15264 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 55 / Monday, March 23, 2015 / Notices 

32See Notice, supra note 3, 79 FR 60226, 60227. 

33See Notice, supra note 3, 79 FR 60226, 60227; 

ISE Response Letter at 1, supra note 6. 

34See e.g., FINRA Rule 5310 (Best Execution and 

Interpositioning); see also Securities Exchange Act 

Release No. 34–51808, 70 FR 37496, 37537–8 (Jun. 

29, 2005) (File No. S7–10–04) (Regulation NMS 

Final Rules); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 

37619A, 61 FR 48290, 48322–3 (Sep. 12, 1996) (File 

No. S7–30–95) (Order Execution Obligations Final 

Rules). 

35See ISE Response Letter at 1, supra note 6. 

36 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). 

37 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

that guards customer interests and 

protects against the misuse of material 

non-public information.32

Finally, as noted above, the 

commenter expressed concern that this 

proposed rule change would introduce 

a conflict of interest that would erode 

the duty of best execution and harm 

customers. The Exchange believes, and 

the Commission agrees, that this 

proposed rule change, as modified by 

Amendment No. 1, does not alter a 

broker-dealer’s duty of best execution.33

Although the proposed rule change, as 

modified by Amendment No. 1, will 

permit EAMs to know and consider the 

quotes of its affiliated market makers 

when making routing decisions, the 

Commission continues to expect that 

routing decisions related to the duty of 

best execution will be premised solely 

on customer considerations such as the 

likelihood of execution, the opportunity 

to obtain price improvement, 

availability of best price and 

minimization of market impact.34 The 

Commission emphasizes that a brokerdealer’s duty of best execution exists 

whether an EAM determines to route 

customer order flow toward its affiliated 

market maker or away from its affiliated 

market maker. Further, the Commission 

notes that in response to the 

commenter’s concern that the proposed 

rule change would negatively impact 

best execution considerations, ISE 

stated that it would ‘‘continue to 

monitor for abnormalities in interaction 

rates between members, and will 

investigate and take appropriate 

regulatory action against members that 

fail to comply with their best execution 

obligations . . . [and that] these 

surveillance tools will allow ISE to 

comply with its regulatory 

responsibilities, consistent with 

treatment across competitor options 

exchanges.’’ 35 Among other things, the 

Commission’s oversight of the ISE 

program is designed to evaluate the 

ISE’s performance in regard to that 

representation. 

V. Conclusion 

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to 

Section 19(b)(2) of the Act 36 that the 

proposed rule change (SR–ISE–2014– 

43), as modified by Amendment No. 1, 

be, and it hereby is, approved. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.37

Jill M. Peterson, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06515 Filed 3–20–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–74519; File No. SR–CBOE– 

2015–026] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; 

Chicago Board Options Exchange, 

Incorporated; Notice of Filing of a 

Proposed Rule Change Relating to 

Rules 6.74A and 6.74B 

March 17, 2015. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2

notice is hereby given that, on March 6, 

2015, Chicago Board Options Exchange, 

Incorporated (the ‘‘Exchange’’ or 

‘‘CBOE’’) filed with the Securities and 

Exchange Commission (the 

‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

change as described in Items I, II, and 

III below, which Items have been 

prepared by the Exchange. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the proposed rule 

change from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

The Exchange seeks to amend CBOE 

Rules 6.74A and 6.74B. The text of the 

proposed rule change is provided below 

(additions are italicized; deletions are 

[bracketed]). 

* * * * * 

Chicago Board Options Exchange, 

Incorporated Rules 

Rule 6.74A. Automated Improvement 

Mechanism (‘‘AIM’’) 

* * * * * 

. . . Interpretations and Policies: 

* * * * * 

.04 [Any solicited orders submitted 

by the Initiating Trading Permit Holder 

to trade against the Agency Order may 

not be for the account of a Market-Maker 

assigned to the option class.] A MarketMaker submitting a solicited order to 

execute against a particular Agency 

Order may not modify its preprogrammed response to Request for 

Responses based on information 

regarding the particular Agency Order 

or solicited order. 

* * * * * 

Rule 6.74B. Solicitation Auction 

Mechanism 

* * * * * 

. . . Interpretations and Policies: 

* * * * * 

.03 Under Rule 6.74B, Trading Permit 

Holders may enter contra orders that are 

solicited. The Auction provides a 

facility for Trading Permit Holders that 

locate liquidity for their customer 

orders. Trading Permit Holders may not 

use the Auction to circumvent Rules 

6.45A.01, 6.45B.01 or 6.74A limiting 

principal transactions. This may 

include, but is not limited to, Trading 

Permit Holders entering contra orders 

that are solicited from (a) affiliated 

broker-dealers, or (b) broker-dealers 

with which the Trading Permit Holder 

has an arrangement that allows the 

Trading Permit Holder to realize similar 

economic benefits from the solicited 

transaction as it would achieve by 

executing the customer order in whole 

or in part as principal. Additionally, 

[solicited contra orders entered by 

Trading Permit Holders to trade against 

Agency Orders may not be for the 

account of a CBOE Market-Maker 

assigned to the options class.] a MarketMaker submitting a solicited order to 

execute against a particular Agency 

Order may not modify its preprogrammed response to Request for 

Responses based on information 

regarding the particular Agency Order 

or solicited order. 

* * * * * 

The text of the proposed rule change 

is also available on the Exchange’s Web 

site (http://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/

CBOELegalRegulatoryHome.aspx), at 

the Exchange’s Office of the Secretary, 

and at the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, the 

Exchange included statements 

concerning the purpose of and basis for 

the proposed rule change and discussed 

any comments it received on the 

proposed rule change. The text of these 

statements may be examined at the 

places specified in Item IV below. The 

Exchange has prepared summaries, set 

forth in sections A, B, and C below, of 

the most significant aspects of such 

statements. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 55 / Monday, March 23, 2015 / Notices 15265 

3The Exchange notes that the SAM Auction is 

currently deactivated. See CBOE Regulatory 

Circular RG14–076—Deactivation of the Solicitation 

Auction Mechanism (SAM) (May 16, 2014). 

4The Exchange proposes to delete all of the 

language currently in Interpretation and Policy .04 

to Rule 6.74A and replace it with the word 

‘‘Reserved.’’ The Exchange also proposes to delete 

the last sentence of Interpretation and Policy .03 to 

Rule 6.74B, which states that ‘‘Additionally, 

solicited contra orders entered by Trading Permit 

Holders to trade against Agency Orders may not be 

for the account of a CBOE Market-Maker assigned 

to the options class.’’ 

5See BOX Options Exchange LLC Rule 7150— 

Price Improvement Period (‘‘PIP Auction’’). The PIP 

Auction’s Directed Order process allows brokerdealers to route orders to BOX Market-Makers for 

possible PIP Auction execution. The Market-Maker 

that receives the Directed Order has three seconds 

to initiate a PIP Auction or decline. 6The Exchange notes that Market-Makers that 

make markets on multiple exchanges will also have 

to continue to quote aggressively to access order 

flow on those other exchanges. 

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

1. Purpose 

The Exchange proposes to amend its 

rules regarding the ability of a MarketMaker assigned to an options class to be 

solicited as the contra party to an 

Agency Order in that class on the 

Exchange’s Automated Improvement 

Mechanism (‘‘AIM’’) and Solicitation 

Auction Mechanism 3 (‘‘SAM’’ and, 

together with AIM, the ‘‘Auctions’’). 

Currently, Interpretation and Policy .04 

to Rule 6.74A (AIM) states that ‘‘Any 

solicited orders submitted by the 

Initiating Trading Permit Holder to trade 

against the Agency Order may not be for 

the account of a Market-Maker assigned 

to the option class.’’ Similarly, the last 

sentence of Interpretation and Policy .03 

to Rule 6.74B (SAM) states that 

‘‘Additionally, solicited contra orders 

entered by Trading Permit Holders to 

trade against Agency Orders may not be 

for the account of a CBOE Market-Maker 

assigned to the options class.’’ This rule 

language acts to limit a Trading Permit 

Holder (‘‘TPH’’) initiating Auctions from 

access to liquidity that should otherwise 

be available. 

On the Exchange, there are a number 

of large, global Market-Making firms 

that have market-making and 

proprietary operations. In addition, 

there are small market-making firms that 

only have market-making operations. 

The current rule neither prohibits the 

proprietary arm of a global firm from 

submitting a contra order in these 

Auctions nor prohibits the global firm’s 

market-making operation from 

responding to an Auction in which the 

proprietary desk has submitted a contra 

order. More importantly, if two MarketMakers are nominees of the same firm— 

one appointed to a class on CBOE and 

the other appointed in the same class on 

another exchange (PHLX for example)— 

the current rule allows the PHLX 

Market-Maker to be solicited to 

participate on an AIM order and the 

CBOE Market-Maker to respond to the 

AIM auction. The rule does, however, 

effectively prohibit the small marketmaking firms from providing liquidity 

in the form of contra orders. In 

preventing a Market-Maker assigned to 

an options class from being solicited by 

TPHs to trade against Agency Orders in 

that class, the small Market-Making 

firms are effectively prohibited from 

being solicited by TPHs to trade against 

nearly all Agency Orders. Because a 

TPH initiating an auction using AIM or 

SAM can thusly not solicit contra orders 

from these Market-Making firms, the 

TPH is unable to access the greater 

liquidity that these firms can provide. 

The Market-Makers, TPHs, and 

customers are harmed by this rule 

language, and the Exchange therefore 

proposes to delete it.4 The Exchange 

believes this is a reasonable 

modification designed to provide 

additional flexibility for the Exchange’s 

TPHs to obtain executions on behalf of 

their customers and to provide CBOE 

Market-Makers assigned to a given 

option class with the same opportunity 

as other solicited parties to participate 

in the auction process through means of 

solicited orders submitted by the 

Initiating TPH. Absent this rule change, 

CBOE Market-Makers assigned to a 

given option class are not able to 

achieve solicited contra order priority 

status when trading against Agency 

Orders executed through AIM/SAM 

while all other parties solicited by the 

Initiating TPH may have such priority 

status. Additionally, the Exchange does 

not believe the rule change will deplete 

the liquidity available through 

Auctions; rather, the Exchange believes 

that by allowing more individuals to 

participate in the Auction process 

liquidity will increase. 

It is important to note that the rule 

language that the Exchange proposes to 

delete applies only to AIM and SAM 

transactions. As such, a Market-Maker 

assigned to an options class can 

currently be solicited to trade against an 

Agency Order in that class for non-AIM/ 

SAM transactions. Therefore, because 

Market-Makers only face this 

prohibition for AIM and SAM 

transactions, the rules for whether a 

Market-Maker assigned to an options 

class can currently be solicited to trade 

against an Agency Order in that class 

differ depending on the execution 

mechanism. The proposed change 

would eliminate this difference. 

In addition, the Boston Options 

Exchange LLC (‘‘BOX’’) rules include a 

‘‘Directed Order’’ process that is 

functionally equivalent to the 

solicitation of orders, and also does not 

prevent Market-Makers from being 

solicited to trade against an Agency 

Order in a class in which the MarketMaker is appointed.5 As such, the 

Exchange merely proposes to put 

Market-Makers at CBOE on a similar 

competitive footing vis-a`-vis the 

directed orders on BOX. 

Furthermore, the Exchange does not 

believe there is a meaningful regulatory 

purpose behind the prohibition against 

Market-Makers being solicited to trade 

against an Agency Order in a class in 

which the Market-Maker is appointed 

because for the firms with appointments 

on multiple exchanges, the solicited 

order can simply come from a MarketMaker on a different exchange. More 

importantly, a Market-Maker that is 

solicited to trade against an Agency 

Order in a class in which the MarketMaker is appointed would still be 

required to abide by Exchange Rules 4.1 

(Just and Equitable Principles of Trade), 

4.18 (Prevention of the Misuse of 

Material, Nonpublic Information), and 

6.9 (Solicited Transactions) (as well as 

all other Exchange rules, of course). As 

such, a Market-Maker would still be 

prohibited from, for example, learning 

(via solicitation) that a large order is 

being sent to the Exchange and therefore 

widening its quotes. Moreover, because 

upon entry, an AIM/SAM order is 

‘‘stopped’’ for its full quantity at the 

contra order’s price, if a Market-Maker 

were to widen his quotes, it would not 

impact the price of the trade. Also, 

because many classes on the Exchange 

have a number of Market-Makers 

appointed, the widening of quotes by 

one Market-Maker would likely have 

limited impact on the NBBO (and 

indeed, it is possible that the solicited 

Market-Maker that is widening quotes 

would not be on the NBBO in the first 

place). Regardless, the Exchange notes 

that it does not believe the changes 

contemplated in this filing will have an 

adverse effect on Market-Maker quoting 

because the Exchange believes MarketMakers will continue to seek access to 

order flow that comes into the Exchange 

outside of the auction process. In order 

to access that order flow, Market-Makers 

will need to continue to quote 

aggressively.6 The same is true for 

Auctions in that the solicited MarketMaker will still need to price 

aggressively in order to trade with an 

Agency Order because Auctions are 

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15266 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 55 / Monday, March 23, 2015 / Notices 

7 15 U.S.C. 78f(b). 

8 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). 9 Id. 

competitive with other Market-Makers 

actively responding. 

The Exchange is also proposing to add 

language that explicitly states that ‘‘a 

Market-Maker submitting a solicited 

order to execute against a particular 

Agency Order may not modify its preprogrammed response to Request for 

Responses based on information 

regarding the particular Agency Order 

or solicited order.’’ This language 

prohibits a Market-Maker from using 

any information regarding a particular 

Agency Order or the Market-Maker’s 

solicited order for purposes of 

modifying the Market-Maker’s Request 

for Responses. However, this language 

also recognizes that a Market-Maker’s 

quotes may change for many reasons 

other than an Agency order or the 

Market-Maker’s solicited order (e.g., a 

non-exclusive list of reasons that a 

Market-Maker may choose to adjust the 

size and/or price of quotes, irrespective 

of an Agency Order or a Market-Maker’s 

solicited order, is a change in the price 

of the underlying, the Market-Maker’s 

inventory, or interest rates) and those 

unrelated changes are not prohibited. 

Furthermore, this language is not 

intended to prohibit a Market-Maker 

from providing multiple responses to 

Request for Responses. Finally, the 

CBOE Department of Market Regulation 

already surveils for market participants 

seeking to take advantage of non-public 

information by attempting to terminate 

Auctions early in an effort to limit the 

number of Auction Reponses in order to 

ensure a larger allocation amount. 

2. Statutory Basis 

The Exchange believes the proposed 

rule change is consistent with the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’) and the rules and regulations 

thereunder applicable to the Exchange 

and, in particular, the requirements of 

Section 6(b) of the Act.7 Specifically, 

the Exchange believes the proposed rule 

change is consistent with the Section 

6(b)(5) 8 requirements that the rules of 

an exchange be designed to prevent 

fraudulent and manipulative acts and 

practices, to promote just and equitable 

principles of trade, to foster cooperation 

and coordination with persons engaged 

in regulating, clearing, settling, 

processing information with respect to, 

and facilitating transactions in 

securities, to remove impediments to 

and perfect the mechanism of a free and 

open market and a national market 

system, and, in general, to protect 

investors and the public interest. 

Additionally, the Exchange believes the 

proposed rule change is consistent with 

the Section 6(b)(5) 9 requirement that 

the rules of an exchange not be designed 

to permit unfair discrimination between 

customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers. 

The Exchange believes that the 

proposed change will provide TPHs 

initiating auctions via AIM and SAM 

with the ability to access more liquidity 

by allowing them to solicit MarketMakers assigned to the relevant options 

class. This will also let Market-Makers 

assigned to a class benefit from being 

able to be solicited for trades in that 

class. As such, the proposed rule change 

both provides greater access to liquidity 

and increases the market participants 

that can participate in a trade (thereby 

preventing discrimination against 

Market-Makers assigned to a class). In 

these ways, the proposed change 

removes impediments to and perfects 

the mechanism of a free and open 

market and a national market system. 

The Exchange believes that the 

proposed change is reasonable and 

should promote price competition by 

providing CBOE Market-Makers with a 

more reasonable opportunity to compete 

for proposed crosses along with other 

market participants. By providing CBOE 

Market-Makers with the opportunity to 

be solicited on AIM/SAM Agency 

Orders in classes in which the MarketMakers are appointed, the proposed 

change prevents discrimination by 

providing such Market-Makers with the 

same opportunity to participate in the 

transaction (via solicitation) with which 

other market participants are provided. 

Furthermore, the Exchange does not 

believe the proposed rule change will 

alter Market-Maker incentives to 

respond to AIM/SAM Auctions. MarketMakers responding to Auctions are 

seeking to execute as many contracts as 

possible with the Agency order. The 

best way to accomplish that goal— 

currently and after the proposed rule 

change—is to aggressively respond to 

Auctions, regardless of who else may be 

responding or whether the contra-order 

is a solicited Market-Maker. An Auction 

with a solicited Market-Maker as contra 

should have no bearing on whether a 

competitive and interested responder 

will respond, nor should it have any 

bearing on which price that interested 

Market-Maker would place on his 

response. In addition, the Exchange 

does not believe this proposal will have 

an adverse effect on quoting because, as 

previously noted, in order to execute 

against order flow outside of Auctions 

or on other exchanges Market-Makers 

will have to continue to quote 

aggressively. 

The proposed rule change also 

removes impediments to and perfects 

the mechanism of a free and open 

market and a national market system, 

and prevents unfair discrimination, 

because a Market-Maker assigned to an 

options class can currently be solicited 

to trade against an Agency Order in that 

class for non-AIM/SAM transactions. 

Therefore, because Market-Makers only 

currently face this prohibition for AIM 

and SAM transactions, the rules for 

whether a Market-Maker assigned to an 

options class can currently be solicited 

to trade against an Agency Order in that 

class differ depending on the execution 

mechanism. The proposed change 

would eliminate this difference. 

The proposed rule change also 

removes impediments to and perfects 

the mechanism of a free and open 

market and a national market system, 

and prevents unfair discrimination, 

because BOX rules include a ‘‘Directed 

Order’’ process that allows for the 

solicitation of orders and does not 

include a prohibition that prevents 

Market-Makers from being solicited to 

trade against an Agency Order in a class 

in which the Market-Maker is 

appointed. As such, the Exchange 

merely proposes to put Market-Makers 

at CBOE on a similar competitive 

footing vis-a`-vis these solicited orders. 

The Exchange notes that the proposed 

rule change would not impact a MarketMaker’s requirements to abide by 

Exchange Rules 4.1 (Just and Equitable 

Principles of Trade), 4.18 (Prevention of 

the Misuse of Material, Nonpublic 

Information), and 6.9 (Solicited 

Transactions). As such, a Market-Maker 

would still be prohibited from, for 

example, learning (via solicitation) that 

a large order is being sent to the 

Exchange and therefore widening its 

quotes. Indeed, while this could 

theoretically occur regarding non-AIM/ 

SAM solicitation orders, the Exchange 

currently prohibits this activity. 

Moreover, because upon entry, an AIM/ 

SAM order is ‘‘stopped’’ for its full 

quantity at the contra order’s price, if a 

Market-Maker were to widen his quotes, 

it would not impact the price of the 

trade. Also, because many classes on the 

Exchange have a number of MarketMakers appointed, the widening of 

quotes by one Market-Maker would 

likely have limited impact on the NBBO 

(and indeed, it is possible that the 

solicited Market-Maker that is widening 

quotes would not on the NBBO in the 

first place). As previously noted, 

however, the Exchange does not believe 

the changes in this proposal will 

adversely effect Market-Maker quoting. 

Finally, in addition to the above 

general prohibitions, the proposed 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 55 / Monday, March 23, 2015 / Notices 15267 

10 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

prohibition against a Market-Maker 

modifying its pre-programmed 

responses to Request for Responses 

based on information regarding a 

particular Agency Order or solicited 

order serves to protect investors and the 

public interest. 

B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement on Burden on Competition 

CBOE does not believe that the 

proposed rule change will impose any 

burden on competition that is not 

necessary or appropriate in furtherance 

of the purposes of the Act. 

CBOE does not believe that the 

proposed rule change will impose any 

burden on intramarket competition that 

is not necessary or appropriate in 

furtherance of the purposes of the Act 

because it actually provides the 

opportunity for a market participant to 

be solicited on an order when such 

market participant currently does not 

have that opportunity (the MarketMaker assigned to that option class). 

Furthermore, the Exchange does not 

believe soliciting Market-Makers will 

negatively impact auction responses. As 

noted above, the Exchange believes that 

an Auction with a solicited MarketMaker as contra should have no bearing 

on whether a competitive and interested 

responder will respond, nor should it 

have any bearing on which price that 

interested Market-Maker would place on 

his response. The Exchange also 

believes that exposure to an electronic 

auction following a solicitation 

encourages competition; thus, 

expanding the pool of available solicited 

parties prior to the initiation of an 

Auction further exposes orders to 

competitive Auctions and results in a 

higher level of potential execution 

quality for customers. 

CBOE does not believe that the 

proposed rule change will impose any 

burden on intermarket competition that 

is not necessary or appropriate in 

furtherance of the purposes of the Act 

because the proposed change applies 

only to trading on CBOE. However, the 

opportunity for a Market-Maker to be 

solicited on an order in a class to which 

he is assigned may make CBOE a more 

attractive marketplace by giving more 

trading opportunities to Market-Makers 

as well as providing greater volume and 

liquidity, thereby enhancing 

competition. As such, to the extent that 

the proposed change makes CBOE a 

more attractive marketplace to market 

participants on other exchanges, such 

market participants may elect to become 

CBOE market participants. 

C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement on Comments on the 

Proposed Rule Change Received From 

Members, Participants, or Others 

The Exchange neither solicited nor 

received comments on the proposed 

rule change. 

III. Date of Effectiveness of the 

Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 

Commission Action 

Within 45 days of the date of 

publication of this notice in the Federal 

Register or within such longer period 

up to 90 days (i) as the Commission may 

designate if it finds such longer period 

to be appropriate and publishes its 

reasons for so finding or (ii) as to which 

the Exchange consents, the Commission 

will: 

A. By order approve or disapprove 

such proposed rule change, or 

B. institute proceedings to determine 

whether the proposed rule change 

should be disapproved. 

IV. Solicitation of Comments 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit written data, views, and 

arguments concerning the foregoing, 

including whether the proposed rule 

change is consistent with the Act. 

Comments may be submitted by any of 

the following methods: 

Electronic comments 

• Use the Commission’s Internet 

comment form (http://www.sec.gov/

rules/sro.shtml); or 

• Send an email to rule-comments@

sec.gov. Please include File Number SR– 

CBOE–2015–026 on the subject line. 

Paper comments 

• Send paper comments in triplicate 

to Secretary, Securities and Exchange 

Commission, 100 F Street NE., 

Washington, DC 20549–1090. 

All submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–CBOE–2015–026. This file 

number should be included on the 

subject line if email is used. To help the 

Commission process and review your 

comments more efficiently, please use 

only one method. The Commission will 

post all comments on the Commission’s 

Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/

rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the 

submission, all subsequent 

amendments, all written statements 

with respect to the proposed rule 

change that are filed with the 

Commission, and all written 

communications relating to the 

proposed rule change between the 

Commission and any person, other than 

those that may be withheld from the 

public in accordance with the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be 

available for Web site viewing and 

printing in the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 

Washington, DC 20549 on official 

business days between the hours of 

10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such 

filing also will be available for 

inspection and copying at the principal 

office of the Exchange. All comments 

received will be posted without change; 

the Commission does not edit personal 

identifying information from 

submissions. You should submit only 

information that you wish to make 

available publicly. All submissions 

should refer to File Number SR–CBOE– 

2015–026, and should be submitted on 

or before April 13, 2015. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.10

Jill M. Peterson, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06514 Filed 3–20–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

40th Meeting: RTCA Special 

Committee 206, Aeronautical 

Information and Meteorological Data 

Link Services 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), U.S. Department 

of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Meeting Notice of RTCA Special 

Committee 206, Aeronautical 

Information and Meteorological Data 

Link Services. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is issuing this notice 

to advise the public of the fortieth 

meeting of the RTCA Special Committee 

206, Aeronautical Information and 

Meteorological Data Link Services. 

DATES: The meeting will be held April 

13–17, 2015, 9 a.m.–5 p.m. on Monday 

(EST), 8:30 a.m.–5 p.m. Tuesday to 

Thursday and 8:30 a.m.–11 a.m. on 

Friday. 

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held 

National Institute of Aerospace (NIA), 

100 Exploration Way Hampton, VA 

23666. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The 

RTCA Secretariat, 1150 18th Street NW., 

Suite 910, Washington, DC, 20036, or by 

telephone at (202) 330–0652/(202) 833– 

9339, fax at (202) 833–9434, or Web site 

at http://www.rtca.org. 

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