The Honor able Solomon Oliver Jr., United St ates District Judge f or the Nor

thern District * of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. -1- NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0026n.06 F iled: Janu ary 9, 2007 No. 05-5460 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. P AT RI CK

WI LLIA M S, Defendan t-Appellee.

___________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI STRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF ORE: BO GGS, Chief J udg e; MARTI N, Circuit J udg e; and OL I VER, District J udg e. * PER CU RIAM . Patr ic k Wil liams m ov e d to su pp re ss t wo pie c e s o f e vid e nc e be fo re his trial on cha

rg es of possessingan illeg al and unr eg istered f irea rm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), a

nd with being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). F ir st, he argue d th at hi s st ate me nt t hat he ha d a

g un un de r h is m a ttr e ss i s in a dmi ssi ble be c a us e it
r e s u l t e d f r o ma c u s t o d i a l i n t e r

r o g at i o nc o n d

u c t e d a b s e n tth e w ar

n i n g s r e qu i r e d

b y Miranda v. Arizona , 3 84 U. S. 4 36 (1 96 6) . Se c on d, he argue d th a t th e g un its e lf is i na dmi ssi ble be c a

us eNo. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

-- 2
-- police off icer s lacke d the authority to conduct the se arc h uncover ing it. The district court g rante d Wil liams’s suppression motion in i ts entirety , and the g overnme nt filed this interlocutory appea l. Be cause the district court did not make the fac tual finding s nece ssary to determine whether

the public safe ty

exception to the Miranda rule a pplies and whe ther the se arc h was va lid as a sea rch incident to arr est, we va cate and re mand. I Offic er Micha el J ackson a nd three other Memphis police of fice rs soug ht to ex ecute an outstanding w arr ant for Williams’s arre st on charg es of a g g ravated ra pe and a g g ravated robbe ry . They went to a boa

rdinghouse, showed two pe ople sitting on the porc h a police photo of Wil liams, and wer e told that he lived in a r oom on the second f loor. They

knocked on the door of that room. At the suppre ssion hearing , J ackson a nd Wil liams told very

differ ent stories about wh at ha pp e ne d n e xt. Jac ks on te sti fi e d th at he a sk e d th e man w ho re sp on de d to his kn oc k o n th e do or to produce identification bec ause the man did not look like the man in the police photo. The ma n replied that his identification was in the pocke t of his pants, on the floor ne arby . When the man started to re trieve the pants, J ackson told him to stop. All four office rs enter ed the r oom, and J ackson a sked the man “ if any body else wa s in the room and if he had any wea pon.” He replied that no one else was in the room but that he ha d an old gun under his bed. I n response to a second que stion from J ackson, he specifie d that the gun was unde r the mattre ss. J ackson the n place d the man in handc uffs while a nother off icer retrie ved a sa

wed- off shotgun.No. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

-- 3
-- Willi ams, on

the oth e r h and , te sti fi e d th a t an o ff ic e r a lmo st i mme diate ly

ha nd c uf fe d h im and plac ed him in a cha ir in the hallway outside his room. Meanwhile, the othe r three office rs enter ed the r oom and started se arc hing. Williams asked what they wer e looking for, a

nd an of fi c e r a ns we re d b y

a sk ingwh e the r h e ha d a

ny g un s o r w e a

po ns on his pe rs on . Wil liams s a id
no . T he of

fi c e r t he n a sk e d w he the r Wi lli ams h a d a ny we a po ns in t he ro om, to whic h Wil liams responde d: “I f you say

so.” Eventua lly , the offic ers f ound the gun, alleg edly

afte r one of

them saw Willi ams looking at the bed. Ac cordingto Wi lliams, the office rs neve r aske d him for identification. J ackson a nd Wil liams also presente d somewhat inconsistent ac counts of the r oom’s g e og ra phy . Jac ks on

te sti fi e d th at th e ro om w a s “ kin d o f s ma ll, ” wi th “ [a]b out thre e fe e t or le ss” betwee n the door a

nd the bed. Williams i nitially descr ibed the room a s “not very big,” but later called it “la

rg e.” H e explained that the room “ had no turns [and] no walls.” The district cour

t was not wholly

clea r as to whose acc ount it credited. Ha ving previously

summarized the testimony of Jackson and Will iams, it stated: Def endant wa s order ed to sit in a chair ne ar the dresse r. Ye t, office rs, did not a dv ise De fe nd ant o f h is r ig hts and a lle g e dly pr oc e e de d to a sk

him po te nti a lly i n cr i m i n at i n g qu es t i o n s ab o u twe ap o n s o r a m mun i t i o n . As s u m i n g th i s ex ch an ge happene d as the off

icer s sugg est, the cour

t finds that any

statements of De fenda

nt mus t be su

pp re sse d a s h e wa s n ot a dv ise d o f h is r ig hts
. United States v. W

illiams , No. 04-20454 (W.D. Te nn. Fe b. 10, 2005) (or der g rantingmotion to s uppress). This finding c ontains an interna l contradic tion. The district court cla ims that it assumed that the “exchang e happe ned as the office rs sug g est,” but it impli citly reje cted at least part of

Offic er Jac ks on ’s sto ry

wh e n it c on c lud e d th at Will iams w a s si tti ngin a c ha ir , r a the r t

ha n g oin g toNo. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

“ Qu ar le s rema ins good la

w” a fter the Supreme Court’s holding“that the r ight to a 1 Miranda war

ning is c onstitut ionally

based.” United States v. Talley , 2 75 F .3 d 5 60 , 5 64 -6 5 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( d i s cu s s i n g Dicke rson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428 (2000)).

-- 4
-- retrie ve his identification, whe n questioned. The district c ourt’s findingthat Wil liams was seated “nea r the dre sser” does not appe ar to be supported by either Jackson’s testimony or Will iams’s testimony , since Willi ams claimed that the office rs place d him in a chair in the ha llway , not near the dr e sse r. In th e re st o f i ts o pin ion , it ne ith e r e xpla ine d th is d isc re pa nc y no r m a de sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t r e le va nt t o th e qu e sti on s p re se nte d in thi s a pp e a l. II Under the familiar rule of Miranda v. Arizona , “ the pr os e c uti on may no t us e state me nts , whether exculpatory

or inculpatory , stemming fr om custodial interrog ation of the de fenda nt
un le ss i t de mon str ate s th e us e of pr oc e dura l sa fe g ua

rd s e ff e c tiv e to s e c ur e the pr ivi le g e a g a ins t self-inc rimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). How ever , when of fice rs ask “ questions
nece ssary to secure their own saf

ety or the saf ety of the public” as opposed to “que stions desig ned solely

to elicit testimoni al evidenc e fr om a suspect,” they do not need to provide the
w ar n i n g s r e qu i r e d

b y Miranda
. New Y

ork v. Q uarles , 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984). Her e, the 1 g overnme nt conce des that Will iams’s alleg ed stateme nt satisfies the threshold conditions of Miranda ( i.e. , th at th e of

fi c e rs ha d Wil liams i n c us tod y and ha d n ot a dv ise d h im o f h is r ig hts wh e n th e y

a sk e d h im whe the r h e ha d a ny we a po ns ) b ut a

rgue s th a t th e state me nt i s a dmi ssi ble under the public safe ty

exception announce d in Quarles
.No. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

-- 5
-- The public saf

ety exception applies “whe n office rs have a re asonable belief ba sed on articula ble fa cts that they

are in dang er.” United States v. Talley , 275 F.3d 560, 563 ( 6th Cir. 2001). We eva luate the r easona bleness of a

n office r’s be lief de novo , basingour eva luation on objective f

acts rather than on the office r’s subjec tive state of mind. Ibid. Our e valuation takes into consideration a numbe r of f actor s, which may

include the known history and cha rac teristics of the suspec t, the known fa cts and c ircumstance s of the alleg ed cr ime, and the f acts a nd circ umstances c onfronted by the offic er when he unde rtake s the arr est. For an off icer to have a
rea sonable be lief that he is in dang er, at minim um, he must have re ason to believe (1) that the defe ndant might have (or rec ently have ha d) a w eapon, a

nd (2) that someone other than police might g a in a c c e ss t o th at w e a po n a nd inf lic t ha rm wi th i t. T he pu

bli c sa fe ty

e xce pti on

a pp lie s if and only if both of those two conditions are satisfied and no othe r conte x t-specif ic evidenc e rebuts the infe renc e that the of fice r re asonably

could have perc eived a

threat to public safety
. See United States v. Estrada , 4 30 F .3 d 6 06 , 6 13 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ) ( fi nd ingthat th e pu bli c sa fe ty exception applied wher e off icer s “had r eason to be lieve” that the suspect wa s “ca pable of violence,” based on his prior a ssault convictions; that he might have a gun, based on e vidence that he dea lt drug s out of the apa rtment at which he was a

rre sted; and that anothe r per son
rec eived mail and w as pre sent at the a partment whe re the suspect wa s arr ested); United States v. Johnson , 95 F. App’ x 448, 449 (3d Cir. 2004) (a pplying the public safe ty

exception in an investigation of “a ‘ road r ag e’ inc ident in which . . . [the suspect] had pointed a gun at [another driver]”); United States v. De Summa , 272 F.3d 176, 181 ( 3d Cir. 2001) (re fusing to apply the public safe ty

exception when “the arr esting ag ents wer e not advised that the defe ndant was a nyNo. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

-- 6
-- more da ng erous or

violent than a per son acc used of a ty pical Ponzi s cheme .”). United States v. Re ill y , 224 F.3d 986, 992 ( 9th Cir. 2000) (applying the public safe ty exception when off

icer s knew that the suspe ct was w anted in conne ction with severa l armed ba nk robber ies and a

violent
car jackingand sawthe suspect make a suspicious move by brining his hands to his waistband when he still had the c apac ity to rea ch and grab ne arby objects bec ause he had not bee n ha nd c uf fe d) ; United States v. W

illiams , 181 F.3d 945, 954 n.14 ( 8th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that the ar restingoffice rs had infor

mation that a suspect “ had bee n arr ested in the pa st on a wea pons possession char g e” a

nd “wa s dealingdrug s out of his apartment” ). Th ou g h it may be ob je c tiv e ly re a so na ble to b e lie ve that Will iams h a d a we a po n in his apar tment based solely

on the violent crimes that he alleg edly had committed, ag g ravated ra pe
and a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

(s atis fy ingthe fi rs t c on dit ion ), that a lon e is n ot s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a finding that the offic ers ha d an objec tively rea sonable fe ar f

or their sa fety . To satisfy the sec ond
c on dit ion , th e of

fi c e rs a lso wo uld

have ha d to be lie ve that so me on e oth e r t ha n p oli c e c ou ld
a c c e ss t he we a po n a nd inf lic t ha rm wi th i t. We c ann ot d e te rm ine wh e the r s uc h a be lie f w ou ld h av e b e e nr e a s o n a

b l e w i th o u te v a l u at i n g th e c r e d i b i l i ty o f J a c k s o nan d

W i l l i am s a s w i tn e s s e s . If
one we re to be lieve that Willi ams was unr estraine d and had tur ned bac k into his room to retrieve his ide nti fi c atio n w he n Jac ks on qu e sti on e d h im, a s Jac ks on te sti fi e d, the n th e pu

bli c sa fe ty exception might apply , dependingon whether those fac ts and the other f acts a nd circ umstances
cause d the offic ers to have an objec tively rea sonable fe ar f

or their sa fety
. Cf. United States v. Ronayne , 1995 U.S. App. L EXI S 10085, *4-*5 (6th Cir. May 2, 1995) (unpublished) ( applying the pu bli c sa fe ty

e xce pti on

wh e n a su sp e c t, t ho ug h r e str a ine d a ft e r s c uf fl ingwi th p oli c e , c ou ldNo. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

-- 7
-- have a cce ssed a we apon on his person) . Conversely , if one we re to be lieve that Willi ams was seate d outside his room and handc uffe d when a n office r questioned him, as Willi ams testified, then the off

icer s plainly

could not have ha d an objec tively rea sonable fe ar f

or their sa fety

and the public safe ty

exception would not apply
. Se e, e .g., Un ite d S tates v . B ra thw aite , 458 F.3d 376, 382 n.8 (5th Cir. 2006) (re fusing to apply the public safe ty

exception when an of

fice r aske d the de fe nd ant whe the r h e ha d gun s in his ho us e e ve n th ou g h, “ a t th e tim e of qu e sti on ing , th e a g e nts had per formed two sw eeps of the house a

nd had both occ upants of the house in handcuf fs”) ; United States v. Moble

y , 4 0 F .3 d 6 88 , 6 93 (4 th C ir . 1 99 4) (r e fu sin g to a pp ly the pu bli c sa fe ty
e xce pti on wh e n o ff ic e rs arr e ste d th e de fe nd ant whil e the de fe nd ant w a s n ake d, fo un d n o o ne e lse prese nt in a secur ity

swee p of his one-r oom apar tment, and knew that the defe ndant was the apar tment’s only

resident, but aske d, while leadingdefe ndant awa y , whether

there wer e any
we a po ns pr e se nt) ; Un ite d S

tates v . R ab or

n , 8 72 F .2 d 5 89 , 5 95 (5 th C ir . 1 98 9) (r e fu sin g to a pp ly the public safe ty

exception when an of

fice r aske d a suspec t where in his truck he had hidde n a g un when “ only

the police of

fice rs had a cce ss to the truck”)
. Even if the of

fice rs re asonably

believed both that Williams m ight have had a wea pon and that Wil liams could have use d that wea pon ag ainst them, indications that the office rs may have acte d prete x tually

might re but the presumption that the public safe ty exception should apply . An office r may

rely on the public safe ty

exception only

if he ha s a objec tively

rea sonable be lief that he is in dang er. Talley , 275 F.3d at 563. Thoug h evidenc e of pr etext goes most direc tly to the office r’s subjec tive beliefs ( rathe r than the obje ctive re asonable ness of those be liefs), we consider suc h evidenc e to the extent that it informs our understandingof the objec tiveNo. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

In r are c ir c ums tanc e s, an o ff ic e r m ig ht u

nd e re sti mate the ma g nit

ud e of an o bje c tiv e ly 2 extant dange r, or mig ht give a pre text ual orde r to a suspec t and then re alize that this order has c r e at e d anun s a f e s i tu at i o n . In th o s e c a s e s , th e p u b l i c s a f e ty e x c e p t i o nm i g h ta

p p l y.

-- 8
-- c ir c ums tanc e s. Ge ne ra lly , th e fa c t th at an o ff ic e r w a s w ill ingto m anip ulate the sc e ne of an a rr e st in o rd e r t o g athe r e vid e nc e make s it un lik e ly that he c ou ld h ave fo rm e d a n o bje c tiv e ly

re a so na ble belief that he was in da

ng er. Her e, one c ould conclude that J ackson a sked Will iams to retrieve 2 th e i d en t i fi ca t i o nn o tb ec au s e h e r ea s o n ab l y wa s af ra i d , b u tb ec au s e h e w an t edW i l l i am s t o go back into the r oom so that the office rs could ask a bout weapons or

conduct a

broade r sea

rch. Since the people who direc ted the off icer s to W illiams’s room recognized W illiams from the police photo, it is possi ble that the off icer s did too. I f the finde r of f act c redits J ackson’ s version of the fa cts, it must assess the exi stence and import of this possible pretext on the part of the of fi c e rs – a lon g wi th t

he re st o f t

he fa c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s –

to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he pu bli c
s a f e ty e x c e p t i o ns h o u l d

a p p l y. We a re no t a ble to e va luate the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, sin c e we did

no t se e the ir testimony first-hand. See U

nited States v. Bailey , 4 44 U. S. 3 94 , 4 14 -1 5 ( 19 80 ) ( statin g that it is not “for a ppellate c ourts . . . to say

that a par ticular witness spoke the truth or fa bricated a c ockand-bull story”). The district court’s stateme nt that it assumes J ackson’ s testimony to be true points one way . Some of its specific f actua l rec itations and the outcome it rea ched point the other wa y . We do not have finding s on which we can ba se a c lear ruling of law. Thus, w e
rema nd the ca se to permit the district cour t to make the fa ctual finding s nece ssary to determine whether the public safe ty

exception applies. See U nited States v. Taylor , 997 F.2d 1551, 1554- 55No. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

The district cour

t properly conclude d that the sea

rch w as not valid as a pr otective swe ep. 3 W illiams , No. 04-20454 (or der grantingmotion to s uppress); JA 30-31. I t did not address the question of whethe r it was valid as a sear ch incident to ar

rest, eve n though the g overnme nt raised that alternative justification in opposit ion to the motion t o suppress. JA 21. That argument thus rema ins pending on rema nd.

--

9
-- (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holdingthat, when a district court fa ils to m ake c lear finding s of fa ct, a c ourt of appea ls should remand unless it can a ffirm ba sed on testimony “either uncontested or

found
cre dible by

the [d] istrict [ c]ourt”). III When car rying out a

custodial arr est, an off

icer may conduct, without a wa

rra nt, “a se arc h of the arr e ste e ’s pe rs on

and the are a ‘w ith in h is i mme diate c ontr ol’ – c on str uin g that phra se to
me an th e are a

fr om w ith in whic h h e might g a in p os se ssi on of a we a po n o r d e str

uc tib le evidenc e.” Chi me l v . Ca lif or nia , 3 95 U. S. 7 52 , 7 63 (1 96 9) ; see also United States v . Hudson , 405 F.3d 425, 432 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (equating “ immediate control” with the suspect’s “ wing span”)
.

“ So l on ga s th e de fe nd ant h a d [an] it e m w ith in h is i mme diate c on tr ol ne ar thetim e of h is a rre

st , the item rema ins subject to a sea rch inc ident to arre st.” Nor throp v . Tr ipp e tt , 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) ; se e als o U nite d S tates v . R om e ro , 4 52 F .3 d 6 10 , 6 15 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; United Sta te s v . W hite , 871 F.2d 41, 44 ( 6th Cir. 1989). As such, if the a rea under the mattress wa s within W illiams’s im mediate c ontrol at any point during or

just before his encounter with police, the offic ers ha d authority to conduct the se arc h uncover ing the g un. 3 Th e dim e ns ion s o f t

he are a wi thi n a su sp e c t’ s imme diate c on tr ol d e pe nd on the sp e c if

ic context. Se e, e .g ., Ro me ro , 452 F.3d at 615 (approvingthe sea rch of a close d nightstand “ a fe wNo. 05-5460

Un ite d St ate s v . Wil liams

- - 1 0
- - fe e t awa y ” fr om a n a rr e ste e ); United States v. Miller , 946 F.2d 1344, 1345 ( 8th Cir. 1991) (per mitti nga sea

rch unde r a pillow whe n the ar restee was standingfour- and-a -half f eet f rom the be d) ; Un ite d S

tates v . H ill , 730 F.2d 1163, 1165 ( 8th Cir. 1984) (holding inva lid the searc h of a
c los e d s uit c a se fi ve to t e n f e e t awa y fr om t he arr e ste e ); W

atkins v. United States , 564 F.2d 201, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1977) (a llowing of fice rs to sear ch under

a mattre ss when the a

rre stee wa s in the
same room a

n unspecifie d distance a

way ). Absent f

irm fac tual finding s reg ardingthe layout of the room and Williams’s posit ion within it throug hout his encounter w ith police, howeve r, we cannot make a conf

ident deter

mination as to whether the office rs exceede d the per missibl e scope of a se arc h incident to arr est. We remand on this issue as we ll. On remand, the district court must determine fr om the overa ll context , consistent with our discussion above, whe ther the
mattr e ss w a s w ith in Wi lli ams’ s c on tr ol. In d oin g so , th e c ou rt mus t de c ide , amon g oth e r t hin g s, whether to cre dit the testimony

of Jackson that the bed wa s “[a]bout three fee t or less” fr om the door, or whe ther the be d was at some further or nea rer distance. IV For the fore g oing r easons, we vacate the district cour t’s order g rantingWil liams’s motion to suppress and r emand to the district cour t for fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.