UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

SUZANNE SHELL, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

BRENDA SWALLOW, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 16-1150 

(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00309-MSK-KMT) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Suzanne Shell, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying her 

motion for entry of a default judgment against Brenda Swallow on her claims for 

copyright infringement, unfair trade practices, misappropriation of trade secrets, and 

breach of contract. This is the second appeal of this matter. In the prior appeal, we 

held that the district court had not provided Shell sufficient notice that she was 

expected to produce, at the hearing for entry of default judgment, evidence 

supporting her claims on the merits, rather than simply on damages. See Shell v. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

November 23, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Henderson, 622 F. App’x 730 (10th Cir. 2015). On remand and after appropriate 

notice, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and entered a judgment in 

Swallow’s favor. Shell filed two post-judgment motions, both denied by the district 

court. Given the timing of the motions and the notice of appeal, this court has 

jurisdiction to review only the final motion seeking a new trial. Swallow has not 

filed an appellate brief. 

 The district court entered judgment in Swallow’s favor on January 15, 2016. 

Shell filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment on February 12, 2016, pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The motion was filed within 28 days after the judgment, see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), so it tolled the time to appeal the judgment, see Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment on 

February 16, 2016, which started the 30-day time to appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, the notice of appeal was due no later than March 17, 2016. 

Shell filed a second post-judgment motion requesting a new trial on March 15, 2016. 

Even though the second motion was filed before the deadline for the notice of appeal, 

the deadline was not extended. See Okon v. CIR, 26 F.3d 1025, 1026 (10th Cir. 

1994) (“This court has noted on several occasions the general principle that tolling 

motions may not be tacked together to perpetuate the prescribed time for appeal.”). 

The district court denied the motion for new trial on April 1, 2016. Shell filed her 

notice of appeal on April 28, 2016, which was past the March 17, 2016 deadline. As 

a result, the notice of appeal is untimely as to the original judgment in favor of 

Swallow. 
3 

 “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional 

requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Therefore, we have 

jurisdiction over only the second Rule 59(e) motion for a new trial. 

With respect to that motion, Shell claimed the district judge’s rulings in the 

case caused her to become disabled by post-traumatic stress disorder, thus entitling 

her to a new trial. She argues on appeal that the judge denied her motion for a new 

trial “on the basis that [she] was faking [her] disability” and “mocked the disability 

that [the court] inflicted on [her].” Aplt. Br. at 16. This is the theme throughout her 

brief: the district court was biased against her, engaged in “outright manipulation of 

the facts and the law,” id. at 6, was “dishonest and disingenuous,” id., and issued 

“burdensome and abusive court orders,” id. at 7.1

 Shell also alleged that her 

 1

 Shell’s appellate brief also contains the following allegations against the 

district judge: (1) “The District Court administered the case with its thumb on the 

scales of justice to ensure that this Plaintiff could not prevail and which had the 

intended effect of dramatically increasing the Plaintiff’s costs of litigation as well as 

resulting in a fundamentally unfair process and a predetermined outcome detrimental 

to the Plaintiff,” Aplt. Br. at 3; (2) “the judge[’s] . . . reasoning was so bizarre that it 

appeared to be rendered under the influence of some mind-altering substance,” id.

at 5; (3) the judge chose “to escalate her outrageous design to deny [Shell] justice,” 

id.; (4) the judge demonstrated a “blatant and profane . . . abuse of judicial discretion 

and abuse of the authority she holds by virtue of her appointment to this bench,” id.

at 6; (5) “[t]he judge has consistently demonstrated she has no regard for the law, no 

regard for the venerable institution that she represents, and no regard for parties who 

appear before her. . . . She uses the law as a weapon to inflict harm, not as a tool to 

effect justice,” id.; (6) “[t]his judge has repeatedly set traps and triggered them with 

similar bizarre contortions of the law to foreclose all legal remedies available to 

[Shell], id.; and (7) the judge issued “burdensome and abusive court orders that were 

not enforced, but also included the judge rewriting [Shell’s] pleadings and the 

defendants’[] pleadings to support outcomes favorable to the defendants, . . . in other 

words, lying,” id. at 7. 
4 

“experience before this judge was so egregious that [she is] permanently disabled.” 

Id. at 8. The basis of Shell’s claims are adverse rulings by the district court. 

 We affirm the district court’s order denying the motion for a new trial because 

Shell “has forfeited [her] right to a review of that decision,” Garrett v. Selby Connor 

Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Her appellate brief “contain[s] 

no argument of substance, and the scurrilous tone convinces us to refrain from 

exercising any discretion we may have to delve for substance in a pro se pleading.” 

Id. We recognize that “a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and 

held to a less stringent standard than formal proceedings drafted by lawyers.” Id.

(brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “pro se parties [must] 

follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants . . . [and] the court 

cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing 

arguments and searching the record.” Id. (citations, brackets, and internal quotation 

marks omitted). In sum, Shell has failed to identify any legal basis for relief from 

this court. 

Indeed, Shell’s appellate brief does “little more than attempt to impugn 

(without basis) the integrity of the district judge. Such writings are intolerable, and 

we will not tolerate them.” Id. at 841. If a brief is “abusive or contain[s] offensive 

language, [it] may be stricken sua sponte under the inherent powers of the court.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). As noted, pro se litigants are typically granted 

leniency, however, “[t]his court simply will not allow liberal pleading rules and 

pro se practice to be a vehicle for abusive documents. Our pro se practice is a shield 
5 

against the technical requirements of a past age; it is not a sword with which to insult 

a trial judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The district court denied Shell’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma 

pauperis (IFP). She has renewed the motion in this court. “In order to succeed on 

[her] motion, an appellant must show a financial inability to pay the required filing 

fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in 

support of the issues raised on appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 

(10th Cir. 1991). We conclude that Shell has not made a reasoned, nonfrivolous 

argument and therefore deny her IFP motion. 

The district court’s order is affirmed. Even though we affirm, this “does not 

relieve [Shell] of [her] obligation to pay the filing fee in full.” Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of 

Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2007). Shell is directed to pay all filing and 

docketing fees in full to the Clerk of the District Court for the District of Colorado. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge