1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PASSION STEWART , Plaintiff,

v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION , Defendant

. Civil Action No. 21

- 2478 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ( August 3 , 2022 ) Plaintiff Passion St ewart ( “ Stewart ” ) , proceeding pro se , alleges that Defen dant Federal Express C orporation ( “ FedEx ” ) has misha ndled packages delivered to her address in Washington, DC

. After removing the action from the Su perior Court of the District of Colum bia, FedEx has moved to dismiss Stewart ’ s complaint for failure to stat e a claim. To the
extent t hat St e wart meant to advance a state

- law cl aim, any such claim is preempted by federal
statute , the “ Carmack Amendment ” to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Furthermore, even construing Stewart ’ s complaint liberally, she has not shown she has standing to maintain an Interstate Commerce Act claim

. Accordingly, and upon consideration of the pleadings, 1 the relevant le gal authority, and the entire record, the Court sh all GRANT FedEx ’ s [8] Motion to Dismiss and DISMISS WITH OUT PREJUDIC E Plaintiff ’ s [6] amended Complaint

. However , because it appears possib le that a more definit e complaint would establish

1 This Memorandum Opinion and Order focuses on the following documents:
• Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1

- 2 (“Compl.”);
• Plaintiff ’ s amended Comp laint , ECF No. 6 (“ Am. Compl. ”);
• Defendant ’ s Mem orandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“ Mot .”);
• Plaintiff ’ s Opposition , ECF No. 1 1 (“ Opp .”) ; In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that hold ing oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).2 standing to proceed, the Co urt will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to file a seco nd amended
comp laint

. I. BACKGROUND Plai ntiff filed her first complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. ECF
No. 1

- 2 at 2. T he complaint alleges that St ewart has submitted “ mu ltiple claims with Fedex due to their carriers leaving [her] packages in open spaces which results in the packages being stolen. ” Id. Plaintiff states that she and her neighbors have given Fed Ex specific instructions as to delivery but that Fed Ex has improperly delivered her packages, resulting in pe cuniary loss of $100,000. Id. FedEx removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1441( b). Shortl y after removal , Plaintiff filed a second “ Complaint, ” which the Court construes as an amended complaint. Am. Compl. , ECF No. 6. Plaintiff re alleges that FedEx has mishandled her packages. Id. Plaintiff “ request[s] the max of $ 75,000 for the negligence of [FedEx ’ s] drivers, ignoring all signs posted in my building [ regarding package delivery], and lying on my le asing officer when they know for a fact they can deliver packages to our door. ” Id. FedEx maintains that this complaint fails to s tate a c laim for two reasons. F i rst, FedEx argues, rather perfunctorily , that “ P l aintiff does not allege any facts that entitle her to recovery ” because “ she does not specify for which packages she seeks redress. ” Mot. at 4. FedEx does not cite any authority for such a proposition and does not explain why, in FedEx ’ s view, Plaintiff ’ s allegations are “ [un]te thered to any legal basis for recovery. ” Id. Second, FedEx reads Pla intiff ’ s complaint to advance, exclusively, a state

- law negligence claim. Id. at 5. FedEx notes that federal law preempts state

- law claims against com mon carriers such as FedEx. Id. ( citing Adams Express C o. v. Croninger , 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913) ). P laintiff has filed a short3 opposition essentially restating her factual allegations . Opp. at 1

- 2. Defendant has not filed a reply. The Motion is now ripe for resolut ion

. II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b )(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iq bal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plaus ibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to stat e a claim, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well

- pleaded factual allegations . See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig

. , 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994).
III. DISCUSSI ON
M ost shopping happens online now adays

. When a consumer w ants to purchase a particular good, they vi sit, for example, Amazon.com. Af ter purchase , Amazon contracts with a package carrier , FedEx, for example , to deliver the purchased goods from Amazon to the buyer

.4 FedEx then issues the seller ( e.g. , Amazon ) a receipt , sometimes called a “ bill of lading, ” reflecting the goods to be shipped to Amazon ’ s buyer. Und er federal law, whoever holds rights under that receipt , and only that p erson, can sue the carrier (FedEx) for misdeli ver ed or undelivered parcels. 49 U.S. C. § 14706(a)(1); see also , e.g. , Coughlin v. United Van Lines, LLC , 362 F. Supp. 2d 116 6, 1167

- 68 (C.D. Cal. 2005). That l aw , often called the Carmack Amendment to the Inter state Commerce Act , goes even fu rther to preempt all state

- law claims against a package carrier. See Adams Express Co. v. Cro ni nger , 226 U.S. 491, 505

- 06 (1913);

see generally 14 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 503 (West 2022) (collecting cases). As such, the only remedy against a package carrier for misdeli vered or undelivered goods aris es under the
Interstate Commerce Act

. See Worldwide Moving & Storage, Inc. v. District of Columbia , 445 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

. Accordingly, to the extent the complain t alleges state

- law

c laims, they are dismissed as preempted. FedEx goes further, however, arguing that the entire compl aint must be dismissed because Plaintiff has not pleaded a Carmack Amendment claim . That misapprehends both Plai ntiff ’ s complaint and the law of pro se pleading. As a thresh old matter , Plai ntiff ’ s pro se compl aint must be “ ‘ liberally construed ’ ” and held to “ ‘ less stringent standa rds than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. ’ ” Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon , 169 F. Supp. 3d 1 19, 123

- 24 (D.D .C. 2016) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “ Cons truing a document li berally means , at a minimum, that a plaintiff need not use ‘ magic words ’ or legal jar gon. ” Walker v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. , 276 F. Sup p. 3d 1224, 1230 (N. D. Okl a. 2017). Where , after drawing a ll factual inf erences in th e pro se plaintiff ’ s favor, some legitimate clai m for relief lies, the court may not grant a motio n to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Anyanwutaku v. Moore , 151 F.3d 105 3, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1998)5 ( “ Eve n if [a plaint iff] might los e on the merits, . . . the district court should [] permit[] [a] claim, draft ed pro se and based on legitimate factual allegations [] to proceed. ” ) ; Williams , 169 F. Supp. 3d at 124. In support of Def endant ’ s argument that the complaint states only state

- law claims, Defendant notes that Stewart uses the term “ ne gligence ” in the operative complaint and does not say th e very sp ecific words “ Carmack Amendment

. ” See Mot. at 5. As a pro se litigant, the
Court cannot find that Plaintiff has failed to allege a particular c laim by omitting certain “ ma gic words. ” Walker , 276 F. Supp. 3d at 12 30. Nor is the use of the word “ negligence ” obviously and exclusively indicative of a state

- law claim. As the Supreme Court has explained , t he Carmack Amendment serves the p urpose of “ reli ev[ing] [sellers] of the burden of searching out a particular negligent carrier from among numerous carri ers hand ling an int erstate s hipment. ” See Reider v. Thompson , 339 U .S. 113, 119 (1950) (emphasis added ). P ut differently, a plaintiff
states an Inter state Commerce Act claim by “ establish [ing] a prima faci e case of negligence

. ” Distribuidora Mari Jose , S. A. v

. Transmaritime , Inc. , 7 38 F.3d 703, 706 (5 th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). A prima facie case under the Interstate Commerce Act requires a showing of injury to goods , collected by the carrier in good condition, th at caused identifi able, economic loss. See id. Because the operative complaint states as much, the Court construes it to advance

a n Inter st ate Commerce Act claim. Next, FedEx argues that Stewart cannot ma intain an acti on under the Inter state Commerce Act because she is not a “ shipp er, ” i.e., the seller who gave Stewart ’ s purchase to FedEx for shipment. Mot. at 6. Because most plaintiffs in actions such as these are literally , per 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a)(1), the “ person[s] entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading, ” FedEx is correct that P laintiff may (or may not ) fall within the ambit of those cases. It remains6 unclear , for instance, from Plaintiff ’ s plea dings whether she shipped goods to herself via FedEx or whether she purchased goods from a sel le r who entrusted those goods to FedEx for shipment. Yet i t is not only shippers (i.e., sellers) who have standing to enforce the terms of a receipt or a bill of lading. “ Cases interpreting the [Interst ate Commerce] Act have confined the right to s ue [ not just] to ship pers or consi gnors [] or holdings of the bill of lading issued by the carrier , [but also] persons beneficially interested in the shipment although not in possession of the actual bill of lading [] or ass igne es thereof. ” Harrah v. Minn. Min. and Mfg. Co. , 809 F. Supp. 3 13 , 318 ( D.N .J. 1992) (citations omi tted) (collecting cases). This final cat egory includes consignees, i.e., those “ ‘ to whom the carrier may lawfully make delivery in accordance with the contract of carriage. ’ ” Id. ( quoting Consignee , Black ’ s Law Dict ionary (4 th ed. 19 68)) . As such, it remains entire ly possible that Stewart can maint ain an action under the Interstate Commerce Act. The complaint fails, however , not for failure to state a claim , but for lack of definiteness
p ursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a)

. The operative complaint does not identify which packages were purpo rtedly mishandled , who sent the package s to Plaintiff, whether there is a receipt or bill of lading associated with the allegedly offending packages, and Plaintiff ’ s relationship to the sender of the packages. As such, the operative complaint does not give FedEx sufficiently “ f air notice of the basis for [Plaintiff ’ s] claims. ” See Charles v. Un ited States , Civ.
A. No. 21

- 064, 2022 WL 1045293, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 , 51 4 (2002) ). Because the complaint does not plead facts that , taken as true, would definitely endow Plaintiff with standing to advance a n Interstate Commerce Act claim, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff ’ s operative complaint

. See Stokes v. Cross , 327 F.3d 1210, 1215 (D .C. Cir. 2003). Nevertheless , as it appears possible t hat Plaintiff does have standing to7 proceed, the Court shall exercise its discretion to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to file a second amended complaint. See Ciralsky v. CIA , 355 F.3d 661, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
IV. CONCL USION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED , that Defendant ’ s [8] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED . It is further
ORDERED , tha t Plaintiff ’ s [6] amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE . It is further
ORDERED , that Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint o n or before September 7 , 2022

. If no complaint is filed by that da te, this case shall be dismissed.

Da ted: August 3 , 2022 /s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR

- KOTELLY United States District Judge