[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-12098

Non-Argument Calendar

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BROOKE GOLDSTEIN, 

In the Matter of W.S., B.S., and Z.S.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

MATTHEW SIMON, 

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-20633-CMA

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Before ROSENBAUM, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal arises under the Hague Convention on the Civil 

Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention), as 

implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act 

(ICARA). See 22 U.S.C. § 9001, et seq. Brooke Goldstein, the mother, 

appeals the district court’s order denying her petition to return her 

children to Israel. After careful review, we affirm. 

I.

The parties are familiar with the facts of this case. We keep 

this section brief and address only those facts necessary to the discussion below.

Brooke Goldstein and Matthew Simon, the mother and father, have three children together. The first child was born in 2015, 

the second in 2017, and the third in 2020. All three children were 

born in New York, but the family often traveled domestically and 

internationally. Before 2020, the family lived in Brooklyn, the 

Hamptons, and Los Angeles. The family moved to Israel in December 2020, and halfway through 2021, the children became Israeli 

citizens and obtained Israeli passports. 

During the next few years in Israel, the children visited doctors, were enrolled in schools, and participated in extracurricular 

activities. The children speak English, but not Hebrew. The family 

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went on vacation to Italy in October 2023, and during that time, 

Hamas attacked Israel. As a result, the family decided to move elsewhere because of the war. They settled in Miami where the children enrolled in school and participated in extracurricular activities. The children visited doctors and spent time with extended 

family in the area. For the 2024–2025 school year, the children are 

enrolled in schools in Miami and Israel. 

In late 2023, the mother and father began to disagree about 

keeping the family in Miami versus returning to Israel. As a result, 

the mother filed an ICARA petition in federal district court seeking 

to require the father to return the children to Israel. The mother 

and father continued living together in Miami with their children 

when the mother filed her petition, alleging the father’s wrongful 

retention. 

After a four-day bench trial, the district court denied the petition. In doing so, it determined that the children’s habitual residence was Florida. Alternatively, the district court concluded that, 

even if the children’s habitual residence were in Israel, the father 

did not wrongfully retain the children or prevent the mother from 

taking them to Israel. The mother appealed.

II.

The Hague Convention “address[es] ‘the problem of international child abductions during domestic disputes.’” Lozano v. 

Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 4 (2014) (quoting Abbott v. Abbott, 560 

U.S. 1, 8 (2010)). The treaty’s “core premise” is that “‘the interests

of children . . . in matters relating to their custody’ are best served 

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when custody decisions are made in the child’s country of ‘habitual 

residence.’” Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 72 (2020) (quoting

Convention Preamble, Hague Convention, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 

No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11 (Treaty Doc.), at 7). Congress 

passed ICARA, which implements the Hague Convention’s requirements and allows a parent to file a petition for return of a child 

in state or federal court. 22 U.S.C. § 9003. The Hague Convention 

and ICARA settle the forum for a custody dispute, but neither authorizes a court to adjudicate the merits of a custody dispute. Lops 

v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 936 (11th Cir. 1998). 

As a general rule, a parent that wrongfully retains or removes a child from her habitual residence must return the child. 

Art. 12, Treaty Doc., at 9. The Hague Convention makes an exception to this general return requirement if a return poses a “grave 

risk” of harm to a child. Monasky, 589 U.S. at 72 (quoting Art. 13, 

Treaty Doc., at 10). The party opposing the return has the burden 

of demonstrating the risk to the child. Golan v. Saada, 596 U.S. 666, 

672 (2022). 

“A child’s habitual residence presents . . . a ‘mixed question’ 

of law and fact—albeit barely so.” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 84 (quoting 

U.S. Bank N.A. ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, 

LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 396 (2018)). This review is considered “mixed” 

because we first review, under a de novo standard, whether the 

judge applied the correct legal standard to determine the habitual 

residence. Id. If the trial judge correctly applies the “totality of the 

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circumstances” standard to determine habitual residence, then we 

review the factual findings made by the court for clear error. Id. 

Our review for clear error is highly deferential. This deference is overcome only when “‘on the entire evidence’ we are ‘left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Seaman v. Peterson, 766 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 

(1985)). 

III.

The mother argues that the district court erred in denying 

her petition to return the children to Israel. First, she argues that 

Israel is the correct habitual residence of the children. Second, she 

argues that the father wrongfully retained the children by refusing 

to approve of their return to Israel. Third, she argues—even

though the district court did not reach the issue—that the father 

failed to present sufficient evidence that the children would be in 

grave danger if returned to Israel. The father disagrees with the 

mother’s contentions.

We will start, and end, with the first issue. The Hague Convention, as implemented by ICARA, applies to “Contracting 

States,” which, here, are the United States and Israel. See 22 U.S.C. 

§ 9001, et seq. So, even though the district court’s determination 

was specific to Florida, we must determine whether the district 

court clearly erred in finding that the United States is the children’s 

habitual residence. Because we conclude the district court did not 

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clearly err in finding the children’s habitual residence to be in the 

United States, we need not address the other issues on appeal. 

The district court correctly applied the totality of circumstances as the legal standard to determine habitual residence. This 

standard is a “fact-driven inquiry” depending on the “specific circumstances of the particular case.” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 78. The 

only question is whether the district court clearly erred in any fact 

findings. The mother points to several fact findings that she says 

are clearly erroneous. We disagree.

First, the mother contends that the district court used an incorrect wrongful retention date in its habitual residence determination. Habitual residence is determined “at the time of removal 

or retention[.]” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 77. To establish this date, 

ICARA requires the mother to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, when the father wrongfully retained the children. See Seaman, 766 F.3d at 1257. The district court found that the mother neither alleged a specific date nor did she dispute the father’s proposed 

date. Based on this finding, the district court determined that the 

date of the filed petition would serve as the date of wrongful retention. Although the record reflects a disagreement between the 

mother and father before the filed petition, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in its finding that, if the father wrongfully 

retained the children, he did so as of the date of the mother’s petition. 

Second, the mother argues that the district court disregarded the parties’ shared intent (or lack thereof) when they 

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returned to the United States from Israel. Shared intent is not “dispositive[,]” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 78, and “it cannot alone transform 

the habitual residence.” Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th 

Cir. 2004). Contrary to the mother’s argument, the district court 

found that the parties shared an intention of staying in Florida until 

the war in Israel ended—or, at a minimum for six months to a year. 

Ample evidence in the record supports that intention, and the 

mother filed her petition during this period. Accordingly, we are 

not left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the court erred. 

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 

Third, and relatedly, the mother contends that the children’s 

habitual residence never changed from Israel. But we cannot say 

that the record compels that finding. The mother had to show, by 

a preponderance of evidence, that the children were “habitual resident[s] of [Israel] immediately before retention in the United 

States[.]” Chafin v. Chafin, 742 F.3d 934, at 938 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). To determine the children’s habitual residence, the 

district court relied on “objective facts,” Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255, like 

the children’s enrollment in schools and extracurriculars in the 

United States. It also based its finding, in part, on the father’s “credible testimony,” to conclude that the children’s residence was the 

United States at the time of the filed petition. When a district court 

makes determinations based on witness credibility, we give “even 

greater deference to the trial court’s findings[.]” Anderson, 470 U.S. 

at 575. Being “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case[,]” 

Monasky, 589 U.S. at 78 (quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 

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744 (7th Cir. 2013)), the district court also considered the family’s 

transitory history—they had often moved to different cities, states, 

and countries for short periods of time—as relevant to whether the 

children had established a habitual residence in the United States. 

In light of the unique circumstances of this case, the district court 

determined that the mother did not meet her burden in demonstrating that Israel was the children’s habitual residence at the time 

of the alleged retention, and we cannot say the district court committed clear error in making that determination. 

Lastly, the mother challenges the district court’s assessment 

of the children’s acclimatization to the United States. “For older 

children capable of acclimating to their surroundings, courts have 

long recognized, facts indicating acclimatization will be highly relevant.” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 78. And in cases of young children, 

“the intentions and circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant considerations.” Id. Courts consider “academic activities,” 

“social engagements,” “meaningful connections with the people 

and places in the child’s new country,” “language proficiency,” and 

“location of personal belongings.” Id. at 78 n.3 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, J. Garbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the 

Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges 

67–68 (2d ed. 2015)). 

Applying the Monasky factors, the district court considered, 

among other facts, the children’s extracurricular activities, the location of their belongings, and their relationship with family in 

Florida. While the mother argues that the youngest child could not 

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have acclimated, we cannot say the district court erred in evaluating this evidence as to the children. Facts pertaining to the children’s acclimatization to the United States are relevant to assess a 

child’s habitual residence, and therefore, the district court did not 

clearly err in its consideration of them. 

IV.

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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