IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs at Knoxville August 16, 2016

BRUCE MENDENHALL v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2008-C-2541 Steve R. Dozier, Judge

No. M2015-02043-CCA-R3-PC – Filed November 28, 2016

The Petitioner, Bruce Mendenhall, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court‟s denial 

of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of 

solicitation to commit first degree premeditated murder and resulting effective thirty-year 

sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of 

the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Jesse Lords, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bruce Mendenhall. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M. Todd Ridley, Assistant 

Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Pamela Anderson, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

According to this court‟s opinion from the Petitioner‟s direct appeal of his 

convictions, 

[i]n 2007, the Defendant was arrested and charged with the 

murder of Sara Hulbert. Sergeant Pat Postiglione and 
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Detective Lee Freeman of the Metropolitan Nashville Police 

Department (MNPD) led the murder investigation. Shortly 

after his arrest, the Defendant gave a statement alleging that 

he had nothing to do with Ms. Hulbert‟s murder and that three

other individuals were responsible for killing Ms. Hulbert: 

Lori Young, Ritchie Kiem, and David Powell. However, the 

police were unable to find any evidence connecting these 

individuals to Ms. Hulbert‟s murder. While awaiting trial for 

the murder of Ms. Hulbert, the Defendant was housed at the 

Davidson County Sheriff‟s Department‟s (DCSD) Criminal 

Justice Center (CJC) in Nashville, Tennessee. On August 15, 

2008, the Defendant was indicted for soliciting a fellow 

inmate, Roy Lukas McLaughlin, to commit the premeditated 

first degree murders of Ms. Young, Mr. Kiem, and Mr. 

Powell. The Defendant was also indicted for soliciting 

another fellow inmate, Michael Jenkins, to commit the 

premeditated first degree murders of Sgt. Postiglione and Det. 

Freeman. A jury trial on the charges was held from January 

11 to January 15, 2010.

State v. Bruce D. Mendenhall, No. M2010-01381-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 360525, at *1 

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jan. 30, 2013), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. June 11, 

2013). The jury convicted the Petitioner of soliciting Mr. McLaughlin to commit the first 

degree premeditated murders of Ms. Young, Mr. Kiem, and Mr. Powell, Class B felonies,

but acquitted him of soliciting Mr. Jenkins to murder Sergeant Postiglione and Detective 

Freeman. Id. at *33. After a sentencing hearing, the Petitioner received three 

consecutive ten-year sentences. Id. at *1.

On appeal of his convictions to this court, the Petitioner raised various issues, 

including that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. See id. at *1. This 

court found the evidence sufficient, noting that Mr. McLaughlin testified that the 

Petitioner hired him to kill Ms. Young, Mr. Kiem, and Mr. Powell and that “wire 

recordings reveal[ed] that [the Petitioner] was actively planning the victims‟ murders 

with Mr. McLaughlin.” Id. at *64, 66. After our supreme court denied the Petitioner‟s 

application for permission to appeal, he filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction 

relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Appointed counsel 

 

1 The Petitioner actually filed a form titled “PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS BY A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY.” In a written order, the post-conviction 

court found that the claims presented in the petition were more often affiliated with claims for postconviction relief. The court appointed counsel, ordered that counsel discuss the matter with the 

Petitioner, and ordered that counsel inform the court within thirty days as to whether the Petitioner 
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filed an amended petition. Relevant to this appeal, the Petitioner alleged that he received 

the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel refused to present an 

entrapment defense and refused to present witnesses to testify against Mr. McLaughlin. 

At the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner testified that two attorneys represented 

him at trial but that he met with co-counsel more often than lead counsel. He 

acknowledged that counsel met with him regularly in jail and said that they discussed 

“different things that was going on with the court.” The Petitioner said that Sergeant

Postiglione had claimed the police “handed solicitation charges to my attorney.” 

However, “[t]hat was a lie” because trial counsel was in Chicago when the indictment 

was filed and did not receive the indictment for one week. The Petitioner told co-counsel 

that he wanted to use an entrapment defense, but co-counsel refused. The Petitioner also 

gave lead counsel the names of eleven witnesses so she could have them “refute 

McLaughlin” at trial, but she “didn‟t use nary a one of them.” The Petitioner said that 

two of the witnesses would have testified that they overheard Mr. McLaughlin tell fellow 

inmates that Mr. McLaughlin had “made a deal with the State.” Regarding discovery, the 

Petitioner said, “A lot of it I didn‟t get.” He said that he asked counsel for discovery but 

that they said his jail cell was too small for all of the documents. At the time of trial, 

counsel had not gone over discovery materials with the Petitioner, so he was “in the dark” 

about much of the evidence. He said he was unable to help with his defense because 

counsel “wouldn‟t ask for [his] help.”

On cross-examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that in addition to counsel

representing him in this case, they also represented him at his trial for murdering Sara 

Hulbert. The Petitioner was suspected of murders in other states. The State asked if he 

was aware that pursuing an entrapment defense could have opened the door to evidence 

of his other crimes, and he answered, “Not really, no.” He acknowledged that counsel 

told him about the charges, met with him about discovery, went over police reports with 

him, and allowed him to review recordings. The State then asked, “They went over 

extensively what the State‟s proof would be, correct?” The Petitioner answered, 

“Somewhat.” He said that lead counsel gave his list of eleven witnesses to the State. He 

said that he knew the names of a couple of the witnesses on the list but that he did not 

know the remaining names. He acknowledged that none of his proposed witnesses were 

at the evidentiary hearing.

Co-counsel testified that he had been licensed to practice law since 2002 and 

currently worked on civil and criminal cases in private practice. At the time of the 

appellant‟s case, though, he was a supervising attorney in the Davidson County Public 

Defender‟s Office, handling “[m]ostly serious felony cases.” Co-counsel began 

 

wanted to proceed with the matter as a petition for post-conviction relief. 
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representing the Petitioner when the Petitioner was arrested for killing Sara Hulbert. 

Subsequently, the Petitioner was charged in this case. Co-counsel went over the charges 

and discovery with him. Co-counsel said that he and the Petitioner “had to talk through a 

lot of things” but that the Petitioner seemed to understand their discussions. Counsel had 

their own expert conduct a mental evaluation of the Petitioner and obtained the services 

of a mitigation specialist. The Petitioner thought a videotape had been “doctored,” so cocounsel consulted with an expert about the issue. However, there was no evidence the 

tape had been altered.

Co-counsel testified that he did not remember having any specific discussions with 

the Petitioner about an entrapment defense and that “I can say here today that it‟s not a 

defense that I think we would have pursued.” He said the Petitioner‟s position was that 

“I didn‟t do it,” not that “I did this but I was talked into doing it.” The Petitioner brought 

“various people” to counsels‟ attention, and counsel interviewed “almost all of them.”

On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that counsel talked with potential 

witnesses in Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois and that “[t]he whole team of lawyers did 

this and met with all these people at their jobs and interviewed them.” The Petitioner 

knew most of the potential witnesses “from years ago from where he grew up in Albion,” 

but most of them were not involved in this case and would have “severely hurt” the case 

if called to testify. Co-counsel noted that the jury acquitted the Petitioner of two counts 

of solicitation. 

In a written order, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction 

relief. Regarding the Petitioner‟s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue 

an entrapment defense, the court accredited co-counsel‟s testimony that he did not think 

entrapment was a valid defense and concluded that counsel made a strategic, tactical 

decision not to present it. As to the Petitioner‟s claim that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call the eleven witnesses, the court again accredited co-counsel‟s testimony that 

co-counsel “followed up and investigated all witnesses that the petitioner provided but 

did not find any witnesses who could help the petitioner‟s case.”

II. Analysis

The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, 

arguing that trial counsel was deficient by failing to provide him with the indictment until 

one week after it was issued, failing to pursue an entrapment defense, failing to provide 

him with discovery, and failing to present his eleven witnesses at trial. He argues that he 

was prejudiced by counsels‟ failure to provide him with discovery because it prevented 

him from analyzing and building his own defense and that he was prejudiced by 

counsels‟ failure to call the eleven witnesses to testify because “[i]f any one witness had 
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testified, it is probable that the verdict would have been different.” The State claims that 

the post-conviction court properly denied the petition. We agree with the State.

To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the 

factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). “„Clear and convincing evidence means 

evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the 

conclusions drawn from the evidence.‟” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 

1992)). Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded 

their testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be 

resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 960 

S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court‟s findings of fact are 

entitled to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against 

those findings. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 

See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction 

court‟s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See

Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458. However, we will review the post-conviction court‟s 

conclusions of law purely de novo. Id.

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel‟s 

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. 

State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel‟s 

performance was below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the 

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Generally, [b]ecause a petitioner must establish 

both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a 

sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not 

address the components in any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner] 

makes an insufficient showing of one component. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Initially, we note that the fact section of the Petitioner‟s brief fails to comply with 

Rule 27(a)(6), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires that an 
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appellant‟s brief contain “[a] statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the 

issues presented for review with appropriate references to the record.” The statement of 

facts in the Petitioner‟s brief is only three sentences in length and consists of only the 

Petitioner‟s testimony at the evidentiary hearing. 

As to the Petitioner‟s claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to present an 

entrapment defense, the post-conviction court accredited co-counsel‟s testimony that 

entrapment was not a valid defense. We note that the Petitioner has not cited to any 

evidence at trial that would have supported an entrapment defense and did not present 

any such evidence at the evidentiary hearing. As to his claim that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to present his eleven witnesses, the Petitioner said at the hearing that two of 

the witnesses would have testified that they overheard Mr. McLaughlin tell fellow 

inmates that Mr. McLaughlin had made a deal with the State. The Petitioner has not 

explained how the other nine could have refuted Mr. McLaughlin‟s testimony. 

Moreover, he did not present any of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Black v. 

State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). We may not speculate on what 

benefit the witnesses may have offered to the Petitioner‟s case. Id. 

The Petitioner also alleges that counsel was deficient by failing to provide him 

with the indictment until one week after it was issued and by failing to provide him with 

discovery. As noted by the State, the Petitioner failed to raise these issues in his petitions 

for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court did not address them in its order

denying relief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). In any event, regarding the indictment, the 

Petitioner testified that counsel did not receive the indictment until one week after it was 

issued because they were in Chicago. Moreover, he acknowledged that counsel 

explained the charges to him, and he has not alleged how he was prejudiced by his not 

receiving the indictment earlier. Regarding discovery, the Petitioner acknowledged on 

cross-examination that counsel met with him about discovery, went over police reports 

with him, and allowed him to review recordings. He has not offered any specific 

examples of discovery materials that counsel withheld from him or offered any specific 

explanation as to how he was prejudiced by the withholding of discovery. Thus, we 

agree with the post-conviction court that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

_________________________________ 

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE