2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-23-2009

USA v. Fabian Metoyer

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-3866

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Fabian Metoyer" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 959.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/959
 The Honorable Jan E. DuBois, Senior District Judge for the United States District Court *

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-3866

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

FABIAN METOYER, a/k/a Spliff

 

Fabian Metoyer,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District Court of New Jersey

District Court No. 3-96-cr-00149-004

District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

June 26, 2009

Before: BARRY, SMITH, Circuit Judges

and DuBOIS, District Judge*

(Filed: July 23, 2009)

 

OPINION

 

DuBois, District Judge.
 Although Metoyer played a lesser role in the underlying narcotics conspiracy, he had a 1

criminal history category of VI (based on five previous convictions—four drug convictions and

one conviction for simple assault) and was determined to be a career offender (based on two of

his previous drug convictions). These factors determined Metoyer’s sentencing range for the

underlying conviction—151 to 188 months after an offense-level reduction of three points for

acceptance of responsibility. 

2

Defendant-Appellant Fabian Metoyer appeals from the Judgment of the United

States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which revoked his previously

imposed term of supervised release for violations of the conditions of his supervised

release and sentenced him to twenty-one months imprisonment to be followed by a

fifteen-month term of supervised release. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that

the District Court did not abuse its sentencing discretion and will affirm the District Court

Judgment.

I.

Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will only summarize

those facts which are relevant to our brief discussion.

Metoyer’s underlying conviction is based on his July 16, 1996 guilty plea to one

count of conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846, an offense with a 20-year statutory maximum. On November 7, 1996, the

Honorable Garrett E. Brown sentenced Metoyer to 151 months imprisonment and 3 years

supervised release. Metoyer served approximately 11 years in prison and was released on 1

June 4, 2007. 
3

On September 2, 2008, Metoyer appeared before the District Court and pled guilty

to four violations of supervised release: (1) commission of another federal, state, or local

crime—theft of services and fraud; (2) commission of another federal, state, or local

crime—possession of drug paraphernalia, failure to make proper disposal of drugs, and

wandering; (3) failure to submit to random drug screenings on nine occasions between

November 7, 2007 and March 5, 2008; and (4) failure to notify the probation department

within 72 hours of the termination of his employment on February 1, 2008. 

The first of these violations was a Grade B violation which carried a guideline

range of 21 to 27 months imprisonment in Metoyer’s criminal history category of VI.

U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.4(a) (2007). The remaining three violations were Grade C

violations, with a guideline range of 8 to 14 months in criminal history category VI. Id.

The statutory maximum term of imprisonment for Metoyer’s violations was 24 months

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Metoyer was also subject to an additional term of

supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). 

At the September 2, 2008 hearing, defense counsel sought a below-guidelines

sentence in the range of 12 to 18 months and argued against the imposition of any

additional term of supervised release on the ground that Metoyer had not proven himself

amenable to the conditions of supervised release. The government requested the statutory

maximum sentence—24 months incarceration. The District Court sentenced Metoyer to

21 months incarceration—3 months above the high end of defendant’s suggested
4

sentencing range and 3 months below the government’s requested sentence. The District

Court also imposed a 15-month term of supervised release. 

On appeal, Metoyer argues that the District Court failed to appropriately consider

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, focusing on Metoyer’s prior and present

criminal conduct and failing to consider mitigating factors, such as Metoyer’s strong

relationship with his family, his efforts to sustain employment, and his lifelong drug

addiction, particularly its relationship to his offenses. Metoyer also argues that the District

Court’s decision to impose an additional term of supervised release was unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented at the revocation hearing which demonstrated that

“Metoyer was difficult to supervise and that imposing a new term of supervised release

was both excessively punitive and futile.” (Appellant’s Br. 18.)

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the

reasonableness of sentencing determinations for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007).

Under this standard of review, the appellate court must ensure that the district

judge gave “meaningful consideration” to the relevant sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e) (listing relevant § 3553(a) factors for purposes of modifying or revoking a
5

defendant’s supervised release). District courts are not, however, required to discuss each

factor explicitly or make findings as to each factor as long as the record reflects that the

district court took the factors into account at sentencing. United States v. Lessner, 498

F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007); Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543. Further, a sentencing court’s

“failure to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve [does not

render a] sentence unreasonable.” Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546.

The record reflects that the District Court provided a brief, but adequate,

discussion of the issues presented at sentencing and its reasons for imposing the instant

sentence. This discussion included consideration of the nature and circumstances of the

original offense and the violations (§ 3553(a)(1)), Metoyer’s history and characteristics

(§ 3553(a)(1)), the need to deter further criminal conduct and/or violations

(§ 3553(a)(2)(B)), and the need to protect the public from additional crimes

(§ 3553(a)(2)(C)). In light of these considerations and the arguments presented by defense

counsel with regard to mitigating factors, the court decided to impose a sentence at the

low end of the guidelines range for the Grade B violation, and not below it. In our

judgment, the District Court meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors and did not

abuse its discretion in applying and weighing those factors. 

Contrary to defense counsel’s assertions, the District Court did consider Metoyer’s

arguments against imposing an additional term of supervised release following

incarceration. Specifically, the District Court stated: “I heard what [defense counsel] said
6

about [Metoyer’s] lack of amenability to supervised release. I don’t think that’s a reason

to not put him on supervised release. It’s . . . time to put him on supervised release and

make sure that he succeeds before he gets arrested for something else.” (App. 43.) That

the District Court disagreed with Metoyer’s position is no basis for reversal. 

III.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court’s sentence

was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Thus, we will affirm the District

Court Judgment.