15810 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 57 / Wednesday, March 25, 2015 / Notices 

Graves Protection and Repatriation 

Review Committee (Review Committee). 

The Review Committee will meet on 

April 13, 2015, from 2 p.m. until 

approximately 5 p.m. (Eastern) via 

teleconference. All meetings will be 

open to the public. 

DATES: The Review Committee will meet 

on April 13, 2015, from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. 

Register before April 10, 2015, to be 

provided the telephone access number 

for the meeting. 

ADDRESSES: A registration link can be 

found at http://www.nps.gov/nagpra. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Melanie O’Brien, Designated Federal 

Officer, Native American Graves 

Protection and Repatriation Review 

Committee, National NAGPRA Program 

(2253), National Park Service, 1849 C 

Street NW., Washington, DC 20240, or 

via email nagpra_dfo@nps.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Review Committee was established in 

section 8 of the Native American Graves 

Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 

(NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. 3006. The Review 

Committee will meet via teleconference 

on April 13, 2015, for the sole purpose 

of finalizing the Review Committee’s 

Dispute Procedures. This meeting will 

be open to the public. Those who desire 

to attend the meeting should register 

through a link found at http://

www.nps.gov/nagpra, before April 10, 

2015, to be provided the telephone 

access number for the meeting. A 

transcript and minutes of the meeting 

will also appear on the Web site. 

General Information 

Information about NAGPRA, the 

Review Committee, and Review 

Committee meetings is available on the 

National NAGPRA Program Web site at 

http://www.nps.gov/nagpra. For the 

Review Committee’s meeting 

procedures, click on ‘‘Review 

Committee,’’ then click on 

‘‘Procedures.’’ Meeting minutes may be 

accessed by going to the Web site, then 

clicking on ‘‘Review Committee,’’ and 

then clicking on ‘‘Meeting Minutes.’’ 

Approximately fourteen weeks after 

each Review Committee meeting, the 

meeting transcript is posted on the 

National NAGPRA Program Web site. 

Review Committee members are 

appointed by the Secretary of the 

Interior. The Review Committee is 

responsible for monitoring the NAGPRA 

inventory and identification process; 

reviewing and making findings related 

to the identity or cultural affiliation of 

cultural items, or the return of such 

items; facilitating the resolution of 

disputes; compiling an inventory of 

culturally unidentifiable human 

remains that are in the possession or 

control of each Federal agency and 

museum, and recommending specific 

actions for developing a process for 

disposition of such human remains; 

consulting with Indian tribes and Native 

Hawaiian organizations and museums 

on matters affecting such tribes or 

organizations lying within the scope of 

work of the Review Committee; 

consulting with the Secretary of the 

Interior on the development of 

regulations to carry out NAGPRA; and 

making recommendations regarding 

future care of repatriated cultural items. 

The Review Committee’s work is carried 

out during the course of meetings that 

are open to the public. 

Before including your address, 

telephone number, email address, or 

other personal identifying information 

in your comment, you should be aware 

that your entire comment—including 

your personal identifying information— 

may be made publicly available at any 

time. While you may ask us in your 

comment to withhold your personal 

identifying information from public 

review, we cannot guarantee that we 

will be able to do so. 

Dated: March 18, 2015. 

Alma Ripps, 

Chief, Office of Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06798 Filed 3–24–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4310–EE–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Antitrust Division 

United States v. Waste Management, 

Inc. and Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc.; 

Proposed Final Judgment and 

Competitive Impact Statement 

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the 

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 

15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that a proposed 

Final Judgment, Stipulation and 

Competitive Impact Statement have 

been filed with the United States 

District Court for the District of 

Columbia in United States of America v. 

Waste Management, Inc. and 

Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc., Civil Action 

No. 1:15–cv–00366. On March 13, 2015, 

the United States filed a Complaint 

alleging that Waste Management, Inc.’s 

proposed acquisition of Deffenbaugh 

Disposal, Inc. would violate Section 7 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The 

proposed Final Judgment, filed the same 

time as the Complaint, requires Waste 

Management, Inc. to divest small 

container commercial waste collection 

routes it acquired from Deffenbaugh 

Disposal, Inc. as follows: Five specified 

routes in Springdale, Arkansas; two 

specified routes in the Van Buren/Fort 

Smith, Arkansas area; and four specified 

routes in Topeka, Kansas. Waste 

Management must also adhere to other 

requirements. 

Copies of the Complaint, Stipulation, 

proposed Final Judgment and 

Competitive Impact Statement are 

available for inspection at the 

Department of Justice, Antitrust 

Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 

450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 1010, 

Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202– 

514–2481), on the Department of 

Justice’s Web site at http://

www.usdoj.gov/atr, and at the Office of 

the Clerk of the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia. 

Copies of these materials may be 

obtained from the Antitrust Division 

upon request and payment of the 

copying fee set by Department of Justice 

regulations. 

Public comment is invited within 60 

days of the date of this notice. Such 

comments, including the name of the 

submitter, and responses thereto, will be 

posted on the Department of Justice, 

Antitrust Division’s internet Web site, 

filed with the Court and, under certain 

circumstances, published in the Federal 

Register. Comments should be directed 

to James J. Tierney, Chief, Networks and 

Technology Enforcement Section, 

Antitrust Division, Department of 

Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., 

Washington, DC 20530, (telephone: 

202–307–6200). 

Patricia A. Brink, 

Director of Civil Enforcement. 

United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia United States of 

America, Plaintiff, v. Waste 

Management, Inc. and Deffenbaugh 

Disposal, Inc., Defendants. 

Civil Action No.: 1:15–cv–00366 

Description: Antitrust 

Date Stamp: 3/13/2015 

Complaint 

The United States of America, acting 

under the direction of the Attorney 

General of the United States, brings this 

civil action to enjoin the proposed 

acquisition by Defendant Waste 

Management, Inc. (‘‘WMI’’) of Defendant 

Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc. (‘‘DDI’’). The 

United States alleges as follows: 

I. Introduction 

1. Pursuant to the Agreement and 

Plan of Merger dated September 17, 

2014, WMI proposes to acquire all of the 

outstanding securities of DDI. WMI and 

DDI compete to provide small container 

commercial waste collection service in 

certain geographic areas in the United 


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States. They are two of only a few 

significant providers of small container 

commercial waste collection service in 

and around Springdale, Arkansas; Van 

Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas; and 

Topeka, Kansas. 

2. WMI and DDI have competed 

aggressively against one another for 

customers in these three areas, which 

has resulted in lower prices for small 

container commercial waste collection 

service. Unless the transaction is 

enjoined, consumers of small container 

commercial waste collection services in 

these areas likely will pay higher prices 

and receive lower quality service as a 

consequence of eliminating the vigorous 

competition between WMI and DDI. 

Accordingly, WMI’s acquisition of DDI 

likely would substantially lessen 

competition in the provision of small 

container commercial waste collection 

service in and around Springdale, 

Arkansas, Van Buren/Fort Smith, 

Arkansas, and Topeka, Kansas, in 

violation of Section 7 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. 

II. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Interstate 

Commerce 

3. This action is filed by the United 

States under Section 15 of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 25, as amended, to 

prevent and restrain the violation by 

Defendants of Section 7 of the Clayton 

Act, 15, U.S.C. 18. 

4. The Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 

Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 

25, and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), and 

1345. In their small container 

commercial waste collection businesses, 

WMI and DDI makes sales and 

purchases in interstate commerce, ship 

waste in the flow of interstate 

commerce, and engage in activities 

substantially affecting interstate 

commerce. 

5. Defendant WMI transacts business 

in the District of Columbia, and WMI 

and DDI have consented to venue and 

personal jurisdiction in the District of 

Columbia. Venue is therefore proper in 

this District under Section 12 of the 

Clayton Act, 15, U.S.C. 22, and 28 

U.S.C. 1391(c). 

III. The Defendants and the Transaction 

6. WMI is a Delaware corporation 

headquartered in Houston, Texas. WMI 

is the largest waste hauling and disposal 

company in the United States providing 

collection, transfer, recycling, and 

disposal services throughout the nation. 

For fiscal year 2014, WMI reported 

revenues of approximately $14 billion. 

7. DDI is a Delaware corporation 

headquartered in Kansas City, Kansas. 

DDI provides waste collection, transfer, 

recycling and disposal services in 

Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Nebraska, 

and Iowa. DDI’s revenues for 2013 were 

approximately $180 million. 

8. On September 17, 2014, WMI and 

DDI entered into an Agreement and Plan 

of Merger by which WMI proposes to 

acquire all of the outstanding securities 

of DDI for approximately $405 million. 

IV. Trade and Commerce 

A. Relevant Service Market: Small 

Container Commercial Waste Collection 

9. Waste collection firms, also referred 

to as ‘‘haulers,’’ collect municipal solid 

waste (‘‘MSW’’) from residential, 

commercial, and industrial 

establishments and transport the waste 

to a disposal site, such as a transfer 

station, landfill, or incinerator, for 

processing and disposal. Commercial 

customers typically contract directly 

with private waste collection firms, 

such as WMI and DDI, for the collection 

of MWS generated by their businesses. 

MSW generated by residential 

customers, on the other hand, often is 

collected either by local governments or 

by private waste collection firms 

pursuant to contracts, or franchises 

granted by, municipal authorities. 

10. Small container commercial waste 

collection service is the business of 

collecting MSW from commercial and 

industrial accounts, usually in 

dumpsters (i.e., a small container with 

one to ten cubic yards of storage 

capacity), and transporting such waste 

to a disposal site by use of a front- or 

rear-end load truck. Typical small 

container commercial waste collection 

customers include office and apartment 

buildings and retail establishments (e.g., 

stores and restaurants). Small container 

commercial waste collection does not 

include other types of waste collection 

services, such as residential collection 

service or the collection of roll-off 

containers. 

11. Small container commercial waste 

collection service differs in many 

important respects from residential 

waste collection or other types of 

collection services. An individual 

commercial customer typically 

generates substantially more MSW than 

a residential customer. To handle this 

high volume of MSW efficiently, 

commercial customers are provided 

with small containers, also called 

dumpsters, for storing the waste. 

Commercial accounts are organized into 

routes, and the MSW generated by these 

accounts is collected and transported in 

front-end load (‘‘FEL’’) trucks uniquely 

well-suited for commercial waste 

collection. Less frequently, haulers may 

use more maneuverable, but less 

efficient, rear-end load (‘‘REL’’) trucks, 

especially in those areas in which a 

collection route includes narrow 

alleyways or streets which are difficult 

to navigate with FEL trucks. Because 

FEL trucks are unable to navigate 

narrow passageways easily they cannot 

efficiently collect the waste located in 

them. 

12. On a typical small container 

commercial waste collection route, an 

operator drives a FEL truck to the 

customer’s container, engages a 

mechanism that grasps and lifts the 

container over the front of the truck, and 

empties the container into the truck’s 

storage section where the waste is 

compacted and stored. The operator 

continues along the route, collecting 

MSW from each of the commercial 

accounts, until the vehicle is full. The 

operator then drives the truck to a 

disposal facility, such as a transfer 

station, landfill or incinerator, and 

empties the content of the truck. 

Depending on the number of locations 

and the amount of waste collected on 

that route, the operator may make one 

or more trips to the disposal facility 

during the servicing of the route. 

13. In contrast to a small container 

commercial waste collection route, a 

residential waste collection route is 

significantly more labor-intensive. The 

customer’s MSW is stored in much 

smaller containers (e.g., garbage bags or 

trash cans) and, instead of FEL trucks, 

waste collection firms routinely use REL 

trucks or side-load trucks manned by 

larger crews (usually, two- or threeperson teams). On residential routes, 

crews generally hand-load the 

customer’s MSW, typically by tossing 

garbage bags and emptying trash cans 

into the vehicle’s storage section. 

Because of the differences in the 

collection processes, residential 

customers and commercial customers 

usually are organized into separate 

routes. 

14. Other types of collection 

activities, such as the use of roll-off 

containers (typically used for 

construction debris) and the collection 

of liquid or hazardous waste, also are 

rarely combined with small container 

commercial waste collection. This is 

due to differences in the hauling 

equipment required, the volume of 

waste collected, health and safety 

concerns, government regulations, and 

the ultimate disposal option used. 

15. The differences in the types and 

volume of MSW collected and in the 

equipment used in collection services 

distinguish small container commercial 

waste collection from all other types of 

waste collection activities. Absent 

competition from other small container 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
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commercial waste collection firms, a 

small container commercial waste 

collection service provider profitably 

could increase its charges without 

losing significant sales or revenues to 

firms engaged in the provision of other 

types of waste collection services. Thus, 

small container commercial waste 

collection is a line of commerce, or 

relevant service, for purposes of 

analyzing the effects of the acquisition 

under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 18. 

B. Relevant Geographic Markets 

16. Small container commercial waste 

collection service is generally provided 

in highly localized areas because a firm 

must have sufficient density (i.e., a large 

number of commercial accounts that are 

reasonably close together) in its small 

container commercial waste collection 

operations to operate efficiently and 

profitably. If a hauler has to drive 

significant distances between 

customers, it earns less money for the 

time the truck is operating. 

17. Accounts must also be near an 

operator’s base of operations. Firms 

with operations concentrated in a 

distant area cannot effectively compete 

against firms whose routes and 

customers are locally based. It is 

economically impractical for a small 

container commercial waste collection 

firm to service areas from a distant base, 

which requires that the FEL truck travel 

long distances just to arrive at its route. 

Local waste collection firms have 

significant cost advantages over other 

more-distant firms, and can profitably 

increase their charges to local customers 

without losing significant sales to firms 

outside the area. Waste collection firms, 

therefore, generally operate from garages 

and related facilities within each of the 

local areas they serve. 

18. In each of the following areas a 

small container commercial waste 

collection firm could profitably increase 

prices to local customers without losing 

significant sales to more distant 

competitors: Springdale, Arkansas Area; 

Van Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas Area; 

and Topeka, Kansas Area. Accordingly, 

each of these areas is a section of the 

country, or relevant geographic market, 

for the purposes of analyzing the 

competitive effects of the acquisition 

under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 18. 

C. Anticompetitive Effects of the 

Proposed Acquisition 

19. Defendants WMI and DDI directly 

compete in small container commercial 

waste collection service in each of the 

relevant geographic markets defined in 

paragraph 18. The acquisition of DDI by 

WMI would remove a significant 

competitor in small container 

commercial waste collection in these 

already highly concentrated and 

difficult-to-enter markets. 

20. In the Springdale, Arkansas Area, 

the market for small container 

commercial waste collection services is 

highly concentrated and would become 

substantially more concentrated as a 

result of the proposed transaction. By 

the parties own estimates, WMI has 

approximately 48% of the market and 

DDI has approximately 18% of the 

market. The remaining 36% is split 

between only two other competitors. 

Thus, in the Springdale, Arkansas Area, 

the proposed acquisition would reduce 

from four to three the number of 

competitors in the collection of small 

container commercial waste. 

21. In the Van Buren/Fort Smith, 

Arkansas Area, the market for small 

container commercial waste collection 

services is highly concentrated and 

would become substantially more 

concentrated as a result of the proposed 

transaction. By the defendants’ own 

estimates, WMI has approximately 33% 

of the market and DDI has 

approximately 33% of the market. The 

remaining 34% belongs to a third 

competitor. Thus, in the Van Buren/Fort 

Smith, Arkansas Area, the proposed 

acquisition would reduce from three to 

two the number of competitors in the 

collection of small container 

commercial waste. 

22. In addition, in both the 

Springdale, Arkansas Area and the Van 

Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas Area, DDI 

is often the low-price leader, and 

customers in these areas frequently 

switch between the existing competitors 

in order to take advantage of lower 

prices. In both of these areas, WMI and 

DDI are also among the few small 

container commercial waste firms that 

can reliably service larger accounts. 

23. In the Topeka, Kansas Area, the 

market for small container commercial 

waste collection services is highly 

concentrated and would become 

substantially more concentrated as a 

result of the proposed transaction. By 

the defendants’ own estimates, WMI has 

approximately 35% of the market and 

DDI has approximately 32% of the 

market. The remaining 33% belongs to 

a third competitor. Thus, in the Topeka, 

Kansas Area, the proposed acquisition 

would reduce from three to two the 

number of competitors in the collection 

of small container commercial waste. 

And for many of the larger small 

container commercial waste customers 

in the Topeka, Kansas Area, WMI and 

DDI are currently the only two options. 

These customers would be left with 

only one option as a result of the 

acquisition. 

24. In each of these markets, the 

resulting significant increase in 

concentration, loss of competition, and 

absence of any reasonable prospect of 

significant new entry likely will result 

in higher prices and lower quality 

service for the collection of small 

container commercial waste. 

D. Entry Into Small Container 

Commercial Waste Collection 

25. Significant new entry into small 

container commercial waste collection 

is difficult and time-consuming, 

including in the Springdale, Arkansas 

Area; the Van Buren/Fort Smith, 

Arkansas Area; and the Topeka, Kansas 

Area. 

26. In order to obtain a comparable 

operating efficiency, a new firm must 

achieve route densities similar to those 

of firms already competing in the 

market. However, the incumbent’s 

ability to engage in price discrimination 

and to enter into long-term contracts 

with collection customers is often 

effective in preventing new entrants 

from winning a large enough base of 

customers to achieve efficient routes in 

sufficient time to constrain the postacquisition firm from significantly 

raising prices. 

27. Incumbent firms also frequently 

use three- to five-year contracts, which 

may automatically renew or contain 

large liquidated damages provisions for 

contract termination. Such contracts 

make it more difficult for a customer to 

switch to a new firm in order to obtain 

lower prices for its collection service. 

28. By making it more difficult for 

new firms to obtain customers, these 

practices increase the cost and time 

required by an entrant to form an 

efficient route, reducing the likelihood 

that an entrant ultimately will be 

successful. 

V. Violations Alleged 

29. The proposed acquisition likely 

would lessen competition substantially 

for small container commercial waste 

collection services in the Springdale, 

Arkansas Area; the Van Buren/Fort 

Smith, Arkansas Area; and the Topeka, 

Kansas Area, in violation of Section 7 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. 

30. Unless enjoined, the proposed 

acquisition likely would have the 

following anticompetitive effects 

relating to small container commercial 

waste collection services in the 

Springdale, Arkansas Area; the Van 

Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas Area; and 

the Topeka, Kansas Area, among others: 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 57 / Wednesday, March 25, 2015 / Notices 15813 

(a) Actual and potential competition 

between WMI and DDI would be 

eliminated; 

(b) competition generally would be 

substantially lessened; and 

(c) prices would increase and the 

quality of service would decrease. 

VI. Requested Relief 

31. Plaintiff requests that this Court: 

(a) adjudge and decree that WMI’s 

acquisition of DDI would be unlawful 

and violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 

15 U.S.C. 18; 

(b) permanently enjoin and restrain 

defendants and all persons acting on 

their behalf from consummating the 

proposed acquisition of DDI by WMI, or 

from entering into or carrying out any 

other contract, agreement, plan or 

understanding, the effect of which 

would be to combine WMI with DDI; 

(c) award the United States the cost 

for this action; and 

(d) award the United States such other 

and further relief as the Court deems 

just and proper. 

FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA: 

lll/s/lll 

WILLIAM J. BAER (DC BAR #324723), 

Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. 

lll/s/lll 

RENATA B. HESSE (DC BAR #466107), 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General. 

lll/s/lll 

PATRICIA A. BRINK, 

Director of Civil Enforcement. 

lll/s/lll 

JAMES J. TIERNEY (DC Bar # 434610), 

Chief, NETWORKS AND TECHNOLOGY 

SECTION. 

lll/s/lll 

AARON D. HOAG Dated: March 13, 

2015, 

Assistant Chief, NETWORKS AND 

TECHNOLOGY SECTION. 

lll/s/lll 

IAN D. HOFFMAN 

DANIELLE G. HAUCK 

ANURAG MAHESHWARY (DC BAR 

#490535) 

Dated: March 13, 2015. 

United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Waste Management, Inc. 

and 

Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc., 

Defendants. 

Civil Action No.: 1:15-cv-00366 

Description: Antitrust 

Date Stamp: 3/13/2015 

Competitive Impact Statement 

Plaintiff United States of America 

(‘‘United States’’), pursuant to Section 

2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and 

Penalties Act (‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney 

Act’’), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h), files this 

Competitive Impact Statement relating 

to the Final Judgment submitted for 

entry in this civil antitrust proceeding. 

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding 

Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of 

Merger dated September 17, 2014, 

Waste Management, Inc. (‘‘WMI’’) 

proposes to acquire all of the 

outstanding shares of common stock of 

Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc. (‘‘DDI’’) in a 

transaction valued at approximately 

$405 million. 

The United States filed a civil 

antitrust Complaint on March 13, 2015, 

seeking to enjoin the proposed 

acquisition. The Complaint alleges that 

the proposed acquisition likely would 

substantially lessen competition for 

small container commercial waste 

collection service in the area of Topeka, 

Kansas, and in two areas in 

Northwestern Arkansas—Van Buren/

Fort Smith, and Springdale—in 

violation of Section 7 of the Clayton 

Act. This loss of competition would 

result in consumers paying higher 

prices and receiving inferior services for 

small container commercial waste 

collection service in those areas. 

At the same time the Complaint was 

filed, the United States also filed a Hold 

Separate Stipulation and Order and 

proposed Final Judgment, which are 

designed to eliminate the 

anticompetitive effects of the 

acquisition. Under the proposed Final 

Judgment, which is explained more 

fully below, defendants are required to 

divest specified small container 

commercial waste collection assets. 

Under the terms of the Hold Separate 

Stipulation and Order, WMI and DDI are 

required to take certain steps to ensure 

that the assets to be divested will be 

preserved and held separate from other 

assets and businesses. 

The United States and the defendants 

have stipulated that the proposed Final 

Judgment may be entered after 

compliance with the APPA. Entry of the 

proposed Final Judgment would 

terminate this action, except that the 

Court would retain jurisdiction to 

construe, modify, or enforce the 

provisions of the Final Judgment and to 

punish violations thereof. 

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise 

to the Alleged Violations 

A. The Defendants 

WMI is a Delaware corporation with 

its headquarters in Houston, Texas. 

WMI provides collection, transfer, 

recycling, and disposal services 

throughout the United States. In 2014, 

WMI had estimated total revenue of $14 

billion. 

DDI is a Delaware corporation, with 

its headquarters in Kansas City, Kansas. 

DDI offers collection, transfer, recycling, 

and disposal services in Kansas, 

Missouri, Arkansas, Nebraska, and Iowa. 

In 2013 DDI had estimated total revenue 

of approximately $180 million. 

B. The Competitive Effects of the 

Transaction on Small Container 

Commercial Waste Collection in 

Topeka, Kansas, and Van Buren/Fort 

Smith and Springdale, Arkansas 

Municipal solid waste (‘‘MSW) is 

solid, putrescible waste generated by 

households and commercial 

establishments. Waste collection firms, 

or haulers, contract to collect MSW from 

residential and commercial customers 

and transport the waste to private and 

public MSW disposal facilities (e.g., 

transfer stations and landfills), which, 

for a fee, process and legally dispose of 

the waste. Small container commercial 

waste collection is one component of 

MSW collection, which also includes 

residential and other waste collection. 

WMI and DDI compete in the collection 

of small container commercial waste. 

Small container commercial waste 

collection service is the collection of 

MSW from commercial businesses (e.g., 

office and apartment buildings) and 

retail establishments (e.g., stores and 

restaurants) for shipment to, and 

disposal at, an approved disposal 

facility. Because of the type and volume 

of waste generated by commercial 

accounts and the frequency of service 

required, haulers organize commercial 

accounts into routes, and generally use 

specialized equipment to store, collect, 

and transport MSW from these accounts 

to approved MSW disposal sites. This 

equipment (e.g., one to ten-cubic-yard 

containers for MSW storage, and frontend load vehicles commonly used for 

collection and transportation of MSW) 

is uniquely well-suited for providing 

small container commercial waste 

collection service. Providers of other 

types of waste collection services (e.g., 

residential and roll-off services) are not 

good substitutes for small container 

commercial waste collection firms. In 

these types of waste collection efforts, 

firms use different waste storage 

equipment (e.g., garbage cans or semiVerDate Sep<11>2014 15:26 Mar 24, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\25MRN1.SGM 25MRN1

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stationary roll-off containers) and 

different vehicles (e.g., rear-load, sideload, or roll-off trucks), which, for a 

variety of reasons, cannot be 

conveniently or efficiently used to store, 

collect, or transport MSW generated by 

commercial accounts and, hence, are 

rarely used on small container 

commercial waste collection routes. In 

the event of a small but significant 

increase in price for small container 

commercial waste collection services, 

customers would not switch to any 

other alternative. Thus, the Complaint 

alleges that the provision of small 

container commercial waste collection 

services constitutes a line of commerce, 

or relevant service, for purposes of 

analyzing the effects of the transaction. 

The Complaint alleges that the 

provision of small container commercial 

waste collection service takes place in 

compact, highly-localized geographic 

markets. It is expensive to transport 

MSW long distances between collection 

customers or to disposal sites. To 

minimize transportation costs and 

maximize the scale, density, and 

efficiency of their MSW collection 

operations, small container commercial 

waste collection firms concentrate their 

customers and collection routes in small 

areas. Firms with operations 

concentrated in a distant area cannot 

effectively compete against firms whose 

routes and customers are locally based. 

Distance may significantly limit a 

remote firm’s ability to provide 

commercial waste collection service as 

frequently or conveniently as that 

offered by local firms with nearby 

routes. Also, local small container 

commercial waste firms have significant 

cost advantages over other firms, and 

can profitably increase their charges to 

local small container commercial waste 

collection customers without losing 

significant sales to firms outside the 

area. 

Applying this analysis, the Complaint 

alleges that in the Topeka, Kansas Area, 

the Van Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas 

Area, and the Springdale, Arkansas 

Area, a local small container 

commercial waste collection monopolist 

could profitably increase charges to 

local customers without losing 

significant sales to more distant 

competitors. Accordingly, the Topeka 

Area, and the Van Buren/Fort Smith and 

Springdale Areas of Northwest 

Arkansas, are sections of the country or 

relevant geographic markets for the 

purpose of assessing the competitive 

effects of a combination of WMI and 

DDI in the provision of small container 

commercial waste collection services. 

There are significant entry barriers to 

small container commercial waste 

collection. A new entrant must achieve 

a minimum efficient scale and operating 

efficiencies comparable to those of 

existing firms in order to provide a 

significant competitive constraint on the 

prices charged by market incumbents. In 

order to obtain comparable operating 

efficiencies, a new firm must achieve 

route density similar to existing firms. 

However, an incumbent’s ability to 

price discriminate and to enter into 

long-term contracts with existing small 

container commercial waste customers 

can leave too few customers available to 

the entrant to create an efficient route in 

a sufficiently confined geographic area. 

An incumbent firm can selectively and 

temporarily charge an unbeatably low 

price to specified customers targeted by 

new entrants. Because of these factors, 

a new entrant may find it difficult to 

compete by offering its services at preentry price levels comparable to the 

incumbent and may find an increase in 

the cost and time required to form an 

efficient route, thereby limiting a new 

entrant’s ability to build an efficient 

route and reducing the likelihood that 

the entrant will ultimately succeed. 

The need for route density and the 

ability of existing firms to price 

discriminate raise significant barriers to 

entry by new firms, which likely will be 

forced to compete at lower than preentry price levels. Based on the prior 

experience of the Department of Justice, 

Antitrust Division, such barriers have 

made entry and expansion difficult by 

new or smaller-sized competitors in 

small container commercial waste 

collection markets. 

In the Topeka, Kansas and the Van 

Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas Areas, the 

proposed acquisition would reduce 

from three to two the number of 

significant competitors in the collection 

of small container commercial waste. 

Moreover, in Topeka, for many of the 

largest small container commercial 

waste customers WMI and DDI are 

currently the only two options. These 

customers would be left with only one 

option as a result of the acquisition. 

In the Springdale, Arkansas Area, the 

proposed acquisition would reduce the 

number of competitors in the collection 

of small container commercial waste 

from four to three. Moreover, in both 

areas in Arkansas, DDI is often the lowprice leader, and customers in these 

areas frequently switch between existing 

competitors in order to take advantage 

of lower prices. In addition, in both of 

the areas in Arkansas, WMI and DDI are 

among the few small container 

commercial waste firms that can reliably 

service larger accounts. 

In all three markets, according to the 

defendants’ estimates, after the 

acquisition the combined WMI–DDI 

entity would service between 64 and 

67% of each market. 

The complaint alleges that the 

combination of WMI and DDI in those 

areas would remove a significant 

competitor for small container 

commercial waste service. In each of 

these markets, the resulting increase in 

concentration, loss of competition, and 

absence of any reasonable prospect of 

new entry by smaller competitors likely 

will result in higher prices and reduced 

quality of small container commercial 

waste service. 

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final 

Judgment 

The divestiture requirements of the 

proposed Final Judgment will eliminate 

the anticompetitive effects of the 

acquisition in small container 

commercial waste collection service in 

the Topeka, Kansas Area, the Van 

Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas Area, and 

the Springdale, Arkansas Area. The 

proposed Final Judgment will remove 

small container commercial waste 

collection assets from the merged firm’s 

control and place them in the hands of 

one or more independent firms that are 

capable of preserving the competition 

that otherwise would have been lost as 

a result of the acquisition. 

The proposed Final Judgment requires 

defendants, within ninety days after the 

filing of the Complaint, or five days after 

notice of the entry of the Final Judgment 

by the Court, whichever is later, to 

divest: Small container commercial 

waste collection assets (routes, trucks, 

containers, garages and offices, 

leasehold rights, permits, and intangible 

assets such as customer lists and 

contracts) in the Topeka, Kansas Area, 

the Van Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas 

Area, and the Springdale, Arkansas 

Area. To eliminate the anticompetitive 

effects of the acquisition in the market 

for small container commercial waste in 

the Topeka Area, defendants must 

divest DDI’s small container commercial 

waste routes T501, T502, T503, and 

T504, and, at the acquirer’s option, 

DDI’s Topeka small container 

commercial waste collection facility. In 

the Van Buren/Fort Smith Area, 

defendants must divest DDI’s small 

container commercial waste routes V501 

and V502, and, at the acquirer’s option, 

assign or offer to sublease DDI’s Van 

Buren small container commercial 

waste collection facility. In the 

Springdale Area, defendants must divest 

DDI’s small container commercial waste 

routes B501, B502, B503, B504, and 

B505, and, at the acquirer’s option, must 

lease to the acquirer for up to 10 years 

(length at the election of the acquirer) 


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DDI’s Bethel Heights small container 

commercial waste collection facility, or 

WMI’s Springdale small container 

commercial waste collection facility. 

In addition, in the Springdale market, 

the proposed Final Judgment requires 

WMI to enter into a disposal agreement 

providing the acquirer with the right to 

dispose of MSW at its Eco Vista landfill 

in Springdale, Arkansas. The disposal 

agreement must be for a period of no 

less than three years from the date of the 

divestiture, with the acquirer(s) of the 

divestiture assets having the option of 

seven one-year renewals, under 

reasonable terms. The disposal 

agreement shall also provide the 

acquirer access to gates, side houses, 

and disposal areas under terms and 

conditions that are no less favorable 

than provided to WMI’s own vehicles. 

WMI and the acquirer shall negotiate 

the price for disposal rights and access 

to the Eco Visa landfill subject to 

approval of the United States. This 

provision is intended to prevent WMI 

from using its acquisition of DDI and 

DDI’s nearby transfer station as a means 

to prevent the acquirer of DDI’s divested 

routes from establishing itself in the 

Springdale market due to an inability to 

find an economically viable location to 

dispose of MSW collected in this 

market. 

The proposed Final Judgment 

provides that sale of the divestiture 

assets may be made to one or more 

acquirers, so long as the Topeka, Kansas 

Area, the Van Buren/Fort Smith, 

Arkansas Area and the Springdale, 

Arkansas Area disposal assets are 

divested to a single acquirer for each 

area. This provision is intended to 

ensure the continued operation of an 

efficient competitor whose participation 

in each market will closely replicate the 

competition existing prior to the 

acquisition. 

The assets must be divested to 

purchasers approved by the United 

States and in such a way as to satisfy the 

United States that they can and will be 

operated by the purchaser as part of a 

viable, ongoing business or businesses 

that can compete effectively in each 

relevant market. Defendants must take 

all reasonable steps necessary to 

accomplish the divestitures quickly and 

shall cooperate with prospective 

purchasers. 

In the event that defendants do not 

accomplish the divestitures within the 

period prescribed in the proposed Final 

Judgment, the proposed Final Judgment 

provides that the Court will appoint a 

trustee selected by the United States to 

effect the divestitures. If a trustee is 

appointed, the proposed Final Judgment 

provides that defendants will pay all 

costs and expenses of the trustee. The 

trustee’s commission will be structured 

so as to provide an incentive for the 

trustee based on the price obtained and 

the speed with which the divestitures 

are accomplished. After the trustee’s 

appointment becomes effective, the 

trustee will file monthly reports with 

the Court and the United States, setting 

forth the trustee’s efforts to accomplish 

the divestitures. At the end of six 

months, if the divestitures have not 

been accomplished, the trustee and the 

United States will make 

recommendations to the Court, which 

shall enter such orders as appropriate in 

order to carry out the purpose of the 

trust, including extending the trust or 

the term of the trustee’s appointment. 

IV. Remedies Available to Potential 

Private Litigants 

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who 

has been injured as a result of conduct 

prohibited by the antitrust laws may 

bring suit in federal court to recover 

three times the damages the person has 

suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 

attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed 

Final Judgment will neither impair nor 

assist the bringing of any private 

antitrust damage action. Under the 

provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final 

Judgment has no prima facie effect in 

any subsequent private lawsuit that may 

be brought against defendants. 

V. Procedures Available for 

Modification of the Proposed Final 

Judgment 

The United States and defendants 

have stipulated that the proposed Final 

Judgment may be entered by the Court 

after compliance with the provisions of 

the APPA, provided that the United 

States has not withdrawn its consent. 

The APPA conditions entry upon the 

Court’s determination that the proposed 

Final Judgment is in the public interest. 

The APPA provides a period of at 

least sixty days preceding the effective 

date of the proposed Final Judgment 

within which any person may submit to 

the United States written comments 

regarding the proposed Final Judgment. 

Any person who wishes to comment 

should do so within sixty days of the 

date of publication of this Competitive 

Impact Statement in the Federal 

Register, or the last date of publication 

in a newspaper of the summary of this 

Competitive Impact Statement, 

whichever is later. All comments 

received during this period will be 

considered by the United States 

Department of Justice, which remains 

free to withdraw its consent to the 

proposed Final Judgment at any time 

prior to the Court’s entry of judgment. 

The comments and the response of the 

United States will be filed with the 

Court. In addition, comments will be 

posted on the U.S. Department of 

Justice, Antitrust Division’s internet 

Web site, and, under certain 

circumstances, published in the Federal 

Register. Written comments should be 

submitted to: James J. Tierney, Chief, 

Networks and Technology Enforcement 

Section, Antitrust Division, United 

States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth 

Street, NW., Suite 7700, Washington, 

DC 20530. 

The proposed Final Judgment 

provides that the Court retains 

jurisdiction over this action and the 

parties may apply to the Court for any 

order necessary or appropriate for the 

modification, interpretation, or 

enforcement of the Final Judgment. 

VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final 

Judgment 

The United States considered, as an 

alternative to the proposed Final 

Judgment, a full trial on the merits 

against Defendants. The United States 

could have continued the litigation and 

sought preliminary and permanent 

injunctions preventing WMI’s 

acquisition of DDI. The United States is 

satisfied, however, that the divestiture 

of the assets described in the proposed 

Final Judgment will preserve 

competition for small container 

commercial waste collection service in 

the Topeka, Kansas Area, the Van 

Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas Area, and 

the Springdale, Arkansas Area. Thus, 

the proposed Final Judgment would 

achieve all or substantially all of the 

relief the United States would have 

obtained through litigation, but avoids 

the time, expense, and uncertainty of a 

full trial on the merits of the Complaint. 

VII. Standard of Review Under the 

APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment 

The Clayton Act, as amended by the 

APPA, requires that proposed consent 

judgments in antitrust cases brought by 

the United States be subject to a sixtyday comment period, after which the 

court shall determine whether entry of 

the proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the 

public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In 

making that determination, the court, in 

accordance with the statute as amended 

in 2004, is required to consider: 

(A) the competitive impact of such 

judgment, including termination of alleged 

violations, provisions for enforcement and 

modification, duration of relief sought, 

anticipated effects of alternative remedies 

actually considered, whether its terms are 

ambiguous, and any other competitive 


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1The 2004 amendments substituted ‘‘shall’’ for 

‘‘may’’ in directing relevant factors for a court to 

consider and amended the list of factors to focus on 

competitive considerations and to address 

potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 

U.S.C. 16(e) (2004) with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); 

see also SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 

(concluding that the 2004 amendments ‘‘effected 

minimal changes’’ to Tunney Act review). 

2Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the 

court’s ‘‘ultimate authority under the [APPA] is 

limited to approving or disapproving the consent 

decree’’); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 

713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, 

the court is constrained to ‘‘look at the overall 

picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope, 

but with an artist’s reducing glass’’). See generally 

Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether ‘‘the 

remedies [obtained in the decree are] so 

inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall 

outside of the ‘reaches of the public interest’’’). 

considerations bearing upon the adequacy of 

such judgment that the court deems 

necessary to a determination of whether the 

consent judgment is in the public interest; 

and 

(B) the impact of entry of such judgment 

upon competition in the relevant market or 

markets, upon the public generally and 

individuals alleging specific injury from the 

violations set forth in the complaint 

including consideration of the public benefit, 

if any, to be derived from a determination of 

the issues at trial. 

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In 

considering these statutory factors, the 

court’s inquiry is necessarily a limited 

one as the government is entitled to 

‘‘broad discretion to settle with the 

defendant within the reaches of the 

public interest.’’ United States v. 

Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 

(D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United 

States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. 

Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing 

public interest standard under the 

Tunney Act); United States v, U.S. 

Airways Group, Inc., No. 13–cv–1236 

(CKK), 2014–1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 78, 

748, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57801, at *7 

(D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2014) (noting the court 

has broad discretion of the adequacy of 

the relief at issue); United States v. 

InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08–1965 (JR), 

2009–2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,736, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3, (D.D.C. 

Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the court’s 

review of a consent judgment is limited 

and only inquires ‘‘into whether the 

government’s determination that the 

proposed remedies will cure the 

antitrust violations alleged in the 

complaint was reasonable, and whether 

the mechanism to enforce the final 

judgment are clear and manageable.’’).1

As the United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia Circuit has 

held, under the APPA a court considers, 

among other things, the relationship 

between the remedy secured and the 

specific allegations set forth in the 

government’s complaint, whether the 

decree is sufficiently clear, whether 

enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, 

and whether the decree may positively 

harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56 

F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the 

adequacy of the relief secured by the 

decree, a court may not ‘‘engage in an 

unrestricted evaluation of what relief 

would best serve the public.’’ United 

States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 

(9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. 

Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th 

Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d 

at 1460–62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 

152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); 

InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at 

*3. Courts have held that: 

[t]he balancing of competing social and 

political interests affected by a proposed 

antitrust consent decree must be left, in the 

first instance, to the discretion of the 

Attorney General. The court’s role in 

protecting the public interest is one of 

insuring that the government has not 

breached its duty to the public in consenting 

to the decree. The court is required to 

determine not whether a particular decree is 

the one that will best serve society, but 

whether the settlement is ‘‘within the reaches 

of the public interest.’’ More elaborate 

requirements might undermine the 

effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by 

consent decree. 

Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis 

added) (citations omitted).2 In 

determining whether a proposed 

settlement is in the public interest, a 

district court ‘‘must accord deference to 

the government’s predictions about the 

efficacy of its remedies, and may not 

require that the remedies perfectly 

match the alleged violations.’’ SBC 

Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see 

also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting 

the need for courts to be ‘‘deferential to 

the government’s predictions as to the 

effect of the proposed remedies’’); 

United States v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 

(D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court 

should grant due respect to the United 

States’s prediction as to the effect of 

proposed remedies, its perception of the 

market structure, and its views of the 

nature of the case). 

Courts have greater flexibility in 

approving proposed consent decrees 

than in crafting their own decrees 

following a finding of liability in a 

litigated matter. ‘‘[A] proposed decree 

must be approved even if it falls short 

of the remedy the court would impose 

on its own, as long as it falls within the 

range of acceptability or is ‘within the 

reaches of public interest.’’’ United 

States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. 

Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations 

omitted) (quoting United States v. 

Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. 

Mass. 1975)), aff’d sub nom. Maryland 

v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); 

see also U.S. Airways, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 57801, at *8 (noting that room 

must be made for the government to 

grant concessions in the negotiation 

process for settlements (citing Microsoft, 

56 F.3d at 1461); United States v. Alcan 

Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 

(W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent 

decree even though the court would 

have imposed a greater remedy). To 

meet this standard, the United States 

‘‘need only provide a factual basis for 

concluding that the settlements are 

reasonably adequate remedies for the 

alleged harms.’’ SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. 

Supp. 2d at 17. 

Moreover, the court’s role under the 

APPA is limited to reviewing the 

remedy in relationship to the violations 

that the United States has alleged in its 

Complaint, and does not authorize the 

court to ‘‘construct [its] own 

hypothetical case and then evaluate the 

decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56 

F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57801, at *9 

(noting that the court must simply 

determine whether there is a factual 

foundation for the government’s 

decisions such that its conclusions 

regarding the proposed settlements are 

reasonable; InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

84787, at *20 (‘‘the ‘public interest’ is 

not to be measured by comparing the 

violations alleged in the complaint 

against those the court believes could 

have, or even should have, been 

alleged’’). Because the ‘‘court’s authority 

to review the decree depends entirely 

on the government’s exercising its 

prosecutorial discretion by bringing a 

case in the first place,’’ it follows that 

‘‘the court is only authorized to review 

the decree itself,’’ and not to ‘‘effectively 

redraft the complaint’’ to inquire into 

other matters that the United States did 

not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459– 

60. As this Court recently confirmed in 

SBC Communications, courts ‘‘cannot 

look beyond the complaint in making 

the public interest determination unless 

the complaint is drafted so narrowly as 

to make a mockery of judicial power.’’ 

SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 

In its 2004 amendments, Congress 

made clear its intent to preserve the 

practical benefits of utilizing consent 

decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding 

the unambiguous instruction that 

‘‘[n]othing in this section shall be 

construed to require the court to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing or to 

require the court to permit anyone to 

intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also 

U.S. Airways, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

57801, at *9 (indicating that a court is 

not required to hold an evidentiary 


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3See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 

2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ‘‘Tunney 

Act expressly allows the court to make its public 

interest determination on the basis of the 

competitive impact statement and response to 

comments alone’’); United States v. Mid-Am. 

Dairymen, Inc., No. 73–CV–681–W–1, 1977–1 Trade 

Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508, at 71,980, *22 (W.D. Mo. 1977) 

(‘‘Absent a showing of corrupt failure of the 

government to discharge its duty, the Court, in 

making its public interest finding, should . . . 

carefully consider the explanations of the 

government in the competitive impact statement 

and its responses to comments in order to 

determine whether those explanations are 

reasonable under the circumstances.’’); S. Rep. No. 

93–298, at 6 (1973) (‘‘Where the public interest can 

be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of 

briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that 

should be utilized.’’). 

hearing or to permit intervenors as part 

of its review under the Tunney Act). 

The language wrote into the statute 

what Congress intended when it enacted 

the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator 

Tunney explained: ‘‘[t]he court is 

nowhere compelled to go to trial or to 

engage in extended proceedings which 

might have the effect of vitiating the 

benefits of prompt and less costly 

settlement through the consent decree 

process.’’ 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) 

(statement of Sen. Tunney). Rather, the 

procedure for the public interest 

determination is left to the discretion of 

the court, with the recognition that the 

court’s ‘‘scope of review remains 

sharply proscribed by precedent and the 

nature of Tunney Act proceedings.’’ 

SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.3

A court can make its public interest 

determination based on the competitive 

impact statement and response to public 

comments alone. U.S. Airways, 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57801, at *9. 

VIII. Determinative Documents 

There are no determinative materials 

or documents within the meaning of the 

APPA that were considered by the 

United States in formulating the 

proposed Final Judgment. 

Dated: March 13, 2015. 

Respectfully submitted, 

lll/s/lll 

Ian D. Hoffman, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust 

Division, Networks and Technology 

Enforcement Section, 450 Fifth Street NW., 

Suite 7644, Washington, DC 20530, (202) 

598–2456, ian.hoffman@usdoj.gov. 

United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Waste Management, Inc. 

and 

Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc., 

Defendants. 

Civil Action No.: 1:15–cv–00366 

Description: Antitrust 

Date Stamp: 3/13/2015 

Proposed Final Judgment 

Whereas, Plaintiff, United States of 

America, filed its Complaint on March 

13, 2015, the United States and 

defendants, Waste Management, Inc., 

and Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc., by their 

respective attorneys, have consented to 

the entry of this Final Judgment without 

trial or adjudication of any issue of fact 

or law, and without this Final Judgment 

constituting any evidence against or 

admission by any party regarding any 

issue of fact or law; 

And whereas, defendants agree to be 

bound by the provisions of this Final 

Judgment pending its approval by the 

Court; 

And whereas, the essence of this Final 

Judgment is the prompt and certain 

divestiture of certain rights or assets by 

the defendants to assure that 

competition is not substantially 

lessened; 

And whereas, the United States 

requires defendants to make certain 

divestitures for the purpose of 

remedying the loss of competition 

alleged in the Complaint; 

And whereas, defendants have 

represented to the United States that the 

divestitures required below can and will 

be made and that defendants will later 

raise no claim of hardship or difficulty 

as grounds for asking the Court to 

modify any of the divestiture provisions 

contained below; 

Now therefore, before any testimony 

is taken, without trial or adjudication of 

any issue of fact or law, and upon 

consent of the parties, it is ordered, 

adjudged and decreed: 

I. Jurisdiction 

This Court has jurisdiction over the 

subject matter of and each of the parties 

to this action. The Complaint states a 

claim upon which relief may be granted 

against defendants under Section 7 of 

the Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 

18). 

II. Definitions 

As used in this Final Judgment: 

A. ‘‘Acquirer’’ or ‘‘Acquirers’’ means 

the entity or entities to whom 

defendants divest the Divestiture Assets. 

B. ‘‘WMI’’ means defendant Waste 

Management, Inc., a Delaware 

corporation with its headquarters in 

Houston, Texas, its successors and 

assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, 

groups, affiliates, partnerships and joint 

ventures, and their directors, officers, 

managers, agents, and employees. 

C. ‘‘DDI’’ means defendant 

Deffenbaugh Disposal, Inc., a Delaware 

corporation with its headquarters in 

Kansas City, Kansas, its successors and 

assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, 

groups, affiliates, partnerships and joint 

ventures, and their directors, officers, 

managers, agents, and employees. 

D. ‘‘Disposal Agreement’’ means an 

agreement between WMI and the 

Acquirer(s) of the Springdale Arkansas 

Area Divestiture Assets allowing the 

Acquirer(s) to dispose of MSW at WMI’s 

Eco Vista Landfill located at 2210 Waste 

Management Drive, Springdale, 

Arkansas. 

E. ‘‘Divestiture Assets’’ means the 

small container commercial waste 

collection routes and other assets listed 

below: 

1. Springdale, Arkansas Area 

a. DDI’s small container commercial 

waste collection routes B501, B502, 

B503, B504, and B505; 

b. At the election of the Acquirer, a 

lease of up to 10 years (length at the 

election of the Acquirer) to either WMI’s 

small container commercial waste 

facility located at 1041 Arbor Acres Rd., 

Springdale Arkansas 72762, or to DDI’s 

small container commercial waste 

facility located at 848 Highway 264 E, 

Bethel Heights, Arkansas 72764; and 

c. At the election of the Acquirer(s), 

a Disposal Agreement. 

2. Van Buren/Fort Smith, Arkansas 

Area 

a. DDI’s small container commercial 

waste collection routes V501 and V502; 

and 

b. At the election of the Acquirer, the 

assignment or sublease of DDI’s current 

lease at the small container commercial 

waste facility located at 2598 S. 4th St., 

Van Buren, Arkansas 72956. 

3. Topeka, Kansas Area 

a. DDI’s small container commercial 

waste collection routes T501, T502, 

T503, and T504; and 

b. At the election of the Acquirer, 

DDI’s small container commercial waste 

facility located at 711 NE Highway 24, 

Topeka, Kansas 66608. 

F. ‘‘MSW’’ means municipal solid 

waste, a term of art used to describe 

solid putrescible waste generated by 

households and commercial 

establishments. Municipal solid waste 

does not include special handling waste 

(e.g., waste from manufacturing 

processes, regulated medical waste, 

sewage and sludge), hazardous waste, or 

waste generated by construction or 

demolition sites. 

G. ‘‘Route’’ means a group of 

customers receiving regularly scheduled 

small container commercial waste 

collection service and all tangible and 

intangible assets relating to the route, as 

of January 28, 2015, (except for de 

minimis changes, such as customers lost 


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and gained in the ordinary course of 

business), including, but not limited to, 

capital equipment, trucks and other 

vehicles (those assigned to routes and a 

pro-rata share of spare vehicles); 

containers (at the customer location and 

a pro-rata share of spares); supplies 

(pro-rata share); customer lists, records, 

and credit records; customer and other 

contracts; leasehold interests; permits/

licenses (to the extent transferable), and 

accounts receivable. The customers for 

each route as of January 28, 2015, are on 

file with the Department of Justice, 

Antitrust Division. 

H. ‘‘Small container commercial 

waste collection’’ means the business of 

collecting MSW from commercial and 

industrial accounts, usually in metal 

bins (i.e., a small container with one to 

ten cubic yards of storage capacity), and 

transporting or ‘‘hauling’’ such waste to 

a disposal site by use of a front- or rearend loader truck. 

III. Applicability 

A. This Final Judgment applies to 

WMI and DDI, as defined above, and all 

other persons in active concert or 

participation with any of them who 

receive actual notice of this Final 

Judgment by personal service or 

otherwise. 

B. If, prior to complying with Sections 

IV and V of this Final Judgment, 

defendants sell or otherwise dispose of 

all or substantially all of their assets or 

of lesser business units that include the 

Divestiture Assets, they shall require the 

purchaser to be bound by the provisions 

of this Final Judgment. Defendants need 

not obtain such an agreement from the 

Acquirers of the assets divested 

pursuant to this Final Judgment. 

IV. Divestitures 

A. Defendants are ordered and 

directed, within 90 calendar days after 

the filing of the Complaint in this 

matter, or five (5) calendar days after 

notice of the entry of this Final 

Judgment by the Court, whichever is 

later, to divest the Divestiture Assets in 

a manner consistent with this Final 

Judgment to an Acquirer or Acquirers 

acceptable to the United States, in its 

sole discretion. The United States, in its 

sole discretion, may agree to one or 

more extensions of this time period not 

to exceed 60 calendar days in total, and 

shall notify the Court in such 

circumstances. Defendants agree to use 

their best efforts to divest the 

Divestiture Assets as expeditiously as 

possible. 

B. At the election of the Acquirer, 

WMI and the Acquirer of the 

Springdale, Arkansas, Area Divesture 

Assets shall enter into a Disposal 

Agreement allowing the Acquirer to 

dispose of MSW at WMI’s Eco Vista 

Landfill located at 2210 Waste 

Management Drive, Springdale, 

Arkansas. The Disposal Agreement shall 

run for a period of no less than 3 years 

from the date of the divestiture, with the 

Acquirer of the Springdale, Arkansas, 

Divestiture Assets having the option of 

seven 1-year renewals, under terms that 

are reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 

The Disposal Agreement shall require 

that WMI provide access to the Acquirer 

to gates, side houses, and disposal areas 

under terms and conditions (except 

with respect to rates) that are no less 

favorable than provided to WMI’s own 

vehicles. WMI shall perform all duties 

and comply with all the terms of the 

Disposal Agreement. Any amendments, 

modifications, extensions or early 

termination of any Disposal Agreement 

may only be entered into with the 

approval of the United States. 

C. In accomplishing the divestiture 

ordered by this Final Judgment, 

defendants promptly shall make known, 

by usual and customary means, the 

availability of the Divestiture Assets. 

Defendants shall inform any person 

making an inquiry regarding a possible 

purchase of the Divestiture Assets that 

they are being divested pursuant to this 

Final Judgment and provide that person 

with a copy of this Final Judgment. 

Defendants shall offer to furnish to all 

prospective Acquirers, subject to 

customary confidentiality assurances, 

all information and documents relating 

to the Divestiture Assets customarily 

provided in a due diligence process 

except such information or documents 

subject to the attorney-client privilege or 

work-product doctrine. Defendants shall 

make available such information to the 

United States at the same time that such 

information is made available to any 

other person. 

D. Defendants shall provide the 

Acquirer(s) and the United States 

information relating to the personnel 

involved in the operation and 

management of the Divestiture Assets to 

enable the Acquirer(s) to make offers of 

employment. Defendants will not 

interfere with any negotiations by the 

Acquirer(s) to employ any defendant 

employee whose primary responsibility 

is the operation or management of the 

Divestiture Assets. 

E. Defendants shall permit 

prospective Acquirers of the Divestiture 

Assets to have reasonable access to 

personnel and to make inspections of 

the physical facilities of the Divestiture 

Assets; access to any and all 

environmental, zoning, and other permit 

documents and information; and access 

to any and all financial, operational, or 

other documents and information 

customarily provided as part of a due 

diligence process. 

F. Defendants shall warrant to the 

Acquirer(s) that each asset will be 

operational on the date of sale. 

G. Defendants shall not take any 

action that will impede in any way the 

permitting, operation, or divestiture of 

the Divestiture Assets. 

H. Defendants shall warrant to the 

Acquirer(s) that there are no material 

defects in the environmental, zoning or 

other permits pertaining to the 

operation of each asset, and that 

following the sale of the Divestiture 

Assets, defendants will not undertake, 

directly or indirectly, any challenges to 

the environmental, zoning, or other 

permits relating to the operation of the 

Divestiture Assets. 

I. Unless the United States otherwise 

consents in writing, the divestiture 

pursuant to Section IV, or by Divestiture 

Trustee appointed pursuant to Section 

V, of this Final Judgment, shall include 

the entire Divestiture Assets, and shall 

be accomplished in such a way as to 

satisfy the United States, in its sole 

discretion, that the Divestiture Assets 

can and will be used by the Acquirer(s) 

as part of a viable, ongoing small 

container commercial waste collection 

business in each of the geographic areas 

identified in Section II.E. Divestiture of 

the Divestiture Assets may be made to 

one or more Acquirers (except that the 

Divestiture Assets serving any single 

geographic area identified in Section 

II.E must be sold to the same Acquirer, 

and) provided that in each instance it is 

demonstrated to the sole satisfaction of 

the United States that the Divestiture 

Assets will remain viable and the 

divestiture of such assets will remedy 

the competitive harm alleged in the 

Complaint. The divestitures, whether 

pursuant to Section IV or Section V of 

this Final Judgment, 

(1) shall be made to an Acquirer(s) that, in 

the United States’ sole judgment, has the 

intent and capability (including the 

necessary managerial, operational, technical 

and financial capability) of competing 

effectively in the small container commercial 

waste business; and 

(2) shall be accomplished so as to satisfy 

the United States, in its sole discretion, that 

none of the terms of any agreement between 

an Acquirer(s) and defendants give 

defendants the ability unreasonably to raise 

the Acquirer’s costs, to lower the Acquirer’s 

efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the 

ability of the Acquirer(s) to compete 

effectively. 

V. Appointment of Divestiture Trustee 

A. If defendants have not divested the 

Divestiture Assets within the time 

period specified in Section IV(A), 


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defendants shall notify the United 

States of that fact in writing. Upon 

application of the United States, the 

Court shall appoint a Divestiture 

Trustee selected by the United States 

and approved by the Court to effect the 

divestiture of the Divestiture Assets. 

B. After the appointment of a 

Divestiture Trustee becomes effective, 

only the Divestiture Trustee shall have 

the right to sell the Divestiture Assets. 

The Divestiture Trustee shall have the 

power and authority to accomplish the 

divestiture to an Acquirer(s) acceptable 

to the United States at such price and 

on such terms as are then obtainable 

upon reasonable effort by the 

Divestiture Trustee, subject to the 

provisions of Sections IV, V, and VI of 

this Final Judgment, and shall have 

such other powers as this Court deems 

appropriate. Subject to Section V(D) of 

this Final Judgment, the Divestiture 

Trustee may hire at the cost and 

expense of defendants any investment 

bankers, attorneys, or other agents, who 

shall be solely accountable to the 

Divestiture Trustee, reasonably 

necessary in the Divestiture Trustee’s 

judgment to assist in the divestiture. 

Any such investment bankers, attorneys, 

or other agents shall serve on such terms 

and conditions as the United States 

approves including confidentiality 

requirements and conflict of interest 

certifications. 

C. Defendants shall not object to a sale 

by the Divestiture Trustee on any 

ground other than the Divestiture 

Trustee’s malfeasance. Any such 

objections by defendants must be 

conveyed in writing to the United States 

and the Divestiture Trustee within ten 

(10) calendar days after the Divestiture 

Trustee has provided the notice 

required under Section VI. 

D. The Divestiture Trustee shall serve 

at the cost and expense of defendants 

pursuant to a written agreement, on 

such terms and conditions as the United 

States approves including 

confidentiality requirements and 

conflict of interest certifications. The 

Divestiture Trustee shall account for all 

monies derived from the sale of the 

assets sold by the Divestiture Trustee 

and all costs and expenses so incurred. 

After approval by the Court of the 

Divestiture Trustee’s accounting, 

including fees for its services yet unpaid 

and those of any professionals and 

agents retained by the Divestiture 

Trustee, all remaining money shall be 

paid to defendants and the trust shall 

then be terminated. The compensation 

of the Divestiture Trustee and any 

professionals and agents retained by the 

Divestiture Trustee shall be reasonable 

in light of the value of the Divestiture 

Assets and based on a fee arrangement 

providing the Divestiture Trustee with 

an incentive based on the price and 

terms of the divestiture and the speed 

with which it is accomplished, but 

timeliness is paramount. If the 

Divestiture Trustee and defendants are 

unable to reach agreement on the 

Divestiture Trustee’s or any agents’ or 

consultants’ compensation or other 

terms and conditions of engagement 

within 14 calendar days of appointment 

of the Divestiture Trustee, the United 

States may, in its sole discretion, take 

appropriate action, including making a 

recommendation to the Court. The 

Divestiture Trustee shall, within three 

(3) business days of hiring any other 

professionals or agents, provide written 

notice of such hiring and the rate of 

compensation to [defendants] and the 

United States. 

E. Defendants shall use their best 

efforts to assist the Divestiture Trustee 

in accomplishing the required 

divestiture. The Divestiture Trustee and 

any consultants, accountants, attorneys, 

and other agents retained by the 

Divestiture Trustee shall have full and 

complete access to the personnel, books, 

records, and facilities of the business to 

be divested, and defendants shall 

develop financial and other information 

relevant to such business as the 

Divestiture Trustee may reasonably 

request, subject to reasonable protection 

for trade secret or other confidential 

research, development, or commercial 

information or any applicable 

privileges. Defendants shall take no 

action to interfere with or to impede the 

Divestiture Trustee’s accomplishment of 

the divestiture. 

F. After its appointment, the 

Divestiture Trustee shall file monthly 

reports with the United States and, as 

appropriate, the Court setting forth the 

Divestiture Trustee’s efforts to 

accomplish the divestiture ordered 

under this Final Judgment. To the extent 

such reports contain information that 

the Divestiture Trustee deems 

confidential, such reports shall not be 

filed in the public docket of the Court. 

Such reports shall include the name, 

address, and telephone number of each 

person who, during the preceding 

month, made an offer to acquire, 

expressed an interest in acquiring, 

entered into negotiations to acquire, or 

was contacted or made an inquiry about 

acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture 

Assets, and shall describe in detail each 

contact with any such person. The 

Divestiture Trustee shall maintain full 

records of all efforts made to divest the 

Divestiture Assets. 

G. If the Divestiture Trustee has not 

accomplished the divestiture ordered 

under this Final Judgment within six 

months after its appointment, the 

Divestiture Trustee shall promptly file 

with the Court a report setting forth (1) 

the Divestiture Trustee’s efforts to 

accomplish the required divestiture, (2) 

the reasons, in the Divestiture Trustee’s 

judgment, why the required divestiture 

has not been accomplished, and (3) the 

Divestiture Trustee’s recommendations. 

To the extent such reports contains 

information that the Divestiture Trustee 

deems confidential, such reports shall 

not be filed in the public docket of the 

Court. The Divestiture Trustee shall at 

the same time furnish such report to the 

United States which shall have the right 

to make additional recommendations 

consistent with the purpose of the trust. 

The Court thereafter shall enter such 

orders as it shall deem appropriate to 

carry out the purpose of the Final 

Judgment, which may, if necessary, 

include extending the trust and the term 

of the Divestiture Trustee’s appointment 

by a period requested by the United 

States. 

H. If the United States determines that 

the Divestiture Trustee has ceased to act 

or failed to act diligently or in a 

reasonably cost-effective manner, it may 

recommend the Court appoint a 

substitute Divestiture Trustee. 

VI. Notice of Proposed Divestiture 

A. Within two (2) business days 

following execution of a definitive 

divestiture agreement, defendants or the 

Divestiture Trustee, whichever is then 

responsible for effecting the divestiture 

required herein, shall notify the United 

States of any proposed divestiture 

required by Section IV or V of this Final 

Judgment. If the Divestiture Trustee is 

responsible, it shall similarly notify 

defendants. The notice shall set forth 

the details of the proposed divestiture 

and list the name, address, and 

telephone number of each person not 

previously identified who offered or 

expressed an interest in or desire to 

acquire any ownership interest in the 

Divestiture Assets, together with full 

details of the same. 

B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of 

receipt by the United States of such 

notice, the United States may request 

from defendants, the proposed 

Acquirer(s), any other third party, or the 

Divestiture Trustee, if applicable, 

additional information concerning the 

proposed divestiture, the proposed 

Acquirer(s), and any other potential 

Acquirer. Defendants and the 

Divestiture Trustee shall furnish any 

additional information requested within 

fifteen (15) calendar days of the receipt 

of the request, unless the parties shall 

otherwise agree. 


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15820 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 57 / Wednesday, March 25, 2015 / Notices 

C. Within thirty (30) calendar days 

after receipt of the notice or within 

twenty (20) calendar days after the 

United States has been provided the 

additional information requested from 

defendants, the proposed Acquirer(s), 

any third party, and the Divestiture 

Trustee, whichever is later, the United 

States shall provide written notice to 

defendants and the Divestiture Trustee, 

if there is one, stating whether or not it 

objects to the proposed divestiture. If 

the United States provides written 

notice that it does not object, the 

divestiture may be consummated, 

subject only to defendants’ limited right 

to object to the sale under Section V(C) 

of this Final Judgment. Absent written 

notice that the United States does not 

object to the proposed Acquirer(s) or 

upon objection by the United States, a 

divestiture proposed under Section IV 

or Section V shall not be consummated. 

Upon objection by defendants under 

Section V(C), a divestiture proposed 

under Section V shall not be 

consummated unless approved by the 

Court. 

VII. Financing 

Defendants shall not finance all or 

any part of any purchase made pursuant 

to Section IV or V of this Final 

Judgment. 

VIII. Hold Separate 

Until the divestiture required by this 

Final Judgment has been accomplished, 

defendants shall take all steps necessary 

to comply with the Hold Separate 

Stipulation and Order entered by this 

Court. Defendants shall take no action 

that would jeopardize the divestiture 

ordered by this Court. 

IX. Affidavits 

A. Within twenty (20) calendar days 

of the filing of the Complaint in this 

matter, and every thirty (30) calendar 

days thereafter until the divestiture has 

been completed under Section IV or V, 

defendants shall deliver to the United 

States an affidavit as to the fact and 

manner of its compliance with Section 

IV or V of this Final Judgment. Each 

such affidavit shall include the name, 

address, and telephone number of each 

person who, during the preceding thirty 

(30) calendar days, made an offer to 

acquire, expressed an interest in 

acquiring, entered into negotiations to 

acquire, or was contacted or made an 

inquiry about acquiring, any interest in 

the Divestiture Assets, and shall 

describe in detail each contact with any 

such person during that period. Each 

such affidavit shall also include a 

description of the efforts defendants 

have taken to solicit buyers for the 

Divestiture Assets, and to provide 

required information to prospective 

Acquirers, including the limitations, if 

any, on such information. Assuming the 

information set forth in the affidavit is 

true and complete, any objection by the 

United States to information provided 

by defendants, including limitation on 

information, shall be made within 

fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of 

such affidavit. 

B. Within twenty (20) calendar days 

of the filing of the Complaint in this 

matter, defendants shall deliver to the 

United States an affidavit that describes 

in reasonable detail all actions 

defendants have taken and all steps 

defendants have implemented on an 

ongoing basis to comply with Section 

VIII of this Final Judgment. Defendants 

shall deliver to the United States an 

affidavit describing any changes to the 

efforts and actions outlined in 

defendants’ earlier affidavits filed 

pursuant to this section within fifteen 

(15) calendar days after the change is 

implemented. 

C. Defendants shall keep all records of 

all efforts made to preserve and divest 

the Divestiture Assets until one year 

after such divestiture has been 

completed. 

X. Compliance Inspection 

A. For the purposes of determining or 

securing compliance with this Final 

Judgment, or of any related orders such 

as any Hold Separate Stipulation and 

Order, or of determining whether the 

Final Judgment should be modified or 

vacated, and subject to any legally 

recognized privilege, from time to time 

authorized representatives of the United 

States Department of Justice, including 

consultants and other persons retained 

by the United States, shall, upon written 

request of an authorized representative 

of the Assistant Attorney General in 

charge of the Antitrust Division, and on 

reasonable notice to defendants, be 

permitted: 

(1) access during defendants’ office 

hours to inspect and copy, or at the 

option of the United States, to require 

defendants to provide hard copy or 

electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, 

accounts, records, data, and documents 

in the possession, custody, or control of 

defendants, relating to any matters 

contained in this Final Judgment; and 

(2) to interview, either informally or 

on the record, defendants’ officers, 

employees, or agents, who may have 

their individual counsel present, 

regarding such matters. The interviews 

shall be subject to the reasonable 

convenience of the interviewee and 

without restraint or interference by 

defendants. 

B. Upon the written request of an 

authorized representative of the 

Assistant Attorney General in charge of 

the Antitrust Division, defendants shall 

submit written reports or response to 

written interrogatories, under oath if 

requested, relating to any of the matters 

contained in this Final Judgment as may 

be requested. 

C. No information or documents 

obtained by the means provided in this 

section shall be divulged by the United 

States to any person other than an 

authorized representative of the 

executive branch of the United States, 

except in the course of legal proceedings 

to which the United States is a party 

(including grand jury proceedings), or 

for the purpose of securing compliance 

with this Final Judgment, or as 

otherwise required by law. 

D. If at the time information or 

documents are furnished by defendants 

to the United States, defendants 

represent and identify in writing the 

material in any such information or 

documents to which a claim of 

protection may be asserted under Rule 

26(c)(1)(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and defendants mark each 

pertinent page of such material, 

‘‘Subject to claim of protection under 

Rule 26(c)(1)(g) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure,’’ then the United States 

shall give defendants ten (10) calendar 

days notice prior to divulging such 

material in any legal proceeding (other 

than a grand jury proceeding). 

XI. No Reacquisition 

Defendants may not reacquire any 

part of the Divestiture Assets during the 

term of this Final Judgment. 

XII. Retention of Jurisdiction 

This Court retains jurisdiction to 

enable any party to this Final Judgment 

to apply to this Court at any time for 

further orders and directions as may be 

necessary or appropriate to carry out or 

construe this Final Judgment, to modify 

any of its provisions, to enforce 

compliance, and to punish violations of 

its provisions. 

XIII. Expiration of Final Judgment 

Unless this Court grants an extension, 

this Final Judgment shall expire ten 

years from the date of its entry. 

XIV. Public Interest Determination 

Entry of this Final Judgment is in the 

public interest. The parties have 

complied with the requirements of the 

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 

15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies 

available to the public of this Final 

Judgment, the Competitive Impact 

Statement, and any comments thereon 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 57 / Wednesday, March 25, 2015 / Notices 15821 

and the United States’ responses to 

comments. Based upon the record 

before the Court, which includes the 

Competitive Impact Statement and any 

comments and response to comments 

filed with the Court, entry of this Final 

Judgment is in the public interest. 

Date: llllllllllllllll

Court approval subject to procedures of 

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties 

Act, 15 U.S.C. 16 

lllllllllllllllllll

United States District Judge 

[FR Doc. 2015–06810 Filed 3–24–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Notice of Lodging of Proposed 

Amendment to Consent Decree Under 

the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability 

Act 

On March 19, 2015, the Department of 

Justice lodged with the United States 

District Court for the Southern District 

of Ohio a proposed cash-out agreement 

in the lawsuit entitled United States v. 

The Atlas Lederer Company, et al. Civil 

Action No. 3:91–cv–309. The proposed 

agreement, if approved, will amend a 

Consent Decree entered by the Court in 

1998 (‘‘Original Decree’’). 

Under the Original Decree, the 

Settling Generator Defendants have 

cleaned up the United Scrap Lead 

Superfund Site (‘‘Site’’) in Troy, Ohio, 

and reimbursed the United States 

Environmental Protection Agency 

(‘‘EPA’’) for a portion of its response 

costs. Now, under the proposed cashout agreement, the Settling Generator 

Defendants will resolve their remaining 

obligations under the Original Decree by 

(1) paying a cash-out amount of 

$158,564, (2) dismissing, with 

prejudice, their challenge to EPA’s 

oversight bills under the Disputes clause 

of the Original Decree, and (3) waiving 

their right to share proceeds generated 

from the sale of the Site. In exchange, 

the United States shall excuse Settling 

Defendants from their obligations to (1) 

pay any additional oversight costs in the 

future, (2) conduct any studies 

reasonably necessary to support EPA’s 

periodic review of the remedy in 

accordance with 42 U.S.C. 9621(c), and 

(3) use best efforts to obtain access to 

the Site from third parties. Apart from 

these proposed modifications, all other 

terms of the Original Decree remain 

unchanged and binding upon the 

parties. 

The publication of this notice opens 

a period for public comment on the 

proposed cash-out agreement. 

Comments should be addressed to the 

Assistant Attorney General, 

Environment and Natural Resources 

Division, and should refer to United 

States v. The Atlas Lederer Company, et 

al., D.J. Ref. No. 90–11–3–279B. All 

comments must be submitted no later 

than thirty (30) days after the 

publication date of this notice. 

Comments may be submitted either by 

email or by mail: 

To submit 

comments: Send them to: 

By email ... pubcomment-ees.enrd@

usdoj.gov. 

By mail ..... Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 

DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, 

Washington, D.C. 20044– 

7611. 

During the public comment period, 

the proposed consent decree 

amendment may be examined and 

downloaded at this Justice Department 

Web site: http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/

Consent_Decrees.html. We will also 

provide a paper copy of the proposed 

consent decree amendment upon 

written request and payment of 

reproduction costs. Please mail your 

request and payment to: Consent Decree 

Library, U.S. DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 

7611, Washington, DC 20044–7611. 

Please enclose a check or money order 

for $4.75 (19 pages at 25 cents per page 

reproduction cost) payable to the United 

States Treasury. 

Randall M. Stone, 

Acting Assistant Section Chief, 

Environmental Enforcement Section, 

Environment and Natural Resources Division. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06761 Filed 3–24–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–15–P 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Employment and Training 

Administration 

Investigations Regarding Eligibility To 

Apply for Worker Adjustment 

Assistance 

Petitions have been filed with the 

Secretary of Labor under Section 221(a) 

of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘‘the Act’’) and 

are identified in the Appendix to this 

notice. Upon receipt of these petitions, 

the Director of the Office of Trade 

Adjustment Assistance, Employment 

and Training Administration, has 

instituted investigations pursuant to 

Section 221(a) of the Act. 

The purpose of each of the 

investigations is to determine whether 

the workers are eligible to apply for 

adjustment assistance under Title II, 

Chapter 2, of the Act. The investigations 

will further relate, as appropriate, to the 

determination of the date on which total 

or partial separations began or 

threatened to begin and the subdivision 

of the firm involved. 

The petitioners or any other persons 

showing a substantial interest in the 

subject matter of the investigations may 

request a public hearing, provided such 

request is filed in writing with the 

Director, Office of Trade Adjustment 

Assistance, at the address shown below, 

not later than April 6, 2015. 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit written comments regarding the 

subject matter of the investigations to 

the Director, Office of Trade Adjustment 

Assistance, at the address shown below, 

not later than April 6, 2015. 

The petitions filed in this case are 

available for inspection at the Office of 

the Director, Office of Trade Adjustment 

Assistance, Employment and Training 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Labor, Room N–5428, 200 Constitution 

Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210. 

Signed at Washington, DC, this 11th day of 

March 2015. 

Michael W. Jaffe, 

Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment 

Assistance. 

20 TAA PETITIONS INSTITUTED BETWEEN 2/23/15 AND 3/6/15 

TA–W Subject firm 

(petitioners) Location Date of institution 

Date of 

petition 

85846 ...................................... U.S. Steel Tubular Products, Inc. (Company) ....... Hughes Springs, TX ...... 02/23/15 02/20/15 

85847 ...................................... Wabash Technologies, Inc. (Company) ................. Huntington, IN ................ 02/23/15 02/20/15 

85848 ...................................... Thomasville Furniture (Workers) ............................ Lenoir, NC ...................... 02/23/15 02/23/15 

85849 ...................................... Zemco Industries, Inc. d/b/a/ Tyson Foods, Inc. 

(Workers).

Buffalo, NY ..................... 02/24/15 02/17/15 

85850 ...................................... Teleflex, Inc. (State/One-Stop) .............................. Menlo Park, CA ............. 02/24/15 02/23/15 

85851 ...................................... Bose Corporation (State/One-Stop) ....................... Blythewood, SC ............. 02/25/15 02/24/15 


rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES