J-S35021-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY EDWARDS

Appellant No. 2553 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 12, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0902511-1999

BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2015

Appellant, Anthony Edwards, appeals from an August 12, 2014 order 

entered in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County that denied his third petition filed pursuant to the 

Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

Since Appellant’s petition was untimely and he failed to plead and prove an 

exception to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to entertain his claims. Accordingly, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the relevant historical and procedural facts 

as follows:

[Appellant] was found guilty after a jury trial of third-degree 

murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of 

an instrument of crime on June 2, 2000, before the [Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.] On the same day, 

[Appellant] was sentenced by [the court] to serve a life sentence 

because [he] had previously been convicted of second degree 
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murder. See 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9715. After [Appellant] filed a 

timely appeal, [this Court] affirmed the judgment of sentence on 

June 22, 2001. The Supreme Court denied [Appellant’s petition 

for allowance of appeal] on December 6, 2001.

[Appellant] filed his first pro se post[-]conviction relief petition 

on April 22, 2002. Thereafter, counsel was appointed and filed a 

“no merit” letter pursuant to [Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 

213 (Pa. Super. 1988)]. The petition was dismissed by the court 

on October 9, 2003 [and Appellant] did not file an appeal from 

the order denying his PCRA petition.

[Appellant] filed his second post[-]conviction petition on March 

5, 2009[] and the petition was dismissed as untimely on 

November 5, 2012. After filing a timely notice of appeal, [this 

Court] dismissed [Appellant’s] appeal on March 13, 2013[] for 

failure to file a brief.

[Appellant] filed his current post[-]conviction petition[, his 

third,] on August 12, 2013[.] [On November 21, 2013, 

Appellant filed an amended petition alleging that he received an 

illegal sentence because the Department of Corrections did not 

possess a written judgment of sentence. On March 25, 2014, 

Appellant amended his petition to assert that the imposition of a 

life sentence under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9715 for his second murder 

conviction violated Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. (2013). 

On April 21, 2014, the PCRA court issued notice pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition as 

untimely. On May 19, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to amend 

his petition and, on May 19, 2014, he supplemented his filing by 

asserting that all three exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year timebar applied. In particular, Appellant noted his recent discovery 

of the Alleyne decision and the absence of a written sentencing 

order. On August 12, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s petition as untimely. On August 14, 2014, Appellant 

again supplemented his petition by asserting that Alleyne

applied retroactively. This appeal followed.]

Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/14, at 1-2.

“Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the court's rulings are supported by the evidence of 
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record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d

1270, 1274-1275 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “It is an appellant's 

burden to persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred and that relief is 

due.” Id. “This Court treats the findings of the PCRA court with deference if 

the record supports those findings.” Id. “As the timeliness of a PCRA 

petition is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

In this case, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on grounds 

that it was untimely and because Appellant failed to plead and prove the 

application of an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. We 

therefore confine our discussion to whether these conclusions were legally 

correct and supported by the record.1

The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited 

statutory exceptions. This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition, 

including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s brief on appeal challenges the constitutionality of the PCRA’s 

jurisdictional time-bar. This contention is unreviewable since it was raised 

for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). It is also meritless. See

Commonwealth v. Sanders, 743 A.2d 970, 973 (Pa. Super. 1999) (1995 

PCRA amendments did not fall outside scope of designated matter of 

legislature's special session and, therefore, did not violate constitutional

prohibition against legislation on subjects outside parameters of special 

session where governor's proclamation sought to toughen criminal laws and 

resulting legislative process involved revising post-conviction relief statutes).
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date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the] 

petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the 

timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever, 

947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further, 

since the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts, 

we are required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are 

able to consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 

731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained:

the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from 

considering untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000)

(stating that “given the fact that the PCRA's timeliness 

requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no 

court may properly disregard or alter them in order to reach 

the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is 

filed in an untimely manner”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 

737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (holding that where a 

petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA time requirements, this 

Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition). [The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] also held that even where 

the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the 

PCRA timing mandate, th[e Court would] consider the issue 

sua sponte, as it is a threshold question implicating [its] 

subject matter jurisdiction and ability to grant the requested 

relief.

Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 475-476 (Pa. 2003).

Since the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our 

courts, “courts are without jurisdiction to offer any form of relief . . . 

[b]eyond th[e jurisdictional] time-period.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 

A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). This proscription extends even to claims 
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challenging the legality of a sentence. Id. In Jackson, we held that, since 

the “[PCRA] petition was patently untimely, [] the PCRA court did not have 

jurisdiction under [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 9545 to consider [the petitioner’s illegal 

sentence] claim.” Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521-522. Once the PCRA’s statutory 

deadline has passed, “section 9545 . . . acts to divest a court of [subject 

matter] jurisdiction” over the claims. Id. at 523.

In the present case, a jury convicted Appellant on June 2, 2000 of 

third-degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of 

an instrument of crime and, on the same day, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to a life sentence. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence on June 22, 2001. Thereafter, our Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 6, 2001. Since 

Appellant did not seek review by the United States Supreme Court, his 

judgment of sentence became final on March 6, 2002. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the review); U.S. Sup. 

Ct. Rule 13 (appellant has 90 days to file a petition for certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issues a 

decision). As Appellant did not file his current petition until August 13, 

2013, his petition is manifestly untimely and the burden thus fell upon him 

to plead and prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year 

time-bar applied to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); 
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Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to 

properly invoke a statutory exception to the one-year time-bar, the PCRA 

demands that the petitioner properly plead and prove all required elements 

of the relied-upon exception).

The statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar are as 

follows:

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges 

and the petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result 

of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court 

to apply retroactively. 

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in 

paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the 

claim could have been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

Further, as our Supreme Court held, “the 60-day rule requires a 

petitioner to plead and prove that the information on which he relies 

could not have been obtained earlier, despite the exercise of due diligence.” 
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Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis 

added); Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234, 1239 (Pa. 2014) 

(same).

The record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant did not 

properly invoke an exception to the PCRA court’s timeliness requirement. 

Within his August 13, 2013 petition, Appellant did not explicitly invoke any

of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. Nor did 

Appellant assert that he filed his petition within 60 days of the date his 

claims first could have been presented. On a supplemental submission form, 

filed on May 19, 2014 after the PCRA court issued its Rule 907 notice, 

Appellant checked several boxes listing all three exceptions to the PCRA’s 

jurisdictional time-bar. However, Appellant’s May 19, 2014 filing offered no 

factual support for any alleged interference by government officials, any 

newly-discovered evidence that was unknowable through due diligence, or 

any retroactive constitutional right. It was not until August 14, 2014 (after 

the PCRA issued its order dismissing the instant petition) that Appellant 

alleged for the first time that Alleyne applied retroactively. Since this Court 

has previously held that Alleyne did not create a new constitutional right 

that applies retroactively to claims pending on collateral review, 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 994 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

Appellant’s contention would have been unavailing even if it had been raised 

in a timely fashion. Because Appellant failed to plead and prove that one of 

the enumerated exceptions to the time-bar applied to his case, the PCRA 
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court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant’s third PCRA 

petition. Hence, the court’s August 12, 2014 order dismissing Appellant’s 

petition for collateral relief was legally sound and supported by the record.2

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/22/2015

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s petition alleged in the alternative that the Department of 

Corrections lacked legal authority to continue to detain Appellant because it 

did not possess a sentencing order in this case. In Joseph v. Glunt, 96 

A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court held that an identical claim should be 

treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus instead of a petition under 

the PCRA. Id. at 369. We further held, however, that even when the 

Department lacks possession of a written sentencing order, it has continuing 

authority to detain a prisoner where a criminal docket provided by trial court 

and a transcript of the sentencing hearing confirm the imposition, and 

legitimacy, of the prisoner's sentence. Id. at 372. Our review of the record 

in this case reveals the presence of these materials. Hence, Appellant’s 

alternate claim merits no relief.