United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 2016 Decided November 29, 2016

No. 15-1156

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO,

PETITIONER

v.

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Postal Regulatory Commission

Michael T. Anderson argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the brief were Lorrie E. Bradley and Jeremiah 

Fugit.

Jeffrey E. Sandberg, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 

brief were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Michael S. Raab, Attorney, David A. 

Trissell, General Counsel, Postal Regulatory Commission, 

and Christopher Laver, Deputy General Counsel. 
2

Before: WILKINS, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: The American Postal Workers 

Union (the “Union”) petitions this Court for review of the 

Postal Regulatory Commission’s (“PRC”) denial of its 

December 13, 2013 amended complaint. In its amended

complaint, the Union alleged that the United States Postal 

Service failed to comply with First-Class Mail service 

standards. See Am. Compl. ¶ 20. Upon review, the PRC 

dismissed the Union’s amended complaint for three reasons. 

First, the PRC explained that the service standards set forth in 

39 C.F.R. § 121.1 are service “expectations” and not service 

“requirements.” U.S. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, Order No. 

2512, Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration and 

Granting Motion to Dismiss 9 (May 27, 2015) [hereinafter 

PRC Order No. 2512]; see id. at 14. Second, the PRC ruled it

remedied the Postal Service’s noncompliance when it 

instructed the Postal Service to improve service compliance in 

the Annual Compliance Determination. Id. at 17-20. Third, 

the PRC noted that the Union’s amended complaint failed to 

raise new or material issues of fact or law. Id. at 13-17. For 

the following reasons, we deny the Union’s petition. 

I.

In 2006, Congress enacted the Postal Accountability and 

Enhancement Act (“PAEA”) to reform postal operations and 

mitigate the U.S. Postal Service’s financial difficulties. See 

Postal Accountability & Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-

435, 120 Stat. 3198 (2006). Congress concluded that the 

Postal Service maintained more facilities than economically 

necessary, and instructed the Postal Service to devise a 
3

strategy for eliminating excess processing capacity. Id.

§ 302(c)(1)(B), 120 Stat. at 3219. As part of this mandate, 

Congress created the PRC to ensure postal accountability and 

oversee postal functions and facility reductions. See 39 U.S.C. 

§ 501.

The PAEA required the Postal Service to establish a set 

of service standards for market-dominant products, including 

First-Class Mail. Id. § 3691(a). These standards must be 

devised in conjunction with the PRC, and serve as enforceable 

benchmarks published in the Code of Federal Regulations.

Id.; see also U.S. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, Order No. 465, 

Order Establishing Final Rules Concerning Periodic 

Reporting of Service Performance Measurements and 

Customer Satisfaction 5 (May 25, 2010). The service 

standards are designed to achieve the general policy goals of 

mail reliability and speed, and specify the amount of time 

within which a customer may ordinarily expect his mail to be 

delivered. 39 U.S.C. § 3691(b)(1). The Postal Service 

promulgated its initial service standards in 2007, and has 

revised those standards periodically. Id. § 3691(a). 

As relevant to this case, the Postal Service issued a final 

rule on May 25, 2012, altering its existing service standards in 

conjunction with the Mail Processing Network 

Rationalization (“MPNR”) initiative. The MPNR initiative 

proposed closing more than 229 mail processing facilities in 

two phases for a forecasted net savings of $2.1 billion. See 

U.S. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, No. N2012-1, Advisory 

Opinion on Mail Processing Network Rationalization 

Changes 1, 28, 46 (Sept. 28, 2012) [hereinafter MPNR 

Advisory Opinion]; see generally Revised Service Standards 

for Market-Dominant Mail Products, 77 Fed. Reg. 31,190, 

31,191-92 (May 25, 2012). During Phase 1, which was 

scheduled to last from July 1, 2012 through February 2013, 
4

the Postal Service proposed closing approximately 140 plants. 

77 Fed. Reg. at 31,192; MPNR Advisory Opinion, supra, at 

46. Phase 2, which would result in the closure of the 

remaining plants, was scheduled to begin in February 2014. 

77 Fed. Reg. at 31,192; MPNR Advisory Opinion, supra, at 

46. The post-February 2014 service standards for First-Class 

Mail are summarized as follows: 1

• Overnight Mail: An overnight service standard will 

be applied to intra-Sectional Center Facility (“SCF”) 

domestic Presort First Class Mail pieces properly 

accepted at the SCF before the day-zero Critical Entry 

Time (“CET”). 77 Fed. Reg. at 31,194. The overnight 

standard will no longer apply to mail sent by retail 

customers, regardless of location. Id.

• Two-Day Mail: A two-day service standard will be 

applied to all inter-SCF domestic First-Class Mail 

pieces that are properly accepted before the day-zero 

CET if the drive time between the origin Processing 

and Distribution Center or Facility and destination 

SCF is six hours or less. Id. 

• Three-, Four-, and Five-Day Mail: The three-, four-, 

and five-day service standards remain unchanged. A 

three-day service standard will be applied to all 

domestic First-Class Mail pieces properly accepted 

 1 The current service standards contained in 39 C.F.R. § 121.1 

reference an effective date of January 2015. For purposes of this 

appeal, we are concerned with the service standards in effect during 

the MPNR initiative. An interim version of the service standards 

applied during Phase 1 of the MPNR initiative (from July 1, 2012 

through January 31, 2014), and a final version of the service 

standards took effect on February 1, 2014. For simplicity, only the 

final service standards are detailed in this opinion.
5

before the day-zero CET if the overnight and two-day 

service standards do not apply and additional 

origin/destination criteria are satisfied. Id. at 31,194-

95. A four-day service standard will apply to domestic 

First-Class Mail pieces properly accepted before the 

day-zero CET if the overnight, two-day, and three-day 

service standards do not apply and additional 

origin/destination criteria are satisfied. 39 C.F.R. 

§ 121.1(d) (2014). A five-day service standard will 

apply to “all remaining domestic First-Class Mail 

pieces properly accepted before the day-zero CET.” 

Id. § 121.1(e).

These new service standards shifted a substantial portion

of mail previously subject to the overnight standard to either 

the two-, three-, four-, or five-day service standards, and 

further transferred a large volume of the two-day mail to the 

three-, four-, and five-day service standards. PRC Order No. 

2512, supra, at 18; MPNR Advisory Opinion, supra, at 7;

U.S. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, Annual Compliance 

Determination Report Fiscal Year 2013 105 (Mar. 27, 2014) 

[hereinafter ACD FY 2013].

The PAEA further directs the Postal Service to develop a 

“plan” for meeting its service standards, including the 

establishment of “performance goals” for mail delivery. 

PAEA § 302(a), (b)(1), 120 Stat. at 3219; see also U.S. Postal 

Serv., Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act § 302

Network Plan (June 2008), available at 

https://about.usps.com/postal-act-2006/postal-servicenetworkplan.pdf [hereinafter Network Plan]. In accordance 

with this directive, the Postal Service created a set of 

“performance targets” to track its success in meeting its 

service standards. See Network Plan, supra, at 7. For fiscal 

year 2013, the target on-time delivery rates were 96.7%, 
6

95.1%, and 95.0% for mail subject to overnight, two-day, and 

three- to five-day service standards, respectively. U.S. Postal 

Regulatory Comm’n, Annual Compliance Determination 

Report Fiscal Year 2014 96 tbl. V-4 (Mar. 27, 2015) 

[hereinafter ACD FY 2014]. The targets increased for fiscal 

year 2014 to 96.8%, 96.5%, and 95.25% for mail subject to 

overnight, two-day, and three- to five-day service standards, 

respectively. Id. 

To evaluate the Postal Service’s compliance with its 

service standards, the PRC must issue an Annual Compliance 

Determination (“ACD”) report for each fiscal year. See 39 

U.S.C. § 3653(b). If the PRC finds noncompliance, it must 

take appropriate action to remedy the noncompliance. Id. 

§ 3653(c). During Phase 1 of the MPNR initiative, the PRC 

concluded that First-Class Mail presorted letters and postcards 

met or exceeded all annual service performance targets for 

fiscal year 2013. ACD FY 2013, supra, at 99, 105. 

Comparably, First-Class Mail single-piece letters and 

postcards met or exceeded service performance goals for the 

overnight and two-day service targets, but did not reach the 

service performance targets for the three- to five-day mail 

category. Id. at 105. First-Class Mail flats and parcels, 

however, underperformed and failed to reach any of their ontime delivery performance goals for the third year in a row.

Id. at 99, 104, 106-07. 

The ACD results for fiscal year 2014 showed a continual 

decline in Postal Service performance. While First-Class Mail 

presorted letters and postcards subject to overnight or two-day 

service standards continued to meet their applicable service 

goals, all remaining First-Class Mail products failed to satisfy 

their service requirements, including: (1) single-piece letters 

and postcards subject to overnight, two-day, and three- to 

five-day delivery; (2) pre-sorted letters and postcards subject 
7

to three- and five-day delivery; (3) flats; (4) parcels; (5) 

inbound letter post; and (6) outbound single-piece 

international letters. ACD FY 2014, supra, at 87-88 tbls. V-1, 

V-2. Although the decreased service performance occurred 

during Phase 2 of the MPNR initiative, the Postal Service 

linked its noncompliance to severe winter storms that plagued 

the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2014. Id. at 88.

After reviewing the data, the PRC concluded that winter 

storms likely impacted service delivery times, but nonetheless 

cautioned that “weather cannot consistently be employed as a 

catchall excuse for failing to meet performance standards.” Id. 

at 104. The PRC further instructed that it “expects service 

performance to improve in FY 2015.” Id. Regarding FirstClass Mail flats specifically, the PRC directed the Postal 

Service to “improve service for First-Class Mail Flats in FY 

2015 or to provide an explanation in the FY 2015 [Annual 

Compliance Report] for why efforts to improve service 

performance results . . . have been ineffective and detail what 

changes it plans to make to improve service performance.” Id.

Notwithstanding the PRC’s responsibility to publish 

ACD reports, any interested person who believes the Postal 

Service is not operating in compliance with its regulatory or 

statutory requirements may file a complaint with the PRC. 39 

U.S.C. § 3662(a). Within 90 days after receiving a complaint, 

the PRC must either issue an order dismissing the complaint, 

id. § 3662(b)(1)(A)(ii), or begin proceedings on any 

complaint that “raises material issues of fact or law,” id.

§ 3662(b)(1)(A)(i). If the PRC finds a complaint to be 

justified after discovery and appropriate hearings, it shall 

order the Postal Service to “take such action as the 

Commission considers appropriate in order to achieve 

compliance with the applicable requirements and to remedy 

the effects of any noncompliance.” Id. § 3662(c). In cases of 

deliberate noncompliance by the Postal Service, the PRC may 
8

additionally require the Postal Service to pay a fine. Id. 

§ 3662(d). 

Given the dual remedies available through the ACD and 

complaint process, the Newspaper Association of America

expressed concern several years ago that a finding of 

compliance or noncompliance in an ACD could moot a 

pending complaint on the same issue. U.S. Postal Regulatory 

Comm’n, Order No. 195, Order Establishing Rules for 

Complaints and Rate or Service Inquiries 21 (Mar. 24, 2009) 

[hereinafter Rules for Complaints]. The PRC responded by 

noting that Congress contemplated this exact issue and 

addressed it in the statute. Id. at 22. Specifically, section 

3653(e) creates a rebuttable presumption of compliance by the 

Postal Service if the PRC issues a timely written 

determination of compliance in an ACD. 39 U.S.C. § 3653(e); 

see Rules for Complaints, supra, at 22-23. If Congress had 

wished for an ACD to render a complaint moot, it would have 

created a non-rebuttable presumption in section 3653(e).

Rules for Complaints, supra, at 23. The dual enforcement 

scheme of ACD reports and complaints is necessary because 

ACD proceedings are completed in short, fixed timeframes 

and are not subject to the same opportunities for contesting 

evidence in adversarial proceedings. Id. Thus, “Commission 

findings in an annual compliance determination are relevant 

to a pending complaint proceeding, but are not necessarily 

dispositive of those issues.” Id.

II.

On September 5, 2013, the Union submitted a complaint 

to the PRC alleging that the Postal Service violated the 

requirements of 39 U.S.C. §§ 3661 and 3691. See generally 

Compl. ¶¶ 6-8, 21, 28. The Union amended its complaint on 

December 13, 2013. See generally Am. Compl. In particular, 
9

the Union alleged that the Postal Service regularly failed to 

comply with its First-Class Mail service standards. Id. ¶ 20.

This failure to comply with service standards was allegedly 

the direct result of the Postal Service’s MPNR initiative. Id. 

¶ 21. As a result, the Postal Service violated service standards 

on a nationwide basis and deprived individuals and business 

mailers of the service to which they are entitled under law. 

See id. ¶¶ 25-97. To support this theory, the Union provided a 

list of representative locations affected by the MPNR 

initiative where service standards were consistently violated.

See id. ¶¶ 25-77. The Union further conducted a test mailing 

of forty letters from its office in Washington, D.C. to various 

Union members across the country. Id. ¶¶ 78-91. Twenty-five 

percent of these letters were not delivered in accordance with 

the service standards set forth in 39 C.F.R. § 121.1. Id. ¶ 79.

Upon review, the PRC initially dismissed the Union’s

amended complaint for lack of standing on February 27, 

2014. See U.S. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, Order No. 2000, 

Order Dismissing Complaint (Feb. 27, 2014). Subsequently, 

on May 27, 2015, the PRC granted the Union’s motion for 

reconsideration and vacated its earlier dismissal. See PRC 

Order No. 2512, supra, at 1, 5-8. Nonetheless, the PRC again 

dismissed the amended complaint, this time on the merits. 

Splitting 2-1, the PRC offered three primary bases for its 

decision. First, the PRC explained that the service standards 

set forth in 39 C.F.R. § 121.1 are service “expectations” not 

service “requirements.” Id. at 9. While service standards play 

an important role in postal regulation, they “do not act as legal 

requirements” unless measured by reference to external 

performance goals. Id. at 10. Service standards themselves 

provide no guarantee of actual service, but rather only offer a 

description of expected mail delivery time. Id. Therefore, “the 

premise that a complaint lies based on failing to provide 

service in conformance with an expectation is misplaced.” Id.
10

Second, the PRC noted that the Union’s complaint failed 

to raise new or material issues of fact or law. Id. at 13. While 

the Union performed a limited mailing test to support its 

allegations, its results did not add any new information that 

was not already publicly known or addressed by the PRC. Id. 

at 16-17. The PRC was aware of the Postal Service’s 

noncompliance with service standards and should not be 

required to expend limited resources reestablishing a known 

fact. See id. at 17; see also id. at 19-20 (“[A]fter an issue has 

been considered under [either an ACD or a complaint], in 

most instances reconsidering the same issue using the 

alternative approach is not a necessary or efficient use of 

resources.”). Unlike the situation contemplated by Congress 

in which the PRC’s finding of compliance serves only as a 

rebuttable presumption, the Union presented allegations 

entirely consistent with the PRC’s findings. Id. at 20. Such 

consistency does not present a new issue of material fact. 

Finally, the PRC noted that it already directed the Postal 

Service to take remedial action to ensure future compliance.

Id. at 17. Given the unusual impact caused by winter storms, 

the PRC determined that the appropriate action was to 

“reiterate the Postal Service’s responsibility to meet service 

performance goals.” Id. at 19. Because the PRC may direct 

the same remedies for a finding of noncompliance under 

either an ACD or a complaint, the PRC ruled it is unlikely to 

award further relief for this instance of noncompliance. See 

id. at 19-20. Thus, the PRC dismissed the Union’s amended 

complaint. 

Commissioner Goldway, however, dissented from the 

majority opinion and argued that the Union’s amended 

complaint was prematurely dismissed. See U.S. Postal 

Regulatory Comm’n, Order No. 2512, Dissenting Opinion of 

Commissioner Goldway 1-3 (May 27, 2015). The dissent 
11

argued that the PRC previously observed that full effect 

would not be given to the statutory scheme if complaints 

could be rendered moot by issuance of an ACD report. Id. at 

2. Accordingly, the Union should be afforded the opportunity 

to prove its case, and the majority’s dismissal denies the 

Union a fair opportunity to engage in discovery and create a 

full record. Id. at 3. Because the PAEA “anticipate[d] a robust 

Complaint mechanism,” Commissioner Goldway argued, the 

PRC’s remedial authority is much broader than the majority 

described. Id. The PAEA intended for the ACD and complaint 

processes to work in tandem, not in a manner that is mutually 

exclusive. Id. Thus, the mere fact that the PRC has previously 

recognized service quality problems in its ACD reports should 

not bar a legitimate complaint. Id. at 1. The Union timely filed 

a petition for review in this Court on May 29, 2015. 

III.

This case presents two primary questions. First, did the 

PRC reasonably determine that the Postal Service’s 

compliance with regulatory standards is evaluated by

reference to separately published service performance goals? 

We answer this question in the affirmative. Second, did the 

PRC act arbitrarily or capriciously by dismissing the Union’s 

amended complaint for failure to raise a material issue of fact 

or law? We answer this question in the negative. 

A.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the PRC’s dismissal 

of a complaint pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 3663. According to 

section 3663, any person adversely affected by a final order of 

the PRC may institute proceedings for judicial review of that 

order. 39 U.S.C. § 3663. The Court “shall review the order or 

decision in accordance with section 706 of title 5” based on 

the record before the PRC. Id. Section 706 of the 
12

Administrative Procedure Act permits the Court to set aside 

agency action, findings, and conclusions if they are “arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see GameFly, 

Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 704 F.3d 145, 148 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013). The scope of review under the arbitrary and 

capricious standard “is narrow” and the Court “is not to 

substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle 

Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 

U.S. 29, 43 (1983). That said, the Court must be satisfied that 

the agency examined all relevant data and articulated a logical

explanation for its decision, including a rational connection 

between the facts and ultimate outcome. Id. An agency rule 

may be considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency 

relied on factors which Congress did not intend it to consider 

or “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 

the evidence before the agency.” Id. 

With regards to statutory interpretation, the Court follows 

the framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). See 

U.S. Postal Serv. v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 640 F.3d 

1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that because Congress 

expressly delegated to the PRC responsibility to implement 

the PAEA, the PRC’s interpretation is reviewable under 

Chevron). Chevron review involves a two-step analysis. First, 

if a statute is clear, the Court must give effect to Congress’s 

unambiguous intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Where 

ambiguity plagues a statute, the Court must turn to the second 

Chevron principle and give deference to the agency’s 

reasonable interpretation of the statute. Id. at 843. 
13

B. 

The first issue we address is the PRC’s interpretation of 

“service standards.” The Union argues that the PRC 

erroneously interprets service standards as aspirational goals 

that lack the force of law. See Pet’r Br. 23-32. According to 

the Union, the PRC has conflated service standards with 

operational performance goals and implicitly authorized the 

Postal Service to underperform. See id. at 30-35. The Union, 

however, misconstrues the PRC’s order. The PRC does not 

contend that service standards are legally unenforceable. 

Resp’t Br. 33; see generally PRC Order No. 2512, supra, at 8-

12 (highlighting that service standards are enforceable when 

assessed in conjunction with performance goals). Rather, the 

PRC maintains that whether the Postal Service has complied 

with its statutory requirements is evaluated by separately 

published service performance goals. Resp’t Br. 33; see PRC 

Order No. 2512, supra, at 8-12 (explaining the interaction 

between service standards and performance goals). The PRC 

acknowledges that the service standards contained in 39 

C.F.R. § 121.1 possess legal force. Resp’t Br. 34. Thus, the 

issue before this Court is not whether service standards are 

legally enforceable – all parties agree they are – but whether 

the PRC’s method for evaluating when those service 

standards have been violated (i.e., by examining external 

performance goals) is reasonable. We find that it is. 

First, Congress has not directly addressed the issue of 

how Postal Service noncompliance should be calculated. 

Pursuant to the PAEA, the Postal Service must promulgate 

regulations that establish service standards for marketdominant products. 39 U.S.C. § 3691(a). In addition, the 

Postal Service is tasked with developing a plan for complying 

with service standards, which includes establishing 

“performance goals.” PAEA § 302(a), (b)(1), 120 Stat. at 
14

3219. The PAEA does not, however, contain any governing 

principle by which to distinguish compliance from 

noncompliance. Rather, by its silence, the PAEA commits to 

the PRC’s discretion the development of legal benchmarks 

necessary for determining whether the Postal Service violated 

its service standards. Thus, given congressional silence on this 

issue, we proceed to Chevron step two. 

Second, we find the PRC’s interpretation that “service 

standards” should be measured in conjunction with separately 

defined performance goals reasonable and entitled to

deference. The PAEA requires the Postal Service to establish 

a set of service standards, not service guarantees. See 39 

U.S.C. § 3691(a). These standards must be designed to 

“reasonably assure Postal Service customers delivery 

reliability, speed and frequency.” Id. § 3691(b)(1)(C). Such 

“reasonabl[e] assur[ance]” simply creates an “expectation” of 

on-time delivery without developing an enforceable right to 

sue over each-and-every piece of mail that arrives outside that 

delivery window. Therefore, when examining whether the 

Postal Service has complied with its service obligations, the 

PRC regularly analyzes the Postal Service’s rate of on-time 

delivery performance in reference to separately published 

service performance goals. 

This interpretation is reasonable given that nothing in the 

PAEA suggests that the Postal Service violates the law every 

time a piece of mail arrives outside the applicable time 

window set forth in 39 C.F.R. § 121.1. A small amount of 

mail will always fail to be delivered within its specified 

service standard. See Modern Service Standards for MarketDominant Products, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,216, 72,220 (Dec. 19, 

2007). This reality is the result of unpredictable weather 

conditions, high mail volume, unanticipated labor disputes,

human error, and other workplace or regional events. The 
15

PRC is aware of the logistical impossibility of ensuring timely 

delivery of each piece of mail and, therefore, determined that 

Postal Service compliance must be analyzed with reference to 

an external target. The Union’s contentions to the contrary 

would subject the Postal Service to a flood of litigation each 

time a birthday card or letter was delivered late. Given the 

financial woes already plaguing the Postal Service, we cannot 

conclude that Congress intended such a result.

Further, if service standards could be violated on an 

envelope-by-envelope basis, it would be a foregone 

conclusion in every ACD that the Postal Service is in 

noncompliance with the statute. This result would eliminate 

any meaningful distinction between compliance and 

noncompliance. Rather than being subject to remedial 

directives only in years of noncompliance, the Postal Service 

would be forced to undertake remedial measures yearly. See 

39 U.S.C. § 3653(c) (“If, for a year, a timely written 

determination of noncompliance is made under subsection (b), 

the Postal Regulatory Commission shall take appropriate 

action . . . .”). This contravenes the statutory structure, which 

clearly contemplates that the Postal Service can be found in 

compliance with its service standards. See, e.g., id. § 3653(b) 

(“If, with respect to a year, no instance of noncompliance is 

found under this subsection to have occurred in such year, the 

written determination shall be to that effect.”). A contrary

result would frustrate congressional intent. 

Similarly, nothing in the PAEA requires the Postal 

Service to disclose information to the PRC regarding the 

delivery outcome of every single piece of mail. The PAEA 

only mandates that the Postal Service provide the PRC with a 

report analyzing the “quality of service” in enough detail “to 

demonstrate that all products during such year complied with 

all applicable requirements” in Title 39. Id. § 3652(a)(1). The 
16

information provided by the Postal Service must describe the 

level of service (i.e., speed of delivery and reliability) 

provided, but need not identify whether each individual item 

of mail achieved its on-time service performance standard. 

This supports the PRC’s determination that compliance 

evaluations should occur in the aggregate. 

Finally, the legislative history bolsters the PRC’s 

interpretation. In 2004, Congress considered a legislative 

proposal in which the language corresponding to section 

3691(b)(1)(C) would have required service standards to 

“guarantee Postal Service customers delivery reliability, 

speed and frequency consistent with reasonable rates and best 

business practices.” S. 2468, 108th Cong. § 301 (2004) 

(emphasis added). A later version of the legislation, which 

was enacted, replaced the word “guarantee” with the phrase 

“reasonably assure,” S. 662, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005), thus 

clarifying that service standards do not create binding on-time 

delivery requirements for each piece of mail. See 39 U.S.C. 

§ 3691(b)(1)(C); Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 

84, 93 (2001) (“We ordinarily will not assume that Congress 

intended ‘to enact statutory language that it has earlier 

discarded in favor of other language.’” (quoting INS v.

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987))). In light of 

these factors, we hold that the PRC’s interpretation of service 

standards is reasonable and entitled to deference. 

C. 

The second question we must answer is whether the PRC 

acted arbitrarily or capriciously by dismissing the Union’s 

amended complaint. As a preliminary matter, we find that the 

PRC reasonably construed the Union’s amended complaint as 

alleging that the Postal Service’s aggregate rate of compliance 

fell below its established goals. See PRC Order No. 2512, 
17

supra, at 13. As previously discussed, a complaint alleging 

violations of service standards on an envelope-by-envelope 

basis does not state a cognizable claim. Rather, service 

standards may only be violated in the aggregate when 

measured against external performance goals. Thus, PRC’s 

construction of the Union’s amended complaint conforms 

with its interpretation of service standards discussed in 

Section III.B. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that 

the PRC’s decision to dismiss the Union’s amended complaint 

was not arbitrary or capricious. 

The strongest support for upholding the PRC’s dismissal 

is the fact that the PRC already recognized the Postal 

Service’s failure to consistently meet its service standards, 

and instructed the Postal Service to take remedial action on 

this front. See id. at 13, 17, 19-20. Section 3662 allows any

interested person who believes that the Postal Service is not 

operating in compliance with its service obligations to file a 

complaint. 39 U.S.C. § 3662(a). The PRC, however, may 

dismiss any complaint that does not raise “material issues of 

fact or law.” Id. § 3662(b)(1)(A). While this phrase is not 

statutorily defined, it is not unreasonable to require the issue 

of fact or law to be one that the PRC has not already 

addressed. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “material” as 

being “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would 

affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential.” 

Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In this 

case, the PRC was already aware of the Postal Service’s 

noncompliance with service standards, and acknowledged that 

this noncompliance was likely attributable to severe and 

uncharacteristic winter weather. ACD FY 2014, supra, at 88, 

104. Nonetheless, the PRC instructed the Postal Service to 

take appropriate remedial action to ensure service compliance 

in fiscal year 2015. See id. at 104. In dismissing the Union’s 

amended complaint, the PRC concluded that none of the 
18

allegations brought any new facts to the PRC’s attention that 

would cause it to modify the relief previously imposed. See 

PRC Order No. 2512, supra, at 13, 16-20. Because the PRC 

already addressed the Postal Service’s noncompliance, there 

was nothing “material” about the Union’s allegations. 

In essence, the Union’s amended complaint requested 

that the PRC issue a different remedial order that required the 

Postal Service “to cease and desist from making changes in its 

mail processing network that will cause it to violate service 

standards.” Am. Compl. at 22. By articulating an alternative 

rationale for the Postal Service’s noncompliance, the Union 

contends that the PRC’s remedial order was ineffective to 

redress violations of service standards caused by post office 

closures. The Union, however, did not challenge the adequacy 

of the PRC’s remedy before this Court and, accordingly, has 

forfeited this claim. See Nat’l Oilseed Processors Ass’n v. 

OSHA, 769 F.3d 1173, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that 

petitioners forfeited a claim by mentioning it “only in a 

cursory manner”); Pet’r Br. 45 (arguing that if the PRC’s 

statements urging the Postal Service to improve “were 

enforceable through agency order and court injunction, they 

might satisfy the Commission’s duty”). 

Finally, the Union argues that the PRC cannot rely on its 

finding of noncompliance in the ACD to avoid processing a 

meritorious complaint on the same or similar issues. Pet’r Br. 

36, 41-42. The PRC addressed a comparable concern in its 

March 24, 2009 Order Establishing Rules for Complaints and 

Rate or Service Inquiries. Specifically, the PRC agreed that 

“it would not give full effect to the statutory scheme if 

complaints could be rendered moot by the issuance of an 

annual compliance determination.” Rules for Complaints, 

supra, at 22. The PRC does not take a contrary position in the 

present case. Nothing in the PRC’s order states that an 
19

individual is estopped from contesting findings in the ACD

report by objecting or filing a complaint. The right to object

remains intact. As shown above, the PRC’s denial of the 

Union’s amended complaint in this case was based on the fact 

that the complaint failed to raise a material issue of fact or 

law. Thus, the Union’s argument on this ground is 

unpersuasive. 

Accordingly, we hold that the PRC’s dismissal of the 

Union’s amended complaint was not arbitrary or capricious. 

***

For the reasons discussed above, we deny the Union’s 

petition. The PRC reasonably determined that whether service 

standards are violated must be evaluated in reference to 

external performance goals. Based on this interpretation, the 

PRC logically construed the Union’s amended complaint as 

asserting a claim for violation of service standards in the 

aggregate, in accordance with the relevant performance goals. 

The PRC’s subsequent dismissal of this amended complaint 

was not arbitrary or capricious because the amended 

complaint failed to allege new issues of material fact or law. 

Accordingly, the petition is denied. 

So ordered.