UNITED STATES NAVY–MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

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No. 201500368

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

v.

KHRISTOPHER L. SLAUGHTER

Staff Sergeant (E-6), U.S. Marine Corps

Appellant

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Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Colonel Howard D. Russell, USMCR.

For Appellant: Lieutenant Rachel E. Weidemann, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: Major Cory Carver, USMC; Lieutenant Taurean K. 

Brown, JAGC, USN.

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Decided 29 November 2016

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Before PALMER, MARKS, and FULTON, Appellate Military Judges

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This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but may be cited 

as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Practice and 

Procedure 18.2.

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PER CURIAM:

A panel of members with enlisted representation sitting as a special 

court-martial convicted the appellant, contrary to his plea, of one 

specification of wrongful use of marijuana in violation of Article 112a, 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 912a (2012). The 

members sentenced the appellant to a bad-conduct discharge. The convening 

authority approved the sentence as adjudged. 

The appellant assigned two errors: first, that the trial counsel’s 

arguments on findings and sentencing were improper; and, second, that a 

bad-conduct discharge is an inappropriately severe punishment for the 
United States v. Slaughter, No. 201500368

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appellant’s offense. We specified a third issue, whether the record of trial was 

factually sufficient to support his conviction, and received briefs on the 

specified issue from the appellant and the government. We decide the 

specified issue in favor of the appellant and therefore do not reach the two 

assigned errors.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time of the offense, the appellant had just completed a tour as a 

recruiter at Marine Corps Recruiting Station Houston and was in the process 

of transferring to Camp Pendleton. On 9 December 2014, as he was packing 

his household goods and preparing to transfer, the appellant was summoned 

to provide a urine sample that ultimately tested positive for the metabolites 

of THC, the psychoactive component of marijuana. The accused’s urine 

contained 261 nanograms of metabolite per milliliter of urine, well over the 

15-nanogram minimum necessary to establish a positive urine sample test. 

The government’s case relied primarily on the permissive inference that 

the presence of THC metabolite in the appellant’s urine resulted from the 

appellant’s knowing use of marijuana. The appellant presented an extensive 

case on the merits and testified in his own defense. The defense theory of the 

case was that the appellant innocently ingested THC when he ate THC-laced 

brownies. 

The appellant’s half-brother, MB, testified for the defense. The appellant 

and MB had spent time together growing up but had not been close as adults. 

They made an effort to rekindle a relationship while the appellant was 

stationed in Houston, but their lifestyles remained very different. MB 

testified that he regularly used marijuana and had, during a trip to Colorado,

legally purchased four commercially produced THC-laced “cosmic” brownies. 

The brownies were individually wrapped and labeled to indicate they 

contained THC. MB ate one of the brownies in Colorado and returned to his 

Houston area home with the rest of the brownies. Since THC-laced brownies 

were illegal in Texas, he removed the labels. After keeping them in a drawer 

for a few days, he moved them to his refrigerator. 

MB testified that he invited some friends, the appellant, and the 

appellant’s wife to a going-away party to mark the appellant’s move from 

Houston to California. The appellant and his wife arrived in the evening. The 

appellant went upstairs and played a round of the drinking game “beer 

pong.” After playing beer pong, the appellant and the other guests went 

downstairs to eat and have more drinks. After eating, MB and the appellant 

went back upstairs and played another round of beer pong. Halfway through 

the round of beer pong, the appellant said that he was tired and wanted to 

stop. The appellant and his brother went into another room, and the 

appellant fell asleep on a couch, where he spent the night. The next day, MB 
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noticed that two of the THC-laced brownies were missing. MB did not warn 

the appellant the brownies contained THC, explaining that he did not want 

to “tell him about the vice side of my life because he is a Marine.”1 He further 

explained when he later surmised the appellant possibly ate the brownies, he 

kept quiet hoping the drugs would “wash out” of his system,2 and only came 

forward when he learned of the appellant’s positive urinalysis. 

The appellant testified and denied knowingly using marijuana. His 

testimony was largely consistent with his brother’s. He testified that he 

arrived at his brother’s party between 1900 and 2000. Guests were drinking 

beer and playing beer pong. He drank approximately four beers and then 

looked for some food in his brother’s refrigerator. The appellant testified that 

he found brownies in his brother’s refrigerator and ate two of them. After 

that, he remembered sitting on his brother’s couch. Even though the party 

was not over, the appellant fell asleep on the couch and did not wake up until 

around 0730 the following day. Although the appellant did not usually go to 

bed so early, he attributed his drowsiness to his alcohol consumption, the fact 

he had been up since 0430, and that he had spent much of the day packing 

his household goods and loading them into a rental truck in preparation for 

his move.

According to the appellant, after waking up at his brother’s house he soon 

received a message telling him to take part in a unit sweep urinalysis. He 

thereafter made the 45-minute drive to the downtown Houston recruiting 

station and reported to the urinalysis coordinator.

Gunnery Sergeant MR, the urinalysis coordinator, testified that the 

appellant arrived for the urinalysis on time in civilian clothes and that he did 

not appear nervous. Both he and the appellant testified that the appellant 

attempted to provide a sample as soon as he arrived but was unable to 

provide the minimum 30 milliliters of urine. Since he had started to provide a 

specimen, the appellant was required to stay at the recruiting station until 

he could provide a sufficient urine sample, which he did 30-60 minutes later. 

There was no evidence of any irregularities in the urine collection or testing 

processes. 

The appellant learned upon reporting to his new command at Marine 

Corps Base Camp Pendleton that he had tested positive for marijuana. He 

testified that he was very surprised to learn that he had tested positive and 

initially believed his sergeant major was joking with him. 

 

1 Record at 272. 

2 Id. at 267.
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Mr. CG, a forensic chemist, testified for the government about the Navy 

Drug Lab’s testing of the appellant’s urine and interpreted the laboratory’s 

results for the members. He testified that the appellant’s urine contained 261 

nanograms of THC metabolite per milliliter, over the DoD cutoff of 15 

nanograms per milliliter. He also testified that that amount of metabolite 

found in the appellant’s urine was consistent with the appellant having 

unknowingly consumed edible marijuana products the night before the 

urinalysis. He further testified that the appellant would not necessarily have 

noticed the effects of THC ingestion resulting in that level of metabolite. 

Finally, he agreed that “because . . . distilled THC is colorless and odorless, a 

person consuming [it in baked goods] would have no idea that it contains

THC.”3 In short, he agreed with the defense counsel that the urinalysis 

results were consistent with the defense’s theory of innocent ingestion. 

In addition to the testimony of the appellant and his brother, the defense 

presented eight character witnesses who testified to the appellant’s good 

military character and character for truthfulness. 

II. ANALYSIS

Article 66(c), UCMJ requires this Court to review convictions for 

factual sufficiency. We conduct this review using a de novo standard of 

review. United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 459 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after weighing the 

evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not having 

personally observed the witnesses, [we are] convinced of the [appellant]’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 

(C.M.A. 1987). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the 

evidence must be free from conflict. United States v. Goode, 54 M.J. 836, 841 

(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001). Rather, presuming neither guilt nor innocence, 

we take a “fresh, impartial look” at the evidence presented in trial, “to make 

[our] own independent determination as to whether the evidence constitutes 

proof of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 

Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002). 

The elements of the appellant’s offense are first, that the appellant 

used marijuana; and, second, that his use of marijuana was wrongful. Article 

112a, UCMJ. In order to have wrongfully used marijuana, the appellant must 

have knowingly used it. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES

(2012 ed.), Part. IV, ¶37(b)(2).

We have considered the parties’ pleadings and the entire record, 

making allowances for not having heard and observed the witnesses. We 

 

3 Id. at 201.
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believe that there remains a real possibility that the accused did in fact 

unknowingly ingest THC by eating his brother’s brownies. We are not, 

therefore, personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant 

knowingly used marijuana.

The government’s proof in this case consisted of the positive urinalysis 

and little else. In contrast, the appellant’s theory of innocent ingestion was 

specific, plausible, and corroborated. It was also consistent with the 

government’s only substantial proof of guilt—the urinalysis results. We find 

that the government’s argument that the appellant meant to take advantage 

of a drug-test-free period during his transfer to be unsupported. The 

appellant had not checked out from his command. The record demonstrates 

that the appellant was still subject to urinalysis testing when he ingested 

THC, and there is no evidence that would tend to show that the appellant 

was mistaken about this fact. Additionally, there is no evidence that the 

appellant—an experienced staff sergeant who worked relatively 

independently as a recruiter—made any effort whatsoever to avoid the 

urinalysis. To the contrary, on a day when he did not expect to perform 

military duties, he made the 45-minute drive from his brother’s house and 

immediately attempted to provide a sample. 

We find MB’s testimony—that he legally acquired THC-infused 

brownies in Colorado, removed the labels to facilitate interstate transport, 

and stored them in his refrigerator—to be plausible. As such, given the 

evidence that MB neither disclosed his recreational drug-using lifestyle nor 

warned anyone the brownies contained THC, the appellant would have no 

reason to believe the brownies were infused with an illegal substance. 

Further, although we agree familial affection could have motivated MB to 

falsely testify, we also note that his testimony was self-incriminating and 

thus against his own penal interests. 

The government’s forensic chemist testified that it was possible for the 

appellant to have ingested an amount of THC consistent with the urinalysis 

results and not have felt the effects of the colorless and odorless THC, 

particularly since the appellant had been drinking alcohol. While a positive 

urinalysis result can support an inference that an accused knowingly used a 

contraband substance, see United States v. Harper, 22 M.J. 157, 159 (C.M.A. 

1986), the drawing of this inference is not required, and a positive urinalysis

result does not shift the burden of proving innocence to the accused. We 

believe that the record as a whole does not exclude the appellant’s theory of 

innocent ingestion beyond a reasonable doubt and are therefore not 

personally convinced of the appellant’s guilt. 

 
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III. CONCLUSION

The findings and sentence are set aside and the charge and its sole 

specification are dismissed. 

 For the Court

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court