STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A15-2053 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Quentin Todd Chute, 

Appellant. 

Filed November 21, 2016 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 

Cleary, Chief Judge 

Ramsey County District Court 

File No. 62-CR-11-9695 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, 

Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross, Judge. 

S Y L L A B U S 

When a police officer enters the curtilage of a home for the purpose of conducting 

a warrantless search, the officer’s position within the curtilage is not lawful and the 

warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment. 
2 

O P I N I O N 

CLEARY, Chief Judge 

Appellant Quentin Todd Chute challenges his conviction for receiving stolen 

property. Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 

the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his property, by denying his motion 

to dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right, and by holding that the evidence was 

sufficient to support his conviction. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

FACTS 

On October 22, 2011, B.W.F. called the police to report that he located the camper 

that he had reported stolen in July 2011. An officer met B.W.F. near a residential property 

on County Road D in Maplewood. The property had two driveways. The first was at least 

partially asphalt and led to a garage, and the second was dirt and appeared to be used by 

cars carrying persons seeking a backdoor entrance to the house and garage. B.W.F. pointed 

out his camper to the officer from a location on County Road D at the end of the dirt 

driveway. The officer confirmed that the make and model of the camper matched those of 

the camper that B.W.F. had reported stolen. 

The officer parked his squad in the dirt driveway and walked with B.W.F. down the 

driveway toward the camper. Before arriving at the camper, B.W.F. told the officer that 

he had repaired the front of the camper, leaving a unique set of bolts. These bolts were 

visible from the dirt driveway. At a spot on the driveway next to the camper, the officer 

could determine that its license plate was removed. The camper’s vehicle identification 
3 

number (VIN) was also removed. The officer called the camper’s manufacturer to 

determine if the VIN was stamped in another location, learned that a partial VIN was 

stamped on the metal frame, and located the partial VIN, which matched the VIN of the 

camper stolen from B.W.F. The officer went into the camper and located an item of 

personal property belonging to B.W.F. 

The officer heard a noise coming from the garage, walked to the garage door, and 

knocked. Appellant answered and identified himself as the property owner. When the 

officer asked appellant if he owned the camper, appellant said he was storing it for a friend. 

Appellant consented to the officer’s request to search the garage. After finding personal 

property from the camper in the garage, the officer asked appellant for permission to search 

the basement and house. Appellant consented, and additional items of personal property 

from the camper were found in the basement and house. 

The State of Minnesota charged appellant with receiving stolen property. Appellant 

moved to suppress all evidence obtained by police as a result of the warrantless search and 

to dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right. The district court denied appellant’s 

suppression motion, holding that the officer’s warrantless search of the camper was 

permissible under the plain-view doctrine and that appellant consented to the searches of 

his garage, basement, and house. The district court also denied appellant’s motion to 

dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right. After a trial, the jury found appellant guilty 

of receiving stolen property. Appellant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing 
4 

that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The district court denied 

appellant’s motion. This appeal followed. 

ISSUES 

I. Did the district court err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress the 

evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his property? 

II. Did the district court err by denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for denial 

of his right to a speedy trial? 

III. Did the district court err by holding that the evidence was sufficient to 

convict appellant of receiving stolen property? 

ANALYSIS 

I. 

Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the 

evidence that police obtained from the warrantless search of his property. “When 

reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review a court’s factual findings 

under our clearly erroneous standard” and its “legal determinations, including a 

determination of probable cause, de novo.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 

2012) (citation omitted). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it lacks evidentiary 

support in the record, if it was induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Roberts, 876 

N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2016). 
5 

The United States Constitution guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless an 

exception applies. Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 798. 

A. 

The district court found that the officer’s actions with respect to the camper were 

permissible under the Fourth Amendment, because the plain-view doctrine was satisfied. 

Under the plain-view doctrine, police may seize an object that they believe to be the fruit 

or instrumentality of a crime without a warrant if (1) the object’s incriminating nature is 

immediately apparent; (2) the police are legitimately in the position from which they view 

the object; and (3) the police have a lawful right of access to the object. Id. at 799. 

To seize an item under the plain-view doctrine, the police must have probable cause 

to believe the item seized is of an incriminating nature. State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 

671 (Minn. 2015). “Police have probable cause to seize an object in plain view if the facts 

available to the officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that 

certain items may be . . . useful as evidence of crime.” Id. (quotation omitted). To 

determine whether an object may be useful as evidence of a crime, an officer may consider 

background information that casts light on the nature of the object. Id. at 672. 

Appellant argues that the camper’s incriminating nature became immediately 

apparent only after the officer and B.W.F. saw the bolts on the camper from his dirt 

driveway. Respondent contends that the plain-view doctrine was satisfied when the officer 
6 

and B.W.F. viewed the camper from County Road D. While on County Road D, B.W.F. 

pointed out the camper to the officer. The record suggests that the officer, from a position 

on County Road D, confirmed that the make and model of the camper on appellant’s 

property matched those of the camper that B.W.F. reported stolen. But these facts were 

insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the camper might 

be evidence of a crime. The district court’s analysis supports this conclusion, as it 

determined “that the unique bolts on the camper were visible from the driveway, and after 

seeing the bolts, it was immediately apparent that the camper was the one stolen from 

B.W.F.” The camper’s incriminating nature became immediately apparent only after the 

officer and B.W.F. entered appellant’s dirt driveway. 

Next, we must determine whether the officer’s position on the dirt driveway was 

lawful. Appellant argues that the driveway is curtilage and that the officer had no right to 

be present on it for the purpose of examining the camper. Respondent argues that the 

officer was legitimately present on the driveway, as the driveway is beyond the curtilage 

or, alternatively, impliedly open to the public. 

“Although the Fourth Amendment refers only to ‘persons, houses, papers and 

effects,’ courts generally have held that it applies also to the ‘curtilage.’” State v. Crea, 

305 Minn. 342, 345, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1975). The curtilage is an area 

immediately and intimately connected to the home, such that a resident has a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in it. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013); Milton, 

821 N.W.2d at 799; Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001). The Minnesota 
7 

Supreme Court has recognized that the driveway to a house is within a home’s curtilage. 

State v. Lewis, 270 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Minn. 1978); Crea, 305 Minn. at 346, 233 N.W.2d 

at 739. In Crea, the court recognized that police officers entered the curtilage when they 

walked onto the property’s driveway. Crea, 305 Minn. at 346, 233 N.W.2d at 739. In 

Lewis, the court held, “the driveway to a house is part of its curtilage for purposes of 

executing a search warrant.” Lewis, 270 N.W.2d at 897. By entering appellant’s dirt 

driveway, the officer and B.W.F. entered the curtilage of appellant’s home. 

Generally, police may not search the curtilage without a warrant. Milton, 821 

N.W.2d at 799. However, police with legitimate business may enter areas within the 

curtilage of the home if those areas are impliedly open to the public. Crea, 305 Minn. at 

346, 233 N.W.2d at 739. The impliedly-open exception permits police to “walk on the 

sidewalk and onto the porch of a house and knock on the door if they are conducting an 

investigation and want to question the owner.” Id. “[I]n such a situation the police are free 

to keep their eyes open and use their other senses.” Id.

The district court cited State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 1987), for the 

proposition that “police do not need a warrant or even probable cause to approach a 

dwelling in order to conduct an investigation if they restrict their movements to places 

visitors could be expected to go (e.g. walkways, driveways, porches)” and concluded that 

the officer had a legitimate right to be on appellant’s driveway under the impliedly-open 

exception. Krech, 403 N.W.2d at 637 (quotation omitted). Appellant argues that the 

impliedly-open exception cannot support the officer’s entry into his driveway in light of 
8 

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jardines. See State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 

51, 54 (Minn. 2012) (“Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, including the 

interpretation and application of the United States Constitution, is binding on this court.”). 

In Jardines, the Supreme Court explained that the legitimacy of an officer’s entry into the 

curtilage is determined by considering the scope of the implied license that homeowners 

extend to visitors. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415-17. Like private citizens, an officer without 

a warrant has an implied license to enter the curtilage for the purpose of knocking on the 

home’s door. Id. at 1415-16. However, police do not have a license to enter the curtilage 

where “their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search.” Id. at 1417. If 

the police enter the curtilage for the purpose of conducting a warrantless search, that search 

violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1413, 1417-18. 

This court has similarly recognized that the legitimacy of an officer’s entry into the 

curtilage depends on his purpose for entering. In Tracht v. Commissioner of Public Safety

and Haase v. Commissioner of Public Safety, we were asked to determine whether police 

officers violated the Fourth Amendment by their warrantless entries into defendants’ 

garages. Haase v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 679 N.W.2d 743, 744-45 (Minn. App. 2004); 

Tracht v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 592 N.W.2d 863, 864-65 (Minn. App. 1999), review 

denied (Minn. July 28, 1999). Like a driveway, a garage is within a home’s curtilage. 

Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 746; Tracht, 592 N.W.2d at 865. 

In Tracht, officers received a report of a motor vehicle accident and a description of 

the vehicles involved. Tracht, 679 N.W.2d at 864. About two blocks from the accident 
9 

scene, the officers found a pickup truck registered in Tracht’s name that was leaking 

radiator fluid and had a broken window and exploded airbag. Id. The driveway in which 

the truck was parked led to an attached garage, which had its large, overhead door open. 

Id. The officers entered the garage through the large doorway, knocked on the service 

door, and explained that they wished to speak with Tracht. Id. Because we determined 

that “[t]he officers entered the garage for the purpose of knocking on the service door and 

were not looking for evidence in the garage,” we concluded that the officers’ warrantless 

entry into the garage did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 865. 

We reached a different conclusion in Haase. In Haase, an officer responded to a 

call that a vehicle had crossed the center line several times. Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 745. 

The officer ran a license-plate check, learned that the vehicle was registered to Haase, and 

went to Haase’s residence, where he saw the reported vehicle pulling into the garage. Id. 

The officer parked, walked to the open garage, and stood at the garage’s threshold, waiting 

for the driver to emerge. Id. While the officer was waiting, Haase caused the garage door 

to begin to close. Id. The officer interrupted its closing by kicking his leg out to trip the 

auto-reverse sensor. Id. After Haase exited the vehicle, the officer interviewed Haase, 

who exhibited signs of intoxication. Id. We determined that “the officer did not enter the 

garage to access a door to the home, but to investigate whether Haase was driving while 

impaired” and concluded that the officer’s entry was unreasonable. Id. at 747. 

Whether the officer was legitimately on appellant’s dirt driveway depends upon his 

purpose for entering the property. The district court did not expressly determine for what 
10 

purpose the officer entered appellant’s driveway. However, the district court’s order and 

the record establish that the officer entered the driveway for the purpose of conducting a 

search. 

The district court found that appellant’s property contained two driveways. One 

driveway was at least partially asphalt and led to a garage, while the other was dirt and 

appeared to be used by cars carrying persons to the backdoor entrance to appellant’s house 

and garage. After B.W.F. pointed to the camper from a spot on County Road D at the end 

of the driveway, the officer parked his squad some way into the dirt driveway. Rather than 

immediately approaching the front entrance of appellant’s house, the officer chose to walk 

with B.W.F. down the dirt driveway toward the camper. This choice suggests that the 

officer entered appellant’s property for the purpose of conducting a search. 

The officer also performed several acts to identify the camper as B.W.F.’s stolen 

property before attempting to contact appellant. After arriving at a spot on the driveway 

next to the camper, the officer determined that the license plate had been removed. He 

checked the front of the camper, noted that the VIN was removed, and called the camper 

manufacturer to determine if the VIN might be stamped in another location. The officer 

learned that a partial VIN was stamped on the metal frame and located it. The officer went 

into the camper and found an item of personal property belonging to B.W.F. The officer 

then heard a noise coming from the garage, walked to the garage door, and knocked. The 

officer testified, “Once I verified it was the stolen camper, [I] tried to make contact with 

the homeowner.” The officer’s behavior in inspecting and entering the camper before 
11 

seeking the property owner objectively reveals that he entered appellant’s property to 

conduct a warrantless search. Because the officer entered the dirt driveway for an improper 

purpose, his presence there was not lawful and the plain-view exception does not apply. 

The officer’s search of the camper violated the Fourth Amendment. 

B. 

Appellant argues that all observations, evidence, and statements that the officer and 

B.W.F. obtained while on appellant’s property must be suppressed under the exclusionary 

rule. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence seized during an unlawful search cannot 

be used as proof against the victim. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S. 

Ct. 407, 416 (1963). The exclusionary rule extends to indirect products of invasions and 

can be used to bar both physical and verbal evidence. Id. at 484-86, 416. 

The district court concluded that the evidence obtained from the searches of 

appellant’s garage, basement, and house was admissible. Relying upon its conclusion that 

the officer’s actions with respect to the camper were permissible, the district court held that 

appellant’s consent to the searches was not tainted by unlawful behavior and denied 

appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence. Appellant argues that his consent was 

ineffective, because it was the fruit of an unlawful invasion. 

A person’s consent to a search is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement. 

State v. Barajas, 817 N.W.2d 204, 217 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 

2012). However, we must consider whether police misconduct tainted the consent. Id. 

When the police obtain a person’s consent to search after 

unlawful police conduct has occurred, the state must 
12 

demonstrate both (1) that the subsequently obtained consent 

was voluntarily given and (2) that the connection between the 

unlawful conduct and the evidence is so attenuated as to 

dissipate the evidence of the ‘taint’ of the unlawful conduct. 

Id. Whether consent is voluntary is a question of fact that must be determined by 

considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 218. To determine whether taint is 

purged, “we consider (1) the temporal proximity between the illegal search or seizure and 

the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and 

flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 The record does not clearly establish whether appellant’s consent was voluntary. 

Even assuming it was voluntary, respondent must additionally demonstrate that the 

connection between the unlawful conduct and the challenged evidence is so attenuated as 

to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct. Id. Respondent cannot meet its burden. 

 We first consider the temporal proximity between the unlawful search and 

appellant’s consent. After the officer inspected and entered the camper, he walked to the 

garage door and knocked. Appellant answered and identified himself as the property 

owner. The officer asked if appellant owned the camper, and appellant explained that he 

was storing it for a friend. According to the officer’s testimony, he told appellant and 

another man who was in the garage that the camper was stolen property, and he learned 

that the propane tank from the camper had been moved into the garage. The officer asked 

appellant if he could search the garage, and appellant consented. Because only this 

conversation separated the officer’s unlawful search of the camper and appellant’s consent 
13 

to the search of his garage, the temporal proximity factor weighs against finding the taint 

purged. 

 We next determine whether intervening circumstances would have led the police to 

independently discover the evidence. Id. It is unclear whether the officer would have 

questioned appellant about the camper and requested to search his property but for the 

illegal search of the camper. This factor weighs slightly against finding the taint purged. 

 Finally, we consider the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Id. 

“[P]ermitting the police to obtain consent after conducting an unlawful search so as to 

circumvent the exclusionary rule, even if the police conducted the unlawful search in good 

faith, would undermine the constitutional limitation on unreasonable searches and seizures 

and the purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Id. Because the record shows that the officer 

entered appellant’s property for the purpose of conducting a warrantless search, the final 

factor weighs against finding the taint purged. 

 All three factors indicate that the taint of the unlawful search of the camper had not 

been purged when appellant gave his initial consent to the search of his property. Because 

respondent cannot show that the taint was purged, respondent cannot claim the consent 

exception to the warrant requirement. The district court erred by admitting the evidence 

obtained from the searches of appellant’s garage, basement, and house. 

 Appellant argues that the district court’s failure to suppress the unlawfully-obtained 

evidence requires reversal. We agree. It appears that the vast majority of the evidence 

obtained was due to the illegal searches, requiring reversal. 
14 

II. 

Appellant asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for 

violation of his right to a speedy trial. “Criminal defendants have the right to a speedy trial 

under the constitutions of both the United States and Minnesota.” State v. Taylor, 869 

N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6). We 

review claims of Sixth Amendment violations de novo. Id. Minnesota has adopted the 

Barker test, under which “we must consider: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for 

the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and 

(4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted). No factor is 

necessary or sufficient; all must be considered with other relevant circumstances. Id.

 “The delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from the point at which the sixth 

amendment right attaches: when a formal indictment or information is issued against a 

person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.” State v. Jones, 

392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986). A delay of seven months is long enough to trigger the 

consideration of the other Barker factors. Id. Respondent filed its complaint on 

December 5, 2011, and appellant’s trial commenced on September 22, 2014. Over 33 

months passed between the attachment of appellant’s Sixth Amendment right and the 

commencement of the trial. This delay triggers consideration of the other Barker factors. 

When considering the delay, “the key question is whether the government or the 

criminal defendant is more to blame.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quotation omitted). 

“Delays caused by defense motions generally weigh against the defendant.” State v. Hahn, 
15 

799 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011). When the 

defendant’s actions cause the overall delay in bringing the case to trial, there is no speedytrial violation. State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 109 (Minn. 2005). When the delay 

weighs against the state, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. Taylor, 

869 N.W.2d at 20. “[A] [d]eliberate delay to hamper the defense weighs heavily against 

the prosecution, while neutral reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts weigh 

less heavily.” Id. (quotations omitted). “[A]dministrative delay, by itself, is generally 

insufficient to violate a defendant’s speedy-trial right in the absence of a deliberate attempt 

to delay trial.” Hahn, 799 N.W.2d at 32. 

The delay of appellant’s case had several causes, some chargeable to respondent 

and others chargeable to appellant. The record indicates that the officer who searched 

appellant’s property was unavailable on the originally scheduled date of the suppression 

hearing. The delay caused by the officer’s unavailability is chargeable to respondent. 

Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 (finding the delay caused by the unavailability of the state’s 

witness was attributable to the state). The district court’s congestion and calendaring 

difficulties also contributed to the delay. This delay is similarly chargeable to respondent. 

However, appellant also significantly contributed to the delay. Appellant concedes 

that approximately seven months of delay is attributable to him, as his original trial date 

was moved mainly to accommodate the schedule of his attorney and her untimely motion. 

Appellant is also responsible for the delay caused by his counsel’s decision to leave the 

public defender’s officer and her request to reschedule the case. Finally, the delay caused 
16 

by appellant’s counsel’s request for a continuance, unavailability, and selection of the later 

trial date offered by the district court is similarly chargeable to the appellant. 

In sum, the officer’s unavailability and court congestion caused considerable delay. 

Because there is no evidence of an intent to hamper the defense, this delay weighs less 

heavily against respondent. However, a significant amount of the delay is chargeable to 

appellant, as substantial delay was caused by his counsel’s late motion for suppression and 

unavailability, as well as changes in appellant’s counsel. The second Barker factor only 

slightly favors appellant. 

A defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary 

weight in determining whether the right has been deprived. State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 

509, 515 (Minn. 1989). “[T]he Supreme Court has looked for any action whatever . . . that 

could be construed as the assertion of the speedy trial right.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 

311, 317 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). However, a defendant’s statement that he is 

ready to go to trial now, without more, is not clear enough to be construed as an assertion 

of the right to a speedy trial. State v. Rhoads, 802 N.W.2d 794, 806 (Minn. App. 2011), 

rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 2012). 

Appellant argues that he asserted his speedy-trial right at the November 18, 2013 

hearing when his counsel said, “We’re prepared for trial.” However, this statement does 

not constitute a demand. Because appellant does not argue that he asserted his right at any 

other time, he failed to demand a speedy trial. “When a defendant moves for dismissal, 

but does not move for a speedy trial, this factor will not favor the defendant.” State v. 
17 

Cham, 680 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2004). 

Because appellant moved for dismissal without demanding a speedy trial, the third Barker

factor weighs against appellant. 

We consider three interests to determine “whether a defendant suffered prejudice: 

(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of 

the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Taylor, 

869 N.W.2d at 20 (quotation omitted). The final interest, preventing the possibility of 

impairing the defendant’s case, is the most serious. Id. at 20. Because it is difficult to 

prove exactly how a case was impaired by delay, a defendant is not required to prove 

specific prejudice. State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Minn. App. 2009). 

Oppressive pretrial incarceration is not at issue here, as appellant was granted a 

release on his own recognizance. Appellant asserts he was prejudiced, because he suffers 

from renal failure, and the anxiety and concern he endured while awaiting trial for over 33 

months affected his health. Appellant does not argue that his case was impaired by the 

delay. Where a defendant’s only argument regarding the final Barker factor is a bare 

assertion that he suffered anxiety and concern over his future and the handling of his case, 

the defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the delay. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 

at 32-33. Although appellant’s assertion of prejudice is based upon the stress he 

experienced while awaiting trial, he explains that this stress affected his health and offers 

more than a bare assertion of anxiety. Considering all of the prejudice factors together, 
18 

appellant has shown that he suffered a minimal amount of prejudice. The final Barker

factor only slightly favors appellant. 

In sum, the Barker factors show that appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not 

violated. Although the 33-month period between the filing of the complaint and trial is 

significant, appellant contributed to much of the delay, failed to demand a speedy trial, and 

offered only his increased anxiety and poor health to show prejudice. The district court 

did not err by denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right. 

III. 

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of receiving 

stolen property, because the evidence failed to prove that he knew or had reason to know 

that the camper was stolen property. Because we hold that the district court erred by 

denying appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search 

of appellant’s property, we do not determine whether the evidence produced at trial was 

sufficient to convict appellant. 

D E C I S I O N 

 The district court erred by denying appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence 

obtained from the warrantless search of his property. Because the officer entered 

appellant’s property for the improper purpose of conducting a warrantless search, the plainview doctrine cannot justify the search of the camper. Appellant’s consent to the search of 

his property was tainted by the unlawful search of the camper and cannot justify the 

searches of his garage, basement, and house. 
19 

We hold that the district court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to dismiss 

for violation of his speedy-trial right, as the balancing of the Barker factors shows that no 

violation occurred. Because we conclude that the district court should have suppressed the 

evidence obtained from the warrantless search, we reverse and we do not determine 

whether the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to convict appellant. 

 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.