·. - s,:TANDARD FORM NO. I• 

D STATES 

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GOVERNMENT 

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"J;O . , AIBA-OOAJ GGlf «X.'CJ oar. llJ 12 DATE 14 DeeedJer 1950 

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' REF J~~ ~.~5.7 TOP SLCRt #UiUtliV 

REPORT BY ,.t~CIB COORDUTATOR 9?""""0 __ _ 

~UNITED STATES COMlroNICATimrsffeARD 

on 

llEASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF 001.'.MUNICATION INTELLIGEUCE 

TEE I'R.OBLEM 

1. What additional measures should be taken to protect (1) present 

CO][[NT sources and (2) such new sources as may be expected soon to yield 

vital information? 

FACTS BE.ARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION 

2. As set f'orth in Paragraphs 1-12 in the Enclosure. 

CONCWSIO:NS 

3. It is concluded that: 

a. A review of the entire problem of the security of present 

COMINT sources is warranted in the light of' the present situation wherein 

there appears to be a gradual lessening of security in the fact of a more 

pressing need therefor. 

b. The possibility of some approach,, in the not distant future,, 

to a state of readability of certain high-level cryptosystems makes it 

imperative that there be no delay in the re-examination of' present COMINT 

security measures and the f'ormulation and application or new or additional 

measures which may prevent a repetition of the losses suffered in the 

recent past. 

c. In connection with all high-level OO~TINT problems it is 

possible and it may be advisable to institute security safeguards such 

as were in force in connection with certain high-level COMDIT problems in 

World War II. 

TO? SECRET l ACORN 
RECOMMENDATIOUS 

4. It is recommended that: 

a. USCIB direct the USCIB Security Committee to make the 

review referred to in Par. 3a and to submit recommendations arising from 

a study based upon consideration of Pars. 3b and 3c of the foregoing 

conclusions. 

b. The USCIB Security Committee be directed to submit its 

report to USCIB not later than 15 December 1950. 

2 
REF ID:A55657 

EliCLOSURE EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

FACTS BEARING UPON TEE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION 

l. Since the end of World War II there has beeri\a continual 

improvement in the types of cryptosystems employed by \:f'oreign governments 

and a steady tightening of communication security practices_, making the 

production of COMINl' a problem of constantly increasing difficulties. 

This is true especially as regards/ C01lINT dealing with the\D 

2. In the face of the increasing d:i.f.ficulties in its production_, 

the demand for COM.INT has bec.ome even greater and the need for the protection of all COMINT sourc.es increasingly imperative. Not only is this 

true as regards all current COMINT sources_, but we must anticipate even 

greater needs for the protection of new sources. For example .. when as 

a result of concentrated effort AFS!A succeeded in solving certainl._ ___ ___, 

cryptosystems., the fruits thereof were soon denied us because of the withdrawa.l from usage/ of a11 l .... ___ .... ~gh-level systems soon after success in 

their solution was attained., and we have now been virtually out of' touch 

\'Ii th_l ___ .... lhigh-level comnnmications _for three years. If we should 

regain contact and then lose it again ~~ are likely to be denied this 

vital source of intelligence for a much longer period. 

3. a. The basic essentials for effective security control of 

COMINT have finally been established after years of ef'fort and the 

security situation has been considerably improved. 

b. There is a general appreciation of' the value o.f' COMINT and 

the need for protecting its sources; and 1va now have the fcllmving 

mechanisms .for better protection: 

l ACORN 
f!EF ID : ~:_6~ 7 

TO? SECRET ACUR't 

(1) A federal protective law (Public le.w No. 513) 

(2) Improved investigative machinery 

(3) An interdepartmental authority (USCIB) 

(4) A single U.S. producer of high-level COMI~'"T (.AFSA) 

(5) Common security standards 

(6) Security agreements with our foreign collaborators 

4. a. The part played by USCIB in the foregoing improvements in I 

,J security£ notable. USCIB Directive No. 1. approved on 16 lfovember 

1948~ and revised as of 13 October 1950. provides: 

"4. ••• The Board Vv"i.11 perform such functions as may be 

required to accomplish its objective. but it will place 

particular emphasis upon the following: 

* * * 

(c) Prescribing basic security standards and dissemination policies to protect all Communications 

Intelligence activities and sources." 

b. The same reference (Par. 12) establishes. among other 

standing committees. a Committee on Security with the following responsibili ties: 

"(b) Security. Formulation of interdepartmental 

security and dissemination policies. and coordination of other security matters under cognizance 

of USCIB." 

TOP SECRET 2 ACOR~~ 
e REF ID:A55657 

TOP S'CRET ACORN 

c. USCIB Directive Uo. 4,, approved on 14 January 1949,, and 

revised as of 25 October 1950,, establishes "Instructions for the 

Compartmentation of COMINT information",, including certain "Precautions 

in dissemination and utilization of results." 

5. As a consequence of the foregoing,, there has been instituted 

within .A.FSA itself a fairly rigid system of compartmentation of problems,, 

~ feature which militates against teolmical efficiency in COMINT production but which is considered essential for security. 

6. a. Nevertheless, the USCIB Coordinator is becoming increasingly 

concerned over what appears to be a gradual lessening of the security of 

OOMINT in the face or a more pressing need therefor. Although important 

and basic steps have been taken since the war to establish security on a 

firmer foundation,, other developments have occurred which have,, to a 

large extent,, nullified the effects of our advances. 

b. Despite the mechanisms and factors for better control, it 

is not believed that the security situation has been improved to a degree 

which warrants brushing aside of all fear that current and future success 

on high-level problems may be nullified by leakage of information to the 

Governments whose communications are nmV" being or soon will be successfully attacked. In fact,, the basis for continued apprehensions on this 

score re:mains the same or even stronger than before,, because of certain 

new factors in the COMINT security picture. Among them are the 

following: 

(1) There has been a steady and substantial increase of 

both workers and consumers. The list of indoctrinated consumers alone 
there have been iDD.umerable individuals brought into the fringe of 

knowledge for administrative, budgetary, or other reasons. 

(2) Certain dissemination safeguards have gradually been 

relaxed. Material is now distributed and maintained in a number of areas 

in Washington outside the producing agencies, where it v1as never permitted 

before. Moreover, distribution has been authorized to additional agencies. 

Restrictions on the distribution of material to, and maintenance in, 

occupied areas have also been eased. 

(3) The administrative, control, and budgetary machinery 

and procedures are such that large numbers of individuals must be 

apprised of numerous details of COMINT activities. (The large number of 

agencies, offices, boards, and connnittees concerned with the operation 

and administration of COMINT activities necessitates innumerable reports, 

justifications, etc., which are very hazardous to security. The arrangereents governing the operation of CIA are much more conducive to secrecy.) 

(4) The dissemination of results is far too voluminous for 

safety. (Over 1,000,000 copies of COMINT translations. representing some 

16,pOO individual decrypted messages, ~~re disseminated in September. 

1950. The handling of the German problem proved that COMINT can be ~ 

~ ,.., 

effectively used even with the most drastic restrictions on dissemination.) 'J'- 0 

"Y 50 

(5) There is no over-all authority to insure observance of 

COMINT security regulations within offices of COMINT consumer agencies . and organizations. Possibly too much individual authority and discretion 

are' left to individual consumer and producer agencies to insure uniform 

application of adequate security measures. (The security control of 

atomic energy ini'ormation- is more centralized and rigid. Inspection 

TG? S'CRET i ACORN 
.. F ID:A55657 e 

T3P StCRCT ACORN 

authority such as that \Vhich was vested in and exercised by the Cryptographic Security Board might well be vested in and exercised by USCIB.) 

7. It is obvious that under the foregoing conditions the laws of 

probability are bound to operate to produce inadvertent leakage of 

information, even though the question of loyalty may not enter into the 

picture at all. The chances for the leakage increases in direct proportion 

to tha nUl!l.ber of persons who are taken into the picture; the chances for 

loss of documents increases in direct proportion to the number of documents 

disseminated, and in the COMINT field the loss of a single document, 

sometimos regardless of its specific contents, may have disastrous consequences. If the document should fall into the wrong hands it most 

certainly will be followed by such consequences upon our COMINT activities. 

8. During World War II certain special security safeguards were 

established in particular segments of the German CCMINT problem. Actual 

experience with those safeguards amply demonstrated their feasibility and 

the practicability of operating successfully with an extremely limited 

number of operational personnel who had a real "need-to-know" and with 

the absolute minimum of dissemination. That experience proved the 

possibility of maintaining the utmost security under difficult circumstances and constitutes a contradiction of the frequently-heard contention 

that operational effectiveness of COMINT is inevitably defeated by too 

strict limitation of_ dissemination to cons'Lll!lers. 

9. It is possible to safeguard COl.fINT by employing special disguises which will not handicap its usefulness and which at the same time 

will serve to hide the exact source f'rom which it comes. 

TOP StCHET sACORN 
.REF ID: A§~~ A 

TOP Sct;HET ACORN - 10. The latt&r possibility, together ~'"ith more rigid limitations 

on dissemination may be necessary to insure us against the drying up o.r 

the sources of this vital in.for.m.ation. 

11. a. In considering what additional steps should be taken as 

soon as possible it is convenient to divide the whole problem of CO~'"Ilfr 

security into four principal segments: 

(1) Security precautions applicable to all steps in 

the production of the information. 

(2) Format of the final product (whether or not the 

source o.r the information, when it leaves the production 

agency, is obvious). 

(3) Control of production 0£ copies and their dissemination to consumers. 

(4) Security precautions applicable to the operational 

use of COMINT. 

b. Under its charter USCIB prescribes basic security standards 

and dissemination policies and therefore it bas cognizance or all four 

of the above-mentioned segments. 

~oX~...o...Q.. 12. a. The USCIB Coordinator hasAjurisdiction over only the first 

segment (Par. lla{l)) and has instituted within AFSA as rigid security 

controls in the production of COMINT information as practicable under 

the mechanics of processing. Compartmentation has been especially rigid 

in respect to the processing of the principal high-level cryptosystems 

and it is doubtful whether .further steps can be taken in that direction 

TOP SECRET 6 ACORN 
~F ID:A55657 

T8P S~Cfff T ACOR•~ toward increased security. However .. USCIB "!IJFJ.Y wish to look into this 

question and inquiry is welcomed by DIRAFSA. 

b. The USCIB Coordinator has no jurisdiction .. hmvever .. over 

the other three segments of the problem and believes that it is to those 

areas, especially (2) and (3), that USCIB should navr direct its 

attention. 

c. The USCIB Security Cormnittea could be directed to study 

those segments of the problem and submit recommendations as regards the 

greater security protection of current as well as anticipated new sources 

of COMINT. 

TOP SECRET ACORN 

7