IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-11-00295-CR

TORIE EUGENE RICKS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 19th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2010-1531-C1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Appellant Torie Eugene Ricks of five counts of aggravated 

sexual assault of a child and assessed his punishment at life imprisonment for each 

count, to run consecutively. This appeal ensued.

Extraneous Offenses

In his first issue, Ricks contends that the trial court reversibly erred by allowing 

the introduction of his extraneous offenses during his sister Andreka Jackson’s 

testimony because he did not “open the door” to such matters.
Ricks v. State Page 2

Jackson testified that Ricks had been married to Sarah Carr for about five years

and that they have two children together. When Sarah was not in jail, they were 

actually living as a family away from Sarah’s family. Two of Sarah’s other children 

would also live with them. The victim, another of Sarah’s children, lived with Sarah’s 

parents, but sometimes she would come and visit at the house. When Jackson visited 

the house, she would see Ricks taking care of his kids. He would cook, clean, and 

change diapers. Ricks and Sarah did not share the responsibilities equally. It seemed 

like Ricks would be doing more work. As far as Jackson saw, Ricks took a primary role 

in taking care of the kids. He also worked. 

On cross-examination, the State asked if Jackson was basically there to testify 

that her brother is a good father. Jackson replied, “Yes.” The State then asked Jackson 

if, during this time when she is suggesting that her brother is having a happy family 

life, he was actually committing several crimes. Jackson replied that she was not aware 

of that. At that point, Ricks objected based on relevance.

Outside the presence of the jury, the State argued that Jackson’s testimony 

created a false impression and that it should be able to correct that false impression by 

asking Jackson if she was aware that Ricks had committed several crimes during this 

“rosy period” that she had described. Ricks responded that Jackson’s testimony was 

actually offered to rebut the testimony of John Carr, Sarah’s father, “who basically said 

he didn’t work, he was a freeloader, he had nowhere to go, [and] he didn’t support 

himself.” After further discussion, the State proposed limiting its questioning to the 

time when Ricks and Sarah had been together because Jackson’s testimony had been 
Ricks v. State Page 3

limited to that time frame. The trial court ultimately overruled Ricks’s objection, gave 

him a running objection, and allowed the State to question Jackson about the specific 

instances of conduct during the period of time that Ricks and Sarah were involved in 

their relationship. 

After the jury returned, the State then asked Jackson if she was aware that Ricks 

had been committing crimes and had been sent to jail during the period of time about 

which she had testified. The State asked Jackson if she was aware that in 2005 Ricks 

had committed the offense of theft and had been sentenced to one year in jail. The State 

also asked Jackson if she was aware that in 2006 Ricks had committed another theft and 

was sentenced to 120 days confinement. Finally, the State asked Jackson if she was 

aware that in 2005 Ricks had lied about his name to a police officer and committed the 

offense of failure to identify while a fugitive from justice and was sentenced to six 

months in jail. 

To preserve a complaint about admitting evidence, a party must make a proper 

objection and get a ruling on that objection. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 

188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003)). However, “[a]n error [if any] in the admission of evidence is cured where 

the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection.” Id. See also Leday v. State, 983 

S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“Our rule . . . is that overruling an objection to 

evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without 

objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling.”). “This rule applies whether 

the other evidence was introduced by the defendant or the State.” Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 
Ricks v. State Page 4

718.

In this case, Ricks testified in his own defense, during which the following 

exchange occurred between him and his trial counsel:

Q. I’m going to talk first about some things that are a little bit 

probably uncomfortable. You’ve been in trouble with the law before. Is 

that correct?

A. Yes, ma’am, I have.

Q. And let’s start about 16 years ago. You were convicted of a 

robbery. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And where was that conviction from?

. . . .

Q. . . . Was it in McLennan County?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Okay. And did you plead guilty to that offense?

A. Yes, ma’am, I did.

Q. And what kind of sentence did you receive for that?

A. I received a five-year sentence.

Q. And did you do some time in prison?

A. Yeah. Five years.

Q. Okay. And you’ve also been convicted of theft several times; 

in fact, a total of five times of misdemeanor theft. Is that correct?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. And you did various jail sentences for those thefts. Is that 
Ricks v. State Page 5

correct?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. And on one occasion -- and I know that this has already 

come in through the State’s cross-examination of your wife -- I’m sorry --

of your sister -- you were convicted of giving a false name to a police 

officer. Is that right?

A. Yes, that’s right.

On cross-examination, the State also impeached Ricks with his prior convictions. Thus, 

error, if any, in allowing the introduction of his extraneous offenses during Jackson’s 

testimony was cured when the same evidence was admitted without objection during 

Ricks’s testimony. We overrule Ricks’s first issue.

Assessment of Fees

In his second issue, Ricks contends that the evidence was insufficient for the trial 

court to require him to pay investigator and court-appointed attorney’s fees as court 

costs. 

The clerk’s record includes a bill of cost listing the various fees assessed against 

Ricks in this case and totaling $934. One of the fees is a court-appointed attorney fee in 

the amount of $100. The trial court signed five judgments in this case, one for each 

count for which Ricks was convicted. In the judgment for Count I, the trial court

assessed court costs in the amount of $834. In the “Court Costs” section of the 

judgments in Counts II through V, the trial court stated, “See Count I.” Also 

incorporated into each of the judgments is an order to withdraw funds from Ricks’s 

inmate account in the amount of $934, payable to the McLennan County District Clerk.
Ricks v. State Page 6

In order to assess attorney’s fees and investigator’s fees as court costs, the trial 

court was required to determine that Ricks had financial resources that would enable 

him to offset in part or in whole the costs of legal services provided. See TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2012). The clerk’s record reflects that, before 

trial, the trial court found that Ricks was indigent and appointed an attorney to

represent him in this case. Once Ricks was initially found to be indigent, he was 

presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings unless it was shown 

that a material change in his financial resources had occurred. See id. art. 26.04(p) (West 

Supp. 2012). 

The State concedes in this case that there is insufficient evidence to support the 

assessment of court-appointed attorney’s fees and investigator’s fees against Ricks. The 

trial court did not make any fact-findings or otherwise address Ricks’s financial 

condition again before signing the judgments. Furthermore, after signing the 

judgments, the trial court appointed an attorney for purposes of appeal because Ricks 

desired to appeal his conviction but “[did] not have sufficient funds to employ an 

attorney.” Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient for the trial court 

to have ordered Ricks to pay his attorney’s fees and investigator’s fees. See Mayer v. 

State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

 Ricks first requests that the “judgment” be reformed to delete the erroneous 

order of costs. The trial court in assessing the court costs in the Count I judgment 

appears, however, to have already deducted the court-appointed attorney fee of $100 

from the amount. Therefore, we need not reform the Count I judgment. And because
Ricks v. State Page 7

in the “Court Costs” section of the judgments in Counts II through V, the trial court 

merely stated “See Count I,” we need not reform those judgments.

Ricks also requests that “the order to Texas Department of Justice Inmate Trust 

Account for payment of the fees from Mr. Ricks’ trust account should be removed.” 

The orders to withdraw funds incorporated into the judgment for all five counts are in 

the amount of $934, which includes the court-appointed attorney fee in the amount of 

$100; therefore, the orders should be modified to the amount of $834.

Ricks’s second issue is sustained in part and overruled in part.

Conclusion

We reverse in part the trial court’s judgments to the extent that they each include 

an order to withdraw funds that includes a court-appointed attorney fee. We remand 

this case to the trial court to reform the judgments as set forth above. We affirm the 

remaining portions of the trial court’s judgments. 

 

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part

Opinion delivered and filed July 25, 2013

Do not publish

[CRPM]