J-S83028-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: N.N.W., A/K/A N.W., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: S.W., BIRTH FATHER

No. 950 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000028-2016

IN RE: S.L.W., A/K/A S.J., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: S.W., BIRTH FATHER

No. 951 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000029-2016

IN RE: Z.T.W., A/K/A T.W., A/K/A 

T.Z.W., A MINOR,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: S.W., BIRTH FATHER
J-S83028-16

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No. 952 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000033-2016

IN RE: N.J.W., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: S.W., BIRTH FATHER

No. 953 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000027-2016

IN RE: S.L.W., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: S.W., BIRTH FATHER

No. 969 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered June 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000026-2016
J-S83028-16

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BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 1, 2016

S.W. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered on June 3, 2016, 

granting the petitions of the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and 

Families (“CYF”) for involuntary termination of his parental rights to his five 

children:1 Sr.W., born June of 2006; Nr.W., born September of 2009; Nh.W, 

born July of 2010; Zr.W., born October of 2011; and Sh.W., born February 

of 2013 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),2(2), (5), (8), and (b).3 We affirm.

The trial court accurately and aptly set forth the factual background 

and procedural history of this case, as follows:

Although involved with the Allegheny County Office of 

Children Youth and Families (“CYF”) for some time prior, the 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 We acknowledge that the abbreviations of the children’s names in the 

captions differ from the abbreviations utilized throughout this Memorandum. 

For consistency, we chose to utilize the abbreviations used by the trial court.

2

 The trial court orders reflect the termination of Father’s parental rights 

under section 2511(a)(1), but the trial court opinion does not recite 

termination under that subsection. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/16, at 1-2; 

cf. N.T., 6/1/16, at 79.

3

 On June 3, 2016, the trial court also terminated the rights of A.R.L.J., 

a/k/a A.R.J., the Children’s biological mother (“Mother”). Mother did not file 

an appeal, and she is not a party to the instant appeal. Moreover, on that

same date, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of any 

unknown father with regard to Nh.W., Zr.W., and Sh.W. See N.T., 6/1/16, 

at 79. No unknown father has appealed or is a party to the instant appeal.
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family’s case became court-active in September 2013 when the 

children—then aged 7 years old to 23 months[4]—were removed 

after reports that they were left unsupervised. At the time, 

Father was briefly incarcerated but was released soon after the 

shelter hearing. See Exhibit 3, Shelter Care Order of Court, 

dated September 30, 2013. After his release, Father apparently 

left the family, though it was never particularly clear how much 

he lived with them in the first place. See Exhibit 2, page 2. The 

children were adjudicated dependent on November 4, 2013. See

Transcript of Testimony (“T.T.”), dated June 1, 2016, at 7-10; 

31; see also Exhibits 3–7 (the children’s respective certified 

records). They were placed with the maternal grandmother 

[“Grandmother”]—their pre-adoptive foster mother—where they 

have remained since. CYF created a Family Service Plan (“FSP”)

to assist the parents’ reunification with the child[ren]. See

Exhibit 8. FSPs consist of goals, which are designed to track the 

parents’ progress. The parents’ goals were the same: to obtain 

safe and appropriate housing; to get a drug and alcohol 

evaluation and follow recommendations; to stay in contact with 

the agency and cooperate with services; to address any mental 

health issues via an evaluation; to visit the children. See T.T., at 

17; 11. Father made no progress. In September 2014, the 

Court granted CYF’s petition to proceed on an “Aggravated 

Circumstances” basis due to Father’s lack of contact with his 

children. Id., at 31. Since the children’s removal twelve months 

prior, he had visited twice. See Exhibit 2, Aggravated 

Circumstances Order of Court, dated September 8, 2014. An 

“Aggravated Circumstances” finding is warranted when the 

children are in the custody of a county agency (in this instance, 

CYF) and when Father’s identity and whereabouts are known, 

but has failed to maintain substantial and continuing contact 

with the children for at least six months. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6302. Upon the [c]ourt’s finding of “Aggravated Circumstances,” 

CYF was relieved of providing reasonable efforts to reunify the 

children with Father. Id.; see also, Exhibits 3-7, Aggravated 

Circumstances Orders, dated September 8, 2014. Father’s 

noncompliance and noncontact continued. See generally

Permanency Review Orders, Exhibits 3–7. CYF filed its petition 

____________________________________________

4

 The youngest child, Sh.W., actually was only seven months old in 

September of 2013. N.T., 6/1/16, at 6.
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to terminate Father’s rights on February 22, 2016. Father 

appeals.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/16, at 1–2.

On July 5, 2016, Father timely filed a notice of appeal5along with a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925 (a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court, sua sponte, consolidated the appeals on 

July 11, 2016.

Father raises the following single issue on appeal:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that Allegheny County 

Children, Youth and Families met its burden of proving that 

termination of Birth Father’s parental rights would meet 

the needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) by clear and convincing evidence when 

such determination is not supported by the record?

Father’s Brief at 13.6

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

____________________________________________

5

 We note that Father’s appeal was due to be filed no later than July 3, 

2016, which was a Sunday. The following day, Monday, July 4, 2016, was a 

federal holiday, and the courts were closed. July 5, 2016, was the first date 

that the court was open for business after the Independence Day holiday. 

See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when the last day of appeal period falls on Saturday, 

Sunday, or any day made a legal holiday, such day is omitted from the 

computation).

6

 This is the sole issue raised in Father’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements, as 

well.
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petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 

608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings 

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; In re 

R.I.S., 614 Pa. 275, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia 

Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 455, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 

2011); Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 

(Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343–344 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012)).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 
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have explained that the “standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 

1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “It is well established that a court must 

examine the individual circumstances of each and every case and consider 

all explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence in light of 

the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants termination.” In re 

Adoption of G.L.L., 124 A.3d 344, 346 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing In re 

Adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Moreover, this 

Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under section 

2511(a) is on the parent, but under section 2511(b), it is on the child. In re 

Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).

Initially we note that Father has waived any challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under section 2511(a) by 

his failure to include such a challenge in both his concise statements of 

errors complained of on appeal and the statement of questions involved in 

his brief on appeal. In re G.D., 61 A.3d 1031, 1036 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citing Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 

776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are 

not raised in both his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

and the statement of questions involved in his brief on appeal)). Indeed, 
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Father concedes that CYF satisfied its burden of proof with regard to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). See Father’s Brief at 20. Rather, he challenges the 

trial court’s order only as to section 2511(b), asserting that the evidence 

was insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights under that 

section of the Adoption Act. Thus, we focus upon 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (b), 

which provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (b). Father argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support a finding that the termination of his parental rights best serves the 

Children’s needs and welfare and that there was no relationship between the 

Children and him that would cause the Children to suffer irreparable harm if 

his rights were terminated. Father’s Brief at 20–23.

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court has explained as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare 

of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

[620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

In assessing whether termination of Father’s parental rights served the 

needs and welfare of the Children, the trial court noted as follows:

After consideration of testimony and evidence, the [c]ourt finds 

that CYF met its burden. Father has likely never provided any 

substantial parental care for these children. His visitations were 

so infrequent that CYF was relieved from providing reunification 

efforts. And so it was not surprising to learn from the CYF 

caseworker that the [C]hildren do not ask about their Father. 

The [C]hildren have been in the home of the maternal 

grandmother for nearly three years. For the three youngest 

children, the maternal grandmother is essentially the only 

caregiver they have ever known.

In her psychological evaluation report, psychologist Dr. 

Patricia Pepe noted that Father has not had any contact with the 

[C]hildren. Dr. Pepe reported that the [C]hildren are general[ly] 

doing very well and exhibiting positive functioning. Four-yearold Zr.W. had been having developmental and speech delays, 

but after assistance from service providers[,] he is now verbally 

expressive. Sr.W. is in the second grade and was acting out 

some at school. The grandmother suspected that these 

outbursts were related to another student’s racist behavior, for 

the child exhibited positive functioning at football and at church. 

The [c]ourt notes that the child has made considerable progress 

considering that he was seven when he came into the 

grandmother’s care and had never been in school. Nr.[W.] 

received an award for his high marks at school; Nh.[W.] also 
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does well at school, though there is some difficulty focusing. All 

of the [C]hildren are in good health.

Dr. Pepe reported that the grandmother was the center of 

the [C]hildren’s attention, and that the grandmother was able to 

be aware of all of the [C]hildren at the same time. Dr. Pepe 

reported that the siblings exhibited positive interaction with one 

another and there was a general harmonious tone to the family’s 

functioning. The [C]hildren remained positive and behaved, 

even though there were five of them, four of [whom] were very 

young. Dr. Pepe reported that she was amazed that the 

[C]hildren could share with minimal problems. Critically, all five 

of the [C]hildren “consistently exhibited multiple bonding 

behaviors suggestive of a positive and primary attachment to 

their grandmother, whom each child identified as ‘mom.’” Dr. 

Pepe concluded that all of the [C]hildren seemed happy, that the 

grandmother presents as a “very positive permanent placement 

resource.” The [c]ourt notes that Dr. Pepe could not conduct an 

interactional evaluation with Sr.W., because the family arrived 

one hour late to the appointment. The interactional between Dr. 

Pepe and Father was cancelled.

Given Father’s continual lack of contact throughout the 

duration of this case and throughout the duration of these 

children’s lives, the [c]ourt is constrained to opine that Father 

does not know these [C]hildren and that these [C]hildren largely 

do not know their Father. He has never provided for them. He 

has never cared for them. He has never raised them, or sent 

them to the doctor’s office, or sent them to school, or sent them 

gifts. There is no bond between them.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/16, at 4–5 (internal citations omitted).

We find guidance in In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Therein, this Court explained that in cases where there is no evidence of any 

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Id. at 763. “The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. We instructed 

that the court should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 
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comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, we stated that the court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond may 

be severed without detrimental effects on the child. Id.

We further observed in K.Z.S. that where the subject child had been 

constantly and consistently separated from his parent for four years, any 

relationship between the two had to be “fairly attenuated,” such that even if 

a bond existed, it did not defeat the termination of the mother’s parental 

rights. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. Based on the strong relationship that 

the child had with his foster mother, the child’s young age, and his very 

limited contact with his mother, this Court found competent evidence to 

support the orphans’ court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. Id.

The same is true in this case. A parent’s own feelings of love and 

affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). A child’s life “simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s 

basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to 

have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2004). The record reflects that the trial court appropriately considered the 
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Children’s needs and welfare and conducted a bond-effect analysis in 

deciding whether to terminate Father’s parental rights.

After careful review, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s 

factual findings, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826–

827. The Children’s primary attachment is with Grandmother. They have 

resided with Grandmother, who plans to adopt them, since September 27, 

2013. N.T., 6/1/16, at 24, 40. CYF caseworker, Sherri Ihrig, testified that 

Grandmother “provides for [the Children’s] needs, food, [and] shelter . . . . 

She is the one who takes them to the doctor and the dentist, deals with the 

school.” Id. at 35. Ms. Ihrig further testified that the Children “look to 

[Grandmother] as their parent.” Id. Moreover, the Children last saw Father 

in April of 2014. Id. at 21. They do not ask about him. Id. at 39. The 

youngest two children, who were two years old and fourteen months old in 

April, 2014, were too young even to remember Father. N.T., 6/1/16, at 6.

Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to determine that no bond 

exists such that the Children would suffer permanent emotional harm if 

Father’s parental rights were terminated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that any bond with the parent would be fairly 

attenuated when the child was separated from the parent, almost 

constantly, for four years). It is well-settled that “we will not toll the wellbeing and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” Adoption of C.L.G., 956 
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A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a 

parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.”)). We, therefore, affirm the orders terminating Father’s parental 

rights.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/1/2016