UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LIZZIE EARLINE GREEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 98-1556

JOHN CHATILLON & SONS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem.

N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-96-317-6)

Submitted: September 29, 1998

Decided: October 19, 1998

Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Warren Sparrow, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.

David C. Smith, Linda L. Helms, ALLMAN, SPRY, LEGGETT &

CRUMPLER, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In April of 1996, Lizzie Earline Green ("Green") filed a lawsuit

against John Chatillon & Sons ("Chatillon") asserting claims under

the Americans with Disabilities Act, the North Carolina Handicapped

Persons Protections Act, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Green sought recovery because she was allegedly the

subject of harassing conduct by her supervisor which she contends

was related to her physical and mental disabilities.

In March of 1998, after finding that Green had neglected to

respond to discovery requests for over eight months despite assurances that the information would be provided, the district court

granted Chatillon's motion for sanctions and dismissed Green's case

for failure to comply with a court order regarding discovery under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Green appeals, and we affirm.

Chatillon served Green with its first discovery request, Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents, on June 26, 1997.

Green did not respond to this discovery request within the thirty-day

deadline, nor did she request an extension. After numerous attempts

to obtain the requested information, Chatillon's counsel filed a motion

to compel on October 24, 1997. Green filed no response to Chatillon's motion to compel. On December 10, 1997, a magistrate judge

ordered that Green respond to each of the Defendant's discovery

requests within twenty days from entry of its order. The magistrate

judge's order also reserved the imposition of sanctions and warned

Green that should she fail to obey the order, the court could and

would likely impose sanctions against her, including granting a

default judgment against her. Green did not provide any discovery

responses by December 30, 1997, nor did she request an extension.

On January 9, 1998, after Chatillon's counsel still had not received

any discovery responses from Green, Chatillon moved for sanctions

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Green filed no response to Chatillon's

motion for sanctions and never provided responses to Chatillon's

requests for discovery. The district court subsequently granted Chatillon's motions for sanctions and ordered that Green's case be dis-

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missed with prejudice. On appeal, Green challenges the propriety of

the dismissal.

The district court may impose sanctions, including dismissal of the

action, if a party fails to comply with a court order regarding discovery. See Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503 (4th

Cir. 1977). Dismissal of a complaint is an extreme sanction, reserved

for flagrant cases of bad faith and callous disregard for the court's

authority. See Hillig v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 171, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1990)

(vacating dismissal of petition); see also Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass'n v. Richards & Assoc., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989)

(affirming default judgment). We review such a decision only for

abuse of discretion. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan

Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976).

To determine whether a dismissal was proper, we examine the following factors: "(1) whether the noncomplying party acted in bad

faith; (2) the amount of prejudice the noncompliance caused the

adversary; (3) the need for deterring the particular type of noncompliance; and (4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions." Hillig, 916

F.2d at 174 (citing Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 92).

Although Green repeatedly assured Chatillon's counsel that she

would provide discovery responses, she never fulfilled these promises. Further, Green never requested more time or offered an explanation for her failure to comply with these discovery requests. Finally,

when ordered by the magistrate to respond to Chatillon's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents within twenty-days,

Green failed to comply. This conduct constitutes bad faith. See

Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 93.

Despite Green's contention that Chatillon was not prejudiced by

her failure to provide discovery responses because she submitted to

a deposition and an examination by Chatillon's expert witness, the

information sought is clearly material to the defense of the action.

Chatillon sought information such as medical records, documents

related to any alleged misconduct of her supervisor, a list of healthcare providers that provided her with treatment for any alleged mental

or physical disability, the type of healthcare treatment she received,

a list of witnesses, and a list of expert witnesses.

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Further, deterrence of the type of conduct engaged in by Green and

counsel was plainly warranted. Their failure to respond to Chatillon's

eighteen straightforward interrogatories and requests for production

of documents, despite numerous opportunities to do so and in the face

of an explicit order entered by a magistrate judge, demonstrates flagrant bad faith and callous disregard by Green and her counsel of

their obligations, and thus, warranted dismissal as a deterrent to others. See National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643.

Moreover, it is clear that less drastic alternatives were not available. First, since Green had recently filed for bankruptcy, the district

court's view that she was unlikely to be able to pay a monetary sanction finds ample support in the record. Second, application of any of

the less drastic sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b), would likely

have had the same effect as a dismissal. Finally, the magistrate

judge's previous warning that her failure to comply could result in a

dismissal had no apparent effect. Green failed to follow the magistrate

judge's order and never responded to Chatillon's motion for sanctions. Under these circumstances, the district court in its discretion,

found that dismissal was appropriate. We find no abuse of discretion

in that determination.

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the case. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the material before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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