COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 5, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1894 Cir. Ct. No. 2017CX5

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

SHAWANO COUNTY,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

TERESA K. ANDERSON,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,

SHIRLEY ZERBE,

 DEFENDANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Shawano County: 

JAMES R. HABECK, Judge. Affirmed. 
No. 2018AP1894

2

¶1 HRUZ, J.1 Teresa Anderson, pro se, appeals an order compelling 

her compliance with Shawano County’s Health, Junk and Environmental Hazard 

Ordinance No. 7-09. The order permits Shawano County to enter onto Anderson’s 

property and, if necessary, remove items at Anderson’s expense so as to bring the 

property into compliance with the ordinance. Anderson argues the circuit court 

erred by entering the order. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2017, Anderson took ownership of real property in the 

Village of Eland, Shawano County, from her mother Shirley Zerbe. Prior to that 

time, Anderson had been living at the property for approximately sixteen years

while Zerbe resided in Florida. Since 2004, the Eland Village Board had been 

aware of various vehicles and junk dispersed throughout the property, and it had 

worked with the family to keep the property in compliance with local ordinances. 

¶3 In October 2015, the village board moved to require the family to 

clean up the property, and in August 2016, the village board referred the matter to 

the County. The County cited Zerbe in April 2017 for violating Shawano 

County’s Health, Junk and Environmental Hazard Ordinance No. 7-09, although, 

as previously noted, Zerbe lived in Florida and Anderson resided at the property at 

the time. A default judgment on the citation was entered on September 21, 2017. 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2017-18). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2018AP1894

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Anderson was subsequently added as a defendant because she had taken 

ownership of the property.

2

 

¶4 After waiting over thirty days following entry of the default 

judgment, the County filed a complaint on October 27, 2017, seeking an order to 

compel Anderson’s compliance with ordinance No. 7-09. The circuit court held 

an evidentiary hearing on September 24, 2018. Andy Popp, the county zoning 

administrator, testified for the County. 

¶5 One of Popp’s duties is to enforce ordinance No. 7-09. As such, 

Popp explained that he had visited the property prior to the County citing Zerbe in 

order to discuss with “the owners” the items on the property that were violating

the ordinance. Those items included scrap metal, tires, and a variety of licensed 

and unlicensed vehicles. After Anderson failed to bring the property into 

compliance with the ordinance requirements, the County issued the citation in 

April 2017. 

¶6 Popp admitted that Anderson had “made some efforts to clean up the 

property.” Still, because she had not brought the property entirely into compliance 

with the ordinance, Popp advised the County to seek a court order giving it the 

ability to clean up whatever items Anderson failed to address. 

 

2

 There appears to be a discrepancy as to when Anderson took ownership of the property. 

Anderson explains that the default judgment was entered because she was “not allowed to 

represent” Zerbe at the September 21, 2017 hearing on the County’s April 2017 citation, but that 

Anderson is now listed as a defendant because the property “was then transferred to [her] name.” 

She also testified, however, that she thought she took ownership of the property in July 2017. 

The exact date on which Anderson took ownership of the property is inconsequential to our 

decision. 
No. 2018AP1894

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¶7 As relevant to this appeal, the most recent date Popp visited the 

property was on August 16, 2018—less than one month before the evidentiary 

hearing. While at the property, Popp took a handful of pictures, which the circuit 

court received as an exhibit at the hearing. The pictures depicted that junk and 

licensed and unlicensed vehicles remained on the property. Specifically, there 

were twenty-five cars, trucks, and vans, and one motor home. Popp explained:

“Four of those had collector plates including the motor home. Sixteen vehicles 

were unlicensed. Four were licensed. Two had past due stickers, so they were 

technically unlicensed. But ... it sounded like they were going to pursue getting 

them licensed.” Popp also testified that when he was last on the property on 

August 16, the items on the property were not screened from public view because 

the property’s trees would not obscure the view into the property in late fall, 

winter, and early spring when those trees’ leaves would be absent. 

¶8 Anderson testified next. She described the clean-up efforts she and 

her husband had undertaken since the citation was issued, which included the 

removal of approximately thirty vehicles from the property. Anderson explained 

that she and her husband are licensed Wisconsin automobile collectors and that, 

after undergoing a “serious effort” to comply with all applicable laws, she 

believed the property now complied not with the ordinance, but rather with WIS.

STAT. § 341.266. Furthermore, she asserted that provisions within § 341.266 

granted her the right to store vehicles and park cars on the property and, 

consequently, ordinance No. 7-09 conflicted with § 341.266. Because Anderson 

believed the property complied with § 341.266 and that statute preempted 

ordinance No. 7-09, she argued that the County’s request for an enforcement order 

was improper. 
No. 2018AP1894

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¶9 On cross-examination, Anderson further explained how the property 

was cleaner at the time of the hearing than when Popp visited the property on 

August 16. Anderson submitted pictures of the property that were taken on 

September 20, four days prior to the hearing. She explained that she had removed 

more vehicles and junk, and she had erected a screen fence on two sides of the 

property. Anderson testified that on the date of the hearing, twenty cars remained 

on the property, which she again contended was permissible under WIS. STAT.

§ 341.266. Out of the twenty remaining vehicles, five had collector plates. 

Although the pictures showed that the property had been further cleaned since 

Popp’s visit on August 16, Anderson admitted that “[t]here’s clearly some more 

that we intend to be working on cleaning.” 

¶10 The circuit court concluded the County had proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that it needed an order to compel Anderson’s compliance 

with ordinance No. 7-09. The court determined that WIS. STAT. § 341.266 had no 

bearing on the case because “quite a number of statutes allow municipalities to 

have more strict regulations.” It further determined that, in this instance, there was 

not a statute that interfered with the County’s authority to require that the property 

be compliant with the ordinance. Notably, the court also found, as a factual 

matter, that Anderson’s property had insufficient screening: “When the leaves are 

on, I would agree that’s a pretty effective fencing situation there. However, I 

recognize a month from now that’s going to look substantially different than now. 

So I recognize that as well.” Thus, although the court observed that “both parties 

are in agreement with my observation that there has been progress on clean up 

over time here ... I’m giving the County the authority it wants.” 

¶11 Accordingly, the circuit court entered an order giving Anderson 

thirty days to make the property fully compliant with the ordinance. The order 
No. 2018AP1894

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also granted the County authority to enter the property after the thirty days had 

elapsed and perform, at Anderson’s expense, all reasonable actions necessary to 

bring it into compliance with the ordinance if the property failed the County’s 

inspection. Anderson now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred by granting the 

County an order to enforce ordinance No. 7-09 based upon the County’s April 

2017 citation. This issue requires us to construe the ordinance and apply it to a 

particular set of facts, which are questions of law that we review de novo. Village 

of Egg Harbor v. Sarkis, 166 Wis. 2d 5, 10, 479 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1991). 

However, we will not set aside the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are 

clearly erroneous. WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2).

¶13 Section 3.01B of ordinance No. 7-09 prohibits Shawano County 

residents from storing “any junk outside a building and within public view for a 

period of any part of 5 or more days during any 30-day time period.” The 

ordinance defines “junk” as “any of the following that pose a threat to public 

health, safety, or property rights.” SHAWANO COUNTY, WIS. ORDINANCE No. 7-09 

§ 2.01C (Dec. 16, 2009). The definition then provides commonsense examples of 

items prohibited as “junk,” such as scrap metal, glass, debris, garbage, and tires. 

Id. The definition also includes the following: “Any junked, ruined, dismantled, 

wrecked, unlicensed, unregistered, or inoperative motor vehicle, including but not 

limited to buses, vans, trucks, cars and recreation vehicles.” Id. Section 3.01D

declares that violating § 3.01B constitutes a public nuisance and subjects the 

violator to penalties that are enumerated in § 5.01. 
No. 2018AP1894

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¶14 There are exceptions to the ordinance’s prohibited acts. Id., § 3.02. 

As relevant here, the ordinance “is not intended to prohibit the storage of 

inoperative or abandoned equipment that is screened from public view or adjacent 

property owners by a visual barrier.” Id., § 3.02C. Additionally, the ordinance “is 

not intended to prohibit the proper outside storage of licensed and operable motor 

vehicles; and two stock cars, and two unlicensed vehicles.” Id., § 3.02D.

¶15 Like the circuit court, we conclude that the order compelling 

Anderson’s compliance with ordinance No. 7-09—based upon the County’s April 

2017 citation and subsequent September 2017 default judgment—was proper. 

Assuming the County was required to prove the violation subsequent to the entry 

of the default judgment, the County submitted pictures of the property from 

August 2018—approximately one year after Zerbe defaulted on the County’s 

citation and the County filed its complaint—depicting the property littered with 

scrap metal, tires, and dilapidated appliances and machinery. These items meet 

the ordinance’s definition of “junk.” Those same pictures also showed a variety of 

licensed and unlicensed vehicles on the property. More than two unlicensed or 

unregistered vehicles are also defined as “junk” within the meaning of the 

ordinance. 

¶16 Additionally, the circuit court found that the foregoing items 

meeting the definition of “junk” were not screened from public view. Thus, as of 

at least August 2018, the property was in violation of the ordinance because 

anything that was “junk” and not a vehicle was not screened from public view and 

because the property held more than two unlicensed vehicles. Given that the 

property still failed to comply with the ordinance approximately one year after the 

default judgment and the filing of the complaint, we conclude that the order 
No. 2018AP1894

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granting the County permission to enter the property and remove whatever items 

are necessary to bring the property into compliance was not in error.

¶17 Anderson’s arguments on appeal are flawed in two different ways. 

First, she relies upon facts not found by the circuit court. It is clear that Anderson 

believes that the property’s condition at the time of the September 24, 2018 

evidentiary hearing should be the only relevant point in time for assessing the 

property’s compliance with the ordinance. However, any remedial actions taken 

by Anderson allegedly to bring the property into compliance—such as the 

apparent cleanup and screening efforts she undertook between the time Popp 

visited the property on August 18, 2018, and when the pictures that were taken of 

the property on September 20—are inconsequential because the order from which 

Anderson appeals is an enforcement order based upon prior violations. Cf. City of 

Superior v. Cunningham, No. 2013AP2626, unpublished slip op. ¶¶4, 13-15 (WI 

App May 6, 2014) (concluding on summary judgment that the defendant violated 

city ordinances after the court assessed evidence of the defendant’s property at 

various times before and after the city issued the defendant citations for violating 

those city ordinances).

¶18 The property had already been found to be in violation of the 

ordinance well before the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, the property was 

effectively found in violation of the ordinance when the default judgment was 

entered in September 2017 based upon the County’s April 2017 citation. The 

County then issued its complaint seeking a circuit court order compelling

Anderson’s compliance with the ordinance in October 2017. The purpose of the 

hearing and the order at issue was to give the County a means to legally enter the 

property and remove junk after years of informal requests and discussion with 

Anderson had already failed to ensure compliance with the ordinance. The 
No. 2018AP1894

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purpose was not solely, if at all, to decide whether the property was still in 

violation of the ordinance, although that answer could have been relevant to the

court’s determination of whether the relief the County requested was necessary. 

¶19 To that end, the County elected to prove that the order was necessary 

by submitting pictures of the property taken over one year after Zerbe had been 

cited. It is possible that the circuit court could have concluded the order was 

unnecessary due to Anderson’s remedial actions taken after the citation was issued 

and default judgment was entered (as evidenced by her photographs). However, 

we conclude Anderson’s failure to bring the property into compliance after 

approximately one year—beginning from either the April 2017 citation or the 

September 2017 default judgment until the date when Popp observed and 

photographed the property in August 2018—was enough evidence for the court to 

determine that the order was necessary. 

¶20 Second, and relatedly, Anderson’s arguments that WIS. STAT.

§ 341.266 preempts ordinance No. 7-09 are not ripe for adjudication. The 

ordinance allows for only two unlicensed motor vehicles to be kept on the 

property, and the order provides that the County “shall be able to remove any 

additional remaining unlicensed vehicles.” Anderson argues that § 341.266 

permits her to keep as many unlicensed vehicles on the property as she wants, as 

long as they do not constitute a health hazard and they are screened from ordinary 

public view. Thus, in Anderson’s view, the ordinance and § 341.266 conflict. 

¶21 We need not address at this time whether WIS. STAT. § 341.266 

preempts ordinance No. 7-09 under any particular set of facts. As noted above, 

the circuit court order was based upon the undisputed fact that junk and unlicensed 

vehicles on the property had not been properly screened from public view for a 
No. 2018AP1894

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substantial period of time after entry of the default judgment on the citation. Both 

the ordinance and § 341.266 require such screening.3 See WIS. STAT.

§ 341.266(4); SHAWANO COUNTY, WIS. ORDINANCE No. 7-09 § 3.02C (Dec. 16, 

2009). Accordingly, the order was based on facts showing Anderson was clearly 

in violation of both the ordinance and the statute. For the foregoing reason, we 

decline to address the merits of Anderson’s preemption argument on this appeal.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)4.

 

3

 Anderson called Joseph Zatloukal to testify at the evidentiary hearing, but the 

substance of his testimony is immaterial to our analysis. Most of his testimony pertained to 

Anderson’s preemption argument, which we decline to address. Additionally, we recognize 

Zatloukal testified that Anderson’s “property was screened from public view [within] the intent 

of” WIS. STAT. § 341.266 when he visited the property on September 20, 2018—four days prior 

to the hearing. Zatloukal’s opinion, however, is of no moment for two reasons. First, questions 

of fact are left to the circuit court’s discretion—which we cannot set aside unless it is clearly 

erroneous. See WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). Second, as we have already explained, the court was not 

required to take into account subsequent remedial actions by Anderson allegedly to bring the 

property into compliance.