SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2643- 21
SYLVIA MELANIA TEJADA DE TAPIA, Plaintiff,

v. 74 INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and
VELCRO U SA , INC., CARLISLE FINISHING, LLC, COATS AMERICAN, INC., a/k/a COATS NORTH AMERICA, CHAMPLAIN PLASTICS, INC., BETHEL INDUSTRIES, INC., AMERICAN & EFIRD, LLC , BRITTANY DYEING & PRINTING CORP., SINAI CUTTING, EXA CTA CUTTING, NEWBURY CUTTING, BII CORP., a/k/a B2 CORP., CHST OF NJ, LLC, Defendants, NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 2643

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and 74 INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant- Respondent.

______________________________

Argued October 12, 2023

– Decided July 12, 2024 Before Judges Vernoia and Walcott-Henderson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L- 5288

- 18. Thomas J. Monroe argued the cause for appellant (Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, attorneys; Thomas J. Monroe, on the brief ). Richard J. Williams, Jr., argued the cause fo r respondent (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, attorneys; Richard J. Williams, Jr. , of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Slyvia Melania Tejada de Tapia was injured at work and filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer, 74 Industr ies, Inc. (74 Industries) ,3 A- 2643

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which was settled pursuant to an order approving se ttlement with dismissal under N.J.S.A. 34:15-20 (the Section 20 Settlement) . The Section 20 Settlement resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's workers' compensation cla ims with prejudice

. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company 's (NJM) had issued a standard workers' compensation and employers liabil ity insurance policy (the Policy) to 74 Industries and recommended settlement of plaintiff's workers' compensation claim. 1 Prior to the settlement, however, plaintiff had als o filed a complaint in the Law Division alleging intentional torts against 74 Industries, and 74 Industries filed a third-party complaint aga inst NJM seeking coverage under the Policy for plaintiff's claims of intentio nal wrong asserted against 74 Industries. NJM denied coverage citing policy excl usions for intentional torts and moved to dismiss 74 Industries's third-party co mplaint. The Law Division

1 The Policy contains two mutually exclusive parts

. Part One of the Policy provides coverage for 74 Industries 's statutory obligations under the Workers' Compensation Act , N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to - 147 (WCA), to pay benefits to an employee injured during the course of their employm ent. Part Two of the Policy provides coverage for claims "where recovery is per mitted by law" and excludes coverage and/or defense for civil suits brough agai nst 74 Industries, including an intentional wrong.4 A- 2643

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judge granted NJM's motion to dismiss 74 Industries 's third-party complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
I. Plaintiff suffered an injury after she was bitten o r stung by an insect during the course of her employment as a sewing machine op erator with 74 Industries

. According to plaintiff, insects routinely infested the packages of fabric and materials that employees handled and frequently bit and stung employees

. Plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment related to the infection she suffered as a result of the insect bite. The infection caused he r right leg to swell and form
green open sores. Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim again st 74 Industries seeking medical and temporary disability benefits related t o her injuries. 74 Industries denied plaintiff's workers' compensation claim and sought coverage from NJM under the Policy. NJM defended 74 Industries in workers' compensation court and eventually recommended 74 Industries settle plainti ff's case for a lump sum payment of $25,000 by way of an order approving set tlement with dismissal, with prejudice, under Section 20, N.J.S.A. 34:15- 20, of the WCA.5 A- 2643

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In its settlement letter, NJM advised 74 Industries that "[t]he proposed settlement for $25,000 takes into account estimate[ d] permanency value, the exposure to temporary total disability benefits[,] . . . the exposure to liability for medical expenses, and the cost and fees that would be incurred under an [o]rder [a]pproving [s]ettlement, but which would shift to the petitioner for a [S]ection 20 resolution." NJM further wrote, "the proposed Section 20 settlem ent provides the benefit of certainty and a final closu re." Approximately one month later, the parties appeared in workers' compensation court where plaintiff accepted the Sec tion 20 settlement on the record before a judge of workers' compensation. At that hearing, the workers' compensation judge explained to plaintiff that in r eturn for the $25,000 lump sum payment, NJM and 74 Industries would "receive [] the benefit of what we call a dismissal of your claim petition with prejud ice." The judge further explained that with respect to her claim petition, plaintiff was barred from "seek[ing] anything further including money, includ ing medical treatment , including payment of any medical bills[.]" In resp onse to a query from the judge, plaintiff confirmed she understood and accep ted the settlement. At no time during the hearing or prior to the court's acc eptance of the settlement did the worker's compensation judge or plaintiff refer to or acknowledge plaintiff's6 A- 2643

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pending Law Division action or address whether or t o what extent plaintiff's acceptance of the settlement affected her right, ifany, to pursue any intentionalwrong claims against 74 Industries. 2 The judge entered an order approving the Section 20 settlement, stat ing in relevant part:

This is a lump sum settlement between the parties i n the amount of $25,000 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-20 which has the effect of a dismiss[al] with prejudic e, being final as to all rights and benefits of the pe titioner and is a complete and absolute surrender and releas e of all rights arising out of this/these claim petition (s). The payment hereunder shall be recognized as a payment o f workers' compensation benefits for insurance rating purposes only. Prior to the entry of the Section 20 settlement, ho wever, plaintiff had filed an action in the Law Division alleging her injuries were caused by 74 Industries's intentional misconduct under the principles explain ed by the Court in Laidlow

2 In addition, the summary judgment record includes a certification from plaintiff stating that her understanding of the set tlement of the worker's compensation action was that in exchange for her re ceipt of the $25,000 lump sum payment, she would give up "all the claims [she had] made against 74 Industries in the [Workers' Compensation ] Action, and only the claims [she had] made in the [Workers' Compensation] action[.]" Pla intiff further certified that "at no time did [the judge of workers' compensation ] ever tell [her] that [she] could not prosecute an intentional wrong claim again st 74 Industries . . . if [she] entered into the Section 20 settlement[.]"7 A- 2643

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v. Hariton Mach. Co., 170 N.J. 602, 14 (2002)

. The "intentional wrong" exception to the surrender of common-law remedies u nder the Worker's Compensation Act is governed by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8

— also known as the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. See Milliso n v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 169, 179 (1985) (holding "the Compensation Act should serve as a worker's sole and exclusive remed y under circumstances such as those alleged."). More particularly, N.J.S.A. 3 4 :15 -8 provides that the WCA is the exclusive remedy for claims made against an employer by an employee for injuries or death while working for the employe r, "except for intentional wrong." In Laidlow, our Supreme Court clarified that "an in tentional wrong is not limited to actions taken with a subjective desire t o harm, but also includes instances where an employer knows that the conseque nces of those acts are substantially certain to result in such harm." 170 N.J. a t 613. Consequently, an employee seeking to prove his employer committed an intentional wrong must demonstrate either (1) that the employer had a subj ective desire to injure, or (2) that "based on all the facts and circumstances of th e case . . . the employer knew an injury was substantially certain to result." Id . at 614.8 A- 2643

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Plaintiff had filed a series of amended complaints, each of which included the same four counts against 74 Industries. Plaint iff filed an amended complaint on September 19, 2019, a second-amended complaint o n November 14, 2019, a third-amended complaint on March 30, 2020, and a fo urth-amended complaint on February 1, 2021. In each of her complaints, pl aintiff asserted four counts against 74 Industries, alleg ing intentional wrongs that plaintiff claimed are within the exception to the workers' compensation b ar under N.J.S.A. 34:15- 8. In count one, titled "Intentional Wrong against 74 Industries," alleged 74 Industries breached its duty to plaintiff to keep t he "premises free from known defects, dangers, and dangerous and hazardous condi tions not typically associated with [p]laintiff's job responsibilities" b y ignoring her complaints and those of its other employees, and by failing or ref using to undertake any action to correct, prevent, or alleviate the injuries. In count two, titled "Conduct Substantially Certain to Cause Injury Against 74 In dustries," plaintiff alleged 74 Industries was "substantially and virtually cert ain that its failure to remedy the persistent and c ontinuing dangerous and hazardous condition created by large flying insects" embedded in fabrics handled b y its employees in the workplace caused injuries.9 A- 2643

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In count three, titled "Intentional Wrong against 7 4 Industries," plaintiff alleged 74 Industries "was aware that its refusal to allow an injured employee to seek prompt medical treatment after sustaining an i njury at work would cause injury to such an employee or exacerbate or aggrava te the injury sustained at work." In count four, titled "Conduct Substantially Certai n to Cause Injury against 74 Industries," plaintiff alleged 74 Indust ries was substantially and virtually certain that directing plaintiff "to choo se between continuing her employment with 74 Industries or seeking prompt med ical treatment after sustaining an injury at work" would cause injury. Defendant tendered plaintiff's third-amended compla int

— with the same four counts present ed in the fourth-amended complaint

— to NJM for defense and indemnification under the Policy. In a letter date d November 18, 2020 to 74 Industries, NJM denied coverage under Part Two of t he Policy for claims in the third-amended complaint citing various "terms, cond itions and exclusions of the NJM policy" which served "as the basis for NJM's di sclaimer." 74 Industries moved to amend its answer and add a counterclaim an d third-party complaint against NJM seeking a declaratory judgment that NJM was required to fully defend, indemnify, and reimburse it pursuant to the Policy, which provided coverage for the period from January 1, 2016, to January 1, 2017. NJM then10 A- 2643

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moved to dismiss 74 Industries's third-party compla int against it for failure to state a cause of action. The motion court granted NJM's motion to dismiss 74 Industries's thirdparty complaint for failure to state a claim pursua nt to Rule 4:6 -2(e). In its written opinion, the court analyzed the WCA's exclu sive remedy provision and the Supreme Court caselaw defining the narrow excep tion to the provision for injuries caused by intentional wrongs by the employ er . The court found plaintiff's fourth amended complaint had ple ad ed causes of action for intentional wrongs, and that "Part Two of the Policy clearly an d unambiguously exclude s intentional wrongs from insurance coverage." The court further found that plaintiff's allegation s fell squarely within the Policy's C5 exclusion for "intentional wrongs" and rejected 74 Industries's contention the Policy was ambiguous because the C7 exclusion and C7 endorsement provided coverage for "bodily injuries" under Part Two of the Policy. The court stat ed that "[w]hile plaintiff assert[s] that she was thr eatened with adverse employment action if she left the jobs ite for medical treatment, . . . none of her counts allege employment discrimi nation or retaliation . . . ." and concluded the alleged threat involved an intent ional wrong. The court11 A- 2643

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further reasoned that there is no duty to defend whe n an action is not covered by a policy. It is the court's dismissal of 74 Industries's cove rage claims that is the subject of this appeal as plaintiff's Law Division causes of action against 74 Industries have been settled. This case is therefo re not about plaintiff's damages for the intentional wrongs alleged in her complaint , but rather it requires that we consider whether NJM had a duty under the Policy to indemnify and defend 74 Industries in the Law D ivision action for the in tentional wrongs alleged by plaintiff in her complaints.
II. "We review a grant of a motion to dismiss a complai nt for failure to state a cause of action de novo, applying the same standa rd under Rule 4:6 -2(e) that governed the motion court." Wreden v. Twp. of Lafayet te, 436 N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 2014). That standard is whether the pleadings even "suggest[]" a basis for the requested relief. Printing Mart-Mo rristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. , 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citation omitted). As a reviewing court, we assess only the "legal sufficiency" of the claim based on "the facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J . 431, 451 (2013) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746). Conseq uently, "[a]t this12 A- 2643

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preliminary stage of the litigation [we are] not co ncerned with the ability of [a party] to prove the allegation contained in the com plaint," Printing MartMorristown, 116 N.J. at 746, rather a court must acce pt the facts as pled are true and accord them "all legitimate inferences," Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi , 184 N.J. 161, 166, 183 (2005). The workers' compensation system is "an historic 't rade-off' whereby employees relinquish their right to pursue common-l aw remedies in exchange for prompt and automatic entitlement to benefits fo r work-related injuries." Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 605 (citing Millison, 101 N.J. at 174); see also N.J.S.A. 34:15 -7 to -8. "That system, however, is not without ex ception. When a worker's injuries have been caused by an employer's 'intentional wrong,' that 'intentional wrong' voids the 'trade-off' and the e mployee may seek both workers' compensation benefits and common-law remedies." Ch arles Beseler Co. v. O'Gorman & Young, Inc., 188 N.J. 542, 546 (2006) (c iting N.J.S.A. 34:15

– 8). "The interpretation of an insurance policy, like any contr act, is a question of law, which we review de novo." Sosa v. Mass. Ba y Ins. Co., 458 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Selective Ins. Co . of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med. & Physical Therapy, 210 N.J. 597, 605 (2012)). "I n attempting to discern the meaning of a provision in an insurance contract, the13 A- 2643

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plain language is ordinarily the most direct route. " Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231, 238 (2008) (citing Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001)). "We are guided by general principles: 'coverage provisio ns are to be read broadly, exclusions are to be read narrowly, potent ial ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured, and the policy is to be read in a manner that fulfills the insured's reasonable expectations.'" Sosa, 458 N.J. Super. at 646 (quoting Selective Ins. Co., 210 N.J. at 605). By contrast, "[i]f the plain language of the policy is unambiguous, we will 'not engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability or write a better policy for the insured than the one purchased.'" Ibid. (quoting C hubb Custom Ins. Co., 195 N.J. at 238). "[C]ourts will enforce exclusionary clauses if [the y are] 'specific, plain, clear, prominent, and not contrary to public policy ,' notwithstanding that exclusions generally 'must be narrowly construed,' and the insurer bears the burden to demonstrate they apply." Abboud v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 450 N.J. Super. 400, 407 (App. Div. 201 7) (quoting Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 441-42 (2010)).14 A- 2643

- 21 II I. 74 Industries's arguments essentially fall under th ree theories: that NJM had a duty to defend that was triggered by NJM's rep resentat ion of 74 Industries in the underlying workers' compensation case, inclu ding recommend ing that NJM settle plaintiff's petition via a Section 20 se ttlement ; that NJM had a duty to defend because a fair reading of two exclusions

— the C5 and C7 exclusions

— and their accompanying endorsements are ambiguous a nd requires NJM to sustain coverage , see Charles Beseler Co., 380 N.J. Super. at 202 ("[ w]hen an insurance policy's language fairly supports two mea nings, one that favors the insurer, and the other that favors the insured, the policy should be construed to sustain coverage") (quoting President v. Jenkins, 1 80 N.J. 550, 563(2004)); and that, as a matter of public policy, NJM had a duty to indemnify them. First, we reject 74 Industries' s argument that NJM had a duty to defend it
in the Law Division action because the Section 20 sett lement in workers' compensation court was intended to resolve "all of plaintiff's claims against 74 Industries." 74 Industries further argues that by virtue of NJM' s

re commendation and re presentation of 74 Industries in the workers'15 A- 2643

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compensation case, NJM was duty bound to continue t o represent it in the Law Division and provide coverage for plaintiff's claims

. "Section 20 is a settlement mechanism available to the employee, the employee[']s dependents, and the employer to avoid a hearing on contested issues and to provide the parties with the security of a certain outcome." Univ. of Mass. Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Christodoulou, 36 0 N.J. Super. 313, 347-48 (App. Div. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 180 N.J. 334, 349 (2004). A Section 20 settlement is "designed to achieve a complete se ttlement of all issues for all of the parties concerned." Id. at 320. As such, a plaintiff's acceptance of a Section 20 settlement bars a subsequent lawsuit aga inst the paying employer as it would be unfair to hold the employer liable for both common law damages and workers' compensation liability. See Hawksby v . DePietro, 165 N.J. 58, 66- 67 (2000) ( holding that a Section 20 settlement barred a subsequent medical malpractice claim against plaintiff's treating phys ician and co -employee because it would be unfair to hold the employer liable for both common law damages and workers' compensation liability ). Prior to the Section 20 settlement , plaintiff had filed her fourth-amended complaint in the Law Division alleging her intentio nal wrong claims

. The workers' compensation settlement record is silent a s to plaintiff's then-pending16 A- 2643

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intentional-wrong suit in the Law Division. In fact, there is no mention of the then-pending Law Division action before the worker s' compensation court judge by any party or by the judge at the settlement hear ing. Rather, during the Section 20 settlement hearing, t he workers' compensation judge solely addressed the impact of t he Section 20 settlement, stating that "in return for making this payment to you . . . 74 Industries and . . . NJM received the benefit of what we call a dismissa l of your claim petition with prejudice." The judge went on to explain "that mea ns this case is over, finished and done with forever." (Emphasis added). In response, plaintiff said, "I understand." However, in the Section 20 settlement, plaintiff co nsented only to a release of all claims "arising out" of the claim pe tition filed in workers' compensation court, which by definition under N.J.S .A. 34:15- 8 cannot and did not include claims for intentional wrongs such as t he causes of action plaintiff had filed against 74 Industries in the Law Division . Accordingly, there is nothing in the record to support defendant's argument that the Section 20 settlement also resolved plaintiff 's Law Division claims. Thus, 74 Industries's argument that NJM had a duty to defend and indemnif y it on the pending Law Division claims based on the Section 20 settlement is unavailing.17 A- 2643

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74 Industries next argues the Policy is ambiguous, specifically as to the C5 and C7 exclusions

— and corresponding endorsements

— and that this ambiguity requires that NJM provide a defense and indemnity in the Law Division action . 74 Industries also argues the language in C5 is ambiguous and must further be read in conjunction with the "bodil y injury" language in the endorsement to the C7 exclusion

. The C5 exclusion states: "This insurance does not cover: '[b]odily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you.'" The e ndorsement provides:

With respect to [the] C5 [exclusion], this insurance does not cover any and all intentional wrongs withi n the exception allowed by N.J.S.A 34:15-8 including but not limited to bodily injury caused or aggravated by an intentional wrong committed by you or your employees, or bodily injury resulting from an act o r omission by you or your employees, which is substantially certain to result in injury. [emphasis added.] In Charles Beseler Co ., we reviewed a version of this exclusion and endorsement without the "substantially certain" lan guage and considered whether the exclusion covered all "intentional wron gs" contemplated in N.J.S.A. 34:15 -8. 380 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 2005). Previou sly i n Laidlow, the Court had explained that "an intentional wrong is n ot limited to actions taken with a subjective desire to harm, but also includes instances where an employer18 A- 2643

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knows that the consequences of those acts are subst antially certain to result in such harm." 170 N.J. at 613. The Court reasoned:

[I]n order for an employer's act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, two conditions must b e satisfied: (1) the employer must know that his acti ons are substantially certain to result in injury or de ath to the employee, and (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment a nd (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intende d the Workers' Compensation Act to immunize. [Id. at 617.] Relying on Laidlow , we held that the C5 exclusion without the "substantially certain" language was ambiguous beca use it excluded from coverage "only injuries that result from a subjecti ve intent to injure. " Charles Beseler Co., 380 N.J. Super. at 202. We also found that the C5 exclusion failed

to exclude from coverage the subset of intentional wr ong claims based on "wrongful employer conduct that allegedly was subst antially certain to have caused injury." Ibid. We determined that such claims categorically fall u nder the "substantially certain" prong of the intentiona l-wrong exception recognized by Laidlow. Id . at 202

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. The Supreme Court adopted our determination that an "'intentional wrong,' qualifying for exception to the surrender o f common-law remedies under19 A- 2643

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N.J.S.A. 34:15

– 8, was broader than the [C5] exclusion from employe r-liability coverage for injuries 'intentionally caused' by the employer." Id. at 547 (citing Charles Beseler Co., 380 N.J. Super. at 202 )

. And, the Court further concluded that: bodily injuries, which are "intentionally caused" by the

employer and are subject to the [C5] exclusion, encompassed only "intentional injuries." So interpreted, the exclusion was held not to apply to [the employee]'s claim, which involved "an unintended injury caused by an intentional wrong." The panel refused to read into the [C5] exclusion any additio nal words that would extend the exclusion to a claim of wrongful employer conduct that allegedly was subs tantially certain to have caused injury, which wo uld satisfy the Laidlow standard for permitting a common-law action. [Charles Beseler Co., 188 N.J. at 547. (internal ci tations omitted).] In affirming our decision in Charles Beseler Co., the Court stat ed "the policy language does not unambiguously exclude inju ries falling under the 'substantially certain' prong of the intentional-wr ong exception recognized by Laidlow." Ibid. It further stated:

[a]n insured could reasonably conclude that the "intentionally caused or aggravated by" language is narrower than the statutory "intentional wrong" exception under the workers' compensation scheme. Based on that eminently reasonable reading of the precise language of the exclusion, an insured such as20 A- 2643

- 21 Beseler would not expect that it would be bare of coverage against the allegations in [employee]'s common-law action. [Ibid. ; accord New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Delta Plastics Corp., 380 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div. 2005 ), aff'd, 188 N.J. 582 (2006).] The C5 endorsement in Part Two of the Policy at iss ue here includes the "substantially certain" language such that it resol ves the ambiguity as to the "substantially certain" prong of the intentional wr ong standard we consid ered in Laidlow and the Court addressed in Charles Beseler Co. 74 Industries acknowledges that it "is not aware of any case law challenging the validity of the current [ C5 ] exclusion[.]" In any event, the plain and unambiguous language in the C5 endorsement clearly covers plaintiff's intentional tort claims under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8

— both those that "result from a subjective intent to injure" and those that are "substantially certain to have cause d injury." Charles Beseler Co. , 188 N.J. at 547. Thus, we reject 74 Industries's c laim the C5 exclusion is ambiguous, and we therefore conclude the Policy exc ludes from coverage plaintiffs' intentional tort claims. 74 Industries next argues that a separate endorseme nt to the C7 exclusion provides coverage, because the C7 endorsement state s NJM "will defend any claim . . . where bodily injury is alleged." This argument is equally unavailing21 A- 2643

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for the following reasons. First, the C7 exclusion e xpressly provides there is no coverage for:

Damages arising out of coercion, criticism, demotio n, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination against or termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions; The separate C7 endorsement provides: With respect to Exclusion C7, we will defend any claim, proceeding or suit for damages where bodily injury is alleged. We have the right to investigat e and settle. We will not defend or continue to defend a fter the applicable limits of insurance have been paid. Such policy limits include any legal costs assessed agai nst you on behalf of your employee(s). Here, 74 Industries relies on a broad reading of t he endorsement provision, "we will defend any claim . . . where bodily injury is alleged" but, in doing so, ignores that the endorsement is limited to only cla ims that are otherwise excluded from coverage under the C7 exclusion. It therefore incorrectly argues that the bodily injury allegations in plaintiff's c omplaint trigger a coverage obligation for any and all bodily injury claims sim ply because the C7 endorsement referenc es "bodily injury. " The plain language of the C7 exclusion excludes coverage for allegations of "coercion, discipline, harassment, termination of any employee, or any22 A- 2643

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personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions," which the Supreme Court in Schmidt v. Smith defined as "a class of discomforts that one typically would not associate with bodily injury[.]" 155 N.J. 44, 52 ( 1998) (reviewing a substantially similar version of the C7 exclusion that did not include the term "coercion"). The Court determined that "[t]he excl usion is valid as long as the liability arising from those discomforts is not rel ated to bodily injury, " and that had that plaintiff alleged "emotional injuries acco mpanied by physical manifestations," the carrier's attempt to avoid ind emnification would violate "the public policy underlying the workers' compensation sc heme" and would be void. Ibid. (first citing Voorhees v. Preferred Mu t. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 179 (1992), then citing Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jers ey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172 N.J. Super. 10, 22 (App. Div. 1980) ).
A lthough t he C7 endorsement provides that NJM "will defend an y claim, proceeding or suit for damages where bodily injury is alleged," the endorsement cannot be read separate and apart from the language in the exclusion provision

. See New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Certain Underwriter s at Lloyd's London, 461 N.J. Super. 440, 454 (App. Div. 2019), aff'd, 245 N .J. 104 (2021) ("We must read the contract as a whole 'in a fair and common sense manner.' The court must 'give effect to the whole policy, not just one part of it[.]'") (quoting Cypress23 A- 2643

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Point Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L. C., 226 N.J. 403, 415-16 (2016)). In fact, the endorsement is limited to the cir cumstances set forth in the C7 exclusion: the endorsement expressly stat es it applies "[w]ith respect to Exclusion C7." And, there is no language in the endorsement suggesting the exception it provides for bodily injuries applies t o any other policy provision. Again, based on the plain language, the endorsement provides only that C7 exclusion will not be used to deny coverage for bod ily injuries, such as "the emotional injuries accompanied by physical manifest ations" explicitly noted by the Schmidt Court, 155 N.J. at 52, it does not create new co verage for all bodily injuries outside C7 the circumstances referenced in the exclusion

. Here, the court rejected 74 Industries's argument t hat the C7 exclusion and endorsement compelled indemnification because it fo und plaintiff's allegations did not fall within those provisions, stating "[w]h ile plaintiff asserts that she was threatened with adverse employment action if she le ft the jobsite for medical treatment, " none of her counts alleged employment discrimination or re taliation to come under C7

. We agree with the court's conclusion. It is true th at plaintiff did not plead any counts falling within the C7 exclusion for "[d] amages arising out of coercion, criticism, demotion, evaluation, reassignme nt, discipline, defamation,24 A- 2643

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harassment, humiliation, discrimination against or termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, policies, 3 acts or omissions[.]" However, as the motion court acknowledged, "plaintiff assert[s] tha t she was threatened with adverse employment action if she left the jobsite f or medical treatment," which based on a fair reading of the complaint suggests a cause of action for coercion. 4 Furthermore, in count three, plaintiff alleged 74 I ndustries "was aware that its refusal to allow an injured employee to seek prompt medical treatment after sustaining an injury at work would cause injury to such an employee or exacerbate or aggravate the injury sustained at wor k." Regardless, defendant's claim it is entitled to coverage under the C7 exclusion fails because pla intiff's causes of action are founded on intentiona l

wron gs and they are excluded from coverage under the C5 e xclusion. Indeed, as the Court recognized in Schmidt, the employer t here was entitled to coverage for bodily injury claims claimed by the plaintiff-e mployee falling within the C7

3 Although C7 covers personnel policies and practices, 74 Indust ries did not and does not claim any such personnel policies or p ractices are at issue here.

4 In her "Allegations Common To Each Count," plaintif f alleges she "immediately reported the injury and showed the inj ury to her supervisor who told [p]laintiff to stay on the factory line until she was unable [to] work any longer because if the supervisor told their manager , the manager would fire [p]laintiff."25 A- 2643

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endorsement but only because the plaintiff had not alleged that the employer had caused the alleged injuries intentionally such that the C5 exclusion applied. 155 N.J. at 50- 51

. As such, the Court in Schmidt recognized that there is no coverage for any claimed actions that fall within the C7 bodily injury endorsement , under C7, where, as here, the actions allegedly resulting in the bodily injuries constitute intentional wrongs excluded from coverage by th e C5 exclusion. See ibid. We are further persuaded that as the language in th e C5 exclusion is clear and unequivocal, plaintiff's claims of intentional wrong conduct on the part of her employer, as defined in Laidlow , are not covered under NJM's Policy. 74 Industries's argument that the C7 endorsement must contr ol

— to require NJM to indemnify it

— without taking into account the C5 exclusion which exclud es coverage for bodily injur ies intentionally caused or substantially certain t o be caused by the insured, ignores general contract pri nciples. See New Jersey Transit Corp. , 461 N.J. Super. at 454 ("The court must 'give effect to the whole policy, not just one part of it[.]'")

. 74 Industries's approach runs contrary to Schmidt, which recognized that the any claimed acti ons that fall within the coverage for bodily injury under C7, as reinforced by the later C7 endorsement, does not cover acts

— like those alleged against 74 Industries

— that are26 A- 2643

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intentional because they are subject to the C5 excl usion. S ee Schmidt , 155 N.J.

at 50 -51

. Lastly, w e reject 74 Industries's argument that public policy supports coverage for intentional wrongs, as we have consist ently held that exclusions for intentional wrongs contained in insurance polic ies a re legally valid. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 119 (1986) ( quoting Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 482 (1978))

. We therefore find no basis to support 74 Industries's argument that public policy favors cov erage for plaintiff's intentional wrongs filed in Law Division. S ee Schmidt, 155 N.J. at 50- 52 (reviewing both the C5 and C7 exclusions and explai ning these insurance contracts provide coverage for "bodily injuries fal ling both inside and outside of the workers' compensation structure" and "[t]o t he extent Exclusion C7 would otherwise operate to deny coverage" for emotional i njuries accompanied by physical manifesta tions vicariously caused by the employer, "the exclusion violates the public policy underlying the workers' compensation scheme and is therefore void. ")

. We therefore discern no basis to conclude NJM had a duty to defend or indemnify 74 Industries against plaintiff's intenti onal wrong claims made in the27 A- 2643

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Law Division fourth-amended complaint by virtue of NJM's settlement recommendation in the workers' compensation court o r on any other basis

. Affirmed.