* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-11500

Summary Calendar

 

DANIEL JOSEPH HITTLE,

Plaintiff-Counter - 

 Defendant-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF GARLAND, TEXAS;

J.G. GEORGE, City of Garland

Police Officer; D.W. ROEHRIG, City 

of Garland Police Officer; S.A.

CROSS, City of Garland Police

Officer,

Defendants-Counter 

 Claimants - Appellees.

GARLAND POLICE DEP’T; JOHN

DOES 1-10; D. SWAVEY, City of

Garland Police Officer; J. HOLMES,

City of Garland Police Officer,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:91-CV-2621-T

- - - - - - - - - -

September 15, 1997

Before REAVLEY, KING and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Daniel Joseph Hittle, Texas prisoner # 000981, argues that

the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions
No. 96-11500

-2-

for a default judgment and in granting the defendants’ motions

for summary judgment dismissing Hittle’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

complaint. 

We have reviewed the record, including the orders of the

district court addressing the numerous motions filed in the case,

and the briefs of the parties, and affirm the district court’s

court’s orders granting the defendants’ motions for summary

judgment based on the complaint against the defendant officers

being barred by the statute of limitations. See Burrell v.

Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989); Fed. R. App. P.

15(c)(3). 

We have also determined that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Hittle’s motions for default

judgment and his motion to strike the defendants’ answers because

such a drastic remedy would not have been appropriate under the

circumstances of this case. See Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican

Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989). 

We further find that Hittle’s conclusional allegations that

the district court’s rulings against him reflected a bias against

Hittle are not sufficient to demonstrate that Hittle was deprived

of an impartial tribunal in the district court proceedings. See

Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994).

We also find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in permitting Hittle’s counsel to withdraw from their

representation of Hittle. The record reflects that counsel had
No. 96-11500

-3-

valid professional considerations for seeking to withdraw. 

Hittle has not shown that he was prejudiced by the fact that the

proceedings concerning the motion to withdraw were held in camera

in Hittle’s absence or because the pleadings involved in the

motion were sealed. Hittle had access to the sealed documents

and was given the opportunity to file additional responses to

counsels’ motion and he chose not to do. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing

to appoint new counsel to represent Hittle because Hittle had

shown his ability to provide himself with adequate

representation. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212-13

(5th Cir. 1982).

Hittle has not shown that he was unduly prejudiced by the 

the defendants advising the court of Hittle’s murder conviction

and of other murders with which Hittle had been charged. This

information was provided to the district court in response to

Hittle’s request that he not be displayed as a prisoner and not

be closely guarded during the civil proceedings. The information

was relevant to the issue of security during the civil

proceedings. Hittle has not shown that it had any effect on the

trial court’s rulings in the case. 

Hittle’s argument that the district court improperly severed

his case is patently frivolous. 

Hittle’s motion for appointment of counsel in the district

court is DENIED as moot.
No. 96-11500

-4-

AFFIRMED.