REF RK8TRIGTEB 

TO FROM 

_Chief, v: ASA (10)_ Tech Staff (96)_ 

_ Asst to the Cluef (11)--1- Ch, Secunty Div (80)_ _ Co'r Jomt Oper (12)__ __ Tech Staff (81) __ 

_ Deputy Chlef, ASA (20)-1-- Ch, Materiel Br (82) __ 

Secretariat (20)71 _ Ch, Methods Br (83)_ 

Ch, Comm Res Sec (14) __ I ___ Ch, Protective Br (84)_ 

Ch, Hist Umt (18)_ __ Ch, Mamt Br (85)_ 

Ch, Pers Sec (21)__ __ Ch, Res & Dev Div (70)_ 

Ch, Org & Tng Sec (22)-- Tech Staff (71)_ 

Ch, Plans & Oper Sec (23)_ Ch, C1ph & CJ.f Br (72) __ 

Ch, Material Sec (24)_ Ch, Int Eqmp Br (73)_ 

Ch, Fiscal Sec (25)__ Ch, Electromech Br (74) __ 

AdJutant General (26)___ Ch, Lab Serv Br (75)_ 

Ch, Sec Cont Sec (27)_ Ch, Cryptologic Br (76) __ 

_ Ch, Operations Div (90) __ 1 __ Ch, Electromcs Br (77)_ 

Ch, Lab Br (91)_ I ___ Ch, Pers & Tng Br (61)_ 

Ch, Machme Br (92)_ I ____ Cb, Supply Br (62) __ 

Ch, Crypt Br (93) ___ I _ _ CO, Arlmgton Hall (40) __ 

Ch, Int Cont Br (94) __ I __ -------- Ch, I & D Br (95)_ 1 ______ _ 

( ) ..,Approval & Return 

( 0" As Requested 

( ) Concurrence or Comment 

( ) Information & Forwarding 

( ) Information & Return 

( ) Information & File 

( ) Recommendation 

( ) Signature Jf Approved 

( ) Your Action by 

( ) For recommended reply 

+. Herewith two papers. 

a. Draf't of ASA comment on prooosed memo.from 

C,/s-USA_to Joint (,biefs, Subject Establishment of a 

Joint Intelli~ence Bureau. Comment was coordinated 

WJ th AS-20 srui: AS-9Q.__.,N.Qt.fL.:!Lba.t I mak:e no reference to 

GLINI' material in comment, in view of classification of 

basjc paper, which_perhaos P.lll'.Q.QS~lef~ GLIN.I' out of 

the picture. ___ b. 1:'.raposed ia1ru:L.i'.TI:ll!Ll>.Ll-J'&__Cha.llma...n,_JIS_Q;rn_,_ 

Subject: Maximum. Exploitation of COMINI'. This paper, 

hs sad upon the l st draft whJ ch yon al reaey__ have seen, _ 

was worked over ~ith two collaborators who shall be 

eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-24-2014 pursuant to 

.0. 13526 
REF ID:A61194 

anonymous and who, I think, did an excellPnt JOb. 

2. Su~gest both papers be presented to D/I 

rith exple.nation that the 2d one 'ltas a bearing on 

lat. The latter would make an excellent first step 

in a proper airection and would be most help£ul to 

the 2d. Both plans, if executed, ~ou~d su~plement 

each other and put us a long way forward to~ard 

establishing a really efficient intelligenc~ service. 

The last step ~oul~ be to inte~rate and unifycryptanalytic processing and the three steps would \ 

put us at least on a par 1\ith British. Cf>""{T\ i:&.tr~ 

. 

J 
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DR11! \ 

MEMORANDUM FORa Director of Intelligence, GSUSA 

\ 

SUBJEC'l's laxi11W11 Exploitation of GOMIBr 

\ 

l. Herewith 1• a proposed memorandum for the Chairman or USCIB; Subject 1 

Maximum Exploitation ot COMillT. 

2. This paper ha.a aa its obJect the establishment of a eingle organization 

for the eYaluation and oiaaemination of cofll"liUnication intelligence. It proposes 

to do for COMINT, at least in ~e•pect to the Matter or eYaluation and diasemin:s.-

tion, the same thing that you propose tor other ihtalligenc• in t~~ paper on 

the subjects >stablishm&nt of a Joint Intelli~snce 1'ur&au~ 

3. A Joint Intelligence Bureau and a ce~trai organization for the eva~uation and dissemination ot COJJINI' would complement •acb other in important raepecta 

and both mtepa would take the U.S. a long ~8:1' fol'lM.l'd in eatabliahing a much more 

efficient int&lligerice •ervice tor the U. S. Qovernment. 

4. The final step would be, or couree, th~ real integration of COMINT 

processing, b7 unifying the operatione of the latt•r p~oceseing agencie• 

Ullder a single h.ad, either lt.lon~ the linea propo1ed by the Army in the Stone 

Report or alon~ eiailar lines. 

CARI'EP w. cunn: 

Colonel, Si'£1lfll Corpa 

Chief, army Security Agency-

(tU rnru rn, ~., I •· ' 
e REF 

1 

naou.1Wlni FOR• THE c~1AIR'4Ali t1SOIB 

$lJIJIC!; Ml.xi.am t.xploitation of OOMillr. 

1. Under the pr•eent. org&l).i•ation ot US COlllfl',. the gO't'ernment 

11 not provided Yith total intelligence derivable .tram Co.MIR!' aou~ce 

aater1al. 

2.. ! revi•• 0£ t.ha preaent method• of producing and dlaaeminating 11'.te.l.llge.nc• f':rorn this aourc• indicatae t.hat l"adical cha.ngea in theae 

••thode mu.at 119 made it USCIB i• tQ :f"ultill all or it• re1pon•ibilitie1. 

). a. A atu.d7 llu been pr11pa.rtd by ID,. GSUSAt whicloi examines preaent 

US C(l{DlT exploit•tion and. duaem1:nat1on with the purpose ot determinina 

a aethod which will pro<ride t"Ull exploitation at thia source and insure 

aaximum et'f1ciency, aecurit7, tillelineaa, and econof11¥. Xn this atudr, th• 

following recomm.•nda.tiona are ma.des 

{l) '!'hat a central COIM evaluating unit be 1et up at one 

0£ the USCIB technical lli&nci••• 

(2) That tlrl• unit be :reepomible tor th.e production ot all 

inte~ce ba..-d on COMIN'l' and for the public.,t1on a.nd d1a1emina.tion ot 

a.11 ltuch intelligence to ti. S., goTernm-.nt }'C°aonnel authorized to receiYe it. 

(l) That each USCIB !Hllber con.tribute. per•onnel to thia oenter, , 

such p81'1omiel to be a.dminiatratiY•~ subordinate to th.air respective 4epartment1 lllld. operational.lT •ubordinate to the C~ie.f' or the technical agency 

a.nd tD have th• dual naponaib1lit7 or producill8 total 1ntalligence to:r th• 

lat.tonal SecuritT Council and intel.U.gence ot pl"ima.17 interest \o t.heir 

respective department•. 
REF ID:A61194 

(4) That upon the e.tabli•h.ment of the central unit, all 

ex1at1ng COMDT evaluating units of the five USCIB aembe1'• be diesolTed., 

b. TJie complete text o£ the etud7 i• attached aa Incloeure l. 

4. I't 1• r•quested that the recouandation• ma.de in thi1 atudT 

be placed Oll the Agenda tor di•CU•s1on at the next regular ••&ting of 

tl'SCII. 

l nci. 

t 

61JN7 
REF ID:A61194 

e 

SUBJPX;t s llarlJllUll Exploitation o£ COMINT. 

l. Th• .t>robl1111 To exam.ili.e present TJS c01.tm exploitation and 

diaaea1nation in order to deteraine a method w~lch •ill provide .tall 

nploitation of thia aouroa with the maximum efficiency, eeclll"ity, 

timeliness, and econo1117. 

2. f!.qt1 Blaring on the Ptgbl.Efma 

a. The U.S. annually expende approximately ')J5,000,000 for the 

technical. production ot COMINT ~a• material. It has rough]3' a $48,000,000 

plant inves~ment in the facilities or the USCIB technical agencies, ASA, 

and CS!'I. 

b. Ea.oh of the member• of USCIB maintain& a COM:INl' eva.luating and 

dia•eainating unit. For the mo•t part, the work or these five unite is not 

coordinated and, to date, there haa not been produced an integrated, comprehensive, COMiltt eetillate covering an.y given wbject from the point of vi•• 

or total U.S. intelligence requirements. Under the pro1ent arrang91llent, 

there ia no proTision tor the timel.T application ot total GOlillft' to the 

intelligence requireJlente of the Bational Security Council or the policy 

planners or the depa'rtment• 0£ USCIB. 

.. ·.. · .· ... · 

EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

I ,.._. 

;- f ,,_ 
e REF ID : i\il ~~- (h)( ) 9 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 fi\ rrafF\ [fi) rr I 

I 

IJ -flLINf 

3. ;ui1a11isa 

a. The unique and •ital natu!'"e or OOllDT and the co.t or COVIi'!' 

production require arrangement• nich can provide the United Ste.tea with 

maxiaua exploitation or this •ource. The present arrangement• tor the 

evaluation and dia•em.ination ot COMilft' preclude such exploitation. They 

are not efficient, not secure, and not economical, and, •oreover, they 

f'ail to insure timeq di•••ination ol' intelligence. 

(1) EUicienCYt The five COMINT evaluation unita produce and 

disseminate a number or publieatione co•erin~ fields of p~imary interest 

to their reepective dapartment ... -e.g., the MILITARY DIGEST (Army); th9 

SOVIET IRrELLIGE~E SU?et ARY (le.VT); the DIPLOMA.TIC SUF .. AR! (produc•d largeq 

b7 State under the authority ot USCIB); ORDER o.F BATTL'f (Ar117, Na.,,,-11 Alr}J 

and special atudie1 {all department•). Th.eae publications contain eTaluated 

COlfINT on •arioua .ubjaota. Occaa1onal]T,. the ll8Jlle nw material--ltValuated 

from the point of view or the Department 1nvolved-... 1• uaed • .• aa the baeia for 

reports .from two or more ot the unite. To date, there haa .not been produced 

an 1nteifrated CO.MINT eetiDla.te covering an;y given aubJect t'J:oom tho point ot 

view of total U.S. intalligenoe requirements. For exa.aple,thae ia not 

available to the National Securit7 Council a combined COMI!lt eat111a.ta of the 

11.ilitar7 oapabilitiea and industrial potential of th~ lor, under the 

pre1ent arrangementa, could a combined eat!IQl.te be produced with IRlfticient 

apeed to make weh an undertaking practicable, and pol.ic7 leY•l reo1pienta 

or OOJIIIT receive a Yariet.7 o.f ~reporta, which mq duplicate, or 

conflict with, one another, and which the reader hiaaelt 11tt11t ty!rt.heaize. 

2 
• 

Ia addition to ita aMPU&t1on i"roa othe' C<llIBl' unite, each ot th• fiTe 

eYaluating •nita or USCI8 function• more or l••• apal"t troa th• general 

intellipnoe units •ithin it• depar'bl4ini and, ot 00Ul"la1 troll the &eneral 

intellig•no• units at the other d•p.wtment•. Such ura.ncement•, «.ltbqh 

nece••ar.r hr COflilr ROUrit7 lJDder preaent conditicma, inhibit rapid, direct 

application of collatel"al int•ll!,c•n.o• to CCJl.nrt ud ailitate against the 

tim•l¥ production ot total illt•J.ll&'tt.lO• 011 a giftll cbJeot both within and 

uona the US.CID ••here. 

(a) 'fJ!•lt.JMe11• Clea:r-qJ the nlue ot all 1ntelllgenc• depend• 

to a large extent on 1te tiaelin•••· !hi• i• partieularlt true ln the 

•••• ot COMilft'. A ••••&• 1micat111g iapedding a.tta.ek diaaa1d.nated. atter 

the fact i• ot acad.aic 1.nterell't onq. Under th• pr•tent arn.ng•ent•, 

ho•v•r, th.• inevitable \~-lag resulting trom th• ••paration of the 

.five naluating agenciee from -.ch other, and or -.ch or th.ea fraa one or 

both of the prooeesin.g &genci••· eff'ttctiYel)" reduce• the ch&Jiee• o£ 

receiTi.ng such a ••••I• 'bettor. it 1• tH late to act.. (It. 1• .aaawaed &• 

&. strong probe.bill 'Q' tha.t no ••sage will contain pont.i••• .. ir-widen.t 

indication or hostile intent ..... without naluat.1•n on the b&•i• ot other 

intonation f.Til.Uable at one or all et. the int•lligenc• unit•. ) IA addition, ,-

the hPa:t'ation o£ evalua.tiq aad tecbnioal. elt• mu•• 11apo•a1blo the t:lllel;r 

p:reparatiOil ot ba•ic COII.11' lltudi•• on .mbJeota ~ joi.nt 1Atereat and the 

aaintet:ta$:e ot SUQb .tudiea at a cu.rnnt da.te leftl. 

(3) lferitra Tb• diati-1 but.ion ot CQIUIT ra.• •t•rial to 

five intelliaence miit• in 'la.ahington pr••ezrt.a ~ obviou p_.aical HOU.rity 
.. REF ID:A61194 

_ ...... 

l 

baa.rd. Th• 1eparation t4 lhe•e unit• troa the technical agoncie1 ioequire1 

the publication ot indiTidual •••u.g• texta, notated ao a• to renal th• 

cryptographic qatem in 'fihich they were Hnt and the radio oirouita .f'roa 

which the7 were interceptecr-'a practice •bich rtrreala the co:r. ot US 

COJIIBr operation•& apecU'i• atatu• of oryptana.ljytio attack. Th• poasibilit7 

cannot be ignored that th.t figid ••cur1t7 measure• adopted. b7" the USSR are 

a direct result or the i~urit7 inherent in the pre•ent COYINr organ1mation 

in the United states. 

(4) leonoRI !ha existence of five COMM evaluating unita 

reault• in exc-eas1Te expenc11Vr•• for per•onnel and eQuipment and 

oonaiderable duplication tt !'fort. Thi• duplication ot ettort reaulta in w 

a di•aipation o£ the lbt.~, &Yailable, qualified tna!lpower and lillit1 the 

qualit7 and quantity or P'UT produc•4. In addition, it oreatee the need 

for publiahing aan;r c:opitJ at the COMilll' raw material, for a large courier 

1erTio•, f'or auer.al f ilel ot the l&lle aateri&l, and tor the publication by 

the technical apnci•• o;t ..a 1ta1 which could have beu. discarded at th• 

1"irat stage ot procaalfiJ:ll Ir m evaluating group had been cloae at hand to , 

gUide the work of the t•~Uli•. 

b. The eatabliahhnt of a. aingle CCllll'l' naluating unit, located 

at one of the USCII tec~oal agencies, would eliminate the disadvantage• 

deecribed in para. a., a.btt:' and would inaure tull exploitation or COMm 

with maximu.a efficienc1, &.a.uneea, 11ecur1t7, and ecoJlOlll1. 

(l) Ettic\'1' ~ 

(a} sup. a. arrang•ent. would provide, at the verr leaat, 

~~ 

the phf 1ical conc!itiona n for collaboration among the COMIBT 

fii) ,-

evaluating peraonnel or I rJ · 
.. REF ID:A61194 

-4-1-Hl-+l+l--.L:f--~~-mT"irr-t'lt -I f{,ltN i 

(b) Baa!c COJIINl' evaluation would be improved, for the 

£ollowing reaaona1 

(i) The raw material would be evaluated at ita 

•ouroe--an opti)IUll condition tor acour&te intelligence production. 

{ii) Inte;ration ot other aource intelligence with 

OOMilfi' would be taoilltated. The technical. ageno,., !"or ita own crn>tanaqtic 

purpoae11, au.et maintain central tiles or intelligence :report.a £!-om all 

aouroea. The eingle evaluating UJ'lit, through the oollateral !'"ilea of the 

technical agenc;r, would haYe direct aoceas to the mat•rial from other 

intel.ligenc• sourcea no• ••parate:i,- held by' eaoh ot the tive USCIB member•. 

(iii) lxploitation ot COllIIfr in the fields ot prima17 

interest to each of the USCIB member• would be improved b)' the proximit;r 

of naluatora to tranal&tor1 and t:raff ic anal;r.t•. 

(c) COMDIT operation• ae a whole would be improved. The 

quick and unillpeded exchange of new 1dea1, new developaanta, and new 

intelliaence or technical requirement• would greatq increase the et.ficienc7 

ot both technical and evaluating perao!1ll•l• 

(d) 11niehed GLIJ'J.' intell1~ance would be available tor 

d1aaea1nat1on to polio7-level r.c1piant1 in a fol'll d•eigned to meet their 

n•eda--1.e., the7 w~uld receive total COMil'fr on a i1Ten 11Ubject, 1n one 

117nth••ised report. 

(2} Timelly11• 

(a) The prox:ill.ity of evaluating personnel to techniCJal 

peraonnel would permit d11carding of unimportant material at the earllatt 

stage• ot ceyptanali:v'aie and, in 10 reducing the ma11 or material f\tl.q 

prooe1aad, would expedite rr 

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.. 

REF ID:A61194 • 

eonnaera cauld be ap.d.ltiouq 1n1tialed and cmrrelltly maintained. 

(e} ~nation Of the publication aac1 dellTery of M.iJ,T 

eopi•• ot COlllf.r ra.• •t•r~ would wbstaitla1.J3 :re4u.oe the ti11e lag between 

•••1&&• JOl.ut1on cd llftlut,ion. 

(J) S•2£1k' '.A-

(a) 1'h• d111eaination ot OOJIIlfl' ra.w aatvial outaid• the 

technical apnci•• would b4 reduced to a ilinialua. 

(b} Xnowledge ct the dear•• ot speeitic OJ'Tptan~i,..tio 

1L1Cce•• could fMlrf eaall,y be lillit•d to work!J31 pe:taonnel with the need to 

know and, in the caae or en.luat1J,lg pernnnel, confined to ona inat.a.lla.tion. 

(4) 1£11911' 

(a) Diaaard ~ urdJlport.ant -.taial at earlieat at&1•• 

of eJ7Pt&naJTtic proc•••ing w(mld reduce the total coat of' intelligence 

proiluced ill :relatiouhip to total material Foo••ad• 

(b) lublica:tion co•t• would be iu.taial]¥ reduced. 

(c) Duplication dE intellig•?JO• £ile8 , with ite attend.ant 

u.n•conoaioal u.. of liaited. space and par.onnel, a.i1d unnecessary duplicatiou 

ot effort. at the irrluation leyal would be eliminated. 

4. lsnala•&ous 

a. A central. COllil'l' naluating llld.t ahon.ld 'be Mt up at one ot 

:;.-

the t-*!m.1c•l age~oiea, witk the r•aponaib111tf f'or producing &11 iittelligenoe 

baaed o. COJltNT and di•anin&tinc all BtlCh intelligence to u.s. govermuo.t. 

' 
• • l .. 

'1: 

\ ... b. .Each USCIB m•b31* th6llld contribute personnel to this cen~.- • # 

Such peraonnel ahould pel"tors thfi dual 'f\l,notion ot producing to'tal int.ell!- ,\ 

gence tor the lla.tiona.l Seeur!t7 cm&cil and i:ltelligenoe of' prblaJ!7 int.ereat 

t- "' to their respective department1. 

o. Upon the eatabUlhment ot the •u..tral unit, 8l:l erl.eting 

COliilfl' evaluating unite ot the tin USCiit ll,.,&J:i:. ahould be d11aolTad. 

' 

~ ' 

a. A eantz-al CCl4Ill' ft'aluat ing tUttt b• •.t up at one of the trSCIB 

' ' 

technical agenciea. ' ' 

r 

b. Thia unit be reapona1ble tor '~ pl"CKtuctt.on of all intelligenc• \ 

baaed on COMDI' and for the publication ~ ~h•••inat~9n qt all au.oh 

i I \) ' 

intelligence to t1.S. gOTerment peraonnel .,t.bor1z9d to' ~·~e1~e it. 

f \ .... 

c,. Each USCIB 11e11ber oontl"ibut• p•eonnel to thie cent-.r, eueh 

per1onnel to be e.da1nietrati1'e]T ll'tlbordina.te. to their reapacttn department• 

and operational]3 subordinate to the Chiet at the tet1hnical agency and to 

' 

have the dual raeponaibility or producing totil intelligence for the 

National Securit7 Council &.nd intelligence of primary interest to their 

respective fepartmenta. 

d. Upon ' the e.tabliabment ot the oentral \1]rl.t, all existinc 

OOJIM evaluating units ot the tiT• USC!B mel..ber• b• di•aolved. 

~ 

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