DA 15-0570

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2016 MT 314N

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

RICHARD NORMAN KAMPF,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,

In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC 12-436

Honorable David M. Ortley, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana 

For Appellee:

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Caitlin Overland, Deputy County 

Attorney, Kalispell, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: September 14, 2016

 Decided: November 29, 2016

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

11/29/2016

Case Number: DA 15-0570
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Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports.

¶2 Richard Kampf (Kampf) appeals from his conviction in Flathead County Justice 

Court and the ruling in his subsequent appeal to the Eleventh Judicial District Court. 

After he received multiple misdemeanor citations on December 12, 2006, Kampf never 

appeared to answer for the charges in Justice Court—despite the court issuing a bench 

warrant—until he was arrested for Partner or Family Member Assault in 2012, and the 

previous warrant was uncovered. He filed a motion to dismiss the 2006 citations on 

Montana and United States Constitutional speedy trial grounds on September 18, 2012, 

which the Justice Court denied. The court concluded that § 46–13—402(2), MCA, which 

governs, among other things, speedy trial standards for misdemeanor prosecutions, had 

not been satisfied because not more than six months had elapsed between the defendant’s 

initial appearance to enter a plea and his subsequent trial. However, approximately six 

years had passed since the county had issued the initial complaint against him and his 

trial. The Justice Court held, and the District Court affirmed on appeal, that Article II, 

Section 24, of the Montana Constitution does not apply to misdemeanor offenses, leaving 

the six month window between appearance and trial in § 46–13–402(2), MCA, as the 
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standard and sole basis of analysis for an alleged speedy trial violation in a misdemeanor 

prosecution in Justice Court. We affirm.

¶3 We restate the issue for review as follows: Whether Article II, Section 24, of the 

Montana Constitution, and the framework of analysis promulgated in State v. Ariegwe

2007 MT 204, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815, apply to misdemeanor prosecutions.

¶4 Trooper David Mills cited Kampf on December 12, 2006 for driving while 

suspended (§ 61–5–212, MCA); failing to carry proof of insurance (§ 61–6–302, MCA); 

and following too closely (§ 61–8–329, MCA) in the aftermath of an accident. All of the 

charges for which the citations were issued were misdemeanors. The citations required 

Kampf to appear personally in Flathead County Justice Court on December 22, 2006. 

Kampf did not appear before the court on December 22, and did not heed the court’s 

warning letter sent on January 5, 2007. The Justice Court suspended his license on 

January 29, 2007, and issued a bench warrant on March 6, 2007 for his failure to appear. 

That warrant remained in effect until July 16, 2012, when Kampf was arrested on charges 

of Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA). He appeared in Justice Court on July 17, 

2012, to answer for the PFMA charge and his misdemeanor citations. He pled not guilty 

to all charges, but failed to appear at his omnibus hearing on August 28, 2012. In his 

absence, the court set trial for his 2006 misdemeanor charges for October 16, 2012.

¶5 Through assigned counsel, Kampf moved to dismiss his misdemeanor charges on 

Montana and United States constitutional speedy trial grounds on September 18, 2012, 

but the Justice Court denied his motion by order on October 5, 2012. In his motion for 

dismissal, Kampf argued that the delay between the filing of the complaint against him 
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and his trial date, a span of approximately six years, violated his right to a speedy trial 

under the United States and Montana Constitutions. In its order denying the motion, the 

Justice Court reasoned that this Court’s decision in Ariegwe, the controlling framework 

for constitutional speedy trial claims in Montana, did not apply to misdemeanor 

violations. Rather than following Ariegwe by conducting a speedy trial hearing, the 

Justice Court held that Ariegwe did not apply, and § 46–13–401(2), MCA, instead 

controlled the analysis. 

¶6 Less than six months had passed between Kampf entering a plea on July 17, 2012, 

and his motion to dismiss being filed on September 18, 2012. Since the Justice Court 

recognized § 46–13–401(2), MCA, as the only controlling authority, the court concluded 

Kampf had not been denied his speedy trial right. Kampf did not appear at his bench trial 

on October 16, 2012 and was convicted on all counts in absentia. Kampf appealed to the 

Eleventh Judicial District Court, where the Justice Court’s rationale underlying the denial 

of his motion to dismiss was upheld, and his convictions were affirmed. 

¶7 On appeal from Justice Court, the District Court functions as an intermediate 

appellate court. See §§ 3–5–303 and 3–10–115, MCA. On appeal to this Court, we 

review the case as if the appeal had been filed originally in this Court. City of Bozeman 

v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40, ¶ 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d 461; State v. Ellison, 2012 MT 50, 

¶ 8, 364 Mont. 276, 272 P.3d 646 (citing Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, ¶ 26, 334 

Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643). “We examine the record independently of the district court’s 

decision, reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, 
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its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion, and its legal conclusions and mixed 

questions of law and fact under the de novo standard.” Ellison, ¶ 8. 

¶8 We have previously held that while “Ariegwe has no application in a statutory 

speedy-trial claim,” a defendant is not precluded from pursuing both his statutory right to 

a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a speedy trial in the same matter. City of 

Helena v. Heppner, 2015 MT 15, ¶¶ 13, 18, 378 Mont. 68, 341 P.3d 640. A statute may 

not abrogate a constitutional provision, so a defendant is free to pursue constitutional 

protections for a speedy trial when his claims under statutory protections fail or are 

otherwise not available. Heppner, ¶ 18.

¶9 The Justice Court denied Kampf’s speedy trial claim on the grounds that Article II, 

Section 24, of the Montana Constitution, and the Ariegwe framework do not apply to 

misdemeanors. Rather than apply Ariegwe’s four factors and conduct a balancing test, 

the court constrained its application of law to the provisions of § 46–13–401(2), MCA. 

Additionally, it concluded that Kampf’s arraignment was the trigger date for a speedy 

trial analysis, not the date the complaint was filed. Although the court was correct that 

the date of Kampf’s arraignment was the trigger date for the misdemeanor statutory 

speedy trial protections in § 46–13–401(2), MCA, it erred by not conducting a separate 

constitutional speedy trial right analysis under Ariegwe.

¶10 Section 24 and Ariegwe do indeed apply to misdemeanor violations, but 

misdemeanor defendants often times will be better served by moving to dismiss under the 

smaller threshold window of six months, granted by the statutory protection of 

§ 46-13-401(2), MCA. Although Kampf did not meet the statutory threshold of six 
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months between arraignment and trial, he did meet Ariegwe’s threshold of 200 days 

between complaint and trial. Kampf’s motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds 

therefore should have been heard before the Justice Court, and analyzed consistent with 

our ruling in Ariegwe: the Justice Court should have issued findings of fact, conclusions 

of law, and conducted a balancing test of the four factors.

¶11 However, just as we may determine, in the absence of the Justice Court 

conducting an Ariegwe analysis, that the threshold 200 days has been satisfied and 

triggers a constitutional analysis, so too may we determine that Kampf’s avoidance of the 

several hearing dates culminating in the issuance of a warrant outstanding for six years 

conclusively establishes that he had not asserted and did not want his right to a speedy 

trial. Factor (3) of the Ariegwe constitutional speedy trial analysis requires the court to 

determine whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial. Ariegwe, ¶ 20. 

Although we recognize that Ariegwe requires the trial court to enter findings of fact and 

conclusions of law as to each factor, Ariegwe, ¶ 117, remand under the facts present here 

would be an exercise in futility. Kampf never appeared to answer the charges despite 

having been provided notice to personally appear. Kampf also did not appear after the 

Justice Court’s warning letter sent on January 5, 2007. Further, despite the suspension of 

Kampf’s license for six years and an outstanding bench warrant for an equal amount of 

time, Kampf continued to avoid trial until he was arrested for a new offense and the 

outstanding warrant was discovered. Even then, Kampf failed to appear at his omnibus 

hearing and was ultimately tried in absentia on October 16, 2012. 
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¶12 Based on these facts, we have no difficulty concluding that although the Justice 

Court erred in not conducting a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the record clearly 

establishes Kampf did not want or assert his right to a speedy trial. Indeed, the record 

demonstrates Kampf did everything he could to avoid a speedy resolution of these 

proceedings.

¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of 

our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion 

of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear 

application of relevant standards of review.

¶14 Affirmed. 

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

We Concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

/S/ JIM RICE