NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JENNIFER M., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.W., K.M., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0118

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015JD201304034

The Honorable Richard Weiss, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
JENNIFER M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Jennifer M. (“Mother”) appeals from an order terminating 

her parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother was arrested on an outstanding warrant in 

September 2013, whereupon the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took 

custody of then-two-month-old D.W. At the time of her arrest, Mother 

had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.17 and was in violation of an order 

of protection. Mother denied that D.W. had special needs, though he was 

born with a condition that requires feeding him “through a G-tube 

inserted into his stomach area,” and he had recently undergone a blood 

transfusion. 

¶3 The superior court found D.W. dependent. The initial case 

plan goal was family reunification. DCS provided services to Mother,

including visitation and transportation, parenting skills and domestic 

violence classes, a psychological evaluation, drug/alcohol testing, and 

individual counseling. Mother denied having issues with alcohol and 

“completely disavowed any personal responsibility for her actions.” The 

psychologist who evaluated Mother, though, diagnosed her with “a 

serious personality disorder secondary to a substance abuse disorder” and 

recommended “full and sustained remission [one year of being clean and 

sober]” before DCS ended its involvement. 

¶4 In January 2015, Mother gave birth to K.M., and DCS took 

custody of him because Mother “had not mitigated any of the concerns 

that [DCS] had concerning the removal of her other children.”1 

 

1 Mother has an older child who was also the subject of DCS 

intervention, but she is not at issue in this appeal.
JENNIFER M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶5 In June 2015, Mother told DCS her significant other was 

residing in her home three to four days per week. This individual was a 

level one sex offender, and DCS advised Mother he could not be around 

the children and stated that if she continued that relationship, 

reunification could be jeopardized. Approximately three weeks later, 

Mother told DCS the relationship had ended, and the agency began 

allowing K.M. to stay overnight in Mother’s home to begin his transition 

back to her care. This ended, though, when DCS learned of a shooting at 

Mother’s residence. 

¶6 On the day of the shooting, Mother told a police officer she

went to the river with K.M. and several other individuals, where she 

drank alcohol. Contrary to what she had told DCS, Mother advised the 

officer she had been living with her significant other for the past eight 

months and stated that a handgun was kept in the bedroom dresser. Her 

significant other used this gun to shoot an individual who came to 

Mother’s apartment. 

¶7 Mother’s version of events was materially different at the 

severance trial. She testified to ending her romantic relationship with the

significant other “sometime in June” 2015. When he came to her home to 

retrieve his belongings, she said, he ended up “passed out on the couch.” 

The next morning, before leaving for the river, she told him to be gone by 

the time she returned. When she returned with K.M., though, he was still 

there, and the shooting occurred. Mother also denied knowing the 

handgun was in the house. 

¶8 In September 2015, the case plan changed to severance and 

adoption. After a contested trial, the superior court found three statutory 

grounds for severing Mother’s parental rights and also found that 

severance was in the best interests of D.W. and K.M. 

¶9 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1) and 

-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find

the existence of one of the grounds enumerated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by 

clear and convincing evidence. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 

Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). 
JENNIFER M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶11 The superior court concluded DCS had proven three

statutory grounds: neglect; chronic abuse of alcohol; and, as to D.W., outof-home placement for 15 months or longer. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (3), 8(c). 

Because reasonable evidence supports the chronic alcohol abuse ground

as to both children, we need not address the other grounds found by the 

superior court. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3 (“If clear and convincing 

evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile 

court ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the 

other grounds.”).

¶12 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the superior court’s order and will affirm that order if it is 

supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 

Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). As relevant here, to terminate Mother’s

parental rights based on A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), DCS was required to prove 

by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a history of chronic abuse of alcohol; 

(2) Mother’s inability to discharge parental responsibilities because of her 

chronic abuse of alcohol; and (3) “there are reasonable grounds to believe 

that the condition will continue for a prolonged and indeterminate 

period.” See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 381, ¶ 15 

(App. 2010). 

¶13 Mother’s alcohol use has been an issue from the outset of the 

dependency proceedings. D.W. was taken into custody after Mother’s 

arrest when, as a medically fragile infant, he was left outside on a 104-

degree day while Mother was “drunk.” Additionally, Mother has been 

arrested “on numerous occasions while under the influence of alcohol,” 

including for driving under the influence. And after DCS took custody of 

D.W., police officers responded to a “domestic fight” between Mother and 

D.W.’s maternal grandmother. Mother was intoxicated at the time. 

¶14 Although Mother completed a number of services, the DCS 

case manager testified at trial that she continued to drink alcohol and had 

not taken responsibility for her actions or benefitted “from the counseling 

or the therapy” provided.2 Additionally, Mother did not consistently 

 

2 Mother argues DCS failed to provide the intensive psychotherapy 

recommended by the evaluating psychologist. Mother has waived this 

claim, though, by failing to assert it in the superior court. See Shawanee S. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178, ¶¶ 12–13 (App. 2014) (DCS’s 

obligation to provide “appropriate reunification services” does not relieve 
JENNIFER M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

participate in urinalysis testing. Excluding excused absences, she missed 

approximately 30% of the required tests. And Mother tested positive for 

alcohol in January 2014, March 2014, and January 2015 (nine days after 

giving birth to K.M.). Her last positive test was in September 2015, after 

the shooting and after completing parenting classes and individual and 

substance abuse counseling. The evaluating psychologist diagnosed 

Mother with a substance abuse disorder and recommended she 

demonstrate one year of sobriety before resuming parenting 

responsibilities. At the time of the February 2016 severance trial, Mother 

had not achieved this goal. 

¶15 Alcohol abuse “need not be constant to be considered 

chronic.” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 381, ¶ 16. “Where the parent has been 

unable to rise above the addiction and experience sustained sobriety in a 

noncustodial setting, and establish the essential support system to 

maintain sobriety, there is little hope of success in parenting.” Id. at ¶ 25. 

Here, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding that 

Mother was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of 

chronic alcohol abuse — a condition likely to “continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period.” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶16 The superior court also found severance to be in the 

children’s best interests. The existence of a current adoption plan can 

support a best interests finding. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

233 Ariz. 345, 350, ¶ 23 (App. 2013). Other relevant factors include the 

current placement’s ability to meet the children’s needs and the negative 

effect(s) the statutory ground for severance has on the children. Id. 

¶17 The superior court found that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights “would benefit the children because it would further the plan of 

adoption, which would provide the children with permanence and 

stability. The children are residing in an adoptive placement which is 

meeting all of their needs.” The record amply supports these findings.

 

parent of the obligation “to raise a timely objection if the parent believes 

services are inadequate.”).
JENNIFER M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to D.W. and K.M.