REF ID:A66348 ·-· ............. -............ -... . . . . .. . 

DISPOSITION FORM 

fll£ HO. 

TO COivl' 

PROD 

CGiiSEC 

R/D 

SEC 

TNG 

SUBJECT 

MSA Lecture and Policy Statement 

FROM P P DATE 2 Oat. 1954 COMMENT N0.1 

~'.njor Dean, P/P, o06o5/Jl 

1. Inclosed is a draft co11y of' a lecture to be given by Captain Holtwick1 USN, 

Special Assistant, on 17 November 1954 at the Armed Forces Staff ColleBe, Norfolk, 

Virginia. In addition to this text, thirty-six photographic slides will be shown 

as visual aids to the lecturer. A second inclosure is a proposed draf't of the 

Director's l~cture policy to be issued by the Chief of Staff. 

2. It is requested that you review that portion of the lecture text, pertaining to your function, for accuracy and expression and review the proposed lecture 

policy. Any additional observations and s~estions which you may have regardins 

the entire presentation are also solicited. 

3. It is requested that all copies be returned. with comments pr'ior to 

29 October 1954.. 

Incl: 

a/s 

4. Downcraded to CONFIDENTIAL when inclosures are removed. 

~tfl~~a i J. DAVIS 71': olone:i, Arty 

TOP SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-23-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

DD FOIM 9 6 REPLACES MME. FORM M, \OCT ti. WlllCH MAY IE USE.II. I FEB 110 
It is a ple~sure to :prer;ent to you a ·orief outline of the organization, 

functions e.nd rcsponsibilit:l.cs of' the I\a.tional Security A~ency and its place 

in the National structureo The Directcrp NSAp wiahea me to·extend his warmest 

recards and to e:xiireas the hope that this presentation. w:!.11 serve, in a small 

wo.y, to inform you of the internR~ workinr,s of this ;.mique source of intellicence 

information. 

Alth~h the clRssification of this lec~\L"'e is TO~ SECRET, the pest or 

»reaent ouaaQD~e~ or failurQ~ in th~ f~sli of Conmw.nioat~ons IntelliGence 

cannot 'bQ 6.tmou!ilGQtl.1 ii\nd shoul.d not fci-r,, tbs °h&Qi~ fo:r qU9Et1onc, Thia 

limitation alwa1s hao baen obme:rved due to the vulnerabilit1 of th:ta effort 

to aarelaaa or intentional 41Gclooures. :Kncwledae that one•n communiaationa 

are 'beina rea4 by the anem,y laods to swift and drastic chanaen which 111111 au11if7' 

montha or ev~n rearo of pQ1nntak1na work, In recoan1tion of thin clanger, the 

1rea!4ent ot the United States approved an Aat on 13 )187 19501 referred to a1 

Beat1on 7981 'l'1tle 18, u.s. Code,, which wru1 9:oactod "to cllhanae ful'ther the 

11ourit7 ot the United States by preventina discloEureo of 1nfo:rmat1on aoaaerniDI 

the ar:yptographia e7otema and the ccnirnunic~t1onm 1ntell1cence nativities ot tbe 

t7n1te4 States", For these reasons, this presentation w1J+ be somewhat 11mite41 

'but, it 11 1nta114ecl to cleracr1be the NBA ort;anhat:Lon, f'unction1, respona:l'b1lit1eli 

and relationships as co~letely as pos~ible within the time allotted, 

'l'he :Hatiozial Becurit:y Asenc1 1r;i conce:rned with two ma~or efforta, name~, 

1Jonm.miaation1 intel11sanae and comrrn.micattozu:i oocur1t;r, In aMition, it 

operatea it1 awn research and cl.evolopment function :Ln aupport of both communiaation1 

intelligence and aeaurity, To avoid coni'us1on, we shall cona14ar oommunicat1on1 

intelli19naa tir1t an4 the other eubJeatsin order, 

TOP SECRET 
Befo~e ~ro~eedllll);!t is itl]!ortant that we haves common underetand.ing 

cf the na~t:re or comnr..mications intelligence and the nlSa.ning o~ se'lrerel 

relatad. terrnso 

CH.ART fJl 

W~:~'h t~is b:rf.ei' description of COMII'lT» \.!'e will r.ow ~onsiie:- t'he 

orge.ni2:e.·~:'!.oc.o functions a.nd. responsibilities of tl:e m~.tio:na: CCMINT efforto 

CHART ff-2 

In O~tc'be:r 1952.P the PresiG.ent :recognized the Un:;.:i;ed. States cc:l1111ru:Cice·J;:'1.or:.15 

e~tiv~~ies sa e natior.a.l responsibility a~d designated the Sec~eta.r~es of 

State a.ncl. Defense as a Special Cor.nittee of ·cha !fational Seclr'ity Council for 

COMI:NTo lie C.irected this S1,ecial Committee[) with the assistance of ·~he D1~ac·~mo 

to kea:P the Pz-edC:.e::it advis·ad of suc~1 policies tarou.g"n "G'he Exacrl5:ve Sacret&ry' 

o~ t~e ~SCo T:.~e P:reeiier.t furtne~ designs.te~ the Deps.rtmer.t of Dafsnse as 

Executive A.~ant of the Gover::unent.o fo~ the p~oductio::i of ~0~1INT i:!tfo:rmation, 

anC. 6.i:re~ted the estab::i.iahlr.ent of the Ne.tionsl Secu:"ity Aae::ieyo :!l accordance 

wit~ this ~~ection; Secu:ity Council Intelli~ence Directive Noo 90 Revised, was 

pi:.blie~s~ i::i Decamoer 1952, In this doc·.l.!!lent[) tne Special Ccmm!.ttee provided 

"!or ms.ey c~e.x:ges i::i the CONINT struct1.<re includinc tha reconstit'l:..t:::.on of <v'.b.e 

Unitea St~tes CoillI!r.:mications Intelli~ence Board (USCIB)o 

'USC!B was first esta~olished in July 1948.? S'l.4.persed.int; the S'cate.? A...-,omy 6:Cd 

Ne.vy COiCJIYT Bca.rlc As Teconstituted on 28 I-Iove:l!ioar 19520 it :'1..s !?. bcdy o.cting 

fol" si:d. \Z'!lear ·l:;he IIBC Special Col"'U11i ttee o Mem·oersiiip includes: 'l"ne Director / 

Cl..~,, i-:.l':'l·~ is tile permsnent Cha.:1.rne.nJ> without vote 0 the Director.o NS.A..? and one 

represec.ts.tive each from State_, TlefenPr-?_, FBI.P Arrry0 m::wy.si Air Force e.nd CIA. 

TOP SECRET 
~r i/f"0, 

\'.!I ~d0T~ ~ 

• "i\l: ~ 4V~ -f.-...... - ~ _.~,, -· --!'-- L.. - ~ -

USCIB advises and makes rcconnnendations to the Secretary of Defense on COMO~ 

matters fallin~ under the Jurisdiction of the Director, NSA. On matters not 

under the Jurisdiction of NSA, USCIB: 

(1) Coordinates the COMnrr activities of all departments and agencies, 

(2) Considers and recol'!ll!'~nds COMil:iT ~c~icies of common interest, 

includinc security st~ndards and practices, and 

(3) Investigates and studies the standards and practices of departments 

and ac;encies in the use and protection of COMDIT information. 

USCIB decisions are bindinc on the Secretary of Defense and all 

other departments and acencieso 

The National Security Acency (USA) was established in October 1952 by the 

Secretary of Defense to provide an effective, unified oreanization and control 

of u.s. COMim' activities. It is a successor to the Armed Forces Security Agency 

(AFSA) established by the Secretary of Defense 1~ Y.e.y 1949. AFSA was established 

to coordinate the Service COMnrr efforts. NSA,., or.. the other hand, is an integration 

of activities formerly carried on by the A.,.-rrry,., Navy, and Air Force, and was 

established to achieve greater efficiencyG ecor.OJl!tY', and effectiveness in the 

conduct of these sensitive operationso 

Basic COMINT policies and procedures were promulff8ted by the national Securit7 

Council Intelliaence Directive lro. 9, Rav:i.ee6.;1 of December 19521 familiarly known 

aa BSCm No. g, Detailed COMIIfr responsibilities of the Director, NBA, and the 

Military Departments were set forth in a Secretary of Defense Memo of December 1952 

entitled Implementation of l-TSCID Noa 9a 
' 'fOP SBeRB'l' 

Responsibilities of the Director; NSA~ in~l~de~ 

CHART #3 

CHART /f2 

In B'Wll!ll8ry1 COMINT is a Nations: reapo::iaibi::..H;y~ The NSC Special 

Committee establishes basic COMIJ:.i"T policies and advisee the President 

concerning them. Under the Special Conun1ttee1 USC!B advises the Secretary 

of Defense on COMINT under the Jurisdiction of NSA, On COMINT matters not 

under NSA Jurisdiction, USCIB'coordinates activities, recommends policies 

and investicatee Security standards and practices. The Department of Defense 

is the Executive A~ent for COMINT activit~eso Unde~ the Secretary of Defense 

and in accordance with USCIB policies, the Direc~or, NSA, operationally and 

technically controls all u.s. COM.I?JT faci:itiesQ 

To effect this control, the Director has level~ed a unique o~ganization 

which is an integrated rather than a joint entityo All personnel, Ar'1113'1 Navy, 

Air Force, and civilian, are fused intc a composite unit under the direction 

and contro~ of the Director who is a career commissioned officer of the armed 

services, appointed by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the JCS. 

He serves for ~ minimum of 4 years, is eligible fcT raappointment1 an~ e~~oys 

at least 3-star rank during his incumbency. 

The Agency organization includes: a Directorate, a Ste.ff, an Operating 

level and several Field Activities. 

NBA is a line and staff orcanization. The Director exercises direct line 

control to the operating elements. The Staff pz-ovides guidance on specialised 

matters and thereby provides background info~~ion for the Director's decisions. 

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TOP SECRET 
These dr:icisions ::l.re the b~uds for instructions to 1;he operatinc; elements. 

Procedures for implementinc; the instructions are formed by the Staff 1 usually 

in coordination with the Operatini:; elen1entA o The Chiefs of Sta.ff' elements 

are responsible for fttrnishin~ the function&l ~id.ance ~equired. The principles 

of the opera.tine; elements a.re res);Joni;iblc for the a11plication of the functional 

guidance which they receive. 

CHART 71~4b 

NSA Field Activities a.re located in: (see chart). The Chiefs of these 

activities are charced, as perso11al re1>reeentatives of the Director, (see chart). 

·Military personnel requirements of NSA sre met by the Services within the 

allotment set by the Secretary of Defense for each Service., Presently em.ployed 

at NSA are: 

CHART /f5 

Totals by Service and erade are as follows: 

CHART .'.'6 ,, 

The nwnbers of personnel enGaced within the major subdivisions of the 

organization are: 

CHART .f!:6b .r 

The relationships of NSA to the Services and their COMINT Agencies are 

portrayed on this chart: 

CHART f/-1 

The chain of command stems from the Secretary of Defense tbrouah the 

Departments and Agencies to the Operatinc; Eleme:ite. Operational and Technical 

control is exercised by the Director, NSA, over the Service COMilrr Activities. 

-5-

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Totals of personnel, intercept positions and stations throughout the 

· world that are engaged in COMI!~ activities are aiven below: (on Chart 7) • 

The objective. of this far-flung COMiln' organization is to satisfy the 

intelligence requirements of the consumer within its capabilities. These 

requirements are levied and met in several ways. A list of National 

intelligence requirements in order of priority is prepared by the USCIB 

Intelligence Committee and forwarded to NSA with the approval of the Board. 

This list is modified, as necessary, to fit-the peculiar capabilities of the 

COMINT activity. Upon receipt, lrSA translates these requirements into COMINT 

targets for assignment to the various field units throughout the world. 

CHART #--8 

COMINT intelligence requirements of Field Commanders are satisfied in 

the field in two ways, namely, Close-Support and Cross-Sel"\'icing. Close.-

Support is that support provided to a military commander in satisfaction of 

the immediate operational requirements of combat forces under his command for 

C01'IINT information reli:Ltive to foreign forces directly opposing or of direct 

tactical ~onc.ern to the comr.1a.nder. llhen the need tor close support is justified 

and made known, the Director may delegate operational cont~ol to a subordinate 

COMINT unit tor close support or a designated commander. Technical control 

including methods, operational procedures, etc. of these unite remains·with the 

Director. 

Cross-Servicing is the means whereby the needs of one COMINT consumer tllAY' 

be satisfied by another department or agency participatin' in the National 

COMINT effort. 

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TOP SECRET 
Thus, a cc;mmiander may levy a requirernent on any COliIIIrr unit tor information 

being produced by that unit, instead of bein~ limited to the COMINr resources 

of, his own Service. In this manner, an Army Co:rnrna.nder in the field and a Navy 

Commander operating in adjacent waters ce.n receive required Air Force-produced 

COMINT at the same time it is given to Air Force Commanders in the area. 

CHART #9 

As a result ot these arrangement, COMUn' inf'orr.ia.tion flows to the consumer 

Whether at a National level or in the field, with the least possible clela;y. 

In order to accomplish these tasks, thousands of hi:jbly skilled personnel 

·ana costly equipment are strategically placed throughout the world. This vast 

network requires the ultimate in communications to insure that the product is 

delivered in the shortest possible time. Some idea of the masnitude at this 

operation can be gained from the tollowinc statistics: 

CHART /}10 

CHART .1t11 

CHART ~12 CliARTJ13 

:But, COMINT operations are only part, albeit an important one, of the NSA 

responsibilities. In addition to COMDfr operations, NSA also has responsibilities 

and functions in the field ot Co:m.nn.lJlications Security, or COMSEC. 

CHART 1/:14 

COMSEC may be defined as: 

CHART /Jl5 

As shown on the chart, NSA administers its assisned responsibilities under 

\ 

the direction of the Secretary of Defense and is guided by the po~icies of the USCSB. 

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TOP SECRET 
I 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NSA res:ponstbilities were estnbl:l.shed by the NSC in :i.ts Directive No. 168 o:f' 

October 1953• This direc·tivc, restated provisions of a previous Presidential 

Directive and p"t"omulgated new prov1.sions • 

CHART /f 16 

As constituted by the Special Committee of the NSC, USCSB is composed of' 

one representative from each of the following: 

CHART #17 ~f'1S_FC!.. 

As Executive Agent for all matters, Defense is directed to: 

CHART 1/:18 

The Director; NSA, acts for the Executive Agent in the fields\ of' crypto. 

security, transmission security, physicl'\l security and cover and deception. 

It is his responsibility to: 

CHART- {#!I" 

In addition to these national responsibil~ties, the Director has been 

assigned international COMSEC responsibilities ·in S'1PPOrt ~'. N~~. 

CHART {/:20 

As shown on the chart, the NATO Communications-Electronics Coordinating 

Section (CECS) is responsible to the Standing Group tor the production, 

4istr1but1on, accounting and securitY: ot NATO cryptomateriel. CECS bas 

f In 19531 the Secretary 

of' Defense designated I 

' 

~ 

NSA furni~hes two members to the CECS · CO'.MSEC Panel which performs 

' 

COMSEC planning and coordinates activities in the safeguarding of NATO cryptomateriel. 

TOP SE8CRET 
In implementation of his CONSEC res;ronsibilities, the Director produces 

and distributes COMSEC materials througho~t the world. !n the interest of 

speed, econoIIG", and flexibility of operation, present production and distribut~on 

of COMSEC materials are dispersed among the following locations: 

' 

CHART f/:21 

In anticipation of COMSEC requirements during a possible emergency, it 

is planned to further extend this dispersion to the follow!ng points= 

CHART /t2'J.. 

Some appreciation of the magnitude of the COMSEC ~ctions and responsibilitie~ ,' 

can be gained from the following statistics: 

CHART~·#22 

Because of the peculiar requirements of COMINT and COMSEC, the USC bas 

authorized and directed the Director, NSA, to conduct an USA Research and 

Developmen1; program. 

Within NSA, the Office of Research and Development implements all programs 

for research and development of cry;pt~logic.equipment and me~hods. The ci~lian 

head of R/D is a Deputy Director of NSA and is accountable to the ~ector for 

the fulfillment of the R/D function. 

R/D at NSA is organized in support of major cryptologic operational I 

functions. Included among its various 'conu>onents are: 

CHART 1/:23 

The cost of these R/D _activities is represented by the following: 

CHART 1/:24 

USA maintains many and devious channels for the administrative support ot 

its operations. The Director is authorized to make requests of the JCS, the 

Military Departments, and other governmental agencies and ac~ivities for information 

_ and assistance which he requires. 

TOP SE{JRET 
Accordin~ly, to obtain certain Service loaistic support of its operation, 

NSA prepares and sends a detailed list or all required items to the appropriate 

Service. Dollar cost is not included. The Service includes these items in its 

own budget. A similar procedure is followed ~n requisitioning certain items, 

from other governmental a~encies. All other operating costs, of NSA, are 

prepared and submitted in the i'oll.owina manner. Each HSA element prepares and 

I 

forwards a cost estimate to the NSA Program and Budget Advisors. With the 

advice of this body", the Director reviews and approves an unclassified budget 

estimate and forwards it to the f\rrro' in two sections, namely, R/D and Maintemnce 

and Operations. The Army includes these estimstes in its own budget. NSA then 

prepares a detailed classified budcet coverinc the same material for the approval 

of the Secretary oi' Defense. By thie procedure, NSA justifies that part of the 

Army budcet pertaining to USA support. Upon Defense approval, NSA still must 

justify its budaet before Concress when that body considers the Military estimates 

tor the new Fiscal Year. All USA r.ionies, which are made available by Cobgress, 

are funded to NSA through the An;ry Sic:nal Corps. Throughout this procedure, ISA 

controls its.funds at all times. 

I 

A similar procedure is followed in the case of NSA civilian personnel. 

All NSA civilians are accounted for by the Arrrt:f and not identified with NSA. 

For thie p'U;l'pose, NSA rerorts its civilian employee status periodically to the 

Army. 

NSA commun~cations ~ink require~ents are submitted to the Director, 

Communicattons Electron~cs who levies the Services as appropriate. These 

requirementP inelude sucb ~ta as: a list of' required terminals, estimated 

t~afi'ic loads, etc. 

-10-

T OP SECRET 
'JJOP SEORB'f T 0 J>RES F?G'P!ET ' 

The establishment of the many COMDn' overseas stations involves the 

negotiations of Bas~ Rights with the various foreian governments concerned. 

In addition to the requirements submitted by the separate services, NSA 

submits a COMD'1T base requirements H.st annually to Defense (OSD) with an 

information copy to the DCE. 'l'hese requirements correspond to the MSA Intercept 

Installation Deployment Plan and are coordinated informally with the Service 

Cryptologic A,aencies. .A:rter approval, Defense passes the list to the JCS. ~ 

The JCS forward the list at the JCS Executive Agent, who prepares implementing 

' . papers for review by State. State fo~rards the requirements to the Chief' of' 

Mission in the Nation concerned for preliminary negotiations to obtain agreement 

in principal and to designate national ne6otiators. 

After agreement in principal has been reached, the Chief' of Mission delesates 

the detailed negotiations to the JCS Area Commander. The Comnand negotiators are 

assisted by an,NSA technical advisor and, when appropriate, by advisors from the 

Service Cryptologic A~ncy concerned. '' , " ·~ ~-

As previously stated, NSA Field Activities have been established at various .~ I 

points thro~hout the world. This action vas accomplished with the api)roval of , 

the several Defense Executive Agents as requested by the Director, NSA. Logistic 

sup.Port of these activities is furnished by the appropriate Sel"V'ice Commanders 

at the direction of the Area Executive Agent. 

1

.l'he requirements for intercept positions and processing facilities are 

levied by USA on the Services in .its Intercept Deployment Plan. These intercePt ·'··~P 

requirements are prepared by the USA Operatin~ element and reflect consumer 

intelligence requirenents. u.s. Intercept Requirements were submitted to the 

Secretary of Defense for approval. Upon arproval, these requirements were forwarded to; 

the serlrice cryptologic a~cneies by NS.~ for impleMentation under the Intercept 

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T OP SECRET 
T 0 im:s FJC*P:e-T 

Deployment Plan. Subsequent changes are f'orwarded to the .Serv'ice concerned 

tor implementation. 

Operational and technical control of u.s. CCJ.-IINT :f'aci·lit1ea 1s exercised. 

\ I 

b;y the Director, NSA, either directly to the field units or through the Chief 

ot the Agenc;y concerned. Tec~nical Control a~ Routine ~erational Control 

instructions are aent 41rectl;y to the field unit concerned• 'l'heae instructions·· 

inclua.e auch things as: terohniques, met?lods and procedures used in intercept 

and analys18J task assigmnenta, and the routi~e employment ot personnel and 

facilities. Non-routine instructions are sent directl;y to the Chief' of the 

COMDT Agency concerned for implementation. These instructions include task 

assignments and operational instruct~ons requiring administrative or losistical 

action beyond mere employment of personnel and facilities available and rea~. 

for use and task assignments involving a Njor change of' effort. 

A great deal of internal and external coordination and planning in the 

cryptologic ettort is accomplished throu~ a wide variety· or Boards, Panels 

and Committees. A fw or these are: 

CHART #25 

.~6 

:/121 

'.f-28 

fi

~9 

130 

r 1 

1/:32 

{/:33 

All NSA domestic activities Which have been outlined are conducted in 

Washington at the U.S. Army Arlington Hall Station and at the ?rs\ral Security 

Station. The present facilities have served. their purpose during the years of 

NSA growth and development but are. now inadequate. The need for additional space, 

TOP SPi~CRET 
disper1ion of governmental activities, and unification of NBA elementa under 

one roof' maae a move neceaaary. Accordingly, the NSA organisation will mof'e 

into nri quarters at Port Meade, Maryland. The initial D.W"e will be •de in 

January, 19551 and the final move in· the fall of i95G. 

The new aite ot approximately 200 acres will include an operations 

bu:ll.d1ng1 'J30Q•s and troop housing. 

CHART 7/:34 

The operatio~s building is represented here by the architects 4raw1q. 

It v:l.11 cost: ·;,, 

CHART r//:35 

CHART {}36 

(read stat1st1os) 

:tn aU.S.tS.n to the operations 'bu1141ng, several 500 nan bar.racks a.net I 

IQQ' 1 rill 'be JNYi&el 'bo 00191ete~ bouae the RSA Semoe :pe:rsozmel aid ·a 

Wl\eft7 louins JI04et1' i1 .tieing Jlorme4 to aceommo4ate ISA tam111ee, 

COICttmmG STA~ 
... 

POLICY ON LBCTURES 

< 'I 

l. Recently the Director approved in concept the request ot the 

Commandant Armed Forces Staff COllege, Morfolk, Virginia for an NSA 

presentation which would be broader in scope than past presentations. 

Plans and Poliey in coordination with Trainin~ and other activities will 

assenible material including visual aids and narrative suitable for use 

in this presentation. It is anticipated that similar or identical 

presentations maybe requirea annually at th~ National War College and 

the Service War College1. Senior officials of the agency will be selected 

to deliver the NSA presentation at these schools. This memorandum is 

intended as a guide to assist the NSA representative who is responsible 

for a particular prese~tation. 

2. Lecturers should avoid mentioning and attempt to suppress 

interrogation along the following specific lines: 

a. COMINT Successes (Past, Present and Future): The urge to 

advertise lVSA by reference to past COMINT successes may have great appeal. 

This practice must be avoided on the 8I"Ounds of security. In addition, it ... 

is normally considered bad taste for a lecturer to· overtly com;pliment the 

agency.which be represents. The .approved presentation material will contain 

a security limi~ation statement which will explain why discussion of successes 

must be avoided. If' the subJect is introduced by the audience it is suggested \ 

that they be reminded of this security statement and then be referred to such 

standard library references as "The :Black Chamber", "The Pearl Harbor Report", 

and "War in the Ether." Extracts from thes~ references should not be quoted 

and their content should not be. evaluated. 

TOP SECRET 
b. UKUSA Third Parties, etc. Any discussion of UKUSA relations 

and other foreign liaison activity, should be avoided. While this does 

not constitute a codeword security violation, it does exceed the need to 

know of the audience end could easily lead to misunderstanding, i.e., we 

trade secrets with foreign nationals which we withhold generally from 

US officials. Questions along this line should be parried by the admission 

l"';\ ~.p~~ ·. 

that in some cases we arrance for the procurement of traffic which is 

intercepted by other than US sources. 

c. Cle&rance, indoctr,.nation and COMINT Service: In the services 

the determination of who is to receive CO~o:NT items is a command responsibility. 

Any reference to means, the purpose, or to whom the var~ous services provide I 

access to COMINT is not an appropriate subject for comment by NSA representatives. 

Queries along this line should be answered by referring the individual to his 

own service channels and notifyin~ him that when a genuine need to know exists, 

the individual must be cleared and indoctrinated before the COMilfl' material 

can be provided to him •. 

,,,. :;:'" ~"' 

d. Poly61"aph: The use of the po~ygl"aph by MSA has been the subJect 

ot considerab~~ criticism and adverse publicity tor the agency. Direct ~ 

.. ';i..~_;!t~'i .-

discussion should be avoided. It it cannot be avoided, the lecturer should ~ . 'lr-=~ 

emphasize two main points. First, NSA is doing all within its power to use 

the~e machines intelligentl;yi and without embarrasement to its employees. 

Second, the machines, together with National Agency Checks, provide a valuable 

economical, and reliable means for clearing new employees on a temporary basi,., 

p~1or to the ~QDIRletion of :f'Ull backcround investigations. J 

TOP SECRET 

.. 
e. ELD~: 1'TSA's charter does not cover electronicn intellicence 

activities. We do liaison with cleared :l.ndividuals of the proper ELil1T 

activities (usually ANEEG) particularly when unidentified signals (those 

which r.ay be communications or Electronic in nature) ore beina investigated .• 

A question may be pointed at the alleae.tion that NSA is actively seeking 

responsibility for and/or control of ELINT as part of its missions and 

functions. This alle1Stion should be directly and summarily denied. 

t. International' COMSEC: NSA activities in support of NATO, SHAPE, 

DACLANT, etc., may be discuseed. Foreian requests for specific COMSEC aid 

should not be discussed. Specific interroptions at this nature will best 

be countered by denying personal knowledge of any such negotiations • 

• 

~OP SECRET