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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

November 22, 2016 

v No. 328281 

Calhoun Circuit Court 

GHERMELL JAQUES BOLDEN-JAPRICE, LC No. 2014-002705-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and OWENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Ghermell Jaques Bolden-Japrice, appeals as of right his jury trial convictions 

of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2).1 The trial 

court sentenced him to 225 months to 30 years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, 

and to 95 months to 20 years’ imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, with the sentences 

to be served consecutively. We affirm defendant’s convictions but remand for a Crosby2

proceeding pursuant to People v. Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). 

 This case arises out of a nighttime robbery at the home of the victim, Allyn Reeve, which 

resulted in Reeve being fatally shot in the chest. At the time of the robbery, Reeve lived with 

Bradley Launder, who grew medicinal marijuana in the basement of the house. Defendant was 

implicated in the robbery, along with Christopher Leon Felton, who was convicted of firstdegree felony murder and first-degree home invasion in a separate jury trial and whose appeal is 

pending before this Court.3

 On appeal, defendant claims that the lead detective, Detective Jeffrey Coons, “effectively 

vouched” for two critical witnesses, Katie Bond and Ashley VanVleet, by affirming that their 

prior statements to police had been consistent. Because defendant did not object to the testimony 

 

1

 Defendant was also charged with first-degree felony murder, but the jury acquitted him of that 

offense. 

2 United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2 2005). 

3

 Docket No. 328280. 
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at issue, we review defendant’s unpreserved evidentiary claim for plain error affecting 

substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

 “It is generally improper for a witness to comment or provide an opinion on the 

credibility of another witness, because credibility matters are to be determined by the jury.” 

People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 71; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). This prohibition typically 

extends to third-party testimony that a witness’s in-court testimony was consistent with the 

witness’s earlier statements. People v Washington, 100 Mich App 628, 633; 300 NW2d 347 

(1980) (finding inadmissible a police officer’s testimony that an eyewitness’s trial testimony was 

“for the most part” the same as the witness’s prior statements because the witness had not been 

accused of recently fabricating her account). 

 However, under certain circumstances, a prior consistent statement may be admitted 

through the testimony of a third party. See People v Jones, 240 Mich App 704, 706; 613 NW2d 

411 (2000). For example, MRE 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the 

declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement and the statement 

“is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 

that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so 

testifying.” Additionally, when a defendant introduces portions of a prior inconsistent statement 

to impeach witness credibility, the prosecution may explore the extent of inconsistencies by 

showing how the statement was consistent with the witness’ trial testimony. People v Sayles, 

200 Mich App 594, 595; 504 NW2d 738 (1993). 

 Defendant indicated in his opening statement that this case involved witnesses who were 

mistaken, lying, or not credible. Among the prosecution’s witnesses were Bond, VanVleet, and 

Detective Coons. Bond and VanVleet testified to their observations of defendant and his cohort 

planning the robbery beforehand, with Bond witnessing defendant and his cohort running from 

the scene after the shooting. Detective Coons testified that he had interviewed Bond on the date 

of the incident and “multiple times” thereafter when “delivering subpoenas and such.” The 

prosecution asked Detective Coons whether, “. . . throughout the testimony of Ms. Bond has she 

been consistent?” Detective Coons responded, “Yes.” Defendant takes issue with this exchange, 

contending that it constituted an impermissible attempt to vouch for the credibility of the 

witness. We disagree. 

 By the time Detective Coons testified, defendant had thoroughly impeached Bond using 

prior statements made in interviews with police and her preliminary examination testimony. He 

had also questioned her rather extensively about her ongoing Children’s Protective Services case, 

implying that she was improperly influenced or motivated to testify in this matter so that she 

would be viewed favorably in that case. Moreover, defendant cross-examined Bond regarding 

alleged inconsistencies in her preliminary examination testimony, eliciting from Bond testimony 

that she “stuck with the same [testimony]” and that her trial testimony did not differ from her 

interview statements. Thus, because defendant introduced Bond’s alleged prior inconsistencies 

to impeach her credibility, the prosecution was able to explore the extent of these alleged 

inconsistencies. See Sayles, 200 Mich App at 595. Accordingly, defendant has shown no plain 

error with respect to the admission of Detective Coons’s testimony regarding Bond’s prior 

consistent statements. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. 
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 With regard to VanVleet, defendant implied at trial and through his questioning of 

VanVleet that she was not credible because of her heroin use and addiction. Upon questioning 

by the prosecution, Detective Coons testified that he had interviewed VanVleet on the day of the 

incident, “probably once or twice delivering subpoenas,” and that “[o]nce in a while during the 

year” he had gotten “a phone call from somebody about something in reference to the case, but 

that was it.” The prosecutor asked if VanVleet has been consistent throughout, and Detective 

Coons responded, “Yes.” Defendant argues that this exchange was also inadmissible. 

 Upon review of the record, we conclude that this testimony was not admissible under 

MRE 801(d)(1)(B) because VanVleet’s statements to Detective Coons came at a time after the 

purported improper influence or motive to fabricate. Jones, 240 Mich App at 707 (“the prior 

consistent statement must be made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose”) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). VanVleet testified that she used heroin on the morning 

before the robbery and before she had any contact with Detective Coons. Therefore, to the 

extent Detective Coons’s testimony was intended to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or recent 

improper influence or motive to testify stemming from her heroin use, admission of the 

testimony regarding VanVleet’s prior consistent statements was in error. Carines, 460 Mich at 

763. Nevertheless, in light of the evidence presented and the jury instructions given, the 

testimony did not affect defendant’s substantial rights, as it did not affect the outcome of the 

proceedings. See People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 356; 662 NW2d 376 (2003) (“To establish that 

a plain error affected substantial rights, there must be a showing of prejudice, i.e. that the error 

affected the outcome of the lower-court proceedings”). 

 Defense witness Shawn Pike testified that defendant was present and awake at 

VanVleet’s house when he, Pike, went to sleep at 1:00 a.m. on June 17, 2014, which contradicted 

defendant’s statement to Detective Coons that he left VanVleet’s house at 10:30 p.m. on June 16, 

2014. Pike also indicated that defendant discussed robbing the house across the street during the 

weeks leading up to the robbery, which corroborated Bond’s and VanVleet’s testimony that 

defendant discussed multiple times robbing the house with the medical marijuana plants growing 

in the basement. Bond and VanVleet corroborated each other’s account of the night at issue with 

testimony indicating that, on the night of the robbery, defendant discussed robbing the house 

during a conversation at the dining room table, both defendant and “L” asked for T-shirts, and 

both men left VanVleet’s house after obtaining the T-shirts. VanVleet testified that she gave 

defendant and “L” a pair of white and pink polka dot socks, which Jamie Moffitt, the surviving 

victim, corroborated with testimony that the cloth wrapped around the gunman’s hand holding 

the gun was white or pink in color. Moffitt also testified that the gunman demanded marijuana 

from the victim during the robbery, which corroborates the testimony that defendant and “L” 

discussed going across the street to steal the marijuana. Bond testified that she observed 

defendant running from the house following hearing the gunshots. Moreover, the jury was 

instructed multiple times that the task of determining witness credibility was solely the duty of 

the jury. “[J]urors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 

486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Thus, in light of the admissible evidence presented to the jury, and 

considering the trial court’s instructions, defendant has not shown that the admission of 

Detective Coons’s testimony regarding VanVleet’s prior statements affected his substantial 

rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. 
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 Defendant asserts briefly on appeal that the prosecutor placed the prestige of her office 

and the office of the police behind the contention that defendant was guilty, and that he was 

denied a fair trial. However, defendant fails to brief either issue adequately. People v Kelly, 231 

Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998) (“An appellant may not merely announce his 

position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he 

give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.”). With respect to 

his claim that he was denied a fair trial, the law defendant cites is inapplicable, and he fails to 

apply the facts of this case to his cursory argument. Although both of these arguments are 

effectively abandoned, see id., we reviewed them nevertheless and found them to be without 

merit. 

 Likewise, because defendant raises but gives cursory treatment to an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, we deem the claim abandoned. Id. Nevertheless, from our review 

of the trial court record, we conclude that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance 

by failing to object to the statements of Detective Coons at issue. In order to establish a claim of 

constitutionally ineffective assistance, defendant must show that “(1) counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, 

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” People v 

Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Because the admission of Detective 

Coons’s testimony regarding Bond’s prior consistent statements was not plain error, defendant 

cannot show that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the detective’s testimony fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. Id. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel’s failure to 

object to the detective’s inadmissible testimony regarding VanVleet’s prior consistent statements 

did fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, for the reasons stated above, there is no 

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had trial counsel objected. Id. 

 In a Standard 4 brief,4

 defendant challenges his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds 

and asserts that the remedy set forth in Lockridge is insufficient to cure the Sixth Amendment 

violation. Defendant’s counsel also filed a supplemental brief seeking a remand in light of 

Lockridge. We agree that a remand is necessary under Lockridge, but find that defendant’s claim 

of entitlement to a remedy different than the one set forth in Lockridge lacks merit. 

 In Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364, our Supreme Court concluded that Michigan’s sentencing 

guidelines were constitutionally deficient to the extent that judicial fact-finding could be used to 

mandatorily increase a defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range. As a result, the Court 

severed MCL 769.34(2)5

 to the extent that it was mandatory and struck down the requirement 

 

4

 A “Standard 4” brief refers to a brief filed on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant pursuant 

to Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 2004-6, Standard 4. 

5

 The relevant statutory language states the following: 

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection or for a departure from the 

appropriate minimum sentence range provided for under subsection (3), the 

minimum sentence imposed by a court of this state for a felony enumerated in part 

2 of chapter XVII committed on or after January 1, 1999 shall be within the 
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that courts must articulate substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the guidelines. Id.

at 391. The Lockridge Court concluded that a remand to the trial court is appropriate for “all 

defendants (1) who can demonstrate that their guidelines minimum sentence range was actually 

constrained by the violation of the Sixth Amendment and (2) whose sentences were not subject 

to an upward departure.” Id. at 395. In such cases, the procedure outlined in Crosby, 397 F3d 

103, must be followed to determine whether the sentencing court “would have imposed a 

materially different sentence but for the constitutional error.” Id. at 397. 

[O]n a Crosby remand, a trial court should first allow a defendant an opportunity 

to inform the court that he or she will not seek resentencing. If notification is not 

received in a timely manner, the court (1) should obtain the views of counsel in 

some form, (2) may but is not required to hold a hearing on the matter, and (3) 

need not have the defendant present when it decides whether to resentence the 

defendant, but (4) must have the defendant present, as required by law, if it 

decides to resentence the defendant. Further, in determining whether the court 

would have imposed a materially different sentence but for the unconstitutional 

constraint, the court should consider only the “circumstances existing at the time 

of the original sentence. [Id. at 398-399, citations and quotation marks omitted).] 

 In this case, without judicially found facts supporting the scoring of the OV points, 

namely offense variable (OV) 3, defendant’s sentencing cell would differ from the one under 

which he was sentenced. Thus, we remand to the trial court for a Crosby proceeding. 

 Defendant raises what appears to be various claims regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

To the extent defendant asserts that the remedy outlined in Lockridge is not the proper or a 

sufficient remedy for Sixth Amendment violations based on judicial fact-finding, pursuant to 

stare decisis, this Court is required to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court. People v Hall, 

249 Mich App 262, 270; 643 NW2d 253 (2002). Therefore, the appropriate remedy for 

defendant is the one set forth in Lockridge, 498 Mich at 391, and defendant fails to support his 

argument that any other remedy applies. 

 We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand the case for a Crosby proceeding. We do 

not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

/s/ Donald S. Owens 

appropriate sentence range under the version of those sentencing guidelines in 

effect on the date the crime was committed.