J-S86001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERIC RAMBERT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 90 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002765-1987

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2016

Appellant, Eric Rambert, appeals pro se from the December 19, 2014, 

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing 

his serial petition filed under the PCRA.1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On January 

27, 1987, a fire broke out at a state correctional institution where Appellant 

was an inmate. As a correctional officer attempted to unlock cells and direct 

inmates to the yard, Appellant struck the officer from behind, with several 

other inmates joining in the attack. The prisoners beat the correctional 

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1

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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officer into unconsciousness and he later required more than seventy-five 

stitches. 

A jury convicted Appellant of assault by a prisoner, riot, and 

conspiracy, and on November 10, 1987, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate of six years to twenty-five years in prison. On November 

30, 1988, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Rambert, 1710 Pittsburgh 1987 (Pa.Super. filed 

11/30/88) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for 

allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. 

Thereafter, Appellant filed serial PCRA petitions, including one filed on 

July 9, 2012. The PCRA court dismissed the petition, and on appeal, this 

Court affirmed the dismissal. See Commonwealth v. Rambert, No. 320 

WDA 2013 (Pa.Super. filed 11/12/13) (unpublished judgment order). 

Specifically, we concluded that there was no indication Appellant was still 

serving a sentence for the convictions at issue, and thus, it appeared he was 

ineligible for PCRA relief. See id. at 2. Alternatively, we concluded that 

Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely filed, and Appellant did not meet his 

burden of proving that any of the timeliness exceptions applied. See id. at 

2-3. 
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On May 15, 2014,2 Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, and the 

PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to dismiss the petition 

without a hearing. Appellant provided a pro se response, and by order filed 

on December 19, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

This timely pro se appeal followed. The PCRA court directed Appellant to file 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant timely complied, and the PCRA 

court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.3

Preliminarily, we note that, in order to be eligible for relief under the 

PCRA, Appellant must demonstrate that he is currently serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation, or parole for the convictions at issue. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i). Instantly, the trial court sentenced Appellant on 

November 10, 1987, to six years to twenty-five years in prison. “Nothing in 

the record indicates Appellant is still serving the sentence for the convictions 

at issue. Therefore, Appellant appears to be ineligible for PCRA relief.” 

Rambert, No. 320 WDA 2013, at 2 (citation omitted). 

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2 Although Appellant’s PCRA petition was docketed on May 28, 2014, we 

shall deem it to have been filed on May 15, 2014, when it was handed to 

prison authorities. See generally Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 

231, 234 n.5 (Pa.Super. 2012).

3

“Our standard of review of the denial of PCRA relief is clear; we are limited 

to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the 

record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. Wojtaszek, 951 A.2d 

1169, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quotation and quotation marks omitted). 
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Alternatively, we conclude Appellant’s instant PCRA petition was 

untimely filed. Pennsylvania law makes it clear that no court has jurisdiction 

to hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 

500, 837 A.2d 1157 (2003). The most recent amendments to the PCRA, 

effective January 19, 1996, provide that a PCRA petition, including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A 

judgment is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA 

allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition 

will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a 

petition must allege and the petitioner must prove:

(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or the law of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

law of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provide in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

“We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the burden to allege 

and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” Commonwealth 

v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (2008) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, “the PCRA limits the reach of the exceptions by providing that a 

petition invoking any of the exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the 

date the claim first could have been presented.” Commonwealth v. 

Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 592 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations omitted). See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Instantly, there is no dispute that Appellant’s current petition is facially 

untimely. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on 

November 30, 1988, and Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of 

appeal. However, Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until May 

15, 2014. Thus, the petition is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1). 

Appellant attempts to invoke the governmental interference and/or the 

newly-discovered facts exceptions.4 In this vein, he argues that he recently 

discovered in the “volumes of legal documents” that two of the victim’s 

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4 We are mindful that “although this Court is willing to construe liberally 

materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special 

benefit upon an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). It merits mentioning that Appellant’s 

pro se brief is disjointed and difficult to read.
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statements, dated January 27, 1987, and January 28, 1987, which he gave 

to Pennsylvania state troopers, contained exculpatory evidence. Appellant 

avers that the Commonwealth committed a Brady5violation in failing to turn 

over the statements prior to Appellant’s trial. 

To the extent Appellant’s argument touches upon the governmental 

interference exception of Subsection 9545(b)(1)(i), we note that, to 

establish the exception, “the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to 

previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government 

officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the 

exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 

941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (2008) (citation omitted). 

To the extent Appellant’s argument touches upon the newlydiscovered facts exception of Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), we note that, to 

establish the exception, the petitioner must prove (1) the fact was unknown 

to him and (2) the fact could not have been ascertained previously by the 

exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 

A.2d 1264 (2007). 

With regard to due diligence, we are guided by the following: “Due 

diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his 

own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the 

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5 Brady v. Maryland, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). 
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new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly 

enforced.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (citations omitted). 

In the case sub judice, assuming, arguendo, Appellant presented his 

claim within 60-days of when he first learned of the victim’s statements, see 

Walters, supra, we conclude Appellant has failed to demonstrate the 

necessary due diligence to invoke either the governmental interference or 

newly-discovered facts exception. Simply put, inasmuch as Appellant admits 

in his brief that trial counsel knew of the statements during trial, and 

Appellant discovered the statements simply by reading the “volumes of legal 

documents,” Appellant has not explained why he could not have learned of 

the existence of the victim’s statements earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2016
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