1 

 2016 IL App (5th) 150360 

 NO. 5-15-0360 

 IN THE 

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

 FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

ROSEMARY KEEFE, on Behalf of Herself ) Appeal from the 

and All Others Similarly Situated, ) Circuit Court of 

 ) St. Clair County. 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 04-L-502 

 ) 

ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE CORPORATION ) 

and ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE ) 

CAPITAL CORPORATION, ) Honorable 

 ) Vincent J. Lopinot, 

 Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justice Moore concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Presiding Justice Schwarm dissented, with opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Rosemary Keefe, appeals from an order granting a motion to compel 

arbitration filed by defendants, Allied Home Mortgage Corporation and Allied Home 

Mortgage Capital Corporation. The plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in finding 

that the parties' arbitration agreement was enforceable where the designated arbitrator was no 

longer able to conduct consumer arbitrations and where there was no showing that the 

NOTICE

Decision filed 11/28/16. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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designated procedures governing the arbitration agreement authorized the appointment of a 

substitute arbitrator. For reasons that follow, we reverse and remand. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In 1999, the plaintiff, Rosemary Keefe, contacted the defendants for assistance with 

the refinancing of a loan on her property in Berwyn, Illinois. The defendants were in the 

business of brokering mortgages and providing mortgage related services in several states in 

the United States, including Illinois. On May 18, 1999, the plaintiff signed several 

refinancing documents, which included an arbitration rider. Two months later, the parties 

closed on the loan. 

¶ 4 On September 2, 2004, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the 

defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants engaged third parties to provide certain 

loan-related services, such as credit reports and appraisals, and paid the fees charged for 

those services. The plaintiff further alleged after payment of the third-party fees, the 

defendants then charged the plaintiff, and similarly situated borrowers, sums in excess of 

those fees ("upcharges"), and then concealed the "upcharges" by failing to disclose the actual 

fees that the defendants had paid to the third parties. The plaintiff's complaint included 

counts asserting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, unjust enrichment, and consumer fraud. 

¶ 5 On December 15, 2004, the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay 

judicial proceedings based upon the arbitration rider. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in 

opposition. The plaintiff asserted that the arbitration rider was unenforceable because it was 

cost-prohibitive, unsupported by consideration, against public policy, and procedurally and 
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substantively unconscionable. Over the next several months, the parties submitted additional 

oral and written arguments to the trial court. On July 18, 2007, the trial court denied the 

defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the arbitration rider was 

illusory and procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The defendants appealed. In an 

opinion issued on July 10, 2009, this court found that the arbitration rider was supported by 

adequate consideration but that the provision prohibiting class arbitrations was substantively 

unconscionable. Keefe v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 393 Ill. App. 3d 226, 912 N.E.2d 

310 (2009). This court also determined that the provision prohibiting class arbitrations was 

severable from the remainder of the arbitration rider, leaving the agreement to arbitrate in 

place. Keefe, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 236, 912 N.E.2d at 320. The case was remanded to the 

circuit court with directions to sever the provision prohibiting class actions and to enforce the 

remainder of the arbitration clause. 

¶ 6 Within days after the opinion was issued, the parties' chosen arbitrator, the National 

Arbitration Forum (NAF), became embroiled in a controversy. On July 14, 2009, the 

Minnesota Attorney General filed a complaint against the NAF, and alleged, among other 

things, that the NAF had systematically used arbitrators with pro-business biases, and 

thereby engaged in consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices. On July 28, 2009, the 

NAF entered into a consent decree with the Minnesota Attorney General, and agreed to stop 

accepting all consumer cases for arbitration. See Minnesota v. National Arbitration Forum, 

Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009) (consent decree); In re 

National Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litigation, 704 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 (D. Minn. 

2010). 
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¶ 7 On September 23, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion in the circuit court, and argued 

that the arbitration rider was unenforceable because the NAF was no longer able to arbitrate 

this dispute. On October 27, 2009, the defendants filed a memorandum in opposition. The 

defendants argued that the unavailability of the NAF did not render the arbitration rider 

unenforceable because the NAF was not designated as the exclusive arbitral forum and 

because the circuit court was authorized to appoint a substitute arbitrator under section 5 of 

the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 5 (Supp. III 2010)). On October 29, 2009, the 

plaintiff filed a reply and argued that the arbitration rider effectively designated the NAF as 

the exclusive arbitral forum and that no other provision in the rider authorized the selection 

or use of a substitute arbitrator. On January 7, 2011, the defendants filed a second motion to 

compel arbitration. On October 14, 2014, the circuit court granted the defendants' motion to 

compel arbitration. This appeal followed. 

¶ 8 ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 Agreements to arbitrate are favored as a matter of policy in Illinois and federally. 

QuickClick Loans, LLC v. Russell, 407 Ill. App. 3d 46, 52, 943 N.E.2d 166, 172 (2011). 

Whenever possible, Illinois courts will construe arbitration agreements to uphold their 

validity. Salsitz v. Kreiss, 198 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 761 N.E.2d 724, 731 (2001). This proarbitration policy, however, is not intended to render arbitration agreements more 

enforceable than other contracts, and it does not operate in disregard of the intent of the 

contracting parties. Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 55, 976 N.E.2d 

344; Ervin v. Nokia, Inc., 349 Ill. App. 3d 508, 510, 812 N.E.2d 534, 537 (2004). Rather, 

arbitration agreements are to be enforced according to their terms, including those specifying 
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the arbitral forum and the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted. 9 U.S.C. § 4 

(Supp. III 2010); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 

S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). 

¶ 10 Arbitration is consensual, and arbitration agreements, as creatures of contract, are 

construed under ordinary principles of contract law. Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 241 Ill. 2d 15, 

20, 944 N.E.2d 327, 329 (2011). Under ordinary contract principles, the primary objective is 

to give effect to the intent of the parties. Thompson v. Gordon, 241 Ill. 2d 428, 441, 948 

N.E.2d 39, 47 (2011). A contract must be construed as a whole, viewing each provision in 

light of the other provisions, rather than in isolation. Thompson, 241 Ill. 2d at 441, 948 

N.E.2d at 47. If the words in the contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given 

their plain, ordinary and popular meaning. Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 

213 Ill. 2d 141, 153, 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (2004). If the terms of the contract are reasonably 

susceptible of more than one meaning, they are ambiguous and will be strictly construed 

against the drafter. Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153, 821 N.E.2d at 213. An 

arbitration agreement will not be extended by construction or implication. QuickClick 

Loans, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 943 N.E.2d at 172. In addition, an arbitration agreement may 

be invalidated under state law contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, and impossibility. 

Carter, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 18, 976 N.E.2d 344. 

¶ 11 In this case, we are asked to determine whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate is 

enforceable. The question of enforceability arises now because the NAF, as the designated 

arbitral forum, is no longer able to conduct arbitrations involving consumer loans. The 

NAF's unavailability raises two fundamental, multi-layered issues. The first is whether the 
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designation of the NAF as the arbitral forum was integral to the parties' agreement to 

arbitrate, and if not, whether any other provision in the arbitration rider authorizes the 

appointment of a substitute arbitrator. The second is whether the term stating that the 

arbitration rider shall be governed by the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration 

Forum (NAF Code) in effect at the date of the agreement is integral to the agreement to 

arbitrate. If the NAF Code is integral to the agreement to arbitrate, then there are questions 

about whether the applicable version of the NAF Code is available for use and whether it is 

permissible for an arbitrator, other than the NAF or its affiliates, to conduct an arbitration 

under the NAF Code. The interpretation of this arbitration rider presents questions of law 

that are reviewed de novo. Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 20, 944 N.E.2d at 329. 

¶ 12 The Arbitration Rider 

¶ 13 The arbitration rider at issue states in pertinent part: 

"All disputes, claims or controversies arising from or related to the loan evidenced by

the Note, including statutory claims, shall be resolved by binding arbitration, and not 

by court action, except as provided under 'Exclusions from Arbitration' below. This 

arbitration agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate 

commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4) 

and the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum as in effect at the date 

of this agreement. Copies of rules and forms can be obtained and any claims can be 

filed at any National Arbitration Forum office, www.arb-forum.com, or at P.O. Box 

50191, Minneapolis, MN 55405." 

¶ 14 This provision, drafted by the defendants and agreed to by both parties, plainly states 

that all claims and disputes arising from the loan "shall" be resolved by binding arbitration 

and that the arbitration agreement "shall" be governed by sections 1 through 4 of the FAA 

and the NAF Code in effect on the date of the agreement. The provision further states that 

copies of the rules and forms can be obtained and claims can be filed at any NAF office, 
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online, or by mail. Thus, the arbitration rider contains three basic agreements. First, the 

parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes. Second, the parties agreed that the arbitration 

would be governed under sections 1 through 4 of the FAA and the version of the NAF Code 

that was in effect on May 18, 1999, the date that the arbitration rider was executed. The third 

agreement, albeit implicit, is that the parties intended to arbitrate their disputes before the 

NAF. 

¶ 15 Although the arbitration rider does not expressly designate the NAF as the exclusive 

arbitral forum, when the terms of the rider are considered together, the intent of the parties is 

clear. The arbitration rider specifically mandates that the parties' arbitration agreement 

"shall" be governed by the 1999 NAF Code. The arbitration rider also directs the parties to 

obtain copies of the rules and claim forms from any NAF office, or from its website, and to 

file the claim forms at any NAF office, online, or through its post office box. The inclusion 

of these directions supports a finding that the parties intended to arbitrate before the NAF. 

Indeed, these directions would be meaningless in the absence of the NAF's designation as the 

arbitral forum. When the arbitration rider is considered as a whole and the term mandating 

the use of the 1999 NAF Code is read in conjunction with the provision directing the parties 

on how to obtain the rules and claim forms and where to file the claim forms, the reasonable 

and natural inference is that the parties intended that their disputes would be arbitrated 

exclusively before the NAF, and governed by the 1999 NAF Code. 

¶ 16 Section 5 of the FAA & Enforceability of the Arbitration Rider 

¶ 17 In this case, the NAF is no longer available to arbitrate this dispute. The parties 

disagree on the impact of the NAF's absence. The plaintiff contends that the designation of 
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the NAF is an integral part of the agreement, and that the NAF's unavailability renders the 

arbitration rider unenforceable. The defendants contend that the NAF's unavailability does 

not doom the arbitration rider because the circuit court can appoint a substitute arbitrator 

under section 5 of the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 5 (Supp. III 2010)). 

¶ 18 The FAA provides a comprehensive procedure for the arbitration of disputes between 

the parties. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. III 2010). Generally, sections 1 through 4 of the 

FAA address the applicability of the FAA to the parties' disputes, as well as the ability of one 

party to compel arbitration where another party has neglected or refused to comply with an 

arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (Supp. III 2010). Section 4 permits a party to 

petition the court for an order directing that arbitration proceed in the manner provided in the 

arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. III 2010). The remaining sections, including 

section 5, provide procedural rules governing arbitration proceedings. 9 U.S.C. §§ 5-16 

(Supp. III 2010). 

¶ 19 Section 5 of the FAA provides a mechanism for appointing a substitute arbitrator, and 

states as follows: 

"If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing 

an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no 

method be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall 

fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in 

the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon 

the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint 

an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the 

said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically 

named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be 

by a single arbitrator." 9 U.S.C. § 5 (Supp. III 2010). 
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¶ 20 Generally, section 5 anticipates that a designated arbitrator may become unavailable, 

and provides a procedure to appoint a substitute arbitrator. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (Supp. III 

2010); Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 30, 944 N.E.2d at 335. But the procedure provided in section 5 

may not be employed to circumvent the parties' designation of an exclusive arbitral forum. 

Accordingly, where the designation of an arbitral forum is integral to the agreement to 

arbitrate and the arbitral forum becomes unavailable to arbitrate the dispute, section 5 cannot 

be used to appoint a substitute arbitral forum and thereby salvage the arbitration agreement. 

Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 26, 944 N.E.2d at 333. In contrast, where the designation of an arbitral 

forum is "only an ancillary, logistical concern and the primary consideration is the intent to 

arbitrate disputes, allowing a court to appoint a substitute arbitrator fulfills the parties' 

agreement to arbitrate." Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 27, 944 N.E.2d at 333. 

¶ 21 In determining whether the designated arbitral forum is integral to the parties' 

agreement to arbitrate, a court looks to the essence of the agreement. Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 22, 

944 N.E.2d at 331; Brown v. Delfre, 2012 IL App (2d) 111086, ¶ 16, 968 N.E.2d 696. If the 

designation of the arbitral forum and the agreement to arbitrate are of equal importance, then 

the designation of the arbitral forum is integral and an alternate forum may not be 

substituted. Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 22, 944 N.E.2d at 331; Brown, 2012 IL App (2d) 111086, 

¶ 16, 968 N.E.2d 696. 

¶ 22 In this case, the arbitration rider does not use explicit language indicating that the 

NAF is the exclusive arbitral forum. But, as discussed earlier, the arbitration rider 

specifically mandates that the arbitration of disputes "shall" be conducted under the 1999 

NAF Code and specifically directs that copies of the rules and claim forms may be obtained 
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from the NAF and that claims may be filed with the NAF. After considering the arbitration 

rider as a whole and viewing each provision in light of the others, we have determined that 

the parties intended to arbitrate their disputes exclusively before the NAF, governed by the 

1999 version of the NAF Code. The language in the arbitration rider demonstrates that the 

designation of the NAF as the arbitral forum, the designation of the 1999 NAF Code, and the 

agreement to arbitrate were of equal importance. Because the designation of the NAF as the 

arbitral forum and the agreement to arbitrate were of equal importance, the designation of the 

NAF was integral to the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Accordingly, section 5 cannot be 

used to appoint a substitute arbitrator and thereby salvage the arbitration rider. Carr, 241 Ill. 

2d at 26, 944 N.E.2d at 333. 

¶ 23 Further, setting aside for a moment the "integral versus ancillary" debate over the 

NAF's designation, there emerges another clear and basic reason why section 5 of the FAA 

cannot be invoked in the case. The arbitration rider, by its very terms, incorporates only

sections 1 through 4 of the FAA. Section 5 of the FAA is not referenced in the rider. The 

arbitration rider was crafted by the defendants. It is reasonable to infer that by incorporating 

only the first four sections of the FAA, the defendants intended to omit the procedural 

sections of the FAA and to rely instead on the provisions in the 1999 NAF Code to govern 

the arbitration proceedings. To rewrite the arbitration rider to include section 5 of the FAA 

would violate basic principles of contract law and run contrary to the clear intent of the 

parties as expressed in the plain language of their agreement. Because section 5 of the FAA 

was intentionally omitted from the parties' agreement, the procedural mechanism in section 5 

cannot be employed to appoint a substitute arbitrator and thereby save the arbitration rider. 
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¶ 24 The NAF Code & Enforceability of the Arbitration Rider 

¶ 25 Next, we consider whether the applicable version of the NAF Code authorizes the 

appointment of a substitute arbitrator where the designated arbitrator is unavailable. In this 

case, the arbitration rider clearly and unequivocally states that any disputes "shall" be 

governed by the NAF Code in effect on the day of the agreement, May 18, 1999. The use of 

the mandatory language "shall" demonstrates the parties' intent that the rules in the 1999 

NAF Code would govern any arbitrable disputes. The 1999 NAF Code was inextricably 

woven into the fabric of the arbitration agreement. Thus, the 1999 NAF Code was integral to 

the agreement to arbitrate, and it cannot be excised as some ancillary term. 

¶ 26 Given the importance of the 1999 NAF Code, it is almost inconceivable that it was 

not produced in the circuit court. When the defendants filed their motions to compel 

arbitration, they included the 1999 arbitration rider and an affidavit attesting to the 

authenticity of that document, but they did not attach the 1999 NAF Code. In subsequent 

pleadings, the defendants attached and referenced portions of the 2005 NAF Code. A copy 

of the 2003 NAF Code was included with the plaintiff's pleadings. Because the defendants 

moved to compel arbitration, it was initially their burden to establish the enforceability of the 

arbitration agreement. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 359 Ill. App. 3d 976, 983, 835 N.E.2d 113, 

121 (2005). Any doubts about enforceability that arise from the absence of the 1999 NAF 

Code are resolved against the defendants. 

¶ 27 The dissent, however, contends that it was the plaintiff's burden to present a 

sufficiently complete record to support her claims of appellate error and that any doubts 

about the enforceability of the arbitration agreement that arise from the absence of the 1999 
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NAF Code should be construed against the plaintiff. In making this argument, the dissent 

has entwined the defendants' burden of proof in the trial court and the plaintiff's duty in the 

appellate court. The appellant has a duty to present a sufficiently complete record of the 

proceedings in the trial court to support a claim of error. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 

391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). The appellant may not supplement the record on 

appeal with documents that were available but not presented to the trial court. See Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 329 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006) (a party may supplement the record on appeal only with documents 

that were actually before the trial court); Deason v. Gutzler, 251 Ill. App. 3d 630, 631, 622 

N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (1993). By all accounts, the record on appeal contains the complete 

record of proceedings before the circuit court. This is not a case where the appellant failed to 

include some portion of the circuit court record. The 1999 NAF Code was never presented 

to the trial court, and the trial court never considered it. As the party moving to compel 

arbitration, the defendants had the burden to establish the validity and enforceability of the 

arbitration agreement. The plaintiff had no duty to make the defendant's record in the trial 

court, and the plaintiff could not include, in the record on appeal, a document that was not 

actually before the trial court. As such, any doubts arising from the absence of the 1999 

NAF fall squarely on the defendants.

¶ 28 In this case, we do not have the text of the 1999 NAF Code. Therefore, we have no 

means to determine whether the 1999 NAF Code would permit the appointment of a 

substitute arbitrator, and if so, under what circumstances. See Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 944 

N.E.2d at 336. 
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¶ 29 The absence of the 1999 NAF Code presents additional obstacles to the enforceability 

of the arbitration rider. The parties are, without their designated rules of procedure, 

mandated by the language of the rider itself. Can a different code of procedure be 

implemented, and if so, who decides which code should be used? Where is the claim to be 

filed, and what is the filing fee? What are the powers and duties of the substitute arbitrator? 

What rules determine the availability and the scope of discovery, the format of the hearing, 

the introduction of evidence, and the costs of arbitration? Who will be obligated to pay those 

costs? In the absence of access to the 1999 NAF Code, any findings by this court regarding 

those questions are based on pure speculation. See Carr, 241 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 944 N.E.2d at 

336. 

¶ 30 In this case, the plain language of the arbitration rider reveals that the parties never 

intended that this court, or the circuit court, would choose the rules of procedure by which 

this arbitration would proceed. The parties agreed that the arbitration of any disputes would 

be governed by a specific set of procedural rules, the 1999 NAF Code. The procedural rules 

set forth in sections 5 through 16 of the FAA were specifically excluded. The 1999 NAF 

Code was an integral part of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, and it cannot be severed 

without gutting the arbitration rider. The absence of the 1999 NAF Code renders the 

agreement to arbitrate unenforceable. 

¶ 31 The NAF Consent Judgment 

¶ 32 Finally, we pause to consider what level of confidence should be placed in the 

neutrality of the NAF Code in light of the consent judgment. Prior to 2009, the NAF was the 

largest forum in the United States for consumer-based arbitrations. When complaints of 
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fraud and deceptive practices were raised by consumers, the Minnesota Attorney General 

began an investigation into the NAF's practices, including the appointment of anti-consumer 

arbitrators. The Minnesota Attorney General found evidence that the NAF was not a neutral 

forum for consumer arbitrations as contemplated by the FAA and Congress. As a result of 

information obtained during the investigation, the Minnesota Attorney General filed a 

complaint against the NAF, alleging consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, and false 

statements in advertising. Within a few weeks after the complaint was filed, the NAF settled 

the case with the Minnesota Attorney General. A court-approved consent judgment was 

entered on July 28, 2009. As part of the consent decree, the NAF agreed that it would not 

"accept any fee for processing any new Consumer Arbitration," and that it would not 

"administer or process any new Consumer Arbitration." See Minnesota v. National 

Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009) (consent 

decree). Thus, the largest consumer-based arbitral forum in the United States agreed to cease 

all consumer arbitrations immediately. 

¶ 33 In this case, the designated 1999 NAF Code was crafted by an entity that has been 

nationally discredited as an arbitral forum for consumer-based arbitrations. This should 

generate serious questions about the neutrality of the NAF Code, and the fundamental 

fairness and integrity of any proceeding conducted under the NAF Code. Such questions, 

while troubling, are not presently before this court and must be saved for another day. 

¶ 34 CONCLUSION 

¶ 35 In summary, the unavailability of the NAF and the absence of the 1999 NAF Code

leave the parties without their designated arbitrator and the rules specifically chosen to 
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govern the arbitration. The designation of the NAF as the arbitral forum and the term 

mandating use of the 1999 NAF Code were integral to the parties' agreement to arbitrate. 

The arbitration rider specifically omitted the procedural rules set forth in sections 5 through 

16 of the FAA, leaving the court without any rules by which this arbitration should proceed. 

It is not within the province of this court, or the trial court, to rewrite the arbitration rider to 

reinstate omitted terms or to add new terms. Such actions would violate basic rules of 

contract law and run contrary to the clear intent of the parties as expressed by the plain 

language in the arbitration rider. The unavailability of the NAF as an arbitral forum and the 

absence of the 1999 NAF Code render the parties' agreement to arbitrate unenforceable. 

¶ 36 Accordingly, the order of the circuit court granting the defendants' motion to compel 

arbitration is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. 

¶ 37 Reversed and remanded. 

¶ 38 PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHWARM, dissenting. 

¶ 39 I respectfully dissent. The majority argues that the arbitration rider contains an 

"agreement, albeit implicit, *** that the parties intended to arbitrate their disputes before the 

NAF." Supra ¶ 14. However, the language of the arbitration rider does not support this 

conclusion. The arbitration rider states that "[a]ll disputes *** arising from *** the loan *** 

shall be resolved by binding arbitration, and not by court action." The arbitration rider states 

that claims can be filed at any NAF office but does not require it. The arbitration rider 

concludes with a block-letter disclaimer stating that the signee is "AGREEING TO HAVE 

ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT [OF] THE MATTERS DESCRIBED *** ABOVE 
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DECIDED EXCLUSIVELY BY ARBITRATION." Thus, the arbitration rider has no 

language stating that the NAF must act as arbitrator. This case is unlike Carr v. Gateway, 

Inc., 241 Ill. 2d 15, 944 N.E.2d 327 (2011), where the arbitration agreement contained a 

clause "that allowed the arbitrator to impose monetary penalties on a party for bringing a 

dispute in any forum other than the NAF." Id. at 20, 944 N.E.2d at 329. Because the 

arbitration rider in this case lacks a penalty provision or any other clause with a similar 

effect, it does not contain an agreement, even implicitly, that all disputes be arbitrated before 

the NAF. 

¶ 40 Further, the designation of the NAF's Code of Procedure without designating the NAF 

as arbitrator indicates that the NAF was not considered to be the exclusive arbitrator for any 

dispute. In Brown v. Delfre, 2012 IL App (2d) 111086, 968 N.E.2d 696, the parties had 

agreed to an arbitration agreement stating that arbitration would be " 'conducted by and 

according to the securities arbitration rules then in effect of the [arbitration company].' " 

(Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 4. The appellate court noted that the plain language stated only 

that arbitration "[would] be conducted 'by and according to' the rules" of the arbitration 

company. Id. ¶ 19. The court noted that "if the parties contemplated that [the arbitration 

company] would be the exclusive arbitral forum, there would be no need to specify that the 

arbitration must be conducted by [the arbitration company's] rules." Id. ¶ 20. The court 

ultimately determined that the arbitration agreement did not require the use of the arbitration 

company as arbitrators and, therefore, held the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration 

agreement unenforceable. Id. ¶ 29. Similarly, if the parties in our case intended to have the 

NAF arbitrate all disputes, then the arbitration rider would not need to state that it was to be 
17 

governed by the NAF's Code of Procedure. Thus, the statement that arbitration was to be 

governed by the NAF's Code of Procedure without an indication that NAF was to be the 

exclusive arbitrator supports the inference that the NAF was not to be the exclusive 

arbitrator. 

¶ 41 The majority further argues that the arbitration rider's failure to include section 5 of 

the FAA prevents us from affirming the circuit court's decision. However, because the 

arbitration rider does not designate the NAF as exclusive arbitrator, the lack of a right to 

substitute arbitrator should have no bearing on this case. The arbitration rider did not require 

that NAF act as exclusive arbitrator, and we therefore are not being asked to appoint a 

substitute arbitrator to "replace" the NAF. The circuit court's order simply compels the 

parties to settle their dispute before an agreed-upon arbitrator. Because no arbitrator has 

been a part of this case, the arbitration rider's failure to include the FAA provision regarding 

procedures to appoint a substitute arbitrator should not affect our decision. 

¶ 42 If the NAF were intended as an exclusive arbitrator, the parties may have included 

that information in the 1999 NAF Code governing the arbitration agreement. However, the 

1999 NAF Code is not a part of the record. The majority argues that "it was initially [the 

appellees'] burden to establish the enforceability of the arbitration agreement" and thus 

determines that "[a]ny doubts about enforceability that arise from the absence of the 1999 

NAF Code are resolved against the [appellees]." Supra ¶ 26. However, "[t]he law is well 

settled that the appellant bears the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record to 

support her claim of error and any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will 

be resolved against her." Lewandowski v. Jelenski, 401 Ill. App. 3d 893, 902, 929 N.E.2d 
18 

114, 123 (2010). "When the appellant has failed to present this court with a complete record, 

the reviewing court must indulge in every reasonable presumption favorable to the judgment 

and will presume the trial court followed the law and had a sufficient factual basis for its 

ruling." Id. See also Lamb-Rosenfeldt v. Burke Medical Group, Ltd., 2012 IL App (1st)

101558, ¶ 22, 967 N.E.2d 411 (failure to include full transcripts of discovery depositions, 

response to motion for summary judgment, and transcript of hearing on the motion for 

summary judgment resolved against the appellant); In re Estate of Matthews, 409 Ill. App. 

3d 780, 783, 948 N.E.2d 187, 191 (2011) (petitioner's failure to ensure her petition to vacate 

respondent's claim and the transcript of the hearing conducted on her petition appeared in the 

record on appeal interpreted against her even when her petition is attached on the appendix to 

her appellate brief); Han v. Holloway, 408 Ill. App. 3d 387, 390, 945 N.E.2d 45, 48 (2011) 

(absence of appellant's trial testimony, which was referenced throughout her brief and central 

to her argument on appeal, is interpreted against her). Thus, throughout civil law, failure to 

provide a sufficiently complete record is interpreted against the appellant. Even in criminal 

law, it is the appellant's burden to properly complete the record on appeal, and any doubts 

arising from the incompleteness of the record are construed against the appellant unless the 

appellant shows the record is incomplete due to no fault of his or her own and demonstrates 

there is a colorable need for the missing portion of the record in order to have appellate 

review. People v. Henderson, 2011 IL App (1st) 090923, ¶ 45, 961 N.E.2d 407. Therefore, 

any doubts about enforceability that arise from the absence of the 1999 NAF Code should be 

interpreted against the appellant, not the appellees. 
19 

¶ 43 Further, even if we could interpret the 1999 NAF Code's absence against the 

appellees, we should not do so in this case. The majority correctly notes that "[t]he party 

seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving that an arbitration agreement exists 

and that the claims raised are within the agreement's scope." Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 359 Ill. 

App. 3d 976, 983, 835 N.E.2d 113, 121 (2005). The appellees moved to arbitrate on 

December 15, 2004. This motion was denied on July 18, 2007, and this court reversed the 

circuit court and compelled arbitration on July 10, 2009. Throughout these proceedings, the 

appellees used the arbitration rider to show that the arbitration agreement existed and that the 

claims were within its scope. The 1999 NAF Code was not needed, nor likely relevant, to 

meet the appellees' burden. The 1999 NAF Code only became relevant when the appellant 

presented the motion leading to this appeal on September 23, 2009, after the appellees had 

successfully compelled arbitration. It was therefore the appellant's burden to submit the 

1999 Code before the circuit court, just as it was her burden to provide it as part of a 

complete record on appeal. 

¶ 44 The arbitration rider here stated repeatedly and clearly that it was to require that all 

disputes arising from the loan be resolved by binding arbitration. It contained no language 

requiring that the NAF act as exclusive arbitrator. It contained no penalty provision to be 

enforced if the parties chose an arbitrator other than the NAF. Based on the plain and 

obvious meaning of the arbitration rider as a whole, it is clear that the parties' primary intent 

by the agreement was to arbitrate their disputes under NAF rules and not to require that the 

NAF serve as arbitrator. The arbitration rider does not implicitly show an agreement 

between the parties that the NAF will act as the exclusive arbitrator. Thus, the NAF is not 
20 

the exclusive arbitrator, and the failure to include section 5 of the FAA in the arbitration 

rider is irrelevant because there has been no need for a substitute arbitrator. Moreover, even 

if the 1999 NAF Code could support the appellant's argument, it was the appellant's burden 

to include the 1999 NAF Code both in the circuit court and on appeal, and any doubts arising 

from its absence should be construed against the appellant. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
 2016 IL App (5th) 150360 

 

 NO. 5-15-0360 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

ROSEMARY KEEFE, on Behalf of Herself ) Appeal from the 

and All Others Similarly Situated, ) Circuit Court of 

 ) St. Clair County. 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 04-L-502 

 ) 

ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE CORPORATION ) 

and ALLIED HOME MORTGAGE ) 

CAPITAL CORPORATION, ) Honorable 

 ) Vincent J. Lopinot, 

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Opinion Filed: November 28, 2016 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Justices: Honorable Judy L. Cates, J.

 Honorable James R. Moore, J., 

 Concurred 

 Honorable S. Gene Schwarm, P.J., 

 Dissented

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Attorneys Jeffrey J. Lowe, James J. Rosemergy, Carey, Danis & Lowe, 8235 

for Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63105 

Appellant 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Attorney Michael A. Brockland, Cosgrove Law Group, LLC, Pierre Laclede Tower

for II, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1675, St. Louis, MO 63105 

Appellees 

______________________________________________________________________________