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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LISA WHITNUM-BAKER

(AC 38327)

Beach, Sheldon and Gruendel, Js.

Argued September 15—officially released November 29, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, geographical area number twenty,

Wenzel, J.)

Lisa Whitnum-Baker, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Walker, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s

attorney, Jacob L. McChesney, former special deputy

assistant state’s attorney, and John R. Whalen, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Lisa Whitnum-Baker,1

appeals from the judgment of conviction,rendered after

a trial to the court, of creating a public disturbance in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-181a. On appeal, the

defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence

to convict her of creating a public disturbance. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court reasonably could have found the following

facts. On April 24, 2014, the defendant entered the Stamford Courthouse Law Library. After an argument ensued

between the defendant and another library patron, the

librarian requested assistance from a state marshal, Patrick Valcourt, who was posted in the hallway immediately outside of the library. Valcourt entered the library,

observed the defendant arguing loudly, and instructed

her to stay away from the other patron. Because the

defendant was uncooperative, Valcourt, with other marshals then present, began to escort her out of the library.

While being escorted, the defendant began yelling

loudly and attempted to bite Valcourt’s arm. The supervising marshal who observed the attempted bite then

ordered that the defendant be handcuffed and detained.

Once the defendant was properly restrained, the marshals escorted her out of the library to the detention

area, where she was held until she was arrested by

state police on the charge of breach of the peace in the

second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a181. The state later filed a substitute information charging the defendant with creating a public disturbance in

violation of § 53a-181a.

On appeal, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for creating a

public disturbance in violation of § 53a-181a (a) because

the state failed to prove all essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the

defendant contends that the trial court erred by not

crediting her testimony about the events leading up

to her arrest, which, she asserts, disproves the state’s

evidence.2 We disagree.

We first set forth our standard of review and the

relevant law. ‘‘The appellate standard of review of sufficiency of the evidence claims is well established. In

reviewing a sufficiency [of the evidence] claim, we

apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the jury reasonably could have concluded that the

cumulative force of the evidence established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘The evidence must be construed in a light most

favorable to sustaining the [court’s] verdict. . . . Our

review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining
whether the inferences drawn by the [fact finder] are

so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . . [T]he

inquiry into whetherthe record evidence would support

a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not

require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the

evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. . . . Instead, the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘We do not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a

vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that

some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record.

We have not had the [fact finder’s] opportunity to

observe the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the

witnesses and to gauge their credibility. . . . We are

content to rely on the [fact finder’s] good sense and

judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Serrano, 91 Conn. App. 227, 241–42, 880 A.2d 183, cert.

denied, 276 Conn. 908, 884 A.2d 1029 (2005).

General Statutes § 53a-181a (a) provides: ‘‘A person

is guilty of creating a public disturbance when, with

intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or

recklessly creating a risk thereof, he (1) engages in

fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior, or (2) annoys or interferes with another person by

offensive conduct; or (3) makes unreasonable noise.’’

‘‘‘Violent’ is defined as ‘characterized by extreme

force’ and ‘furious or vehement to the point of being

improper, unjust, or illegal.’ . . . ‘Threatening’ is

defined as a ‘promise [of] punishment’ or, ‘to give signs

of the approach of (something evil or unpleasant).’ . . .

When two or more words are grouped together, it is

possible to ascertain the meaning of a particular word

by reference to its relationship with other associated

words and phrases under the doctrine of noscitur a

sociis. . . . Placed within the context of the other

words in the statute, the word ‘threatening’ takes on a

more ominous tone. The statute proscribes ‘engaging

in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening

behavior.’ . . . [T]he language of subdivision (1) . . .

‘violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior,’ evinces

a legislative intent to proscribe conduct which actually

involves physical violence or portends imminent physical violence.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Lo Sacco, 12

Conn. App. 481, 490–91, 531 A.2d 184, cert. denied, 205

Conn. 814, 533 A.2d 568 (1987).

In the present case, our review of the record in the

light most favorable to sustaining the verdict discloses

that sufficient evidence was presented to support

beyond a reasonable doubt the court’s finding that the

defendant created a public disturbance. Evidence in the

record reveals that the defendant engaged in violent

and threatening behavior toward Valcourt when she
attempted to bite his arm. The evidence submitted by

the defendant does not disprove that the defendant

attempted to bite Valcourt’s arm, but merely questions

the timing of the events. In essence, the defendant

argues that the court erred by failing to credit her testimony over that of the marshals who had witnessed the

attempted biting. ‘‘Questions of whether to believe or to

disbelieve a competent witness are beyond ourreview.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jagat, 111

Conn. App. 173, 178, 958 A.2d 206 (2008). Because the

state presented evidence that the defendant engaged in

threatening and violent behavior by attempting to bite

the arm of a court marshal, the findings made by the

court were supported by evidence in the record.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 Although the police record and information identify the defendant as

Whitnum, in her pleadings and brief on appeal, the defendant has referred to

herself as Whitnum-Baker, which is the name we use for a consistentrecord.

2 Although the self-represented defendant did not explicitly state in her

brief or at oral argument that she is appealing from her judgment of conviction on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, the substance of her

argument is that the court’s verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Accordingly, our review of this appeal will focus solely on the issue of

whetherthere was sufficient evidence in the record to convict the defendant.