This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains documents other than rules or

proposed rules that are applicable to the

public. Notices of hearings and investigations,

committee meetings, agency decisions and

rulings, delegations of authority, filing of

petitions and applications and agency

statements of organization and functions are

examples of documents appearing in this

section.

Notices Federal Register

15979 

Vol. 80, No. 58 

Thursday, March 26, 2015 

1The Regulations are currently codified at 15 CFR 

parts 730–774 (2014). The EAR issued under the 

Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 

U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–2420 (2000)) (‘‘EAA’’). Since 

August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the 

President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 

17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which 

has been extended by successive Presidential 

Notices, the most recent being that of August 7, 

2014 (79 FR 46959 (Aug. 11, 2014)), has continued 

the Regulations in effect under the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, 

et seq.) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Order Temporarily Denying Export 

Privileges; Flider Electronics, LLC, 

Pavel Semenovich Flider, Gennadiy 

Semenovich Flider, et al. 

Flider Electronics, LLC, a/k/a Flider 

Electronics, d/b/a Trident International 

Corporation, d/b/a Trident International, 

d/b/a Trident International Corporation, 

LLC, 837 Turk Street, San Francisco, 

California 94102 

and 

Pavel Semenovich Flider, a/k/a Pavel Flider, 

21 Eye Street, San Rafael, California 94901 

and 

Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, a/k/a 

Gennadiy Flider, 699 36th Avenue #203, 

San Francisco, California 94121 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations (the 

‘‘Regulations’’ or ‘‘EAR’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested that I issue an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges of Flider 

Electronics, LLC, also known as Flider 

Electronics, and doing business as 

Trident International Corporation, 

Trident International, and Trident 

International Corporation, LLC. Flider 

Electronics, LLC is a California limited 

liability company based in San 

Francisco, California. It is operated, at 

least in substantial part, for the purpose 

of procuring and exporting U.S.-origin 

electronic components. California State 

Corporation Number C1908339 has been 

used in connection with the doing 

business names of Trident International 

Corporation, Trident International, and 

Trident International Corporation, LLC, 

but that number is associated with 

Flider Electronics, LLC and the address 

used in connection with those doing 

business as names is the same address 

as Flider Electronics, LLC. Pavel 

Semenovich Flider, also known as Pavel 

Flider, is the president and owner of 

Flider Electronics/Trident International 

(‘‘Trident’’). His brother Gennadiy 

Semenovich Flider, also known as 

Gennadiy Flider, has identified himself 

as Trident’s office manager, since 2003, 

and his duties include the purchase of 

items from U.S. distributors, the 

shipment of those items abroad, and 

related filings with U.S. Government 

agencies. 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 

776.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be 

‘imminent’ either in time or degree of 

likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS 

may show ‘‘either that a violation is 

about to occur, or that the general 

circumstances of the matter under 

investigation or case under criminal or 

administrative charges demonstrate a 

likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As 

to the likelihood of future violations, 

BIS may show that the violation under 

investigation or charge ‘‘is significant, 

deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur 

again, rather than technical or negligent 

[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of information 

establishing the precise time a violation 

may occur does not preclude a finding 

that a violation is imminent, so long as 

there is sufficient reason to believe the 

likelihood of a violation.’’ Id. 

In its request, OEE has presented 

evidence that it has reason to believe 

that Trident engaged in conduct 

prohibited by the Regulations by 

exporting items subject to the EAR to 

Russia via transshipment through third 

countries. In Automated Export System 

(‘‘AES’’) filings it made, Trident 

identified as ‘‘ultimate consignees’’ 

companies in Estonia and Finland that 

BIS has reason to believe were operating 

as freight forwarders and not end users 

of the U.S.-origin items. OEE’s 

presentation also indicates that at least 

two of these transactions are known to 

have involved items that are listed on 

the Commerce Control List and that a 

search of BIS’s licensing database 

reveals no licensing history of 

controlled U.S.-origin electronics to 

Russia for the company and individuals 

captioned in this case. Based on, inter 

alia, the transshipment of the items, the 

misrepresentations made on the AES 

filings, and information obtained 

pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance 

Treaty (‘‘MLAT’’) request, OEE indicates 

that it has reason to believe that these 

exports required a license. 

A. Detained Shipments on April 6, 2013 

On or about April 6, 2013, the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’) 

detained two outbound shipments at 

San Francisco International Airport. 

CBP ultimately allowed one of these 

exports to proceed, but the other 

attempted export was not and the items 

were ultimately seized. The manifest 

and the AES filing for the seized 

shipment described the items as ‘‘power 

supplies,’’ but the shipment actually 

contained, among other items, 15 Xilinx 

field programmable gate array (FPGA) 

circuits that were controlled under 

Export Control Classification Number 

(ECCN) 3A001.a.2.c for national security 

reasons and generally required a license 

for Russia. The shipping documentation 

also listed Logilane Oy Ltd. in Finland 

(‘‘Logilane’’) as the ultimate consignee. 

Open source information confirmed that 

Logilane was a freight forwarder and 

thus unlikely to be the end user for the 

items contained in the shipment. When 

questioned about the shipment, Pavel 

Flider requested that the ultimate 

consignee be changed to Adimir OU 

(‘‘Adimir’’) in Estonia, which itself also 

proved to be a freight forwarder as 

discussed further below. 

B. Interviews of Pavel Flider and 

Gennadiy Flider 

On or about April 19, 2013, OEE 

interviewed Trident office manager 

Gennadiy Flider, who identified his 

responsibilities as handling the 

procurement and shipment of items, 

including for export. He stated Trident 

had been doing business with Adimir 

for many years and that it was the only 

customer that his company had. He also 

indicated that Trident at times shipped 

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15980 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 58 / Thursday, March 26, 2015 / Notices 

items intended for its Estonian customer 

to Finland, claiming this was because it 

was cheaper. 

Similarly, in an August 5, 2013 

interview, Trident’s president and 

owner Pavel Flider stated that Adimir 

was Trident’s one and only customer 

and that at times Adimir requested that 

items be shipped to a freight forwarder 

in Finland. Both Gennadiy Flider and 

Pavel Flider denied shipping to Russia. 

C. July 2013 Detention and Subsequent 

Seizure 

On or about July 20, 2013, the U.S. 

Government detained a Trident 

shipment bound for Adimir in Estonia. 

In addition to Adimir being identified as 

the ultimate consignee on the AES 

filing, the items were identified as 

‘‘Electronic Equipment.’’ A review of 

the invoice showed six Xilinx FPGAs, 

items which were controlled under 

ECCN 3A001.a.2.c for national security 

reasons and generally required a license 

for Russia. Moreover, an inspection of 

the shipment uncovered 51 controlled 

Xilinx chips, rather than just the six that 

had been declared. CBP ultimately 

seized the shipment on or about October 

18, 2013. 

D. Information Concerning Purported 

Estonian End User Obtained via an 

MLAT Request 

Based on information obtained in 

2014 via a late 2013 MLAT request sent 

to Estonia relating to Adimir, BIS has 

reason to believe that Adimir was not an 

end user. During an interview, an 

Adimir corporate officer admitted to 

transshipping Trident shipments to 

Russia at the request of Pavel Flider. 

Adimir subsequently ceased operating. 

E. Changes in the Scheme 

Following the detention and seizures, 

the MLAT request, and the Adimir 

interview, Trident began exporting 

directly to Russia, claiming that the 

controlled circuits were for use in 

railroads. This assertion sought to track 

a note to ECCN 3A001.a.2, which 

indicates that the ECCN does not apply 

to integrated circuits for civil 

automotive or railway train 

applications. Pavel Flider reported to 

the U.S. distributor that Trident had 

been ‘‘referred’’ Russian customers by 

Adimir, which was going out of 

business. After being made aware that 

the items actually were intended for 

export to Russia, the U.S. distributor 

requested that Trident sign a Form BIS– 

711 ‘‘Statement by Ultimate Consignee 

and Purchaser,’’ which includes an end 

use statement and must be signed by the 

purchaser and the ultimate consignee. 

From on or about January 23, 2014, to 

on or about April 16, 2014, Trident 

began listing in its AES filings OOO 

Elkomtex (‘‘Elkomtex’’) in St. 

Petersburg, Russia, as the ultimate 

consignee. On or about July 17, 2014, 

the Elkomtex employees admitted that 

the company was not an end user but a 

distributor of electronics, acting as a 

broker between an exporter and an end 

use company. 

Beginning with an export on or about 

May 6, 2014, Trident again changed its 

export route and began exporting to a 

purported ultimate consignee named 

Logimix Ltd., in Vantaa, Finland 

(‘‘Logimix’’). Between on or about May 

6, 2014, to on or about March 12, 2015, 

AES filings indicate that Trident has 

made 33 exports with Logimix listed as 

the ultimate consignee. Based on 

Logimix’s Web site and other open 

source Internet information, however, 

OEE’s presentation indicates that it has 

reason to believe that Logimix is a 

freight forwarder and not an end user. 

Moreover, given the violations, 

deceptive actions, and other evidence 

involving Trident, including those 

admitted by the Fliders, OEE also 

indicates that it has reason to believe 

that Trident has been making 

transshipments to Russia. 

OEE has further indicated that in 

February 2014, Trident ordered an 

additional 195 integrated circuits 

controlled under ECCN 3A001.a.2.c 

from a U.S. distributor and that those 

items would be available by in or 

around April 2015. In addition, Trident 

and Pavel and Gennadiy Flider have 

been indicted for smuggling and money 

laundering, including in connection 

with some of the transactions discussed 

above. 

F. Findings 

I find that the evidence presented by 

BIS demonstrates that a violation of the 

Regulations is imminent in both time 

and degree of likelihood. Trident has 

engaged in some known violations of 

the Regulations and its actions, 

including changes in how it structures 

its export transactions and routes its 

shipments, appear designed to 

camouflage the actual destinations, end 

uses, and/or end users of the U.S.-origin 

items it has been and continues to 

export, including items on the 

Commerce Control List that are subject 

to national security-based license 

requirements. Moreover, when 

interviewed in 2013, the Fliders could 

not provide a reasonable explanation for 

the purported exports to Estonia and 

Finland. When for a time Trident began 

direct exports to Russia, the entity listed 

as the ultimate consignee admitted that 

it was not an end user and instead 

acting as a broker. 

In sum, the fact and circumstances 

taken as a whole provide strong 

indicators that future violations are 

likely absent the issuance of a TDO. As 

such, a TDO is needed to give notice to 

persons and companies in the United 

States and abroad that they should cease 

dealing with Trident in export 

transactions involving items subject to 

the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with 

the public interest to preclude future 

violations of the EAR. 

Additionally, Section 766.23 of the 

Regulations provides that ‘‘[i]n order to 

prevent evasion, certain types of orders 

under this part may be made applicable 

not only to the respondent, but also to 

other persons then or thereafter related 

to the respondent by ownership, 

control, position of responsibility, 

affiliation, or other connection in the 

conduct of trade or business. Orders that 

may be made applicable to related 

persons include those that deny or affect 

export privileges, including temporary 

denial orders . . .’’ 15 CFR § 766.23(a). 

As stated above, Pavel Flider is the 

president and owner of Trident. 

Gennadiy Flider also is a Trident office 

manager, with responsibilities relating 

directly to the procurement and export 

activities at issue. As such, I find that 

Pavel Semenovich Flider and Gennadiy 

Semenovich Flider are related persons 

to Trident based on their positions of 

responsibility and that their additions to 

the order is necessary to prevent 

evasion. 

Accordingly, I find that an order 

denying the export privileges of Trident, 

Pavel Flider, and Gennadiy Flider is 

necessary, in the public interest, to 

prevent an imminent violation of the 

EAR. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with Section 

766.24 of the Regulations. 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, that Flider Electronics, LLC, 

a/k/a Flider Electronics, d/b/a Trident 

International Corporation, d/b/a Trident 

International, d/b/a Trident 

International Corporation, LLC, 837 

Turk Street, San Francisco, California 

94102; Pavel Semenovich Flider, a/k/a 

Pavel Flider, 21 Eye Street, San Rafael, 

California 94901; and Gennadiy 

Semenovich Flider, a/k/a Gennadiy 

Flider, 699 36th Avenue #203, San 

Francisco, California 94121, and when 

acting for or on their behalf, any 

successors or assigns, agents, or 

employees (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ and 

collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’) may 

not, directly or indirectly, participate in 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 58 / Thursday, March 26, 2015 / Notices 15981 

1See Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing 

Duties on Supercalendered Paper from Canada 

(February 26, 2015) (Petition). 

2The Coalition for Fair Paper Imports consists of 

Madison Paper Industries and Verso Corporation. 

3See Letters from the Department, ‘‘Petition For 

The Imposition Of Countervailing Duties on 

Imports of Supercalendered Paper from Canada: 

Supplemental Questions’’ (March 3, 2015) and 

‘‘Petition For The Imposition Of Countervailing 

Duties on Imports of Supercalendered Paper from 

Canada: Additional Supplemental Question’’ 

(March 13, 2015). 

4See Letters from the petitioner, 

‘‘Supercalendered Paper From Canada/Petitioner’s 

Response To The Department’s Questions 

Regarding The Petition’’ (March 9, 2015) (Petition 

Supplement) and ‘‘Supercalendered Paper From 

Canada/Response to the March 13, 2015 Additional 

Supplemental Question for Volume II of the 

Petition’’ (March 16, 2015). 

any way in any transaction involving 

any commodity, software or technology 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from 

the United States that is subject to the 

Export Administration Regulations 

(‘‘EAR’’), or in any other activity subject 

to the EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, License Exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR, or in any other 

activity subject to the EAR; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or in any 

other activity subject to the EAR. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf 

of a Denied Person any item subject to 

the EAR; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

a Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States, 

including financing or other support 

activities related to a transaction 

whereby a Denied Person acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from a Denied Person of any 

item subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States; 

D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the 

United States any item subject to the 

EAR with knowledge or reason to know 

that the item will be, or is intended to 

be, exported from the United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by a Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by a Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States. For 

purposes of this paragraph, servicing 

means installation, maintenance, repair, 

modification or testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

Section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to a Denied Person 

by ownership, control, position of 

responsibility, affiliation, or other 

connection in the conduct of trade or 

business may also be made subject to 

the provisions of this Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, Flider 

Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident 

International Corporation, may, at any 

time, appeal this Order by filing a full 

written statement in support of the 

appeal with the Office of the 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 

Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South 

Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 

4022. In accordance with the provisions 

of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) 

of the EAR, Pavel Semenovich Flider 

and Gennadiy Semenovich Flider may, 

at any time, appeal their inclusion as a 

related person by filing a full written 

statement in support of the appeal with 

the Office of the Administrative Law 

Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing 

Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 

Maryland 21202–4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. Flider 

Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident 

International Corporation may oppose a 

request to renew this Order by filing a 

written submission with the Assistant 

Secretary for Export Enforcement, 

which must be received not later than 

seven days before the expiration date of 

the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be sent to 

Flider Electronics LLC d/b/a Trident 

International Corporation and each 

related person, and shall be published 

in the Federal Register. 

This Order is effective upon issuance 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Dated: March 19, 2015. 

David W. Mills, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06894 Filed 3–25–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

International Trade Administration 

[C–122–854] 

Supercalendered Paper From Canada: 

Initiation of Countervailing Duty 

Investigation 

AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, 

International Trade Administration, 

Department of Commerce. 

DATES: Effective Date: March 26, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Joshua Morris or Shane Subler, AD/CVD 

Operations, Office I, Enforcement and 

Compliance, International Trade 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution 

Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20230; 

telephone: (202) 482–1779 or (202) 482– 

0189, respectively. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

The Petition 

On February 26, 2015, the Department 

of Commerce (the Department) received 

a countervailing duty (CVD) petition 1

concerning imports of supercalendered 

paper (SC paper) from Canada, filed in 

proper form on behalf of the Coalition 

for Fair Paper Imports (the petitioner).2

The petitioner is an ad hoc association 

of domestic producers of SC paper. 

On March 3 and 13, 2015, we 

requested information and clarification 

for certain areas of the Petition.3 The 

petitioner responded to these requests 

on March 9 and 16, 2015.4

In accordance with section 702(b)(1) 

of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 

(the Act), the petitioner alleges that the 

Government of Canada (the GOC) and 

certain Canadian provinces are 

providing countervailable subsidies, 

within the meaning of sections 701 and 

771(5) of the Act, to imports of SC paper 

from Canada, and that such imports are 

materially injuring, or are threatening 

material injury to, the domestic industry 

in the United States pursuant to section 

701 of the Act. Consistent with section 

702(b)(1) of the Act, the Petition is 

accompanied by information reasonably 

available to petitioner supporting its 

allegations. 

The Department finds that the 

petitioner filed the Petition on behalf of 

the domestic industry because the 

petitioner is an interested party as 

defined in section 771(9)(F) of the Act, 

and that the petitioner has demonstrated 

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