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IN RE INTEREST OF TYRONE K.

Cite as 295 Neb. 193

In re Interest of Tyrone K., a child

under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska, appellee, 

v. Tyrone K., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed December 2, 2016. No. S-15-1057.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional issue that 

does not involve a factual dispute presents a question of law, which an 

appellate court independently decides.

2. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, 

as in any other appeal, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine 

whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain 

and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous.

4. Statutes. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into 

a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the 

province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of 

a statute.

5. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In reading a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as 

ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its 

plain, ordinary, and popular sense.

6. ____: ____: ____. Components of a series or collection of statutes 

pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should 

be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of 

the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, harmonious, 

and sensible.

7. Statutes: Courts. A court’s proper role is to interpret statutes and 

clarify their meaning.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

12/02/2016 09:10 AM CST
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Cite as 295 Neb. 193

8. Statutes: Legislature: Public Policy. It is the Legislature’s function 

through the enactment of statutes to declare what is the law and public 

policy of this state.

9. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Reissue 2016), an appellate court may review three types of final 

orders: (1) an order affecting a substantial right in an action that, in 

effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; (2) an order 

affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding; and (3) 

an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an 

action after a judgment is rendered.

10. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential 

legal right, not a mere technical right.

11. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A substantial right is affected if an 

order affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a 

claim or defense that was available to an appellant before the order from 

which an appeal is taken.

12. ____: ____. A substantial right is not affected for purposes of appeal 

when that right can be effectively vindicated in an appeal from the 

final judgment.

13. Statutes: Judgments: Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. The fact 

that the statutory scheme enacted by 2014 Neb. Laws, L.B. 464, contains no specific provision regarding appellate review of juvenile transfer orders does not mean such orders are immune from appellate review 

on direct appeal after final judgment.

14. Records: Appeal and Error. It is the appellant’s burden to create a 

record for the appellate court which supports the errors assigned.

15. Constitutional Law: Juvenile Courts: Criminal Law. There is no constitutional right to proceed in juvenile court rather than criminal court.

16. Juvenile Courts: Criminal Law. A juvenile whose case may be transferred to criminal court has no right to have his or her case remain in 

juvenile court, and an order transferring such a case from juvenile to 

criminal court does not affect a substantial right.

17. Constitutional Law: Juvenile Courts: Legislature. Access to juvenile 

court is a statutory right granted and qualified by the Legislature; it is 

not a constitutional imperative.

18. Juvenile Courts: Criminal Law. Juveniles whose cases may be transferred to criminal court, and juveniles whose cases may be directly filed 

in criminal court, have no right to avoid the collateral consequences of a 

criminal conviction.

Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster 

County: Reggie L. Ryder, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
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Cite as 295 Neb. 193

Joe Nigro, Lancaster County Public Defender, and Sarah J. 

Safarik for appellant.

Joe Kelly, Lancaster County Attorney, and Ashley J. Bohnet 

for appellee.

Juliet Summers for amicus curiae Voices for Children in 

Nebraska and Christine Henningsen, of Center on Children, 

Families and the Law at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 

for amicus curiae Nebraska Youth Advocates.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, 

Kelch, and Funke, JJ.

Stacy, J.

This case presents the issue of whether an order granting 

a motion to transfer a juvenile case to criminal court is final 

and appealable. We conclude it is not, and dismiss the appeal 

as premature.

I. FACTS

A petition filed in juvenile court on September 4, 2015, 

alleged 16-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts of theft 

by receiving stolen property and one count of operating 

a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The charges arose from a 

series of vehicle thefts which occurred after Tyrone escaped 

from a youth rehabilitation and treatment center. The alleged 

law violations were classified as two Class III felonies, a 

Class IV felony, and two Class I misdemeanors.1 Due in part 

to Tyrone’s extensive history in the juvenile court system, the 

prosecutor immediately moved to transfer the proceedings to 

county court for arraignment and further proceedings under 

the criminal code.2 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, 

the juvenile court granted the motion to transfer. Tyrone filed 

this appeal. We moved the case to our docket on our own 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-517, 28-518, and 28-905 (Reissue 2016).

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-274(5) (Reissue 2016).
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motion pursuant to our statutory authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of this state.3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual 

dispute presents a question of law, which an appellate court 

independently decides.4

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Tyrone assigns there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to transfer his case to county court.

IV. ANALYSIS

[2] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, it is the duty 

of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.5

 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01 

(Reissue 2016) gives an appellate court jurisdiction to review 

“[a]ny final order or judgment entered by a juvenile court 

. . . .” Whether we have jurisdiction to review the juvenile 

court’s transfer order at this point in the proceedings depends 

on whether Tyrone has appealed from either a judgment or a 

final order.

A transfer order is not a judgment, and no party argues otherwise. The transfer order did not address or decide the merits 

of the alleged law violations and made no final determination 

of the parties’ rights;6 it merely determined the state court 

forum in which the case would proceed. Therefore, the threshold question presented here is whether Tyrone has appealed 

from a final order.

Tyrone makes two arguments in support of his position that 

a transfer order is a final order. First, he argues the Legislature 

3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2016).

4 See Purdie v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 292 Neb. 524, 872 N.W.2d 

895 (2016). 

5 In re Interest of Cassandra B. & Moira B., 290 Neb. 619, 861 N.W.2d 398 

(2015).

6 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301 (Reissue 2016).
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redefined transfer orders as final orders when it enacted 2014 

Neb. Laws, L.B. 464. Second, he argues the transfer order is 

a final order under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016), 

because it was made in a special proceeding and affects a substantial right. We address each argument in turn. Before doing 

so, however, it is necessary to provide an overview of the relevant statutes.

1. Overview of New

Juvenile Statutes

From 1974 to 2014, when a juvenile committed a law violation, the relevant juvenile delinquency statutes gave the prosecuting attorney substantial discretion regarding whether to file 

charges in criminal court, file delinquency proceedings in juvenile court, or offer juvenile pretrial diversion or mediation.7

If the prosecutor elected to file in criminal court, the juvenile 

could file a motion asking that the case be transferred to the 

juvenile court for further proceedings under the Nebraska 

Juvenile Code.8

In 2014, through L.B. 464, the Legislature made significant 

changes to this statutory scheme. According to the Introducer’s 

Statement of Intent:

Nebraska is one of the few states that allows prosecutors broad authority in deciding whether or not to 

file charges in adult or juvenile court. . . . In 2010 in 

Nebraska, 45 percent of filings against youth were in 

adult court, despite the fact that nearly 90 percent of 

charges against youth in adult court were misdemeanors. 

Requiring more cases to originate in juvenile court will 

give more youth a chance at rehabilitation and reduce 

their chance of having a criminal record.9

7 See § 43-274(4) (Reissue 2008) and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (Cum. Supp. 

2012).

8 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1816 (Cum. Supp. 2012).

9 Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 464, Judiciary Committee, 103d 

Leg., 1st Sess. 1 (Mar. 6, 2013).
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Generally speaking, L.B. 464 limited the discretion of prosecutors to decide whether a case should be filed in juvenile or 

criminal court, and replaced it with a three-tiered jurisdictional 

structure that specifies the court in which a case should be 

filed, depending on the age of the juvenile and the nature of 

the alleged law violation. The new jurisdictional structure is 

first set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01 (Reissue 2016). 

The relevant sections of L.B. 464 became operative January 

1, 2015.10

(a) Exclusive Original Jurisdiction

Section 43-246.01(1) grants exclusive original jurisdiction 

to the juvenile court over offenders who (1) are under 16 years 

of age and committed a misdemeanor or infraction, other than 

a traffic offense, or (2) are under 14 years of age and committed a felony.11 Proceedings against these juvenile offenders 

must always be filed via a juvenile petition and must always 

proceed to completion in juvenile court.12 Tyrone does not fall 

into this category of juvenile offenders.

(b) Original Jurisdiction 

Subject to Transfer

Section 43-246.01(2) grants original jurisdiction to the 

juvenile court over juvenile offenders who are (1) 16 years 

of age and committed a misdemeanor13 or (2) 14 years of 

age or older and committed a felony lesser in grade than a 

Class IIA.14 Actions against these juvenile offenders must 

always be initiated in juvenile court by filing a juvenile petition, but are subject to transfer to county or district court 

10 2014 Neb. Laws, L.B. 464, § 37.

11 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) and (2) (Supp. 2015).

12 § 43-246.01(1).

13 As of January 1, 2017, this jurisdiction also extends to juveniles who are 

17 years old, pursuant to § 43-246.01(2)(a).

14 § 43-246.01(2)(b).
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for further proceedings under the criminal code.15 All of the 

allegations against Tyrone, except the allegation of operating 

a motor vehicle to avoid arrest, put him in this category of 

juvenile offenders.

(c) Concurrent Jurisdiction

Section 43-246.01(3) grants to the juvenile court and the 

county or district courts concurrent jurisdiction over juvenile 

offenders who (1) commit a traffic offense that is not a felony 

or (2) are 14 years of age or older and commit a Class I, IA, 

IB, IC, ID, II, or IIA felony.16 Actions against these juveniles 

may be initiated either in juvenile court or in the county or 

district court.17 The allegation against Tyrone of operating a 

motor vehicle to avoid arrest put him within this category of 

juvenile offenders.

All of the offenses allegedly committed by Tyrone are 

offenses over which both the juvenile court and the criminal court can exercise jurisdiction under the new statutory 

scheme. With respect to such offenses, if the action is initiated 

in juvenile court, a party can move to transfer it to county or 

district court via § 43-274(5) (Reissue 2016), a new statutory 

provision created by L.B. 464.18 And if the action is initiated in county or district court, a party can move to transfer 

it to juvenile court via § 29-1816 (Reissue 2016).19 Section 

29-1816 existed prior to the enactment of L.B. 464, but was 

amended by it.

(d) Transfers Under § 43-274(5)

 All of the allegations against Tyrone were initiated via a petition filed in juvenile court, and the prosecutor simultaneously 

15 § 43-246.01(2).

16 § 29-1816(1)(a)(ii).

17 See §§ 43-246.01(3) and 29-1816.

18 § 43-246.01(3).

19 § 29-1816(1)(a)(ii) and (2).
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filed a motion to transfer the proceedings to criminal court. 

Section 43-274(5) controls in this circumstance. That section authorizes a city or county attorney to seek a transfer to 

criminal court when both the juvenile court and the criminal 

court have statutory jurisdiction.20 It specifies that the transfer motion must be filed with the juvenile court petition, and 

requires the juvenile court to schedule a hearing on the motion 

within 15 days.21 The city or county attorney has the burden to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the case should 

be transferred.22 The juvenile court must make a decision 

within 30 days of the hearing, and must “set forth findings for 

the reason for its decision.”23

(e) Transfers Under § 29-1816

Both before and after L.B. 464, § 29-1816 provided that 

if the case is filed in county or district court, at the time of 

arraignment, the court must advise the juvenile that he or she 

may move at any time not later than 30 days after arraignment 

to transfer the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings 

under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. If the juvenile so moves, 

a hearing must be held within 15 days, and the court “shall” 

transfer the case “unless a sound basis exists for retaining the 

case.”24 The county or district court must “set forth findings for 

the reason for its decision.”25

Prior to L.B. 464, § 29-1816 specifically provided that 

the county or district court’s ruling on a motion to transfer 

an action to juvenile court “shall not be a final order for the 

purpose of enabling an appeal.”26 But L.B. 464 removed this 

20 § 43-274(5).

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 § 29-1816(3)(a).

25 § 29-1816(3)(b).

26 § 29-1816(2)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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language, and § 29-1816 (Reissue 2016) is now silent as to the 

finality of an order ruling on a motion to transfer a case from 

criminal court to juvenile court. Similarly, § 43-274(5), the 

new statute enacted by L.B. 464, is silent regarding whether 

a juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to transfer an action to a 

county or district court is a final order.

2. L.B. 464 Did Not Determine

Finality of Transfer Orders

Tyrone argues the transfer order is a final, appealable order. 

In doing so, he places much significance on the effect of 

L.B. 464 on §§ 29-1816 and 43-274(5). He argues that by 

deleting the nonfinal order language from § 29-1816, the 

Legislature intended to authorize interlocutory appeals from 

orders ruling on motions to transfer from criminal court to 

juvenile court. And he argues that because the Legislature 

intended to authorize interlocutory appeals from orders ruling 

on motions to transfer from criminal court to juvenile court 

under § 29-1816, we should judicially construe § 43-274(5) to 

also authorize interlocutory appeals from orders transferring 

cases from juvenile court to criminal court.

[3-6] Our analysis of the statutory changes made by L.B. 464 

is guided by familiar rules of statutory construction. Statutory 

language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and 

an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain 

the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and 

unambiguous.27 It is not within the province of a court to read 

a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the language; 

neither is it within the province of a court to read anything 

plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a statute.28 In reading a 

statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose 

and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire 

27 State v. Sikes, 286 Neb. 38, 834 N.W.2d 609 (2013); State v. Parks, 282 

Neb. 454, 803 N.W.2d 761 (2011).

28 State v. Warriner, 267 Neb. 424, 675 N.W.2d 112 (2004); State v. Gartner, 

263 Neb. 153, 638 N.W.2d 849 (2002).
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language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and 

popular sense.29 Components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia 

and should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions 

are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.30

We find nothing in the legislative history, and the parties 

direct us to nothing, suggesting why the nonfinal order language of § 29-1816 was removed. Tyrone argues the removal 

of the language is significant in and of itself, based on the 

general rule that the Legislature is presumed to know the 

language used in its statutes, and if in a subsequent act on 

the same or similar subject it uses different terms in the same 

connection, a court should presume that a change in the law 

was intended.31

We are not convinced that this principle of statutory construction applies under these circumstances. Here, language 

prohibiting an interlocutory appeal was removed by L.B. 464, 

but no different terms were substituted in the same connection. 

Deleting a negative does not automatically create a positive.

Moreover, when articulating the procedure to be followed 

after a transfer order is granted by the juvenile court, the 

Legislature left no room in the statutory process for interlocutory appeal, providing instead:

If the proceeding is transferred from juvenile court to the 

county court or district court, the county attorney or city 

attorney shall file a criminal information in the county 

court or district court, as appropriate, and the accused 

shall be arraigned as provided for a person eighteen years 

of age or older . . . .32

29 State v. Mucia, 292 Neb. 1, 871 N.W.2d 221 (2015); State v. Huff, 282 

Neb. 78, 802 N.W.2d 77 (2011).

30 State v. Hernandez, 283 Neb. 423, 809 N.W.2d 279 (2012).

31 See Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 283 Neb. 340, 808 N.W.2d 875 (2012).

32 § 43-274(5).
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Generally, when the Legislature has authorized interlocutory appeals from orders entered in ongoing criminal cases, 

it has done so expressly and has set out detailed and specific 

procedures for such appeals which balance the interests of the 

litigants and the interests of justice.33 In contrast, L.B. 464 

contains no specific procedures governing appellate review 

of transfer orders, and the statutory procedure the prosecutor 

is to follow after a transfer order is granted appears designed 

to facilitate timely resolution of the criminal matter, not interlocutory appeal.

Although Tyrone urges us to conclude otherwise, we are not 

persuaded that anything meaningful can be gleaned from the 

fact that § 43-274(5) is silent regarding the finality of a juvenile court’s order on a motion to transfer a case to county or 

district court. We note that when L.B. 464 first was introduced, 

§ 43-274 contained a provision that a juvenile court’s decision 

to transfer proceedings to criminal court “shall be a final order 

for the purpose of enabling an appeal.”34 But that final order 

language was omitted from § 43-274 during the legislative 

process, and we find nothing in the legislative history explaining why this language was removed. Tyrone urges us to interpret § 43-274(5) to supply by implication the very language 

which the Legislature pointedly rejected. We decline to do so. 

It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning 

into a statute that is not there.35

Considering §§ 29-1816 and 43-274 together, we observe 

that when enacting L.B. 464, the Legislature removed language 

from § 29-1816 that prevented transfer orders from being 

final and appealable, and also removed proposed language 

from § 43-274 that would have made transfer orders final and 

33 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-116 through 29-118 and 29-824 through 

29-826 (Reissue 2016).

34 Introduced Copy, L.B. 464, Judiciary Committee, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. 14 

(Jan. 22, 2013).

35 Republic Bank v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal., 283 Neb. 721, 811 N.W.2d 

682 (2012); Trieweiler v. Sears, 268 Neb. 952, 689 N.W.2d 807 (2004).
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appealable. Consequently, after L.B. 464, we are left with juvenile transfer statutes that are uniformly silent on whether any 

transfer orders are final and appealable.

[7,8] The briefing submitted to this court advances several 

public policy arguments both for and against authorizing 

interlocutory appellate review of transfer orders in juvenile 

cases. But a court’s proper role is to interpret statutes and 

clarify their meaning,36 and it is the Legislature’s function 

through the enactment of statutes to declare what is the law 

and public policy of this state.37 Within the proper confines 

of established rules of statutory construction, we find nothing 

which permits the conclusion that the Legislature intended, 

by either silence or omission, to affirmatively confer a statutory right of interlocutory appeal from an order on a motion 

to transfer a case from criminal court to juvenile court, or 

vice versa. We conclude that when the Legislature removed 

the final order language from § 29-1816 without adding any 

different language pertaining to finality, it left to the judiciary 

the familiar task of applying Nebraska’s final order statute, 

§ 25-1902, to determine whether transfer orders are final 

and appealable.

3. Transfer Orders Are Not Final

Orders Under § 25-1902

[9] Under § 25-1902, an appellate court may review three 

types of final orders: (1) an order affecting a substantial right 

in an action that, in effect, determines the action and prevents 

a judgment; (2) an order affecting a substantial right made 

during a special proceeding; and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after 

a judgment is rendered.38 The order here neither determined 

36 State v. Custer, 292 Neb. 88, 871 N.W.2d 243 (2015).

37 In re Interest of Kendra M. et al., 283 Neb. 1014, 814 N.W.2d 747 (2012).

38 Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 

425 (2015).
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the action and prevented a judgment; nor was the order made 

on summary application after judgment. As such, the transfer 

order is final and appealable only if it was made during a special proceeding and affected a substantial right.

The transfer decision was made by the juvenile court, and as 

a general rule, juvenile delinquency proceedings are considered 

special proceedings.39 For purposes of this appeal, we assume 

without deciding that the transfer order at issue was made in 

a special proceeding. We focus our analysis on whether the 

order from which Tyrone appeals affected a substantial right. 

Specifically, the question presented is whether a substantial 

right of a juvenile is affected when the juvenile court grants 

the prosecutor’s motion to transfer a case to county court and 

both the juvenile court and the county court have statutory 

authority to resolve the proceeding.

[10-12] A substantial right is an essential legal right, not 

a mere technical right.40 A substantial right is affected if 

an order affects the subject matter of the litigation, such 

as diminishing a claim or defense that was available to an 

appellant before the order from which an appeal is taken.41 A 

substantial right is not affected for purposes of appeal when 

that right can be effectively vindicated in an appeal from the 

final judgment.42

In asserting that the transfer order is final and appealable, 

Tyrone presents three general arguments. First, he argues that if 

an interlocutory appeal is not allowed now, he will forever lose 

his right to appeal from the transfer order. Second, he argues 

that the transfer order affects a substantial right, because a 

39 See In re Interest of Laurance S., 274 Neb. 620, 742 N.W.2d 484 (2007).

40 In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., 290 Neb. 589, 861 N.W.2d 415 (2015); 

In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581, 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012).

41 Becerra v. United Parcel Service, 284 Neb. 414, 822 N.W.2d 327 (2012); 

In re Estate of McKillip, 284 Neb. 367, 820 N.W.2d 868 (2012).

42 See, Schropp Indus. v. Washington Cty. Atty.’s Ofc., 281 Neb. 152, 794 

N.W.2d 685 (2011); State v. Vela, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006).
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juvenile whose criminal charges are tried in county or district 

court is denied timely access to rehabilitative services such as 

pretrial evaluations, plans, and services. Third, he argues that 

the transfer order affects a substantial right, because a conviction in criminal court exposes him to collateral consequences 

in the form of loss of civil rights and privileges that are not at 

issue in juvenile proceedings.

(a) Appealing Transfer Order 

After Final Judgment

Prior to L.B. 464, we regularly reviewed errors assigned to 

a trial court’s ruling on a motion to transfer, and we did so at 

the conclusion of the criminal case as part of the direct appeal 

of the conviction and sentence.43 Tyrone argues that under the 

statutory scheme enacted by L.B. 464, he cannot effectively 

challenge the transfer order at the conclusion of the criminal 

proceedings. We disagree.

Other jurisdictions addressing this question have concluded 

that a juvenile may appeal an order transferring his or her 

cause to criminal court at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.44 Indeed, several courts conclude this is the preferable procedure. As one court reasoned:

“To permit interlocutory review of [a transfer] order 

would obviously delay the prosecution of any proceeding 

43 See, State v. Dominguez, 290 Neb. 477, 860 N.W.2d 732 (2015); State 

v. Stevens, 290 Neb. 460, 860 N.W.2d 717 (2015); State v. Mantich, 249 

Neb. 311, 543 N.W.2d 181 (1996); State v. Reynolds, 247 Neb. 608, 529 

N.W.2d 64 (1995); State v. Ice, 244 Neb. 875, 509 N.W.2d 407 (1994); 

State v. Nevels, 235 Neb. 39, 453 N.W.2d 579 (1990).

44 See, People v. Browning, 45 Cal. App. 3d 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1975), 

overruled on other grounds, People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 3d 663, 547 P.2d 

1000, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1976); People in Int. of D.H., 37 Colo. App. 

544, 552 P.2d 29 (1976); Interest of Clay, 246 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1976); 

In re Appeal No. 961, 23 Md. App. 9, 325 A.2d 112 (1974); Interest of 

Watkins, 324 So. 2d 232 (Miss. 1975); In re T. J. H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 

1972); In re Becker, 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974); In re D.H., 

No. 27074, 2016 WL 4168867 (Ohio App. July 1, 2016).
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in either the juvenile or the criminal division, with the 

result that the prospect of a just disposition would be 

jeopardized. In either proceeding the primary issue is 

the ascertainment of the innocence or guilt of the person 

charged. To permit interlocutory review [of a transfer 

order] would subordinate that primary issue and defer 

its consideration while the question of the punishment 

appropriate for a suspect whose guilt has not yet been 

ascertained is being litigated in reviewing courts. . . .”45

Tyrone’s concern appears to be premised on the lack of 

statutory direction as to how to attain appellate review of the 

transfer order when a case is transferred from juvenile to criminal court. Section 43-274(5) provides:

If the proceeding is transferred from juvenile court to the 

county court or district court, the county attorney or city 

attorney shall file a criminal information in the county 

court or district court, as appropriate, and the accused 

shall be arraigned as provided for a person eighteen years 

of age or older in . . . § 29-1816.

Tyrone argues this language prevents him from appealing the 

transfer order at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, 

but it is not entirely clear from his briefing why he believes 

this is so.

To the extent Tyrone’s argument turns on the absence of a 

clear statutory directive regarding the procedure by which a 

party may seek appellate review of a juvenile court’s transfer 

order, we agree L.B. 464 did not include express provisions in 

that regard.

[13] But contrary to Tyrone’s argument, the fact that the 

statutory scheme enacted by L.B. 464 contains no specific provision regarding appellate review of juvenile transfer orders 

does not mean that transfer orders are somehow immune from 

45 In re Becker, supra note 44, 39 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 314 N.E.2d at 159. See, 

also, Interest of Clay, supra note 44; Interest of Watkins, supra note 44; 

State v. Thomas, 970 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. App. 1998); In re Joseph T., 575 

A.2d 985 (R.I. 1990).
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appellate review on direct appeal after final judgment. We 

have not been directed to anything in the statutory scheme or 

in our court rules which would prevent a juvenile, on direct 

appeal from a criminal judgment, from requesting and presenting a sufficient record to support an assignment of error 

related to the juvenile transfer order which authorized the filing of the criminal proceedings.

We acknowledge that our current rules of appellate procedure, which were promulgated prior to the enactment of 

L.B. 464, were not designed to address and did not contemplate the need to create an appellate record from multiple 

courts with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular matter.46

But the provisions of our current court rules do not support 

Tyrone’s fundamental premise that error related to the transfer 

order cannot effectively be reviewed on direct appeal from any 

final judgment in the criminal case.

[14] It is the appellant’s burden to create a record for this 

court which supports the errors assigned.47 Under the existing appellate rules, there is nothing preventing an appellant 

from filing a praecipe in each court “from which the appeal 

is taken,”48 directing the clerk to prepare the transcript necessary to support the assigned errors.49 Likewise, nothing would 

preclude an appellant from filing a praecipe to prepare a bill 

of exceptions in each such court, with a copy delivered to the 

proper court reporting personnel.50 The concerns articulated by 

Tyrone do not support the conclusion that he will be prevented 

from obtaining appellate review of the transfer order unless he 

is permitted to appeal immediately.

46 See, generally, Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-104 and § 2-105 (rev. 2010).

47 See, Centurion Stone of Neb. v. Whelan, 286 Neb. 150, 835 N.W.2d 62 

(2013); InterCall, Inc. v. Egenera, Inc., 284 Neb. 801, 824 N.W.2d 12 

(2012).

48 § 2-104(A)(1).

49 See § 2-104(A)(1) and (2).

50 See, generally, § 2-105.
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(b) Substantial Right to Rehabilitative 

Services in Juvenile Court

Tyrone argues he has a substantial right to proceed in juvenile court and receive timely access to the rehabilitative services available in that forum. This argument is premised on the 

assumption that because he was a minor at the time the alleged 

offenses were committed, he has a right to have his case proceed in juvenile court.

There is only one Nebraska case addressing this general 

premise. In State v. Meese,

51 a confidential informant purchased marijuana from a 16-year-old juvenile in May 1996. 

The juvenile was not charged or arrested until October 1997. 

She was nearly 18 years old at that time, and the charges 

were filed in county court. The juvenile moved to transfer 

the proceedings to juvenile court, and the county court denied 

her motion. The criminal case was then bound over to district 

court for trial.

[15] Prior to trial, the juvenile filed a motion to discharge. 

She argued the State’s delay in charging her violated her right 

to due process of law, because it resulted in the county court, 

rather than the juvenile court, handling the case. We held she 

had not appealed from a final order. In doing so, we noted 

there is no constitutional right to proceed in juvenile court 

rather than criminal court, and we observed that on several 

occasions, we had waited until after any conviction and sentence to review the validity of a trial court’s decision on a 

motion to transfer. We also explicitly stated “the loss of access 

to juvenile court itself does not affect a substantial right.”52

Tyrone emphasizes that Meese was decided at a time when 

§ 29-1816 specifically provided that the decision on a motion 

to transfer to juvenile court was not a final order, and thus he 

argues that Meese is not persuasive authority in light of the current version of that statute, which contains no such language. 

51 State v. Meese, 257 Neb. 486, 599 N.W.2d 192 (1999).

52 Id. at 495, 599 N.W.2d at 199.
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While we acknowledge the change in statutory language, we 

conclude it does not affect our reasoning in Meese.

This is so, in large part, because the current statutory 

language is not inconsistent with the statutory language in 

effect when Meese was decided. As noted earlier, the current version of § 29-1816 simply omits the language that 

specifically stated an order transferring a case from criminal 

court to juvenile court was not final and appealable. Thus, 

at most, the current version is silent as to whether a right to 

interlocutory appeal exists from such an order, whereas the 

former version expressly stated there was no such right. This 

difference in the statutory language does not undermine the 

holding in Meese.

[16] More important, despite Tyrone’s arguments to the 

contrary, the jurisdictional changes brought about by L.B. 464 

did not create a right to have his alleged offenses proceed in 

juvenile court rather than criminal court. It is true that when 

enacting L.B. 464, the Legislature sought to create a statutory 

scheme that would result in more alleged law violations against 

juveniles being filed in and resolved in juvenile court.53 And 

under that statutory scheme, a certain category of juveniles 

do have the right to proceed exclusively in juvenile court.54

Tyrone, however, is not one of those juveniles. Given his 

age and the nature of his alleged offenses, the current statute 

required that three of the four offenses against Tyrone must be 

originally filed in juvenile court.55 But because all of Tyrone’s 

alleged offenses are those which can, upon proper motion and 

showing, be transferred to criminal court,56 Tyrone has no right 

under the current statutory scheme to have his case remain in 

juvenile court, so the order transferring his case does not affect 

a substantial right.

53 See Introducer’s Statement of Intent, supra note 9.

54 See § 43-246.01(1).

55 See § 43-246.01(2).

56 See, § 43-246.01(2) and (3); § 43-274(5).
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[17] Our reasoning in Meese was thus not affected by the 

changes in the statutory scheme. Even after L.B. 464, access to 

juvenile court is a statutory right granted and qualified by the 

Legislature; it is not a constitutional imperative. As such, we 

conclude the transfer of Tyrone’s case from juvenile court to 

criminal court did not affect a substantial right.

Our holding in this regard does not ignore the importance 

of the unique opportunities and the juvenile-centered programs available in juvenile court. But in Nebraska, the possibility of disposition under the juvenile code remains available 

to juveniles even if their case is transferred from juvenile 

to criminal court. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204.02(4) (Supp. 

2015) provides:

If the defendant was under eighteen years of age at the 

time he or she committed the crime for which he or she 

was convicted, the court may, in its discretion, instead of 

imposing the penalty provided for the crime, make such 

disposition of the defendant as the court deems proper 

under the Nebraska Juvenile Code.

Tyrone concedes that § 29-2204.02(4) allows a juvenile tried 

in criminal court to receive disposition under the juvenile code. 

But he contends that the code also allows for pretrial juvenile 

services, while a criminal action does not, and he argues that 

transferring the case to criminal court has deprived him of 

the substantial right to receive preadjudication evaluations 

and rehabilitative services available in juvenile court. Again, 

however, under the current statutory scheme, Tyrone has no 

right to receive the rehabilitative services under the juvenile 

code, because both the juvenile court and the criminal court 

have jurisdiction over his case. A delay in receiving services 

to which he has no statutory right does not affect a substantial right.

(c) Exposure to Collateral Consequences 

of Criminal Conviction

[18] Finally, Tyrone argues the transfer of his case to criminal court affects a substantial right, because a finding of guilt 
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would expose him to the collateral consequences of a criminal 

conviction. It is true that an adjudication of delinquency on 

the same charges would not result in a criminal record or the 

loss of civil rights. But as we noted previously, under the statutory scheme enacted by L.B. 464, juveniles whose cases may 

be transferred to criminal court, and juveniles whose cases 

may be directly filed in criminal court, have no right to avoid 

the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. And of 

course, not all of the collateral consequences of a transfer 

from juvenile to criminal court are disadvantageous to juveniles. A transfer makes available rights that are restricted or 

unavailable in juvenile court, such as the right to a jury trial,57

the right to a speedy trial,58 and the full panoply of criminal 

procedural rights.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the transfer order 

from which Tyrone appeals is not a final order. The appeal 

is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

57 Neb. Const. art. I, §§ 6 and 11; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2004 (Reissue 2016).

58 U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Neb. Const. art. I, § 11; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 

(Reissue 2016).