.~ 

USCIB: 13/3.38 Af'P:li~BEB BBet::JU11ffl'S 00N= 

txIN COOJI r l!l!TJ!R!llL 

28 Mq 1953 

Ml!XORANDUM FOR THE M:mmERS OB USCIB: 

Subject: Securi~7 ~ COMINT Int'ormation. 

The enclosure is forwarded tor inrormation at 

the request ~ the Director. ISA. 

&lclosure 

NSA Ser: 0003038 dtd 

26 MB.)" 539 w/l incl. 

USCIB: 13/338 

L/ ~ RUFUS L. TAYLOR 

{f ... Cait.am. Uo S. Nav 

Executive Secret&17 9 USCIB 

APP.INDlm ~ QeN-

'l'AIH eeBB W8RB IM'fBRiAfi 

TOP SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-20-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
This document be read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in a . ordance with com- munication 1ntclh.geoce security regulations and authorized to receive the information reported herein. 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHING'l'C!i 251 D. C. 

!0P SB:lRS'P 0MtQ! SSG{JEGff lRP0RlfA!i9N 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Security of COMINT Inf'ormation 

Serial: 0003035 

26 Kq 1953 

lo During the period November 1952 - March 195.3, the Director., 

NSA, received. a considerable number ot report.a of incidents wherein 

COMINT information has been subjected. to canpranise. A B'UJllll8J.7 or 

the incidents in 'Nhich the Director, NSA,, has determined that COMINT 

inf'ormation must be considered potential.11' can.promised is attached. 

as Inclosure 1o 

2.. In one of the incidents summarized (paragraph 5 of the 

inclosure), the loss or a COMINT document can not be explained.. The 

document is believed, however. to have been inadvert.entq destroyed .. In all of the other incidents, COMINT information was subjected to 

compromiae as the resu+t ot inadvertent .f'ailure to observe established 

rules and procedures .tor maintaining the security or COMINT communicatioos o 

3. The Director, NSA, has not observed thus tar any positive evidence that for~ign countries have exploited the compromiees sunnarized 

il'l the inclosure. Although in some or all ot these instai\ces, the 

material in qu'!stion actual~ mq never have been obtained. bJ" unauthorizGd 

persons 6 the possibility that it has been compromised. de£inite)Jr exists, 

and the consequences must be raced. 

4. As is indicated in the inclosureg certain COMINT codewords must 

be considered llompromised. No positive securi:t;y benefits would be expected to result f'rom aupersession of these codewords and no codeword 

changes therer~re are recommended. at this time. 

5. It is requested that copies ot this correspondence be 

!orw'"8.l'ded. to USCIB members for intormation.. It is obvious that all 

possible effort must be exerted to prevent .turt.ber compromises, and 

Encloaure with USCIB 13/.338 dated 2S May" 195.3. 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
REF ID:A55077 

r"l 

Thi• doelllilent 1 o be read only by those personnel officially md,octrina~ed m a~ordanee rt':dth CO!"• 

munication mtell!gence ae0l11'ity regulatioilll and authorized to receive the mformat1on repo herem. 

Ser: 00030;35 

26 Mq 19.53 

USCIB members ara enjoined to take all possible measures within 

activities under their juriadiction to insure better security. 

The Director, NSA, will t'orward a cop;y to SUSLO with a request 

that appropriate British authorities be intormed of its contentso 

Incl: 

a/s 

FOR THE DIRECTOR: 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

2 

(Signed) 

ALFRED R. MARCY 

Colonel. US Artiq 

Chiet or statr 
.&..i '""" ... " .&..i 

Th111 document be read only by thOBe personnel ofllcially indoctrinated 1n ordance With com• munication intelll1enae aoeurlty regulationa and authorized to receive the information reported herein. 

/~o 3.3(h)(2) 

Rt 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SUMMARY OF RECENT COMPROMISES OF.COMINT INFORMATION 

lo A 'OOP SIOORE.'r CANOE messag• and eix SECRET CHUTE m.easagea 

originated at HQ NSA• and tranSJDitted in an. ORCUS qstem on \.various 

long-distance c:lreuita were subjected to compromise (and must be 

considered compromised······) b• ... · t: of an :::: wbic: :;r Oll\10 November 1952 at CammSupAct,~ \\ !The 

nature ~t;i·····on· /wase use o! ~ecryp ....... rotor a .... n·.·· ... a.nge- ment a~-- ~-tor the encryption o£ two messages transmitted. 

(CRCUS o r- iho from that location., The TOP SECRET message mentimecl 

abcne indicated thatl lcommunicatiana 

are being ~loited., ibe SECRET messages reveil succes$ea in st1ldi•• 

otl !call signs, operating signal.a and frequency allocationao 

2o On 20 December 1952.e a message classified SF.cRl!."T CHUTE was 

inadverterat.q transmitted in plain-~guage on land-linet from HQ ASA, 

Europe9 Frankfurt.., to 86o8 AAU, Schey-em., As a result of this transmission security "liolation,, the mess e must be conEJ:Ldered c cm.Ueda 

The message contains a r d 

reveal.a thereby that the s en so :v-1 

and ia being exploitedo repo o :vea J.ga: ASA Europe stat.eel 

that the two mcu responsible ~ere severely reprimanded.u 

.30 Four r110ssages • .:wo sent JO December 195211 and two sent 31 

December 19S2, are considered. compromised as the result or operator 

error on those dates at 86ll. AAU • 'Baumholdero The nature of' the error 

was re-use'ot ORCUS (ott-Une) message rotor alignments, and failure to 

check-d.ocr.vpt prior to transmission of the messageso .f!aeh ot the 

messages 1f!l.S c3.assified Sl!CRE'l' CHUrE, end conaiatecl of inl>~~tore' log extractao The texts indicated some exploitation oti __ J 

but no elements or Cl"J'Ptanalysis were indicatedo· A ful 1f1Vls 1ga:xon ol 

the incidents has been conducted by ASA, Europe., whereupon it was decided 

that the form of logging at encmting positions must be changed,, and a 

.formal training program must be conducted at 86ll AAUo 

4o On 24 Jwiuar,y 1953, the 6920th Security Group reported the inadvertent transm:J.aeion in the clear of th• COMIJil'T codeword TWJ!ED over an 

on-line APOLLO cireuit between the 6920th Security Group. Johnson Air 

Baee 11 Irumagawa,, and the 2143rd Air Weather Wing. Toqoo There was no 

clear;-text trausm..tseion of codeword informationo As a result ot this 

error, the cod.oword must be considered com.promisedo The 692ot.h Security 

Group now requires that on-line operators send a preUm:f.naey stereotyped unclassified plain=language transmission prior to encipherment in such 

cases.. Thia procodure should prevent recurrence or the error .. 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Form1 !:.1~0SC TQP SECRET CANOE 
Thia document be read only by those peraonnel officially indocuinated m dance wtth com• munication intelligence security regulation• and authorized to receive the information reported herein. 

E03.:3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

....__ ______ _. was ecOTered., One portion of the document was classified SEChE'r ~JlrCH and the remaJnder was classified $.ECIU:T QIUTE,, The 

document had been retained in a 1tecure area at Arlington\ Hall station in 

the cust.odT ot NSA pe:rsamiel trdlo a.re tully cleared and indoctrinated fOl' 

COMIHT,, The loss has not been explained despite a thorOUgh investigation 

ot the incident, and the document therefore must be considered compromisedc 

Inveat,igating authorities are ot the opinion, however, tha.t the loss did 

not res\llt from penetration or detectiono This opinion ilf l;)ased not onlJr 

upcn an examination ot physical security and personnel secu~ity conditions, 

but also upon consideration that eubversiva intent would be •quall1' eenecl 

and better e:OYered if' an agent mere]¥ noted that the UoSo bas reconstructed 

These call signs., The document is believed to have been inadvertentq 

destroyed., 

60 Four SECRET CHU'l'E messages must be considered canpramiaed as the 

resltlt ·ot rotor failure and failure or operating pe~aonnel to perform 

ottective cheek decryption prior to transmission. The incident occurred 

on ll Februaey 1953 in an ORCUS off-line radio tran•mirssion tram DETo~, 

.333rd Communieat.iona R~onnaissanee CompaDT, Rame, to the U.S.,\ 1'he messages 

~:e:!p~:::~011an::r:::::s in :ra.tfic analysis. J~~~!rd .. re:· .... ;t!: and 

included in the co~ GU.G ..., ·.. . 

7., On 12 Februar,y 1953,, a portion ot a TOP S.ECRJ!.T CANOE message was 

1.na.dvartentl.1 transmitted in the clear during an intended plain=l.angu&ge 

test trana"Orl.asil,)?1 on land line from HQ USAFSS., Brooks AFB, San .Antoniog 

to HQ, NSA., As a result or this violation, the cle~....ldiilillol.L.....lil!!illi:ll&.olilillL.ldlilll4liF 

rnitted mat be «.:onsid.ered com romiaed It reveals 

8., On 1.3 Febr-ua.17, 195)9 aa the result ot m.1 0perat0l" error at 6961 

CClllmwdcation Securit.y 5quadron9 Brock• AFB, San An'tonio, a small portion 

ot OOMINT ra.w :lntereept was tranemi.tted in the clear on a radio circll:ito 

Qn..,11.ne APOLLO was intended., The transmitted. por\!;icxi must be conaideted 

comprcmisBdo The comprcmised material is CC!lFIDBlTIALo 

9n Du!'ing a two day p£"riod (2 and 3 March 195.3) there were three 

operator errol"'e at 6920t.h Security Group~ Johnson Air Base,. Irumagawa, in 

APOLID on-line radio circuits from Japan to the U .so In each ot the tbJ,oee 

ine1dents11 a emall portion ot the text ot a SECR.h'T CHUTE message was transmitted in plai.n language,, In two or these incidents the plain language 

tranmnissions were lim.ted to raw intercept and ais a result, CONFID~TIAL. 

COMIN.T mater·ial is considered. campromiaedl ;n ::a :ird i::iden:a $h:RE: CHUTE ft'idenees ot aueeeastul anal,yeis ot . _ _ _ __ _ __ _ l 

were sent in the clear and this information al ou not e cc ewor 

th:! s case) Dm!!Jt be considered comprcmiseda 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Form1 ~11JOSC TOP SECRET CANOE t 

2