[Cite as State v. Martin, 2016-Ohio-7916.]

STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

V. 

MATTHEW JAMES MARTIN, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

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CASE NO. 15 BE 0045 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio 

Case No. 15 CR 83 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee No brief filed 

For Defendant-Appellant Attorney John M. Jurco 

P.O. Box 783 

St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

 

 

 Dated: November 17, 2016 
[Cite as State v. Martin, 2016-Ohio-7916.]

DONOFRIO, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Matthew Martin, appeals from a Belmont County 

Common Pleas Court judgment overruling his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea to a single count of having a weapon under a disability. 

{¶2} On April 1, 2015, a Belmont County Grand Jury indicted appellant on one 

count of having a weapon under a disability, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 

2923.13(A)(2), and one count of tampering with evidence, a third-degree felony in violation 

of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). Appellant initially entered a not guilty plea. 

{¶3} On May 21, 2015, appellant entered into a plea agreement with plaintiffappellee, the State of Ohio. Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to the 

charge of having a weapon under a disability. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the 

charge of tampering with evidence. The trial court accepted appellant’s plea, found him 

guilty of having a weapon under a disability, and set the matter for a sentencing hearing. 

{¶4} A week after entering his plea and several days before his sentencing hearing, 

appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As a basis for his motion, appellant 

stated that at the time he entered the plea he was under great stress, having great difficulty 

adjusting to the Belmont County Jail, and was in such a state of turmoil that he preferred 

going to prison rather than to spend any more time in jail. He further stated that since he 

entered his plea, his mental state had improved and he was doing fine in jail. Therefore, he 

wished to withdraw his plea and assert his innocence. He also stated he believed the state 

would not be able to produce a key witness. 

{¶5} The court set appellant’s motion for a hearing. At the hearing, however, 

appellant withdrew his motion to withdraw his plea and stated that he wished to proceed with 

sentencing. Therefore, the trial court moved on to sentence appellant. The court sentenced 

appellant to 30 months in prison. 

{¶6} Appellant filed a pro se motion for delayed appeal and a notice of appeal on 

July 10, 2015, listing the court’s June 4, 2015 judgment entry of sentence as the judgment he 

was appealing from. 

{¶7} The same day that appellant filed the motion for delayed appeal in this court, 

he also filed a new pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. He again stated 
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that he was not thinking clearly when he entered his guilty plea due to his addiction, mental 

health issues, and issues at the jail. Appellant also filed a motion for jail-time credit, a motion 

for appointment of appellate counsel, and a motion for preparation of his transcripts at the 

state’s expense. 

{¶8} On July 13, 2015, the trial court overruled appellant’s motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. It noted that the reasons expressed by appellant were essentially the same reasons 

he put forth in his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea, which he withdrew. The court 

found that appellant failed to demonstrate a manifest injustice. As to his other motions, the 

trial court granted appellant’s motions for appointed appellate counsel and for transcripts at 

the state’s expense. It took appellant’s motion for jail-time credit under advisement, pending 

responses from the state and the probation department. 

{¶9} We granted appellant’s motion for a delayed appeal on August 5, 2015. As 

will be seen below, appellant does not take issue with his judgment entry of sentence. His 

only assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his post-sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For this ruling, appellant’s notice of appeal was actually 

premature, not late. 

{¶10} Appellant now raises a single assignment of error that states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 

{¶11} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

withdraw his plea because he demonstrated a manifest injustice. He points out that the trial 

court recognized that his plea was the result of his mental distress from being held in jail, the 

withdrawal symptoms of his crack cocaine addiction, and using a guilty plea as his way out of 

the county jail. Appellant then references his presentence motion to withdraw his plea (which 

motion he withdrew) and a letter he wrote to the trial court where he described his stress and 

addiction. 

{¶12} The decision to grant or deny a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 

within the trial court's discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526, 584 N.E.2d 715 
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(1992). Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that 

the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 

Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 

{¶13} Crim.R. 32.1 provides: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest 

may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 

sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his 

or her plea.” This rule establishes a fairly stringent standard for deciding a post-sentence 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 526. 

{¶14} The burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice is on the 

individual seeking to vacate the plea. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 

(1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. Under the manifest injustice standard, a post-sentence 

motion to withdraw a plea is allowed only in extraordinary cases. Id. at 264. “The standard 

rests upon practical considerations important to the proper administration of justice, and seeks 

to avoid the possibility of a defendant pleading guilty to test the weight of potential 

punishment.” Id., citing Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963). 

{¶15} Furthermore, although there is no time limit to make this motion after a 

sentence is imposed, an undue delay between the time when the motion is filed and the reason 

for filing the motion is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant. Id. at 

paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶16} At the change of plea hearing where appellant entered his guilty plea, the trial 

court took careful effort to ensure that appellant understood his rights and the effect of his 

plea. 

{¶17} The court inquired of appellant if he understood what he was doing and if he 

was entering his plea voluntarily. (Plea Tr. 3). The court explained appellant’s rights to him 

and appellant indicated that he understood them. (Plea Tr. 9-11). The court inquired of 

appellant if he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation and appellant indicated that he 

was. (Plea Tr. 7). The court explained the possible penalties appellant faced and the 

ramifications of a prison sentence, which appellant stated that he understood. (Plea Tr. 8-9). 

There was no indication at the change of plea hearing that appellant did not understand what 
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he was doing or that he was uninformed in any way. 

{¶18} Approximately a week later, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. In 

his motion, appellant stated that when he entered the plea he was under great stress, he was 

having great difficulty adjusting to the Belmont County Jail, and he was in such a state of 

turmoil that he preferred going to prison rather than to spend any more time in jail. He further 

stated that since he entered his plea, his mental state had improved and he was doing fine in 

jail. But when he appeared for the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, appellant’s 

counsel informed the court that appellant wanted to withdraw his motion and proceed with 

sentencing. (Sen. Tr. 2). Appellant’s counsel told the court appellant knew he was going to 

be sentenced to prison and was anxious to proceed. (Sen. Tr. 3-4). Appellant also addressed 

the court and stated that he knew he was going to prison and wanted to get it over with as fast 

as possible. (Sen. Tr. 8). Consequently, the court proceeded to sentence appellant. 

{¶19} Approximately one month later, appellant filed his post-sentence motion to 

withdraw his plea. As the trial court pointed out, appellant asserted essentially the same 

reasons that he asserted in his presentence motion to withdraw his plea, which he withdrew. 

{¶20} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s post-sentence 

motion to withdraw his plea. The court found that appellant did not prove a manifest injustice 

as is required for a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Appellant had already 

filed a presentence motion to withdraw his plea, which he withdrew. At the hearing where he 

withdrew his motion, he expressed to the court that he knew he was going to prison and 

wanted to get this matter over with. If appellant truly believed he should not have entered his 

guilty plea because he was not of the proper state of mind when he entered the plea, then 

presumably he would not have withdrawn his motion and asked the court to proceed with 

sentencing. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court acted arbitrarily, 

unconscionably, or unreasonably in denying appellant’s motion. 

{¶21} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶22} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs. 
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Robb, J., concurs.