No. 01-733 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2002 MT 198 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

RAYMOND JOSEPH McMAHON, 

Petitioner, Respondent, and Cross-Appellant, 

and 

GWEN ELIZABETH McMAHON 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Gwen Elizabeth Gardner, f/k/a Gwen Elizabeth McMahon, Billings, Montana 

 (pro se) 

For Respondent: 

Mark D. Parker, Casey Heitz, Parker Law Firm, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 28, 2002 

 Decided: September 5, 2002 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
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Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Appellant Gwen Elizabeth McMahon, appearing pro se, appeals 

from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of 

dissolution entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, 

Yellowstone County. We affirm. 

¶2 Gwen purports to raise three issues for our review. However, 

we will not restate the issues presented because the determinative 

issue in this case is whether we should dismiss Gwen’s appeal for 

failure to comply with the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Gwen and Respondent Raymond Joseph McMahon (R.J.) were 

married in Hawaii on June 12, 1991. Prior to the marriage, Gwen 

gave birth to three daughters, none of which were fathered by R.J. 

 The District Court found that Gwen brought little to the marriage 

as compared to R.J.’s substantial premarital assets. During the 

marriage, Gwen assisted R.J in the operation and management of his 

liquor and gaming establishment located in Billings, Montana. R.J. 

provided significant financial support to Gwen’s children during 

the course of the parties’ marriage. The parties received no 

financial contribution from the children’s natural father. 

¶4 On November 16, 2000, R.J. filed a petition to dissolve his 

marriage to Gwen. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial on July 

12, 2001. Both parties were represented by counsel at trial. 

Following a one-day trial, the District Court entered its findings 

of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution. The 
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District Court itemized the premarital and marital assets and 

valued each asset accordingly. Pursuant to the District Court’s 

property distribution, Gwen received the parties’ 1999 Jaguar, a 

certificate of deposit worth $20,000, a cash bond worth $10,000, 

some personal property, and a cash award of approximately $246,000. 

 On August 29, 2001, Gwen, appearing pro se, filed a notice of 

appeal “from the District Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 

Law and Decree dated July 30, 2001.” On September 4, 2001, R.J. 

filed a notice of cross-appeal but has since dismissed the same. 

DISCUSSION

¶5 Gwen ostensibly submits three issues for our review which are 

difficult to comprehend and presented in contravention of the 

prescribed rules of appellate procedure. Gwen’s brief alludes to 

libelous conduct, unscrupulous activity regarding trial court 

documents, false testimony, judicial bias, and erroneous 

calculation of marital assets. However, Gwen has failed to include 

citations to legal authority in support of her allegations and, 

instead, relies significantly on matters outside of the District 

Court record. 

¶6 Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., requires that an appellant present 

a concise, cohesive argument which “contain[s] the contentions of 

the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons 

therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and pages of 

the record relied on.” As stated above, Gwen’s brief contains 

general contentions of impropriety but no citations to the record 

or supporting legal authority. This Court has repeatedly held that 
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we will not consider unsupported issues or arguments. In re 

Custody of Krause, 2001 MT 37, ¶ 32, 304 Mont. 202, ¶ 32, 19 P.3d 

811, ¶ 32. Similarly, this Court is under no obligation to locate 

authorities or formulate arguments for a party in support of 

positions taken on appeal. In re B.P., 2001 MT 219, ¶ 41, 306 

Mont. 430, ¶ 41, 35 P.3d 291, ¶ 41. Failure to comply with Rule 

23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., is fatal to an appeal. State v. Blackcrow, 

1999 MT 44, ¶ 33, 293 Mont. 374, ¶ 33, 975 P.2d 1253, ¶ 33. While 

dismissal is a harsh result, it is nonetheless necessary when the 

utter failure to comply with the rules of appellate procedure 

results in an appellate filing that can neither be comprehended by 

this Court or realistically responded to by the opposing party. 

See City of Whitefish v. Hansen (1989), 237 Mont. 105, 771 P.2d 

976. 

¶7 In the past, we have demonstrated that we are willing to make 

accommodations for pro se parties by relaxing those technical 

requirements which do not impact fundamental bases for appeal. 

However, a district court’s decision is presumed correct and it is 

the appellant who bears the burden of establishing error by that 

court. Matter of M.J.W., 1998 MT 142, ¶ 18, 289 Mont. 232, ¶ 18, 

961 P.2d 105, ¶ 18. Gwen simply has not met her burden in this 

regard. Accordingly, we hereby dismiss Gwen’s appeal for failing 

to comply with the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure and affirm 

the decision of the District Court. 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 
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We Concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON