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16-5-cv 

Martinez v. Mount Sinai Hospital 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A 

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

30th day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

Present: 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

 Circuit Judges. 

 

_____________________________________ 

DONNA MARTINEZ, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 16-5-cv 

 

MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL, AKA MOUNT 

SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

_____________________________________ 

For Plaintiff-Appellant: DAVID ABRAMS, New York, N.Y. 

For Defendant-Appellee: RORY MCEVOY (Katherine D. Watson, on the brief), 

Blank Rome LLP, New York, N.Y. 

Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Crotty, J.), entered December 23, 2015. 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF it is hereby ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Donna Martinez appeals from the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Defendant-Appellee Mount Sinai Hospital on her claim that Mount Sinai failed to 

accommodate her eye condition in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. 

Exec. Law § 290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. 

Admin. Code § 8-107 et seq., and the district court’s denial of Martinez’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment on her NYCHRL claim. Martinez has abandoned her New York State 

Human Rights Law claim on appeal, and now is exclusively pursuing her NYCHRL claim. See 

LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Kirkendall v. Halliburton, Inc., 707 

F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.’” Sousa v. Marquez, 702 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a)). All ambiguities must be resolved, and all reasonable inferences drawn, in favor of the 

non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 

1999). 

The district court here properly granted summary judgment to Mount Sinai, and denied 

Martinez’s motion for summary judgment, because the record demonstrates that, even assuming 

that a reasonable jury might conclude that Mount Sinai was aware of Martinez’s eye condition, 

Mount Sinai offered, and Martinez accepted, a reasonable accommodation of this eye condition. 

During a December 2012 meeting, after Mount Sinai had issued Martinez several disciplinary 
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warnings for frequent tardiness (a violation of Mount Sinai’s Human Resources Policy and 

employee Code of Conduct),1

 Martinez’s supervisors offered to move the start of her shift by 

either a half hour or a full hour. The record suggests that such an accommodation was 

sufficient to eliminate the majority of Martinez’s late arrivals because she was usually late by 

less than an hour, and often by just a half-hour or less. Rather than counter with an alternative 

accommodation or indicate that what Mount Sinai offered was insufficient, Martinez accepted 

one such accommodation, choosing to start her shift a half hour later. Therefore, even 

construing the NYCHRL liberally, see N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130; see also Ya-Chen Chen v. 

City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2015), Mount Sinai engaged in the required 

“interactive process” with Martinez, Jacobsen v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 

838 (2014), and it ultimately offered her a reasonable accommodation—one that she accepted, 

no less—thereby entitling Mount Sinai to summary judgment. Porter v. City of N.Y., 128 

A.D.3d 448, 449 (1st Dep’t 2015) (“Defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a 

matter of law by demonstrating that they engaged in a good faith interactive process through 

which they provided [the] plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation to address her vision and 

reading disabilities.”); cf. Noel v. BNY-Mellon Corp., 514 F. App’x 9, 10 (2d Cir. 2013) 

(summary order) (finding that the plaintiff could not recover on a failure to accommodate claim 

under, inter alia, the NYCHRL because she had “abandoned [the] interactive process”). 

The fact that Martinez now seeks an additional accommodation, namely forgiveness of 

her late arrival on June 24, 2013 and reinstatement, does not warrant a different result. Mount 

Sinai was only required to offer a reasonable accommodation, not the exact accommodation that 

 

1 Notably, Martinez did not grieve any of these disciplinary warnings, though she claims it was 

because she was unaware she could do so. 
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Martinez now demands. Porter, 128 A.D.3d at 449; see also 9 N.Y.C.R.R § 466.11(j)(6) (“The 

employer has the right to select which reasonable accommodation will be provided, so long as it 

is effective in meeting the need.”). Here, despite being on notice as of the December 2012 

meeting that any additional late arrivals risked suspension and termination, Martinez accepted 

one of Mount Sinai’s proposed accommodations without objection. There is no evidence that 

Martinez indicated that the accommodation she chose was insufficient after she was suspended 

for arriving late on seven additional occasions in March and April 2013 and warned that any 

additional tardiness would result in her termination. It was only after Martinez was terminated 

that she sought forgiveness of the late arrival that triggered her termination, and even then she 

did not assert that the accommodation that Mount Sinai provided was inadequate, but rather only 

contended that she “called in [late] with [a] proper reason.” App’x 46. Accordingly, even if 

the NYCHRL applies to post-termination grievance procedures—an issue we need not 

reach—Mount Sinai adequately fulfilled its obligations under the law here. 

We have considered all of Martinez’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk