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REF ID:A40267 

,_ S N I E 11-8-54 

14 September 1954 

lOP SECRET 

SPECIAL 

iilA Tse fM.· 

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

N U M B E R 11-8-54 

ESTIMATE 

PROBABLE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK 

ON THE US THROUGH MID-1957 

Submitted by the 

DmECTOR OF CENTRAL 11\'TELLIGENCE 

The following organizations participated in the preparation 

of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency; the intelli._ 

gence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, 

the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff; and The 

National Security Agency. 

Concurred in by the 

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

on 14September1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, 

Intelligence, Department of State;-the Assistant Chief of Staff, 

G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director 

for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the Director, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being 

outside of its jurisdiction . 

COPY NO. 

. ..---

TOP SECRET 
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.· ' · ... _.,,,.. ' 

DISSEMINATION NOTICE 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

, . ' _ ....... 

1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy 

is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination 

may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments: 

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of 

State 

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army 

c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy 

d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force 

e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff 

f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission 

g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 

2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. 

3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain 

· it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should 

either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 

June 1953. 

WARNING 

This material contains information affecting 

the National Defense of the . United States 

within the meaning of the espionage laws, 

Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner 

to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. 
I 

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TOP SElOREl':I? 

PROBABLE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK 

ON THE US THROUGH MID-1957 

THE PROBLEM 

To estimate the probable degree of advance warning that could be provided by 

intelligence in the event of Soviet attacks ·on the United States and key US installations overseas through mid-1957.1 

INTRODUCTORY NOTE-THE NATURE OF WARNING 

When discussing the advance warning of Soviet attack which intelligence may be 

able to provide, it is necessary to define various possible kinds of warning: 

1. Warning of the increased likelihood of war, probably resulting either from Soviet actions or Soviet reactions to Western actions, but not necessarily involving any 

direct military aspect; 

2. Warning of increasing Soviet military readiness to attack, but without definitive evidence of intent to attack or of the time of attack; 

3. Warning of clear intent to attack; 

4. Warning of clear intent to attack at or about a particular time. 

It now seems improbable that stage 4., or possibly even stage 3., would be reached conclusively except in the event of high level penetration of the Soviet command, which 

today seems unlikely, or in case of some exceptional intelligence bonus or breakthrough. While intelligence might be able to say that the USSR would be fully prepared to attack within, say 10 days, it would find it very difficult to say whether such 

preparations connoted a firm intent to attack, were primarily in anticipation of an 

expected US attack, were a deception maneuver, or were to prepare against any contingency. When we speak of degree of warning, therefore, it is important to bear in 

mind that both time and specificity are involved, and that the earlier the warning the 

less specific it is likely to be. This inverse relation between time and specificity is 

an inherent limitation of the warning function. 

'Since the Soviet attack on the US would be tantamount to general war, this estimate also deals with 

the over-all warning which the US would be likely to receive of Soviet initiation of general war. It 

does not consider the warning likely to be given by US or Allied early-warning radar. 

TOP SEOREl'f' 1 
REF ID:A40267 

' . __ .... 

TOP SElCRE'f' 2 

The fact that warning is likely to be in some degree imprecise or contingent also 

gives increased importance to other considerations affecting the warning function. 

The degree of warning which can be obtained will always be dependent on many complex factors; some of them unique to any given set of circumstances. Warning will 

depend first of all on maximum alertness and a maximum scale of continuous effort 

by intelligence. These would probably be maintained only in a period of rising tension and might be reduced, even unwittingly, if the tension ceased to rise, if there 

were intermittent periods of apparently declining danger, or if intelligence had previously given false warnings. The effectiveness of warning also depends on the continued credibility of intelligence warnings to responsible officials, for warning as a process is complete only when it is acted upon. The warning process is thus affected by 

the whole context of events in which it operates, including psychological factors and 

even pure chance. It cannot be regarded as a mechanical process which it is possible 

for intelligence to set up once and for all and which thereafter OJ?erates automatically. 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. We believe that a Soviet initiation of 

general war by attacks on the US, its 

allies, or key overseas installations would 

almost certainly be preceded by heightened political tension. While such tension would in itself constitute warning 

that war was becoming more likely, the 

indications of Soviet preparations which 

would probably be obtained could be interpreted as evidence of preparations for 

defense or as part of a war of nerves. 

Therefore, Soviet behavior in a period of 

heightened political tension would not 

necessarily give specific warning of a Soviet intention to attack. Nevertheless, 

intelligence could probably give warning 

of the USSR's increasing war readiness 

and could probably chart the trend toward a period of maximum danger. 

2. If the USSR chose to initiate war with 

full-scale land, naval, and air attacks 

after a period of mobilization, there would 

be numerous indications of military, as 

well as of economic and political measures 

necessary to prepare such attacks. We 

believe that US intelligence might be able 

to give a generalized degree of warning as 

long as four or possibly even six months 

prior to D-Day, ap.d that the minimum 

period would not be less than 30 days. 

After D-30 the number of indications 

would probably be reduced due to Soviet 

security measures, although the latter 

would themselves provide warning. From 

D-10, and especially D-5, there would 

probably be certain indications of lastminute preparations, although processing 

these on a timely basis would probably be 

difficult. As the time of attack drew 

near, indications of its approach would 

become increasingly specific. Based on 

observed Soviet military activities, warning could probably be given from a few 

hours to a few days in advance of the actual launching of the attack. 

3. In order to gain some degree of surprise, the USSR might choose to initiate 

general war by attacks of less than full 

scale, for example, by an attack on Western Europe with the forces currently stationed in East Germany, while simultaneously attacking the US and key overseas 

installations. Even so, the minimum 

preparations which the USSR would have 

'f'OP SElORE'I' 
REF ID:A40267 

· .•. ___ .·· 

'f'OF SECRE'i? 3 

to take to assemble its forces in East Germany in forward positions, to put them 

in a state of readiness to attack, and to 

provide support after the attack began 

would probably require about 15 days. 

We believe that warning of the probability 

of attack could be given about one week 

in advance, but the period might vary 

from a few hours to as much as 10 days, 

depending on the seasonal pattern of Soviet military activity. 

4. If the USSR chose to undertake a maximum-scale air attack on the US, employing the 850 long-range aircraft which we 

estimated in SNIE 11-7-54 could be 

launched for such an attack in 1954, extensive prior preparations would be required. We believe that the indicators 

would probably assume a meaningful 

pattern in time for intelligence to give 

warning 15-30 days prior to attack. 

5. We have estimated in SNIE 11-7-54 

that the bases in the Kola, Chukotski, 

and Kamchatka areas have the capacity 

of launching 300 aircraft in 1954.~ However, we do not believe that they are presently capable of doing so at short notice. 

Accordingly, we believe it virtually impossible that an attack of this scale 

launched against the US in 1954 could 

achieve a high degree of surprise. A reduced scale of attack (e.g., 50 to 100 aircraft) might, however, achieve a high degree of surprise even in 1954. 

6. By 1957 the bases, training, and equipment of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force 

'The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Naval Intelligence dissented from this 

judgment in SNIE 11-7-54 on the ground that 

intelligence is insufficient to warrant a finite 

estimate of the number of aircraft which could 

be launched; for the full text of the dissent, see 

SNIE 11-7-54, paragraph 49. 

could, by a major effort, be improved to a 

point where only minimum preparations 

would be required in advance of a maximum attack of 1,000 aircraft. In this 

case, the period of warning might be reduced to the time required for the staging 

operation at the Chukotski, Kamchatka, 

and Kola bases. Intelligence might be 

able to discover the movement of aircraft 

to the staging bases, and if this movement was in fact discovered, we believe 

that warning could be given at least 12 

hours before the attacking aircraft 

reached the early warning radar screen. 

However, if this movement was not discovered, warning of attack could be given 

only if continuous reconnaissance of the 

staging areas was being carried out. In 

such a case, the period of warning might 

be reduced to a few hours, or even virtually to zero, because of probable difficulties and delays in processing· and interpreting the results of the reconnaissance. 

7. There are two possible ways in which 

the USSR might by 1957 (and possibly 

somewhat before that year) launch an 

attack on the US in such a way that no 

specific warning would be likely before 

the actual launching of the attack: 

a. Assuming that the USSR pressed 

ahead with development of its advance 

bases in the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and 

Kola areas, and with the general preparation of its Long-Range Air Force, a 

"normal" pattern of activity involving 

these bases would tend to be established. 

Under these circumstances, a considerable number of aircraft would almost certainly be able to take off from these bases 

(and from Leningrad) for a surprise attack upon the US without any such unusual prior preparations or assembly as 

'FOP SEGRE'!' 
REF ID:A40267 

'FOP SEGRE'F 4 

would particularly attract the attention 

of Allied intelligence. 

b. Assuming that the USSR acquires an 

inflight refueling capability (which it can 

do although there is no evidence at present that the Soviet Air Force is practicing 

this technique) and develops it to the necessary degree, Soviet long-range bombers 

could be launched from home bases and. 

without staging at advanced bases, refuel 

from tanker aircraft in order to attain the 

necessary range for attacks upon the US. 

We have estimated in NIE 11--4--54 that 

the USSR could have about 550 tanker 

aircraft in mid-1957. Thus, even assuming that some mission aircraft from the 

nearer home bases such as Leningrad required no refueling, the scale of such an 

attack would probably be substantially 

less than the maximum. 

8. If the USSR, concurrently with any of 

the scales of attack discussed above. undertook offensive submarine operations 

against the US and key overseas installations, it would be necessary for the submarine fleet to proceed to wartime patrol 

stations shortly before the expected commencement of hostilities. The passage of 

these submarines. if detected, would support up to two ~·eeks warning of Soviet 

preparation for attack against the US 

and key o\·ersea.s installations. 

9. SO\iet preparations to receh·e a retaliatory blo\\ from A.Hied. e.ir power would 

probably pnwide Slime indicators of 

So\"iet attack. Minimum preparations 

would probably include the alerting of 

air defense iorces and the civil defense 

organization. preparations of military 

units and installations for air defense, the 

dispatd1ing of submarines to locate US 

cal'l"ier forces. the e\"acuation of key personnel or even considerable segments of 

population from potential target areas, 

and some measures to increase Soviet 

ability to recuperate from nuclear blows. 

If these steps we1·e taken, they would 

probably provide a warning period of as 

much as a week to 10 days, and. taken 

in conjunction with other indicators, 

would greatly increase the definiteness of 

any warning US intelligence might be 

able to give. 

DISCUSSION 

I. WARNING FROM SOVIET BEHAVIOR 

IN VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES 

10. The various possible circumstances in 

which the USSR might decide to attack the 

US and enter upon general wllr would have a 

considerable bearing on the degree of waming which might be obtained. 

a. There are three situations in which the 

USSR might decide to attack the US and key 

overseas installations, thus initiating general 

war. These situations would arise if the Soviet leaders came to believe: (1) that the USSR 

had acquired such military capabilities that it 

could be certain of success in a general war; 

(2) that Rn attRck by the US and its allies on 

the USSR was imminent and that the USSR's 

only hope of survival lay in seizing the initiative: or (3) that an irreversible shift in the 

relative weight of military power was impending which would ultimately force the USSR 

to choose between certain defeat in war and 

sacrifice of its vital interests. We believe that 

the Soviet leaders are unlikely to come to any 

of these conclusions during the period of this 

estimate. 

b. There remains a possibility that general 

war might occur after a series of actions and 

counteractions in some local crisis which 

neither the USSR nor the Western Allies origTOP SECRET 
REF ID:A40267 

·- ___ ... .. -.. ~· 

'fOF BECRE'f 5 

inally intended to lead to general war. If the 

USSR believed that the issues at stake were· 

vital to its security or that the loss of prestige 

involved in backing down would be equally 

dangerous to Soviet power, and if it believed 

that the US would not concede, then the USSR 

might decide that general war was the unavoi~able consequence of the crisis and that 

it should seize the initiative. We believe that 

if the USSR decides to launch general war in 

the period through mid-1957, the decision is 

most likely to come as the consequence of 

such a situation. 

11. Likelihood of a Period of Tension. In the 

situation described under b. above, a Soviet 

decision to attack the US would be preceded 

by a period of heightened tension. Moreover, 

even if the Soviet leaders reached any one of 

the three conclusions in a. above, they would 

probably 90 so because of an important shift 

in international alignments, or because of 

some equally open and marked alteration, or 

impending alteration, of the relative weight 

of military power. Such developments would 

themselves be likely to produce heightened 

political tension. There are situations, however, in which a Soviet decision for war could 

be taken in the absence of political tension. 

For example, a Soviet decision motivated as 

under a. (1) above might be the result of some 

technicai advance in Soviet military capabilities unknown to the Western allies, or a Soviet decision motivated as under a. (3) above 

might be the result of some secret technical 

advance in Western military capabilities of 

which Soviet intelligence learned. We believe that such situations are unlikely to arise. 

Therefore, since an attack on the US, if it 

occurs, is most likely to be the result of the 

situation described in paragraph lOb. and 

would in that case inevitably be preceded by a 

period of heightened tension, we conclude 

that a Soviet attack on the US and key overseas installations would almost certainly be 

preceded by a period of heightened tension. 

12. Reliability of Political Indicators in a 

Period of Tension. While the existence of a 

prior period of tension would in itself constitute warning that war was becoming more 

likely, it would also greatly increase the difficulty of obtaining from Soviet political behavior a specific warning of attack. Most of 

the political actions taken by the USSR during a period of war preparation might not 

differ· greatly from those undertaken as a 

standard routine in any period of heightened 

political tension. These actions might include: diplomatic approaches to some states 

designed to influence them toward abandonment of their alliances with the US; massive 

· "peace" propaganda directed at the populations of Western states and intended to undermine the will to resist or to destroy confidence in the ~otives and intentions of governments; explicit threats against would-be 

aggressors; new proposals to ban nuclear 

. weapons; instructions to Communist parties 

to ready themselves for their sabotage and 

subversion missions in the event of war; intensified propaganda directed to the Bloc populations to prepare them psychologically for 

"resistance to aggression." All such actions, 

however, could be interpreted as defensively 

motivated or as part of a war of nerves. Thus 

while they might provide warning of the increased likelihood of general war, they would 

not provide specific warning of attack. 

13. Reliability of Military Indicators in a 

Period of Tension. The existence of a period 

of heightened political tension would also 

make more difficult the determination from 

Soviet military preparations of a specific intent to attack. If in such a period the USSR 

undertook various military preparations, it 

would probably be as difficult to distinguish 

offensive from defensive intent as in the. case 

of indicators from Soviet political behavior. 

In a protracted situation of this sort intelligence probably could only give warning of the 

USSR's increasing war readiness and chart 

the trend toward the period of maximum danger. but not warn of a Soviet intention to 

attack. The USSR might carry through 

these preparations not in order to initiate war 

but in. readiness for instant retaliation to a 

US attack which it feared was impending. 

14. Possibility of Soviet Deception. It would 

also be possible for the Soviet leaders, after a 

period of prolonged tension in which they had 

brought both their political and military preparations to an advanced stage. to bring about 

an amelioration of the crisis atmosphere as a 

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REF ID:A40267 

'·-·' 

'l'OP SEGBE'I' 6 

deception move. They could offer concessions 

as a basis for new negotiations, and simulate 

reduction of some of their military preparations, or even actually reduce them. If they 

considered surprise essential to their strategic 

plans and believed that they still could achieve 

some degree of surprise in their initial attack, 

this would be a likely course for ·the Soviet 

leaders to pursue. However, such a course 

would involve SE!-Crifice of some important advantages. An initial surprise assault aimed 

at Western retaliatory power would probably 

have to include air attacks on the territories 

of some states which the USSR might otherwise have had some hope. of being able to 

neutralize politically. It would also involve 

the clear assumption of responsibility for initiating war by aggressive action, and thus 

might harden the will to resist in Western 

countries. However, the Soviet leaders would 

probably accept these disadvantages and attempt deceptive political maneuvers if they 

considered that the maximum degree of surprise attainable was essential to their strategic plans. 

15. Although a large degree of deception 

could be introduced into Soviet behavior, 

Allied intelligence might still be able to detect 

the continuation of specific military preparations. Such indications could be interpreted 

as due to Soviet caution and mistrust, but they 

would also point to the possibility of a deception maneuver and they would be particularly 

significant as evidence of a Soviet intention 

to achieve surprise in launching general war. 

16. Summary. We believe, therefore, that 

Soviet behavior in a. period of heightened 

political tension would not necessarily give 

warning of attack. It would establish that 

the likelihood of general war was increasing 

and probably that Soviet readiness for general war was also increasing. It would also 

lead to heightened activity and sensitivity on 

the part of Allied intelligence. However, 

neither a belligerent and unyielding attitude 

nor a defensive and conciliatory one would 

be a sure guide to Soviet intentions. 

II. WARNING OF FULL-SCALE SOVIET ATTACK 

17. One course open to the USSR would be a 

full-scale attack on the US and simultaneously on states allied with the US, undertaken 

after a period of mobilization. Such a plan 

of attack would sacrifice strategic surprise in 

favor of maximum military preparation, although the USSR might still hope to achieve 

some degree of tactical surprise. 

18. The range of activities necessary for such 

full mobilization of war potential in a highly 

industrialized state like the USSR is so extensive and involves so many measures affecting broad sections of the population that even 

a totalitarian government would find it impossible to conceal all of them. In the economic field, a complex redirection and intensification of productive effort would have to 

take place as materials, manpower, and facilities were transferred "from consumption and 

investment goods industries to armament industries. These measures would probably be 

impossible without the use of pubJic information media. Manipulation or domestic opinion is so persistent a preoccupation of the 

Soviet Government and its concern over popular morale under conditions of crisis is so 

intense that its vast propaganda apparatus 

would certainly be openly committed to preparing the Soviet people to withstand the 

strains of general war. In the military field . 

itself, the induction of additional military 

classes, formation of new units and fteshingout of existing units to full strength, intensified and more realistic training, redeployment 

of combat groups to forv1ard areas in the Satellites, and a variety of logistic measures 

would hardly escape entirely the observation 

of Western intelligence. In particular, it 

would be difficult to avoid detection of largescale troop mO\·ements in East Germany. 

Specific preparations v:hich if detected would 

give warning of attack on the US would arise 

from the activities of the Soviet Long-Range 

Air Force. These are discussed in paragraphs 

28-34 below. 

19. We believe that we would be most likely 

to receive numerous L11dications of large-scale 

Soviet mobilization in the period from about 

six months to about one month before D-Day. 

largely because the preparations likely to be 

undertaken up to this time would be those 

least susceptible of concealment. From 

roughly D-30 to around D-10 days. howe,·er. 

TOP SKGRE'i' 
REF ID:A40267 

. ·" 

TOP Bl!lG:Ri:T 7 

we would be likely to get much less in the 

way of indications because the preparations 

in this period would be those which Soviet 

security is best equipped to conceal. Moreover, by about one month before D-Day the 

progressive tightening of Soviet security measures would probably have reached a high 

point. There would almost certainly be a reduction in information from sources within 

the Bloc; at the same time, however, the drying up of internal Bloc sources because of intensified security measures would in itself provide an indication of Soviet preparations. 

Then, in the period from D-10 and especially 

D-5 on, we could expect indications of lastminute preparations. At this time, however, 

there would be a serious problem of processing 

such indications on a sufficiently timely basis. 

20. We believe that Western intelligence 

would probably be able to sort the variety of 

indicators into a meaningful pattern at a relatively early stage of Soviet mobilization for 

a full-scale attack. US intelligence might become aware of this mobilization as long as 

four or possibly even six months prior to DDay. The minimum period would probably 

not be less than 30 days. Even though intelligence was able to give only a generalized 

degree of warning, showing the progressive 

increase of Soviet war readiness, it would 

probably still be able to chart the trend of 

full-scale preparations, to anticipate their 

probable course to completion, and thus to 

designate the beginning of a period of maximum danger. It might even be able to identify features of Soviet full-scale mobilization 

which because of their uniqueness or extreme 

costliness could be interpreted specifically as 

evidence of an intention to attack. 

21. As the time of attack drew near, indications of its approach would become increasingly specific. Based on observed Soviet military activities, warning could probably be 

given from a few hours to a few days in advance of the actual launching of the attack. 

This would be rendered very difficult, however, 

if Soviet forces, when their preparations for 

attack were known to be near completion, 

undertook air, naval, and ground reconnaissance, or attempted major feints. These 

activities might provide evidence of Soviet intention to attack, but would aggravate the 

difficulty of determining the time of such 

attack. It must also be recognized that, in 

theory at least, the USSR could always refrain from or delay attacking even after 

preparations were complete. Hence the indications of military readiness, taken by themselves, would not necessarily provide conclusive evidence that attack was certain. 

Ill. PROBABLE DEGREES OF WARNING IN THE 

EVENT OF LESS THAN FULL-SCALE ATTACK 

22. Even if the USSR attempted to achieve 

the utmost surprise in initiating general war 

and accepted all feasible imitations on its prior 

preparations, it would still probably consider 

a minimum number of prior preparations a 

matter of necessity and elementary prudence 

in order to be in a position to wage general 

war. At least some of the general preparations discussed in Section II above would 

almost certainly have to be undertaken, 

even if a high degree of prior mobilization 

was foregone. Some of these preparations 

would be detected by Allied intelligence, but 

it might be very difficult to ascertain any 

such clear pattern of preparations as would 

be discernible in event of mobilization for fullscale attack. Consequently, we believe it 

possible, though unlikely, that these preparations would not lead to a warning of attack, 

especially if they were carried out over a long 

period of time and with careful concealment. 

23. If the USSR attacked the US and key 

overseas installations without full prior mobilization for general war, and hence without 

full-scale attacks in other areas, two general 

alternatives would be open: 

a. The USSR could combine its attack 

against the US and key overseas installations 

with a ground campaign chiefly in Western 

Europe without prior reinforcement of its 

forces in East Germany.a 

b. The USSR could undertake initially air, 

and possibly other forms of attack, against 

• The USSR could of course strengthen this ground 

attack by some degree of prior reinforcement. 

For the purpose of this estimate, however, we 

take the above case as the limiting one: i.e., any 

prior reinforcement would tend to provide additional indicators and hence additional warning. 

TOP SEORl!l'f 
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REF ID:A40267 

'fOF SEORET 8 

the US and key overseas installations, but 

delay its ground campaigns and discernible 

preparations for other military operations 

until after these initial attacks. 

Soviet Campaign in Western Europe and 

Simultaneous Attacks on the US and 

Key Overseas Installations 

24. If the USSR chose to initiate general war 

by an attack on Western Europe with the 

forces currently stationed in East Germany 

and the Satellites, together with attacks on 

the US and key overseas installations, the 

degree of its over-all war preparations before 

such attacks would vary greatly depending on 

the intensity and duration of the political 

tensions which preceded the attack. If, as we 

think likely, there had been a long period of 

crisis, the USSR might have already achieved 

a considerable degree of military and economic mobilization for war, and its foreign 

and domestic political preparation might be 

well advanced. Therefore, as we have noted, 

the indicators derived from this range of 

activities, though warning of the increased 

likelihood of war, would probably be of limited significance for warning of this type of 

attack. 

25. Even so, the local preparations which the 

USSR would still have to take at a minimum 

for an attack with forces stationed in East 

Germany would provide some degree of wa1·ning. Some time would be required to assemble major elements in forward positions, 

although this would vary seasonally. (The 

longest period required would be between May 

and August when units are split between 

home stations and field training areas; a lesser period would be required between November and March when units are consolidated 

at home stations; the minimum period required would be in April when units are moving to training areas and in September-October when units are either engaged in largescale maneuvers or are being moved· back to 

home stations.) Other minimum preparations would include the release from stocks of 

transport, munitions, and supplies in quantities well in excess of those used even on 

full-scale· maneuvers. In addition, some two 

weeks before the attack it would probably be 

necessary to begin the movement of large 

numbers of locomotives and rolling stock from 

East Germany to the Soviet border in order 

to prepare for resupply and reinforcement 

operations to support and expand the offensive. Altogether, the USSR would probably 

be engaged in these preparations over a period 

of about 15 days and US intelligence would 

probably begin to acquire some indicators at 

an early stage, although varying with the 

season of the year. We believe that warning 

of the probability of attack could be g·iven 

about one week in advance. However. in the 

absence of other indicators and with Soviet 

actions appearing to be part of a normal pattern the warning could vary as follows: 

(a) from a few hours to a few days in April 

and in September-October; 

(b) from two to five days in the period 

November-March; 

(c) from five to 10 days in the period 

May-August. 

26. If the USSR undertook concurrent offensive submarine operations against the US and 

key overseas installations, it would be necessary for the submarine fleet to proceed to 

wartime patrol stations shortly before the expected commencement of hostilities. The 

passage of these submarines, if detected, 

would support up to two weeks warning of 

Soviet preparation for attack against the US 

and key overseas installations. 

27. The extent to which the preparations going on simultaneously for air attack on the 

US and key overseas installations would tend 

to confirm and/or advance the warning would 

depend somewhat upon the planned scale of 

these attacks, as discussed below. 

Initial Attacks on the US and Key Overseas 

Installations 

28. For the purposes of this estimate it appears necessary to consider two types of air 

attacks on the US and key overseas installations: (a) a maximum effort using as many 

aircraft as possible; (b) an attack designed to 

achieve a high degree of surprise. The USSR 

could undertake these air attacks on the US 

and key overseas installations simultaneously 

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with a full-scale attack or with the ground 

campaign and submarine operations discussed 

in paragraphs 24-27. Alternatively, the USSR 

could initiate general war with such air attacks only, while delaying discernible preparations for other military operations in order to 

increase the likelihood of surprise against the 

US. In this case, the very disparity between 

preparations for long-range air operations 

and those for other general war campaigns 

would be a highly significant indicator of the 

probable nature of the initial Soviet attack. 

29. Maximum Scale Attack. We have estimated in SNIE 11-7-54 that by exercising its 

maximum capability the USSR could now 

launch 850 long-range aircraft against the 

US in an initial attack and that by 1957 this 

number could be increased to 1,000.4 Extensive prior preparations would be required, 

particularly in the early part of the period 

covered by this estimate. These would include improving airfields, maintenance and 

fuel storage facilities in the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and Kola areas, bringing personnel 

and equipment to full strength in long-range 

air units, intensified training of air personnel, 

increased frequency of long-distance training 

missions, and raising levels of maintenance. 

30. At present such activities would require at 

least several months and would probably become known to US intelligence, especially 

if carried forward with great urgency. 

Throughout the period of this estimate the 

critical indicators would be those relating to 

increased levels of activity at staging bases in 

the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and Kola areas. 

We believe that the indicators would probably 

assume a meaningful pattern in time for intelligence to give a generalized degree of warning 15-30 days prior to attack. On the other 

hand, such preparations could be undertaken 

gradually over the next few years. By 1957 

the bases, training, and equipment of the 

Soviet Long-Range Air Force could be advanced to a point where only minimum preparations would be required in advance of an 

attack. For example, it might not then be 

•The warning problem would probably not be significantly different if some portion of these aircraft were tankers. 

necessary to undertake such finai preparations as the movement of personnel and equipment, or these preparations might be on such 

a reduced scale that they might not be discovered. Under these circumstances, indicators of the preparations taking place in the 

Soviet Long-Range Air Force might be few, 

and warning of air attack would depend almost entirely on indicators received during the 

staging of aircraft through advanced bases. 

·31. In the course of the staging process Allied 

intelligence might be able to discover the 

movement of aircraft to the staging bases. If 

this movement was in fact discovered, we believe that in 1954 warning could be given at 

least 24 hours before the attacking aircraft 

reached the early warning radar screen. By 

1957, increased handling capability at staging 

bases and reduction of flight time by increased 

speeds of jet aircraft might decrease the warning derived from discovery of movement of aircraft to staging bases to a minimum of about 

12 hours before attacking aircraft reached the 

early warning radar screen. However, if this 

movement was not discovered, warning of attack could be given only if continuous reconnaissance of the staging areas was being 

carried out. In such a case, the period of 

warning might be reduced to a few hours, or 

even virtually to zero, because of probable 

difficulties and delays in processing and interpreting the results of the reconnaissance. 

32. If US overseas installations were to be 

attacked simultaneously, the additional preparations which would be necessary would not 

add significantly to the risks of detection. 

The long-range air arm would already be in 

a maximum condition of readiness and the 

readying of the IL--28 light bomber units 

which would be used for attacks on US installations in Western Europe, the UK, and 

some parts of the Middle East could be accomplished without serious additional risk of 

detectfon. If guided missiles were employed 

in such attacks, no warning of their use would 

be obtained, apart from the generalized warning which might have been derived from prior 

preparations. 

33. Surprise Attack. We have estimated in 

SNIE 11-7-54 that if the USSR attempted a 

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surprise attack against the US in 1954, aircraft would probably be launched from staging bases in the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and 

Kola areas. .The capacity of these bases was 

estimated to be 300 aircraft.r. We do not believe, however, that ·these bases are currently 

ready to launch this scale of attack on short 

notice. Preparations would be required, which 

would probably be detected by Allied intelligence and would permit a generalized degree 

of warning of about 15 to 30 days. Accordingly, we believe it virtually impossible that 

an attack of this scale against the US during 

1954 could achieve a high degree of surprise. 

A reduced scale of attack (e.g., 50 to 100 aircraft) might, however, achieve a high degree 

of surprise even in 1954. 

34. In 1957, as is evident from paragraphs 30 

and 31 above, the USSR, could, provided base 

construction, training, and equipment of the 

Soviet Long-Range Air Force were sufficiently 

advanced, launch its maximum air attack of 

1,000 aircraft against the US under such conditions that the period of warning would probably be of the order of 12 hours, but might be 

considerably less if the movement of aircraft 

to staging bases was not discovered. The 

maximum Soviet air attack could thus achieve 

a high degree of surprise. Even if the USSR 

chose to reduce substantially the total number of aircraft, participating in the attack, it 

would still probably use the Chukotski, Kamchatka, and Kola bases to full capacity, and 

therefore not greatly reduce the likelihood of 

discovery of aircraft moving to staging bases. 

35. There are two possible ways in which 

the USSR might by 1957 (and possibly somewhat before that year) launch an attack on 

the US in such a way that no specific warning 

would be likely before the actual launching 

of the attack: 

a. Assuming that the USSR pressed ahead 

with development of its advance bases in the 

''The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Naval Intelligence dissented from this 

judgment in SNIE 11-7-54 .on the ground that 

intelligence is insufficient to warrant a finite 

estimate of the number of aircraft which could 

be launched; for the full text of the dissent, see 

SNIE 11-7-54, paragraph 49. 

Chukotski, Kamchatka, and Kola areas, and 

with the general preparation of its LongRange Air Force, "normal" flights of aircraft 

to and from these bases would almost certainly occur in increasing number· as the development of the bases progresses. A pattern of 

activity would tend to be established. Under 

these circumstances, a considerable number 

of aircraft would almost certainly be able to 

take off from these bases (and from Leningrad) for a surprise attack upon the US without any such unusual prior preparations or 

assembly as would particularly attract the 

attention of Allied intelligence: We are unable to estimate the number of aircraft which 

might be in a positioo to participate in such 

an attack. 

b. Assuming that the USSR acquires an inflight refueling capability (which it can do 

although there is no evidence at present that 

the Soviet Air Force is practicing this technique) ai.id develops it to the necessary degree, 

Soviet long-range bombers could also be 

launched from home bases and, without staging at advanced bases, refuel from tanker aircraft in order to attain the necessary range for 

attacks upon the US. We have estimated in 

NIE 11--4-54 that the USSR could have about 

550 tanker aircraft in mid-1957. Thus, even 

assuming that some mission aircraft from the 

nearer home bases such as Leningrad required 

no refueling, the scale of such an attack would 

be substantially less than the maximum. 

IV. WARNING FROM SOVIET PREPARATIONS 

TO RECEIVE RETALIATORY ATTACKS 

36. An important element not included in the 

foregoing examination is that of Soviet defensive preparations to receive a retaliatory 

blow from Allied air power. Minimum preparations would probably include the alerting 

of air defense forces and the civil defense 

organization, preparations of military units 

and installations for air defense, the dispatching of submarines to locate US carrier forces ' the evacuation of key personnel or even considerable segments of population from potential target areas, and some measures to increase Soviet ability to recuperate from nuclear blows. If these steos .. were not taken , 

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'fOP SEOREl':P 11 

they would constitute serious limitations on 

the USSR's ability to withstand a retaliatory 

blow. If they were taken, they would probably provide a warning period of as much as a 

week to 10 days, and, taken in conjunction 

with other indicators, would greatly increase 

the definiteness of any warning US intelligence might be able to give. The risk which 

the USSR would be willing to accept as a 

result of neglecting some or all of this type of 

defensive preparation would depend in part 

on the degree of success which the Soviet 

leaders expected their own initial attack to 

achieve. We believe that in elementary prudence they would be unwilling to forego all 

preparation to receive a retaliatory blow, and 

some important indicators of this type would 

probably be obtained. 

V. THE PROBABLE SOVIET CHOICE BETWEEN 

A FULL-SCALE AND A SURPRISE ATTACK 

37. The Soviet choice between a full-scale attack or some one of the alternative scales of 

surprise attack would probably depend in 

part on the intensity and duration of the 

crisis which preceded the Soviet decision to 

attack. The preferertce shown in Soviet military doctrine for offensive action only after 

maximum preparation and a high degree of 

superiority to the enemy has been achieved 

might argue for the postponement of decision 

to the last possible moment. A prolonged 

crisis might thus result during which Soviet 

general mobilization would be brought near to 

completion. This might make full-scale attack feasible and would also facilitate deception. On the other hand, the USSR might 

estimate that the process of mobilization 

itself, especially if it included forward movement of large bodies of troops into the Satellite area, would cause a Western miscalculation and result in the initial attack being 

made on rather than by the USSR. 

38. Probably the decisive argument for a Soviet surprise attack, however, would be the 

overwhelming importance to the USSR of 

effectively blunting US retaliatory power and 

disrupting US mobilization. We believe that 

in the period through mid-1957 the Soviet 

leaders, if they decided to initiate war, would 

consider some form of surprise attack essential to achieving their objectives, and that 

they would therefore give highest priority to 

achievement of a substantial degree of surprise against the continental US and key installations overseas. 

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