UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4322

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KEVIN REEVES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge. (2:07-cr-00206-1)

Submitted: November 18, 2016 Decided: November 29, 2016

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Research & Writing Specialist, David R. Bungard, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellant. Carol A. Casto, United States Attorney, Joshua C. 

Hanks, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kevin Reeves pled guilty in 2008 to one count of possession 

with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012), and was sentenced to 60 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by 60 months of supervised release. He 

began his term of supervised release in November 2015. In April 

2016, a petition to revoke Reeves’ supervised release was filed. 

After a hearing, the district court found that Reeves had 

violated the terms of his supervised release by: (1) driving a 

motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, (2) 

failing to comply with a direction of the probation officer that 

he attend substance abuse counseling; and (3) failing to 

complete a four-month program at a halfway house, Dismas 

Charities. 

The court revoked Reeves’ supervised release and imposed a 

within-Guidelines sentence of four months’ imprisonment, 

followed by 35 months of supervised release, including a special 

condition that Reeves serve five months in a community 

confinement center, or “halfway house.” He appeals, claiming 

that the district court erred by imposing the five-month term of 

confinement in a halfway house. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” 

United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).
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Accordingly, in examining a revocation sentence, this court 

“takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of 

fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review 

for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, because Reeves did not object, review is limited to 

plain error. United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 711 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2911 (2015); Fed. R. Crim. P. 

52(b). 

We will affirm a revocation sentence that falls within the 

statutory maximum, unless we find that the sentence is “plainly 

unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th 

Cir. 2006). In reviewing a revocation sentence, we must first 

determine “whether the sentence is unreasonable,” using the same 

general analysis employed to review original sentences. Id. at 

438. Only if we find a sentence to be procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable will this court determine whether the 

sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439. A district court may 

impose community confinement as a condition of supervised 

release, though it is recommended that such a term not exceed 

six months. See USSG § 5F1.1 cmt. n.2. 

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court has considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012) factors and the policy statements contained in Chapter 
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Seven of the Guidelines. Id. The district court also must 

provide an explanation for its chosen sentence, although this 

explanation “need not be as detailed or specific” as is required 

for an original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 

544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper 

basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the 

sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. 

Here, the district court ordered the community housing 

condition to assure that Reeves receive drug abuse counseling 

and treatment. The court noted that Reeves’ conduct underlying 

the revocation of his supervised release involved possession of 

marijuana, operating a vehicle while under the influence of a 

controlled substance, and failure to participate in drug abuse 

counseling sessions as directed by his probation officer.

Accordingly, the special condition addressed Reeves’ need for 

medical care and treatment as contemplated by § 3553(a)(2)(D). 

Because the district court properly considered the 

applicable § 3553(a) factors and Chapter 7 policy statements, 

provided an explanation of the sentence it imposed, and was 

authorized to impose the special condition of supervised 

release, we conclude that Reeves’ sentence was reasonable. 

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED