Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 150 / Thursday, August 5, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 47203 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding 

a new airworthiness directive to read as 

follows: 

2010–15–03 Eurocopter France: 

Amendment 39–16369. Docket No. 

FAA–2010–0713; Directorate Identifier 

2009–SW–63–AD. 

Applicability: Model EC 130 B4 helicopters 

that have been modified in accordance with 

MOD 073774, and have not had MOD 073591 

nor the modification specified in Eurocopter 

Drawing No. 350A085340 incorporated, 

certificated in any category. 

Compliance: Required within 10 hours 

time-in-service (TIS), unless accomplished 

previously. 

To detect interference and prevent damage 

to an electrical harness by a lower structure 

fairing attachment screw (attachment screw), 

which could lead to short-circuiting of 

various warnings, inflation of the emergency 

floatation gear (emergency floats) during 

flight, and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter, accomplish the following: 

(a) Remove the lower forward right-hand, 

left-hand, and center fairings. 

(b) Inspect each electrical harness for 

chaffing, a tear, a hole, or other damage at the 

location of each attachment screw as 

depicted in Details B, C, and D in Figure 1 

in Eurocopter Emergency Alert Service 

Bulletin No. 88A001 R1, dated April 17, 2007 

(EASB), and as shown at point (a) in Figure 

2 and Figure 3 in the EASB. 

(1) If there is no chaffing, tear, hole, or 

other damage to the electrical harness at any 

attachment screw: 

(i) Determine the length of each attachment 

screw that secures the fairings. Replace any 

attachment screw that is longer than 14mm 

with an airworthy attachment screw, part 

number (P/N) A0164TK050S014X; 

(ii) Install the spacer on the electrical 

harness in accordance with paragraph 

2.B.3.a. of the Accomplishment Instructions 

of the EASB; 

(iii) Relocate the electrical harness on the 

cable holders in accordance with paragraph 

2.B.3.b. of the Accomplishment Instructions 

of the EASB; and 

(iv) Install the harness clamp blocks in 

accordance with paragraph 2.B.4. of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the EASB. 

(2) If there is chaffing, a tear, a hole, or 

other damage to an electrical harness at the 

location of an attachment screw, remove any 

protective tape from the electrical harness as 

shown at point (b) in Figure 2 of the EASB 

and inspect the insulation on each electrical 

wire and cable strand for chaffing, a tear, a 

hole, or other damage at the attachment 

screw location. 

(i) If there is no chaffing, tear, hole, or 

other damage to the insulation on any wire 

or cable strand, wrap the electrical harness 

with protective tape and comply with 

paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iv) of this 

AD. 

(ii) If there is chaffing, a tear, a hole, or 

other damage to the insulation on any 

electrical wire or cable strand, but the 

electrical wire or cable strand is not 

damaged, wrap the electrical wire or cable 

strand that has damaged insulation with 

protective tape and wrap the electrical 

harness with protective tape, then comply 

with paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iv) of 

this AD. 

(c) If 3 or less electrical wires or cable 

strands in the same immediate area are 

damaged: 

(1) Repair each damaged electrical wire or 

cable strand with an extension lead, P/N 

E0541–10, in accordance with the Appendix 

to the EASB; test the electrical continuity of 

the repaired electrical wire or cable strand 

using an ohmmeter, continuity test light, or 

equivalent device; and functionally test the 

system affected by the repair; 

(2) Wrap the electrical harness with 

protective tape; and 

(3) Comply with paragraphs (b)(1)(i) 

through (b)(1)(iv) of this AD. 

(d) If 4 or more electrical wires or cable 

strands in the same immediate area are 

damaged: 

(1) Contact the Safety Management Group, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, ATTN: George 

Schwab, Aviation Safety Engineer, 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas, 76137, 

telephone (817) 222–5114, fax (817) 222– 

5961, for an approved electrical conductor 

repair procedure; and 

(2) Comply with (b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iv) 

of this AD. 

(e) Reinstall the fairings. 

(f) Contact the Manager, Safety 

Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

FAA, ATTN: George Schwab, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, 

Texas, 76137, telephone (817) 222–5114, fax 

(817) 222–5961, for information about 

previously approved alternative methods of 

compliance. 

(g) The Joint Aircraft System/Component 

(JASC) Code is 3297: Landing Gear System 

Wiring. 

(h) The inspections, modifications and 

repairs, if needed, shall be done in 

accordance with the specified portions of 

Eurocopter Emergency Alert Service Bulletin 

No. 88A001 R1, dated April 17, 2007. The 

Director of the Federal Register approved this 

incorporation by reference in accordance 

with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

Copies may be obtained from American 

Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 Forum Drive, 

Grand Prairie, TX 75053–4005, telephone 

(800) 232–0323, fax (972) 641–3710, or at 

http://www.eurocopter.com. Copies may be 

inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional 

Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham 

Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://www.archives.

gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_

regulations/ibr_locations.html. 

(i) This amendment becomes effective on 

August 20, 2010. 

Note: The subject of this AD is addressed 

in European Aviation Safety Agency (France) 

AD No. 2006–0344 R1, dated May 10, 2007, 

which revises European Aviation Safety 

Agency Emergency AD No. 2006–0344–E, 

dated November 13, 2006. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on July 8, 

2010. 

Scott A. Horn, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–17282 Filed 8–4–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0403; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–166–AD; Amendment 

39–16379; AD 2010–16–03] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell 

Douglas Corporation Model MD–11 and 

MD–11F Airplanes Equipped With 

General Electric CF6–80C2 Series 

Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Model MD–11 and MD–11F airplanes. 

This AD requires revising the airplane 

flight manual to advise the flightcrew to 

use certain procedures during descent 

in certain icing conditions. This AD 

results from reports of several in-flight 

engine flameouts, including multiple 

dual engine flameout events, in icecrystal icing conditions. We are issuing 

this AD to ensure that the flightcrew has 

the proper procedures to follow in 

certain icing conditions. These certain 

icing conditions could cause a multiple 

engine flameout during flight with the 

potential inability to restart the engines, 

and consequent forced landing of the 

airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective September 9, 

2010. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 


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other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, 

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 

Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, California 90712–4137; 

telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562) 

627–5210. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain Model MD–11 and MD–11F 

airplanes. That NPRM was published in 

the Federal Register on April 7, 2008 

(73 FR 18719). That NPRM proposed to 

require revising the airplane flight 

manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew 

to use certain procedures during descent 

in certain icing conditions. 

Other Relevant Proposed Rulemaking 

NPRM, Docket No. FAA–2008–0402, 

Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–165–AD 

(73 FR 18721, April 7, 2008), proposes 

to require similar actions for Model 747 

airplanes and Model 767 airplanes, 

certified in any category, equipped with 

General Electric Model CF6–80C2 or 

CF6–80A series engines. These 

airplanes have been determined to be 

subject to the identified unsafe 

condition addressed in this AD. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received. 

Support for the NPRM 

The Air Line Pilots Association, 

International supports the intent and 

language of the NPRM. The National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 

based on the success of similar AFM 

requirements to address this unsafe 

condition on Hawker Beechcraft 

Corporation Model 400, 400A, and 400T 

series airplanes and Model MU–300 

airplanes, supports the adoption of the 

proposed requirements. 

Request for FAA To Actively Pursue 

Research To Develop a Permanent 

Solution 

The NTSB notes that the NPRM is 

intended as interim action, and points 

out that it has issued Safety 

Recommendation A–06–59, dated 

August 25, 2006. In this safety 

recommendation the NTSB asked the 

FAA to ‘‘* * * work with engine and 

airplane manufacturers and other 

industry personnel as well as the 

appropriate international airworthiness 

authorities to actively pursue research 

to develop an ice detector that would 

alert pilots to internal engine icing and 

require that it be installed on new 

production turbojet engines, as well as 

retrofitted to existing turbojet engines.’’ 

Therefore, the NTSB hopes the FAA 

pursues research in concert with the 

multinational Aircraft Icing Research 

Alliance that might develop an ice 

detector to alert flightcrews to the 

accretion of ice crystals on internal 

engine surfaces, so that flightcrews can 

take the appropriate actions. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s request. We agree that the 

General Electric (GE) CF6–80C2 series 

engine needs to be modified to mitigate 

the risk of flameouts caused by ice 

crystal accretion. However, at this time, 

we do not agree to pursue research to 

develop an ice detector that would alert 

flightcrews to the internal engine icing, 

or with requiring manufacturers to 

install ice detectors internal to the 

engines. In addition, no such designs 

have been proposed to the FAA. Instead, 

for future designs, we are developing 

rulemaking to show acceptable engine 

operation in an ice crystal environment. 

For engines that currently demonstrate 

a susceptibility to ice crystals, we are 

working with manufacturers to develop 

engine design changes to make engines 

more robust during ice crystal 

accumulation and shedding encounters. 

We will continue to provide feedback to 

the NTSB through the established 

process for addressing safety 

recommendations. For this AD, if 

different methods to address the unsafe 

condition are developed, under the 

provisions of paragraph (h) of this AD, 

we will consider requests for approval 

of an AMOC if sufficient data are 

submitted to substantiate that the 

method would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. No change to the AD is 

necessary in this regard. 

Request To Require Demonstration of 

Non-Susceptibility in Future Designs 

The NTSB states that it hopes the 

FAA will require future engine designs 

to demonstrate that they will not be 

susceptible to the accretion of ice 

crystals on internal surfaces. The NTSB 

points out that this request is in keeping 

with information provided to the NTSB 

by an FAA icing expert during a briefing 

with the Safety Board. 

From these statements, we infer that 

the NTSB is requesting that we revise 

the NPRM to include a statement of our 

intent to require manufacturers to 

demonstrate that future engine designs 

are not susceptible to the accretion of 

ice crystals. We partially agree. We 

agree that current FAA regulations 

addressing engine and airplane icing do 

not apply to the ice crystal environment; 

therefore, we are working with the 

aviation industry to develop appropriate 

regulations that address operation in an 

ice crystal environment. As we 

determine the necessary requirements to 

address this issue, we will consider 

additional rulemaking. We do not agree 

to revise this AD to include a statement 

regarding future regulations that have 

not yet been determined. No change to 

the AD is necessary in this regard. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM 

GE acknowledges that a small number 

of inclement weather or significant 

weather system encounters have 

resulted in short-duration multiple 

engine power loss. GE points out that 

these few events occurred out of 14 

million flights over 20 years of total 

service experience on the Model CF6– 

80C2 series engine. GE states that a 

forced landing resulting from one of 

these in-flight ice-crystal icing events is 

extremely improbable (including 

demonstrated relight performance). 

Therefore, GE asserts that the proposed 

condition does not meet the definition 

of ‘‘unsafe condition,’’ as defined by 

FAA Advisory Circular 39–8, 

‘‘Continued Airworthiness Assessments 

of Powerplant and Auxiliary Power Unit 

Installations of Transport Category 

Airplanes,’’ dated September 8, 2003. 

From these statements, we infer that 

GE requests that we withdraw the 

NPRM. We do not agree. We have 

evaluated the unsafe condition and find 

that sufficient data exist to demonstrate 

that the environment that causes the 

engine flameout would likely cause 

engine damage that potentially would 

prevent an engine from relighting. The 

condition could exist on all of an 

airplane’s engines, resulting in a forced 

landing. The advisory circular 

referenced by the commenter merely 

provides guidance. We have determined 

that an unsafe condition exists, and the 

appropriate vehicle for correcting an 

unsafe condition is an AD. We have not 

changed the AD regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Wording of the 

Unsafe Condition 

Boeing proposes that we revise the 

wording of the unsafe condition from, 

‘‘These certain icing conditions could 

cause a multiple engine flameout during 


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flight without the ability of the engines 

to be relit * * *’’ to ‘‘These certain icing 

conditions may cause a multiple engine 

flameout during flight, with the 

potential inability to restart the engines 

* * *.’’ Boeing asserts that the wording 

in the NPRM overly conveys the 

likelihood of not being able to restart the 

engine(s) after flameout. While the 

possibility exists, Boeing confirms that 

all engines involved in all of the 

flameout events to date have been 

restarted in flight with subsequent 

normal landings. 

We agree. We acknowledge that none 

of the flameout events on this engine 

model to date have resulted in a forced 

landing due to the inability to restart the 

engines. We agree that the inability to 

restart the engines following flameout is 

possible, not probable. Therefore, we 

have revised the unsafe condition 

statement in the Summary section and 

paragraph (e) of this AD (specified as 

paragraph (d) of the NPRM) as proposed 

by Boeing. 

Requests To Revise Wording in the 

Discussion Section of the NPRM 

Boeing proposes that we revise the 

Discussion section of the NPRM to state 

that there have been seven engine 

flameout events, not six. Boeing states 

that it has received seven reports of 

flameout events on Model MD–11 

airplanes due to ice-crystal icing 

conditions. 

We acknowledge that Boeing has 

received seven reports, instead of the six 

specified in the NPRM. However, the 

Discussion section of the NPRM is not 

restated in the final rule; therefore, no 

change to the AD is necessary in this 

regard. 

GE suggests that we revise the 

wording of the Discussion section of the 

NPRM to remove the word ‘‘core,’’ or, if 

that is not acceptable, to change ‘‘core 

flow path’’ to ‘‘booster and core flow 

path.’’ GE points out that the term ‘‘core’’ 

can be interpreted to mean just the highpressure spool portion of a turbofan. 

We partially agree. We do not agree 

with GE’s suggestion to remove the 

word ‘‘core’’ from the Discussion 

section. We do agree that the phrase 

‘‘booster and core flow path’’ is more 

accurate; however, because the 

Discussion section of the NPRM is not 

restated in this AD, there is no need to 

revise the AD in this regard. 

GE suggests that we revise the 

Discussion section of the NPRM to 

change the word ‘‘usually’’ to ‘‘often’’ in 

the following sentence: ‘‘Therefore, it 

[ice-crystal icing] is usually undetected 

by the flightcrew.’’ GE states that this 

change would make the NPRM 

consistent with a similar NPRM 

(Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–165– 

AD, Docket FAA–2008–0402 (73 FR 

18721, April 7, 2008)), which addresses 

the same unsafe condition on certain 

Model 747 and 767 airplanes. 

From this statement, we infer that GE 

is requesting that we revise the 

Discussion section of the NPRM to 

clarify that ice-crystal icing is often 

undetected by the flightcrew, not 

usually undetected. We partially agree. 

We agree that the wording change 

suggested by GE would make this AD 

consistent with a similar NPRM that 

addresses the same unsafe condition on 

certain Model 747 and 767 airplanes. 

However, as previously noted, the 

Discussion section in the NPRM is not 

restated in this AD, therefore, there is no 

need to revise the AD in this regard. 

Requests To Revise the Costs of 

Compliance Section of the NPRM 

GE suggests that there should be an 

operational cost of compliance included 

in the proposed Costs of Compliance 

provided in the NPRM. GE states that, 

while increasing engine off-take or bleed 

does provide additional margin against 

flameout, doing so requires somewhat 

increased fuel burn. GE believes the 

proposed procedure would be required 

on a significant percentage of flights. 

Federal Express (FedEx) believes that 

the total cost of the NPRM has either not 

been fully considered, or has not been 

properly communicated. FedEx asserts 

that the cost of using wing and tail antiice increases fuel burn and exposes the 

airplane to additional reliability risks 

associated with increased use of the 

anti-ice system, while only providing a 

small incremental amount of 

effectiveness. FedEx also states that it 

estimates the increased fuel 

consumption to be 40 pounds for a 

descent from flight level (FL) 400 to 

landing. 

From these statements, we infer that 

GE and FedEx are requesting that we 

revise the Costs of Compliance section 

of the NPRM to provide an operational 

cost for increased fuel burn necessitated 

by use of the proposed AFM procedure. 

We do not agree. The cost information 

in AD actions describes only the direct 

costs of the specific action required by 

the AD: an AFM revision in this case. 

The estimated cost of this action 

represents the time necessary to perform 

only the actions actually required by 

this AD. We recognize that, in doing the 

actions required by an AD, operators 

might incur operational costs in 

addition to the direct costs. The cost 

analysis in AD rulemaking actions, 

however, typically does not include 

incidental or operational costs such as 

the time required for planning or other 

administrative actions, and, in this case, 

possible additional fuel costs. Those 

costs, which might vary significantly 

among operators, are almost impossible 

to calculate. Additionally, we have 

determined that the additional fuel burn 

necessitated by the AFM procedure 

would be insignificant. However, as we 

explain under ‘‘Request to Revise the 

Proposed AFM Text,’’ we have revised 

the procedure to allow the ANTI–ICE 

switches to be placed in the OFF 

position when icing conditions are no 

longer present or anticipated. This 

allowance will further reduce any 

additional fuel burn caused by the use 

of the anti-ice system. We have not 

changed the Costs of Compliance 

section of this AD in this regard. 

Request To Include Alternative AFM 

Requirements 

FedEx recommends that we revise the 

NPRM to allow alternative AFM 

requirements based on the full authority 

digital engine control (FADEC) 

electronic control unit (ECU) installed 

software version. FedEx states that GE 

has documented six flameout events 

suspected to be a result of ice-crystal 

accretion. FedEx points out that GE 

Service Bulletin 73–21–07, Engine fuel 

and control—Electronic Control Unit 

Introduction of Software Version 8.3.K 

(8322), was introduced to improve the 

flameout margin in ice-crystal 

conditions. FedEx explains that this 

software change will create new engine 

control configurations with enhanced 

variable bypass valve (VBV) scheduling 

logic for inclement weather, and will 

change the scheduling of the VBVs at 

high altitude to increase ice extraction 

from the booster-core flowpath 

transition to the fan exit stream. FedEx 

believes there have been no suspected 

flameout events on airplanes using the 

combination of engine anti-ice and ECU 

software version 8.3.K on Model MD– 

11s, and indicates that it is upgrading its 

fleet to ECU software version 8.3.K in 

accordance with AD 2007–22–07, 

Amendment 39–15243 (72 FR 60227, 

October 24, 2007), applicable to GE 

CF6–80C2D1F turbofan engines. 

Therefore, FedEx proposes that 

airplanes with ECU software version 

8.3.J or previous should follow the AFM 

requirement proposed in the NPRM, and 

airplanes with software version 8.3.K or 

subsequent should be allowed to follow 

alternative AFM requirements. FedEx 

provides suggested wording for an 

alternative AFM requirement. 

We do not agree to revise this AD to 

allow alternative AFM requirements 

based on the installed software version. 

Based on a recent multiple engine 

flameout incident on a Model 747–400 


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airplane equipped with CF6–80C2B1F 

engines and ECU software equivalent to 

the version 8.3.K, we have determined 

that ECU software version 8.3.K alone 

will not necessarily provide an adequate 

margin of safety against engine flameout 

in all environments. We note that the 

nacelle anti-ice had been switched on 

prior to engine flameout. Increasing the 

bleed flow and engine idle speed by 

placing the ENG, WING, and TAIL 

ANTI-ICE switches in the ON position 

will provide additional margin for 

engine flameout. We have not revised 

the AD in this regard. 

Request To Remove Part of the AFM 

Requirement 

FedEx requests that additional 

justification be made available to 

support the proposed AFM requirement 

to use wing and tail anti-ice systems. 

FedEx states that both its flight 

operations and engineering staffs agree 

that increasing the flameout margin to 

buffer against possible core shedding of 

ice-crystal accretion is an important 

requirement, and fully support 

activation of the ENG IGN OVRD switch 

and engine anti-ice as effective means of 

reducing flameouts. However, FedEx 

feels strongly that part of the proposed 

AFM requirement is of limited value 

and might not be justifiable. FedEx 

asserts that selection of wing anti-ice 

would result in a small or incremental 

increase in core temperature, while 

increasing fuel flow and unnecessarily 

exposing the airplane to additional 

reliability risks. FedEx further notes that 

the NTSB, in its comments to the 

NPRM, made no mention of wing and 

tail anti-ice systems being part of the 

successful recommendations on Model 

400A airplanes. 

We do not agree to remove the 

requirement to use wing and tail antiice. As discussed previously, despite 

having the nacelle anti-ice switched on, 

a Model 747–400 airplane experienced 

a multiple engine flameout. Therefore, 

the use of nacelle anti-ice alone is not 

sufficient to prevent a multiple engine 

flameout. Increasing the bleed flow and 

engine idle speed by placing the ENG, 

WING, and TAIL ANTI-ICE switches in 

the ON position will provide additional 

margin against engine flameout. We 

have not revised the AD in this regard. 

Request To Revise the Proposed AFM 

Text 

Boeing proposes that we revise the 

proposed AFM text provided in the 

NPRM as follows: 

Prior to reducing thrust for descent, when 

icing conditions (defined by visible moisture 

in the air and TAT is 6 Deg C or below) are 

present, the ENG IGN OVRD switch and the 

ENG, WING, and TAIL ANTI-ICE switches 

must be placed in the ON position. When 

icing conditions are no longer present or 

anticipated, place the ENG IGN OVRD switch 

and the ENG, WING, and TAIL ANTI-ICE 

switches in the OFF position. 

Boeing states that this AFM text 

provides additional procedural 

information, as noted in the current 

Interim Operating Procedures for icing 

conditions that exist or are anticipated 

prior to descent. 

We agree that the AFM text changes 

suggested by Boeing do provide helpful 

procedural information. We have also 

determined that there is no additional 

benefit to having the engine, wing, and 

tail anti-ice switched on once icing 

conditions are no longer present or 

anticipated. Therefore, we have revised 

the AFM text provided in paragraph (g) 

of this AD (specified in paragraph (f) of 

the NPRM) to include the supplemental 

procedural information provided by 

Boeing, and to allow engine, wing, and 

tail anti-ice to be switched off once icing 

conditions are no longer present or 

anticipated. 

Explanation of Additional Paragraph in 

This AD 

We have added a new paragraph (d) 

to this AD to provide the Air Transport 

Association (ATA) of America subject 

code 30: Ice and rain protection. This 

code is added to make this AD parallel 

with other new AD actions. We have 

reidentified subsequent paragraphs 

accordingly. 

Explanation of Additional Change 

Made to the AD 

We have revised this AD to identify 

the legal name of the manufacturer as 

published in the most recent type 

certificate data sheet for the affected 

airplane models. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. If 

final action is later identified, we might 

consider further rulemaking then. 

Explanation of Change to Costs of 

Compliance 

Since issuance of the original NPRM, 

we have increased the labor rate used in 

the Costs of Compliance from $80 per 

work-hour to $85 per work-hour. The 

Costs of Compliance information, 

below, reflects this increase in the 

specified hourly labor rate. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 118 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs for U.S. operators to 

comply with this AD. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours Average labor 

rate per hour Parts Cost per airplane 

Number of 

U.S.-registered 

airplanes 

Fleet cost 

AFM revision ............................................ 1 $85 $0 $85 70 $5,950 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 


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products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–16–03 McDonnell Douglas 

Corporation: Amendment 39–16379. 

Docket No. FAA–2008–0403; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–166–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective September 9, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas 

Corporation Model MD–11 and MD–11F 

airplanes, certified in any category, equipped 

with General Electric CF6–80C2 series 

engines. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 30: Ice and rain protection. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD results from reports of several 

in-flight engine flameouts, including 

multiple dual engine flameout events, in icecrystal icing conditions. We are issuing this 

AD to ensure that the flightcrew has the 

proper procedures to follow in certain icing 

conditions. These certain icing conditions 

could cause a multiple engine flameout 

during flight with the potential inability to 

restart the engines, and consequent forced 

landing of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revision 

(g) Within 14 days after the effective date 

of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of 

the McDonnell Douglas MD–11/MD–11F 

AFM to include the following statement. This 

may be done by inserting a copy of this AD 

into the AFM. 

‘‘Prior to reducing thrust for descent when 

icing conditions (defined by visible moisture 

in the air and TAT is 6 °C or below) are 

present, the ENG IGN OVRD switch and the 

ENG, WING, and TAIL ANTI-ICE switches 

must be placed in the ON position. When 

icing conditions are no longer present or 

anticipated, place the ENG IGN OVRD switch 

and the ENG, WING, and TAIL ANTI-ICE 

switches in the OFF position.’’ 

Note 1: When a statement identical to that 

in paragraph (g) of this AD has been included 

in the general revisions of the AFM, the 

general revisions may be inserted into the 

AFM, and the copy of this AD may be 

removed from the AFM. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(h)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: 

Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion 

Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, Los Angeles 

Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount 

Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712– 

4137; telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562) 

627–5210. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington on July 16, 

2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–19156 Filed 8–4–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–1215; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NM–126–AD; Amendment 

39–16364; AD 2010–14–19] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A330–200 and –300 Series Airplanes, 

and Model A340–200, –300, –500 and 

–600 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; correction. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is correcting 

airworthiness directive (AD) 2010–14– 

19, which published in the Federal 

Register on July 13, 2010. That AD 

applies to certain Model A330–200 and 

–300 series airplanes, and Model A340– 

200, –300, –500 and –600 series 

airplanes. A certain service bulletin 

number in Note 3 of the regulatory 

section is incorrect. This document 

corrects that service bulletin number. In 

all other respects, the original document 

remains the same. 

DATES: This correction is effective 

August 5, 2010. The effective date of AD 

2010–14–19 remains August 17, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–1138; fax (425) 227–1149. 


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