MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian A. Karle

Ball Eggleston, PC

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darrell A. Williams,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 30, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A02-1604-CR-782

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Randy J. Williams, 

Judge

The Honorable Daniel J. Moore, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

79D01-1306-FC-26

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1604-CR-782 | November 30, 2016 Page 1 of 10
Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Darrell A. Williams appeals his conviction for class C felony operating a motor 

vehicle after driving privileges were forfeited for life, following a bench trial. 

He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting any evidence 

obtained as a result of the traffic stop of his vehicle because such stop was 

conducted in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution. Finding no federal or state constitutional violation, and therefore 

no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 29, 2013, at approximately 6:58 a.m., Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s 

Office Lieutenant Greg Frantz and Deputy Aaron Gilman traveled separately

to the residence of Alicia Hickman, a woman whom they believed Williams 

was in a relationship and living with. Lieutenant Frantz had received a tip 

from the local prosecutor’s office that Williams may be operating a vehicle with 

an “HTV [habitual traffic violator] life status.” Tr. at 6. After personally 

confirming Williams’s HTV status in the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles 

database, Lieutenant Frantz, who was already somewhat familiar with 

Williams’s appearance, “refreshed [his] memory” that morning by looking at 

Williams’s most recent photograph in law enforcement records. Id. at 7.

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[3] Lieutenant Frantz and Deputy Gilman positioned themselves near Hickman’s 

residence to conduct surveillance. Deputy Gilman noted that two vehicles were 

parked in the driveway of the residence. After running the plates on those 

vehicles, Deputy Gilman found that both vehicles were registered to Hickman. 

Both officers were then called away to investigate unrelated reports.

[4] Upon returning to the residence at approximately 7:30 a.m., Deputy Gilman 

discovered that one of the two vehicles was no longer parked in Hickman’s 

driveway. Deputy Gilman parked in a nearby alley so that he could watch and 

see if the vehicle returned or if the remaining vehicle left the residence. Shortly 

thereafter, Deputy Gilman observed the second vehicle, a silver 2007 Hyundai 

Santa Fe, exiting the driveway. Deputy Gilman could not see the driver. 

Deputy Gilman radioed to Lieutenant Frantz, who was positioned at the 

entrance to the neighborhood, that the vehicle was headed his way.

[5] As the vehicle approached Lieutenant Frantz, he used binoculars to look

through the front windshield of the vehicle and determined that the driver was a 

black male, but the officer “could not see if it was [Williams].” Id. at 96. 

However, when the vehicle “made the turn to go northbound on Concord 

Road, still using the assistance of the binoculars, [Lieutenant Frantz] was able 

to see through the front window [that] it appeared to be [Williams],” although 

Lieutenant Frantz was not “a hundred percent sure at this point.” Id. After the 

vehicle passed Lieutenant Frantz, the officer began following the vehicle. 

Lieutenant Frantz was able to “clearly see” through the vehicle’s rear window 

into the rearview mirror, and could see the driver’s forehead, eyes, and nose. 

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Id. at 96-97, 116-17. Lieutenant Frantz determined that “it was indeed” 

Williams. Id. at 96, 97. Lieutenant Frantz activated his police lights and 

initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. Thereafter, Lieutenant Frantz confirmed 

Williams’s identity and placed him under arrest. 

[6] The State charged Williams with class C felony operating a motor vehicle after 

driving privileges were forfeited for life. Williams filed a motion to suppress

alleging that the traffic stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional pursuant to the 

federal and state constitutions, and therefore all evidence obtained should be 

suppressed. The trial court denied the motion and held a bench trial on 

February 19, 2016. Williams renewed his objection to the admission of 

evidence during trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found 

Williams guilty as charged. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Williams asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting any 

evidence that he was operating a vehicle after his driving privileges were 

forfeited for life because the traffic stop which revealed that evidence was 

unconstitutional. Our review of rulings on the “admissibility of evidence is 

essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to 

suppress or by trial objection.” Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005). “We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting 

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. We must also consider 

the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. We will not disturb 

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the trial court’s evidentiary ruling unless it is shown that the trial court’s 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court. Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011). However, 

the constitutionality of a search and seizure is a question of law that we review 

de novo. Lewis v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ind. 2011).

Section 1 – The traffic stop did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment.

[8] William’s first contends that the traffic stop of his vehicle violated his rights 

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth 

Amendment states,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

“The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment ‘is to protect the 

legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their 

homes, and their belongings.’” Hines v. State, 981 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013) (quoting Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). 

This protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001). 

[9] In general, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless search and seizure 

absent a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Peak v. State, 26 N.E.3d 

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1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). One exception to the warrant requirement is a 

Terry stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Specifically, it is well settled 

that 

an officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of an individual 

when, based on a totality of the circumstances, the officer has a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 

The investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop, is a lesser 

intrusion on the person than an arrest and may include a request 

to see identification and inquiry necessary to confirm or dispel 

the officer’s suspicions. Reasonable suspicion is determined on a 

case by case basis. The reasonable suspicion requirement is met 

where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, 

together with the reasonable inferences from such facts, would

cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity 

has occurred or is about to occur.

J.B. v. State, 30 N.E.3d 51, 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective

justification for making a stop, something more than an un-particularized 

suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable 

cause.” Polson v. State, 49 N.E.3d 186, 189-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied

(2016).

[10] Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances here, we conclude that 

Lieutenant Frantz’s investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. 

Lieutenant Frantz and Deputy Gilman were investigating a report from the 

local prosecutor’s office that Williams may be operating a vehicle despite his 

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HTV status.

1

 Accordingly, after personally confirming Williams’s status as an 

HTV, the officers began conducting surveillance of the residence where they 

had reason to believe Williams was staying. Upon determining that one vehicle 

had already left the residence and that the second vehicle was in the process of 

leaving the residence, the officers began their attempts to identify the second 

driver. Lieutenant Frantz stated that he had familiarized himself with 

Williams’s appearance that morning, and that when he first observed the 

vehicle coming toward him, he was able to determine only that the driver was a 

black male but he “could not see if it was [Williams.]” Tr. at 96. However, 

Lieutenant Frantz also testified that as the vehicle got closer and turned, “still 

using the assistance of the binoculars [he] was able to see through the front 

window” that the driver did “appear[] to be [Williams].” Id. When Lieutenant 

Frantz began following the vehicle, the officer was able to “clearly see” through 

the rear window of the vehicle into the vehicle’s rearview mirror. Id. at 97. 

Lieutenant Frantz explained how he could “easily see” the driver in the 

rearview mirror, and that after seeing a significant portion of the driver’s face in 

the mirror, including his forehead, eyes, and nose, Lieutenant Frantz 

determined that the driver “was indeed” Williams. Id. at 96, 102. 

1 In his reply brief, Williams focuses much of his argument on likening the tip from the prosecutor’s office to 

an “anonymous tip.” Reply Br. at 4-6. This argument is misplaced. As we discuss more fully below, 

regardless of how the tip is characterized, the State did not rely on the tip as the basis for reasonable 

suspicion. Lieutenant Frantz’s stop of the vehicle was based upon his visual identification of Williams as the 

driver of the vehicle and his independent confirmation of Williams’s HTV status.

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[11] Although Williams implies that the facts available to Lieutenant Frantz at the 

moment of the stop were insufficient to positively “confirm” that he was the 

driver of the vehicle, we remind Williams that reasonable suspicion does not 

require such certitude. Appellant’s Br. at 9. Moreover, our review of the record 

reveals that Lieutenant Frantz did exactly what a law enforcement officer 

should have done under the circumstances. Rather than acting hastily and 

stopping the surveilled vehicle immediately, Lieutenant Frantz continued to 

observe the driver until he was able to make a reasonable visual identification of 

the driver as Williams. Under the totality of the circumstances, Lieutenant 

Frantz had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on articulable facts 

to support the traffic stop of Williams’s vehicle. Therefore, the stop did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting evidence obtained as a result.

Section 2 – The traffic stop did not violate the Indiana 

Constitution.

[12] Williams also contends that the traffic stop violated his rights under Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. While the language of Article 1, 

Section 11 is virtually identical to its Fourth Amendment counterpart, our 

supreme court has “made an explicit point to interpret and apply Section 11 

independently from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Mitchell v. State, 

745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001). “Instead of focusing on the defendant’s 

reasonable expectation of privacy, we focus on the actions of the police officer,”

concluding that a search or seizure is legitimate where it is reasonable given the 

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totality of the circumstances. Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006). 

In assessing reasonableness, we consider (1) the degree of concern, suspicion or 

knowledge that a violation has occurred, (2) the degree of intrusion the method 

of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and (3) the 

extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 

2005).

[13] In this case, there was a high degree of suspicion that a violation had occurred 

or was occurring. Lieutenant Frantz personally confirmed that Williams’s 

driver’s license had been suspended for life. After conducting surveillance of 

the residence where officers believed Williams was staying and observing a 

vehicle leave the residence, Lieutenant Frantz was able to determine through 

visual identification that the male driver of the vehicle was indeed Williams. 

This factor weighs in favor of finding that Lieutenant Frantz’s decision to 

conduct a Terry stop of the vehicle was reasonable.

[14] Second, the degree of intrusion here was minimal. After visually identifying the 

driver of the vehicle as Williams, Lieutenant Frantz initiated a brief traffic stop

of the vehicle to confirm or dispel his belief that Williams was the driver. Our 

supreme court has acknowledged that generally the degree of intrusion of a 

Terry stop is relatively minor. See Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 

2014). Also, the extent of law enforcement needs was high. Operating a 

vehicle after driving privileges have been suspended for life is a serious felony 

offense.

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[15] In sum, for essentially the same reasons explained in the context of the Fourth 

Amendment, we hold that Lieutenant Frantz’s stop of Williams’s vehicle was 

reasonable given the totality of the circumstances and therefore did not violate 

the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result of the stop.

[16] Affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.

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