UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TERRANCE M. FARRELL, III, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, 

COLORADO; GREG KELLERMEYER; 

ANY INSURANCE CARRIER FOR 

GREG KELLERMEYER; MEDICAL 

ADMINISTRATOR OF DOWNTOWN 

DENVER DETENTION CENTER; 

PATIENT ADVOCATE FOR DENVER 

HEALTH MEDICAL CENTER; DENVER 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL 

AUTHORITY; DENVER COUNTY 

SHERIFF GARY WILSON; DENVER 

SHERIFF DEPUTY MICKELSON; 

DENVER SHERIFF DEPUTY 

SHERROD; DENVER SHERIFF 

DEPUTY TOMSICK; DENVER SHERIFF 

DEPUTY NORRGARD; DENVER 

SHERIFF DEPUTY SINGLETON; 

DENVER SHERIFF DEPUTY BLAINE; 

ANY INSURANCE CARRIER FOR CITY 

AND COUNTY OF DENVER, 

COLORADO, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 16-1307 

(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01605-MSK-CBS) 

(D. Colo.) 

 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 2, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Proceeding pro se,1

 Colorado prisoner Terrance M. Farrell III appeals the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment against him on his Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claims. Because the district court correctly concluded that 

Farrell didn’t establish that defendant Greg Kellermeyer was subjectively indifferent 

to Farrell’s medical needs, we affirm. 

Farrell was admitted to Denver Health Medical Center after he overdosed on 

heroin and cocaine. Upon his discharge, Farrell was transferred to the Denver 

Detention Center (DDC), where he began taking medications for his various 

psychiatric health conditions. Nearly three months into Farrell’s treatment at DDC, 

Dr. Patrick Fox discontinued Farrell’s medication regimen after DDC staff caught 

Farrell “diverting” his medication, i.e., spitting his pills into a cup or concealing them 

in his mouth instead of swallowing them. R. vol. 2, 252. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment isn’t binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 

32.1. 

1

 We liberally construe Farrell’s pro se filings, but it’s not our role to act as his 

advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). 
3 

Shortly thereafter, Farrell submitted a series of “kites,” or medical grievances, 

to DDC staff. Id. at 245. In a kite on February 20, he asked Dr. Kellermeyer—a DDC 

psychiatrist—to resume his medications, complaining that he was “suffering” without 

them. R. vol. 1, 712. Two days later, Farrell submitted another kite urging that he 

“need[ed] to see psych ASAP.” Id. at 714. On February 23, a licensed practical nurse 

visited Farrell and scheduled him for a psychiatric evaluation. The next day, a 

psychiatric licensed practical nurse visited Farrell, recorded his complaints, and made 

a plan to review the kites with Kellermeyer or another psychiatrist. On February 25, 

Dr. Fox reinstated one of Farrell’s three medications—Elavil—with instructions that 

the medicine be crushed and floated, presumably in water. Kellermeyer stamped and 

initialed both kites, which was his only recorded involvement with Farrell in 

February. 

On March 5, Farrell submitted another kite stating that he needed to speak 

with Kellermeyer about his panic attacks, which he asserted had caused him to fall 

and injure himself. In contrast with the February kites, Kellermeyer didn’t stamp and 

initial this kite, and there’s no record evidence showing that he received it. 

Then, apparently in response to a grievance filed by Farrell, Kellermeyer 

explained Farrell’s circumstances in an email dated March 21. Kellermeyer wrote 

that Farrell has a history of psychiatric issues and admitted to diverting medicine 

while at DDC. Kellermeyer explained that one of Farrell’s discontinued 

medications—Neurontin—is dangerous, subject to abuse, and has little efficacy for 

anxiety. Kellermeyer wrote that Elavil, which Dr. Fox reinstated, might help Farrell 
4 

with his anxiety. Kellermeyer also explained that Neurontin is valuable on the black 

market, and that Farrell was likely feigning certain symptoms in order to obtain it. 

Farrell later filed a § 1983 action against a variety of entities and DDC 

employees in connection with his incarceration. The district court ultimately 

dismissed all defendants but Kellermeyer on grounds that aren’t relevant to this 

appeal.2

 In his operative complaint, Farrell asserts various Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference violations against Kellermeyer. Farrell and Kellermeyer filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kellermeyer. The 

district court identified two potential acts of deliberate indifference by Kellermeyer: 

(1) allegedly discontinuing Farrell’s medications; and (2) allegedly ignoring Farrell’s 

kites.3

 The district court concluded that Farrell failed to show Kellermeyer was 

subjectively indifferent to Farrell’s serious medical needs, citing Mata v. Saiz, 427 

F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The subjective prong of the deliberate indifference 

 2

 In his supplemental brief, Farrell purports to appeal the district court’s 

dismissal of the City and County of Denver. But neither of his briefs addresses the 

basis for that dismissal—Farrell’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Farrell’s opening brief doesn’t mention exhaustion at all, and his supplemental brief 

devotes a single, cursory paragraph to the issue. Accordingly, he hasn’t adequately 

preserved this issue for appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring argument 

section of appellant’s brief to contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for 

them, with citations to the authorities . . . on which the appellant relies”); Garrett v. 

Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying Rule 

28(a) to pro se litigant and declining to “take on the responsibility of serving as the 

litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record”). 

3

 We note that Farrell’s operative complaint identifies possible violations 

beyond these two. But the district court apparently construed Farrell’s summary 

judgment briefing as limited to these two claims, and Farrell doesn’t challenge that 

premise on appeal. 
5 

test requires the plaintiff to present evidence of the prison official’s culpable state of 

mind.”). 

Farrell appeals, challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Kellermeyer and largely renewing the arguments he made below. We review the 

district court’s decision granting Kellermeyer’s motion for summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court and viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to Farrell. See Zisumbo v. Ogden Reg’l Med. Ctr., 801 

F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2015). 

After considering the parties’ arguments and the appellate record, we affirm 

for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s order. 

We further grant Farrell’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of 

costs or fees because (1) he has shown a financial inability to pay the required filing 

fees; and (2) the arguments he raises on appeal are reasoned and non-frivolous. See 

DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). We order Farrell to 

continue making partial payments until he has paid the full amount of his fees and 

costs.

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge