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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43211

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROBERT CONRAD MACNEILAGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 784

Filed: November 21, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bonneville County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and sentences for insurance fraud, affirmed; order 

relinquishing jurisdiction, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Robert Conrad MacNeilage appeals from his judgment of conviction for two counts of

insurance fraud following a jury trial and from the district court’s order relinquishing 

jurisdiction. Specifically, MacNeilage argues the district court (1) improperly excluded witness 

impeachment evidence; (2) imposed excessive sentences; and (3) abused its discretion in 

relinquishing jurisdiction. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

MacNeilage was in the business of repairing and reselling cars. In March 2013, 

MacNeilage purchased a BMW to repair and resell. Later that same month, MacNeilage 

reported to his insurance company that the BMW had been damaged while he was towing it 
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behind his truck. The insurance adjustor declared the car a total loss and paid the claims on the 

damage to the car and truck.

Several months later, MacNeilage’s former business partner, Ronald, contacted the 

insurance company to report that MacNeilage had admitted to intentionally damaging the two 

vehicles. Ronald owned the auto shop from which MacNeilage was running his business. As 

part of the investigation of this allegation, an insurance investigator interviewed a former 

employee of MacNeilage, Tanner, who claimed that he was with MacNeilage when he 

intentionally damaged the vehicles. The State then charged MacNeilage with four counts of 

insurance fraud, Idaho Code § 41-293(1)(c).

During trial, the jury heard evidence that MacNeilage had purchased the BMW with the 

intention of repairing it for a quick sale. MacNeilage was frustrated after learning that a part he 

needed to repair the vehicle would not be received for several months. Witnesses testified that 

after learning this information, MacNeilage engaged in a conversation with several individuals in 

the auto shop about ways to destroy a car. The individuals present for that conversation were 

Tanner, Ronald, Ronald’s girlfriend, Justin, Richard, and MacNeilage. 

On the third day of trial, before the jury convened and before Justin and Richard testified, 

MacNeilage advised the court that it might want to inquire about Justin’s and Richard’s prior 

felony convictions. 

Defense: We do have a 609 issue on Justin [] who was convicted for burglary 

and is currently on probation for felony burglary.

Court: Where is your 609 hearing before trial as required by the rule?

Defense: Well, your Honor, I’m asking for that hearing right now. I don’t know 

what else to say about the conviction. It stands. It’s clearly within the 

grasp of the 609 rule, and it’s clearly a felony that--conviction that 

reflects upon the credibility of the witness.

. . . . 

Court: [B]ased upon what I’ve heard, I will allow reference to the fact that he 

has been convicted of a felony. I will not allow reference to the nature 

of the felony. I don’t think that’s--I don’t think this--I don’t think 

burglary is a crime of moral turpitude. I don’t think it’s the kind of 

crime that---that would require the mention of the nature of the crime. 

But you may ask him if he’s been convicted of a felony, and if he 

answers ‘Yes,’ that’s the end of the discussion. 

The court ruled similarly when MacNeilage asked about admitting evidence of Richard’s felony 

conviction, stating, “I’ll allow reference to [the] conviction, not to the nature of the crime.” 
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The jury found MacNeilage guilty on two counts, but did not reach a verdict on the other 

two counts. The district dismissed those counts without prejudice after the State indicated it 

would not pursue them. The court sentenced MacNeilage to concurrent unified six-year 

sentences, with two years determinate. The court retained jurisdiction and MacNeilage was 

placed in a traditional rider program. MacNeilage filed a timely notice of appeal from his 

judgment of conviction. Several months later, at the recommendation of the correctional facility, 

the court relinquished jurisdiction over MacNeilage. MacNeilage then filed a motion for a new 

trial, which the district court denied.1 We now consider MacNeilage’s appeal from his judgment 

of conviction and the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.

II.

ANALYSIS

MacNeilage raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court erred by 

not allowing MacNeilage to impeach two State witnesses with information regarding the nature 

of their felony convictions. Second, MacNeilage argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by imposing excessive sentences. Finally, MacNeilage contends the district court 

abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. We address each issue in turn.

A. Witness Impeachment Evidence

MacNeilage argues he should have been allowed to attack the credibility of two State 

witnesses using information as to the nature of their prior felony convictions. Specifically, 

MacNeilage wished to elicit that Richard had been convicted of credit card theft and Justin had 

been convicted of burglary. The district court ruled that it would allow reference to the fact that 

both men had previously been convicted of a felony, but would not allow reference to the nature 

of those felony convictions. 

Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) sets forth the test for determining whether evidence of a 

witness’s prior conviction is admissible at trial. At the time of this trial, the rule read, in relevant 

part:

For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the fact that 

the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the felony shall be 

admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, but only if 

the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of 

 

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The denial of this motion is not at issue in this appeal.
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the prior conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to 

the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of admitting this 

evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness.

I.R.E. 609(a).2 Under this rule, the trial court must apply a two-pronged test to determine 

whether evidence of a prior felony conviction should be admitted. The court must determine 

(1) whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the credibility of the witness and 

(2) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. State v. Bush, 

131 Idaho 22, 30, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257 (1997); State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789, 275 P.3d 12, 

15 (Ct. App. 2012). 

MacNeilage first asserts, and we agree, that the district court articulated the incorrect 

standard regarding the admissibility issue. During trial, the court stated: 

[A]s I understand the rule, there’s a two-part finding that I must make. Number 

one, has he been convicted of a felony? Number two, is the nature of the felony 

such that it is warranted to inform the jury of that--of the nature of the felony 

because it reflects upon credibility? 

While the second part of the court’s inquiry aligns with the first prong of the test articulated in 

Rule 609(a), the court’s articulation of the standard fails to address the second prong. Moreover, 

the court twice incorrectly asserted Rule 609 requires a pretrial hearing. Rule 609(a) only 

requires “a hearing be held outside the presence of the jury.” See State v. Franco, 128 Idaho 

815, 817, 919 P.2d 344, 346 (Ct. App. 1996). 

When presented with a Rule 609(a) issue, a court is expected to “make a record of its 

reasons for concluding that a felony conviction for any particular crime is relevant to the 

credibility of the witness with respect to whom the evidence is being adduced.” Franco, 128 

Idaho at 818, 919 P.2d at 347. Then, once this determination has been made, the trial court must

“weigh the probative value of the evidence against the prejudice which might result from the 

introduction of the evidence.” Id. 

Here, the court did not “make a record of its reasons” supporting its conclusion that the 

fact of the convictions would be admissible while the nature of the convictions would not. The 

court merely affirmed MacNeilage’s clarification that it was finding burglary to not be a crime 

 

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Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) has since been modified, effective January 1, 2016. 
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involving moral turpitude,

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but made no findings with respect to credit card theft. Moreover, 

there is no evidence the court expressly considered the probative or prejudicial value of the 

evidence, as required under the second prong. We must surmise the court implicitly considered 

the prejudicial nature of the evidence based on its recognition that the “purpose of [Rule 609] is 

to keep information out from in front of the jury that would be unduly prejudicial,” combined 

with the decision to admit the fact of the convictions.

However, even if we were to accept MacNeilage’s arguments that the district court erred 

by not admitting evidence regarding the nature of the witnesses’ felony convictions in addition to 

the fact of the felony convictions, such error was harmless. Any error in exclusion of evidence 

does not necessarily warrant reversal of a conviction. Where defendants have shown error, 

reversal is appropriate unless the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); 

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010); State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 

712, 316 P.3d 117, 124 (Ct. App. 2013). 

MacNeilage contends the error is not harmless because his inability to challenge the 

veracity of the witnesses, who allegedly either had disagreements or were associated with 

individuals who had disagreements with MacNeilage, contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict. 

We find this contention unpersuasive. 

First, the credibility of these witnesses was not crucial to the State’s case. The testimony 

elicited by the State from both Richard and Justin dealt with the topic of a conversation that took 

place in the auto repair shop shortly after MacNeilage learned he would not be able to obtain 

needed parts for the BMW. They testified that on the day of the conversation, MacNeilage 

seemed frustrated by the situation and that he and the other individuals in the shop all 

participated in joking about various ways to destroy a car. At most, this testimonial evidence 

went toward showing MacNeilage’s state of mind and motive for destroying the car. However, 

the critical testimony in the case came from Tanner, who testified that he was with MacNeilage 

at the time he destroyed the BMW, and from Ronald, who testified that MacNeilage admitted to 

him the way in which he destroyed the BMW. Even if we were to assume more specific 

 

3 MacNeilage had asked the court: “I need the court to just clarify. The reason for the 

ruling as to burglary is because the court finds that is not a crime involving moral turpitude?” 

The court responded, “That’s right.” 
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evidence regarding the nature of Justin’s and Richard’s convictions would have caused the jury 

to question their truthfulness and not accept their testimony, this would have had no effect on 

discrediting the State’s other main witnesses.

Second, the impeachment value of the excluded evidence was minimal. MacNeilage was 

permitted to introduce evidence that the two witnesses had felony convictions but declined to 

take advantage of that impeachment opportunity during trial. Instead, MacNeilage now argues

more specific evidence regarding the felony convictions would have challenged the jury’s 

opinion of the witnesses’ honesty. This argument is unconvincing. First, theft has only a general 

relationship with honesty, and MacNeilage has presented no evidence as to how the facts of these 

specific felony convictions involved any element of fraud or deceit. See Grist, 152 Idaho at 791,

275 P.3d at 17 (finding evidence of burglary minimally relevant where no evidence was 

presented that the statute under which witness was convicted included element of fraud or 

deceit). Moreover, there was already evidence before the jury that both individuals had troubled 

pasts. Richard testified that he was uneasy with the conversation about destroying cars because 

of “problems in [his] past.” Justin testified that when MacNeilage joked about wrecking the 

BMW, Justin “was on felony probation at the time.” Ronald testified that both Richard and 

Justin had “criminal records.” 

Finally, the testimony offered by these individuals was corroborated by other witnesses. 

Tanner and Ronald both testified to being part of the same conversation as Richard and Justin, to 

participating in the jokes about destroying cars, and to not taking MacNeilage’s remarks 

seriously. 

In sum, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any purported error by the trial court 

in excluding evidence of the specific nature of Richard’s and Justin’s felony convictions did not 

contribute to the verdict obtained. 

B. Excessive Sentences

MacNeilage next argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive 

sentences. The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of six years, with two years 

determinate. MacNeilage contends his sentences are excessive in light of the mitigating factors 

present in his case. He specifically points to the strong support he has from family and members 

of the community, as well as a good work history.
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An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. 

Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, 

the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and thus a clear abuse of discretion. 

State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such 

an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it 

appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary 

objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 

rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 

P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed 

an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard 

for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 

interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When 

reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

Applying these standards and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that 

the district court abused its discretion based upon the facts of the case. In imposing the

sentences, the court was focused on its primary objective of protecting society, as well as a desire 

to deter MacNeilage from future criminal activity. The court discussed at great length 

MacNeilage’s criminal history, including its assessment that MacNeilage’s history demonstrated

an attitude of disregard for the law. MacNeilage’s argument that the court should have given 

more deference to his support network and work ethic falls short of demonstrating that the court 

abused its discretion in sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the sentences imposed by the district 

court.

C. Relinquishment of Jurisdiction

Finally, MacNeilage contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 

jurisdiction. As part of MacNeilage’s sentences, the district court retained jurisdiction over 

MacNeilage for the first 365 days of his sentences. MacNeilage was placed into a traditional 

rider program. Approximately three months into this program, the district court received a letter 

from the correctional facility recommending that the court relinquish jurisdiction over 

MacNeilage. The facility made this recommendation because MacNeilage was (1) continuing to 
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use criminal and addictive thinking patterns, attitudes, and beliefs; (2) not demonstrating that he 

was an appropriate candidate for probation; and (3) not willing to take an honest look at his 

criminal behavior, beliefs, or attitudes and continued to pose a significant risk of reoffending if 

released.

A trial court’s decision whether to retain jurisdiction is, like the original sentencing 

decision, a matter committed to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 

230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Ct. App. 1992). Retained jurisdiction allows the trial court an 

extended time to evaluate a defendant’s suitability for probation. State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 

379, 924 P.2d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 1996). The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a 

sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation 

potential and suitability for probation. State v. Atwood, 122 Idaho 199, 201, 832 P.2d 1134, 

1136 (Ct. App. 1992).

MacNeilage argues that in relinquishing jurisdiction, the court failed to consider 

MacNeilage’s accomplishments while participating in the program. He points to his successful 

completion of specific classes and volunteer efforts as evidence of his rehabilitative potential. 

He also argues that the disciplinary actions against him while in the program stemmed, at least in 

part, from being singled out and intimidated by other inmates. The record before the court

demonstrates that despite the successes MacNeilage experienced in the program, his behavior 

was still obstructive and noncompliant. He was reprimanded on numerous occasions for not 

adhering to scheduled programming times, possessing unauthorized property, violating the

personal space of staff members, and the unauthorized sharing of phone time. Thus, based on 

the record in this case, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in following the 

recommendation of the correctional facility to relinquish jurisdiction. 

III.

CONCLUSION

Even assuming the district court erred in excluding evidence regarding the nature of the 

crimes for which the State witnesses had felony convictions, such error was harmless. 

Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing MacNeilage or in relinquishing 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm MacNeilage’s judgment of conviction and sentences and 

the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.