## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 10 - 00105 - CV

NORTHWEST INDEPENDEN T SCHOOL DISTRICT APPELLANT

V. CARROLL INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT APPELLEE

---------- FROM THE 141ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

---------- 

### O PINION ON APPELL EE ’S MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

---------- After considering Carroll Independent School District’s motion for en banc reconsideration and appellant Northwest Independent School District ’ s response , we grant the motion. We withdraw our prior opinion of February 16, 2012 and substitute the following.2 Background Carroll Independe nt School District (CISD) sued Northwest Independent School District (NWISD) alleging a boundary dispute with NWISD. The parties disagreed over the location of the boundary line between the two districts when other litigation between their relat ive counties was resolved. See Tarrant Cnty. v. Denton Cnty. , 87 S.W.3d 159 ( Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g), disapproved on other grounds by M artin v. Amerman , 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004) . As a result of that litigation , the two counties’ boundary line was definitively marked on the ground to reflect the counties’ previous agreements; this resulted in the school district s ’ long

- honored boundary line

— since 1959 1

— being somewhat south of the counties’ previously

- agreed boundary line. Id. at 179

– 80; Carroll ISD v. Nw. ISD , 245 S.W.3d 620, 622

– 23 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). Thus, CISD claimed the school districts’ line should move with the counties’ line because the districts’ line had been tied to the Tarran t
- Denton boundary line. 2 Carroll ISD , 245 S.W.3d at 623. T his would have expanded CISD’s district into NWISD’s territory , an area we will call the Disputed Area as the parties hav e in some of their briefing to this court. See id. In an effort to protect itself, NWISD filed the long

- existing districts’ boundary line

1 NWISD’s boundary was set in 1949. CISD’s was set in 1959.

2 When both school districts were created, the descriptions of their common boundary referenced only the then

- existing Tarrant County

- Denton County boundary line as their boundary line as opposed to a metes and bounds description.3 metes and bounds description with the Texas Education Agency in accordance with the Texas Education Code. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 13.010 (West
2012 ). CISD filed suit against NWISD in March 2005 claiming jurisdiction over the Disputed Area via trespass to try title and declaratory judgment actions

. Carroll ISD , 245 S.W.3d at 623. Shortly thereafter, NWISD filed a m otion to dismiss CISD’s suit for want of jurisdiction , which the trial court granted. Id. The trial court based its decision primarily on its conclusion that the dispute between the two districts was a boundary dispute that should first be determined by the “appropriate authority or authorities as required by the Texas Education Code” and that jurisdiction did not lie in the district court until the parties had first pursued their administrative remedies. Id. CISD filed an interlocutory appeal challengin g the dismissal of its claims against NWISD , and our court issued an opinion reversing the trial court’s d ecision to dismiss and remand ing the case to the trial court. Id. at 626 . In that opinion , we specifically held that the Texas Education Code did no t apply because one district was not seeking to actually detach or annex additional property into its district , which would have required TEA oversight , but was instead seeking a judicial declaration of the “parties’ rights, interests, and obligations” as to the D isputed A rea and the location of its boundary , which could be appropriately resolved through a declaratory judgment action. Id. at 625

– 26.4 In our opinion, w e also held that CISD is a “person” for purposes of the Declaratory Judgments Act and that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on that ground was improper. Id. at 625; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001, 37.004(a), (c) (West 2008) . Furthermore, we addressed NWISD’s attack on the trial court’s jurisdiction based on it s theory that th e validity of annexation of territory can only be determined by a quo warranto proceeding. We disagreed with this basis for the jurisdictional plea as well, noting that the two school districts were merely in a boundary dispute, not attempting to annex ad ditional territory. Carroll ISD , 245 S.W.3d at 626. Upon remand, after the parties had conducted further discovery of the jurisdictional facts and filed amended pleadings, NWISD filed an additional plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal, which the tri a l court denied. NWISD also filed a motion for summary judgment , which the trial court granted as to CISD’s claims for loss of tax revenue and for trespass to try title

. After NWISD filed its second plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgmen t, CISD further amended its petition to assert additional grounds for relief , which required NWISD to file a supplemental second plea to the jurisdiction that the trial court also denied. Thus, in this interlocutory appeal, NWISD is the appealing party an d is challenging the trial court’s denial o f its supplemental plea to the jurisdiction. Does the Law of the Case Doctrine Apply? In two of its three issues, NWISD challenges two legal conclusions already decided by this court in the first interlocutory app eal brought by CISD: that the5 trial court did not lack jurisdiction ( 1) because CISD was not required to follow the Texas Education Code’s administrative procedure for detaching and annexing property inasmuch as it is not seeking to detach and annex prope rty and ( 2) because CISD is included in the definition of “person” in the Declaratory Judgments Act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001

– .011 ; Carroll ISD , 245 S.W.3d at 624

– 25

. Because these two issues have been decided previously by this court, our first opinion in this case constitutes the “law of the case” and determines the resolution of NWISD’s first two issues. Under this doctrine, a decision rendered in a former appeal of a case is generally binding in a later appeal of the same case. In r e Assurances Generales Banque Nationale , 334 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding ) ; see In re Henry , 388 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding [ mand. denied ] ); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Robertson , 89 S.W.3d 26 1 , 264 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). Having decided an issue previously, a court of appeals is not obligated to reconsider the matter in subsequent appeals. Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc. , 372 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. 2012) ; see also I n re Henry , 388 S.W.3d at 727 ; In re Assurances Generales Banque Nationale , 334 S.W.3d at 325 ; Woods v. VanDevender , 296 S.W.3d 275, 279 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2009, pet. denied ) ( all citing Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp

. , 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003) )

. It may do so in its own discretion, however, and there is not an absolute bar to reconsideration if subsequent hearings, briefing , or pleadings have modified the facts or relief6 sought. See Briscoe , 102 S.W.3d at 716

– 17. When , however, the jurisdictional issue is really o ne of law, our discretion to re visit the issue will be used sparingly, if at all. See, e.g. , In re Henry , 388 S.W.3d at 728 ; City of Dallas v. Jones , 331 S.W.3d 781, 784

– 85 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d). Regardless, our review of the r ecord and the revised pleadings leads us to decline the inv itation to revisit these issues since the issues relate to questions of law. NWISD’s first and second issues are therefore overruled. 3
Is T his a Collateral Attack on Prior Elections and County Com mission Orders? In its third issue, NWISD claims the trial court lacked jurisdiction because CISD’s suit is “an untimely contest and collateral attack of the [district ’ s] 1948 and 1949 elections and [commissioners courts’] orders creating [ NWISD ] and it s boundaries.” We did not address this i ssue in our 2008 opinion; therefore, we address it now. NWISD claims that CISD’s request for a declaratory judgment is simply a
means to an end that circumvents the proper regulatory scheme. Use of Declaratory Judgmen t s Act When Boundary Involved or Judgment Questioned After we issued our opinion in Tarrant County v. Denton County , our state’s supreme c ourt issued its opinion in Martin v. Amerman , which held a

3 We will, however, address NWISD’s refinemen ts of its arguments against the applicability of the Declaratory Judgments Act that are contained within its third issue below.7 portion of our opinion invalid , stating that the use of th e D eclaratory J udgment s A ct to decide a bound ary determination was incorrect and that a boundary dispute could be resolved by one method only: a trespass to try title action. Martin , 133 S.W. 3 d at 267

– 68 (holdin g trespass to try title statute governs
met hod for determining title to real property and boundaries as well) , superseded by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004 (c) (reversing Martin’s holding that relief under the Act is unavailable for boundary dispute s ). Quickly, however, the state legisla ture overruled Martin by add ing subsection (c) to s ection 37.004 of the Declaratory Judgments Act

. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(c).
Th is provision authoriz es a party to seek a determination o n the construction of

“ a statute, municipal ordina nce , contract, or franchise ” even when the only determination concern ing title to real property involv es the “ proper boundary line between adjoining properties. ” Id. § 37.0 04(a), (c) (emphasis added) ; see Act of May 17, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 305, § 1 , 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 581, 581 (adding subsection (c) effective June 15, 2007)

. NWISD misconstrues the impact of the legislatu re’s revision to section
37.004. S ubsection (c) does not say that one may now only seek a determination of a boundary line under the Declaratory Judgments Act if one is seeking a determination of title. It says simply and only that if one is seeki ng a determination of title, then notwithstanding that fact , one may seek a determination or declaration of a boundary under the Declarat ory Judgments A ct

. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(c). In other words, if determin ing a8 boundary line may also result in declaring title to real property, a party is no longer prohibited from seeking a declaration of rights under the D eclarator y J udgment s A ct instead of solely under the property code ’s trespass to try title scheme as the supreme court had previously declared. See Martin , 133 S.W.3d
at 267

– 68. The legislation simply removed the prohibition , based on the supreme court’s construc tion of the Act in Martin , against using the Act to determine boundaries. 4 Therefore, we conclude that the determination of a boundary is no longer a disqualifier under the Act, even when title may be affected. NWISD also claims that becaus e the case was filed before the effective date of the amendment to section 37.004 , the amendment cannot apply to CISD’s action. This claim is incorrect for two reasons . First, after the original remand which reversed the trial court’s grant of a dismissal , the parties underwent further discov ery , and CISD amended its suit after the amendment’s effective date, June 15, 2007

. 5 Second ly , even if the first petition was filed

4 We do, however, agree with NWISD that many Texas cases have erroneously and perpetually confused the use of the term “boundary” for both a boundary line that actually determines title, i.e., ownership of real property, and a state or political subdivision boundary line that merely determines “territory.” Thus, NWISD is correct when it states that this is not a boundary line dispu te that involves actual title to, and therefore ownership of, land; it is a boundary dispute that involves the boundary between two independent school districts and the areas to be governed, educated, and taxed by each.

5 The enacting legislation states tha t the amendment “takes effect immediately.” Act of May 17, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 305, § 2, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 581, 581.9 before the amendment’s effective date, applying procedural, remedial, or jurisdictional statutes re troactively does not violate the Texas c onstitution ’ s prohibition on retroactive laws. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Estate of Arancibia , 324 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. 2010). While we generally presume that statutes are prospective unless they are expressly made retroactive, procedural and remedial laws genera lly do not affect vested rights and should be enforced as they exist at the time judgment is rendered. City of Austin v. Whittington , 384 S.W.3d 766, 790 (Tex. 2012); Tex. Mun. Power Agency v . Pub. Util. Comm ’ n of Tex

. , 253 S.W.3d 184, 198 (Tex. 2007 ); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.022 (West 2013 ). Additionally, statutes that do not deprive the litigants of a substantive right but speak more to the power of the court may generally be
ap plied at the time of enactment to a pending case

. Estate of Arancibia , 324 S.W.3d at 548. The Declaratory Judgment s Act is such a remedial statute. See
MBM Fin

. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P. , 292 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2009). We conclude and ho ld that because the Declaratory Judgment s Act is remedial in nature , the revision to section 37.004(c) may be applied to pending

cases. Next, NWISD claims that the D eclaratory J udgment s A ct cannot be used to declare parties ’ rights under the statutes and o rdinances here simply because it does not list the word “judgment” in its list of items that may be construed under the Ac t. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004 (a), (b). Again, we disagree.10 When called upon to determine the meaning and scope o f a statutory provision, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the l egislature’s intent. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.005 ( West 2013 ) ; TGS

- NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). We look to the plain and ordinary meani ng and the words of the statute itself as the best indicator of legislative intent. Bouldin v. Bexar Cnty. Sheriff’s Civ. Serv. Comm’n , 12 S.W.3d
527 , 529 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1999, no pet.). We may consider the object to be attained and the cons equences of a particular construction, among other things. Tex. Gov ’t Code An n. § 311.023 (West 2013 ) ; see also In re Smit h , 333 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding)

. First, the Act specifically authorizes the use of the courts to declare partie s’ rights under a written contract or “other writing s constituting a contract. ” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a). NWISD was the creation of the commissioners courts of Tarrant, Wise, and Denton Counties after elections held in each of those c ounties approved the consolidation of some of their school districts. Likewise, ten years later, the Tarrant County Commissioners Court also created CISD and enter ed its order adopting the voters’ election to create it. The order creating CISD refers to its northern boundary as the Tarrant

- Denton County line, thus honoring the previously declared southern boundary for NWISD, which Tarrant County voted for and approved. Arguably, these elections and commissioners courts’ orders fall generally within the A ct’s phrase of “other writings constituting a contract.” Id.11 Second, t he Declaratory Judgment s Act s pecifically authorizes determinations of “ rights , status, or other legal relations” under “ statute[s], ordinance [ s ], cont r act[s], or franchise[s] .” Id. T he Act allows an interested person to have his or her rights, status or legal relations determined when they arise under such instruments, statutes, ordinances , or franchises. Id

. Also, w e have already held that the word “person” includes independent sch ool districts. Carroll ISD , 245 S.W.3d at 625. Thus , a school district may have its rights or legal relations declared under the Act

. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem

. Code Ann. § 37.004(a). Moreover, courts apply the rule of ejusdem generis so that a listing of

s everal items does not necessarily exclude others of a similar kind or class unless the listing is clearly intended to be exclusive. 6 And, importantly, the Act itself specifically states, “The enumerations in Sections 37.004 and 37.005 do not limit or rest rict the exercise of the general powers conferred in this section in any proceeding in which declaratory relief is sought and a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.” Id. § 37.003(c) ( e mphasis added)

. This directive evidences a clear legislative intent to construe the enumerations broadly so as to allow the courts to exercise the po wers conferred by the statute. See id. § 37.002(b) (providing that Act is “to be liberally construed and administered”). Importantly, th e resolution of a dispute such as this would

6 See Black’s Law Dictionary 594 (9th ed. 2009).12 “terminate the controversy” and “ remov e an uncertainty, ” thus meeting the stated legislative goal s

. See i d. § 37.003(c). We therefore conclude and hold that the Declaratory Judgment s Act applies when, as here, a school district seeks to resolve a controversy regarding a judgment or order iss ued by a commissioners court even though the words

“ judgment” and “order” are not contained within the specific enumeration s listed in the Act. Is This a Prohibited Election Contest or Collateral Attack? NWISD further claims that even if CISD is a person within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgments Act, and even if the Act encompasses a determination of the rights or status of a person under such a judgment or order, the Ac t cannot apply because CISD’s claim is still a collateral attack on the elections held by the two school districts in adopting their boundary and the ir respective territories , as well as the orders issued to implement those elections

. I t points to s ection s 233.001 through 233.014 of the Texas Election C ode. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 233.001

– .014 (West 2010 ). NWISD argues that the elections creating the district that were held in 1948 and 1949 established NWISD’s boundaries and that to challenge those electi ons , CISD must have timely filed a notice of the contest. We agree with NWISD. There are multiple reasons why CISD cannot pursue an election contest now

. First, CISD is not a proper party to challenge the election held by NWISD; only qualified voters “of the territory covered by an election on a measure may13 contest the election.” Id. § 233.002. Second, the time for filing a petition to contest such an election has long passed. Id. § 233.006. Any contest must be brought within thirty days of the date th e official result is determined, which is an obvious and fatal impediment in this case. See i d. Furthermore, and more importantly, the result of an election that has not been challenged by a proper contest cannot be collaterally attacked , and the “commiss ioners ’ court [order] declaring the r esult of the election is final .” Horn v. Gibson , 352 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied ). Thus, we conclude and hold that to the extent CISD is attempting to contest an election, this suit is both a defective and untimely contest o f that election. We sustain this portion of NWISD’s third issue. We now turn to whether CISD’s suit is also an invalid collateral attack on the orders resulting from the election. A collateral attack is an “ attempt to a void the effect of a judgment in a proceeding brou ght for some other purpose. A direct attack on a judgment, conversely, is an attempt to change that judgment in a proceeding brought for that specific purpose, such as a n appeal or a bill of review.” Burg ess v. State, 313 S.W.3d 844, 852 n.10 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2010, no pet.)

. T his court has previously held that collateral attacks on prior judgments or orders adopting election results are prohibited, especially when no prior appeal or challenge to such judgments has been made. Tarrant Cnty. , 87 S.W.3d at 174 ( citing Yoakum C nty . v. Gaines C nty

. , 163 S.W.2d 393, 396

– 97 (Tex. 1942)); c f. Tarrant C nty

. v. Shannon , 104 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1937)14 (recognizing that judgments of commissioners courts are coequal with judgments of other courts and district court may review those judgments only for lack of jurisdiction or clear abuse of discretion of scope of legal authority) . T here was no such timely challenge here. T he districts’ agreements or commissioners cour ts’ orders were not questioned until this challenge

. C ities, counties , and political subdivisions act through their elections, ordinances , and agreements and the orders or judgments they create to implement the same

. Killam Ranch Prop s

. , Ltd. v. Webb C nt y

. , 376 S.W.3d 146, 154 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) ; Amaro v. Wilson C nty

. , 398 S.W.3d 780 , 785 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2011, no pet. ). But in this case, as opposed to Tarrant County v. Denton County , in which a party was seeki ng to avoid the previously agreed upon orders, a fact has changed that makes a term in the agreement ambiguous: the parties are seeking a clarification or determination of the meaning of a phrase
in their agreements as a result of an event that happened ye ars after the part ies entered into the agreements and entered orders im plementing those results. In other words, p ost judgment events have created an ambiguity in their orders that makes the enforcement of such orders uncertain at best. Neither party may seek the nullification or avoidance of their agreements , orders , or judgments that resulted therefrom, but they may seek an interpretation or clarification of those agreements, orders , and judgments when external factors have made such interpretations unce rtain. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. CBI15 Indus., Inc. , 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) (defining latent ambiguity as one arising from a collateral matter as applied to the contract). If, however , CISD is seeking to avoid the result of the 1948 and 1949 elections and orders by now claiming the Disputed Area, despite its acquiescence for over sixty years, then we agree that this would be both a defective, untimely election contest and an impermissible collat eral attack on the commissione r s courts’ orders certifying the election results that created NWISD and establish ed its boundary. As noted in NWISD’s motion for summary judgment, “A declaratory judgment action is intended to establish existing rights,
stat us , or other legal relationshi ps ” and is not to “be used as an affirmative ground of recovery to alter rights, status or relationships.” W e agree that one cannot do by a declaratory judgment action what one cannot otherwise do. See Bonham State Bank v. Beadle , 907 S .W.2d 465, 468 (Te x. 1995); Segrest v. Segr est , 649 S. W.2d 610, 611

– 12 (Tex. ) , cert. denied , 464 U.S. 894 (1983). However, if the suit for declaratory relief is really just one to clarify a term incor porated into both commissioners co urts’ agreements, and therefore the judg ments and orders they both entered, then this narrow objective or request for relief is properly addressed in a declaratory judgment action. Responses to Concurring and Dissenting Opinions In response to Justice Dauphinot’s concurring and dissenting opinio n, we respectfully disagree that the majority’s remand expands the relief available to CISD. The majority opinion limits the relief available to CISD only to locate the16 existing sixty

- year - old boundary line between the districts. In CISD’s fifth amended petition filed Februar y 17, 2010, it stated, CISD contends that the common boundary between the two school districts is located on the county line, as determined by Tarrant County v. Denton County [

. ]

. . . . . . P laintiff CISD seeks a declaratory judgment that the common boundary between CISD and NWISD lives along the Tarrant/Denton County line as determined by Tarrant County v. Denton County

. . . . The answer to this question necessarily encompasses a declaration of where the sixty

- year boundary has been located and is located. Our remand is limited to that determination and is therefore properly provided for in this narrow remand: i.e., where is the actual line that both parties agreed to, voted on, approved, adopted, and have recognized for sixty years? Regarding Justice Gardner’s concurring and dissenting opinion, the majority opinion does not conflict with the prior opinion in this case or in our Tarrant County v. Denton County case . We agree with our prior opinion in this

case by saying that whether CISD couches its suit for declaratory judgment relief as an attempt to determine where the common boundary line is

— as it did in its pleadings below

— or as an attempt to annex the Disputed Area (which we
pre viously stated it could not do), t his opinion actua lly reaffirms an d recognizes our prior opinions. S ince CISD says it was not seeking to annex additional territory into its district in the first suit, the issue of jurisdiction to hear that action was not implicated. But in som e respects, the lawsuit on appeal now specifically17 req uests to move the line from where the parties “historically thought the [boundary] line was.” T he majority opinion is simply recognizing that if the schools’ common boundary line is now moved, the result is an annex ation of the Disputed Area, which we previously held CISD cannot now do. Therefore, we hold that if the objective is to challenge the prior elections or
to change or modify the judgments or orders of the commissioners court s by seeking authority to actually move the di stricts’ sixty

- year - old boundary line and thus transfer the Disputed Area from one independent school district to another, then such would be an impermissible election contest and an invalid collateral attack via a declaratory judgment act ion

. W e hold tha t upon remand the only proper avenue of declaratory judgment relief is to seek a clarification of the actual, on

- the

- ground location of the long

- existing boundary between the two school districts. We overrule the balance of NWISD’s third issue on appeal.
W e affirm the trial court’s denial of NWISD’s plea to the jurisdiction to the limited extent that CISD seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the parties’ orders and judgments creating their existing respective school districts’ sixty

- year actual boundary l ocation

. Because w e sustain NWISD’s third issue to the extent CISD seeks to contest and challenge NWISD’s 1948 and 1949 elections and the orders creating NWISD and its boundaries , in an attempt to move the existing boundary, we reverse the trial court’s d enial of NWISD’s plea to the jurisdiction18 as to that contest and challenge . Therefore, we remand the case to the trial
court for trial on the limited basi s set forth in this opinion. 7
/s/ Terrie Livingston TERRIE LIVINGSTON CHIEF JUSTICE EN BANC DAU PHINOT, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. GARDNER, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which WALKER and GABRIEL, JJ., join.
DELIVERED: June 19, 2014

7 Six of the justices agree that NWISD may proceed in the trial court on a declara tory judgment action to clarify the school districts’ existing sixty

- year actual boundary location: Chief Justice Terrie Livingston, Justice Anne Gardner, Justice Sue Walker, Justice Bob McCoy, Justice Bill Meier, and Justice Lee Gabriel. Additionally, f our justices agree that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to hear any claim regarding an attempt to move the existing boundary by disputing the result of the 1948 and 1949 elections and subsequent commissioners courts ’ orders: Chief Justice Terri e Livingston, Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot, Justice Bob McCoy, and Justice Bill Meier. Accordingly, a majority of the justices agree to remand for the trial court to consider CISD’s declaratory judgment claim regarding clarification of the boundary line betw een the two districts.