

and denied Walsh’s, we affirm.
2

BACKGROUND

The facts are undisputed. In 2017, Walsh requested several categories of 

information related to all deaths in Texas in 2016 and 2017 up to the date of his 

request to DSHS (the “2017 Request”). The categories were: (1) the decedent’s 

first and last name, (2) the decedent’s street address, (3) the decedent’s city, state, 

and Zip Code, (4) the decedent’s date of birth, (5) the decedent’s date of death, (6) 

the decedent’s cause of death, and (7) the decedent’s gender. 

DSHS released some of the information. Specifically, DSHS released the 

first and last name, date of death, and gender of all decedents. DSHS refused to 

release the address, date of birth, and cause of death of the decedents. DSHS took 

the position that this information was confidential and protected from disclosure 

under section 552.115 of the Texas Public Information Act. DSHS then asked the 

attorney general, pursuant to section 552.301(a) of the Texas Public Information 

Act, for a ruling on whether the withheld information was subject to disclosure to 

Walsh. The attorney general subsequently issued a letter ruling, stating that DSHS 

must release the withheld information. Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2018-00468, at 2. The 

letter ruling also provided that it was “limited to the particular information at issue 

in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore this ruling must 

not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or 

any other circumstances.” Id. at 3.

DSHS filed suit against the attorney general under section 552.324 of the 

Texas Public Information Act challenging the attorney general’s letter ruling. 

Walsh intervened. Beyond filing an answer, the attorney general took no further 

action as the defendant in the trial court.1

1 On appeal, the attorney general is serving as counsel for DSHS, but the attorney general 

is not a party,
3

Both DSHS and Walsh agreed that the only issue in dispute, whether the 

withheld information was subject to release under the Texas Public Information

Act, presented a legal issue. Both Walsh and DSHS moved for summary 

judgment. After hearing argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment, 

the trial court granted DSHS’s motion and denied Walsh’s motion, declaring that 

the withheld information, specifically the records of Texas decedents’ addresses, 

dates of birth, and causes of death, were protected from disclosure by Section 

552.115 of the Texas Public Information Act. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS2

Walsh brings five issues on appeal arguing that the trial court erred when it 

granted DSHS’s motion for summary judgment and denied his own. Walsh also 

brings a sixth, contingent issue, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied 

his request for attorneys’ fees.

I. Standard of review and applicable law

There are no disputed facts in this case, instead the issue before us is the 

application of the Texas Vital Statistics Act, the Texas Public Information Act, and 

related regulations to those undisputed facts. These are questions of law we review

de novo. Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 66 (Tex. 2019). As a result, 

this dispute was ripe for resolution by summary judgment. See Rudisill v. Arnold 

White & Durkee, P.C., 148 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2004, no pet.) (citing Gramercy Ins. Co., Inc. v. Auction Fin. Program, Inc., 52 

2 The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Third Court of Appeals to transfer this case to 

this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

“the court of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in accordance with the 

precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if the transferee court’s decision 

otherwise would have been inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court.” Tex. R. App. 

P. 41.3. We are unaware of any conflict between the Third Court of Appeals precedent and that 

of this court on any relevant issue.
4

S.W.3d 360, 363 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (“In this case the parties 

do not argue that a material question of fact exists which should have precluded

summary judgment. Instead, the issues presented involve the proper construction

of a specific statutory provision, and application of that provision to the undisputed

facts of this case.”)). We review a trial court’s order granting a traditional 

summary judgment de novo. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 

621 (Tex. 2007). When both parties move for summary judgment, each party

bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). When 

the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the appellate court reviews 

both motions and determines all questions presented. Id. The reviewing court 

should then render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered, or 

reverse and remand if neither party met its summary judgment burden. Id.

This appeal also requires us to review the trial court’s interpretation and 

application of various statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law 

subject to de novo review. Cadena Commercial USA Corp. v. Texas Alcoholic

Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017). Our fundamental goal when 

reading statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. at 326.

To do this, we look to and rely on the plain meaning of a statute’s words as 

expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied, is apparent 

from the context, or the plain meaning of the words leads to absurd or nonsensical 

results. Id. We presume the legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, 

including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not 

chosen. Id. In that vein, we take statutes as we find them and refrain from 

rewriting the legislature’s text. Id. Put differently, our objective is not to take 

definitions and mechanically tack them together; rather, we consider the context 
5

and framework of the entire statute and meld its words into a cohesive reflection of 

legislative intent. Id. Still, we are concerned with the definitions of the specific 

words because they provide the material that is refined with statutory context. Id.

The definitions of some terms are either provided by the legislature or clear based 

on their common usage and meaning. Id. For others, we must look to the statutory 

context to provide meaning. Id.

Section 552.115 of the Texas Public Information Act addresses the 

confidentiality of death records. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.115(a). It 

provides that a death record is public information available to the public on or after 

the 25th anniversary of the date of death as shown on the death record filed with 

the vital statistics unit or a local registration official. Id. at § 552.115(a)(2). The 

statute further provides that a “general death index” maintained by the vital 

statistics unit is public information that is available to the public to the extent the 

record relates to a death record that is public information and available to the 

public as provided in section 552.115(a)(2). Id. at § 552.115(a)(3). Finally, the 

statute states that a “summary death index” is “public information and available to 

the public.” Id. at § 552.115(a)(4). 

Pursuant to Chapter 191 of the Vital Statistics Act, DSHS is responsible for 

collecting, recording, transcribing, compiling, and preserving all vital statistics. 

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 191.002. The statute also requires persons with 

information related to a death to supply that information to DSHS “on a form 

provided by the department or on the original certificate.” Id. at § 191.024. The 

statute further provides that “information required on a certificate must be written 

legibly in durable blue or black ink or may be filed and registered by photographic, 

electronic, or other means as prescribed by [DSHS].” Id. at § 191.025(d). DSHS 

is also empowered to adopt rules for collecting, recording, transcribing, compiling, 
6

and preserving vital statistics. Id. at § 191.003(a). The Texas Administrative Code 

contains the rules for collecting, recording, transcribing, compiling, and preserving 

vital statistics. It defines “vital statistics” as “the registration, preparation, 

transcription, collection, compilation, distribution and preservation of data 

pertaining to . . . deaths . . . and such other data as deemed necessary by [DSHS].” 

25 Tex. Admin. Code § 181.1(34). 

Chapter 193 of the Vital Statistics Act is titled “Death Records.” It specifies 

the information and procedures required for death certificates. It also specifies that 

information on death certificates related to the location of a decedent’s remains is 

public information. Id. at § 193.001(c) & (d). Section 193.002 specifies that the 

person in charge of interment or removal of a body must “file the [death]

certificate electronically as specified by the state registrar. Id. at § 193.002(4). 

II. DSHS was not prohibited from seeking a decision from the attorney 

general because there had been no previous determination on the 

precise information Walsh sought in his 2017 Request.

Walsh, citing section 552.301(f) of the Texas Government Code, argues in 

his first issue that (1) DSHS was prohibited from asking the attorney general for a 

letter ruling on his 2017 Request because there had been a previous decision on the 

“precise categories of information” included in that request, and (2) the trial court 

should have granted his summary judgment on this basis. See Tex. Gov’t Code 

Ann. § 552.301(f). Section 552.301(f) provides:

A governmental body must release the requested information and is 

prohibited from asking for a decision from the attorney general about 

whether information requested under this chapter is within an 

exception under Subchapter C if:

(1) the governmental body has previously requested and 

received a determination from the attorney general concerning the 

precise information at issue in a pending request; and
7

(2) the attorney general or a court determined that the 

information is public information under this chapter that is not 

excepted by Subchapter C.

Id. DSHS responds that it was not prohibited from seeking a ruling from the

attorney general because there had been no previous determination “concerning the 

precise information at issue” in Walsh’s 2017 Request. We agree with DSHS.

Walsh’s argument rests entirely on his contention that the final judgment in 

trial court cause number D-1-GN-11-001290 qualified as a “previous 

determination” under section 552.301(f) because a previous determination on the 

precise information within the meaning of section 552.301 means the precise 

category of information, not the precise piece of information in the earlier ruling.

3

 

Walsh then cites three appellate cases which he contends support his argument. 

The first two cases cited by Walsh involve disputes between the Houston 

Chronicle and the City of Houston over whether the City of Houston’s police 

records, parts of which were referred to as the “police blotter,” were subject to 

release to the public pursuant to the Texas Open Records Act, the predecessor to 

the Texas Public Information Act. In Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of 

Houston, the First Court of Appeals held that certain portions of those records were 

“available to the press and public under the Open Records Act.” 531 S.W.2d 177, 

188 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975), writ ref’d per curiam, 536 

S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976) (collectively “Chronicle I”). In City of Houston v. 

Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., the Houston Chronicle once again sought 

release of information contained in the City of Houston’s police records. 673 

3

In cause number D-1-GN-11-001290, the attorney general previously determined that 

some of the requested information must be released. Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2011-04298, at 4. The 

attorney general also stated, “This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in 

this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied 

upon as a previous determination regarding any other info1mation or any other circumstances.” 

Id. The trial court, however, ruled that all of the requested information must be released.
8

S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (“Chronicle II”). 

In Chronicle II, the City of Houston refused to release the requested information, 

including the information that the Houston Chronicle asserted had been previously

determined to be public information in Chronicle I. Id. at 318. Our sister court 

stated that “the decision in Chronicle I determined the kind of information in the 

Houston Police Records which is ‘public information.’” Id. at 323. It then held 

that the City of Houston was required to immediately disclose those parts of the 

requested records that had been determined to be public information. Id.

The final case cited by Walsh involved a dispute over whether the college 

transcripts of certain school district administrators were subject to public 

disclosure under the Open Records Act. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Mattox, 

767 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. 1989). The actual issue to be resolved by the Texas 

Supreme Court was “whether the Attorney General of Texas can enter into, and a 

district judge render, an agreed order that prohibits the Attorney General from 

issuing a decision under the Open Records Act.” Id. The Court held that “while it 

is possible that the legislature may decide to exempt such transcripts from 

disclosure under the Open Records Act, the Attorney General must apply the law 

as it is currently written. He may not refuse to fulfill his duties in order to see what 

the legislature might do.” Id. at 698. In reaching this decision, the Court observed

that the Open Records Act

does not require a previous determination on the specific piece of 

information; it allows the Attorney General to explicitly refuse to 

render a decision if he decides that a previous determination has been 

made regarding the category of information to which the request 

belongs. The Attorney General’s refusal to render a decision is 

subject to review by the courts on an abuse of discretion standard.

Id.

In Walsh’s view, the collective import of these cases is that “a previous 
9

determination on the precise information within the meaning of section 552.301 

does not mean the precise piece of information, rather, it means the precise 

category of information.” Based on this analysis, Walsh argues that the 2011 final 

judgment in cause number D-1-GN-11-001290 addressing similar death records for 

years 2009 and 2010 qualifies as a previous determination under section 552.301(f) 

of the Texas Public Information Act which thereby prohibited DSHS from seeking 

an opinion from the attorney general on the 2017 Request.

Further, while the legislature has made attorney general decisions an integral 

part of the open government provisions relating to public information in 

Government Code chapter 552, we know those decisions are not binding on the 

judiciary. In recognition of that significant, but limited role, the Third Court of 

Appeals and the First Court of Appeals both give “due consideration” and “great 

weight” to such decisions. See, e.g., Rainbow Grp., Ltd. v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 

897 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied), Houston Indep. Sch. 

Dist. v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 798 S.W.2d 580, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); City of Houston v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 

673 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).

Open Records Decision Number 673 addresses previous determinations in 

part as follows:

We believe there are only two instances in which a previous 

determination under section 552.30l(a) exists. The first and by far the 

most common instance of a previous determination pertains to 

specific information that is again requested from a governmental body 

where this office has previously issued a decision that evaluates the 

public availability of the precise information or records at issue. This 

first instance of a previous determination does not apply to records 

that are substantially similar to records previously submitted to this

office for review, nor does it apply to information that may fall within 

the same category as any given records on which this office has 
10

previously ruled. The first type of previous determination requires that 

all of the following criteria be met:

1. the records or information at issue are precisely the 

same records or information that were previously 

submitted to this office pursuant to section 

552.30l(e)(l)(D) of the Government Code;

2. the governmental body which received the request for 

the records or information is the same governmental 

body that previously requested and received a ruling 

from the attorney general;

3. the attorney general's prior ruling concluded that the 

precise records or information are or are not excepted 

from disclosure under the [Texas Public Information] 

Act; and

4. the law, facts, and circumstances on which the prior 

attorney general ruling was based have not changed since 

the issuance of the ruling.6

. . . .

6A governmental body must make an initial finding that it in good 

faith reasonably believes the requested information is excepted 

from disclosure. Open Records Decision No. 665 at 3 (2000). A 

governmental body should request a decision from this office if it 

is unclear to the governmental body whether there has been a 

change in the law, facts, or circumstances on which the prior 

decision was based.

Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-673, at 6–7 (2001). We conclude that this first type of 

previous of determination described in ORD-673 is applicable to this case, and we 

we also conclude that above-quoted portion of ORD-673 is a correct interpretation 

of Government Code chapter 552.

Because none of Walsh’s cited cases address the public nature of death 

records under the Texas Public Information Act, we conclude that the cases are 
11

distinguishable and do not control the outcome here. In addition, we conclude that 

Walsh’s expansive view of what qualifies as a previous determination renders the 

legislature’s use of the phrase “precise information at issue in the pending request” 

meaningless. This we cannot do. “Precise” is defined as “exactly defined or 

stated.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary New Edition 565 (2004). Thus, the precise 

information at issue in the pending request are death records for the years 2016 and 

2017.Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-673, at 6–7 (2001). Walsh has not pointed out any 

previous determination for death information for those years. Therefore, we 

conclude that (1) DSHS was not prohibited from seeking an opinion from the 

attorney general, and (2) the trial court did not err when it denied Walsh’s motion 

for summary judgment to the extent it was based on this ground. We overrule 

Walsh’s first issue.

III. Res Judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar DSHS’s claims.

In his second issue Walsh argues the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 

estoppel bar DSHS from re-litigating the 2011 trial court judgment referenced 

above. Among other arguments, DSHS responds that neither applies because 

Walsh did not establish the required elements for either defense.

For res judicata to apply, a party must establish the following elements: (1) a 

prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity 

of the parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the 

same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first action. 

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). Collateral 

estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an issue 

it previously litigated and lost. Calabrian Corp. v. Alliance Specialty Chems., Inc., 

418 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). To prevail 

on his assertion of collateral estoppel, Walsh must establish: (1) the facts sought to 
12

be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) 

the facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were 

cast as adversaries in the first action. Id.

Both res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses and the 

party asserting them has the burden of pleading and proving them. Id. Both res 

judicata and collateral estoppel require that the same claim or facts be at issue in 

both actions. As explained above, the facts or claims at issue in the 2011 trial 

court judgment, whether death records for 2009 and 2010 were subject to public 

disclosure, are not the same as the facts at issue in the present litigation, death 

records for 2016 and 2017. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it rejected 

both defenses. We overrule Walsh’s second issue.

IV. The trial court did not err in its application of section 552.115 of the 

Texas Public Information Act.

Walsh argues in his fourth and fifth issues that the trial court erred when it 

granted DSHS’s motion for summary judgment and denied his own because it (1)

misapplied section 552.115 of the Texas Public Information Act, and (2) allowed 

DSHS to exceed its authority by expanding the types of death records that are 

excepted from public disclosure. DSHS responds that neither allegation supports a 

reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment.

Walsh initially asserts that “section 552.115 simply does not apply to the 

requested data” and he was entitled to summary judgment on that basis. Walsh

supports this assertion by arguing that the information he requested in his 2017 

Request is not a “death record,” which he contends are limited to “discrete and 

distinct documents,” such as death certificates. In Walsh’s view, the exception to 

the public nature of “death records” found in section 552.115 of the Texas Public 

Information Act “was to protect official documents that have significant legal 
13

consequences—not to protect the data per se.” DSHS responds that Walsh seeks 

an “unreasonably narrow definition of death records” that is tied to an “arbitrary, 

antiquated concept” that ignores the fact that most vital statistics information,

including information related to deaths, is data filed electronically by different 

people, including funeral directors, medical examiners, and physicians. DSHS 

goes on to argue that death records are not limited to physically-filed “discrete and 

distinct documents.” As a result of this broader definition of death records, DSHS 

argues that much of the information Walsh sought in his 2017 Request is excepted

from public disclosure for 25 years and the trial court did not err when it granted 

its motion for summary judgment and denied Walsh’s.

Exercising its rule-making authority, DSHS defined “death records” as 

“records governing deaths and fetal deaths filed pursuant to the Texas Vital 

Statistics Act.” Id. at § 181.1(7). Records is not defined in the Texas Public 

Information Act nor in the Vital Statistics Act. We therefore look to its common 

and ordinary meaning, which is a written account of proceedings, known facts

about a person, or “a collection of information (as in a database) treated as a unit.” 

Merriam-Webster Dictionary New Edition 604. Nothing in this definition limits 

records to only a death certificate as Walsh argues. Our conclusion that Walsh’s 

definition is too limited is reinforced by the legislature’s definition of “public 

information.” When it defined “public information” and the “media containing 

public information,” the legislature cast a broad net. It specified that “public 

information” includes “information that is written, produced, collected, assembled, 

or maintained under law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of 

official business.” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.02(a). The legislature also 

determined that “public information” applies to any electronic communications

created, transmitted, received, or maintained on any device if the communication is 
14

in connection with the transaction of official business.” Id. at § 552.02(a-2). 

Finally, the legislature determined that the forms in which the media containing 

public information exists includes, in part, books, papers, letters, documents, 

emails, electronic communications, microfilm, and voice, data, or video 

representations held in computer memory. The legislature determined that “a 

death record is public information.”

4

 Id. at § 552.115(a)(2). Because it is public 

information, we conclude that death records may take any form recognized by the 

legislature. Therefore, limiting death records to only death certificates as Walsh

suggests would be contrary to the legislature’s intent. See Bracey, 417 S.W.3d at 

103 (stating that our primary goal when interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 

legislature’s intent). 

In addition, Walsh’s proposed limitation of death records to only death 

certificates such that the certificate itself is excepted from public disclosure but the 

individual decedent’s data contained on that certificate is not, defies common sense 

and the entire logic behind generally excepting decedent information from public 

disclosure for 25 years. See Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 38 (Tex. 2015) 

(“The Cades’ assertion that section 13.002 only provides them with notice of the 

deed’s existence and not the deed’s contents defies common sense and clashes with

our precedent that mineral interest owners bear a high duty of due diligence to 

protect their mineral interests.”); Best v. Falcon Rock Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-17-

00052-CV, 2018 WL 4139092, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30, 

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“It defies common sense to define the [statutory] term 

builder to include a licensure requirement that legally does not exist in Texas.”). 

4 The legislature then generally limited public access to that public information for 25 

years. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.115(a)(2). In addition, the legislature also carved out an 

exception for death records related to unidentified decedents, which become available one year 

after the date of death. Id. This exception is not at issue in this case.
15

In addition, adopting Walsh’s proposed definition making all death information 

filed with DSHS except the actual death certificate subject to immediate public 

disclosure, would render the legislature’s express creation of a summary death 

index, which is public information, superfluous. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §

552.115(a)(4); City of Dallas, 463 S.W.3d at 57 (stating that courts should “eschew 

constructions of a statute that would render any statutory language meaningless or 

superfluous”).

Walsh also argues in his fourth and fifth issues that DSHS exceeded its 

statutory and rulemaking authority when it determined that some of the 

information he included in his 2017 Request was excepted from public disclosure.

5

 

In Walsh’s view, this allowed DSHS to amend the Texas Public Information Act

and expand the death information considered confidential. Based on this, Walsh 

argues that the trial court erred when it granted DSHS’s motion for summary 

judgment and denied his own.

Despite Walsh’s arguments to the contrary, an examination of the Texas 

Public Information Act establishes that it was the legislature, not DSHS, which

established the initial confidential nature of death records in Texas. In section 

552.115, the legislature established that death records were generally excepted 

from public disclosure for 25 years. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.115(a)(2) 

(stating that a death record maintained by DSHS is public information excepted 

from public disclosure until on or after the 25th anniversary of the date of death). 

It then created an exception to that general rule for a summary death index. Id. at § 

552.115(a)(4) (stating that a summary death index is public information and 

available to the public). The legislature did not define summary death index. As 

5 As mentioned above, DSHS released the first and last name, date of death, and gender 

for all decedents. It refused to release the address, date of birth, and the cause of death of all 

decedents. 
16

mentioned above, the legislature empowered DSHS to adopt rules for collecting, 

recording, transcribing, compiling, and preserving vital statistics. Tex. Health & 

Safety Code Ann. § 191.003(a). Based on that authority, DSHS enacted a rule for

summary death indexes. See 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 181.23(c)(3). This rule 

provides that a summary death index “shall be prepared by event year, in 

alphabetical order by surname of the registrant, followed by any given names or 

initials, the date of the event, the county of occurrence, and sex of the registrant.” 

Id. Far from making this information confidential, this rule excepted the specified

death information from the general rule of confidentiality for death records during 

the initial 25-year confidential period established by the legislature.

Having addressed and rejected Walsh’s arguments raised in his fourth and 

fifth issues, we overrule them. 

IV. We need not reach Walsh’s third and sixth issues on appeal.

In his third issue, Walsh argues the trial court erred when it granted DSHS’s 

motion for summary judgment because DSHS did not prove as a matter of law that 

he was not a “properly qualified applicant” under section 191.051 of the Texas 

Vital Statistics Act. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 191.051 (stating that

“subject to department rules controlling the accessibility of vital records,” DSHS

shall supply a certified copy of a requested death record to a “properly qualified 

applicant”). Because Walsh did not allege that he was a properly qualified 

applicant, and DSHS did not move for summary judgment on the ground that 

Walsh was not a qualified applicant, we conclude we need not reach this issue. See 

Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Lewis v. Nolan, 105 S.W.3d 185, 189–90 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (stating summary judgment can only be 

affirmed on grounds actually raised in the motion).

Finally, in his sixth issue, Walsh argues that if we reverse the trial court’s 
17

judgment in favor of DSHS and render judgment in his favor, he is entitled to 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 552.323 of the Texas Public Information Act. 

Because we have affirmed the summary judgment in favor of DSHS, we conclude 

we need not reach this contingent issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Walsh’s issues necessary to resolve his appeal, we affirm 

the trial court’s final summary judgment.

/s/ Jerry Zimmerer

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain (Spain, J., concurring).