J-S01034-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KWAME MASSINA

Appellant No. 2724 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 13, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0001680-2008

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2016

Appellant, Kwame Massina, appeals from the order entered in the 

Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition brought 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case.2 Therefore, we have no reason to 

restate them. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

2 The court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition by order dated August 12, 

2014, and docketed August 13, 2014. The record makes clear that 

Appellant gave his notice of appeal to prison authorities for mailing on 

September 12, 2014. Thus, pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, Appellant 

timely filed his notice of appeal. 
J-S01034-16

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WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 

COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW AND DENYING [APPELLANT’S] 

PCRA PETITION, WHERE [PCRA] COUNSEL’S 

TURNER/FINLEY3LETTER WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT? 

WHETHER PCRA COUNSEL’S “NO-MERIT” LETTER FAILED 

TO DETAIL THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF [PCRA] 

COUNSEL’S REVIEW OF THE MERITS OF EACH OF THOSE 

CLAIMS? 

WHETHER PCRA COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE HE FAILED TO 

INVESTIGATE, RAISE AND ADDRESS ALL OF THE ISSUES 

PRESENTED IN [APPELLANT’S] PRO SE PCRA PETITION? 

WHETHER PCRA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING 

TO DO A PROPER INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 

RECORD? 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 

[PCRA] COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW AND DENYING 

[APPELLANT’S] PCRA PETITION, WHEREIN PCRA COUNSEL 

FAILED TO CONTEMPORANEOUSLY SUPPLY [APPELLANT] 

WITH A COPY OF [PCRA] COUNSEL’S MOTION TO 

WITHDRAW AND WITH BOTH A COPY OF THE “NO-MERIT” 

LETTER AND A STATEMENT ADVISING THAT IN THE EVENT 

THE COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW, HE HAS 

THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE OR HIRE COUNSEL? 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

[APPELLANT’S] PRO SE NUNC PRO TUNC OBJECTION TO 

PCRA COUNSEL’S TURNER/FINLEY LETTER? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5).4

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

____________________________________________

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 

4

For purposes of disposition, we have reordered Appellant’s issues. 
J-S01034-16

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examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s 

determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101, 108 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference 

to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those 

findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such 

deference, however, to the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. 

Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa.Super. 2012). The PCRA court findings will 

not be disturbed unless the certified record provides no support for the 

findings. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1040 (Pa.Super. 

2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 715, 951 A.2d 1163 (2008). There is no right 

to a PCRA hearing; a hearing is unnecessary where the PCRA court can 

determine from the record that there are no genuine issues of material fact. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal 

denied, 598 Pa. 764, 956 A.2d 433 (2008). 

The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When 

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is 

required to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit, 

(2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction, and, 

(3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable 
J-S01034-16

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probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 312, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999). 

The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the 

claim to fail. Williams, supra. 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Douglas G. 

Reichley, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed January 28, 2015, at 9-14) 

(finding: (issues 1-4) PCRA counsel filed lengthy and detailed “no merit” 

letter with his petition to withdraw, in which he thoroughly reviewed all 

forty-two issues raised in Appellant’s pro se supplemental PCRA petition; 

PCRA counsel properly and thoroughly addressed each of Appellant’s issues 

throughout “no merit” letter; where Appellant’s issues were not patently 

meritless, PCRA counsel documented what steps he took to review merits of 

issue; where issues were patently legally meritless, PCRA counsel properly 

noted this in “no merit” letter; except for issues that were patently legally 

meritless, PCRA counsel provided detailed explanation of nature and extent 

of his review of issues and why he determined issues were meritless; PCRA 

counsel noted he spoke with trial counsel, reviewed trial transcripts, and 

reviewed record prior to preparation of “no merit” letter; court reviewed 

PCRA counsel’s “no merit” letter and concluded it addressed each issue in 
J-S01034-16

- 5 -

Appellant’s pro se supplemental PCRA petition; PCRA counsel conducted 

complete review of record and took every necessary step to discern whether 

Appellant had any ground for PCRA relief; “no merit” letter complied with 

dictates of Turner/Finley and court properly granted PCRA counsel’s 

petition to withdraw; (issue 5) in “no merit” letter mailed to Appellant, 

PCRA counsel informed Appellant that he could either represent himself or 

hire new counsel if court permitted PCRA counsel to withdrawal; at July 15, 

2014 hearing on PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw, court further informed 

Appellant of status of his case and detailed Appellant’s options after court 

granted PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw; Appellant was aware of petition 

to withdraw and his options moving forward prior to 7/15/14 hearing; thus, 

court properly granted PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw (issue 6) court 

denied Appellant’s pro se nunc pro tunc objection because it was 

procedurally improper, untimely and meritless; at July 15, 2014 hearing, 

court granted PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw and issued notice of its 

intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (“Rule 907 notice”); on August 6, 2014, Appellant filed 

timely response to court’s Rule 907 notice; on August 12, 2014, after review 

of Appellant’s response to court’s Rule 907 notice and Appellant’s PCRA 

petition, court determined dismissal without hearing was appropriate 

because no arguably meritorious grounds for relief existed; on August 28, 

2014, Appellant filed pro se nunc pro tunc objection to PCRA counsel’s “no 
J-S01034-16

- 6 -

merit” letter after court had already dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition; 

under these circumstances, court properly denied Appellant’s August 28, 

2014 objection as untimely because Appellant’s August 6, 2014 response to 

Rule 907 notice demonstrated Appellant’s understanding of status of his 

case). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/24/2016
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By the Court: 

the above-captioned matter to the Superior Court forthwith. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Courts, Criminal, transmit the record of 

the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (a); 

IT FURTHER APPEARING that the accompanying Memorandum Opinion satisfies 

matter; 

IT APPEARING that the Appellant has filed a Notice of Appeal in the above-captioned 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this) 77JLY of Jan~ary, 2015, 

KWAME MASSINA, 

Appellant 

No. 1680 of 2008 

2724 EDA 2014 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

vs. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTYPENNSYL VANIA, 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

Circulated 01/26/2016 02:59 PM
2 

bleeding profusely from his head. The man, later identified as William "Big Will" Spearman, 

When Officer Rush went back to Trinkle's Bar, he found a man on his back on the floor 

Officer Rush lost sight of the man as he ran east on Turner Street and then north on Law Street. 

from the scene dressed in dark clothing and a hoodie who was identified as possessing a gun. 

holding pool cues or alcoholic drinks. The bar patrons pointed out a medium-build man running 

Pennsylvania. Officer Rush saw roughly two dozen people leaving the bar, some of whom were 

fight outside Trinkle's Bar in the 500 block of Turner Street in Allentown, Lehigh County, 

Police Department was on routine patrol when he witnessed what he believed to be a large scale 

On January 31, 2008 at approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer Jeffrey Rush of the Allentown 

Factual History 

PCRA petition was meritless and the instant appeal should be dismissed. 

Pa.C.S.A § 9541 et seq. on September 8, 2014. For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant's 

this Court's dismissal of his Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition pursuant to 42 

·:?. . c..,'.'> 

Douglas G. Re1e_!,!~y, J. ·:_,, 

..... · .,,,,.,,, 

Kwame Massina, Appellant, filed a Notice of Appeal on September 23, 2014 follo1hf 

January 27, 2015 ./ 

-~ : ... , .. 

1925(a) Opinion 

No. 1680 of 2008 

2752 EDA 2012 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

KW AME MASSINA, ) 

Appellant ) 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTYPENNSYLVANIA, 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 
3 

Ms. Iris Rodriguez was also at the bar that night. While in the ladies bathroom, Rodriguez 

heard a loud argument. When she came out of the bathroom, Rodriguez began to speak with 

Morales when she saw the Appellant leave from the mens' bathroom, then go back in, followed 

by a struggle between the Appellant and Spearman. Ms. Rodriguez saw Appellant with a gun and 

then heard shots ring out. 

The bartender Edward Reid also heard a loud bang and saw patrons fleeing from one end 

of the bar. Mr. Reid then saw the victim on the floor bleeding and called 911. 

At the scene of the shooting, the police recovered a New York Yankees baseball hat from the 

pool table close to the victim. Surveillance videotape from within the bar showed the suspect 

wearing a Yankees hat. DNA evidence recovered from inside the Yankees hat was compared the 

Appellant's known DNA profile. While the DNA analysis could not determine a match with the 

Appellant, the analysis did determine that 1 in 2,700 unrelated Caucasians, 1 in 3,900 unrelated 

African-Americans, and 1 in 3,200 unrelated Hispanics would be expected to be included in the 

DNA mixture found on the Yankees hat headband. 

was unresponsive and had a large neck wound. The officer noticed the faint smell of gunpowder 

in the bar. Spearman later died. 

Officer Rush saw a woman, Margarita Morales, was giving CPR to the victim. Ms. 

Morales later related to the police she had been in the bar for about 7 hours when she noticed the 

victim and a man identified as the Appellant coming out of the bathroom in the bar and having a 

physical struggle. During this struggle, Ms. Morales saw the Appellant with a gun and heard two 

gunshots. After the gunfire, Morales saw Spearman slump to the floor and people running from 

the bar. 
4 

An autopsy revealed the victim died from multiple gunshot wounds. The manner of death 

was identified as homicide. 

Further analysis of the surveillance videotape from the bar showed the struggle between 

the victim and the shooter. The victim was seen on the floor with the shooter standing over him 

holding a gun while wearing a Yankees hat. However, the shooter's face was partially obscured 

by a hoodie. 

Upon reviewing a photographic array, Mr. Reid identified the Appellant as the shooter, 

but admitted he could only be 60% sure of his identification. Ms. Rodriguez and Ms. Morales 

viewed the same photo array and both identified the Appellant as the shooter. 

At trial, the Commonwealth also presented testimony from Charles Sumpter, a cellmate of the 

Appellant. Sumpter testified the Appellant confessed to shooting Spearman and that the 

Appellant revealed various details of the homicide which had not been disclosed in press 

accounts about the shooting, including where the Appellant placed the gun after the shooting. 

The gun though was never recovered by the police. 

Procedural History 

Appellant was convicted on September 4, 2009 following a jury trial on one count of 

Criminal Homicide graded by the jury as Murder in the First Degree. The Appellant was 

sentenced by the Honorable Lawrence J. Brenner on October 151 2009 to life imprisonment 

without parole. 

On October 23, 2009, the Appellant filed post-sentence motions including a Motion for 

Judgment of Acquittal/Motion in Arrest of Judgment and for a New Trial; a Motion challenging 

the Sufficiency of the Evidence; and a Motion Challenging the Verdict as against the Weight of 

the Evidence. Those motions were denied on February 1, 2010. A Notice of Appeal was filed on 
5 

or about February 24, 2010. On appeal, the Appellant challenged the decision of the Suppression 

Court in denying the omnibus pretrial motion to suppress identification of the Appellant from a 

photo array, the trial court's decision to allow a videotape into evidence before the jury, the trial 

court's decision to deny the Appellant's motion in limine to exclude DNA evidence, and the trial 

court's denial of the Appellant's post-trial motions challenging the weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on October 28, 2010. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a petition for allowance of appeal on March 16, 2011. 

The Appellant was originally represented by Attorney Dennis Charles of the Lehigh 

County Public Defender's Office. However, on January 26, 2009, that office was granted 

permission to withdraw as counsel for the Appellant, and Kimberly Mak.oul, Esq. was appointed 

by the Honorable Kelly L. Banach to represent the Appellant. Upon the filing of the PCRA 

petition on March 16, 2012, the undersigned appointed Robert Long, Esq. as PCRA counsel on 

March 19, 2012. Subsequent to his review of the facts of this case and the applicable caselaw, 

Attorney Long filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel following his submission of a "Finley" 

letter indicating there were not any cognizable grounds for relief under the PCRA statute. 

On June 5, 2012, following a hearing attended by the Appellant and his court-appointed 

counsel, the Court granted Attorney Long's petition to withdraw as counsel and indicated the 

Court's intention to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The 

Court granted the Appellant 90 days to respond to the notice from the Court of the intention to 

dismiss the PCRA petition or to allege any other grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel not 

previously specified. The Appellant filed a responsive pleading on August 20, 2012. 

On August 22, 2012, the Court denied and dismissed the PCRA petition. The Appellant 

mailed a Notice of Appeal from this order on September 21, 2012. The Appellant was directed to 
6 

file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. After granting the Appellant 

additional time to file his 1925(b) Statement until November 9, 2012, the Appellant filed his 

Concise Statement on October 31, 2012. Appellant's Concise Statement alleged thirty-eight (38) 

grounds for relief. 

The Court prepared its 1925(a) Opinion addressing each ground for relief. In addition to 

authoring that opinion, the Court separately advised the Superior Court that it determined that 

counsel's Turner/Finley letter was legally insufficient and indicated that a remand would be 

appropriate. 

On August 15, 2013, the Superior Court remanded the case pursuant to this Court's letter 

request. Upon receiving the Superior Court's opinion, this Court ordered that David D. Ritter, 

Esq. be appointed to represent Appellant in his PCRA petition. The Court afforded Attorney 

Ritter sixty days to file either an Amended PCRA petition or an appropriate Turner/Finley letter. 

Appellant filed a pro se thirty-page document entitled "Amended/Supplement to 

P.C.R.A. Petition" on September 4, 2013. Because counsel had been appointed, the Court 

forwarded that petition to Attorney Ritter for review without acting on it. 

Attorney Ritter was a conflicts attorney for Lehigh County at the time of his appointment 

to this case. However, he resigned from that position effective November 15, 2013. Attorney 

Ritter notified Appellant of that determination by letter dated October 18, 2013. In the same 

letter, Attorney Ritter indicated that he would be requesting a ninety-day extension to file an 

Amended PCRA Petition so that his replacement in the conflict counsel position could have 

adequate time to review the case. 

Appellant wrote to the Court to communicate his concern about Attorney Ritter's 

retirement from the conflicts position and the lack of communication Attorney Ritter had with 
7 

Appellant regarding the instant case. The Court wrote a letter back to Appellant informing him 

that new counsel would be appointed and the Court would properly allow adequate time for that 

attorney to review the matter and file whatever was appropriate. 

Attorney Sean T. Poll was hired as conflicts counsel and was advised that he would be 

assigned to Appellant's case in late-2013 or early 2014. Attorney Poll contacted the Court in 

early-January 2014 to discuss the procedural status of the case and the time deadlines applicable 

thereto. On January 16, 2014, the Court again responded to a correspondence from Appellant 

regarding the status of his counsel. 

On January 27, 2014, Attorney Poll was formally appointed to Appellant's case. He was 

given ninety (90) days to file an Amended PCRA or a Turner/Finley letter at his discretion. 

On April 21, 2014, Attorney Poll filed a petition requesting an extension of time for an 

additional thirty days, citing the fact that he was still waiting on trial counsel's files and had not 

been able to review all of the relevant materials. The Court granted the extension on April 22, 

2014 and afforded counsel an additional thirty days. 

On May 22, 2014, Attorney Poll filed a formal Motion to Withdraw. Unlike the prior 

Turner/Finley letter filed in 2012, Attorney Poll's motion thoroughly discussed each of 

Appellant's forty-two (42) issues on appeal and explained that all of them were either meritless 

or not cognizable under the PCRA. The Court reviewed that motion and found that it was 

appropriate. Accordingly, the Court placed Appellant on notice of its intent to dismiss his PCRA 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 by order dated July 15, 2014. On July 15, 2014, the Court orally 

granted Attorney Poll's motion to withdraw as counsel. Appellant filed a response on August 6, 

2014. 
8 

2 While the Court had previously granted Attorney Poll's motion to withdraw, through an oversight, a written order 

was never generated. The October 1, 2014 order created a record entry consistent with the oral grant of Attorney 

Poll's motion on July 15, 2014. 

1 Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, the Court treated the appeal as timely because it was dated September 12, 

2014. 

This Opinion follows. 

On January 21, 2015, Attorney Rapa filed the Concise Statement for Appellant. 

Statement, which the Court granted the same day. 

On December 22, 2014, Attorney Rapa requested additional time to file his Concise 

granted on October 27, 2014. 

2014, Attorney Rapa requested additional time to file a Concise Statement, which the Court 

Court forwarded that filing to Attorney Rapa for his consideration and review. On October 23, 

Concise Statement on October 9, 2014, but because counsel had already been appointed, the 

counsel to Appellant for appellate purposes, Attorney Matthew Rapa. Appellant filed a pro se 

Also on October 1, 2014, out of an abundance of caution, the Court appointed new 

Attorney Poll from representation of Appellant. 2 

PCRA to the Lehigh County Prothonotary. On the same day, the Court entered an order releasing 

On October 1, 2014, Appellant submitted a pro se letter regarding the dismissal of his 

Court ordered Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. 

On September 23, 2014, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.' On September 26, 2014, the 

of merit. 

dismissed in an order with a footnote explaining that the PCRA was dismissed based on its lack 

Appellant filed a pro se "Nunc Pro Tune Objection to Finley/Turner Letter," which the Court 

Appellant raised, the Court denied and dismissed Appellant's PCRA. On August 28, 2014, 

On August 12, 2014, after careful review of Attorney Poll's letter and the issues 
9 

Discussion 

Appellant raises six issues on appeal, all with respect to the Court allowing Attorney Poll 

to withdraw as counsel. In summary form, these issues are as follows: 

1. PCRA counsel's Turner/Finley letter was legally insufficient; 

2. PCRA counsel failed to address all of Appellant's issues; 

3. PCRA counsel's letter failed to detail the nature and extent of counsel's review of 

each of the issues being raised; 

4. The Court erred in permitting PCRA counsel to withdraw based on counsel's 

alleged failure to contemporaneously supply Appellant with a copy of the motion 

to withdraw and a copy of the no-merit letter; 

5. The Court erred in denying Appellant's prose Nunc Pro Tune objection to the 

Turner/Finley letter; 

6. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a proper independent review 

of the record. 

Each of these issues is discussed herein. Preliminarily, in order to be eligible for relief 

under the PCRA, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction 

or sentence resulted from a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the federal Constitution, 

or ineffective assistance of counsel which so undermined the truth-determining process that no 

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 17 

A.3d 297 (Pa. Super. 2011). There is not any requirement that the PCRA court hold a hearing on 

every issue a petitioner raises. Commonwealth v. Clark, 599 Pa. 204, 961 A.2d 80 (2008). After 

the PCRA court dismisses a PCRA without a hearing, a defendant must show that he raised a 

genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the 
10 

lengthy and detailed "no-merit" letter was attached to counsel's motion to withdraw. 

Addressing each of these requirements in turn, first, the record clearly reflects that a 

Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607, 615 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

1) As part of an application to withdraw as counsel, PCRA counsel must attach to 

the application a "no-merit" letter, 

2) PCRA counsel must, in the "no-merit" letter, list each claim the petitioner 

wishes to have reviewed, and detail the nature and extent of counsel's review of 

the merits of each of those claims, 

3) PCRA counsel must set forth in the "no-merit" letter an explanation of why the 

petitioner's issues are meritless, 

4) PCRA counsel must contemporaneously forward to the petitioner a copy of the 

application to withdraw, which must include (i) a copy of both the "no-merit" 

letter, and (ii) a statement advising the PCRA petitioner that, in the event the trial 

court grants the application of counsel to withdraw, the petitioner has the right to 

proceed prose, or with the assistance of privately retained counsel; 

5) the court must conduct its own independent review of the record in the light of 

the PCRA petition and the issues set forth therein, as well as of the contents of the 

petition of PCRA counsel to withdraw; and 

6) the court must agree with counsel that the petition is meritless. 

follows: 

withdrawal request were specifically and succinctly articulated in Commonwealth v. Friend as 

The requirements of a Turner/Finley letter and dismissal granting appointed counsel's 

Accordingly, the first issue on appeal is the legal sufficiency of that second letter. 

counsel filed his own Turner/Finley letter, which was much more detailed than the initial one. 

insufficient. Once new counsel was appointed and had sufficient time to review Appellant's case, 

the Court, upon further review while preparing an opinion for the appeal, determined was legally 

This case is somewhat unique because prior counsel had filed a Turner/Finley letter that 

Issues 1, 2, 3, and 6: Legal Sufficiency of Turner/Finley Letter and PCRA Counsel's 

Investigation 

431 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 AJd 
11 

issue an illegal sentence in violation of the Tarver decision?" Appellant was convicted of first 

example, the second issue Appellant sought to pursue was, "Was it Governmental interference to 

facially or legally meritless and it was sufficient for counsel to simply note that as the case. For 

indicated what steps he took to review the merits of the issue. In other instances, issues were 

addressed each issue. In those instances where issues were not patently meritless, counsel 

Consistently throughout the Turner/Finley letter, counsel properly and thoroughly 

because Attorney Makoul presented an effective case. 

that Attorney Poll reviewed the trial transcript and concluded that the issue was meritless 

Makoul, his trial counsel, was ineffective for failing to present issues well. The letter indicates 

Another example is in issue number 14 where Appellant sought to argue that Attorney 

doorknob. 

because by the time she was assigned to his case, too much time had passed to viably test the 

spoke to defense counsel who indicated she did not have a specific door knob at issue tested 

sustain its burden of proof. As for defense counsel not requesting that it be tested, Attorney Poll 

not test everything found at a crime scene; its only obligation is to acquire sufficient evidence to 

scene. However, in Attorney Poll's letter, he accurately indicated that the Commonwealth need 

Commonwealth and defense counsel failed to test certain physical evidence found at the crime 

By way of example, in the first issue, Appellant sought to argue that both the 

I 

forty-two (42) issues Appellant sought to raise in his PCRA. 

for the Superior Court to review. In counsel's letter, counsel thoroughly reviews each of the 

withdraw, the Court reviewed the contents of the letter in thorough detail. The letter is of record 

Regarding the substantive merits of the letter, prior to granting counsel's motion to 
12 

degree murder, and as Attorney Poll properly noted, the penalty for first degree murder is life 

imprisonment, rendering this claim meritless. 

In sum, in his Turner/Finley letter, Attorney Poll thoroughly and properly reviewed every 

issue Appellant sought to raise and explained very clearly and concisely what steps he undertook 

to review that issue and why it was meritless. Accordingly, the first issue on appeal alleging legal 

insufficiency of the letter is meritless. 

Next, as discussed in detail both above and in the body of the Turner/Finley letter, 

counsel thoroughly investigated and addressed each of Appellant's issues in preparing the letter. 

Counsel detailed the nature and extent of his review of every single issue except in those 

circumstances where the issues were facially legally meritless. This included conducting 

conversations with Appellant's trial counsel, reviewing the transcript of the trial, and reviewing 

the record wherever appropriate. 

All of these actions.render Appellant's first, second, third, and sixth issues on appeal 

meritless. The Court reviewed the Turner/Finley letter and concluded that it thoroughly 

addressed every issue Appellant sought to raise in his PCRA. The letter further demonstrated that 

counsel took every necessary step to review each of these issues so as to properly conduct a 

complete review of the record in order to discern whether there was any ground for PCRA relief. 

As a result, the Turner/Finley letter was legally sufficient and counsel was properly permitted to 

withdraw as a consequence. 

Issue 4: PCRA Counsel's Compliance with Procedural Requirements 

Appellant argues that counsel failed to provide him the proper notice of his 

options pursuant to the requirements of filing a withdrawal motion with a Turner/Finley 

letter. "PCRA counsel must contemporaneously forward to the petitioner a copy of the 
13 

Additionally, on July 15, 2014, the Court conducted a hearing in consideration of 

counsel's motion to withdraw during which Appellant was provided notice on the record 

of the status of his PCRA and his options following the Court's decision to grant the 

withdrawal petition. 

Accordingly, this issue is meritless and no relief is due. 

Issue 5: Dismissal of Appellant's Pro Se Objection to Turner/Finley Letter 

The final issue on appeal involves the Court's dismissal of a pro se filing 

objecting to Attorney Poll's Turner/Finley letter. The filing was dismissed because it was 

procedurally improper, untimely, and meritless. A brief review of the relevant procedural 

history sheds some light on this issue. 

On May 22, 2014, PCRA counsel filed his withdrawal motion along with the 

Turner/Finley letter. The Court scheduled a hearing for July 15, 2014 because of the 

procedural issues that had previously impacted this case so that Appellant could be 

[9].) 

application to withdraw, which must include (i) a copy of both the "no-merit" letter, and 

(ii) a statement advising the PCRA petitioner that, in the event the trial court grants the 

application of counsel to withdraw, the petitioner has the right to proceed pro se, or with 

the assistance of privately retained counsel." Friend, 896 A.2d at 615. 

In this case, at the end of counsel's letter, he explains, "I have enclosed a copy of 

the Petition to Withdraw as Counsel with this attached letter, which I will be filing with 

the court. If the court permits me to withdraw, you will have the option of either 

representing yourself or hiring counsel of your own choosing." (Turner/Finley letter, at 
14 

advised on the record of what was transpiring and be given a full and fair opportunity to 

object. 

At the July 15, 2014 hearing, it was explained that the motion to withdraw would 

be granted and that Appellant would be afforded notice of the Court's intent to dismiss 

his PCRA without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant was given 

appropriate time to respond. In fact, Appellant did file a type-written response on August 

6, 2014 to the Court's notice. 

The Court reviewed that response and the issues Appellant sought to raise and 

determined that there was no arguably meritorious ground for relief necessitating a 

hearing. Accordingly, the PCRA was denied and dismissed on August 12, 2014. 

On August 28, 2014, Appellant filed a prose document entitled "Nunc Pro Tune 

Objection to Finley/Turner Letter. By that time, the PCRA had already been dismissed. 

Additionally, Appellant demonstrated his cognizance of the time frame because he timely 

filed a response to the Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss. 

In contrast to the August 6, 2014 response, the August 28, 2014 filing was 

untimely. It also failed to raise anything meritorious. Accordingly, it was properly 

dismissed. 
15 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the instant appeal is meritless. PCRA counsel was given ample 

time to prepare and to conduct an independent investigation of the issues. The Turner/Finley 

letter thoroughly and properly addresses all of the issues Appellant sought to raise and explains 

why they are not meritorious or are improper for PCRA review. Additionally, the letter properly 

advised Appellant of his rights as required by governing case law. Finally, Appellant's pro se 

filing on August 28, 2014 was properly dismissed in light of the procedural posture of the case. 

Consequently, Appellant's PCRA was properly dismissed and the within appeal is meritless. The 

Court respectfully recommends that its dismissal of Appellant's PCRA be affirmed. 

By the Court: