[Cite as State v. Stidam, 2016-Ohio-7906.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ADAMS COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 15CA1014 

 

v. : DECISION AND 

 JUDGMENT ENTRY 

AARON STIDAM, : 

 

Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 11/21/2016 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Ohio Public 

Defender, Columbus, Ohio for appellant. 

David Kelley, Adams County Prosecutor and Michele L. Harris, Assistant Adams County 

Prosecutor, West Union, Ohio for appellee. 

 

Hoover, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Aaron Stidam (“Stidam”) appeals from the Adams County 

Common Pleas Court the portion of his sentence classifying him as a Tier III sex offender. At the 

age of 22, Stidam was indicted on two counts of rape. The indictment alleged that Stidam 

committed these offenses when he was a juvenile. Through plea negotiations with the State of 

Ohio (“State”), Stidam pleaded guilty to two amended counts of sexual battery. The trial court 

sentenced Stidam to an aggregate total of five years in prison. Also, the trial court designated 

him a Tier III sex offender. 

 {¶ 2} Here on appeal, Stidam asserts that his automatic classification as a Tier III sex 

offender for offenses he committed as a juvenile violates his due process rights and the 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 2 

prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the United States and Ohio 

Constitutions. Stidam relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in In re C.P. 131 Ohio St.3d 

513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that 

automatic, lifetime sex offender registration for juvenile offenders tried within the juvenile 

system violated constitutional protections against cruel and usual punishment, as well as 

constitutional rights to due process. Id. at syllabus. Stidam contends that based upon the 

reasoning of In re C.P., he should not be subject to automatic lifetime sex offender registration 

requirements for offenses he committed as a juvenile just because he was apprehended for those 

offenses after the age of 21. 

 {¶ 3} In evaluating Stidam’s claims, we determine that the facts here are distinguishable 

from those of In re C.P. At no time was Stidam tried for his crimes in the juvenile system. 

Accordingly, the reasoning and analysis presented in the Court’s decision in In re C.P. is not 

applicable under the facts here. Therefore, for those reasons and the reasons discussed below, we 

overrule Stidam’s sole assignment of error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

I. Facts and Procedural Posture

 {¶ 4} In October 2014, the Adams County Grand Jury indicted Stidam on two counts of 

rape, first degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). At the time of the indictment, 

Stidam was 22 years old. The indictment alleged that the criminal activity took place “[o]n or 

about and between April 1, 2008 and April 20, 2009[.]” Therefore, Stidam was either 15 or 16 

years old at the time when the offenses occurred. The indictment stated that at the time of the 

offenses the victim was a minor under the age of 10. 

 {¶ 5} Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, in September 2015, Stidam pleaded 

guilty to two amended counts of sexual battery, second degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 3 

2907.03(A)(1). At the change of plea hearing, Stidam admitted on the record that between April 

2008 and April 2009, on two occasions, he coerced his eight or nine year old cousin to put his 

penis in her mouth. The trial court accepted Stidam’s guilty pleas and found him guilty of the 

offenses. Following his guilty pleas, Stidam filed a motion requesting that the trial court (1) 

declare the adult sex offender classification statutes unconstitutional; and (2) decline to classify 

him under those statutes. In the motion, Stidam argued that the adult sex offender classifications 

as applied to him, an adult indicted for crimes he committed as a juvenile, violated his right to 

due process and constituted cruel and usual punishment. The State filed a response to Stidam’s 

motion. 

 {¶ 6} The trial court never filed a separate entry overruling Stidam’s motion. Instead, 

during the sentencing hearing on October 2, 2015, the trial court indicated that it declined 

Stidam’s motion. The trial court stated: 

I do find though, however, the arguments made to be very compelling of this 

exception that we have in this case as I see it, but otherwise the court sees that it is 

a tier 3 sex offender registrant and at this time I’m not adopting either individually 

to constitutionally challenge the constitutionality or to challenge the jurisdiction 

of an unconstitutional statue [sic]. I’m not going to at this time in this case adopt 

that invitation. While inviting, certainly inviting as I read the memorandum, at 

this time, the court will decline on that. 

The trial court sentenced Stidam to an aggregate five-year prison term. Because of Stidam’s 

violation of R.C. 2907.03, the trial court classified him as a Tier III sex offender. 

 {¶ 7} Stidam now asserts this timely appeal challenging his classification as a Tier III sex 

offender. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 4 

II. Assignment of Error 

 {¶ 8} Stidam assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review: 

The trial court erred by requiring Aaron Stidam to register for life as a Tier III Sex 

Offender for an offense he committed as a child. Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the 

Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a) and 2950.07(B)(1); Sentencing Entry 

(Oct. 2, 2015); T.p. 15 (Oct. 2, 2015). 

III. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, Stidam contends that, as applied to him—an adult 

indicted for offenses he committed as a juvenile—his Tier III sex offender classification violates 

the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment and the due process protections contained in 

the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. Stidam primarily relies on the Ohio 

Supreme Court’s recent decision In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 

729. In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that “[t]o the extent that it imposes automatic, 

lifelong registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the 

juvenile system, R.C. 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment contained in the [United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution] and the Due 

Process Clause [contained in the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution]* * *[.]” 

Id. at syllabus. Stidam claims that based on In re C.P., mandatory lifetime registration 

requirements for offenses committed as a juvenile also violate his right to due process and the 

prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. 

 {¶ 10} Specifically, Stidam contends that based on the factors examined by the Court in 

In re C.P. we should declare his Tier III sex offender classification unconstitutional for the 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 5 

following reasons: (1) a child is just as culpable for a sex offense if he is apprehended 

immediately or seven years later; (2) lifetime registration for a childhood offense is equally 

severe regardless of when the child is apprehended; (3) the modern juvenile system is almost as 

punitive as the adult system; (4) lifetime registration inhibits rehabilitation regardless of when a 

person is charged for a childhood offense; (5) lifetime registration serves the goal of 

accountability equally poorly regardless of when a child is charged; (6) lifetime registration is a 

poor deterrent for a child regardless of when charges are filed; and (7) the need for retribution is 

the same regardless of when a child is charged. 

 {¶ 11} The State contends that Stidam’s classification as a Tier III sex offender should be 

upheld because (1) he is not a juvenile offender because R.C. 2151.23(I) exempted him from the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the common pleas court; (2) lifetime sex offender 

registration neither constitutes cruel and unusual punishment nor violates Stidam’s rights to due 

process and fundamental fairness; and (3) lifetime registration is mandatory pursuant to R.C. 

2950.01 et seq. 

A. Ohio’s Sex Offender Registration 

 {¶ 12} In 2007, the General Assembly enacted the Adam Walsh Act, which “repealed 

Megan’s Law, effective January 1, 2008, and replaced it with new standards for sex-offender 

classification and registration pursuant to the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 

Act, Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code.” Bundy v. State, 143 Ohio St.3d 237, 2015-Ohio2138, 36 N.E.3d 158, ¶ 5. The implementation of the Adam Walsh Act transformed the nature of 

the sex offender registration statutes from remedial to punitive. State v. Metcalf, 12th Dist. 

Warren No. CA2015-03-022, 2016-Ohio-4923, ¶ 19, citing State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 

344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 21. “Because the AWA is punitive, and thus imposes 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 6 

a punishment, the possibility exists that a sexual offender may be deprived of a protected liberty 

interest by virtue of his classification.” Metcalf at ¶ 19. This scheme, which the General 

Assembly codified in R.C. Chapter 2950, divides sex offenders into Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III 

sex or child-victim offenders. R.C. 2950.01(E) through (G). The sex offender’s classification is 

automatically determined by the offense for which a person is convicted and the judge has no 

discretion to modify the classification. State v. Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio4624, 48 N.E.3d 516, ¶ 11. The duration of the offender’s obligation to update his or her personal 

information for the registry, as well as the frequency of that duty, depends upon his or her tier 

classification. 

 {¶ 13} For Tier III sex offenders, the act requires registration and verification of the 

offender’s address every 90 days for the remainder of their lifetime. R.C. 2950.06(B)(3). Here, 

Stidam was convicted of two counts of sexual battery, second degree felonies, in violation of 

R.C. 2907.03(A)(1). Pursuant to R.C. 2950.01(G)(a), the trial court classified Stidam as a Tier III 

sex offender. R.C. 2950.01(G)(a) states, “ ‘Tier III sex offender/child-victim offender’ means 

any of the following: (a) A violation of section 2907.02 or 2907.03 of the Revised Code.” 

B. In Re C.P.

 {¶ 14} In In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729 the Ohio 

Supreme Court determined: 

To the extent that it imposes automatic, lifelong registration and notification 

requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system, R.C. 

2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, and the Due Process Clause of the 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 7 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio 

Constitution, Article I, Section 16. 

Id. at syllabus. 

 {¶ 15} In In re C.P., 15 year old juvenile was charged in a multi-count indictment 

including charges of rape and kidnapping with sexual motivation. Id. at ¶ 2. The appellant 

remained in the juvenile system throughout the proceedings. Id. at ¶ 6. Eventually, the appellant 

entered an admission to each charge of the indictment. Id. at ¶ 7. The juvenile court found 

appellant to be a delinquent child and designated him as a serious youthful offender (“SYO”) 

pursuant to R.C. 2152.13(A)(4)(b). The trial court sentenced appellant to a three-year 

commitment to the Ohio Department of Youth Services and a five-year aggregate prison term. 

Id. The prison term was stayed pending appellant’s successful completion of his juvenile 

sentence. Id. Pursuant to R.C. 2152.86, the court classified appellant as a public-registryqualified-juvenile-offender registrant (“PRQJOR”) and automatically classified him as Tier III 

sex offender. Id. at ¶ 8. 

 {¶ 16} On appeal, appellant argued that R.C. 2152.86 violated his rights to due process 

and equal protection and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at ¶ 9. 

Throughout its analysis regarding the cruel and unusual punishment and due process issues, the 

Court focused on appellant’s placement within the juvenile system. The Ohio Supreme Court 

stated in In re C.P. that “the nature of an SYO disposition requires that the juvenile remain under 

the continuing jurisdiction of a juvenile judge[.]” Id. at ¶ 24. The Court explained: 

“ ‘A juvenile charged as a potential serious youthful offender does not face 

bindover to an adult court; the case remains in the juvenile court. Under R.C. 

2152.11(A), a juvenile defendant who commits certain acts is eligible for “a more 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 8 

restrictive disposition.’ That ‘more restricted disposition’ is a ‘serious youthful 

offender’ disposition and includes what is known as a blended sentence—a 

traditional juvenile disposition coupled with the imposition of a stayed adult 

sentence. R.C. 2152.13. The adult sentence remains stayed unless the juvenile 

fails to successfully complete his or her traditional juvenile disposition. R.C. 

2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii). Theoretically, the threat of the imposition of an adult 

sentence encourages a juvenile’s cooperation in his own rehabilitation, 

functioning as both carrot and stick.” 

[State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209] at ¶ 18.

Only further bad acts by the juvenile as he is rehabilitated in the juvenile system 

can cause the stayed adult penalty to be invoked: 

Any adult sentence that the trial court imposes through R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i) 

is only a potential sentence—it is stayed pursuant to R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii) 

“pending the successful completion of the traditional juvenile dispositions 

imposed.” R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(ii) requires the court to impose a juvenile 

disposition when it imposes an adult sentence; how the juvenile responds to that 

disposition will determine whether the stay is lifted on the adult sentence. 

Id. at ¶ 30. 

R.C. 2152.86 changes the very nature of an SYO disposition, imposing an adult 

penalty immediately upon the adjudication. The juvenile is not given the 

opportunity to avoid the adult portion of his punishment by successfully 

completing his juvenile rehabilitation. Instead, he must comply with all of S.B. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 9 

10’s reporting and notification requirements for Tier III sexual offenders 

contained in R.C. Chapter 2950. 

In re C.P. at ¶¶ 14-16. 

 {¶ 17} The issue Stidam now presents is whether the holding of In re C.P. also applies to 

offenders who committed offenses as juveniles but were tried as adults because they were 

apprehended after they turned 21 years old. Stidam presents the same arguments for his 

contentions that the Tier III classification violates both constitutional due process protections and 

constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. However, we will address each 

constitutional argument separately. 

C. Standard of Review 

 {¶ 18} Stidam’s argument here on appeal challenges his Tier III sex offender 

classification pursuant to R.C. 2950.01(G)(a) as unconstitutional. Such a “challenge focuses on 

the particular application of the statute.” State v. Carrick, 131 Ohio St.3d 340, 965 N.E.2d 264, 

2012–Ohio–608, ¶ 16. “A statute may be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis that it is 

invalid on its face or as applied to a particular set of facts.” State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 

861 N.E.2d 512, 2007–Ohio–606, ¶ 17. Here, Stidam challenges the statute as unconstitutional as 

applied to him, i.e., an adult indicted for offenses he committed as a juvenile. 

 {¶ 19} “[S]tatutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.” State v. Hoover, 123 

Ohio St.3d 418, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056, ¶ 8. “A statute will be upheld unless the 

challenger can meet the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is 

unconstitutional.” Id. We use a de novo standard of review to assess errors based upon violations 

of constitutional law. State v. Burgette, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA50, 2014-Ohio-3483, ¶ 10. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 10 

D. Stidam’s Classification as a Tier III Sex Offender Does Not Violate His Right to Due 

Process.

 {¶ 20} First, we will address Stidam’s claim that his classification as a Tier III sex 

offender violates the due process clauses of both the United States and Ohio Constitution. “The 

right to procedural due process is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Rohrer, 4th Dist. Ross 

No. 14CA3471, 2015-Ohio-5333, ¶ 20. (Other citations omitted). In State ex rel. Hattie v. 

Goldhardt, 69 Ohio St.3d 123, 630 N.E.2d 696 (1994), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed due 

process rights as follows: 

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law * * *.’ Hence, the Due Process Clause 

applies ‘only if a government action will constitute the impairment of some 

individual’s life, liberty, or property.’ ” 2 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on 

Constitutional Law (1992) 580, Section 17.2. 

Id. at 125. 

 {¶ 21} It is clear that Stidam was approximately 15 or 16 years old when he committed 

the offenses of sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1). Because Stidam was indicted 

after he turned 21 years old, he was subject to the jurisdiction of the general division of the 

common pleas court. R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) exempts from the definition of a child “[a]ny person 

who, while under eighteen years of age, commits an act that would be a felony if committed by 

an adult and who is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person 

attains twenty-one years of age * * *.” Also, R.C. 2151.23(I), the statute addressing the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court, states: 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 11 

If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an act that would be a 

felony if committed by an adult and if the person is not taken into custody or 

apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the 

juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine any portion of the 

case charging the person with committing that act. In those circumstances, * * * 

the case charging the person with committing the act shall be a criminal 

prosecution commenced and heard in the appropriate court having jurisdiction of 

the offense as if the person had been eighteen years of age or older when the 

person committed the act. All proceedings pertaining to the act shall be within the 

jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and that court has all 

the authority and duties in the case as it has in other criminal cases in that court. 

(Emphasis Added.) Accordingly, Stidam pleaded guilty in the general division of the common 

pleas court and was subject to an adult sentence. 

 {¶ 22} In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court separately analyzed appellant’s due process 

and cruel and unusual punishment claims. The Court found that “R.C. 2152.86’s automatic 

imposition of an adult punishment- lifetime reporting and notification- stands in contrast to the 

R.C. 2152.14 process for invoking the adult portion of the sentence in an SYO disposition.” Id.

at ¶ 79. Accordingly, the Court determined that the automatic imposition of lifetime sex offender 

registration requirements interfered with a juvenile judge’s discretion in an SYO disposition, 

resulting in a violation of due process. Id. at ¶¶ 83-86. The Court explained and concluded the 

following: 

Again, we are dealing with juveniles who remain in the juvenile system through 

the decision of a juvenile judge—a decision made through the balancing of the 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 12 

factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(B)—that the juvenile at issue is amenable to the 

rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system. The protections and rehabilitative 

aims of the juvenile process must remain paramount; we must recognize that 

juvenile offenders are less culpable and more amenable to reform than adult 

offenders. 

The requirement in R.C. 2152.86 of automatic imposition of Tier III classification 

on a juvenile offender who receives an SYO dispositional sentence undercuts the 

rehabilitative purpose of Ohio’s juvenile system and eliminates the important role 

of the juvenile court’s discretion in the disposition of juvenile offenders and thus 

fails to meet the due process requirement of fundamental fairness. In D.H., 120 

Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 59, we held that because of the 

central role of the juvenile judge in a juvenile’s rehabilitative process, 

fundamental fairness did not require the same jury-trial rights for juveniles as we 

required for adults in Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. 

In this case, we determine that fundamental fairness is not a one-way street that 

allows only for an easing of due process requirements for juveniles; instead, 

fundamental fairness may require, as it does in this case, additional procedural 

safeguards for juveniles in order to meet of the juvenile system’s goals of 

rehabilitation and reintegration into society. 

Id. at ¶¶ 84-85. 

{¶ 23} Here, Stidam was not determined to be a serious youth offender or even 

adjudicated within the juvenile system. Thus, the In re C.P. decision is clearly distinguishable 

from the present case. Nonetheless, Stidam contends the automatic, non-discretionary nature of 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 13 

his Tier III classification for offenses he committed as a juvenile still violates due process. We 

disagree. 

 {¶ 24} As the aforementioned citations to In re C.P. demonstrate, the Ohio Supreme 

Court repeatedly referenced the protections and rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile system, as 

well as the important role of the juvenile judge’s discretion in sentencing. Because Stidam was 

indicted as an adult, those aspects of the juvenile system are simply not applicable here. It was 

C.P.’s status as an SYO and his disposition in the juvenile system that led the Court to find that 

automatic, lifetime registration “undercuts the rehabilitative purpose of Ohio’s juvenile system 

and eliminates the important role of the juvenile court’s discretion in the disposition of juvenile 

offender.” Id. at ¶ 85. Fundamentally contrasting, Stidam was adjudicated in the general division 

of the common pleas court in the adult court. Although Stidam was indicted for crimes he 

committed as a juvenile, we find the fact that he was indicted at the age of 22 is crucial; and we 

decline to extend the reasoning articulated in In re C.P. to the facts here. Thus, we conclude that 

Stidam’s Tier III classification does not violate his right to due process. 

 {¶ 25} Furthermore, R.C. 2151.23(I), the statute requiring Stidam to be subject to adult 

adjudication, has been upheld as constitutional. The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2151.23(I) 

as part of a series of amendments to the juvenile statutes in 1997. State v. Chavis, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 15AP-557, 2015-Ohio-5549, ¶ 21. “These changes to the statutory scheme 

effectively removed anyone over 21 years of age from juvenile-court jurisdiction, regardless of 

the date on which the person allegedly committed the offense.” State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 

437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 14. This rule of law in Ohio and the statutes that codify 

it has previously been challenged as unconstitutional. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 14 

 {¶ 26} In Walls, the defendant Walls was indicted in 1998 for aggravated murder. Id. at ¶ 

6. Walls was 29 years old at the time of the indictment. The murder occurred in 1985, when 

Walls was only 15 years old. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 5. “Even though Walls was a minor at the time of the 

alleged murder, the versions of R.C. 2151.011(B)(6)(c) and 2151.23(I) then in effect allowed the 

state to try Walls as an adult.” Id. at ¶ 6. Walls moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the 

1985 version of R.C. 2151.011(B)(1) should control his disposition rather than the 1997 

amended statutes. “Under the 1985 law, Walls could not be tried as an adult until a juvenile court 

had first bound him over for trial to the general division of the court of common pleas.” Walls at 

¶ 6, citing former R.C. 2151.011(B)(1), 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 584. On appeal, “[Walls] argued 

that the court of common pleas, general division, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 

case because the amended statutes were unconstitutionally retroactive as they violated his right 

to a bindover proceeding in juvenile court.” State v. Adams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-83, 

2012-Ohio-5088, ¶ 16, citing Walls at ¶ 8. 

 {¶ 27} The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statutory amendments as constitutional. The 

Court determined that the statutes did not impair any substantive rights because Walls did not 

have a substantive right to a juvenile bindover proceeding under prior law. Walls at ¶ 19. The 

Court explained: 

The 1997 changes to R.C. Chapter 2151 did not impair any of Walls’s vested 

rights within the meaning of our retroactivity jurisprudence. Although the 1997 

amendments to the juvenile statutes allowed criminal prosecution without the 

bindover proceeding required under the 1985 law, we cannot characterize this 

change as anything other than remedial. Even under the law in effect in 1985, 

Walls was subject to criminal prosecution in the general division of a court of 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 15 

common pleas if the juvenile court made certain determinations specified by 

statute. See former R.C. 2151.26(A) and (E), 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 585–586. 

Thus, under either the 1985 law or the 1997 law, Walls was on notice that the 

offense he allegedly committed could subject him to criminal prosecution as an 

adult in the general division of **838 the court of common pleas. The 1997 law 

merely removed the procedural prerequisite of a juvenile-court proceeding. Even 

though they may have an occasional substantive effect on past conduct, “it is 

generally true that laws that relate to procedures are ordinarily remedial in 

nature.” Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 411, 700 N.E.2d 570; see, also, In re Nevius

(1963), 174 Ohio St. 560, 564, 23 O.O.2d 239, 191 N.E.2d 166. 

Walls at ¶ 17. 

 {¶ 28} In State v. Warren, 118 Ohio St.3d 200, 2008-Ohio-2011, 887 N.E.2d 1145, the 

Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether “due process is violated when the defendant receives a 

mandatory term of life imprisonment for forcible rape of a victim under age 13 when the 

defendant was 15 years of age at the time of the offense but not prosecuted until he had passed 

the age of 21.” Id. at ¶ 1. The defendant specifically challenged R.C. 2152.02(C)(3), which 

required that because he was not apprehended until after he had reached 21 years of age, he 

cannot be considered “a child” in relation to the offenses in that case. Id. at ¶ 29. The Court also 

stated that R.C. 2151.23(I) and R.C. 2152.12(J) were relevant to its analysis because the statutes 

“reiterate the clear legislative intent underlying R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) that once an offender reaches 

21 years of age, he is to be prosecuted as an adult, regardless of his age when the acts were 

committed. Id. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 16 

 {¶ 29} In the lead opinion garnering three votes, the Court, relying on its decision in 

Walls, held that R.C. 2152.02(C)(2), 2151.23(I), and 2152.12(J) did not affect a substantial right 

because the defendant was on notice that the offenses he allegedly committed could subject him 

to criminal prosecution as an adult in the general division of the court of commons pleas. Warren

at ¶ 46, citing Walls. Accordingly, the Court overruled Warren’s arguments that the challenged 

statutes violated his rights to due process and fundamental fairness. Id. at ¶ 58. The Court 

concluded: 

Walls is not directly on point with this case because it did not involve a due 

process argument based upon principles of fundamental fairness. However, the 

similarities between the situation in this case and in Walls are substantial, and the 

essential principles that emerge from Walls make it impossible for Warren to 

prevail on his due process argument. 

Most important, as in Walls, the application of the statutes requiring that Warren 

be tried as an adult in common pleas court (in this case, R.C. 2152.02(C)(3), 

2151.23(I), and 2152.12(J)) cannot be viewed as affecting a substantive right 

because under either the 1985 bindover law or the 1997 law that was applied to 

him, Warren was on notice that the offense[s] he allegedly committed could 

subject him to criminal prosecution as an adult in the general division of the court 

of common pleas. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, at 

¶ 17. 

In addition, Walls stands squarely in the way of any argument that Warren might 

make about the lack of a bindover hearing in his case, because although Warren 

“perhaps remained eligible for retention within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 17 

court under a technical reading of the old statutes, the practical reality is that [he] 

had virtually no chance of being kept in the juvenile system.” Walls, at ¶ 31. As in 

Walls, any bindover hearing under the statute that was in place in 1988 would 

have been simply a procedural step in the process of transferring Warren for 

prosecution as an adult. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 

829, at ¶ 41. 

Warren does not explicitly argue that he was prejudiced by the absence of a 

bindover hearing or that the juvenile court should have retained jurisdiction over 

his case. Instead, he claims to have been prejudiced by the trial court’s inability to 

consider his age at the time of the offenses in sentencing him for rape. Warren 

argues that he would have received more favorable treatment if he had been 

charged with rape while still a juvenile and that that favorable treatment should 

extend to the rape conviction in this case. Those arguments are significantly 

undercut by Walls, in which this court held that no substantive rights are affected 

in this situation. Id. at ¶ 19. 

Warren at ¶¶ 48-51. 

 {¶ 30} Other Ohio appellate districts have rejected constitutional challenges to the 

statutes at issue in Warren and Wells. See State v. Scharr, 5th Dist. No. 2003CA00129, 2004-

Ohio-1631, ¶¶ 27, 29 (rejecting defendant’s claims that R.C. 2151.23(I) violated due process and 

fundamental fairness because “changing the jurisdiction from the juvenile to the general division 

of the common pleas court did not involve any substantive right” and finding no equal protection 

violation for R.C. 2151.23(I).); see also State v. Fortson, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0031, 

2012-Ohio-3118 (rejecting defendant’s arguments that R.C. 2151.23(I) violated his fundamental 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 18 

right to be tried in a juvenile court because it would conflict with the holdings in Walls, Schaar, 

and Warren.) Adams, 2012-Ohio-5088 at ¶ 20 (rejecting defendant’s claims that R.C. 

2152.02(C)(2), R.C. 2151.23(I), and R.C. 2152.12(J) violated principles of due process and equal 

protection). 

 {¶ 31} Therefore, considering the critical factual distinctions between this case and In re

C.P. and the above authority rejecting due process challenges to R.C. 2151.23(I), we do not find 

that Stidam’s Tier III sex offender classification violated his right to due process under either the 

United States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution. 

D. Stidam’s Classification as a Tier III Sex Offender Does Not Violate Constitutional 

Protections Against Cruel And Unusual Punishment.

1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the United States Constitution. 

 {¶ 32} Stidam also argues that his mandatory lifetime Tier III sex offender registration 

requirements, for offenses he committed as a juvenile, violate the prohibitions against cruel and 

unusual punishments contained in both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. 

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall not be 

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” “Central to 

the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is the ‘precept of justice that 

punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” In re C.P., 131 

Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 25, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 

U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). “As applied to juveniles, the United States 

Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty 

and the imposition of life without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses.” State v. 

Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, ¶ 8, citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 19 

551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 

176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). More recently, the Eighth Amendment was held to ban mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences on juveniles in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 

L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).

 {¶ 33} Addressing challenges based upon cruel and unusual punishments under the 

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: 

 The United States Supreme Court has observed that its cases addressing 

proportionality fall into two categories. The first involves “challenges to the 

length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case.” 

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). 

The second involves categorical restrictions that, until Graham, applied only in 

capital cases. The second approach traditionally involves “cases in which the 

Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions 

on the death penalty.” Id. These restrictions include a prohibition on the death 

penalty for nonhomicide crimes, for defendants who committed the crime before 

the age of 18, and for defendants with low mental functioning. See Kennedy v. 

Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (prohibiting 

death as a punishment for nonhomicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 

125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for 

defendants who committed crimes before turning 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 

304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for 

persons with low intellectual functioning). 

Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d 516, at ¶ 18. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 20 

 {¶ 34} In addition to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in In re C.P., Stidam also cites 

the reasoning in the United States Supreme Court cases of Graham, Miller, and Roper in support 

of his argument. In Graham, the Court held that a juvenile offender should not be punished with 

a sentence of life without parole. The Court concluded: 

 In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for 

juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of 

juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences 

all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel 

and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not 

commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without 

parole. This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without 

parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not 

sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment. Because “[t]he age of 18 is the 

point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 

adulthood,” those who were below that age when the offense was committed may 

not be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime. Roper, 543 U.S., 

at 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183. 

Id. at 74-75. 

 {¶ 35} In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life imprisonment 

without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The Court explained: 

To start with the first set of cases: Roper and Graham establish that 

children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 21 

Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, 

we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” 

Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. Those cases relied 

on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “ 

‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” leading to 

recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 

S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable * * * to 

negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and 

peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the 

ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And 

third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less 

fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” 

Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1183. 

* * * 

 We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing 

scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile 

offenders. Cf. Graham, 560 U.S., at ––––, 130 S.Ct., at 2030 (“A State is not 

required to guarantee eventual freedom,” but must provide “some meaningful 

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 

rehabilitation”). By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to 

imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk 

of disproportionate punishment. Because that holding is sufficient to decide these 

cases, we do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 22 

Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, 

or at least for those 14 and younger. But given all we have said in Roper, 

Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and 

heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing 

juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially 

so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of 

distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender whose crime 

reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender 

whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Roper, 543 U.S., at 573, 125 S.Ct. 

1183; Graham, 560 U.S., at ––––, 130 S.Ct., at 2026–2027. Although we do not 

foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we 

require it to take into account how children are different, and how those 

differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. 

* * * 

 Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear 

that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating 

circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By 

requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration 

without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related 

characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes 

before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth 

Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 

Miller at 2464-2465, 2469, and 2475. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 23 

 {¶ 36} In In re C.P., in addition to concluding that the automatic imposition of lifetime 

registration for juvenile SYO offenders violates due process, the Ohio Supreme Court also found 

that it violates the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments contained in the United 

States and Ohio Constitutions. Id., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶¶ 

58, 68. The In re C.P. court first determined that the national consensus disfavored publication of 

juvenile sex offenders’ personal information. Id. at ¶¶ 30-37. Then, the Court conducted an 

independent review of the factors considered by the United States Supreme Court in Graham, 

including the culpability of the offenders, the nature of the offenses, the severity of the 

punishment and the penological justifications. Id. at ¶¶ 38-58. 

 {¶ 37} The Court concluded: 

 In sum, the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders who 

remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the severity of lifetime 

registration and notification requirements of PRQJOR status, and the inadequacy 

of penological theory to justify the punishment all lead to the conclusion that the 

lifetime registration and notification requirements in R.C. 2152.86 are cruel and 

unusual. We thus hold that for a juvenile offender who remains under the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the Eighth Amendment forbids the automatic 

imposition of lifetime sex-offender registration and notification requirements. 

Id. at ¶ 58.

 {¶ 38} Two Ohio appellate courts have addressed whether automatic Tier III sex offender 

classification and registration requirements for juvenile offenders who were tried as adults 

violate due process rights and the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. In State v. 

Reidenbach, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2014CA0019, 2015-Ohio-2915, the 17 year old defendant, 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 24 

Reidenbach, was indicted on twenty counts of rape and twenty counts of gross sexual imposition. 

Id. at ¶ 1. Reidenbach was bound over from the juvenile division to the general division of the 

common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(B) and R.C. 2152.12, at the juvenile division’s 

discretion. Id. at ¶ 33. Reidenbach pleaded guilty to three counts of gross sexual imposition. Id. 

at ¶ 2. The trial court sentenced Reidenbach to an aggregate term of ten years in prison. Id. The 

trial court also classified Reidenbach as a Tier III sex offender. Id. On appeal, Reidenbach 

argued that the Tier III sex offender registration requirement under R.C. 2950.01(G)(1) was 

unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 

Id. at ¶ 15. 

 {¶ 39} The Fifth District Court of Appeals declined to extend the reasoning in Graham, 

Miller, and In re C.P. to the facts of that case.1

 The court stated, “The juvenile court provided 

appellant with due process, holding a probable cause hearing and amenability hearings before 

making its determination [to bind defendant over to the general division of the common pleas 

court.]” Reidenbach at ¶ 33. The Fifth District also distinguished In re C.P. from the facts in 

Reidenbach because “* * *the C.P. case applied to juveniles deemed juvenile offender 

registrants who remained in the juvenile system.” Reidenbach at ¶ 33. 

 {¶ 40} In State v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102783, 2016-Ohio-922, the Eighth 

District Court of Appeals also declined to extend the reasoning of In re C.P. to a case where a 

juvenile was bound over to the general division of the common pleas court. Id. at ¶¶ 27-29. The 

defendant, Martin, was 16 years old when he was indicted on two counts of aggravated robbery, 

two counts of kidnapping, and two counts of rape. Id. at ¶ 4. The State filed a mandatory 

 

1

 Because appellant failed to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory scheme at the trial 

court level, the Fifth District reviewed the constitutional issue under appellant’s ineffective 

assistance argument presented in another assignment of error. Reidenbach at ¶¶ 16-17. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 25 

bindover motion pursuant to Juv.R. 20 and R.C. 2152.12. Id. at ¶ 5. The juvenile court held a 

hearing, found probable cause that Martin committed the offenses, and transferred the case to the 

adult court. Id. Martin pleaded guilty to an amended indictment including one count of rape in 

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A). Id. at ¶ 7. As a part of the Martin’s sentence, he was classified as a 

Tier III sex offender. 

 {¶ 41} On appeal, Martin argued that automatic Tier III classification for a juvenile 

offender is unconstitutional because (1) it violated his due process rights and (2) it amounted to 

cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. The Eighth District stated that the “* * *problem 

with Martin’s arguments is that he was not in juvenile court.” (Emphasis sic). The court stated, 

“In enacting the mandatory bindover statutes, the legislature ‘single[d] out older juvenile’ 

offenders, ‘who are potentially more street-wise, hardened, dangerous, and violent.’ ” Id. at 18, 

quoting State v. Lane, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3144, 2014-Ohio-2010, ¶ 67. The court 

observed that Martin was not challenging the bindover and Ohio Courts have found the 

mandatory bindover statute to be constitutional. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. 

 {¶ 42} The Eighth District found that the reasoning behind the Ohio Supreme Court’s 

decision of In re C.P., i.e, that the automatic, lifetime registration and notifications of R.C. 

2152.86 frustrated two of the fundamental elements of juvenile rehabilitation: confidentiality and 

the avoidance of stigma, did not apply under the facts of that case. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27, quoting In re

C.P. at ¶ 67. With regards to Martin’s cruel and unusual punishment arguments, the Eighth 

District stated: “The flaw in Martin’s argument is that he is trying to equate a death sentence or a 

life sentence without the possibility of parole with having to register as a sex offender for life. It 

is illogical to do so and, as such, we decline to extend the reasoning in the three United States 

Supreme Court cases to the facts present here.” Id. at ¶ 21 (addressing Martin’s reliance on 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 26 

Roper, Graham, and Miller). Accordingly, the court rejected Martin’s argument that his Tier III 

sex offender classification violated his right to due process or constituted cruel and unusual 

punishment. Id. at ¶ 29. 

 {¶ 43} In the case sub judice, we have already noted the distinguishing fact here 

compared to the facts of In re C.P., i.e. that Stidam was not adjudicated within the juvenile 

system, but was indicted as an adult for offenses he committed as a juvenile. This is a critical 

distinction. Although, considering Stidam’s cruel and unusual punishment argument, the facts 

here present a close question. Because Stidam committed the offenses as a juvenile, he possessed 

a diminished culpability like the offenders of In re C.P., Graham, and Miller. However, in In re

C.P., the Court relied heavily on the defendant’s status within the juvenile system in regards to 

analyzing the severity of the punishment and the penological justifications under Graham.

 {¶ 44} Regarding the severity of the punishment, the court in In re C.P. found: 

For juveniles, the length of the punishment is extraordinary, and it is imposed at 

an age at which the character of the offender is not yet fixed. Registration and 

notification necessarily involve stigmatization. For a juvenile offender, the stigma 

of the label of sex offender attaches at the start of his adult life and cannot be 

shaken. With no other offense is the juvenile’s wrongdoing announced to the 

world. Before a juvenile can even begin his adult life, before he has a chance to 

live on his own, the world will know of his offense. He will never have a chance 

to establish a good character in the community. He will be hampered in his 

education, in his relationships, and in his work life. His potential will be 

squelched before it has a chance to show itself. A juvenile—one who remains 

under the authority of the juvenile court and has thus been adjudged 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 27 

redeemable—who is subject to sex-offender notification will have his entire life 

evaluated through the prism of his juvenile adjudication. It will be a constant 

cloud, a once-every-three-month reminder to himself and the world that he cannot 

escape the mistakes of his youth. 

Id. at ¶ 45. 

 {¶ 45} Here, although Stidam committed his crimes as a juvenile, he was indicted as a 

22-year-old adult. The legislature, pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(I), determined that he should be 

subject to punishment as an adult. Tier III registration requires Stidam to register and verify his 

address every 90 days for the rest of his life. Stidam plead guilty to a violation of R.C. 

2907.03(A)(1), which admits that he engaged in sexual conduct with another as the result of 

knowingly coercing his victim to submit by any means that would prevent resistance by a person 

of ordinary resolution. The victim in this case was Stidam’s eight to nine year old cousin. 

 {¶ 46} In examining the severity of the punishment in In re C.P., the Court noted the 

timing of the punishment and the impact on a SYO juvenile offender tried within the juvenile 

system. Here, the timing and the impact of the punishment differ because Stidam was indicted 

some six to seven years after he committed his crimes. Accordingly, the Tier III registration 

requirements have a distinguishing impact on him as a 22-year-old than the requirements did on 

a 15-year-old SYO offender tried within the juvenile system. 

 {¶ 47} Concerning the penological justifications, the court in In re C.P. examined the 

goals of juvenile disposition under R.C. 2152.01 and the considerations set forth in Graham: 

retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” The court found that lifetime 

registration requirements run contrary to the goals of R.C. 2152.01 and the goals articulated in 

Graham. In re C.P. at ¶¶ 47-49. Specifically, the court stated, “We conclude that the social and 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 28 

economic effects of automatic, lifetime registration and notification, coupled with an increased 

chance of re-offense, do violence to the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court process.” Id. at ¶ 

57. 

 {¶ 48} The purposes of juvenile disposition in R.C. 2152.01(A) are: “to provide for the 

care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect 

the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the 

victim, and rehabilitate the offender.” In comparison, the purposes of adult sentencing in R.C. 

2929.11(A) are “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish 

the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes 

without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” Stidam 

contends that the modern juvenile system is almost as punitive as the adult system. Stidam 

argues that the penological goals are the same regardless of when the offender was charged. 

 {¶ 49} Still, the critical distinction between this case and the facts of In re C.P. remain 

significant. The goals of sentencing in the adult court differ, however minute Stidam contends 

that they are, with the goals of the juvenile system. The stated purpose of the tiered sex offender 

classification is “to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state.” R.C. 

2950.02(B). Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged, “that sex-offender registration 

schemes have been criticized on the ground that they do not actually serve the intended purpose 

of community protection.” Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d 516, at 

¶ 29. However, the court also stated, “the penological grounds for imposing such requirements 

are still accepted in many quarters and are justified in part based upon the perceived high rate of 

recidivism and resistance to treatment among sex offenders.” Id. at ¶ 30. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 29 

 {¶ 50} Although the facts in Martin and Reidenbach are distinguishable from the facts at 

issue here, we find the courts’ reasoning and conclusions in those cases persuasive. The uniting 

connection between Martin, Reidenbach, and the case sub judice is that statutes, the bindover 

procedures in Martin and Reidenbach and R.C. 2151.23(I) here, prevented the defendants from 

being subject to juvenile system and thus outside the bounds of the Ohio Supreme Court’s 

analysis in In re C.P.

 {¶ 51} In conclusion, we find that Stidam’s Tier III sex offender classification is not 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

There is a critical distinction between the concerns of sentencing within the juvenile court and 

sentencing within the adult court. Therefore, we are not persuaded to extend the ruling of In re

C.P. and find that automatic Tier III sex offender requirements, for an adult indicted for offenses 

he committed as a juvenile, constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment under Ohio Law 

{¶ 52} The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, contains its own prohibition against 

cruel and unusual punishment. It provides unique protection for Ohioans. 

 The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of 

individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where 

applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may 

not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the United 

States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of 

Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and 

protections to individuals and groups. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 30 

Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

Thus, the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, provides protection independent of the 

protection provided by the Eighth Amendment. 

{¶ 53} In its own jurisprudence regarding Article I, Section 9, the Ohio Supreme Court 

has recognized that cases involving cruel and unusual punishments are rare, “limited to those 

involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any 

reasonable person.” McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964). Lack of 

proportionality is a key factor: “A punishment does not violate the constitutional prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishments, if it be not so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to 

shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 282 N.E.2d 46 

(1972), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 54} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the appellant’s challenges under the Ohio 

Constitution in In re C.P stated: 

For juveniles who remain in the juvenile system, R.C. 2152.86 is striking 

in the disproportionate way it treats PRQJORs. In In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 

72, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969), this court stated that “the decided emphasis [of 

juvenile courts] should be upon individual, corrective treatment.” We trust judges 

to make the important calls in imposing the adult portion of the SYO sentence. In 

discretionary SYO cases, juvenile judges determine whether an SYO 

denomination is appropriate. But under R.C. 2152.86, the juvenile judge is given 

absolutely no discretion over the portion of the juvenile’s penalty that could 

extend for a lifetime. There is none of the important, individualized work that 

juvenile judges do. Instead, a lifetime punishment is imposed with no chance for 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 31 

reconsideration of its appropriateness for 25 years. Compared to punishments for 

other juvenile offenders, whose cases are reevaluated when their juvenile 

disposition ends and at regularly scheduled intervals thereafter, this punishment is 

disproportionate. 

Lack of proportionality is also evidenced by the very public nature of the 

penalty. The punishment of lifetime exposure for a wrong committed in childhood 

runs counter to the private nature of our juvenile court system. Confidentiality has 

always been at the heart of the juvenile justice system. That core principle is 

trampled by any requirement of public notification. Timothy E. Wind, The 

Quandary of Megan’s Law: When the Sex Offender is a Child, 37 J.Marshall 

L.Rev. 73, 117 (2003). Publicity is even more of a concern for PRQJORs, whose 

information is disseminated on the Internet. 

Id. at ¶¶ 61-62. 

 {¶ 55} In holding that R.C. 2152.86 violated the Ohio Constitution, the court concluded: 

S.B. 10 forces registration and notification requirements into a juvenile system 

where rehabilitation is paramount, confidentiality is element, and individualized 

treatment from judges is essential. The public punishments required by R.C. 

2152.86 are automatic, lifelong, and contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the 

juvenile system. We conclude that they “shock the sense of justice of the 

community” and thus violate Ohio’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishments.” 

Id. at ¶ 69. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 32 

{¶ 56} Stidam asserts a separate argument that his Tier III sex offender registration 

requirements violate the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 

Stidam contends that his case is stronger than the appellant in In re C.P. because the appellant in 

that case had the opportunity to seek relief from registration after 25 years. 

 {¶ 57} In Blankenship, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Tier II sex offender 

registration requirements for an adult, who also committed his offenses as an adult, did not 

violate the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,145 Ohio St.3d 

221, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d 516, ¶ 38. Analyzing the appellant’s argument under the Ohio 

Constitution, the court stated: 

 We are also mindful that “reviewing courts should grant substantial 

deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types 

and limits of punishments for crimes.” State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 

715 N.E.2d 167 (1999). The General Assembly has seen fit to impose registration 

sanctions in cases involving sex offenses to protect the public. Indeed, such 

sanctions now are the norm. People v. Temelkoski, 307 Mich.App. 241, 262, 859 

N.W.2d 743 (2014) (“all 50 states and the federal government have *231 enacted 

some form of sex offender registration and notification provisions”). They cannot 

be said to be shocking to the sense of justice of the community. 

 The stated legislative intent of the General Assembly in enacting S.B. 10 

is to protect the public. While some may question whether the registration 

requirements are the best way to further public safety, questions concerning the 

wisdom of legislation are for the legislature. “ ‘[W]hether the court agrees with it 

in that particular or not is of no consequence. * * * If the legislature has the 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 33 

constitutional power to enact a law, no matter whether the law be wise or 

otherwise it is no concern of the court.’ ” (Ellipsis sic.) Butler v. Jordan, 92 Ohio 

St.3d 354, 376, 750 N.E.2d 554 (2001), quoting State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 

86 Ohio St. 1, 20, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912). It is undisputed that the General 

Assembly is “ ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy’ ” and the only branch of 

government charged with fulfilling that role. Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 

Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. 

Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Dupuis, 98 

Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 21. Blankenship has not met 

his burden to show that Tier II sex-offender registration requirements are cruel 

and unusual punishment. 

Id. at ¶¶ 36-37. 

 {¶ 58} Similarly, we hold that the concerns that led the Ohio Supreme Court in In re C.P.

to conclude that the requirements of lifetime registration for SYO juveniles violated the Ohio 

Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment are not present here. By 

enacting R.C. 2151.23(I), the General Assembly intended for offenders 21 years of age to be 

prosecuted as adults and subject to adult sentences, regardless of when their acts were 

committed. An adult sentence includes the automatic imposition of lifetime registration 

requirements under a Tier III classification. Under the facts at issue here, we are not persuaded to 

overrule the will of the legislature and make an exception for certain Tier III sex offenders. 

Therefore, we do not find that Stidam’s classification as a Tier III sex offender violates the 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio 

Constitution. 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 34 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 59} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Stidam’s sole assignment of error. We find 

that the registration and address-verification requirements for Tier III offenders under R.C. 

Chapter 2950, as applied to Stidam, an adult indicted for offenses he committed as a juvenile, do 

not violate his constitutional rights to due process or his constitutional protections against cruel 

and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

 
Adams App. No. 15CA1014 35 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein 

taxed. 

The Court finds that reasonable grounds exist for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County 

Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS 

BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is 

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The 

purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an 

application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by 

this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of 

the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day 

appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. 

Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, 

the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. and *Stautberg, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 

 For the Court 

 By: 

 Marie Hoover, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and 

the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk. 

*Peter J. Stautberg, Judge of the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment of The Supreme 

Court of Ohio in the Fourth Appellate District.