Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141448

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

JOSHUA JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Third Division

Docket No. 1-14-1448

Rule 23 order filed

Rule 23 order

withdrawn

Opinion filed

Rehearing denied

August 31, 2016

September 16, 2016

September 21, 2016

September 29, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-CR-920(02); 

the Hon. Thaddeus L. Wilson, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed as modified in part and vacated in part.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Emily Filpi, all of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Christine Cook, and Margaret A. Hayes, Assistant State’s Attorneys, 

of counsel), for the People.
- 2 - 

Panel JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Mason concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Joshua Jackson was convicted of armed robbery with a 

firearm and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 21 years’ 

imprisonment for armed robbery with a firearm, which included a 15-year enhancement for 

possessing a firearm during the offense, and 6 years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery with 

a deadly weapon, to be served concurrently. On appeal, defendant asserts that (1) the evidence 

was insufficient to show that the object used in the offense was a firearm; (2) he is entitled to a 

new sentencing hearing in light of recent legislation; (3) his sentence was unconstitutional; and 

(4) the fines, fees, and costs assessed against him must be reduced. We vacate certain fines and 

order that presentence custody credit be applied against others but affirm the judgment in all 

other respects. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On November 22, 2011, two individuals put a gun to Quintin Kimbrough’s back, beat him, 

and absconded with his backpack. Defendant and codefendant Randy McKnight were 

subsequently charged with armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 

2010)), armed robbery with a dangerous weapon (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2010)), 

aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 2010)), and 

aggravated battery on a public way (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2010)). Defendant, who was 

17 years old at the time of the offense, was tried as an adult.1

¶ 4 At trial, Kimbrough testified that at about 7:30 p.m. on the night in question, he was 

walking north on Pulaski when three men approached him. Kimbrough did not recognize them 

at the time but later identified defendant from a photo array and a physical lineup. When they 

asked if Kimbrough had any change, he responded that he did not. The three men then crossed 

the street, but Kimbrough kept an eye on them as they continued walking on Pulaski. After one 

of the men, who was never identified, turned onto a side street, defendant and codefendant 

returned to Kimbrough’s side of the street. 

¶ 5 Pulaski was well-lit from streetlights and automobile headlights. As Kimbrough 

approached a somewhat darker section of Pulaski, he felt “the long piece of a gun” on his upper 

back, just above the top of the backpack he was wearing. Kimbrough acknowledged, however, 

that he had not seen a gun at this point. He quickly said, “You don’t have to do anything. I’ll 

give you [sic] it to you.” Defendant and codefendant told Kimbrough to keep walking and 

subsequently took his backpack, which contained clothes, an iPod, credit cards, and a couple of 

dollars. Defendant and codefendant then pushed Kimbrough into a dark area and instructed 

him not to look back. Despite this instruction, he looked back and was immediately struck in 

his right eye with the handle of a firearm. Furthermore, he recognized the object as a firearm 

because he had seen firearms when visiting relatives who hunt. 

 

1Codefendant apparently pled guilty to armed robbery with a firearm in exchange for a 10-year 
- 3 - 

¶ 6 When Kimbrough fell to the ground, defendant and codefendant began kicking and hitting 

him. After being struck several times, Kimbrough got up and attempted to escape his attackers 

but was hit in his left eye and knocked to the ground again. Eventually, Kimbrough made his 

way into the middle of the street, where a bus driver assisted him. Paramedics took Kimbrough 

to the hospital, where he received treatment for his badly swollen eyes, bruised arms, and 

bruised back. He ultimately had surgery on both eyes. 

¶ 7 Officer Deltoro testified that when he responded to the scene, Kimbrough was “badly 

battered” and “[h]is face, his eye was swollen, his right eye, bloody, very huge, bad shape.” In 

addition, Kimbrough described his attackers as “[t]hree male blacks, young, somewhere 

between the ages of 17 to 21 *** but average height, maybe 5-foot-10 to 6 feet, thin.”

¶ 8 Several witnesses testified on defendant’s behalf. Justin Jackson, defendant’s brother, 

testified that defendant was at school on the day in question. Additionally, Justin, Tamara 

Boughton, and Danisha Cockrell testified that they, as well as defendant, attended basketball 

games in the gym until 7 or 8 p.m. Afterward, Justin waited with Cockrell and defendant for a 

southbound bus, and Boughton crossed the street to wait for a northbound bus. When the 

southbound bus arrived, defendant and Cockrell boarded it. This was the last time Justin and 

Boughton saw defendant that night. Justin testified that at no time did he see defendant with a 

firearm or with codefendant. Additionally, Cockrell testified that she rode the bus with 

defendant until the Pulaski and Lake stop, where he exited the bus and walked up the stairs to 

the Green Line train platform. 

¶ 9 Defendant testified on his own behalf that he neither robbed nor battered Kimbrough and 

was never with codefendant on the day in question. Instead, he spent the day at school and 

subsequently attended basketball games with Justin, Cockrell, and Boughton. Afterward, he 

took the bus home. Although defendant initially told police that he was at wrestling practice 

after school that day, the police reminded him that practice had been cancelled, leading 

defendant to remember that he had been watching basketball instead. 

¶ 10 Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of all counts and 

entered a special finding of great bodily harm. The court ultimately sentenced defendant to 21 

years’ imprisonment for armed robbery with a firearm and 5 years’ imprisonment for 

aggravated battery, to be served concurrently. Defendant’s armed robbery sentence included a 

15-year enhancement for possession of a firearm. 

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 12 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial 

court’s finding that the object used during the offense was a firearm. Specifically, defendant 

argues that Kimbrough lacked the opportunity to identify the object that hit him and was 

unable to adequately describe it. He also argues that no evidence corroborated Kimbrough’s 

testimony that defendant had a firearm.2

¶ 14 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must 

determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been 

 

2Defendant has abandoned his alibi defense on appeal. 
- 4 - 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. We will not 

overturn a criminal conviction except in instances where the evidence is so improbable or 

unsatisfactory as to warrant a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Campbell, 

146 Ill. 2d 363, 374 (1992). Because the trial court is better situated to observe the witnesses, 

that court is entitled to assess their credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw 

reasonable inferences therefrom. People v. Irvine, 379 Ill. App. 3d 116, 132 (2008). Thus, we 

will not substitute the trial court’s credibility assessments with our own. People v. Sutherland, 

223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). Furthermore, this deferential standard equally applies to a trier of 

fact’s assessment of a witness’s testimony that the defendant had a firearm, even where the 

witness was unable to accurately describe the weapon. See People v. Lee, 376 Ill. App. 3d 951, 

956 (2007). 

¶ 15 Under section 18-2(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code), the State must prove that 

the defendant committed a robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 2010)) while he carried a firearm 

“on or about his or her person or [was] otherwise armed with a firearm.” 720 ILCS 

5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010). In addition, section 2-7.5 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/2-7.5 (West 

2010)) has adopted the definition of “firearm” found in section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners 

Identification Card Act: “ ‘Firearm’ means any device, by whatever name known, which is 

designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of gas 

***.” 430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2010). The definition excludes certain items, however, such as 

B-B guns, signaling devices, and antique firearms. Id. Under this broad definition, unequivocal 

testimony that the defendant held a firearm constitutes circumstantial evidence sufficient to 

show the defendant was armed within the meaning of the statute. People v. Fields, 2014 IL 

App (1st) 110311, ¶¶ 36-37. Similarly, courts have consistently held that eyewitness testimony 

that the offender possessed a firearm, combined with circumstances under which the witness 

was able to view the weapon, is sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that the weapon was 

actually a firearm. People v. Davis, 2015 IL App (1st) 121867, ¶ 12; see People v. Wright, 

2015 IL App (1st) 123496, ¶¶ 74, 76, appeal allowed, No. 119561 (Ill. Nov. 25, 2015). 

Consequently, the State need not present a firearm in order for the trier of fact to find the 

defendant possessed one. See People v. Washington, 2012 IL 107993, ¶ 36; People v. Clark, 

2015 IL App (3d) 140036, ¶ 24 (holding that in the absence of a recovered firearm, the 

witnesses’ unequivocal testimony that they observed the defendant carrying a firearm was 

sufficient). 

¶ 16 Here, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find defendant possessed a firearm. 

Kimbrough unequivocally testified that when defendant and codefendant approached him 

from behind, Kimbrough “felt the long piece of a gun” in his back and was told, “Don’t turn 

around, keep walking.” While defendant did not verbally threaten to shoot or kill Kimbrough, 

the trial court could find that defendant implicitly threatened him. See People v. Toy, 407 Ill. 

App. 3d 272, 289 (2011) (finding the evidence sufficient to support aggravated criminal sexual 

assault with a firearm and attempted armed robbery where a victim testified that the defendant 

verbally threatened to kill her when he pressed what she believed to be a gun against her head). 

More importantly, Kimbrough testified that when he turned around to face defendant, “the 

handle of the gun hit [him] in the eye.” See Wright, 2015 IL App (1st) 123496, ¶¶ 75-76 

(rejecting the defendant’s argument that because the witnesses only viewed the handle of the 

firearm, their testimony was insufficient to show the item was a firearm). Kimbrough’s 

unequivocal testimony identifying the object did not reflect speculation or conjecture. Cf.
- 5 - 

People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 335-36 (1998) (observing that “conjecture and 

speculation” are insufficient); People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 277 (2008) (rejecting the 

subjective approach to determining whether a weapon was “dangerous” under the prior version 

of the armed robbery statute). Moreover, Kimbrough’s identification of the part of the firearm 

that hit him indicates that he had sufficient opportunity to observe it. Although the trial court 

could have found that Kimbrough lacked sufficient time to identify the object, the court was 

not required to make that finding. 

¶ 17 We also observe that the record does not support defendant’s assertion that Kimbrough was 

unable to describe the firearm; rather, neither attorney asked whether he could provide 

additional details. In any event, reviewing courts have upheld trial court determinations that 

the defendant possessed a firearm even where very little description of the weapon was 

presented. See Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311, ¶ 37 (finding evidence was sufficient where 

the witness merely described the firearm as black). While reviewing courts have also upheld 

findings that defendants had firearms where more detail was provided, those cases do not 

establish a minimum requirement for showing a defendant possessed a firearm. See Wright, 

2015 IL App (1st) 123496, ¶¶ 7, 9 (finding evidence sufficient where one witness described the 

firearm as an “automatic, black gun” and a second witness described the firearm as a 

9-millimeter pistol); People v. Malone, 2012 IL App (1st) 110517, ¶¶ 4, 52 (finding evidence 

sufficient where video surveillance showed the defendant had a gun in his hand, corroborating 

witness testimony that the defendant yielded a “black or black and silver” firearm).

¶ 18 Moreover, the trial court could find Kimbrough’s familiarity with his family’s hunting 

rifles enhanced his ability to identify the object as a firearm. Although the weapon that hit him 

may not have been a rifle, this court has found that testimony supported a trial court’s finding 

that the defendant had a firearm even where the witness had no prior experience with any 

firearm. See id. ¶¶ 51-52. Additionally, no evidence suggested that Kimbrough was hit with 

anything but a firearm. See Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311, ¶ 37 (finding “[t]here [was] no 

evidence suggesting the gun falls within the statutory exception to the general, broad definition 

of a firearm in the FOID Act”). Finally, we note that the trial court was well aware that no 

weapon was recovered but implicitly found the lack of physical evidence did not undermine 

Kimbrough’s credibility. We cannot substitute the trial court’s credibility determination with 

our own. 

¶ 19 B. New Juvenile Legislation 

¶ 20 1. Juvenile Jurisdiction and Transfer 

¶ 21 Next, defendant asserts in a supplemental brief that he is entitled to a new sentencing 

hearing in juvenile court in light of Public Act 99-258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), which amended the 

automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 ILCS 

405/5-130 (West 2014)). At the time of the offense, section 5-130 effectively excluded 

defendants charged with armed robbery with a firearm from juvenile court proceedings. 705 

ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2010). Following Public Act 99-258, however, armed robbery with a 

firearm no longer excludes a defendant from that court. Pub. Act 99-258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) 

(amending 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2014)). 

¶ 22 In response, the State contends that Public Act 99-258 does not apply retroactively. Two 

divisions of the First District of this court recently reached different conclusions in this regard. 

People v. Hunter, 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶ 71; People v. Patterson, 2016 IL App (1st) 
- 6 - 

101573-B, ¶ 15. Even assuming this most recent amendment to section 5-130 applies 

retroactively, it would not help this defendant because another factor disqualified him from 

being subject to juvenile proceedings: his age at the time of the offense. In reaching this 

determination, we begin by considering the impact of Public Act 98-61 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) on 

section 5-120. Although the parties have failed to address this statute, section 5-130 is a mere 

exception to section 5-120. 

¶ 23 We review questions of statutory construction de novo. People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669, 

¶ 10. In addition, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine the legislature’s 

intent. Id. ¶ 11. To determine whether a statutory amendment is to be applied retroactively, 

however, we must apply the more specific two-step approach set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film 

Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 

2d 27, 39 (2001). Pursuant to Landgraf, courts must first determine whether the legislature has 

clearly indicated the amended statute’s temporal reach; if so, courts must give such intent 

effect, absent a constitutional prohibition. People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc., 2015 IL 

117193, ¶ 29. If the legislature has not provided the statute’s temporal reach, however, courts 

must proceed to the second step, which requires determining whether applying the statute 

would involve a retroactive impact. Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 38. If 

retrospective application would result in a retroactive impact or inequitable consequences, we 

must presume that the legislature did not intend such an application. J.T. Einoder, Inc., 2015 IL 

117193, ¶ 30. 

¶ 24 At the time of the offense, section 5-120, the Juvenile Act’s exclusive jurisdiction 

provision, stated, in pertinent part, as follows: 

“Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning any 

minor who prior to the minor’s 17th birthday has violated *** any federal or State law 

*** and any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has violated *** any federal, 

State, county or municipal law or ordinance classified as a misdemeanor offense. *** 

Except as provided in Section[ ] *** 5–130, *** no minor who was under 17 years of 

age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this 

State.” (Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2010). 

Thus, unless charged with a misdemeanor, a defendant must be under 17 years old at the time 

of the offense to be subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Even if a defendant was under 

17 years old at that time, he will not be tried as a juvenile if section 5-130 applies. Under 

section 5-130(a)(1), “[t]he definition of delinquent minor under Section 5–120 of this Article 

shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who 

is charged with: *** armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm.”

705 ILCS 405/5-130(a)(1) (West 2010).

¶ 25 There is no dispute that defendant was charged with felonies, not misdemeanors. At the 

time of the offense, defendant was 17 years old, not under 17 years old as required for section 

5-120 to apply. Thus, defendant did not fall within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, regardless 

of section 5-130. Although the exception found in section 5-130 would also have removed him 

from the juvenile court due to the crime with which he was charged, we need not consider 

whether the exception to the general rule applies where the general rule is itself inapplicable. 

¶ 26 We recognize that after defendant committed this offense, the legislature enacted Public 

Act 98-61, which amended section 5-120 to include minors who commit felonies before their 

eighteenth birthday. 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2014). With that said, the amendment contains 
- 7 - 

a savings clause. People v. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶ 3. Specifically, the amendment to 

section 5-120 stated, “[t]he changes made to this Section by this amendatory Act of the 98th 

General Assembly apply to violations or attempted violations committed on or after the 

effective date of this amendatory Act.” 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2014). Thus, the legislature 

has clearly indicated this amendment’s temporal reach: defendants who commit felonies 

before their eighteenth birthday are subject to juvenile proceedings only if they committed the 

charged offenses on or after January 1, 2014, the effective date of Public Act 98-61. 

¶ 27 Here, defendant’s initial brief conceded that the amendment did not apply to him and that 

he did not fall within juvenile jurisdiction under section 5-120. We agree. The offense at hand 

occurred well before 2014. Consequently, as a 17-year-old, he was not subject to juvenile 

proceedings. Because defendant never fell within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 

section 5-120, section 5-130 could not have removed him from that court. Even assuming the 

changes that Public Act 99-258 made to section 5-130 apply retroactively, defendant would 

nonetheless have been tried as an adult. 

¶ 28 2. Juvenile Sentencing 

¶ 29 We also reject defendant’s contention that he should be resentenced based on the recently 

enacted section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Pub. Act 99-69 (eff. Jan. 1, 

2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105)). Pursuant to Public Act 99-69 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), and 

Public Act 99-258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), our legislature has provided that “[o]n or after the 

effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly, when a person commits 

an offense and the person is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, 

the court” must consider specific sentencing factors applicable to juveniles. Pub. Act 99-69 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105). Trial courts also now have discretion to 

decline to impose firearm enhancements, such as the enhancement applied to defendant’s 

sentence. Id.

¶ 30 Even assuming the amendment’s prefatory language is not an unambiguous indicator of its 

temporal reach, this new statute cannot be applied to defendant. Where the statute at issue is 

silent as to temporal reach, section 4 of the Statute on Statutes controls the first step of the 

Landgraf inquiry. Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 91-92 (2003). Section 4 states as follows: 

“No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is 

expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to 

any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right accrued, or 

claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense 

or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or 

any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the 

proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the 

time of such proceeding. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any 

provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be 

applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. This section shall 

extend to all repeals, either by express words or by implication, whether the repeal is in 

the act making any new provision upon the same subject or in any other act.” 

(Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2010). 

Under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, legislative enactments can constitute a substantive 

change or a procedural change, or they can mitigate the sentence. People v. Gancarz, 228 Ill. 
- 8 - 

2d 312, 319, 321-22 (2008). Although this third category of enactments arises less frequently, 

our supreme court has found that the language concerning the mitigation of punishment means 

that a defendant sentenced before the effective date of the sentencing amendment at issue is not 

subject to the amendment. People v. Bradford, 106 Ill. 2d 492, 504 (1985); People v. Hansen, 

28 Ill. 2d 322, 340-41 (1963); see also Gancarz, 228 Ill. 2d at 318 (observing that mitigating 

the available sentence is not a substantive change). 

¶ 31 As stated, defendant was sentenced well before the effective date of section 5-4.5-105. 

Accordingly, section 5-4.5-105 does not entitle defendant to any relief. 

¶ 32 C. Unconstitutional Legislation Regarding Juveniles 

¶ 33 Defendant further asserted in his initial brief that the Juvenile Act’s jurisdiction provisions 

(705 ILCS 405/5-120, 5-130 (West 2010)), as well as the mandatory firearm enhancement 

(720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2010)), and the truth-in-sentencing provision, are unconstitutional 

(730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), (iii) (West 2010)). In his reply brief, however, defendant concedes 

that his assertion was foreclosed by People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102. He maintains his 

position solely to preserve this matter for further appeal. In light of his concession, we need not 

consider this issue further. 

¶ 34 D. Fines and Fees 

¶ 35 Finally, defendant asserts, and the State concedes, that the $10 mental health charge (55 

ILCS 5/5-1101(d-5) (West 2010)), $5 youth division charge (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(e) (West 

2010)), the $5 drug court charge (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010)), the $30 Children’s 

Advocacy charge (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f-5) (West 2010)), the $15 State Police operations charge 

(705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5) (West 2010)), and the $50 court system fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c) 

(West 2010)) must be offset by $5-per-day presentence custody credit (725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) 

(West 2010)). 3 Although defendant also asserts that the $2 State’s Attorney records 

automation fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(c) (West 2012)) constitutes a fine subject to offset, the 

State disagrees. We adhere to our prior determination that this charge is not a fine subject to 

offset. People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 16; People v. Rogers, 2014 IL App (4th) 

121088, ¶ 30.

¶ 36 With that said, the State concedes that the $2 public defender records automation fee (55 

ILCS 5/3-4012 (West 2012)) should be vacated because defendant was represented by private 

counsel. In addition, defendant asserts that the court improperly assessed against him the $25 

Violent Crime Victim Assistance (VCVA) fine (725 ILCS 240/10(c)(1) (West 2010)). The 

State contends that the $25 fine was miscellaneous, not the VCVA fine, but agrees that the fine 

should be vacated. Accordingly, we vacate $27 in assessments and order that $115 in 

assessments be offset with presentence custody credit. 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 38 The evidence was sufficient for the trier of fact to find that defendant possessed a firearm at 

the time of the offense. In addition, recent legislation does not warrant further proceedings. We 

agree, however, that the fines and fees order must be modified consistent with this decision. 

 

3Defendant was awarded 805 days of presentence custody credit. 
- 9 - 

¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed as modified in part and vacated in part. 

¶ 40 Affirmed as modified in part and vacated in part.