1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re E.G., A.G., and B.G.

No. 19-0659 (Kanawha County 19-JA-101, 19-JA-102, and 19-JA-103)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Father R.G., by counsel Edward Bullman, appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha 

County’s July 2, 2019, order terminating his parental rights to E.G., A.G., and B.G.

1 The West 

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Mindy M. Parsley, 

filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem, Jennifer R. Victor, 

filed a response on behalf of the children in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, 

petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights instead of imposing 

a less-restrictive dispositional alternative.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In February of 2019, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition after receiving a referral 

that petitioner was “seen walking around in the street in his underwear and appeared incoherent 

when the children were being dropped off by the bus from school” and was “often seen walking

up and down the road in [the community] looking sickly, ‘beat up,’ and [with] sores on his face.” 

The petition further alleged that petitioner was involved in drug manufacturing and committed 

substance abuse and domestic violence in front of the children. It also alleged educational neglect, 

and that he failed to protect the children from the presence of a registered sex offender. In February 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

FILED

April 28, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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of 2019, the circuit court held a preliminary hearing and found reasonable cause to believe the 

children were abused and neglected and that petitioner’s home was unsafe for the children.2

In April of 2019, the circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing where the DHHR sought 

the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. At the hearing, a DHHR employee testified to many 

of the allegations in the petition, including that the children disclosed petitioner stabbed the walls 

of the residence with knives when he would get angry and used methamphetamine in front of them. 

The DHHR employee also testified to interviewing petitioner and witnessing missing parts of the 

wall in his bedroom as well as a visible methamphetamine pipe. Further, the DHHR employee 

testified that petitioner admitted to using methamphetamine in the children’s presence but denied 

it was a problem because he did not allow them to use the controlled substance. Petitioner testified 

at the hearing and admitted to using methamphetamine “occasionally,” but denied the children had 

ever witnessed it. Petitioner further testified that the children lied about him stabbing walls in the 

residence but acknowledged he had been involuntarily hospitalized on at least two separate 

occasions. After the presentation of evidence, the circuit court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that the children were abused and neglected because of petitioner’s drug abuse and 

untreated mental health issues. The circuit court further found that petitioner committed 

“educational neglect” and “failed to protect the children from domestic violence in the home.” 

Accordingly, in its adjudicatory order, the circuit court found petitioner to be an abusing parent. 

The circuit court ordered that petitioner could not exercise supervised visits unless he stayed drug 

free as confirmed by random drug screens.

In May of 2019, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing. At the hearing, the circuit 

court admitted a drug screen from April 12, 2019—the day of petitioner’s adjudicatory hearing—

where petitioner tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. The DHHR 

moved for the termination of petitioner’s parental rights because of his continued substance abuse 

problem and refusal to enter an inpatient treatment program. According to a DHHR employee who 

testified, petitioner attended a multidisciplinary team meeting, admitted he was high at the hearing, 

and refused to participate in an intake performed at a local hospital. According to the employee, 

petitioner maintained he did not have a substance abuse problem and believed there was a 

difference between “substance abuse and substance use.” In response to questioning from the 

circuit court, petitioner admitted he continued to use methamphetamine and would “probably” test 

positive at the dispositional hearing. Based on this evidence, the circuit court found that there was 

no reasonable likelihood petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect, 

given that petitioner had “habitually abused or is addicted to . . . controlled substances and/or drugs 

to the extent that proper parenting skills have been seriously impaired” and failed to “respond[] or 

follow[] through with a reasonable case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.” The circuit court 

further found that petitioner “demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of child 

abuse and neglect on his own, or with help” and that termination of petitioner’s parental rights was 

in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, the circuit court terminated his parental rights to the 

children.

3 It is from the dispositional order that petitioner appeals. 

2

Petitioner did not appear at the hearing but was represented by counsel. 

3

The children’s mother is a nonabusing parent, and the children have achieved permanency 

in her care.
3

The Court has previously established the following standard of review:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

On appeal, petitioner alleges that the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights 

without giving him additional time to participate in an improvement period. While petitioner 

acknowledges his “parenting was affected by his substance abuse and mental illness,” he argues 

the “short duration of th[e] proceedings . . . was insufficient time . . . to recognize and treat these 

two underlying conditions interfering with his ability to parent,” especially considering the 

extended period he exercised custody of the children prior to the petition’s filing. Petitioner further 

argues he had “begun to cooperate” by “participating in the proceedings and drug screening.” In 

light of this, he argues that the circuit court should have “allowed him additional time to determine 

if . . . his addiction and mental illness could be treated.” We disagree.

To the extent petitioner argues that the circuit court should have granted him an 

improvement period, we note that the decision to grant or deny an improvement period rests in the 

sound discretion of the circuit court. See In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 

(2015) (“West Virginia law allows the circuit court discretion in deciding whether to grant a parent 

an improvement period.”); syl. pt. 6, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) 

(“It is within the court’s discretion to grant an improvement period within the applicable statutory 

requirements . . . .”).

In terminating petitioner’s parental rights, the circuit court specifically found that petitioner 

“demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of child abuse on his own, or with 

help.” This is largely because of petitioner’s lack of acknowledgment of his problems, and refusal 

to follow through with a “reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.” Indeed, the 

record establishes that petitioner not only refused to acknowledge the conditions of abuse and 

neglect below—at one point claiming his own children were lying—but objected to the imposition 

of services, other than drug screens, designed to correct those conditions. While it may be true that 

petitioner is now attempting to acknowledge struggling with substance abuse, he previously flatly

denied such abuse, even when confronted with positive drug screens and other evidence. Indeed, 

petitioner showed a blatant disregard for the court proceedings altogether by appearing at a
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multidisciplinary team meeting while under the influence, testing positive for multiple controlled 

substances on the date of his adjudicatory hearing, and admitting he would “probably” test positive 

at his final dispositional hearing. Additionally, petitioner refused to avail himself of the DHHR’s 

services at nearly every point in the proceedings.

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) provides that the circuit court may grant a parent a 

post-adjudicatory improvement period when the parent “demonstrates, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the [parent] is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.” “This Court 

has explained that ‘an improvement period in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings is 

viewed as an opportunity for the miscreant parent to modify his/her behavior so as to correct the 

conditions of abuse and/or neglect with which he/she has been charged.’” In re Kaitlyn P., 225 W. 

Va. 123, 126, 690 S.E.2d 131, 134 (2010) (citation omitted). However, the circuit court has 

discretion to deny an improvement period when no improvement is likely. In re Tonjia M., 212 W. 

Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002). Further, we have previously held that

[i]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be 

acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth 

of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the perpetrator 

of said abuse and neglect, results in making the problem untreatable and in making 

an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (citation omitted). Given 

petitioner’s failure to acknowledge his drug addiction and how his actions constituted abusive and 

neglectful behavior, the granting of an improvement period would have been futile. While

petitioner argues that nothing precluded the circuit court from granting him an improvement period 

in this case, there is no evidence that he would comply with an improvement period. Accordingly, 

we find no error in the circuit court’s denial of his motion.

Next, petitioner alleges that the circuit court should have imposed a less-restrictive 

dispositional alternative pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(5); however, the same 

evidence set forth above supports the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604(b)(6) permits a circuit court to terminate parental rights upon findings that “there 

is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in 

the near future” and that termination is necessary for the welfare of the children. Additionally, 

under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(1), a situation in which there is no reasonable likelihood 

that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected includes one in which 

[t]he abusing parent . . . [has] habitually abused or [is] addicted to alcohol, 

controlled substances or drugs, to the extent that proper parenting skills have been 

seriously impaired and the person or persons have not responded to or followed 

through the recommended and appropriate treatment which could have improved 

the capacity for adequate parental functioning.

With these parameters in mind, the record clearly supports the circuit court’s finding that 

there was no reasonable likelihood petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of neglect, 

given his untreated drug addiction and refusal to seek treatment. While it is true that petitioner may 
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be able to undergo some treatment in the future for his substance abuse, such possible improvement 

was based on pure speculation. Indeed, petitioner denied that he had a substance abuse problem 

on several occasions and denied all offers of assistance to him during the proceedings. Despite 

this, petitioner claims that he should have been granted a less-restrictive disposition because he 

might eventually be able to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect, but we have previously 

held that “[c]ourts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental 

improvement . . . where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened.” Cecil 

T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, syl. pt. 4, in part (citation omitted).

While petitioner argues that the circuit court should have employed a less-restrictive 

dispositional alternative, we have held that

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive 

alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be

substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 

114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). Accordingly, as the circuit 

court’s findings are fully supported by the record below, we find no error in the termination of 

petitioner’s parental rights.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its July

2, 2019, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 28, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison