J-S37031-14

2014 PA Super 185 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.J., a Minor IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: YORK COUNTY OFFICE OF 

CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 

 Appellant No. 469 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered February 11, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Juvenile 

Division, at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000970-2008 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2014 

 York County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) appeals 

from the 90-day status hearing Order entered by the juvenile court on 

February 11, 2014. By that Order, the juvenile court found that S.J. 

(“Child”) (born in October of 2008) was doing well in the care of her 

maternal great aunt, A.H. (“Aunt”). Aunt is Child’s Subsidized Permanent 

Legal Custodian (“SPLC”).1

 The juvenile court found that although Child’s 

mother, I.L. (“Mother”), and father, D.J. (“Father”), were exercising partial 

physical custody, Child would continue in the care of Aunt. The juvenile 

 

1

“In Pennsylvania, a juvenile court may award permanent legal custody to a 

child’s caretaker pursuant to Section 6351(a)(2.1) of the Juvenile Act.” In 

re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2013). Under such an arrangement, 

“the juvenile court discontinues intervention as well as supervision by a 

county agency, and awards custody of a dependent child, on a permanent 

basis to a custodian.” Id. Under this arrangement, parental rights are not 

terminated. Id. 
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court’s Order denied CYF’s request to terminate the court’s jurisdiction, and 

scheduled a review hearing for January 27, 2015. We reverse and remand 

with instructions. 

 In its Opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the juvenile court 

set forth the relevant history of this appeal as follows: 

[Child] was born premature ... to [Mother], a dependent 

youth, age 16 years at the time of [Child’s] birth.... On 

November 17, 2008, legal and physical custody of [Child] was 

awarded jointly to []CYF and Mother; [Child] was placed with 

Mother at Pinkney’s Vineyard of Faith, where Mother had been 

previously placed. [Subsequently, Child] was adjudicated 

dependent ... and continued in placement with Mother at

Pinkney’s Vineyard. 

 In March of 2009, paternity of [Child] was established in 

[Father]. A visitation schedule was established for Father. 

Father appeared at one visit in April of 2009, but then failed to 

have contact with [Child] or []CYF until January 2010. Mother 

turned 18 in November of 2009, but elected to remain in care. 

[Child] and Mother began home passes from Pinkney’s 

Vineyard to the home of [Aunt] between the March review 

hearing and a 90-day hearing held on May 26, 2010.... On May 

26, 2010, [the juvenile hearing officer] noted that[,] during the 

time that Mother and [Child] were on home passes, Mother 

relinquished parenting of [Child] to [Aunt].... 

 A permanency review hearing occurred on August 11, 

2010. [Aunt] ... was approved for kinship care.... Compelling 

reasons not to terminate parental rights were stated by []CYF to 

be the bond with Mother and the fact that [Child] and Mother 

had always been placed together. 

* * * 

 [At a November 2010 review hearing,] concerns were 

raised regarding Mother’s parenting of [Child] in the kinship 

home and her poor decision[-]making. On November 17, 2010, 
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[]CYF filed a [M]otion to change the goal from reunification with 

a parent to permanent legal custodianship with [Aunt]. 

 On December 16, 2010, a hearing was held to address the 

change of goal. ... [On that same date, the juvenile court 

entered an Order changing the goal for Child to subsidized 

permanent legal custodianship.] ...

* * * 

 On April 8, 2011, Mother left the kinship home and failed 

to return. On April 15, 2011, []CYF filed a [M]otion to terminate 

juvenile court jurisdiction for Mother. A hearing was scheduled 

for April 19, 2011, to coincide with Mother’s permanency review 

hearing. As of the date of the hearing, Mother indicated that she 

wished to remain in care[;] however[,] it was determined that a 

different foster care home was needed. [Child] remained in the 

kinship foster home and a visitation schedule was developed for 

Mother and [Child]. 

 On April 20, 2011, []CYF presented a [M]otion to terminate 

[the] court[’s] jurisdiction[,] as the subsidy for [Aunt’s kinship 

care] had been approved by the [York] County Commissioners. 

The proposed Order[,] prepared by [the] []CYF solicitor[,] 

specifically noted the hearing previously scheduled for December 

1, 2011, to address the status of [Child]....

Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/25/14, at 4. 

On April 25, 2011, the juvenile court entered an Order terminating its 

jurisdiction in the dependency/SPLC matter as to Child. The Order directed 

that Child’s visitation with Mother and Father be continued.2

 The Order 

further provided, in relevant part, as follows: 

Although Juvenile Court jurisdiction is being terminated, the 

Court has directed that all parties appear on Thursday,

December 2, 2011, at 9:30 a.m. ... before the Honorable Maria 

 

2

 Mother left her new foster home on May 2, 2011. On May 16, 2011, the 

juvenile court entered an Order terminating its jurisdiction over Mother. 
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Musti Cook, so that the Court may receive an update on the 

minor child and her parents. 

Juvenile Court Order, 4/25/11. 

 At the December 2011 status hearing, counsel for CYF objected to the 

juvenile court’s ongoing review of the dependency/SPLC matter. N.T., 

12/1/11, at 14. Nevertheless, the juvenile court entered an Order 

scheduling a status review hearing for May 12, 2012. Juvenile Court Order, 

12/2/11. CYS timely filed an appeal of that Order at No. 29 MDA 2012, 

which this Court quashed as interlocutory and premature.

3

 Father subsequently filed a Complaint for Custody. On October 9, 

2012, a Stipulated Order for Custody was entered awarding joint legal 

custody to Father and Aunt.4

 On February 12, 2013, the juvenile court conducted a status hearing in 

the dependency/SPLC matter. Father did not appear at the hearing, 

although the juvenile court judge was apprised of the Stipulated Order for 

Custody. At that time, CYF requested that the juvenile court again 

 

3

 This Court quashed the appeal because the December 1, 2011 Order 

neither granted nor denied a status change in Child’s disposition, and 

contemplated further proceedings, citing Adoption of R.J.S., 889 A.2d 92, 

95 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating that, generally an order that contemplates 

further proceedings is interlocutory and unappealable). See In the 

Interest of: S.J., A Minor, No. 29 MDA 2012 (Order) (Pa. Super. filed on 

February 2, 2012). 

4

Father’s Custody Complaint and the subsequent custody proceedings are 

not part of the certified record in the instant matter. The juvenile court 

judge in the dependency matter was not assigned to the custody 

proceedings. 
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terminate its jurisdiction over the dependency/SPLC matter, and refrain from 

scheduling additional status hearings. On February 11, 2014, the juvenile 

court entered an Order refusing to terminate its jurisdiction over the 

dependency/SPLC matter. Juvenile Court Order, 2/11/14. The juvenile 

court scheduled a review hearing for January 27, 2015. CYF timely filed a 

Notice of Appeal and Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal. 

CYF now presents the following claims for our review: 

A. Did the [juvenile] court err when it denied the request of 

[CYF] to terminate juvenile court supervision despite the 

previous Order filed April 25, 2011, which terminated juvenile 

court supervision? 

B. Did the [juvenile] court err in scheduling a subsequent 

hearing for January 27, 2015, despite the previous Order filed 

April 25, 2011, which terminated juvenile court supervision? 

Brief of Appellant at 4. 

As an initial matter, we must first address whether the law of the case 

doctrine bars our consideration of CYF’s claims. 

The law of the case doctrine [sets forth various rules that] 

embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of 

a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by 

another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the 

earlier phases of the matter. 

Ario v. Reliance Ins. Co., 980 A.2d 588, 597 (Pa. 2009). At issue is 

whether this Court’s disposition of the prior appeal at No. 29 MDA 2012 

precludes consideration of the issues presented in CYF’s present appeal. 

Our review of the record discloses that this Court has never ruled on 

the underlying merits of the issues now presented by CYF. On January 27, 
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2012, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why the appeal at No. 29 MDA 

2012 should not be dismissed as interlocutory. CYF filed its response to the 

Rule, claiming that the Order was appealable as a collateral order. On 

February 15, 2012, this Court dismissed appeal as interlocutory, because the 

juvenile court’s Order “neither makes nor denies a disposition and expressly 

contemplates further proceedings.” In the Interest of: S.J., A Minor, No. 

29 MDA 2012 (Order) (Pa. Super. filed on February 2, 2012). 

In the present appeal, CYF claims that the juvenile court erred when it 

denied CYF’s request to terminate the court’s jurisdiction over the 

dependency/SPLC matter. Brief of Appellant at 11. CYF claims that the 

juvenile court’s April 25, 2011 Order “removed any actual case or 

controversy from the purview of the [c]ourt[,] and rendered any further 

proceedings before the [c]ourt moot.” Id. CYF also argues that the 

juvenile court failed to apply this Court’s holding in In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973 

(Pa. Super. 2013), when it scheduled additional status review hearings. 

Brief of Appellant at 20. 

Our review discloses that when this Court quashed the appeal at No. 

29 MDA 2012, the Court did not render a decision as to whether an actual 

case or controversy existed in the dependency/SPLC proceedings. This 

Court also did not address whether the juvenile court’s jurisdiction had 

terminated, or should be terminated. Because this Court never addressed 
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the claims now raised by CYF, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable. 

See Ario, 980 A.2d at 597. 

 CYF first claims that no actual case or controversy remained before the 

juvenile court following the entry of its April 25, 2011 Order. Brief of 

Appellant at 11. CYF points out that all parties had reached an agreement 

that it would be in Child’s best interest to change the permanency goal from 

reunification to subsidized permanent legal custodianship. Id. CYF states 

that after the finalization of the SPLC paperwork, and upon CYF’s Motion, the 

juvenile court entered its April 25, 2011 Order terminating the adjudication 

of dependency. Id. at 14. As a result, CYF argues, the juvenile court 

terminated CYF’s services and the court’s supervision over the 

dependency/SPLC matter. Id. Although the juvenile court has expressed its 

regrets over having entered that Order, CYF asserts that no actual claim or 

controversy in the dependency/SPLC matter has existed since April 25, 

2011. Id. at 14-15. In support of its argument, CYF directs our attention to 

this Court’s holding in In re S.H. Brief of Appellant at 17. 

 In In re S.H., this Court interpreted section 6351(a)(2.1) of the 

Juvenile Act, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

(a) General rule.—If the child is found to be a dependent child 

the court may make any of the following orders of disposition 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental, and 

moral welfare of the child: 

* * * 
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(2.1) Subject to conditions and limitations as the court 

prescribes, transfer permanent legal custody to an 

individual resident in or outside this Commonwealth, 

including any relative, who, after study by the probation 

officer or other person or agency designated by the court, 

is found by the court to be qualified to receive and care 

for the child. A court order under this paragraph may set 

forth the temporary visitation rights of the parents. The 

court shall refer issues related to support and continuing 

visitation by the parent to the section of the court of

common pleas that regularly determines support and 

visitation. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a)(2.1). This Court explained that, 

[b]y using the term “permanent” in describing legal custody, the 

legislature intended to end the supervision of the children 

by the county agency and discontinue the case from 

periodic reviews in the juvenile court division. This 

language does not confer or divest parents of any substantive 

rights but rather addresses the proper venue for visitation and 

support matters following the grant of a permanent legal custody 

arrangement. 

* * * 

 . . . We find that neither the Juvenile Act nor the Adoption 

and Safe Families [A]ct of 1997 prohibit a parent from 

petitioning the [juvenile] court to regain custody of a child who 

is the subject of an award of permanent legal custody.

In re S.H., 71 A.3d at 978-79 (emphasis in original). 

 In view of the statutory interpretation provided in In re S.H., we 

cannot agree with the juvenile court’s view that this appeal should be 

quashed. Our review discloses that, upon entry of the April 25, 2011 Order, 

no case or controversy remained in the dependency/SPLC proceedings. The 

April 25, 2011 Order expressly terminated the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

over the dependency/SPLC proceedings. In the absence of any remaining 
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case or controversy, we conclude that the juvenile court erred by continuing 

its supervision in the dependency/SPLC matter. 

Because no case or controversy existed in the dependency/SPLC 

matter after the juvenile court’s April 25, 2011 Order, we reverse the 

juvenile court’s February 11, 2014 Order, and remand with instructions.5

 On 

remand, the juvenile court is directed to cancel the review hearing scheduled 

for January 27, 2015. 

Order reversed; case remanded with instructions; Superior Court 

jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/27/2014 

 

5 As the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in the dependency/SPLC matter 

terminated as a result of its April 25, 2011 Order, a second order 

terminating jurisdiction is not necessary. All dependency/SPLC proceedings 

since April 25, 2011 are a nullity, as the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction in 

the absence of a case or controversy.