IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs July 12, 2016

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DESHUN HAMPTON, MATTHEW TYLER 

and DEVONTA HAMPTON aka DEVONTA TAYLOR

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

Nos. 13-01803, 13-01807, 13-02893, 13-02895, 13-02894 James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

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No. W2015-00469-CCA-R3-CD - Filed November 23, 2016

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This case represents the consolidated appeals of Defendants Deshun1 Hampton, Matthew 

Tyler, and Devonta Hampton. The three Defendants, having entered open guilty pleas to 

various felonies, challenge only the trial court‘s sentencing decisions, including its 

decision to impose partially consecutive sentences. The trial court sentenced Mr. Tyler to 

an aggregate sentence of sixty-six years,

2 Mr. Deshun Hampton to an aggregate sentence 

of fifty-five years, and Mr. Devonta Hampton to an aggregate sentence of thirty-two 

years. Mr. Deshun Hampton and Mr. Tyler, who were between fifteen and sixteen years 

old at the time of the crimes, assert that their sentences amount to de facto life sentences 

and are therefore in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

They also challenge the application of certain enhancement and mitigating factors. All 

three Defendants challenge the trial court‘s sentencing decisions, asserting that the trial 

court abused its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences. We conclude that 

the sentences at issue, while lengthy, allow for a meaningful opportunity for release and 

do not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment, and we affirm the judgments of the trial 

court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed; 

Case Remanded

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E.

GLENN and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

 

1 Deshun Hampton‘s first name is spelled in various ways in the record. The indictment and his 

statement to police both use the spelling ―Deshun.‖ We note that many of the judgment forms spell his 

name ―Deshuan,‖ and we remand for correction of these forms.

2 The trial court calculated Mr. Tyler‘s sentence to be sixty-six years, apparently including in that 

figure an eleven-year sentence in indictment 13-01802, which is not part of this appeal.
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Autumn Chastain, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Deshun Hampton; Linda 

Khumalo, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Matthew Tyler; and Stephen Bush, 

District Public Defender, and Harry E. Sayle, III, (on appeal), and Michael Johnson (at 

trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Devonta Hampton.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Thomas Henderson 

and Jose Leon, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Defendants came to the attention of law enforcement when Mr. Tyler and Mr. 

Devonta Hampton committed an aggravated robbery against victim Jose Mateos.

3

 The 

conviction for the aggravated robbery of Mr. Mateos is not at issue in this appeal, but Mr. 

Mateos nevertheless testified at the sentencing hearing that on January 24, 2013, he was 

returning home from work when he was approached by two men. He allowed one of the 

men to use his telephone and that man subsequently pointed a gun at his head and 

demanded his property and keys. The second assailant then got in Mr. Mateos‘s truck, 

and the first assailant attempted to force Mr. Mateos into the truck as well. After a 

struggle, Mr. Mateos reached the door of his apartment and shouted to his wife to call the 

police, and the assailants fled. 

Mr. Tyler and Mr. Devonta Hampton were arrested in Mr. Mateos‘s vehicle 

shortly thereafter. They both acknowledged their role in the crime against Mr. Mateos, 

Mr. Tyler admitting that he was the gunman and Mr. Devonta Hampton admitting that he 

was the driver. Both proceeded to give further statements incriminating the three 

Defendants in numerous other crimes. Mr. Tyler further pointed the police to certain 

videos on a telephone belonging to him which was in the custody of law enforcement due 

to a previous arrest. Mr. Deshun Hampton also gave statements to police acknowledging 

his role in certain crimes. 

Ultimately, the three Defendants entered open guilty pleas to numerous crimes, 

and the Defendants now challenge the trial court‘s sentencing decisions. Each of the 

 

3 Mr. Mateos‘s first name is alternatively given as ―Yair‖ in the record. According to an updated 

presentence report, Mr. Tyler was convicted of the aggravated robbery of Mr. Mateos on September 23, 

2014.
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three Defendants entered an open guilty plea to one count of aggravated robbery in 

indictment 13-01803. Mr. Tyler pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery in 

indictment 13-01804. Mr. Deshun Hampton and Mr. Tyler also entered open guilty pleas 

to one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one 

count of employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony in indictment 13-

01807. Mr. Deshun Hampton and Mr. Tyler pled guilty in indictment 13-02893 to one 

count of animal cruelty and one count of killing an animal. Each of the three Defendants 

pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one 

count of employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony in indictment 13-

02894; and to two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and 

one count of employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony in indictment 

13-02895. 

The criminal activity at issue in this appeal began in May 2012. At the February 

5, 2015, sentencing hearing, Officer Fausto Frias of the Memphis Police Department 

testified that he interviewed Mr. Tyler after Mr. Tyler was apprehended for the robbery of 

Mr. Mateos and that Mr. Tyler was ―bragging about‖ various other crimes that he had 

committed, including a shooting that he claimed to have recorded on a cellular telephone 

which was in the possession of police. Officer Frias found the telephone in the property 

room and prepared a search warrant. Two relevant videos emerged. One video was 

footage of the shooting of a dog. The video depicts the assailants walking up to a barking 

dog which is behind a chain-link fence, shooting the dog with a gun, and running away 

laughing. Relative to this crime, the State noted at Mr. Tyler‘s plea hearing that David 

Sanchez had reported that he kept his pit bull at his business for security purposes and 

that the dog was shot through the neck sometime between May 22 and May 23, 2012. 

Based on the video, Mr. Deshun Hampton and Mr. Tyler were each charged in indictment 

13-02893 with one count of aggravated animal cruelty and one count of the intentional 

killing of an animal. 

The other relevant video recovered from Mr. Tyler‘s telephone showed footage of 

an attempted murder which took place a day or two after the shooting of the dog. At the 

sentencing hearing, James Giggers, Jr., testified that he was working as an armed security

guard in an apartment complex on May 24, 2012. In the early morning hours, Mr. 

Giggers was sitting in the golf cart he used to patrol the complex when he heard a shot, 

followed by several more shots. The glass on the passenger‘s side of his car shattered, 

and he rolled out of the car. Overall, he heard approximately eight shots, but he could not 

locate the shooter. Mr. Giggers had glass and shrapnel in his eye from the broken 

window, and he had to wear an eye patch for approximately one month. The video

recovered from Mr. Tyler‘s telephone shows Mr. Tyler and Mr. Deshun Hampton 

shooting at Mr. Giggers‘s car. 
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Mr. Tyler‘s statement detailed the incident, including the name of the 

videographer. Mr. Tyler stated that he was angry because Mr. Giggers had chased him 

and a group of youths away from the apartments a few months prior to the shooting. 

During that incident, he claimed that he and Mr. Deshun Hampton stole an iPad from Mr. 

Giggers‘s vehicle while Mr. Giggers chased their friends. Mr. Tyler stated that on the 

day of the shooting, he and Mr. Deshun Hampton were looking for someone to rob when 

they saw the security guard. Mr. Tyler stated that he ―told [Deshun] that I was fixing to

walk past the truck and when the security guard gets out to chase me, I told [Deshun] to 

shoot him in the face.‖ Mr. Giggers did not get out of the truck when Mr. Tyler walked 

past. Mr. Tyler and Mr. Deshun Hampton moved across the street and hid behind a wall,

and Mr. Tyler shot at Mr. Giggers once, then handed the gun to Mr. Deshun Hampton, 

who ―emptied the clip.‖ The video shows the two young men shooting at the car as 

described by Mr. Tyler. Mr. Tyler and Mr. Deshun Hampton were each charged with one 

count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of 

employing a firearm in a dangerous felony in indictment 13-01807 as a result of these 

events. 

Shortly thereafter, on June 2, 2012, all three Defendants participated in a home 

invasion in the same apartment complex. According to the prosecution‘s presentation of 

the facts at Mr. Tyler‘s plea hearing, victims Angelo Lorenzo and Carlos Tercero opened 

the front door for the assailants and were then robbed at gunpoint of money and 

telephones. According to Mr. Tyler‘s statement, the three Defendants and other 

confederates were ―looking for somebody to rob,‖ and looked inside a window in the 

apartment complex. They saw two men whom they took to be intoxicated. The 

assailants took the victims‘ money and telephones. Mr. Tyler stated that both he and one 

of the Hamptons had a BB gun. Mr. Tyler stated that he and Mr. Deshun Hampton went 

to the back of the apartment and saw a woman and some children asleep before they were 

alerted to leave by other participants in the crime, who were watching for the approach of

security officers. Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s statement also noted that there were other 

participants and that they chose the victims because they looked through the window and 

thought the victims were intoxicated. Mr. Devonta Hampton stated that Mr. Tyler had a 

BB gun and that Mr. Deshun Hampton had a .45 caliber pistol. According to Mr. 

Devonta Hampton, he and Mr. Tyler were the first to enter, and they left after robbing the 

victims because he saw some other people asleep in the apartment. Mr. Deshun Hampton 

also acknowledged participating, but he stated that only Mr. Tyler was armed. As a 

result, the three Defendants were all charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, one 

count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm in the commission of 

a dangerous felony in indictment 13-02895. 

The three Defendants then participated in another home invasion in the same 

apartment complex. Margaret Bichon testified at the sentencing hearing that she heard a 
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loud bang on her front door at 1:30 a.m. on July 12, 2012. The men at her door told her 

that they were police officers, but when she saw that there was no police car in front of 

her apartment, she called the police. In the meantime, the men forced their way in 

through the back door. One held her at gunpoint while others went to the bedrooms. The 

men took her telephone, a laptop computer, and some change. Ms. Bichon was terrified 

and ―just knew [she] was going to get shot.‖ Mr. Tyler‘s statement was that the three

Defendants went to the apartments, where they saw the laptop but did not see anyone 

through the window. He stated he told the others to pretend to be police, and that he 

meanwhile broke in the back door. Mr. Tyler held the victim up with a BB gun, and they 

took a laptop, a telephone, and an orange drink. Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s statement was 

that the three Defendants and several accomplices saw the victim alone in the apartment, 

broke open the back door, and held her at gunpoint. He stated they took the telephone 

and some change. According to Mr. Deshun Hampton‘s statement, there were several 

others youths involved in this crime, and they had seen the victim alone in the home by 

looking through the window. He stated that she would not open the door and they broke 

in through the back. According to Mr. Deshun Hampton, Mr. Tyler pointed a BB gun at 

her and that they took the laptop, a laptop charger, the telephone, and some food. The 

Defendants were charged with aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a 

firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in indictment 13-02894. 

The next crime was committed by Mr. Tyler acting alone. According to the 

prosecutor‘s statement of facts, on December 19, 2012, police responded to a robbery at 

the same apartment complex. The victim, Antonio Arguello, stated that a man had 

approached him with a gun and taken his wallet and sixty dollars. Mr. Tyler 

acknowledged that he ―was walking around looking for somebody to rob,‖ when he saw 

the victim near the victim‘s apartment. He pulled out the gun and told the victim to 

―come on with everything.‖ He took the victim‘s wallet and ran away. As a result, he 

was charged with aggravated robbery in indictment 13-01804. 

All three Defendants then participated in the aggravated robbery of Luis Ramirez

on January 23, 2013. According to Mr. Tyler‘s statement, he and the Hamptons saw the 

victim pull up into his apartment complex at around 11:48 p.m., and Mr. Tyler 

approached him with the black BB gun. The Defendants took the man‘s money and the 

keys to his car, which they soon after crashed into a brick wall doing a ―donut.‖ Mr. 

Devonta Hampton‘s statement was that the three saw the victim pull into his apartment 

complex and that Mr. Tyler pointed the gun at him while Mr. Deshun Hampton searched 

his pockets. Mr. Devonta Hampton acknowledged looking through the victim‘s wallet 

for gift cards and told police that he then gave the wallet back to the victim. They took 

the victim‘s telephone and car, which Mr. Tyler crashed into a brick wall. Mr. Deshun 

Hampton confirmed in his statement that the three took the victim‘s telephone, money, 

and vehicle while Mr. Tyler pointed a weapon. He stated that Mr. Devonta Hampton 
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patted down the victim and gave him the victim‘s keys so that he could drive. As a result 

of the crime, the Defendants were charged with aggravated robbery in indictment 13-

01803. 

The Defendants introduced mitigating evidence regarding their troubled 

childhoods. Michelle Hampton, the mother of Mr. Deshun and Mr. Devonta Hampton, 

testified on behalf of her children. Ms. Hampton stated that she had six sons and that all 

of her children were diagnosed with a ―mild mental problem‖ and were ―easily 

influenced.‖ The father of Mr. Deshun and Mr. Devonta Hampton was killed in front of 

the two boys in 1998. She acknowledged that her children went to juvenile court twice 

for dependency and neglect, stating that she had gone to jail for three years for attempted 

second degree murder. During her incarceration, Mr. Deshun Hampton lived with her 

sister, and Mr. Devonta Hampton lived with her mother. According to Ms. Hampton, Mr. 

Deshun Hampton had difficulties reading, had learning disabilities, was in resource 

classes, and suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Mr. Devonta Hampton

was also in resource class and had been diagnosed with ADHD and bipolar disorder. He 

had been taking lithium from the age of nine or ten until a little before the commission of 

the crimes. A psychological evaluation of Mr. Deshun Hampton revealed that he has a 

borderline IQ of 72 but concluded he was not mentally deficient or mentally ill. Mr. 

Devonta Hampton was diagnosed in prison with depression and psychosis, including 

hallucinations. Ms. Hampton acknowledged that she had received warning letters from 

juvenile court regarding her sons. She acknowledged that Mr. Deshun Hampton and her 

nephew ―broke into a church or something‖ at eight years old. She testified that Mr. 

Tyler had stayed with her off and on, that he was ―a good boy, too,‖ and that she could 

not say whether he was the leader in these crimes. 

Patricia Rambo, Mr. Tyler‘s grandmother, testified on behalf of Mr. Tyler. Ms. 

Rambo stated that Mr. Tyler‘s father had been a member of a gang and had been abusive 

to his mother. Mr. Tyler had witnessed this abuse. Mr. Tyler was nevertheless very

attached to his father, looked up to him, and tried to emulate him. When Mr. Tyler was 

six years old, his mother‘s new boyfriend killed Mr. Tyler‘s father. Mr. Tyler was 

―hysterical if you mentioned his father at that time, even at the age of six.‖ The man who 

had killed his father then moved in with the family, which Ms. Rambo testified was 

particularly traumatic for Mr. Tyler. Mr. Tyler began running away at age eleven. At 

one point, Ms. Rambo learned that Mr. Tyler was living with an adult ―female 

impersonator,‖ who went by the name ―Peaches.‖ Ms. Rambo contacted the sex crimes 

unit and was able to find the origin of some telephone calls to determine that ―Peaches‖

had taken Mr. Tyler out of the state. Ms. Rambo believed ―Peaches‖ was prostituting Mr. 

Tyler, and a police officer had identified certain Craigslist advertisements which police

believed were possibly related to Mr. Tyler and ―Peaches.‖ In order to separate him from 

―Peaches,‖ the family gave up custody of Mr. Tyler to the Department of Children‘s 
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Services (―DCS‖). Mr. Tyler continued to run away from DCS, and Ms. Rambo 

continued to search for him. At one point, he told her he was staying with the Hamptons. 

Ms. Rambo stated that Mr. Tyler had expressed remorse about his crimes to her, and that 

―we recognized they were horrendous also.‖ She acknowledged the existence of a video 

where ―Peaches‖ is abusing a child and Mr. Tyler is laughing and video recording it. 

The Defendants introduced various certificates they had received in prison. Mr. 

Tyler had a Certificate of Baptism, a Certificate of Recognition for class participation and 

willingness to excel, a Certificate of Achievement for class participation and willingness 

to excel, a Certificate of Participation in a 4th of July Education Program, a Certificate of 

Participation in Hope Academy East, and a Certificate of Completion for the ―Moral 

Reconation Therapy‖ program. Mr. Deshun Hampton presented a Certificate of 

Participation in Hope Academy East. 

Mr. Tyler addressed the court eloquently, stating that he would like to apologize to 

the victims ―for the pain and scars created by my actions.‖ He stated that he had been a 

―wild and troubled child‖ who did not realize how his actions affected others. He told the 

court that he had not meant to hurt anyone and that he ―was ashamed of the person 

viewed in those videos.‖

Mr. Tyler and Mr. Deshun Hampton entered guilty pleas to the offenses on 

October 20, 2014, and Mr. Devonta Hampton entered guilty pleas on November 6, 2014. 

The trial court took the proof at the sentencing hearing under consideration and 

announced the sentences on February 9 and 10, 2015. The trial court analyzed each 

conviction for each Defendant, stating on the record which enhancement and mitigating 

factors it would apply to each count of each indictment for each Defendant. For each 

Defendant, the trial court noted that it had considered the relevant statutory 

considerations and purposes and principles of sentencing. 

In sentencing Mr. Tyler, the court noted its concern with the magnitude of the 

crimes and the manner in which they escalated, and it noted that Mr. Tyler was 

consistently the participant who was armed during the offenses, either with a BB gun or a 

.45 caliber weapon. The trial court found that Mr. Tyler was the ―main player in all of 

this.‖ The trial court found that Mr. Tyler was a Range I offender for each crime. It 

applied as mitigating factors to each of Mr. Tyler‘s convictions his youth at the time of 

the offenses and his completion of programs while in prison. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(6), 

(13). The trial court found that Mr. Tyler was a leader in each offense and that he had a 

previous history of criminal behavior in addition to that necessary to establish him as a 

Range I offender. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (2). The trial court also enhanced the 

animal offenses on the basis that they were committed to gratify a desire for pleasure and 

involved a firearm, and found that the Defendants had no hesitation about committing a 
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crime in which the risk to human life was high for the burglary convictions. See T.C.A. § 

40-35-114(7), (10). For the burglary and firearms offense committed against Mr. Tecero 

and Mr. Lorenzo in indictment 13-02895, the trial court also found that there was more 

than one victim. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(3).

In sentencing Mr. Deshun Hampton, the trial court found that, for each conviction,

he had a history of criminal behavior in addition to that necessary to establish the range

based on the offenses at issue. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1). The court found that he was 

also a leader in indictments 13-01807, 13-02894, and 13-02895. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

114(2). For the burglary and firearms offense committed against Mr. Tecero and Mr. 

Lorenzo in indictment 13-02895, the trial court also found that there was more than one 

victim. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(3). The trial court enhanced the animal offenses on the 

basis that they were committed to gratify a desire for pleasure and involved a firearm, and 

it found that Mr. Deshun Hampton had no hesitation about committing a crime in which 

the risk to human life was high relative to the burglary convictions. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

114(7), (10). The trial court applied as mitigating factors Mr. Deshun Hampton‘s youth 

and his completion of programs in prison. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(6), (13). 

The trial court found that Mr. Devonta Hampton had a history of criminal behavior 

in addition to that necessary to establish the range for each conviction. See T.C.A. § 40-

35-114(1). The trial court did not find Mr. Devonta Hampton to be a leader in any of the 

offenses, but it did apply the enhancement factor that Mr. Devonta Hampton had no 

hesitation in committing a crime in which the risk to human life was high for the burglary 

offenses. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (10). It found that the burglary offense committed 

against Mr. Tecero and Mr. Lorenzo in indictment 13-02895 involved more than one 

victim. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(3). It found that Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s youth and his 

attempt to complete prison programs were mitigating factors. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(6), 

(13).

The trial court imposed sentences as summarized in the following table.

Matthew Tyler Deshun Hampton Devonta Hampton

13-01803

Aggravated robbery

10 years at 85%

(concurrent with all)

8 years at 85%

(concurrent with all)

8 years at 85%

(concurrent with all)

13-01804

Aggravated robbery

10 years at 85% 

(concurrent with all)

-- --

13-01807 – Count 1

Attempted murder 

15 years 15 years --
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13-01807 – Count 3

Employing a firearm

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 1)

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 1)

--

13-02893 – Count 1

Animal cruelty

2 years 2 years --

13-02893 – Count 2

Killing an animal

2 years

(concurrent with 

Count 1)

2 years

(concurrent with 

Count 1)

--

13-02894 – Count 1

Aggravated robbery

10 years at 85% 10 years at 85% 8 years at 85%

13-02894 – Count 2

Aggravated burglary

10 years 10 years 10 years

13-02894 – Count 3

Employing a firearm

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 2)

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 2)

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 2)

13-02895 – Count 1

Aggravated robbery

10 years at 85% 10 years at 85% 8 years at 85%

13-02895 – Count 2

Aggravated robbery

10 years at 85% 10 years at 85% 8 years at 85%

13-02895 – Count 3

Aggravated burglary

10 years 10 years 10 years

13-02895 – Count 4

Employing a firearm

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 2)

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 2)

6 years at 100%

(consecutive to 

Count 2)

The trial court found each of the three Defendants to be a dangerous offender 

whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and who had no hesitation 

about committing a crime where the risk to human life was high. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

115(b)(4). Accordingly, the trial court aligned the sentences to be partially consecutive

for all of the Defendants. The weapons offenses were ordered to be served consecutively 

to the burglary offenses in indictments 13-02894 and 13-02895, as required by law. See 

T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). The weapons offense in indictment 13-01807 was to be 

served consecutively to the attempted murder conviction by law, and the trial court 

merged the conviction for aggravated assault in this indictment into the attempted murder 

conviction. See id. Otherwise, for each Defendant, the offenses within each indictment 

were ordered to be served concurrently. 
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The trial court ordered Mr. Tyler‘s convictions in indictments 13-01803 and 13-

01804 to run concurrently with the other convictions. Otherwise, each indictment under 

which Mr. Tyler was convicted was to run consecutively. The trial court also ordered 

these indictments to be served consecutively to another conviction for armed robbery in 

indictment 13-01802. The trial court calculated the aggregate sentence to be sixty-six 

years, apparently including the sentence for indictment 13-01802, which Mr. Tyler‘s 

presentence report showed to be eleven years. 

Mr. Deshun Hampton‘s convictions were likewise concurrent within each 

indictment except for the weapons offenses, which ran consecutively as required by 

statute. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). The trial court ordered Mr. Deshun Hampton‘s 

conviction in indictment 13-01803 to run concurrently with all of the other indictments

but ordered the other indictments to be served consecutively to one another. Mr. Deshun 

Hampton‘s aggregate sentence is fifty-five years. 

Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s convictions were also to be served concurrently within 

each indictment except as required by law for the weapons offenses. See T.C.A. § 39-17-

1324(e)(1). Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s conviction in indictment 13-01803 was also to run 

concurrently with all other indictments. The other two indictments were ordered to be 

served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of thirty-two years. 

On appeal, Mr. Tyler challenges the aggregate length of his sentence, asserting 

that it violates the United States Constitution because it amounts to a life sentence for a 

juvenile for a nonhomicide offense. Mr. Tyler also asserts that the trial court did not 

properly apply mitigating factors, particularly his youth and his voluntary confession 

regarding numerous crimes, and that it misapplied one enhancement factor, the finding 

that Mr. Tyler was a leader in many of the offenses. Mr. Tyler asserts that the trial court 

could not rely on the crimes at issue in finding that he had a record of extensive criminal 

activity to justify consecutive sentencing. 

Mr. Deshun Hampton likewise challenges the aggregate length of his sentence as 

violating federal constitutional principles. He also asserts that the trial court misapplied 

one of the enhancement factors in the animal offenses. 

Mr. Devonta Hampton challenges the trial court‘s decision to align his convictions 

in indictments 13-02894 and 13-02895 consecutively. He asserts that the aggregate 

sentence is not reasonably related to his ―social circumstances or the facts of the crimes.‖ 

ANALYSIS
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Initially, the State argues that because the record does not contain the plea hearing 

transcripts for Mr. Deshun and Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s plea hearings, their sentencing 

claims are waived. However, the State does not explain how the absence of these records 

affects our review of sentencing in this case, where the factual bases of all of the offenses 

were detailed during the sentencing hearing. The record contains the transcripts of the 

sentencing hearing and the trial court‘s findings of fact regarding each Defendant. We 

conclude that the record is adequate for our review. 

I. Eighth Amendment

Mr. Deshun Hampton and Mr. Tyler assert that their aggregate sentences violate 

the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because they amount to a life 

sentence with no possibility of release for their nonhomicide offenses. Mr. Deshun 

Hampton notes that his sentence is fifty-five years, ―much of which will be served at 

eighty-five to one hundred percent,‖ and he asserts it is ―essentially a life sentence.‖ 

Mr. Tyler likewise notes that he was sentenced to serve sixty-six years for non-homicide 

offenses.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. 

amend. VIII. Courts must consider, under this prohibition, the proportionality of the 

crime to the punishment. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) as modified by 

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 1 (2008). In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 

the United States Supreme Court ruled that punishing juveniles with death violates the 

Eighth Amendment. Id. at 575.

The Defendants premise their Eighth Amendment argument primarily on the 

United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). In 

Graham, the Court considered a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence: more 

specifically, whether a punishment of life without the possibility of parole was cruel and 

unusual punishment for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense. Id. at 61, 63. In 

determining that such a punishment was not constitutionally permissible, Graham noted 

that ― ̳juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 

offenders.‘‖ Id. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). This is because juveniles have a 

lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and are more vulnerable to 

outside pressures and influences. Id. at 68. Juveniles are more capable of change and 

have brains which have not yet matured in the areas involved in behavior control. Id. 

Graham observed that even expert psychologists have difficulty differentiating between a 

juvenile who commits a crime as a result of ― ̳transient immaturity‘‖ and one whose 

criminal behavior is the result of ― ̳irreparable corruption.‘‖ Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. 

at 573). 
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In reaching its decision, Graham distinguished between homicide and 

nonhomicide offenses, noting that ―defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee 

that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 

punishment than are murderers.‖ Id. at 69. Accordingly, juveniles ―who did not kill or 

intend to kill [have] a twice diminished moral culpability‖ due to their status as juveniles 

and the nature of their crimes. Id. The Court also compared life without parole to the 

death sentence, noting that while death is unique in its severity and irrevocability, the two 

share some characteristics, including a forfeiture that is irrevocable and equates to a 

―denial of hope.‖ Id. at 69-70 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (1989)). 

The Court was further persuaded by the fact that juvenile offenders would suffer a 

harsher punishment and longer term under such a sentence than adult offenders would

due to the fact that they were imprisoned earlier in life. Id. at 70. Graham noted that 

while the State ―is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender 

convicted of a nonhomicide crime,‖ it must give the defendant ―some meaningful 

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.‖ Id. at 

75. The Court concluded that a categorical ban on life without parole sentences for 

juvenile nonhomicide offenders was appropriate because ―a categorical rule gives all 

juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.‖ Id. at 79. 

Continuing its line of cases which distinguish between punishments permissible 

under the Eighth Amendment for adults and those which are permissible for juveniles, the 

United States Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), held that a 

mandatory sentence of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders also violates 

the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2460. The Court reiterated that ―children are 

constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,‖ being less deserving of 

the harshest punishments. Id. at 2464. The Court stated that a child‘s ―transient rashness, 

proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences‖ bore upon the child‘s moral 

culpability for a crime and also on the child‘s potential for rehabilitation. Id. at 2465. 

The Court noted that such a mandatory punishment ―ignores that [the accused] might 

have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated 

with youth — for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors 

(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.‖ Id. at

2468. The Court concluded that, while it did not foreclose the punishment of life without 

parole for juvenile homicide offenders, it did mandate ―a certain process — considering 

an offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics — before imposing a particular 

penalty.‖ Id. at 2471. Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, concurring, noted that one of the 

defendants, who was not the shooter of the victim in his offense, could only be sentenced 

to life without parole if there was a determination that he killed or intended to kill the 

victim because ―the kinds of homicide that can subject a juvenile offender to life without 

parole must exclude instances where the juvenile himself neither kills nor intends to kill 

the victim.‖ Id. at 2475-76.
-13-

Although the State assumes that the Defendants‘ plea to attempted first degree 

murder amounts to a conviction for a homicide crime which removes the case from the 

ambit of Graham, the State cites no authority for this position, and we note that other 

courts have concluded that attempted murder is not a homicide crime under Graham. See

Bramlett v. Hobbs, 463 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ark. 2015) (holding that attempted capital 

murder is not a homicide offense under Graham); People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293 

(Cal. 2012) superseded by statute as stated in People v. Michael X. Bell, No. B263022, 

2016 WL 5462094, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016); People v. Guy V. Lucero, No. 

11CA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *1 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2013) perm. app. granted 

(Colo. Dec. 22, 2014); Gridine v. State, 175 So. 3d 672, 674 (Fla. 2015), reh’g denied

(Sept. 24, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1387 (2016) (―[A]ttempted first-degree murder 

is deemed a nonhomicide offense under Florida law‖); Akins v. State, 104 So. 3d 1173, 

1173-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); but see People v. Gipson, 34 N.E.3d 560, 576 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2015), reh’g denied (June 22, 2015) (―In the context of the eighth amendment, 

we seriously question whether attempted murder constitutes a nonhomicide offense.‖). In 

making a distinction between homicide and nonhomicide crimes, Graham relied on the 

fact that homicide is irrevocable for the victim, whereas for victims of other serious 

crimes, ―life ... is not over and normally is not beyond repair.‖ Graham, 560 U.S. at 69

(citation omitted). We conclude that the attempted murder here is best analyzed as a 

nonhomicide offense under Graham. 

In this case, the Defendants were not sentenced to life without parole but were 

instead given separate sentences which were aligned in a partially consecutive manner 

resulting in an extended term of imprisonment. Graham did not address the question of 

whether an aggregate term-of-years sentence for a series of crimes would violate the 

Eighth Amendment, and there is a split of authority on the question. The Sixth Circuit 

denied habeas corpus relief to a juvenile who was sentenced to consecutive, fixed terms 

exceeding his life expectancy for several non-homicide crimes. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 

546, 547 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Bunch v. Bobby, 133 S.Ct. 1996 (2013). 

In denying relief, the federal court found that the aggregate sentence was not contrary to 

clearly established federal law. Id. at 551. Bunch further noted that Graham did not 

analyze consecutive sentences which might amount to a sentence of life without parole, 

and it cited to the difficulties of determining what term of years would amount to a life 

sentence without the possibility of parole, allowing for variations in the offender‘s life 

expectancy. Id. at 552. The Ninth Circuit, however, came to a different conclusion in 

Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013), concluding that the defendant‘s aggregate 

sentence for various violent felonies violated the Eighth Amendment because the 

defendant would never have a meaningful opportunity for release. Id. at 1194; but see

Moore v. Biter, 742 F.3d 917, 920-21 (9th Cir. 2014) (O‘Scannlain, J., dissenting from 

denial of rehearing en banc) (citing cases for the proposition that finding no Eighth 

Amendment violation was not contrary to clearly established federal law). 
-14-

Some courts have held that Graham does not apply to aggregate sentences which 

amount to a sentence of life without parole when aligned consecutively. See Brian A.

Starks v. Joe Easterling, No. 14-6230, 2016 WL 4437588, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016)

(concluding that Tennessee‘s refusal to apply Graham to consecutive, fixed-term 

sentences is not contrary to clearly established federal law); State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 

415-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012)

decision quashed by Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 

Ct. 1455 (Mar. 21, 2016); State v. Brown, 118 So.3d 332, 341-42 (La. 2013); Vasquez v. 

Com., 781 S.E.2d 920, 928 (Va. 2016) (―Graham does not apply to aggregate term-ofyears sentences involving multiple crimes, and we should not declare that it does.‖); see 

also United States v. Walton, 537 Fed. App‘x 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2013); People v. Minniti, 

No. 2-12-0913, 2015 WL 1828181, at *4-5 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 21, 2015), perm. app. 

denied. 

Some courts have come to the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Caballero, 282 P.3d 

at 294-95; People v. Rainer, No. 10CA2414, 2013 WL 1490107, at *12 (Colo. Ct. App. 

Apr. 11, 2013) perm. app. granted (Colo. Dec. 22, 2014); Henry, 175 So. 3d at 680; State 

v. Boston, 363 P.3d 453, 457-58 (Nev. 2015), as modified (Jan. 6, 2016) (concluding that 

Graham applies to juvenile offenders with aggregate sentences that are the functional 

equivalent of a sentence of life without parole); see also People v. Reyes, No. 119271, 

2016 WL 5239589, at *2 (Ill. Sept. 22, 2016) (concluding that a mandatory sentence for a 

homicide and two attempted murders which would require service of eighty-nine years 

violated Miller); Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 7-8 (Ind. 2014); State v. Ronquillo, 361 

P.3d 779, 784-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that the aggregate nature of the 

defendant‘s 51.3-year sentence for four separate crimes including homicide does not 

protect it from a Miller challenge); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 73 (Iowa 2013); Bear 

Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 141-42 (Wyo. 2014). 

Tennessee has addressed the question of whether a lengthy aggregate sentence for 

numerous nonhomicide crimes violates the Eighth Amendment. In State v. Tavaria 

Merritt, the juvenile defendant pled guilty to nine counts of rape of a child and was 

sentenced to nine consecutive terms of twenty-five years. State v. Tavaria Merritt, No. 

M2012-00829-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6505145, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2013). 

This court, while acknowledging that the sentence was the equivalent of life 

imprisonment with no possibility of release, nevertheless concluded that Graham’s

holding applied narrowly to juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses, and implicitly held that aggregate 

sentences did not fall into this category. Id. at *6. This court nevertheless found the 

sentence disproportionate and remanded for entry of a sentence of fifty years. Id.; see 

also Charles Everett Lowe-Kelley v. State, No. M2015-00138-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 

742180, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2016), perm. app. denied (June 23, 2016)
-15-

(concluding that two consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole did not 

violate Miller).

Neither the Defendants nor the State has provided any calculations regarding the 

Defendants‘ release eligibility, beyond the Defendants‘ assertion that the sentences 

amount to life imprisonment without the opportunity for parole. We note initially that 

while Mr. Tyler challenges the aggregate sentence of sixty-six years, the record does not 

contain the judgment form for indictment 13-01802, a conviction for aggravated robbery 

which apparently took place pursuant to a separate trial and sentencing hearing4and 

which accounts for eleven years of the term-of-years sentence. We have only a note in 

Mr. Tyler‘s presentence report that he was sentenced to eleven years for this offense and 

the trial court‘s oral calculation from the bench of the aggregate sentence to be sixty-six 

years. This indictment is not part of the appeal before us and the sentence is not under 

review. Nevertheless, even if we accept Mr. Tyler‘s contention that this conviction, 

combined with the sentences on appeal here, resulted in a term of sixty-six years, we 

conclude that the sentences are not so lengthy as to run afoul the Eighth Amendment. 

While Mr. Deshun Hampton notes that much of his aggregate sentence is required 

to be served at eighty-five or one hundred percent, he neglects to mention that the 

sentences which have these minimum release eligibility requirements run concurrently 

within the indictments. Thus, for each burglary-related offense, Mr. Hampton and Mr. 

Tyler will be serving one six-year sentence at one hundred percent consecutively to a tenyear sentence at thirty percent. The Defendants will have to serve a minimum of nine 

years on these sentences before they are eligible for parole, and these sentences are 

concurrent, within each indictment, with the aggravated robberies requiring the service of 

eighty-five percent of a ten-year sentence, or 8.5 years. By our calculations, Mr. Deshun 

Hampton will be eligible for parole after serving 29.1 years, and, accepting the premise 

that Mr. Tyler‘s aggregate sentence is for the convictions at issue here plus an elevenyear aggravated robbery sentence, Mr. Tyler will be eligible for parole after serving 38.45

years. 

These sentences are shorter than sentences that have been held not to amount to a 

sentence of life without parole under the Eighth Amendment. In State v. Kayln Marie 

Polochak, the defendant argued that her life sentence was unconstitutional because it was 

a mandatory sentence requiring fifty-one years of service and therefore constituted an 

effective mandatory sentence of life without parole for a homicide offense under Miller. 

State v. Kayln Marie Polochak, No. M2013-02712-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 226566, at 

 

4 The prosecutor at the sentencing hearing referred to a trial for this charge, but he also referred to 

a plea for the same indictment. Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s counsel stated in his brief that Mr. Devonta 

Hampton entered a guilty plea for this indictment. 
-16-

*33-34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). This 

court rejected the claim that the sentence would violate Graham or Miller, noting that the 

defendant, while receiving a mandatory life sentence, would be eligible for parole after 

serving fifty-one years. Id. at *34; see Billy L. Grooms v. State, No. E2014-01228-CCAR3-HC, 2015 WL 1396474, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2015), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. July 21, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1216 (2016) (concluding that imposition of

mandatory life sentences with the possibility of parole to be served concurrently does not 

violate Miller); Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., v. State, No. W2013-00901-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 

1377579, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 18, 

2014) (dismissing on procedural grounds but noting that the petitioner‘s sentence of life 

with the possibility of parole was not the functional equivalent of life without parole);

Tavaria Merritt, 2013 WL 6505145, at *6 (upholding sentence requiring fifty years of 

service for a nonhomicide crime); see also Springer v. Dooley, No. 3: 15-CV-03008-

RAL, 2015 WL 6550876, at *3 (D.S.D. Oct. 28, 2015) (concluding that defendant who 

would be eligible for parole at the age of forty-nine had meaningful opportunity for 

release and citing cases); Guy V. Lucero, 2013 WL 1459477, at *3 (holding that 

defendant who would be eligible for release at age fifty-seven did not have a sentence of 

life without parole); Andrew R. Ellmaker v. State, 329 P.3d 1253, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App.

2014) (holding that fifty-year sentence was not the functional equivalent of life without 

parole); but see Brian A. Starks, 2016 WL 4437588, at *4-6 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016)

(White, J., concurring) (concluding that release eligibility after fifty-one years of 

imprisonment does not provide a meaningful opportunity for release under Miller and 

Graham but that Tennessee courts‘ contrary holding was not contrary to or unreasonable 

application of federal law); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (concluding that a 52.5-year sentence 

was sufficient to trigger Miller because the ―prospect of a geriatric release‖ was not a 

meaningful opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation and rejecting the notion that ―the 

determination of whether the principles of Miller or Graham apply in a given case should 

turn on the niceties of epidemiology, genetic analysis, or actuarial sciences in 

determining precise mortality dates‖).

Both Mr. Tyler and Mr. Deshun Hampton received credit on their sentences for 

the time they had spent in jail prior to entry of the judgment, from March 20, 2013 to 

February 18, 2015. Both Defendants were sixteen years old when they were charged 

with the offenses and imprisoned. Mr. Deshun Hampton will, by our calculations, be 

forty-five years old when he is first eligible for parole. Mr. Tyler will be fifty-five. 

Under Kayln Marie Polochak, we conclude that, while these sentences are indeed 

lengthy, they are not the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole. 

Accordingly, Graham does not entitle the Defendants to relief even if we were to 

construe it to apply to aggregate sentences.
-17-

Mr. Deshun Hampton also argues that his consecutive sentences are in any event 

disproportionate to the crime, given his social circumstances. Mr. Deshun Hampton was 

convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, three 

counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, attempted 

murder, animal cruelty, and intentionally killing an animal. He cites no authority for the 

proposition that his sentence of fifty-five years is grossly disproportionate to these 

crimes. When a non-capital defendant makes a proportionality challenge, this court must 

first determine, as a threshold inquiry, whether a comparison of the sentence with the 

crime leads to ―an inference of gross disproportionality.‖ State v. Harris, 844 S.W.2d 

601, 603 (Tenn. 1992). We conclude that in this case, it does not. 

II. Enhancement and Mitigation

Mr. Tyler and Mr. Deshun Hampton challenge the trial court‘s decisions regarding 

the length of their sentences based on the application of certain enhancement and 

mitigating factors. A trial court‘s sentencing decisions are generally reviewed for abuse 

of discretion, with a presumption of reasonableness granted to within-range sentences 

that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. 

Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when it 

applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a 

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an 

injustice to the party complaining. State v. Herron, 461 S.W.3d 890, 904 (Tenn. 2015). 

The court will uphold the sentence ―so long as it is within the appropriate range and the 

record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and 

principles listed by statute.‖ Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10. Even if the trial court 

―recognizes and enunciates several applicable mitigating factors, it does not abuse its 

discretion if it does not reduce the sentence from the maximum on the basis of those 

factors.‖ State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn. 2008). The trial court is ―to be 

guided by — but not bound by — any applicable enhancement or mitigating factors when 

adjusting the length of a sentence.‖ Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. Further, ―a trial court‘s 

misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence 

imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.‖ 

Id. A sentence imposed by the trial court that is within the appropriate range should be 

upheld ―[s]o long as there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of 

sentencing as provided by statute.‖ Id. The appealing party bears the burden of proving 

that the sentence was improper. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). 

In determining the sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) any evidence 

received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the 

principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and 

characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by 
-18-

the parties on the applicable mitigating and enhancement factors; (6) any statistical 

information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices 

for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement the defendant wishes to make in 

the defendant‘s own behalf about sentencing. T.C.A. § 40-35-210(b) (2010). ―The 

sentence imposed should be the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes 

for which the sentence is imposed,‖ and ―[t]he potential or lack of potential for the 

rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant should be considered in determining the 

sentence alternative or length of a term to be imposed.‖ T.C.A. § 40-35-103(4), (5). 

Here, the trial court specifically noted for each Defendant that it was considering 

the principles and purposes of sentencing and the factors listed above. The trial court 

noted that ―that the nature of these offenses, the magnitude of these offenses, the manner 

in which these offenses escalated over a period of time‖ reaching ―a crescendo‖ of 

violence was an important consideration in imposing the sentences. 

Mr. Tyler asserts that the trial court gave short shrift to the mitigating 

circumstance of his youth and to the fact that his confessions helped the police to solve 

numerous unsolved crimes. He also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he 

was the leader of the offenses. His brief could also be read to assert that the trial court 

misapplied the enhancement factor that he had a history of criminal behavior in addition 

to that necessary to establish the range. We note that Mr. Tyler did not argue to the trial 

court that the mitigating factor that he ―assisted the authorities in uncovering offenses 

committed by other persons or in detecting or apprehending other persons who had 

committed the offenses‖ applied to his crimes. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(9); Tenn. R. 

App. P. 36(a). Regarding the weight assigned by the trial court to Mr. Tyler‘s youth, we 

note that under Bise, ―mere disagreement with the trial court‘s weighing of the properly 

assigned enhancement and mitigating factors is no longer a ground for appeal.‖ Bise, 380 

S.W.3d at 706. The trial court meticulously noted for each conviction that it found Mr. 

Tyler‘s youth to be a mitigating factor, and we can discern no error. 

In finding that Mr. Tyler‘s sentences should be enhanced based upon the fact that 

he was a leader in the commission of offenses involving two or more criminal actors, the 

trial court noted that the Defendants‘ statements agreed that Mr. Tyler was the party who 

was generally armed, and the court found he was the ―main player in all of this.‖ See 

T.C.A. § 40-35-114(2). Mr. Tyler‘s brief asserts that it is impossible to tell from Ms. 

Bichon‘s testimony which Defendant was armed, points out that Mr. Deshun Hampton 

fired the majority of the shots in the attempted murder of Mr. Giggers, and highlights Mr. 

Tyler‘s lack of a juvenile record. However, Mr. Tyler‘s own statements asserted that he 

was the armed assailant in the offenses against Ms. Bichon, and Mr. Tyler can be heard 

encouraging Mr. Deshun Hampton to fire in the video recording of the attempted murder 

of Mr. Giggers. The other two Defendants did not participate in all of the crimes at issue 
-19-

as Mr. Tyler did. A trial court need not find that a defendant is the only leader in an 

offense to apply this factor. State v. Madden, 99 S.W.3d 127, 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

2002) (noting that both of two criminal actors may be a ―leader‖ as the statute does not 

require the offender to be the sole leader). The trial court found that, in several of the 

offenses, Mr. Deshun Hampton and Mr. Tyler were both leaders because there was 

evidence that they were the armed parties and that there were other participants. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in applying this factor. 

Mr. Tyler asserts that the trial court could not rely on the instant convictions to 

establish that he had a ―previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in 

addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range.‖ T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1). 

However, ―the offenses under review here may also qualify as  ̳prior criminal history.‘‖

State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that 

enhancement factor was properly applied to a defendant who had single misdemeanor 

conviction prior to being convicted of forty-six offenses), overruled on other grounds by

State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886, 899-900 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Cummings, 868 S.W.2d 

661, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (―Although he has no prior criminal convictions on his 

record, his criminal behavior because of the multiplicity of counts is a factor.‖). The trial 

court correctly applied the enhancement factors. In any event, the trial court imposed 

sentences in the correct range which reflected a proper consideration of the purposes and 

principles of sentencing. The trial court found that the offenses were aggravated in that 

the Defendants were ―accosting people in this neighborhood‖ ―for no particular reason,‖

and the trial court expressed concern regarding the escalation in the crimes, which 

eventually reached ―a crescendo of more and more violence.‖ The mere misapplication 

of an enhancement factor would not invalidate the sentences unless the sentences 

departed wholly from the Sentencing Act. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706 (upholding sentences 

when trial court incorrectly applied the single enhancement factor because other reasons 

consistent with the purposes of sentencing supported the sentences). The trial court in 

this case took particular care to distinguish between each individual conviction for each 

individual Defendant in a complex sentencing hearing. The length of Mr. Tyler‘s 

sentences are affirmed. 

Mr. Deshun Hampton argues that the trial court incorrectly enhanced the offenses 

related to the shooting of the dog from one year to two years because it found that the 

crimes were committed to gratify the Defendants‘ ―desire for pleasure or excitement,‖ a 

factor which he asserts is already an element of the crime of animal cruelty. See T.C.A. § 

40-35-114(7). It is an offense to intentionally kill a companion animal ―with aggravated 

cruelty and with no justifiable purpose,‖ and the statute defines aggravated cruelty as 

―conduct which is done or carried out in a depraved and sadistic manner and which 

tortures or maims an animal, including the failure to provide food and water to a 

companion animal resulting in a substantial risk of death or death.‖ T.C.A. § 39-14-
-20-

212(a), (b)(1). Mr. Deshun Hampton cites to an opinion from the Attorney General 

which concludes that, applying the dictionary definition of ―depraved and sadistic,‖ ―[i]n 

order to violate the statute with respect to aggravated cruelty, a person must intentionally 

torture or maim an animal by engaging in conduct in a morally corrupt or perverted 

manner or by deriving pleasure or sexual gratification from inflicting pain or cruelty on 

an animal.‖ Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 08-124 (July 16, 2008). 

Initially, the State correctly notes that this argument was never raised in front of 

the trial court. It is accordingly waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (―Nothing in this 

rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or 

who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the 

harmful effect of an error.‖). In any event, Mr. Deshun Hampton is not entitled to 

resentencing on his two-year sentence in this conviction, which runs concurrently with 

the conviction for intentional killing of an animal, see T.C.A. § 39-14-205(a)(1)(A). 

Even if we were to conclude that the trial court misapplied this enhancement factor, the 

trial court imposed a sentence in the correct range after properly considering the purposes 

and principles of sentencing. T.C.A. § 39-14-212(d) (classifying the crime as a Class E 

felony); T.C.A. § 40-35-112(a)(5) (stating that a Range I sentence for a Class E felony is 

not less than one nor more than two years). The trial court correctly applied other 

enhancement factors to this particular crime, including Mr. Deshun Hampton‘s previous 

history of criminal behavior in addition to that necessary to establish the range and the 

use of a firearm. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (9). Because ―a trial court‘s misapplication 

of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless 

the trial court wholly departed‖ from the Sentencing Act, and because the sentence in this 

case was supported by ―other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of 

sentencing as provided by statute,‖ we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing a two-year sentence, rather than the minimum sentence of one 

year, for this crime. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s 

decisions regarding the length of Mr. Deshun Hampton‘s sentences.

III. Consecutive Sentencing

As noted above, a trial court‘s sentencing decisions are generally reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707. Likewise, the ―standard of appellate 

review for consecutive sentencing is abuse of discretion accompanied by a presumption 

of reasonableness.‖ State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tenn. 2013). The 

presumption of reasonableness applies only when the trial court has provided reasons on 

the record establishing at least one of the seven statutory bases for imposing consecutive 

sentences delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). Id. at 861. The 

trial court may properly impose a consecutive sentence upon the finding of just one of the 

criteria listed above. State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 748 (Tenn. 2013). Tennessee 
-21-

Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) allows a court to impose consecutive sentences 

when ―[t]he defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive‖ or 

when ―[t]he defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no 

regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to 

human life is high.‖ T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2), (4). Because the criterion that the 

defendant is a dangerous offender is ―the most subjective and hardest to apply,‖ this 

category requires additional findings in order to support consecutive sentencing. State v. 

Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999). When the trial court bases its decision to run 

sentences consecutively on the dangerous offender category in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4), it must make additional findings as set out in State v. 

Wilkerson: that the aggregate sentence is ―reasonably related to the severity of the 

offenses‖ and ―necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal acts by the 

offender.‖ Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 

(Tenn. 1995)) (emphasis provided in Pollard). If the trial court fails to make the requisite 

findings, the appellate court may either conduct a de novo review to determine whether 

there is an adequate basis for the imposition of consecutive sentences or remand to the 

trial court so that it may consider the appropriate factors and make the proper findings. 

Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 864.

Mr. Devonta Hampton asserts that the trial court erred in ordering some of his 

sentences to be served consecutively because the aggregate sentence was not reasonably 

related to the crimes. Mr. Tyler challenges consecutive sentencing on the basis that the 

trial court could not rely on the offenses to which he was simultaneously pleading guilty 

to establish that he had a record of criminal activity that was extensive. Mr. Tyler also 

asserts that the trial court failed to make the requisite finding that the aggregate sentence 

was reasonably related to the offenses.

In imposing partially consecutive sentences on Mr. Devonta Hampton, the trial 

court found that he did not have an extensive record of criminal activity. Instead, it relied 

solely on the dangerous offender category. The trial court found that he was ―a 

dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life‖ and that 

he had ―no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high.‖ 

The court noted that the burglary crimes which were run consecutively were 

―aggravated‖ in that the Defendants were looking in windows searching for victims, were 

armed, intimidated the inhabitants, and demonstrated a ―depraved‖ attitude. The court 

found that confinement for an extended period would be necessary to protect society 

from Mr. Devonta Hampton‘s unwillingness to lead a productive life and his resort to 

criminal activity. It found that the aggregate length of the sentence was reasonably 

related to the offenses. The Defendants committed numerous violent crimes over the 

course of several months. While Mr. Devonta Hampton disagrees with the trial court‘s 

conclusion regarding the aggregate length of the sentence, he has not shown that the trial 
-22-

court applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical conclusion, or based its 

decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. See Herron, 461 S.W.3d at

904. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s decision to impose partially consecutive 

sentences.

The trial court considered the prosecution‘s argument that Mr. Tyler‘s sentences 

could be imposed consecutively due to an extensive record of criminal activity. See 

T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2). The courts ruling from the bench was ambiguous: 

I do find that this series of events very well could qualify and needs to be 

reviewed. I feel that under the law it could be applicable but I‘m not sure

that that‘s the way this particular sentence is to be considered and imposed. 

If I‘m incorrect, I‘m sure they can tell me.

However, the trial court‘s completion of the ―Sentencing Findings of Fact‖ form clarifies 

that the trial court did not apply this factor.5 Instead, it relied on the finding that Mr. 

Tyler was a dangerous offender. See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(4). The trial court may 

properly impose a consecutive sentence upon the finding of only one of the criteria listed 

in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). Dickson, 413 S.W.3d at 748. In 

finding that Mr. Tyler was a dangerous offender, the court noted that his behavior 

indicated little or no regard for human life and that he had no hesitation about committing 

a crime in which the risk to human life was high. The trial court found that the crimes 

were committed under aggravated circumstances. The trial court noted that the crimes 

escalated, and that Mr. Tyler was with a large group of youths walking through the 

apartment complex, ―looking for people to rob,‖ that he was armed, and that the 

offenders were forcing their way into residences which they knew were occupied in order 

to accost the residents. The trial court noted that Mr. Tyler shot at Mr. Giggers with a .45 

caliber weapon ―just because the man had done his job,‖ and it found that the shooting of 

the dog was committed out of ―sheer ... excitement.‖ The trial court found that 

 

5 We note nevertheless that in finding a defendant to be an offender whose record of criminal 

activity is extensive, the trial court is not limited to prior convictions. In State v. Cummings, the 

defendant had no criminal history at all prior to pleading guilty to eight counts of fraudulently obtaining a 

controlled substance, crimes which took place over a period of months. State v. Cummings, 868 S.W.2d 

661, 662, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). This court upheld consecutive sentencing based on a finding of 

extensive criminal activity. Id. at 667; see also In re Sneed, 302 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tenn. 2010) 

(upholding consecutive service of contempt convictions based on extensive criminal record due to the 

―flagrant nature‖ and ―sheer number‖ of fifty separate acts of criminal contempt which were 

simultaneously adjudicated and also concluding consecutive sentencing was justified because the 

sentences were for criminal contempt). The trial court accordingly could properly have considered Mr. 

Tyler‘s thirteen separate convictions for various violent felonies in finding that his record of criminal 

activity was extensive. 
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confinement for an extended period of time was necessary to protect society from Mr. 

Tyler‘s unwillingness to lead a productive life and his resort to criminal activity in 

furtherance of his anti-societal lifestyle. Contrary to Mr. Tyler‘s assertion, the trial court 

then specifically found that the aggregate length of the sentence was reasonably related to 

the offenses, considering the multiplicity of the charges. We conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in finding Mr. Tyler to be a dangerous offender. The trial 

court‘s finding of just one of the factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-

35-115(b) is sufficient to support consecutive sentencing. We cannot conclude that the 

trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical conclusion, or based its 

decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. See Herron, 461 S.W.3d at

904. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. Tyler‘s sentences to be 

run partially consecutively to one another. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court‘s judgments regarding the length of the Defendants‘

sentences and the trial court‘s decision to impose partially consecutive sentences on each 

Defendant. We remand for the correction of the spelling of Mr. Deshun Hampton‘s name 

on those judgment forms which spell his name ―Deshuan.‖ We also note that some of the 

judgment forms reflect other errors. For instance, the judgment form for Mr. Tyler in 

Case 13-01804 notes that the single count is to run concurrently with itself and does not 

indicate whether it should be served concurrently with indictment 13-01803. The 

judgment forms for Mr. Tyler in indictment 13-02895 list indictment 13-02895 as a 

sentence to be served consecutively, and the same is true for the judgment forms for Mr.

Deshun Hampton in indictment 13-02893. The judgment forms for Mr. Devonta 

Hampton in indictment 13-02894 state that the sentence is to be served consecutively to 

the sentence in indictment 13-02985 rather than indictment 13-02895. We remand for 

any corrections necessary on the judgment forms. 

____________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE