Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1602-JT-453 | November 17, 2016 Page 1 of 23

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Marianne Woolbert

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of M.K., Minor Child, and K.K., 

Mother, 

K.K.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

November 17, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A04-1602-JT-453

Appeal from the 

Madison Circuit Court

The Honorable 

G. George Pancol, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C02-1505-JT-50

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] K.K. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to M.K. (“Child”), contending that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the termination of her parental rights.1

[2] We affirm.

2

Facts and Procedural History3

[3] Mother and R.M. are the biological parents of Child, who was born on August 

2, 2013.4 On September 23, 2013, Indiana Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”) received a report that Child was at Community Hospital Anderson

(“Community Hospital”). DCS learned that Child was intubated and, due to 

seizure activity, was being transferred to Riley Hospital for Children (“Riley 

Hospital”) in Indianapolis. Appellee’s Br. at 8. DCS went to Riley Hospital but 

no additional medical information was available at that time. 

[4] Two days later, DCS learned that Child, who was less than two months old at 

the time, needed surgery because he had “two large spots of subdural blood on 

 

1 Mother also contends that she was not given a sufficient opportunity to participate in services after her 

release from the Indiana Department of Correction. Mother has made no separate argument on this issue in 

her brief. Accordingly, we discuss that issue only as it pertains to Mother’s claim that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights. 

2 We commend the juvenile court on its thorough findings and conclusions thereon, which greatly facilitated 

our appellate review.

3 The court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, R.M.; however, R.M. does not participate in 

this appeal. Therefore, we set forth only those facts pertinent to Mother’s appeal. 

4 During the termination hearing, a DCS case manager testified that Child was born August 2, 2013. TPR 

Tr. at 10. The juvenile court’s termination order appears to have a scrivener’s error in that it shows the 

month of Child’s birth as September. Appellant’s App. at 35. 
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[his] brain.” Appellant’s App. at 50. A doctor from Riley Hospital Child 

Protection Program indicated that Child’s injuries were “very straight forward, 

abusive head trauma.” Id. Child also had “two possible healing fractures, one 

in the right femur and one in the left foot.” Id. 

[5] When interviewed by law enforcement on September 25, 2013, Mother 

admitted that she and Child had been living with her boyfriend (“Boyfriend”) 

for about three weeks and that the previous weekend, September 20 through 22, 

she had used large amounts of intravenous drugs. Id. Mother later disclosed

that, on Saturday, September 21, she had observed Boyfriend “shaking and

screaming at the baby to be quiet.” Id. Mother explained that Child had 

seizures on the night of September 22, 2013, and “had been having symptoms 

for several hours prior to Mother seeking treatment.” Id. When Mother took 

Child to Community Hospital, more than twenty-four hours had passed since 

Child had been shaken. Mother and Boyfriend were arrested and charged in 

connection with this incident. 

[6] Mother subsequently pleaded guilty to Count I, Class D felony neglect of a 

dependent; Count II, Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance; and 

Count III, Class B felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily 

injury.5 Count I was merged into Count III, and Mother was sentenced to eight 

 

5 We note that, effective July 1, 2014, our criminal code was amended to, in part, categorize crimes as Levels 

instead of Classes of felonies. Because Mother committed her crimes prior to July 1, 2014, she was charged 

according to the statutes in effect at the time she committed her crimes.
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years on Count III and three years on Count II. These sentences were ordered 

to run concurrently, but consecutive to prior convictions for possession of a 

syringe and neglect of a dependent, that being one of Mother’s other two 

children. Of the eight years, eighteen months were ordered executed in the 

Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”), twelve months served on inhome detention, and six months suspended to probation. DCS Ex. 3D at 1. 

When Mother did not timely register for in-home detention, that privilege was 

revoked, and the trial court ordered that time to be served on work release.

CHINS Proceedings

[7] DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), 

and on October 4, 2013, the CHINS court detained and removed Child from 

Mother’s care. Two weeks later, during an initial hearing on the CHINS 

petition, Mother admitted to the CHINS allegations, the following of which are 

pertinent to this appeal:

2. On or about September 22, 2013, Mother brought Child to 

Community Hospital emergency room with seizure-like 

symptoms.

3. Child was transported to Riley Children’s Hospital and had to 

be intubated.

4. An MRI determined that Child had two large brain bleeds that 

were the result of abusive head trauma.

5. Mother admits to observing [Boyfriend] shaking Child on 

September 21, 2013.
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6. Mother failed to seek treatment for Child until approximately 

10:45 p.m. on September 22, 2013.

7. Mother admitted to a large amount of intravenous drug use 

during the entire weekend of injury to Child.

8. Both Mother and [Boyfriend] have been arrested in regards to 

this incident involving Child.

DCS Ex. 1D at 1. Child was determined to be a CHINS.

[8] Following a November 27, 2013 dispositional hearing, the CHINS court 

determined that Child should be a ward of DCS and remain in his foster care

placement. The CHINS court found that Child required ongoing medical care 

and evaluation, including neurological care and treatment due to Child’s

injuries. DCS Ex. 1F at 1-2. Mother was ordered to comply with a Parental 

Participation Order, which ordered her to: (1) participate in parenting, 

substance abuse, and mental health assessments and follow all 

recommendations; (2) participate in home-based services and follow all 

recommendations; (3) execute all necessary releases of information for DCS to 

monitor her progress in services; (4) obtain and maintain adequate housing and 

a legal source of support or income sufficient for the safe and appropriate 

upbringing of Child; (5) submit to random drug screens; (6) participate in

supervised visitation with Child; (7) notify DCS of any changes in living

situation, including household composition, address, and telephone number,

within 48 hours of any such change; (8) seek the establishment of paternity for 

Child; and (9) pay child support in the amount of $43.00 per week. Id. at 2-3. 
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The CHINS court determined that: (1) continuation of Child’s residence in the 

home and care of Mother would be contrary to Child’s welfare; and (2) it was 

in Child’s best interests to be removed from the home environment. Id. at 3. 

[9] In March 2014, DCS filed a Progress Report. Following a hearing, the CHINS 

court entered an order finding, in part, that during the November 27, 2013 to

March 13, 2014 review period, Mother had complied with Child’s case plan, 

had enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental obligations, had cooperated with 

DCS, and had visited with Child. DCS Ex.1G at 1. Mother had also 

participated in case planning, periodic case reviews, dispositional reviews, and 

placement and visitation of Child. Id. at 2. Mother had participated in homebased services, taken requested drug screens, completed a substance abuse 

assessment, and participated in many of the recommended treatment classes. 

Id. Prior to the March 2014 hearing, Mother had been placed on in-home

detention for two offenses committed on March 20, 2013—neglect of a 

dependent (involving one of her other two children) and unlawful possession of 

a syringe. Those charges were pending when DCS first became involved. 

[10] The CHINS court conducted a permanency hearing on September 3, 2014. As 

part of its order, the CHINS court found that Child had spent the previous five 

months in the same foster home and was progressing well. DCS Ex. 1H at 1. 

Mother had been discharged from home-based services due to “no-show and 

missed appointments,” thus requiring DCS to issue a second referral. Id. at 2. 

Mother had completed a treatment recovery group, a mental health evaluation, 

and a parenting assessment and was participating in individual therapy. Id. At 
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that point in time, the CHINS court found that, of the available permanency 

plans, Child’s reunification with one of his parents was most appropriate. Id. 

[11] About six months later, the CHINS court held a review hearing and found that 

Mother had not complied with the case plan, was incarcerated and had not 

visited Child, had not enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental obligations, 

and had not cooperated with DCS. DCS Ex. 1I at 1. On March 18, the CHINS

court approved the concurrent pursuit of a plan for Child’s adoption and one 

for his reunification. DCS Ex. 1J. 

[12] On May 26, 2015, DCS filed its “Motion to Modify CHINS Dispositional 

Decree,” requesting the CHINS court to suspend services, including visitation, 

on the basis that such would be unnecessary because DCS had initiated 

termination proceedings. Appellant’s App. at 101. Following a hearing, that 

motion was granted in an order dated July 2, 2015. DCS Ex. 1K. Mother was 

released from the DOC that same day. Tr. at 70. At the September 2, 2015 

permanency hearing, the court approved termination of Mother’s parental 

rights and adoption of Child as the permanency plan, finding: (1) Child had 

been in the same licensed foster care for the previous seventeen months and was 

progressing well; (2) Mother had been released from DOC in July 2015 after ten 

months of incarceration; (3) Mother was not in compliance with Child’s case 

plan, nor had she enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental responsibilities; and 

(4) of the available permanency plans, adoption of Child is most appropriate 

and consistent with Child’s best interests. DCS Ex. 1L at 2. 
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Termination Proceedings

[13] Meanwhile, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on May

26, 2015, and the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on October 20, 

2015. As support for its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, DCS 

presented the testimony of three witnesses, one of whom was Mother. The first 

witness, DCS Family Case Manager Brandi Murphy (“FCM Murphy”), 

testified that she had been involved in Mother and Child’s case since September 

2013, “even before the admission and the adjudication of CHINS on [C]hild.” 

Tr. at 10. Therefore, she knew that Child “had hemorrhaging [in his brain] and 

needed to receive surgery . . . from possibly being shaken.” Id. FCM Murphy 

was aware that Mother and Boyfriend had been using drugs during the 

weekend when Child suffered injuries, and that Mother had observed Boyfriend 

shaking Child more than twenty-four hours before she took Child to 

Community Hospital. 

[14] FCM Murphy testified that Child’s injuries continued to impact some of his 

milestones, such as walking and talking. Id. at 12. She described that Child, 

who was two years old, could not yet walk. He was able to roll over and lift 

himself up, but had only recently started to crawl. Id. He received treatment 

four times a week, including physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech 

therapy. Developmental therapy was also being considered because Child had

troubles with feeding and struggled with movement on the right side of his 

body. Id. FCM Murphy explained that most two year olds can walk, are 

mobile and verbal and, usually, can use utensils. Id.
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[15] FCM Murphy spoke of Mother’s progress with services prior to September 

2014. While Mother had been incarcerated at the commencement of the 

CHINS case, once released, she started services and was able to complete 

mental health, substance abuse, and parenting programs. However, Mother 

was unable to complete visitation or home-based therapy because she was 

closed out due to her inconsistency.6 In September 2014, Mother was ordered 

to serve her sentence at DOC for the crimes that formed the basis for this

CHINS. She was released in July 2015 to in-home detention. FCM Murphy 

testified that, a few weeks before the October 20, 2015 termination hearing, a 

warrant was issued for Mother’s arrest because she had failed to timely sign up 

for in-home detention. When Mother was arrested, the trial court revoked her 

in-home detention based on Mother’s admission to having violated the terms. 

The trial court sentenced Mother to one year on work release, and she was 

ordered to jail to await an open spot in the work release program. Appellant’s 

Br. at 11. FCM Murphy testified that, at the time of the termination hearing,

Mother was still in jail awaiting that spot. Tr. at 32. 

[16] FCM Murphy testified that Mother’s inability to successfully complete the 

visitation necessary to reunite with Child was of particular importance because 

that would have allowed DCS to determine whether Mother could take care of 

Child, who had special needs. Id. It was FCM Murphy’s opinion that Mother 

 

6 The Children’s Bureau closed out Mother’s visitation in June 2014, and Lifeline restarted it for Mother 

around that same month. Tr. at 19-20. However, the record before us does not state whether Mother 

consistently attended the Lifeline visitations. 
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could not comply with any attempted services “in her current state.”7Id. at 34. 

Child had been in the same foster care placement for over a year and was doing 

well. Id. at 37. FCM Murphy testified that she had visited Child at least once a 

month and had noted that Child is very attached to and responds to his foster 

mother (“A.R.”). Child will climb up to A.R. and smile. Id. at 38. He reaches 

out to her when anyone else comes into the room and he is “very comfortable 

in his environment.” Id. In turn, A.R. is very attentive to Child and his needs, 

and she makes sure that he attends all of his appointments with doctors and 

First Steps. Id. A.R. has learned techniques for Child’s care from First Steps, 

“and she reiterates those when [service providers] come to visit.” Id. Also, 

since Child has challenges with language, A.R. is “trying [to] teach him sign 

language.” Id. at 39. FCM Murphy testified that Child would be a good fit 

with A.R., and A.R. wants to adopt Child; it was in Child’s best interest to live 

in a stable environment, where his medical, mental, and educational needs can 

be met, and A.R.’s home is such a place. Id. at 41. 

[17] Child’s court appointed special advocate (“the CASA”) testified during the 

termination hearing that she had visited Child at A.R.’s home once a month for 

more than a year, and that in this placement, Child was doing “better than what 

the Doctors said he would do.” Id. at 53. The CASA confirmed that A.R. 

 

7

It is unclear from the record exactly what FCM Murphy was referring to by using the phrase, “in her 

current state.” Tr. at 34. FCM Murphy testified regarding her concern about Mother’s IQ; however, in 

response to Mother’s objection that this information was hearsay, nothing further was said on the topic. Id. 

at 33. 
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shows love and affection to Child and gives Child freedom so he can explore his 

surroundings. At two years old, Child is very much still a baby; he crawls fast, 

gets into things, climbs, can sit up alone, and can roll over. In regards to 

children his own age, Child is limited in his speech and his mobility. Child

currently attends appointments for speech and with First Steps, and those 

services must continue in the future.

[18] The CASA testified that she had seen Mother during five different visitations 

with Child, but Mother did not appear to understand what had to be done to 

care for Child. Id. at 56. Mother seemed unable to understand what the care 

providers were explaining to her about Child. Id. Although Child was 

paralyzed on his right side, Mother “saw [Child] as normal and healthy and 

couldn’t get the grasp of what had to be done for him.” Id. at 56-57. The 

CASA stated that stability was an important part of Child’s care and his 

caregiver has to understand his medical conditions and be available for him full 

time. Id. at 58. 

[19] The CASA also expressed concern about Mother’s criminal history, the most 

recent of which was a charge for theft in September 2015.8 Of particular 

concern, however, were Mother’s convictions for neglect of a dependent on two 

separate occasions with regard to two of her children. The CASA testified that 

 

8 Mother was involved in three criminal incidents: (1) one prior to DCS involvement, involving neglect of a 

dependent and possession of a syringe; (2) one that led to DCS involvement, involving neglect of a dependent 

resulting in serious bodily injury and maintaining a common nuisance; and (3) one in the months just prior to 

the termination hearing, involving theft. Appellee’s Br. at 11. 
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Child cannot “take any more abuse or neglect and [still] thrive.” Id. The 

CASA opined that termination of Mother’s parental rights and adoption was in

Child’s best interests. Id. at 61. 

[20] Mother testified that she completed services pertaining to substance abuse and 

participated in a sixteen-week program in a wellness and recovery group. Id. at 

66. Mother maintained that she was visiting with Child twice a week, once 

with Child alone and the other time with all three of her children. Mother 

completed only one class that was specifically designed for the care of Child—a 

class pertaining to seizures, which Mother completed while Child was in Riley 

Hospital. Id. at 67. Mother insisted that she was complying with services from 

November 2013 until September 2014, including visitation with Child, getting 

clean drug screens, and meeting with home-based services. She also stated that 

she participated in individual counseling. Id. at 68. In September 2014, Mother 

was sentenced on the criminal charges pertaining to Child and served ten 

months with DOC. Id. at 68-69. While incarcerated, Mother completed a 

parenting class and a program called Mothers Against Meth. Id. at 69. Mother 

explained that the parenting class entailed reading a pamphlet and answering 

questions in a group. Id. Mother did not participate in any other programs 

“that had to do with children.” Id. 

[21] Mother was released from DOC on July 2, 2015. Upon contacting FCM 

Murphy, Mother learned that her visitation with Child was suspended because 

DCS had filed a petition to terminate her parental rights; Mother admitted that 

she had received a copy of the TPR petition while incarcerated. Id. at 70-71. 
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At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was again incarcerated. Id. at 

71. She explained, “I was staying with a guy I was gonna hook-up to house 

arrest and uh stuff went wrong and he went to jail so I couldn’t do it there[,] I 

asked for an extension and I guess I got a court date[,] but it went to my old 

address . . . so I uh got a warrant for that[,] I went to jail for a day over it and I 

got out and now they are putting me on work release.” Id. at 71-72. 

[22] During the termination hearing, Mother admitted that she has two other 

children, who live with her mother (“Grandmother”). Mother gave 

Grandmother temporary custody of the two older children when she “was 

doing pretty bad about four years ago,” and “didn’t want them to get taken 

[into] the system.” Id. at 76. Grandmother’s temporary custody ultimately 

changed to permanent custody. Id. Mother testified that she believed that she 

could care for Child and all of his special needs. Id. at 77. Mother conceded 

that Child was in “a good place,” but argued that her home could also be a 

good place for Child, because then Child could also see his siblings. 

[23] On December 1, 2015, the juvenile court entered its order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[24] “Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial 

courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—

so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 

N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home 

and raise her child, and thus parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, 

the law allows for the termination of those rights when a parent is unable or 

unwilling to meet her responsibility as a parent. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Stated differently, a 

juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child 

when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re J.W., Jr., 

27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. 

[25] When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 

149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, 

in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will 

set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is 

clearly erroneous. Id. at 148-49. Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to Child, the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions. When a 

trial court’s judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, 

we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008), trans. denied. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or 

inferences drawn therefrom that support it. Id. If the evidence and inferences 
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support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 

[26] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree.

. . . .

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these 

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In 

re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a 

petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate 

the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). A 

judgment will be reversed as clearly erroneous if upon review of the record 

there is “a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In Re J.W., 779 

N.E.2d 954, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. 

[27] Mother does not contest the juvenile court’s conclusions that Child has been 

out of her care for more than six months or that DCS deems adoption to be a 

satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child. Instead, Mother argues

that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that conditions that 

resulted in the removal of Child will not be remedied, that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship with Mother poses a threat to Child, and that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interest.

Whether Conditions will be Remedied

[28] Mother first argues that DCS did not meet its burden of proving two of the 

elements under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). It is well-settled that 

because Indiana Code section 31-5-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the 

juvenile court need only find that (1) the conditions resulting in removal from 

or continued placement outside the parent’s home will not be remedied, (2) the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child, or (3) 

the child has been adjudicated CHINS on two separate occasions. See In re 
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C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added), trans. denied. 

Therefore, where the juvenile court determines one of the above-mentioned 

factors has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting 

the juvenile court’s determination, it is not necessary for DCS to prove, or for 

the juvenile court to find, any of the other factors listed in Indiana Code section 

31-5-2-4(b)(2)(B). In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[29] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal will not 

be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-43

(quoting another source). First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; 

and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those 

conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643 (quoting another source). “In the 

second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the 

termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed 

conditions,” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152—balancing a parent’s recent 

improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether 

there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. (quoting 

another source). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has 

discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only 

shortly before termination.” Id. (citing another source). “Requiring trial courts 

to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding 

that parents' past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[30] Mother acknowledges that Child was removed from her care after he was 

admitted to Riley Hospital with bleeding on the brain, injuries described by a 
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doctor as “very straight forward, abusive head trauma.” Appellant’s App. at 50. 

Mother admitted that she saw Boyfriend shaking and yelling at seven-week-old 

Child, but waited more than twenty-four hours before taking him to the 

hospital. Tr. at 10-11. Even so, Mother contends that the evidence does not 

support the juvenile court’s finding that the conditions resulting in Child’s 

removal from or continued placement outside the parent’s home will not be 

remedied. As support for her position, Mother argues that she participated in 

services such as substance abuse assessment, she took part in visitation with 

Child, and she completed a program for wellness and recovery. Appellant’s Br. 

at 12, 13. She also asserts that she participated in home-based services, which 

consisted of counseling. Id. Further, Mother offers that she was “compliant” 

with services until she was sentenced and incarcerated for the charges 

pertaining to Child. Mother concedes that, once released from DOC, she failed

to timely sign up for in-home detention and was again incarcerated, where she 

remained while awaiting an open spot in the work release program. Mother 

offers, however, that she has a plan to “serve approximately 6 months with the 

chance to modify to 3 months . . . . [She will] get housing with her aunt and 

continue her job cleaning houses.” Id. at 12. Mother testified she understood 

that Child has special needs and “disagreed with testimony that she did [not] 

see his condition as serious.” Id. This evidence, Mother claims, demonstrates 

that “she is not unwilling to cooperate with [DCS], and as such, termination of 

her rights would be inappropriate based on all of the evidence before the 

[juvenile c]ourt at the time of the termination hearing.” Id. at 13. We disagree. 
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[31] The juvenile court found that Mother was first arrested for neglect of a 

dependent and possession of a syringe in March 2013. Appellant’s App. at 38. 

At that time, she was injecting controlled substances into her body despite the 

fact that she was four months pregnant with Child. Id. One of Child’s older 

siblings was present and within reach of syringes used for injecting drugs, 

including at least one syringe that was “loaded” with liquified pills. Id. From 

Mother’s conduct, the juvenile court found that she demonstrated “a 

fundamental inability to understand the basic safety needs of a minor child, or 

to comport her actions to any recognizable standard of safety for her children.” 

Id. The court also found that the “purposeful use” of illegal substances while 

knowing she was pregnant with Child, demonstrated a willingness to elevate 

her own interests over those of her children, and to do so in such a way that 

severely jeopardized the life and health of Child. Id. at 38-39.

[32] Mother’s second arrest was prompted by the offenses connected to the 

termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found that Mother 

witnessed Boyfriend violently shaking seven-week old Child, yet did not seek 

medical care until the next day, despite seeing seizure-like symptoms. “This 

delay exacerbated [Child’s] medical condition.” Id. at 39. Mother was 

sentenced to eight years, but ordered to serve only two years—eighteen months

in DOC, twelve months on in-home detention, and six months on probation. 

Once released from DOC, Mother failed to timely establish in-home detention, 

causing the revocation of that privilege, and Mother again being incarcerated to 

await a spot in work-release. 
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[33] On September 11, 2015, Mother was charged with Class A misdemeanor theft, 

for stealing property from Walmart. Id. at 40. This criminal act occurred five 

weeks after Mother had failed to comply with in-home detention and mere 

weeks before the juvenile court’s scheduled hearing on the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. Id.

[34] The juvenile court set forth extensive findings regarding Mother’s criminal 

history, use of drugs in the presence of one of her older children, use of drugs all 

weekend while Child was in her care, failure to timely obtain necessary medical 

care for Child, and amount of time she was incarcerated during Child’s first two 

years of life. The juvenile court also noted the services Mother completed and 

her failure to complete visitation. Mother does not challenge the juvenile 

court’s findings. Instead, she argues that the juvenile court erred because: (1) 

Mother has demonstrated that she is willing to cooperate with DCS; (2) she 

participated in some services; (3) her incarceration should extend the time that 

she has to complete services; and (4) the evidence “would not necessarily reflect 

probabilities of future neglect or abuse.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.

[35] As part of the termination order, the juvenile court concluded:

Despite the certain knowledge that her good conduct was critical 

to maintaining a legal as well as physical relationship with 

[Child], [Mother] was unable to remain in an in-home sentence 

for more than sixteen days before revocation of that privilege. 

Mother’s inability to comport her conduct to legal standards 

despite the risk of further and more restricted incarceration 

and/or loss of a legal relationship to [Child] demonstrates the 
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risk to the health and safety of [Child] posed by maintaining the 

parent-child relationship.

Mother’s inability to maintain good conduct despite the risks of 

failing to do so also demonstrates the likelihood that the 

conditions resulting in the ongoing removal of [Child] from 

[M]other’s care will not be remedied.

. . . . 

Mother’s criminal conduct demonstrates that any progress or 

participation in services while at liberty has had no effect in 

remedying her tendency to commit crime or lose her liberty, or to 

enable her to fulfill her parental responsibilities to [Child]. She 

cannot even fulfill the general obligation to refrain from 

committing criminal acts despite the risk of long-term criminal 

incarceration or the loss of a legal relationship to [Child]. 

Appellant’s App. at 40. Mother offers many of the same arguments on appeal 

that she offered to the juvenile court. To this extent, Mother’s appeal is a 

request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re E.M., 4 

N.E.3d at 642. Here, the unchallenged findings support the juvenile court’s 

determination that the conditions resulting in the ongoing removal of Child 

from Mother’s care will not be remedied. Having found conditions will not be 

remedied we need not reach Mother’s claim that the continuation of the parentchild relationship poses a threat to Child. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882.

Best Interests of Child

[36] Mother asserts that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Mother 
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offers that the juvenile court failed to look to the totality of the circumstances, 

and instead, considered only the reasons for Child’s removal. Appellant’s Br. at

14; see In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158 (in determining child’s best interests, 

trial court must look to totality of evidence, and not just factors identified by 

DCS). Mother recognizes that “permanency is a central consideration in 

determining the best interest of a child,” but contends there is no evidence that 

permanency through adoption would be beneficial to child or that remaining in 

foster care or with relatives would be harmful. Id. 

[37] The juvenile court found that Child requires ongoing medical care and 

evaluation, including neurological care and treatment due to the injuries Child 

sustained. Appellant’s App. at 35. Child’s right side is paralyzed and, at the age 

of two, he still suffers from developmental issues related to the physical abuse 

he suffered. Id. at 41, 42. He is developmentally behind others of his same age; 

he cannot walk, he requires physical, occupational, and speech therapies, and 

he should receive developmental therapy. Id. at 41. Mother does not have a 

realistic understanding of Child’s limitations or needs. Id. at 42. Further, 

Mother has not taken advantage of opportunities, like in-home detention, to 

make herself available for Child. Id. at 41. Even after her in-home detention 

was revoked, Mother stole property from Walmart. Id. 

[38] Child was taken out of Mother’s care at seven weeks of age and has lived with 

A.R. for about twenty-five consecutive months. In that home, Child has 

progressed well and “received extensive and loving care” from A.R., who wants 

to adopt him. Id. The juvenile court agreed with Mother’s self-assessment that 
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her conduct was “not that of a person serious about being a parent.” Id. at 43. 

The juvenile court agreed with the opinions of FCM Murphy and the CASA 

and found that termination of the parent-child relationship and adoption of 

Child are in his best interest. Id. at 45. We cannot say that the juvenile court 

erred in giving credence to the professionals’ opinions that termination and 

adoption are in Child’s best interests. In sum, Mother has failed to establish 

that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that termination of the parentchild relationship and adoption are in Child’s best interests.

[39] Affirmed.

May, J., and Crone, J., concur.