J-S82013-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.M.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.C.W., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1022 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered May 26, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 66 Adoptions 2015

BEFORE: OTT, DUBOW, and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016

R.C.W. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered May 26, 2016, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, which involuntarily 

terminated his parental rights to his minor daughter, C.M.W. (“Child”).1 

After careful review, we affirm.

The orphans’ court summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

history of this matter as follows. 

[K.B. and J.B. (“the Petitioners”)] are the maternal great 

aunt and great uncle of Child. Child was born [in January of 

2015] and placed in the custody of [the Petitioners] [a few days 

after her birth]. Child was placed into the custody of [the 

Petitioners] by the State of Maryland’s Child Welfare Services, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, H.N.B. 

(“Mother”), on January 21, 2016. Mother has not filed a brief in connection 

with this appeal, nor has she filed her own separate appeal. 
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pursuant to a safety plan entered into by that agency and Child’s 

Mother. . . .

When Child was conceived, [Father] was on parole 

following a conviction for attempted armed robbery. [Father] is 

presently incarcerated in the State of Maryland, after violating 

the conditions of his parole by failing a drug test and failing to 

report to his parole officer. The earliest date [Father] could be 

paroled would be some time in October of 2016. [Father] will 

then remain on parole until 2023. 

Subsequent to receiving Child, [the Petitioners] filed for 

custody and, by Order of Court dated March 24, 2015, received 

primary physical custody and shared legal custody of Child. 

Importantly, only [the Petitioners] and Mother received any 

physical or legal custody of Child. Mother was permitted only 

supervised visitation, while [Father] was not awarded any 

custody or visitation at that time. Mother never exercised her 

periods of visitation. [Father] specifically did not receive shared 

legal custody, and was prohibited from filing a petition to review 

the custody arrangement until his release from prison and his 

completion of a drug and alcohol evaluation.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/21/2016, at 1-2.

On August 13, 2015, the Petitioners filed a petition to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights to Child. The orphans’ court held a 

termination hearing on February 19, 2016, during which the court heard the 

testimony of the Petitioners and Father.2 Following the hearing, on May 26, 

2016, the court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights. 

Father timely filed a notice of appeal on June 23, 2016, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal.

____________________________________________

2

Father was represented at the hearing by court-appointed counsel. Due to 

Father’s incarceration, he participated in the hearing via telephone. 
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Father now raises the following issue for our review. “Did the 

[orphans’ c]ourt abuse its discretion when it determined that [Father] took 

little interest in the child and that it would be in the best interest of the child 

to have [Father’s] parental rights terminated?” Father’s brief at 2.

We consider Father’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 
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determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). We need only agree 

with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, 

we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(1) and 

(b), which provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

***

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 
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described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). To 

meet the requirements of this section, “the moving party must produce clear 

and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months 

prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006)). The court must 

then consider “the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct” and “the 

post-abandonment contact between parent and child” before moving on to 

analyze Section 2511(b). Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 

708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998)).

This Court has explained that a parent does not perform his or her 

parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development 

of the child.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal 

denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (quoting In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 

(Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 859 A.2d 767 (Pa. 2004)). Rather, 

“[p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith 

interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the 

parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). Critically, incarceration does not 
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relieve a parent of the obligation to perform parental duties. An 

incarcerated parent must “utilize available resources to continue a 

relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 

828 (Pa. 2012) (discussing In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa. 

1975)).

Instantly, the orphans’ court found that Father has taken little, if any, 

interest in Child since her birth. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/26/2016, at 5-6. 

The court stressed that Father has never met Child, nor has he called 

Petitioners to ask about Child, sent letters to Child, or requested visits. Id.

at 5. While the court acknowledged that Father may not have had contact 

information for the Petitioners, the court stressed that Father has remained 

in contact with Mother, and could have requested the Petitioners’ contact 

information from her. Id. at 6. In addition, the court observed that Father 

had contact information for the Petitioners’ attorney. Id. at 11.

Father argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion because his 

incarceration alone is not sufficient to support the termination of his parental 

rights. Father’s brief at 6. In addition, Father claims that he displayed an 

interest in Child, as he took part in naming Child and received occasional 

updates and pictures from Mother and his relatives. Id. at 6, 8. Father 

emphasizes that he did not have contact information for the Petitioners, and 

that the Petitioners never attempted to reach out to him. Id. at 8. Finally, 

Father insists that he would call Child on a regular basis if she were older 

and able to talk. Id. at 9.
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After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Father’s parental rights to Child. During the termination hearing, K.B. 

testified that she and her husband, J.B., have cared for Child since a few 

days after her birth in January of 2015. N.T., 2/19/2016, at 4. K.B. 

explained that she has never met Father, and only knows who Child’s father 

is because Mother told her. Id. at 5-6. K.B. stated that her address has 

remained the same since the custody proceedings in March of 2015, but that 

she has not received any letters or other attempts at communication from 

Father. Id. at 6-7. 

Similarly, J.B. testified that he has never met Father, and that he has 

not received any attempts at communication from Father in the past year. 

Id. at 12-13. Father did not send letters, gifts, or text messages, nor did he 

call on the phone. Id. at 13. J.B. confirmed that he and K.B. have had the 

same address and phone number for the past year, and that he has not 

done anything to conceal this information from Father. Id. at 14. 

While Father admitted that he has never met Child, Father testified 

that he played a role in naming Child, and that he has maintained contact 

with Mother, who provides him with occasional updates on Child.3 Id. at 21-

____________________________________________

3 Concerning Mother’s ongoing contact with the Petitioners, J.B. testified that 

he and K.B. were required to text pictures of Child to Mother as a result of 

the March 2015 custody proceedings. N.T., 2/19/2016, at 30-31. J.B. 

reported having minimal contact with Mother since that time. Id. at 31, 33. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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22. Father also reported that Mother and his sister have provided him with 

pictures of Child “every couple months” since Child’s birth. Id. at 22. 

Father recalled that he received paperwork as a result of the March 2015 

custody proceedings, but that the paperwork did not include the Petitioners’ 

address. Id. at 24-25. Father stated that he did not receive an address or 

phone number for the Petitioners until about three weeks prior to the 

termination hearing. Id. at 24. Father acknowledged, however, that he did 

have the address of the Petitioners’ attorney. Id. at 27. Father admitted 

that he never wrote to or called the Petitioners’ attorney “before this past 

month.” Id. at 27-28. As to why he did not attempt to contact the 

Petitioners’ attorney, Father stated, “I had all the information I needed. . . . 

I didn’t know I had to.” Id. at 27. 

Accordingly, the record confirms that Father refused or failed to 

perform parental duties for a period of at least six months prior to filing of 

the termination petition on August 13, 2015. The record supports the 

finding of the orphans’ court that Father has never met Child, and that 

Father has expressed little, if any, interest in her. As observed by the court 

in its opinion, Father had access to contact information for the Petitioners’ 

attorney starting in at least March of 2015. Father also kept in touch with 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

J.B. explained, “the phone numbers that we had, when we got one and we 

got a call or a text from her, we would try it and then a week later it would 

be unavailable.” Id. at 33. 
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Mother, who could have provided Father with Petitioners’ contact 

information. Despite the availability of this information, Father made no 

attempt to contact the Petitioners or their attorney. 

Further, we stress that Father’s incarceration did not relieve him of his 

responsibility to perform parental duties. To the contrary, as discussed 

above, incarcerated parents must utilize all available resources to maintain a 

relationship with their children. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828. 

Here, Father made no effort to utilize the resources at his disposal in order 

reach out to the Petitioners and develop a relationship with Child. While 

Father complains that the Petitioners did not attempt to reach out to him, it 

is clear that the Petitioners were under no obligation to do so. Father is not 

entitled to relief.

We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We will 

review Section 2511(b) pursuant to In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1010 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc) (considering Section 2511(b) despite the appellant’s 

failure to challenge the court’s analysis).4

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4

In his statement of questions involved, Father indicates that he is 

challenging the findings of the orphans’ court that he “took little interest in 

the child and that it would be in the best interest of the child to have 

[Father’s] parental rights terminated[.]” Father’s brief at 2. Thus, it would 

appear that Father is attempting to challenge the court’s findings with 

respect to both Section 2511(a) and Section 2511(b). 
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Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court found that Child is thriving in the care of the 

Petitioners. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/26/2016, at 11-12. The court 

observed that the Petitioners have cared for Child for nearly her entire life, 

that the Petitioners’ home is the only home that Child has ever known, and 

that Child clearly is bonded with the Petitioners. Id. at 10. The court 

further found that Child has no bond with Father, and that Father will be in 

no position to care for Child any time soon. Id. at 10-12. The court 

concluded that Child will not suffer any harm if Father’s parental rights are 
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terminated, and that termination will best serve Child’s needs and welfare. 

Id. at 12.

We again discern no abuse of discretion. K.B. testified during the 

termination hearing that Child is thriving in her home, and has “come a long 

way.” N.T., 2/19/2016, at 8. K.B. explained that she and J.B. have four 

biological children, and that their children are bonded with Child and have

treated her like a sibling. Id. at 3, 8. J.B. testified that it would be in 

Child’s best interest that Father’s parental rights be terminated so that he 

and K.B. can adopt Child. Id. at 15. J.B. explained, “We have a loving, 

stable home environment for her. She’s got siblings . . . that love and care 

for her and a couple of parents that love and care for her[.]” Id.

Thus, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court that 

Child will not suffer harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated, and that 

terminating Father’s parental rights will best serve Child’s needs and 

welfare. Child has no bond with Father, as Child has never even met Father. 

Moreover, Father is not currently capable of caring for Child, and it is not 

clear when, if ever, he will be capable. In contrast, the Petitioners have 

cared for Child since shortly after her birth, and stand ready to adopt Child 

into a loving, permanent, and stable family. As this Court has stated, “a 

child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the 

maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot 

and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 
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stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513.

Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to 

Child, we affirm the order of the orphans’ court.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2016