alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.4






EXHIBIT 10.4
AMENDMENT ONE TO THE GENERAL SERVICES AGREEMENT 
THIS AMENDMENT ONE TO GENERAL SERVICES AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is made effective as of July 1, 2011, by Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., (“ACS”) and Ashford University, LLC (“Customer”).
WHEREAS, ACS and Customer entered into that certain General Services Agreement effective January 1, 2009; and
WHEREAS, ACS and Customer now desire to amend the Agreement pursuant to the terms and conditions described herein; and
WHEREAS, ACS and Customer are entering into this Amendment pursuant to Section 17(h) of the Agreement.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, ACS and the Customer, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows:
1.Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meanings set forth for such terms in the Agreement.
2.Section 4.3 is modified to provide for the following:
(v) Forgery of signatures or certifications; 
(vi) False statements of income; and
(vii) Payment of any commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based in any part, directly or indirectly, upon success in securing enrollments or the award of financial aid to any person or entity engaged in any student recruitment or admission activity or in making decisions regarding the award of title IV, HEA program funds.
3.In the event of a direct conflict between the terms of this Amendment and the Agreement, the terms of this Amendment will govern.   All other terms and conditions outlined in the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.  
The Parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by the signatures of their respective authorized representatives.


[Signature Page Follows]











IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed the Amendment to this Agreement.


	
						
	Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.
	 
	Ashford University, LLC
	 

	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	By:
	/s/ Richard K. Schnacker
	 
	By:
	/s/ Daniel J. Devine
	 

	(Print Name) Richard K. Schnacker
	 
	(Print Name) Daniel Devine
	 

	Title:
	Group President
	 
	Title:
	EVP/CFO
	 

	Date:
	6/30/2011
	 
	Date:
	7/14/2011
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2115 

To amend title 28, United States Code, to prohibit the exclusion of individuals 

from service on a Federal jury on account of sexual orientation or 

gender identity. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 17, 2021 

Mrs. SHAHEEN (for herself, Ms. COLLINS, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. WHITEHOUSE, 

Ms. CANTWELL, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. MARKEY, and Ms. CORTEZ MASTO) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 28, United States Code, to prohibit the exclusion of individuals from service on a Federal jury on 

account of sexual orientation or gender identity. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Jury Access for Capa5 ble Citizens and Equality in Service Selection Act of 

6 2021’’ or the ‘‘Jury ACCESS Act of 2021’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2115 IS

1 SEC. 2. EXCLUSION FROM FEDERAL JURIES ON ACCOUNT 

2 OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION OR GENDER IDEN3 TITY PROHIBITED. 

4 Section 1862 of title 28, United States Code, is 

5 amended by inserting ‘‘sexual orientation, gender iden6 tity,’’ after ‘‘sex,’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2138

RICHARD MARTIN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HOWARD J. WALSH, III, Esq.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. George J. Hazel, District Judge. 

(8:15-cv-2302-GJH)

Submitted: August 19, 2016 Decided: November 23, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, FLOYD, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Martin, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Richard Martin appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing his civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). We review a district court’s 

dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, applying the same 

standards employed when reviewing a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6). De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 

2003). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On appeal, Martin challenges the district court’s 

conclusion that his claims were untimely. Martin’s claims, 

whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were 

subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations. 

See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (2013) (general 

civil statute of limitations); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 

§ 5-105 (2013) (actions for assault and defamation); Owens v. 

Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 

2014) (§ 1983 claims), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1893 (2015). 

While Martin’s malicious prosecution claim has not yet accrued, 

this claim is barred by his inability to meet the favorable 

termination requirement. See Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 

(Md. 2000). Contrary to Martin’s assertions, the facts alleged 

in the complaint demonstrate that his remaining claims accrued, 

at the latest, by the time he was released from prison, and the 

limitations period was not subject to tolling. See A Soc’y 
3

Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(accrual under § 1983); Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 43 

A.3d 1029, 1034-35, 1039-41 (Md. 2012) (discussing accrual and 

tolling under state law); see also Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Raleigh, 

947 F.2d 1158, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1991) (describing continuing 

violations doctrine). Finally, because Martin’s claims were 

properly dismissed, the district court committed no error in 

denying as moot Martin’s request to file electronically.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### RUNALS *vs.*BROWN.

APPEAL EROM CIRCUIT COURT, WALWORTH COUNTV.

Heard March 9.]

[Decided June 4, 1860.

*Place of Trial.*

Where a party applies for a change of the place of trial on account of the prejudice of the judge, in accordance with the statute, the change must he ordered.

*Bines vs, Boyd, et*al7 Wis., 155, considered and approved.

This was an action commenced by Eli G. Runnels against Chas. C. Brown, to recover the amount due upon several promissory notes. The summons was served on the 24th of May, and the complaint filed the 10th of June, 1859. The answer was served and filed the 28th of June. On the 4th of November, Brown served a notice of a petition for a change of venue, which was brought on on the 16th, and denied. The petition was sworn to, and was as follows: “The petition of the above named defendant respectfully shows to the court that your petitioner verily believes that Hon. David Noggle, judge of the circuit court for said county of Kenosha, is so prejudiced in favor of the plaintiff, that this defendant cannot expect a fair trial of this action in said county of Kenosha. Tour petitioner further says, that he fears that he will not re--ceive a fair trial in said county of Kenosha, where said action is now pending, on account that the Hon. David Noggle, judge of the circuit court of said county, is prejudiced against your petitioner, and in favor of the plaintiff above named, so *186that your petitioner cannot receive a fair trial in said county. Wherefore your petitioner prays this honorable court to award a change of the place of trial of this action, from said county of Kenosha, to some county where the pauses above complained of do not exist, and your petitioner will ever pray.”

The defendant then left the court, and the cause was tried by a jury, and verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $3,090,02; from which the defendant appealed.

*Coon*& *Lee,*tor the appellant.

*J. J. Pettit,*for the respondent

*By the Court,*

Cole, J.

This case must follow the decision in the case of *Rines vs. Boyd et al., 7*Wis., 155. We there held that it was the imperative duty of the circuit court to remove the cause when the prescribed petition was presented. It is true the application in that case was made under chapter 51, General Laws, 1853, but that statute has been substantially embraced in chapter 123, R. S., under which the application in the present case was made. The petition for the change of the place of trial was in conformity to the statute, and the application should *have been*granted.

The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in accordance with this decision.
#### Sophie Laner, Plaintiff, *v.*Hyman Laner, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County,

November 20, 1937.

*Morton Brauer,*for the plaintiff.

*Maurice M. Friedman,*for the defendant.

*577Lockwood, J.

This is an application by plaintiff for an allowance of counsel fee. The action was brought to annul the marriage between parties because of defendant’s alleged physical incapacity. The defendant interposed a counterclaim for an annulment based upon the plaintiff’s alleged physical incapacity. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff annulling the marriage “ because of the physical incapacity of the plaintiff wife and defendant husband of entering into the marriage contract with each other.” The defendant has served notice of appeal from such judgment, and the plaintiff seeks an allowance for counsel fee and expenses to enable her to oppose said appeal. An award of counsel fee to a plaintiff in an annulment action has been upheld in this department. *(Ginsbarg*v. *Ginsbarg,*236 App. Div. 844, with two justices dissenting upon the authority of *Jones*v. *Brinsmade,*183 N. Y. 258; and *Farnham*v. *Farnham,*227 id. 155.)

The judgment in this action establishes the non-existence of a marriage between the parties hereto. The court may not award a counsel fee to the plaintiff unless there is a relationship of husband and wife between her and the defendant. *(Lake*v. *Lake,*194 N. Y. 179.)

The judgment herein contains no reservation whatever, nor is there a continuance of the defendant’s duty to support the plaintiff. Therefore, *Fox*v. *Fox*(263 N. Y. 68) has no application.

In appealing, the defendant seeks to reverse the judgment of annulment — to uphold or reinstate the marriage relationship. The plaintiff in opposing the appeal seeks to uphold the judgment — to affirm the declaration that there is no marriage.

Motion denied.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Reserve System

The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and § 225.41 of the Board's Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire shares of a bank or bank holding company. The factors that are considered in acting on the notices are set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).

The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The notices also will be available for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their views in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for that notice or to the offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must be received not later than April 8, 2015.

A. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Dennis Denney, Assistant Vice President) 1 Memorial Drive, Kansas City, Missouri 64198-0001:

                    1.                     *The Frank D. Dunnick Trust, Pittsburg, Kansas, and Kevin F. Mitchelson and Larry J. Dunnick,*                     both of Pittsburg, Kansas, as co-trustees, to acquire voting shares of Southeast Kansas Bancshares, Inc., Girard, Kansas, and thereby indirectly acquire voting shares of Prescott State Bank Holding Company, Inc., and Prescott State Bank, both in Prescott, Kansas; and Exchange State Bank, Saint Paul, Kansas.                

      ( print page 15605)    
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 19, 2015.

Margaret McCloskey Shanks,

Deputy Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 2015-06676 Filed 3-23-15; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-20198 Conference Calendar

__________________ DONALD RANDLE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus MENNEN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:92-CV-82

- - - - - - - - - - (August 22, 1995) Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * A complaint filed in forma pauperis can be dismissed sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Cay v. Estelle , 789 F.2d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 1986). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc. , 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). "A claim for relief under section 1983 requires a showing of two elements: first, that the claimant has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and laws' of the UnitedNo. 95-20198 -2- States, and second, that the deprivation was conducted `under color of any statute . . . of any State.'" Frazier v. Board of Trustees of N.W. Miss. Regional Medical Ctr. , 765 F.2d 1278, 1283 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)), amended in other part , 777 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied , 476 U.S. 1142 (1986). Randle's claim against the Mennen Company fails because he has failed to show that he was injured as the result of any state action. His sole claim is against Mennen, a company which Randle described as the manufacturer of the defective product. Randle has not alleged that Mennen is a state actor and therefore he cannot establish that state action caused his boil to develop, nor has he alleged any basis for jurisdiction other than § 1983. Randle's appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because this appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-40972 Conference Calendar

__________________ MELVIN LEE JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus BETO I UNIT; UNIDENTIFIED JOHNSON, Lieutenant at Beto I Unit; KEN E. KUYKENDALL, Doctor at Beto I Unit; HERBERT SCOTT, Warden, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:95-CV-511

- - - - - - - - - - June 26, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Melvin Johnson, #643399, appeals from the magistrate judge's dismissal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) of his civil rights complaint. He contends that the magistrate judge erred by dismissing his complaint as frivolous. We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge's memorandum opinion andNo. 95-40972 -2- order and AFFIRM the dismissal of Johnson's complaint for essentially the reasons set forth by the magistrate judge. See Johnson v. Beto I Unit et al. , No. 6:95-CV-511 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 1995). Johnson's motion for a default judgment is DENIED.
AFFIRMED.
# CA2014108EN.01001001.xml

| 10.4.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CA 108/10 |
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10.4.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CA 108/10

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REVIEW OF COMPETITION C A OFFICIAL JOURNALS

REVIEW OF COMPETITION C A OFFICIAL JOURNALS

2014/C 108 A/02

Please find below the list of C A Official Journals published during the present year.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Official Journals are published in all language versions.

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EXHIBIT32

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18U.S.C. SECTION1350,

ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Calif Acquisitions, Inc (the"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2004, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, Anthony N. DeMint, President and Chief AccountingOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

-  The    Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the    Securities Exchange Act of 1934; andThe    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/Anthony N.DeMint                       

AnthonyN. DeMint

Presidentand Chief Accounting Officer

November 10,2004
Order entered November 23, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01132-CV

FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP AND RICHARD A. WOLFE,

Appellants

V.

MILLENNIUM CHEMICALS INC., MILLENNIUM AMERICA HOLDINGS, LLC AND 

MILLENNIUM HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellees

On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-13422

ORDER

Before the Court is appellees’ unopposed motion for extension of time to file brief. We 

GRANT appellees’ motion and ORDER the brief filed by January 3, 2017.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
# C_2015059EN.01000201.xml

| 19.2.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 59/2 |
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19.2.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 59/2

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7505 — Carlyle/Warburg Pincus/DBRS)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2015/C 59/03)

On 16 February 2015, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7505. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
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in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7505. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

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#### Martin vs. Pugh.

*Defendant’s ‘pleading and, proof in action on promissory note.*

1. In an action upon a note, proof of *payment*cannot be received under a *generad denial.*

2. In such action, under a counterclaim for money had and received, defendant cannot prove payment of usurious interest and have the same allowed, without having alleged specifically the facts showing usury.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Milwaukee*County.

The complaint alleged that, on, etc., defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff his promissory note, whereby, for value received, six months from the date thereof, he promised to pay plaintiff $200; that said note is now lawfully held and owned *185by the plaintiff, and there is now due and in arrear from defendant to plaintiff thereon $200, with interest from date. The answer admits that defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff the note described in the complaint, for a valuable consideration, but denies generally all the other allegations of the complaint. It also sets up a counterclaim for money had and received by plaintiff from defendant for the use of the latter Eeply, in denial of the counterclaim.

Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; and defendant appealed.

*E. Fox Goo7e,*for appellant,

argued that all objections to the form of the answer were waived by the reply (8 N. T. 2, 9 ; 10 Eosw. 143); and to the point that the allegation for *“*money had and received ” was sufficient, cited 20 Wis. 406; 12 How. Pr. E. 326; 7 N. V. 476.

*Rogers db*Johnson, for respondent, to the point that payment cannot be proved under a general denial,

cited 2 Seld. 189; 6 Duer, 392; 21 Barb. 275; 16 N. Y. 297; 8 How. Pr. E. 273. To the point that usury cannot be proved unless alleged, they cited 5 Abb. 411; 15 How. Pr. E. 29; 21 N. Y. 567; 22 id. 472; 10 Wis. 333.

PaiNE, J.

This was an action on a promissory note, and the answer was a general denial, and a counterclaim for money had and received. On the trial, the defendant offered evidence of payment under the general denial, which was excluded because payment had not been alleged in the answer. Under his general counterclaim for money had and received, he offered to prove the payment of usurious interest, which he sought to recover back and have allowed. This was excluded, because he had not alleged specifically the facts showing usury. The authorities cited by the respondent show that the rulings of the court below were right on both points.

*By the Court.*— The judgment is affirmed.