IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0330

Filed February 7, 2018

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EMMANUEL SAMUEL MABIOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory D. Brandt, 

District Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated theft. AFFIRMED.

Daniel M. Northfield of Daniel Northfield, Attorney at Law, Urbandale, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., Bower, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2018).
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GOODHUE, Senior Judge.

Emmanuel Samuel Mabior was charged with aggravated theft. Mabior filed 

a motion to dismiss on the basis of the State’s violation of the applicable speedytrial requirements. The motion to dismiss was denied. Mabior appeals. We affirm 

the decision of the district court.

I. Facts

Mabior was arrested and incarcerated on August 14, 2016, but he bonded 

out two days later. A trial information was filed on September 23, 2016, and he 

was ordered to appear for arraignment on September 26, 2016, at 9:30 a.m. 

Mabior failed to appear for arraignment, an arrest warrant was issued, and a bond 

forfeiture hearing set. On November 7, 2016, Mabior was rebooked into the county 

jail and arraigned. A plea of not guilty was entered. A pretrial conference was set 

for November 18, 2016, and the trial was set for January 4, 2017. Mabior did not 

waive his right to a speedy trial. On November 18, Mabior’s counsel’s motion to 

withdraw based on a conflict was granted, and a successor counsel was 

appointed. A pretrial conference was held on November 18, and a status 

conference was set for December 22. The trial date remained set for January 4, 

2017.

On January 3, 2017, Mabior filed a motion to dismiss based on the speedytrial rule set out in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b), which requires a 

trial be held within ninety days of the filing of an indictment. Mabior asserts the 

trial was not held until 103 days after the filing of the trial information and, therefore,

not within the ninety-day period. In defense, the State alleged good cause as a 

result of Mabior’s absence and the resulting failure to appear for arraignment. On 
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that basis, the motion to dismiss was denied. Mabior waived the jury and agreed 

to be tried on the minutes of evidence in the trial information. The minutes were 

considered, and Mabior was convicted of the charge.

II. Error Preservation

Mabior made a motion to dismiss based on the delay between the filing of 

the trial information and the trial, and it was denied. The State does not contest 

error preservation. Error has been preserved.

III. Standard of Review

Our review of the denial of a motion to dismiss for a violation of the speedytrial requirements is for an abuse of discretion, but when a violation is attempted 

to be excused by good cause, the discretion is narrowed. State v. McNeal, 897 

N.W.2d 697, 704 (Iowa 2017). 

IV. Discussion

An almost identical case has already been considered and decided by the 

Iowa Court of Appeals. See State v. Cunningham, No. 15-1583, 2016 WL 

7403724, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). Mabior’s absence rendered an 

earlier trial date impractical. “Arraignment is a prerequisite to trial, unless waived.”

State v. Lyle, 225 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1975). There is no way for the court or 

the State to determine whether the accused is going to plead guilty or not guilty 

until the arraignment is held. Therefore, there is no way to know whether a trial 

date even needs to be set until the arraignment has been held. There are multiple 

motions that must be filed within forty days of arraignment. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 

2.11(4). The reduction of time between the arraignment and the trial also reduces 

the time for plea bargaining, taking depositions, and otherwise preparing for trial. 
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Mabior’s absence constituted good cause for the delay, and the motion to dismiss 

was correctly denied. We affirm the decision of the district court.

AFFIRMED.