TO Consultant, Special Staff DATE: 25 August 1952 

1. On 21 August 1952, Mr. Dingley of' the Office of Research and Development 

requested that I forward Inclosure 1 to you. 

2. 'Ibis Division has drafted a related paper, a copy of which is attached 

as Inclosure 2 for your information and comments. When the draft has been 

coordinated with all AFSA elements concerned, it will be put in final form as 

a report to DIRAFSA. 

Inclosures - 2 

RUSSELL H. HORTON 

Lt Colonel, SigC 

Asst. Chief, Plans & Policy m vision 

1. AFSA Serial 00547, dtd 8 Aug 52, subj: Support 

of COMINT Activities. 

2. Draft, dtd 8 Aug 52, subj: Relationship between 

COMINT Intercept and Processing Activities ard 

Non-Communications Signal Surveillance Activities 

eclassified and a roved for release b NSA on 03-27-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 
•.::, . . .. 

SUBJ!X::T1 Support ot CCMINT Activities 

S8l"ial.1 00547 

8 August 19S2 

TOI Assistant Chiet of statt, G-2, UoSo Al'lflT 

The Pentagon 

Director, Na'V&l Canmunicat.ions 

u.s. Naval Securi't1' Station 

Director ot Intelllgence, UaSo Air Force 

The Pentagon 

lo The volume am useMneae ot COMINT produced lv° this 

Agency 1s greatq dependent upon the thoroughness llm4 etficienc;r 

ot the CWlNT collection program. De.ticimoies in Service in~ 

caption of o<mnmmicatioms for COMl.N'l' proceaaing at this Agmc7 

are 'b\'GUght to the attention ot appropriate author1Uee u thq 

are noted. One notable problem requires JOlD' ccnsiderationz 

tranlmissions which probabq would be vital SQUl'Cea of COMIHT,, 

exploitable tor strategic and tac~a.1. plll",POSes, are· appearing 

regularq on experimental and operational ccmmmicatioms circuits 

1n trequenq banl8 which &l'8 too low or too high tor coverage at 

most COMINT tacilitie&o In m1n7 inetances, these transmissions 

could be recorded suitabq,, it certain facilities of the Armed 

Forces engaged in nan-COMINT activities, such • electronic 

carmteme&SUNS activities, were usedo 

2. Until such time as the necessU'J' C<lllNT facilities are 

available, I woul.d be gratetal tor whatever apport JOU mq 

tumisho The t;rpe ot · support reqairtld 'l«Nld be preparation, tor 

forwarding to this Agenc;y, ot recordings of communications signals, and unknown signals which mq be cc:mmnicatione signal a, 

obaerV'ed 1n the coUr&e of non-cOl!liJJm5catioms intercept ·act1viti&so 

It is expected that such obaerv'ations wuld be made .trequentq 

during spectrum ssarohea for ncm--cmmunicationll aigUJJ_so 

3o In some 1rustcncea, the :zae~ts tor such support 

have been reco~zed and .tultilled. (not meas~ upon raqueats 

from this ·Agenq) lV' authorities in the Serviceso The purpose 

Inclosure 1 with Chief, P&P Memo dtd 25' Aug 5'2 

SECRET 
....... 

SUBJECTS Support ot COMINT Activities 

-----------------~--------.---------

ot this COft'e~e ie to obtain tJhatever additional support·~ 

be .tumiahed upon 1'oim.1 recfl8&to Therefo1'90 it is J"eq'18Sted that, 

within the limitat.1.cms of mating capabilities and dii'ectives ~ all 

non-commmications intercept activities contfGlled. or coordinated 

by pi be imtrw:ted (in 11batever detail JQ\l 1181' comd.der appropriate] to tnmish the greatest possible support; ot the t712e indicated 

1n parasraph 2 abo'no -lt is suggested that wtatever uaisbance I 

might fUmiah in t1:1e W'1' of preparJ.ng deta:Uecl inat'l'UCtions 11 providing certa:ln recording materJ.als, etc., be an-anged an. a 1rlOJ'ldng 

level between Mro :a. Eo M:Uler (Ext. 60289 ·cm the Pentagon exchange) 

ot 11JT staff, and persomel. or organizaticms dmipakd· 'tv' JOU• 

4. Reciprocal au~ by this ASf!Jl1C7 to appl'Opr:late activities 

of the three 8ervicea {loeo, fm'ld.sbing them recordings ot non-can11md catimla sipals obsenecl in the conduct ot comrr activities) 

is alreaclT 1n ef'fecto · Al.thaqh such support; has not necessaril.¥ 

been recpeated it JD91'. be understood that it has been f'umiahad to 

the geatest possible ment9 and will continue 1nde.t1Dital¥o 

'

·: 

·.~.::..,~ 

. :. -~~~- . 

· Cop;r t.o1 

Adjo Geno (3) 

)..Plans & PoliCT Divo (3) 

ott. of ·opm. 

Mro w.B.By.m/P&PDi-v/60S4S/ga/SAug~2 

~FOB RECO!f} 

Otto ot R &: D 

• .. 

Intzia...Semce coordination ct n.oncommunica.tions intercept. activities ia 

performed by the addresseeeo The correepondence othezwise is self-explam.tor,,o 

SECRET 
f II REF ID:A66933 ~ 

P&PD1~ag52 

B&ATIONSHIP - CO!II'? INTERCEPJdl PB>~ .\CTifVITW AID wl-COl8iJHIC:oxs SIGNAL SURVE Cl <IC :cir!V IIS 

1. COMINT int.eroept and proceaaing activit1ee and NCSS act1Yit1•• 

are conducted aeparatel,y aa a matter of. well eatabliehed national policy. 

Relationship• between theae COKINT activities and NCSS have not been giftll 

much aondderation heretofore·. principally because, mtil recently, there 

bas been 'ri.rtuall1' no rel&tionehip or·a t1]>8 which would cause the conduct. 

ot one to be affected b7 the conduct ot the· other. For example: 

a. Communications ligrial.s and non-O()l!!llllmicaticna . at.gnale ordinaril.1' 

were transmitted in nparate. portione ot the trequenc;r apectrum. 

b. Personnel and equipment •c1alties were dissimilar. 

2. It is now considered naoessarr to clarify the relationlhipa between COMINT intercept and processing acti'ri.tiea and. ?fCSS actiTities, and 

to plan tor their coordination, aa required, in the 1n\ereate of efficiency 

and eoonorv pr.lncipalq because incomplete cowrag• ot so-cal.led non-coaDlmiaat1ona signal band• indicates that there ia a trend tc.-ard. wider uae 

ot these bands tor cCllllllllnicationa aignal.a. AFSA therefore •hould det81'111ne 

(aa a continuing project) which ot these oommun:lcations signals can and 

•houl.d be copied. 

3. Aa this trend continua withou.t clarified relationship• and planned 

ooordina\ion ot the activities 1n queetion, an appreciable amount ot duplicated effort will develop, and at the same time 1 neither acti'ri.t7 will 

benetit 'b7 the mpec:l•U•ed ·lbilitiee ot the other. For nample, t.he following ait\iationa are torea•ru 

a. NCSS activities mq handle certain COKINT tunctions, such a• (1). 

interception and analysis ot 11an1dentit1ed11 signal.a which later . . 

prove to be canmunicationa eignal• and, (2) interception, anal.yd.a, 

and uploitation ot operating instructiona and other caamunications 

aignala appearing on circuits 11nd primar:ll.r tor non-co.nmunicationa 

signals. 

... ~-~; ,-. 

~p 

l 
- - -

REF ID:.A66933 .... · 

P&PDiT7'1Aug52 

b. · IC8S act.inti•• may intercept, identity, and diaoarcl oerhin cammm1cat1ona ld.gnale which might be ot imp<?rt.ant. value to AFSA. . 

c, .A.PsA J1L8i.Y have to develop certain personnel. and eqUipinent epecialltie•. 

. similar to thoae ·.now anployed tor NCSS purpose•", in lieu of arrange111ents which might be made tor a •haring ot these apecialitiea~ 

4. Proposed relationships between the COMINT and KCSS activities in 

question and plamiing ·tor coordination or those activities mq follow one o! 

several possible general course•, such as: 

a. Organisation ot NCSS activities within the framework ot Al''SA and. the 

·Service Cmtologic Agencies. Thia is the course taken by th• British,· 

who conduct both under G~. The u .. s. Nav also is organised along 

·these lines with both activ.1.tiea under OP-202, but alwqa Uk•• the 

distinct.ion betWHD cryptologic et.tort and HCSS et.tort aa .tar aa 

joint activities are concerned. The U.S. Army and Air Force have 

kept ICSS operations .. •eparate tram cryptologic operations, . bot.h 

joint, and. 1ntra-S.n1ce J NCSS operations are under Signal Otfi cer 

direction ancl Intelligence Otticer coordi•t.ion •. There 1• no joint. 

.or Rational agenq or coordinating aut.hority for NCSS Matter• aa 

coUnter-parb of thoae .tor Cl"J'Ptologic .utt.er•. By placing the 

COmT and NCSS activities under. a Bingle authority, tbs problem 

ot clari·fJing relationahipa would d1m1niah,,. and coordination· might. 

be insured. Hcnrner, complex problems ot logistics, clearuicee,, 

and other adllinistrative details would be introduced and it is 

expected that the Serdceit 1'ould be strongly opposed to the establishment of •uoh an organization. 

b, Establishment ot a joint NCSS Ag!BCl'. A. proposal tor IRlch an Agency 

is now being studied by JCEC. It it were eat&bliahed., ooordination 

between the COllllft activities and the HCSS ac\i'ri.Uee woald. be accomplished. by contacts between A1SA and th• n• agency and 

coordination would be greatly aimpllfied thve'b7,. ControNrai.al 
REF ID:A66933 

•• P&PD1 v/8Aug52 

matters would b.-re.f'erred to JCS. :.:owever, although coordination 

would be aimplltied, it would at111 oe necessary to have clai-1.tied 

the relationahipo be~ween t.i1e COMm .activities and the NCSS activities. 

c. Rellnquiahing ot certain COl{lNT responsibilities to llCSS activities. 

Under this course, arrangements would be made where'Dy' Ness activities 

would be responsible tor ban~ all &ignala (including communications signal.a) appearing on non-cQIDIDUJljcations circuits• or all 

"md.dentitied" signal.a in certain bands, etc., calling upon the 

cryptologl.c agencies tor assistance when required. · 

s. The recommended position ot the Director, AFSA, on proposed :relationships between COMINT intercept and processing activities and NCSS activities,· 

and on plans for coordination. or these activities is outlined below.· Upon 

approval by the DJ.rector, A:FSA, P~ana and Polley Divisi~n Wul initiate action 

toward adoption ot tbia position, -as a National. policy, by a.ll concerned: 

,. 

j 

I 

: 

a, Ed.eting reeponaibilities ot AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Agancie• 

will not change t~r the purpose ot establi•hing the relationships and 

coordination· in question (1.e., no COMIHT n11ponaibilltiea will be 

relinquished to, or •bar.ad with non-CCIUNT >Hicie•, and no non-

. COllINT tmct1ona will be aa•*d b7 tb8 COllINT agencies). 

b. In accordance with existing responsibilities, the. COllINT agencies 

will handle all COllINT taska including those which ma.v- border on 

non-communications intercept and anal1'sia, such aa: 

(1) Unidentif'ied signals which might reasonably be expected to be 

(2) 

(3) 

communications signal.a. 

Communications signals trom. stations which o~narily transmit 

non-canimunications signals. 

Communications lignals on bands which ordinarill' are amp~Of•d 

tor non-commun1cati.ons signal.a. 

3 
. . REF ID: A66933 • 

IV /8Aug52 

c. A Joint agenoy tor coordinating the NCSS activities ot the Services, 

and for coordinating with AFSA on all ~:iCSS matters pertaining to 

COii.IINT, should be eetablished. 

d. Jlirectives should be promulgated by appropriate authority to insure 

that all COMn:r· materials obtained in the course of non-coMINT 

activities are .f'umiahed to AFSA (with provisions for. reciprocity). 

e. Agreements should be reached on the extant to which COY.INT agencies 

and NCSS agencies will assist each other in performing certain . 

intercept and processing fLUlctions (as distinct from re.Ponaibil1t1es). 

For example, in the interests o.t National security, it mq be _agreed 

that certain NCSS taciliti_es should be placed under the operation&l 

control ot the Director, AFSA, at the sacrifice ~t non-conmunicationa 

coverage; certain.non-communications signals Dl8l' have security feature• 

baaed on cryptologic principles and·.111ai1 be handled more succeaafully 

if analy'zed by APSA technicians.