burden of demonstrating that the extraordinary remedy of writ relief is 

warranted. Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 

Nev., Adv. Op. 61, 331 P.3d 876, 878 (2014). 

"[We] will only consider writ petitions challenging a district 

court denial of a motion for summary judgment when no factual dispute 

exists and summary judgment is clearly required by a statute or rule, or 

an important issue of law requires clarification." Walters v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 66, 263 P.3d 231, 234 (2011). 

Summary judgment is only appropriate when "no genuine issue of 

material fact exists" and the party obtaining the judgment "is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731, 

121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005) (setting forth the standard for summary 

judgment under NRCP 56). 

In the present case, real party in interest Joyce Rhone was 

working for her employer, petitioner Bellagio, LLC, when an off-duty 

coworker attacked her. Rhone sued Bellagio and the coworker, alleging, 

among other things, that Bellagio negligently hired, supervised, and 

retained the coworker. Bellagio filed a motion for summary judgment, 

arguing in relevant part that (1) the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act 

(NITA) provides Rhone's exclusive remedy and, thus, precludes her tort 

claims and (2) Rhone's punitive damages claim was improper Rhone did 

not file a motion for summary judgment to preclude Bellagio's use of the 

NIIA exclusive remedy provision as an affirmative defense. 

The district court denied Bellagio's motion with regard to the 

application of the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision because it found, 

based on the facts of the case, that Rhone's injuries were not causally 

connected to her job. Thus, despite the fact that Rhone did not file a 

motion for summary judgment, the district court summarily resolved the 

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issue of the application of the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision in her 

favor. The district court denied Bellagio's motion for summary judgment 

with regard to Rhone's punitive damages claim because it found that there 

were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether punitive damages 

could be supported. Bellagio then filed the present petition for a writ of 

mandamus seeking intervention from this court to compel the district 

court to grant its motion for summary judgment on these issues. 

The district court erred by finding that the NIIA's exclusive remedy 

provision could not apply in this case 

When an employee is injured in the course of employment and 

the injury arises out of the employment, the NIIA provides the employee's 

exclusive legal remedy. NRS 616A.020(1); Fanders v. Riverside Resort & 

Casino, Inc., 126 Nev. 543, 549, 245 P.3d 1159, 1163 (2010). "An injury is 

said to arise out of one's employment when there is a causal connection 

between the employee's injury and the nature of the work or workplace." 

Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032. If an employee is attacked while 

at work, the resulting injury can arise from the employment and be 

subject to the NIIA if the employment created or increased the employee's 

risk of being attacked. See Cummings v. United Resort Hotels, Inc., 85 

Nev. 23, 27, 449 P.2d 245, 248 (1969). "However, workers' compensation 

statutes do not apply when the animosity or dispute which culminates in 

the assault is imported into the place of employment from the injured 

employee's private or domestic life, . . . at least where the animosity is not 

exacerbated by the employment." Wood, 121 Nev. at 734, 121 P.3d at 1033 

(internal quotations omitted); see also McColl v. Scherer, 73 Nev. 226, 230, 

315 P.2d 807, 809 (1957) (stating the same). 

In the present case, the district court found that the NIIA's 

exclusive remedy provision did not apply to Rhone's claims because 

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Rhone's resulting injuries were not related to risks associated with her 

employment. This factual finding and the resulting legal conclusion were 

made in error because the record reveals a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether Rhone's employment caused or exacerbated her risk of 

attack. See Wood, 121 Nev. at 731, 733-34, 121 P.3d at 1031-33. Because 

the district court made factual determinations about material facts that 

were in dispute and resolved an issue that was not presented to it in a 

motion for summary judgment, extraordinary intervention is warranted to 

correct the district court's determination that the NIIA's exclusive remedy 

provision does not apply to Rhone's claims. Instead, that is a question to 

be resolved by the jury. Therefore, we grant the petition in part and direct 

the district court to vacate the portion of its order that found that the 

NIIA's exclusive remedy provision does not preclude Rhone's tort claims. 

Despite its factual findings that were made in error, however, 

the district court's denial of Bellagio's motion was proper because the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment. 

See Holcomb v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 56, 289 P.3d 188, 200 

(2012) (affirming a district court order that reached the correct result 

albeit for the wrong reasons). Thus, extraordinary intervention is not 

warranted to reverse the portion of the district court's order denying 

Bellagio's motion for summary judgment on this issue. 

On the issue of punitive damages, Bellagio has an adequate remedy in the 

form of an appeal and, thus, extraordinary relief is not warranted 

The district court did not resolve the issue of whether Rhone is 

entitled to recover punitive damages from Bellagio. Whether punitive 

damages are recoverable is an issue that is readily reviewable on appeal. 

See Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 474-75, 244 P.3d 765, 784-85 (2010). 

Thus, Bellagio has an adequate and speedy remedy to address this issue 

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J. 

Saitta 

should the district court permit Rhone to present this issue to the jury. 

See D.R. Horton, 123 Nev. at 474, 168 P.3d at 736. Therefore, Bellagio has 

not demonstrated that extraordinary intervention is warranted with 

regard to this issue. 

Conclusion 

The district court erred by finding that the facts of the case 

preclude the application of the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision because 

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rhone's injuries 

arose from a risk associated with her employment. However, because of 

this genuine issue of material fact, the district court did not err by denying 

Bellagio's motion for summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore, 

Bellagio has not demonstrated that extraordinary relief is warranted with 

regard to the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on 

the issue of punitive damages. Therefore, we 

ORDER the petition GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED in 

PART AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT 

OF MANDAMUS instructing the district court to vacate the portion of its 

order that improperly found that the NIIA's exclusive remedy provision 

does not preclude Rhone's tort claims. 

 C.J. 

Hardesty 

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cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge 

Kravitz, Schnitzer & Johnson, Chtd. 

Harold P. Gewerter, Esq., Ltd. 

Pitaro & Fumo, Chtd. 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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