2016 IL 120110

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

(Docket No. 120110) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. ANITA ALVAREZ, Petitioner, 

v. HONORABLE VINCENT GAUGHAN et al., Respondents.

Opinion filed December 1, 2016.

 CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion. 

 Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in 

the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The petitioner, Anita Alvarez, State’s Attorney of Cook County, seeks a writ of 

mandamus (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a)) to compel respondent, the 

Honorable Vincent Gaughan, judge of the circuit court of Cook County, to sentence 

defendant, Steven Castleberry, with a mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement 
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imposed on each of his two convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault. See 

720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(8), (d)(1) (West 2008) (providing, in subsection (d)(1), that 

“15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court” for 

aggravated criminal sexual assault when the defendant committed the offense of 

criminal sexual assault while “armed with a firearm,” as specified in subsection 

(a)(8), thus rendering the criminal sexual assault “aggravated”).1 For the following 

reasons, we reject arguments interposed against issuance and award the writ. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Following a jury trial, Steven Castleberry was convicted in the circuit court of 

Cook County of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 

5/12-14(a)(8) (West 2008)) based on separate acts of oral and vaginal contact with 

the victim. At sentencing, the State argued that Castleberry was subject to a 

mandatory 15-year sentencing enhancement on each of the two convictions 

because the crimes had been committed while Castleberry was armed with a 

firearm. When added to the mandatory minimum term of six years’ imprisonment 

for each offense, the sentencing enhancements meant Castleberry would be subject 

to a mandatory minimum term of 21 years’ imprisonment on each conviction.

¶ 4 The circuit court disagreed with the State, concluding that the legislature had 

intended the enhancement to be applied only once under the circumstances. 

Consequently, the circuit court sentenced Castleberry to a nine-year term of 

imprisonment on each conviction, adding the 15-year enhancement to only one of 

the sentences. The two sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total term 

of 33 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 5 Castleberry appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the 15-year enhancement was 

unconstitutional and, therefore, should not have been applied by the circuit court at 

all. The appellate court rejected Castleberry’s arguments. However, the appellate 

court went on to address the State’s contention that the 15-year enhancement was a 

mandatory statutory requirement that had to be added to the sentence for each of the 

 

1The statute was renumbered as section 11-1.30 by Public Act 96-1551 (Pub. Act 

96-1551, art. 2, § 5 (eff. July 1, 2011)), but the pertinent provisions are otherwise 

unchanged. 
- 3 - 

two counts on which defendant had been convicted. The appellate court agreed 

with the State and, invoking the then-extant “void sentence rule,” remanded the 

matter to the circuit court for resentencing. 2013 IL App (1st) 111791-U, ¶ 38. 

¶ 6 We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 

1, 2013)), principally to address “whether the ‘void sentence rule,’ which states that 

‘[a] sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void’ (People v. 

Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995)), should be abandoned,” concluding, ultimately, 

that it should. People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 1, 19. In the course of our 

analysis we stated that the “appellate court *** had no authority in this case to 

vacate the circuit court’s sentencing order in response to the State’s argument.” Id.

¶ 25. This court determined, however, that the State was not without a remedy: 

“The remedy of mandamus *** permits the State to challenge criminal sentencing 

orders where it is alleged that the circuit court violated a mandatory sentencing 

requirement, but precludes the State from challenging ordinary, discretionary 

sentencing decisions.” Id. ¶ 27. This court advised: “Nothing in this opinion should 

be read as preventing the State from filing such a request.” Id. 

¶ 7 Our opinion in Castleberry—issuing that admonishment and abolishing the 

“void sentence rule” as a means to correct sentences that do not comport with 

statutory mandates—was filed on November 19, 2015. On November 23, 2015, 

State’s Attorney Alvarez filed in this court a motion for leave to file a petition for 

writ of mandamus, seeking—as the State had sought in the course of Castleberry’s 

direct appeal—imposition of the 15-year mandatory sentencing enhancement with 

respect to each of Castleberry’s convictions. Judge Gaughan and Castleberry are 

named as respondents. The attached proof of service indicates that service was 

effected upon Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender of the Office of the State Appellate 

Defender; the Honorable Vincent M. Gaughan, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook 

County; and “Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois.” The Office 

of the State Appellate Defender subsequently filed objections to Alvarez’s motion 

on behalf of Castleberry, and its attached proof of service reflects service upon 

State’s Attorney Alvarez, Attorney General Madigan, Judge Gaughan, and 

Castleberry. On February 19, 2016, this court entered an order allowing Alvarez’s 

motion for leave to file the petition. 
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¶ 8 Of all the filings of record, there are none by the Attorney General. The 

Attorney General, despite notice of this proceeding, has not objected, nor has she 

taken a position contrary to that advanced by State’s Attorney Alvarez.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public officer to 

perform nondiscretionary official duties.” People ex rel. Senko v. Meersman, 2012 

IL 114163, ¶ 9. This court will award mandamus only if the petitioner establishes a 

clear right to the relief requested, a clear duty of the public officer to act, and clear 

authority of the public officer to comply with the writ. Id.

¶ 11 In its criminal case against Castleberry, the State ultimately proceeded to trial 

on two counts of the original eight-count indictment. Those counts alleged that 

Castleberry violated section 12-14(a)(8) of the Criminal Code of 1961 in that he 

committed acts of sexual penetration upon the victim, by the use of force or threat 

of force, while he was “armed with a firearm.” See 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(8) (West 

2008). In count 3, the State alleged oral penetration; in count 6, the State alleged 

vaginal penetration. A jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. As the State 

observes, “the jury’s verdict demonstrated that it found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that defendant committed two distinct acts of sexual penetration by force while 

armed with a firearm. The fact that the same gun was used as an element of both 

counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault while armed with a firearm is 

immaterial ***.” Thus, the State argues, two convictions, based on two separate 

acts of sexual penetration while armed with a firearm, warrant the imposition of 

two separate sentence enhancements, one for each offense. 

¶ 12 Castleberry answers by arguing that (1) a conflict in statutes defeats a “clear 

right to relief,” (2) the State’s Attorney does not have standing to sue in this court 

on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, and (3) the relief sought is barred by 

the equitable doctrine of laches. We note, at the outset, that counsel for respondent 

Castleberry conceded, at oral argument, that the 15-year sentence add-on should 
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have been applied to each of Castleberry’s convictions. In that respect, everyone 

appears to agree—as do we.2 

¶ 13 The appellate court so held (2013 IL App (1st) 111791-U, ¶¶ 37-38), then cited, 

as authorization for its remand for resentencing, this court’s decision in People v. 

White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶¶ 20-21, 26 (“a court exceeds its authority when it orders a 

lesser or greater sentence than that which the statute mandates,” and such a 

sentence is “illegal and void”). In Castleberry, this court stated that the “appellate 

court *** had no authority in this case to vacate the circuit court’s sentencing order 

in response to the State’s argument.” Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 25. In fact, 

prior to this court’s repudiation of Arna in Castleberry, the appellate court did have 

that authority, and it was correct to cite White in support thereof. White cited Arna 

with approval. See White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 20. In Arna, this court upheld an 

appellate court remand—from a defendant’s appeal—ordering the circuit court to 

impose statutorily mandated consecutive sentences, where concurrent sentences 

had been ordered by the circuit court. In Arna, this court stated “the actions of the 

appellate court were not barred by our rules which limit the State’s right to appeal 

and which prohibit the appellate court from increasing a defendant’s sentence on 

review.” Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113. Thus, prior to our decision in Castleberry—in

which we “abolished” the void sentencing rule (see Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, 

¶ 19)—the State had reason to believe it could seek correction of Castleberry’s 

sentence in the course of his direct appeal, and the appellate court had reason to 

believe it had the authority to grant that relief. Those observations are relevant to, 

and we believe dispositive of, Castleberry’s laches argument. 

¶ 14 As this court has recently reiterated, laches is an equitable principle that bars 

recovery by a litigant whose unreasonable delay in bringing an action for relief 

prejudices the rights of the other party. Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 

IL 119518, ¶ 51. Stated differently, “it must appear that a plaintiff’s unreasonable 

delay *** has prejudiced and misled defendant, or caused him to pursue a course 

different from what he would have otherwise taken.” (Internal quotation marks 

 

2

See generally People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 188 (1996) (concluding that 

convictions for both home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault were proper as 

they were based on separate, independent acts, though “both offenses shared the common 

act of defendant threatening the victim with a gun”). The principle applied in Rodriguez 

applies as well to the facts of this case. 
- 6 - 

omitted.) Id. ¶ 51. The determination of whether laches applies depends on the 

facts and circumstances of each case. Tully v. State, 143 Ill. 2d 425, 432-33 (1991). 

¶ 15 We note, first, that there is no indication of unreasonable delay on the part of the 

State. The State argued its point in the circuit court, and it raised the matter 

immediately thereafter before the appellate court, where defendant was bringing 

his own challenge to the imposition of the enhancement. Despite our subsequent 

observations in Castleberry regarding the theoretical and constitutional infirmities 

of the “void sentence rule,” it remained a viable means of correcting the circuit 

court’s sentencing error when the State pursued it, and the appellate court acted, 

and it had the advantage of facilitating resolution of all related sentencing issues in 

one proceeding before a single tribunal. Notwithstanding the contemporaneous 

availability of mandamus as an alternative means of rectifying sentences that did 

not comport with statutory mandates (see, e.g., Meersman, 2012 IL 114163, ¶ 21), 

we will not find the State less than diligent in choosing this avenue of redress while 

it existed. 

¶ 16 Moreover, it is clear that Castleberry suffered no prejudice. Even assuming, 

arguendo, undue delay on the part of the State, we note, on just one of his 

convictions, Castleberry was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment. In the proof of 

service attached to his objections to Alvarez’s motion for leave to file the petition 

for writ of mandamus, his address is listed as Menard Correctional Center. It is 

reasonable to assume he will be incarcerated for some time. This is not, as his 

counsel posited in answer to a question from the bench during oral argument before 

this court, a situation where an inmate is about to walk out the prison door when the 

State seeks correction of his sentence. In his brief, Castleberry suggests that the 

State’s delay in seeking mandamus is “inherently prejudicial to the public, because 

the delay has a chilling effect on a defendant’s right to appeal, and is contrary to 

policy considerations in favor of finality in judgments.” However, the facts of this 

case—by which are we are constrained (see Tully, 143 Ill. 2d at 432-33)—do not 

support even an inference that any State delay affected Castleberry’s decision to 

appeal, in the course of which he chose to put the “finality” of his sentence in 

question. 
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¶ 17 We conclude there was neither unreasonable delay in the State’s assertion of 

sentencing error and its attempt to rectify that error, nor any conceivable prejudice 

to Castleberry. Hence, laches does not apply. 

¶ 18 Nor do we find Castleberry’s contention of statutory conflict of arguable merit 

or an impediment to granting the State’s clear right to mandamus relief. Castleberry 

suggests application of the mandatory sentence enhancement at this juncture would 

conflict with section 5-4.5-50(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 

5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2014) (titled “Motion to Reduce Sentence”)), which generally 

prohibits a circuit court from increasing a defendant’s sentence once it is imposed. 

Castleberry also cites section 5-5-4(a) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 

5/5-5-4(a) (West 2014)) in support of his position. That section, which applies 

when a conviction or sentence has been set aside, states in pertinent part that “the 

court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense *** which is more 

severe than the prior sentence *** unless the more severe sentence is based upon 

conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing.” 

¶ 19 As this court noted in People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 431-32 (1997), those 

provisions3 were consistent with and incorporated the reasoning of the United 

States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), wherein 

the Court reasoned that due process of law 

“ ‘requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully 

attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a 

new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally 

deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first 

conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension 

of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.’ Pearce, 

395 U.S. at 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 669, 89 S. Ct. at 2080.” Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 

432.

Obviously, the punitive concerns addressed by those statutes are not implicated in 

this case. Castleberry has not challenged the unlawfully lenient sentence imposed 

upon him by the trial judge. Castleberry’s sentencing claim on appeal was in fact 

 

3

Section 5-4.5-50 was then section 5-8-1(c) of the Code of Corrections. 
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rejected by the appellate court (see 2013 IL App (1st) 111791-U, ¶ 36) and is not at 

issue here. There is no reason to believe that Castleberry will be the victim of 

judicial vindictiveness if this cause is—pursuant to vindication of the State’s

position herein—remanded for resentencing and imposition of the statutorily 

required firearm enhancement. This case does not present the circumstances 

sections 5-4.5-50(d) and 5-5-4(a) were intended to address. Imposition of the 

enhancement on remand is not discretionary. Thus, it cannot be the medium for 

judicial vindictiveness. That disposition is mandated by an enactment of the 

legislature, given these facts. It seems to us unreasonable to suggest that the 

legislature intended sections 5-4.5-50(d) and 5-5-4(a) to function as a bar against 

correction of sentences that do not comply with statutory mandates prescribed by 

the legislature elsewhere in the Code of Corrections. “In determining legislative 

intent, we may consider the consequences of construing the statute one way or 

another, and we presume that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, 

inconvenient, or unjust results.” People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 25. 

Applying that principle of statutory construction, we hold only valid sentences may 

serve as the baseline for assessment of compliance with prohibitions against 

increase. 

¶ 20 Castleberry also appears to suggest that this court’s ability to order correction 

of his sentence, to bring it into compliance with the statutory mandate, was 

dependent upon the void sentence rule. In his brief to this court, Castleberry asserts: 

“The abolition of Arna’s void sentence rule makes clear that the circuit 

court may not increase Castleberry’s sentence under the judicially-created 

exception to the prohibition against such increases. Because the original 

sentence in this case was not void, the trial court is precluded from increasing it. 

***

Thus, where the State is asking for Judge Gaughan to increase Castleberry’s 

sentence, but the circuit court is prohibited by Illinois law from increasing 

Castleberry’s sentence, and no exceptions to this statutory prohibition exist 

here, the State’s Attorney has not established the requisite factors for 

mandamus relief to lie.” 

¶ 21 However, the State is not asking Judge Gaughan to increase Castleberry’s 

sentence; it is asking this court to order Judge Gaughan to correct his sentence, 
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which necessarily entails an increase. To the extent Castleberry is suggesting 

otherwise, we note there is no jurisdictional impediment here. Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 381 authorizes original mandamus actions in this court “to review a 

judge’s judicial act.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 381 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001). In Meersman, we issued 

a writ of mandamus under very similar circumstances. Pursuant to a petition filed 

by the State’s Attorney of Rock Island County, we ordered the respondent judge to 

vacate defendant’s sentences, which the judge had ordered to be served 

concurrently, and directed the judge to impose, instead, statutorily mandated 

consecutive sentences. See Meersman, 2012 IL 114163, ¶ 21 (requiring 

consecutive sentencing in accordance with 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2) (West 2010)). 

In Castleberry itself, this court acknowledged that the “remedy of mandamus *** 

permits the State to challenge criminal sentencing orders where it is alleged that the 

circuit court violated a mandatory sentencing requirement,” concluding, “[n]othing 

in this opinion should be read as preventing the State from filing such a request.” 

Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 27. 

¶ 22 Finally, we address Castleberry’s argument that the State’s Attorney of Cook 

County—and by logical extension any State’s Attorney—has no standing to bring a 

mandamus action in this court to seek correction of a sentence not authorized by 

statute. Castleberry acknowledges that, in numerous cases cited in the State’s brief, 

“this Court allowed the State’s Attorney to appear as a relator in this Court.” 

Indeed, the State avers, “over the past 140 years, this Honorable Court has decided 

many cases where a State’s Attorney appeared as a relator and sought extraordinary 

relief of a writ of mandamus or prohibition in matters arising out of a criminal 

matter.” State’s Attorney Alvarez cites the following: People ex rel. Senko v. 

Meersman, 2012 IL 114163; People ex rel. Glasgow v. Kinney, 2012 IL 113197; 

People ex rel. Alvarez v. Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34 (2011); People ex rel. Birkett v. 

Dockery, 235 Ill. 2d 73 (2009); People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185 

(2009); People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 lll. 2d 445 (2007); People ex rel.

Devine v. Sharkey, 221 Ill. 2d 613 (2006); People ex rel. Birkett v. Jorgensen , 216 

Ill. 2d 358 (2005); People ex rel. Devine v. Macellaio, 199 Ill. 2d 22l (2002); 

People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510 (2001); People ex rel. Waller v. 

McKoski, l95 Ill. 2d 393 (2001); People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175 

(1988); People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d 470 (1988); People ex rel. 

Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26 (1986); People ex rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 Ill. 2d 4l 

(1983); People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Ill. 2d 271 (1982): People ex rel. Daley 
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v. Limperis, 86 Ill. 2d 459 (1981); People ex rel. Carey v. Scotillo, 84 Ill. 2d 170 

(1981); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537 (1981); People ex rel. 

Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67 (1980); People ex rel. Carey v. Collins, 81 Ill. 2d 

118 (1980); People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531 (1979); People ex rel. 

Carey v. Pincham, 76 Ill. 2d 478 (1979); People ex rel. Carey v. Rosin, 75 Ill. 2d l5l 

(1979); People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill. 2d 382 (1976); People ex rel. 

Carey v. Covelli, 61 Ill. 2d 394 (1975); People ex rel. Carey v. Power, 59 Ill. 2d 569 

(1975); People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 61 Ill. 2d 231 (1974); People ex rel. 

Ward v. Moran, 54 lll. 2d 552 (1973); People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Power, 54 Ill. 2d 

154 (1973); People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti, 50 Ill. 2d 5l (1971); People ex rel. Hollis 

v. Chamberlain, 49 Ill. 2d 403 (1971); People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d 

171 (1971); People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill. 2d 62 (1968); People ex rel. 

Ward v. Salter, 28 Ill. 2d 612 (1963); People ex rel. Adamowski v. Dougherty, 19 

Ill. 2d 393 (1960); People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250 (1930); People 

ex rel. Swanson v. Sullivan, 339 Ill. 146 (1930); People ex rel. Smith v. Jenkins, 325 

Ill. 372 (1927); People ex rel. Fullenwider v. Jenkins, 322 Ill. 33 (1926); People 

ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315 (1918); People ex rel. Hoyne v. Lueders, 

269 Ill. 205 (1915); People ex rel. Metzner v. Edwards, 66 Ill. 59 (1872). 

¶ 23 Notwithstanding the historical practice represented by those cases, Castleberry 

argues that lack of standing was not asserted therein; thus, “[t]hose cases are not 

contrary to this point.” In support of his revelatory position, Castleberry cobbles 

together generic authority from diverse sources, arguing that “the Attorney General 

is the only officer authorized to bring a petition for a writ of mandamus in the 

Illinois Supreme Court.”

¶ 24 Castleberry begins with this quote extracted from this court’s opinion in People 

ex rel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485 (1976): “[T]he Attorney General is the sole 

officer authorized to represent the People of this State in any litigation in which the 

People of the State are the real party in interest ***.” Id. at 500 (discussing Fergus 

v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304 (1915), and its incorporation into the 1970 Constitution (Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. V, § 15)). We do not find that generic statement, rendered in a 

different context, dispositive of the issue before us. 

¶ 25 Fergus involved, inter alia, a legislative enactment that purported to strip the 

Attorney General of powers and duties relating to insurance and transfer them to 
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the insurance superintendent. Fergus, 270 Ill. at 334-35. This court found that 

action impermissible and, pursuant to that finding, declared appropriations to the 

insurance superintendent “for legal services and for traveling expenses of attorneys 

and court costs in prosecutions for violations of insurance laws *** 

unconstitutional and void.” Id. at 342. 

¶ 26 In Briceland, an action was brought seeking a declaratory judgment that only 

the Attorney General was empowered to institute and prosecute cases before the 

Pollution Control Board. The Briceland plaintiffs also sought an injunction barring 

the Environmental Protection Agency from pursuing actions before the Pollution 

Control Board. This court held that a provision of the Environmental Protection Act 

authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency to prosecute cases before the 

Pollution Control Board was unconstitutional because “the Attorney General is the 

sole officer entitled to represent the interests of the State in litigation conducted 

before the Pollution Control Board.” Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d at 500. 

¶ 27 Neither Briceland nor Fergus addressed the powers of State’s Attorneys 

vis-à-vis the Attorney General. As this court observed in County of Cook ex rel. 

Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., 215 Ill. 2d 466 (2005): 

“Like the Attorney General, a State’s Attorney is a constitutional officer. 

The 1870 Illinois Constitution provided that there ‘be elected a state’s attorney 

in and for each county in lieu of the state’s attorneys now provided by law.’ Ill. 

Const. 1870, art. VI, § 22. This court has held that the State’s Attorney is a State 

officer under the 1870 Constitution. Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, 470-73 

(1914). The 1970 Illinois Constitution contains a similar provision: ‘A State’s 

Attorney shall be elected in each county in 1972 and every fourth year 

thereafter for a four year term.’ Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19. In Ingemunson v. 

Hedges, 133 Ill. 2d 364, 369-70 (1990), we reaffirmed the holding in Hoyne,

noting that the debates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1970 

indicate the drafters of the 1970 Constitution agreed that State’s Attorneys 

should be classified as state, rather than county, officers.” Id. at 474-75. 

Further, we noted that a “State’s Attorney is a constitutional officer with rights and 

duties ‘analogous to or largely coincident with the Attorney General, though not 

identical, and the one to represent the county or People in matters affected with a 

public interest.’ ” Id. at 476 (quoting People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 
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231, 249 (1945)). This court concluded that “[t]he State’s Attorney’s powers are 

analogous to and largely coincident with those of the Attorney General and it 

follows, therefore, that the legislature may not usurp those constitutionally derived 

powers.” Id. at 478. 

¶ 28 In support of his position, Castleberry cites two legislative enactments, arguing 

that they restrict the authority of State’s Attorney Alvarez to act in this instance. He 

first resorts to section 4 of the Attorney General Act (15 ILCS 205/4 (West 2014)), 

which recites various “duties of the Attorney General,” among them: “To appear 

for and represent the people of the State before the supreme court in all cases in 

which the State or the people of the State are interested.” Castleberry then cites 

section 3-9005(a)(1) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1) (West 2014)), 

stating that each State’s Attorney shall “commence and prosecute all actions, suits, 

indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his 

county.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 29 Castleberry does not mention subsection (a)(8) of section 3-9005, which speaks 

to the collaborative relationship of the State’s Attorney and Attorney General. That 

subsection, in pertinent part, charges the State’s Attorney “[t]o assist the attorney 

general whenever it may be necessary, and in cases of appeal from his county to the 

Supreme Court, to which it is the duty of the attorney general to attend, *** [to] 

furnish the attorney general *** a manuscript of a proposed statement, brief and 

argument to be printed and filed on behalf of the people, prepared in accordance 

with the rules of the Supreme Court.” 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(8) (West 2014). Nor 

does Castleberry acknowledge the catchall provision in subsection (a)(11) of 

section 3-9005, which provides, broadly, that the State’s Attorney shall “perform 

such other and further duties as may, from time to time, be enjoined on him by 

law.” 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(11) (West 2014).

¶ 30 Even if the legislature could, constitutionally, usurp or diminish the powers of 

State’s Attorneys and the Attorney General heretofore recognized—and Rifkin, 

Briceland, and Fergus suggest the legislature cannot—we do not read the statutes 

cited by Castleberry—prescribing certain duties of the Attorney General and 

State’s Attorneys, respectively—as diminishing or circumscribing their powers, yet 

that is what Castleberry contends. That the Attorney General has a duty “[t]o 

appear for and represent the people of the State before the supreme court in all cases 
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in which the State or the people of the State are interested” (see 15 ILCS 205/4 

(West 2014)) does not necessarily mean that the State’s Attorney from whose 

county the matter arises lacks the authority or standing to do so, particularly when 

he or she represented the people of the State of Illinois in that very case. That the 

State’s Attorney is assigned a statutory duty to “commence and prosecute all 

actions, in the circuit court for his county,” and “defend all actions and proceedings 

brought against his county” (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2014)), does not 

necessarily mean that the authority of the State’s Attorney—a state officer (see 

Rifkin, 215 Ill. 2d at 475) licensed to practice in this court—to seek a legislatively 

mandated result, in a case he or she initiated on behalf of the people of the State of 

Illinois, ends in the circuit court. Apart from any authority inherent in the office, 

subsections (a)(8) and (a)(11) of section 3-9005, respectively, make clear that 

(1) the State’s Attorney may act as the Attorney General’s agent or “assist the 

attorney general whenever it may be necessary” and, specifically, function as an 

active participant—with the Attorney General—in appeals to this court from his or 

her county, the attorney in fact responsible for preparing written argument in State 

appeals, and (2) the enumeration of a State’s Attorney’s duties in section 3-9005 is 

not meant to be all-inclusive or restrictive, as evinced by subsection (a)(11)’s 

broad, catchall language. 

¶ 31 To be sure, the Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the 

state and, as such, is afforded a broad range of discretion in the performance of 

public duties, including the discretion to institute proceedings in any case of purely 

public interest. Lyons v. Ryan, 201 Ill. 2d 529, 539 (2002). The primacy of the 

Attorney General in that respect is not open to question. However, in reaffirming 

the Attorney General’s discretionary preeminence in such matters, even this court 

has blurred the line between the authority of the Attorney General and that of 

State’s Attorneys. See id. at (citing, in support of Attorney General’s discretionary 

authority, cases referencing the State’s Attorneys’ discretionary authority).4 

 

4

See People v. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d 103, 115 (1984) (“The State’s Attorney is the 

representative of the People and has the responsibility of evaluating the evidence and other 

pertinent factors and determining what offense can properly and should properly be 

charged.” (quoting People v. Rhodes, 38 Ill. 2d 389, 396 (1967))), vacated on other 

grounds, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987). 
- 14 - 

¶ 32 Though the Attorney General undoubtedly could have instituted and prosecuted 

this mandamus action—and consistent with section 4 of the Attorney General Act, 

could have entered an appearance and made her position in this matter explicit—we 

hold, given the facts of this case, that the State’s Attorney from whose county the 

underlying criminal case arose had the authority and standing to bring this action as 

well. In so holding, we rely, cumulatively, on the following: (1) longstanding case 

authority acknowledging that a “State’s Attorney is a constitutional officer with 

rights and duties ‘analogous to or largely coincident with the Attorney General *** 

and the one to represent the county or People in matters affected with a public 

interest’ ” (see Rifkin, 215 Ill. 2d at 476 (quoting Nagano, 389 Ill. at 249)); 

(2) notice to the Attorney General of the pendency of this action, and no objection 

on her part therefrom or attempt to intervene or espouse a position contrary to that 

taken by the State’s Attorney, who may properly be seen as a state agent of the 

people and the Attorney General in this matter; (3) the legislature’s recognition of, 

and/or acquiescence in, the plenipotential part a State’s Attorney may play in 

“assist[ing] the attorney general whenever it may be necessary” and, specifically, a 

State’s Attorney’s role in challenging an erroneous circuit court judgment rendered 

against the people of the State of Illinois in his or her county (see 55 ILCS 

5/3-9005(a)(8) (West 2014)); and (4) the legislature’s acknowledgment that the 

powers and duties of State’s Attorneys are broader than those specifically 

enumerated in section 3-9005 and may include those not heretofore explicitly 

recognized and those that are subsequently imposed “by law” (see 55 ILCS 

5/3-9005(a)(11) (West 2014)).5

 

5As we have noted herein, the Attorney General, as the chief legal officer of the state, 

has discretionary preeminence in legal matters involving the public interest. As evinced by 

cases pending before the court this very term, the Attorney General may exercise her 

discretion by assuming different procedural stances, depending upon her assessment of the 

individual case. Compare People ex rel. Glasgow v. Carlson, No. 120544 (Sept. Term 

2016) (Attorney General brings a mandamus action, arguing that the circuit court failed to 

comply with mandatory sentencing requirements), with People ex rel. Alvarez v. Gaughan, 

No. 120110 (Sept. Term 2016) (Attorney General, with notice of pendency of the action, 

allows State’s Attorney to proceed with her argument that circuit court failed to comply 

with mandatory sentencing requirements, signaling Attorney General’s implicit 

acceptance of State’s Attorney’s standing and argument advanced by State’s Attorney), 

and People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, No. 120729 (Sept. Term 2016) (Attorney General 
- 15 - 

¶ 33 CONCLUSION 

¶ 34 In view of Castleberry’s concession, indeed the agreement of all 

concerned—the parties, the appellate court, and this court—that, pursuant to 

subsections (d)(1) and (a)(8) of the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute and 

this court’s precedent, two convictions based on two separate acts of sexual 

penetration while armed with a firearm warrant the imposition of two separate 

sentence enhancements, one for each offense, we issue a writ of mandamus, 

ordering the respondent judge to vacate his sentencing order and resentence 

Castleberry, imposing the mandatory firearm enhancement on both of 

Castleberry’s convictions. In so doing, as aforesaid, we reject Castleberry’s 

contentions that (1) the relief sought is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, 

(2) a conflict in statutes defeats a “clear right to relief,” and (3) the State’s Attorney 

does not have standing to sue in this court on behalf of the People of the State of 

Illinois.

¶ 35 Writ awarded.

 

appears on behalf of, and supports the legal position taken by, circuit judge but does not 

dispute State’s Attorney’s right or standing to bring a mandamus action in a proper case for 

purpose of fully presenting alternative views for judicial determination).