alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2014352EN.01000301.xml

| 7.10.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 352/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.10.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 352/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7373 — Ortner / Strauss / UBM)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2014/C 352/02

On 30 September 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in German language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7373. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7373. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
# C_2016221EN.01000101.xml

| 18.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 221/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 221/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.8024 — NTT Data International/IT Services Business of Dell)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2016/C 221/01)

On 14 June 2016, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32016M8024. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32016M8024. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
#### Dearth vs. Baker.

*Liability for injury done by domestic animals.*

The owner of a domestic animal is not liable for injuries done by it, unless he had notice of its mischievous propensity, or the injury was attributable to some neglect on his part.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *La Fayette*County.

Action for damages accruing to plaintiff by reason of his team of horses, while being driVen upon a highway, having been attacked by defendant’s dog, and caused to run away, whereby one of the horses was killed. The complaint avers that the dog was in the habit of attacking teams on the highway, and that plaintiff knew of such habit. Answer, a general denial. The' court instructed the jury that plaintiff could not recover, unless the injury resulted from some mischievous propensity of the dog, known to defendant.

Verdict for the plaintiff; new trial denied, and defendant appealed from a judgment on the verdict.

*P. A. Orton, Jr,,*for appellant.

*George L. F'ost*and *Chas. Dunn*(with whom was *S. U. Pinney,*of counsel), for respondent.

DowNER, J.

The evidence shows that the dog jumped upon .one of the horses of the plaintiff, and barked, and so frightened the horses that they ran away, and one of them was killed. But there is no evidence that the appellant-(defendant below) previously knew that the dog was accustomed to do such acts, or that he had ever done such an act before. The owner of a domestic animal is not liable for injuries done by such animal, unless he previously had notice of his vicious or mischievous propensities, or the injury was attributable to some neglect on his part. Chitty’s Pl., 69; *Vrooman v. Lawyer,*13 Johns., 339.

*By the Court.*— -The judgment is reversed, and a *venire de novo*awarded.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 29, 2010 

s0322 

Order 

 

March 29, 2010 

139692 & (29) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 139692 

 COA: 291337 

Ingham CC: 03-000461-FC 

AARON DANIEL CANTLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 29, 2009 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The 

motion to add issues is DENIED.
#### Hubbard vs. The Town of Lyndon.

*Bill of exceptions.*

An order granting or refusing a new trial will not be reversed where the motion was based “ on the judge’s minutes,” unless the bill of exceptions states that it contains *all*the minutes on which the motion was heard; and a statement at the close of the bill that “ the foregoing *is a copy*of the minutes,” etc., is insufficient.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Sheboygan*County.

The plaintiff appealed from an order setting aside the verdict for insufficient evidence, and granting a new trial.

*J. A.*Bentley, for appellant.

*B. Williams,*for respondent.

Cole, J.

In this case the verdict was for the plaintiff. The defendant moved, upon the judge’s minutes, to set the verdict aside for insufficient evidence, and grant a new trial. The motion was granted. The plaintiff has settled a bill of exceptions, containing the minutes and charge of the court, and has appealed from the order. The bill of exceptions, however, does not state that it contains all the minutes upon which the motion was heard and decided. This being so, it seems to us we cannot say that the new trial was improperly granted. Where a motion for a new trial has been made on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, or that the evidence was insufficient to support it, we have frequently held that we would not review the order of the court denying the same, unless the bill of exceptions stated that it contained all the evidence given on the trial. We see no reason for making a distinction between that case and one where the motion is made for the same reason upon the minutes of the judge. It may be said, that, as the bill of exceptions states or recites that the foregoing is a “copy of the minutes,” *232the presumption must be that it is a “ copy” of *all*the minutes. It may be a faithful transcript of the original minutes as far as it goes, but may not include all of such original. The same presumption might be made where the bill of exceptions states that “the foregoing is the evidence given on the trial.” Yet, upon such a statement, courts refuse to assume that the bill contains all the evidence. The real presumption in such cases is, that the court below decided properly upon the matters before it, until the contrary appears. And that presumption must prevail here upon this record. *Bowen v.*Malbon, 20 Wis. 491.

*By the Qov/rt.*— The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**** 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Turbodyne Technologies, Inc. ("Company") Annual Report on Form 10-K for the years ended December 31, 2009 (Restated) and December 31, 2010 ("Report"), the undersigned certifies that:

 

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

| Date: January 2, 2015 | By:    | */s/ DEBI KOKINOS*      |   |
|-----------------------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|                  |   | Chief Financial Officer |   |

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2657 

To amend the Small Business Act to define the term ‘‘State’’ for the purposes 

of the microloan program carried out under that Act, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 5, 2021 

Ms. HIRONO introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship 

A BILL 

To amend the Small Business Act to define the term ‘‘State’’ 

for the purposes of the microloan program carried out 

under that Act, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Northern Mariana Is5 lands Entrepreneurship Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MICROLOAN PROGRAM DEFINITIONS. 

7 Section 7(m)(11) of the Small Business Act (15 

8 U.S.C. 636(m)(11)) is amended— 

9 (1) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking ‘‘and’’ 

10 at the end; 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2657 IS

1 (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period 

2 at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

3 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

4 ‘‘(E) the term ‘State’ means each of the 

5 several States of the United States, the District 

6 of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 

7 Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, 

8 the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is9 lands, and American Samoa.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed 

October 2, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00780-CV

IN RE VICTORIA I. OKO & UWAKWE C. OKO, Relators

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF INJUNCTION

County Court at Law No. 1

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 15-CCV-055306

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 15, 2015, relators Victoria I. Oko and Uwakwe C. Oko filed a 

petition for writ of injunction in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 

(West 2004); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relators ask this court to 

enjoin Constable Ruben Davis of Precinct 2 in Fort Bend County, from evicting 

relators from certain property pursuant to a writ of possession until this court 
2

considers the appeal from the judgment awarding possession of the property to real 

party in interest Junior Properties, LLC.1

Junior Properties brought an eviction action against relators in Justice of the 

Peace Court, Precinct 2 of Fort Bend County. The justice court awarded 

possession of the property to Junior Properties. Relators appealed the justice

court’s judgment to County Court at Law No. 1 in Fort Bend County. On August 

13, 2015, the county court at law granted Junior Properties’ motion for summary 

judgment and signed a final judgment awarding Junior Properties possession of the 

property. The judgment further stated a writ of possession would issue if relators 

did not vacate the premises by August 26, 2015. A writ of possession was issued 

on September 1, 2015. A notice to vacate was served on relators on September 3, 

2015, ordering them to vacate by September 5, 2015.

The purpose of a writ of injunction is to enforce or protect the appellate 

court’s jurisdiction. In re Olson, 252 S.W.3d 747, 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). The use of a writ of injunction is limited to cases in 

which we have actual jurisdiction of a pending proceeding. Id. The appellate 

court may grant injunctive relief if the failure to do so would result in the appeal 

becoming moot and the subject matter being destroyed. Becker v. Becker, 639 

S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ). 

 1 Although relators titled their petition “Original Petition for Writ of Mandamus,” we 

construe it as a petition for writ of injunction because they are requesting injunctive relief from 

this court.
3

Relators state that they filed a notice of appeal. However, there is no appeal 

pending in this court from the judgment in the underlying case. Therefore, we do 

not have jurisdiction over this original proceeding.

Accordingly, we dismiss relators’ petition for writ of injunction for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Donovan.
1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-14-1997

Latessa v. NJ Racing Comm

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-5316

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Latessa v. NJ Racing Comm" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 103.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/103
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 Latessa v. New Jersey Racing Commission 

 No. 96-5316 

The following modifications have been made to the Court’s 

opinion issued on [date] in the above-entitled appeal and will 

appear as part of the final version of the opinion: 

Page 18, Last Sentence of the First Paragraph, the word 

“defendant” is replaced with “defendants;” 

Page 20, Fifth Sentence of the First Full Paragraph, the 

first letter of the words “Administrative Law Judge” are 

capitalized; and, 

Page 21, First Full Sentence on the page, the word “rather” 

is deleted and a comma inserted after the word “concern,” so that 

the sentence reads, “Because Mr. Latessa’s internal complaints 

about administrative procedures touch upon matters of public 

concern, the issue of retalitory action for internal speech must 

be remanded.” 

/s/ P. Douglas Sisk, 

 Clerk 

Dated: May 14, 1997
Source: http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2008inventory.html

Tier 1 Summaries - Criteria Air Pollutants only by 13 majors tiers

State/County - County slected

Geographic Aggregation

Region 3 - District Of Columbia

Pollutant: CAP - Nitrogen Oxides

Tier 1 category - all selected.

Downloaded: April 9, 2012.
fips stfips ctyfips state_abbr county_nameTIER1 TIER1NAMEpollutant_code description

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia 1 FUEL COMB. ELEC. UTIL. NOX Nitrogen Oxides

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia 2 FUEL COMB. INDUSTRIAL NOX Nitrogen Oxides

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia 3 FUEL COMB. OTHER NX Nitrogen Oxides

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia 6 PETROLEUM & RELATED INDUSTRIES NOX Nitrogen Oxides

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia10 WASTE DISPOSAL & RECYCLING NOX Nitrogen Oxides

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia11 HIGHWAY VEHICLES NOX Nitrogen Oxides

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia12 OFF-HIGHWAY NOX Nitrogen Oxides

11001 11 1 DC District of Columbia14 MISCELLANEOUS NOX Nitrogen Oxides
emissions

113.2457

234.2952

1521.056

3.779812

0

6333.161

3125.098

1.68
Order entered November 29, 2016 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01369-CV 

IN RE HOWARD HOLLAND, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 86th Judicial District Court 

Kaufman County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 31610-86 

ORDER 

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY relator’s November 18, 2016 

motion to compel the trial court to rule on relator’s motion for production of grand jury 

transcript, which we treat as a petition for writ of mandamus. . 

/s/ BILL WHITEHILL 

 JUSTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40474

Cons. w/ No. 15-41076

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JESUS ALVAREZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CR-96-1

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Jesus Alvarez has moved in these 

consolidated appeals for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Alvarez has filed a response. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 28, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-40474 Document: 00513774892 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/28/2016
No. 16-40474

Cons. w/ No. 15-41076

2

Included in Alvarez’s response is a claim that trial counsel and appellate 

counsel were ineffective for failing to argue that the district court did not have 

jurisdiction over his criminal proceedings because Congress does not have the 

power under the Constitution to create federal crimes. We generally do not 

review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. United 

States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014). However, this is one of those 

“rare cases in which the record” permits us to “fairly evaluate the merits of the 

claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Alvarez was 

convicted pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 

and 841. The CSA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s authority under the 

Commerce Clause. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12-22 (2005). 

Accordingly, Alvarez has not shown a nonfrivolous issue regarding whether his 

trial counsel or his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 

district court’s jurisdiction over his criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record 

reflected therein, as well as Alvarez’s response. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeals present no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused 

from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEALS ARE DISMISSED. See

5TH CIR. R. 42.2. Alvarez’s motion for transcripts and the appointment of new 

counsel is DENIED. See United States v. Wagner, 158 F.3d 901, 902-03 (5th 

Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Ramos, 390 F. App’x 425, 426 (5th Cir. 

2010).

 Case: 16-40474 Document: 00513774892 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/28/2016
prepared forCENRAP/CENSARAprepared byGreg StellaJim WilkinsonT.W. TescheAlpine Geophysics, LLCFt. Wright, KY5 May 2006Appendix BPM2.5Composition and Preliminary VisibilityProjections at Class I MonitorsContentsContentsComposition of PM2.5 mass at Class I Areas3⁄4Obtained from most recent dataposted on the IMPROVE website3⁄4http://vista.cira.colostate.edu/views/web/AnnualSummaryDev/Composition.aspxPreliminary Visibility Projections at Pertinent ClassI Area3⁄4Morris, R.E., G. Mansell, B. Koo,A. Hoats, G. Tonnesen, M. Omary,C-J Chien, and Y. Wang, 2006b. CENRAP Modeling: Preliminary2018 Visibility Projections”, presented at the 7 February 2006CENRAP Workgroup/POG Meeting, prepared by ENVIRONInternational Corporation and U.C. Riverside.Big Bend (TX)

# Boundary Waters Canoe AreaBoundary Waters (MN)Visibility Projections Not Available from Morris et al.,Visibility Projections Not Available from Morris et al.,2006b due to data insufficiency at Boundary Waters.2006b due to data insufficiency at Boundary Waters.Breton Island (LA)Pie Chart Data Not Available from IMPROVE websitePie Chart Data Not Available from IMPROVE website

# Caney Creek, ArkansasCaney Creek (AR)Guadalupe Mountains, (TX)

# Hercules Glade, MissouriHercules-Glades (MO)

# Mingo, MissouriMingo (MO)

# Upper Buffalo, ArkansasUpper Buffalo (AR)Voyageurs (MN)Wichita Mountains (OK)

# Mammoth Cave, KentuckyMammoth Cave (KY)

# Sipsey Wilderness Area, ALSipsey Wilderness (AL)Isle Royale (MI)Badlands (SD)Great Sand Dunes (CO)Lostwood Wilderness (ND)Rocky Mountain National Park (CO)Salt Creek (NM)Theodore Roosevelt (ND)Wheeler Peak (NM)White Mountains (NM)Wind Cave National Park (SD)
EXHIBIT 15.4


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM




We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-101990, No. 333-119885 and No. 333-125064) on Form F-3 and Form S-8 of Top Image Systems Ltd. of our report dated April 21, 2009, with respect to the consolidated balance sheet of Top Image Systems (Asia Pacific) Pte. Ltd. (“the Company”, formerly known as Asiasoft Global Pte Ltd) and its subsidiaries as of December 31, 2008, and the related consolidated statement of operations, changes in shareholders’ equity, and cash flow for the year ended December 31, 2008 and the six months ended December 31, 2007, which report appears in the December 31, 2009 annual report on Form 20-F of Top Image Systems Ltd.






KPMG LLP




Singapore


June 28, 2010
Exhibit 32.1

SOHU.COM INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Sohu.com Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Charles Zhang,
Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company, certify, pursuant to U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of
June 30, 2011 and results of operations of the Company for the three months ended June 30, 2011.



/s/ Charles ZhangCharles Zhang, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of DirectorsAugust 8, 2011