1 The plaintiff’s claim also na med as de fenda nts B radle y Co unty and its coun ty sheriff, D aniel R . Gilley. These

claims are no t befor e us on this app eal.

2 “State emp loyee” is define d in T enn. C ode Ann. § 8-42 -101 (3)(A ) (20 02)

. See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 112(a) (199 9). 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on

Briefs J anuary

3, 2003 GLENDA COOPE R v. STATE OF TE NNESSEE Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Comm ission, Eastern Division No. 20101387 Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Comm issioner FILED JANUARY 27, 2003
No. E2002-02415-COA-R3-CV

This is a wr ongful death actio n file d aga inst th e State of Tennessee 1 with the Te nnessee Claims Commission. The State fileda motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it was not liable for the actions of the Bradle

y Co unty Sheriff , whose ne glige

nce is alleged t

o be the pr

oximate ca

use of the death of the plaintiff’s intestate. The Claims Commission, relying upon the case of Spurlock v. Sumner County , 42 S.W.3d 75 (Tenn. 2001), held that the sheriff was not a state employ ee 2 but rather a county office r. It dismissed t

he claim a

gainst t he State. We affir

m. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission Affirmed; Case Remanded
C HARLES D. S USANO , J R ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which H OUSTON M. G ODDARD , P.J., and D. M ICHAEL S WINEY , J., joined.
John C. Cavett, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Glenda Cooper, individually and as th e Ad mi ni st rat rix of t he E st ate of W il li am B url Co ope r, II.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor

Genera l; and Mark A. Hudson, Senior Counsel, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION-2- I.
Glenda Cooper sued the State in he r individ ual capacity

and as the Administratrix of the Estate of William Burl Cooper, II . Her complaint arises out of the death of her son, who was shot and killed by

one Travis Best, a former state prisoner , on April 7, 2000. The complaint alleges that Best had previously bee

n serving a state sentence in the custody of the Sheriff of

Bradley County at the county workhouse. I

t is alleged in the complaint that the sheriff illegally re leas ed Best before he had fully serve d his sentence. The plaintiff charge s that the sheriff is legally r

esponsible for her son’s death and that his malfeasance occurr ed while t he sh eriff was serving both as an ag ent of Bradley County and as an ag ent of the State.
As previously indicated, the Claims Commission determin ed that the sherif

f was not a

state employee and that, consequently, the plaintiff cou ld not purs u e a claim against the State. The plaintiff appeals, contending the sheriff was a cting as a state employee

when he improperly

released Best. The issue

on this app eal is simp ly th is: Does a

county sheriff act as a state employee

when he or sh e t ak es ac ti on wi th re sp ec t t o a st at e p ri so ne r i n t he sh er if f’ s c us to dy?
II.
Both parties r ely upon lang

uage in the Supre me Courtcase of Spurlock v . Sumner County , 42 S.W.3d 75 (Tenn. 2001). In Spurlock , the Sumner County Sheriff’s De partment investigated the plaintiffs in connection with a murder. Id. at 76. In the ir compla int, the pla

intiffs a lleged that, in spiteof a lack of evidence

connecting them to the crime, the sheriff’s de partment continued to focus the investigation on them. Id.
The fabricated testimony

of an informant led

to the plaintiffs’ convictions and sentences of life imprisonment. Id. Subsequently, a new investig ation into the murder revealed information that eventua lly resulted in other individuals confessing to the murder. Id. Thereaf t er, the p laintiff

s’ convictions were vacated. Id.
The plaintiff

s then filed suit ag ainst, amo ng othe rs, Sumner

County in the Unit

e d State s District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, claimingthat the d efenda nts had co nspired t

o wrongf ully convict the plaintiffs of murder, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988. Id. The p laintiffs premised their claim against Sumner County on Monell v. Department of Socia l Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), w hich held that liability may

be imposed against local governments for policies tha t give rise to constitutional torts. The plaintiffs argued that they were ha rmed by the law e nforce ment p oli cies esta

blished by

the Sumner

County sheriff. Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d at 77. In a motion to dismiss, Sumner County c ountered that the sheriff “did not speak with final policymaking author ity f

or th e county,” a s the law in Tennessee recognizes the sheriff as a county officer rather than

a state officer. Id. Because the district court found the law in

Tenness ee to be a

mbiguouson this subject, it certified the following question to the-3-

Tennessee Supreme Court: “‘Does a sheriff, when acting in a law e

nforce ment cap acity , [act] as a state [official] or [as a] county officia l under Tennessee law?’” Id. at 76 (bracketing in Spurlock ).
The Tenn essee Supreme Court began its analy sis with an examination of McMillian v. Monroe County , Alab

ama , 520 U.S. 781, 117 S. C t. 1734, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997), in which the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether an A labama sheriff was a state or county officia l. The United State s Supreme Court ado

pted two p

rinciple s to guide

its analy sis:
First , the question is not whether [the sheriff] acts for Alab ama o r Monroe Count y in

so me categorical, “all or nothing ” manner. Our cases on the liability of local gove rnments under

§ 1983 instr

uct us to ask whe ther g overnmental officials are final policy makers for the local government in a particular are a, or on a particular issue ....Thus, we are not seeking to make a char acterization of

Alabama sheriffs that will h old tr

ue fo r eve ry ty pe of offi cial acti on the

y e nga ge i n. We simply ask whet her [the sh

eriff] r eprese nts th e Stat e or the c ounty wh en he ac ts in a l aw en fo rc em en t c ap ac it y. Second, our inquiry

is dependent on an analy sis of state law.... This is not to say

that state

law can answer the quest

ion fo r us by, for example, simply labeling as a state of ficia l an official who cl early makes county policy . But our understanding of the actual function of a govern mental official, in a particular area, will nec essarily be dependent

on the definition of

the official’s functions under relevant state law....
Id

. at 785-86 , 117 S. Ct. a

t 1737 (citations omitted). Th e Court the

n determ ined that “Alabam a sheriff s, when executing their law enforcement duties, re present the State

of Alaba ma, not the

ir counties.” Id. at 793, 11 7 S. Ct. at 17 40. However, the Court wen

t on to state

that “sinc e it is entirely natural that both the role of sheriffs and the im portanc e of coun

ties vary from State

to State, there is no inconsistency cre ated by cour t decisions that declaresheriffs to be county officers in one State, and not in another.” Id. at 795, 117 S. Ct. at 1742.
After exam inin g McMillian , the Tennessee Supreme Court – noting that “Tennessee law has notalways cle arly def

ined whether sheriffs function as state or county officers”–

sought to clarify the law on this issue. Spurlock , 42 S.W.2d at 78. Following the road map of McMillian , the Court first looked to t

he Tenne ssee Cons titution, which “de signate s sheriff s as membe

rs of cou nty government

rather than as members of the state executive department.” Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d at 78 (citing Tenn. Con st. art. VII , § 1). Second, the Court stated that the Tennessee Constitutionprovides that “the sheriff, along with other county officials, is to be elected by the voters of the county, a nd vacancies in the office of sheriff a re to be fi lled by the county legislative body.” Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d at 78 (citing Tenn. Const. art. VI I, §§ 1, 2). Third, state law provides that the county rather than the state is responsible for pay ing the sheri ff’ s salary and othe r expenses associated with the-4-

office. Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d at 79; see gene rally

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-101, et seq

. (2002). The Courtreasoned that

this factor

supported a holding that the sheriff was a county officer, predicated on the Court’s earlier observation that “‘[t]he primary badge of a

State officer is that the Leg islature provide that the State pay the salary of the

office.’” Spurlock , 42 S .W.3 d at 79 (quot ing Durham v. Dismukes , 206 Tenn. 448, 454, 333 S.W.2d 935, 938 (1960)).
In addition, the Court pointed out that the sheriff’s duties “when acting in his or her la w enforcem ent capaci tyordinarily extend only to the border of the county in which the sheriff was elected,” Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d at 79 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-3-102 (1997)), and that “the overall duties of the office of sheriff, which are defined by statute, are largely

applicable within the sher iff’ s county.” Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d a t 79; see gene rally

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201, et seq

. (2002). The Court also found it quite significant that the Government al Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”) provides that counties are liable for the n egl igent a cts of the ir sherif fs under certain circumst ances. Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d at 80 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101, et seq. (2000 & Supp. 2002)). Relying upon t hese and o ther factors, the Court clarified Tennessee ’s ambiguous position withrespec t to the g overnme ntal clas sificati on of a she riff by hold ing that“the she

riff ser ves as a county officia l when acting in hi s or her l aw enfo rcemen t capacity .” Spurlock , 42 S.W.3d at 82. The Court expounded upon this holding by adopting the language used by

Justice Ginsburg in her dissentin McMillian , stat ing t hat, in Tennes see, “‘[a] sheriff lo cally elected, paid, and equipped, who autonomously sets and implements law enforcement policies operative within the geog raphic confines of

a county , is ordina

rily just what h

e [or she] se

ems to be: a

county officia

l.’” Spurlock , 42 S.W. 3d at 8 2 (quo ting McMillian , 520 U.S. at 804, 117 S. Ct. at 1746 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (bracketing in Spurlock ).
III.
We agree with the

State’s interpretation of the Spurlock case as it relates to the facts of the case at bar. When the she

riff released B est from h

is custody , the sher

iff was a cting in his role a s a law enforcement officer. As sher iff, he was responsible for thecounty workhouse. I t is clear that the prisoners housed there – be they state prisoners or county

inmates – were in the sheriff’s custody because he was th e c hi ef

la w e nf or ce me nt of

fi ce r o f B ra dl ey C ou nt y. The responsibilities related to th e care

and custo dy o f prisone

rs held in county facilitie s are obl

igation s imposed b y la

w upo n county sheriff

s, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201(3) – sheriffs being the individuals who have been elected by the people of the

various counties to perform these and other la

w enfor cement f unctions. If the sher iff was g uilty of actio nable ne glige

nce in re leasing Best a nd tha t negligence was the proximate

cause of the death of the plaintiff’s son, Bra dley County

is leg ally re sponsible for the sheriff’s conduct under the GTLA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-102(2), (3) (2000). The State of Tennessee is not. Under Spurlock , it is clear that the sheriff was not acting a s an employee or agent of the Sta te when he relea sed Bes t.-5- IV.
The judgment of the Claims Commission is affirmed. This matter is remand

ed to the Cl aims Commission for the collection of costs assessed there, pursuant to applica ble law. Costs on appeal are taxed to Glenda Cooper.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE