-,-- STANDARD~N064 TORF S>Ei6&E • ~' ~ ~ 

- bffice Memorandum • uNITEn sTATEs GovERNMENT 

TO 

AFSA-00 

AFSA-OOB DATE l May 1950 

FROM AFS A-12 

W~ECT Establishment Of OONSIDO 

Attaohed hereto is a eopy of "Dratt ot Prinoiples 

tor Establishment of OONSIDO" tor your information and 

file. 

A. C. PETERSON 

Lt. Colonel, CAO 

Ohief • AFSA-12 

eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-22-2014 

ursuantto E.O. 13526 

teP SECRET 
• REF ID:A61ili.2 

..,. 

1. Iaolotun 1 1 •Lf.o~i I. have prel"1oual7 dlao-u.ued wtth 

pu, 11 f1')!"ftY.ded al~n- Wrlt'!'l v c.maente, •• ,.cquaato4 b'1 

J"OU• 

8. ibeff 1a 'ut.t.'1 ti0 °tf ~ld fol" Yr. ~1ed•U:t' I potnt 

or vltnr• but I bel.i••• •~·e ~f ~is atat•~·~ts o! taot •nd 

co;cluston$ ••r~ant e~ntnet1on. Upon the baata ot 187 own 

ex;pertene•• I • afraid th.al; l 1n11t t•lt• 1aaue wi\h aome or 

th.• points h• make;. If4V9Z'tl"•l••• his eo=nonttt d•••rve ea~etul eon1\derat1on, et~oot"allJ !G vie• ot hia lolltS. aDd 

outatan,lne reoord ot ac•o~.pl1ah."19nt tn the o~.II'? t1•14. 

a. I a&l'Oo t~at rufe11'nco (4) la ct •a~ptional 

l~=>I"tanoo a.ild t?aat 1.t 1a l<u*" onl'due. .t do not bel1eft1 

;."1QW•Yo_...., that it 14 antix-ely Oo!'TeCt t:> 141'# Al ds1;e4 in 

parasrsph 3 or "11• Mt'!tt> to mo, l~.a\ •at1.U, •• ot \bl• Jate. we ::av& ................ not evon a slft&l,o* •l.f•ot1v., u.n.lr1.ed. agenoi .to~ \h• •valun'1~n. 1ntorz;r•tat1on fll1d 

tl1aMl'lliurtlon ot etrat&,;1e• 1x;n-oiH4lnt1onal 1ntoll1..,enoa 

to prot:?Ot ~- •'""•1~.Jt tii< poaa1bll1t7 ot another Pear1 

li.a?bor." wbeth•l' t!'.Ult)" "" otteet1vo - t10-t. the tact 

reaina t!l& \ t'"'o" at-• aotually th:lt$e a.:,t.nwi«. e ohs~~vd with 

I:¥li&:1!\1 notlo.tl..~l or 3Qlnt. strate~ie eat1~ate1 a:tld 1nt.e,._ p~•t-tiona. Tho ~•n'tr'al Int4ll1~•nG• 1~•nof baa O.•n 

e11tabl1sh•4 lar0 e11 as a r.a.il i ot \be f&arl Kal'b.ol' Invoatt~atlon to provid• aut'"'l0~1~at1Y• natt~nal 1n\•1• l.1~~e.ioe, •••o.f.allJ' :Or tbe iat1onal .::eouri\1 aounou. ll't 

addttior1, two &&enolos ot tbe lo.tnt oiw..r1 or St4t.t are 

speolt1eat17 cb.arc,.ed wlth the g;.~e)attation o.t." Jolnt intel.• 1.~~nlce ••it.tee. Th• ot.t!cial naie•nt ot the t'w'lc•tona 

ot th• Jotnt lntelllaenM Co•1•t•• locl..a.'tec the .tollcnrln&t 

-f 81' SE6fft: f-
fllllSUJltl • REF ID:A61152 

lif liBB 

*De l.S.\ Ja••ll.ia•n• O...S.•he• aeaietod 1>7 

n. Jes.at .z.t.ntaenoe O.Oup at.ad •••mmt,kea, 

lit "•on•lltl• so tbtt lotat Cbl•t• o' St.t.t tot 

•a, Int•..,.'• 1'1'6111&•aee noe1ftd tl-o1n al.l •v•1 _, PNPAr8 Jo1at 1n'6ll~•n• •nS.t•• fer the lo.f.ni otd.at• or atat.r 

mll ti.tr Mt>Of'ttoc ag.-aol••• 

Q.) Aa dtne•e« b7 tbe Jotn.t CbS.te ol at.arr. 

(2) Ae t"~\uitt;ed '1 •h• t'>infto)IO or the 

loU-t ablt, 

(3:) Aa :raqueate4 b7 otfba •&••let ot tbe 

Joh• Cht..•.fa or sta.t.t, 0J1 

(4) o.a it• ... Ud.tlall••·· 

la •\\fP<>rt o:t '1l1a, -. lolm; lnt.U~.._ Qfroup oL ._ Josa• atat.t .ta •ha••*' •1~ lh• 1'bUft'l.Qi .amo."1911111 

•!!»Joint lalell!.o•ne• 3N"IP• ..tel*' the d.U.o,1on 

or t;~ I>.Pll'J' D1no'1R .tor ~UllJ,.puo•• Wbo ta 

&la.c. 4 -'bO Of \bit 110 ant aet• ta t:lM a-her1h4 

•Jl&'ber 1n P••nttn.;; WMt aP'fttaP •ttadi•• to ti. Coaait•••• 

•t.,. boourea JAhllJ.4•a.• tor the JobD 1iatt. 

-.., lns•antea J.t.lt•lll..i•• Pfilae1n4 ,mm al.l 

WOlQ.'••• and pr.pa•• .totn't lntellig•n• •nlaaieat 

(1) Aa 1n1\1ated •mt •••tc;ne4 l>J '2w :t>1nof;e:P •l tM Join\ atatt;r 

ca) •• d!Peoted b)' \ti. loin la'•llipn• e..in. •• 

($) A• requeat•4 'b7 ••h•r lo.bl\ Btatt sro\tP•• or 

<•> OA it..• ~*11 1r.d.,1a1d.Y•• an4 

(6} la aoOOH w1\h tbe .Pl'leitie1 that; 11111' b9 

••tabl.S.ah•4: bJ the ifl,r9'o o~ t;M Jebt 

Aif•t.t.• ... --1 
REF ID:A61152 • • 

ltf.JfAfti! 

6. As m •• qu••tlbn ~r 41•1•1-n ot Napona1'bt11t7 1~• the ••••• et 1tl\9111J•no• •d1-te1 alltl 1nt•1"Pl'ftt•tiofta• 

ill• 5at1oiial l•OU71•7 l'4ir 1peottl••ll7 Ja"o•S..• \bat •ta. 

4•JKPi•m a ..a other •&•r?•l•• ot tbe Sov•,....ntt flhall 

eont11l• to o•ll••!t •ftlua1f•1 ool'Nlat.. **1 d1••-n.tnaw 

d.•P@r-\-.ntal tn\elll(;•n•• • Jll •J>Pon or t:b.1.•, the a\at._n, et .,._.lt.ou ol •tw ...._. FOPMa •at 'he lot..nt. Gbteta of 

Sta.rt 1 • appr:io••d by \1- i're•l&lat on AP•11 11. 19'8t 

n1pw.a\•• upl.1o1UJ 'thai Mob S.nlo• •ball •provide an 

Ot:\ian1.a,1on ._,,.-bl• or t\alrrilah~ atequat•• \Sl&elft ad 

nliabl • 1n,elllgen09• .ro-r tut S.n1•• !'hta la tit 

retopltloa ot a ba•l• J>l'itlc1ple ol lODG atan41D6,t tu• 

.lnt..111.e.enoe 1• a tUa••io.n or ...-a1. 

L ln vin or-. ~:r.t.>01' .taet•• lhe •l• ot tbt 

d1-4ftettl ot ti. C.:liSIDO ,.,.r b&• bMn to ••ta"bl16 an 

a.tenoy •itbln tll» ham.e1r0vdl ot u1•11• law aa4 •xeeut1Y• 

••attea tb&t •ould •••tn al.H ... d7 \\.Ublt•d &...>•rtolee 1n tba p•toruac• ot tbtlr i.,i.-,. tunot1ou, rather than 

io npl•oe auob ageno1•• or aaaume tM1P Napo11atbUi1'l••• 'Tbla• l belt.T•• ha• O..n the 'bat1o oou•p1i beblnd coNstDO 

$.ild la bo1"Jle od bJ' \b• pNasnt•tl-on 0£ the draft Cv.ISD>O 

pa_p•l" •J.• a"t •• •'7th lit•\~ or V.iGD. 1M 41ao'Gll at1u1oh.:4 t.o t;U. ean (1M tnoloavo l'} 1• ....,.U.ui.••17 1llua~~b1v• et \hi• prtno1P1•• 

•• Incl••~ l 4"11• at • .,. 1•*'6'21 v,port d1•1elon or 

reapon1tr;tltt1 •l•h r••J>O•• to the .toUI' px-lAdpl• ~•1• 

11.tienoe .t\tftotlona and depl Mt•• the taet tha' a a•pantlon 

or •P•i1••1on ot •••taln ot the• ,tltnolioaa 1a o:tlit•apl&M4• 1 •ntn~ It 11 Sllportant to dt1'tlv uiatlaotlona. PbJ'aieal 

•P•l'•t1on lt oue tb!»g1 and e•pant1on or oonti;o1 ~u.lte 

AllOthiU'• A• ... 41100.,.Ntt _.~ tn. ,..._. th9 •• .. :ntlal 

th1l16 nc. to TM'•• e.loN pb7steal relat1oatb1pa b-eWeen ~·)¥ tft p1'*'04uc•:r• and th• 111tull1genoe paoplo Wbo PN-•• 

the pHduot. Ct>Mil'f ~ re~arU••• o:t how t.ponant it 1•• 

'o•• not etAM al.3ne• attd ll\ttt be oo11•k4 wltb o•he• 

roma ot bltellS.•nH. lt 'WtHAd •PP••• tba\ e!tbei- all 

other m••lll4•nc• _,, b• oolla••d un4aw t;JMIIT au~b.o1"1*1• 

o~ all C:h:IU1 11\Ult be oollat•d wid.•~ lnt•llt.a-nee •utho~\1• 

l'hc id.al att.r~e=.ent, aa •• 41•ooveroa kt \l'JAt ••V7• arid 

\U.\d•» •b.1ch .. ha•• o&l'1'1e4 on operation• •1~h ~11t1e4 

auc.••••• l. s ~o bave tnt. ooll.atil')t\ tll• ma1nt41tt•d Jo1ntl7 

.... . VI ~~J 
REF ID:A61152 • 

l'i7 tbe C·J JJ.tlll' people and 'bt Inte llig•noe peopl.•• lto4w t~ia •:r•\•i:.- 'he Intol11~onee .,.opl• •'1PP17 all $he s•nt"1 

1ntoll1.u.•nc• \o \be .n.1._,. .ntt tbtt ·-;oxzn people nppl1 coia~t. 'lb\u• 'tna.t • 11n&l.• ru. la M\lu.h-•4 aot tqp11-.-

t 1an ot ettort ta avo14•4• 1'hl•• I i11'ad•l"•t&Micl• l• t;M 

Utt•~·~-' ooa~pl&\$d tb• COi:!IOO. 

'I• ln-1.0amte J. e.US!.rtes in a\a.11 CHA't41n 1nkl.~~8l'tH 

tW2ot1ona •bl#h must be ;:er!'Qitm•d• To 'b•'.1.l1 witt., 1 b~lte.... tbat 11 1• •Jl'l"Oneoua to ••1 that Y1rtQllJ.l7 DO 

na1utt1on ot eOtJ;tMT l• r.tiu1,..e4. »:r. &ledrlaft baa taU•« 

•o lllt.Jift a 41at1n••lon ~•twe~n ~ &Olll"OI et tater .. pt•4 

NtU!4.,.' e and tll01r 40.nlent. l\ la tttue ihat th• •Ta'J.Wltton 

or tho a.:narCM ot "'.;)~!IT !a no~lJ peStl0l'll04 bf the o.i.r.tft 

•.:. unt1ta• and ia la.rc1e11 au1.0J1&tt•• Th• eftluat.ton tl-1' t.i.. 

oon\on'• ot •••~fa 1s qu1te aao~.,,. .P"l>l• ad 1\. la 

tar &om a.aw•t1o, ln tho •• o:t 41j)101Mt1e OIMlll.Unloat.J.0118 in pa~1nlar1 •• cntt 7t7lor Qrus• e.ptl1 a\atoJ• 9 the •utbent1olt7 o.f ~ 1.nrl)"a'lon M~• 1°1'0~ •• 

ftorMt• JQ.OUtb an.-.ostl.7 art.• latoma\1on Ob\ain.e.4 tJ!rOe 

plain ••d •••as••• •• •e !"taw l••r.•• nqube• a T&•t 

.._"'10,mt ot ••aluetilott aat't Mr'J)'!alat1ott ~- lb4t f.nt•llit;euoo 

point ot "Vin btrtf<Jn 1t b•e~"'t~f ~ft.il 31 lnt•ll~•n•• 

G., A• tor 'h• •tt•r of' d:llf$Pb1St1.on1 1t Sa obrloua t~..-t s o•ntJ!&lized tnt~ i: t..;~n1N a,r;e13ey •uon •• Ot1:13mo 

eau ~1.41.y (o •o tar in tbf* ~tstrlbution ot 1\e pl'Oduot. lt 1& ol••r tl'o~ ltitl.O&\U''* t that t~ dbec• an4 l9C191d 

•nlM ot opera,tc:mel eom~11nde 1• tont•111lat:ed1 "'tltl47"3 _.h 

•• •• f'ltS..-n noown4s • »1•-1Ml1011 wS.tbJ.n oonaandt 

aat bfJ a l\meUott 9r ~nd. Onl.7 a ~••i- ot an 

O}htrat1cn i• !:n • poat.tton to deteNtne what tbroee w1$1'11n 

hie ooarmand •b.ou.14 aud •bould not r.oeiY• ••lain in.ton&• 

•tor.. I thlak cut • mvat ne-.er 1N• ·~' qr •i. taot that 1nte111a•noe 11 tM a~\ oz ...-ltd. -4 not doe 

.,. ..... 

t. l MlUM t'bat Otl!iSlDO Will 1M no be"4lll• nm! 

...,,. .. , 'tbalt ll1 d1Hd1oa. Tb d.1Het1 ... lt ..... to • 1 leawa ..,i.e NOil rtw Mff:lO:PMnl 1l'l tU17 d1roet1on tba~ e1•ouu•an•a me.7 requ.1Htt Like all • ....,.,, or 

ttll• t~. '' ,. at oen • O°"P:c'QalR Gd. t• la boa '° 

" a "•~• lMoau•• 411'.teMnt; tnt•11••'• ._, o. •n•4• 

coauoo •1 .,, be ld•al tro11 uq .. poin't of'..,...., b•• 

f8Ptitbitl 
.. REF ID:A61152 

I belt••• tt 1a a 4eE1n1t• atep in the right direction, ana 

until tn. leaal reapon11bil1t1ea ot the ••••ral depai-tmenta and &t'.';tr.u:sies ot the Go••~ent invol••d &1'• re.olved~ it 11 

probabl7 •• rar a1 •• oan p •' \hi• t1•• 

10.. .A.1 with an7 la•• it 1• ltapo:rtan• t;o read ttbe 

document in the light o~ ~he atudiea and 41aouaa1on1 tha' 

l•d up to it in order that • pro.,_P 1nterprelat1on of lta 

nrioua part1 u7 be ar1*1'f'ed at. Thette an aol!U) p~JJll\8•• 

whiob. oould undoubtodl.7 be olar1.tJ.ed.; however. aa 1ou w1ll 

ftcall we were not paX'tie• to tho d.ra.rting, but ••l'• ma»el7 

peaitted. to oomm.ent &om the ;o1nt or rln ot ANA' a ~•sponatb1lit1••• Rtspon•1b1lit1 lbr the eatabli•bment ot COISID~ prop•rl7 lies with th• lntelliganoe Dlr$otora. It 

ma,- b• well to pcu1a tthea• oommexita on to them a1 .r•pre.-nt;ing the vine or an tnd1rldu.•l with a lons: and outatand1ng record 1n the tield o:t CO~UN2. Vndoubteiil7 aome et the 

point& wbioh 14r. .F.l'iedman aia.1 a,_.e well 1'U.n~ buts I believe 

th.at the Qaaic objeot1voa ot OOISIDO muat be Choro1J6bl.7 

olar1t1ed before an7 rad1cal cha.nge 11 mad• in 1ta organ1• zat1on or tunntiont• in other 1r0rd•1 1' l'IU8t be ol.e~l7 

underatood whether the aim 1a to tao111tat• the operations 

ot a&•no1ee al:re-ady eatabll~h&d and l•aAtlly eha.ra•d with the 

respon•1b111t7 ot maJd.ne intellii;eno• eatimat•e• er whether 

1t la to eft Up a new agency tor thi• P'W'POM • 

2 ln.oloa~ea 

l ~'fop Saerei ~•:O i""rom n.1. :l'riedman 

dtd 3 Jan SO, sw.>J$Ct aa above. 

8 • l'HHn.tat1on ot Uratt 00li8IDO 

lap•is ('O'SCIB ae/1). 

,.,. 

•StUHti 
2 

3 

4 

FROM NAME OR TITLE 

ORGANIZATION AN :OCATI 

CIRCULATE 

CONCUR 

REN CE 

F'IJ..E 

INF'ORMATION 

NECESSARY 

ACTION 

NOTE AND RETURN 

SEE ME 

SIGNATURE 

TELEPHONE 

~~-\y.. ~W~D~A~G~0~f0~R~M~--.;,;;;;._ __ .._,~----------------1-e--4-b4-87---l--U __ s_GO-V~ER-NM-EN-T-PR-IN_T_ING_O_F_flC;-

1 JUN 1:J<lS 895 
v 

SubJect Comments on latest dreft directive for CONSIDO 

Reference (a) USCIB 26/2 ? Dec 49, Establishment of CONSIDO 

1. Although comments on reference (a), the latest draft 

directive setting up a CO~SIDO, were not requested, I am taking the liberty of submitting herewith some personal views thereon 

for such consideration or action as you deem appropriate. 

2. a In my opinion, reference (a) overlooks one of the 

most important recommendations of the Final Report of the Joint 

Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 

Attack. It is possible that the draft is intentionally general in certain places, or that I fail to read it correctly, or miss 

certain implications therein which I should grasp But I would 

be derelict in my duty if I let fear of a possible failure to 

read correctly, or a possiole obtuseness in seeing supposedly plainly present implications interfere with setting forth my own 

comments, basing the latter upon an earnest desire to be 

constructive. 

b Reference (a) is of exceptional importance and I 

feel that its wording should leave no room for anything to be 

understood by implication, background information, or expressed 

or unexpressed intention of its sponsors I have, therefore, 

studied it with these desiderata in mind and submit my comments 

on the basis only of what the document actually says--not on 

what may have been intended to be implied. 

3. It is noted that reference (a) bears the date 7 December 

1949, the month and day of which are symbolic. Eight years have 

passed since the disaster at Pearl Harbor, almost five years have gone by since the Joint Congressional Investigation was 

launched, and four years have passed since Admiral King suggested 

to General Marshall (letter 2 Oct 45) that a centralized unit be 

established at least for Joint evaluation and dissemination of 

strategic non-operational intelligence Still, as of this date, 

we have no such unit -- not even a single, effective, unified 

agency for the evaluation, interpretation and dissemination of 

strategic, non-operational intelligence to protect us against the 

possibility of another Pearl Harbor. And the agency which is now 

proposed would, I feel, be weak and ineffective because it would 

be hampered by restrictions 1 complications, conflicts, and 

ambiguities which are the inevitable results of divided 

,-op SECRET 
REF_ID:A61152 ..,, 

-.·op SECRE 

MEMORANDUM FOR Capt Wenger, 3 Jan 1950 

responsibility Such a unit might fail us in an emergency 

4 The foregoing remarks and the attached comments all 

fall under the category of destructive criticism I feel that 

I should offer some constructive criticism, too, and by way of 

such criticism would say that a few significant changes in the 

draft directive could be made which would eliminate its present weaknesses Principally, the elimination of divided responsibility would improve it immeasurably and enable the Department of Defense 

to forge in its Comint operations a powerful weapon for national 

security. 

Inclosure - l 

<kJ;11JA1111 

WILLIAM F 

~~~ FRIEefMAN 

Chief, Technical Division 

TOP qECRET 
REF.D:A61152 ~ 

,-op seeRE'T 

Comments on P~oposed Consido Directive of 7 Dec 49 

(USCIB 26/2) 

1. a The Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, after months of hearing aad study of 

millions of words of testimony, brought out a report embodying in 

Part V thereof certain 11 Conclusions and Recommendations 11 (p 251). 

b. Under "Conclusions" (p 252) there apoears the following. 

11 11 The Intelligence and War Plans Division of the 

War and Navy Depa~tments failed 

(a) to give careful and thoughtful consideration 

to the intercepted messages • an£. to raise a_question 

as to their significance Since Lthe message§/ indicated 

a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this 

intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with 

other information available to them, in making their 

estimate of the situation. 

(b) to be properly on the qui vive to receive the 

•• intercept and to recognize in the message the fact 

that some Japanese military action would very possibly 

occur somewhere at 1 p.m., December 7 If properly appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a 

dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this info~mation, as General Ma~shall attempted to do 

immediately on seeing it. 11 

c. Both foregoing subparagraphs deal with and point up the 

importance of proper interpretation and dissemination of intelligence. 

d. The Committee made but five "Recommendations" (p 252-3), the second of which begins with the following significant sentence. 

11 That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies La order to avoid the pitfalls of 

divided res onsibilit which ex erience has made so 

abundantly apparent Emphasis supplied 

\ 

e. The serious consequences of divided responsibility in any field of military operations needs little comment Divided responsibility in the interpretation and dissemination of COMINT may be especially serious 

2. a Tne proposed directive purports to establish a 

11 Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, Department of 

,-ep seeRE'T 
REF.D:A61152 ~ 

-roP SEGRET 

Defense 11 But the sort of CO~SIDO that would be established under it 

would neither be a consolidated unit nor would it have authority to 

disseminate to the users of Comint any final product, except as a 

purely mechanical act dictated by other agencies. It is true that 

the draft directive appears to give CONSIDO certain dissemJnation fu~ctions but, as these comments Will show, the dissemination authority of' CONStDO is quite limited. 

b There are four final steps in the Comint operation which 

are usually regarded as intelligence functions and which are of such 

a nature that they are most efficiently conducted 11 under the same roof' 11 

They are (1) evaluation, (2) collation, (3) interpretation, and 

( 4) dissemination - But in the draft directive CONSIDO is assigned only the first two functions, the last two remain the responsibilities of the Directors of Intelligence The separation of evaluation and 

collation from interpretation and dissemination is an artificial one 

from a technical point of view, it represents a serious division of 

responsibility in performing functions which technically belong together This primary division in responsibility is bad enough, but 

on examining it further, it is found that there is an even more 

serious division of responsibility in respect to the interpretation end dissemination functions The function of interpretation remains 

divided among the Directors of Intelligence in the three Services, 

with the attendant risk of having different and conflicting inte~pretatio~s reach field commands. Tne function of dissemination is also 

split three wa1s among the Directors of Intelligence in the three 

Services, with the attendant risk that dissemination to those field com~anders who should have the Comint will not be expeditious and 

efficient. Many persons whose long eYperience in this field has given opportunity to observe the different methods which have been tried 

feel that the separation of the various steps involved ia crypt- analytic processing from the last four steps of evaluation, collation, 

interpretation and dissemination has been an artificial and technically unwise seg~egation And now not only is that original separatioa maintained but an additional splitting is proposed in what should be 

a streamlined operation embracing at least the last four steps All 

in all, the arrangewents proposed for performing the four interrelated functions are alarmingly reminiscent of the defective arrangements that were at least in part responsible for the disaster of 

? Dec. 1941 at Pearl Harbor. The draft directive will now be taken 

up paragraph by paragraph. This will involve a certain amount of 

unavoidable repetition in these comments. 

3 a. Par 1 of the draft directive states that the purpose of establishing CONSIDO is two-fold. It is to provide for (a) 

placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation 

of the AFSA product and (b) the maintenance of liaison between AFSA 

2 

-roP SEGREl. 
REF~D:A61152 ~ 

,-op SEGRE 

and the consumer agencies 11 in connection with the functions and 

responsibilities outlined in paragraph 3 below. 11 The specific and 

rather pointed omission of any reference whatsoever to interpreta- tion and dissemination in this parsgraph makes it clear that the 

draft di~ective contemplates that CONSIDO is not to do any interpret- ing or disseminating It is tr~e that the draft directive (Par 3e 

(5)) authorizes CONSIDO 11 to prepare and disseminate information 

summaries, studies, and reports based on the product of AFSA, 11 and 

11 to prepare and disseminate such other summaries, studies and reports 

as the JIC may aut.horize and direct." Although the preparation of 

such summaries, etc , is very important, such a function is not a 

primary one for a CONSIDO and it is not deemed necessary to establish 

a special unit for this purpose It can and has been done to a 

limited extent in the past by the Comint processing people, and 

with the establishment of AFSA this sort of work will be facilitated. 

Also, while the paragraph in question authorizes dissemination, 

Par 3g(4) insures that dissemination by CONSIDO itself stops at 

tne doors leading to the precincts of the Directors of Intelligence 

b Let us consider the stated first purpose, namely, that 

of providing for placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation of the AFSA product. In the document itself 

evaluation is defined as 11 the process of determining the credibility and accuracy of information and of eliminating irrevelant and unreliable matter from further consideration. 11 First, as to 

11 credibility, 11 it may be said that the AFSA product requires very little or no evaluation to determine credibility with respect to 

whether the encrypted message contains what the cryptanalyst says it contains. Tne AFSA product does not represent the fruits of 

guess work, nor is it comparable to the alleged 11 decipherments 11 

certain amateur cryptanalysts put forth in support of their 

enthusiasm for Baconian euthorship of Shakespeare's wo.cks. The 

word 11 cred1bil1ty, 11 as used in the definition, must therefore refer 

to a question as to whether what the message says is believable or 

not. It is obvious that to a large degree the AFSA product requires little evaluation to determine this sort of credioility, because as 

a general rule the information comes 11 right out of the horse's 

mouth" and car.cies its own stamp of authenticity Of course, the 

exceptional diplomatic message that is reporting something that 

somebody else said, saw, did, heard, etc., undoubtedly requires some 

sort of weighing to determine credibility of the report. And there 

are plenty of cases in st.cictly military Comint which may require similar evaluation. This sort of evaluation can only be fruitful 

by comparing the specific message with other messages. Further, 

the cryptanalyst is the only person who can realistically weigh the difference between the 11 probable 11 and the 11 sure 11 meaning when 

any such a case arises Since the Comint processing people have 

3 

Tep SEGRE-r 
REF.D:A61152 ~ 

'TOP SEGRE,-

access to all the messages, they can and usually do make this sort 

of determination of credibility. As for eliminating so-called 

11 irrelevant 11 and 11 unreliable 11 matter, it is not often that military Comint contains 11 irrelevent matter, 11 unless by this expression is 

meant the casting aside of messages which are of so little intelligence value as not to warrant their translation in whole or even in 

part The processing agencies have usually done this sort of 

eliminating themselves, with a small amount of assistance by personnel of intelliwence staffs As regards the elimination of 

11 unreliable matters,' this has already been disposed of in connection with the determination of credibility To sum up, Comint re- qui~es little evaluation such as other intelligence usually needs, 

and when required the evaluation generally is part and parcel of the 

Comint processing. 

c. With regard to collation, here again the Comint 

processing people must do a job on a continuing basis. Their collation usually restricts itself to comparing one message with 

another from the same or other sources of Oomint. But this may be 

only half of the collation process. The other half consists in 

comparing Comint with info£mation from non-Comint sources, and this 

can perhaps best be done by intelligence staffs. But the Comint 

processing people must of necessity often conduct research relating 

to this half of collation as an integ~al part of processing, e.g., the use of information on disposition and operations of our own 

as well as enemy forces as an aid to solution. In any case, it 

appears clear that collation belongs with evaluation and that both 

are often part and parcel of the Comint processing. There ap~ears 

to be no need to set up a special office particularly for these 

functions, unless it is also given th• interpretation and dissemination functions, which are closely related to evaluation and 

collation. 

d. According to the draft directive, when Consido has 

finished the evaluation and collation processes connected with 

strategic or tactical Comint, its wor~ is done. This in my opinion re~reseats a major shortcoming of the directive, because while tge ostensible purpose in initially proposing the establishment of a 

CONSIDO was to streamline all steps in evaluating, collating, interpreting, and disseminating Comint, the sort of CO~SIDO the 

draft directive would estabJish would fall far short of the goal. For en a~tificLal delay is inJeoted near the terminal stage, since 

the final CONSIDO product must be filtered more or less slowly through three more separate off ices outside CONSIDO for interpreta- tion and decision as to dissemination and then come back to CONSIDO 

for transmission Later on, more Will be said on this point. 

4 

'TOP SECRET 
REF ID:A61152 

• e i-ep SECRET 

e. The second stated purpose of CONSIDO is to provide for 

certain liaison It is to be inferred from this that the liaison 

in question is now non-existent, or poorly conducted This is not 

the case, for the indicated liaison has been carried on fairly effect1vel1 for a number of years between the COMINT producing agencies and the Intelligence Staffs of the Military Departments, the Department of State, the CIA, and the FBI To establish a 

special or sep~rate agency fo~ such a purpose is merely to interpose a needless echelon. 

4. a. Par. 3, Functions and Responsibilities, combines in 

one long paragraph tne functions and responsibilities of CONSIDO, 

the JIC, the Services, and AFSA. The successive subparagraphs will 

be briefly reviewed 

b Pars 3a,3b and 3c, appear to be satisfactory. Subpar. 3d sets forth the functions and responsibilities of the JIC Subpa.!'. 3d(l) and (2) appeer to be satisfactory But subpar 3d(3) gives the 

JIC authority to establish CONSIDO's at the headquarte~s of unified 

commands and at such other commands ae 1nay be designated by the JCS. 

Since the draft Qirective gives CONSIDO only evaluation and collation 

functions, and since there will in peacetime presumably be very little 

COMINT processing at such unified commends, to establish CONSIDO's - at such commands appears to be superfluous. Even in war time it is 

doubtful whether there would be a need for OO~SID0 s of this type at 

unified com~ands. If, however, CONSIDO had specific responsibility for interpretation and dissemination, there would be a real need for 

branch offices of the Washington OONSIDO at the headquarters of 

unified commands 

c Par. 3e sets forth the functions and responsibilities of the Chief of CONSIDO Subpars 3e(l) and 3d(3) give him enormous 

power and responsibilities which in a real degree would enable him 

to exercise management control over AFSA Oomint processing, without 

providing definitely stated supervisory checks and balances Under 

present arrangements, USCIB establishes certain Com1nt requirements, specifically, those derivable from the so-called 11 Jo1nt Field, 11 

viz , all systems oth~r than the strictly military, naval, and air 

systems And the draft directive (Par 3e(l)) makes the Chief of 

CONSIDO responsible 11 to insure equitable treatment in the satisfaction of the Comint requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Military Departments, the Department of State, the CIA, and the FBI 11 

But it is the responsibility of DIRAFSA to insure such equitable 

treatment. How is this conflict in jurisdiction to be resolved? 

\that about the question of divided responsibility? 

d Par 3e(2) deals "K"ith liaison 11 on all matters involving the dissemination of the product or OONSID0, 11 Par 3e(4) gives CONSIDO responsibility for the dissemination of the product of 

,.ep 5SECRET 
REF ID:A61152 

- • TOP SECRS 

CONSIDO, Par 3e(5) gives it responsibility for the dissemination 

of certain studies based on the product of AFSA. But the three Se~vlce De artments retain the res onsibilit within the De artment of Defense for the dissemination of all COMINT Par 3 4 

Here are definite conflicts, ambiguities, and divided responsibilities in respect to the fundamental purpose of the whole Comint operation. 

e Par. 3e(6) gives CONSIDO the function of providing and exercising supervision over the means of dissemination 

(SSO system?) but apparently CONSID0 1 s part in this complicated 

arrangement for dissemination is to be pu~ely mechanical, since 

the Service Departments retain responsibility for decision and for 

the actual material to be disseminated. In essence, the effect of 

the arrangement would be to interpose a needless additional delay in getting the final Comint product to the user. 

f. Pars 3g(3) and (4) give the three Service Departments ~esponsibility, within the Department of Defense, for interpretation and dissemination of the CONSIDO product But no mechanism is 

provided to insure that a single interpretation is made, from which 

either strategic or operational intelligence could be disseminated 

in time to affect operations or, in exceptional cases, even to avoid 

disaster Especially in the case of tactical COMINT is speed in 

interpretation and dissemination of paramount importance Interpreta- tion and dissemination should be a responsibility of a single, constantly operative unit -- not of three separate units with no 

mechanism for almost instantaneously reconciling differences of 

interpretation and expeditiously disseminating the intelligence. Of course, it might be claimed that JIC could reconcile differences 

in interpretation--but it certainly could not do so expeditiously. Moreover, since there is a distinct possibility of three different 

interpretations being made of the same material, there is also a 

possibility of disseminating three different interpretations to 

the same or to different commands, with danger of disaster to all 

concerned. Here are the very pitfalls of divided responsibility which Congress has charged us to eliminate. To sum up this comment, 

I feel that the divided responsibility herein pointed out represents the fatal and outstanding weakness in the draft directive 

g It is possible that this weakness can be eliminated 

by having representatives from the intelligence staffs of the three 

Service Departments sit around the same table with the key people of CONSIDO If these representatives were given the necessary autho~ity to interpret and to disseminate for their respective Agencies, and if management control as well as technical control 

of the SSO system were made a responsibility of CONSIDO, then the 

needs of the three Services might be taken care of in an expeditious 

manner Eomwanders in the field would get d final product that 

6 

TGP SECRET 
REF ID:A61152 

~OP SECREI 

represented the unified collaboration of all people concerned in 

preparing the Comint, evaluating, colleting, interp~eting and get- ting it to where it will do the most good in the fastest time 

possible It is possible that the sponsors of the draft directive 

had exactly this sort of an arrangement in mind. But the directive 

itself is completely silent on these points. If such an arrangement is contemplated, then the document should spell it out in clear and 

unmistakable language. But such an arrangement would still not be 

very satisfactory because the authority and responsibility would 

not be centralized in one individual. The arrangement would merely place within CONSIDO at ledst three individuals, each with equal authority and each merely representing his Service Even if they would Jointly interpret and disseminate for the three Services, 

this would be only on e more or less ad hoc or voluntary basis There 

is nothing whatever in the draft directive which requires or insures that a single, joint interpretation will be made available 

simultaneously and expeditiously to several commands. Responsibility is not fixed and no mechanism is provided for this purpose. Since 

CONSIDO will in large part be staffed by representatives of these 

very Services, it would seem far better to make the Chief of OONSIDO 

responsible also for joint interpretation and dissemination for the 

three Services rather than have the functions uerformed within his 

shop by people not under his authority, or empowered only with 

authority to do so independently for each of the three Services. 

5. Reference has already been made to Par 3e(5) of the draft 

directive, which gives CONSIDO authority to prepare information 

summaries, studies and reports based on the product of AFSA This 

would be a useful function, of course, and would ~esult in the 

production of JOintly elabo~ated documents containing information 

of high strategic value The production of such studies on a joint basis has hitherto not been practicable under a situation involving decentralization and division of responsibility. Here is a good example of the advantages of centralizing authority and eliminating divided responsibility in the Comint field. If all the other functions connected with the handling of the AFSA product were similarly treated, that is, if evaluation, collation, interpretclt1on and 

dissemination were also treated so as to cent~alize authority and 

eliminate divided responsibility, the results would be even more 

important. 

6. a. I think that some of the unsatisfacto~y aspects of the 

draft directive arise from the definition 1t gives of communication 

intelligence. It is noted that Par 5e of the draft directive 

defines communication intelligence as "the intelligence information 

which is derived from the study of foreign communications." This 

is follored by a varenthetical explanation "It is to be noted 

that this definition is inconsistent with the normal differentiation betwe~n information and intelligence, but is adopted because of 

long usage." 

TOA SEGRET 

• 
I • REF ID:A61152 

- e ~OP SECRET 

b No authority is cited for the foregoi~g definition. 

As a matter of fact there is but one authoritative and governing definition of the term communtcation intelligence. It is the one 

contained in NSCID No. 9 dated 1 July 1948, Par 12b of which 

reads as follows. 

"Communications intelligence is intelligence produced 

by tne study of foreign communications Intelligence based 

in whole or in part on Communications Tntelligence sources 

shall oe considered Communications Intelligence as pertains 

to the authority and responsibility of the United States 

Communications Intelligence Board. 11 

c. According to the foregoing and only authoritative 

definition, communications intelligence is intelli~ence--not 

"information," nor even "intelligence information, as the draft 

directive would have it. 

d. However, there may be excellent ~easons for regarding AFSA' s Job in connection 'lifl. th Comint to stop Tfi th the production of 

11 informat1on11 in the form of the decrypts and translations It is 

quite possible that the remaining steps in the Oomint operation, viz the evaluation, collation and inte.!'pretation of that 11 information'1 to produce "intelligence," and the final step of dissemination, 

had best be conducted by intelligence staffs But then all four of 

these should be integrated and conducted as a Joint intelligence operation, with responsibility centralized and definitely fixed. 

I think that in this way and only in this way can the Oom1nt opera- tion as a whole be conducted effectively and in a manner that will 

best meet the urgent needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Military Departments, the Department of Defense, the Department of 

State, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. Comint that will be of highest importance to the 

national security can, in my opinion, be evaluated, collated, 

interpreted, and disseminated expeditiously only as a fully streamlined, unified, centralized, and joint operation. 

9FGP0 SECRET 
REaID:A61152 

-

TOP SEGREl 

USCIB 26/2 

7 December 1949 

MEIDRANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF USCIB 

Subject Presentation of Draft CONSIDO Paper. 

1. For purpose of record it is requested that this sheet be attached as a cover to "Appendix 

A - Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense" which 

was distributed at the Forty-seventh Meeting of USCIB, 

2 December 1949 and considered under Item 7 of the 

agenda. 

2. The attached receipt covers copies of 

the Enclosure (Appendix A) distributed at the above 

meeting. 

USCIB: 26/2 

/s/ H. D. Jones 

H. D. JONES 

for P. J. KARL 

Secretariat, USCIB 

TOP SECRET 

GOPY 

(1) !o produce oa1 I ruJoa.tia 1.Atelllgwe hat 

OOXUl't NW aa'flerial IDt 1:e l'ae au.oh intelli• 

1w 1'1~ rn&m LilOru.tlaa 

no-.t;;a'.•0Ul'09••* <•PWla aupplW) 

(I) !1ta expnaaion 1lte .tue a.m in.t.llig...,. '91.th ,_... 

ti:atmt ooll&teral intoraat1cm ncaiwd. he ot'bil!' anroea• i• oal7 uother. 

-1 PH•1bly better. ~ at aying ._ tat.grate .uah 5.ntellipnc• 111th 

brtel.11g91H pnrrided to -t1w Jebtt ChiU-a f4 •tatt bT tu f.n"Mlligenoe 

.Wt• or the Senioaa.• 

(I) !henflore. the dr&tt di!'eetift nest onq ukea proyiaion 

for tho operation 11fhiolt th• n ••o ...... hu not Hen proYlded ror, 'bat 

..,.. broa4cts tu aoope 't4 i;blt.t operation 'by iapcahtg u 111d taticm upon 

the •other scurcct•• ~ Sltfonnat1on. 

(tr) The- oonttm:t1on cmpletel7 o...-loob tiOt only the paraigraph quoted in Par. 1o(l) abow but alao the roll.Olf1ngt 

(a) Par. lb(l){b)(ii} ~ the ~~ •tutti• 

•(u) r::z•tion ~other aour• i.nt.llifti• wttb 

COlllft - b• &ntt&Ga. !hi proo8•• apnq,. for 

t'ilea 

ii'jp&Uit)'\!o 

or iutel ligmce 

purpo 

J'epl)rte 

... , aut 

'frail 

ubltain. 

all •o~•. 

~ 

fhe 

aiDgle ....:tuating unit., tbroup th• oell&Wral filea 

or the proce.aa1ng ~. •uld haw direct .-c.eaa 

t-o the mat.rial trm otbar 1.Jxte1lipnoe aourcu. na1r 

.. ~ately held by e&Oli ,;f G'.i 'P!w11tttl ... s;r. •• • 

(ls) Par. Ta(I) ot the Draft DS.r1'Ct1w1 

•(&)To maintain eloae liaiaon with the JCS aad tha 

Ia.tel lipnoe m. Ti•iona o~ t1e reaptrii w 891"'t'iau , bl a.11 ma.tten inTOl T.tng -the 4i•Md.nt.ticm or aoh 

httel11g8d an4 the eatabli•hnn.t ot pr1oriti•• 

th ... 1n. - wll u tho&• la'l'al~ 1'!'!!12J'_.:!!!t ot 

•oll..Wi-&1: Iii1'onl&Uon !i&i tt. ~ource.. , 

4,. !be ~ongoing is M.lttioient to indicate that t1wa r .. ona 

o1te4 in Pai-. a o-r tM D ._o an no't .a:lid. !.bat ~ al.ao cc:apl.Wly dianprtta the content. ot Pan. lb(l) and l'b(4) of 'tlw Start 

Btuq ~ 'th• dratt dinotiw. Wot; ~ is iategn.tion ot 

COllift with other aouroes ~ idtalllg~tt ~Yided tar. 1ntt elfiom 

and "T would 'M £!!!lztlrw4 tar the detailed reucma po out lnl&l'P f!f&dipu:&giap ••ticned. 

t. a. llet«n"iJ:J.g to Far. b ot the D ..,. the fint olauae or the 

tint amt-.o• 'thereof' ia alao a categorical atat.eut ~ted by 

'the t.ota, u 1'111 be shown a.t cmoe. 

2 
,,. J.t JrMent ........ Uatelligmae atatta la ... of. 

a.n:s..a .. •11 .. tu 'b ~-t or ........ th• cu. "lndJ there .. -., ~ mit. til -.oh ot .._ .wt• u ,.....,.. Qtft'• (1) Giii 

ii11IOii 

~ 

• IJiflf rliW •&i'Ll. rn•&. an4 4!atlldat. it., -· la ....... 11hOl9 ••l>C"IJ tJt...r-... .--to the ~o prooeaatug agenciHJ (I) thoaa wtd.ob 4o not h&w fllllT o~ wtth OOEft raw _.rW. JllnlMn or the n.nt tJpt or .S.t _.. authorl.l'ed and olend. 

tor 1-411DI wrtain ~at 111 a a rcr tntt1•• that tobac mt:o .. or 

'belm:tgiag wl:ttbt~ '*" oad.!tg Olds or the COJl.tft nala. 1Nt .abent ot the 

nOOlld 1:fpe ot -.tt are ,..S.tw t.e -.ce in onlJ' & 1......, tnttS.ot 

re.ting ~ hlto .. COKillf rwala. 

•• !be d....rt d.irectiw Mbe no ohanp wha.t4rt'w in ih• foroagoillg 

napaot. !he 1ntmt ot the direotiw i• •_,.lT :to 'bri\:r~\81,., 

et Ant a mast!=-4 abow to..__. i&f,. ifii 7 

S -• &I Slii'Iifiwa \Iii ~ ~ aet1nts... !h1a 

would plaoe 'thm olon to the •ource ot tb9 COllIIT nw ~. anti -- ti.a WOl"k hwamiaul.J' M & sillgle ._., ua4er um.t1ec! 4ireotioa,. 

a. a. t.taTiJlg -to Pai-. o or the D -.m. tm 4...rt direotiw proTi&\M br the ..tabU.._t, of .. OOJ'SXDO in ~ It also pl'Olidell 

tor tba eatablialaeat ot. aiaile.r omon iD. lotat ~- Tlwl*etor.. 

to • .,. that *the dratt 41J"ect1Te Ml• to pr"O'l'1c1e rs tta .,.at Uom 

•• ~ OOJII'ft i'll eupport ot the ....m !\motions or ttse leni• Dapart- ..W ... tor the attataotion ot Tltll operatioaal requirenmb or .......... 1n theat.ra ot Mn.bat• 1• not .i, UIBl'atT&l1ted but al.so the 

d&tcmt owrloo'bt Pars. lb(l) .m (2) or 1:h. statt Btu4J'.._ dealing nth Bt'f'ioi~ -4 TiMlirl' u wll u Ptr. ?a(T} w1 Par. Tb of' the dnft wwww: !he laS: .. worth quot!Dgt 

(l) ~-. fa.('1} ot * .. ~ ~noti;t!,• 

•(7) To aeroi• g..-.1 auperY!aia OYe2" the apeoial. 

aptam tor the elactr1cal iz'anadp1oa or .. iotellipnoe to !beater ~ -1 to tmonlah thl 

1llztB ~ mch -.tmi.a1 ror --.U.aaiaa,. aooord.Sng 

to pri.oritiee ditt&mined by the Chief"• OOISIDG-1flmlilcm>I. • 

(1) Pw. f'b ot the drat"t Gireotlwa 

"b. ftie reapca»ibili ti.es of a COlfll'.DO •....tnc • Joint 

fbeaad will in geeral be aia:f.lar • t'hoa• outline4 

ta aubplncraph a abaft. tta pl"!.1toipill. ~pozw1bi11:tJ 

is (1) to ....:i.uato. p~l .. c..'h,, eel diuemi•t• oammuni .... 

ti.a iatelli&tD!Mi 'buel UJ}Oll COllift l'8' •at.rial f'umiahe4 

'by th• loce.l e~e prooea•ing ag..,.. -1 (I) to 

ti...S.Dllte ix> tippropr'!.ate apnotn 1'11ltd.n the 'fbe&ter:1 

u authorisotl ly t.i. JCS• auob o--.ml.oation ilrtellig.,_ 

u 111 t0l"lll\r4e4 'bf' COISino...a8BllftOI.," 

I 

'IT@~ ~~@00~1f 
b • .U to the 4ratt 4i"4t1w -..Sng ODllIDC-WA.SltIWG!OK R.bordlnate to 'the DJncltor. Al'M4 r..... '-uri.\7 Agway. ad. therw'b7 re-

..,.mg 1-t .rn. th• hltellig.,.. •hal.n or t'tMt l'ats.oaal Jf.llitary Bsta:blish.-

.-r.d:• t1- ~oUCRdng may be •aith 

(1) 1&en i• ._. u noh mtit,- u • •iatelligence chain 

or ... 1'aticmal Milita.r.y- Betablia>awrt.• .l'\£?H'ltt tber• I.re a.t laut 

thn• *!rm• ohd.11.a. ~ to tt1e ree ..p.r.i. wee •• !Iii •i&r&iiit 01 a. •iql• •;t.utel.U.gmoe oh&1a or the •uonal Kilitary 

'lsta'blia'.bact" i• oD8 Of tl:le ~t a.Sas ot th• 4r1Lt't; directive. 

(%) It 1a not Uildentood ~tu t'ult'illaent ot the COlttft 

neeu o~ oCIGlllJldenr ill tllatera ot ot8b&t ~'be jeopanli.sed 'b1' aakbag 

OOl'SIDO-'DSIX?IGTOI aubordinAW to th6 Dinctor,. AP8l ai.nce not onlJ' i• 

the latter to bo aaaided by a. cfsputi)t trt.a nob. ot tl» Sen!cea but Ala.ct 

the c1ra.tt directiTtt in PN-. 2b parori.4-• th..t *for the purpoaea or aaaist-

~ 

ing hia (t:he Chi.et. C011SlrJO-DSJD'.mTOll) !».-.cm.ting hi• t'ancticma 1n 

oeat.m!e&tion itttelligenoe be 1til.1 h&n & deptrl;J' troll. each~ 

t.he s.nicea.• 

(8) brewr., U it ia 4e-..d inad"1ahle to l.llaD 001'81D0-

11'ASBlEfOI nbordin&te to the l)inoto:r • .ua. ti. aubatJ.tution or tba 

present Pan. k ancl A or the ban direotiw by tM alternatiw para.-

gnpha ~-4 in tbs 181.Q to Gen • .,.a.ruy would .eat the objeoticm.. 

Thaae •Uld pl&ce OOltaIDO-DSBllrG'fOJI m:der tba Joint Intelligenoe Qroup 

bl' tll8 JCS orpniu.tion. 

4. •• Werrtng to Par. dot the D -..06 11; ia V&ted that just 

u Jas %010 will requi.r• oert&ln a43wJuru•t• in ISCIJ> 'flil •o o•rt&in. 

Mjuiaum.ta wq h&n to be U4e in -ti. ... 4oo-.a.t it the dr&n 

411.'Wti• ·--· Appri)ftd. 'but tbu• ad.ju:--- will be or .. ainor nature 

jut u the ..tjuataeta, it any-. J-elNl ting t'nll!t the ol"M'tion ot AP&. &l"9 

11lmlrS.M lllinor 1ll -..~ .. 

h. (1) n. apeoittio !\motion• ot uson. u ••t .forth 1J1 

men d.il"80t1w wo. i. 16 ~IMS. at.mJ\g troa ucm f8 are aa 

tollona 

(a) Pol'Sulating u.tical. Oamaunioationa 

Iawlllgence pollay am objecti"R•· 

(b) All~'\ing tao:ng the lit~ departmeuta 

atl4 agce7 •peoitio r•aponaibility PA: 

tlMt eoadUC't of' OQamunica.tiona Illtelligence 

'\iMb in. ar4.er to ina"ur• e. ca&preheui w 

ooordtna.ted progna and to elhd.D&te ur:t.-

nn•Hl'1' dup11ca.tioa at ettart. (!ular 

1a thoaa fields ~ reaponaibllity' or 

1#.tw••il that are M'tW-1.ly u.d apecitical.17 .,..1.gned to the ••'her depart.act. and actllOT 

• 
,,,. i. Ot" bf CGapetlimt autboriv .. llhal.1 

be ncogrd.md aa the Prim&17 rupou1 ... biltt)r or ta. cogni&lm't de~ or 

aget107). 

(c) Prescribing 'baste 119C\U"it;r •t.ndm-da a1x1 

ti...U..tion palioi• w protect aU 

ec.mm ca.ti.OU Intelligcoe aoti"li ti• 

and .o~. 

(d) bN'Oi•U\g aupenS.ctan OWi' the Mtab11ah-

•.rt and ~ or all li&iaon wi:th 

.f'oreip and ~r 4caeat1o agenoiea 

ill t.M fi.ald ot Calulnmioat10'1'HJ IJ:itelligenae. 

(•) J.uwbsg th9 national Ccamtmioa.tiam Xntiall1C-O• nq~ta. amd N'tull.id.ng 

pmaal ll011c1• ~ •phu11 -.4 

priori ti• of ettort aocorcUngl;y. 

(~} Coordinating Caamunioationt Intell1genoa 

research and de?&lopn.et ib ocmton.d v 

with pwtinmt llnoaroh an! Dftelopnct 

8ovd po11oi•· 

It 1e ditticult to aee how tlia Ntahliamumt o~ tbl OODlDO ooncapt woul4 

interfere 1d. th _,,- ~ thoae !'\mc:tiona. li>re.o'nr., the lia'h doea 110t 

-con'bain a a~le •flmtica ot the wrda "nalua.tton, • or •public.a.tioti.1 a 

&114 the word •diuedmtiou• ia used oal.1 in OGJJnOGtion with the »"'* 

•or1bmg of pol1o1ea to prcrteot WJlll'? aetJ:ri:tiu and aouroea,. not 1d. th 

dissadnatieb M it ia coz:moc~ldth the Mtu.l aploita.tion or wse ot 

the timl p.roduct ~ all tba 001.tIIT artort • 

• 
.. REF ID:A61152 

TIJlP SffiREf 

}). (2) Par. d or the D memo fails to point out specitical- 17 in what respects the dra.tt directive 1a not in consonance with the 

provisions of NSCID 19, unless the etatement that NSCID If) "e1tablished the U.S. Communication Intelligence Board to effect authoritative 

coordination or C<JIIl'.l' activities of the government" is what the D 

memo means to point out as the element with which the COBSIDO directive 

is in contlict. U that is indeed the element deemed to be in contllct, 

then just how the adoption of the COffSIDO concept would interfere with 

the purpose for which USCIB was established, via., 11 to ei'fect the 

authoritative coordination or COMIRr activities of the Government'' 

is difficult to see. In point of tact. by accepting and IUJ>porting 

the CONSIDO concept, USCIB would be enablea to execute its intended 

function in a !ar more effective manner than is now the case, as will 

become clear in a moment. 

(3) Re.f'err!ng to NSOID 19 and t~ the portion of it 

just quoted, the directive itself defines ~communication intelligence 

activities" aa followsi 

"'bommunication intelligence activities' comprise 

all processes involved in the collection for 

intelligence purposes, ot foreign communications, 

the production of info:nnation rro~ such communications, the dissemination or that information, 

and the control or the protection of that inf ormation and the aecurit7 of its sources.n 

It will be noted that if the foregoing definition is taken into 

account in connection with Par. 1 of ISCID 119, USCIB has had, since 

its creation, the authority to coordinate not only the production of 

the C<JIIlfl' raw material but also the evaluation of this material to 

produce communication intelligence, and the publication and dissemination or the final product. But aa regards the latter steps, USCIB 

has as a practical matter exercised very little of the authority it 

•as given. Certain.!¥ there baa been no atte1J1pt to coorainate 

evaluation processeB in the COIIl.'1' rield, or to coordinate the 

production of detailed studies invol'rlng the use of CCllINT. Aa 

regarde the coordination 0£ publication, USCIB baa restricted itself to the establishment of formats for the publication of nonmilitary and non-naYal materialJ and as regards dissemination, the 

attention 0£ USCIB baa been for the most part directed toward 

establishing measures tor the protection of the sources of OOllilf'l' 

against the basard1 of ita dissemination. '!'here ha.• been no attempt whatever to coordinate internal diss8Jlination within the Departments 

and Agency involved. 
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e • m? sm~H (4) Up until now USCIB bas had five independent 

agencia• to coordinate. With the establishment o~ A.FSA. the coordinating authorit7 of l'.1SOIB will be .facilitated by the reduction to 

only three independent organizations, viz., AFSA, the Department 

or State, and the OU. It would seem that it USCIB were to exercise 

the authority ~iven it by its charter and were to give its full support to the CONSIDO concept, t~ere would be an increase in the overall efficiency and econo1D7 of the "Communications Intelligence 

activities of the Government" becau$e USCIB would then be in a better 

poeition to coordinate the principal terminal activities in the COIIl'fr 

realm, vis., evaluation, publication, and d1ss•1nation. And it ollOUld 

etill have jurisdiction over all o£ the functions listed under par. b 

(l) with the possible exception ot function• {b) and (f). 

(5) Ir the CORSIDO concept •ere adopted, USCIB could 

very well add to the list of functions in para~rapb b(l) above those 

relatinz to evaluation, publication, and dissemination. The coordination of the activities of COBSIDO-WASHDiGioN so far as they are of 

interest to or involve AFSA., the Department of state, and the CIA 

would leave plenty of work :for USCIB. ' Far from being out of ha.rmor:v 

with the provisions of t.SCID #9, the draft directive, if adopted, 

would be 0£ assistance to USCIB by facilitating their exercise oi: 

certain authority it has always had but has failed to uae hitherto. 

5. The CONSIDO conoept ia in rao.lit7 nothing new. All through 

the war the U. s. Naq f llowed it and ia still following it. The 

British had adopted it before the U.S. Navy and had found it to be 

vital to the efficient exploitation of COMI!fr subces'se1. The first 

official suggestion that it should be +.dopted by both the U.S. !ray 

and the U. S. Navy is embodied in a letter dated .lS September 1945, 

£rom Admiral King to General Ka.rshall. In fact, this is a good 

point at which to :refer to the various lettel'a and memoranqa exchanged 

between Admiral ling and General Mar15hall, and (18.ter) between A.amiral 

Nimitz and General Eisenhower, on the mubject of integration of COIIll' 

activities. Th97 contain maD,f reterencea to the desirabilit7 and 

necessity for the •stablishment ot sue~ a concept as the draft di~ective contemplates. The D lemo complete]¥ reverse& the position 

then taken by both the Navy and the Army (ineluding the Air Force) 

in respect to the consolidation of evaluation, publication, and 

dissemination activities. There is no reason to feel that oonditione 

have changed so that such a rnereal is warranted. If aeything JCS 

2010 makee the consolidation of thesa activities more logical. more 

desirable, and mgre urgent than eyer before. To fail to consolidate 

them will in fact jeopardise all that JCS 2010 is intended to 

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ffi? SEC~H accomplish, because the security of COIIlr operations &• a whole 

will be vitiated unless proper precaution• to safeguard the end 

product are also taken. In connection with the foregoing thought, 

it is to be noted that the D Mem9 ha1 .failed utterly to take 

cognizance or the facts pointed out in Par. 3a(3) of the Stat£ 

StudT. It ie lli1' considered opinion that. the failure of the D 

Uemo to truce into consideration the extremeq dangerous securit7 

hazards which now exist in respect to our whole COllIN'l' effort 

demonstrates a lack of appreciation of the ~avity of the aitua• 

tion. The serious reaponsibility which the JCS is undertaking 

when it continue• to accept those risks a:tter the latter ~ave 

been pointed out should be understood by' all concdr\ed. 

6. In closing these comments a final thou~ht will be preeented. Without saying it ln eo mallT words the first reason cited in 

Par. a of the D Memo implies that the intent of the draft directive 

is to establish a sixth and large evaluation, publication, and 

Qissemination unit in aadition to the five exiatin~ ones. That 

such an ilnplicat:ton .lf!J! drawn or waa intended to be conveyed to the 

reader of the D Memo is established by the use of the phrase •in 

addition" as the i~troduotory worde to the third sentence of Far. 

a of the D ¥emo, indicating that the aecond sentence of that 

paragraph constitutes a first reason and the third sentence con• 

stitutes a second reason. lire it not tor that preliminary phrase, 

one would be warranted in thinking that the aontention ot a decrease 

rather than an increase in efficiency and eoonomy is supported b;r 

only a single reason, viz., that %ork which is now dona by other 

intelligence agencies operating in the non•COMINr field and the 

product of which CONSI.00-WASHI.NGI'O.H would have to have in order to 

do its jQb proper]J", would have to be done also by CONSIDO-WASHINGTOR. 

From this it would .follow that CONSIDO-ft'ASFIINGTON would have to 

operate in the non-GOllitn' field a• well aa in that field. It 

being impossible to conceive that the writer of the D »emo entertained 

such a thought, one can only be driYen to the conclusion that the 

contention is indeed supported by two separate reasons, as indicated 

in Par. la(l) arid (2) of these comments. It, now, reason (1) is 

indeed intended to stand by itself ana to convey the thought that a 

sixth evaluation, publication, and dissemination office is contemplated 

by the CONSIDO directive, the only conclusion to lfhich one is driven 

is that the D demo not on~ manifests little kno•ledge of the technical 

aspects of the activities involved but also ~ivee indications that 

the draft directive and the Stat£ Study which accompanied it were 

uubjected to oniy a moat casual scrutil>1'. 

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