COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

TERRENCE MACK BOOTH, S/K/A 

 TERRANCE BOOTH 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0862-95-1 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 JUNE 11, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 

 Timothy P. Sceviour (Abrons, Fasanaro & 

Sceviour, on brief), for appellant. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from his convictions of second degree murder and 

use of a firearm in the commission of murder, Terrence Mack Booth 

contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. 

 We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 

Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The judgment of a 

trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 On August 28, 1994, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Andreano of the Norfolk Police Department responded to a radio 

dispatch that a man had been shot close to the intersection of 

28th Street and Debree Avenue. Upon his arrival at the scene, 

Officer Andreano found the victim lying dead on the ground with 

blood on his face and surrounding his head. No other shooting 

occurred in that area on August 28, 1994. 

 Sharmeka Spratley testified that on the evening of August 

28, 1994, Booth telephoned her and arranged to spend the night at 

her home. He told her that "he shot somebody or he might have." 

 The next morning, Ms. Spratley and two friends drove Booth home. 

 At the intersection of 28th Street and Debree Avenue, the 

driver, Ms. Jerry Morris, asked Booth, "where the gentlemen he 

had killed at." Booth pointed to the crime scene, which was 

cordoned off with yellow tape, and replied, "right over there." 

 Booth contends that the evidence against him is wholly 

circumstantial. Acknowledging that the evidence is suggestive of 

his guilt, he argues that it nonetheless fails to exclude every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence and, thus, is insufficient to 

support his conviction. We disagree. 

 Direct evidence is evidence which tends to establish a 

fact in issue without the aid of an inference. 

 It is 

 [E]vidence that directly proves a fact, 

without an inference or presumption, and 

which in itself, if true, conclusively 

establishes that fact. 

* * * * * * * 

 Circumstantial evidence, sometimes called indirect 
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evidence, is evidence of facts and circumstances not in 

issue from which facts or circumstances in issue may be 

inferred. 

Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia (Fourth Edition, 1993), 

§ 12-1. 

 Officer Andreano's description of his findings at the crime 

scene is direct evidence. Likewise, Sharmeka Spratley's report 

of Booth's statements is direct evidence. However, the inference 

required to link those two elements of proof, renders each of 

those elements circumstantial proof as to the issue of whether 

Booth killed the victim. 

 Although this case is based on circumstantial evidence, 

circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. 

Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 518, 446 S.E.2d 451, 456 

(1994) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

 All necessary circumstances proved must be 

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with 

innocence; they must exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis of innocence; the chain of these 

circumstances must be unbroken; and the 

"circumstances of motive, time, place, means, 

and conduct must all concur to form an 

unbroken chain" linking the appellant to the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 518-19, 446 S.E.2d at 457 (citation omitted). The proof 

must exclude only those reasonable hypotheses of innocence that 

flow from the evidence, and not those that derive from the 

ruminations of defense counsel. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 

Va. App. 269, 289, 373 S.E.2d 328, 338 (1988), cert. denied, 496 

U.S. 911 (1990). 
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 The evidence supports Booth's convictions. He confessed to 

Ms. Spratley that "I shot someone." When passing the crime scene 

the following day, he said "that's where it happened." No other 

shootings occurred in that area on August 28, 1994. Booth 

admitted his presence at the crime scene, but stated that he 

thought the victim was drunk. The trial court found this 

explanation incredible. When the trial court asked defense 

counsel to offer a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, counsel 

could proffer none. The evidence unerringly compels the 

conclusion of Booth's guilt. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.