SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1686-16T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RENEE S. WAGNER, a/k/a

RENEE MILLER, and RENEE 

SIMON,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Argued October 17, 2018 – Decided August 27, 2019

Before Judges Fuentes, Accurso and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Warren County, Indictment No. 14-10-0366.

George T. Daggett argued the cause for appellant.

Kelly A. Shelton, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Richard T. Burke, Warren 

County Prosecutor, attorney; Kelly A. Shelton, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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On March 26, 2014, New Jersey State Police Trooper Patrick Wynn 

arrested defendant Renee S. Wagner and charged her with obstructing an 

investigation of a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b), and providing false information 

to a law enforcement officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4), both disorderly persons

offenses. Based on the same core of operative facts, a Warren County grand 

jury indicted defendant on October 15, 2014, with one count of third degree 

resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a). The case came to trial before a jury more 

than two years later. 

The jury found defendant guilty of resisting arrest as a disorderly persons 

offense, as a lesser included offense of the third degree indictable offense, and 

the disorderly persons offense of hindering one's own apprehension, and 

acquitted defendant of the disorderly persons offense of obstructing the 

administration of law.

1

 On December 14, 2016, the trial judge sentenced 

defendant to one year probation, and ordered her to pay the mandatory statutory 

penalties. We derive the following facts from the record developed before the 

trial court.

 

1

 We must point out that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the two 

disorderly persons offenses of hindering one's own apprehension and 

obstructing the administration of law. State v. Denelsbeck, 225 N.J. 103, 111-

12 (2016). 
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In March 2014, defendant was involved in a minor car accident at a Quick

Chek convenience store and gasoline station. According to defendant, a car 

driven by a "young man" named Shane Nolan "tapped" her car, causing "a slight 

dent on his side panel and [her] bumper." Defendant testified that Nolan "was 

very, very upset" about how his parents would react to this mishap because he 

had been in a "pretty severe" accident "a couple of months" earlier. Nolan was 

specifically concerned about how this might increase his car insurance premium. 

Defendant testified that she told Nolan: "[W]ell, listen, I'm going to give you 

my name and my number, when you talk to your parents have them give me a 

call and, you know, we can settle it between [ourselves] because it was very 

minor." 

Trooper Wynn testified that the barracks sergeant received a called about 

an automobile accident at the Quick Chek convenience store. Based on 

information Nolan provided the sergeant, Wynn reported to the Quick Chek to 

see if there was video footage of the accident from the store's surveillance 

cameras. Wynn testified the video recording of the accident showed:

Nolan's vehicle at the gas pumps subsequently depart. 

As he was leaving at the exit portion, the other vehicle 

came around the side and struck Mr. Nolan's vehicle.

. . . .
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After the collision, I was able to clearly see both 

vehicles stopped and the drivers exit both cars, at which 

point, I was able to observe Mr. Nolan and what 

appeared to be a [w]hite female with light colored hair 

in the other vehicle. 

Nolan spoke to Trooper Wynn about the accident and gave him a sheet of 

paper containing defendant's first name and cellphone number. Trooper Wynn 

proceeded to investigate the accident. Based on the information he had at the 

time, Trooper Wynn decided to continue the investigation of the accident. 

Specifically, he needed "to confirm who . . . was driving that vehicle," and obtain 

the vehicle's registration and insurance information. Trooper Wynn testified 

that over the next two weeks, he and Nolan called the cellphone number several 

times. Trooper Wynn testified he personally left "at least one" voicemail 

message over this two-week period.

Defendant acknowledged she received a telephone call during this time 

period. She did not return the call because she did not recognize the phone 

number. However, the one time she returned the call, she spoke to "a dispatcher 

from the State Trooper." She told the dispatcher her name and said she was 

returning a call from "somebody" who had called her. The transcription of the 

March 26, 2016 telephone call from defendant shows she correctly identified 

herself as "Renee Wagner." However, the State Police dispatcher mistakenly 
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refers to her as "Britney Wager." This initial error is soon discovered and 

Trooper Wynn was able to speak to defendant. Unfortunately, the recording 

ends before the parties began to discuss anything about the accident. 

Trooper Wynn testified that he explained to defendant he was 

investigating the car accident she had with Nolan and "needed the basic 

information to complete [his] job and complete the report[.]" Trooper Wynn 

characterized defendant's responses to his questions as "evasive." When he 

asked her for her name: "I got several different names of Melody, Melanie, [and]

Melanie May[.]" Based on her failure to provide basic information and overall 

uncooperative attitude, Trooper Wynn testified he warned defendant: "You've 

lied several times, giving several different names at this point. I do need to 

follow up. It's not just going to go away." Trooper Wynn testified the 

conversation ended without a satisfactory resolution. Defendant refuted Trooper 

Wynn's account of this telephone call. She claimed she was cordial at all times 

and offered to come to the State Police Barracks the following day. Defendant 

testified that Trooper Wynn responded: "I know where you live and I'll come 

and find you." She claimed the conversation ended at this point. 

Trooper Wynn testified that after the telephone conversation with 

defendant ended, he was able to locate a photograph of defendant and her home 
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address in the State motor vehicle records. He and Trooper Abendschoen were

dressed in their official State Police uniforms when they arrived at defendant's 

residence on the evening of March 26, 2014. As he approached the residence, 

Trooper Wynn testified he saw an older model black Chevrolet blazer that had 

a damaged front quarter panel, which was consistent with the damage of "the 

vehicle [he] observed in the surveillance footage[.]" The Trooper went to the 

front door of the house and spoke to a man who identified himself as defendant's 

former husband; this man told Trooper Wynn that defendant lived on the 

property, in a part of the house he referred to as the "annex." 

Trooper Wynn testified that he and Trooper Abendschoen proceeded to 

the part of the property where defendant resided and announced themselves as 

State Police. As he got closer, Trooper Wynn saw an "older female that was 

sitting there say something to the two juveniles that were there." The two girls 

"immediately . . . stood up and left the room." Trooper Wynn approached the 

sliding glass door carrying a flashlight, made eye contact with defendant, and 

again identified himself as being with the State Police. 

Defendant partially opened the sliding glass door "wide enough" to enable 

her to "stick her face through it." This enabled Trooper Wynn to notice that her 

eyes were "bloodshot and watery" and her eyelids were "droopy." According to 
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Trooper Wynn, defendant asked him: "well, what do you want?" This enabled 

Trooper Wynn "to detect an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from her 

breath." He told defendant that he was the Trooper who spoke to her earlier that 

evening on the telephone and referenced the accident. According to Trooper 

Wynn, defendant denied speaking to anyone earlier that night. 

Trooper Wynn again advised defendant he was there to investigate the 

motor vehicle accident and needed to get from her "basic information" such as 

who was driving the car, the registration number of the vehicle, and to see the 

insurance identification card. According to Trooper Wynn, defendant remained 

uncooperative and defiant. Defendant told the Trooper her name was Melody 

or Melanie. When Trooper Wynn told defendant he knew her name was Renee 

Wagner, she denied it. When Trooper Wynn confronted her with her driver's 

license photograph, defendant "immediately [became] confrontational," claimed 

Trooper Wynn had not previously identified himself as a law enforcement 

officer, and said: "I don't know who you are. I don't have to tell you anything, 

[and] things along those lines."

At this point, Trooper Wynn testified that he advised defendant that if she 

continued to refuse to cooperate, he was going to arrest her for hindering an 

investigation. Trooper Wynn testified he asked defendant to step outside 
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multiple times; she refused and attempted several times to slam the sliding glass 

door closed. The door struck Trooper Wynn's hand several times. At this point, 

Trooper Wynn "grabbed her shirt, grabbed her arm, her shoulder . . . to attempt 

to stop her from getting inside that house." The Trooper eventually pulled

defendant out of her house, wrestled her to the ground, handcuffed her, and took 

her into custody. Trooper Abendschoen corroborated Trooper Wynn's account 

of the events that led to defendant's arrest. 

Defendant's testimony describing the event that led to her arrest that night 

is irreconcilable with the Troopers' testimony. She claimed she responded to 

her name; she stepped outside her house when the Trooper asked her to do so; 

she was in the process of closing the sliding glass door to prevent her dog from 

running out, when Trooper Wynn grabbed her, wrestled her to the ground, and 

arrested her. Defendant maintained before the jury that she was injured from 

being handcuffed and was significantly bruised by Trooper Wynn's actions. 

Defendant testified that Trooper Wynn did not identify himself as a State 

Trooper, but that she recognized Trooper Abendschoen as a State Trooper 

standing in the background. 

Against this factual backdrop, defendant raises the following arguments 

on appeal.
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POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CHARGING 

JUSTIFICATION AS AN ELEMENT OF A 

DISORDERLY PERSONS CHARGE OF RESISTING 

ARREST.

POINT II

THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE HINDERING

APPREHENSION CHARGE CLEARLY ESTABLISH 

THAT IT WAS DE MINIMIS.

POINT III

THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 

PERMITTED TO CONSIDER THE HINDERING 

APPREHENSION CHARGE.

Defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following brief comments. 

Defendant did not ask for a justification defense during the charge conference 

conducted pursuant to Rule 1:8-7(b). As an appellate court, we are bound to 

disregard any error or omission unless it is clearly capable of producing an 

unjust result. R. 2:10-2. There is no factual or legal basis to find defendant 

satisfied this heavy burden here. State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997). In 

fact, defendant's counsel argued against the trial judge charging the jury with 

the lesser included offense of a disorderly persons resisting arrest. Thus, this 
10 A-1686-16T4

argument is also precluded under the invited error doctrine. State v. Jenkins, 

178 N.J. 347, 359 (2004).

Finally, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(1)(a) provides:

The use of force is not justifiable under this section:

(a) To resist an arrest which the actor knows is being 

made by a peace officer in the performance of his 

duties, although the arrest is unlawful, unless the peace 

officer employs unlawful force to effect such arrest[.]

There is no evidence in this record from which a rational jury could find 

the arresting officer employed unlawful force to arrest defendant.

However, there is an issue that, although not raised by the parties, must 

nevertheless be addressed and corrected. The Judgment of Conviction (JOC) 

erroneously reflects defendant was convicted of the disorderly persons offense 

of obstructing an investigation under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b). We thus direct the 

trial judge to amend the JOC to reflect defendant was acquitted of this offense 

and convicted of the disorderly persons offense of hindering an investigation by 

providing false information to a law enforcement officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

3(b)(4).

Affirmed and remanded for amendment of the Judgment of Conviction in 

a manner consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.