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APPENDIX

SIDNEY PARKER v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION*

Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland

File No. CV-12-4004958

Memorandum filed February 19, 2015

Proceedings

Memorandum of decision on petitioner’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus. Petition denied.

Cheryl A. Juniewic, for the petitioner.

Kelly A. Masi, senior assistant state’s attorney, for

the respondent.
Opinion

BRIGHT, J.

I

INTRODUCTION

The petitioner, Sidney Parker, brings this petition for

a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel’s

legal representation and advice regarding his decision

to plead guilty under the Alford doctrine was ineffective.1 By way of relief, the petitioner seeks an order

vacating his conviction and allowing him to withdraw

his plea.

In count one of his amended petition, the petitioner

claims that his trial counsel, Attorney Michael Dolan,

was ineffective in that he:(1)failed to adequately advise

the petitioner of the elements of the charges to which

he was pleading guilty; (2) failed to adequately advise

the petitioner as to any defenses and/or mitigating circumstances, including intoxication; (3) failed to advise

the petitioner of the evidence and witnesses the state

would likely rely upon; (4) failed to adequately investigate the petitioner’s case; (5) failed to adequately consult with the petitioner regarding plea negotiations and/

or exercised undue influence over the petitioner during

those negotiations; and (6) failed to negotiate a better

plea deal for the petitioner.2

This court held a trial on the merits of the petition

on September 10, 2014. The petitioner produced three

witnesses, himself, Attorney Dolan, and Dr. Kelly Johnson-Arbor, who testified as to how the petitioner’s mental state was affected by smoking PCP prior to the

events that led to his conviction. The respondent, the

Commissioner of Correction, called two witnesses, Eric

Brown, who testified that the petitioner made incriminating statements to him, and Attorney Terri L. Sonnemann, the assistant state’s attorney who prosecuted the

petitioner and negotiated his plea agreement with Attorney Dolan. The court also received as exhibits the transcripts from the petitioner’s court appearances,

including when he entered his plea and was sentenced,

the court record regarding the petitioner’s criminal

case, and correspondence from the petitioner and

Brown. The petitioner also filed a posttrial brief.

II

FINDINGS OF FACTS

Based on the evidence presented, the court finds the

following facts. On December 20, 2009, the petitioner

was arrested and charged in the judicial district of Litchfield with nine crimes arising from his alleged actions

on the night of December 19 into the early morning

hours of December 20 in Torrington. The charges

included attempted sexual assault in the first degree,

unlawful restraint the first degree, strangulation in the
third degree, assault in the third degree, interfering with

an officer, and four different drug charges.

On August 10, 2010, with his case on the firm jury

list, the petitioner pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to one count of attempt to commit sexual assault

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes

§§ 53a-49 and 53a-70. As set forth by Attorney Sonnemann, had the case gone to trial, the state was prepared

to prove the following facts. ‘‘This event occurred on

or about [December 20, 2009] in the town of Torrington

at about 1:40 in the morning when Torrington police

did receive a 911 call from the complainant’s sister.

. . . And the 911 call contains the complainant’s sister

screaming that the [petitioner] is trying to rape her

sister.

‘‘The complainant did give a statement to the police,

indicated that [the petitioner] had gone to her apartment, they were watching a movie upstairs because

the cable box was broken downstairs. While they were

upstairs, [the petitioner] began to tell the complainant

that he loved her, that she was his soulmate, his Oreo.

He then held her on the bed by her neck and was

trying to remove her pants. There was a struggle. The

complainant’s sister at this point jumps on the [petitioner] to try and get him off of her. She manages to

do that. The complainant flees into a hallway. There is

another struggle at that point involving the complainant’s sister trying to protect the complainant. [The petitioner] manages to get the complainant’s sister off of

him, grabs the complainant’s panties, rips them off, he

strikes the complainant’s sister and pursues the complainant. [The complainant] goes to the neighbor’s. . . .

‘‘The [petitioner] has, at this point, grabbed the complainant again, has her outside against a wall, tries to

rip her shirt and bra off. He strikes the complainant’s

sister again. Finally, the complainant is pleading with

the [petitioner] that he doesn’t need to rape her, please

calm down. He does that. The complainant flees into

an apartment and calls 911 again. Police arrive and the

[petitioner] is taken into custody.’’ Respondent’s Exh.

B, August 10, 2010 transcript, pp. 3–4.

After reciting these facts, Attorney Sonnemann noted

that ‘‘[t]here is some evidence that the [petitioner] was

high on PCP at the time of the alleged offense, but,

nonetheless, the state believes it could have proven this

beyond a reasonable doubt. And the attempted sex,

one, Judge, is a general intent crime.’’ Id., at p. 4.

The court then canvassed the petitioner. During that

canvass, the petitioner acknowledged that: (1) he had

enough time to talk toAttorney Dolan about his decision

to plead guilty; (2) he was satisfied with Attorney

Dolan’s representation; (3) he went over with Attorney

Dolan all of the evidence that could be used against

the petitioner at trial; (4) he went over with Attorney
Dolan the elements of the offense, as well as the maximum and mandatory minimum sentences for the

offense. Id., at pp. 4–5. The petitioner also acknowledged that he would have to register for life as a sex

offender. Id., at p. 5. The petitioner also acknowledged

that his guilty plea was not the product of any threats

or promises. Id., at p. 8.

While the court acknowledged the parties’ agreement

to a sentence of eight years of incarceration, followed

by seven years of special parole, the matter was continued so that the petitioner could coordinate the running

of his sentence with a four year sentence he was going

to receive out of Waterbury on a drug charge and a

violation of probation. By agreement, the sentences on

both cases would run concurrently. Consequently, on

September 3, 2010, the petitioner returned to court to

be sentenced on the sexual assault charge, to which

he had pleaded guilty. Prior to the court’s imposing

sentence, Attorney Sonnemann disclosed to the court

that on the Friday before the petitioner pleaded guilty,

the complainant had been arrested on ‘‘a matter which

could be used by defense counsel for purposes of crossexamination had the matter proceeded to trial.’’ Id.,

September 3, 2010 transcript, p. 3. While the record

reflects that the petitioner may have known of the arrest

prior to entering his guilty plea, Attorney Sonnemann

did not learn of it until after the petitioner pleaded

guilty. In any event, the petitioner was notified on the

record of his right to file a motion to vacate his guilty

plea. He chose instead to be sentenced so that the

sentence in this case and his Waterbury case could

begin running at the same time.3 Pursuant to the parties’

agreement, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to

eight years of incarceration, followed by seven years

of special parole. The state entered nolles on the other

eight counts with which the petitioner was charged.

The petitioner’s plea agreement was the product of

protracted negotiations between Attorney Dolan and

Attorney Sonnemann. The petitioner retained Attorney

Dolan shortly after he was arrested. Attorney Dolan

had previously represented the petitioner on a sexual

assault charge in the judicial district of Waterbury. After

a trial to a jury in that matter, the petitioner was found

not guilty.

After being arrested and before retaining Attorney

Dolan, the petitioner was briefly held on a $250,000

bond. During that time, the petitioner shared a cell with

Brown, who was facing charges in the judicial district

of Waterbury. In late December/early January, Brown

sent a letter to ‘‘Michael—Chris,’’ claiming that the petitioner had made incriminating statements to Brown

about the events in Torrington. Petitioner’s Exh. 3.4

In particular, the letter stated that the petitioner ‘‘told

[Brown] how [the petitioner] attacked the two girls at

the house and what happened.’’ Id. In the letter, Brown
offered his full cooperation if someone would ‘‘put a

word to the prosecutor about getting me the help I

need.’’ Id. Brown testified credibly in this matter about

what the petitioner told him while they were incarcerated together. The petitioner told Brown that he was

with two sisters. The petitioner said that he attacked

one of the sisters and that the other jumped on the

petitioner’s back to try to help her sister. In the process,

one of the sisters had a tooth knocked out. The petitioner told Brown that he attacked the one sister

because he thought one of them had taken some money

or drugs from him. The petitioner also told Brown that

it was snowy and icy the night he was arrested, that

he ran outside with half his clothes, and that the police

tased him. The petitioner also told Brown that he owned

a barber shop and that he owned dogs. There was no

evidence that Brown could have received any of the

foregoing information from anyone other than the petitioner. Furthermore, other evidence established that

the petitioner and Brown discussed their cases with

each other while incarcerated together. The petitioner

acknowledged that he recommended Attorney Dolan

to Brown. He told Brown that Attorney Dolan had previously represented him on the earlier sexual assault

charge on which the petitioner was found not guilty.

Consequently, Brown retained Dolan to represent him

on his pending criminal charges in Waterbury.

The petitioner did eventually post the $250,000 bond

and was released. However, shortly thereafter, the petitioner was incarcerated on the drug and violation of

probation charges out of Waterbury and did not post

bail. On March 16, 2010, the petitioner’s bond was

increased by $100 on his Litchfield case, so that he

could earn pretrial jail credit on that matter.

The evidence established that by May 25, 2010, Attorney Dolan was representing both the petitioner and

Brown. On that date, the state gave Attorney Dolan a

copy of Brown’s letter. Brown showed the petitioner

the letter during a court appearance that day. Concerned that one of his clients was offering to provide

evidence against another client, Attorney Dolan discussed the potential conflict of interest with the petitioner. The petitioner was steadfast in his decision to

keep Attorney Dolan as his counsel for the Litchfield

case. To make that clear, the petitioner executed a

handwritten waiver that Attorney Dolan drafted. Petitioner’s Exh. 2. That waiver, dated May 25, 2010, reads

as follows. ‘‘I am aware of the letter Eric Brown wrote.

I understand this could create a conflict. At this time,

I am waiving the potential conflict. I understand I can

consult a lawyer regarding this issue.’’ Id.

At the time that Attorney Dolan and the petitioner

became aware of Brown’s letter, Attorney Dolan and

Attorney Sonnemann had already been involved in plea

negotiations. The state’s first offer was a sentence of
fifteen years, execution suspended after eight years of

incarceration, followed by twenty years of probation.

The most troubling part of the offer to the petitioner

was the twenty years of probation. Consequently, after

further negotiations with Attorney Sonnemann, Attorney Dolan was able to secure a second offer of eight

years of incarceration, followed by seven years of special parole. By substituting special parole for probation,

the petitioner would only be exposed to incarceration

beyond his initial eight year term for no more than

seven years. In addition, every day of special parole

the petitioner successfully completed would reduce his

exposure to future incarceration by one day. The same

would not be true on probation, where the petitioner

would still be exposed to seven years of incarceration

if he violated his probation any time during the twenty

year probationary period.

At a hearing on June 8, 2010, with the petitioner

present, Attorney Sonnemann informed the court that

the parties had been involved in plea negotiations, an

offer and counteroffer had been made, and that the

state had made a final offer. Respondent’s Exh. B, June

8, 2010 transcript, p. 2. While the transcript from the

hearing does not describe the offer, the recollections of

Attorney Dolan,the petitioner andAttorney Sonnemann

were consistent that the state’s final offer was eight

years, followed by seven years of special parole. Attorney Sonnemann reported that the petitioner wanted

time to considerthe offer, and the matter was continued

to July 7 for the petitioner to accept or reject the offer.

At that hearing, counsel also discussed with the court

the potential conflict Attorney Dolan faced because he

represented both the petitioner and Brown. The trial

court expressed its concerns that if the petitioner’s

matter went to trial Attorney Dolan would have a difficult time cross-examining his other client, Brown. The

court further informed the petitioner that if the case

went to trial, Attorney Dolan would likely have to withdraw from representing him. The petitioner told the

court that he understood the conflict, but wanted to

waive the conflict to allow Attorney Dolan to continue

to represent him through the plea bargaining process.

Attorney Dolan also informed the court that he was

going to immediately withdraw as Brown’s attorney in

his Waterbury case, which he did the next day.

At his next court appearance on July 7, the petitioner

requested additional time to consider the state’s offer.

The state and the court agreed, and the matter was

continued until July 20. The court informed Attorney

Dolan and the petitioner: ‘‘If [the petitioner’s] not going

to accept [the offer], it’s going to be withdrawn. And

then if he has to get a new lawyer, I will give him time.

But that new lawyer is not going to be able to come in

and renegotiate the case. Just so that’s clear.’’ Id., July

7, 2010 transcript, p. 4. The petitioner nodded his under-
standing. Id.

The petitioner next appeared in Litchfield Superior

Court on July 20. After discussing the matter with the

petitioner, Attorney Dolan asked for another continuance to do further investigation. In particular, the petitioner informed Attorney Dolan of a potential

exculpatory witness and that the complaining witness

may have been arrested. Id., July 20, 2010 transcript,

p. 2. The state opposed any continuance to consider

the offer and asked that the matter be placed on the

firm jury list. The court agreed and noted that all offers

were withdrawn. Id., at pp. 2–3. The petitioner then

changed his mind, and decided to accept the state’s

offer. After the petitioner entered a guilty plea under

the Alford doctrine to attempted sexual assault in the

first degree, the court vacated the plea when the petitioner stated during the court’s canvass that he was not

satisfied with Attorney Dolan. Id., at p. 7. The court

placed the case on the firm jury list for September 3.

The petitioner then immediately tried to again plead

guilty, but the court refused to let him do so. Id., at p. 8.

Evidently, the state and the trial court reconsidered

their positions as the petitioner was returned to Litchfield Superior Court on August 10, where he accepted

the state’s offer and entered his plea as set forth in

greater detail previously.5 The petitioner was then sentenced, consistent with the plea agreement, on September 3.

Throughout the plea negotiations, one issue that was

a point of contention was the petitioner’s state of mind

on the night of the incident. Attorney Dolan argued to

Attorney Sonnemann that the petitioner was intoxicated and under the effects of PCP, thereby negating

any intentto commit a sexual assault.Attorney Sonnemann was not persuaded because the evidence showed

that the petitioner had made advances toward the complaining witness and efforts to get together with her

in the days leading up to the assault. In addition, the

petitioner faced a number of other charges, including

four drug charges, as to which his intoxication or PCP

use would not be a defense. Attorney Sonnemann also

knew that the petitioner had twelve prior convictions

between 1993 and 2009, including three for the sale of

narcotics. As a result, on the drug charges alone in

Litchfield, the petitioner faced decades of incarceration

as a subsequent offender. For all of the reasons, the

state was not willing to consider any proposed plea

agreement less severe than the final offer the petitioner accepted.

Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

III

DISCUSSION

It is now well established that ‘‘[a] criminal defendant

is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal

proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668,

686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. This right

arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to

the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of

the Connecticut constitution.’’ Copas v. Commissioner

of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 153, 662 A.2d 718 (1995).

The United States Supreme Court has recently held that

pretrial negotiations implicating the decision whether

to plead guilty is a critical stage in criminal proceedings

for purposes of the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Missouri v. Frye,

U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012);

Lafler v. Cooper, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384,

182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.

356, 373, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). ‘‘In

today’s criminal justice system . . . the negotiation of

a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is

almost always the critical point for a defendant.’’ Missouri v. Frye, supra, 1407. Similarly, ‘‘[o]ur Supreme

Court has recognized that pretrial negotiations implicating the decision of whether to plead guilty is a critical

stage, and, therefore, a defendant is entitled to adequate

and effective assistance of counsel at this juncture of

the criminal proceedings. Copas v. Commissioner of

Correction, [supra, 153].’’ Ebron v. Commissioner of

Correction, 120 Conn. App. 560, 567, 992 A.2d 1200

(2010), rev’d in part on other grounds, 307 Conn. 342,

53 A.3d 983 (2012), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone v.

Ebron, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802

(2013). The decision to plead guilty is ‘‘ordinarily the

most important single decision in any criminal case.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 572. ‘‘During

plea negotiations defendants are entitled to the effective

assistance of competent counsel.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Lafler v. Cooper, supra, 1384. ‘‘Anything less . . . might deny a defendant effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid

and advice would help him.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Missouri v. Frye, supra, 1408. ‘‘Although this

decision [whether to plead guilty] is ultimately made

by the defendant, the defendant’s attorney must make

an informed evaluation of the options and determine

which alternative will offer the defendant the most

favorable outcome. A defendant relies heavily upon

counsel’s independent evaluation of the charges and

defenses, applicable law, the evidence and the risks

and probable outcome of a trial. The right to effective

assistance of counsel includes an adequate investigation of the case to determine facts relevant to the merits

or to the punishment in the event of conviction.’’ Copas

v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 154.

To establish his claim of ineffective assistance, the

petitioner has the burden to show that ‘‘(1) counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different had it not been for the deficient

performance.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 575, 941 A.2d

248 (2008). ‘‘The first prong requires a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant

by the [s]ixth [a]mendment.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 576, quoting Strickland v. Washington,

supra, 466 U.S. 687. With respect to the prejudice prong

for claims of ineffective assistance when the conviction

resulted from a guilty plea, the petitioner must demonstrate ‘‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v.

Commissioner of Correction, supra, 576, quoting Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d

203 (1985); Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction,

144 Conn. App. 461, 476, 72 A.3d 426 (2013), cert.

granted on other grounds, 312 Conn. 925, 95 A.3d 521

(2014).6

When assessing trial counsel’s performance, the

habeas court is required to ‘‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance . . . .’’ Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 689. The United

States Supreme Court explained:

‘‘A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances

of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy. . . . There are countless ways to

provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the

best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a

particular client in the same way.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Applying the Strickland-Hill test here, the court finds

that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden under

either prong of the test as to any of his claims.

The petitioner’s first claim is that Attorney Dolan

failed to adequately advise him of the elements of the

crime to which he pleaded guilty. This claim is without

merit. Attorney Dolan testified credibly that he discussed with the petitioner what the state would have

to prove on each of the charges he faced. In particular,

although he could not remember exactly when, Attor-
ney Dolan discussed the concept of specific and general

intent. In fact, Attorney Dolan had discussed that very

topic with the petitioner in connection with the earlier

sexual assault trial at whichAttorney Dolan represented

the petitioner. Furthermore, when the petitioner

entered his guilty plea on August 10, both he and Attorney Dolan acknowledged to the court that they had

discussed the elements of the offense. Given the petitioner’s extensive experience with the criminal justice

process, both with guilty pleas and trials, his claim

now that Attorney Dolan never discussed with him the

elements of the crimes with which he was charged is

just not credible.

The petitioner’s second claim is that Attorney Dolan

failed to advise the petitioner as to any defenses or

mitigating circumstances. In particular, the petitioner

claims that Attorney Dolan failed to advise the petitioner that his intoxication could have negated the requisite intent required for attempted sexual assault in the

first degree. In support of this argument, the petitioner

presented the testimony of Dr. Johnson-Arbor. Dr. Johnson-Arbor has taught, practiced and written in the field

of toxicology. Based on her conversation with the petitioner and a review of his medical records, as well as

police reports and witness statements relating to the

incident, Dr. Johnson-Arbor opined that at the time he

assaulted the sisters, the petitioner had both cocaine

and PCP in his system. She further testified that PCP

intoxication can cause a person to be dissociated, meaning that his mind does not realize the actions his body

is taking. She further opined that the petitioner was in

such a dissociative state on the night of the assault and,

more likely than not, did not know what he was doing

around the time of the assault.

On cross-examination, Dr. Johnson-Arbor acknowledged that she could not say when the dissociative state

began. She also acknowledged that periods of lucidity

can occur during such a state. Finally, she acknowledged that a person in a dissociative state would not

think to provide water as a substitute for urine to avoid

testing positive for drugs or alcohol. There was evidence that the petitioner did just that after being

arrested.

The petitioner argues that Attorney Dolan was deficientin his performance because he did notretain someone like Dr. Johnson-Arbor. He further argues that had

Attorney Dolan done so, the petitioner would not have

pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first

degree.

The petitioner has failed to prove either contention.

First, given the posture of the case when the petitioner

entered his guilty plea, the court cannot say that Attorney Dolan was deficient for not retaining a toxicology

expert. The evidence is clear that Attorney Dolan had

discussed with the petitioner a possible intoxication
defense. That defense also played a prominent role in

Attorney Dolan’s negotiations with Attorney Sonnemann. In fact, Attorney Sonnemann made specific reference to the defense when the petitioner entered his

guilty plea. Consequently, the petitioner was fully aware

that he could have raised such a defense when he

pleaded guilty.

The petitioner also knew that it was very unlikely

that Attorney Dolan would be his counsel at trial, where

such an expert might be needed. The trial court made

it clear to the petitioner two months before he entered

his guilty plea that Attorney Dolan would likely have

to withdraw from the case due to the conflict between

the petitioner and Brown. The trial court also told the

petitioner that he would be given time to work with a

new attorney to prepare for trial. The court cannot say

that it was unreasonable for Attorney Dolan not to

retain a toxicology expert when he knew he most likely

would not be trying the case and another attorney

would be.

Second, the court is not persuaded that the lack of

a toxicology expert prejudiced the petitioner. Even if

he had such an expert, the petitioner knew that the

case against him was strong. As Attorney Sonnemann

noted, the state had evidence to show that the petitioner

had made advances toward the complaining witness.

He also knew that Brown was prepared to testify against

him and recount details Brown learned from the petitioner. Such evidence would be inconsistent with a

defense that the petitioner was so intoxicated that he

could not appreciate what he was doing. So would the

evidence that the petitioner attempted to provide a false

sample for the purpose of a drug test following his

arrest. And, as noted previously, Dr. Johnson-Arbor

made certain concessions during cross-examination

that made her opinion far from definitive. Furthermore,

the petitioner knew that he faced four drug charges, as

to which the defense of intoxication would provide him

no help. In fact, there does not appear to be any defense

to those charges.

The evidence also established that the petitioner was

highly motivated to plead guilty when he did, and to

dispose of his case with his Waterbury case. By resolving both cases at the same time, the petitioner was able

to run his sentences concurrently and to maximize the

benefit of his pretrial jail credits. Consequently, the

petitioner chose to plead guilty in Litchfield despite

knowing that he would have to plead guilty to attempted

sexual assault in the first degree and register as a sex

offender for life. He chose to plead guilty even though

the trial court told him that the court would give him

time to consult with a new attorney if he chose to go

to trial. He did so despite knowing that the complaining

witness had recently been arrested and that the arrest

could be used to impeach her at trial. Even when offered
the option of filing a motion to set aside his guilty plea

because of this new information, the petitioner chose

to be sentenced to assure the benefits of his coordinated

pleas in Litchfield and Waterbury.

Based on all of the foregoing, the court concludes

that there is no reasonable possibility that the petitioner

would have made a different decision had Attorney

Dolan retained a toxicology expert like Dr. JohnsonArbor.

The petitioner’s third claim is that Attorney Dolan

failed to advise him of the evidence the state had to

present against him. In particular, the petitioner testified that Attorney Dolan did not provide him copies of

all the police reports and witness statements related to

his case. The petitioner also argues that Attorney Dolan

failed to review with him the physical evidence seized

from the scene.

This claim requires little discussion. The petitioner

presented none of this material to the court during the

trial of this matter. Thus, the court is in no position to

determine whether Attorney Dolan’s performance was

deficient or whetherthe petitioner was in any way prejudiced. It was the petitioner’s burden to prove this claim,

and he failed to do so.

The petitioner similarly argues that Attorney Dolan

was deficient in not advising him of the witnesses the

state would present at trial. There is no evidence to

support this claim. Attorney Dolan testified that he told

the petitionerthat the complainant, her sister and police

officers would be witnesses at the criminal trial. The

court found Attorney Dolan’s testimony to be credible.

Furthermore, the petitioner was told by both Attorney

Dolan and the trial court that Brown could testify

against the petitioner. The petitioner has failed to identify any particular potential witness he was unaware

of. Nor has he presented any evidence as to how the

knowledge of any particular witness would have

affected his decision to plead guilty. The claim is without merit.

The petitioner next argues that Attorney Dolan failed

to adequately investigate a defense. This is a rehashing

of the petitioner’s argument regarding Attorney Dolan’s

failure to hire a toxicology expert. The court has already

addressed this claim. For the reasons previously stated,

the petitioner has failed to prove either deficient performance or prejudice.

The petitioner also makes several arguments relating

to the manner in which Attorney Dolan advised him

regarding his guilty plea. First, he claims that Attorney

Dolan advised the petitioner that if he pleaded guilty

under the Alford doctrine, he could later reopen his

case and retry it. The petitioner’s testimony was just

not credible. Attorney Dolan is an experienced criminal

defense attorney. If Attorney Dolan advised the peti-
tioner as claimed, then he purposely deceived him. Yet

Attorney Dolan had no motivation to do so. There was

no evidence that Attorney Dolan bore any animus

toward the petitioner. To the contrary, the petitioner

was a repeat client. Nor was Attorney Dolan concerned

with trying to avoid a trial. He knew that if the case

went to trial, he would almost certainly have to withdraw from the case.

The petitioner’s claim is further undermined by the

transcript of his plea canvass. Twice during that canvass, the petitioner acknowledged that once he pleaded

guilty, there would not be a trial. Respondent’s Exh. B,

August 10, 2010 transcript, p. 8. He also acknowledged

that there would be no appeal from the conviction. Id.

The petitioner also acknowledged to the court that he

could not come back to court and ask that his plea be

vacated. Id. At no point did he ask the court about the

advice he claims Attorney Dolan provided. He did not,

despite the fact that both his aborted and final plea

canvasses show that the petitioner was not reticent

about raising any concerns he might have.

Similarly unpersuasive is the petitioner’s claim that

Attorney Dolan misled him regarding the charge the

petitioner would have to plead guilty to. The petitioner

claims that he thought the charge he would plead guilty

to was assault, not a sexual assault. The petitioner was

clearly told on July 20, 2010, that he was being asked

to plead guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first

degree. When the court vacated his plea after the petitioner said that he was not satisfied with Attorney

Dolan, the petitioner made repeated attempts to reinstate his guilty plea to that charge. He then had three

weeks to consider his options before returning to court

and again pleading guilty to attempted sexual assault

in the first degree. There is no question that the petitioner was fully advised and understood the charge he

was pleading guilty to.

The petitioner also claims that Attorney Dolan exercised undue influence upon him to plead guilty. In particular, he claims that the potential conflict with Brown

was used to coerce the petitioner to plead guilty. The

evidence does not support this claim. The evidence

showed that Attorney Dolan reviewed Brown’s letter

with the petitioner when he became aware of it. The

evidence was also clear that the petitioner wanted

Attorney Dolan to stay on his case despite the conflict.

The petitioner signed a waiver confirming that fact and

told the court the same thing when he was canvassed

on June 8, 2010. The transcript from the hearing that

day shows that the petitioner was in no way coerced.

He was simply informed by the court of the issues

created by the conflict and asked if he wished to waive

the conflict for plea negotiations. One month later, on

July 7, the court told the petitioner that if he wanted

to go to trial, the court would give him time to get a
new lawyer. It is hard to imagine what more Attorney

Dolan or the court could have done for the petitioner

under the circumstances.

The petitioner’s final claim is that Attorney Dolan

was deficient in not negotiating a better plea deal by

using a toxicology expert to buttress his intoxication

defense. Again, there is no evidence to support the

petitioner’s claim. It is pure speculation that the state

would have made a better offer if Attorney Dolan had

retained a toxicology expert. To the contrary, Attorney

Sonnemann and Attorney Dolan both testified credibly

that much of their negotiations centered on such a

defense, but that the state gave it little credence. This

fact was confirmed by Attorney Sonnemann’s comments when the petitioner entered his guilty plea. In

the end, the final offer the petitioner accepted was the

product of protracted and contentious negotiations, and

there was no evidence to suggest that there was any

possibility that the petitioner was going to do any better.

In fact, Attorney Dolan was able to negotiate away

the twenty years of probation to which the petitioner

objected and get the incarcerated portion of the sentence close to the six years the petitioner was aiming

for. The petitioner has failed to prove either deficient

performance or prejudice.

IV

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied.

* Affirmed. Parker v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 421,

A.3d (2016).

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970).

2 The amended petition also includes a count two, which alleges ineffective

assistance of counsel against a second attorney, Thomas Nalband. That

count was withdrawn by the petitioner at the beginning of his trial.

3 Although not mentioned explicitly in the transcript, the court infers,

partly from the petitioner’s testimony in this matter, that the petitioner was

concerned, at least in part, with how his pretrial jail credit would be applied

if he was not sentenced out of both courts on the same day. Had he only

been sentenced on the Waterbury matter he likely would have lost the

benefit of any pretrial confinement credits on the Litchfield matter. At the

time of his plea, the petitioner had been held in lieu of bond on both matters

for approximately six months. Respondent’s Exh. A.

4 The court received no evidence as to who the intended or actual recipients of the letter were. Although Brown testified about his conversations

with the petitioner, he was asked no questions about the letter. The petitioner, though, was able to identify the handwriting on the letter as Brown’s.

And it is clear that the letter was actually sent, as the testimony established

that the state ultimately produced a copy of the letter to Attorney Dolan

and he showed it to the petitioner.

5 The petitioner testified that after the state made its final offer, he asked

Attorney Dolan to make one last effort to get the state to reduce its offer

to six years of incarceration. Attorney Dolan refused because it would have

been fruitless in light of the state’s position that its offer was, in fact, final.

6 The Supreme Court granted certification to appeal from the Appellate

Court’s decision, ‘‘limited to the following issue: ‘Did the Appellate Court

properly determine that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in

assessing the petitioner’s claims?’ ’’ The legal standard at issue in Carraway

is the prejudice prong determination when there is a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel arising from guilty plea cases.