J-S86015-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF L.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 949 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order June 9, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans’ Court Division at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000001-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016

Appellant, C.H. (“Father”), appeals from the June 9, 2016, order 

involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor child, L.S. (born in 

March of 2012), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 

(5), (6), and (b).1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: L.S. was 

born in March of 2012 to Mother, who was single and had never been 

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1 Mother signed a consent for adoption as to L.S., and following a hearing, 

the trial court confirmed Mother’s consent. Mother is not a party to this 

appeal, and she has not filed a separate appeal. 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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married.2 L.S. was living with maternal grandmother, until he was removed 

by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) on 

August 14, 2014.3 At this time, Mother could not be located and Father was 

incarcerated at SCI Greene for homicide with 2021 as his earliest release 

date. 

On September 3, 2014, L.S. was adjudicated dependent, and due to 

lack of contact, the trial court determined aggravated circumstances existed 

such that CYF was relieved of its obligation to provide reunification efforts 

for Mother. On January 8, 2016, CYF filed a petition for the involuntary 

termination of Father’s parental rights as to L.S.,4and on January 20, 2016, 

the goal for L.S. was changed to adoption.

On June 3, 2016, the trial court held a hearing as to CYF’s petition to 

terminate Father’s parental rights. At the hearing, Jessica Andrews, a CYF 

caseworker, testified that Father was incarcerated in 2012, and he 

completed parenting classes during his incarceration. Id. at 12. In August 

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2 Mother did not list a father on L.S.’s birth certificate; however, she later 

informed authorities that Father was L.S.’s biological father. Subsequent 

genetic testing in December of 2014 confirmed Father is L.S.’s biological 

father. 

3 Mother left L.S. in the care of maternal grandmother in June of 2014 and 

then failed to return. Upon investigation, it was discovered that maternal 

grandmother and maternal grandfather had extensive criminal histories.

4 The petition also sought the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental 

rights; however, CYF later withdrew its petition when Mother signed the 

consent for adoption, which the trial court confirmed. 
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of 2015, L.S. began visiting Father at the prison in Waynesburg, 

Pennsylvania. N.T., 6/3/16, at 12-13. Caseworkers, including Ms. Andrews, 

drove L.S. for the visitations. Id. at 13. Ms. Andrews testified that she 

witnessed the visitations, and in particular, she testified as follows:

[L.S.] is very active. He’s a 4-year-old child and he likes 

to run around and play. And during—there is a visiting room and 

stuff and so he likes to be in there. So I try to get him to be out 

in—because [Father] isn’t allowed in the playroom. They don’t 

let inmates in the playroom. So I try to get [L.S.] to stay out in 

the visitation area where he can actually visit with [Father], but 

there is a lot of him just running around and me chasing him to 

try to get him to stay put to visit with [Father] and a lot of me 

trying to, you know, get him to just play with the toys right 

there.

Id. at 13-14. 

As to whether Father is able to redirect or chase L.S. during the visits, 

Ms. Andrews testified:

I don’t know if [Father] is actually allowed to get up and chase 

after him. That, I’m not sure of but I believe that it’s been—the 

interaction seems kind of awkward which would be 

understandable given that it’s my understanding that the first 

time [Father] met [L.S.] was when I took [L.S.] for his first visit 

on August 29th of 2015. So there is a bit of unfamiliarity, 

whereas [L.S.] at that point had known me for over a year and 

[I] had been visiting and seeing him on a regular basis because 

of that. So there are a number of factors I think that play into 

that. 

Id. at 14. 

Ms. Andrews testified that, during the visits, Father will hug L.S. and 

try to talk to him, but it is difficult because L.S. just wants to play. Id. Ms. 
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Andrews testified that, if Father’s parental rights are terminated, there will 

be no detriment to L.S. as it relates to a parent-child bond. Id. at 14-15. 

Ms. Andrews testified Father asked that L.S. be placed with paternal 

grandmother and, accordingly, in January of 2015, Ms. Andrews went to 

paternal grandmother’s residence. However, upon inspection of the 

residence, Ms. Andrews discovered three roommates residing with paternal 

grandmother. One of the roommates was a registered Megan’s Law sex 

offender; one of the roommates had been indicated on ChildLine for sex 

abuse; and one of the roommates had previously had her parental rights as 

to her children terminated due to physical abuse. Id. 17-18. Accordingly, 

CYF did not deem paternal grandmother to be suitable for placement 

purposes. Id. at 18. 

Thereafter, Father informed CYF that his brother had evicted paternal 

grandmother’s roommates, and thus, he asked that CYF reconsider placing 

L.S. with paternal grandmother. Id. However, CYF indicated it declined to 

do so since paternal grandmother identified one of the roommates as her 

paramour and there was “a trust issue.” Id.

Ms. Andrews testified that L.S. was placed with a foster mom and dad, 

and their adult daughter, A.T., moved in with them in February of 2015 to 

assist with L.S.’s care. A.T. indicated she had become attached to L.S. and, 

therefore, on December 15, 2015, placement of L.S. was officially granted to 
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A.T. with the goal of adoption.5 Id. at 15-16. Ms. Andrews noted that Dr. 

Rosenblum had evaluated A.T. and L.S., and he recommended that A.T. be 

permitted to adopt L.S. Id. at 16. Moreover, Ms. Andrews testified CYF has 

concluded that it would be detrimental to remove L.S. from the care of A.T. 

as he has lived with her for close to a year and a half. Id. at 19.

Ms. Andrews denied that CYF was seeking termination of Father’s 

parental rights solely due to his incarceration; but rather, she indicated CYF 

was seeking termination as “he’s not capable of providing the care and 

control that [L.S.] needs.” Id. She opined that termination of Father’s 

rights would best meet L.S.’s needs and welfare. Id.

On cross-examination, Ms. Andrews admitted that Father attempted to 

maintain contact with L.S. by sending letters and cards to him. Id. at 24. 

She also admitted that Father seemed to want to establish a bond with L.S.; 

however, “it was just difficult because there hadn’t been a prior relationship 

and trying to build that is difficult with a child that wants to run around.” 

Id. at 23. 

Father, who was represented by counsel, testified that, as soon as 

paternity testing confirmed that L.S. was his biological child, he requested 

visitation through CYF. Id. at 28. He testified that he has done all that he 

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5 The record reveals that L.S. has a half-sibling, A.M.J. The children have 

the same biological mother but different biological fathers. Along with L.S., 

A.M.J. has also been placed with A.T. with the goal of adoption. 
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was supposed to do to begin visitations, and he has had “more than three or 

four” visits with L.S. Id. at 27-28. Father testified that “[t]he visits were 

nice. I enjoyed them. Because like Ms. Andrews said, he’s very playful and 

he’s happy all the time. So I enjoyed all the visits.” Id. at 28. Father noted 

he has maintained contact with the caseworker, has completed parenting 

classes, has written letters to L.S., and has sent cards to L.S. Id. at 28-29.

Father indicated that, when he suggested paternal grandmother as a 

placement resource, he was unaware that she had other people living in her 

home. Id. at 29-30. When he was informed of the fact by CYF, he enlisted 

the help of his brother to have the people evicted because he “want[s] [his] 

son.” Id. at 30. Father indicated he was contesting the termination of his 

parental rights because he does not want to give up his child and it is only 

because of his incarceration that his relationship with L.S. is hindered. Id.

at 30. Father testified that he was incarcerated in 2011, and when he was 

told that Mother alleged he was the biological father of L.S., he wanted it 

confirmed via a paternity test. Id. He noted that he “took the test” in 

October of 2013, but he had to wait an entire year for the results. Id. at 

30-31. 

Father admitted that he is “limited” as to what he can do for L.S. and 

“all [he] can do at the time [is] reach out to the family, potential people to 

see if they can help.” Id. at 31. Father indicated he loves L.S., and it is the 
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only child he has. Id. He acknowledged his earliest release date from 

prison is 2021. Id. at 32. 

On cross-examination, Father indicated he would concur with the 

caseworker’s report that he had seven visits with L.S. Id. He acknowledged 

that he knew Mother was pregnant when she testified against him at his 

criminal trial, but he did not think the baby was “his baby.” Id. at 32-33. 

He admitted that because of his incarceration he is not able to care for L.S.; 

however, he wants L.S.’s paternal grandmother to care for L.S. Id. at 33-

34.

At the conclusion of all testimony, by order entered on June 9, 2016, 

the trial court granted CYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate the parental 

rights of Father. Specifically, the trial court determined that CYF met the 

grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). 

Father filed a timely counseled notice of appeal, as well as a 

contemporaneous statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

The trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

Father raises the following issues in his counseled brief:

1. Is the trial court’s findings of grounds for involuntary 

termination of [Father’s] parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) proven by [a] showing of clear and 

convincing evidence?

2. Is the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights 

serves the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child [ ] proven by clear and convincing 

evidence under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b)?
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Father’s Brief at 5.6 

Our Supreme Court has set forth the following standards in reviewing 

the termination of parental rights.

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re R.J.T., 608 

Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id. As has been 

often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely 

because the reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 

28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could 

support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994). 

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6

Father has presented no issues regarding the trial court’s order changing 

the permanency goal for L.S. to adoption. 
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In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012) 

(some internal citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained “[t]he standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting

In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

In terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court relied on 

Subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. This Court 

may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental 

rights with regard to any one Subsection of 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). In the case sub judice, we 

will focus on Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Section 2511 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.─The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 
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without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

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(b) Other considerations.─The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We have stated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be 

met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and 

(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations 

omitted).

“The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 
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duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted). Further, as our Supreme Court has held:

[I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can 

be determinative of the question of whether a parent is 

incapable of providing “essential parental care, control or 

subsistence” and the length of the remaining confinement can be 

considered as highly relevant to whether “the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for 

termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2). If a court 

finds grounds for termination under subsection (a)(2), a court 

must determine whether termination is in the best interests of 

the child, considering the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 

[subsection] 2511(b). In this regard, trial courts must carefully 

review the individual circumstances for every child to determine, 

inter alia, how a parent’s incarceration will factor into an 

assessment of the child’s best interest. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 332, 47 A.3d at 830-31 (citations and 

parentheticals omitted).

In terminating Father’s parental rights under Subsection 2511(a)(2), 

the trial court relevantly found the following:

Father, who has been imprisoned since 2011, met [L.S.] 

for the first time in August, 2015, when visits with [L.S.] were 

scheduled at SCI Greene. Since then, Father’s only interactions 

with [L.S.] have been occasional visits at SCI Greene [ ] which, 

according to the testimony of the attending CYF caseworker[,] 

are “awkward” due to the “unfamiliarity” between [L.S. and 

Father]. Father has never provided [L.S.] with daily parental 

care and supervision, and Father’s “repeated and continued 

incapacity” has “caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being.” See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). 

[The trial court] concluded, furthermore, that the 

conditions which led to the removal of [L.S.] continue to exist 

and could not be remedied, within a reasonable period of time, 
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given the length of time remaining before Father’s earliest 

possible release date in 2021, at which time [L.S.]—who was 

over three years old when he first met Father, and who [ ] has 

never resided with Father or interacted with Father except for 

periodic visits at SCI Greene—will be nine to ten years old. 

Accordingly, [the trial court] concluded that Father has not in the 

past, and will not within a reasonable time, be able to provide for 

the child’s needs[.]

Trial Court Opinion, dated 8/8/16, at 6-7. 

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by concluding CYF met its burden of proving 

termination of Father’s parental rights was warranted, by clear and 

convincing evidence, under Subsection 2511(a)(2). In re R.N.J., supra. 

The evidence clearly demonstrates that Father is incapable of providing L.S. 

with parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being. While Father may claim to love L.S., a parent's own 

feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination

of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010). We 

have stated that a child's life “simply cannot be put on hold” in the hope that 

a parent will somehow summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting. Id. Rather, “a parent's basic constitutional right to the custody 

and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her 

parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment 

of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., 

N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004).
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After we determine that the requirements of Subsection 2511(a) are 

satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of Subsection 

2511(b) are satisfied. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 

2008) (en banc). This Court has explained that the focus in terminating

parental rights under Subsection 2511(a) is on the parent, but, under 

Subsection 2511(b), the focus is on the child. Id. at 1008.

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under Subsection 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the 

child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” [The court] [has] 

held that the determination of the child's “needs and welfare” 

requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the 

parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. 

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628-29, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013) (quotation and 

citations omitted).

As to the bond analysis, we have stated that, in conducting a bonding 

analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony, but may rely on 

the testimony of social workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., supra. This 

Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is formed between a child 

and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the 
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child's life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated. In 

re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa.Super. 2008).

In concluding termination of Father’s parental rights was in L.S.’s best 

interest under Subsection 2511(b), the trial court relevantly found the 

following:

[The court], in terminating Father’s parental rights, 

considered the developmental, physical and emotional needs of 

[L.S.] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), and determined that 

termination was warranted in light of [L.S.’s] lack of any 

relationship with Father from birth until August of 2015, and 

[L.S.’s] limited relationship with Father thereafter, together with 

the fact that Father has been imprisoned since 2011, and will not 

be able to provide for [L.S.’s] daily needs, at least until his 

earliest possible release date in 2021. In addition, evidence and 

testimony presented at the hearing indicated that [L.S.] 

displayed a “very strong emotional connection” to his preadoptive mother, referring to her as “Mommy,” and that [L.S.] 

“respond[s] very well to her.” (See Ex. 2 Expert Report of Dr. 

Rosenblum, 7/31/15). Moreover, CYF presented evidence and 

testimony that she has “earned the child’s love and trust,” is 

“attached” to him, is eager to assume parental responsibility, 

and has the ability to effectively provide for [L.S.’s] needs.

Trial Court Opinion, dated 8/8/16, at 7-8. 

Further, the trial court recognized that it would not be in L.S.’s best 

interest to reside with paternal grandmother, as suggested by Father, in 

light of the criminal history of paternal grandmother’s roommates, as well as 

the fact L.S. has never met paternal grandmother. Id. at 8. The trial court 

concluded that “given the length of time that [L.S.] has resided with [preadoptive mother], with whom [L.S.] has formed a bond, it would be 

detrimental to remove him from [her] care.” Id. at 9. 
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After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights under 

Subsection 2511(b). While Father argues that CYF did not meet its burden 

since the evidence was insufficient to establish a lack of a parental bond 

between him and L.S., we disagree. Ms. Andrews, the CYF caseworker, 

testified that, if Father’s parental rights are terminated, there will be no 

detriment to L.S. as it relates to a parent-child bond. N.T., 6/3/16, at 14-

15. Moreover, Father admitted that he visited with L.S. a total of seven 

times during L.S.’s lifetime, and all of these visits occurred at the prison. 

Accordingly, we reject Father’s claim.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s June 9, 

2016, order terminating Father’s parental rights as to L.S. on the basis of 

Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act.

Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2016