IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60227

Summary Calendar

GENTRY TRE-MAINE SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

V. HORTON, Warden at East Mississippi Correctional Facility; GEO GROUP, 

INCORPORATED, Operator of East Mississippi Correctional Facility; BART 

GRIMES, Warden at East Mississippi Correctional Facility; UNKNOWN 

CARR, Sergeant at East Mississippi Correctional Facility,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:13-CV-958

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Gentry Tre-Maine Smith, Mississippi prisoner # 106460, filed a 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against the operator and staff of the East 

Mississippi Correctional Facility (EMCF), alleging that the defendants 

violated due process by falsely convicting him of, and placing him in

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 23, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-60227

2

administrative segregation for, assaulting another inmate with a dangerous 

weapon. He further alleged that the conditions of his confinement in 

administrative segregation violated the Eighth Amendment. The parties 

consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The 

magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and 

also denied Smith’s motion to amend his complaint. Because Smith fails to 

address the propriety of the magistrate judge’s ruling denying his motion to 

amend his complaint, he has waived appeal of that issue. See Brinkmann v. 

Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Reviewing de novo the magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment, we 

affirm. See McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012).

As to Smith’s due process claim, we note that a prisoner’s treatment 

presents a vindicable liberty interest only if it “imposes atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Smith’s punishment via long-term 

administrative segregation did not, without more, deprive him of a 

constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 

612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Moreover, there was at least “some evidence to support the findings made in 

the disciplinary hearing.” Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole 

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985). To the extent Smith asserts that the 

defendants failed to adequately investigate his ensuing administrative 

grievance, he had no protected liberty interest in either the adequacy or the 

result of prison administrative grievance procedures. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 

F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (5th Cir. 

1996). In light of the foregoing, the magistrate judge correctly determined that 

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the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Smith’s due 

process claim. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484-85; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the conditions of 

his confinement in administrative segregation, Smith must show (1) that the 

deprivation alleged was sufficiently serious as to result in the denial of the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) that the defendants 

acted with deliberate indifference—that is, reckless disregard—to his health 

or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Davidson v. 

Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986). Liability under § 1983 may not be premised 

on a theory of respondeat superior or on a finding of mere negligence; rather,

the defendants’ deliberate indifference must be the “moving force” behind the 

unconstitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1991).

The conditions of Smith’s confinement, standing alone, do not present a 

risk of injury sufficiently extreme to implicate the Eighth Amendment. See

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); see also Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 

1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the 

defendants were the “moving force” behind the complained-of confinement 

conditions. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658 at 692-94. Accordingly, the magistrate 

judge correctly determined that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law on Smith’s Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

834; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

AFFIRMED.

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