J-S90033-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

REGINALD BRYANT

Appellant No. 2455 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order July 10, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1206841-1997

 CP-51-CR-1206851-1997

BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J. AND JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016

Appellant Reginald Bryant appeals from the order of the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas dismissing as untimely his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et 

seq. After careful review, we affirm.

On March 30, 2001, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, 

third-degree murder, arson, aggravated assault, conspiracy, and possession 

of an instrument of crime following a horrific 1997 home invasion in which 

Appellant and an accomplice shot Madeline Carter, poured gasoline on her 

body, and set fire to her and her house.1 On April 4, 2001, the trial court 

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1

For a full recitation of the facts of the underlying matter, see 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 1151 EDA 2001 (unpublished memorandum), 

pp. 1-4.
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sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for first-degree murder and an 

aggregate term of 171⁄2 to 35 years’ imprisonment on the remaining 

convictions.

Appellant appealed. This Court affirmed his convictions on September 

13, 2002, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allocatur on 

August 19, 2003.

On August 11, 2008, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition,2and the 

PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition on November 

2, 2010. Ultimately, on July 10, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s 

PCRA petition as untimely. Appellant timely appealed.3

Appellant raises the following two issues for our review:

[1.] Whether the General Assembly intended 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)’s one year filing deadline to be jurisdictional and, 

therefore, not subject to equitable tolling[?]

[2.] If [PCRA section] 9545(b)’s one year filing deadline is 

jurisdictional, whether its application in [Appellant’s] case 

violated [Appellant’s] state and federal due process rights[?]

Appellant’s Brief, p. 6.

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2

In the interim, Appellant filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which the 

district court denied on April 14, 2005.

3 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of matters of on appeal, and Appellant did not file such a 

statement. The trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on March 14, 

2016.
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Our well-settled standard of review for orders denying PCRA relief is 

“to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by 

the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings 

will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-192 

(Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

We must first consider the timeliness of the petition, as a petition’s 

timeliness implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal 

denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012) (“Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court 

has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition”). “It is undisputed that a 

PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the judgment of 

sentence becomes final.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 

651 (Pa.Super.2013); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). “This time requirement is 

mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in 

order to reach the merits of a petition.” Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa.2000)). A judgment of 

sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). However, a facially untimely petition 

may be received where any of the PCRA’s three limited exceptions to the 
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time for filing the petition are met. Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 (footnote 

omitted). These exceptions include:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). As our Supreme Court has repeatedly 

stated, the petitioner maintains the burden of pleading and proving that one 

of these exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 

1263, 1268 (Pa.2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916 (2008). Further,

[a] petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within 

sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the 

exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, the petitioner 

must plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim 

was raised within the sixty-day time frame under section 

9545(b)(2).

Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651-652 (internal quotations omitted). Further, in 

the absence of one of the enumerated exceptions, a PCRA court lacks 

authority to extend the PCRA’s filing period. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 

A.2d 214, 222 (Pa.1999); see also Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 

980, 983 (Pa.2011) (“[To] accord finality to the collateral review process[,]” 
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the PCRA “confers no authority upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc

equitable exceptions to the PCRA timebar”).

Here, Appellant was sentenced on April 4, 2001. Appellant litigated his 

direct appeal through our Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for allocatur 

on August 19, 2003. Appellant’s judgment of sentence therefore became 

final 90 days later, on November 17, 2003, when his time for seeking 

certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States expired. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.Rule 13.1 (allowing 90 days for the filing 

of a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States). 

Accordingly, Appellant had until November 17, 2004 to timely file a PCRA 

petition. 

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on August 11, 2008, over 

three and a half years after the expiration of his PCRA limitations period. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s petition is facially untimely. Thus, he must plead 

and prove that his petition falls under one of the Section 9545(b) exceptions 

set forth in the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

Appellant acknowledges the untimeliness of his petition. See

Appellant’s Brief, p. 8. To overcome the PCRA’s time bar, Appellant states 

the following:

[Appellant] can overcome the untimeliness for two reasons; both 

being directly connected to [prior appellate counsel’s] egregious 

and unethical representation of [Appellant] during his initialreview PCRA proceedings: (1) based on [prior counsel’s] 

representation, [Appellant] was entitled to have the PCRA’s one 

year filing deadline equitably tolled until he filed his pro se

petition on August 11, 2008; and (2) based on [prior counsel’s] 
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representation, the application of the PCRA’s one year filing 

deadline violated [Appellant’s] state and federal due process 

rights.

Appellant’s Brief, p. 8.

Appellant’s attempts to overcome the time bar fail. “It is well settled 

that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the 

jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. 

Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa.2005) (petitioner’s claim of 

ineffectiveness of prior counsel did not toll PCRA time bar); see also

Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 915-16 (Pa.2000) (petitioner’s 

claim in a second PCRA petition, that all prior counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance, did not invoke timeliness exception); Commonwealth v. 

Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785-86 (Pa.2000) (prior PCRA counsel’s 

failure to develop issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness not exception to 

time-bar); Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 589 (Pa.2000) 

(allegation of counsel ineffectiveness not sufficient justification to overcome 

otherwise untimely PCRA claims). 

Additionally, our Supreme Court has held that, because “the PCRA’s 

time restrictions are jurisdictional, . . . the period for filing a PCRA petition is 

not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, save to the extent the 

doctrine is embraced by § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii).” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 

737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa.1999). Further, the Supreme Court has noted that 

the PCRA “confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly 
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delineated in the Act.” Watts, 23 A.3d at 983 (quoting Commonwealth v.

Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa.2003)). Because Appellant did not 

plead any of the enumerated section 9545(b) timeliness exceptions, he is 

not entitled to any form of tolling. 

Appellant’s claim that the PCRA’s timeliness limitations violated his due 

process rights because it forfeited an entire legal proceeding also fails. Our 

Supreme Court has expressly stated that the PCRA’s time limitations are 

constitutional. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 643 n.5. The PCRA’s time limitations 

did not cause the forfeiture of entire legal proceedings in this matter, 

Appellant caused the forfeiture by failing to comply with the time 

limitations.4

Because Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition over three and a half 

years after the expiration of the PCRA limitations period and cannot avail 

himself of any time-bar exception, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing 

this petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 We acknowledge that Appellant claims to have requested that his prior 

appellate counsel file a PCRA in lieu of a federal habeas corpus petition. 

However, even if this claim were true and counsel ignored Appellant’s 

request, Appellant had, at worst, 60 days from the receipt of counsel’s 

October 27, 2005 letter explaining his actions and the result of the habeas 

petition to assert his rights. Appellant did not assert any claim of rights 

related to the discovery of prior appellate counsel’s actions at that time. 

Instead, he waited nearly three years from the date of counsel’s letter to 

attempt to challenge counsel’s actions.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2016