[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-14602

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A208-031-866

ROMMELL FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ BARAJAS,

 Petitioner, 

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(November 28, 2016)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Rommel Fernando Rodriguez Barajas contends that he is eligible for asylum 

because he suffered numerous attacks by pro-Hugo Chavez forces in his native 

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Venezuela. An Immigration Judge rejected his application, finding that Rodriguez 

could not meet his burden of proof without corroborative evidence. The Board of 

Immigration Appeals affirmed, and Rodriguez now petitions for review by this 

Court.

I.

After the Department of Homeland Security charged Rodriguez as 

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), he filed an Application for 

Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, alleging persecution due to his political 

opinion and his membership in a particular social group. In a sworn statement 

accompanying his application, Rodriguez explained that in Venezuela he had 

actively opposed the government of former President Hugo Chavez and current 

President Nicolas Maduro. He stated that since 2010 he had been attacked 

approximately eight times by pro-Chavez forces, known as “Chavistas.” In one 

attack, he was kidnapped and taken to a hospital, where he was forced to take antischizophrenia drugs even though he does not suffer from schizophrenia. In other 

attacks, Chavistas put a gun in his mouth and attempted to hammer a nail through 

his foot.

At Rodriguez’s asylum hearing the IJ found that Rodriguez’s testimony was 

consistent with his sworn statement. Rodriguez testified that he was a member of 

the opposition party Accion Democratica and that he had fled to the United States 

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because Chavistas wanted to kill him for his opposition. He also stated that he had 

been diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2011. On cross-examination Rodriguez 

admitted that he took his bipolar medication “on and off.” When he did not take 

the medication, he would feel a compulsion to go out into the street and scream. 

He also admitted that he had previously lived in the United States, and that he had 

left in 2010 after being arrested for the sale of a controlled substance.

Rodriguez called three more witnesses. First, a psychologist testified that 

Rodriguez had developed posttraumatic stress disorder from his experiences in 

Venezuela. Second, Rodriguez’s mother testified that she had heard from various 

sources (including Rodriguez himself) that Rodriguez had been attacked because 

of his political activity. And third, a friend from New York testified that before 

Rodriguez’s problems in Venezuela he was “robust” and “fun-loving,” but now he 

seemed “slower.”

In his oral decision the IJ denied Rodriguez asylum. He explained that 

Rodriguez’s testimony was “internally consistent” but was of only a “very general 

nature.” Because there was “no objective evidence as to [Rodriguez’s] significant 

political activity in Venezuela” to supplement his vague testimony, Rodriguez had 

not met his burden of proof. Beyond that finding, the IJ also noted that persecution 

on account of mental illness can be a basis for asylum. But he found that instead 

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of facing persecution in Venezuela for his bipolar disorder, Rodriguez had been 

receiving treatment for it, so he did not qualify for relief on that ground.

1

The BIA agreed with the IJ that Rodriguez had not met his burden to 

establish asylum eligibility because his testimony lacked specificity and he had not 

provided corroborative evidence. In addition to his appeal, Rodriguez also moved 

for the BIA to remand the case based on an affidavit that he had recently received 

from Accion Democratica. The BIA held that the affidavit did not justify a remand 

because it did not “corroborate [Rodriguez’s] alleged significant political activity 

and alleged harm as a result of his political activity.” Finally, the BIA rejected 

Rodriguez’s request for a remand to determine whether he had been persecuted for 

his membership in the social group of “those who suffer from bipolar disease and 

who exhibit erratic behavior.” The BIA held that the bipolar disorder claim was 

barred because Rodriguez had not asserted it before the IJ.

II.

Rodriguez first contends that the BIA erred by denying him asylum. “To 

establish asylum eligibility” the burden is on the applicant to “establish a wellfounded fear that his or her political opinion (or other statutorily listed factor) will 

cause harm or suffering that rises to the level of persecution.” D-Muhumed v. U.S. 

 1 The IJ also denied withholding of removal, and Rodriguez has not challenged that 

decision. In addition, the IJ found that Rodriguez was not eligible for withholding based on the 

United Nations Convention Against Torture, although there is no indication that Rodriguez had 

requested CAT relief.

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Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). “When 

the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the extent the 

BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision.” Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 

1344 (11th Cir. 2007). We review the BIA’s factual findings for “substantial 

evidence.” Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 

2009). Under that “highly deferential” standard, we must affirm the decision “if it 

is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 

considered as a whole.” Id. at 1351. By contrast, we may only reverse the BIA’s 

findings if “the record not only supports reversal, but compels it.” Id.

Because the IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding, we must assume 

that Rodriguez’s testimony is credible. Mejia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 498 F.3d 1253, 

1257 (11th Cir. 2007). “Uncorroborated but credible testimony may be sufficient 

to sustain the burden of proof for demonstrating eligibility for asylum. The weaker 

an applicant’s testimony, however, the greater the need for corroborative 

evidence.” Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). 

In Yang the applicant testified that she had been forcibly brought to a 

hospital where doctors prepared to inject her with a sterilization drug. Id. at 1200.

The doctors only stopped when the applicant told them that she was allergic to 

anesthesia. Id. We assumed that her testimony was credible, but even so it was 

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impossible to know, without corroborative evidence, whether she had faced 

involuntary sterilization or if the threatened injection was actually a form of 

temporary birth control. Id. at 1202–03. That gap in the record was “substantial 

evidence” that supported the IJ’s finding that she had not faced past persecution. 

Id. at 1203.

Similarly, even if Rodriguez’s testimony was credible, we cannot tell from 

the record whether the claimed attacks occurred because of his political activity or 

for some other reason, such as his mental illness. As the IJ noted, Rodriguez’s 

testimony was of a “very general nature.” And Rodriguez did not fill in the gaps in 

his testimony with independent evidence that could corroborate his claims. He did 

not submit any documentary evidence showing that he was politically active, and 

he did not call any witnesses with firsthand knowledge of his political activity. His 

inability to substantiate his testimony is “substantial evidence” supporting the 

BIA’s decision, so we must defer to that decision.

III.

Rodriguez also contends that the BIA erred when it declined to remand his 

case. First, he argues that the affidavit by Accion Democratica was new evidence 

that warranted remanding the case for a new hearing. A motion to remand that 

seeks to introduce new evidence is treated by this Court as a motion to reopen, and 

“we employ a very deferential abuse of discretion standard” in reviewing those 

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motions. Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the 

applicable regulations, the BIA must not grant a motion to reopen unless the new 

evidence “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or 

presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “An alien who 

attempts to show that the [new] evidence is material bears a heavy burden and 

must present evidence that demonstrates that, if the proceedings were opened, the 

new evidence would likely change the result in the case.” Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

568 F.3d 1252, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2009).

Rodriguez has not met his “heavy burden” because the Accion Democratica 

affidavit is unlikely to change the result in this case. Both the BIA and the IJ based 

their decisions on Rodriguez’s inability to connect the instances of purported 

persecution with “significant political activity.” Evidence that Rodriguez was a 

member of an opposition party, without more, does not undermine that 

determination. Although the affidavit verifies Rodriguez’s membership in the 

party, it does not show that he engaged in “significant political activity,” let alone 

was targeted by Chavistas for that activity.

Second, Rodriguez argues that the BIA should have remanded his case so 

that the IJ could determine whether he faces persecution for his membership in the 

social group of “those who suffer from bipolar disease and who exhibit erratic 

behavior.” We lack jurisdiction to review that argument because Rodriguez did 

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not raise it before the IJ. See Dormescar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 690 F.3d 1258, 1269 

n.11 (11th Cir. 2012); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 

1250–51 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). True, Rodriguez marked 

on his initial application that he was applying based on “[m]embership in a 

particular social group.” But nothing in his sworn statement, his Pre-Hearing 

Statement, or his case before the IJ suggested that the social group he was referring 

to was “those with bipolar disease and who exhibit erratic behavior.” A 

checkmark, without actual argument accompanying it, is not enough to raise the 

issue before the IJ and thus not enough to provide us with jurisdiction. Cf.

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We 

have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only 

passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting 

arguments or authority.”).

The IJ’s (apparently sua sponte) decision to address the possibility that 

Rodriguez’s bipolar disorder qualified him for asylum does not change that 

analysis. This Court’s jurisdiction is based on the issues Rodriguez raised, not the

issues the IJ and the BIA decided. See Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d at 1250–51. 

As a result, we lack jurisdiction over that portion of Rodriguez’s appeal.

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

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