[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Cleveland v. Oles, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-5834.]

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-5834 

THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT, v. OLES, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Cleveland v. Oles, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-5834.] 

Constitutional law—Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution—Article I, 

Section 10 of Ohio Constitution—Placement of a suspect in front seat of a 

police vehicle during a traffic stop does not alone determine whether 

suspect has been subjected to custodial interrogation such that Miranda

warnings were required—Relevant inquiry is whether, under totality of 

circumstances, a reasonable person in suspect’s position would have 

understood himself to be in custody—Appellee was not subjected to 

custodial interrogation because intrusion by trooper was minimal, 

questioning and detention were brief, and interaction was nonthreatening 

and nonintimidating—Judgment affirming suppression of appellee’s 

statements reversed and cause remanded. 

(Nos. 2016-0172 and 2016-0282—Submitted March 1, 2017—Decided July 19, 

2017.) 

APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 102835, 2016-Ohio-23. 
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2 

______________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, we address whether the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution require a law-enforcement officer to provide Miranda warnings to a 

suspect who is placed in the front seat of a police vehicle for questioning during a 

traffic stop. We hold that the placement of a suspect in the front seat of a police 

vehicle during a traffic stop is not alone determinative of whether the suspect has 

been subjected to a custodial interrogation. The relevant inquiry is whether, under 

the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position 

would have understood himself or herself to be in custody. Accordingly, we answer 

the certified-conflict question in the negative. We also reverse the judgment of the 

Eighth District Court of Appeals because the circumstances here do not indicate 

that appellee, Benjamin S. Oles, was subjected to a custodial interrogation. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} On the night of September 19, 2014, an Ohio State Highway Patrol 

trooper was monitoring traffic on Interstate 90 in Cleveland with a laser speedmeasuring device. He was standing outside his patrol car, which was parked at the 

divergence of two highways in a gore—a triangular area with hash marks indicating 

that traffic is not permitted—when he saw Oles’s vehicle cut across the gore and 

nearly strike his patrol car. The trooper pursued the vehicle and initiated a traffic 

stop. He approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, advised Oles of the reason he 

had been stopped, and asked where he was coming from. Oles responded that he 

was coming from a wedding. The trooper noticed the odor of alcohol but was 

unsure whether it came from Oles himself or from somewhere in the vehicle. The 

trooper then asked Oles to step out of the car and sit in the front seat of the patrol 

car. During their interaction, the trooper observed Oles moving slowly and 

deliberately. 
January Term, 2017 

3 

{¶ 3} In the front seat of the patrol car, the trooper again asked Oles where 

he was coming from and asked him how much alcohol he had consumed that 

evening. Oles responded that he had consumed four mixed drinks while at the 

wedding. 

{¶ 4} The trooper then asked Oles to step out of the patrol car to perform 

field sobriety tests. Because Oles failed the tests, the trooper believed that he was 

under the influence of alcohol. He arrested Oles and placed him in the back seat of 

the patrol car. Oles was cited with two counts of operating a motor vehicle while 

under the influence (“OVI”) under R.C. Chapter 4511 and a marked-lanes violation. 

At no time was Oles administered Miranda warnings. 

{¶ 5} In the Cleveland Municipal Court, Oles moved to suppress evidence 

obtained during the stop, including his statements made to the trooper while he sat 

in the front seat of the patrol car and the results of his subsequent field sobriety 

tests. Oles challenged the admissibility of his statements on the grounds that they 

were obtained in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution and without the procedural safeguards established in Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The court granted 

the motion to suppress. 

{¶ 6} The city appealed, and the Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. The Eighth District concluded that “[u]nder the totality of the 

circumstances presented in this case, we find that a reasonable person, removed 

from his or her own vehicle and questioned about their alcohol consumption in the 

passenger seat of a police cruiser would not feel free to leave.” 2016-Ohio-23, 45 

N.E.3d 1061, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 7} The Eighth District, sua sponte, certified that a conflict existed 

between its decision and decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, and 
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Eleventh District Courts of Appeals. We accepted the following certified-conflict 

question: 

“[I]n the course of a traffic stop, d[o] the Fifth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the 

Ohio Constitution require a law enforcement officer to provide 

Miranda warnings to a suspect who is removed from his vehicle and 

placed in the front seat of a police vehicle for questioning?” 

(Brackets sic.) 145 Ohio St.3d 1455, 2016-Ohio-2807, 49 N.E.3d 319, quoting the 

court of appeals’ journal entry. We also asserted jurisdiction over Cleveland’s 

discretionary appeal and consolidated the two cases. 145 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2016-

Ohio-2807, 49 N.E.3d 320. 

ANALYSIS 

{¶ 8} In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 

694, the United States Supreme Court established procedural safeguards for 

securing the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution makes the privilege against self-incrimination applicable 

to a witness in a state proceeding. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 84 S.Ct 1489, 

12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). A similar privilege is recognized in Article I, Section 10 

of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 9} What are now commonly known as Miranda warnings are intended 

to protect a suspect from the coercive pressure present during a custodial 

interrogation. Miranda at 469. A custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated 

by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444. If a suspect 

provides responses while in custody without having first been informed of his or 
January Term, 2017 

5 

her Miranda rights, the responses may not be admitted at trial as evidence of guilt. 

Id. at 479.

{¶ 10} In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 

317 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed whether the scope of Miranda extended 

to the roadside questioning of a motorist during a routine traffic stop. In that case, 

an Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper initiated a traffic stop after observing a 

vehicle weave in and out of a highway lane. The trooper asked the driver to get out 

of the vehicle. When the driver had difficulty standing, the trooper asked him to 

perform a field sobriety test, which the driver failed. When asked whether he had 

been using intoxicants, the driver, in slurred speech, said that he had consumed two 

beers and had smoked several marijuana joints. The trooper then arrested the driver 

and transported him to jail, where he was administered a blood-alcohol test and 

asked additional questions. At no time were Miranda warnings provided. 

Berkemer at 424. 

{¶ 11} In Berkemer, the Supreme Court recognized that although a traffic 

stop “significantly curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of the driver and passengers, if 

any, of the detained vehicle,” the stop alone does not render a suspect “in custody” 

and therefore does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings. Id. at 436, 440. The 

court explained that “[i]f a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop 

thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical 

purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by 

Miranda.” Id. at 440. 

{¶ 12} The court specifically noted the noncoercive aspects of a traffic stop 

that “mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced ‘to speak where 

he would not otherwise do so freely.’ ” Id. at 437, quoting Miranda, 384 at 467, 

86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. For example, in contrast to a stationhouse 

interrogation, traffic stops are generally temporary and brief, involving a short 

period of questioning and possibly a citation before the driver is free to go. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

Berkemer at 437-438. Additionally, an ordinary traffic stop is less “ ‘police 

dominated’ ” than interrogations that require Miranda warnings because the lawenforcement officer’s “aura of authority” over the driver is offset by the public 

nature of the stop and the typical one-to-one ratio of officer to motorist. Id. at 438-

439. 

{¶ 13} Ultimately, in Berkemer, the court held that the only relevant inquiry 

is how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood his or 

her situation. 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317. Because the 

motorist in Berkemer was not able to demonstrate that he had been subjected to 

“restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest,” the court 

concluded that he had not been taken into custody for purposes of Miranda. Id. at 

441-442. 

{¶ 14} We applied Berkemer in State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-

Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, in which a trooper questioned the subject of a traffic 

stop while the subject was seated in the front seat of a police vehicle. In Farris, the 

trooper smelled marijuana in a vehicle after initiating a traffic stop for speeding. 

The trooper then asked the driver to step out of the car, performed a pat-down search 

of the driver, took the driver’s keys, and asked the driver to sit in the front seat of 

his police vehicle. In the front seat, the following occurred: 

[The trooper] told Farris that he had smelled marijuana in the car. 

Without administering a Miranda warning or seeking consent to 

search the car, [the trooper] asked Farris about the smell of 

marijuana. Farris told [the trooper] that his housemates had been 

smoking marijuana when he left the house. [The trooper] told Farris 

that he was going to search the car and then specifically asked 

whether there were any drugs or drug devices in the car. Farris 
January Term, 2017 

7 

admitted that there was a “bowl,” i.e., a marijuana pipe, in a bag in 

his trunk. 

Id. at ¶ 3. After this admission, the trooper administered Miranda warnings and 

then repeated the same questions. Id. at ¶ 4. 

{¶ 15} Citing Berkemer, we concluded that a reasonable person in Farris’s 

position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody while sitting in 

the police vehicle. Id. at ¶ 14. Specifically, the trooper’s treatment of Farris—

patting him down, taking his keys, instructing him to sit in the police vehicle, and 

telling Farris that he was going to search the car due to the smell of marijuana—

permitted a reasonable belief that Farris could not leave and would be detained long 

enough for the officer to conduct the vehicle search. Id. Therefore, Farris’s 

statements obtained without Miranda warnings were inadmissible. Id. at ¶ 13-14. 

{¶ 16} Since Farris, decisions of our courts of appeals, including the 

conflict cases identified by the Eight District Court of Appeals, have distinguished 

Farris and concluded that officers who questioned suspects in the front seat of 

police vehicles during traffic stops did not engage in custodial interrogations. 

{¶ 17} In State v. Brocker, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2014-P-0070, 2015-

Ohio-3412, ¶ 18, the Eleventh District held that the questioning of a driver inside a 

police vehicle did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation because the 

detention in the front seat was brief, the questioning was not intimidating, and the 

trooper neither took the driver’s keys nor searched the driver’s vehicle. See also

State v. Serafin, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0036, 2012-Ohio-1456, ¶ 38 (no 

custodial interrogation when the driver was subjected to a pat-down search before 

the trooper questioned him in the front seat of the police vehicle). 

{¶ 18} In State v. Kraus, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-070428 and C-070429, 

2008-Ohio-3965, ¶ 13-14, the First District held that a driver’s questioning in the 

front seat of a police vehicle was not a custodial interrogation because the intrusion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

was minimal in that the driver was not searched or handcuffed, was permitted to 

keep his keys, and was not subjected to a lengthy period of questioning. See also

State v. Leonard, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060595, 2007-Ohio-3312, ¶ 17-23 (no 

custodial interrogation of driver in front seat of police vehicle because intrusion 

was minimal in that neither the driver nor his vehicle was subjected to a search, the 

driver was not handcuffed, the driver retained his keys, and the detention was brief). 

{¶ 19} In State v. Crowe, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 07CAC030015, 2008-

Ohio-330, ¶ 35, the Fifth District distinguished Farris, noting that the driver in 

Crowe was not subjected to a pat-down search before being placed in the front seat 

of the cruiser, was not handcuffed, was permitted to keep his keys, and was not 

subjected to a vehicle search or a lengthy detention. See also State v. Mullins, 5th 

Dist. Licking No. 2006-CA-00019, 2006-Ohio-4674, ¶ 30. 

{¶ 20} And in State v. Coleman, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 06 MA 41, 2007-

Ohio-1573, ¶ 37, the Seventh District distinguished Farris and determined that an 

officer who asked a driver seated in the front seat of the officer’s police vehicle 

how much alcohol the driver had consumed had not conducted a custodial 

interrogation. 

{¶ 21} These decisions illustrate that determining whether front-seat 

questioning during a traffic stop is a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda 

warnings demands a fact-specific inquiry that asks whether a reasonable person in 

the suspect’s position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody 

while being questioned in the front seat of the police vehicle. Farris, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 14; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 

104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317.

{¶ 22} Determining whether the totality of the circumstances in a particular 

case indicates that a custodial interrogation occurred requires a more exacting 

inquiry by the courts than the simple application of a bright-line rule of law. Indeed, 

the Supreme Court in Berkemer acknowledged that its decision would leave lower 
January Term, 2017 

9 

courts with occasional difficulty in deciding whether a suspect was “in custody” for 

Miranda purposes. Berkemer at 441. But the court warned against the lure of 

establishing a bright-line rule that Miranda applies to all traffic stops or that 

Miranda does not apply until a formal arrest. Id.

{¶ 23} Similarly, here, we decline to adopt the bright-line rule that 

questioning a suspect in the front seat of a police vehicle during a traffic stop rises 

to the level of a custodial interrogation. In some cases, such as Farris, the totality 

of the circumstances will demonstrate that questioning a suspect in the front seat of 

a police vehicle is a custodial interrogation that requires Miranda warnings. But 

front-seat questioning, by itself, does not necessarily constitute a custodial 

interrogation. 

{¶ 24} Drawing from Berkemer, Farris, and subsequent decisions of our 

courts of appeals, we identify the following factors that may provide guidance: 

questioning a suspect during a traffic stop in the front seat of a police vehicle does 

not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation when (1) the intrusion is minimal, 

(2) the questioning and detention are brief, and (3) the interaction is nonthreatening 

or nonintimidating. 

{¶ 25} We apply these factors here. 

{¶ 26} The trooper in this case asked Oles to sit in the front seat of his patrol 

car and did not perform a pat-down search. Unlike the officer in Farris, the trooper 

here did not indicate that he wanted to search Oles’s vehicle and permitted Oles to 

keep the vehicle keys during the traffic stop. The setting was in public view on the 

highway shoulder, and the trooper performed procedures typical of a traffic stop. 

Thus, we find that the intrusion was minimal. 

{¶ 27} Second, the record demonstrates that Oles’s questioning and his 

detention in the patrol car were both short in duration. The trooper had a brief 

conversation with Oles to discern whether the odor of alcohol originated from Oles 

himself or from somewhere else in his car. Once Oles revealed how many drinks 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

he had consumed that evening, the trooper began the field sobriety tests. The 

brevity of the interaction underscores the ordinary nature of the traffic stop and the 

noncoercive nature of the questioning. 

{¶ 28} Third, the interaction between Oles and the trooper was 

nonthreatening and nonintimidating. Oles was not handcuffed. There is no 

indication that the questioning was overly repetitive or that Oles objected to any of 

the trooper’s requests or questions. In the vehicle, the trooper asked Oles the kind 

of general, on-the-scene questions that are typical of a routine traffic stop in which 

alcohol is suspected to be a factor. This differs from the kind of interrogation—

designed to pressure a suspect to confess to illegal conduct—that was of particular 

concern to the Supreme Court in Miranda. And it differs from the interaction in 

Farris, in which the trooper made it known that he suspected illegal conduct (i.e., 

that he smelled marijuana), told Farris that he would search the car, and then asked 

about illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia that he might find in the car. 

{¶ 29} When viewing the totality of the circumstances in this case, we find 

that a reasonable person in Oles’s position would not have understood himself or 

herself to be in custody. The trooper’s questioning of Oles in the front seat of the 

patrol car did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda 

warnings. 

{¶ 30} Oles contends that his belief that he was not free to leave should be 

dispositive. The court of appeals also articulated the test this way, finding that a 

reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. But the relevant inquiry is 

whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood 

himself or herself to be in custody. This nuance is important and well reasoned. If 

the inquiry were whether the driver felt free to leave, then every traffic stop could 

be considered a custodial interrogation because “few motorists would feel free 

either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop 

without being told they might do so,” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 
January Term, 2017 

11 

82 L.Ed.2d 317. And a law-enforcement officer, in the midst of investigating a 

traffic stop and performing all its attendant procedures, would not consider a driver 

free to leave unless given permission. But “not free to leave” and “in custody” are 

distinct concepts. 

{¶ 31} For purposes of the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination, the test is not whether the individual feels free to leave but whether 

the situation “exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his 

free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned 

of his constitutional rights.” Id. at 437. Considering the totality of the 

circumstances here, we conclude that no constitutional violation occurred.1

{¶ 32} Because we reverse the judgment affirming the suppression of 

Oles’s statements and the results of the field sobriety tests, we need not reach the 

city’s second proposition of law, regarding the independent-source doctrine. 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 33} The placement of a suspect in the front seat of a police vehicle 

during a traffic stop is not alone determinative of whether the suspect has been 

subjected to a custodial interrogation. The relevant inquiry is whether, under the 

totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would 

have understood himself or herself to be in custody. Accordingly, we answer the 

 

1

 In Farris, we determined that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides greater 

protection to criminal defendants than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution with 

respect to the admissibility at trial of physical evidence seized as a result of unwarned statements 

made in custody without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 

849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 48. We held in Farris that such evidence is inadmissible under Article I, 

Section 10, whereas a plurality of the United States Supreme Court had agreed that the admission 

of such evidence does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, United 

States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004). 

 Here, however, that issue is not present because we conclude that Oles was not subjected 

to a custodial interrogation, and therefore, the need for Miranda warnings was not triggered. We 

decline to extend our holding in Farris regarding the protection offered by the Ohio Constitution 

beyond the scope of that case, particularly without argument from the parties regarding whether the 

Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the Fifth Amendment in this scenario. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

certified question in the negative, reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court 

of Appeals, and remand the cause for further proceedings. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

O’NEILL, J., dissents with an opinion. 

__________________ 

O’NEILL, J., dissenting.

{¶ 34} I must respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the 

Eighth District Court of Appeals and hold that custody began and Miranda

warnings were required as soon as the trooper directed appellee, Benjamin Oles, to 

sit in the front seat of the patrol car. 

{¶ 35} A reasonable person who has been stopped for any traffic violation 

and asked to have a seat in a police vehicle—whether front seat or back seat, 

whether handcuffed or not—would believe that he or she is in custody at that point. 

He or she would certainly not feel free to leave—and, as the trooper testified in this 

case, Oles was not free to leave. 

{¶ 36} To follow the majority’s logic, one would have to accept the 

proposition that a citizen sitting in the front seat of a police cruiser at the officer’s 

request would be free to state, “Well, I have had enough of this chat” and then 

reach, furtively or otherwise, for the door handle and exit the vehicle. Common 

sense and the safety of both the officer and the citizen require a wholly different 

conclusion. 

{¶ 37} In fact, technology has completely changed the landscape since 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was 

decided back in 1966, over 50 years ago. Police vehicles are now equipped with 

computers, giving officers access to a world of information while seated inside 
January Term, 2017 

13 

them. Every police vehicle is now a police station on wheels. Being directed to 

have a seat in a police vehicle is akin to being taken to the police station. 

{¶ 38} As the United States Supreme Court stated in Berkemer v. McCarty, 

“the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would 

have understood his situation.” 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 

(1984). The Eighth District was exactly right when it stated that “a reasonable 

person, removed from his or her own vehicle and questioned about their alcohol 

consumption in the passenger seat in a police cruiser would not feel free to leave.” 

2016-Ohio-23, 45 N.E.3d 1061, ¶ 19. In fact, it would be “unrealistic and 

irrational” for a reasonable person to believe otherwise. Id. at ¶ 20. I fail to see 

how any other conclusion is possible. 

{¶ 39} This is a different situation than what occurs during a typical traffic 

stop or a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 

(1968). In those circumstances, the officer has stopped the suspect because of 

observed behavior and is permitted to begin a preliminary investigation by asking 

a few questions. Once the officer directs the suspect out of his or her car or off the 

sidewalk and into the police vehicle, a fundamental change has occurred. Once the 

suspect is instructed to enter the police vehicle, that person’s actions are now being 

controlled by the police officer. A reasonable person in the suspect’s position 

would feel that he or she is, at that point, under the control of the officer and in 

custody. The suspect’s freedom of action has been curtailed in a significant way. 

{¶ 40} The fundamental question in police-custody cases has always been 

a matter of where we should draw the line. The result has been the functional 

equivalent of gerrymandering. Courts have been enabled to draw the line in and 

around the countless fact patterns that have arisen. It has reached the point at which 

neither the police nor trial courts can safely rely on an established rule of law. The 

time has come to change that and define an easily articulable rule: if an officer is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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instructing a suspect to have a seat in a police vehicle, then Miranda warnings are 

required. Period, end of sentence. 

{¶ 41} Whether the suspect is instructed to sit in the front seat or back seat 

should not matter, nor whether the suspect is patted down, searched, or handcuffed. 

Once that suspect is placed in the police station on wheels, he or she is in custody. 

If the officer wants to ask some preliminary investigative questions, that can be 

accomplished while the suspect is still in his or her own vehicle, or standing outside 

it. Not only would this be an easily understood rule of law, but it also makes sense. 

{¶ 42} I must dissent. 

__________________ 

 Barbara Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, Kimberly G. Barnett-Mills, 

Interim Chief Prosecutor, and Jonathan L. Cudnik, Assistant Prosecutor, for 

appellant. 

 Patituce & Associates, L.L.C., Joseph C. Patituce, and Megan M. Patituce, 

for appellee. 

 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 

T. Van and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal 

for amici curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association and Cuyahoga County 

Prosecutor’s Office. 

 Russell S. Bensing, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association 

of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 

______________________