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15-3950-cv 

Forest v. New York State Office of Mental Health

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A 

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

Present: 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

 Circuit Judges, 

 CAROL BAGLEY AMON, 

 District Judge.

*

_____________________________________ 

RUTH A. FOREST, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 15-3950 

 

NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

_____________________________________ 

For Plaintiff-Appellant: KYLE T. PULIS & Scott Michael Mishkin (on the brief),

Scott Michael Mishkin PC, Islandia, New York 

For Defendant-Appellee: ANDREW RHYS DAVIES, Assistant Solicitor General of 

Counsel, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor 

 

*

 Judge Carol Bagley Amon, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 

sitting by designation. 
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General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General (on 

the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General 

of the State of New York, New York, New York 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF it is hereby ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Ruth Forest appeals a grant of summary judgment entered in the 

Southern District of New York (Forrest, J.) on November 10, 2015, dismissing her claim of 

retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the 

issues on appeal, some of which we briefly reiterate here. 

I. Background 

Ruth Forest has been a registered nurse at Sullivan Correctional Facility (“SCF”) since 

2006. On March 21, 2011, Forest filed an internal complaint of gender discrimination with 

SCF’s Affirmative Action Department. In May 2011, Forest went out on medical leave and 

returned in January 2012. She complains that, upon her return, her supervisors, Shelley Depew 

and Sueann Smith, retaliated against her for filing the internal complaint by having her work 

weekdays instead of weekends for a period of two weeks, asking her to review the new policies 

implemented during her eight-month absence, preventing her from leaving the facility for lunch, 

and reprimanding her for using red ink on patients’ charts. 

In April 2012, Forest filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human 

Rights (“NYSDHR”), alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. After that complaint, she 

alleges that she was again retaliated against by supervisors when she was: (1) written up for 

completing paperwork on a patient who had already been discharged; (2) assigned an extra week 

of medication classes; and (3) disciplined for a missing syringe. She also claims that from 
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“about 2011” to June 2013, her supervisors prevented her from answering the phones during the 

nurses’ morning meetings. 

On March 14, 2013, Forest filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. She 

brought gender discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII against the New York State 

Office of Mental Health (“OMH”) and gender discrimination claims against Smith and Depew 

under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In November 2014, the district court 

dismissed the gender discrimination claims against both OMH and her supervisors, holding that 

Forest had not plausibly alleged any “materially adverse employment action” sufficient to sustain 

a discrimination claim. In November 2015, the district court entered summary judgment for 

OMH on Forest’s remaining Title VII retaliation claims. Forest now appeals the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment as to the retaliation claims. 

II. Discussion 

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in its favor.” Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). To 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a “plaintiff must submit sufficient admissible evidence 

to allow a trier of fact to find: (i) conduct by the plaintiff that is protected activity under Title 

VII; (ii) of which the employer was aware; (iii) followed by an adverse employment action of a 

nature that would deter a reasonable employee from making or supporting a discrimination 

claim; (iv) that was causally connected to the protected activity.” Cox v. Onondaga Cty. 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2014). The employer must then articulate a 

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Jute v. Hamilton 

Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff 
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has to come forward with evidence to support the conclusion that the proffered reason is 

pretextual. See Kessler v. Westchester Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 211 (2d Cir. 

2006). 

The district court suggested that Forest’s alleged acts of retaliation were not “materially 

adverse” sufficient to sustain a retaliation claim under Title VII. See Tepperwien v. Entergy 

Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 568 (2d Cir. 2011) (defining a materially adverse action 

as one that would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a charge of discrimination). 

Regardless, the court found that Forest failed to establish a causal connection between most of 

the alleged acts of retaliation and her complaints. For the remaining acts, OMH offered 

legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons, and Forest offered no response. 

We conclude that Forest failed to establish a materially adverse employment action and 

so affirm on this basis. Material adversity is to be determined objectively, based on the reactions 

of a reasonable employee. Id. “[T]rivial harms”—i.e., “those petty slights or minor 

annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience”—are not materially 

adverse. Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). An 

employer’s “enforcement of its preexisting disciplinary policies in a reasonable manner” does 

not amount to a materially adverse action. Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 

743 F.3d 11, 26 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 

2012)). In addition, “criticism of an employee (which is part of training and necessary to allow 

employees to develop, improve and avoid discipline) is not an adverse employment action.” 

Tepperwien, 663 F.3d at 570 (quoting Weeks v. N.Y. State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86 (2d 

Cir. 2001)). 

As an initial matter, Forest was only—at most—criticized for the missing syringe and for 
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using red ink on patients’ charts. See id. (stating that a lack of disciplinary action cuts against 

finding of material adversity). Moreover, many of the allegedly retaliatory acts reflect the 

reasonable enforcement of OMH’s preexisting disciplinary policies. Specifically, OMH’s 

Human Resources Administrative Manual requires all mental health staff to remain on the 

compound for lunch.1 OMH policy required nurses properly to identify patients before giving 

them treatment and to document only the treatment they provided. In addition, OMH has put into 

the record its written policy about syringe/sharp disposal. Any formal discipline Forest received 

was in accordance with this policy.2

 See Rivera, 743 F.3d at 26. 

Furthermore, the other actions on which Forest relies—that her schedule was shifted from 

weekends to weekdays for two weeks, that she had to review the policies implemented while she 

was on medical leave, that she was prevented from answering phones, and that she was assigned 

an extra week of medication classes—reflect “trivial harms.”3 See Tepperwien, 663 F.3d at 

568, 571-72. Thus, Forest failed to establish the third element of her prima facie case of 

 

1

 At oral argument, Forest contended that this policy was applied only to her. The record suggests 

otherwise. It is undisputed that the policy was not enforced during the period before Forest left on 

medical leave, but there is also undisputed evidence that in the beginning of 2012, when Forest returned 

from medical leave, OMH administrators made a renewed effort to enforce the lunch policy. Forest 

acknowledges that no one was allowed to leave the facility during lunch after the policy was 

reimplemented. And before the policy was reimplemented, both Forest and her colleagues were allowed 

to go out and pick up lunch. Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that this policy applied only to her 

at any point in time. 

2

 Forest further claims that Depew filed a “fabricated” sexual harassment complaint against Forest on 

March 18, 2014. But that event occurred after Forest filed her Second Amended Complaint in 

November 2013. Forest mentioned the event for the first time in her statement of additional facts 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(b) on September 29, 2015. The district court did not 

address this additional event when it granted OMH summary judgment. OMH argues on appeal that the 

allegation is not a part of this suit and that Forest failed even to allege that the accusation was related to 

any protected activity. We agree. 

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 As to the assignment of an extra week of classes, Forest claims she was assigned 13 weeks of 

medication classes instead of the normal 12. The record reveals, however, that Forest only ended up 

teaching 10 of the 13 weeks during that period. In addition, assignments within an employee’s job 

description are generally not materially adverse. See Rodas v. Town of Farmington, 567 F. App’x 24, 27 

(2d Cir. 2014) (summary order). 
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retaliation under Title VII. The district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. 

III. Conclusion 

We have considered Forest’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk