J-A24017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

M.S.P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

W.P., III

Appellee No. 3336 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree October 23, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2007-19144

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and SOLANO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED November 23, 2016

M.S.P. (“Wife”) appeals from the decree in divorce entered on October 

23, 2015,1in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas related to the 

dissolution of her marriage to W.P., III (“Husband”). The trial court entered 

the decree after dismissing Wife’s “exceptions” to the report and 

____________________________________________

1 We note Wife filed her pro se notice of appeal from the order entered 

October 19, 2015, dismissing her exceptions in equitable distribution, and 

making final a master’s report and recommendation entered February 11, 

2015. See Notice of Appeal, 11/2/2015; Order, 10/19/2015. However, this 

Court has made clear “a pre-divorce decree distributing marital property is 

interlocutory ... [and] cannot be reviewed until it has been rendered final by 

the entry of a decree in divorce.” Wilson v. Wilson, 828 A.2d 376, 378 

(Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court entered a final 

decree in divorce on October 23, 2015. Therefore, we will consider this 

appeal as properly filed after the entry of the divorce decree. See Pa.R.A.P. 

905(a)(5). We direct the Prothonotary of this Court to correct the caption 

accordingly.
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recommendation of a master determining the parties’ claims of equitable 

distribution. On appeal, Wife contends the trial court erred in (1) dismissing 

her “exceptions,” rather than continuing the trial de novo, when she failed to 

appear, and (2) permitting her attorney to withdraw. Moreover, Husband 

has filed a motion seeking quashal of this appeal and an award of sanctions. 

For the reasons that follow, we deny Husband’s motion to quash the appeal, 

and affirm the divorce decree. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are summarized by the trial 

court as follows:

On August 7, 2007, [Wife] filed a Complaint in Divorce 

against [Husband]. Count II of the Divorce Complaint requested 

equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property. On 

November 3, 2014, an equitable distribution hearing was held 

before the Honorable Arthur R. Tilson, S.J. sitting as Special 

Master. On January 22, 2015, Judge Tilson issued a Master’s 

Report and Recommendation upon Equitable Distribution, 

Alimony, Counsel Fees and Costs.1 On February 11, 2015, 

[Wife] filed Exceptions to Recommendation of Conference 

Officer/Master. On June 18, 2015, the court scheduled [Wife’s] 

exceptions for a two day trial to be held on October 19 and 20, 

2015. The June 18, 2015 scheduling notice was sent to both 

parties at their addresses of record, as well as to [Wife’s] 

counsel, Thomas F. Grady, Esquire, and [Husband’s] counsel, 

Mary T. Vidas, Esquire.

__________

1 On February 26, 2015 Judge Tilson issued an Amended 

Master’s Report and Recommendation upon Equitable 

Distribution, Alimony, Counsel Fees and Costs. [Our 

review reveals no changes in amended report.]

__________

On October 19, 2015, Thomas Musi, Esquire appeared on 

behalf of [Wife], but [Wife] failed to appear.2 [Husband] and 

Ms. Vidas were present and ready to proceed with the hearing. 
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Mr. Musi stated to the court: “I was contacted in July in this 

matter ... I’ve attempted to work with the client, and there has 

been a lack of communication.” N.T. October 19, 2015 at 3-4. 

Mr. Musi stated to the court that he had filed by letter with the 

court “a continuance of this hearing based upon my client’s 

direction.” The continuance request had been objected to by 

[Husband’s] counsel, and denied by the court before the October 

19, 2015 hearing. N.T. at 4. Mr. Musi stated that he and [Wife] 

“... were certainly not working together preparing for this trial 

...”, and that he had “very limited ability to review 

documentation” prior to trial because [Wife] “...was not 

authorizing me to do such.” N.T. at 5. Mr. Musi stated that on 

September 29, 2015 he filed “a request to allow me to withdraw 

my appearance.” N.T. at 5. Mr. Musi stated[:] “So based upon 

all those facts, I’m simply not prepared to proceed, and would 

renew my request to allow me to withdraw from this matter.” 

N.T. at 5. When addressing [Wife’s] absence from the 

courtroom, Mr. Musi stated: “I looked out in the hallway, I’ve 

asked opposing counsel as well as the witnesses as to whether 

they’ve seen her. Everyone has indicated that they have not 

seen her or heard from her.” N.T. at 7. In response to Mr. Musi, 

the court stated: “And I have not heard – and I just stopped at 

my chambers before I came up here, and my secretary didn’t 

say that [Wife] had called, or was any way saying she was late 

or something to that effect.” N.T. at 8. Ms. Vidas stated that 

she did not object to Mr. Musi’s request to withdraw his 

appearance. N.T. at 6. The court permitted Mr. Musi to 

withdraw his appearance.

__________

2 On September 23, 2015 Mr. Grady filed a withdrawal of 

his appearance for [Wife], and ... Mr. Musi filed his entry of 

appearance for [Wife].

__________

Ms. Vidas made an oral motion to dismiss [Wife’s] 

equitable distribution exceptions, and requested that the court 

enter “as the order of the court Judge Tilson’s recommendation 

that was dated January 23, 2015 arising from the hearing and/or 

trial that was held on November [3], 2014.” N.T. at 6. The 

court granted [Husband’s] counsel’s request and [Wife’s] 

exceptions in equitable distribution were dismissed. Referring to 

[Wife’s] absence from the courtroom, the court stated: “... my 

chambers hasn’t heard from her, you haven’t heard from her, 

she’s not here, they are her exceptions.” N.T. at 8. 
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On October 19, 2015 the court issued an order granting 

[Husband’s] oral motion to dismiss [Wife’s] February 11, 2015 

Exceptions in Equitable Distribution, and make Judge Tilson’s 

equitable distribution report and recommendation a final order. 

On October 23, 2015, [Wife] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of 

[the trial court’s] Order of 10/19/15 Dismissing [Wife’s] 

Exceptions of 2/11/15 Equitable Distribution. In her motion, 

[Wife] stated that she failed to appear at the October 19, 2015 

hearing due to “medical issues requiring hospitalization of 4 

nights including 10/19/15.” [Wife] states in the motion that due 

to the difficulty in communicating and preparing for trial with her 

counsel, and due to the fact that the court denied Mr. Musi’s 

request for a continuance of the October 19, 2015 hearing, 

[Wife] was “under a lot of stress”. [Wife] states she was, 

therefore, “required” to seek medical attention, and she 

contacted two physicians. [Wife] states that one of these 

physicians recommended [Wife] “seek hospitalization”, and 

[Wife] drove herself to a hospital and was admitted. [She] 

states she was in the hospital “for 4 nights, including the trial 

date of October 19, 2015.” [Wife] does not state anywhere in 

her motion what her medical diagnosis was, or what ailment or 

injury she was suffering from which required hospitalization. 

[Wife] states generally in her motion that she was hospitalized 

for “medical reasons” from October 17, 2015 to October 20, 

2015 and that “documents showing [Wife] was hospitalized for 

medical reasons” are attached to the motion. However, no 

attachment was made. Furthermore, despite having notice of 

the trial date of October 19, 2015, [Wife] did not contact the 

court, or her attorney, to inform anyone about her 

hospitalization. Instead, [Wife] states in her Motion that “no 

effort was made to call [Wife’s] cell phone number...by her 

counsel or the court to inquire of her whereabouts.” 

On October 29, 2015, the court denied [Wife’s] October 

23, 2015 Motion for Reconsideration. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 1-4 (some record citations omitted). This 

timely appeal followed.2

____________________________________________

2 On November 6, 2015, the trial court ordered Wife to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Before we may review Wife’s substantive claims on appeal, we must 

first consider Husband’s motion to quash. On March 3, 2016, Husband filed, 

in this Court, a motion seeking to (1) quash Wife’s appeal for her failure to 

comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure; and (2) strike 

from the reproduced record medical documents that were not included in the 

certified record before the trial court. See Motion to Quash Appeal and for 

Sanctions, 3/3/2016, at ¶¶ 3-5, 13, 15-20. He also requested the 

imposition of monetary sanctions, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744, due to Wife’s 

“dilatory, vexatious, and bad faith conduct.” Id. at ¶ 22. Thereafter, on 

March 17, 2016, Wife filed a response, as well as an application for a partial 

seal of the record, specifically those documents related to her medical 

records.3 On April 4, 2016, this Court entered a per curiam order, striking 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Wife complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on 

November 23, 2015. We note that when Wife filed her notice of appeal, she 

was proceeding pro se, however, she subsequently retained counsel, who 

filed a timely reply brief.

3

Implicit in her request to partially seal the record was a request to 

supplement the record with the aforementioned medical documents that 

were not attached to her motion for reconsideration. That same day, Wife 

filed in the trial court a document titled, “Emergency Motion for 

Reconsideration of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 23, 2015 

and Application to Correct and Modify the Record pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1926.” Wife’s Reply Brief at 5 n.7. While this emergency motion is not 

included in the certified record, Wife explains in her Reply Brief:

That Emergency Motion set forth the fact that certain medical 

records (three pages) confirming the hospitalization expressly 

intended to be attached to the Reconsideration Motion were in 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Wife’s medical records from the reproduced record, deferring both Husband’s 

motion to quash and his request for sanctions to the merits panel, and 

denying Wife’s requests to supplement and partially seal the record. See

Order, 4/4/2016. Accordingly, Husband’s motion to quash is ripe for our 

review.

Husband seeks to quash the appeal based upon the deficiencies in 

Wife’s pro se brief and reproduced record. Namely, he asserts (1) the brief 

is “completely devoid of legal support[;]” and (2) the reproduced record 

improperly contains documents which were “absent from the record on 

appeal.” Motion to Quash Appeal and for Sanction, 3/3/2016, at ¶¶ 3, 13. 

He concludes these actions constitute “dilatory, vexatious, and bad faith 

conduct” necessitating monetary sanctions. Id. at ¶ 22. We disagree.

It is well settled “this Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the 

appellant fails to conform substantially to the briefing requirements set forth 

in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Karn v. Quick & Reilly 

Inc., 912 A.2d 329, 335 (Pa. Super. 2006). Moreover, 

[a]lthough this Court is willing to liberally construe materials 

filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit 

upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to 

represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

fact submitted to court personnel, but apparently not considered 

when reconsideration was denied on October 29, 2015.

Id. The trial court subsequently denied the motion on March 25, 2016. 

See id. 
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extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will 

be his undoing. 

Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281, 1284–1285 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(quotation omitted).

Our review of Wife’s pro se brief reveals no substantial defects that 

hamper our assessment of her claims on appeal. Contrary to Husband’s 

assertion that Wife’s brief is “completely devoid of legal support,”4she does 

refer to the controlling statute in the argument section of her brief. 

Accordingly, we decline to quash Wife’s appeal.5

Although Wife purports to raise seven issues on appeal, her argument 

is focused on two claims: (1) the trial court erred in dismissing her 

“exceptions” to the master’s report and recommendation when she had a 

satisfactory excuse for her failure to appear at the de novo hearing; and (2) 

the trial court erred in permitting her attorney to withdraw in her absence. 

First, Wife contends the trial court erred in dismissing her 

“exceptions,” rather than granting a continuance, when she had a 

satisfactory excuse for her failure to appear at the de novo trial, namely, 

____________________________________________

4 Motion to Quash Appeal and for Sanction, 3/3/2016, at ¶ 3.

5 We also decline to award Husband monetary sanctions because he has not 

demonstrated Wife’s conduct in filing this appeal was “dilatory, obdurate or 

vexatious.” Pa.R.A.P. 2744. Although we agree Wife improperly attempted 

to include medical documentation in the reproduced record that was not 

before the trial court, those documents have been struck from the 

reproduced record, and we will not consider them on appeal. See Order, 

4/4/2016.
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“she was hospitalized for severe depression and anxiety and as a precaution 

for suicide, due to past history.” Wife’s Brief at 17. Wife’s “argument” 

largely consists of a recitation of the events preceding the October 19, 2015, 

trial de novo. See id. at 18-22. Specifically, she asserts that while she was 

aware of the trial date in June 2015, she retained Thomas Musi, Esquire, and 

Luke Clark, IV, Esquire,6as new counsel in mid-July 2015, and “they 

dropped the ball[.]” Id. at 18. Wife claims Musi and Clark failed to prepare 

for trial, or even obtain the files from her prior attorney. See id. at 19. She 

maintains they then filed a petition to withdraw as counsel on September 29, 

2015, less than one month before trial. Although Wife attempted to obtain a 

continuance of the scheduled trial, the court denied her request. See id. at 

20. Wife contends the stress of the impending trial, for which she was 

unprepared, as well as a pre-existing medical condition, led her to seek 

“emergency medical attention” on October 16, 2015. Id. at 21. She states 

she was hospitalized under psychiatric care on October 17, 2015, and not 

released until October 20, 2015, after the scheduled trial date. 

Furthermore, Wife asserts no one attempted to contact her on October 19, 

2015, to determine her whereabouts, and she was not informed by either 

counsel or the trial court that the de novo trial would proceed in her 

absence. See id. at 22.

____________________________________________

6 Only Mr. Musi appeared for Wife at the October 19, 2015, hearing.
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Our disposition of Wife’s claims involves an interpretation of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.7 Rule 1920.51 permits a trial court 

“upon its own motion or the motion of either party” to appoint a master to 

determine certain matters in divorce actions, including equitable distribution 

of property. Pa.R.C.P. 1920.51(a)(1). After the appointed master holds a 

hearing, and issues a report and recommendation, a party seeking to 

challenge the master’s report must either file exceptions pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2, or request a de novo hearing pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

1920.55-3. When exceptions are filed under Rule 1902.55-2, the trial court 

hears argument on the exceptions before entering a final decree. Pa.R.C.P. 

1920.55-2(c). If no exceptions are filed by either party, the Rule states “the 

court shall review the report and, if approved, shall enter a final decree.” 

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(d).

Conversely, when a case proceeds under Rule 1920.55-3, no record is 

made of the master’s hearing. Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(a). A party who seeks 

to challenge the master’s report and recommendation “may file a written 

demand for a de novo hearing.” Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(c). When such a 

demand is filed, “the court shall hold a hearing de novo and enter a final 

decree.” Id. Like the previous rule, if neither party demands a de novo

____________________________________________

7

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our standard of 

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Tosi v. Kizis, 85 

A.3d 585, 588 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 97 A.3d 745 (Pa. 2014).
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hearing, “the court shall review the report and recommendation and, if 

approved, shall enter a final decree.” Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(d).

Rule 1920.55-1 provides that “[m]atters referred to a master for 

hearing shall proceed as prescribed by Rule 1920.55-2 unless the court by 

local rule adopts the alternative procedure of Rule 1920.55-3.” Pa.R.C.P. 

1920.55-1(a). In the present case, the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas has adopted the procedures set forth in Rule 1920.55-3. 

See id. Therefore, Wife properly requested a de novo hearing to address 

her dispute with the master’s report and recommendation.8

As Wife emphasizes in her counseled reply brief, the trial court 

appears to have been under the misunderstanding that Wife’s complaints 

regarding the master’s report were “exceptions” under Rule 1920.55-2. See

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 12 (citing Rule 1920.55-2, and stating it 

“dismissed [Wife’s] exceptions since she was not present to litigate them.”) 

(emphasis supplied). To that end, she argues the court abused its 

discretion. See Wife’s Reply Brief at 10. Indeed, Wife asserts: “There is a 

significant difference between the substantive and procedural due process 

protections afforded a litigant under the applicable Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-3 

from that afforded under the inapplicable 1920.55-2.” Id. In particular, she 

____________________________________________

8 We note the document Wife filed was titled, “Exceptions to 

Recommendation of Conference Officer/Master.” See Exceptions, 2/11/2015 

(emphasis supplied). However, the document did not list exceptions to the 

master’s findings, but rather, simply requested a de novo hearing. See id.
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points out Rule 1920.55-3 explicitly states the master’s hearing is not

recorded, as compared to Rule 1920.55-2, which provides for the filing of 

the transcript. See id. Wife further argues that where, as here, a timely 

demand for a hearing de novo was filed, “the initial unrecorded hearing and 

the Master’s Report and Recommendation each becomes a ‘nullity’ that was 

incapable of being adopted as a final order of the trial court.” Id. at 12, 

citing Pavie v. Pavie, 606 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. Super. 1992). Therefore, 

she contends that because the trial court misapplied the law, “its order[] 

should be reversed.” Id. at 10. 

Wife’s interpretation of the applicable procedural rules ignores the 

crucial fact that despite the court’s reference Rule 1920.55-2, it did schedule 

on October 19 and 20, 2015, a “two (2) day Protracted Hearing,” i.e., a 

hearing de novo, for which Wife failed to appear without notice to counsel 

or the trial court. Order, June 18, 1015. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure 218 provides, in relevant part: 

(a) Where a case is called for trial, if without satisfactory excuse 

a plaintiff is not ready, the court may enter a nonsuit on motion 

of the defendant or a non pros on the court’s own motion.

* * * *

(c) A party who fails to appear for trial shall be deemed to be not 

ready without satisfactory excuse.

Pa.R.C.P. 218.

Here, Wife acknowledges she received notice of the scheduled October 

19, 2015, hearing four months earlier, that is, in June of 2015. See Wife’s 
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Brief at 18. Moreover, she admits she sought a continuance of the hearing 

in early October 2015 – “as a result of the attorney issues and their dropping 

the ball” – but was advised on October 13, 2015, before the hearing (and 

before her claimed hospitalization), that her request had been denied.9 Id.

at 20. Thereafter, Wife failed to appear for the hearing de novo, without 

alerting counsel or the trial court, and counsel, although present, was 

unprepared to proceed, purportedly due to Wife’s lack of cooperation. Under 

these circumstances, the court deemed Wife “not ready without satisfactory 

excuse” pursuant to Rule 218(c), and dismissed her “exceptions,” i.e., her 

request for a de novo trial. Pa.R.C.P. 218(c).

The trial court explained the basis for its ruling as follows:

Not only did [Wife] fail to present the court with a 

satisfactory excuse, she failed to present the court with any 

excuse prior to the commencement of the October 19, 2015 

hearing for her absence. In paragraph 9 of her October 23, 

2015 Motion for Reconsideration, [Wife] states that due to 

“being under a lot of stress” she contacted two physicians. The 

first was contacted on October 13, 2015, six days before the 

scheduled hearing was to begin. The second was contacted on 

October 15, 2015, four days before the scheduled hearing. 

Despite contacting her physicians several days before the 

hearing, [Wife] made no attempt to contact the court, or her 

attorney, about her alleged medical condition. In her motion for 

reconsideration, [Wife] states she admitted herself into the 

hospital on October 16, 2015, three days before the scheduled 

____________________________________________

9 Wife’s attorney also purportedly requested a continuance in a letter sent to 

the court on September 23, 2015, which the court also denied. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 6. Neither continuance request is included in 

the certified record or listed on the docket. 
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hearing, and also states she was “hospitalized...for 4 nights” on 

October 17, 2015. Despite knowing on October 17, 2015 that 

she would be hospitalized for four days, [Wife] still failed to 

contact the court, or her attorney, to inform them of her 

situation. In fact, [Wife’s] alleged medical issues were not 

raised with the court until [Wife] filed her October 23, 2015 

Motion for Reconsideration, and even then, [Wife] refers to her 

medical condition in vague terms and without any specificity as 

to the nature of her illness. She also did not attach any medical 

documentation or physician’s letter to her motion, despite 

stating in her motion that she had done so. Nor did she present 

any medical documentation or physician’s letter to the court 

independently of her motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, 

based on [Wife’s] statements made in her motion for 

reconsideration, the court concluded that [Wife’s] hospitalization 

was not based on a true medical emergency, but rather appears 

to be based on [her] own initiative in contacting her physicians 

due to “being under a lot of stress”. Nothing stated by [Wife] in 

her motion indicates that [her] alleged medical condition was life 

threatening, or that she was specifically forbidden from 

attending the hearing due to a medical diagnosis or doctor’s 

instructions. The court does not find that [Wife’s] opinion that 

she was “under a lot of stress” satisfactorily excuses her from 

not appearing at trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 6-7.

In determining whether a trial court properly proceeded under Rule 

218, “our inquiry must focus on whether the trial court’s decision was a 

proper exercise of discretion based on all facts of the case.” Faison v. 

Turner, 858 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2004). Here, based on the facts 

before the trial court at the time it dismissed Wife’s request for a de novo

hearing and entered the master’s report and recommendation as a final 

order, we find no abuse of discretion. When Wife failed to appear for trial, 

the court properly deemed her “not ready without satisfactory excuse” 

pursuant to Rule 218(c). Pa.R.C.P. 218(c). Both counsel and the trial court 
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stated they had not heard from Wife regarding her absence. See N.T., 

10/19/2015, at 5, 7-8. Moreover, counsel explained to the court that he 

was not prepared to proceed as a result of Wife’s lack of communication with 

him and his “very limited ability to review documentation” due to her failure 

to “authoriz[e]” him to do so. Id. at 5. He also noted that after he filed a 

petition to withdraw, Wife responded, in a timely answer, by “specifically 

request[ing] that the Court grant [his] petition to withdraw.” Id. Counsel 

further claimed his efforts to contact Wife after receiving her response were 

futile, and stated: “[S]o, therefore, I do not even know what her position is 

or where she is or what is going on.” Id. At that point, the trial court was 

under no obligation to proceed with the de novo hearing.10 Rather, when it 

deemed Wife not ready without satisfactory excuse, it proceeded as if no de 

novo request had been filed under Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(d), and, after 

review, approved the report and recommendation of the master.11 See

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(d).

____________________________________________

10 It is evident from a review of the trial court’s opinion that it found 

counsel’s statements regarding Wife’s failure to cooperate and communicate 

with him credible. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 11 (“[C]ounsel 

presented the court with sufficient testimony as to his reasons why he found 

it necessary to withdraw from the case, which included lack of 

communication with [Wife] and lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial due 

to [Wife’s] actions.”). See also Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1255 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (“The fact-finder is in the best position to assess credibility of 

witnesses and we do not disturb credibility determinations on appeal.”), 

appeal denied, 934 A.2d 1275 (Pa. 2007).

11 In her Reply Brief, Wife insists the trial court

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Although Wife filed a timely motion for reconsideration in which she 

provided an explanation for her failure to appear, the trial court found that 

Wife’s hospitalization, which appeared to be self-imposed, did not constitute 

a “satisfactory excuse” for her absence.12 Indeed, in the motion, Wife

asserted she had been “under a lot of stress” and contacted her physicians 

as early as October 13, 2015, the same day she learned her request for a 

continuance was denied. Motion for Reconsideration, 10/23/2015, at ¶ 9. 

Moreover, she further stated she was admitted to the hospital on October 

17, 2015, still two days before her scheduled de novo hearing. See id. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

rubberstamped, sight unseen, the disputed and nullified master’s 

report and recommendation in a multi-million dollar equitable 

distribution dispute – by default and without taking any 

admissible evidence to whatsoever support the “equitable 

distribution” it entered as a “final order” with the issuance of the 

Dismissal Order.

Wife’s Reply Brief at 15-16. However, we have no basis to doubt the trial 

court’s statement that it did review the report before entering it as a final 

order. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 12. Furthermore, to the extent 

Wife complains the court issued the final order without taking any evidence 

or reviewing “any admissible facts of record,” we note the court properly 

proceeded under Rule 1920.55-3(d), as if no de novo request had been 

made. See Wife’s Reply Brief at 10 (emphasis omitted). When no demand 

is made, the Rule mandates only that the court “shall review the report and 

recommendation” before entering a final decree. Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(d).

12 It bears emphasis that Wife failed to attach supporting medical 

documentation to her motion. Therefore, while we do not doubt Wife was 

hospitalized at the time of the hearing, she failed to verify her purported 

inability to make telephone calls, or to have someone make such calls on her 

behalf, to inform the court or counsel of her hospitalization. 
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Significantly, Wife did not provide any reason why she could not contact 

either counsel or the trial court before or during her hospital stay to inform 

them that she would be unavailable for the de novo hearing. See id. We 

cannot say under these circumstances, the court abused its discretion. 

We also reject Wife’s claims that the trial court should have either (1) 

granted a continuance when she failed to appear, or (2) conducted a de 

novo hearing in her absence. See Wife’s Reply Brief at 14-15. First, the 

court was under no obligation to continue the matter when it had already 

denied a continuance request, and Wife failed to appear without any notice 

to the court or counsel. The court explained “the case had been in litigation 

for over eight years” and the de novo hearing date was originally scheduled 

“in order to accommodate [Wife’s] prior counsel, Mr. [Thomas F.] Grady.”13 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 8, 9. 

Furthermore, the language in Rule 218 does not require the trial court 

to proceed with a hearing when the moving party fails to appear or is 

otherwise not ready to proceed. Contrary to Wife’s characterization, the 

master’s report and recommendation did not become a “nullity” as soon as 

she requested a de novo hearing. See Wife’s Reply Brief at 12. Rather, 

because Wife was the party who requested the de novo hearing, and then 

____________________________________________

13 Our review of the record reveals Wife has retained no fewer than five 

different attorneys during these proceedings.
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she failed to appear, the court properly proceeded as if Wife had never made 

such a demand pursuant to Rule 1920.55-3(d). See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(d) 

(“If no demand for de novo hearing is filed ... the court shall review the 

report and recommendation and, if approved, shall enter a final decree.”). 

The trial court opined:

Because [Wife’s] exceptions[/request for a de novo hearing] 

were dismissed due to her failure to appear, ... the court 

reviewed the report and recommendation, and, after review, 

made the report a final order. [Wife] failed to appear for the 

October 19, 2015 hearing, therefore the court was under no 

obligation to create a record or enter exhibits on her behalf in 

support of her equitable distribution exceptions.

Trial Court Opinion, 15/2016, at 12. Again, we find no reason to disagree.14

Moreover, to the extent Wife argues in her reply brief that the trial 

court erred in relying on Rule 218 to dismiss her request for a de novo

hearing in a divorce matter,15 we note Pa.R.C.P. 1920.1(b) states “if the 

____________________________________________

14 Wife cites Pavie, supra, to support her assertion that the trial court was 

required to conduct a de novo hearing in her absence. See Wife’s Reply 

Brief at 12. We find such reliance misplaced. First, Pavie was decided in 

1992, before the adoption of Rule 1920.55-3. See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3 

(Adopted Sept. 11, 1995, effective Jan. 1, 1996). Furthermore, in that case, 

after the wife filed exceptions to the master’s report, the trial court actually 

conducted a de novo hearing, although “no witnesses were sworn, nor was 

any testimony taken.” Pavie, supra, 606 A.2d at 1208. Rather, the court 

heard the arguments of counsel and subsequently affirmed the master’s 

recommendation. See id. On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed the 

trial court’s order and remanded for a proper de novo hearing “at which 

evidence is presented, witnesses heard, and the proceedings recorded.” Id.

at 1211. Conversely, in the present case, no de novo hearing was ever held. 

15 See Wife’s Reply Brief at 19.
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rules governing divorce do not provide a specific procedure then ‘the 

procedure in the action shall be in accordance with the rules relating to a 

civil action.’” Kropf v. Kropf, 24 A.3d 405, 409 (Pa. 2011), quoting

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.1(b). Accordingly, we conclude Wife is entitled to no relief 

on her first issue.

Next, Wife argues the trial court erred in permitting counsel to 

withdraw when she failed to appear for the de novo hearing. See Wife’s 

Reply Brief at 22. The trial court defended its ruling as follows: 

Because the court found that [Wife’s] absence was unexcused, 

the court proceeded to hear [her] counsel’s motion to withdraw 

his appearance [in her absence. Wife’s] counsel presented the 

court with sufficient testimony as to his reasons why he found it 

necessary to withdraw from the case, which included lack of 

communication with [Wife] and lack of sufficient time to prepare 

for trial due to [Wife’s] actions. Furthermore, in [her] October 2, 

2015 Answer to Mr. Musi’s Motion to Withdraw, [Wife] requested 

that the court permit Mr. Musi to withdraw from the case, and in 

an October 8, 2015 letter to the court, Mr. Musi stated that 

[Wife] “agreed to our withdrawal from the case...” [Wife’s ] 

claim ... that the court erred by granting her counsel permission 

to withdraw is, therefore, without merit, and contrary to [her] 

position on this issue prior to the October 19, 2015 hearing. The 

fact that [Wife’s] counsel was permitted to withdraw from the 

case before the court entered “an adverse judgment” against 

[Wife] is of no merit. [Wife] did not oppose the withdrawal, and 

she voluntarily absented herself from the October 19, 2015 trial. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2016, at 10-11.

Here, Wife contends that, contrary to the trial court’s characterization, 

she did not simply agree to counsel’s withdrawal in her answer to the 

petition. See Wife’s Reply Brief at 23-24. Rather, she detailed how counsel 

failed to retrieve her files from her former attorney or otherwise prepare for 
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trial. See Answer to Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 10/2/2015, at ¶ 3. 

Furthermore, Wife insists her agreement with counsel’s request was 

conditional because she also requested 90 days to hire new counsel and 

sought a return of her retainer fee. See id. Moreover, Wife emphasizes 

that because the court issued a Rule to Show Cause order, scheduling a 

hearing on counsel’s petition for November 2, 2015,16 she “had no reason to 

understand that she would be unrepresented at the [October 19, 2015, de 

novo] hearing, irrespective of her availability to attend such hearing.” Wife’s 

Reply Brief at 23. 

While we agree the trial court’s order permitting counsel to withdraw 

was premature, Wife is entitled to no relief. Once the trial court issued the 

show cause order, and scheduled a hearing for November 2, 2015, it should 

have waited until that date to rule upon counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

Nevertheless, even if the court had declined to consider counsel’s motion at 

the October 19, 2015, de novo hearing, it would not have changed the fact 

that neither Wife nor counsel was prepared to proceed with the hearing. 

Therefore, the court’s premature ruling on counsel’s petition to withdraw is 

irrelevant to its dismissal of Wife’s de novo request pursuant to Rule 218. 

____________________________________________

16 See Rule to Show Cause, 9/29/2015.
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Moreover, because Wife does not articulate a remedy for the court’s error, 

we find she is entitled to no relief.17 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by: 

(1) dismissing Wife’s request for a hearing de novo, after she failed to 

appear without any satisfactory excuse; (2) approving, after review, the 

master’s report and recommendation; (3) entering the master’s report as a 

final order of the court; and (4) entering a decree in divorce. Therefore, we 

affirm the decree on appeal. 

Decree affirmed. Motion to Quash Appeal and for Sanctions denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:11/23/2016

____________________________________________

17 Indeed, in her answer to counsel’s petition, Wife requested the trial court 

grant counsel’s request to withdraw. See Answer to Petition to Withdraw as 

Counsel, 10/2/2015, at ¶ 3. Her dispute with counsel concerning their lack 

of preparation and her demand for the return of her retain fee properly lies 

with counsel, not this Court. 
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