APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 1 of 21

NO. 03-16-00353-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTICT OF TEXAS 

at AUSTIN 

STEVE VEIGEL, 

 Appellant/Defendant 

v. 

TEXAS BOLL WEEVIL ERADICATION FOUNDATION,INC. 

 Appellee/Plaintiff 

Appealed from the County Court at Law No. 1 

of Travis County, Texas

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 

APPELLANT 

STEVE VEIGEL, PRO SE 

105 Quince Street 

Hereford, Texas 79045 

(806) 231-1008 

SVeig@aol.com 

ACCEPTED

03-16-00353-CV

13916912

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

11/21/2016 9:56:14 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/21/2016 9:56:14 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 2 of 21

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

COVER PAGE.....................................................................................................1

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................. 5

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................... 7

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S AGRUMENT ISSUE 1 ..................................................... 9

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S ARGUMENT ISSUE 2 ................................................... 14

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S ARGUMENT ISSUE 3 ................................................... 17

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S CONCLUSION ............................................................. 18

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ......................................................... 20

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE............................................................................... 21
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 3 of 21

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes

TEX. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 4, § 3.502................................................................. 13

TEX. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 4, § 3.70................................................................... 13

TEX. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 4, § 3.75 .............................................................. 6, 14

TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.101 ............................................................................ 5

TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.109.......................................................................... 11

TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.115 ...................................................................... 6, 14

TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.127 ............................................................................ 8

TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.129.......................................................................... 11

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.061..................................................... 4, 7

TEX. TAX. CODE § 171.2515............................................................................ 6

TEX. TAX. CODE § 171.252........................................................................ 6, 15

TEX. TAX. CODE § 171.255.............................................................................. 6

Other Authorities

50 Tex. Jur. 3d Limitation of Actions § 20 .................................................. 11

Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation Self Evaluation Report to 

the Texas Sunset Commission................................................................... 8

Constitutional Provisions

TEX. CONST. ART. III, § 52 ............................................................................. 4

TEX. CONST. ART. XVI, § 59 .......................................................................... 4

TEX. CONST. ART. XVI, § 68 .................................................................... 4, 12
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 4 of 21

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

COME NOW, the APPELLANT named herein in the above styled and 

numbered appeal, and present the Court the following APPELLANT’S REPLY 

BRIEF to APPELLEE’S BRIEF filed on October 31, 2016.

SUMMARY OF THE APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

1. In contradiction to the clear intent of the Texas Legislature and the 

Texas Constitution, APPELLEE’S BRIEF essentially request this Court to 

ignore the expressed requirements of Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 16.061

and declare APPELLEE to be a qualifying “political subdivision” exempt from 

any statute of limitations by judicial fiat.

2. APPELLEE’S BRIEF does not deny that APPELLEE’S formation was only 

authorized and continued pursuant to Article XVI, Section 68 of the Texas 

Constitution instead of pursuant to Section 52, Article III, or Section 59, 

Article XVI, Texas Constitution required of qualifying “political 

subdivisions” under Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 16.061.

3. APPELLEE’S BRIEF does not cite any legal authority that the Texas 

Legislature or the Texas Constitution expressly holds or provides that 

APPELLEE is a “political subdivision” as there is none. Instead, both the 

governing Texas Agriculture Code [“TEX. AGRI. CODE”] Chapter 74 and 

Texas Administrative Code Title 4 [“4 TAC”], Chapter 3 have clear 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 5 of 21

provisions that the Legislature provided that the APPELLEE is a single 

statewide quasi-government entity and a government unit in certain respects,

but is not and does not function as separate local political subdivisions in 

each eradication zone exempt from statutes of limitations. Unlike political 

subdivisions, the APPELLEE is expressly “acting under the supervision and 

control of the commissioner” of agriculture and the Texas Department of 

Agriculture and is not governed by a separate locally elected and/or 

appointed board for each eradication zone.

4. Quite simply, APPELLEE’S claims to collect debts are barred by the 

four year limitations statute as the APPELLEE is not exempt for such statutes 

of limitations.

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S STATEMENT OF FACTS 

5. APPELLEE’S BRIEF’S Statement of Facts [Appellee’s Brief p. 1-2] does 

not assert that APPELLEE is a political subdivision or deny that it is instead a 

quasi statewide government entity/unit acting under the supervision and 

control of the Texas Department of Agriculture and the Texas Commission 

of Agriculture pursuant to TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.101(a)(1). [APPELLANT’S 

BRIEF p. 18-22.]
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 6 of 21

6. APPELLEE states that “Veigel Farms, Inc. (“Veigel Farms”) is a Texas 

corporation that farmed cotton for commercial production from 1999 to 

2002... and, therefore, was subject to assessments... The Foundation levied 

assessments against Veigel Farms ... as a result of its cotton farming 

operation...”. [APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 1]. However, it is undisputed that 

APPELLEE only seeks to collect assessments including penalties and interest

for the 1999 and 2001 cotton crops which were undisputedly grown during 

the time from August 27, 1996 until September 26, 2002 wherein Veigel 

Farms, Inc. had lost its corporate privileges to legally transact any business 

in Texas pursuant to Tex. Tax Code § 171.2515. As such, pursuant to Tex. 

Tax Code § 171.255(b) Veigel Farms, Inc. is to be treated as a general 

partnership consisting of Bob and Steve Veigel individually instead of a 

corporation authorized to do business in Texas including growing cotton in 

1999 and 2001. [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 8, 10, and 14] 

7. APPELLEE states “[b]y letters dated March 8, 2000 and May 20, 2003 

the Foundation demanded payment from Veigel Farms ... and advised that 

the Foundation will [sic] take legal action...”. [APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 1.] 

However, such letters did not comply with TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.115 and

TEX. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 4, § 3.75 which requires of right to an administrative 

hearing concerning assessment of a penalty.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 7 of 21

8. APPELLEE states “Appellant made his strategic legal decision to direct 

Veigel Farms not to defend these lawsuits.” [APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 2.]

However, pursuant to Tex. Tax Code § 171.252, Veigel Farms Inc. was 

legally prohibited from defending itself from such lawsuits. [APPELLANT’S 

BRIEF p. 10 and 14.] 

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

9. APPELLEE does not cite any facts or legal authority that APPELLEE is a 

political subdivision much less a qualifying political subdivision exempt 

from some statutes of limitations under Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 

16.061. APPELLEE (and its board) are state agencies only for purposes of 

indemnification and exemption from taxation and APPELLEE is a government 

unit for purposes of immunity. [Appellant’s Brief p. 21-22.] APPELLEE

clearly is not and does not function as a political subdivision in any respect

and does not qualify to be exempt from any statue of limitations otherwise 

applicable in this Case.

10. Given that it is undisputed that APPELLEE seeks to recover the 1999 

assessment which was due almost 11 years prior to filing this suit and the 

2001 assessment which was due almost 6 years prior to filing this suit, 

APPELLEE’S claims are barred by limitations [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 15-16, 

18–24.]
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 8 of 21

11. Unlike political subdivisions with limited geographical jurisdiction,

APPELLEE is a non-profit corporation which serves as the single quasi state 

wide government entity/unit that has statewide jurisdiction in Texas (and 

portions of New Mexico) which unlike most political subdivisions is subject 

to the Texas Sunset Act and has a statutory limited existence. See TEX.

AGRIC. CODE § 74.127. In APPELLEE’S August 2007 Texas Boll Weevil 

Eradication Foundation Self Evaluation Report to the Texas Sunset 

Commission, APPELLEE makes repeated references to its statewide agency 

jurisdiction including APPELLEE’S answer to question A in Section VII 

Guide to Agency Programs on report page 21 stating that its 

location/division was “statewide”. 

12. Unlike political subdivisions APPELLEE is constitutionally prohibited 

from assessing any taxes. [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 23-24.] Unlike political 

subdivisions with local control, APPELLEE is under the expressed control and 

supervision of the Texas Department of Agriculture and the Texas 

Agriculture Commissioner who appoints at least 5 of the 21 members of 

APPELLEE’S board of directors with only 1 member being elected locally 

from each eradication zone. [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 23.]
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 9 of 21

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S AGRUMENT ISSUE 1

13. APPELLEE states “[o]mission from section 16.061 does not mean the 

Foundation does not qualify as a political subdivision.” [APPELLEE’S BRIEF

p. 7.] APPELLEE argues that “[u]nder Texas law, “including” or “includes” 

are words of enlargement and not limitation or exclusive enumeration... .” 

However, in holding that a plain and literal reading of section 16.061

demonstrates that it does not apply to a municipal utility district as a state 

agency, the Texas Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. 

Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939-940 (Tex.1993) stated:

The goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the 

intent of the legislature. ... “Where language in a statute is 

unambiguous, this court must seek the intent of the 

legislature as found in the plain and common meaning of 

the words and terms used.” ... When the legislature has 

failed to define a word or term, courts will apply its 

ordinary meaning. ... When applying the ordinary 

meaning, courts “may not by implication enlarge the 

meaning of any word in the statute beyond its ordinary 

meaning, and implications from any statutory passage or 

word are forbidden when the legislative intent may be 

gathered from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as 

it is written.” ... The language of section 16.061 is clear and 

unambiguous. The statute applies to “[a] right of action of this 

state, a county, an incorporated city or town, or a school 

district....” ... The legislature has not defined “state” as it is 

used in section 16.061. Consequently, we apply its ordinary 

meaning.... 

The ordinary meaning of “state,” as it used by the Texas 

courts, envisions an entity [*940] having statewide 

jurisdiction rather than an entity having local or limited 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 10 of 21

jurisdiction. In Guaranty Petroleum Corp. v. Armstrong, 609 

S.W.2d 529 (Tex.1980), we held that a navigation district 

created pursuant to article XVI, section 59 of the Texas 

Constitution was a political subdivision of the state, and “not a 

‘department, board or agency of the state’....” Id. at 530. In 

reaching that conclusion, we recognized that

[a] political subdivision differs from a department board 

or agency of the State. A political subdivision has 

jurisdiction over a portion of the State; a department, 

board or agency of the State exercises its jurisdiction 

throughout the State. Members of the governing body of a 

political subdivision are elected in local elections or are 

appointed by locally elected officials; those who govern 

departments, boards or agencies of the State are elected 

in statewide elections or are appointed by State officials. 

Political subdivisions have the power to assess and collect 

taxes; departments, boards and agencies do not have that 

power. Our examination of a number of statutes shows 

that the legislature has consistently recognized these 

distinctions between departments, boards or agencies on 

the one hand and political subdivisions on the other. Id.

at 531 (footnote omitted)

This interpretation of “state” comports with the legislature’s 

ordinary use of the word. State government is defined generally 

in terms of the executive, legislative, and/or judicial branches, 

excluding entities with limited jurisdiction.

To read “political subdivision” into “state” would by 

implication enlarge “state,” and section 16.061, beyond 

their plain and ordinary meaning. Such implication is 

forbidden when, as here, the legislative intent may be 

determined from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as 

written. Applying the ordinary meaning of “state” to section 

16.061, we conclude that it was the intent of the legislature to 

include within “state” only those entities having statewide 

jurisdiction. Therefore, we hold that section 16.061 does [*941]

not apply to municipal utility districts such as Cornerstones. 

[emphasis added]
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 11 of 21

14. With knowledge of and subsequent to Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones 

Mun. Util. Dist. and Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. 

Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.1997), section 16.061 was amended in 1997

to expressly include “or a political subdivision of the state, including” “a 

municipal utility district” and “, or an entity created under Section 52, 

Article III, or Section 59, Article XVI, Texas Constitution” and the TEX.

AGRIC. CODE CHAPTER 74 was amended. However, the legislature did not 

and has not made any effort to include APPELLEE in section 16.061 as a 

political subdivision or otherwise expand APPELLEE’S expressly limited 

status as a “state agency” or “government unit” under TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 

74.109 or TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.129.

15. As stated in 50 Tex. Jur. 3d Limitation of Actions § 20, the plain 

section 16.061 does not apply to all political subdivisions just because of the 

word “including”.

In addition to rights of actions brought by the State, a right of 

action of a political subdivision of the State, including a county, 

an incorporated city or town, a navigation district, a municipal 

utility district, a port authority, an entity acting under a 

statutorily specified chapter of the Transportation Code, a 

school district, or an entity created under statutorily specified 

constitutional provisions, is generally not barred by the 

statutory provisions governing limitations of actions. By the 

foregoing statute, the Legislature has exempted counties and 

certain, statutorily specified political subdivisions and 

entities—unlike ordinary litigants—from the limitations 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 12 of 21

defense in appropriate cases. [emphasis added]

16. The intent of the legislature as found in the plain and common 

meaning of the words and terms used. Applying the ordinary meaning, 

courts may not by implication enlarge the meaning of any word in the statute 

beyond its ordinary meaning, and implications from any statutory passage or 

word are forbidden when the legislative intent may be gathered from a 

reasonable interpretation of the statute as it is written. The language of 

section 16.061 is clear and unambiguous that it does not apply to the 

APPELLEE even if the APPELLEE was nevertheless a political subdivision 

created under Section 52, Article III, or Section 59, Article XVI, Texas 

Constitution, which it is not. APPELLEE was created under TEX. CONST. ART. 

XVI, § 68. [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 20.]

17. The APPELLEE is expressly only a quasi government entity and 

governmental unit for specially defined purposes whose jurisdiction is 

statewide and not limited by a geographical region of each eradication zone. 

There is one statewide foundation and one board that governs the entire state 

under the expressed control and supervision of the Texas Department of 

Agriculture and the Texas Agricultural Commission. There is not a 

foundation and locally elected or appointed governing board for each 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 13 of 21

eradication zone required for each foundation to be considered or function as 

a political subdivision.

18. APPELLEE tries to equate itself to the El Paso County Juvenile Board 

held to be a political subdivision because the juvenile board’s ability to 

impose fees not taxes under the Texas Family Code claiming that the 

APPELLEE has the authority to similarly impose assessments as fees. 

[APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 12.] However, unlike a juvenile board or other 

political subdivision, APPELLEE has no statutory authority to “impose” taxes, 

assessments or penalties. APPELLEE can only make recommendations of 

assessment rates to the Texas Agriculture Commission through the Texas 

Department of Agriculture. TEX. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 4, § 3.502 expressly 

provides:

(a) Each year, the foundation shall recommend assessment 

rates, the date a notice of assessment will be sent, and 

assessment due dates for each active eradication zone to the 

department for consideration by the commissioner.

(b) The Commissioner will review these proposals and 

determine the assessment rates and due dates for each zone. 

[emphasis added]

19. TEX. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 4, § 3.70 provides: 

The Code, § 74.113, provides the foundation with the 

authority to collect assessments for each eradication zone as 

part of the foundation’s duties. The Code, § 74.121, provides 

that each person within an active eradication zone growing 

cotton shall furnish to the foundation, upon request, information 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 14 of 21

concerning the size and location of all commercial and 

noncommercial cotton. The Code, § 74.118, provides the 

department with the authority to require participation in an 

established eradication program. The Code, § 74.115, 

provides the department with the authority to place a lien on 

cotton produced and harvested that year from acreage that is 

subject to an assessment that is due and unpaid. The Code, § 

74.115, also provides the department with the authority to 

assess administrative penalties for failure to pay an 

assessment when due, and the Code, § 74.118, provides the 

department with the authority to assess administrative penalties 

for failure to comply with department rules regarding 

participation in cost sharing and acreage reporting. The Code, § 

74.116, provides the department with the authority to establish 

criteria for exemption from penalties assessed under the Code, § 

74.115. [emphasis added]

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S ARGUMENT ISSUE 2

20. APPELLEE, without citing any legal authority, asserts that 

APPELLANT’s laches defense fails solely because of actions by APPELLANT

with knowledge of impending legal and not actions by the APPELLEE. 

[APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 16-17.] However, APPELLEE does not deny that it 

does not have the records or other evidence to explain how or why it or the 

Texas Department of Agriculture did not enforce its statutory lien or 

otherwise actually received timely payment of the assessments from Veigel 

Farms Inc.’s sale of cotton with checks jointly paid to the Texas Department 

of Agriculture. [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 11, and 17.] APPELLEE does not deny 

that relevant evidence and documents in the possession and control of the 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 15 of 21

APPELLEE, Texas Department of Agriculture, the Plains Cotton Cooperative 

Association, Ag Services of America, Inc., and Ag Acceptance Corporation 

have also been lost or destroyed during the approximate 15 year delay in 

APPELLEE prosecuting this Case. [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 11-12, 14, 16-17.] 

21. APPELLEE has apparently also lost any record or evidence to show that 

it complied with TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 74.115 and TEX. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 4, §

3.75 which requires of right to an administrative hearing concerning 

assessment of a penalty.

22. APPELLEE states Appellant “... made his “strategic legal decision” to 

direct Veigel Farms not to defend the lawsuits....” [APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 16.] 

However, pursuant to Tex. Tax Code § 171.252, Veigel Farms Inc. was 

legally prohibited from defending itself from such lawsuits. Furthermore, 

there is no evidence showing or otherwise indicating that APPELLANT had 

any knowledge of any impending legal action against him personally prior to 

the filing of this suit on August 3, 2010 or that APPELLANT was aware that 

Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate privileges had been forfeited until he filed 

documents to reinstate with the Secretary of State in September 2002.

23. APPELLEE has offer no reasonable justification for its almost 15 year 

delay in prosecuting this Case or any evidence that APPELLANT did not 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 16 of 21

change his position to his detriment and is not prejudiced by APPELLEE’S 

unreasonable delay.

24. APPELLEE contends that APPELLANT submitted no authority supporting 

his contention of constructive notice that Veigel Farms Inc. had lost its 

corporate privileges and that APPELLEE did not have actual knowledge of 

such until May 19, 2010. However, there is no evidence that APPELLEE did 

not have actual knowledge of Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate forfeiture long 

before 2010.

25. APPELLANT cited that Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate status was a 

matter of public record that APPELLEE had access which serves as a legal 

basis for such contention. [APPELLANT’S BRIEF p. 10, 12, 16, and 26.] As 

APPELLEE surely knows, “constructive notice” or “constructive knowledge” 

are common legal terms for notice or knowledge implied or imputed by the 

law with regard to facts shown to the world properly recorded as matters of 

public record. 

26. Although APPELLANT has not found a case holding that APPELLEE had 

a legal duty to check Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate status prior to making 

the assessments at issue as there involving in rem actions where there is a 

legal duty to check public deed and probate records, it is not uncommon 

business and legal practice in the context of extending credit or contracting 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 17 of 21

with entities. For example, creditors commonly conduct lien and corporate 

searches of the Secretary of State’s public records before extending credit 

ensuring that the corporate debtor is in good standing and allowed to 

conduct business in Texas. Given that the APPELLEE relies on cotton acres 

planted as reported to the Farm Service Agency, it is not an unreasonable 

burden for the APPELLEE to similarly search the Secretary of State’s online 

records to confirm a cotton grower’s good standing as a proper party prior to 

be given notice of assessments by the APPELLEE. Had APPELLEE taken 

such reasonable legal precautions, it could not and should not have accessed 

Veigel Farms Inc. as a “cotton grower”.

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S ARGUMENT ISSUE 3

27. APPELLEE contends that APPELLANT failed to present and brief 

relevant material facts or argument or authority of his waiver defense. 

[APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 23.] However, there is un-contradicted evidence in 

the record that APPELLEE or the Texas Department of Agriculture were 

instructed by APPELLANT to receive jointly payable checks for the 1999 and 

2001 cotton sales in a sufficient amount to timely satisfy the respective 

assessments due at the time and that such checks must have been endorsed 

by the APPELLEE or the Texas Department of Agriculture as the checks were 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 18 of 21

apparently cashed. Yet, apparently the APPELLEE or the Texas Department 

of Agriculture did nothing to protect their statutory security interest in the 

proceeds or show the assessments timely satisfied. [CR 198-199, 204-206]

28. There is nothing in the record to contradict the likely reasonable 

possibility that the Texas Department of Agriculture or APPELLEE actually 

received and endorsed the assessment payment from such joint checks but

somehow failed to have the APPELLEE give the appropriate credit to satisfy 

the assessments. Such documents and records of this transaction have 

apparently been lost or destroyed by the APPELLEE, the Texas Department of 

Agriculture, Veigel Farms Inc., APPELLANT, or other third parties over the 

15 year delay of Appellee’s prosecution of this Case. Whether it is viewed 

waiver, negligence, release, failure to mitigate, or something else there is a 

least a dispute of material facts in the record concerning the endorsement of 

the jointly payable checks and the actual receipt/application of such funds 

sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 

REPLY TO APPELLEE’S CONCLUSION

29. APPELLEE makes a partial quote apparently from 50 Tex. Jur. 3d 

Limitations of Actions § 20. [APPELLEE’S BRIEF p. 23] The next sentence 

therein indicates there are exceptions which are applicable in this Case 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 19 of 21

stating “Therefore, the State is not bound by any statute of limitations unless 

that statute expressly provides that it applies to the State ...”. In this Case, 

APPELLEE admits that its is not a state agency exempt from some limitations 

but rather tries to argue that it should be exempt from some limitations 

statutes pursuant to section 16.061 merely because it claims that it is a 

political subdivision and that all political subdivisions are exempt under 

section 16.061.

30. There is simply no statute, regulation, or court case that supports 

APPELLEE’S contention that it is a political subdivision in form or function in 

any context including exemption from some limitation statutes pursuant to 

section 16.061. APPELLEE’S jurisdiction is clearly statewide and not limited 

to a local geographical area and is under the control and supervision of the 

Texas Department of Agriculture and its Commissioner instead of a locally 

elected or appointed board in each eradication zone. APPELLEE does not even 

set or impose its own assessment rates and penalties for non-payment. If the 

Legislature ever intended APPELLEE to be a political subdivision or any 

other type of quasi government entity or governmental unit exempt from 

some limitations pursuant to section 16.061, it could have clearly done so, 

but it has not.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 20 of 21

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For these reasons stated herein above, APPELLANT prays that the Court 

that determine that the Trial Court erred in reinstating the Case to the Docket 

and subsequently denying APPELLANT’S MFSJ and granting APPELLEE’S 

MFSJ and reverse and rendered that APPELLEE should take nothing and 

immediate file releases of record of its judgment in this Case and any other 

relief in law or equity that APPELLANT may be entitled. 

Respectfully submitted,

APPELLANT:

/S/ STEVE VEIGEL_______________

STEVE VEIGEL, PRO SE

105 Quince Street

Hereford, Texas 79045

(806) 231-1008

SVeig@aol.com
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF page 21 of 21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document was produced on a computer using 

Microsoft Word 2003 using 14 point New Times Roman font and contains 

3,678 words, as determined by Microsoft Word 2003 word-count function, 

excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

/S/ STEVE VEIGEL ____________

Steve Veigel, pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that when a true and correct file marked copy of this 

e-filed document is available to me, it will be e-mailed that day to 

APPELLEE’S counsel as follows:

Mr. Matt Dow at MDow@JW.com

Mr. Andrew J. McKeon at AMcKeon@JW.com

Jackson Walker L.L.P

100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1100

Austin, Texas 78701

/S/ STEVE VEIGEL _____________

Steve Veigel