1

Filed 3/25/21 In re A.C. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

In re A.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C092444

YOLO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. R.C., Defendant and Appellant. (Super. Ct. No s . JVSQ193242, JVSQ193243)

Mother, R

. C., appeals from the juvenile court’s six

- month review order concerning her children A.C. and Z. C. , arguing: (1) the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency ’s (Agency) failure to provide mother with reasonable visitation precludes the court’s reasonable service and reasonable efforts findings ; (2) th e court’s minimal progress finding should be reversed for the same reason ; (3) the juvenile court2

improperly delegated to the minors the power to determine whether visitation would

occur and abused its discretion in providing visits with Z.C. would continue via Zoom ; and (4) the juvenile court erred in limiting mother’s educational rights without “a concrete reason why such a limitation was necessary.”
We concur that the juvenile court erred in ordering visitation that was expressly subjec t to the wishes of the minors and limiting mother’s education rights as to Z.C. only

. Because the visitation order has already been modified, we will remand for further proceedings to determine whether it was necessary to limit mother’s educational rights as to Z.C. only. We otherwise affirm the judgment

.



### F ACTS AND 

### P ROCEDURAL 

### H ISTORY

The Petition and Detention
On October 21, 2019, the Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (statutory section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise stated ) petition alleging A.W. (age 17) , A.C. (age 14 ) , and Z.C. (age 8 ) had suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm caused by mother’s physical abuse of the minors (§ 300, subd. (a))

. It alleged mother hit A.W. with a closed fist and a hanger on October 16, 2019, causing significant bruising on A.W.’s face, ear, and to the back of her neck. A.C. and Z.C. witnessed this incident. All minors individually feared returning to mother’s home a nd reported that “ mother routinely hits them with a whip, a hanger, a brush, or her closed fists.” A.W. fear ed mother would kill
her. Mother ’s short temper and threats of physical punishment as well as physical punishment put the minors at risk of injury. Mother also withh e ld food as a punishment. The Agency expressed concern about the level of mother’s violence, as well as her lack of insight into the impact of this ongoing violence in the home. This petition was
amende d after th e minors ’ detention to include alleg ations of mother’s failure to protect
A.C. a nd Z.C. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1))

.3

The severity of the incident resulting in Agency intervention was underscored in
the detention report , which reflect ed mother beat A.W. because of an argument over the
television , hitting her across the face with a hanger (ultimately breaking it on her) , thr owing a cup at her, and then climb ing on top of her and punch ing her repeatedly on the
head. Two doctors diagnosed A.W. wit h “post

- concussive syndrome” as a result of the beating. A.W. worried her mother truly wanted to hurt her and might kill her given mother’s reported dreams wherein she did just that. She reported that mother coerced her siblings to lie about the ir physical abuse and cover up the ir bruises.
A.C. and Z.C

. confirmed witnessing the altercation between A.W. and their
mother

. Both minors confirmed mother physically hit them , r elaying specifi c instances of abuse involving fists or a whip. Marks were observed on Z.C.’s back

. Mother told Z.C. to hide signs of his abuse, which he did with clothes

. Maternal grandparents were
aware of the abu se and tried unsuccessfully to intervene.
Mother took medicin e for social anxiety, but denied mental health or substance abuse problems. Mother denied hit ting the minors with a closed fist, a hanger, a whip, or a brush. Mother admitted to spanking A.W. and taking away her phone. She also admitted her children were scared of her, but denied that any of the injuries observed on
the minors were because of her , i nstead providing ambiguous explanations that the injuries occurred at school or during sports. Mother denied she intended to threaten A.W. by telling her about her dream.
All minors reported being afraid of mother at their first visitation and displayed signs of fear through facial expressions and body language. A.C. and Z.C. acquiesced to mother’s request for a hug, but A.W. refused.
The minors were detained at the hearing on Octo ber 22, 2019. The juvenile court ordered mother receive three hours a week of supervised therapeutic visits to begin after the minors were enrolled in therapy and after mother enrolled in anger management
and /or individual counseling. The court awarded t he Agency authority to accelerate4

visitation as appropriate. A combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was set for November 26, 2019. At the November 26, 2019 hearing, the juvenile court continued the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing unt il December 19, 2019

. The contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing was continued again until January 13 , 2020, in light of mother’s desire to retain private counsel.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
The December 19, 2019 , jurisdiction and disposition report recommended the juvenile court sustain the allegations of the amended petition for all minors and grant A.W.’s father full legal custody of her. The report further recommended the court declare A.C. and Z.C. dependents and provide reunification services to mother

. In
addition to the facts supporting detention , the report a lso described an incident where
mother hit A.W. in the face with a pan. Mo ther admitted striking A.W. with a hanger on one occasion and threatening all three minors with a hanger and whip. Mother also admitted to open hand spanking A.C. and Z.C. on their bottoms.
The social worker spoke with Z.C. , who confirmed his previous statements of mother’s physical abuse, which he said occurred “ ‘a lot,’ ” but clarified that he had only heard his mother’s confrontation with A.W. Z.C. told his maternal grandparents mother
hit him , and they told him to obey mother. Z.C. was glad everyone was engaged in counseling and thou ght things would be safer at home if mother received treatment for her anger. Z.C. later said that he wanted to go home and planned to stay safe by not upsetting mother.
A.C. disclosed mother had been physically abusing her for a number of years (using a hanger, whip, and spatula) and that A.C. did not think she would be safe living
with mother. Maternal grandparents’ home would also not be safe, because they “would5

not hold boundaries with her mother.” She also disclosed receiving a text from her
moth er before the interview that stated , “ ‘don’t lie for [ A .W

. ] ’ ”
Mother denied her abusive behavior at her November 1, 2019 , meeting with the social worker, complaining about the previous social worker and downplaying the incident. Mother accused A.W. of making up the allegations for personal reasons. Mother initially denied hitting with a fist , brush, or hanger, stating she only threatened spanking and sometimes used curse words. However, mother later admitted usin g a hanger for discipline approximately two times per month, but denied leaving marks. She
also admitted hitting A.W. on the back with an open fist. Mother denied ever withholding food. When confronted with the minors’ statements, mother agreed it was a problem that the minors feared her. Mother agreed to obtain mental health services a nd parent education, the first of which she was already receiving.
Mother me t with the social worker again on November 8, 2019, arguing Z.C. and
A.C. should be immediat ely returned because there was no proof supporting the allegations. W hen co nfronted with that proof (including her own previous admissions), mother protested that “she did not leave any marks nor injuries.” Mother refused to discuss prior reports that sh e had been subject to psychiatric holds under section 5150 in
20 08 and 2012 and denied that she had any current mental health problems. Mother’s request to select and arrange counseling for the minors was denied. The
social worker worked diligently to secure therapists for the children and initiate therapy so that the clinicians would be enabled to make recommendations regarding the ordered therapeutic visitation. This process was difficult and complicated by Z.C.’s escalating
behaviors , necessitating Z.C.’s enrollment in WRAP services. The social worker kept mother informed of this progress. A.C. was receiving counseling, although her therapist recently switched because of a conflict. Both A.W. and A.C. separately stated a preference n ot to visit their mother or their grandparents. Mother consistently requested6

visits with the minors and wrote letters to them. A.C. and A.W. refused mother’s letters, but Z.C. accepted his letter and wrote back.
The A gency referred mother for counseli ng, anger management, and parenting classes, which mother had started. According to the head of mother’s anger management
program, Bobby Stewart, mother denied abusing her children and portrayed herself as a
victim. “[M]other appears to have deep denial about her anger issues, struggles with managing anger and has not admitted any behaviors or issues where she has struggled with managing her anger or frustration.” Mother was engaged in weekly therapy with Melissa King, MFT I , but the social worker had not been able to communicate with King regarding mother’s progress. The Agency further recommended that mother undergo a psychological assessment given her “denial and current decision

- making

. ” In light of this information, t he Agency recommended against immediate ly returning the minors to mother , who continued to be in deep denial of her actions and th e corresponding effect s o n her children. The Agency also recommended against returning
the minors to the maternal grandparent s : (1) who were aware of the minors’ abuse, but failed to act to protect them ; (2) who had struggled to follow visitation guidelines, whispering to the children and making promises ; and (3) with whom nei t her A.W. nor
A.C. wanted to live

. The A gency recommended declaring A.C. and Z.C. dependents a nd maintaining them in their out

- of

- home placements, which was a foster home for A.C. and a group home with WRAP services for Z.C. At the January 13, 2020 , contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, mother waived her right to testify and present evidence, electing to submit on the petition. The court sustained the petition under both section 300 , subdivisions (a) and (b). The court awarded full legal custody of A.W. to her biological father and dismissed the case as to A.W. only

. As to A.C. and Z.C., t he court adopted the findings and orders prepared by the Agency for disposition and set the matter for six

- month permanency planning on7

May 4, 2020. Th e goal of the case plan was reunification with mother. Mother’s
visitation order remained the same. Mother’s case plan directed her to obtain a psychological assessment to determine which mental health services would be best for her. The plan also directed mother to participate in transparent individual counseling to identify what may be impairing her ability to safely parent. This included t hat mother “develop an understanding of what constitutes physical and emotional abuse, identify how her past behaviors have impacted her children’s physical and emotional health and safety, and coping skills to effectively manage frustration and anger in a healthy, nonthreatening, [ and ] positive manner.” Mother was directed to openly and honestly participate in an anger management/domestic violence program for the same reason. Finally, mother was directed to participate in parent edu cation classes to obta in the skills necessary to parent without being physically and emotionally abusive. Mother did not appeal this decision.

The Six

- Month Review Following continuances : (1) on the juvenile court’s own motion due to COVID

19 , (2 ) because of mother’s request due to her change of counsel , and (3) because of mother’s request to get paperwork together , the contested six

- month review hearing was held on August 3, 2020. Leading up to this hearing, the Agency submitted a six

- month review report (filed April 30, 2020) and supplement al report (filed June 25, 2020) , which recommended against the return of the minors and for an additional six months of
reunification services

. The Agency r eported , mother was on pre

- trial release pending three charges of infliction of corporal injury on a child (Pen. Code, § 273d , subd. (a)) and three charges of abusing or endangering the health of a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). Her probation offic er was satisfied with her performance on release , but relayed mother’s lack8

of interest in that officer’s discussion encouraging mother to take responsibility for her
actions , as opposed to merely participating in her court mandated CPS services.
Mother completed her parent education classes, although her instructor Nancy Chavez, opined that mother should engage in more classes to further her understanding of “the importance of listening to her children and practicing safe discipline te chniques.”
Ms. Chavez recommended mother “engage in counseling services to increase her insight on the impact of her abuse on her children, take responsibilit[y] for her actions and work through her own possible mental health issues.” Similarly, mother’s first anger management instructor , Bobbie Stewart, reported
that mother made minimal progress and need ed to continue taking classes “to work on accountability, taking responsibility, gain insight as to her issues and why her children

we re removed from her care.” W hile mother attended classes with limited participation , she continued to deny she physically abused her children and accuse d her daughter of lying. Stewart also worried whether mother suffered from mental health issues that

n eed ed to be addressed. Ultimately, mother failed to successfully complete this program, despite having attended 42 sessions, because mother refused to accept responsibility for her actions requiring her treatment and failed to meaningfully participate in groups. Mo ther’s second anger management instructor, Myrna Brady, confirmed mother’s
enrollment and participation in anger management classes consisting of an online
assessment and workbook exercise s. She also reported that mother did not provide her
court documents or mother’s case plan. Repeated efforts to obtain a release of information to provide Ms. Brady with the relevant information we re unsuccessful. Mother reported engaging in counseling since October 25, 2019 , with Vanessa King, MFT I , but numerous attempts to contact King to obtain information were
unsuccessful until June 2020

. King report ed that mother was learning new skills thr ough therapy, but continue d to deny p hysically abusing her children.9

At a February 26, 2020 , meeting with mother to discuss her case plan, reunification timeline, and services, etc., mother stated she would not complete her psychological evaluation with the referred provider, a lthough she could not say why.
Mother refused assistance in locating another provider and acknowledged receipt of the requirements for any psychologist and examination.
The reafter, mother hired psychologist Amy Kline in March to conduct the assessment, but despite repeated requests of mother and Ms. Kline, the social worker was not able to obtain a release of information so that Kline would have the Agency
information relevant to the court ordered examination. Ms. Kline also displayed questionable professionalism and impartiality because Kline had met with mother five times prior to contacting the Agency and made statements indicating a bias in mother’s
favor in communications with t he social worker. Due to the se concerns, Agency counsel contacted mother’s counsel to warn that Ms. Kline’s work as then being conducted would not comply with the case plan. Counsel provided contact information for two different providers for mother to c hoose from to complete her court ordered assessment.
Rath er than heeding the Agency’s warning , mother submitted a May 23, 2020 evaluation from Dr. Kline, which was prepared without the benefit of any information from the Agency and which did not discuss the minors’ reported abuse by mother, nor mother’s ongoing denial of those reports. According to this report, mot her suffer ed from anxiety and dependent personality disorder w ith avoidant personality traits and obs essive compulsive personality features. The Agency told m other and her counsel that Kline’s report failed to satisfy the case plan and directed mother participate in the court ordered evaluation with one of two proffered providers. According to the Agency, A.C. was doing well at her placement and school. She began therapy in December 2019 , where in she worked on processing her trauma as well

as learning self

- awareness and relaxation techniques

. Both A.C. and her therapist agreed she should continue her treatment. A.C. felt happy, stable , and comfortable at her10

placement. Notably, A.C. exhibit ed distress following a CASA visit wherein her CASA worker repeatedly told her that mother loved her, result ing in reassignment of that
worker.
Z.C. began individual therapy in December 2019, had successfully completed WRAP services, was doing better in school, and his behavioral issues (including tantrum s wherein Z.C. kick ed/

hit others and/or destroys others’ property) were decreasing. In light of this, the Agency moved Z

. C

. from a group home to a therapeutic foster home on
June 22, 2020 . Z.C. was starting to open up regarding mother’s physical abuse, which he had disclosed to his therapist, as well as group home staff , but had been unable to therapeutically discuss

. Z.C. was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and mild oppositional defiant disorder. He suffered from nightmares , negati ve moods, and a refusal to forgive unless the offending individual was first punished

. Z.C.’s therapist discussed his reports of abuse with mother, who denied the abuse , accused Z.C. of lying , and demanded to question him about his reports

. Z.C. voluntee red a preference to live
with maternal grandparents, rather than mother. Mother diligently visited Z.C., but had had no visits with A.C. Further information regarding visitation will be discussed , post

. At the six

- month review hearing on August 3, 2020, the Agency presented the testimony of Christi a na Ebere , the social worker, that the A gency recommend ed six more
months of reunification services

. Ebere testified that mother e ngaged in a pattern of participating in services, but failing to fully disclose the reason for the services, thus precludi ng a focus on the issues that mother need ed to address in order to be successful
with her services. Ebere also had difficulty communicating with mother, who refused to speak over the phone without recording the conversations and demanded that
communication be in e

- mail. However, mother’s e

- mail communication was one

- sided, with mother contacting Ebere when she wanted something, but failing to respond to or even acknowledge Ebere’s e

- mails.11

Ebere reiterated mother’s failure s to comply with the case plan requirements as previously described in the reports, including her failure to obtain a qualif ying psychological evaluation , her failure to acknowledge that she had abused the minors , her failure to take responsibility for her actions in anger management resulting in her discharge from her first anger management program , and her failure to provide her successive anger management provider information concerning the need for services and cooperate in obtaining releases so that such information could be shared

. Mother’s parenting class provider was concerned that mother may be suffering from untreated
mental health issues.
Ebere confirmed checking with A.C. monthly regarding visits with her mother, but
that A.C. ha d refused such visits . Z.C. struggled with Zoom visits with mother , often having tantrums after being told it was almost time for visits. Z.C. continued reporting mother’s abuse and expressed fear that if he was returned home, the abuse w ould resume and mother will hide it so that no one w ould know. Given mother’s lack of progress,
continued denial of the reason for CPS interventio n, possible mental health problems, and the minors’ ongoing fear of mother, Ebere opined it would be detrimental to return the
minors to moth er

. No further testimony was presented. M other’s counsel argued for the immediate return of Z.C. and for therape utic visits to immediately commence with A.C. so that she could be transitioned home as soon as possible. Counsel continued that mother had diligently complied with her case plan by completing the psychological evaluation, anger management, and parenting classes. Further counsel complained that the true issues associated with Z.C.’s visits with mother was the Zoom medium, not mother herself, and that he should be immediately returned to her so that she could demonstrate what she
learned from her services.
Z.C. ’s counsel vehemently objected to his being returned to mother, highlighting that mother still denied the abuse occurred and had avoided real progress in her court12

ordered services. T he Agency argued it was unquestionable that there would be a

mean ingful risk to the minors if returned to mother, that mother had not meaningfully participated in services, and that mother should be ordered to participate in a psychological evaluation with Dr. Wilkenfield. The Agency continued that the minors
consisten tly maintained that mother abused them , and mother persist ed in saying the children are lying. The Agency recommended six more months of services. Thereafter, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that returning the minors to “mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being

. ” The court reasoned that mother had made minimal progress even though she was taking classes because she failed to take responsibility for
her a ctions and continued asserting that the minors (who feared her) were lying. The
court ordered mother to comply with her case plan, including the execution of all necessary releases of information and that mother participate in the psychological
evaluation with Dr. Wilkenfield. T he court further found the Agency had complied with the case plan and made reasonable efforts to return the minors, but that mother had “only made minimal progress towards alleviating and mitigating the causes necessitating placeme nt.” The court adopted the Agency’s recommended findings and orders and set
the case for 12

- month review on December 22, 2020. Mother timely appealed.


### D ISCUSSION

I The Agency Provided Mother Reasonable Services
Mothe r does not challenge th e adequacy of Agency plans to treat the issues requiring the removal of her children by requiring that she participate in and referring her for a psychological evaluation, parent education, anger management, and individual counseling. Nor does she challenge the Agency implementation of these services. Rather, she challenges whether she received adequate visitation with A.C. and Z.C.,13

arguing the lack of visitation preclude d the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding. The Agency disagrees, arguing substantial ev idence supports the juvenile court’s finding. We will address mother’s arguments as to each minor in turn and find the evidence supports the finding that the Agency provided reasonable visitation under the
circumstances.

A. The Applicable Law

“ Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings. (§ 361.5; [citations]; see 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7).) At the dispositional hearing, the court is required to order the agency to provide child welfare services to the child and h is or her parents. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Services ‘may include provision of a full array of social and health services to help the child and family and to prevent reabuse of children.’ (§ 300.2.) Reunification services should be tailored to the particu lar needs of the family.” ( In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) Visitation is an essential component of any such services provided pursuant to the reunification plan. ( In re Alvin R . (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972; accord , In re M.F., at p. 16.)
“A t each review hearing, if the child is not returned to his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether ‘reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent

. . . in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent

. . . ’ (§§ 366.21, subds. (e)(8) & (f)(1)(A), 366.22, subd. (a).) The ‘ adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency ’ s] efforts are judged according to t he
circumstances of each case. ’ [Citation.] To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, ‘ the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where14

compliance proved difficult

. . . . ’ ” ( In re M.F., supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13

- 14.)
The services provided d o not have to be the best services that could have been provided, rather they must have been reasonable under the circumstances. (See Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 [citing In re Misako R. (1991)
2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 ] .) The standard to be applied to a reasonable services determination under section 366.21, subd ivision (e)(8) where services to the parent are continued is unclear. The
statute does not say. (See 1 Seiser & Kuml i , Cal

. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2020) Part I Analysis, § 2.152 [noting where a § 366.26 hearing is not set, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)(A) does not specify which standard applies].) Under these circumstances, the preponderance of the evidence standard normally applies. (See Katie V. v. Superior
Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594 [citing Evid. Code , § 115].) However, a ssuming
without dec iding that a clear and convincing evidence standard applies, we still find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order.
As recently explained by our high court: “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evi dence, the question before the appellate court
is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence

. ” ( Conservatorship of O.B . (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011

- 1012.)

B. Analysis

B ecause of the severity of the abuse and the minors’ trauma as demonstrated at mother’s first supervised visit, the court ordered therapeutic visitation only after the15

minors were enrolled in individual counseling and mother enrolled in anger management and/or individual counseling. Mother did not object to this order entered at the detention hearing on Octo ber 22, 2019.
The so cial worker acted diligently, and the minors were enrolled in individual counseling by the originally scheduled disposition hearing on November 26, 2019 . While mother complained that she had not yet had any visits, the social worker explained that the parties were waiting on word from the minors’ counselors that they were ready to begin those therapeutic visits. Mother was reminded that she could file a noticed motion if she wanted to change the court’s order , and the visitation orde r remained in place as previously entered. Mother’s visitation order remained the same following the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on January 13, 2020 ( three hours per week supervised), recognizing that therapeutic visits with A.C. would only occur once cleared with her therapist. Mother’s counsel confirmed, “Just to be clear, so it’s between the therapist, the Department and [A.C.] as to when the visits will commence with the idea is hopefully soon.” A.C.’s counsel clarified, “Consulti ng [ with ] the therapist

. . . and I will ask for them to consult me as well.” Mother’s counsel did not object to this arrangement, stating: “Thank you.”

1. Visit ation with Z.C. Following this hearing , mother diligently visited Z.C. in person and later via video
chat as scheduled. These video chats were up to three hours once a week, but had to be reduced to one hour a week after Z.C. compl ained that he was “overwhelmed with all the
video telephone call visitations.” Z.C. was displaying signs of anxiety a nd acting out.
He sometimes shut down during visits and refused to participate. On one occasion, mother became upset when Z.C. tried to cut a video call short to go to the park. Mother called the police complaining that Z.C. was in danger due to coronav irus, resulting in16

Z.C.’s exclusion from park outings. Z.C. requested help in forming his mother that he wanted shorter visits. He was afraid to tell mother he did not want to visit, and when Z.C. attempted to cut visits short, mother ignored his efforts. The reduction in video visits also applied to grandparents and his siblings, which could be increased upon Z.C.’s request. Mother complains she was not afforded make

- up visits and should not have been
forced to continue with online visitation following the end of Yolo County’s stay

- at

home order. However, she has not shown that it was unreasonable given the
considerations of the ongoing C OVID

- 19 epidemic for the Agency to continue her supervised visits in an online medium , nor did she seek rel ief from the court for a ny perceived deficiency arising from the manner of those visits

. “On March 4, 2020, due to the outbreak of the COVID

- 19 virus, Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (W HO) declared COVID

- 19 a pandemic. On March 19, 2020, Governor Newsom issued an executive order directing all Californians not providing essential services to stay at home.” ( In re M.P . (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1016.) Likewise, on March 18, 2020 , Yolo County issued a shelter

- in

- place order, 1 ordering individuals to stay home because one of the known ways to prevent the spread of COVID

- 19 is “to limit interactions among people to the greatest extent practicable.” In recognition of the ongoing crisis, the J udicial C ounsel promulgated an emergency rule mea nt to address visitation in juve nile dependency proceedings , which would expire 90 d ays after the lifting of the state of emergency related to COVID

- 19 . ( See In re M.P

. , at p. 1017; Cal.

1 We grant mother’s request for judicial notice of this order, but find it unnecessary to take judicial notice of the Yolo County April 30, 2020 , press release also attached to mother’s request.17

Rules of Court, a ppen

. I [Emergency Rules Related to COVID

- 19] , rule 6(d) .) However,

t he COVID

- 19 state of emergency endures. Emergency Rule 6(c)(7) states in pertinent part , “During the state of emergency
related to the COVID

- 19 pandemic, previously authorized visitation must continue, but the child welfare agency is to determine the manner of visitation to ensure that the needs of the family are met. If the child welfare agency changes the manner of visitation for a
child and a parent or legal guardian in reunification,

. . . the child welfare agency must notify the attorneys for the children and parents within 5 court days of the change. Al l changes in manner of visitation during this time period must be made on a case by case basis, balance the public health directives and best interest of the child, and take into
consideration whether in

- person visitation may continue to be held safely. F amily time is important for child and parent well

- being, as well as for efforts toward reunification. Family time is especially important during times of crisis.” This rule authorized an attorney for a minor or parent to seek modification of the changed m anner of visitation and made clear that the moving party bears “the burden of showing that the change is not in the best interest of the child or is not based on current public health directives.” (Cal. Rules of Court, a ppen

. I, Emer. Rule 6( c )(7)(A).) Even assuming , as mother now argues, that “better” visitation, such as visits in an outdoor fora, could have been provided at some point, perfection in services is not required. ( Elija h R. v. Superior Court, supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 969; In re Misako R.,

supra , 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 .) Emergency Rule 6 expressly authorized the Agency to modify the manner visitation, taking in consideration the public health directives, best
interes t of the child, and safety considerations. (Cal. Rules of Cour t, a ppen

. I, Emer. Rule 6( c )(7).) We are unconvinced that the record shows that the Agency failed to abide by this directive. Nor are we convinced by mother’s argument in her reply brief that the Agency’s alleged failure to notify her counsel within five court days that it was acting pursuant to its emergency authority provides additional support for mother’s argument18

that she was not afforded reasonable reunification services because she was denied due
process an d an opportunity to be heard

. It is undis puted that m other failed to challenge the Agency’s decision to require virtual visits via the emergency rules (Cal. Rules of Court, a ppen

. I, Emer. Rule 6( c )(7)(B)) or via a noticed motion for specific enforcement
of her court ordered visitation

. In the absence of such complaint , and in light of the reasonable visitation services provided , the record does not show the Agency abused its
discretion to set the manner of visitation. Further, mother’s argument that she should have been provided make

- up visits ignores th at her right to visitation may be curtailed in light of the “well

- being” of Z.C., who was clearly distressed by his three hour lo ng virtual visits with mother, as shown by his acting out prior to visits and refusal to participate in those visits

. (See Serena M. v. Superior Court ( 2020 ) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 673 [ “visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well

- being of the child” ] ; § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Thus, it
was reasonable for the social wo rker and Z.C.’s caregiver to limit his online visitation
time on a weekly basis. Under those circumstance s , it is clear that additional visits to “make

- up” any time lost in the shorter visits would not have been in Z.C.’s interest , and thus, it was reason able to refuse them

.

2. Visi t ation with A.C.
Mother argues the Agency failed to m ake reasonable efforts to overcome A.C.’s opposition to visiting. Mother had no visit s with A.C. in this reporting period because A.C. continued to refuse such visitation, affirming her choice in monthly meetings with
the social worker. A.C.’s therapist confirmed that A.C. had not indicated she wanted to
visit with mother. Mother had been pr eviously advised of her right to request a change order, but did not request a different visitation order or enforcement of the court’s prior
order for a three

- hour supervised therapeutic visit each week

. ( See In re So f ia M. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046 [when child cannot be persuaded to visit pursuant to a19

lawfully issued visitation order , it is incumbent upon the parent to move for juvenile court intervention].) However, as of the June 2 9 , 2020 addendum, A.C. had recently expressed interest
in a face

- to

- face therapeutic meet ing with mother so that A.C. could tell mother how mother’s actions impacted and continue d to impact her. The social worker coordinated
with both A.C. ’s and mother’s therapists regarding such a meeting, and mother’s therapist indicated pre

- meeting coachin g with mother would be required so that mother would be able to “stay in her space, stay present and absorb what her child is going to say
to her .” While, A.C. was concerned a bout signing a release so information could be shared with mother’s therapist be cause sh e worried such information might be disclosed
to mother , there is no indication this concern prevented the meeting. Thus, h ere, A.C. who had been in therapy since late 2019, had finally progressed to a point in June of 2020 where she was ready to contemplate a therapeutic session with her mother. Mother complains that this session had not occurred as of the August 3, 2020
six

- month status hearing. However, we do not find the delay in setting up this meeting unreasonable. On the contrary, mother ’s own therapist requested time to prepare mother for this difficult meeting. Given mother’s continuing denial that she had physically abused her children, it is manifestly reasonable that mother required coaching before meeting with A.C. to discuss that abuse and its impact on A.C. The reasonable efforts by
A .C.’s social wo rker as outline d above distinguishes this matter from In re Alvin R.,

supra , 108 Cal.App.4th at p ages 972

- 973 , where the social wo rker’s failure to timely aid the family i n securing individual therapy and apparent ignor ance of successive orders seeking to facilitate therapeutic visitation precluded a finding o f reasonable services. We , therefore, conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided to mother.20 I I Mother’s Minimal Progress
Mother complains the A gency’s lack of reasonable visitation services invalidates the juvenile court’s determination that she had made only minimal progress towards eliminating the need for the minors’ placement. At each six

- month review hearing the juvenile court must determine: “The extent of progress that has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care.” (§ 366, subd. (a)(1)(E).) Having previously rejected mother’s challenge to the visitation services provided her , we highlight the substantial evidence supporting the court’s minimal progress finding . ( See J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 530, 53 5 [ progress finding is evaluated by substantial evidence standard].) Mother failed out of her first anger management program, despite having attended 42 sessions, because mother refused to accept responsibility for her actions requiring her
treatment and f

ailed to meaningfully participate in groups. He r instructor reported mother’s minimal progress and continuing need “to work on accountability, taking responsibility, gain insight as to her issues and why her children were removed from her care.” While mo ther attended classes with limited participation, she continued to deny she physically abused her children and accused her daughter of lying. Stewart also
worried whether mother suffered from mental health issues that needed to be addressed.
Mother fail ed to sign the releases necessary to provide her second anger management instructor with the Agency information necessary to assure mother was receiving targeted treatment, which had consisted of an online self

- reported assessment
and workbook exercises. While mother had learned some new skills through individual therapy, mother’s therapist reported her continued den ial of any physical abus e of her
children.21

Further, while m other completed her parent education classes, her instructor
worried that mother needed more classes to further her understanding of “the importance of listening to her children and practicing safe discipline techniques” and that mother
needed to “engage in counseling services to increase her insight on the impact of her abuse on her children, [and] take responsibilit[y] for her action s .” This provider worried that mother was suffering from untreated mental health issues. Mother was also ordered to participate in a psychological evaluation , but knowingly failed to obtain a psychological evaluation that would comply with her case plan. Moreover, the Agency had difficulty communicating with mother, who refused to speak over the phone without reco rding the conversations and demanded that
communication be in e

- mail. However, mother’s e

- mail communication was one

- sided, with mother contacting the social worker when she wanted something, but failing to respond to or even acknowledge the social worker ’s e

- mails. M other further engaged in a pattern of participating in services, but failing to fully disclose and/or inaccurately disclosing the reason for the services, thus precluding a focus on the issues that mother
needed to address in order to be succ essful with her services. It was against this backdrop that the juvenile court found mother had made minimal progress even though she was taking classes because she failed to take responsibility for her actions and continued asserting that the minors (wh o feared her) were lying. Substantial evidence supports th e juvenile court’s finding. ( J.H. v. Superior Court, supra , 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 535 .)

III

The August 3, 2020 Visitation Order
Mother complains the juvenile court’s August 3, 2020 , visitation order from the
six

- month review hearing is in error because : (1) she should have been allowed to visit with Z.C. in person and (2) the court improperly delegated its power to determine22

mother’s rights to visitation under In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310 and In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41. Mother requests we remand the matter so that the juvenile court may conduct a new visitation hearing.
At the six

- month review hearing, Z.C.’s counsel argued for all visits with Z.C. to
be via Zoom. Counsel explained he was placed in a foster home with a high

- risk family member and that family had already lost another family member to C OVID

- 19. Further, Z.C. was doing well in this placement, necessitating the Zoom visitation. Counsel further requested that the number of visits between Z.C. and A.C. increase , that the number of
visits with mother be reduced , that Z.C. be allowed to decide whether he wanted to visit
mother , and that he should not be forced to visit. T he Agency h ad no objection to th ese request s . Mother’s counsel objected for the record: (1) that mother requested in

- person visits, (2) to discretion for visits not to occur, and (3) requested as many visits as possible. Mother complained the quality of visits wit h Z.C. would improve if conducted in person where he could not get distracted or avoid the video visit. The court ruled, “I do think all visitation for both [A.C.] and for [Z.C.], is completely up to them. If they don’t want to visit with Mom, they don’ t have to. I’m not going to force either one of those children to visit with their mother if they don’t want to.” Z.C.’s visit ation would continue on Zoom. That the minors would be allowed to
choose whether to visit with mother was further reflected in the court’s minute order which stated, “visits with mother are by children’s choice .” (Italics added.) The juvenile court altered this visitation order on October 22, 2020, ordering that A.C. would not have any visits with mother because those visits woul d be detrimental. 2 Also on October 22, 2020, the court ordered mother would have one hour per week of Zoom visits with Z.C., which could transition to in

- person visits providing they could be

2 We grant r espondent’s request for judicial notice of the Yolo Court’s October 22, 2020 minute order.23

safely conducted. Further, visits could increase following co nsultation with Z.C.’s
counsel. Mother has failed to persuade us that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering that mother’s visits with Z.C. should continue via Zoom. Z.C. was successfully stepped down into a therapeutic foster home with a high

- risk family member and a recent death in the family due to C OVID

- 19 . We see no abuse in the juvenile court balancing mother’s desire for in

- person visits with the dangers associated with the pandemic and Z.C.’s interest in maintaining his placement

. ( See In re R.R . (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
126 4 , 1284 [court’s visitation order balancing the rights of parent with well

- being of minor is reviewed for an abuse of discretion]. ) However, w e do concur that a visitation order giving A.C. and Z.C. sol e discretion
to determine whether any visits with mother would occur was error. ( See In re S.H.,

supra , 111 Cal.App.4th at p p

. 317

- 320 and In re Julie M, supra , 69 Cal.App.4th at
p p

. 4 8

- 5 1 .) Nonetheless , we find it unnecessary to remand for the requested visitation modification hearing because it appears that such a hearing has already taken place and
the erroneous express conditioning of visits up on the will of the minors was removed. Accordingly, there is no need to remand for a visitation modification hearing , even though it is proper for this court to identify the error given its potential to impact future proceedings in this matter

. (See, e.g., In re Dylan T . (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769

- 770 [mother’s release from jail did not moot challenge to juvenile court order denying mother visitation in support of reunification while incarcerated] ; In re C.C. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1488

- 1489 [addressing mother’s complaints concerning order denyin g visitation where that visitation was later restored because the original order could impact subsequent proceedings in the case] .)24 IV Mother’s Educational Rights
Mother complains the juvenile court’s order limiting her educational rights and vesting educa tional rights for both A.C. and Z.C. in their caregivers and CASA workers

was error

. Section 361, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes the juvenile court to limit a parent’s educational rights to a minor child as “necessary to protect the child” and only “in the best interests of” that child. We review the juvenile court’s order limiting mother’s education rights for an abuse of discretion. ( In re R.W . (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277.) We discern no error in limiting mother’s education al rights as to A.C., but we must reverse the order limiting mother’s education al rights as to Z.C.
The limitation of education al rights w as addressed a t the six

- month review hearing, but only as to A .C. While the court had originally indicated there was no reason to limit mother’s education al rights to the minors , the Agency thereafter requested A.C.’s
education al rights be granted to her current caregivers or shared in light of the lack of visitation, m other’s ongoing communication problems , and A.C.’s outstanding academic performance. The Agency argued under these circumstances, the individuals providing daily care for A.C. should “ have some input into her education.” A.C.’s c ounsel agreed
that the fo ster parents should have education al rights and argued that the CASA worker was also willing to hold education al rights, but that mother should not share those rights because of her problems with cooperation. Mother’s counsel objected, requesting that

mot her be allowed to share A.C.’s education al rights. Ultimately, the court determined A.C.’s education al rights would be held by A.C.’s foster parents and CASA worker

. However, the court’s findings and orders issued after the six

- month hearing limited mother’s rights as to both A.C. and Z.C

. We discern no abuse in t he court’s decision to limit mother’s education al rights to A.C. given the Agency and A.C.’s counsel explanation for limiting those rights.25

However, the juvenile cour t ’s order limit ing mother’s education al rights as to Z.C.
occurred with out any discussion at the hearing , any recommendation in the Agency’s
documents , or otherwise apparent reason why such a limitation was necessary to protect
Z.C. or serve his best inter ests. This was error.


### D ISPOSITION
The juv enile court’s order limiting mother’s education al rights as to Z.C. is reversed with directions for further proceedings to determine whether such limitation is actually necessary. The judgment is otherwise af firme d

.

HULL, J.

We concur:

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

RENNER, J.