J-S86033-16

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY ALONZO AYANDELE

Appellant No. 750 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 7, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009454-2001;

CP-02-CR-0010008-2001

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016

Appellant, Anthony Alonzo Ayandele, appeals pro se from the order 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed 

his pro se second petition for collateral relief (labeled a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus ad subjiciendum), per the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On February 20, 2003, the court convicted 

Appellant of third-degree murder and firearms not to be carried without a 

license. The court sentenced Appellant on May 14, 2003, to an aggregate 

term of 20-40 years’ imprisonment. This Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence on February 20, 2004, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of 

appeal on October 6, 2004. See Commonwealth v. Ayandele, 849 A.2d 

601 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 693, 860 A.2d 121 (2004). 
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Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 14, 2005. The 

court appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley1 no-merit letter and 

motion to withdraw on August 15, 2007. The court granted counsel’s motion 

and issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on October 10, 2007. The court denied 

PCRA relief on November 30, 2007, and this Court affirmed on February 20, 

2009. See Commonwealth v. Ayandele, 970 A.2d 463 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

On August 13, 2015, Appellant filed in civil court the current pro se petition 

for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was transferred to criminal 

court on September 2, 2015. The court treated the filing as a PCRA petition 

and appointed counsel. Counsel filed a request to withdraw and 

Turner/Finley no-merit letter on March 1, 2016. The court issued Rule 907 

notice on March 3, 2016; Appellant responded pro se on March 16, 2016. 

On March 31, 2016, counsel filed a supplemental no-merit letter. The court 

dismissed the petition on April 7, 2016, and granted counsel’s request to 

withdraw. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on April 25, 2016. 

On May 5, 2016, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement; Appellant timely complied.

Preliminarily, any petition for post-conviction collateral relief will 

generally be considered a PCRA petition, even if captioned as a request for 

habeas corpus relief, if the petition raises issues for which the relief sought 

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 
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is available under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 

547, 722 A.2d 638 (1998); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA shall be sole 

means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law 

and statutory remedies for same purpose). As well, the timeliness of a PCRA 

petition is a jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 

1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A 

PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying 

judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is “final” 

at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking 

review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The exceptions to the PCRA time-bar 

allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition 

will be excused; a petitioner asserting an exception must file a petition 

within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2). Instantly, Appellant claims he had insufficient 

notice of the charges against him where the Commonwealth charged him 

with murder generally, and the court lacked statutory authority to impose a 

sentence of imprisonment for his crimes. These claims are cognizable under 

the PCRA. See generally Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 

A.2d 978 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 

277 (2009) (explaining collateral attack on underlying murder conviction 

falls within ambit of PCRA); Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586 

(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 715, 944 A.2d 756 (2008) 
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(holding collateral attack on legality of sentence must be raised in PCRA 

petition; challenges to legality of sentence must first satisfy PCRA time limits 

or one of statutory exceptions). Thus, the court properly treated Appellant’s 

most recent prayer for collateral relief as a PCRA petition. See Peterkin, 

supra. Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 4, 

2005, upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Appellant filed the 

current pro se petition for collateral relief on August 13, 2015, which is 

patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant did not 

acknowledge the untimeliness of his petition or assert any timeliness 

exception. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Thus, the court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2016