United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-20160

Summary Calendar

Patricio Estrada, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Troy Nehls, Sheriff of Fort Bend County, Texas; Sergeant Pale; 

Officer Owens; Deputy Erivo; Deputy Lilly; Correct 

Care Solutions, Medical Contractor with the Fort Bend County Jail; 

Dr. Kahn; Nurse Shirley Rabius; Fort Bend County; 

The State of Texas, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CV-3883

Before King, Costa, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 13, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Patricio Estrada, Texas prisoner # 2089041, appeals the dismissal of 

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against: (1) Fort Bend County Sheriff Troy Nehls; 

(2) Sergeant William Pailes1

; (3) Deputy Chris Owens; (4) Deputy Richard 

Erivo; (5) Deputy Connie Lilly; (6) Nurse Shirley Rabius; and (7) Correct 

Care Solutions (CCS). Estrada raised various claims related to a physical 

altercation with another inmate, including challenges to the subsequent 

disciplinary proceeding and the medical care he received after the incident. 

He also moves for appointment of counsel. 

Estrada argues that the district court erred in granting the Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion filed by Sheriff Nehls, Sergeant 

Pailes, Deputy Owens, Deputy Erivo, and Deputy Lilly. Rule 12(b)(6) 

permits dismissals when a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We review Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissals de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing 

those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Morris v. Livingston, 

739 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Even pro se complaints must “plead enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 

458, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

A claim has facial plausibility “where a plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Morris, 739 F.3d at 745 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

Challenging the district court’s dismissal of his claims against Sheriff 

Nehls, Estrada contends that the sheriff committed constitutional violations 

1 Estrada listed Sergeant Pailes as “Pale,” but that appears to be a misspelling based 

on other record documents.

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by seizing reading materials and not activating or fixing a kiosk machine, 

which impeded his ability to obtain hygiene products and file administrative 

grievances. Estrada also claims that Sheriff Nehls violated his due process 

rights by placing him in administrative segregation before having a 

disciplinary hearing. 

Estrada has not demonstrated that the district court erred in granting 

Sheriff Nehls’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See id. Estrada’s conclusory 

allegations regarding the kiosk, the seizure of reading materials, and 

municipal liability are insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Coleman v. 

Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017); Fields v. City of S.

Hous., 922 F.2d 1183, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1991). Similarly, Estrada has not 

stated a facially plausible claim for relief in regard to Sheriff Nehls’s 

placement of Estrada in administrative segregation before a hearing. See 

Coleman, 858 F.3d at 309; Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Because Estrada has not stated a facially plausible claim of a constitutional 

violation, he has not shown that the district court erred in concluding that 

Sheriff Nehls is entitled to qualified immunity on Estrada’s various civil 

rights claims. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

In addition, Estrada argues that the district court erred in its Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal of his claims against Deputy Owens and Sergeant Pailes in 

regard to their response to his safety and medical needs after the altercation 

with the fellow inmate. He asserts that these officers confiscated a second 

mattress despite his medical need for it and the fact that the prescription for 

it remained active. Estrada also urges that the district court erroneously 

dismissed his equal protection claim against Deputy Owens and Sergeant 

Pailes because they treated the fellow inmate differently after the altercation 

despite the fact that he was the aggressor in the fight. He further asserts that 

Deputy Owens and Sergeant Pailes are not entitled to qualified immunity. 

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Estrada has not established that the district court erred in its Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal of these claims because Estrada has not stated a facially 

plausible claim that Deputy Owens and Sergeant Pailes were deliberately 

indifferent to Estrada’s medical needs given that he indeed received medical 

attention and there is no indication that the officers ignored his complaints 

or refused to seek treatment for him. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994); Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th 

Cir. 2001). Similarly, Estrada has not stated a plausible equal protection 

claim that he received inadequate medical care when compared to the 

treatment received by the other inmate because Estrada has not pleaded facts 

to establish that the two inmates were similarly situated in terms of their 

injuries and subsequent medical treatment needs. See Bustos, 599 F.3d at 461-

62; Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998). Because Estrada has 

not stated a facially plausible claim of a constitutional violation, he has not 

shown that the district court erred in concluding that Deputy Owens and 

Sergeant Pailes were entitled to qualified immunity on Estrada’s deliberate 

indifference claims. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

Next, Estrada contends that the district court erred in its Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal of his failure-to-protect claim against Deputy Erivo 

because he was aware that Estrada faced a risk of serious harm from the fellow 

inmate through previous grievances filed by Estrada and other inmates. 

Estrada has not stated a facially plausible claim for relief given that he does 

not detail the substance of those grievances or submit them as evidence. See 

Bustos, 599 F.3d at 461-62. To the extent Estrada argues that Deputy Erivo 

should have resolved any previous grievances in Estrada’s favor, Estrada has 

not pleaded a plausible claim of a constitutional violation because he has no 

constitutional right to satisfactory resolution of his administrative grievances. 

See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Estrada 

has not stated a facially plausible claim of a constitutional violation, he has 

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not shown that the district court erred in concluding that Deputy Erivo was 

entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 

Estrada urges that the district court erred in its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 

of his claims against Deputy Erivo and Deputy Lilly regarding Estrada’s 

disciplinary proceedings while placed in what he categorizes as disciplinary 

lockdown rather than administrative segregation. Again, Estrada has not 

established that the district court erred in its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of these 

claims because “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative 

segregation . . . , being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never 

be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 

(5th Cir. 1996). Because Estrada has not stated a facially plausible claim of a 

constitutional violation, he has not shown that the district court erred in 

concluding that Deputy Erivo and Deputy Lilly were entitled to qualified 

immunity on these claims. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 

Additionally, Estrada avers that the district court erred in granting 

Nurse Rabius’s and CCS’s motion for summary judgment. He claims that 

Nurse Rabius delayed care and exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs after the fight, specifically the administration of pain 

medication, the cancellation of a prescription for a second mattress, and the 

alleged alteration of medical records.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same 

standard as the district court. Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, LLC, 636 F.3d 

752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011). In general, summary judgment is appropriate if the 

record discloses “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Estrada’s conclusional allegations regarding altered medical records

and denial of pain medication, without any supporting record evidence, are 

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insufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding his claim of deliberate 

indifference by Nurse Rabius. See Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 

369 F.3d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 2004). Similarly, he has not shown a genuine 

factual dispute regarding Nurse Rabius’s alleged cancellation of his mattress 

prescription. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In sum, Estrada has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact 

surrounding Nurse Rabius’s medical treatment, see id., and therefore, the 

district court did not err in granting her motion for summary judgment on 

Estrada’s claims of her deliberate indifference to his medical needs, see 

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Estrada has not briefed his challenge to the 

grant of CCS’s motion for summary judgment and therefore has abandoned 

the issue. See United States v. Abdo, 733 F.3d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 2013); see also 

Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The motion for 

appointment of counsel is DENIED.

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