ALL OPERATORS TELEX – ALL OPERATORS TELEX

SUBJECT: ATA 25 OFF-WING RAMP SLIDE SOFT COVER CLOSURE AND VENT VALVE ACTIVATION INSPECTION

OUR REF: AOT A340-25A5191 dated 18 JAN 2011

1. AIRCRAFT AFFECTED ALL A340-600 FROM MSN 371 TO MSN 1122 INCLUDED.

2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION 2.1 AMM 25-62-43-000-801 Removal of the Offwing Escape-Slide 2.2 AMM 25-62-43-400-801 Installation of the Offwing Escape-Slide 2.3 AMM FIGURE 25-62-43-991-00100 / SHEET 2/2 Escape-Slide Assembly 2.4 AMM 25-62-46-000-801 Removal of the Inflation Reservoir 2.5 AMM 25-62-46-400-801 Installation of the Inflation Reservoir 2.6 AMM FIGURE 25-62-46-991-00100 / SHEET 2/2 Inflation Reservoir Assembly 2.7 GOODRICH ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN 4A3931-25A400 revision 1 2.8 AIRBUS TECHNICAL FOLLOW-UP TFU 25.60.00.012

3. REASONS 3.1 FACTS An A340-600 operator has reported the in-flight loss of the blow-out panel and the inflatable assembly from an off-wing ramp-slide. Investigation has not completely identified the root cause of the event. However, the investigation has revealed the two main indicators of a potential slide loss, which are the packboard soft covers not fully closed and the vent valve not activated. 3.2 CONSEQUENCES In flight, the air contained in the inflatable assembly could increase in volume due to changes in air pressure. As a result, pack growth could occur and apply loads on the packboard soft covers and the blow-out panel attachment hardware.A vent valve is used to balance pressure inside the inflatable with the ambient air pressure, and deactivation of this vent valve could lead to pack growth. Analysis indicates that non activation of the vent valve, followed by soft cover opening, could cause the packboard blow-out panel to separate from the slide enclosure. The ramp slide might be pulled from its compartment by the aerodynamic loads, which in turn could cause damage to the aircraft fuselage.
3.3 AIM The aim of this AOT is to specify a one-time inspection of the soft cover condition and check of the vent valve function on each off-wing ramp slide. If the soft covers are observed open or if the sliderelease pin is not fully engaged and not correctly secured with safety tie, or if the vent valve activation check is not successful, the ramp slide must be removed from the aircraft and restored.

4. SHORT-TERM ACTION 4.1 PLANNING AND MANPOWER 4.1.1 ACCOMPLISHMENT TIMESCALE This one-time inspection as per paragraph 4.2 must be performed no later than 3 months from receipt of this AOT. For off-wing ramp slide spares, operators are requested to perform this one-time inspection as per Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 4A3931-25A400 revision 1 paragraph 3 "Accomplishment Instructions" before installation on aircraft. 4.1.2 MANPOWER As per Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 4A3931-25A400 revision 1, the inspection of the off-wing ramp slide can be either done on aircraft or in the workshop. On-aircraft inspection : Total man-hours per aircraft: 3 man-hours Total man-hours per ramp slide: 1.5 man-hours In-workshop inspection : Total man-hours per ramp slide: 0.5 man-hour (off-wing ramp slide removal is not considered) Man-hours may vary depending upon the equipment unit conditions noted during the inspection. 4.2 DESCRIPTION If the inspection is performed in the workshop, proceed as per instructions provided in the Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 4A3931-25A400 revision 1. If the inspection is performed on the aircraft, proceed as follows :
WARNING: •FOLLOW ALL WARNING AND CAUTION NOTES AND PROCEDURES IN THE ••APPLICABLE AIRBUS AMM 25-62-43 PB401 WHEN PERFORMING THE ••FOLLOWING WORK PROCEDURES. 4.2.1 Make sure that the emergency control-handle is set to the disarmed position and that the safety pin is installed according to AMM task 25-62-43-000-801. 4.2.2 Put a warning notice in position to tell persons not to arm the door. 4.2.3 Put an access platform, 5 m (16 ft) – Adjustable in position adjacent to the applicable escape ramp slide on one side of the aircraft. 4.2.4 Safety the applicable Main Landing Gear (MLG) door and flaps according to AMM task 25-62- 43-000-801. 4.2.5 Put a warning notice in position to tell persons not to operate the MLG doors or flaps.4.2.6 Get access to the avionics compartment. Then open, safety and tag this (these) circuit breaker(s):

•••• PANEL••DESIGNATION•••FIN••LOCATION 721VU ••SRPSU NORM• ••1NG ••N14 FOR FIN 7932MX (PRESSURE BOTTLE LH)••• 722VU ••CIDS; DEU B L FWD NORM • 613RH ••A03 743VU ••CIDS DEU B L ESS• •1415RH ••A95 FOR FIN 7933MX (PRESSURE BOTTLE RH)••• 722VU ••CIDS; DEU B R FWD NORM • 614RH ••A04 743VU ••CIDS DEU B R ESS• •1416RH ••A96
4.2.7 Put an access platform, 3 m (10 ft) – Adjustable in position in the wheel well to get access to the inflation reservoir. 4.2.8 In the belly fairing, gain access to the off-wing reservoir assembly. 4.2.9 Install the safety pin in the regulator valve assembly of the inflation reservoir. 4.2.10 Disconnect the pressure hose connection from the inflation reservoir and put a blanking plug on the disconnected line end according to AMM task 25-62-46-000-801. 4.2.11 Perform the inspection as per Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 4A3931-25A400 revision 1 paragraph "Accomplishment Instructions" steps 3.A.(1) to 3.A.(8). 4.2.12 Record findings from paragraphs 4.2.11 on the survey sheet attached to the Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 4A3931-25A400 revision 1. 4.2.13 If an adverse finding is noted from paragraph 4.2.11, remove the off-wing ramp slide at fault and install a serviceable ramp slide prior to the next flight, according to AMM task 25-62-43-400-801. NOTE: •Any adverse condition(s) present on the slide unit can be rectified per Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 4A3931-25A400 revision 1, paragraph 3.H. 4.2.14 Remove the blanking plug from the disconnected line end. Connect the pressure hose connection to the inflation reservoir according to AMM task 25-62-46-400-801. 4.2.15 Move the access platform to the other side of the aircraft and repeat the steps 4.2.1 to 4.2.14. 4.2.16 Put the Aircraft back to its Initial Configuration according to AMM task 25-62-43-400-801. 4.2.17 Make sure the safety pin is removed from the regulator valve assembly of the inflation reservoirs. 4.2.18 Get access to the avionics compartment. Then remove the safety clip(s) and the tag(s) and close this(these) circuit breaker(s): 1NG, 613RH, 1415RH, 614RH and 1416RH. 4.2.19 Remove the warning notices. 4.2.20 Remove the ground support and maintenance equipment, the special and standard tools and all other items.4.3 MATERIAL-TOOLING - Access Platform, 5 m (16 ft) – Adjustable - Access Platform, 3 m (10 ft) – Adjustable - Refer to Airbus AMM tasks 25-62-43-000-801 and 25-62-46-400-801 - Refer to Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 4A3931-25A400 revision 1.

5. FURTHER ACTION The associated Goodrich Packing Instructions have been revised to introduce the vent valve activation check procedure to ensure correct vent valve functioning after off-wing ramp slide packing completion. The Technical Follow-Up TFU 25.60.00.012 will provide operators with investigation results and associated solution status. Inspection findings reported to Airbus will allow Airbus and Goodrich to review and further determine the root cause of this issue.

6. AOT APPROVAL The technical content of this AOT has been approved under EASA Design Organisation Approval EASA.21J.031. It is anticipated that this AOT will be rendered mandatory by issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive.

7. RECORDING/ACKNOWLEDGMENT Operators are requested to acknowledge receipt of this AOT to: Mrs. V. HOLDEN, SEE E-mail: valerie.holden@airbus.com Fax number +33 (0)5 61 93 44 25
Within 48 hours after receipt. This acknowledgement can be made through the Airbus RCSR office when available. This acknowledgement can be made through the Airbus RCSR office when available.
Operators are requested to report inspection findings to: Mr. M. ALAHYANE, SEEC2 Phone: +33 (0)5 67 19 73 12 Fax number +33 (0)5 61 93 44 25 E-mail: mohamed.alahyane@airbus.com
Philippe GOURDON VICE PRESIDENT A330/A340 PROGRAMME CUSTOMER SERVICES DIRECTORATEIf you receive this message via e-mail/internet, we draw your attention to the fact that it may be monitored and/or intercepted. Further, whilst Airbus has taken reasonable measures to ensure the integrity of this message and its contents, no warranty, whether express or implied is given that the contents hereof conform to the original. In case of any doubt, please, retrieve this document from your SITA address or AirbusWorld or request that it be retransmitted by fax or telex.