DLD-032 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-3770

___________

CATHY MESTMAN,

 Appellant

v.

JUDGE LINDA GRASSO JONES, J.S.C.; 

HERBERT FELDMAN

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.N.J. No. 3-16-cv-05791)

District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 3, 2016

Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 23, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Cathy Mestman appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint. 

We will affirm.

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

I.

Cathy Mestman has been involved in a number of landlord-tenant disputes in New 

Jersey state court. In 2014, she filed a federal complaint challenging a state-court order 

of eviction and named as a defendant the state-court judge who entered it. The District 

Court dismissed her complaint, and we affirmed on the grounds that it was barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine1and judicial immunity. See Mestman v. Escandon, 613 F. 

App’x 202, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2015).

The complaint at issue here concerns a different state-court action. On September 

12, 2016, the Honorable Linda Grasso Jones of the New Jersey Superior Court ordered 

Mestman’s ejectment from a condominium owned by Herbert Feldman. Mestman then

filed a complaint naming both Feldman and Judge Jones as defendants. Mestman 

claimed that Feldman is her long-time psychologist, that he agreed to rent his 

condominium to her, and that he committed perjury when he testified otherwise. She 

further claimed that Judge Jones is biased against her and violated various court rules and 

procedures. Mestman did not request any specific relief, but she appeared to seek 

invalidation of the ejectment order and she complained of injuries allegedly cause by that 

order (including homelessness and lack of access to belongings in Feldman’s 

condominium). 

 

1 See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 

462 (1983). 
3

The District Court granted Mestman leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened 

her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction 

and as barred by judicial immunity. Mestman appeals.2

II.

We will affirm. Like Mestman’s previous complaint, this complaint is barred by 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives district 

courts of jurisdiction to hear “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Great 

W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow, but Mestman’s complaint fits squarely within it 

because she complains of injuries caused by a state-court judgment preceding her federal 

complaint and seeks review and rejection of that judgment.

To the extent that Mestman’s complaint can be read to raise any independent civil 

rights claims against Judge Jones based on her conduct of the ejectment hearing, those 

claims are barred by judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); 

 

2 The District Court dismissed Mestman’s complaint “without prejudice,” but its decision 

is final because the deficiencies that it identified are not curable by amendment. Thus, 

we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary. See Allah v. 

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
4

Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Finally, 

we cannot discern any conceivable basis for a federal claim against Feldman arising from 

his alleged perjury. 

We have carefully reviewed all of Mestman’s filings on appeal. We are aware of 

her medical problems, we are sympathetic to her claim that she is currently living out of 

her car, and we do not doubt that she is experiencing the difficulties that she alleges. 

Nevertheless, both the District Court and this Court lack jurisdiction to provide relief 

from the state court’s ejectment order. We express no opinion on whether Mestman may 

obtain such relief from the state appellate courts with appellate jurisdiction over her

ejectment proceeding. 

III.

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Mestman’s

pending motions are denied. We note that Mestman has been calling the Clerk’s Office 

and the Circuit Executive’s Office on a daily basis and yelling at and berating their staff. 

Due to the abusive nature of her phone calls, Mestman is prohibited from calling the 

Clerk’s Office or any other office of this Court. Any further communications from 

Mestman to this Court must be in writing. Mestman is warned that further abusive 

conduct and abusive filings may result in sanctions.