roved for Release b 

Strengthening· the Basis ·of Natiot\al Security 

The Board of Directors• of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 

1'hose charged with saf cguarding the United Sta;.,·s have soztght to minimise the 

danger of internal subve·rsion through the screening of go'Vernment employees and 

persons having acces., to classified infor'lllation. This program is necessary, but it 

poses a serious dilemma: the more co1npletely we succeed in reducing the da11.ger 

that information now in owr possession nwy leak to a potential enemy, the more risk 

we run of iutcrfering with scientific progre.9.9 and of reducing the technolo,qic S'ttperiority and the moral an1J physical strength upon which victory in the ulti1natei 

te.9t woiild depend. The inhm·cnt ilfm.ger.• of thi11 d·ile1i&ma can be le.~.•nuul aml 0·1ir 

strength enhanced by changing owr basic coiicept of internal security from one that 

attempts almost exclusively to minimize our losses to one that places greatly increased empha.9is on maximizing our go.i11,q. 

OUR purpose is to analyze the policies on 

which the nation's security-screening program is based and to suggest two ways 

in which these policies could be changed 

to make them contribute more positively and effectively to the strengthening of the United States and 

the nations of the free world. Four points seem basic 

to a consideration of the security program. 

1) A security-screening program is made necessary 

by the peril of the times. Espionage and sabotage, 

the communication of classified information to unauthorized persons, and infiltration by enemr, ageuts and 

sympathizers must be guar~ed against. No prudent 

government could take any other course. 

2) Examinations of the character of persons likely 

to be entrusted with vital information must go beyond 

a determination of loyalty. ·A person may be of unquestioned loyalty and still be a risk. If he is carelm~s, 

if alcohol loosens his tongue, if close relatives in 

territory under enemy occupation make him subjer~t 

to pressure, then to give him access to vital informa 

tion endangers the nation, even though his loyalty is 

unchallenged. 

3) The security program is for the protection of 

the whole community. It is true that many sdentist::; 

have a special interest in the security problem, fo1· 

the intimate dependence of military strength upon 

scientific p1·ogress means that security-screening affects them more than it docs most people. But the 

welfare of the nation must be the controlling factor, 

not the interests of an individual or the welfare of a 

particular group. The policies must be comprehensive, and their application must be impartial. 

4) Security-screening programs are a means to 11n 

end rather than an end in themselves. Their purpose 

is to conceal plans, to thwart enemy intelligence efforts, and to assist in the development and maintenance of such scientific, technologic,, and industrial 

•The bonrd of directors consists of: George W. Bendle, 

Wallace R. Brode, Edwnrd U. Condon, John R. Dunning, Mark 

H. Ingrnhnm, Pnul E. Klopsteg, Thomns Park. I'nul S1mrs, 

Laurence H. Snyder, Warren Weaver, and e111 oJ!foio, l'nul .... Scherer and Dael Wolfie. This statement has been e111lor~e<.1 

by the council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. 

10 DECEMBER 1954 

Se~~ Vtfl.. 1 '-.o t\-t! ~\~-I 

preeminence as will protect us against the danger of 

successful attack. Security-screening measures play 

an importan't' role in that process, but the role is inherently a defensive and negative one. Such measures 

keep a potential en-:'.l1y,·' from learning some facts 

about our armed for:oe~ ~ut they do not increase the <• size of that force.;:I'en1p21·a1·ily they keep an enemy 

from learning th~ 1~J.1rajrtcristics of weapons being 

developed, but ~y !.h1:!ale no new weapons. 

The last of tlreslf<:i <:'O~r .. pcoints needs more extended 

consideration, ~i>r it ·t;a.....:-110; been discussed as much 

as have the o~er th:',.Tt'~:::mr have its implications been 

as widely conside~ci-: ,' ~asically, the issue is that 

secrecy is not at. ~.u~ .tlti,t is desirable in itself but is 

a means toward'. tln end\ Thus the degree of secrecy, 

the conditions undi:Jr which secrecy is desirable, and 

the risk of losing secrecy arc all to be considered in 

terms of their contribution to the development and 

maintenance of the military, industrial, and moral 

strength which are our ultimate protection against 

effective attack. 

The role of secrecy in defense has, for reasons thf1t 

are historically obvious, been developed in a militm·y 

setting in which the concept of maintaining security 

through secrecy had validity. Communication codes, 

troop strength and dispositiou, stmtegic plans, and 

other such information can he kept out of enemy 

llands, at least temponu·ily, by adequate security safeguards. Although such information eventually becomrs 

obsolete, or is compromise<l through operational use, 

until this happens secl'ecy is proper and effective. 

But a new situation confronts ui:; now that mililnry 

strength depends so essentially upon science, for scientific knowledge cannot be kept secret by the security 

practices that serve to safeguard military information. 

Progress in science is a cumulative process in which 

each scientist builds upon what is already known; 

through research and intellectual effort he adds his 

bit to scientific knowledge. National boundaries and 

sccut'ity systems simply canuot contain this proces!'. 

Scientific knowledge will continue to grow as long as 

men are curious about the world around them. The 

state of learning in a nation affects the rate of scien957 
• REF ID:A66715 

speed 

tific progress; 

and volume 

and 

with 

the state 

which 

of 

a 

technology 

nation can 

affects 

translate 

the • 

scientific findings into practical applications, be those 

applications of a military or of a peaceful nature. In 

scientific knowledge one nation may lead another, ana 

in the application of scientific knowledge to military 

problems one nation may progress along lines not yet 

1·ecognizcd by another as being feasible or important. 

When this is the case, security precautions may provide an advantage of time. But among advanced nations the difference is of time only. The basic fact 

is that there simply are no such things as permanent 

scientific secrets. Even the time di1ference is sometimes lacking; recent decades have been filled with 

instances in which the same fundamental discovery or 

the same military application appeared practically 

simultaneously in two or more countries. 

Once it is recognized that there is no such thing 

as a permanent scientific secret, the whole picture 

changes. If security demands scientific superiority, 

and if superiority cannot be achieved by attempts to 

keep scientific progress secret, then how can superiority be achieved and maintained T Clearly the security 

of the nation requires the most favorable circumstances for the advancement of science, an environment that will foster a healthier, more imaginative, 

more energetic development than that which serves the 

enemies of freedom. 

The truth of these ideas has not yet been generally 

recognized. In fact, the belief is widely held that, by 

taking sufficient precaution, we can safeguard the scientific secrets now in our possession, and that taking 

these precautions is therefore the most effective means 

available of maintaining our national security. These 

beliefs have led to the negative concept of security 

that is in current use. This concept assumes that we 

possess secrets that give us an edge of superiority. It 

assumes that the loss of a few secrets is likely to mean 

the difference betwen success and failure. But instead 

of trying to determine what information is of such 

critical importance, it is assumed that we must safeguard the security of large amorphous categories of 

information. 

So pervasive has this type of thinking become that 

it has blurred the distinction between information that 

is vital and information that is not, between that 

which can be kept secret and that which cannot. There 

remains, of course, a proper role for secrecy to play .. 

The disposition of troops and plans for troop movements, the kinds and capabilities of new weapons and 

the plans for their use if necessary-all such information obviously should be protected, and the relatively 

few people who must have access to it clearly need to 

be carefully screened. Under certain circumstances 

this may also be true of scientific knowledge. It is 

quite possible that an important scientific discovery 

that has profound implications for defense is made 

during a time of emergency. The time of discovery is 

thus sometimes an element, and under such circumstances the discovery should be held secret until it is 

known that a potential enemy also has it. These cases 

958 

involve the difficulty of deciding between the advantages of classifying a discovery and the advantages 

of giving it to the scientific community. The burden 

of proof that a discovery should be classified rests 

squarely on the classifier. 

But not all knowledge belongs in the classified category, and-admitting that the categorization is sometimes difficult-for such information as does noh the 

emphasis in our thinking should be on the positive side 

of progress rather than on the negative side of secrecy. 

With scientific knowledge advancing in many countries, as it most certainly is, our major effort should 

be on further progress and more advanced application 

instead of upon preserving the secrecy of the scientific 

knowledge we already have. We cannot possibly keep 

scientific knowledge secret; but we can hope to keep 

ahead of our potential enemies in basic knowledge 

and in the application of that .knowledge. 

A positive program of preserving national security 

by keeping ahead would substitute the question How 

can we best aid national progress T for the negative 

question How can we avoid the danger of leaksT Instead of asking HO'W can we minimize our ZossesT it 

would ask How can we ma:&imize our gaimT If-as is 

likely-we should be numerically outnumbered, our 

superior strength must come from making better use 

of the material and human resources we do have. It 

follows that ability to make positive contributions to 

the nation's welfare and progress should be a primary 

criterion of a person's suitability for any position 

other than positions involving access to the types of 

information that must properly be closely guarded. 

We do not find that this criterion is now, in actual 

practice, the primary one. It is necessary to ask What 

security risk is incurred in employing this person T 

But it is also vital to ask What risk of delayed progress or diminished achievement is incurred in not employing him T Granting the obvious fact that every 

person is to some extent, however small, a security 

risk, screening boards are faced with the difficult task 

of assessing the size of the risk and then balancing 

that risk against the gains that may accrue if the risk 

is taken. It appears that in practice the potential 

gains have been given little consideration, while great 

emphasis has been placed upon the risk. 

We propose two changes. First, that greater weight 

be given to a man's potential contributions. The risk 

involved must still be considered, but for any given position we can afford a larger risk if we stand to make 

a great gain than if we can expect only a small one. 

The difficulties of determining and properly weighting 

the positive factors which should be given greater consideration are clearly great. But scientists would welcome the opportunity to cooperate with government 

officials in developing appropriate standards and procedures. Even with such standards, decisions would be 

necessary; and many of the decisions would be difficult to make, for the whole man should be considered, 

his strengths and possible contributions as well as his 

weaknesses and possible danger. 

Our second proposal offers much less difficulty. We 

SCmNCE, VOL. 120 
• REF ID:A6671 • 

propose that the risk be measured with more regard 

for the nature of the work to be done than has frequently been true in the past. No satisfactory justification has yet been advanced for screening persons 

engaged in unclassified research, in say biochemistry, 

by the standards appropriate for screening those who 

have access to the details of war plans and advanced 

weapons . .As a matter of logic, there is no question of 

security in unclassified basic research. There is a question of loyalty; both public opinion and the opinion 

of scientists would usually hold against the supplying 

of public funds to a scientist of established disloyalty. 

But demonstrated disloyalty, or even a strong presumption of disloyalty, is a different matter from 

security risk. Disloyalty is not to be tolerated anywhere, but stringent security precautions are approriate only when the information to be guarded justifies the stringency. 

The classification of basic research is likely to retard the development of both peaceful and military 

technology. Basic research thrives on the free interchange of ideas and information. The free discussion 

of research findings and methods allows criticism, permits the discovery of error, stimulates improvement, 

and furnishes the original clues which lead sometimes 

to the development of new weapons and more frequently to the development of peaceful applications 

of science. When the free flow of basic scientific information is stifled, technologic development must 

inevitably suffer, and the greatest loss is to the nation 

that enjoys the highest state of learning and the most 

advanced technology. · 

It is easy to overdraw the distinction between two 

such policies as the negative one we are criticizing and 

the positive one we are advocating, and perhaps we 

have done so. Nevertheless, there is an important difference in the effects of the two. Under a policy that 

attempts to maximize gains, we would encourage the 

interchange of scientific inforrb.ation; we would at-

. tempt to use as many people of high ability as we 

could, even though not all could safely be used in the 

more sensitive positions. 

A policy that attempts to minimize losses leads to 

quite different attitudes and effects. A costly aspect 

of current procedures which seems to have been generally neglected in official circles and which would hr. 

largely obviated by a positive approach to security 

is the wastage of time and talent, the lowered efficiency, and the slowing of. progress that i·esult from 

the excesses of current procedures. We can afford the 

time that goes into the investigatory process itself. W c 

can justify the money costs. But can we afford to have 

government service become less desirable, to diminish 

the effectiveness of research and development programs, to retard the fl.ow of information to and among 

our own scientists, to deprive federal agencies of the 

help of consultants who possess important information. and rare skills the agencies would like to use, 

or to base support for unclassified fundamental research on the political ideology of the investigator 

and his associatesf The lowered morale, the lost time 

and efficiency, and the denial to the nation of the use 

of some persons of great talent add up to a bill of 

unknown but certainly large size, a bill we pay for 

our negative method of maintaining security. Were 

time, talent, and effectiveness so wasted for any other 

reason, those responsible would be considered guilty 

of sabotage of the first order. 

A positive program of security can be developed. 

It requires boldness; it demands continued. belief in 

the fundamental loyalty of American scientists, engineers, and industrialists and in their ability to keep 

the United States ahead of potential enemies. It would 

foster the development and effective use of the resources of knowledge, talent, and enthusiasm which 

can keep us ahead. Such a program would strengthen 

the democratic spirit of freedom and of progress 

which is the hope of the free world. 

Human Ecology: A Problem in Synthesis* 

Paul B. Sears 

Conservation Program, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 

P

EKING man, most ancient of our near kin, is 

not more than a million years old. The earth 

as a separate planet is at least 2000, perhaps 

3000, million years old. The species of Pleistocene mammal to which we belong has been present 

for only the last 30 sec of the 24th hour of earth's 

existence. On this scale, agriculture and urban life are 

less than 0.5 sec old, while modern power technology 

based on fossil fuel compares with a very fast "instantaneous" snapshot. 

• Invitation paper read for the Ecological Society of America 

at Galnesvllle, FJa., 8 Sept. 1954. 

10 DECEllt:BEll. 1954 

We are an explosion. For the first time in earth 

history, a single species has become dominant, and we 

are it. The power and intensity of our pressure upon 

environment is without precedent. Our numbers increase at a net rate-conservatively-of 1 percent a 

year. This means a net gain of more than 50,000 a 

day, and doubling in a generation. This also means 

increasing demand for space in which to live and 

move and increasing demand for food and other necessities from the space that is left. 

Man thus becomes his own rival, or rather the victim of his own rival needs. The modern landscape 

959