COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

February 17, 2023

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP230 Cir. Ct. No. 2016ME157

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF C. J. A.:

OUTAGAMIE COUNTY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

C. J. A.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Outagamie County: 

TIMOTHY A. HINKFUSS, Judge. Affirmed. 

¶1 HRUZ, J.1 Catherine2appeals two orders entered under WIS. STAT.

ch. 51: one recommitting her for twelve months, and another requiring the 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2021-22). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2022AP230

2

involuntary administration of medication and treatment. Catherine argues that the 

circuit court lacked competency to hold a recommitment hearing due to 

Outagamie County’s failure to abide by statutory timelines. Catherine further 

argues that the court committed plain error by admitting hearsay evidence derived 

from Catherine’s treatment record. 

¶2 Regarding the first issue, we agree that the circuit court lost 

competency by postponing the final hearing for more than seven days past the date 

of the originally scheduled final hearing, thereby violating WIS. STAT.

§ 51.20(10)(e). We conclude, however, that Catherine is judicially estopped from 

advancing this argument on appeal, given the specific circumstances surrounding 

the postponement. As to the second issue, Catherine failed to object to the 

admission of the hearsay evidence at the circuit court level—thus her need to 

argue plain error—and we are not convinced that what she alleges constitutes plain 

error. We therefore decline to apply the plain error doctrine on this matter. 

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s orders. 

BACKGROUND

¶3 Catherine started receiving mental health services from the County

in April 2012 as a condition of her probation. In early September 2016, Catherine 

was placed on a seventy-two-hour mental health hold under WIS. STAT. § 51.15,

due to homicidal threats she was making toward a judge. Later that month, after a 

hearing, Catherine was committed under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 for a period of six 

months. Since then, Catherine has been consecutively recommitted four times for 

 

2

 For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential appeal using a

pseudonym, rather than her initials.
No. 2022AP230

3

a period of twelve months each. Catherine has contested most of her 

recommitments. 

¶4 In July 2021, the County timely filed another petition to recommit 

Catherine, which is the recommitment at issue in this appeal. The prior 

recommitment order was due to expire on August 18, 2021, and a recommitment 

hearing was originally scheduled for August 13, 2021. Three days prior to the 

scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent psychological evaluation

by Dr. James Black. In doing so, she agreed “to waive all applicable time limits 

for holding the hearing to allow for an evaluation” and asked “that the hearing be 

set out by 30-45 days to allow for completion of the evaluation.” 

¶5 On August 13, 2021, Catherine and counsel for the County signed a 

“stipulation for temporary extension of commitment.” The stipulation stated that 

“the parties have agreed to continue [Catherine’s] mental health commitment for a 

period of 60 days ... to allow for completion of the independent evaluation with 

respect to the extension of commitment.” The circuit court held a status 

conference that same day, wherein it accepted the stipulation and extended the 

time limit of the existing commitment by sixty days. The court then ordered an 

independent evaluation by Dr. Black. The newly extended recommitment order 

was set to expire on October 17, 2021. 

¶6 The circuit court subsequently held a recommitment hearing on 

October 14, 2021, fifty-seven days after the original recommitment order was set 

to expire. At the hearing, the County called two witnesses: Katie Chaganos and 

Dr. Marshall Bales. Catherine also testified, and she called Dr. Black as a witness. 

All of the witnesses agreed that Catherine suffers from a treatable mental illness; 

the only issue was her dangerousness. No party objected at the hearing to the 
No. 2022AP230

4

court’s competency to proceed. At no point did Catherine object to the

introduction of any inadmissible hearsay. 

¶7 Katie Chaganos, a licensed clinical therapist and social worker who 

had been treating Catherine monthly since March 2020, testified first. Chaganos 

testified that Catherine has been relatively compliant with her treatment conditions 

and “for the most part ... compliant with attending meetings, seeing her doctor and 

taking her medications.” According to Chaganos, in 2017, Catherine switched 

from an oral to an injectable form of the same medication. Chaganos testified that 

Catherine lacks “insight and awareness into her mental illness and [her] need for 

psychotropic medication” and that Catherine denies having been delusional or 

having hallucinations in the past. Chaganos also testified that during her monthly 

meetings with Catherine, Catherine reported that “she does not find any benefit to 

the medication” and often talked “about the negative side effects of the 

medication.” Chaganos concurred that there are “a lot of negative side effects to 

the medication.” During cross-examination, Chaganos testified that Catherine had

not been hospitalized during the past year. Chaganos further testified that 

Catherine was employed. 

¶8 The County then called Dr. Bales, Catherine’s treating physician, as 

a witness. Bales testified that he had worked with Catherine for “a couple years”

as a psychiatrist for the County. Bales diagnosed Catherine with schizoaffective 

disorder. The symptoms of Catherine’s disorder, Bales explained, are that she

experiences mood instability and paranoia and that she becomes very antagonistic. 

Bales also testified that Catherine “will become very angry when in a manic or 

psychotic state.” Bales testified that recently Catherine had “not been dangerous, 

not had crisis reports, not had police contact, [and] not had [any] hospitalizations.” 

Despite those facts, Bales testified that when treatment had been withdrawn from 
No. 2022AP230

5

Catherine in the past, her mental health issues have increased. Bales also testified 

that, in the past, Catherine made threats that have “put her family in fear.” Bales 

opined that if Catherine’s treatment were withdrawn, her mental condition would 

deteriorate and she would become dangerous over time. 

¶9 Catherine called Dr. Black, a licensed psychologist, to testify, and 

his independent evaluation of Catherine was admitted as evidence at the hearing. 

Black opined that Catherine met the criteria for having schizoaffective disorder. 

Despite this diagnosis, Black did not recommend that Catherine be recommitted. 

In Black’s opinion, Catherine did not present a substantial risk of dangerousness,

but he did recognize that Catherine “might present a mild risk based on her 

history.” Black also noted that Catherine had been “remarkably compliant and 

remarkably uninvolved with police or hospitals.” 

¶10 Catherine testified that she had no objections to taking medication or 

continuing treatment. When asked if she would voluntarily seek treatment and 

medication, Catherine testified that she would continue to seek medical help but 

would “probably seek out a different doctor.” Catherine also repeatedly testified 

that she never threatened the judge who was the subject of her prior criminal case. 

Catherine further testified that she had never made a threat to her family and that 

she “never inflicted any fear on any of [her] family ever.” 

¶11 The circuit court found that Catherine suffered from schizoaffective 

disorder, and that her mental illness was treatable. As to dangerousness, the court 

stated that Catherine demonstrates both “a substantial probability of physical harm 

to other individuals” and a “substantial probability of physical impairment or 

injury to herself or other individuals due to impaired judgment.” The court did 

compliment Catherine for having maintained employment and for “deal[ing] very 
No. 2022AP230

6

well with the general public.” Importantly, the court found Catherine not to be a 

credible witness with regard to her testimony that she would continue to take any 

medications or undergo voluntary treatment if the commitment order were 

withdrawn. The court found Catherine to be “in denial” and “fixated with” the 

judge whom she had previously threatened. 

¶12 The circuit court extended Catherine’s commitment order for a 

one-year period and entered an involuntary medication and treatment order for the 

period of her commitment. Catherine now appeals both orders. 

DISCUSSION

¶13 To recommit an individual under WIS. STAT. ch. 51, a petitioner

must prove that the individual is mentally ill; the individual is a proper subject for 

treatment; and the individual is dangerous. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2. In a 

recommitment hearing, a petitioner must prove dangerousness under one or more 

of five separate dangerousness standards in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. A recommitment 

requires a showing of “current dangerousness,” and an alternative evidentiary path 

in the statute allows for a petitioner to prove current dangerousness by 

demonstrating that there is “a substantial likelihood, based on the subject 

individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for 

commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” Sec. 51.20(1)(am); Waupaca County 

v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, ¶3, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366. 

¶14 Here, Catherine challenges the circuit court’s competency to hold 

the recommitment hearing. Catherine also asserts that the County’s solicitation—

and the court’s admission of—supposed hearsay evidence with regard to her 

alleged dangerousness constituted a plain error. 
No. 2022AP230

7

I. Circuit court’s competency to proceed with the recommitment hearing

¶15 “Whether a circuit court has lost competency is a question of law 

that we review independently.” Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 

¶7, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. A circuit court generally loses competency 

to enter an involuntary commitment order if the final hearing is not held within the 

statutory time limits. See State ex rel. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 

325, 328-39, 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982); see also Jefferson County v. 

S.M.S., No. 2020AP814, unpublished slip op. ¶12 (WI App Mar. 11, 2021).3 

When the delay “is caused solely by the conduct and manipulation of the detained 

subject,” however, a reasonable extension of a deadline is allowed. County of 

Milwaukee v. Edward S., 2001 WI App 169, ¶9, 247 Wis. 2d 87, 633 N.W.2d 

241. If a recommitment order is entered after a court has lost competency, that 

order must be vacated. G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 629, 636, 445 

N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989). 

¶16 Catherine argues that the circuit court impermissibly delayed the 

recommitment hearing. She submits that there are only four scenarios where a 

delay in holding the hearing is statutorily authorized. First, and relevant here, 

WIS. STAT. § 51.20(10)(e) allows the final hearing to be postponed “[a]t the 

request of the subject individual or his or her counsel,” but the postponement may 

not “exceed 7 calendar days from the date established by the court under this 

subsection for the final hearing.” Second, the subject individual can “waive the 

time period[]” for the final hearing “for a period not to exceed 90 days from the 

 

3

 Unpublished opinions authored by a single judge and issued on or after July 1, 2009, 

may be cited for their persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).
No. 2022AP230

8

date of the waiver, if the individual and the [petitioner’s] counsel ... agree ... that 

the individual shall obtain treatment under a settlement agreement.” 

Sec. 51.20(8)(bg). Third, if an individual is not detained and “fails to appear for 

the final hearing[,] the court may issue an order for the subject individual’s 

detention and shall hold the final commitment hearing within 7 days from the time 

of detention.” Sec. 51.20(10)(d). Lastly, delay is permitted when an individual 

demands a jury trial, but the final hearing must be within fourteen days of filing 

the jury demand. See § 51.20(11)(a).

¶17 Citing G.O.T., Catherine argues that because the circuit court lost 

competency, the recommitment order should be reversed. We agree that the court 

lost competency when it permitted a fifty-seven-day delay in holding the final 

hearing. While extensions in certain circumstances are statutorily allowed and 

WIS. STAT. § 51.20(10)(e) allows for an extension simply at the request of the 

committed individual, the court is not statutorily permitted to delay the final 

hearing for fifty-seven days, as it did in this case. In addition to the fact that 

fifty-seven days well exceeds the mandatory seven-day limit in § 51.20(10)(e), the 

record does not support the grant of such a lengthy extension. Neither party on 

appeal has demonstrated why Catherine’s request for an independent evaluation 

could not have been completed either within the statutory deadline or soon 

thereafter.

4

 

 

4

 Although we ultimately apply judicial estoppel so as to preclude Catherine from taking 

advantage of her request for a longer delay in order to obtain an independent evaluation, we 

encourage circuit courts to be cognizant that regardless of the committed individual’s requests,

extensions must be short in duration and comply with statutory deadlines.
No. 2022AP230

9

¶18 Despite the loss of competency, we conclude that Catherine is 

judicially estopped from asserting that claim. The County argues that Catherine’s 

recommitment hearing was delayed “solely by her action to seek an independent 

evaluation days before the hearing was originally scheduled to occur.” The 

County further contends that this situation is similar to Edward S., in which the 

committed individual fired his attorney the day before the scheduled hearing, 

thereby necessitating a delay beyond the applicable statutory deadline. Edward S., 

247 Wis. 2d 87, ¶7. In Edward S., we focused our analysis on the fact that the 

delay was a product of a unilateral action by the subject individual and not an 

action by the petitioner. Id. In addition, the delay benefited only the subject 

individual. Id., ¶7. As a result, we refused to enforce the statutory deadline, 

explaining:

“It is contrary to fundamental principles of justice and 

orderly procedure to permit a party to assume a certain 

position in the course of litigation which may be 

advantageous, and then after the court maintains that 

position, argue on appeal that the action was error.” In this 

case, Edward S. indicated a desire to obtain new counsel by 

firing his attorney and then stipulating to an adjournment.

On appeal, he argues that the adjournment was an error 

because it led to an untimely final hearing.

Id., ¶11 (quoting State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 944, 437 N.W.2d 218 (1989)).

¶19 Here, the County argues—and we agree—that the same outcome 

should obtain. While it is true that the County also stipulated to the extension, the 

extension was only prompted by a demand from Catherine and was for her benefit
No. 2022AP230

10

alone.

5

 The County further argues, again citing to Edward S., that Catherine 

should not benefit on appeal from the fact the extension happened after persuading 

the circuit court and the County to consent to the extension. Specifically, the 

County states that the three elements of judicial estoppel are present in this case. 

We agree. 

¶20 Judicial estoppel applies if: (1) a litigant’s later position is clearly 

inconsistent with the litigant’s earlier position; (2) the facts at issue are the same in 

both cases; and (3) the party to be estopped convinced the first court to adopt its 

position. State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 348, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996). “[It] is 

the prerogative of the ... court to invoke judicial estoppel at its discretion.” Id. at 

346-47 (citation omitted). 

¶21 For obvious reasons, all three elements are met in this case. Quite 

simply, Catherine persuaded the circuit court to extend her commitment to permit 

her to possibly improve her defense—namely, by obtaining an independent 

evaluation, which is similar to the committed individual’s request for new counsel 

in Edward S. Now, on appeal, Catherine is taking an inconsistent position, 

arguing that the court lost competency by agreeing to her request for an extension,

which requires us to vacate the court’s recommitment order. Catherine’s 

assertions that her request for an extension was neither “needed,” manipulative

per se, nor unilateral (insomuch as the County stipulated to the requested 

 

5

 We note that if the circuit court or the County had unilaterally moved for such an 

extension, given the high liberty interest at stake, the analysis would be different. See Portage 

County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶16, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (“[C]ommitment for any 

purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” 

(alteration in original; citation omitted)).
No. 2022AP230

11

extension) do not convince us that principles of judicial estoppel should not 

apply.

6

¶22 Catherine contends there is no evidence demonstrating that she 

actually manipulated or played “fast and loose” with the circuit court. True, cases 

such as Petty have used these terms at times when speaking of judicial estoppel 

under their facts. See Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 347. But, the core purpose of judicial 

estoppel is to protect the judiciary, as an institution, from the perversion of judicial 

machinery. See id. at 346. As such, the doctrine is intended “to protect against a 

litigant playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ by asserting inconsistent 

positions.” Id. at 347 (citations omitted). Whether intended or not, the net result 

in this case is that Catherine played “fast and loose” with the circuit court by 

asserting inconsistent positions.

¶23 In addition, Catherine did not simply request an extension. Rather,

Catherine asked the circuit court to delay the recommitment hearing for “30-45 

days,” which itself is a relatively long time. Indeed, she expressly agreed “to 

waive all applicable time limits for holding the hearing to allow for an evaluation.” 

Then, Catherine stipulated to extend the commitment for sixty days, after which 

the court set a hearing date fifty-seven days past the original recommitment 

 

6

 Catherine also argues that judicial estoppel cannot apply here because the law requires 

both inconsistent positions to be “lawful” in order for estoppel to apply. And, because the 

seven-calendar-day statutory deadline by which to extend the time for the hearing is strict, such 

that any further extension is unlawful, she reasons that estoppel cannot apply here. We disagree 

with this argument for at least two reasons. First, as Catherine concedes, there is no support for 

application of the “both positions must be lawful” rule in these types of WIS. STAT. ch. 51 

proceedings, and the authority she cites is inapt. Second, her argument is inconsistent with the 

holding in Edward S., as that case also dealt with a strict statutory deadline, and in the same 

context of ch. 51 proceedings. See County of Milwaukee v. Edward S., 2001 WI App 169, ¶9, 

247 Wis. 2d 87, 633 N.W.2d 241.
No. 2022AP230

12

deadline. If Catherine had not requested such an extension, especially one at such 

length, the final hearing would not have been delayed to this degree. 

¶24 In all, Catherine proposed extending the time limit for a lengthy

period of time, stipulated to a sixty-day extension, and then asked the circuit court 

to approve that extension. Under these circumstances, we conclude Catherine is 

judicially estopped from arguing, on appeal, that the delay in holding her 

recommitment hearing resulted in the court’s loss of competency. 

II. Plain error to admit hearsay evidence

¶25 Some rights—including the ability to object to errors committed by a 

circuit court—can be forfeited when they are not preserved at the circuit court 

level, and “a mere failure to object constitutes a forfeiture of the right on appellate 

review.” State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.

7

 

This forfeiture rule “gives both parties and the circuit court notice of the issue and 

a fair opportunity to address the objection.” Id. Additionally, “[i]ssues that are

not preserved at the circuit court [level] ... generally will not be considered on 

appeal.” Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶15. 

¶26 Here, Catherine acknowledges that she made no contemporaneous 

objection during the recommitment hearing to the introduction of any allegedly 

inadmissible hearsay evidence. Catherine instead argues that the County’s 

solicitation of “layers” of inadmissible hearsay regarding underlying facts derived 

 

7

 Some cases use the words “forfeiture” and “waiver” interchangeably, but these two 

words are distinct legal concepts. See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 

N.W.2d 612. Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, while waiver is the 

intentional abandonment of a known right. Id.
No. 2022AP230

13

from her treatment record was plain error. In particular, she alleges that the 

witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the facts about which they testified 

at the hearing. She claims, instead, that these witnesses were referencing 

information from past witnesses and even those prior individuals did not have 

personal knowledge of the alleged facts when they testified. Catherine alleges that 

ten different statements elicited by the County suffered from these hearsay issues. 

¶27 The plain error doctrine allows an appellate court “to review errors 

that were otherwise [forfeited] by a party’s failure to object.” See State v. 

Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77. “Plain error is 

‘error so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted even though 

the action was not objected to at the time.’” Id. (citation omitted). “The error, 

however, must be ‘obvious and substantial,’ and courts should use the plain error 

doctrine sparingly.” State v. Nelson, 2021 WI App 2, ¶46, 395 Wis. 2d 585, 954 

N.W.2d 11 (2020), review denied, 2022 WI 84 (citation omitted). Whether plain 

error has occurred “is a question of law we review de novo.” State v. Bell, 2018 

WI 28, ¶8, 380 Wis. 2d 616, 909 N.W.2d 750. “[A] court should exercise its 

discretionary authority under the plain error doctrine only when such errors 

‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.’” State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 96, 555 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 

1996) (citation omitted). 

¶28 Catherine has not established that application of the plain error 

doctrine is warranted here. First, we are mindful of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am), 

which expressly provides that when, as here, the petitioner is arguing that the 

individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn, 

dangerousness can be analyzed “based on the subject individual’s treatment 

record.” See § 51.20(1)(am). This approach by the legislature is consistent with 
No. 2022AP230

14

our judicial understanding that while each commitment extension order must stand 

on its own merits, “a recommitment hearing is not ‘an entirely new proceeding,’” 

and “‘the circuit court continues to receive evidence in the same case’ and may 

rely on ‘the individual’s present condition and past response to treatment.’” 

Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶26, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 

(citation omitted). Accordingly, in the context of the hearing at issue, all parties 

and the circuit court were operating with the understanding that, generally

speaking, the court would be considering information in Catherine’s prior 

treatment records and prior history. We mention this context not to conclude that 

any of the unobjected-to, alleged hearsay statements should have been admissible 

had an objection been lodged, but only to note that any purported error was neither

obvious nor substantial.

8

¶29 Furthermore, Catherine does not allege that the admission of the 

hearsay evidence regarding her treatment records deprived her of any 

constitutional or substantial right. See WIS. STAT. § 901.03(4) (notice of plain 

errors affecting substantial rights is allowed regardless of whether an objection

occurred). At best, she implies that it inhibited her ability to prepare for and 

advance her case. She also has not cited any case law applying the plain error 

doctrine to hearsay statements not objected to at trial, either generally or 

specifically with respect to WIS. STAT. ch. 51 recommitment proceedings.

¶30 Ultimately, even if there were some error in admitting the purported 

hearsay evidence, Catherine has failed to show how the admission of any of this 

 

8

 While Catherine replies to this argument by noting, correctly, that individual extension 

orders “must stand on their own merits,” that fact says nothing about the reality of how and why a 

committed individual’s prior treatment records are properly considered by a circuit court in 

recommitment proceedings relying on WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am).
No. 2022AP230

15

evidence was an error that was “fundamental” or “obvious and substantial.” See 

Jorgensen, 310 Wis. 2d 138, ¶21; see also Nelson, 395 Wis. 2d 585, ¶46. As 

noted earlier, the context of the proceedings suggested that Catherine’s prior 

treatment records and case history—including underlying facts noted therein—

were going to be considered by the circuit court in making its decision on 

Catherine’s recommitment. In addition, most, if not all, of the unobjected-to 

alleged hearsay statements were simply related to the history of Catherine’s WIS.

STAT. ch. 51 proceedings and facts that had been properly reported on, or testified 

to, by witnesses at the prior hearings, including the examining doctors. 

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the alleged hearsay statements altered the 

court’s analysis in any way. Rather, the court properly based its conclusion to

extend commitment on Dr. Bales’ testimony and his personal knowledge as 

Catherine’s treating physician, as well as on Dr. Black’s properly admitted report. 

¶31 For the foregoing reasons, assuming without deciding that errors 

occurred regarding the admission of the unobjected-to hearsay statements, we 

conclude that those errors were not so fundamental or obvious and substantial, 

either individually or collectively, to warrant application of the plain error 

doctrine. Therefore, we decline to apply the plain error doctrine in the manner that 

Catherine seeks.

9

 See King, 205 Wis. 2d at 96.

 

9

 Alternatively, the County argues that “[i]f a fundamental, substantial, and obvious error 

exists” in admitting the allegedly inadmissible hearsay, the error was harmless. Because we 

decline to apply the plain error doctrine, we need not reach this argument. See Turner v. Taylor, 

2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (when one issue supports a 

judgment an appellate court is not required to address all the issues raised by the parties). 
No. 2022AP230

16

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.