II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2606 

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 

Chinese Communist Party with respect to the United States, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 4, 2021 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself and Ms. CORTEZ MASTO) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 

influence operations of the Government of the People’s 

Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party 

with respect to the United States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Countering the Chinese 

5 Government and Communist Party’s Political Influence 

6 Operations Act’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com5 mittees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committee on Appropriations of 

7 the Senate; 

8 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of 

9 the Senate; 

10 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

11 the Senate; 

12 (D) the Committee on Health, Education, 

13 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; 

14 (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

15 Senate; 

16 (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 

17 the Senate; 

18 (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

19 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 

20 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of 

21 the House of Representatives; 

22 (I) the Committee on Armed Services of 

23 the House of Representatives; 

24 (J) the Committee on Education and 

25 Labor of the House of Representatives; 


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1 (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

2 the House of Representatives; 

3 (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

4 House of Representatives; 

5 (M) the Permanent Select Committee on 

6 Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 

7 and 

8 (N) the Committee on Financial Services 

9 of the House of Representatives. 

10 (2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—The 

11 term ‘‘political influence operations’’ means the co12 ordinated and often concealed application of 

13 disinformation, press manipulation, economic coer14 cion, targeted investments, corruption, or academic 

15 censorship, which are often intended— 

16 (A) to coerce and corrupt United States in17 terests, values, institutions, or individuals; and 

18 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, 

19 or outcomes in the United States that support 

20 the interests of the Government of the People’s 

21 Republic of China or the Chinese Communist 

22 Party. 

23 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China and the Chinese Communist Party employ a 

3 wide range of political, informational, and economic 

4 measures to influence, coerce, intimidate, and under5 mine the United States interests and the interests of 

6 United States partners and allies. 

7 (2) The December 2017 National Security 

8 Strategy of the United States of America states, 

9 ‘‘Although the United States seeks to continue to co10 operate with China, China is using economic induce11 ments and penalties, influence operations, and im12 plied military threats to persuade other states to 

13 heed its political and security agenda.’’ 

14 (3) Given the economic strength of the People’s 

15 Republic of China and the growing apparatus being 

16 used to spread its influence globally, efforts to pro17 mote its authoritarian ideal pose significant and con18 sequential long-term challenges to United States in19 terests and values. 

20 (4) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

21 China and the Chinese Communist Party use overt 

22 and covert means to target the political and eco23 nomic elite, the media and public opinion, civil soci24 ety and academia, and members of the Chinese dias25 pora. 


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1 (5) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China and the Chinese Communist Party employ an 

3 array of government entities, friendship and ex4 change organizations, private entities and 

5 businesspeople, and government-funded foundations, 

6 think tanks, educational and other projects to carry 

7 out political influence operations, which is often re8 ferred to as ‘‘United Front work.’’ 

9 (6) According to the U.S.-China Economic and 

10 Security Review Commission, ‘‘China uses what it 

11 calls ‘United Front’ work to co-opt and neutralize 

12 sources of potential opposition to the policies and 

13 authority of its ruling Chinese Communist Party. . . 

14 To carry out its influence activities abroad, the 

15 [United Front Work Department] directs ‘overseas 

16 Chinese work,’ which seeks to co-opt ethnic Chinese 

17 individuals and communities living outside China, 

18 while a number of other key affiliated organizations 

19 guided by China’s broader United Front strategy 

20 conduct influence operations targeting foreign actors 

21 and states.’’ 

22 (7) These political influence operations violate 

23 national sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally 

24 different from traditional efforts by countries to 

25 shape international policy debates and improve their 


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1 public image through public diplomacy and strategic 

2 communications campaigns. 

3 (8) The aims of the political influence oper4 ations of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

5 China and the Chinese Communist Party are— 

6 (A) to protect the political security of the 

7 Chinese Communist Party, or its ability to exer8 cise an absolute monopoly on political power 

9 within the People’s Republic of China and to in10 creasingly to dominate international politics re11 garding issues that the Chinese Communist 

12 Party deems important; 

13 (B) to domestically and globally promote 

14 the idea that the Chinese Communist Party’s 

15 political and economic model is superior to that 

16 of democracies; 

17 (C) to spread its governance model to 

18 other countries and to undermine democracy 

19 and free-market economies; 

20 (D) to promote the interests of the regime 

21 globally; 

22 (E) to weaken American alliances and 

23 partnerships by creating new divisions between 

24 them, or by exacerbating existing ones; and 


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1 (F) to foment domestic social and political 

2 divisions, and to exacerbate existing ones, with3 in democratic countries, including by under4 mining popular confidence in democracy and its 

5 essential institutions. 

6 (9) The political influence operations of the 

7 Government of the People’s Republic of China and 

8 the Chinese Communist Party take advantage of the 

9 open and democratic nature of the United States, in10 cluding— 

11 (A) constitutional protections for free 

12 speech and a free press; and 

13 (B) the desire of some companies or insti14 tutions to attract Chinese investment, gain ac15 cess to Chinese markets, or attain greater glob16 al influence. 

17 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con18 gress that— 

19 (1) the political influence operations of the Gov20 ernment of the People’s Republic of China and the 

21 Chinese Communist Party are not ‘‘soft power’’ in22 tended to persuade, but ‘‘sharp power’’ intended— 

23 (A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic 

24 countries and undermine democratic institu25 tions and freedoms; 


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1 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and 

2 policies favorable to the Government of the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China’s interest through 

4 disinformation, coercion, corruption, and other 

5 means; 

6 (C) to widen the scope of Chinese authori7 tarian influence around the world, including— 

8 (i) to suppress political opposition to 

9 the Chinese Communist Party; and 

10 (ii) to violate the internationally rec11 ognized human and civil rights of both 

12 Chinese and foreign citizens living in coun13 tries around the world; and 

14 (D) to undermine the strength of American 

15 alliances around the world; and 

16 (2) the people of the United States need reliable 

17 and current information— 

18 (A) to identify the key institutions, individ19 uals, entities, and ministries that carry out such 

20 operations; and 

21 (B) to distinguish between malign political 

22 influence operations intended to undermine core 

23 American freedoms and democratic institutions, 

24 as opposed to legitimate cultural, educational, 


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1 business, and people-to-people exchanges that 

2 may benefit the United States and China. 

3 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

4 United States— 

5 (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese 

6 people and culture and the Government of the Peo7 ple’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist 

8 Party in official statements, media messaging, and 

9 policy; 

10 (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, inter11 nationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic 

12 communications campaigns and illicit activities to 

13 undermine democratic institutions or freedoms; 

14 (3) to protect United States citizens and legal 

15 residents from malign or coercive political influence 

16 operations; 

17 (4) to enhance cooperation and coordination 

18 with the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New 

19 Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and the mem20 bers of the European Union, whose governments and 

21 institutions have faced acute pressure from the polit22 ical influence operations of the Government of the 

23 People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Com24 munist Party, and with other allies throughout the 

25 world; 


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1 (5) to create strategies to ensure that countries 

2 in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, 

3 and elsewhere are aware of the People’s Republic of 

4 China’s ‘‘sharp power’’ tactics, including the Chinese 

5 Communist Party’s party-to-party training program, 

6 which is designed to instill admiration and emulation 

7 of Beijing’s governance model and weaken democ8 racy in these regions, and provide needed capacity to 

9 counter them effectively; 

10 (6) to implement more advanced transparency 

11 requirements concerning collaboration with Chinese 

12 actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, 

13 and government officials; 

14 (7) to use various forums to raise awareness 

15 about— 

16 (A) the goals and methods of the political 

17 influence operations of the Government of the 

18 People’s Republic of China and the Chinese 

19 Communist Party; and 

20 (B) common patterns and approaches used 

21 by Chinese intelligence agencies or related ac22 tors; 

23 (8) to require greater transparency for Confu24 cius Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and 

25 nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by 


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1 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

2 and the Chinese Communist Party, or by individuals 

3 or public or private organizations with a demon4 strable affiliation with the Government of the Peo5 ple’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist 

6 Party that are operating in the United States to reg7 ister through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 

8 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mech9 anism; 

10 (9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language 

11 proficiency among mid-career professionals that do 

12 not rely on funding linked to the Government of the 

13 People’s Republic of China; 

14 (10) to ensure that existing tools are suffi15 ciently screening for the risk of Chinese influence 

16 operations; and 

17 (11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, 

18 with the goals of— 

19 (A) screening investments from the Gov20 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or 

21 sources backed by such government to protect 

22 against the takeover of United States compa23 nies by Chinese state-owned or state-driven en24 tities; and 


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1 (B) protecting institutions or business sec2 tors critically important to United States na3 tional security and the viability of democratic 

4 institutions. 

5 SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ‘‘SHARP POWER’’ POLIT6 ICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TO PRO7 TECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the 

9 Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with all 

10 relevant Federal agencies, shall develop a long-term strat11 egy— 

12 (1) to carry out the policy set forth in section 

13 3(c); 

14 (2) to effectively counter the ‘‘sharp power’’ po15 litical influence operations of the Chinese Com16 munist Party globally and in the United States; 

17 (3) to ensure that United States citizens, par18 ticularly Chinese Americans and members of the 

19 Chinese, Uyghur, Mongolian, Korean, Taiwanese, 

20 and Tibetan diaspora who are often the victims and 

21 primary targets of malign political influence oper22 ations, are protected; 

23 (4) to ensure that— 

24 (A) the United States Government strategy 

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1 graph (3) is clearly communicated by relevant 

2 Federal officials; and 

3 (B) secure outlets are created for reporting 

4 on intimidation and surveillance; 

5 (5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are le6 gally studying, living, or working temporarily in the 

7 United States know that intimidation or surveillance 

8 by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

9 China and the Chinese Communist Party is an unac10 ceptable invasion of their rights while they reside in 

11 the United States; 

12 (6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on in13 timidation and surveillance; and 

14 (7) to identify new tools or authorities nec15 essary to implement this strategy. 

16 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

17 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 

18 Secretary of State, or an appropriate high-ranking official, 

19 shall— 

20 (1) submit an unclassified report, which may 

21 include a classified annex, containing the strategy 

22 required under subsection (a) to the appropriate 

23 congressional committees; or 

24 (2) describe the strategy required under sub25 section (a) through unclassified testimony before the 


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1 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or 

2 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

3 Representatives. 

4 SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPER5 ATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND 

6 THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Because it is important for 

8 United States policymakers and the American people to 

9 be informed about the influence operations described in 

10 section 3, not later than 270 days after the date of the 

11 enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Sec12 retary of State, in coordination with the Director of Na13 tional Intelligence, and in consultation with the heads of 

14 relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit 

15 an unclassified report, which may include a classified 

16 annex, to the appropriate congressional committees that 

17 describes the political influence operations of the Govern18 ment of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese 

19 Communist Party affecting the United States and select 

20 allies and partners, including the United Kingdom, Can21 ada, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Japan, includ22 ing efforts— 

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1 viduals, or government officials among United States 

2 allies and partners; 

3 (2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens 

4 or legal permanent residents or their families and 

5 associates living in China or elsewhere; 

6 (3) to undermine democratic institutions and 

7 the freedoms of speech, expression, the press, asso8 ciation, assembly, religion, or academic thought; 

9 (4) to otherwise suppress information in public 

10 fora, in the United States and abroad; or 

11 (5) to develop or obtain property, facilities, in12 frastructure, business entities, or other assets for 

13 use in facilitating the activities described in para14 graphs (1) through (4). 

15 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub16 section (a) shall include recommendations for the Presi17 dent and Congress relating to— 

18 (1) the need for additional resources or authori19 ties to counter political influence operations in the 

20 United States directed by the Government of the 

21 People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Com22 munist Party, including operations carried out in 

23 concert with allies; 

24 (2) whether a permanent office to monitor and 

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1 ernment of the People’s Republic of China and the 

2 Chinese Communist Party should be established 

3 within the Department of State or within the Office 

4 of the Director of National Intelligence; and 

5 (3) whether regular public reports on the polit6 ical influence operations of the Government of the 

7 People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Com8 munist Party are needed to inform Congress and the 

9 American people of the scale and scope of such oper10 ations. 

Æ 


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