COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00375-CV 

IN RE COURTNEY LEE RELATOR

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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

TRIAL COURT NO. 57,660-C*1-2 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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 In a petition for writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition that relator 

Courtney Lee filed on October 13, 2016, she asked this court to require the trial 

court to reinstate a bond and to stay further proceedings with regard to her 

criminal charges until that court resolved an issue concerning her competency. 

Relator contended that the trial court violated article 46B.004(d) of the code of 

criminal procedure by not staying the proceedings before declaring her bond 

insufficient and increasing the amount of the bond. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 
2 

Ann. art. 46B.004(d) (West Supp. 2016) (“If the court determines there is 

evidence to support a finding of incompetency, the court . . . shall stay all other 

proceedings in the case.”). On October 17, 2016, we requested a response to 

relator’s petition. 

 On October 26, 2016, the State of Texas, which is the real party in interest 

in this proceeding, filed a “Notice of Cause Resolution.” The State informed this 

court that the competency issue has been resolved2 and that relator has entered 

into a plea bargain that disposes of her charges. The State’s response showed 

that in accordance with the plea bargain, the trial court deferred its adjudication 

of relator’s guilt to the charges and placed her on community supervision for ten 

years. Finally, the State suggested that in light of the resolution of the 

competency issue and the disposition of relator’s charges, she was “no longer 

requesting any relief at this point, but only an improper advisory opinion.” 

 Relator filed a response. In the response, relator agreed that the “case in 

question ha[d] been temporarily resolved,” but she urged us to nonetheless rule 

on her mandamus petition. She contended that this case is not moot because 

the trial court’s action is capable of repetition but evades review. 

 2The State represented that “upon agreement from both the State and 

[relator], the trial court found [relator] to be competent.” The trial court’s 

October 26, 2016 order on competency states, “The Defendant, along with her 

counsel, . . . agreed with [the doctor’s] report that she was competent to stand 

trial. The Court then found her competent to stand trial.” 
3 

 “The rule is an elementary one that a writ of mandamus will not issue if for 

any reason it would be useless or unavailing.” Holcombe v. Fowler, 118 Tex. 42, 

44, 9 S.W.2d 1028, 1028 (1928) (orig. proceeding); see Dow Chem. Co. v. 

Garcia, 909 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding); A Am. Stamp & 

Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Wettman, 658 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1983, orig. proceeding) (“A writ of mandamus will not issue if it would be 

useless or unavailing . . . . Under such circumstances, the courts have 

considered that the subject matter is moot and have refused to order the 

issuance of a writ of mandamus.”). If a controversy ceases to exist, the case 

becomes moot. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). 

 One “rare” exception to this rule of mootness may occur when an issue is 

capable of repetition but evades review. In re Fort Worth Star Telegram, 441 

S.W.3d 847, 852 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, orig. proceeding). To invoke the 

exception, “a party must establish both that the challenged act is of such short 

duration that the issue becomes moot before review may be obtained and that a 

reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected 

to the same action again.” Id. (emphasis added). 

 We cannot conclude that any such “reasonable expectation” exists here. 

Relator’s argument assumes too many uncertain future events: that sometime in 

the next ten years, the State will allege that she violated a term of her community 

supervision; that the State will file a motion for the trial court to adjudicate her 

guilt; that during such an adjudication proceeding, another issue concerning her 
4 

competency will arise; and that the trial court will not stay proceedings in 

accordance with article 46B.004(d) after determining that some evidence 

supports a finding of incompetency. Cf. Ex parte Nelson, 815 S.W.2d 737, 739 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (declining to apply the exception when a habeas corpus 

applicant’s claim hinged on the future possibility that he would “once again 

violate a condition of his parole”); see Ex parte Bohannan, 350 S.W.3d 116, 119–

20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Nelson and reaching a similar conclusion); see 

also Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 826 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) 

(explaining that the “mere physical or theoretical possibility that the same party 

may be subjected to the same action again is not sufficient to satisfy the test”). 

 Because the trial court has determined the competency issue and has 

resolved relator’s criminal charges, any relief we could issue in this proceeding 

would be useless and unavailing. Thus, we dismiss relator’s petition as moot. 

See In re Bonilla, 424 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

/s/ Terrie Livingston 

TERRIE LIVINGSTON 

CHIEF JUSTICE 

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER, J.; CHARLES BLEIL (Senior Justice, 

Retired, Sitting by Assignment). 

DELIVERED: November 14, 2016