United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 14, 2016*

Decided November 22, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 16-3317

JARREN L. AUSTIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN NIBLICK,

Defendant,

CITY OF FORT WAYNE, 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Fort Wayne Division 

No. 1:93-cv-217

William C. Lee,

Judge.

Intervenor-Appellee.

O R D E R

 

* We have unanimously agreed to decide this case without oral argument, because the briefs and record 

adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the 

court. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). The new appeal has been assigned to the panel that handled 

Austin’s earlier appeal, pursuant to Internal Operating Procedure 6(b).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16-3317 Page 2

This case had its origins in 1991, when officers from the Fort Wayne, Indiana, 

police force arrested Jarren Austin and allegedly beat him as they did so. In 1993, 

relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several state-law theories, Austin sued one of the 

arresting officers, John Niblick, as well as several other unnamed officers and the City 

of Fort Wayne. Austin later dismissed his claims against the unnamed officers and the 

city, leaving Niblick as the sole defendant. Niblick made no effort to defend, however, 

though nothing indicates that he was not properly served. In 1995 the district court 

awarded Austin a $16,998.36 default judgment against the absent officer. By that time, 

Niblick had moved to Florida. The record then goes silent until December 16, 2014, 

when Austin filed a pro se “Motion Requesting Extension of Time and Clarification on 

the Court’s Prior Judgment and Order Dated September 8, 1995” in the U.S. district 

court for the Northern District of Indiana, which had entered the 1995 judgment. In 

essence, the motion asked the court to help Austin to collect on the nearly 20-year-old 

judgment against Niblick. After it caught wind of the litigation, the City of Fort Wayne 

intervened to defend against Austin’s request that the City pay the judgment, with 

interest. 

The district court denied Austin’s motion, finding that Indiana law did not 

permit him to sue the City. On appeal, we rejected that rationale, noting that in 

substance Austin had instituted proceedings supplemental to the underlying litigation, 

as authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69. Austin v. Niblick, 626 F. App’x 167 

(7th Cir. 2015) (Austin I). We found that Indiana law did require the city to pay 

judgments against its employees, id. at 169–170, and thus held that the case had to be 

remanded for further proceedings. Mindful of the lengthy delay between the judgment 

and the collection proceedings, however, we pointedly added that “the district court 

may consider the timeliness of Austin’s motion, given that he filed it 19 years after the 

judgment was issued.” Id. at 171. On remand, the district court accepted that invitation

and ruled that the doctrine of laches prevented Austin from enforcing his judgment 

against the city so late in the game. Austin has once again appealed. 

Rule 69(a)(1) provides that the enforcement of money judgments “must accord 

with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs 

to the extent it applies.” In other words, Rule 69 “adopts whatever procedures are 

followed by the state courts in which the collection is sought ... unless there is an 

applicable federal statute expressly regulating the execution of judgments.” Star Ins. Co. 

v. Risk Mktg. Grp. Inc., 561 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Maher v. Harris Trust & 

Sav. Bank, 506 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2007)). Thus while we are not bound to apply 

“every jot and tittle” of state procedural rules, in general we should conform Rule 69 

proceedings to state law. GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 626–27 (7th Cir. 2013) 
No. 16-3317 Page 3

(quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993)). In this 

case, there is no federal statute on point, and so we turn to Indiana law for guidance. 

Laches is an equitable doctrine that permits courts to refuse to aid litigants who 

have slept on their rights. SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Cnty. Airport Auth., 831 

N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ind. 2005). It applies “[i]ndependently of any statute of limitation,” 

meaning that a claim can be barred even if the time for filing has not yet officially 

expired. Id. (quoting Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 698 (1898)). Thus 

even if Austin’s claim is not strictly barred by Indiana’s statute of limitations—an issue 

we do not reach—the district court was permitted nonetheless to conclude that it was 

foreclosed by laches. See Austin I, 626 F. App’x at 171 (noting split of Indiana authority 

on applicability of statute of limitations). Laches bars a plaintiff’s claim if her opponent 

establishes “(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver 

arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in 

circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.” SMDfund, 831 N.E.2d at 729. 

This test is applied flexibly. Indiana recognizes “no fixed or definite rule for the 

application of the doctrine of laches.’” Richmond State Hosp. v. Brattain, 961 N.E.2d 1010, 

1012 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Grantham Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 22 N.E.2d 832, 839 (Ind. 

1939)). 

The district court acted well within the boundaries of its authority when it 

concluded that Austin’s delay was inexcusable. He waited almost 20 years to enforce 

his judgment against the city. Nothing during that period prevented him from asserting 

his rights, and he cannot plead ignorance as Indiana charges him with knowledge of the 

law. SMDfund, 831 N.E.2d at 729 (Ind. 2005). There is no special dispensation for pro se 

litigants, and in any event it appears that Austin was represented by counsel for much 

of the relevant time. He may fault his lawyer for failing to bring this action sooner, but 

it is well established under Indiana and federal law that clients are accountable for their 

attorneys’ conduct, even if that conduct was negligent. Mirka v. Fairfield of America, Inc., 

627 N.E.2d 449, 450 n. 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Bakery Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v. 

Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009).

The same logic governs the second part of the laches analysis. Austin acquiesced 

for nearly two decades to existing conditions. See Hutchinson v. Spanierman, 190 F.3d 

815, 825–26 (7th Cir. 1999). The only evidence of action that he provides is a skimpy

affidavit the district court found was not credible, and a demand letter sent to the city 

mere months before he initiated this litigation. That is not enough to outweigh 19 years 

of stasis. Prejudice, the final element, is also easy to find. Austin wants the city to pay 

not only the original award, but also well over $200,000 in interest. That sum greatly 
No. 16-3317 Page 4

exceeds the original judgment, and the increase is largely attributable to Austin’s delay. 

This is so even taking into account the fact that an adjustment must be made before one 

can accurately express the 2016 value of 1995 dollars. The government’s CPI Inflation 

Calculator indicates that $17,000 in 1995—the approximate amount of the default 

judgment—is equivalent to just $26,965 in 2016. See http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.

pl?cost1=17000&year1=1995&year2=2016. This shows that Austin is asking for quite a 

bit more than he initially received. Moreover, as far as the city knew, Austin had simply 

abandoned this claim. From that perspective, these are all new demands. Indiana law 

does not permit litigants to wait in the wings while their claims increase in value. See,

e.g., Brattain, 961 N.E.2d at 1015; Wagner v. Estate of Fox, 717 N.E.2d 195, 204 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999). Indeed, this is precisely the type of prejudice that laches seeks to prevent. 

Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. The district court 

reasonably decided that Austin, having slept for 19 years, may not wake up now.

The district court’s order denying Austin’s motion is AFFIRMED.