### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nua ry 17, 200 7 S es sio n

JENN IFER

DU NN , In dividually and as the n atural m other and ne xt of k in to JEREM IAS D UN N, dec eased v. AM ELIA DA VIS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-006516-01 K aren R. William s, Jud ge

No. W2006-00251-C OA-R3-C V - F iled March 6, 2007

Th is ap p e a l ar i s e s f

r o m a w r o n g f

u l d e a t h a c t i o n t r i e d b y a j u r y

. T h e j u r y a l l o c a t e d 5 1 % f a u lt t o Def endant a nd assessed total damag es in the amount of $1,250,000. The trial court de nied Def endant’ s motions for new trial, remittitur, a nd judgme nt in acc ordanc e with motion for dire cted verdic t; entere d judgme nt ag ainst Defe ndant in the amount of $637,500; and awar ded Plaintiff dis c re tio na

ry c os ts. De fe nd a nt a

pp e a ls. W e affirm in pa rt , r e ve rs e in p art , a ndre ma ndwi th sug g estion of re mitti tur.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in p art; Reve rsed in part; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J
., W.S
., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

Ni c ho la s E . B ra g or g os a ndPa me la Warno c k G re e n, fo r the app e lla nt, Am e lia Da vis

.

J ohn Daniel Richa

rdson, Ter esa A . Boy d, and Jul ian T. B olton, for the appe llee, Jennifer Dunn.

OP IN ION

Th is a pp e a l aris es fr om a

wr on g fu l de a th a c tio n s te mmi ng fr om a tr a g ic mot or

ve hic le

acc ident. On September

27, 2001, thirteen-y ear old pe destrian J ere mias Dunn (Jeremias) wa s killed while w a lkin g h o me f

r o m s c h o o l w h e n h e w a s s tr u c k b y a w h it e T a h o e ( SU V ) o p e r a te d by Def endant Ame lia Davis (De fenda nt or Ms. Davis), then e ighte en y ear s of ag e. The acc ident

occur red at ap p ro x i m ately

2:57 pm as J ere mias and at lea st one other c hild were crossing Union Av e nu e fr om the so uth we st c or ne r to the no rthw e st co rn e r of Un ion Av e nu e a ndHo lly wo od /A lic ia in Memphis. The traffic light was g ree n for Jeremias a s he beg an his journey acr oss Union Avenue, but appar ently

chang ed whe n he ente red the turning lane in the c enter of Union Ave nue. J ere mias-2-

and at lea st one other c hild attempted to run ac ro ss the rema inder of U nion Avenue. Ms. Da vis’s vehicle struc k J ere mias as he e ntere d the westbound, fa r rig ht (curb- side) lane

.
Whe n th e a c c ide nt o c c ur

re d, Ms. Da vis wa s o n h e r w a y to h e r a ft e r-s c ho ol j ob a t I dle wi ld Day Care. She w as tra v el i n g at approx imately thirty -five miles pe r hour in hea vy traff ic and ha d moved into the far

rig ht la ne sometime afte r crossing the viaduct east of the interse ction of Union and Holly wo o d / Al i cia. The day of the a ccide nt was cle ar a nd hot, and there is no evidence that visibil it y wa s l imited by

weather c onditions. The parties dispute whe ther Jeremias wa s crossing within the crosswa lk and whether Ms. Davis’s view of t he other lanes was obstructed by a U- Haul truck, but the traff

ic light wa s g ree n for Ms. Da vis as she ente red the intersec tion. There is no

e vid e nc e that Ms . D a vis ra n a re d or y e llo w t ra ff ic sig na l, tha t sh e wa s tr a ve lin g a t a n e xce ssi ve rate of spee d, or that she wa s impaired by the use of dr

ug s or alcohol whe n the ac cident occurre d. Additionally , cellular

telephone r ecor ds demonstrated tha t Ms. Davis was not on he r ce ll phone at the time of the a ccide nt. J ere mias died from sever e head and neck trauma w ithin thi rty minutes of bein g s t ru ck . There is no evidence to sugg est that J ere mias was consc ious or alert when the para medics ar ri v ed ap p ro x i m at el y t h i rt ee n m i n u t es af

t er J er em i as wa s s t ru ckb y

M s

. Da v i s ’s v eh icle.

On October 24, 2001, J ere mias’s pare nts, Pl aintiffs Jennifer Dunn ( Ms. Dunn) and William D u n n ( M r

. D u n n , c o ll e c ti v e ly
, “ th e D u n n s ” )
, f il e d a w r o n g f

u l d e a th a c ti o n in d iv id u a ll y a n d a s n e xt of kin a g ainst Ms. D avis. I n their complaint, the Dunns alleg ed the ac cident wa s proxi mately cause d by neg lige nce on t h e part of Ms. Davis. They claimed medic al and f

unera l expenses; loss of

c on so rt ium ; di min ish e d ca pa c ity to en

joy lif e , an d g re a t me nta l a ng uis h. Th e y a lso c la ime d e xtre me pa in a ndsu ff

e ri ng , lo ss o f l if

e (p e c un iary

va lue ) a ndlos s of ea

rn ing c apa c ity on the pa

rt of Jer e mia s. They pray ed for

individual da mag es in the amount of $1,000,000 eac h and dama g es in the amount of $5,000,000 as ne x t of kin.

Ms. Davis answe red, de ny ing a lleg ations of neglig ence . The Dunns subseque ntly amende d their complaint to a dd the owner s of Ms. D avis’s vehicle, her pare nts Char les and Mary Davis (“ the Davises” ), pursua nt to the family purpose d o ct ri n e and respondeat superior. The y further alleg ed the Davise s “either

knew or should have known tha t [ Ms. Davis] was an u n s af e driver a nd under med ica ti on , spe c if

ic a lly Ad e ra l.” Th e Du nn s a lso a dd e d the City of Me mph is (“ the City ” ) a s a De fe ndant
, all e g ing ne g lig e nt a dju stm e nt o f the tr a ff ic c on tr ol l ig ht tha t r e su lte d in ina de qu a te

cr o s s i n g t i m e , a n d i n ad eq u at e s i gn age

. T h e C i t y m o v ed fo r s u m m ar y

j u d gm en tan d
, fo l l o wi n g a hearing, the trial court g rante d the City partial summary judgme nt with respec t to matters rela ting to the timing or prog ramming of the traff ic and pedestria n control signa ls. I n Marc h 2005, the Dunns too k a vo lun tary no n- su it as to the City

. Th e y a lso no n- su ite d th e c la ims of Mr . D un n a nda ll c la ims ag ainst the Davises. The trial c ourt dismissed Mr. Dunn and cla ims ag ainst the Davises on July5, 2005.

The matter

was tried be fore a jury

on J uly 5-7, 1 1
, 1 2 , and 14, 2005. The jury returne d a verdic t allocating 51% fault to Ms. Davis and assessing total damag es in the amount of $1,250,000. The trial c ourt enter ed judg ment on the j ury verdic t in favor of Ms . Dunn in the amount of $637,500 (51% of 1,250,000) plus costs. There afte r, the trial court gra nted Ms. Davis’s motions for dire cted-3-

verdic t on Ms. Dunn’s loss of consortium claim, and denied Ms. Da vis’s motions for directe d verdic t with respec t to Ms. Dunn’s neg lige nce c laims.

Ms. Davi s mo v e d f

o r a n e w tria l, r e mi tt itu r , a n d ju d g me n t in a c c o r d a n c e w ith mo ti o n for dir e c te d v e rd ic t, and Ms

. Dunn mov e d f or pr e jud g me nt i nte re st. Th e tr ia l c ou rt de nie d th e se motions. The trial court aw arde d Ms. Dunn discretionary costs in the amount of $13,659.52. Final judgme nt was ente red in the matter on J anuary 3, 2006, and Ms. D avis filed a timely notice of a

ppeal to this C ourt. We aff

irm the verdic t allocating 51% fa ult to M s

. Da v i s ; reverse the trial court’ s denial of Ms. Da vis moti on for remittit ur; and remand wit h a sugg estion of remitti tur in the amount of $598,768. We aff

irm the trial court’s awa

rd of discr etionary

costs to Ms. Dunn.

Issues Presented

Ms. Davis raise s sever al issues, as we slightly restate them, for our

revie w:
(1 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by de nying De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n f or a ne w t ri a l be c a us e the ve rd ic t is c on tr ary

to the la w, e vid e nc e , a ndjury ins truc tio ns

. (2 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y de ny ing De fe nd a nt’ s mot ion fo r j ud g me nt i n
acc ordanc e with motion f or direc ted verdic t at the close of Plaintiff’s proof and at the c lose of all the e vidence

. (3) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by deny ing D ef

endant’ s motion for remittitur beca use the ve rdict is contra

ry to the law and e vidence

. ( 4 ) Wh e th e r th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in a d mi tt in g in to e v id e n c e a p h o to g r aph of Jer e mia s thr ou g h the te sti mon y of Pla int if f’ s wi tne ss Ge or g e Co le; in

a dmi tti ng the te sti mon y

of Pla int if f’ s e xpe rt tr a ff ic a c c i d e n t

r e c o n s t r u c t i o nis t; and in excluding an e x cer pt of a letter

from Plaintiff’s counse l to Pl aintiff’s expert, offe red to show bias or motive.

(5) Whether the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in awar d i n g Plaintiff’s discretionary

costs and denying D efe ndant’s motion to strike excerpts of the aff idavit of leg al counse l J ulian Bolton.

Stan dard of Revie w

On app e a l f

ro m a jury tr ia l, w e wi ll n ot s e t a sid e the jury ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t un le ss the re is no materia l evidence to support the verdic t. Childress v. Union Realty Co.
, 97 S.W .3d 573, 576 (Tenn. C t

. App.2002); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Upon revie w, this Court will not re-w eig h the

e v i d e n c e , b u tw i l l t ak e t h e s t r o n g e s tv i e w p o s s i b l e o f t h e e v i d e n c e i n f

a v o r o f t h e p r e v a i l i n g p ar t y, and disca rd evide n ce t o t h e contrary

. Id. We will allow all reasona ble infer ence s to uphold the jury ’s ver dict, setting it aside only if there is no material evide nce to support it. Id.-4-

Ou r r e vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l a w i n a jury tr ia l, h ow e ve r, is de novo upon the re cord, with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) ; Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 28 (Tenn. 1996)

.

Motion for Judgm ent in A ccordance with Motion for Direc ted V erdict

We beg in our ana ly sis with whether the trial court err ed by deny ing Ms. Da vis’s motion for judgme nt in accor dance with motion for directed ve rdict at the c lose of Plaintiff’s proof and at the close of a ll the evidence . I t is well-established that to establish neg lige nce the plaintiff must prove: (1) a duty of car e owed by defe ndant to pla intiff; (2) conduc t falling below the a pplicable standa

rd of ca re tha t amounts to a brea ch of tha t duty ; (3) injury or loss; (4) cause in fac t; and (5) pr ox imate, or leg al, cause. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. , 937 S.W .2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996) . Once the court has dete rmined that the de fenda nt in a neg lige nce action owe s plaintiff a duty , the question of whether the def endant ha s brea ched his duty and there by cause d plaintiff’s injury are matters to be determined by

the finder

of fa ct . Patterson-Khoury v. W ilson W or l d Hotel-Cherry R oad , 139 S.W .3d 281, 285 (Tenn. Ct. App 2003). T he courts have de fined duty of ca re a s “the leg al obligation owed by defe n d an t t o plaintiff to conform to a rea sonable pe rson standar d of ca re f or protec tion ag ainst unrea sonable risks of ha rm.” McClung , 937 S.W .2d at 894.

A l t h o u g h n e g l i g e n c e i s n o tp r e s u m e d f r o mth e m e r e f

a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f

f h a s s u f f e r e d a n i n j u r y, when diff ere nt conclusions may

be re ache d reg arding fault, the que stion is one to be decided by the jury

. Hickm an v. Jordan , 8 7 S. W.3 d 4 96 , 4 99 (T e nn . Ct . A pp .2 00 1)

. Th us, a dir e c te d v e rd ic t is appropriate whe n the evidenc e is susceptible to only one conc lusion. Ne e v . B ig C re e k Pa rtn e rs , 106 S

. W

. 3 d 6 5 0
, 6 5 3 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 2 )( ci t i n g Alexande r v. Arme ntrout , 24 S.W .3d 267, 271 (Tenn.2000) ). This conc lusion, however, c annot be ba sed on specula tion, c onjecture
, or g uesswork. Id. I f re as o n ab l e pe rs o n s co u l d d ra w c o n fl i ct i n g co n cl u s i o n s o n i s s u es o f f ac t , t h e m at t ers h o u l d go to the jury

. Id.

Ou r re vie w of a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n r e g ard ing a mot ion fo r d ir e c te d v e rd ic t is we llsettled. When deciding whether a trial c ourt should have g rante d a directed verdict, we must t ake the strong est leg itimate vie w of the evidenc e in f avor of the opponent of the motion. Id. Further,

we mus t a llo w a ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s in fa vo r o f the op po ne nt o f the mot ion a nddis re g arda ll evidenc e contr ary

to the opponent’s position. Id. Our revie w of a trial c ourt’s dec ision reg arding a post-trial motion for e ntry of judg ment in ac co rd an ce wi th a motion for a dire cted ve rdict made during the trial is g aug ed by the standar d applicable to motions for d i re ct ed verdic t. Holmes v

. W ilson , 5 51 S.W. 2d68 2, 68 5 (T e nn

. 19 77 )( c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Ac c or din g ly
, in thi s c a se , we mus t aff irm the t ri al court’s de termination unless there is no material evide nce to support the jury ’s de te rm inatio n th a t Ms . D a vis wa s 5 1% a t f a ult

.
O u r a n a l ys i s o f t h i s i s s u e i n l i g h t o f c o m p ar a t i v e f a u l t p r i n c i p l e s r e q u i r e s a

t w o

- p ar ti n q u i r y. Se e Ea ton v . M

c Lai n , 591 S.W .2d 587, 590-93 (Te nn. 1994)(holding that wher e both plaintiff and de fe nd a nt ha ve be e n fou nd ne g lig e nt, the fi nd e r of fa c t must de te rm ine wh e the r the fa ult a ttribu ta ble to the defe ndant is g reater than tha t attributable t o the plaintiff). F irst, we must determine w hetherA s we und ers t and M s. D unn’ s argum ent , t here i s no al l egat i o n i n t hi s case t hat M s. D avi s saw Jerem i as and 1

was un abl e t o s t op i n t i me t o avoi d hi t t i ng hi m. Rat her
, t he ques t i on ce nt er s on wh et her M s

. D avi s s houl d hav e obse r ved J e re m ia s in th e stre e t i n the fi rs t i n sta n c e

.
-5- the re is a ny

ma te ri a l e vid e nc e in the re c or d to su pp ort a findin g that Ms . D a vis wa s n e g lig e nt. Second, if mate rial evide nce suppo rt s such a f inding, we must determine whe ther a ny materia l

e vid e nc e su pp orts the jury ’s de te rm inatio n tha t Ms. Da vis wa s 51% a t f a ult . T he pe rc e nta g e of

fa ult to be attributed to ea ch party is depende nt on the entirety of th e ci rc umstances, a nd fac tors to be considere d by

the jury include

(1) t h e relative closene ss of the causal relationship between the c onduct of the defe ndant and the injury to the plaintiff; (2) the rea sonablene ss of the party ’s conduc t in confronting a risk, such a s wh et h er t he party knew of the risk, or should have known of it; (3) the e x tent to which the def endant f ailed to re asonably

utiliz e an exis ting opportunityto a void the injury to the plaintiff; (4) the e x istence of a sudden

emer g ency

requ i ri n g a hasty

decision; (5) the signific ance of wha t the party was attempting to a ccomplish by the conduct, such as an a ttempt to save another ’s life; and (6) the party ’s particular c ap ac i t i es , such as a g e, maturity , training , education, and so forth.

Id. at 592. We note, howeve r, t hat “challeng ing a j ury ’s allocation of fault is the leg al equivale nt of a ‘H ail Mary ’ pass.” Braswell v

. Lowe’s Home Ce n t er s , Inc. ,173 S.W .3d 41, 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). I f material evidenc e supports a f inding of neg lige nce, “ [t ]he comparison and a l l o cation of fault is for the jury .” Id. (c i t i n g Brown v. W a l-Mart Discount Cities , 12 S.W .3d 785, 789 (Tenn. 2000)). We will not second-g uess the allocation of fault by a jury if it is supported by

any materia l evidenc e. Id.

Wit h these princ iples in mind, we turn to whether any materia l evidence supports a finding that Ms . Da vis wa s n e g lig e nt. I t is c le ar f ro m th e e vid e nc e that a t th e tim e thi s a c c ide nt o c c ur re d M s. Davis wa s not speeding
, was not operating under t he influence, was not on her c ell phone, and that the traf fic lig ht was g ree n in her dire ction. I t is also clear that Ms. Davis was tra veling in heavy tr a ff ic a ndthat Jer e mia s w a s in the tr a ff ic la ne s of Un ion Av e nu e a t or ne ar the c ro ss w a lk a s Ms

. Da vis app ro a c he d th e int e rs e c tio n o f U nio n A ve nu e a ndHo lly wo od /A lic ia . A dd iti on a lly , M s

. D a vis do e s no t dis pu te that sh e wa s un de r a du ty to ma int a in a re a so na bly sa fe sp e e d; t o h a ve he r v e hic le

un de r c on tr ol; to ke e p a pr op e r loo ko ut un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s; a ndto u se re a so na ble c are to a vo id

an ac cident. Ms. Davis maintains in her brief to this C ourt, howeve r, that, althoug h she obser ved children on the sidewal k at the time of the a ccide nt, she did not see Jeremias until he was “ in the middl e of he r ca

r,” tha t J ere mias was not cr ossing within the cr osswalk, that she c ould not see J ere mias because a U -Haul truck blocke d her vie w. Ms. Dunn, on the other hand, asserts J ere mias was in the c rosswalk a t the time of the ac cident, t h at M s

. Davis should have be en aw are children

we re pr e se nt, a ndthat sh e sh ou ld h a ve se e n Jer e mia s, a nd that the U- Haul t ru c k tr a ve lin g ne ar M s. Davis did not block her vie w. 1-6-

Af te r review in g the e nti re tr ia l tr a ns c ri pt, we a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de nia l of Ms. Da vis mot i o n fo r d irec ted ver dict and motion for judg ment in acc ordanc e with her motion for direc ted verdic t. T h e two major fa ctual dete rminations releva nt to this issue, as we perc eive them, a re
w h e t h e r J e r e m i a s w a s w i t h i n t h e c r o s s w a l k w h e n t h e a c c i d e n to c c u rr e d a n d
, m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y, whether anything obstructed M s. Davis’s view of J ere mias. The recor d contains material evidenc e to support both parties’ contentions reg arding these questions, and we ag ree with the trial court that

rea sonable pe rsons could re ach dif fer ent conc lusions.

Ms. Davis testified that whe n she first saw J ere mias, he was running and was “in the middle” of her car

. She testified t hat s he did not observe children in the s tree t; that she did not see Jeremias to her lef t; and that J ere mias appea red to have “leapt” in front of her car. Ms. Davis also testified that th e tr a ff

ic wa s h e a vy

a ndthat sh e c ou ld n ot h a ve se e n Jer e mia s to he r l e ft be c a us e c ars we re to her le ft. Ms. Davis furthe r testified that she did not reme mber whether ther e wa s a truck in the la ne to the left of he r, althoug h there could have been.

Wit ness L

ula Yanc y

(Ms. Yanc y ) is a re tired nurse who was trave ling westbound on Union in a maro on ve hic le a t the tim e of the a c c ide nt an d who sto pp e d to hel p Jer e mia s a ft e r the a c c ide nt. Ms. Yancy

testified that she observe d only one child crossing Union; tha t he was running ; that she slammed on her brake s to a void hitting the child; a nd that the child was c rossing Union Avenue “at least two ca

r leng ths” west of the crosswa lk. Ms. Yanc y also testified that she did not witness the impact, and that she heard it rathe r than saw it. Ms. Yancy additionally

testified that she did not see a U- Haul truc k.

Wit ness B ridg et Clark (Ms. Clark) was trave ling west on Union to pic k her c hildren up fr om school at the time of the a ccide nt. Ms. Cl ark te stified that she wa s traveling in the far left lane of the westbound lane s an d t h at s he obser ved childre n beg inning to cr oss the eastbound lane s as she

came acr oss the viaduct. She testified that children wer e running in the street a nd drifting in and out of the tra ffic in the e astbound lanes, a nd that the traff ic light chang ed afte r the childre n had starte d to cross. Ms. Clark testified that she a nd Ms. D avis enter ed the intersec tion at about the same time; that a larg e truc k w a s in the la ne be tw e e n h e r a ndMs. Da vis ; a ndthat th e y ha d c ro sse d th e c ro ssw a lk when the c hildren starte d to run ac ross the we stbound lanes. Ms. Clark testified that Ms. Davis’s view of the children would have been blocked by the larg e U- Haul ty

pe truc k. She testified that the

car in front of he r slammed on its brake s to avoid hitting one child; that one child made it a cross the street; and that she slammed on her brake s to a void hitting the sec ond child, J ere mias. She testified that she did not see Ms. Da vis strike J ere m i as b ec au s e her view wa s blocked by the truck. She te sti fi e d th a t th e truc k in the mid dle la ne wa s sli g htl y a he a d of Ms. Da vis a ndthat sh e wa s sl ig htl y behind Ms. Davis within their re spective la nes. Ms. Clark also ac knowl ed ged that at her ea rlier deposition she stated that the re mem b er ed t he vehic le that struck Jeremias a s being a blue Ta hoe, when in fa ct it was white.

Pol ic e Sarg e nt G e or g e Ol ive , ( Sarg e nt O liv e ) w ho was pa rt of the inv e sti g a tio n te a m, testified that he did not believe that J ere mias was in the cr osswalk when the ac cident occ urre d. He testified that he wa s not an acc ident rec onstructionist and that he had relied not on scientific data but-7-

on police wor

k and common sense in rea ching his conclusion based on the circ umstances. Sar g ent Olive testified that he be lieved Jeremias was eig hty -one feet from the i ntersec tion when the a ccide nt

occur red.

On the other

hand, witnesses Jonathan J ohnson (Mr. Johnson) and Terr ance Pope( M r

. Po pe), J ere mias’s schoolmates, testified tha t J ere mias attempted t o cross withi n the crosswalk and that the crossing signa l was g ree n for J ere mias when he beg an to c ross Union Avenue

. Mr. J ohnson testified that only he and Jeremias w ere crossing Union Avenue , but that other schoolmates, inc luding Mr. Pope, wer e in the ar ea. He further testified that the t wo boy s did not see a ny vehicles c oming whe n they bega n t o cr o s s, and that “out of now here , a mar oon-colore d car come f ly ing thr oug h, so we dodg ed it and kept g oing a nd J ere mias g ot hit.” At trial, Mr. Johns on testified the ac cident happe ned in the far rig ht lane althoug h he had sta ted at his Marc h 6, 2002, deposition that the impact occ urre d in the middle of the th re e we s t b o u n d lanes. Mr. Johnson also testified at trial that he did not

reme mber t h at t h e “l ady

in the maroon-c olored c ar,” Ms. Yancy , stopped to help at the a ccide nt

scene , althoug h he stated in his deposition tha t he believe d that she did. Mr. Johns on also testified that the boy s g ener ally

did not cross Union Avenue
, but usua lly went under the viaduct; that J ere mias chose to cross Union on the day of t he accident; that they ran a cross the stre et althoug h the light wa s g ree n for them to cr oss; and that J ere mias and he both dodg ed the mar oo n -c o l ored c ar. Mr . Pope te sti fi e d th a t he sa w Je re mia s a s h e wa s st ru c k a ndthat Jerem ias was in the c ro ssw a lk. He a lso te sti fi e d th a t he ra n th ro ug h tr a ff ic , a ndno t a t th e c ro ssw a lk, to r e a c h Jer e mia s a ft e r the a c c ide nt.

Wit ness L inda Kee ley

(Ms. Kee ley ), a pr obation office r, was trave ling e ast on Union at the tim e of the a c c ide nt. Ms. Ke e le y te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s st op pe d be hin d thr e e c ars wh ile the tr a ff ic lig ht w a s r e d f

or th e Uni on Av e nu e tr a ff

ic , a ndthat sh e ob se rv e d Jer e mia s run nin g a lon e a c ro ss Union Avenue w ith in th e c r o s s w a lk

. Sh e te s ti f ie d th a t th e tr a f

f ic li g h t c h a n g e d a s Je r e mi a s w as running ahea d of traf

fic in the cr o s s wa l k
, and that he was almost acr oss the street whe n the light chang ed. Ms. Kee ley

also testified that she did not view the actua l impact and that she c ould not see it be cause there wer e car s to he r left. When a sked how she was able to observe tha t J ere mias was within the crosswa lk when she w as in the fourth c ar from the light, and whether she was a ssuming that he wa s i n the cr osswalk, Ms. Kee ley responde d: “[t] hat’s what I saw, he was in fr ont of the traff ic, so, y es, he w as in the cr osswalk.” Ms. Ke eley also testified that she sa w no other pe destrian cross the street after traffic stopped after the ac cident. Ms. Kee ley additionally

testified that she wa s a friend of Juli an B olton’s (Plaintiff’s attorney ) sister, and tha t she co n t ac t ed M r. B olton after learning a bout the lawsuit at a birthday party for Mr. B olton’s sister’s baby

.

J anie Hines (Ms. Hines) was trave ling westbound on Union in an SUV ahe ad of the U-Ha ul truc k in the mid dle la ne . T he U- Haul wa s dri ve n by Ms. Hi ne s’ so n, wh o w a s f oll ow ing he r. Ms. Hi ne s te sti fi e d th a t sh e sto pp e d a t the int e rs e c tio n of Un ion a nd Ho lly wo od /A lic ia wh e n th e tr a ff

ic light wa s red, a nd that when she proce eded thr oug h the light a fter it turne d g re en J er emias had

a lr e a dy be e n h it. She te sti fi e d th a t sh e didno t se e the a c c ide nt; didno t kn ow the loc a tio n o f M s. Davis vehic le; and that her son was in the U- Haul behind he r whe n the traf fic lig ht turned g ree n.-8-

Plaintiff’s expert accident rec onstructionist, L arry Wil liams (Dr. Willi ams) testified that based on a trave ling speed of thirty -five miles pe r hour; a f ifty -eig ht foot brake -to-stop time of the Tahoe at that speed; the point at w hich the Tahoe came to rest; and a pe rce ption-rea ction time of .75 to 1.5 seconds, Jeremias wa s within or near the cr osswalk when the acc ident occur red.

The evidence prese nted i n this case supports a variety of determinations, and the testim ony and credibility of each witness was thoroughly examined and cross-examined. The de termination of whe ther Jeremias wa s in fact within the cr oss at the time of the a ccide nt; whether M s

. Davis’s vie w o f Je re mia s w a s b loc ke d b y a U- Haul- lik e truc k; a ndwh e the r M s. Da vis wa s 5 1% a t f a ult in thi s c a se are ma tte rs of

c re dib ili ty

a ndthe we ig ht a ssi g ne d b y the jury to the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d to it. On an appeal fr om a jury verdic t, we do not determine the cr edibilityof witnesses or weig h the evidenc e. Br

own v . D aly
, 83 S.W .3d 153, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App.2001). A ccor dingly , we a ffirm the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de nia l of

Ms. Da vis ’s mot ion s f

or dir e c te d v e rd ic t a ndfo r j ud g me nt i n a c c or da nc e wi th motion for direc ted ver dict.

Mo tio n f or Ne w Tr ial /Mo tio n f or Re mittitu r

Ms. Davis asserts the trial court e rre d b y d en y ing he r motion for a ne w trial or, in the alternative, motion for remittit ur because the verdic t is contra ry to the weig ht of the evide nce; ther e is no substantial ev i dence that Ms. Davis was g uiltyof compa rative f ault g reater than 50% ; and wher e the da m age amount awar ded by the jury is not supported by

the evidenc e. We beg in our analy sis of this issue by noting that Tenne ssee follows the “thirteenth juror” rule, “w hich re quires the trial court to gr ant a motion for a new tria l if the court disag ree s wit h t h e fi n d i n g o f t he jury .” Ba nks and Entman, Te nnessee Civil Procedur e (2 ed. 2004) § 12-2(h)

. Under this rule , “[w]hen nd

a pa rt y mov ing fo r a ne w tr ia l a sse rt s that the ve rd ic t is c on tr ary to the we ig ht o f the e vid e nc e , it is the trial court’s duty

to independently

weig h the evidenc e, to determi n e whether it preponde rate s ag ainst the verdic t, and if so, to order a new trial.” Id. I n its capa city as thirteen jury , the trial court may not rea llocate f

indings of f

ault, but may

only order a new trial. Id.

I n this case, the tr ial court’s or der clear ly ref lects that it exercised its role a s thirteenth juror

a ndc on c lud e d th a t the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate d in fa vo r of the jury ve rd ic t. I n li g ht o f o ur a na ly sis of the issue a

bove, we cannot sa y

the trial court erre d with respec t to the question of neg lige nce or perc entag e of f

ault. There is material evide nce in this case to support the jury ’s determination that Ms. Davis was 51% at fault in this case

. We turn, there fore
, to Ms. Davis’s assertion that the trial court e rre d in failing to gr ant her alternative motion for remittitur.

Se c tio n 2 0- 10 -1 02 of

the Te nn e sse e Cod e pr ov ide s:
(a) I n all jury

trials had in civil actions, af ter the v er d i ct has bee n rende red, a nd on motion for a new trial, when the trial judge is of the opinion that the verdic t in favor of a pa rty should be reduc ed, and a remittitur is sug g ested by the trial judg e on that

acc ount, with the proviso that in case the party in whose favor the verdict has be en
re nd e re d r e fu se s to make the re mit titur a ne w t ri a l w ill be a wa

rd e d, the pa

rt y in-9-

wh os e fa vo r s uc h ve rd ic t has be e n re nd e re d may make su c h re mit titur un de r p ro te st,

a ndapp e a l f

ro m th e a c tio n o f the tr ia l ju dg e to the c ou rt of app e a ls. (b) The court of appea ls shall revie w t he action of the trial c ourt sug g esting

a re mitti tur using the standard of revie w provided for in Rule 13(d) of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e applicable to de cisions of the trial court sitt ing w ithout a jury . I f, in the opinion of the co u rt o f ap peals, the ve rdict of the jury should not have been reduce d, but the j udg ment of t he trial c ourt is corre ct in other re spects, the

case shall be re verse d to that e x tent, and judgme nt sha ll be rende red in the c ourt of

app e a ls f or the fu ll a mou nt o ri g ina lly a wa rd e d b y the jury in the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20- 10-102 (1994)

.
Th e Cod e fu rthe r p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , (a) I f the judg ment of the trial c ourt, with reg ard to a remittitur, is affirmed in the

c ou rt of app e a ls, so that a

pa rt y is r e qu ir e d to make a

re mit titur or su ff

e r a n e w t ri a l, as i n the judg ment of the trial c ourt, or if, by the opinion of the court of appe als, a further or a la rg er r emittitur is required of the party in whose fa vor the ve rdict wa s
re nd e re d, or

if a ft e r the c a se wa s trie d in the low e r c ou rt by the tr ia l jud g e wi tho ut a jury , or if afte r the case was tried in the lower c ourt with a jury and no re mitti tur was sug g ested by

the t rial j udg e, a remittitur is first sug g ested or r equire d in the court of appea ls, o n p e n a lt y o f g r a n ti n g a n e w tr ia l; th e n in e a c h a n d a ll o f th e s e e v ents the party in whose fa vor the ve rdict or judg ment has bee n rende red ma y make the remittitur under prote st in the court of appeals, and take the case , by application for pe rm iss ion to a

pp e a l, f or re vie w u po n th a t po int , to the su pr e me c ou rt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20- 10-103 (1994)

.

T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f

d a m a g e s i n a

p e r s o n a l i n

j u r y c a s e i s w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e j u r y. Grandstaff v. Hawks , 3 6 S. W.3 d 4 82 , 4 99 (T e nn . Ct . A pp .2 00 0) . T ri a l c ou rt s may su g g e st adjustments to the jury ’s awa rd of da mag es wh en they believe the m to be inadequate (sug g esting addi tu r) or

excessive (sug g esting remittitur). Cof fey v . F ay e tte Tab ula r P ro ds

. , 929 S.W .2d 326, 331 (Tenn.1996) . I n a per sonal injury or wrong ful dea th action, compensatory damag es may

include

ec o n o m i c an d n o n -e co n o m i c d am age s

. No n -e co n o m i c d am age s i n cl u d e “ p ai n an d s u ff er i n g, perma nent impairment and/or disfigur ement, and loss of enjoy ment of life-both past an d fut ure.” Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s , I nc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 715 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p

. 1 999). Da mag es for pain and suffe ring include both the phy sical and me ntal discomfort caused by an injury

. Id.

Appellate c ourts revie w a tria l court’s de cisi o n re g arding remittitur under the standa rd of

re vie w s e t f

orth in Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 13 (d ), pr e su min g the c ou rt ’s fi nd ing to b e co rr ec t unless the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. Coffey, 9 2 9 S

. W

. 2 d a t3 3 1

. A p p e l l a te courts may

sug g est a re mitti tur wher e the tria l court has not. Id. Howeve r, our authority is “more circ umscribed” than that of the tria l court. Id. Where the trial court, in its role as thirteenth juror,It i s und i sp uted t ha t t he t rial co urt gran t ed M s. D av i s’ s m o t i o n for d i rec t ed ve rd i ct rega rd i ng M s. D un n’s l o ss 2

o f co n so rtium c la im s. M s. D u n n ha s n o t ap p e a le d this o rd e r.

-10- has appr oved a jury

verdic t, that verdict will not be disturbed whe re the re is any materia l evidence to s u p p o r t it. Id. n. 2. We must, t here fore , revie w the evide nce in this ca se to determine whether materia l evidenc e supports a finding t hat t he jury awa rd i s within the rang e of r easona bleness and not excessive. See Hand v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co.
, No. 03A01-9704-CV-00123, 1998 WL 281946, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998) perm. app. de nied (Tenn. N ov. 2, 1988).

The pa rties in this case have stipul ated to medical damag es in the amount of $1894.40 a nd to funera l expenses in the amount of $4337.32. Additionally
, Ms. D unn’s expert, Dr. Da vid Ciscel (D r. Cis c e l) , te sti fi e d to los t e arn ing s in the a mou nt o f $ 645, 00 0. Dr . Ci sc e l te sti fi e d th a t th is amount repr esente d “the prese nt va lue of the income he (Jeremias) would have e arne d as a w orker had he sur vived,” and ref

lected earning c apac ity

less deductions for

persona l consumption reduce d to present va lue. Dr. Cisce l’s additional tes t i m o n y t h at J ere mias’s lost income had he r ece ived a colleg e deg ree would have be en $960,000 drew obj ection from counsel for Ms. Davis, who objec ted on the g rounds that t he projection was not included in discovery materia l. The trial c ourt sustained the objection, and instructed t he parties that it would either provide a curative instruction or dec lare a mistrial. Counsel for the parties ag ree d to a curative instruction, and the trial c ourt instructed the jury to disreg ard Dr. C iscel’s testimony reg arding what Jeremias could ha ve ea rned ha d he pursue d a colleg e deg ree . No further evidenc e was offe red by either pa rty reg arding pecunia

ry damag es. The jury assessed total g ener al compensatory damag es in the amount of $1,250,000.

I n her brief to this Court, Ms. Davis sug g ests that wher e the e vidence of ec onomic damag es was limited to $651,231.72, damag es in excess of this a mount c ould only be non-e conomic dama g es fo r p a in a ndsu ff

e ri ng

. Ms. Da vis a sse rt s th a t, a lth ou g h p a in a ndsu ff e ri ng mig ht b e inf

e rr e d in this 2

case , Ms. Dunn offere d n o ev idence to sugg est that J ere mias was consc ious after impact and that

“ [n]o m e dic a l te sti mon y

pr e se nte d g a ve ri se to a ny pr oo f o f p a in a ndsu ff

e ri ng .” Ms. Da vis a sse rt s that the damag e aw ard w as, there fore , contra ry to the jury

instruction tha t “f

i rs t class” da mag es inc lud e d “ the me nta l a ndph y sic a l su ff e ri ng a c tua lly

e nd ur e d by Du nn .” Ms. Da vis a lso a sse rt s th a t, althoug h plaintiffs are not require d to introduce e x pert proof of a conclusive dollar value of a dece dent’s life, the evidenc e in this case w as conc lusive.

Ms. Du nn , o n th e oth e r ha nd
, do e s no t a dd re ss Ms. Da vis ’s a sse rt ionthat da ma g e s in e xce ss of $651,231.72 are non-ec onomic damag es for pain and suffe ring

. Rather, Ms. Dunn contends that the jury ’s awa

rd of da mag es wa s based on the jury ’s measur e of the v al u e o f Jeremias’s life considering his backg round, hea lth, and persona l habits. Ms. Dunn cites Thrail kill v. Patterson , 879 S.W .2d 836 (Tenn. 1994) , and this Court’s unpublished opinion in Br ad for d v . Swai n , 1 9 8 9 WL 12 21 , f or the pr op ositio n th a t it

is w ith in the jury ’s dis c re tio n to a ssi g n a va lue to a

hu ma n li fe in excess of the pe cuniary

evidenc e introduce d at trial. Ms. D unn asserts tha t Dr. Ciscel’s testimony establishes mere ly a floor minimum value f or work- life loss. Ms. Dunn contends that Dr . Ciscel’s testimonyand the testimony of Jeremias’s schoo l p ri n cipal, Mr. Georg e Cole (Mr. Cole) , who-11-

testified that J ere mias was a spe cial child, serious, mature, and a n honor student, constitute materia l evidenc e to support the jury awa rd.

I n Thr ail k ill , the c e ntr a l issu e be fo re the su pr e me c ou rt wa s whe the r this Cou rt ha d p ro pe rl y remitted the jury

award

. Thr

ail k ill , 879 S.W .2d at 836-837. I n that medical malpr actice action, plaintiff, dec edent’ s husband, sued defe ndant-phy sicians alleg ing that defe ndants neg lige ntly failed t o d i a g n o s e a n d t r e a t d e c e d e n t f o r p r e

- e c l a m p s i a , a m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p r e g n a n c y. Id. Plaintiff alleg ed that def endants’ ne g lige nce w as the prox imate cause of the death of his wife, then thirty -three y ear s of ag e and pr eg nant with her f irst child. Id. The supre me court determined that liability had been clearly established, and that material e vidence supported the jury ’s awa rd of damag es. Id.

The Thr ail k ill court noted that Tenne ssee’ s wrong ful death statutes provide for rec overy of damag es arising fr om mental and phy sical pain a nd suffe ring , “loss of time, and ne cessa ry expenses resulting to the decease d from personal i njuries.” Id. at 841 (c iting Te nnessee Code Annotated §§ 20-5-1 0 6
, 2 0 -5-107, 20-5-113; T. A. Smedley , “Wrong ful Death Actions in Tennessee , 27 Tenn.L .Rev. 447 (1960)) . The c ourt stated:

[t ]hi s rec overy i s b as ed u pon the pec uniary value of the life of the dece ased to be deter mined upon a consideration of his life
, his a g e, condition of health and stre ng th, capa city for labor and for earning mone y

throug h skill i n any

art, tra de prof

ession,

a ndoc c up a tio n o r b us ine ss.

Id. (citations omitted). The Thr ail k ill court further noted that, under Te nnessee Code Annotated § 20-5-113, da mag es re cover able in a w rong ful dea th action consist of two cla sses. Id. (quoting W il k e r s o n v

. Altizer , 845 S.W. 2d74 4, 74 9 ( Te nn . A pp . 1 99 2) ). Th e fi rs t c la ss o f d a ma g e s is

“ da ma g e s pu re ly fo r inj ury to the de c e a se d, ” wh ic h inc lud e da ma g e s f or me nta l a ndph y sic a l pa in and suffering
, for loss of t ime, and for “nec essary expenses resulting to the dece ased f rom persona l injury .” Id. Th e se c on d cla ss of da ma g e s in c lud e s “ inc ide nta l da ma g e s su ff e re d b y the ne xt of

kin from the de ath. These incidental dama g es include the pecunia ry value of the life of the dece ased.” Id. (citations om itted). The Thr ail k ill court held that the measure of the husband’s r ecove ry in that

c a se fo r the se c on d c la ss o f d a ma g e s w a s
the pec uniary

value of t h e l i fe of the wife to the husband, and not what wag es the wife mig ht have be en able to earn, nor mere ly what it would have ta

ken t o hire another to do the work she did, a s such basis of rec overy would overlook the va lue of the wife ’s per sonal interest in the a ffairs of the home.

Id.

As Ms. Dunn submits, t he Thr ail k ill court re iterate d that “the a ssessment of dama g es is not g overne d by

fix ed rule s of mathematica l prec ision, but t he matter is left to the sound discretion of the jury .” Id. (citations omitted). The c ourt aff irmed that the-12-

amount of dama g es in a de ath action is a matter depe ndent most larg ely upon the jud g me nt o f the jur

y a ndthe ir soun d d isc re tio n a ft e r c are fu lly , h on e stl y a ndfa ir ly

c on sid e ri ng a ll v ari ou s e le me nts that ent e r int o the qu e sti on ,” a nd that “ sin c e no ru le

e xist [s ] b y w h i c h t o m e a s u r e t h e v a l u e o f a l i f e , t h e j u r y i s i n t h e b e s t p o s i tio n to

a sse ss d a ma g e s a nd
, ne xt t o th e jury , th e tr ia l ju dg e is i n th e be st p os iti on to e va luate damag es; and g r e a t w e ig h t m u s t b e g iv e n to th e ju d g me n t o f th e ju r y a n d th e trial jud g e in the abs e nc e of

a ny sh ow ing of

mis c on du c t.

Id. at 841-842 (c itations omi tted).

Howeve r, the Thr ail k ill c ou rt re ve rs e d thi s Cou rt ’s su g g e sti on of re mit titur no t on the ba sis of pec uniary

value of the dec edent’ s life, but beca use the c ourt determined that sufficie nt evidence was int roduce d in that case to war rant damag es on the basis of pain and suffe ring

. Id. at 842. The court noted that, in Ha ll v . Na sh , 184 Tenn. 312, 198 S.W.2d 649 (1947), it “held that whe ther the dece dent l i v ed a few minutes afte r the a ccide nt so as to have suff ere d any pain as to authorize an

awa rd of da mag es wa s a questio n fo r t he jury .” Id. Th e c ou rt ob se rv e d th a t th e e vid e nc e in Thr ail k ill demonstrated that “the dec edent died f our day s after

her c esar ean ope ration; and proof was prese nted re g arding her pa in and suffe ring both prior to and af ter he r oper ation.” I d.

I n Br ad for d v . Swai n , another

medical mal p r actice action, the jury awa rded pla intiff damag es in the amount of $1,000,000 arising fr om the death of plaintiff’s minor child. Br ad for d v . Swai n , 1989 WL 1221, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 13, 1989). In Br ad for d , thi s C o u rt n oted that the five fac tors are to be considere d in de termining the pecunia ry value of a life: life expectanc y , ag e, hea lth,

earning c apac ity , and per sonal habits. Id. at * 4 (c i t i n g Bellamy v . Sadler , 640 S.W. 2d29 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 82 ). We f

ur the r n ote d th a t

it is not nece ssary

that any witness should ex press a n opinion of the amount of . . . pecunia ry loss, it being prope r for the jury to exercise their ow n judgme nt upon the fac ts proved, by

connec ting them with their ow n knowledg e and e x perie nce w hich they are supposed to possess in common with the ge nera lityof mankind.

Id. at * 5 (q u o t i n g Cro we v . P ro v os t , 374 S.W .2d 645, 654 (Tenn. 1963) ). The pla intiff in Br ad for d offe red no expert testimonyreg arding the pec uniary value of the dec edent’ s life and no testimony

re g arding expected ea

rning capa city

. Id. a t* 5

. H o w e v e r , w e h e l d t h a tt h e j u r y c o u l d r e a s on a bly conclude that the dec edent would ha ve an e arning capa city of at least minimum wag e betwe en the ag es o f s ixt e e n a n d s ixt y

- f iv e , a n d th a t p e c u n ia

r y d a ma g e s o f ap p r o xim a te ly $ 3 2 8
, 3 0 0 wer e
rea sonable. Id. at *5. Addition al l y , we observe d that, even w here the child has no history of

earnings, “ substantial damag es” ma y be aw arde d for the death of a minor base d solely on life expectancy , ag e, hea lth and persona l habits. Id. at *6. Upon re view of the rec ord in that ca se, we determined that the ver dict was not complete ly supported by materia l evidenc e, and we sug g ested

a re mitti tur in the amount of $400,000. Id.-13-

I n the pre sent ca se, Ms. Dunn off ere d no evidenc e of pa in and suffe ring . The only medical evidenc e in the rec ord is the deposition of Dr. Ba rry Gilmore (Dr. Gilmore), the attending phy sician who ca r e d f o r Je r e mi a s a t L e B o n h e u r H o s p it a l f o ll o w in g th e a c c id e n t. D r

. G il mo r e te s ti f ie d that EMS incident report enter ed int o evidenc e st ated that, althoug h J ere mias was a live when pa rame dics

arrived at the sc ene of

the ac cident at 3:09 pm, he wa s “totally unresponsive.” He f urther te stified that when the a mbulance le ft the sce ne at 3:31, Jeremias had no pulse and wa s not breathing . Dr. Gilmore stated that there was nothing to indicate that Jeremias wa s conscious whe n the par amedics

arrived, and that J ere mias’s “skull was open to the outside” a nd that brain matter was lea king f rom it. Ms. Dunn does not arg ue in her brief that the jury

awa rd wa s based on pa in and s uffe ring , and Ms. Dunn failed to de monstrate that Jeremias wa s conscious af ter the a ccide nt

. Ac co rding ly , we ag ree with Ms. Davis that there is no materia l e vidence in this case to support an a war d in excess of $ 6 5 1
, 2 3 1 b as ed o n p ai n an d s u ff er i n g.

We likewise find no mater ial evidenc e exists i n this case to support a v er d i ct b as ed on a pecunia ry value in excess of $645,000. Unlike Br ad for d , this case include s expert testimony , and that testimonyevidenc es t hat t he pec uniary value of J ere mias life was likely

to have be en $645,000. This amount refle cted Jeremias’s likely earning c apac ity reduc ed to prese nt value, less a deduction for pe rsonal consumption. Additionally , Dr. Ciscel, Ms. Dunn’s e x pert, testified that he in rea ching this determination he considere d “the quality of his ( J ere mias’s) school experience ” and the f act that J ere mias was a g ood student; tha t Jeremias’ s “conduc t was g ood”; that “he had a f amily that car ed

abo ut h im. ” As no te d a

bo ve , f oll ow ing ob

je c tio n b y

de fe ns e c ou ns el, the tr ia l c ou rt sp e c if ic a lly instructed the jury

to disreg ard D r. Ciscel’s testimony reg arding what Jeremias wa s likely to have

earned had he pursued a colleg e deg ree

. Mr. Cole’s testimony that J ere mias was an honor student and, in essenc e, a “g ood kid” re inforce s Dr. Ciscel’s testimony , but does littl e to evidenc e additional pecunia ry damag es. Ms. Dunn off ere d no ot h er proof re g arding damag es. Thus, in this case, the

rec ord evide nces tha t the expert determination of pe cuniary value based on ea

rning capa city

was ba se d n ot o nly

on min imu m w a g e e xpe c ta tio ns , b ut in c on sid e ratio n of Jer e mia s’ s p e rs on a l ha bit s, life expectanc y , and hea lth.

We a re no t in se ns iti ve to the fa c t that, in a lar ge r s e ns e , it is i mpo ssi ble to p ro ve wi th mathematica l prec ession the value of a life. We also are not insensitive to the fact that no a mount of money can c ompensate Ms. Dunn f or the loss of her

son. Wi thin the frame wor k o f t he court sy stem, howeve r, the plaintiff be ars the bur den of de monstrating dam ages with some material

e vid e nc e . T he re is no ma te ri a l e vid e nc e in thi s c a se to su pp ort a n e c on omi c da ma g e a wa rdin e xce ss of $651,231.72. We acc ording ly rema nd with a sugg estion of remitti tur in the amount of $598,768.

Adm ission of Evidence

We turn next to Ms. Davis’s assertion that the trial court er red in a dmitti ng a photog raph of J ere mias taken some y ear s prior to the a cc i dent, in admitting the testimony of Ms. Dunn’s e x pert

acc ident rec o n s tr

u c ti o n is t, D r

. Wi ll ia ms , a n d in e xc lu d in g a n e xc e rp t o f a le tt e r f r o m M s

. D u n n ’s le g a l c ou ns e l to Dr . Wil lia ms. We a ff or d th e tr ia l c ou rt wi de dis c re tio n re g ard ing the a dmi ssi bil ity of evide nce a nd will not overturn the trial c ourt’s dete rmination absent a c lear abuse of that-14-

discretion. Tire Shredders, Inc

. v. ERM-North Central, Inc. , 15 S.W .3d 849, 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Ms. Davis asserts the trial court e rre d in admitting, over Ms. Davis’s objec tion, a photogr aph

o f J er emias tende red throug h the testimony of Mr. Cole. Ms. Davis c ontends “[t] he photog raph

se rv e d n o r e le va nt p ur

po se , w a s ina c c ur a te , an d ser ve d only to ar ou se the sy mpathy of the jury .” Ms. Davis’s objection, as we understand it, was that the photog raph did not ac curately ref lect Jeremias’s ag e at the time of

the ac cident and w as pre

judicial in light of the que stion of whether J ere mias was old enoug h to appre ciate the dang er of crossing Union Avenue

. We cannot say the t rial court abused its discretion in admitti ng what ap p ea rs to have be en the most rec ent ava ilable photog raph of Jer e mia s. Ad dit ion a lly , e ve n a ssu min g the ph oto g ra ph wa s o f l itt le pr ob a tiv e va lue , it c le arl y did not prejudice the jury

in light of the a

pportionment of fault in thi s case

.
We l ike wi se fi ndno abu se of dis c re tio n in the a dmi ssi on of Dr . Wil liams’ te sti mon y . M s. Davis’s a rg ument, as we perc eive it, is that Dr. Wil liams te stimonywith respec t to the perc eptionrea ction time of Ms. Davis, which he estimated at a pproxi mately

1.5 seconds, is unre liable wher e perc eption-re action time comprises a rang e of ti m e. T h e transcript of the trial re flec ts that Dr. Wil liams te stified that the rang e of perc eption-re action time w as 1 to 1.5 seconds, howe ver, a nd Dr. Wi ll ia ms w a s th o r o u g h ly c r o s s

- e xa mi n e d o n th is is s u e

. We f in d n o e rr o r

in th e a d mi s s io n o f

D r. W i l l i a m s ’ t e s t i m o n y; i t s w e i g h tw a s a m a t t e r p r o p e r l y b e f

o r e t h e j u r y.
Finally , we f

ind no abuse of disc retion in the trial c o u rt ’s ref usal to admit an excerpt of a letter be tween Ms. Dunn’ s l egal c ounsel and Dr . Wil liams. Ms. Davis submit s the excerpt wa s
a dmi ssi ble to de mon str a te that Dr. Willi a ms’ te sti mon y wa s b ia se d b y

c ou ns e l’ s p ro fe sse d d e sir e to pla c e Jer e mia s w ith in the c ro ssw a lk at th e tim e of the a c c ide nt. We ob se rv e , fi rs t, tha t D r. Willi a ms
was c ross-examined re g arding his role as plaintiff’s ex pert a nd that any possible bias with respec t to his testim ony

was c lear ly

befor e the jury . Second, we note that the trial court ag ree d to admit the letter in its entirety . This issue is without merit.

Di sc re tio nar

y Cos ts

Ms. D avis submits the trial court err ed in a war ding Ms. D unn discretionary cost s i n t he amount of $13,659.52. Ms. Davis asse rts that Ms. Dunn claims expert and depositi on expenses for

ma tte rs no t ne c e ssa

ry fo r tr ia l in c on tr a ve nti on of Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re 54 . M s. Da vis

a sk s th is C ou rt

to r e ma ndthe iss ue to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r f urthe r a na ly sis

. As Ms. Davis notes, an awa rd of discr etionary

costs is within t he discre tion of the trial court and the a ppellant bea

rs t he burden of demonstrating that the t rial court abused its discretion. I n her br ie f t o th is C ou rt , h ow e ve r, Ms. Da vis do e s n oth ing mor e tha n s ta te that th e tr ia l c ou rt abu se d it s dis c re tio n in a wa

rd ing c os ts n ot r e c ov era

ble un de r the ru le s. She ha s n ot c arrie d h e r b ur de n to identify w ith p ar ti c u la

r it y c o s ts th a t a ll e g e d ly w e r e n o t r e c o v e r a b le

. We a f

f irm th e a w ar d of discretionary

costs to Ms. Dunn.-15- Hol din g

I n li g h t o f

th e f o r e g o in g , th is matt e r

is r e ma n d e d to th e tria l c o u r t w ith a s u g g e s ti o n of remittitur in the amount of $598,768, resulting in a tot al damage awa rd of $651,232 and a judg ment in favor of

Ms. D u nn in the amount of $332,128.32, plus discretionary costs in the amount of $1 3
, 6 5 9

. 5 2. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is otherwise a ffirme d. Costs of this appea l are taxed

o n e

- h a l f t o t h e A p p e l l e e , J e n n i f e r D u n n , a n d o n e

- h a l f

t o t h e A p p e l l a n t , A m e l i a

D a v i s , a n d h e r

s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE