REF ID:A65669 

T()P SE€RE'f 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

MECHANIZATION IN SUPPORT 

OF COMINT 

PHASE II 

WARNING. 

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 

CODEWORD MATERIAL 

TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMB!R 5 3oolo 7 ~ - . COPY 5 Of SJ I COPlt! i I ill!'.'... 

PAGE OF PAGES 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 08-16-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
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MECHANlZA TION IN SUPPORT OF COMINT 

PHASE II 

Editors 

a. F. De Francesco R/D 

o. L. Hogan R/D 

Repo.rt Committee 

W. A. Blankinship R/D 

H. F. De Francesco R/D 

D. L. Jiogan R/D 

R. A. ~eible r R/D 

A. J. Levenson PROD 

Directed by 

A. B. Clark R/D 

J. J. Eachus R/D 

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PREFACE 

This report contains the results of the second phase of the 

study "Mechanization in Support of COMINT". It is a: somewhat 

detailed statement of what is being done at the present 'time, and 

attempts to point out the weaknesses of that e££ort. Phase Three 

will comprise suggestions as to what can be done to eliminate 

these weaknesses. Readers of this 4.ocument are invited to con~· 

tribute sμggestions for inclusion therein. The fourth and final 

phase will be a considered selection of these proposals, inte-nded 

to form an integ~ated Research and Development program. 

Chapter A was written by H. F. De Francesco and reviewed 

by O. R. Kirby. Chapter B was written by A. H. Housman and 

E. Fergusson. Mr. 0.. R. Kirby also reviewed this chapter. 

W. A. Blankinship wrote the chapter on Traffic Analysis; it was 

refereed by H. L. Conley. The chapter on Weat~er was written 

by H. F. De Francesco and reviewed by A. We Kellond and 

L. Sch~auch. D. L. Hogan and H. F. De Francesco compiled the 

chapter on Plain Language which was checked by P. A. ·O'Sullivan. 

The chapter on Machine Ciphers was prepared under the general 

supervision of A. J. Levenson. The section on Hage~n was written by J. E. Bates, Selector Machines by T. A. Evans and 

M. H. Budenbac:;k. Sturgeon by G. F. Stahly, Introduction and Sec .. 

tion on Enigma by A. J. Levenson. 

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The chapter on Hand System·& -was wr'itten by R. A. Lelbler 1 

The Cinal chapter was written by H. F. De Francesco and 

D. L. Hogan. It was edited by M. M. Mathews and A. B. Clark. 

In addition, L. W. Tordella, H. H. Campaigne • A, B, Clark• 

and J. J. Eachus read through selected chapters of this report 

and gave many valuable suggestions as to form and content. 

Many others, whose names are not listed, have freely contrl• 

buted both time and talent to the fact finding tasks and editing chores. 

To these people we are especially indebted. 

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TABLE OF CONT~NTS 

Preface 

A TRAFFIC COLLECTION ACTIVITY ·I 

I Introduction • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . • • 

II Problems of Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Search Problems • . . • . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 

z. Location and Assignment Problems • . • • I • • . • • . ~ 

3. Budgetary Problems • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • . • 

4. Administrative Problems . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 

5. Technological Problems • • • • . . . • • . • • • • • • . III Present and Future •••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

1. Standardization of Equipment • • • . . • • • • •• • • • • 

2. Standardization of Operation • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • 

3. Site Planning and Modification . • • • • . • • • • • • • • 

4. Operation.Requirements • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

s. Copy R«:;quirements . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

6. Personnel Requirements . . • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • 

B TRAFFIC COLLECTION ACTIVITY-II 

• 

I Introduction . . . . . • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • . • • • 

1. Definition • • . • . • . • . • • • . . • • • • • • • • • . • 

2. Evaluation • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • . • • • • 

3. Non-Conventional Signals • • • • • • • • • . • • • . • . • 

4. Comments and Recommendations • • • • • • • • • . • • • 

II General Description of Traffic Collection Operation • . . . 1. Types of Transmissions • • • . • . . • • • • • . • . . • 

2. Nature of Traffic . • • . • . • . . . . . • . • • • . • • . 3. Quantity of Traffic • . . • • . • . . . • . • • . . • . 4. Intercept Facilities • • . . . . • . • . . . 

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TABLE OF CCNTENTS (cont'd) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

.t--age 

s. Receipt of Traffic ••••• • ••••••• • •• • • • • lb 

1. 

a. Page Copy Production •••••••••• • •• • • 17 

b. Sorting and D~stribution •• • • • • • • • • • • • • 17 

Evaluation of Effectiveness of Currenlt Operations •••• 

Technical Evaluation of Elements • • • • • • • • • • • 

a. Antennas • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

b. Coupling Transformers • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

c. Transmission Line. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • \ 

d. Multicouplers • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

e. Receiving Equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

f. Recording Equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

g. Demultiplex Equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

h. Single-Side -Band . /• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

i. Morse Operator Analysis (MOA) • • • • • • • • • 

j. Radio Finger Printing (RFP) • • • • • • • • • • • 

k. Direction Finding (D/F) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

1. Automatic Mors1e Translating Equipment • • • • • 

m. I !Positions •••••••••• • • • • • • 

n. Intercept Sites • • • • • • • • • • • •••••••• 

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2. Operational Evaluation ••••••••• ,. • • • • • • • 48 

a. Operational Evaluation Criteria • • • • • • • • • • • 48 

b. :, Morse • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

(l) Manual Morse • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

(2) Automatic Morse • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

c. Radio Printer • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

(l) Russian Service Radioprinter •• • • • • • • • • 

<2 > I t. . • • • • • • • • 

d. Radio Telephone • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

e. Qualifying Statements • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 

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TABLE OF CPNTENTS (co,nt1d1 

Comments and Recommendations . . .... . . . . . . . . .. 1. Level o( Performance ••• • • . . . . . . . . . -. . . 2. Area for 'Improvement • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

3. Liaison • • • • • • • • • • • • . .. . . . . . . . . . .. C TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 

Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• 

Description of T /A Oata ••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

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1. Call Signs ••• , • , • • ••• • •••••••• ~ •• • 67 

2. Message Headings ••••••••••••• • • ~ ••• • ~7 

3. Operator Chatter ••• • ••••••••••••••• • 67 

4. Practice Traffic ••••••••• 

s. Bona Fide Messages • ••••••• 

Description of T /A Processes •• • 

• • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • 

67 

68 

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1. The lnte rcept Operation • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 68 

i •. TECSUMS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• • 69 

3. 

4. 

s. 

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7. 

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Forwarding • • • • • • • • • • 

Transcription • • • • • • • •• 

a. Radioprinter ••. • •• • • 

b. Radio Telephone • • ••• 

c. Other Transmission ••• 

Identification •• • • 

Editing and Sorting 

• • • • • • 

. . . . ~ . Analysis • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . ~. . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • ••• 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

a. Decision •••• 

b, Evaluation ••• 

Filing and Storage • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Magnitude • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) 

Receipt •••••• 

Exploite'd Material 

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• • • . .. ,. • • 

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I e • • e 

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3. Non-Exploited Material • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . 76 

Comrrients artd Recommendations • • ••••• • .••••• 

1. Data Handling • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

2. Electrical Forwarding • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

3. Filing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

4. Other Problems • • 

Table A •••••••• 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Table B • ! • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• • • • • 

D WEATHER 

Introduction •••• • • • • • • • • 

Interest In Weather 

Weather Traffic Flow 

• • • • • • • 

. . . . ... 

. ' . . •• • • •• • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Intercept Points and Volumes ••••• • • • • • • • • • • 

c'ryptanalysis • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ 

Traffic Analysis •• • ••••••••• 

• • • • • • • • • • . . . . ~. . . . . . Re commendations 

1. T/A and C/A •• 

• • • 

• • •• 

2. Speed of forwarding • 

3.· Intercept ••••••• 

• • • • • 

• • • • • 

• • ••• 

• • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • 

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E PLAIN LANGUAGE 

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Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 86 

Sources . . . . . _./. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8b 

III ...... 1 ____ __,I Communications • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 86 

l. General e ,. e • e e • e e e 8 e l' e e • • • e I e e •· •• 86 

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4. 

Voice ••• 

In tellige nee 

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International Commercial Radio • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • 

1. 

z. 

General ••••• 

Intercept Control 

"· . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . e • I e I • I a a I I I I I I I I I I • 

3. Intelligence • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

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Areas for Mechanization I ~ I e I I. I I I • I • • • • • • 89 

F MACHINE SYSTE'MS 

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Introduction • • • • • • • • , • , • • • • • • • • • •. • • • • • 

1. Cipher Machines ...................... . 

z. Rotor Devices • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

3, Pin Wheel Machines ••••••••••••••••••• 

4. 

s. 

6. 

7. 

.8. 

a. Hagelin C·38 • •. • • • • • • •. • •••••••• ~-. 

b. Teletype ! .... ____ __.I· ••• • •• • •• • • • • • • • 

Other Varieties ••••••••••••••••• , ••• • • 

Exploitation of the ENIGMA • • • • • 

a. Number of Variables •••••• 

b. ,.μse of a Crib •••• , • • • •• 

c. Message Setting ••••••••• 

d. Volume of Effort • • • • • • • • • 

Use of High Speed Equipment •••• 

Initial Attacks • • • • • • • • • • •• 

• • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • 

. ~ . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • 

a. Pin Wheel Devices • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

b. Rotor Devices •• 

Cryptographic Security 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • • • 

• • • • • 

• • • • • ••• • • 

• • • • • . . .. • • 

The Hagelin Problem • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ' I 

1. Descriptio~ •••••••••••••••••••••••• 

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TABLE OF GO&TENTS (cont'd) 

Weaknesses •••• 

Statistical Solution 

a. Width \l/riting. 

b •. Parity Attacks 

• • • • • 

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• • • • • 

• • • • • 

• • • • 

• • • • • • 

. . . ~ . . ••••••• I 

c. 

d. 

Flagging • • • • • • • • ... • • • • • 

Effectiveness d'f Statistical Attack • 

• • 

• • 

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., . • • • • • • 

. .. • • • • 

• • • • • • 

e. 

£. 

Cage Recovery • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Depth Reading • • • .. • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • ••• 

g. Recovery of Machine Ftom Key .......... . 

Placement 

a. Crib 

• • • 

• • • • 

b. Statistical 

Machine Methods 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • I o o 0 I O • • • • • o I • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • 

• • • • • • .. . . • • • • • • • • • • • 

a. Special Machines ••••••••••• , •••••• 

b. Digital Computers • • • • • • ,• , • • • • • • • • •• 

6. Residual Problems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••••• 

7. Current Traffic and Readibility ·• • • • • • • • • • • • 

The Modified B-211 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

1. Usage •••• ·• • • • • • • • •••••••• 

z. ~Description ••••••••••••••••• 

• 

3. 

a. 

b. 

c. 

d .• 

Fractionation • • •••• 

Rotors •••••••••• 

Steckers •••••••• 

Block Diagramif' •••• 

• • • 0 e I 

• • • • • 

• • • • • • 

• • • • • • 

e. Motion ••• 

Machine Methods 

a. FROG ••• 

• • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • 

. .. 

• • 

• • 

• • 

• • 

• • 

• •_\a • • • 

• • • • • • 

• • • • • • 

• • • • • • 

• • • • • • 

• • • • • • 

• • • • •• 

• • • • • • 

• • • • • • 

b. Computer Program • • • • • • • • • • • • •••• 

c. Analogs • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

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TABLS OF CONTENrs (cont'd) 

d. Handle stc rs • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Stand a rd B .. 211 • • • • e • • • • • • .. • • I I e e • • • I 

Sturgeo11 • • • • • • • . • • • • •• • •••••••••••• 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Description . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • ... . . . I 

Analysi.s ••••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

~Aa'chine Methods ••••.••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Usage and Success ••• • •••• , • • • • • • • •• • I 

Japanese Machine Systems •••••••• • • • • • •••• 

1. 

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3. 

4. 

s. 

Usage and Success •••••••••••• • ••• • • • • 

Key Generation •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

a. Beer ••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

b. Pui:ple •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

c. BA • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Weaknesses •••••••••• • •• • • • •• 

a. Indicators • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • 

• • 

• • • 

• • • 

b. lsologs • • • • • • • • • • • • • '• 

c. Cribs •••••••••••••• '. 

d. Wiring •••••••• • ••••• 

Complicating ~~actors •••••••• 

e I • • e • I • I 

• • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • 

Machine Methods ••••••••.• • • • • • • • • • • • 

a. Within Branch ••••••••• I • e e • e • • • • • 

b. Other ••••••••••••• • • • •• • • • • • •• 

ENIGMA 

NOTE: 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

VIII are EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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Sections VII and 

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Future Machines • • • • • • • • • 

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4. 

General • • • • • .. ·- • • 

CX-52 • • • . . . • • 

._ _____ __.I• • • • • • • • • 

OMI and TBN • • • • • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

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5. Other Developments ••••••• , • • • • • • • • • • • • l3b 

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Comments and Recommendations •••••o••ooo.•o 

G HAND SYSTEMS 

Introduction • o .. • • o o • • • o o ·o , • • o • .. 0 • .. • • 

· 1: Hand Sys~ems o •• o •• o • • • o o •• • • • • • • • 0 

2. Keys • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

3. Usage • • • • • • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Diagnostic Operations • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Need -. ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • It • • • • • • •• 

Preliminary • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Identification •• 

Non-Key ••• o 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • ... ~ ' ............ . 

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Exploitation (Non-key) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

1. Needs • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. 0 • 

2. Methods • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • 0 • • • 

Exploitation (Exploitable Key) • • •• • • • • 6 • o a a • 

1. General • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • 

2. Preliminary Processing • •• a ,. •••• o e • a • o o o 

3. Principal Processing •••••••••• •~ • • • • • • 0 

Exploitation (Non-Exploitable Key) •••• 0 • • 0 • • • • 

1. General • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

2. Depth Location •••• "' • o •• •• •• o ••••••• o • 

3. Depth Reading • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

4. Key Analysis ••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••• 

Comments and Recommendations ••••••••••••• 

1. Rehandling of Traffic ••••••••• • ••••••• a • 

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TAB.LE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) 

.~~~----~-~------~-~-~--~~ 

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II 

lll 

z. 

3. 

4. 

s. 

Code Look Up • • • •. ~ • • , 

Preliminary Processii'l.g ••• 

SLED .. DEMON • e ••• •· •• 

Key· Re -use .. • • • • • • " • 

• • • •• • • • • • •• • • •• 

• • • • • • • 1• • • • • • • 

. . . , . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 

H OTHER SIGNALS 

Cryptographic Radiation 

1. Description •••••• 

• • e • • • • • • • • • •• 

• • • • • • • • • • • • •• 

• • • 

• • • 

2. Potential • • • • • • • • • ~ 

• • • • • • • 

Noise Communications' •••••••••• 

1. Description ••••••••••••••• 

z. Current Effort • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • •• • •• 

• • • • • • •• 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

Short Signals • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

1. Description • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Page 

150 

150 

150 

15\ 

l.?Z 

15Z 

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153 

154 

154 

154 

z. Current and Projected Effort • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 155. 

IV . Ciphony, Cifax and Speech Privacy • • , ·• • • • • • • • • • 

1. 'Introduction • 

a, Ciphony 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • 

• • • • • • 

b, Oifax • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • 

c. ·Speech Privacy •••••••••••••• .: • 

2. · Ciphony and Cifax • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

a, State of COMINT Effort • • • • • • • • • •• 

b, Digitalization of Ciphony • • • • • • • • • • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

c. 

d. 

e, 

f. 

g. 

h. 

Delta Modulation •••••••••• 

Pulse Code Modμlation • • • • • • • 

Vocoder plus PCM ••• • • • • • • 

Comparative rates • • • • • • • • • 

Addition of Noise 

Cifax • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (.cont'd) 

--- -------·~-_...__ 

v 

VI 

Vil 

' 3. Non-Digital Spee ch Security • • • • • • •• . . . . . . . a. Des.cription • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

b. Curr·ent and Projected Effort • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Facsirnile Intercept •••••• . . . .... 

Very High._Frequency ,Inter(ept (VHF) 

Ultra High Frequency lhtercept (UHF) 

• • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • 

VIII Comments and Recomttiendations • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . 

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A TRAFFIC COLLECTION ACTl.VITY-1 

The starting point of NSA 's COM INT activity is the collection 

of target countrys' communications Most communicators employ' 

radio trans miss ion; o.thers employ messengers, ~tc. In what 

follows we shall d~scuss only the intercept of foreign radio communications and the problems associated with this operation. If 

the communications are not transmi~ted electrically, we usually are 

not able to intercept them. 

In order to cover the communication links used by Russia, Poland, 

Communist China, and all other target nations of very high or low 

priority. we require a worldwide setup of intercept stations. Presently 

the United States has about 120 sources from which traffic is obtained. 

These sources range from intercept stations containiiig 100 or more 

positions (a position is a receiver and its associated equipment) to 

very small detachments which operate one or two receivers. Some 

intercept stations are located in very unusual sppts around the world. 

II. PROBLEMS OF COLLECTI~:ti 

1. One of the problems of colle<:tion is to locate and intercept 

transmissions sent over temporary or newly established communication links. The :program under which this problem is studied is called 

the General Se;Jrch Program. Another problem is searching for and 

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identifying new and unusual ty~es of trans miss.ions. For this prob.::·. 

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lem we utilize Technical Sear~h facilities. We ~i{{~r~ntiate be.tween 

there problems because there is a difference in our approach to them. 

New and unusual types of transmissions such as scatter and noise. 

communications, a re presently receiving fi'ttle attention. The search 

for standard high frequency communications falls under the general 

search program which is PROD's responsibility. The search for 

ne.w and unusual types of transmissions is part of the Technical 

Search program which is R/D's responsibility and which wiU be di~-

cussed in the next chapter. When we can intercept new and unusual 

signals, we 'usually try to set up an operational intettept program 

to collect worthwhile mate rial. 

We also have the problem of developing ·iM!~ equipment, new 

techniques, and new methlds for .intercept. We· will touch on this 

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problem and give a few examples in what £oliows, but as a matter of 

. information we must point out that target nations sometimes surpris'e 

us with new and different signals about which we have little or no 

previous knowledge. 

z. In order to have an effective intercept program, we must 

situate and assign our intercept facilities properly and supply them 

with the best equipment available. These axiomatic requirements 

are quite difficult to meet. For instance, we never seem to have 

enough intercept operators, stations, and equipment to cover all 

the targets on the air at any given tim·e. We have to set up priorities 

of cove.rage whereby the most important targets are covered first. 

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- - - ---------------------------· 

We then cover as many of the :less important t~rgets as we can. The 

assignment of inte.rcept s'tatio;_s to sp.eclfic targ~t~ during specific 

'periods of time is cal.led ~'intercept con~~ol, 

With reference to the prob~ems of cryptanalysis and traffic anal-

. ' . ysi~ we £ind. that the collec~ion' effort of ·the Unit~.d States leaves m~ch 

to be desired in terms of accuracy, quality of coverage,. and the exte_nsion of th~ total amount of coverage. 

There are some ~~finite reasons w~y t_his happens and ~hy we 

ar.e not abie to achieve the ultimate in intercept coverage. These 

reasons will now be discussed. 

First of all we have definite limitations' on the locatio.n of intercept sites. We would like to intercept all of the low-level c~mmuni• 

cations emanating f~om. the Moscow area. Unfortunately, we are not 

able to go to Russian territory and set up an interc;ept station to inter• 

cept this traffic. Nor a~e- we 8:1?le t? operate, a_· VHF voice intercept 

installation from an air field· or from aircraft. in the vicinity of Moscow. 

For all practical purposes we c~nnot locate·in any part of Russia or 

. . within the satellite countries. Our only. recours~ is to pick locations 

as close to the target as pos~ible ~nd as much "in line" to the signal 

direction as possible.· In most cases we intercept· traffic under non• 

ideal conditions• 

. ·. . 3. Next there are budgetary limitations· which prevent us from . . . . 

having equipment ·and pe~sonnel sufficient in number and quality. The 

NSASAB conducted a st~dy o~·the p~te~tial of COMINT to supply early 

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warning of an impending en~my attack. This board recognized 

the importance of having high q':1ality intercep't operators, analysts~· 

etc. These are the people on whom we must rely to obtain the rn,ater• 

ial from which COM INT ·is. derived. Most of-our operators are mili• 

tary personnel many of whom serve for a temporary period and then 

return to civilian life. The permanent miii'tary people also remain 

with us in the ·COMINT activity for a limited period of time ~nd are 

"then rotated. We will_ point out what is being done ori this problem 

in the sequel. 

4. We also have some administrative problems. These center on 

the lack of authority we have over field commanders, construction organizations, and others who have a say in the actual construction of inter• 

cept sites· and equipment. We must work through a chain of command. 

During this procedure there is a great deal of time lost. Moreover, 

our requirements may not conform with the req~irements of the services. As a result th~re is much time lost from the inception to the 

completion of required intercept facilities, wherever modifications, 

new sites, and equipments' are necessary. When it is required that a 

specific communications link be intercepted, we would 'like to get there 

with the equipment and men as soon as possible. At present we are 

not able to modify existing sites or put up new sites within any short 

period of time. 

S. Another problem is that of :'icquiring the technological "know how" 

to find, identify, and intercept new communication systems as they 

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- - -----------------

TOP SE1€R1!tlf ~DER 

/EO 3.3(h)(2) 

. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

come on the air, ·This means that we must employ, or l'~tain under 

c·ontract~ the· be st talent in the commun~ca.tions field/80that .. we mig~t 

keep ahead of target co.untries and be prepared to/cope wtth any com·· 

munications system they may employ in the immediate future. In 

the past we were faced with the intercept ofrnanual morse and hand·· . . . 

speed morse transmissions in the medium frequency band. Next we 

had the P.roble·m of radio-teletype. 'The res_ult was that most of our 

effort was placed 9n intercept by means ol standard radio receivers 

and teletype· equipment. Pre.s.ently t~e shift 'Ji.as been to· higher fre • 

quency transmissions, the ranges being/not only the ·s to 30 mega,,. 

cycle range but also the low to ultra-high frequency range.· Here. we 

require more modern types of inter.cept equipment. Recently, the . ' 

Russians have employed a._l ___ _.I multiplex transmission system. 

This is al1....-___ .... ~ultiplex 1Jystem wit_h which the /Russians can. 

transmit on L...-------'------------..r In addition they 

can within a short ....._ ________ ___.,.....__ __________ ____. 

period of time. A complicating cryptanalytic feature is that aU than• 

nels are l ... _____ ... rhile the transmission is on the air. 

As a point of interest, Russia has very good North -South communication links. We are off to one side trying to pick up this type 

of transmission, and the results are not very heartening. We are 

having difficulties intercepting this material and then trying to produce 

usable page copy from it. Adding to the lac'k of directivity the fact 

that we are trying to intercept transmissions having a I ... _____ _, 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

of about_I~~~~~~~---' one can readily ·s-ee·l:tit·at we -r~a'1'1y nee'a 

the best technological approach to this intercept problem in terms of 

equipment, personnel, and op.crating procedures. 

Presently we are dealing with three different intercept operat"idns_, 

setups, and procedures. Each Armed Se rvi,ce has its own equipm.ent, 

modes of ope ration, and setup procedures. Also, differences exist 

within each service; e.g., ASA stations intercepting hand-speed 

. morse employ different equipment, setup proced~res, and modes of 

operations. These differences' must be minimized. 

In the preceding paragraphs we have listed some of the major 

problems which face us. Now we shall discuss what we are doing 

to improve the present situation and what we intend to d6 in the 

future. 

1. First of all we are starting a standardization program for 

intercept ope ration. This does not mean that we intend to make every 

intercept station look like every other intercept station. What we pro• 

pose to do is to design every stati~ so as to obtain maximum efficiencf 

and effectiveness in the intercept activity and in the handling of raw 

material within that station. Within the Ai;med Services we wish to 

have ,uniformity among positions performing essentially the same 

·functions. We do not specify -that every service will employ a Collins 

HF receiver and use that receiver to the exclusion of all others. We 

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"Cv9i1\t"b·aye two OT 't1'T'e-e'-s"tandard typ~s of receivers within the se-1'• 

~ te..;p-eTf8ll'Tn ·tne same intercept mission, provided that these 

-... e<C~r s have equivalent characteristics. 

To accompHsh the standardization needed we suggest a procedure 

as follows. First, we establish the types of transmissions with which 

we have to contend. These may be manual morse, voice and high-fre• 

quency transmissions, ultra -high frequency, voice and microwave 

type transmissions, teletype of various sorts, facsimile, or others. 

Then we must determine the type of 'equipment necessary to intercept these signals. Then we must specify how the equipment should 

be operated. In .particular. some questions to ·be answered are the 

following. How should_the receiver be tuned? What recorders may 

I 

be connected to the different type r~ceivers? What is the best procedure for recording the intercept? 

· z. After we categorize the types of transmissions and the types 

of equipment best suited to intercept the transmissions, we then have 

to supply operational procedures. and information to the intercept 

station. We must determine the number of peopl'e required to do a 

specific _job, at a given intercept position at a.give·n time. 

Our attempt is to emphasize correct operation and production of 

accurate copy of desired targets rather than interception of large vol• 

umes of material. For instance, there may be a frequency range 

\., 

over which a tai·1get nation transmits extremely valuable information 

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but does so infrec.\uently. Here it might pay to guard this frequency 

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. ·... 

TOP SOOR~¥ BIDER 

T.aag·e even though we obtain o.nly se'veral mes sages a month. 

'Seca11ae o.f the value of the product, it might require two attendants 

to the position to obtain high quality intercept. Normally these two 

attendants might operate four positions •. The results that come o{{ 

the four pos~tions might not be worth much,· but too often the tenden• 

cy ln the field is to assign the two. attendants to the four positions 

rather than to the one position. This is the tendency we are trying 

to ~ver.come and it is one of th~ administrative problems facing us. 

We propose to prepare minimum standards for all o{ our major in• 

tercept operations. These standards will give the minimum requtr'e• 

ments for satisfactory intercept in terms o{ equipment, personnel, 

and operating procedures. Stations will not operate below the mini• 

mum standards and most should operate above the standards • 

3. We are also trying to keep ourselves fully informed on modifications to existing intercept sites and on th~ plans for new intercept 

sites. We intend to look at all plans for construction and modif'icati'4;>ns 

before they take place. We have some examples of inte.rcept installations 

which were improperly modified or designed. lR at least one station, 

for example, several antennas were actually cut off the transmission 

lines without affectin~ the operation of thl• station. In order to avoid 

• t 

these errors we need to review proposed plans to ascertain that the: 

stations will meet the minimmn rt"qnirE'mcnts n<'cessary for satis!ac-

' 

tory operation. Moreover, we would like the stations to be flexible 

enough to cope with chanAin~ requirements on directivity, frequency 

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TOP SBe-R~ ~IDER 

....._~e, etc., without heinp. overcquipped and overstaffed., 'i=o 3.3(h)(2) 

4. ... PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

The best way uf illustratin~ thP xequireflients placed Ol\ \.ut i't, 

to discuss a few typl!s gftrani51nissi1Jns we have tgintercept. About .. .__ ___ ___,I, th~ Russians starll~d to employJ .... __________ ......... 

transmission ~·hich they hari never usedbeforu. This incr .. ~ased the 

.. number of types of Russian trans.missions ~e must be capable of 

intercepting. The Russians also employ.._I ______ ___,.__ ____ _.. 

nd othera. 

We can usually intercept th~ single c;hannel ... l ____ _.I transmissions 

using standar<l equipment. However, the reqnirements of ._I ___ ___,~ 

Ddictated that more inform·auon on the tran.•mission had tG' be 

obtained. This required that something had to be added to the stand• 

ard equipment. As a.n example we consider two Russian stations, A 

and B operating full duplex and ernploying start-stop teletype. Such 

a situation may be considered as equivalent to two send positions each 

employing an enciphering device and a teletype. Except for the fre• 

quencies used, the positions A and B are essentially identical. 

What we would like to. obtain now is the time relatio~ships in the 

messages passing between A and B. We definitely wish to pick up 

and: record the time delays betwetln thf? slops and restarts which 

oc,cur durinA transmission. A may send to B for a length of time 

afld then stop for om? reason or another. During this pause, B might 

~top sending to A • UsinJ! standard start-stop equipment, we have no 

"fay of knowing when A or 13 is not spnding. One requirement on 

~ntercept of thiR signal is that we reccrrl both sides of the duplex link 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

·sinrnltaneouslv. If the rec.:>rd_in~ is equally good on both sides of 

the communications channel, and if t1m1t r~lationships are known, 

then a side by s1e1e character analysis will ppint.out whert.? "busts" 

occur. \\hen this pr..:>blem first arose we had/no means of using 

on-line page printers in the field to give us exact time relationships 

for both channels of communications. 

We now obtain time relationships/by means of a tape recorder. 

What we use are dual-track magnetic tape recorders. This equip• 

ment simultaneously records the/activity on both links of the channel 

and makes analysis much simpler. 

5. A great deal of our/efforts in this particular intercept problem 

is directed toward obtaining accurate copy. In some instances we 

employ the Central Processing System wherein the intercepted signal 

is analyzed and copied (usually from magnetic tape recordings) under 

controlled laboratory-like conditions. Originally this system was 

' 

devised to satisfy the side by side presentation requirement on the 

copy of duplex signal. We employ a similar technique on Russian 

I ~ultiplex. This procedure is particular,ly useful where we 

are not able to set up demultiplexing ·e-quj_pment in the field and keep 

it properly maintained. Instead we record the rritl"1t.!plex signal on magnetit tape and then process it by means of the Central Pr~sing 

System. 

We have found that Central Processing is not adequate to meet 

mass production requirements. We canno~ for example, afford to 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

rl·uplicate hour by hour in our p•ntr.1' pr1,<"i~s!'ling the time spent at 

st!ations in recordin~ I krani:;rnhsions. \l\.'e are, therefore, 

einbarkin~ on an·on-U·ne pt'intin.; JHUJ!ram in the field, using model Z8 

tieletype printers to produce page print directly from the intercepted 

signals. For simplex andl !intercept, these 

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printers are modified in such a way that they will produce page prii:its 

which retain the time relationship between channels and within each 

channel. This program will in time reduce the amount of central 

processing required at this headqual'ter·s. 

We are trying to produce standardization procedures td 1back up 

op.erations in the field. These procedures should avoid some of the 

glaring errors that occur in the operation of field stations. We 

wovld.!like. to find out if there is something WTOng in a good !Percentage 

of~stationa,. and if some stations are not carrying the load their equip• 

m.~tie.:;capab~·. of carrying. 

b., A·.larg.e.-va~~ty of equipment·ia necessary to intercept any 

one type .of :t~ansm-ission• For instance, .we may be interce;pting a 

double frequency ·shi.ft·transmission one side of which is a &·channel 

multiplex system, the other• side be in~ a simple signal. To intercept 

this we require an antenna array to pkk up the sign.al, a cable to lead 

the signal into a receiver, the receiver itself, a double frequency 1Jhift 

demodulator, demultiplexing equipment, printers and/or recorders 

and the various test and maintenance equipment. Not only does all 

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this equipment have to be kept in good repair, but it must be 

properly operated as stated before. One of otir biggest problems).~ 

to keep competent people on the job at intercept sites. In order to 

alleviate the shartage of trained operators, we are setting up the 

Civilian Intercept Operator program. We have been authorized 100 

civilian billet's as a trial test. These are ·t;SA billets which will be 

assigned to Army stations. We believe that by means of such a 

program we can develop and keep professional -intercept operators. 

To take care of some of the complicated technical problems of 

intercept, we have set up the Technical Search Mission. Possibly 

in time we may be able to handle ultra-high frequency microwave 

intercept and find answers to some of the other plaguing problems. 

We are enjoying a little success in some of these problems but much 

remains to be done. R/D is considering many of these problems 

as well as the proble'1JS discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The 

next chapter will contain some technical details concerning the equip .. 

ment discussed here and gives some specific recommendations on how 

this equipment might be improved. 

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TOP S~~ ~DER 

B TRAFFIC COLLECTION ACTIVITY-II 

1. INTRODUCTION 

1. The Traffic Collection Activity of NSA is defined, for the 

purposes of this paper, to be the collection of raw traffic in the 

field and the subsequent ~orwarding of this traf~ic to concentrating 

centers both overseas and in the U.S. The problem includes the 

reduction of the traffic to a form suitable for Traffic Analysis 

and Cryptanalysis; said reduction_.being· ef!ected at the intercept 

stations and/or the concentrating centers. The Traffic Collection 

Operation is descri~ed in Section II.of tbi~ chapter. 

2. Section III of this Chapter attempts to present a quantitative 

picture of the effectiveness of the Traffic Collection Activity. This 

evaluation is performed first on a technical basis on those elements 

of the intercept syste!ll which are common to each of the three basic 

intercept positions now being manned by NSA. For example, antennas• 

transmission lines, and multicouplers, are evaluated first as they 

are generally common to Morse, Radio Printe.r, and Radio Telephone 

intercept positions. This evaluation is performed in the light of 

developmen~s which are technically .feasible within the present state 

of the art. It is followed by an operational evaluation 'of each of 

three basic intercept systems. The latter is essentially an 

evaluation of the Traffic Collection effort on the basis of operational 

factors and measures 'the administrative effectiveness of the organization in terms of adequacy of personnel, of facilities [granting 

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TOPS 

technical adequacy of system components.] and of coordinated planning 

in the collection of what is needed in a form.in which it can be used . . 

efficiently. In the broadest sense, this is a partial evaluation of the 

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overall effectiveness of the management of the COMINT efforl 

': First, criteria of effectiyeness an~ definitions of the scale of 

measurement will be given. Second, altoough the scale of measure'-

ment is admittedly coarse, the effectivenes·s of collection will be 

measured in a number of key .intercept categories, and attempts will 

be made roughly to assess the relative impact of the various effectiveness gradations on the overall effectiveness of the COMINT 

collection effort. Last, an example will be given to serve as a rough 

measure of the loss to NSA in material which must be discarded, or 

. only partially exploited, because of the inability to handle the mass 

of certain types of material in the form in which it is now collected. 

Throughout, when fruitful inferences may be drawn, particular 

problems will be examined in relation to functional categories [ICR, 

etc.] or other significant factors. 

3. The evaluation qf the collection effort is performed with 

regard to the intercept of conventional communications signals 

below 30 me, leaving the evaluation of non-conventional signals and 

communications signals over 30 me to Chapter G. 

4. Section IV of this chapter contains comments and recommendations. 

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II. <;i l::J'I J:; l~._\_1 Rf;~<;::~~ I_!.JJ !~J :'\_ Q~ _'!:_ lj_l:: _T_l~_-~_!'""'...~!~-~Q_l)::. EC :n_Q~ 

9 !.-' ~!_{:~.!_I 9 ~ 

1. The three types of inll!TC"l?j>t, wl~ich comprise almost all 

of the current·trdffic collection dfort of NSA and the suμporting 

c ryptoJogic agencies, with the appr"xirnate percentclge of the totcll 

collection effort which tht=y represent ara as follows: Morse 

Intercept (69 pe1·cent), Radio 1 rinter Intercept (.!3 percent), and 

Radio Telephone 'Intercept (8 percent), a fractional percentage 

of the total traffic collection effort is devoted tu "sμecial signals" 

e.g. facsimile anrl microwave signals .. Some trc1.ffic is obtained 

by means which arc not ....__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----' 

wit . h h C d · 1 b d' d EO 3.3(h)(2) int e cognizance o NSA an w1 l not e iscusse here. PL 86_

36150 USC 3605 

Z. Before mentioning features of the collection proc:ess t)lat 

may benefit from improved equipment ~r from mechanh;ation of 

present manual processes, it is instructive to review the -1uantity 

and the nature of the traffic received. 

Traffic is obtained in many forms. The most common form 

is hard copy (one to ·six copies of each item). There is some 

manuscript single copy material and an increasing amount of magnetic 

tape recordings. Undulator tape and clean punched or chadless tele-

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type tape, mic rofllm and photosld.ts .1 re~ also received in large 

quantities. Ther,~ is also a small a11H.lUnt of high precision disc 

recordings and other miscellaneous media. 

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e!DER 

3. While accurate quantitative measurements are· not 

Obtainable, a few figures wHl illustrate the magnitude of 

collection activities. More than. two ~nd OJ?-e quarter million 

morse messages are received each month as page prints. Over 

two million non-morse messages are rec~ived, not counting 

interc'ept that is nof disfinguishable as message unit_s. More 

than two "thousand magnetic tape re~ordings of -non-morse .signals 

and nine thousand pounds of perfora~ed tape that cannot be 

divided easily into message units are received. From non-U~ S. 

sources; co~e about three hundred thousand messages each 

month. These are on microfilm, photostata, perforated tapes 

and other media. 

4. The United States currently uses approximately Zll5 

intercept positions (operator and ass~ciated equipment) of 

various types. They are located mainly in military. installations 

and in all parts of the world. Other sourc~s are at best only· 

partially under United States control and, in the main, are 

not subject to technical improvement as a result of our efforts. 

~. The bulk of the raw material is received at NSA Headq~_;1.1-fers by courier. There are about 37 tons of such material 

delt,rered each month. In addition, nearl_y 30 million groups ~ 

a month are forwarded by teletype. They are largely duplicatiop 

ot fn.ail shipment and represent p.riority ftl.aterial for which"bulk 

ahlpment constitutes a back up. Upon receipt, raw material is 

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routed according to whether. it requires further processing 

to prepare page copy or iner~Jy sorting and"."distribution to 

analytical sections. 

a. Gl!!neral1y speaking, magnetic 'tapes and punch tapes 

are·processed at ~SA Headquarters to produce page copy. II) . . these oper.ations, conventional communk~tions equipment is 

. . 

used-. Sometimes preliminary scanning of intercept logs or of 

text printed on the tapes i's pe~fo~med to minimize the amount .· . 

of material to be ·listed. In all cases listing is ;.,t·automatic·. . . . 

or manua? typewriter speeds (maximum 100 wpm). 

b. Printed material is visuaily scanned and manually 

sorted and distributed by mes~enger to using o~ganizations where 

additional classification and handling are frequently necessar·y 

prior to analytical processing. At least three. copies of hard 

copy are normally required, one fo.r exchange .purpose, while 

o_thera are used for Traffic Analysis and Ctyptanalysis. 

. . III. EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT OPERATIONS 

1. Technical Evaluation of Ele.rrienta Comprising Intercept Syatema 

a. Antennas 

The majority of antennas employ.ed in the medium 

frequency and ·high frequency bands 'at permanent and semi-permanent 

atations ar-e full rhombic a ·and non~resonant·half-rho~bics. An ·. . . . - . 

. . 

attempt is ·made to lay the antenna fielda out along SJ!!mi-.circula~. ~rca 

normal to"the direction of target coverage; for diversity reception, 

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l or 1nort' r11t-1dt.\!:• ,JC rhmnbics are installed. Each individual 

ar1tt:n1i;1 h • .lti ·• m11nir1otl fJ\Jwer g.tin of approximately lZ t~ i6 db·a~d 

providcH !re•.,u(:n,:y covur·ag(? over abo~t a two to one frequency 

range. St;rnd.1 rel .rntcm1o1 kitR .,re available to the services. for 

in_stall.,tiun ·'' inle;c:e;>t sites.; thorough technical da:t~ ia available • p 

. . de&c rihing lh•~ opera ti nic c~haracteriatic·r. of. these antenna a. ..or 

examph!, a Ht;111darrl manual is availalUe to all intercept stations 

·dcacribin1i1 different Hi7..CH "f rbumbica, with d~talla on the aui~· · 

ability e>f CMCh ant.unrld. in lPrtnll Of \ariet range, the db response 

as a· (unction of ·fre,1uancy ·•nd from 4 to ZZ me, and the db resp9nse 

for verliC"al incident wave •••Ries from 0 to SO degr"eea. 

For low bec.1uency and mediHm frequency ·coverage, . 

long wire (Beveragcr antenna& are installed, if physical condition• 

permit. 

Flfr mobile ope.r.ations. a standard military anteftl)a 

kit if; available whh:b dcH!'B lillle more than provide a maa• of wire: . . 

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to string_ out. wherever physical c&1ndltiona pe\"mlt,. .to· try ~nd · 

ca1>ture as. much enP.rgy as posslble from the electr()oomagnetic field. 

. . . It is rec0Jtni:1ed, on ·1n1r-ely technical grounda, that·. 

antennas superior to those antennas now being employed are available. For example, by modifyinA the terminating resistor on a full . . . 

rhombic, the backward response of the antenna can be modified "to 

lhe extent 'of knocking out the response· in any specified back~ard 

direction. This could prove 'ad~antageous in reducing interference 

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in Rome C.:lRe s, but ~h1 s ~echniqu~ is not known to helve been 

employed at field stations. Similarly, . the possibility of 

employing resonant 'anten.nas, in p·artkular the commercially . . . 

emploved Vee-antennas "in stacked arrays, on c·er.tain fixed 

frequency targets, has not been exploited. 

A .~ather,·tho'rough study_ of . .the effectiveness of the 

antennas .employ~d in· the CO MINT collection effort has recently • • • • I• I • I I I 

been completed. by the NSA TM.e:t. This study revealed that . . 

although the curr~ntly employed antenna systems may not be . . . . . 

up to the level of modern dev:elopment's, and recomme.nded that 

.R/D undert~ke a critical evaluati~n of the problem by far the· 

rr:iajor problem was in effectively utilizing the facilities which 

are available. It was found ~~at NSA, in making intercept 

a~signments_ to a particular intercept station often did not use 

the available information on a~tenna facilities ~t that· station. 

. . It was also found that the technical groups ln the services, charged 

with designing antenna fields in fulfillmen{ of NSA assigned missi'ons 

often did not know enough about' the intended mission assign'ments to 

properly design the antenna fie~d. In one case, involving. mission 

assignments to the Navy, it was found-that the engineering personnel, 

. . at the Bureau of Ships charge.d with the 'antenna design were not 

*TMB - The Technical Management Board is composed of repreS:entatives fro"'.' the Office of Comptroller, P/P, COM, R/D, C/SEC, 

and PROD in NSJ'.\, and from. the three Cryptologic agcnci_es, ASA, 

NSG, and AFSS.~ This Board has b~en charged with the mission of 

developing good management practices and techni"iues in the 

ope~a.tional and technical areas under the direction of the DIRECTOR, 

NSA.. 

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adeq~ately ~leared to enabl~ a proper description of th~ prQbl.em 

.to be presented. 

. Steps are being taken to improve this situation yet 

~iich remains. to_ be done. NSA (PROD) is maki~g conce~ted 

effort to improve communications between. the group assigning 

missions •nd the groups"in·the field· atte~pting to fulfill these 

missions. In addition NSA (PROD) recenily completed and . . 

distributed a publication "~ntenna Handboo.k for Field Stations" · 

NSA (R/D) has pr.epared a technical description of a. study to be· 

undertak~n by a~ ou.tside group. udder contract, to perform a 

.critical evaluation of the adequacy of currently employed antenna 

field~ in terms of optimum performance. minimum size, etc. 

b. Coupling Transformers 

The elfectiveness of currently employed coupling 

transformers between antennas and transmission line was also 

studied recently by the NSA Technical Management Board .. 'l;'he 

substance of this study was that existing coupling ~ran,sformers 

. . did not adequately cover .the frequency spectrum. It ~as found 

that coupling transfori:ners for operation wit~ Beverage antennas 

in· the range 75 kc to 300 kc were satisfactory, but ther• were no 

coupling transformers for operati~g .in the range 15 kc to 75 kc. 

Furthermore. it was lound there were no transformers operating· 

in the range 300 kc· to Z me; finally, it was determined that the 

range of existing high fr~quency transformer (4-2.0 me), used in 

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profusion in the field, .should be_ extended to ·cover the range Z-30 me. 

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The following steps are being fa.ken to remedy this 

situation: (1) a coupling transformer design has been ·fbund which 

appears to cover the range 15 kc to 75. kc; this transfo?'.mer is being . . . 

evaluated in R/D, (Z) joint service militaJ;"y characteristics for a . 

' 

coupling transformer operating over the range .300 kc to Z me are 

being prepared by the Intercept Technical·Com.mittee of RADAC*, 

and (3) the Bureau of Ships, which w~s found to be d'eveloping an 

improved coupling tr~nsfdrmer, lias be~n asked to incorporate the 

joint cryptologic service agencies' requirements over the range 

2. to 30 me. 

c. Transmission Lines 

. The effectiveness of currently employed transmission I 

lines is another recent NSA Technical Management Board study. 

This ~tudy revealed that many stations were using open wire transmission lines with le~gths ranging up to 3ZOO feet. Although the· cost 

to install such a line is less tha~ the cost of shielded co-axial cable, 

maintenance is a niuch more serious probl.::m. It was reported in 

some cases that the open wire line was so long and in such disrepair . . . . 

that the rhombic antenna at the terminating en~ of the line could be 

shorted and the received signal strength in the operations building 

undisturbed. 

Such si~ations as this were actually well known before 

the members Qf the Technical Management Board undertook their 

*RADAC - The Resea1·c:h and Development Advisory Council advises 

the Director NSA on the programmi·ng, budgeting and implementing 

of R/D programs and the coordination of R/D requ-irementa of the 

departments and agencies engaged in the National COMINT and COMSEC 

effort. Thia council h r'lmposed of the three Deputy Directors (R/D, 

PROD, and C/SEC), P/P, LOG, COMP, and S/ASST. 

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study .. NSA (l'ROD) had attempted to remedy this particular situation b"y 

letters to the services recommending the u1te of co-axial line. The 

services in turn had acknowledged the advantages of co-axial line and 

had begun to take corrective steps. in certain cases. They in turn, 

however, ran into time d.elays in their ow~ ·supporting groups du~ to 

such factors as the requirement" to progr·a.m for the funds to procure 

the co-axial.cable in the succeedif!&.. fiscal year. Once the material 

was obtained and shipped to the ,intercept stations, additional delays 

were encountered in waiting for the engineering and construction 

groups to make the necessary installation. It is worth noting that 

such' pelays as this have been a major contributing factor to the 

fact that there has never been more than one case of a major antenna 

field change as a result of an NSA request. 

In March 1954, NSA (PROD) made another attempt to 

. . improve the situation by issuing an NSA Regulation establishing a set 

. ' 

of minimum standards for all intercept stations. For example, -in. 

the case of transmission lines, over the range Z-30 me, shielded 

co,-axial cable w·as made mandatory at all permanent and semipermanent field stations. A maximum line attenuation of 6 db was 

permitted, thus limiti.ng the length of the transmission line. 

Unfortunately there, has been little improvement as a 

result of this NSA Regulation. The reason for this lies chiefly iii 

the fact that the services have considered these regulations to be in 

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·the form of recommendations and advice o~ly and therefore not 

binding upon them. The services do not consider these regulations 

as authorative, basic guidance fo.r the. plannin.g of intercept instalka-" 

tions and for the determination of the adeq_uacy pf these installations, 

even though the regulations were is sued as such. 

NSA (PROD) has recognized the situation and is now 

p.reparing a pap.er for DIR~SA ori this suoject .. This paper is being 

prepared in 'the form of a 'letter to the services,. to be issqed b)' 

DIRNSA, in which he declares his intent to use his authority under 

N~CID No. 9 as the responsible agent for all U.S. COMINT resourc·ea. 

NSA (PROD) is planning to ask the director to use this authority (a) 

to specify the standard which must be met for acceptable COMINT 

.intercept operation and (b) to evaluate intercept facil.it~es to i.nsure 

that standards are being adhered to. 

Should the suggestions offered to DIR~SA be acceptable, 

· it is believed that great strides will hav~ been made towa;rd solving 

a major administrative problem. 

d. Multicouplers 

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A~ evaluation of the effectiveness .. of radio frequency 

multicouplers has recently been completed by the Inte:rcep~ Technical 

.commi-ttee of RADAC. I~ was determined that currently employed 

muiticoupl~rs fell considerably short of that which is technical~y 

available within the present state of the art. It was determined that 

the bequency coverage was inadequate, particularly below 

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approximately 3 me; the noi.se f.igures were ori the average of 15 db, 

while 8-10 db is considered 'easily feas,lble; Jhe generation of spuriou• 

responst'.s d'.le to intermodulation characteristics was found to be 

quite poor' it ]:>eing estimated that these responses could generally 

be reduced by as much as 30 db. 

. · ·The Inter.cept' Technical Committee o'f. RADAC is in the . .. .• 

process of completing a set of joint military ch'araGteristics describ- • • • I 

· ing a multicoupler which 'is believed to reasona~ly well full~ll currentand anticipate~ requirements. The.se military characteristics will 

serve as the basis for an R/D contract to de.velop this multicoupler. 

Past experience with the normal contract development-production 

schedule in NSA on an item as simple as this multicoupler indicates 

that 5 years will elapse from the time the military characteristics 

are agreed upon until the time production equipme~ts will be in 

operation in,the field in -1.ua_ntity. How~ver, it is possible to ·reduce 

this period by 30 percent_ to 50 percent. To do so would require _(a) 

streamlining the p~ocedures associated with letting an R/D contract 

and (b) overlapping the development, service-test and production . 

. 

phases. This would naturally entail a certain element ~f risk, but by 

shar.pening the organization, this risk could be minimized. 

e. Receiving E=iuipment 

A general study of the adequacy of radio receivers being 

used in intercept operations has just been completed by the NSA . · I . . -

Technical Mal}Qgement Board. Thf! substance of this study was that 

although cer,.tain VLF/LF and MF/HF receivers in use are obsolete 

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and unsatisfactory for COM.INT operations, there are other receivers 

covering the same frequency range whic_h a.re available to the services 

and are generally satisfactory. A few •mall ·problems with regard to 

these latter equipments, such asthe VLF receive.r bandwidths being 

too narrow for optimum voice intelligibility and one of the h-f receivers 

not being as stable, by modern standards., as it could be were brought .- ' 

out. However, there are two new .receivers ab9ut to. become available 

hi qu,ntity to the servic~s; one·receiver_,· the R3S9, covers the range 

15 kc to 500 kc and the oth~·r receiver, the R390, covers the range . . . . . 

500 ke to 30 me. These· recei~.ers ~re expected to rectify the problems 

. . 

noted by the Technical Mana~ement Board study group ·and be satls• 

factory .for normal intercept operations. It should be noted that 'the 

noise figures of these .receiver.• is expected to vary from about l to s· 

db ac:ross the frequency spectru~, which by ~ode.rn design and 

production t~chnique-. is considered to.be quite good. The dial . . 

"tabil"ity, readability and ov~rall. receiver fr~quency stability ·9{ the . . " . 

·_receivers is truly outstanding. Although these rece~ver-a ·have yet t~ . . . 

be empl~yed extensively by t~e intercept services and it is always . . . . 

possible that unforeseen "bugs", espec'ially o/ a maintenance nature . . 

· may develop, .high hopes are held for these ~quipme.nts to satisfy the 

majority of the receiver intercept requirements over the· range 15 kc 

to 30 me. 

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'I'OP S~~s~ ER 

As the result of a recent SIPS•study, it was determined 

that increas~d emphasis should be placed on the VLF portion of the 

spectrum in particular in the band from 3 'to 15 kc. Although there. 

are no military receivers covering this range •. NSA (R/D) has 

developed an experimental model of s~ch a· receiver. A limited 

number ·Of these e-1uipmenta·are being crash produced to fulfill 

these recently developed requi\eme_nts. There are a number of 

technical deficiencies in this particular receiver and it is planned 

to contract for the development of an improved model during calender 

year 1955. 

The services use a variety of diver~ity receiving ·ayatema, 

some deaigns dating back to over ZO years ago. The latest equipment 

to become available in -iUantity is the AN/FRR-Z8, a dual space 

diversity receiving syst~m which gives satisfactory performance. 

However 1 it is reported that there have been numerous component 

failures, and although the causes have been mt.nor in nature, a 

maintenance problem haa'resulted, nonetheless. A new dual diversity 

receiver is under development, the AN/FRR-2.3, wh\ch is yet to be 

technically and operationally evaluated. 

flSIPB - The Special Intercept Problems Board is compose4 of 

representatives from PROD, P/P, R/D in· NSA and from A~A_, NSG, 

AFSS, and CIA. Thia Board is charged with the mission of ~udying 

special intercept problems and advising the Director of the conclusions 

and recommendations reached. Subsequent to his approval, th, Board 

is responsible for coordinating actions with NSA and other cogni¥nt 

governmental agencies implementing the recommendations • 

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NSA (R/D) has deve.loped a dual diversity antenna 

switch which switches between .antennas,, but utilizes only one 

receiver. A theoretical evaluation of this equipment· shows it to bd 

slightly inferior to a normal dμ.al receiver diversity system. How• 

ever, due to the simplicity. of setting it in operation, it has been 

found ln field res=earch stations e~aluations 'to be generally equal to 

or slightly bett-:ir than more complicated diversity systems. Eight 

'.of these diversit~ switches are b~ing fabricated for service tests 

'by the c'ryptologic service agencies. 

Rec'ent investiga~ions made in the field of diversity 

reception have shown that the existing diversity switching or 

combining units fail to take full advantage 'Of all that diversity 

reception offers. One design of a dual div~rsity system .shows an 

advantage of 3 db over. the best of the m~re conventional systems. 

This 3 db advantage ~s not.a constant with signal levels, however, 

and in fact decreases for sig·nai levels greater or less than an 

optirri.um value. Just what this new apprC?ach would mean in • 

statistical terms in reducing .garble rates of inte~cepted traffic is 

now the subject o.f an NSA R/D contract with a local concern. 

f. Reco~ding Equipment 

An evaluation of the adequacy of COMINT recording 

equipment has been the subject of an intensive study by the Intercept. 

Technical Committee of RADAC over .the past year. This study has 

recently been comple_ted and reveals that the services have used a 

wide variety of commercial and military recording equipments to 

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fulfil~ voice and signal intercept functions. These units have not 

given satisfactory service, primarily due tp.their high maintenance ·. . . 

requirements. fragility, and physical size. In addition, no singl~ 

unit was found to provide the requisite auX\liary functions needed 

in these services, and the variety of equipments in use has presented 

a s'tandari.zation problem. On a recent trip by a member of the 

-· Intercept Facilities Divi~ion in NSA (PROD), it· was found that at 

any one time almost SO percent of the normally employed recording . . 

equipments were i'1 the maintenance shops for repair. 

An NSA R/D contract is about to be let fo~ the development of a rugged low maintenance magnetic tape recorde~-reproducer 

requiring minimum panel apace and suitable for recording and tran:~ 

cri~ing voice signals _in any language. The specificatio~s for- this 

equipment are baaed on a joint set of military characteristics 

prepared by NSA and.the three cryptologic service agencies. Another 

set of joint military characteristics is under preparation calling .for 

the developm_ent of a militarized magnetic tape recorder-reproducer 

capable of recording and reproducing !ac;_simile and c~mplex sign~~ 

Based on the development and produ~on schedules of the past, the 

program will require 4 to 5 years Jt,r production models of both 

the Voice Recorder and the SiJ!•l Recorder to be in the field in 

. quantity perf~rming in fulfiljtnent of the COMINT mission. 

Looking ah•d, it is apparent that some means for 

increasing the 11 packi.rig factor" of information on tape ·-would be of 

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major bene(~t to· the operati<?n o( the agency, not only from an 

economical viewpoint, but n'\ore important to reduce the bulk of 

material which must be handled .. · At the present time, NSA R/D 

• 

la soliciting th.e interest of major commer\:ial concerns interested in 

this problem. One concern has already put. forth a reasonable 

technical proposal for increasing the packing factor by an order. 0£ 

magnitude. It must be emphasized·that this wo'rk is a long range 

e!fort of a very basic, experimental nature. Based on past 

performance for research, d~velopment, and production, success 

would probably not be 'felt significan~ly in field operations in less 

than 8 years-. By following streamlined procedur~s. in particula~, 

by significantly -overlapping research, development and service 

testing phases, this time may be cut by one-quarter to one-half. 

g. Demultiplex .Eguiement 

(1) Frequency Division Equipment 

The vast majority of the frequency division multiplex 

signals being intercepted ar_e known as '' DFS" or "double frequency . . 

shift" signals. This type of signal is nothing more than a single 

carrier t'requency, sharply shifted from one to another of four 

possible discrete frequencies. Each of these four discrete frequencies 

corres~onds to one of the four possible states which can exist between 

two single channel "mark-space" signals operating independently. 

For ex~mple, take two or~inary single channel teletype transl'!lissions, 

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each comprised of sequenct!'e of marlC:.s (MJ ~)\d :ipaces (S). If we let . . . . 

one teletype signal be represe~t6d 1l>y M) or' and the dther teletyf)e 

signal represented by Mz or s2 , then at any.'lnstarit of tim'e-. four 

possible states exist, i.e." Ml Mz, 5i. Sz· 'Mt Sz· or sl Mz·· ·Deb 

of these states is then represent• J. by one" of'Ehe tour discrete 

carrier frequencies mentioned originally. 

There are two eqdtpmenta utiDz11d to demodulate thls 

signal, one equipment operating from the intermediate•freque.ncy 

fi-f) of a receiver, and the other dquipment operating from the 

audio (a .. f) ~tput of a receiver (the beat frequency oscillator of the 

receiver being on). There are many more audio equipments than 

i-f equipments, and a11dio eq11ipments possess an audio diver11ity 

switching system~ l:'rior to.demodulation of the signal. Generally 

speaking, both equipments are satisfactory; however, very-cloae 

scrutiny is being given the audio equipment_ as it i• being uaed to 

demodulate the Russian! l"J.fultiple~ !Signal. Thia 

signal is one of t}i.e major technical proble'M• which the\Agency 

faces. NSA R/D has a co'Utract for the evaluation. of this\ equipment as a part of the whole I IMultiplexui.nt•i-c11pt: llY''tem 1....-__ ___. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

evaluation. EO 3.3(h) (2) 

Recently, requirements have arisen to intercept 

certain single-side band signals containing multi.tone transmissions. 

To date commercial and/or military equipments have been found which 

aftt-r rrl~ti"r.ly minor modifications, have proved satisfactory in 

handlin~ ti •• ·.\. .ues which have arisen. However, this situation could 

be: 11T.p:-ovrt ~i nee tu>ME" of the equipments pressed into service were 

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. "border-line" in the sense that extremely I,.igh maintenance 

standards must· be met to keep quality. of the intercep~ed traffic 

up to par. This technical problem is now 'being studied. 

(Z). Time Divi.sion Equipment 

. . 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

There are quite.a variety of time d.ivision demulti-

. . . plexing·equipments in the field. Th"re are "uriiversa.l" demultiplexers, 

·both electronic and electromechanical, capable of handling from Z to.-9 

channels of time division multiplex traffic e.g. Model CXOF Univers~l 

Electronic Demultiplexer, and the··.re are special purpose demultiplexer•, 

both electronic and electromechanical, intended to •pecialize on a I • 

particular multiplex signal, e.g. Model AFSAV D-24 Two Channel 

Time Division Demultiplex Equipment. Generally speaking, ·the 

majority of these equipments have performed quite well. From timj 

to time modifications to improve performance have been made. As 

an example~ the "clock driving and synchronizing portion" of the 

Model CXOF Uni!ersal Electronic Del'l\ultiplexer is now being redesigned by NSA R/D to simplify the maintenance procedure. Recently,, 

with regard to the Russia~._ ____ .... ~ultiplex system, it was nece~sary 

to provide a modification to the Model CXOF demultiplexer to enable 

it to s~nchronize with this new signal. An equlpment capable of I 

taking .1. shorter band length is also required. •At the present time, 

a sp1:¢ial· equipment to ope rate on the I ... ___ .... I Multiplex signal is 

un~·r development. This is necessary because o! the general limitation• of the CXOF equipment for the. GTP intercept problem. The 

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main advantages of this new "equ,lpmen~ over the Mo~el CXOF wlll 

result lrom. the fact that it is simpler ,equipm·ent, "tailored for old:~ 

one signal, and hence the read.out, a punched tape operated at high 

speeds,. will be much more efficiently achieved. AU thi~ adds up 

to a ·~alter device which should be easier. to. maintain,. 

At a relatively low priority,'lprojecta are being under-· . . . 

taken. in NSA: IVD to reduc>e the size· and complexity of demultiple:x 

equipment by the use of tra~sistora, 'bi-stable ma.gnetic elements, 

and specially develop~d tubes for counting purposes • 

. b. Single Side Band 

Th~ single side band intercept problem baa come belated 

· ly to NSA. lt la now the subject of a study by the Special Intercept 

Problems Board. lt appears that the agency can fulfill its basic 

requirements with a recently developed militarized signal-aide-band 

receiver, Model AN/FRR-41 to become available 'to the services in. 

. . the near f~ture. Until this militarized equipment actually does 

b'9c;pme available in the desil"ed quantities, ·commercial equipments, 

· ete,c=trically equivalen~ to the military ~quipment, can be put into . . ••~Yi~~· Additional ·requirements, over and above those which the · 

AN/,f41•4'f. fμlfills, are expected to develop as a result of the 

S-~" ·ln\-ewc•t .Problems Board study. These requlremen~s will 

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.t.t.k..ay "bf ~t~.d ·by the development of an lmpl_'oved equipment \\nder 

•he ltQt;pl~,a of N$A. 

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i. .M.q ~ !!_e .Ql!.e r a to.~_fu1~ly s i !.JM .. Q!U 

Mor He Operator· ·Analysis (MOA) is a proceas of 

identifying manuaJ k~y (mc>rf!le code) operator& by the characteristic& 

of their hand-set transmis.sions, viz b)· their "fist" The process 

ol operator identiCicati~n has beeri studieq for many years, and 

. . alt.hough se~eral different _analysis aystems af£9rded a limited deg1:ee 

of success in World War II, the uae of MOA techniques during peace · 

time was no~ justified until the recently developed AFSAV Dll Morse 

Operator Analysis equipment became available. ·Heretofore, the 

task of measuring individual character elements on an ink tape 

recording and undertaking the process of averaging, compu~ing, etc., 

was simply too laborious to interest those who would potentially 

benefit from this operation. 

In May 1951, development of the AFSAV Dll M~rse 

Operator Analyz~r equipment was initiated'in order to mechanize 

the particular analysia method which was widely employed at the 

end of Wo.rld War II. This equipment photographically recorded the 

time distribution of dota, dashes and apaces on a Polaroid-Land 

Camera and similarly recorded the individual charaeter formations 

on a 35mm. moving film. In the first model of t'l\is equipment, the 

data from the polaroid film recording was punched onto McBee 

Keysort Cards for mechanical selection o{ possible matches. Six 

of these equipments were fabricated,, of which three were delivered 

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• ' ' I o ·, I '. 'JO I .. : ' ... o I ' 'I o .. • I.... ' ,o 

to the: c ryptu~o_μic .l';c ryii:E;·S (o.r. s er.vie~· te ~tin~d.wo :Wer~ providt!d.. '. " • ' .: , .... I o' o o 

·t~ CIA,· ~~d one wa·s retai'~eci,.'(~"-.N$lt lt/D ·h»x·J~·~~h~.(~yaluation. 

. lnstallat~ ori. ~~:·t~·~ s.t{~c{uip.~~~nfs)ri.·(h e•·.fie:Jd, i-'e sult~-d iJl. 0 ' I f, - I , o

1 o • I 1 ol I e, 

a renewed"·intere st. in Mq:r ~·I!. Oper;.it'oa~: /\n.,,Jy'si:s·j;y"th'e. se~vice s .. Ho~~ I o I "" I .. .. ~ 'I. o ' : .. I o I o I o ', • o o o I o I I I I o o 

ever, use· of 'the AFSAV 'o:~:i ·'itd~:i:g'e.:sc:ai.l::.Tde:~tifi.,~a~ions· ~f o~erator~: · • r • • "' 

. •,,. . . . .. 

Under service condi.tio.ns, 'indicat.~d ce'r•tafo litnitiltionB inherent in the • ' ,• .. • • • • 'o ·~ • : ·~· • • • "r. • .. ' • •· ·:-. ·,, •:'· ·~ • • 

analysis· system. ·When- rii~-ny 9~~r~t.9r.s -h~d-:to be. ~6·~~id~~ed, the • 1 <I' 1 1 •' I , , ,"', • o I 

similarity-between ojieratqrs .be~arrie 'incr'e~~irigly:.-ipp~r~rit.. Invest .. 

igat.loli's. ~f·o~her ci.~ssific~ti.o·~ ~y~.t~~·~. ·~-/.Ns:~ .~·~,x;·, r,~~eai·e~ the 

sam~ b~sic lirriitaiions .. It" w~·s }Qund 'that a·., be st-fit" method of o •, •' • •• • o 1' ' I • o .• 

card 'comparis.on, .substituted for·.th~ Mc Be~ I(ey~o~t, ·increased the 

effectiv~nes~ -~f th~'.AFSA~- ~.~I·b~-~ ~actQr of a.b~ut seven unde.r . . . : : . . . . . ' . 

laborator~ tests. -As a reiult, a~ eq~iprrient, te·r~·ed tli~· AFSAV 069 

'Card Comparator· was devel~ped fo' operate' in c'onjunction with the I ' • ' .,' ' • 

AFSAV 031 to enable.mechanization._of .the lmpr_oved analysis procedure. . . . . 

At the pr'esent tim~, t}J.~ AFSAY. DJi eq~tpments are in a . . . 

s·ervice test status and the fabrication of AFSAV 0£>9 C.ard Comparators : . 

to go with this equipment is nea-rly completed_. (!~ncurrently, NSA 

·(R/O) is in the process of contrac'ting .for the servi\ea .of a competent • • • I 

research group to study, ev:aluate, anci. develop·impro\lled methods and 

equipment for identifying ~anual key operator a. It is rec'9snized that 

an investigation ol improved MOA techniques is basically a pt.oblem 

in the statistics of small samples, and it ls intended that the ~t~y of 

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tl\,e 0 collection of data and reduction of data fbr MOA analysis be ,. 

direo,.tcd toward·the use of machine techniques. 

Whethe'r any additional A FSAV 031/ AFSAV D-b9 MOA 

equipments will be ~uilt. ~ill be determined on the result of the 

service tests now underway. The study contract will not be 

~Olflpleted in l_eRs than a year a_nd the development and evaluating 

of improved .. MC?A techni-tues in .the field wil.1 very likely require al'\ 

additional 2 years· .. If such work is carried out successfully, and 

Production equipments a:re required; an additional Z years shoul~ 

be ·allowed for canst ruction and distribution to the field; thus,· it 

will be at least 5 years before any significant COMINT utilization 

will likely be made of MOA tech11i-tues. As pointed out before, by 

streamlining procedures. this time could be reduced by one to two 

years .. 

Rad.io Finger Printing(RFP) is a process of ide-ntifying 

. . . transmitting equipment by the inadvertant amplitude and frequency 

m~dulation characteristics usuall_y present on any given transmitted 

carrier frequency. Basica·uy. tl:'e operation consists of photogr'ap~­

ically recording, on a moving str~p film, two traces which des.cribe . 

the amplitude and frequ~nc'y deviation's from the norm of the intercept 

signal. 

From an analyst's standpoint, the problem of classification 

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and cataloiulnic RF~ data la dUtlcult. Unfor.t\lnately, R.Fr' ana:ly~h 

11· more of an art than a 1c:lence. The ·analyah operation le lar11ly 

aubjec.Uvu and, baae~ on the individual cla1'1Uler'• Interpretation ot: th• 

evidence available to him. The C\lrrently u11d ran1e of .RFP ch~r&c• 

t-erhtica h lar1e. and their potanUal lde.,tlfylng value, whether Ultufd I 

indlvid~ally or in combination, varlea within wid·e Hmtta. For tb• ~ . . . 

reason, RFP identification reports must be considered aa· graded 

statements 0£ possibility or probability, the validities of .which : 

. . . depends upon the number and nature of the characteristics involved 

~nd the amount of distortion (noise; multipath, interference, etc.-) 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

present in the individual records considered. PL .86-36/50 use 3605 

In spite of the subjectiveness of the analysis procedure: .. 

it has been possible· to build up a large libz:ary of catal~gued quantitative aata; this catalogue was employed on thel 

....__ ___ __, I On this problem, RFP served in a relatively minor though 

· valuable position as an aid in positively c::onfirming Di!!ection Finder 

and .Traffic Analysis reports; howe·.·er, only six RFP equipments, 

out of a total of some 45 produc·ed, were suitably located and avail:-

able on a world wide basic to attack this pro.blen'1:; hence the net • 

contribution from RFP was very small. 

. . The equipment in use today represents a modernized 

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versio11, circa 1950, of the eriginal RFP equ,ipment developed i~· 

: 1940. A study has recently been..completed 011 the efficiency of 

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operation of the equipment now in the field\. This study was bas_,. .. 

on a critical examination of 180 monthly eq~ipment failul"e reports 

from 14 di~f erent stations, coupled with interviews of approximately 

fifty people who had served at outlying stations ·within the past 20 

months. The study indicated that the equipment was reasonably 

well designed and was capable of performing much better than 

failure reports seemed to indicate·•. The equipments have been out 

of ~peration fo.r maintenance a dispr'oportinate percentage of the 

time, primarily due to poor training of the maintenance.men assigned. 

Cases are recorded: where technicians have required thirty-fJ,ve hours 

to ascertain that a cathode ray tube was not functioning properly-; on 

other cases, as long as five hours have been required to fi~d th.at a 

rectifier tube was burned out. The nature ,of these failures has largely • 

been such that redesign of the circuitry is not indicated. 

In· spite of the operationall~ developmental position of RFP, 

technical work has been undertaken in/NSA (R)D.) to improve the 

existing equipment. This work ha9 taken two forms: (1) experimental 

...... work on a system to employ :cusable mag~etic tape in place of the 

one-time use of photograpbi,,T film or paper, and (Z) developmen,J of 

a system to remove som,.,."of the subjectiveness from the analysis 

procedure in classify\,tig RFP data. On this later point, an RFP 

c.orrelator has bee}1 developed which is fundamentally a simple digital 

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PL 8~~3~/50 USC 3605 

computer to average RFP d~ta. I 

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. . •/ 

. k'.. . ~.i.~~£.t~Q.!,l_Ftndin.g JD/]t) · · . • . ·. . . ! . . 

Th~ majority _of the directi~n finding <>peratfons occu·r in 

the ·?ig~··rrequenc y (2•30mc) .r~nge, where the bul~ of the CO MINT" · 

. . . ~ . . . .. . 

. · coliection eff~ri is applied. 'The eq~ipments employed are pr~- and . ... . . . .- , . early w~·rld War II 'designs which have bel;un to outlive their ·useful_:!-· . 

ness. They·a:re obsolete1~and maintenance is· a problem. In additib".'• 

·they. are nQ"t cap.able of coping with. the kind of targets which may bi 

anticipated in a fUture war. I This situa.-tion became clearly· appare.rit .. . . 

in 1950 and possible courses of a.ction were ·studied. The Direcfo.r, 

~ NSA,. delegated the problem of high frequency direction finder (HF:P.i'.') 

research and development to the .Navy, to be a~c~mplished on behalf 

of. all the cryptologic service agencies. 

T.he problem, as undertake·n by the Navy has been statecf. 

as follows: "To meet anticipated operational requirements, it .is. · 

required that t~e HFDF networks be a~l~ ·to determine the loca~ion · 

of a distant ra~io transmitting source within a few miles, when its_.· 

. emission.s consist of. 'short and extremely short signals. It must d~ 

so as rapidly as practical. As a first step, it must be able to cope·· 

with signals which last just a'few sec.onds. Ultimately, it ·must be· 

able to cope with signals which last only a fraction of a s.econd. " 

The,Navy analyzed this problem and concluded that a 

fully adequate ;'olution is difficult, expensive, and quite some time . . . 

away. A.CG.O(~ingly; an interim sqlution was adopted,' based on the 

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~~~"' ... ~~ -~ ~IDER .. _ ...... ~· 

use .of P,otenbally .tvcL~l!lbie ~Htuipments, and alr~ady dev~loped tectl• 

nl~es. The interi~ approa,ch in ·,,olv~s modification of pr~sent 

equipment, ~nd·p~ocurement u! ncw.HFDF.·network control and target 

acqui~ation equipme~t. 

~s a result· of the· Navy program, a .new HFDF -.nd 'network control equipment has been developed whi.ch incorporates all 

of the advances known to date. It is rnore sensitive, more accurate, 

and it is able to cope wit~ signals of about lS to ZO second duration. 

It iS the best equipment which can ·be supplied now. Effective . 

operation of this new HFDF .to achieve it:s ultimate capabilities re. 

quires. provision of ancillary equipment. These HFDF station a will 

b.e linked w"ith semi-automatic se~ure teletype d rcuits to att~in 

·rapid operation, in ·response to the direct~ons of the· network control 

statio~. The most advanced type of conventional radio .teletype 

· equ~pment available- has_ been selected. 

The new t~·pe ~FDF equipme'!-t and the ass~clate.d t:onbol 

appa_ratus is now in production for the Navy ~.th~ t• eitpec:.ted to ~e 

delivered during the calendal" yt!ar J9!;:~ • . The J'lavy wUl receive 

. -sufficient quantit~es or this he~ equipment to i'llltpiace all of the exist-

. ing, outmoded HFDF equipment now installed both within and without. 

~'he Continental_USA. By mid-1956, all 0£ this new equipment should 

. be installed and operating. In the meantime, the Navy R/D program 

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i~ .continuing in the dir~ction of H1c·:i;easing ttie sensit~vity ! accur~e_y 

and speed of operation of this· new net by: de~eloping improved:s~.~rc1): 

receiver~ and ·channel ~atchi.ng eY,uipment~ These improved equip-

' . ments are expected to reach the Navy field stations by 1957. 

. . 

Unfortunately, the Army anq Air Force cryptologic 

groups ha~e. lagged considerably behind the Navy in. improving their 

D/F. nets. These two se.rvices are still using the outmoded HFDF 

equipment which the Navy is now replacing and they have not ordered 

replacements. They a':re thus about 15 years behind the Navy, althotJ.gh 

there appears to be no reason why they can not relatively quickly close 

the gap. 

Outside of the.~ high frequency .band (Z-30~c), comparativeJ.y. · 

little work ·has been done since the end of World War II. NSA (R/D) is 

curren.tly making a survey of all reported military and commercial 

. re search and development efforts in the direction finder field th~oughout the entire radio frequency spectrum. This task 'i.s ~ot being carried_. 

on at a very: high priority, although the part time ser~c.es of a. local . . . 

consulting firm are under co.ntract to accomplish the job •. .l\t the 

·pr~~'nt time. a report on the modern ~ of direction finding is due 

in,NSA. (R/D) by June 1955·. This report is intena~ __ serve as the 

tia~i s on which decisions can be reached on the' researcii a'!Ml.de:velop- .\ ' 

ment tasks which should be undertaken in support of the COMINT · 

operation. As pointed out above·, such research and development 

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prop•ams normally lead tq fruition a1 f'\eld equipments many yean 

i\ft~r thC'Y commence; in the hlah frequency direction finding ·case, 

it ~I "vident that great stride• can be made by two of the three 

c:r-yptologic groups based on the research and development work 

recently accomplished by the Navy. 

1. Au.!Q!!l_ati£~Mo_!'_ll.!L Tr.!.!!!Jlating Egui.12~nt 

It has long been recognized that automatic high speed 

morse, which is now taken on an undulator inked tape recorder and 

visually read, could be reduced to hard copy without a morse code. 

operator. Devices have been built in the past for recording the high 

speed transmissions on a magnetic tape recorder, then reproducing 

the signal at low speeds for either aural translation by an operator 

or machine translation by a relatively slow speed electric typewriter. 

Such devices were unacceptable in intercept operations not only 

because the equipments were large and cumbersome and required a 

slow speed reproduction of the traffic, but because an operator could 

more quickly and easily accomplish the job by visually scanning the 

undulator tape. 

In the past few years, however, a device has been 

built in NSA which permits on-line processing of high speed automatic 

morse transmission. It is possible to punch paper tape on-line at 

speeds as high as 350 to 400 words per minute (wpm) and convert 

to hard copy on electromatic typewriters. Although the electromatic 

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ty.,writer is limited to spe~ds of about lOO~wptn, the flow of traffic 

to the typewriter often comes in spurts, averaging arouhd ~00 wp~ 

or less. Four of these new equipments ha\re recently been completed · . . . . 

and are about to be err1plo-yed in service tests by fh~'cr'yptologic 

servic~s ... It is anticipat~d that these equipments will be used p~imaJ."ily . . on those high speed automatic mor!5e circuits where the percenlage ,. 

of legitimate traffic is highi on _those circuits: where most of ~he· fraffic 

is 11 trash" which can be quickly ~potted by an operator scanning an 

i~ked tape record0ing' the manual method is expected to predomYiate. 

The extent to which the automatic morse translator can me~hanize 

this intercept operation is one of the basic reasons for the service 

test of thi's equipment. 

A study is being made in R/D of the app~ic~'bility ol the. . . 

automatic mor~e translator to hand sent morse transmissions. Although the automatic equfpment is capable ef following average ·changes. . .. . . in speed of. an automatic morse ... transmission, it is not a.dept at follow- . 

ing a poorly sent hand-keyed trans~ission. This study is devoted to .. -..'. · . ... ·. ~ : .. ,• 

determining whetqer 11 classes" of hand.._ sent tr'ansmissions possibly .'. :.'.' : . : ..... ' ·.· 

cannot be handled by different settings of f'l\e machine under close ' : · 

operator supervision. It has been argued that even if one mors~ 

. . intercept operator were required to constantly supervise Z or more • • ' I ' 

.. · . . -... 

machines, this would proportionately cut down on the number of i:e-:·. 

quired morse intercept operators. The training of morse code 

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in~ercept operators is a major COMINT prol:Jlern, particularly ~9·~he 

Army Security Agency this could ·be of material benefit. Prospects 

fJ'r accomplishing much in R/D· i~ the ne-ar f'L:lture along the iine of a • .. ' ' I 

' ' 

simple: machine for in the field tr~nslation: of crudely sent haqd-~eyed 

morse· transmissions are ·quite low.. 

m. luPositions: 

The intercept .of L..l ____ ..... lsignafs p;~;ents the m~;t 

difficult of the traffic collectiOn problems. .E)1nda~e~tct.lly~ the 

reason is that the cryptanalyst l'J'lust have the h,lgheJt quality traffic 

with w~ich to work. Although there a]."e a n'9mber of distinctive 

· I ... ____ __.I typ; signals. ra.nging frol'n single channel synchronou.s. 

teletype to the comple~ I r1tu1up1ex, it i"B primari~y with regard 

to thel ltn.ultiplex signal that the greatest intercept pr~blem has 

existed. The philosophy b~hind the intercept of this signal has been 

to make a recording in the field as. close to the front-end.of the 

recei~ng system as possible, .thus demodulating the signal th·e least 

amount possible before recording. T~e record so made is then· · •,., I 

shipped to a central processing installation -at NSA Head.quarters .for 

full demodulation and print-out of the hard copy.- This procedure has . 

. ·, 

been adopted because it is believed that the demodulating equipment . ' 

will be under better control in a central processing installation than 

at a .field station; furthermore, the cryptan_alyst J:las available.for his 

close inspection, if desired, the incompletely demodulated signal. It,_ 

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EO 3.3(h)( 

PL 86-36( 
r--~~~~~~~~----------~~~--------------------· 

• 

laaa been argued that if interference is present, this procedu~e may 

enable. the cryptanalyst and the cen~r,._1 processing ·team to work to• 

gether in a much closer manner than would be feasible at a field 

station. Also central processing ls the best·interim proc~dure · 

until demux equipment suitable for field use·is developed. It will · 

also be necea.aary to maintain a central procesail)g facility to cope 

with future requi·rements. 

The result of this philosophy baa posed a very difficult 

technical problem to R/D, for the r,cording/reproducing operation 

on the partially undemodulated signal must now introduce leas 

distortion than full demodulation in the field would produc~. After 

considerable experience with this intercept problem, it now ·apeears 

that. control processing onl lumultiple.xmtrafffclf.llu feaeibi~ 

provided maintenance standards on the equipment in the field are 

raised considerably beyond what w.ould be normally required on a . ' 

more conventional system. The standards are so high~ in fact, 

that it has been proposed that specialL..l ___ ..... IMu_ltiplex Mainte~ance 

teams be assigned overseas to provide maintenaoce on a routine 

basis. This proposal is now under study in the Agency. It is 

believed that the present system, when properly maintained and operated, 

is capable of produ~ing traffic with garble rates of leas than 1 per~en~ 

on good signals. 

NSA (R/D) has developed and is continuing work on a 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 
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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

iarge number of operating alas in connection _witl:l.:this problerr{. . . 

. These include special tuning indicators to aid.the operator in .th~ 

field in tuning 'in the intercepted .signal anc:l holding it in tune. A 

gar~le rate indicatoi: has. bee11 developed which measures the quality 

of the synchronizing ch'1nnel. in the multiPteJ"i: signal in order· to gau.-

the qualit"f of thf!f._ ___ ___,~-traffic. A page copy print-~ut of the 

____ ___,~traffic .is desired by the cryptanalyst ~n a ratbe.r elabo_rate 

format, and a device t~> produce the material is under development 

and about to be delivered tu the Central P_rocessing group. A 

cont~actor is performing a thorough technical evaluation on the 

present system and proposing improvements. 

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There are a large number of miscellaneous items 

being worked on in R/D to improve the sensitivity_, stability, a~d 

efficiency of this operation. ·However, operating under th.e present 

philosophy of. central processing, it is believed that it will be at 

least 5 years before the extremely high standards for field mainten.anc~. 

can be lowered by the introduction of a superior system to the fi•ld. 

The philosophy of.central processing itself, on the scale now employed 

and envisaged. deserves close re-examination. 

n. Intercept Sites 

The se~ection of intercept sites is a difficult problem in 

which logistic/administrative factor.a mus~ be considered in addition 

to the basic technical considerations. Needless to say, the selection r 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 36 

. of an.y given site usually represents. a comprorni.se between many\ 

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opposing factors; once a site is selected' the a111signment of missions .· 

also often rep:resent a compromilJle between tifat which is technically 

desired and that which is administratively. feas~ble. _For example. 

the assignment of a cornplex intercept m\ssion, such as against the 

Russia~._l ___ .... l~ultiple~ signal, may be mac;le to a station poorly 

located in terms of t~~ target signal, yet well staffed with a relatively 

strong operational group and possessing the necessary physical space 

to accept a large and complex inter_cept equipment. 

The appropriate elements in NSA (PROD) keep a running 

account on the. times _that intercept of a given signal is obtained at a 

~iven intercept site. This account is graphically portrayed by plotting. 1 .' . 

t~e day of the month on the abscissa·of a chart and the hours of the 

day .o~ the ordinate. The period o~ intercept then shows as a vertical 

bar, broken if the intercept was interrupteCl, ·for each day of the 

month. Compi_ling a large mass o~ these data provides the mission 

assigners with a considerable appr~ciat~on for the capability of 

intercepting given target areas from given intercept sites over a period.' 

of time. 

It. is very difficult to assess quantitatively the effectivenes~ 

·.of th1 present method of site selection and mission a~signment. One 

recefres the impression that those pe_o~l~ engaged in t~is operation 

usuai!ljY s~rike a J"easonable bal!lnce between technical factors and 

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· admin;.strative factors in making mission assignments. It is onl)\in 

i"solated cases that the. OJ:!eration ~bviously breaks down; then. one. ia · 

·led to suspect that the, system could be h:nproved. A recent exampi~· . 

is afforde~ by the ~ssign!flent of a Russia~ .... ____ IM~ltiplex ~i~sion ... 

to an intercept station 90 degrees off the'\>eam of the tr·ansmitted • • I• 

sign~~; in another similar. case, the ~nter~ept station waa)8.0 4egre~a: 

off the. beam. ·in some cases, such a poor technical assignment ~8:Y-: . . . 

·.be warranted on administrative grounds;. and technically ·acceptable .. . \ .. . . provided the intercepted copy is still usable. Howev~r. when de.aJi~g . . . 

"'ith special caaea • such a• I lt.rl!ffic 1 "'here ~e qu,a~ity i>f\\ .. : · : 

traffic must be very high, then the evidence points to po'&aibly i111prov.- · .. "-------:-

ing the system. 

2. a. The operational evaluation definitions follows_: 

Excellent - Substantially garble free traffic,. th!19_ kiftd . 

analysts need to work most effectively: . . . .. . 

against .new crypto, call sign, addres·a 

systems and so on. 

Good - Fully exploitable against known sy~tems, and ... 

permitting analysts to work at reduced. 

effec"tiveness against new systems. 

Fair - ·can··be used if system .is completely exploitab1e . . . . 

. but is useless in atta..ckirig ~ew syste~s. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
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Poor - Generally not usable. 

Traffic will be called: 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

11 Nearl.Y all" excellent, goocl to excellent, e~c. 

if 90 percent or more !alls in those categories, . I 

"Mo~tly" excellent, etc. if 8() percent tQ 90 

per-cent !alls in thos.e categories. 

Approximate figures will.be given in other cases. 

For Radioprinter, the ~riteri.bn isl .... __ __.I specifically 

the .... l ___________ ___.lstation. Intercept reaching NSA is nearly 

a:ll excellent. Although this excellence is partly due to a rigid 

field station screening p~ogram, the missing ••rials in traffic reaching ·NSA do not indicate an exce·ssive dis·card percentage, and undoubtedly the "screening helps catch troubles before they cause serious 

intercept loss. In any case, I .... ___ __.I provid~s a suitable criterion of .. 

excellence.· However, the suitability of .... l ___ ___.las a criterion must 

be tempered by the following ·considerations. 

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TOP S~R1E~ f!!DER 

1. I ~as a very li.rnited cover as signm~e~t 

and onlr hears approximately 6 RCA links. 

2.. lt is also a research station for· T ·Department. 

3.. Their manning stanqards are considerably higher 

tha·n NSA standards •. 

4. It is a unique unit, the only one of its kind bas_ed 

on geographical considerations, I .... __ ,.........~l"gill\h:ation, etc-. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

There is no criterion available for radiotelephone. 

What can be accomplished by the U. 5. services is 

illustrated by the fact that about three stations, operated by two 

services are head and shoulders above the other U.S. serviCe 

operated s.tations. 

The factor(s) for cited shortcomings will be cited thus: 

"Chiefly Responsible" - Correction of this factor 

would ·rai~e output quality 

more than half way to 

"ne.;rly ail excellent" 

t• Largely Responsible" - Corre.ction of both the 

Chiefly and the Largely 

(if any) responsible fac"tors 

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would certainly improve 

quality to II nearly au· (90 

percent) go~d to excellent". 

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, 

"Partly Responsible•: - Correction of these and 

the above would generally · .. . 

·bring .. nearly all (90 

percentJ excellent" re1tults. 

"Slightly Responsible" - ·Correction of these would 

generally serve to increase. 

the deg:;,t;e of excellence. 

Factors will be listed in decreasing o~der of impotlance, and .evidence 

will be cited for each. 

b. ·Morse 

Sixty-nine pe~cettl of the currently manned U.S. intercept 

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positions are assigned to Morse, both Maitual and Automatic. Most ol 

these positions are Manual, and most of the Manual positions are on 

Military Tactical* (Army, Navy, Air) assignment.Si in fact a single 

*For the purposes of this paper, the various communications 

intercepted for NSA have been divided into 6 functional categories: 

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1. International Commercial Radio (ICRf' ·.Message traffic is 

handled by common carriers. ·, ~ 

2. National Commercial Radio (NCR) - Internal mes.sage traffic 

is tarried by· common carriers or some state owned monopoJy. 

3. Government Communicatio~s Services - (GCS) - Message 

traffic is handled by internal nets opeated by such government 

agencies as Border Guards, Secret Police and the like~ 

4.;, Military Tactical (MT) - "Low level" traffic is handled to 

1 and from tactical military unitsi Army, Navy and Air Force 

··are included in this category. Exploitation of this traffic 

yields 11 order of Battle" information, and its intercept is 

generally considered a Close Support function. 

Sj. Milit~ry Strategic (MS) - Potentially 11 High Level" traffic 

is. carried_ on circuits connecting higher headquarters. 

6. Support Communications (SC') - Broadcast and poh~t-to-point communications, such a·s weather nets and broadcasts, and 

navigational aids and services are handled by various agencies, 

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accounting for nearly half the Ma~ual Morse take, represents more 

than one quarter of the total intercept grou.page entering NS~ .from 

all sources on all pr~blems (exc~pting I ... __, _____ _____, _ ___.IPt8.i~ 

text). Most of the high speed Automatic ·¥ors49is on International 

Commercial. radio (ICR) e1:n1 

..__ ____________ __.! &~though great quantities of_ ICR ~re 

intercepted, only a small perce:ntage, mostlyl lcipher, is 

transcribed and sent to NSA: full coverage may be ordered on 1 ... _..,...-_ _. 

circuits. (NOTE: Low speed automatic morse, such as I ... __ ___,f"neM;. 

are intercepted the same as manual morse.) 

(1) Manual Morse 

- Under normal'conditions, and depending on service, 

assignment and station, Manual ;Morse intercept ~uns from nearly all 

good to excellent to as low as 70 percent good to excellen:t. The 1 

breaking into the new system to .one half the above figure, i.e., if 

previous take had been 70 perce*t good to excellent, only 35 percent I I , . 

was now·usable; this drop was caused by operators copying the wrong 

/PL 86-36/SO u 

ito 3.3(h)(2) 

.... , cases as well as other factors arisina ho.ma changed situation.· How·- · 

·.· · •ve.~, a.~~rec~able recove:ry was n.o•edl i1;1- th.e· fill's• l.ll&nth after the change. 

w.i..en a. •itu.a.tion. c;hanges ta~ peJ:ce~a.g.e c~f! fie.ndls •o be deepe~ with the . 

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weaker stations, hence' in it crisis' the value o( a station may. be. 

substantially lower than the normal cunditlori figures would seem to 

indicate. Factors involved in station and/br service shortcomings 

include: 

(a) Chiefly Responsible - Operators 

Evidenced by: 1. "Changes in efficiency 

~hen major personnel. 

rotations occur. 

2. Drop in efficiency ln 

new situations in which 

technical factors remain 

unchanged. 

(b) Partly Responsible • Particular Problem Assigned 

Evidenced by: 1. Experience shows certain 

problems to be more 

difficult than others because of poorer available 

· sites· and other ·factors. 

(c) Partly Responsible - Plant Facilities, intercept 

Evidenced by: 

' · ... ·. 

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Assignments and other · 

administrative factora. 

1. Such items as lZ mes. 

r~mbic antennas assigned 

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to 3 and 4 mes. p~oblems; 

failure to lay out antenn• 

fields according to 

problems; failure o.f NSA 

to give adequate information before station 

construction and simiiar 

factors. · 

(d) Slightly Responsible - Technical inadequacy of 

available equipment ·and 

Technique a. 

Evidenced by: 1. A.s described in Technici.1. 

Evaluation Section Above. 

It will be noted that the major factors susceptible of 

improvement are administrative in nature, and in regard to each of 

these the cognizant PROD element is now actively pursuing remedial 

measures .. PL 86-36/50 US 

EO 3.3(h)(2) .· (Z) Automatic (High Speed) M~rse 

Automatic Morse hite;cept is generally satisfac,. 

tory, running: nearly all excellent c;>nlnternational Commercial Radio 

(lCR) and only a little·poc:>r_er (largely because of signal quality)' on 

________ .... !radio. Automatic Morse is generally transmitted at 

speeds as high as circuit conditions permit (up to 250 words pe.r 

minute). Since high speed Automatic Morse generally appears on main 

line circuits, good operating practices are the rule and favor the 

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interceptor, who also profits froi:n the. f'.lct that good copy can be 

re_adily distinguished from bad, even when_ enciphered. ·The receiv• 

ing and recording equipment used it5 standard, and easily and quickly 

adjustable, and' the operation of a position: is relatively simple to 

learn; hence, the stringent neec:t 'for skillld ope~~tors, so apparent 

in the Manual Morse problem·, does not" exist here. There are no 

special quality improvemen~ measur~s requir~d in this .problem. 

However, manpower requirement may ~ventuail~ be eased by the 

NSA (R/D) developed Morse translator (AFSAV D48) now undergoing 

. . service test. Otherwise, Automatic Morse intercept will naturally 

profit from the improved Plant Facilities which should follow current 

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such technical improvements as those described in the Technical 

Evaluation Section above. 

c. Radioprinter PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Although only 23 percent (483) of the U.S. intercept 

positions are currently assigned to Radioprinters, clear text and . . enciphered on both single channel and multiplexes, approximately 

2,285,000 messages are intercepted per month. Most of this take 

is Russian and, since.about 80 percent of the circuit time intercepted 

is plain text~ it will be seen that ... ______________ ..... r. 

represents NSA's largest· single t'raffic sourcei however, the volume 

alone does not justify. conclusions as to the relative value of this 

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iPL 86-36/50 USC 

traffic compared with other traffic ·on a group by group basi.s. Moa~ 

of this plain text. is .....__ ____________________________ _ and 

it should be noted that more and more of these liQks are going/to . 

...._ _________________________ ___.single channel and 

2 channel Baudot multiplex account .for significant groupages, while 

other government communication seirvices contribute some single 

channel; military and government communication service messages 

are generally enciphered,/with more military I ... ______ __,._......,. _ __. t ! .. 

appearing. Both. single c}l~nne.l and multip~exe~ r~1f~rrin~.er ~~~.ff~~ 

c.o~rfF!.ofl ~npand ar~ cove~ed t.he 1 s~~c:i as q .1"'°'~P."1"f~c ~o~~E'.f. · : · i . · 11 J • · ' · I J . · · 

f'Uh. ~b=>ttf.fhe. •!!me de'gree of iuccess~ 

U> · Russian Servic4!_ Radiopri~ ...---~~.!::::::=============:__..___. 

Under normal conditions, only abdut two thirds of the take 

is good to excellent. This relatively poor showing stems largely from 

the fact that our operators are not equal to the greater demands l'X}.ade 

by the interception of military traffic as against I ... ________ ___, 

in part, unfamiliarity with the language, sloppy transmissions 

(variable teleprinter speeds. frequency shifts, etc.), high percentage 

•There are many literal enciphering systems which are used,..i ... o _____ ...., 

prepare messages for transmission by any means; the t~ . .-ml...,_ _____ _ geQ.era.lly refers to a particular enciphe:rir>g system used w.tth aui9.• 

matic printing equipments. · , 

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of enciphered tr.affic ancl frequently poor signals are contributin'. 

causes. Th~· intercept of I lis even more demanding, bu{ 

an evaluation qf the intercept belongs elsewhere in this paper. (See 

Chapter VII) Factors involved in these shortcomings include: 

(a) Chiefly respon'Sible - P.ersonne.l- Operators anc;I 

Evidenced by: 

Maintenance; Men. 

1. Changes in efficiency 

.when major personll~l 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

rotations occur. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

l. Drop in efficiency in new 

situations in which 

changes in technic'al 

factors s.hould not produce 

such striking effects -

"example~ appeara~ce of 

.__ _____ __,!using unorthodox shifts and printer speeds. 

(b) Largely Responsible Plant' Facilities and other 

administrative factors. 

Evidenced by: 1. Such items as lack of 

suitable diversity antennas; 

failure of NSA to give 

adequate information 

before station construction 

and similar factors. 

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(b1) Another factor largely re'8'ponaible fol" poor tr.affic 

.if the lack of a ·suitable variable frequency shift 

(c) 

converter. 

Slightly Responsible • 'technical Inadequacy of . . 

Evidenced by: 

i"vailable equipment -and 

technique~. 

1. As described ln ·Technical Evaluation Section · 

above. 

It ~11 be noted that major factor• auacep~ible of 

improvement are administrative in nature, and in regard to each ot. 

these the cognizant PROD eleme~t :la now actively purau:lng remedial 

measures. The NSA (PROD) on line Model 28 program will certainly 

be a definite and :ln the production of more accurate intercept. With . . 

a direct page copy, the operator will.be able to monitor his link more 

easily ~nd will know when his traffic ls garbled and can take the 

proper step a to re-~une, etc. With the on-line program we a"lao 

achieve stand~rdization with ~he three services. Training f~r the 

Model 28 maintenance i8 available at Teletype Corporation and will 

also be included in the services' training program, thereby producing 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

more qualified maintenance personnel. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(Z) .._I _________ ____.F~rc~pt I• 

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moastly good to exc~ll_e~t; an evaluation ofJ~e intercept of the 

.__ _____ __.firigle Channel an~( I Multiple~._ ____ ___.lmay 

be found in Chapter VII, while the research and development aspects 

of thel jMU.ltipiex are covered in the Technical Evaluation 

Section above:. Some of the plain text is on single channel radioprinters, but the great bulk of the main -line traffic is carried on 

Baudot time division multiplex systems, carrying as many as nine 

3 0 word per minute channels on a single multiplex. However, the 

Baudot system is obsolescent, and it~ rapid disappea.rance is 

foreseen. The· relatively good quality of this plain text intercept is 

due to the operator's ability to -evaluate his results by looking at the 

output text, to· the relatively high and consistent standards of Civil 

operation (as compared fo the military) and similar factors. It 

must also be borne in mind that higher garble rates are permissible 

. in plain text traffic. Factors involved in existing shortcomings 

include: 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(a) Chiefly Responsible· - Personnel - Operators 

Maintenance Men 

Evidence by: 1. Previous evaluations of unu·sable 

traffic. 

(b) ·Largely Responsible - Plant Facilities and 

· other Administrative 

fact...ors 

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Evidenct:d ~y: l. Lack 9{ suitable 

diversity antenl'.lali; 

failure of NSA. to 

give adequate 

. information before 

station constructi~n .. 

and similar factors. 

It will b.., ''oted th-at the major factors bU&cept~ble oC 

improvcrnenl are a.dminjstralive in nature, and ln regard to each of 

theso the cogniu~nt PltOI> element is now actively pur~uing rtsmedial 

meaaures, 

d. ~.?l'?..!~!!lli!tone 

About 8 percent ,>{ the currently manned U.S. intercttp~ 

positions is assigned to radioteJeμhone, chiefly Milftary Tactical. 

Evaluated on an overall basis. thlH r,1diott•lephone intercept is 

moally l(OOd to excellent, and wouJd be nearly a.11 good to excellent 

U it were not for technical handka.ps euff ered by the o~era.tor-liriguists·. 

Provided the operator vrQperly adjusts his receiver and recorder, 

nea.rly all the intel'cept is good to excellent; unfortunately howev~r •. 

that traffic which is garbled in transcription, in spite of having been 

properly ~eceived and recorded, is· often ·garbled because of unusual 

words or non~routi~e c_omments which would have ~pecial intelligence 

value and, therefore, the overall results •intelligence wise - fall 

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S9.*'1•wl\ft ~-.lqw wiJ,.t. w~~ •e•~ • ~ . .f.~iJ:a.te~ bf ~h'9 "most~y 

goot to ~~cell~l\t". ev.~n. .V-~ff.,o.•ft ln•olve~ in it'be11e ahortcqml,g., 

E;videnc e.d by: a~ E"1i·PJ1'.enf qialacljua4me~a.· 

and iinguhtic faUu~:el!!. 

f2) ~argely Respop-.~le - Jnadequat,e Recprdf!r.s 

Evidence.d by: i, a. La~k 1;>f c:p,nveni~n~e ite~s 

requi~ed tor efficie~t 

transcripti,oli of voice 

intercept. 

(3) Partly Re~ponsible - Particular problem assigned~ 

Evidenced by: a. Experience shows certain 

problems to be mor~ 

·~difficult than other because of language, poorer 

available sites and other 

factors. 

(4) Partly Responsible • Plant Facilities and other 

administrative factors. 

Evidenced by: a. Such items .as inadequate 

antennas and transmission 

lines: failure of NSA to 

give adequate informat~on 

before station construction 

and similar factors. 

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(5) Slightly Responsible - Technical inadequ~cy of 

available equipment and techniques, ·excepting recorders. 

Evidenced by: a. -As described in Technical 

Evaluation Section abov,e. 

It will be no~t.d ~hat, whil~ two major factors are ad~inistrative in· 

nature, inadequate recording equipment is an important factor. ·cog.: 

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nizant PROD elements are now actively pursuing measures to alleviate 

, ' : " 

the administrative factors, while current programs to imP,J-ove recorders 

are discussed in the Technical Evaluation Section above. E.O 3.3(h)(2). 

e. C'llalif ying Statement · PL. 86-36/50 USC 3605 

In assaying the overall _U. 5. intercept perf~r.!Jlance in 

terms of the above Operational Evaluation, two points mui~t be kept in 

view 

(I) The criteria used - asl 

/generally equal or betfer these L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-- . ! I 

standards, but so do various o,ther intercept services (~orne from ~~ . 

nations with installations teclinically inferior to those of the U.S.) 

as evidenced by _traffic obta~ned through special sources. Even allow-

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ing_ that special sources usua.lly bring in traffic these other groups are - I 

peculiarly located o.r adapt~d to intercept, one must weight heavily 

. the fact that four to five years - in one case, ten years - combined 

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. . tr..a.J:Jli.ng an4 experience is r-equired befQ.re a.man may become an 

oper-ato:t in these httercept -services. · 

<.Z) The ev~luati:on~ givqp have ref6rree entirely to 

t~e quality of die intercept in the form it i~ transcri)>~d at the 

.-

. . EO 3.3(h)(2) 

intercept ~osition, · ~thOU.t regard to the 1:1lfimate s~~~~.l?ility of· PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

that fo.rm. Th':1s, in the vitally tmport~11tc=Jproblem, curre~t~~, 

accounting for .more tha~ ~ Cl~arter of NSA 1 s total take (excluding 

,__ _______ ___,~lain t~xt),. oely: 4' '"~·I.• gtven .:e~sic 

Processing il.nsl tM. ·•ematttder is ·~nore~ pn f g~r4phic•f •irea 0 : •,- • ' I 

tia.sle; :&Jtlte lro°iipage rises~ this figure will d'ecline •. The reason 

is that, so 'tong as pr.esent techniques are the, best avall•ble, this 

Agency cannot - and.does not plan to try - to pr~c::ess all Manual 

Morse because the typewritte~ copy made by intercept operators 

is fundamentally not adapted to methods which permit full 

· exploi~ation wi~ reasonable economy of peJ"sonnel. 

IV• COMMENTS.AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

1.. The analysis of our traffic .col~ection operation indicates 

that much can be done toward improving the effort. The area in 

which must improvement can be made is considered to be chiefly 

. . 

admhiistrative, i.e. (l~ inadequate training of ope~ator and maintena~'e personnel by the cryptologic services, and (Z) lack of .. 

defi~ve authority to enforce standardization programs on equip• ,. ... 

me#t, plant layout, etc. T~e importance of the personnel problem 

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·'has been well recognized in ihe Agency and positive. corrective· 

actions are being c.ons£dered and undertaken.:. NSA (PRO.D) has 

l"ecently spo~sored 100 civUian intercept btlleta in the' Army· 

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Security Agency under a pilot pr,c;;gram w~fch la intend4:d to develop· · ' 

' . . a cor.ps ·of permanent, htghly skilled personnel for field operation•, . . . 

The problem of lack of c:i'ellnitlve authoritr. to eniorc~. standardlzatlo.n · . . . 

trogl'ams ill; als-o recognized. Efforts are being· ma~e with. NSA 

(PROD) to build up a 'group wl,ich will establish minimum standard• 

for acceptable COMINT. 'intercept operations and Insure adherency 

to these standards by c~nducting evabiati~ns of intercept facilities, 

. . While considerable improvement of the traffic collection· 

activ~ty could be achieved by proper adrriinistr~tion of field . . 

facilities along the lines indicated, there is also much that could · 

tie dOii.e by wciy of implefnenting an NSA proir~m to d!'vise better, 

&tdij>lei& an.i dufabl~ equipment for fi~ld uli.e. 

t4' ·R.iaelrch inci-developinertt on rhii't advanced intercept . . 

W~s *'h halur:llly aid in 'th-e fra'lfi~ -Ciillectton operation. 

N Efliitracted ~~11earcl~ttevelopment-pro8.lction ·ach.rdule, aa 1t 

n 'tt1trently .&eihg fO.li~ft'CI, requl~e• Bf>prb:xlmatety s years {oi' 

luil-\ti~Uzation in the fil!id. Tl\is period ot time l~ considered to &e 

too itng, but tkire iir mdch that c0ul'CI be done to cut this by 30 

p:t!ft.'nt to SO' pitrcenf by streamlining curre~ procedures. Reaearc~, 

-Ch°""~pmen.t ·.nel pro4uction, when undertaken locally. withi~ · NSA, la · 

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realized in the field in a fraction of the time which the contr;l'.ct 

program requires, as. la to be expect~d. However, there la r.ooht. 

/tfor improving this operation as well, part~culary by speeding up . . . .. 

the process for component procurement. 

It is to be noted.that the area for ·which the most sig_nifitant . . 

improvement in performance may be exp.feted from R/D is less in 

connection with the pure intercept of traffic itself than it la with the 

reduction· ol this traffic to a t'orm more suitable for traffic analyAia 

and cryptanalysis. This point is Eilaborated upon later in this ~eport. 

3. It is believed that a closer tie between tfSA (R/D) and NSA · 

(PROD) would aid in establishing an R/D program whkh would be 

more clos.e_ly tailo.red to the cu.r~ent and anticipated needs of the 

Agency. In the past, this connection has been attemptf!td primarily 

by bringing NSA (PROD) personnel into NSA (R/D) on various 

committees and panels engaged in planning operations. It is believed 

that an advantage would be gained by having some of the senior NSA 

(R/D) personnel engaged in planning R/D operations, spend more 

time gaining a" first hand" appreciatl~fo~ the problems ln PROD. 

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c TRAFF'IC ANt\.t:vs1s I 

Traf!ic analysif; i~ defined c.u the stm'y Pf radio commonlcaUo~ I ., J 

. . . 

by all tnO.r\nS short Of C rypt.rnaJysis uf l'l"\t!~Sil:ftl!. le~t (either ~ec(pher• • I ' 

ing or decoding) sons to produce nnh1ue lntelllgence, to aaaist 

cryptanalysis, to direct. intt!r('E'pt, and to influence our own c.;:ommunlcation security pretctkes. However, the intelligence derived frotn . ' 

llH?S sage texts c:an h.we such il strOnJt influence on the Interpretation 

of 'f/A data that the functions of 1'/A ;and C/A are not entirely 

divorced in NSA. Thus the office <~ha.rged with T /A responalbility 

is also charged _wi.th exploHing all easHy readRble cryptographic 

systems, and iR desi~natcd t.he OHice o{ Exploitation. For this 

. . 

reason we shall dis«.·u1:1M 1'/ A from the i>oint of vl·ew of the Of'ft.ce of 

Exploitation 1·athe1· th•rn p<~r ee. 

II. Q ES~RIP..J 10 ~ _O_J"__T..1A.PA1'.I\_ 

The princip;tl data contributin~ to the end product of traffic 

analysis are contents of Bona Ficte !'v'eRsa~cs, practice traffic, call 

signs~ messagt~ hendin~s, mcssa~c a·oulinR, and ~ranamitter identl• 

·ncation and loc<ttion. All thest.! Hems ;trc interrelated, ei\ch con-

·tributing to the othl'r <~H well :ta to the end product. We shall attemP,t 

here to indi~ate briefly the manner in whfrh they contribute intelligence: 

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·1. Cail Signs. Call Sigps .indicate .lines of° communication,· whl.Cli~. ' 

~n furn indicate organizational st~uctu'l'e. .In general the more comP.licat:--

ed a call sign system is, the more .produc\ive it is of intelligence once 

it is broken. The complicated system must be more highly integrated 

in order to be intelligiblt!. This greater unity usua~ly reflects mo.re. 

completely the organi'zational structure ol the •ctivity employing the 

.system. 

2. Message Heading. The format of the message heading tends to 

identify the country and service sending the' message. In some cases 

it can even identify the originator and his geographical location. ·In 

addition, the method of serializing messages ean give indications as . to routing, ·traffic volumes, etc. 

3. Operator Chatter. Chatter contributes miscellaneous bit's of 

information about eq~ipment, opera:ting ichedules, personalities, · 

local conditions, message routing, messag.e content, encryption of 

call signs, etc. ch'atte:r may also serve to link .or associate encrypte~ 

messages, tbehby yielding vaha:We clues to the -cryptanaJ..yat. 

4. Practice 'l"ralftc.. Since ~ gt.en set of .practice mess .... a Is 

usually assigned to a small set of users, identification of a practicE 

, message tends to iden~ify the transmitting ~tation. In the case of an 

unknown call sign system, practice traffic can be a valuable tool in 

maintaining call sign continuity. A study of the"lttethods by which·. 

practice traffic ill generated frequently gives clues as to the method of 

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encipherment of bona fide messages. Practic~. traff_ic_ recognition ls 

also very essential In order that Practice Messages may be cull~ct 

out from bona fide traffic when other bidlc;ations are either unknown or· . . ... . 

missing. 

5. Bona Fide Messages. (plain text ~nd decryption:•) These 

P.rovide direct intelligence on any and all 'ubje~ts in· a rather obviou·a 

manner. 

III. DESCRIPTION OF T /A PROCESSES 

1. Analysis of foreign comm~nicationa act~ally begins at _the I 

poi~t of intercept. The. Morse intercept operator or the R/T tran• 

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scriber produces in the form of page copy baa beat interpretation . . . '. 

of what he hears on the air. In ·ad!!iti~n he includes certain paren• 

thetic notes on the hard copy which show such info-rmation .as . ' 

fr'Jquency on which the transmission was beard, readability, ~ime. . . 

case number, and any other comm.nta w~ich be feels may be o'f 

as•iatattce in later analysis. In the case of other types of trail•· : . ! 

missions, the intercept operator cannot contribute these latter cont'-

ments, and due to lack of knowledge ' of the l~nguage, can seldom make 

any statements as to readability. (This is a serious problem as ou• 

radioprinter intercept is notoriously poor. It is believed that in 

many cases improper tuning is reaponai~le for this and that a 

greater familiarity with the language would provide the operator with 

crl~eri~ by whlch.~etter copy could be ~roduced.) '. 

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Z. ln the .cases for which page copy ls produc~d at the intercept . - station (manual morse and some R/Tl an efementary seml-procee-.. _ ·

ing of the traffic takes place at the intercept station •. The extent of . 2~· 

this semi-processing depends upon the local 11 take" and upon the 

. . . nu"'-ber and calibre of av.ailable personnel. Except in the case of 

Naval traffic this semi-pl"ocessi'ng consists primarily of extractlOn"', I' ,o 

and sorting of significant portiorts of the transmiBBions. The resuft 

of this semi .. processing is called a TECSUM and consists 0,f a digest 

of all meaningful information intercept by the operators. ·· \ . . 

The TECSUMS are forwarded by electrical means ~C> NS.A .and 

· to the theatre processing headquarters where they form'a.,asis for . · . . . . COMINT reports which are supplied to theatre and other tl~tereated ., 

consumers. In NSA the TECSUMS are combined and furt.ll•r processed in a. more complete manner yielding less timely but; ~ore 

comprehensive intelligence. In this respect considerable: _,rogress , Pi,, 

has, ·in some instances, been made toward mechanization, since 

the TECSUMS are received on perforated tape which lend!$ itself to 

i!llmediate. machine processing ~subject only t~ ihe correc~ion of 

transmission error) .• 

3. ~ter the semi-procell~ing at the ii:ltercept 'site, the raw 

traffic ls forwarded physically to NSA (Washington) for mo.re 

complete processing. Prior. to extraction_ of intelligence, .the 

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'traffic must be put into intel~iJible and analyzable form. this 

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lnvolve·s· tr'ans~ription, id:entification~. editing, sorting and ~og~lng .. 

the· traffic'. 

4. Tran!_c;_ripti~n. Since there are at_ present no "machines for 

sorting or analyzing raw traffic, lt must all be transcribed in the 

form of page copy so that it ·can be scrutinized visually and proc.• 

eaaed manually. This is true of all- formii of intercep~ except 

. . hand sent morse and low-speed e1:utomatic morse which are taken 

down originally in page copy. The processes involvc;d are '9-8 

foliows: 

a. R.8.dioprinter intercept may arrive in the .form of punched 

tape,. undulator tape, magnetic tape, or occasionally page copy. In . ·any event it is transcribed -- manuaily, ln the case of undulator 

tape -- ·into page .copy. 

b, Radiotelephone intercept is record_ed on magnetic tape 

and ls transcribed ma~~ally onto page copy by skilled linguiata. A 

large part of this is dorie at the interc-ept site or at some field 

p~ocessing center. It would bf desirable to be able to scan radio• 

telephon.e i.ntercept automatica;.1y to detect the ,presence of key word•, 

To accomplish this an analysis of si:><>ken language with respect to 

phoneme construction and representation will be ~eceasary~ 

c. All other transmissions (except a~me facsimile) a~ 

.recorded on discs or magnetic tape and forwarded to NSA for 

res~.arch. 

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!; , !.de.n!Jficat.ion. In mqst cases the tran~missi_ons are already 

. . 

~dentified by the intercept operat~r through a ~oreknowledge of cal'l. 

signs and frequency schedules, i.e. becau11e the ope.rator knew.what--

he was seeking lo -intercept. · Identification consists of assigning Ii 

"-case number'.' to the "transmission, A caae number la a sequence of 

four letters and five digits, The four letters identify the transmission 

as to country, service, and type (morse, R/T, etc.), The five digits 

identify the net and individual link. About 20 percent of the traffic 

arriving at NSA h unidentified or lncorrec~ly identified, In identifying 

traffic. all the techniques of traffic analysis are brought to bear on· the 

pt"oblem, since the traffic ls worthless unless the originator c.an be 

identified to some extent. On ~ome circuits, e.g. many rad~oprinters, 

the problem of identification la paramount, since C8rlls are seldom, if 

ever, used and. little lbtelligence ls passed on the circuit. (These 

circuits are, ~owever, a potential aource of intelligence aa they are 

. maintained in a standby state to carry overloads f.rom other circuits.) 

-In the case of hostilities or a breakdown of landline faclllt~es, these 

circuits are capable of handling a great deal o~ traffic. 

6. Editing and sorting. These are the most time-consuming 

and tedious operations in the agency. In some divisions of NSA-90 

as much as 85 percent ot" the personnel and time is devoted to these 

operations. In order for intelligence to be extracted frqm copy, it 

must be presen~ed to the analyst in some logical order~ The parti~ular 

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order will depend on.the typ~ 0£ l~telllgence to be extracted. ls:a s•n·' 

eral the operations p~oceed mor~ or lea~ as tollow1: Fir1t, the . ' . . trafllc must be· eo~ted by case number and, arranged in_ chronological 

order. At tlii~ _poi~t the chatter .can._be analyzed, call elgn1 logged, 

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and messages decrypted or extracted !or subsequent analy•ls. At 

the same time the intercept operator's parenth~tic notes are taken 

into account and appropriate changes made. Aleo the traffic must be 

"deduped" • Thia lnvolv41!1S aea~ching through all the messages trans• 

mitted, and combining duplicate n\essages, l. e., comparing and resolving discrepancies. The "dedupingi• is not confined to, an individual 

link. A search across all related links must also be made. Thia, in 

addition to giving a "best" copy of the _message, gives information ae 

to message routing, the importance of which we have previously no~ed • 

. After the messages have been deduped, and classified as to prac~ 

, tlce or bona fide, they must be classified according to cryptographic . . system &~d transcribed (perhaps in decrypted form). If the messages 

are 'easily decrypted, then the consequent intelligence must be logged 

in such a manner that it ~an be evaluated prop,rly and later included 

in an intelligence report. Some of these messages are individually of 

no ~ntelllgence value. The' intelligence to be der.ived would be of a 

statistical nature arising from the ~valuation of a large number of 

such messages. An outstandi.ng example of this is the RusaianD 

____ lsystemuillu\V!ilch several million messages per mont~ are 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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passed. An individual :meesage is merely 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

However, the totaUtyi o, ..._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--

mes 8 age, a, when properly ·~alu.ated, glve..s ·a vlvi~· picture of the 

R~.asianl r•.y;tem {bo.th o:rganiza.t~onal ~nd geographical), 

concentration,' etc .• ...._~~~~~~~~......-~~~~---' 

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If the messages are nbt e~sily decTypted or are encrypted by 

an .unknown ·system, they are pa~~ed, tog~~er with identlficat~ona 

along to the cognizant cryptanalyats. There they und:ergo further I { 

transcriptions and sorting In var·i~ua fand frequently not predetermined) 

forms. _This is discussed in det~ll in another chapter. . . 7. Analysis •. Reference a have already been rnade in the preceding· 

paragraphs to the actual processes of traffic analysia Although it is • I 

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believed that the bulk 'ot what is *ow called analysis ls in fact paper . I ' 

shUffilng {i.e. getting the da~a into the p~oper order and form) which 

co~ld be mechanized, there still' remain~ the problem of ~valuation, 

which must ultimately be done by a person. Phases of traffic analysis 

, '" . . which cannot be profitably done b~chine are the following: 

a. Decision. The analyst mllat contin~aily survey and resu_r-' 

vey hia raw data, .in order to determine what intelligenc4fca~ be extracted and which facets of the data contain this intelligence. ·Thia la . . 

.~a very lmp~rtant aspect of both C/A and T/A. Old sources of intelli· 

gence are constantly disappearing and new sources crop· up;. The 

analyst must be continually on the alert for new sources. He must . . . . 

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then decide h~w the lnteUlgence la to be extracted, or ln what form 

the data must be preaented ln order to faclHtate extraction. He.ftaumt 

allo eatlmata the amount of work involved and decide wheth1ar or not ' ' 

the latent lnfofmatlon l11 of 11ufflclent. value to warrant the 1axpen.c:Uturm 

of that callort. 

b. Evaluation. T_!le analyst mualltianalyze th~ lntelUsence 

produced by· the above proce1111u, dcaclde whether or not U lm of 11lgnlfl ... 

cance, draw conclualona (preferably prob~blHty 11tatement11) from lto 

· and poa11lbly decide what further procea1ln1 h called for. FlnaUy, he 

mu111. compile the !ntelll3ence ln a1 complete, ·yet conchs, a report &Iii 

po1nlblca for delivery to the conaumers. 

8 d [llln1 and Storas:e a In ordra I' to properly tavaluate datll. D the 

m.nalygt mu;t have acce;llll to the pagt hhitory oir I!. lilltuatlon, Thlli1 eno 

t&Ulil 1&tora1s and lndaxlng of au mlsnHlcant dm.ta l!.lil It OCC\ll'Glo The d&~ 

to be r;:itored conlillliltlil of raw tral!lc and tnlormQtlon rilxtractrild trom 

t.raf.ftc OI' othliilr collstGllrml gourcGrn, The fo.l'mfill' lo prlm&l.rUy m. CJtorag@ 

problram, •Iii the narild to conlilult old f~w tralflc lril r11l1.Hv~ly lnlf@qu!t1aat. 

mnd whfin eal1Gi1d lor, thr; identity rind loemtlon ol the traffic lo \81ilumlly I 

knowno ProJGilet'1 l'IU:JCZJC.R Slnd !>~FROST ar<il cu&pGilctsd to hanCllG tklg 

problgm md~u.atril1y by mle•ofllmlns QU tral!lc: and provldlas e. mm.ahbu> 

for qu.lekly produelne photoct11He eoplGilo of &.\ny Qlill@et@d portlona 

Thc;i prob1'1m of llUfil lnformli\tlon lo oomowhat dMIH•onto Aim 

U<:Jm of Atm1'@r1Di\tion, to bi fully @.1:1p1oltlili~1@, m1.&ot bQ f'41Cic!l \IU&d!illi' r. 

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number of different categories,· and in such a manner that le physically easy to loc-a1:e--and _read. Due ~o the bulk and variety of inlorma"tio_n, 

-.this has become practically impos l}ible with conventional methods of . 

filing. Additioi:ial filing s~ace is no longer available, so th~t only a , 

carefully selected portion of new information can be fll~d, and this 

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at the expense of old but potentially valuaf>le i~ormation which -must 

be burned. · 

Although the problem of space will be solved (at least temporarily) by the move to Ft. Meade,. the paramount problem of a~cess - . .. 

~ill still remain. Files are of little use unless they are.extensively_ 

cross-indexed or can be a-canned easily and 4uickly. Cross-indexing 

is in ge1Jeral unsatisfactory with the types· of problems encountered 

here because. of multiplied bulk and because it is impossible to predict· ' 

all the indices by which it may be desired to enter the. file in the future. 

At present many potentially productive avenues of research are con- .. · · 

'stantly being blocked by the work factor involved in collecting the 

' data from bulky and inadequately catalogued files. .. 

IV. MAGNITUDE 

l~ Ta:l>le A gives a breakdo"'!n of the estimated 3so million 

l'S-~-iiilracterr groups which must be pro~ monthly by NSA-90 

d1ring 1958. (The overall present figures are aii'Ou~_,;Percent l~ss:) 

/I'lieli~ figures represent abbut 80 percent of the total traf!i~_octf.81ied' 

by HS.A, al-though somewhat less than 80 percent of the total an~~'i& J. 

effort. 

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Z. Table B shows the extent to which we are able to exploi~ 

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·our present take of traffic. ·In this table ".Basis Processing" means 

sorting, scanning~- and extracting element_ary T /A info~mation. 

"Advancet Proc~s.si~g" me~na d~cryptiop of kn~wn systems and 

more detciil,d traffic anal_ysia. It does not i~ply complete expioitation. It would be quite optimistic to assume tP,at ZS percent of 

!'., 

inherent 'i~teiligence has been extracted even from that traffic whic~ 

has undergone 11 advanced processing". 

3. After advanced processing there is still a great deal of intelligence which could.be recovered by cros-e-reference, collat~on, and . 

proper statistical and mathematical tre~tment of the results_. Th.tse 

. . . are not fully exploited for two reasons. First, all available personnel 

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are swallowed up in the ta.sk of basic 'processing, which must necessar- · 

. lly be dqne firat and always. Secondly, although most o( the.advanced 

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analysis could b.e done by machine, the data to be analyzed must first 

be put into a form adaptable to machine treatment. This is impossible 

with our present (or any reasonable fuf;ure) co_mpleme~t of key punch 

operators. 

V. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

:pl 86~36/qO USC 3605 

EO· 3.3(h)(2) ~ 

l.· From· fifty to seventy. fiv' percent of t'.he basic tra~fic :processing 

now being done m'1nlJ.~ly'.on specific problems, ~uch as SovietO 

.__ ____ __.!could be done much more quickly and elliciently:by 

machines. Tlie biggest problem is that of data handling. However; a 

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machine cannot handle data J!ltelligently unless the data is in a lo rm _.,#" 0 

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which the machine can interpret. There already exist means !or ., . ' , 

mechanically changing coded dat~ (in the .fprm of magnetic tape, 

punched tape, punched card, etc,) into page copy. But there is 

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as yet little hope of developing a practical' method of changing 

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page copy·into coded form. Furthermore,, there is no likelihood ... 

that the manpower will ever be &ufflcient to' accomplish this proces• 

manually to the extent that is desirable. Add to this· the fact that . 

intercept is transcribed from two to llv~ times during processing, 

and it becomes evident that the only solution is that the intercept ~e 

taken c;lown originally in coded form. This ls mechanic;a.lly easy to .. . 

a,ccomplish, but it will require considerable r~search into th~_require-.. 

ments of the analysts to determine what ·form to use, how to inelude 

parenthetic not~s, how to edit it, etc. It will also require, the dev~lop.l. 

mertt of some extremely fiexible type of data editing equipment in 

order to take maximum advantage of the operators' parenthetic 

comments. 

2,.. Another advantage in taking down intercept in coded.form Wi~l 

be retaliz~d in that it will then be adaptable to immediate sup~rencipher• 

menJ anc;l forwarding by electrical means. Although it appears unlikely 

.. that we will ever have the facilities for forwarding all intercept 

ele4trically, there ~hould always be means available for electrically 

f~rtwarding any given portion on a priority bast~·•. in·· case that portion 

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ehould become productive of. critical and perishable intefligence. 

J. There ii also a need for a. more adequate method of filing 

COMINT and collateral intelllgenc~ (as disFussed under Filing and 

Storage). A system somewhat as follows seems to be indicated: 

a. A file containing punched cards· (or the magnetic equiva--

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lent of punched car-cl). Each II card"· woul~ cortt~iil an item of intel'ligence and_ a co~e symbol fodicatlng the. format in which the lntelligeJice 

is entered. For fi!xample it may contain, with respect to an enemy .. activity, the basic. station trinome·, military unit number, location, 

subordination, types of transmission, type of operation in which · 

engaged, date, location (in the ra~ traffic storage files) o'f the· source 

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of this information, special remarks, etc. Other types of informatio.n 

cards might be case activity summaries, personality files. traffic . . . resumes, cargo information, etc.: . I 

b. A means for electrically scanni?g the fil~ at high speed in 

search of any specified .logical combination of the bits of data (for 

example, to search for all evidence of submarine activity in the Japan 

Sea between 1340 and Z400 on lZ, 14, or 17 Api-jl l9Sl or Z6 Jan 1957)'. 

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c. A means of reprod~clng the items selecte~ ~it.her on a screen 

or in the form of pag~ copy. 

4. A means for revising o~ ~raaing information already -.ntere~ 

into the files, as well as a -means for entering new information. The 

·File should be capable of being'.consulted loc~liy by the individual I • • I 

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seeking 'the ·information. Probably·th.e .task's· o'f ~n~ering, revising and. 

erasing data should be left to spec.ia\i·,ed person~el. 

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·The basic components .for a device of this type already ,exist. . . . . . . . . 

The IBM 702 cuuid probably handle.a year's volume.' of information. 

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However, .a device with a much greater memory capadi:y and more.·'·. ' . ' 

spe~ializ~d set of instructions would be ·more eco~omical and efficient. . ':. , ' . . 

4·. Othet- tha~ the equipment\' just ~iscussed,· .there seems to·b'e 

· • little ·~se for o• special purpose equip~ent • ln 

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th'e olfi~e oi·e~ploitatlon. I o 

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In .general the pr.~blem is one of sorting, 'collating and. summa:rlza-

. . tion. After .. these processes have been.ac.compliahed, there will also . . . be problems of a mathematical riature and some problems of de'cryp-· · · 

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tion. However, each such problem by itsell would be relatively small':· 

and of indefinite duration. 1't s~ems advisable to P.lan to treat t~e.se . 

problems on gene'ral purpose CC?mp~ters until such time a.a their · · · ' I ' o • "' • I 

magnitude a.Pf!. (,jlu~ton. fflc,tlcftf' ~~.e~i•~· .fit·~ ra:t•, -thf.r.e ~~ul~ ... · ' ' . 

be no point ln bui~ding .aoedaJ·e1;1~pQSe i~mtipment until ., •. awa . .. . ~ ' , . . . 

prepared to feed data to i~. · ·" · I ' I ' ' ' ' ' .; o 

The 11 amall" probi'ems 11d..or~ecH:p c,,bo.Y-e a-.e by ne me.11:n11 un- ·. . . , . '· 

i·mj:Jortant. They include .auch prqblerns.~ s-q~~11lz~af •e.aulta, 

DF. fixlng, plotting locations of radar atation'B·, and"ma~ ~~~,., "Qt . -.' '. ' 

.. . ..,. .. late, much attention has bee.n devoted by members of .90~ ·~z, an~.34 ' • ' ' .. I 

to. the . mechanization of. these problems on exiatl~g compiters. and IBM·. : : : .. • • 'I ' o 

equipment. Thia .SU

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pport should be continued, as ~· II small" mech- .. anizable problems are numerous, and new ones are .const~ntly·bein~ 

created. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

ESTIMATED GROUPAGE 

FISCAL YEAR 1958 

Groups to be 

~igh Grade Low Grade 

Fwd.Electric• 

Practice Plain ally each 

Kess es Mess es Mess es T~xt Chatter Total month 

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1,075,640 951,240 4,847,140 2,096,620 20,889,270 29,958;910 5,228,600 

12,672,500 1,104,$20 206,000 l,,f)()2,12f) 2,411,590 17,,)96., 730 2,800,000 

8)1, 750 2,.0~3,;20 None 482,040 2,,280,,090 5,657,4'JO l,loA, 700 

7, 717,2&0 2,439,h)O 5,bkt>,050 1,135,410 2,fi97,890 l9,4Jt),02C? 11:,4)1),900 

3oi<i,3f-O 301,440 1,14),570 955,hTO J-, rn.,~~ ~,478,440 4,6Ll,150 

702,270 47,050 40,200 HonA 359,800 1.,030,;20 2hl,OOO 

735,270 372,120 5,2~8.~80 73,150 39,014,030 45,4,;3,250 s ,'ii25 J l-00 

67,350 7,453,400 490,,79~ 5,624,620 15,413,900 29,049,2~0 4,002,600 

712,420 51,074,120 3,936,230 None JB,484,980 ?4,2117, 750 22,867,2".l') 

B,JS0,940 121,140 None 84,000 5,sn,010 14,127,,190 2,857,880 

)1,846,450 11,295,290 5,247,930 2,070,400 )8,~9,150 89,069.,290 13,654,800 

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Table B 

PEP.CmiTJGE OF TRAFFIC I'ROCESSED 

Percentage ot Traffic on 

which Basic Processing has 

"been completed 

as~ 

BS% 

100% 

-,Sfl'Y.>% 

85% 

asi 

40% 

BS% 

,. 81 •. 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

t=o 3.3(h)(2) 

·-.Percent-age ot TPa.f'tic 

which'hqa undergone 

Adv•ed. ,,rocessing 

60% 

ho:c 

S:J% 

SO% 

lo% 

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0 WEATHER 

!. INTRODUtTION 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

· PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

The Weather Division (NSA-95) and the weathf:r field etationa . 

are primarily concerned wlth extracting eipecial weather intelligence 

from communieations. InieJ!'e&t 

exists in Europe-an Satellites' weatheJ." intelligence, but I .... __ _. 

·preaentl,y has responsibility for ·thia area. 

Weather intelligence, to be of use to the consumer, must reach 

the consumer within six hours of the .initial weather observation. 

The time involved in transmitting or delivering the intercepted 

weather traffic to NSA la far greater than six hours. Hence·, i~ i 

useful intelligence is to be extracted from weather trafCic, the ·. 

traffic must be exploited in the field ·or the tralfic must arrive at 

. . . NSA within an hour of intercept. At present field units proc~sa 

and exploit the weather traffic wherever possible. 

The Weather Division at NSA concerns itself wit~ 'the training 

of personnel for NSA field station duty, advis·es on the op~ration · 

and functions of the field atatlons, and performs the cryptanalytic 

research and traffic analysis necessary to maintain. and constantly 

improve intercept and analysis of weather traffic. Weather intelligence reports are compiled in the Weather Division. 

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teo 3.3(h)(2) II. INTEREST IN WEATHER .PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

Our main interest inl .... _______ .....------~f w•ath1'f 

intelligence is due to the value of this weaiher in~elHgence· tn\help- - . ·~ ' ' ' . 

lng to predi~t or substantiat~._ _____ ___,. __ ..... loff~~sive action 

ag~inst their enemies. l·f a full scale offensive action ~ere to \be 

carried out by I lweatiier cc;>nditiona would ... have to b~ shitable for thd" schedule~ activity. Atao, if a full 

scale offensive were to be launched against .... I __________ ...__ _ ___.l 

weather conditions ove·r the attac~ area would ·.have to be completely 

known· at least tw:enty four hours in advance./ The development of . 

• nuclear weapons puts an. unusual value on all weather intelligence. 

Our secondary interest in the .... l __________ ___,lweather 

stems from its value in predicting weather conditions in parts of 

the world other than! .... _______ .... 

III. WEATHER TRAFFIC FLOW 

In thel f, weather observations · ...__ _______________ ___. 

are ~ade at observation. posts and a~e transmitted as weather reportl 

to collection stations which serve as assembly and retransmission 

points. 

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The weathP.r reports of the services do noi flow in established 

patterns as do reports ·on the hydromet nets. T~ere is a heavy 

exchange .of weather ·reports on an "as neede~"' bash. 

IV • .lli1:.ERC~PT POINTS AND VOLUMES 

These syate.ms are Cully discussed 

in the chapter ti t~ed "Hand Systems" and hence will not· be 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

discussed here. The mechanization of the solution of these systems 

affords problems which differ little from some problem.a discussed 

in the. chapter titled "Hand Systems. 11 The amounts and type of 

mechanization required by the Weather Division will also be 

included there. 

VI. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 

The traffic analysis functions of the Weather Division do not · 

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di~fer esse~tially from the functions performed in the Traffi'c Analy1il 

Di~sio~a. A dJ scu111aion on the tnecha.nlzatio~ of thti~e funC:t.io~1~h.1 

been· ~lly discussed in the Traffic A~alysl.~ Chapter and will not be 

included .he re. 

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. Recoinmendati~ns on tile ~echa.rlizatio.n in suppor't of perform. 

ing T/A and'C/A functions are included in the chapters on T/A and· 

l - Hand Systems respectively. The specific requirements o{ the 

Weather DivisiOn should be carefuily studied in subsequent pha,ses 

of this project. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3:3(h)(2) 

Z. If the exploitation of l._ ___________ ,reather 

traffic is to be accomplished at the NSA, then the recommendations 

set down in the chapter on T /A op processing. tratfic at field station~ 

·and forwarding the traffic electrically to NSA also hold. In that · 

speed is of prime importance in the exploitation of weather traffJ,c, 

special requirements may have to be satisfied here. 

3. Efforts should be r..nade to intercept weather traffic at the 

qbservation outpost level. Obtaining the traffi~ at this level will 

aid considerable in compromising the crypto-systems employed 

du~ing later transmiBBions. 

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E PLAIN LANGUAGE 

.· I. INTRODUCTION 

Analysis of plain languag·e traffic accounts ·for a su~stantial 

share of the intelligence obtained on the economic and military atahis 

of the countrie~ forming the communist bloc·. Thia lnformatiOn ta 

. . not as easily obtained from the plain language messages as one might -- suspect. In most cases considetaJ>le processing and analysis la required to recover and recognize items of importa~ce. In many cases 

relevant items are r!l'ferred to by' number, drawing, or contract, and · 

not by name. 

II. SOURCES ·pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.~(h)(2) 

There are many·types and sources of plain language.traffic: 

/in that these p.re r~presentative of ...._ _____________ ___ the type of processing and analyeia requi?".ed; moreover, they consti. . ,,' ,'' / . -

tute an important source of information o~ the economic and military . . 

potential of I 

111. L_ ____ __J=O=M~M~U=N=I=C=A::..:T:....:l=O=N=S 

~- .. General .... I _____ ..... lcommunic.attons are communications 

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paHcd nn nonmilitary links: primal"i.ly th~se.of th~ ... -----------

.__ _______ .... ~ The tr~Cfic containp both official and private ~ctr· . 

respondence. The of{icial pa rt consiltt1 o! communications between 

_________________________ Fvti!ually' 

·all the traffic ~£this sort obtained by NS/l is through the. elfort•.of 

our intercept stations. Almost all the tr:ansmissions utili.ze Radio0:. 

printer and.Automatic Morse. There are some facsi~ile and voice 

transmissions. Th_, total inter~ept averages 1, 000, 000 non-v~icie 

messages a month and approxima.tely 1000 voice magnetic tape 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

recording•. ~o 3.3(h)(2) 

z. Non-Voice. The non-voice intercept is !orwarded to NSA 

Washington where it ls JNl throu.gh a preliminary scanning process 

which eliminates about 80 pe'l'~Onl QI the t.raffi-c intercepted:. The 

scanners, by process of noting key words, daMify the rema.ining 

20 percent according to subject matter. 'the retained t.raflic is page 

prieted, eerialized, attd microfilmed and then furtber studied with 

respect to criteria determined by curr.eift: intelligence interesti. 

The high priority material is further analyzed arftl the intelligence ~- .... 

value· ·extracted. Non-j>ri"ority material i's stor-ed- fo~ posa.ible future 

use. 

3. , Voice. ~he voice tapes are forwarded unproc~•s•~ to: th.•. 

appropriate area in the Agency where they are audited by Ungtljsts 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

lcir intelligence conte~t. O~ly selected portla,ns are t.ranscribed 

and sent to the analyst •. 

4~ Intelligence. The forega,ilig pro~e19ses of scanning, categorizing and subse~uent analyah of voice and'non-voice plain language 

intercept culminat~ ip a substantial amou~ of intelligence concerning 

the I . , 

IV. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RADIO ·. 

1. General • International Commercial Radio ls a communications 

medium by which the i:on'\DLercial t1-nd governmental.organizations of 

thel lcand other nations as well) comm~nicate wit~ ee.ch 

other. There are some natlonai' nets, con~roll~d, l,>y ~e ·"""I ____ ___, 

services, which carry internat~onal commercial commu~ications. 

Russian, Chinese Communist and Satellite traffic on the monitored 

ICR links received in :NSA averages 100, 000 messages a. month.· The 

national nets yield another ZO, 0-0-0 messages.~. month. This represents I 1 • I • 

only S percent of the ICR traffic interc-~ed. Not all traffic on the . :t 

ICR links is in plain language. From -.zl'te SO 'thous~d commercial 

c·ode messages per mo~th are also retiivd~ ·1he code systems 

employed are mainly those which are eomme"f·ci~ity available. Some 

of ·the code systems are privately cons~_ructed·. 1t is estimated that 

~lmost all of these systems· could be read if need be. However ... at 

p~esent effort i• restricted to reading only select commercial code 

messages. Few intercept stations are assigned to intercept ICR 

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traffic exclusively. Other ~tatfons intercept ICR plain language· 

but discard it when they recogniz~ it as such. ~ 

. 

Z. Intercept Control. The intercept ~tations aBBigned to the 

inteTcept of ICR scan and sele1tt traffic according.to a predetermined 

scan guide. The selected traffic is forwai'._cled to NSA where it is ~ 

scanned according to the couniries invoiv"ed in the communication or 

by the originator of the message and sorted ·accordingly.. 1 The traffic . . 

ls then scanned for intelligence content. This scanning results in 

the retention of about half th!!! traf(ic originally processed. 

3. Intelligence. All theOand ICR messa.ges whi'ch survive 

the preliminary elimi.nation processes are studied by competent 

analysts. Several thousand messages a mo.nth are translated and 

published individually. The contents of many thousands more are 

.published in report&, tabulations, compilations, and su~maries. All 

·messages of poten\ial value are filed, several hundred thousand per 

month being retained. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

v. AREAS FOR MECHANIZATION PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

An area in which machines cen give support is in the early sort-

· ing and selection stages where relatively simple but decisive operations· 

are perform"d on vast quari,tities of traffic. Se'V~ral equipments which· 

will assist in the 11).eChanization of scanning and pa1e printing operations 

and which ~ill completely mechanize the page printing operation of 

.___ ... lradioprinter traffic are under development (these ai-·e Project 

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NELLY and Project BUDD'Yt. 1'he BUDDY device wiU scan chadless tape and page print messages sel,,cted"tiy message endings.·. 

The NELLY device will be an experimentE1:l model of a scanning 

device which will incorporate the functl~J'lt:\. of BUDDY as well as 

select messages by category for 1age p,rlnting. A modification of .. 

. a Model ZB teletype machine will make po~sible on-line processing 

of radio-printe~ tra~fic and the .a'1tomatic production of page print · 

copy. Another current development ia an electror_dc transcriber 

which will operate on .. line in the r.ecording of automatic Mora~ 

transmissiona and produce hard copy. Since automatic Morse la. 

no·w recorded on· undu.lator tape, the amount of tape that can be 

scanned is definitely limited. This electronic transcriber -tibould 

result in a conside;rable increase in the amount of autoplatic Morse 

traffic which can be processed. Automatic translation from undulator 

tape has proven a problem due to variability in,.the inking of 'the tape. 

·' 

Thia is a ~roblem on which more effort should be placed. 

Scanning, categorizing, dec9di~g, ~nd printing of ·commerCial 

code messages could be mechanize.cl' with slight variations on the 

NELLY approach. Other ol;1erf.tlons which might be performed 

mechanically include (1) A14t"ontatlc language translation, (Z) Aut~matic 

editing, masa data pro(lftsaing of hl~ssagea, and automatic filing and 

file recovery~ as ~cussed under Traffic Analysis. A potentially 

mechanizabl. U'eld requiring additional analytic research is that of 

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. ph~neme analysis for the ~utomatic d_.etecti~n. of ~·hot" words "in ~oice . . . 

record~ngs together with improved ~qli,i~ment to .,e~forn:i thh·fuhc'tioq. 

'l'OP SECRET EIDER 
.. 

· 1. Crypto ... eyatem.a can be divided intq .t•o cate1ortea d;tJandiilg 

on how the e.m:iph•rment is performed. by h:aiid cir by machJn:e. itan\f . .. . '• 

systems are treated separately, and for purposes of thia report 

machine ay..-ems are defined as those in whic~ the key used is pro• 

duced as etie1pherment takes place; llie key la generated on the spot • . , . ..,: 

In some ~sage-a previously prepared key is combined with fin text 

electrically or mech~nically. These ~re not regard-ad as chine 

systems since they consist of mechanizing a hand process. If it 

were determined that such key had been produced by means of a 

cipher machine, study of the key and the machine would of course 

be ~egarded aa a machine problem. 

Ciph.er machines have many advantages particularly for middle 

and high echelon military use. They are rapid and uaually provide 

printed copy: their use avoids many o~ the complicated problems of· 

di111tribution raised by key pads and key tapes. Their speed o.f en• 

ciph~·rment permits the handling of la_rge voiumes of traffic; tele• 

type systems can be operated at tape reader speed and so ca.n handle . 

messages·several thousand characters long. Machines requiring 

no outside power source are very good for field use. These factors . . 

· ~ake_ cipher_ machines particular~y adaptable for military. le so 

that it ia extre·mely likely that we will be working against c her 

machines for.some time. 

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z. Two principal categoriea of cipher machines are ttioie tl\at . . 

use (1) rotors (wired rotors) or (2) pin wh~els to produce key. _A 

rotor ia a wheel with two face a, called input ·and output fac.,a, each 

with n contacts or studs and a aet of n wi:tea making electrical 

connections between the facea. The number 0£ inJerconnecting 

wirea is usualty equal to the number of letters in the alphabet of the 

language for which it la being uaed·. Twenty-six is the moat common. 

number for western countries and thJrty for Ruasia. With recent . . 

developments such aa re-entry (where a circuit may paaa through 

the rotor a more than once) this number can vary. The classical 

machine uses a aeries of rotors set between two plates, one of 

whose points are connected to the keyboard and the other to the 

printeri These are referred to as the input a~d output endplates • 

respectively. At a particular position or setting o~ the rotors. a 

key is depressed, this excites a point of the endplate; the -current . . 

goes through the rotors to the output endplate and thence to the · 

printer. The resultant. letter constitutes the enciph~rment of the 

letter on the depressed key at the indicatecJ setting of the rotor a. 

At this setting each l.,tter on the keyboa~d will be associatt;.d· with 

a unique output letter. Thia association of all the letters makes up. 

the enciphering alphabet at a particular positi'on 0£ the rotors. This 

alphabet p'ersiata as long as none of the r.otors alters its position. 

Howeve'I;', if .one or more of the rotors move, a new e.hciphering 

. alphabet is set up. The encipherment 'of each letter will lhen show 

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TOP 8E'3RET ~lDER 

only· an apparently random relation to it,a previous encipherment if 

randomly wired rotors are employed •. 

A rotor machine then consists of a aeries of rotors set between 

a pair of endplates· and a determinable means of rotating them (called 

the rule of motio~) in such a way that a lon4 seri~s of appar!!ntly 

unrelated non.i.repeating encipheri~g alphabets ia produced. Some 

machines have the property that enciphering alphabets are recip• 

rocal: (i.e. if A is enciphered by N then N will be enclphe1;ed 

by ·A ) and no letter can be enciphered by itself. A rotor machine. 

called the ENIGMA, widely used by the German Armed :.rorces 

during the last ·war had thia feature. The ENIGMA also had a set 

of jacks which permitted a daily rearrangen)ent of the order in 

which the keyboard was connected to the e~dplate. The addition 

of these jacks provided more security than the addition of a rotor 

whose posltion must rema,in fixed for many encipherments. · 

3. a. An example of the other type of cipher machine which 

. . uses pin wheels· as opposed to rotors to produce key is ~he Hagelin . - model C-38. A pin wheel ie a circular disc with pins set in the 

perimeter that can take either of two positions. The baalc principle 

of op.eration consists of sliding two alphabets, one in normal order . . . 

and the other reversed, against each other in sucq a way that sue• 

ceaaive juxtapositions of the alphabets depend on the internal structure. 

of the machine. Here each juxtaposition produces one of twellty•six· 

reiated alphabets since there are only twenty-six possible juxtapositions 

0£ twenty-six letter alphabets. Security is inherent-in the highly 

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irregular sequence in which the various, juxtapositions are used. 

The sequence of juxtapositions or offsets is the key which is a functioq 

of the activity o{ the pins and a set of lugs each of which provides for 

a single displacement of the alphabet. Again a particular. setting Of 

the wheels is associated with a given displa\:ement. In order to get 

a long series of such displacements the wheels are made to move. 

In the C-38 all the wheels move a single step between encipherments. 

To guarantee a long period before the series of offsets repeats t~e 

• 

' 

wheels are made relatively prime. The. C-38 has six wheels which range . . 

in_ length from 17 to 26 giving it a cycle length of about one hundred 

million. 

3. b. Another type of pin wheel cipher machine is one which 

generates key for the encipherment of the baudot code. The Baudot 

code is the binary code employed to represent the characters of the 

32 character alphabet of a teletype machine. The function of the 

pin wheels is to produce five bi11ary streams, each stream may be 

represented as a series of dots and crosses or marks and spaces. 

Encipherment consists of adding these streams level by level to the 

plain text. The rule for addition is usually dot plus dot and cross 

plus croa·s sum to dot, and dot plus cross or cross plus dot sum . . 

to cros... Cez:ta.in machines have a further encipherment at this 

, stage ...,/hich involves permuting -the levels of this sum. Again it 

is cle•r that the wheels must be made to move since a particular 

letter of key will always be associated with a given setting of the 

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w.he~ls. It.Isa th-'r~ must .Pe a.••¥ of.i11-Suiin{#J, ioJJg P.~ziod. l:J•fRS• ·~ 

~h~-~~~nJepc~ ~f ~ey lett.,ra si'~~' ~Q "ep·~au. 

4. ni~re are ctph~r machines wh~c~ prodq~e key thro~gh the 

use of·telephone .se:ledQra.-. pthers us~ commutate>rs. There ia a 

wide va~iety' of methods of moving .the elem4'nts of the machine, •' I '" ' ' 

. "'.'ii... ;=: 

bu.t the machines ·mentioned above'_iire· the basic type~. 

s. The ~ryptanalysi~ of these machines is extremely complex 

and mechanization of the methods of, cryptanalysis requires a laz:ge· . . . . 

quantity of ·high speed electronic equipment. 

. An . outline . of ~ese 

method~ will be given to s'1ow w!iy ~uclf equipment is ne~essary. 

We shall often speak of the "solution" of a cipher ma'~hine. Thit 

will have two meanings. The first meaning applies to t~e term 

"machine solution" whereby we .shall mea~ that·e:nough inform~tion 

la known about the machine to allow us to simulate the machine's 

decip~ering .(and hence enciphering) process. 'For e:xa~ple, the 

ENIGMA machine is solved whe~ all rotors, their motion notches-. · 

their wirings, and the rule of motion are obtained. Thia infOrma• · 

· tion· alone is not sufficient· to ensure continuous reading of the . . 

device. Again,· the capture of a cipher machine and all its compon• 

. . ' 

enta constitutes a s.olution of the machine. The ·secona me.aiiing . . 

applies. to the term "daily solution" whereby·:"t"'e shall meas:a that. . . . . . . .,s': ~ . . . . all the parameters of·the dev*.ce are· known for tbe crypto•period. 

. . For example, the parameters of tbe ENIGMA machi~ whlch change 

I • 

"daily" are the wi'l'ing of the reflector. and.stecker, the rotors.-

·' 

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e·mployed, their oi:der and their. i'1~tial '!ettinge. Thus to obtain a' 

11 Jllachine solution" qf the ENIG.Ma lqiowing· th-e: '1&ture .of the .. 

machine, we would hav.e to recovef th..e numbj!r .o.f rotors that·are 

employed an~ tke wirlJlg of .. e.pi., fJ"'-'°stn.g there ltil"e _,eight a~Ua bJe r9tor s to be us·~· ·;;three a~ a •i:fne.., tbis· 'woul~ mean that we . . . 

w:ould Jiave to try (io! f wiri~g•'ifo~ a.~ch '*• to recqver the 

correct wiring. The nupibel' 9l Jt;..-~l• ~ecesaary to rec,:aver· all 

rot~rs would approxlRJate l.,se • ~i;a number exceeds the nu"'~er 

of atoms in the universe and· obv.iou,ly transcends the speed and . . 

capacity of electronic equipment which· may become available in 

the •oreseeable future. 

s. a. The cryptanalytic exploitation of the ENIGMA is a good 

, . 

example of the use of high speed machi~ery. The ENIG~A machine 

was used on almost all communication links of the Ge·rman military 

.establishment. The wiring ol the rotors was completely known 

because machines were captured; even so there remai~ed many 

unknown elements in the encipherment of a message. First, the · ., 

c~oice of rotors used and their order (In the Army an ordered seque*i:C• 

of three was selected from a set of 5 • This can be done In 60 

ways. h. ~econ~, the setting of the rings which gov.erned the "motion 

of the' •heels (this can be done in 17, 576 ways): third, the setting 

of the ~xterior jacks (150, 73.8, 27~, 937~ 250 possibilities); finally~ 

the stttting of.-the rotors ·at the begi~ing of the enclpherment (17, 57& 

possjbilltj.es). This totals to approximately 1024 possibilities • . . 

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PL !36-36/50 u~c 3605 

s. b.1 

!Without L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-' 

having any particular way to make the correct guesses, exhaustive· 

trials of all rotor orders, ring settings and initial settings would 

be required. This wouid amount to 10 billion man hours of work -

clearly out oI the question. However, ~twas possible to build a . . 

special machine, called a Bombe, consisting of sixteen ~nalogues 

I 

of the Enigma machine and a great deal of electronic sensing equip• 

ment which reduced the time to test a single assumption of wheel 

order, ring-setting, and initial setting to one millisecond. Further• 

. ·more, it was possible to handle ring settings in rather large blocks. 

The effect was to reduce the time for a compl'ete set of exhaustive · 

.trials of a matched plain and cipher to a few hours of Bombe•time. 

Of course, there w.~re many possibilities for error; a gar.bled char• 

acter in the assuxned plain text stereotype used as a crib (or a minor 

v:ariation from .One day to the next) would invalidate the ent~re run. 

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S. c. When one meeeage waa read on a pP.rticular ci'rcult on 

a certain day, then the rest of the meesagea. on the circuit ~at day. 

were ea.aier to read because the rotor-order:· ring••ettlng, and 

'· jack.-plugglng would. remain the •ame !or the entire day. . 

s. d·. · More t~an 200 bombes ,were kept bus~ 24 hours a day 

breaking out traffic enciphered on the ENIGMA. The bombea gen• 

eTally required 10 m.inutea per wheel order o~ about, 10 hours in the 

worst possible caae. Various weakqeaeea of German usage frequently 

.reduced 'this considerably. 

6. We see that while ma'chine or daily solution by e~auativ~ 

. . . trial (or brute force) la not feasible with the highest ape.ed equ?-pment 

available today, solution by hand method• ia alao not feasible. What . . 

l• done la .·to reduce the number of trials to the point where aoluti~n 

ean be achieved by high speed electrordc dev!_cea. · T.he bombe ia. an 

example of a machine designed specifically for the ENIOMA problem. 

With the advent of computer• we have available a weapon for more 

general attack on cryptanalytic problems. By means of S'1Ch. devices 

it ia poaaible to solve the EN.IOM:A statistically without the uae of 

crib~. Thia, however, requires a f~irly long .message, but it' la a~ 

example of how more powerful equipment baa macfe possible new 

PL 86-36/50 USC 360 

methods of attack. EO. 3.3(h)~2) 

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derived from the r,eadlni of a _det!t~ - the enclpherm•rat of tw.o· or. 

more different me•••1e1 at the.., ••me •et•up,ol the rnachlne. ··• .•. The 

This 

is an example of how modern equipment has made possible attacks 

considered out.of the question a sh~rt. time ago. Mor_e detail of I . 

the solution! !machines ~11 be given in the discussion o.f 

I 

Ha.gelin and Sturgeon problerrts. _ I 

.. 7. b. The entering wedge to the solution &:nd ·exploitation of 

cipher machines in most cases is a result of eitller the unauthorized 

acquisition of th~ rotor wirings and· other details or the detection 

and breaking out of bust messages which result through machine 

failure or operation misuse. The (irst centering· wedge is self• 

expla~tory and i_nvolves capture, theft, or defection. The. second 

c~ver• e.11 unintentional mis-use of the machine. I 

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·-----------------------------------· 

l.· The ~agelin ~acl)ine, type C-38, is a cryptographic device. 

which involve• reci-proc•l fin the sen:se that no encipher • de,ciphe.~ 

awitch is neected) sub&titμtion and uses reversed standard alp~abeta 

slid ~gah:ist P.acti· other according to· a long mechanically developed 

key. Slight ~;iations exist but these variatio.ns do not effect thfs 

diacu•aiou. The i~itial ~?{faet 1 called aiide, of the two alphabets 

\ 

•- variable. '!¥ Rarameters involved in the manufacture of the 

·key are '(0 a set of Z7 bars with two lugs on each bar, (Z) a set 

of six pin wheels of lengths 2&1 25, 23, ii, 1'9, 17 • Each· bar has 

eight possible ·resting place.a for the lugs on it - one for engagement 

. ' 

by each wheel, and two neutral positions. The a~ount of "kick!' 

(distance and alphabet~ are slid for a given encipherment) is controlled by the activi~y (or inactivity) of the pins on the wheels, and 

the number of lugs set in the pat_hs of the active -wheels. The 

presence of an active pin on a given wheel causes a kicl~ of one for 

each bar having a lug ·resting in the path· of'that wheel. In the case 

EO 3 ; 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

where both lugs on one bar are resting in the p&ths of whed11 1 86-36/50 use 3605 

activity of either or both wheels will cause that ba:l\ to contribute 

.only one to the total kick. Thes·e wheel.a ai-e said to b'tt. "overlapped" 

by the number of bars they have in common. The wheel ~otion is 

regular - each wheel stepping one position before each encipherment. 

z. Properly used the Hagelin machine can be very secure:\ 

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·s. It can readily be seen that it is not feasible to apply all of 

the above outlined methods by hand. 

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s. b. Several programs are available on digital computers to 

carry out both placement and statistical solution attacks. j 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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b. Even with these extensive aids to solution and placement, 

certain difficulties arise which are not yet completely under control. 

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VOLUME 

USE~ M_SGfMQ su_cc_g:§§ 

zso Good 

300 Fairly Good. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 oO Good EO 3.3(h)(2) 

900 Poor. can read depths 

5 Poor, can read depths 

10 None 

130 None 

100 Excellent 

50 Excellent 

*See page 7~ 

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USER 

---- VOLUME 

~-SGLMQ 

50 

zoo 

550 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Fairly Good 

Excellent 

Partial (insufficie'nt and 

poor intercept) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

1000 Partial (low priority) 

1. !!.!age. This machine is a._l __ _.I modification of the 19Z8· 

commercial Hagelin Model B-211. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

z. Description. The modified B-Zll is a wired-wheel cipher 

device. Input is via a standard typewriter keyboard: output may 

be a gummed tape or into an electric typewriter. The basi>c 

cryptographic elements of the machine are (excluding motor, 

print mechanism, gears. etc.) 

(l) Input and output fractionating devices (squares) 

(Z) Four sets of pluggings (steckers) 

(3) Six wired cipher wheels (numbered I, II, III, IV, V, VI) 

(4) Four motion wheels (numbered VII, VIII, IX, X) 

Only the fractionating squares, the steckers, and the cipher wheels 

are involved in the actual encipherment of a letter, the function of the 

motion wheels being solely to impart a non-regular movement to the 

cipher wheels during encipherment. 

z. a. The fractionating devices can each be visualized as a 

5 x 5 square with the letters A- Z (excluding W ) written into the square 

in random order (the same order in each square). The function of the 

input square is to resolve a letter into two components (row and column). 

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each of which is enciphered separately ~nd then recombined in the 

output square to produce a cipher letter·. 

In encipherment (or decipherment) electrical pulses originating 

in the input fractionating square and ending in the output square actually 

pass through the pluggings and cipher wheel!s. The cipher wheels and' 

steckers simply provide a path or circuit for the original pulses. 

z. b. The cipher wheels are of two types: wheels I, II, III, 

and IV are rotors, Wheels V and VI are equivalent to a half :rotor 

with a set of slip rings providing input and a rotor face for an output. 

Each rotor has 15 settings or positions. Wheel settings &T"' 

1

divided 

into three families of five each with family wired to family 

Resting against the faces of the rotors are endplates, efl.~h of 

which have five contacts which are spaced opposite every thf~d contact of the 15 rotor contacts. Thus a path through- any of t11~ five 

input points of an endplate travels through the rotor 1 coming out at 

one of the five output points of the other endplate. Moving the wheel 

varies the paths. 

The half rotors have ten set:tings (in two groups 1 even and odd). 

On one face of the wheel are ten contacts, which ride against an end• 

plate with five contacts, whilef on the other side of the wheel is a 

shaft with five slip rings. Eac,h' slip ring is wired to two of the points 

on the face, one in each family'. Fiv~ brushes provide the input to the 

half rotor. 

The five brushes of each of the two half rotors are wired directly 

to the five rows and five columns of the input fractionating square 

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respectively, so that encipherment proc.eeds Crom the fractionating 

square to the V and VI half rotors. 

2. c. The four variable steckers (plugging) in the machine permit further variation in cir.cuitry. Two of the steckers connect the. 

output points of rotors V and VI with the irlput P?ints of. rotors I 

and IV • Here we can have· V plugged to I (with VI plugged to IV) ~!: 

V plugged to IV (with VI plugged to I). The latter plugging in general, 

presents a more difficult problem of cryptanalysis. This plugging is 

f d II 1 • II re erre to as cross-p ugg1ng. 

The output points of rotor I are connected permanently to the 

input points of rotor II. The same is true of rotors IV and Ill • 

· The output points of rotors II and Ill are plugged into rows and columns 

of the output fractionating square. A variation in "direction" of plug• 

ging is also possible here. so that II may be plugged into rows. with 

III plugged into columns, or vice versa. 

Each stecker has 120(5!) variations, there being five elements 

to plug. 

2. d. A block diagram of the rotor and stecker layout for the 

machine is given below. Here the fractionating squares are referred 

to as plain and cipher squares. Steckers are not shown but the heavy 

lines indicate where the plugging is located. 

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PLAIN 

.---------------lSQUARE 

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- I CIPHER 

SQUARE 

VI 

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6 G 

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Note that with any variation of plugging the order of encipherment 

of either plain component is 

Fractionated Plaini---~Half Rotor---stecker--~Rotor 

Rotor1------.... Stecker 1---~ Fractionated Ci her 

For encipherment or decipherment by hand the wiring of the I 

rotors can be expressed as related alphabets, and the process of 

tracing a path through the wheels becomes one of successively 

applying alphabets to the plain components. 

z. e. The four motion pin wheels have 23, 21, 19, 17 settings 

respectively. Each wheel has a movable pin in its rim at each setting 

(axis of the pin is perpendicular to the face of the wheel) which may be 

set in an "active" or "inactive" position. Movement of the rotors is 

controlled by the action of the pins of the motion wheels. The 23 and 

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Zl pin wheels control movement of roto-rs V and II, both Y and ti 

stepping if an active pin comes up in either or both of the pin wheels 

Wheels IV and VI are similarly controlled by the 19 and 17 pin 

wheels. These four rotors are called "fast" rotor~.they step about 

7S'Vo of the time. Rotors I and Ill are callhd "slow" rotors, since 

they step only ·when 11 and IV step from H to I respectively (about 

5% of the time). The combined cycle of the Z3 and Zl pin wheels 

is 483 , after which rotors V and II undergo exactly the same I 

sequence of motion. Similarly the cycle of the 19 and 17 wheels 

is 3Z3. 

3. Machin~-M~tl12.E.!~ A number of machines and machine methods 

have been developed for application to this problem. These include: 

3. a. FRQG, an electroni~ crib dragger which is an operational 

version o'f an earlier experimental electronic crib dragger (which was 

used operationally for over two years). FROG has been used operationally since April, 1954 and occupies approxima~ely 70 cu. ft. 

The purpose of this machine is to "drag" a ZO letter crib 

through a message in an attempt to find settings, steckers, and 

motion which convert the given plain into c1(1he,r. Only messages 

for which the plugging is from rotor VI to IV ("straight'.' plugging) 

a;re acceptable, and only those rotors involved in the encipherme.nt 

of a single column component are considered (wheels VI-IV-III). 

The straight plugging requirement is the only limit to the 

generality of this machine. If a message is straight plugged (and 

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with the current indicator system about 40% of the traffic is .strai~lt~ 

plugged), and the crib is not garbleq, then the machine will place it. 

Since FROG became operational all breaks into new cryptographic 

periods have been made with the machine. FROG is used about 100 

hours per month. 

when indicator groups are partially known. About 40 hours per month 

of data preparation time and 40 hours per month of computer time are I 

us'ed. 

3. c. _!\_I}_~_l.P.A!• There are three of these relay-type machines, 

which duplicate the cryptography of the B-Zll. Cipher is typed into 

the machine via an input keyboard; plain text is simultaneously typed 

out by an electric typewriter. 

Wiring of the cipher wheels, steckers (plugging), and motion 

wheel pin patterns are all contained qn plugboards, allowing complete 

flexibility of the machine. These machines are primarily used to 

decipher traffic, but their extreme flexibility makes them also very 

valuable in certain cryptanalytic methods. 

3. d. Handtes!~~· These are simple devices, in effect, 

analogues of the B-211 without motion wheels. By manipulation of 

switches (steckers are plugged beforehand) a letter can be deciphered 

through any given cipher wheel settings. 

There are three of these devices. Their primary use is in 

the recovery of motion when cipher wheel starting points and steckers 

are known. 

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4. §t~nd~!_q__I~ . .:~!!_. The commercial B-Zll, which lacks the 

IV. STURGEON 

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1. De !.£.!!P-.ti O!!. STURGEON is the cover name for a German 

invented teletype I 

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. 

3. _Mach!..J!!....M.!!th~ds. A number of computer programs are avail.-

able to perform various processes for STURGEON. I 

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v. JA.J>ANES~-M~~!:.ll~_E:_§_¥STEJvlS 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

1. b. Pur2l.!.• The Purple machine was originally built as an 

encipher -decipher devi~Jt· Depression of a key from a typewriter 

k~yboard caused &,Rurrent to flow through a stecker, telephone 

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selectors, a11d back through the stecker where·!inally a key from &;.1' 

electromatic typewriter automatically printed the end product. 

Current from a set of six letters passed through a single six-input 

tel"phone selector while current from the other set o{ ZO letters 

passed thrQUgh a bank of th1".ee ZO-input se.11'ctors. All selector\s 

had 25 levels~ Various motion patterns were used but in any event 

the machine cycled at 15, 6Z5 letters. (Note that a monoalphabetfc 

substitution on the plain-text would result without wheel motion.) 

Motion patterns and stecker .were changed periodically. 

Some pages o{ early books_ of key were generated by typing one 

of five 500-long sequences £or the link system or two 1250-long sequencea 

for an early versio·n of the circular system into a non-stepping Purple 

machine, thus esae·ntially only applying a monoalphabetic substitution 

to the sequence. 

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These results are later sorted by IBM equipment into a more 

convenient order for hand examination. 

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VI. E!'iIGM.A_ 

PL 86-36/50 USC 36 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

The ENIGMA machine substantially as it was used by the German 

Army during the war has been resurrected by the East German 

Police. They pass about six hundred messages per month. Four 

stored bombes have been put back into service to cope with this 

problem. It is handled precisely as described in the introduction. 

The bombe is provided with a short stretch of matched plain and 

cipher. By making all assumptions of plugging, wheel order and 

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sett~ngs these elements of the·key are recove~ed. This problem 

is also being used for experimental purposes to test new equip• 

tnent designed t~ work on rotor machines. 

v II. A~ .... ------

Note: These sections are bound separately. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

1. Basic descriptions of the work done on a number of actlve 

cipher m~chine problems have been given. Some of these devices 

have been around for a long time and we must anticipate the day 

when they will be supplanted. Others are fairly recent and as yet 

unsolved. This is particularly true of those in which we have the 

greatest interest. Both of these facts are of tremendous impor- , 

tance in any discussion of future equipment. In both cases we 

must expect more complicated devices designed expressly to over• 

come weaknesses that have become matt~rs of quite common knowledge. This means electronic equip~nt of greater flexibility and 

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It is clear that the solution of a cipher· Vlachine involves the 

need for consi~erably more .complicated high speed equipment. 

With each advance in the design of the device a much greater advance 

in the analytic equipment is required. For example, the outside 

motion control of the ENIGMA is a relatively minor change, but the 

redesigning of the bombe that is needed to cope with this is extremely 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

·······. 

difficult. It is therefore necessary to keep abreast of all developments 

in the computer field if we hope t~ cope with the cryptanalysis of cipher 

.I 

machines. 

X. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 

------------------------------------. 

Two dominant charl\cteristics of cipher-machine problems are the 

small but definite number of parameters which have to be recovered 

to effect a solution and the tremendous number ot trials necessary to 

recover these parameters. In the recovery of these parameters 

(wheel order, initial wheel setting, etc.), analytic equipment must 

make use of available information such as cribs, busts. etc., and 

run through logical or statistical tests at very high speed. At the 

same time, the analytic equipment must be able to utilize an analyst 

designed decision process discriminating enough to limit probable 

answers to a manageable number while being sophisticated enough 

not to miss the right answer. The problem solution procedure has 

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two phases: entry and exploitation. Both pha'S.es require that equip~ 

ments operate at the highest speeds currently attainable. The entry 

phase requires Hexible general-purpose equipment that can be set 

up quickly to carry out any process that the analysts hit upon, i.e., 

the machine must be easily programmed and readily available to the 

analyst. Too often suggested processes are not carried out because 'bf 

the difficulty and time involved in programming the process and the 

non-availability of the appropriate equipment. The exploitat;ipn of 

any specific cipher machine usually is attempted and studied' on gen.• 

eral-purpose equipment. After success has been attained, e:ii:isting 

special purpose machines are usually modified or new machlljles are 

designed to handle the problem whenever such machines are 11nore 

efficient than the general purpose machine. In both phases ¢6mputers 

are in most cases inadequate; they have the versatility but not the 

speed. Analytic equipments that have the speed need furthet 'increases 

in versatility. 

In both these fields new and sophisticated approaches ha1V·e been 

proposed that present equipments are unable to handle. For. the 

most part these approaches are ~haracte rized by requiring a combination of high-speed analytic equipment, large-volume data handling, 

and complex control and decisiort facilities. The importance ,0£ such 

attacks will increase as more ex:tremely complex cryptographic systems 

come into widespread usage. 

The types of equipment required to best perform the mechanization 

oC cryptanalytic procedures are listed a~ follows. 

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1, General comp\$ting ef.ftl.,ment of substantially higher speeds 

'than presently avallabl~ (Atlas 111 1BM-701, etc.). 

z. Dat~ pro.ceasing equip~enf of larger capacity and higher 

speecf.s than presently available f'IBM-702). 

l, General utility device11 of greater c'paclties in storage and 

recognition \fnita and more £lealbillty particularly with ~egard to 

sequencing of data. (DEMON'S, SLED) 

4. Elimination of bottleneck& at points such as editing and key 

punching. 

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G HAND SYSTEMS 

1. A gr_eat deal of intercepted traffic is of the so-called hand 

system type. This label covers a wide variety of systems but pri• 

marily describes those in which the encoding process involves a 

large amount of hand labor by the cipher clerk. Included are: 

monome-dinome substitution, multirlomic substitution employing a 

rectangle, transposition, multinomic code, literal code, and combinations of these. A monome-dinome substitution is one wherein 

literal or numeric text is enciphered by means of a rectangle containing the alphabet and digits. The rectangle is bordered by numer• 

als. A text element is enciphered by selecting as cipher the border 

elements of the enciphering rectangle which locate the text element. 

Some rectangle elements are located by a single digit (monome ), 

others by two digits (dinome). A multinomic ·substitution employing 

a rectangle is one wherein plain text is enciphered in essentially the 

same ma'.nner described above. Each text element is enciphered into 

a set of two or more digits, the number oC digits being determined by 

the border of the enciphering rectangle. A transposition system is 

one wherein cipher text is obtained from plain text by reordering the 

plain text elements. As an example, plain text can be entered into a 

rectangle in the natural writing order (filling in row by row), If the 

plain text is then reordered by removing its elem·ents from the rectanglti 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

in a columnar fashion, the resulting text is a transposition of the 

original text. A multinomic code i"s a code wherein words and 

phrases of the p].ain text are given multinomic equivalents and are 

listed in a code book in numerical or alphabetic order. A multinomic code book may be thought of as a dictionary in which every 

word or ph-ase likely to occur in text is given a numeric equivalent 

(numeric rr.eaning), atid vice versa. A literal code is a code wherein 

words and phrases of the plain text are encoded by means of a set 

of letters according to a pre<icribed code book. 

2. Hand systems are often further complicated by the appli• 

cation of key which is usually either one •time •usedi· several-timeused, exploitable -phychological-random or exploitable •machine• 

"non-random. 

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l. Where messages appear which are neither plain text nor in 

some readily readable enciphering system, we must, in the absence 

of outside information, analyze the text of the me.t:.sage in order to 

determine the cryptosystem involved. 

2. The analysis of the messages can often be carried out by 

hand for small system~._ ________ __.I/ but for some of the 

large systems described in the preceding section mechanization 

is required. Preliminary to an analysis of the text it must be 

. .J. 

·e'Ciited, de-duped, and put on suitable medium such as IBM cards, 

perforated tape, etc. These three steps are at present outstanding 

bottlenecks in this and later stages of exploitation. For example, 

of the 10, 000 hours per rnonth of machine timel 

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3. The first step in the analysis is to attempt to identify the 

cryptosystem. Searches are performed to find exploitable intrinsic 

characteristics of plain language .1 nd its encipherments. Examples 

arc the widely varying frequencies at which the individual letters 

occur in literal text and the cohesion of plain language as exhibited 

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by the rough frequency distribution of p.Etirs of letters (digraphs), 

triples of letters (trigraphs ), etc. 

4. In Hand ~ystcms where the enciphering process does not 

involve key (as examples, .monome-dinome substitution, codes, 

etc.), diarn~sis is often not too difficult. Hand analysis, standard 

IBM techniques and programs on general purpose computers 

(IBM's 701, Remington Rand 1s 1103) usually suffice. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

1. When a Hand System has been identified 1t is necessary to 

determine the parameters of the system so that messages can be 

deei.rypted. r 

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lln this area there ~is a need ~or desk aids which 

L...--------' 

will lighten the clerical tasks performed by the analyst and help 

increase his output. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3 
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
v. 

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EXPLOITATION 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

1. As stated in II. Z, editing, de-duping and hand punching and 

printing o{ traffic ar,e major problems in the preparation of text pre• 

liminary to analys~s. To speed up these processes it is recommended 

that more effort b"e placed on the mechanization of the editing and de• 

duping functionS/. Hand punching and printing pose more difficult prob• 

lems in that tll'ey are human operations which cannot be speeded up by 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

.. an·sl11ni!i"c~nt.factor. However. the amount of hand punching requit"ed 

at NSA can he :raduced by having traffic transmitted to NSA in a form 

suitable for machine handling and human analysis. 

2. Not stated in III. 2 is the problem of reading encoded messages 

when received as such or "when any superentipherment has been stripped 

from code messages. When a major portion of the code book has be~n 

recovered, the problem reduces the looking up meanings. Code reading I 

is being performed on MAISIE, a Hpecial purpose decoder. The 

MAISIE 1s are not handling this function adequately. A large amount of 

decoding must be performed on IBM due to MAISIE time not being available. It is recommended ithat effort be placed on making the MAISIE's 

more reliable and more flexible. It is further recommended that the 

MAISIE 's or their successors be designed to handle larger size code 

books. 

3. As stated in IV. 2. the processes in~olved in preliminary 

processing! 

L--__ lare indeed a bottleneck in exploitation. However, these func .. 

tions could adequately be performed on general data processing equip• 

ment such as the IBM-702 or on an equipment especially designed tQ 

handle these and other functions (Farmer-Nomad study). 

4. As stated in V. 2 both general purpose computers and special 

purpose machines are employed in the principal processing of systems 

using exploitable key. General purpose computers are flexible enough 

to adequately perform many phases of this processing. However, computer time is at a premium and a definite need exists for more general 

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E.O 3.3(h)(2) 

. purpos·c devices. The SLEDS and DEMONS are also in great dem4~. 

Man jobs are inefficiently performed on other pieces or equipment 

due t'o the non-availability of DEMON or SLED time. SLED is quite 

difficult to program and could be made more flexible. The DEMuNS 

should be improved by a programmable and.imore flexible device 

which ia widely applicable to the mechanization of Agency problems. 

There is a definite need for equipment and personnel to make such 

runs when the information at hand warrants them. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

1. Electrostatic and electromagnetic fields are associated with · 

the operation of electrical and electro-mecHanical devices. The 

radiation is caused by changes in currents, sparking during switching, 

etc. In particular, unwanted radiation is usually associated with the 

operation o( electrical cryptographic; devices. This is due to the 

nature of operation of these devices, e.g.• the making and breaklng 

of circuits in the device. Experience has indicated that our own 

cryptographic devices may radiate information which may compro .. 

mise either the plain text or the machine. Every elfort is being 

made to minimize unwanted radiation in our cryptoe:raphic devices. 

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TOPS~ER 

II. NO!~E CQMMUNICA TION 

1. A noise communication signal may be loosely defined as a 

signal that, when received on a typical amplitude modulation of !requency modulation receiver of standard design, has an output having 

characteristics simulating those which would be produced by an input 

(over a restricted bandwidth) of "white" noise. In other words, provided the received energy from the noise signal is greater than the 

background noise of the receiver due to atmospheric noise and tube 

noise, an observer would suspect that he is listening to a pure noise 

PL 86-36/50 US 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

generator being fed into the receiver. Noise communication is attractive to communicators because it nossesses both concealment! 

I Noise communication systems generally use some ...__~~~~~~~---' 

reprodutable form of "noise-like" signal as a carrier which is modulatea Qy the intelligence signal. To a properly designed noise com• 

munica.tions receiver and decoding mechanism, the output sounds like 

a good signal reasonably free from noise. However, the signal as 

picked up by an ordinary receiver would sound like ordinary noise. 111 

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a single practical system known to be given serious consideration. 

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no attempt is made to conceal t~•ignal from an ordinary receiver • . ~ . 

The reason for. this is that the advantages claimed by the designers 

are not concealment, but rather, .... 1....,.., ____ __.!features~ 

z. Several groups are studying and djye~oping noise communi• 

cation system,. Most of th~se groups are ftC?t supported by or 

directly associated1 with NSA. However, R/D is trying to keep 

abreast with the findings of these groups. NSA 314 is giving minor 

support to the MIT study. A modest research and development 

program directed toward intercept problems is being carried out 

both locally and under contract. I 

I It; is anticipated that 

this particular phase of the study will be completed by late summer 

1955. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 

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IV. ~HONY I CIFA!( AND SPEECH :PRIVACY 

1. Intw..!lc~iog_. 

1. a. Since communications are conveniently and rapidly 

- carried out ~y means of telephony, it ia natural for communicators who require secret communications to consiaer enciphering 

telephone conversations. The field involving making telephone 

communications secure is called ciphony (ciphered telephony). 

Examples of the need for enciphered' telephone conversation are 

the requirements of the aircraft pilots and high-ranking govern• 

ment officials who desire to make secure their conversations and 

. transmit them directly to specific locations. or persons without de• 

lay or human intervention. Small beginnings of use of a~ch systems 

occurred in World War II. NSA has developed several ciphony sys• 

terns and some of these are now under trial. •Quite wide application 

of ciphony seems probable in the not distant f~ture. 

. 1. b. With the advent of facsimile transmissions, there came 

the need for making such transmissions secure. For example, a 

genei·al (in the field) may wish to obtain by facsimile transmission 

from headquarters a copy-of a weather map showing the )llfeather con•· 

dltions existing over the area under bis command. A' copy of auch a 

map wo~ld be invaluable to the enemy. To. avoid the occurrence of 

compromises, systems were..de"vel6ped which enciphered facaimi~e 

transmissions, This field of secret communications ia called cifax 

(ciphered facsimile), 

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1. c~ Speech privacy h the term used to denote speech sy11 •" , 

tems which afford thC!ir users only limited security. Speech privacy 

systems may employ either digital or non-digital methods of representing the original speech sigt:tal. For illustrative purposes and for sim• 

plicity we shall restrict the discussion on si:>eech privacy to non-digital 

speech security systems. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

2. a. Little attention has as yet been given to the problems of 

deriving COMINT from ciphony or cifax transmissions. 

2. b. To produce a ciphony or cifax signal the original continuous· 

waveform or graphic material, respectively, is digitalized and then 

enciphered befor"e transmission. Three methods of ~igitalization are 

currently in use: Delta-modulation (Delta-mod), Pulse Code Modulation (PCM), and Vocoder followed by PCM. 

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~o 3.3(h)(2) 
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

3. a. In non-digital speech security systems the speech s 

is generally filtered through a set of band pass filters which divide 

the frequency spectrum of the signal into a set of adjacent frequency 

bands. The output of each band is a waveform whose frequency content is limited by the band pass filter. To these outputs are added 

or subtracted signals of constant frequency. The frequencies of the I 

additive or subtractive signals are so chosen that the resultant fre • 

quency bands exhaust the frequency bands 0£ the original signals. 

Some of the frequency bands may be inverted during this process. 

The signals are then mixed to form a new signal which is transmitted 

as enciphered speech. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Analysis of this type of system can be performed by compar.ison 

of the signal waveforms with known segments of voice waveforms. 

It is believed that from this type of analysis various kinds of split 

band systems with or without transposition and/or inversion of 

bands may be reconstructed. After such reconstruction, the intercepted signals become readily readable. 

Some consideration is being given to the desirability of devel• 

oping a flexible (with regard to number and size of bands, trans• 

position of bands, and inversion of bands), non-digital speech security intercept equipment. 

V. FACSIMILE INTERCE~ 

At the present time, the Agency is engaged in a relatively small 

facsimile intercept operation, there being only approximately 10 facsimile intercept positions in operation. The systems currently being 

interce.Jl>ted are not encrypted. Much of the intercepted traffic is --

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recorded in the field on magnetic tape a~d forwarded to NSA Head· 

quarters for central processing, although a small amount is recorded 

on facsimile equlpment in the field. 

The problem is not very difficult, but some mechanization can be 

effected to improve efficiency. At the montent, reproduction from 

the magnetic tape recordings at the Central Processing installation 

is subjected to distortion due to tape stretch and reproduction on a 

machine which. although of the same type as the recorder in the 

fie~d, is slightly different due to normal engineering tolerances pei:-

mitted in production. As a result, an operator must scan the facsimile picture as it is being reproduced and attempt to compensate 

for the distortion by manual adjustments. R/D has recently developed 

a device for recordins a reference tone on the magnetic tape ln the 

field, and then automatically using this tone upon reproduction to com• 

pensate for the normal distortion. This equipment greatly reduces 

the burden on the operators and is expected to result in a marked improvement in the quality of the copy. 

The equipment can also be used in the field to supply a synchronizing 

tone for on-line processing. Fortunately, a limited number of reference 

synchronizing frequencies have been fo\lnd to suft'ice for all known 

Russian Facsimile transmissions, and the exploitation of this feature· 

should facilitate ltigh quality on-line processing in the field. Thia 

improved equipment is now being fabricated for service test by the 

services. It is anticipated that "crash production" of a limited number 

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of these equipments will enable the currently l!'mployed facsimile 

positions to be converted by the end of the calendar year, while 

future facsimile ·positions should be equippe4 with equipments 

obtained through ~ormal production channel~. 

VI. VERY HIGH FREQUENCY INTERCEPT (VHF) 

The VHF /UHF problem has been broken into Categories I and 

II; the VHF problem as here discussed is essentially Category I, 

which is defined as follows: 

"CATEGORY I comprises problems which may generally be 

solved, at least in part, by the application of well-known techniques 

and currently available equipment types. Roughly speaking, Category 

I communications are of wide -spread types, often low-powered, tactical, omni-directional and of a state of sophistication common among 

communicators of the major nations. At present, Category I communications are predominantly MCW and unen,ciphered speech, with 

possible future speech privacy, ciphony and other more sophisticated 

systems as the growth of the art permits. Typical Category I communication services include air-air, air-ground, tank-tank, ship• 

ship, ship-shore and low echelon ground-ground." 

Operationally, the VHF Category I problem is very important, 

with a strong and increasing AFSS effort .and c'ertain near-future 

expansion of small Army and Na"r· near-VHF and VHF activities. 

At the present time, this problem is under study by the Special 

Intercept Problems Board. 

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At this writing, the equipment picture•in the near-VHF 

(20-30 mes) and the VHF (30-300 mes) is sad, with most 

service successes due to field initiative in doctoring available 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

receivers and preparing special antennas. However, an improved, 

militarized ~eceiver, the R-220 (also kno.WU as the AN/URR-Z9 

when equipped· with antennas of no particular COM INT use) is scneduled to come off the line in limited quantities before the end of calendar 1955. While this receiver, which covers the range from zo. t.o 

ZSO mes, may fall considerably short of the ideal, its great superi.• 

ority to older receivers in the field and the fact that it is under q~ntity procurement by all three of the service cryptologic agencies 

should soon bring a considerable strengthening of the Category I 

intercept effort. In the 100-150 mes. range, of prime importance 

to the Air Force and also of great Navy significance, a commercial 

receiver the Clarke lb7Jl is applicable. This receiver, which has 

been the backbone of the AFSS effort for the last three years, will 

probably have even greater future usefulness. Antenna-wise, local 

initiative has been the major source of improvement. Although 

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At present, R/D is conti~uous~y monitoring all military and 

commercial receiver and antenna developm~nts which are applicable 

to this problem. Plans are under way to exploit the "hot" Clarke in 

an effort to provide maximum receiver sensitivity for special Cate• 

gory I problems. The "hot" Clarke is a standard Clarke lo7Jl with 

an NRL developed low .. noise preamplifier and any one of several 

appropriate bandwidth reduction sys~ems. 

Recently R/D has been authon:r.j?d to esti(lblish two experimental 

field research and development positions on the VHF intercept prob· 

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lem, one in the far East ~nd the other in Europe. These units are 

expected to be activated b~£ore September 1955, and should enable 

experimental equipments and techniques to be evaluated and devel• 

oped under actual field conditions. 

Future R/D plans call for service testing of "hot" Clarke receivers, and the develop~ent of panoramic receivers and adapters 

for use in the 100 to 150 .mes. range, where an operational requirement has already been expressed by AFSS. The, study of antennas, 

such as the vertical rhombic developed by the Bureau of Standards, 

and the retention of commercial antenna consultants will aid in even°p. 

tually bringing to the field antennas with maximum directivity. It is 

also intended to study rotators and towers to assure the field of an• 

tenna systems of maximum operational utility. It is intended to 

strengthen R/D Field Support through several activities: 

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(a) Continued and expand~d field trips. 

(b) Establishment of a task type contract to provide a 

ready source of development equipment for the R/D 

Field Positions. 

(c) Establishment of a locd experimen~al mobile van 

which will be used as a proving ground for equipment 

and techniques. To assure maximum understanding of 

propagation phenomenii\, contacts have been made with 

NEL and CRPL of BuStandards, to determine what 

assistance they can provide for prediction in the VHF 

range: two outstanding CRPL men are now being 

cleared for COMINT so they can be brought into the 

entire problem. 

VII. ULTRA HIQ_~ FREQUENCY INTERCEPT (UHF) 

The VHF /UHF problem has been broken into Categories I and II: 

the UHF problem, as here discussed, is essentially Category II, 

which is defined as follows: 

"CATEGORY II comprises special systems, often highly directive with complicated multiplexing and high traffic densities used in 

relay type systems on a point-to-point basis: "High Level" traffic 

may appear in appreciable quantities on these systems. Category II 

represents technical and operational problems of a higher order of 

difficulty than those in Category I and, therefore, may require 

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research and development, special equipment-and personnel for 

each new problem." 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 13605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
As in the case of VHF intercept, it is fntend0

ed to strengthen 

the R/D Field Support through several activities: 

fa) Continued and expanded field trips. Further, a contract is being negotiated for a total of 6 field technical 

representatives. Although th·E\ impetus for this "Tech 

Rep" program has come from the Category II, prograrrr, 

these people will be used for other purposes, notably VHF 

Category I, as the occasion arises. 

(b) Establishment of a task type contract (to be shared with 

VHF) to provide a ready source of development equipment for the R/D field positions. 

(c) Establishment of a l~cal van (to be shared with VHF) 

which will be used as, a proving ground for equipment 

and techniques. 

To assure maximum understanding of propagation phenomena, 

contacts have been made with NEL, and CRPL, of BuStandards, to 

determine what assistance they can provide for prediction in the UHF 

range; two outstanding CRPL men are now being cleared for COMINT 

so they can be brought into the entire problem. 

VIII. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. The amount of R/D effort currently being placed on each of 

the problems associated with the generation or intercept of "other 

signals" is implied in the section discussing the signal. The problems 

are sufficiently diverse and important to recommend continuation of 

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tht. ~urrent R/D effort being placed on them. 

3. The problem of detecting radiated plain text signals in the 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

cipher signal is in some respects similar to the problem of detecting 

a signal in the presence of noise. Communication theorists are daing 

considerable work on the general signal detection problem. Only a 

limited amount of work is being done in the Agency. It is recommended 

that the Agency increase its present efforts in this problem. 

4. The analysis of non.digital speech security systems currently 

requires equipment capable of splitting and mixing frequency bands. 

At present very little R/D'effort is being placed on the development of 

new techniques and equipments. It is recommended that more effort be II' •.,•a; 

placed on the problem. 

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S. The problems of decrypting sop]listicated ciphony and 

cifax systems have, as yet, received preliminary consideration 

only. It is recommended that a plan be drawn up and approval 

sought, for a powerful atta.ck on these problems. 

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