and Richard exchange a handshake. When the codefendant returned to 

the officer, he provided him with two plastic baggies containing marijuana 

in exchange for $20. Shortly after this exchange, police apprehended 

Richard and discovered four individually packaged baggies of marijuana, 

five individually packaged baggies containing cocaine, wadded US 

currency, and a firearm on Richard's person. We conclude that a rational 

juror could infer from these circumstances that Richard committed the 

crimes charged. See NRS 202.350(1)(d)(3); NRS 453.321(1)(a); NRS 

453.337(1); NRS 453.401(1); Doyle v. State, 112 Nev. 879, 894, 921 P.2d 

901, 911 (1996) (holding that "a conspiracy conviction may be supported by 

a coordinated series of acts," in furtherance of the criminal purpose, 

"sufficient to infer the existence of an agreement") (internal quotation 

marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Kaczmarek v. State, 120 

Nev. 314, 91 P.3d 16 (2004). 

Second, Richard claims that the district court erred by • 

allowing police officers to testify as experts without having been noticed as 

experts or qualified to provide expert opinion testimony when officers 

testified as to their training and experience regarding the sale of narcotics. 

Richard did not properly preserve this argument, and he has failed to 

demonstrate plain error. See Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 

93, 95 (2003) ("In conducting plain error review, we must examine 

whether there was error, whether the error was plain or clear, and 

whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights." (internal 

quotation marks omitted)); see also Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 120, 178 

P.3d 154, 161 (2008) (recognizing that, in order to properly preserve an 

objection, a defendant must object at trial on the same ground he or she 

asserts on appeal, absent plain or constitutional error). The officers' 

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testimony consisted of their observations and personal knowledge as lay 

witnesses. See Crowe v. State, 84 Nev. 358, 362, 441 P.2d 90, 92 (1968) 

("Lay witnesses . . . who are sufficiently trained and experienced, may 

testify at the discretion of the trial court relative to the use and influence 

of narcotics."), modified on other grounds by Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 

590, 445 P.2d 938, 940 (1968). Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not err by allowing the testimony. 

Third, Richard contends that the State committed 

prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by misstating the 

State's burden of proof, making a veiled comment on Richard's right to 

remain silent, and injecting personal beliefs as to the strength of the case 

and Richard's guilt. Richard did not object to the prosecutor's comments 

at trial, therefore we review for plain error. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 

1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008). The State properly commented on 

the evidence presented and asked the jury to draw inferences from that 

evidence. See State v. Green, 81 Nev. 173, 176, 400 P.2d 766, 767 (1965) 

("The prosecutor ha[s] a right to comment upon the testimony and to ask 

the jury to draw inferences from the evidence, and has the right to state 

fully his views as to what the evidence shows."). In response to Richard's 

opening statement, in which he claimed that he was in the wrong place at 

the wrong time, the prosecutor pointed out that there was no evidence to 

support that theory but that there was direct evidence to the contrary. 

See Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 631, 28 P.3d 498, 513 (2001) (holding 

that a prosecutor may "properly argue that the defense failed to 

substantiate its theory with supporting evidence"). We conclude that 

Richard fails to demonstrate plain error. 

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C.J. 

Gibboris 

J. 

Pickering Saitta 

Fourth, Richard contends that the prosecutor committed 

misconduct during closing argument by claiming that the firearm 

discovered was a "dangerous weapon capable of firing [a] .22 round" when 

no evidence had been introduced to support this claim. Richard objected, 

and the district court overruled the objection, finding that it was argument 

and that the jury could decide, based on the evidence presented, whether 

the statement was accurate. When considering allegations of 

prosecutorial misconduct, we first determine whether the prosecutor's 

conduct was improper and then whether any improper conduct warrants 

reversal. See Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1188, 196 P.3d at 476. Even assuming 

that the argument about the functionality of the firearm constituted 

prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that it was harmless error. Id. at 

1188-89, 196 P.3d at 476-77. 

Having considered Richard's claims and concluded that no 

relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

J. 

cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge 

Law Office of Scott P. Eichhorn, LLC 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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