alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11023

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MEHEF BEY, 

a.k.a. Arthur L. Daniels, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cr-00063-PGB-GJK-2

USCA11 Case: 22-11023 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 1 of 2
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11023

____________________

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

H. Manuel Hernández, appointed counsel for Mehef Bey in 

this direct appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the entire 

record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the 

appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire 

record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to 

withdraw is GRANTED, and Bey’s convictions and sentences are

AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 22-11023 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 02/28/2023 Page: 2 of 2
# STATEOFLOUISIANA

COURTOFAPPEAL,FIRSTCIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS DEON TREMELL LEE NO. 

### 2021 KW 1593 FEBRUARY 25, 2022 In Re: Deon Tremell Lee, 

## applying for supervisorywrits, 19th

Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 

### 09-97- 0459. BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., PENZATO AND HESTER, JJ.

WRIT DENIED. The East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk of 

### Court has 

## no record of having received a Petition 

### for Writ of 

### Habeas Corpus ( 

### allegedly 

### filed on December 

### 10, 2021). Relator should file the motion with the 

### district court 

### before seeking relief 

### from this court. VGW AHP CHH

COURTOFAPPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

DEPUT CLERK OF COURT

FOR THE COURT
Allocation Large Season

Group YEARMADE WINTER SUMMER WINTER SUMMER WINTER SUMMER Division State Alloc Grp

1 1,2 7% 93% 97% 3% 88% 12% 1 1

3 thru 6 7% 93% 98% 2% 89% 11% 2 2

7,8 6% 94% 98% 2% 89% 11% 3 3

9 thru 16 6% 94% 98% 2% 87% 13% 4 4

2 1,2 8% 92% 99% 1% 85% 15% 50 5

3 thru 6 8% 92% 99% 1% 86% 14% 54 6

7,8 5% 95% 99% 1% 83% 17% 6 7

9 thru 16 4% 96% 99% 1% 84% 16% 73 8

3 1,2 9% 91% 98% 2% 86% 14% 70 9

3 thru 6 9% 91% 99% 1% 89% 11% 8 10

7,8 9% 91% 99% 1% 87% 13% 9 0 11

9 thru 16 10% 90% 99% 1% 84% 16% 9 2 12

4 1,2 15% 85% 98% 2% 73% 27% 

3 thru 6 14% 86% 99% 1% 74% 26% 

7,8 12% 88% 99% 1% 72% 28% 

9 thru 16 12% 88% 99% 1% 67% 33% 

5 1,2 16% 84% 99% 1% 78% 22% 

3 thru 6 16% 84% 99% 1% 79% 21% 

7,8 12% 88% 99% 1% 73% 27% 

9 thru 16 11% 89% 99% 1% 75% 25% 

6 1,2 46% 54% 100% 0% 50% 50% 

3 thru 6 44% 56% 100% 0% 47% 53% 

7,8 44% 56% 100% 0% 45% 55% 

9 thru 16 44% 56% 100% 0% 45% 55% 

7 1,2 21% 79% 99% 1% 72% 28% 

3 thru 6 17% 83% 100% 0% 74% 26% 

7,8 17% 83% 100% 0% 62% 38% 

9 thru 16 16% 84% 100% 0% 62% 38% 

8 1,2 18% 82% 100% 0% 56% 44% 

3 thru 6 15% 85% 100% 0% 54% 46% 

7,8 14% 86% 100% 0% 50% 50% 

9 thru 16 13% 87% 100% 0% 52% 48% 

9 1,2 32% 68% 99% 1% 55% 45% 

3 thru 6 29% 71% 99% 1% 52% 48% 

7,8 26% 74% 99% 1% 47% 53% 

9 thru 16 25% 75% 99% 1% 48% 52% 

10 1,2 29% 71% 100% 0% 45% 55% 

3 thru 6 23% 77% 100% 0% 36% 64% 

7,8 20% 80% 100% 0% 32% 68% 

9 thru 16 20% 80% 100% 0% 32% 68% 

11 1,2 2% 98% 90% 10% 87% 13% 

3 thru 6 2% 98% 91% 9% 89% 11% 

7,8 2% 98% 93% 7% 88% 12% 

9 thru 16 1% 99% 93% 7% 89% 11% 

12 1,2 29% 71% 93% 7% 80% 20% 

3 thru 6 34% 66% 93% 7% 84% 16% 

7,8 42% 58% 92% 8% 81% 19% 

9 thru 16 44% 56% 92% 8% 82% 18% 

Seasonal Allocation Factors

Cooling Only Heating Only Heating & Cooling
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN THE QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                          81,800
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,244,100
<ALLOWANCES>                                   497,300
<INVENTORY>                                    867,600
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,695,300
<PP&E>                                       2,339,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,036,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,818,300
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,092,900
<BONDS>                                        600,000
<COMMON>                                       387,200
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     673,400
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,818,300
<SALES>                                      6,509,300
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,545,100
<CGS>                                        4,659,700
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,659,700
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               389,500
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                32,400
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              60,300
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,465,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,465,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,465,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.43)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.43)
        

</TABLE>
THE JACKSONVILLE BANK,

Appellant,

v.

THOMAS D. DEAN and STACIA 

DEAN, husband and wife,

Appellees.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-609

_____________________________/

Opinion filed November 10, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Tyrie W. Boyer, Judge.

Matthew T. Jackson and Alessandro T. Apolito of Brennan, Manna & Diamond, 

P.L., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Eric N. McKay, Jacksonville Beach, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, RAY, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
# C_2014328EN.01000101.xml

| 20.9.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 328/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.9.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 328/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7303 — PTTGC/Vencorex)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2014/C 328/01

On 29 July 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in the English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7303. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7303. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
98-2383.

#### State ex rel. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. W. Geauga Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

Geauga App. Nos. 97-G-2066 and 97-G-2067. On motion to strike State Teachers Retirement Board’s *1417merit brief and amended merit brief by Hawken School. Motion denied.

Moyer, C.J., and Cook, J., dissent.
#### Maud A. Robinson, as Public Welfare Officer of the Town of Oyster Bay, Nassau County, N. Y., Plaintiff, v. Milton W. Connor, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Trial Term, Nassau County,

November 20, 1937.

*Charles I.*Wood, for the plaintiff.

*Mary B. Moloney,*special guardian, for the defendant.

Cuff, J.

Defendant, an insane person confined in an insane asylum, who has assets, is sought to be held by the town welfare officer for moneys expended upon the insane person’s mother, who applied for, was found eligible to receive, and actually did receive financial aid (relief) during her lifetime and was buried out of public funds. Defendant has had no committee appointed, but an attorney appears for him. There is no doubt that a son is responsible for the maintenance and burial of his mother under the circumstances presented here. But section 128 of the Public Welfare Law, which fixes that responsibility, concludes with this sentence: “ Any public relief received by such person shall constitute an implied contract.” An insane person cannot make a contract. An *“*implied contract,” of course, is a contract. An insane person cannot, merely by his condition, avoid the statutory obligations imposed upon all persons if he has the means to provide support for those dependent upon him. The lack of capacity to consent is the main reason why an insane person cannot enter into a con*407tract. Under circumstances of this nature consent is not required. The law has dispensed with the necessity of giving consent and mandatorily fixes the responsibility upon all persons alike. The defendant herein is responsible and section 128 above has application in this case. There is no defense to this suit. Summary judgment is granted.
#### STATE ex rel., HOLMES *vs.*BAIRD.

ALTERNATIVE WRIT *OF*MANDAMUS.

Heard August 2, 1859.]

[Decided May 9, 1860.

*Mandamus.*

Where a party altogether neglects, or refuses to make return to an alternative writ of mandamus, the relator is not therefore entitled to a peremptory writ, but ho must proceed to enforce a return to the writ.

*261The facts in this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion by the court.

*J. E.*Holmes, in person for the relation.

*By the Court,*

Cole, J.

An alternative writ of mandamus was granted in this case in July, 1858, requiring the respondent to remove and keep his office of county judge, and the books, papers and records of his office, at the county seat of Jefferson county. The alternative writ was personally served on the 16th of that'month. No return having been made to the alternative writ, the relator at the last term made a motion 'for a peremptory writ upon his relation. This motion must be denied. When a party altogether neglects or refuses to make return to an alternative writ of mandamus, the moving party is not necessarily entitled to a peremptory writ upon his relation, but in such a case steps should be taken to enforce a return. Tapping, in his work on Mandamus, side paging, 345, vol. 74, Law Library, states the English practice to enforce a return. He says that it is the duty of the defendant upon whom the writ of mandamus has been per-personally served, to return and file it with his return, on or before the return day in such writ mentioned, or before the expiration of any further time the court may, on application for that purpose, have allowed him; and that, if he neglects his duty in this respect, the practice has. always been for the prosecutor to obtain a rule upon the respondent to return the writ. A-return not having been made and filed in this case according to the exigency of the writ, the relator should proceed to enforce a return instead of applying for a peremptory writ. This appears to be the correct practice as laid down by the authorities, and at all events, it is the practice recognized and established by section 1, chapter 159, R. S., 1859, upon this subject.

The motion therefore for a peremptory writ is overruled.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-16-00520-CV

Alexander MOLINA and Laura Molina,

Appellants

v.

STONEGATE MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CV03741

Honorable Jason Wolff, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 23, 2016

DISMISSED AS MOOT

Appellants Alexander Molina and Laura Molina attempt to appeal from a judgment 

awarding possession of real property at 7522 Stagecoach Drive, San Antonio, Texas to Appellee 

Stonegate Mortgage Corporation which bought the property at a foreclosure sale and then filed a 

forcible detainer action in the justice of the peace court to have Appellants evicted. That court 

ordered the eviction, and upon Appellants’ appeal de novo, the county court at law likewise 

ordered the eviction. The Molinas timely appealed.
04-16-00520-CV

- 2 -

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the appeal is moot because the writ of 

possession has now been executed and Appellants have no continuing interest in possession of the 

property. We requested that Appellants file a response to the motion to dismiss, but Appellants 

did not respond.

The Supreme Court of Texas has explained,

The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the 

premises.

....

An action for forcible detainer is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive 

means to obtain immediate possession of property. Judgment of possession in a 

forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the 

eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to immediate 

possession.

Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785, 787 (Tex. 2006).

Our review of the record reveals no “potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual 

possession” by Appellants. See id. at 787. Further, our review of the record reveals that the only 

possible claim on appeal they could have in this matter would be the challenge of costs assessed 

against them in the judgment. But the supreme court has held in similar circumstances that an 

issue of costs does not prevent the dismissal of the case as moot. Id. at 790. The supreme court 

explained that “[i]f the trial court’s judgment is vacated as a result of the case being moot, . . . 

either there will be no order assessing costs and each party will be required to pay its own costs . . 

., or the appellate court will tax costs.” Id. 

Because Appellants have been evicted and the record reveals no potentially meritorious 

issue related to possession, and because the issue of costs does not operate to prevent the dismissal 

of the case as moot, we grant Appellee’s motion, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and dismiss 

this appeal as moot. See id. 

PER CURIAM
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-16-00381-CR

EARNEST DEMARK FRAZIER, JR.,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 77th District Court

Limestone County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12331-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Earnest Demark Frazier, Jr., has filed a notice of appeal from the trial 

court’s judgment of conviction against him for indecency with a child by exposure. The 

trial court’s certification of defendant’s right of appeal indicates that Frazier waived his 

right of appeal and that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of 

appeal.” This appeal is therefore dismissed.

1

 See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 

 

1 A motion for rehearing may be filed within 15 days after the judgment or order of this Court is rendered. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.1. If the appellant desires to have the decision of this Court reviewed by filing a 
Frazier v. State Page 2

183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals ... must dismiss a 

prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”); Davis 

v. State, 205 S.W.3d 606, 607 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.).

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed November 23, 2016

Do not publish

[CR25]

 

petition for discretionary review, that petition must be filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals within 30 

days after either the day the court of appeals’ judgment was rendered or the day the last timely motion for 

rehearing was overruled by the court of appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2(a).
MOTION DOCKET

99-1268.

#### State v. Cassano.

Richland C.P. No. 98CR171H. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County. Upon consideration of appellant’s motion for extension of time to transmit the record,

IT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion for extension of time to transmit the record be, and hereby is, granted, and the time for transmitting the record is extended to November 8, 1999. No further extensions will be granted.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL C. SCHER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

CITY OF LAS VEGAS; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16127

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02105-APGCWH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Michael C. Scher appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing 

his action alleging federal claims against numerous individuals and the City of Las 

Vegas arising from court proceedings related to a traffic violation. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-16127 

district court’s decision regarding the sufficiency of service of process. Rio Props., 

Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). We vacate and 

remand.

The district court dismissed Scher’s action without prejudice for failure to

effectuate proper service in compliance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure because Scher only sent the summons and a copy of the complaint via 

certified mail. However, the record shows that Scher also submitted proofs of 

service indicating that the Las Vegas Constable’s Office served all defendants, 

personally or through representatives authorized to accept service of process, 

within the prescribed time. Moreover, in their reply to Scher’s opposition to their 

motion to dismiss, defendants note Scher’s “apparent sufficiency of service upon 

the City of Las Vegas,” but the district court did not reference this in its dismissal 

order, or address whether service effectuated through the Las Vegas Constable’s 

Office was proper with respect to the individual defendants. Thus, we vacate and 

remand for the district court to revisit whether service of process on the City of Las 

Vegas and on the individual defendants was proper. 

Scher’s pending motion is denied.
3 15-16127 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. 

VACATED and REMANDED.
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Sarah Adeline Gesner, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Westchester County,

November 12, 1937.

*253*McCloy & Bravman,*for D’Arcy Parrott, as substituted trustee.

*Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan,*for Fred C. Ehnes, assignee.

Sheils, S.

This is a motion by Fred C. Ehnes, as assignee of a portion of the interest of Charles Irving Stewart, one of the distributees of this estate, for an order granting leave to intervene as a party to this accounting proceeding; for the issuance of a supplemental citation to him, and for permission, if so advised, to file objections to the accounts of proceedings filed by D’Arcy Parrott and William V. Burke, as substituted trustees herein. The application is opposed by D’Arcy Parrott.

On September 10, 1937, Charles Irving Stewart, one of the remaindermen of the trust created under the will of this decedent for Josephine I. Stewart, assigned his interest in this estate to the extent of $67,000 to one Fred C. Ehnes. This assignment was duly recorded in the office of the clerk of this court on September 13, 1937, in liber 9 of Assignments of Interest at page 30. The accounts of D’Arcy Parrott and William Y. Burke are in process of settlement. Objections have been filed thereto by an interested party and these objections have been set down for a hearing for November nineteenth next at ten o’clock a. m.

An assignee is a person interested, as defined by subdivision 10 of section 314 of the Surrogate’s Court Act. An assignee of a legatee’s interest under a will may intervene upon the judicial settlement of an executor’s account as a person interested in the estate. *(Gibbons*v. *Shepard, 2*Dem. 247.)

The application is granted to the extent that the petitioner will be permitted to intervene in the accounting proceedings, and if so advised, to file objections thereto. It is not necessary that a supplemental citation issue to him. He may appear by authorization and notice of appearance pursuant to section 41 of the Surrogate’s Court Act.

Settle order on notice.,/
EXHIBIT 15




CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM




The Board of Directors




On Track Innovations Ltd.:




We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form F-3 (No. 333-111770, No. 333-115953, No. 333-121316, No. 333-127615, No. 333-130324, No. 333-135742, No. 333-142320, No. 333-153667 and No. 333-171507) and in the registration statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-101491, No. 333-116429, No. 333-128106, No. 333-140786 No. 333-149034 No. 333-149575 and No. 333-173075) of On Track Innovations Ltd. of our report dated March 29, 2011, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of On Track Innovations Ltd. and its subsidiaries as of December 31, 2010 and 2009 and the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders’ equity and non controlling interest, comprehensive loss and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2010, which report appears in the December 31, 2010 annual report on Form 20-F of On Track Innovations Ltd.


/s/ Somekh Chaikin


Certified Public Accountants (Isr.)


A Member Firm of KPMG International





Tel Aviv, Israel


March 29, 2011