J-A26024-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MICHAEL L. SONOGA, EXECUTOR OF 

THE ESTATE OF ELSIE T. SONOGA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

PRESTON FORD, INC., AND PRESTON 

HYUNDAI OF SHARON

No. 209 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order January 15, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): GD12-4034

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2016

Michael L. Sonoga, Executor of the Estate of Elsie T. Sonoga, appeals 

from the order entered on January 15, 2016, granting summary judgment to 

Preston Ford, Inc. and Preston Hyundai of Sharon. We reverse.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Appellant as the nonmoving party, see Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1161 

(Pa. 2010), produces the following summary of the events leading up to the 

litigation. Elsie Sonoga purchased a new Hyundai Sonata in December of 

2010. Deposition of Theresa Magdits, 2/13/13, at 59. In July, 2011, Ms. 

Sonoga was driving when the car accelerated backwards without driver 

input. Id. at 9, 14. She made an appointment to have the brakes 
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examined and informed the representative that during the incident, green 

and red lights on the dashboard were illuminated. Id. at 9-10, 45.

On July 13, 2011, Ms. Sonoga and her sister Theresa Magdits went to 

the appointment at the dealership. Id. at 10-11. A representative told Ms. 

Sonoga that no one was available to look at the car and she could either 

leave it for further inspection or bring it back on another date. Id. at 10-11, 

25-26. Ms. Sonoga chose to bring the car back another day, as she did not 

have a ride home. Id. at 26. 

As Ms. Sonoga drove home, the Sonata accelerated out of her control. 

Id. at 11, 28. Ms. Sonoga cried out to her sister that she could not stop the 

car. Id. The Sonata collided with a vehicle stopped at a red light, before 

striking a second vehicle. Id. at 11, 28; see also Police Incident Report, 

7/13/11, at 1-4. Ms. Sonoga was killed.1

On March 5, 2012, Appellant filed a wrongful death and survival action 

against Appellees. The complaint raised counts of negligence, strict liability, 

and breach of warranty, averring that the 2011 Hyundai Sonata driven by 

Ms. Sonoga was defective. Compl. at ¶ 38. On April 4, 2012, Appellees filed 

an answer to the complaint with new matter and crossclaim. On April 26, 

2012, Appellant filed a reply to the new matter.

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1 The only piece of the evidentiary record which states that Ms. Sonoga died 

as a result of her injuries is the expert report of Thomas Lacek, which the 

trial court struck as evidence. However, the pleadings indicate that Ms. 

Sonoga did, in fact, pass away as a result of her injuries.
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During discovery, Appellant produced the expert report of Thomas 

Lacek, P.E., which opined that the floor mat of the Sonata may have covered 

the accelerator, causing it to stick. Additionally, Appellant deposed the 

service representative who spoke to Ms. Sonoga on the day of the accident. 

The representative felt the problem was serious and claimed to have offered 

Ms. Sonoga a ride home, which she declined. Deposition of Matthew 

Impton, 2/12/13, at 29-30, 39.

On January 12, 2016, the case proceeded to jury selection. On 

January 15, 2016, the case was assigned to the trial court for the resolution 

of pending motions in limine. Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. On that date, 

however, the trial court heard only Appellees’ motion to strike Appellant’s 

expert report on the basis that it did not opine to a reasonable degree of 

professional certainty that the floor mat was the factual cause of the 

accident. Motion in Limine to Strike Expert Report, ¶ 1-5. 

After argument, the court granted the motion in limine. At that time, 

Appellees made an oral motion for summary judgment, arguing that without 

expert testimony as to causation, Appellant would be unable to establish a 

cause of action for any of the counts raised. Motions Hearing Transcript, 

1/15/16, at 32-33. Appellant argued that expert testimony was unnecessary 

and that there was a factual dispute over whether Appellee’s representatives 

had warned Ms. Sonoga of the danger in driving the car or offered her a 

rental car or ride home. Id. at 34. After argument, the trial court granted 

the motion for summary judgment.
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On January 15, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting the oral 

motion for summary judgment for the reasons it had stated on the record. 

See Order, 1/15/16, at 1, see also Motions Hearing Transcript at 47-49. 

On January 28, 2016, the trial court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s 

complaint with prejudice and directing the Department of Court Records to 

enter a judgment in favor of Appellees against Appellant. Order, 1/28/16, at 

1.

Appellant timely appealed and now raises the following issue:2

Whether the trial court erred by granting [Appellees’] oral 

motion for summary judgment after jury selection without even 

knowing the contents of the full evidentiary record, including and 

especially, [Appellees’] own admissions of record, which would 

have been sufficient to defeat summary judgment and allow the 

case to proceed to the jury for determination absent expert 

testimony?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. Our standard of review is well-settled.

The standards which govern summary judgment are well settled. 

When a party seeks summary judgment, a court shall enter 

judgment whenever there is no genuine issue of any material 

fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense 

that could be established by additional discovery. A motion for 

summary judgment is based on an evidentiary record that 

entitles the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law. In 

considering the merits of a motion for summary judgment, a 

court views the record in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine 

issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. 

Finally, the court may grant summary judgment only when the 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court did not direct compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, nor did it 

issue an opinion in support of its decision.
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right to such a judgment is clear and free from doubt. An 

appellate court may reverse the granting of a motion for 

summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion....

Swords v. Harleysville Ins. Companies, 883 A.2d 562, 566–67 (Pa. 

2005) (citations omitted). To the extent this Court must resolve a question 

of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the context of the 

entire record. Truax v. Roulhac, 126 A.3d 991, 996 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining that an 

expert was required to opine on the issue of causation. Appellant avers that 

because of this predetermination, the trial court failed to consider the full 

evidentiary record. We agree.

A plaintiff may establish causation with any evidence, direct or 

circumstantial, which tends to show the defendant’s actions as the legal 

cause of harm. Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. 1978). 

Expert testimony is not needed in every general negligence case, as it is in 

medical malpractice cases, however, “[e]xpert testimony becomes necessary 

when the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and 

training not common to the ordinary lay person.” Brandon v. Ryder Truck 

Rental, Inc., 34 A.3d 104, 108 (Pa. Super. 2011). In certain situations 

involving physical injury, it is possible for a jury to reasonably infer 

causation from the circumstances of an accident or occurrence and expert 

testimony is not needed. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1285; see, e.g., French v. 

Commonwealth Associates, Inc., 980 A.2d 623, 633-634 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (noting that expert testimony as to causation of defects is not always 
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required in cases of strict liability and breach of warranty); see also

Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, 180 A.2d 414, 418 (Pa. 1962).

In Topelski, a negligence action, the plaintiff was injured when his 

motorcycle collided with defendant’s automobile. Topelski, 180 A.2d at 

415-16. On the issue of causation, lay testimony established that the 

defendant applied the brakes, but the car would not stop. Topelski, 180 

A.2d at 417-18. On appeal, defendant automobile shop challenged the 

sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that lay testimony was insufficient to 

prove causation. Topelski, 180 A.2d at 417-18. However, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument and adopted the lower 

court’s discussion. Specifically, in Topelski, defendant’s statements that 

the brakes had failed were direct evidence to show causation, and he did not 

need to be an expert to attest to that fact: such a matter could be 

understood by any person without special knowledge, training, or skill. 

Topelski, 180 A.2d at 418.

Here, Sonoga cites the following evidence, which was sufficient to 

establish causation if believed by a fact finder, namely that 1) Ms. Sonoga 

informed Appellee of a previous instance where the brakes had failed; she 

had made an appointment to have her breaks examined; 2) Mr. Impton had 

serious concerns about the safety of the car; and, 3) in the moments 

immediately preceding the crash, Ms. Sonoga exclaimed that she could not 

engage the breaks. Thus, as in Topelski, there was sufficient evidence of 

causation without expert testimony.
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Thus, the lack of expert testimony as to causation was not fatal to 

Appellant’s claims, as a jury could have reasonably inferred that a 

malfunction was the cause of Appellant’s injuries. It was thus error for the 

trial court to grant an oral motion for summary judgment without examining 

the entirety of the record. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the court 

and remand for further proceedings.

Order reversed; case remanded; jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2016