J-S81031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.J.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1896 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree June 3, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000408-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002947-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2016

M.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the June 3, 2016, decree involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her son, I.J.W., born in December of 2014. 

Upon careful review, we affirm.1 

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history as follows. 

I.J.W. was born with methadone in his system. Trial Court Opinion 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 By a separate decree dated and entered on June 3, 2016, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of J.B. (“Father”). Father has not 

filed a notice of appeal from the decree.
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(“T.C.O.”), filed 7/22/16, at 1;2 Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 6/3/16, at 13. 

Before his discharge from the hospital, I.J.W. was placed in the custody of 

the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”). T.C.O. at 

1. The trial court adjudicated him dependent on December 29, 2014. I.J.W. 

has resided in the same pre-adoptive home since his placement. N.T. at 25.

Although Mother has six children, none of them are in her care. N.T. 

at 14. Mother’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to 

two of her children. Id. In addition, she is an indicated perpetrator of child 

abuse resulting from an incident involving one of her other children.3 Id. As 

a result, by order dated July 14, 2015, the court found aggravated 

circumstances existed as to Mother. Id. at 13-14; Order, 7/14/15. 

The court set I.J.W.’s permanency plan as reunification. DHS assigned 

Mother Single Case Plan (“SCP”) objectives requiring her to complete drug 

and alcohol treatment; mental health treatment; and to obtain appropriate 

housing and employment. T.C.O. at 3. 

On May 6, 2016, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court’s opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a) is unpaginated. For ease of reference, we have assigned 

page numbers.

3 With respect to the incident, Mother alleged that Father injured one of her 

male children. N.T. at 29. Mother agreed on cross-examination that she 

waited a day and a half to seek medical attention for the child because she 

“was in bed” due to “going through [drug] withdrawal.” Id. at 65.
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and (b). The trial court held a hearing on June 3, 2016, during which DHS 

presented the testimony of Marvella Morris, the Community Umbrella 

Association (“CUA”) social worker, and William Russell, Ph.D., who 

performed a parenting capacity evaluation of Mother. Mother testified on 

her own behalf, and she presented the testimony of Chanel Randolph, a 

Family School social worker.

By decree dated and entered on June 3, 2016, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely filed a 

notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).4 The trial court filed its Rule 

1925(a) opinion on July 22, 2016. 

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [M]other [ ] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(1) where [M]other presented 

evidence that she substantially met her FSP goals and tried to 

perform her parental duties[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [M]other [ ] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(2) where [M]other presented 

evidence that she has remedied her situation by attending family 

____________________________________________

4

The trial court also issued a goal change order dated June 3, 2016, and 

Mother timely filed a notice of appeal. We conclude that Mother has waived 

all issues pertaining thereto for her failure to set them forth in her brief. 

See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth 

in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions 

involved. . . .”) (citations omitted). 
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school, continuing drug and alcohol treatment and receiving 

mental health treatment[?] Mother has the present capacity to 

care for [I.J.W.].

3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [M]other [ ] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(5) where evidence was provided to 

establish that the child was removed from the care of his 

[M]other, and that [M]other is now capable of caring for her 

child[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [M]other [ ] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(8) where evidence was presented to 

show that [M]other is now capable of caring for her child since 

she has completed parenting and continued drug and alcohol 

treatment, mental health treatment and family school[?] 

Additionally, [M]other completed her parenting capacity 

evaluation.

5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [M]other [ ] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(b) where evidence was presented that 

established the child had a strong parental bond with h[is] 

[M]other[?]

Mother’s Brief at 7.

We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 
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have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights 

are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009).

This Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 

2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of 

parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc). We conclude that the trial court in this case properly terminated 
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Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provide as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (b). 

With respect to Section 2511(a)(2), this Court has stated:

[T]he following three elements must be met (1) repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied. 
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In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). Further, we have explained that, “[t]he grounds for termination 

due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of 

refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 

A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted). In addition, “[p]arents 

are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt 

assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Id. at 340 (citation omitted). 

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained that, 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in 

the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court 

“must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with 

utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond.” Id. (citation omitted). 

On appeal, with respect to the termination of her parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(2), Mother asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 

because, in essence, the evidence demonstrates that she “has the present 

capacity to care for her son.” Mother’s Brief at 17. Mother asserts that she 

“cares for her child all day long several days a week at family school.” Id.

at 17. Further, Mother asserts that she completed her SCP objectives 
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regarding parenting classes, mental health, drug and alcohol treatment, and 

family school, and that she obtained a parenting capacity evaluation. 

Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the trial court found that Mother did 

not complete drug and alcohol treatment. T.C.O. at 3. Specifically, the 

court found as follows:

[M]other has a twenty year history of drug abuse. [ ] [M]other 

testified that she has a history of relapsing on drugs while 

attending drug and alcohol programs. . . . [M]other had her 

parental rights terminated [to] two previous children due to her 

drug and alcohol abuse. [M]other ha[d] been in a drug and 

alcohol treatment program for at least one year prior to June 1, 

2016. On July 9, 2015, [ ] [M]other tested positive for opiates. 

Moreover, on December 4, 2015, [ ] [M]other tested positive for 

[Phencyclidine] [“

]

PCP[”

]

. . . . 

Id. at 4 (citations to record omitted). Testimonial evidence supports the 

court’s findings.

William Russell, Ph.D., performed a parenting capacity evaluation of 

Mother in October of 2015. He testified that Mother “reported a longstanding history of substance abuse and alcohol use dating back to the time 

when she was about 11 or 12 years of age.” N.T. at 38. 

Marvella Morris, the CUA social worker, testified that she has been 

involved with this family since April of 2015, and Mother has been in a 

methadone maintenance program at the Jefferson Family Center the entire 

time. N.T. at 13-16. She testified that Mother has not been discharged 

successfully from the program. Id. at 16. Ms. Morris explained that Mother 

received two positive test results from random drug screens at the Clinical 
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Evaluation Unit (“CEU”). Id. at 17-18. On July 9, 2015, when I.J.W. had 

been in placement for one and a half years, Mother tested positive for 

opiates. Id. Ms. Morris stated that Mother told her the positive result was 

“due to her eating an excessive amount of poppy seed bagels.” Id. On 

December 4, 2015, Mother tested positive for PCP. Id. at 18. Ms. Morris 

testified that Mother “stated it must be a false positive due to her being 

prescribed Benadryl.” Id. 

Mother also disputed the positive drug screens during the involuntary 

termination hearing. She testified as follows on cross-examination:

Q. And is it your testimony today to the [c]ourt that you have 

not used any illicit drugs since [I.J.W.] has come into care?

A. That is correct.

Q. That the opiates was a false positive screen?

A. That is absolutely correct.

Q. And that the PCP is also a false positive screen?

A. Yes.

 I have remained sober since August 15, 2014.

Id. at 63-64. 

In addition to finding Mother failed to complete drug and alcohol 

treatment, the trial court determined that she failed to obtain appropriate 

housing. T.C.O. at 4. Specifically, the court found as follows:

[Mother] has lived in a shelter since the child was born. 

[M]other testified that the shelter where she currently resides is 

inappropriate for children. The social worker testified that 
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[M]other did not independently attempt to secure housing. 

Moreover, [M]other indicated that it was DHS’s responsibility to 

obtain a house for her. She was not going to do anything to 

obtain suitable housing on her own initiative.

Id. (citations to the record omitted). Upon our review, we find the 

testimony of Ms. Morris and Mother supports the trial court’s findings.

Further, the trial court relied upon Dr. Russell’s opinion that Mother did 

not have the capacity to parent I.J.W. either at the time of his evaluation or 

approximately one year later at the time of the subject proceedings. T.C.O. 

at 4. Specifically, he opined that Mother cannot provide safety and 

permanency for I.J.W. DHS Exhibit #13, at 11; N.T. at 43-44. In his 

evaluation, Dr. Russell stated that Mother minimizes the concerns of DHS 

“regarding the removal of [I.J.W.] from her care.” DHS Exhibit #13, at 11. 

He stated, “[i]t is unclear whether this behavior indicates failure to take 

responsibility for her actions or whether she truly understands why he was 

removed as well as her role in [his] removal.” Id. Dr. Russell testified at 

the time of the termination hearing that Mother “still presents with all of the 

concerns that I had a year ago [when he performed the parenting capacity 

evaluation].” N.T. at 52. Therefore, Dr. Russell agreed on redirect 

examination that Mother does not have the capacity to parent. Id.

We observe that Chanel Randolph, the Family School social worker, 

testified that Mother had been attending the school from January of 2016 

through the time of the hearing, for a period of six months. N.T. at 53-54. 

Ms. Randolph stated that Mother interacts with I.J.W. from 9:00 a.m. to 
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2:00 p.m. an unspecified number of times per week. Id. at 55. Based on 

her observations, Ms. Randolph asserted that she believes Mother has the 

ability to parent I.J.W. Id. at 55-56. To the extent that the trial court made 

credibility findings in favor of Dr. Russell and against Ms. Randolph, we defer 

to the court’s determination in this regard. See In re T.S.M., supra.

Based on the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, we 

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).5 Indeed, DHS presented 

clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s repeated and continued 

incapacity, neglect, or refusal to successfully complete her methadone 

maintenance program and to obtain appropriate housing has caused I.J.W. 

to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being for his entire life. Further, the causes of 

Mother’s long-standing incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.

Finally, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Specifically, 

Mother asserts that Ms. Randolph testified that, “there is a strong bond 

between mother and child.” Mother’s Brief at 20. Therefore, Mother argues 

____________________________________________

5 Based upon this disposition, we need not consider Mother's issues 

regarding Sections 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8). See In re B.L.W., supra.
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that terminating her parental rights does not serve I.J.W.’s physical and 

emotional needs and welfare. We disagree.

This Court has explained as follows:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it 

is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ 

parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong 

emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of 

child). Rather, the orphans’ court must examine the status of 

the bond to determine whether its termination “would destroy an 

existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption 

of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we 

explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have with 

the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

In addition, in considering the affection a child may have for his or her 

natural parents, we have explained as follows.

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent 

simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is 

not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s 

feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, 

the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics 

as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect 

and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage 
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and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the 

opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] 

and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a 

parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The 

psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in 

terms of the development of the child and its mental and 

emotional health than the coincidence of biological or 

natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Moreover, our Supreme Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a 

bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the 

denial of a termination petition.” In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 629, 71 A.3d at 

267. The Court further stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

Id. at 629, 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing the bond 

considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking 

clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 631, 71 A.3d at 269. The T.S.M.

Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and 

we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When 

courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted 

children.” Id.

Ms. Morris testified that there is a parental bond between Mother and 

I.J.W. N.T. at 32; T.C.O. at 5. However, she did not testify with respect to 
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any observations that led to her opinion regarding the existence of a bond 

between Mother and the child. Further, Ms. Morris acknowledged that I.J.W. 

is “attached to” and “well-bonded with” his foster parent, with whom he has 

lived since birth, and who is a pre-adoptive resource. N.T. at 25-26. 

Importantly, Ms. Morris indicated that I.J.W. could not be safely reunified 

with Mother as of the date of the hearing due to her lack of housing. Id. at 

26. As such, Ms. Morris testified that, as of the date of the termination 

hearing, it was in I.J.W.’s best interest to remain in his foster home. Id. at 

27. 

Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we discern no abuse of 

discretion by the trial court in concluding that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights will serve I.J.W.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare. Accordingly, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). See In re B., N.M., 856 

A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (stating that “a parent’s basic constitutional 

right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to 

fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting 

and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment”). 

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2016