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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43982

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NICOLE MICHELLE SCIANDRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 783

Filed: November 21, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. Hon. Roger Harris, 

Magistrate. 

Order of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate, affirming 

judgment of conviction for driving under the influence, resisting or obstructing 

officers, and possession of an open container, affirmed. 

C. Ira Dillman, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

MELANSON, Chief Judge 

Nicole Michelle Sciandra appeals from the district court’s order, on intermediate appeal 

from the magistrate, affirming Sciandra’s judgment of conviction for driving under the influence 

(DUI), resisting or obstructing officers, and possession of an open container. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

By uniform citation, Sciandra was charged with DUI, I.C. § 18-8004; resisting or 

obstructing officers, I.C. § 18-705; and possession of an open container, I.C. § 23-505(2). 

Following Sciandra’s arraignment, she demanded the State submit a sworn written complaint, 
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which the State did two days before the case was set for trial. The same day, Sciandra filed a 

motion to strike the complaint on the basis that it failed to allege a factual basis for the charges. 

During the trial, Sciandra sought a ruling permitting her to introduce evidence which was, by her 

own admission, precluded by State v. Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112, 357 P.3d 238 (Ct. App. 2015).1 

The magistrate permitted Sciandra to make an offer of proof but ultimately ruled that the 

evidence was inadmissible. A jury found Sciandra guilty of all charges. She appealed to the 

district court, challenging the magistrate’s denial of her motion to strike the complaint and 

arguing the magistrate erred by precluding Sciandra’s evidence pursuant to prior appellate 

precedent. The district court affirmed the magistrate. Sciandra again appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the 

magistrate division, this Court’s standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho 

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there is 

substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the 

magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 

224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 

therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the district 

court’s decision as a matter of procedure. Id. Thus, the appellate courts do not review the 

decision of the magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 

2014). Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. 

Id.

 

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In Tomlinson, this Court, applying Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 153 Idaho 200, 

280 P.3d 703 (2012), held that a per se violation of I.C. § 18-8004 may be shown by test results 

from an approved and properly administered test of blood, breath, or urine. Therefore, as long as 

the testing is approved and properly administered, other evidence (such as a purported margin of 

error or uncertainty in the test results) is irrelevant.
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III.

ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Charging Document

On appeal, Sciandra contends that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over her case 

because an appropriate complaint was never tendered. In support, Sciandra argues that the 

complaint did not allege specific facts and therefore prejudiced her. 

Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law, over which this Court exercises 

free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). In a criminal case, 

the filing of a charging document alleging that an offense was committed within the state of 

Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 757-58, 101 P.3d at 701-02. Because the 

charging document provides subject matter jurisdiction to the district court, the district court’s 

jurisdictional power depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive 

challenge. Id. at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. Whether a charging document conforms to the 

requirements of law and is legally sufficient is also a question of law subject to free review. Id.

In this case, the State filed a uniform citation to charge Sciandra with three 

misdemeanors. Idaho Criminal Rule 3.1 allows any misdemeanor to be charged and prosecuted 

by a uniform citation. However, Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 3(d) allows a criminal 

defendant to demand a sworn complaint in place of a uniform citation. Although the State did 

not provide a sworn complaint until two days before trial, the court may permit amendment at 

any time before the prosecution rests. I.M.C.R. 3(d). Thus, the State complied with the rules

and there was no deficiency unless the complaint was legally insufficient.

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To be legally sufficient, a charging document must impart subject matter jurisdiction and 

satisfy due process. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. To confer jurisdiction upon the 

district court, a charging document must allege that the defendant committed a criminal offense 

within the state of Idaho. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009). The 

uniform citation in this case alleged that Sciandra committed the offenses of DUI, resisting or 

 

2 While the State tendered a sworn complaint within the time provided in the rules, we 

agree with the magistrate and the district court that it is troubling for the State to delay the filing. 

The district court suggested the magistrate consider a filing cut off--such as at the time of the 

second pretrial--to avoid problems. We think this was a sound suggestion.
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obstructing officers, and possession of an open container in the state of Idaho. Thus, the uniform 

citation was sufficient to impart jurisdiction upon the magistrate. Sciandra argues that once she 

demanded a sworn complaint, the magistrate lacked jurisdiction until that sworn complaint was 

filed. However, Sciandra cites no authority to advance the proposition that requesting a sworn 

complaint revoked the jurisdiction imparted by the original charging document. A party waives 

an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 

923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).

Sciandra further argues that the complaint was inadequate because it did not specify what 

conduct she would need to address at trial. Whether a charging document satisfies due process is 

a separate analysis from the jurisdictional analysis. State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 

P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006). To satisfy due process, a charging document must allege 

specific facts to enable the defendant to prepare an adequate defense and prove a res judicata 

effect. State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 55-56, 539 P.2d 604, 607-08 (1975). The complaint may 

be phrased generally in the words of the statute or ordinance. Id.

In this case, the complaint alleged that on or about March 6, 2015, Sciandra: (1) drove a 

motor vehicle upon a highway, street, or bridge or upon public or private property open to the 

public while having an alcohol concentration of (0.08) or more as shown by an analysis of her 

blood, in violation of I.C. § 18-8004; (2) willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a public officer

in the discharge or attempt to discharge a duty of his or her office, in violation of I.C. § 18-705; 

and (3) was in possession of an open container of beer while the vehicle was on a public highway

in violation of I.C. § 23-505. Although the complaint could have alleged more specific facts, it 

sufficiently alleged the time, place, and person at issue and the words of the statutes under which 

Sciandra was charged. Thus, the complaint was sufficient so long as it enabled Sciandra to 

prepare an adequate defense and prove a res judicata effect. A review of the record establishes 

that Sciandra was apprised of the factual allegations underlying the State’s charges against her. 

Moreover, the manner of Sciandra’s defense shows that she and her counsel were aware of the 

facts upon which the charges were based. Accordingly, the complaint satisfied due process. 

Because the complaint imparted subject matter jurisdiction and satisfied due process, it was 

legally sufficient. Thus, the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate’s denial of 

Sciandra’s motion to strike.
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B. Application of Precedent

On appeal, Sciandra challenges the magistrate’s application of Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112, 

358 P.3d 238 to preclude Sciandra from introducing evidence that she was not under the 

influence at the time she was driving. Sciandra argues that Tomlinson should be overturned on 

the basis that it unconstitutionally relied upon the holding in Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho 200, 280 P.2d 

703. Specifically, Sciandra contends that, because Elias-Cruz was a civil case, its holding cannot 

be applied in a criminal case. However, the holding in Elias-Cruz--that general challenges to the 

reliability and accuracy of approved intoxication testing methods are irrelevant--does not vary 

with the burden of proof. Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court recently applied the holding in 

Elias-Cruz to a criminal case in State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 375 P.3d 279 (2016). Stare 

decisis requires that this Court follow controlling precedent unless that precedent is manifestly 

wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is necessary to 

vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued justice. State v. Owens, 158 

Idaho 1, 4-5, 343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015). None of Sciandra’s claims rise to the level of 

overturning precedent. Thus, Sciandra’s claim that Tomlinson unconstitutionally applied the 

Elias-Cruz holding fails. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Sciandra has failed to show the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s order 

denying Sciandra’s motion to strike the complaint. Likewise, Sciandra has failed to show that 

Tomlinson’s application of the holding in Elias-Cruz was error. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court’s order affirming Sciandra’s judgment of conviction for DUI, resisting or 

obstructing officers, and possession of an open container.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.