[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Harper , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2913.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -2913

T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . H ARPER , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Harper , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2913.]
Criminal law—A trial court must include notice to a defendant that any violation of postrelease control will subject th e defendant to the consequences for such violation provided in R.C. 2967.28—Failure of a trial court to include that notice in the sentencing entry does not render the postrelease-control portion of a sentence void—If a senten cing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void, and the sent ence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal—To the exten t that prior cases held that the failure to properly impose postrelease control in a sentence renders that portion of the defendant’s sentence voi d, those cases are overruled—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed in part. (No. 2018-1144—Submitted Novemb er 13, 2019—Decided May 14, 2020 .)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 No. 17AP-762, 2018-Ohio-2529.

_______________________ K

ENNEDY , J. {¶ 1} In State v. Grimes , we held that a trial court does not properly impose postrelease control if the sentencing entry does not notify the offender that any violation of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the offender to the consequences for a violation provided in R.C. 2967.28. 151 Ohi o St.3d 19, 2017- Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 1. This discretionary appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals asks us to clarify whether our decision in Grimes applies retroactively and whether the failure to provide notice of the consequences of a violation of postrelease control in the sentencing entry render s the imposition of postrelease control void ab initio and subject to collateral at tack at any time. Our
resolution of the second issue ma kes it unnecessary to address the first issue. {¶ 2} Our jurisprudence on void sentenc es arose out of the recognitio n that the General Assembly alone has t he power to define offenses and prescribe punishment and that a court therefore lacks authority to substi tute a different sentence for one provided by statu te. In cases in which the tr ial court inadvertently failed to properly impose postrelease control in the sentence, we provided a remedy by holding that the failure rende red the sentence—or part of th e sentence—void and subject to correction at any time before the expiration of the original sentence. See generally State v. Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d
332. {¶ 3} In attempting to apply this remedy, we have had to add addition al exceptions to the traditional rule that errors in sentencing ar e not jurisdictional and that those errors render the resulting sentence voidable, not v oid. Our attempt to bring clarity to the law, howev er, has burdened Ohio courts wit h unnecessary litigation challenging errors in the imposition of postrelease control that could haveJanuary Term, 2020

3 been raised by the parties at sentencing or on direct appeal, u ndermining the finality of criminal judgments. {¶ 4} Today, we realign our precedent in cases involving the impositi on of postrelease control with the tra ditional understanding of what constitutes a void judgment. When a case is within a court’s subject-matter juris diction and the accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction in imposing postrelease control renders the court’s judgment voida ble, permitting the sentence to be set aside if the error has been successfully cha llenged on direct appeal. {¶ 5} In this case, the common pleas c ourt had subject-matter jurisdi ction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the accused. Beca use the court had the constitutional and statutory power to enter a finding of guilt and impose a sentence, any error in the exercise of its jurisdiction in failing to pro perly impose postrelease control rendered the judgment o f conviction voidable, not void, and it is not subject to collateral attack. Therefore, to the extent any prior case conflicts with our holding today, it is overruled. {¶ 6} Accordingly, we reject the notion that the failure to incorpora te a notice of the consequences of a violation of postrelease contro l in the sentencing entry as required by Grimes renders the sentence void to the extent that it does not properly impose postrelease contro l. We therefore reverse the appellate court’s judgment remanding this case to t he trial court for further pro ceedings to correct the entry imposing postrelease control. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 7} In April 2012, the Franklin County grand jury indicted appellee , Andre Dejuan Harper, on two counts of robbery, one charged as a second-degree felony and the other charged as a third-degree felony. In Febr uary 2013, he pleaded guilty to robbery as a third-degree felony, and the state agree d to dismiss the second-degree-felony count of robbery. At the plea hearing, th e trial court advisedS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 Harper in writing that he would be subject to postrelease contr ol and notified him of the consequences of violating it. {¶ 8} The trial court then sentenced Harper to three years in prison and imposed a mandatory three-year term of postrelease control. Ne ither party disputes that the trial court gave the o ral notices required by R.C. 292 9.19(B) in imposing postrelease control, and the tri al court informed Harper of the consequences of violating postrelease control—i. e., that the Adult Parole Autho rity (APA) may impose a prison term of up to one -half of the stated prison ter m—in a separate document. However, the court di d not include the consequences of a violation of postrelease control in the sentencing entry itself. Harper did not file a notice of appeal to challenge his sentence, and he was released from pris on on September 11, 2015, and placed on postrelease control. {¶ 9} In July 2017, after Harper was charged with violating the condi tions of his postrelease-control sanc tion, he moved to vacate that po rtion of his sentence, alleging that it was void because the sentencing entry failed t o state the consequences of violating postrel ease control as required by th is court’s recent
decision in Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700. The trial
court denied the moti on, and Harper appealed. {¶ 10} The Tenth District Court of Appeal s rejected the state’s argume nts that our decision in Grimes did not apply retroactively to Harper’s case and that Harper’s motion was barred by re s judicata, explaining that “a failure to properly impose post-release control rende rs a sentence void in relevant part and therefore open to challenge at any time, irrespective of finality or othe r principles of res judicata.” 2018-Ohio-2529, 115 N.E.3d 840, ¶ 15. Notwithstandi ng this holding, however, the appellate court concluded that “although the impos ition of postrelease control in the judgm ent entry was defective under Grimes , it stated enough information * * * to impose post-re lease control and permit the APA to begin administering it * * *. As a consequence, * * * Harper remains validly underJanuary Term, 2020

5 sentence, even though it may not have been perfectly imposed.” Id . at ¶ 18. The court of appeals affirmed the d enial of Harper’s motion to vaca te, but it also
remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to ent er a nunc pro tunc entry to include the “conse quences” language required by Grimes

. Id. at ¶ 19-20. {¶ 11} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal on the following propositions of law:

(1) This Court’s decision in State v. Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, does not apply re troactively to convictions that were already final when Grimes was decided. (2) The absence of “consequences” language in a sentencing entry as required by State v. Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio2927, does not render the sentence void.

See 153 Ohio St.3d 1503, 2018-Ohio-4285, 109 N.E.3d 1260.
Positions of the Parties {¶ 12} The state maintains two positions. The first is that a new jud icial ruling does not apply retroactively to cases that are final—i.e ., when all appellate
remedies have been exhausted—when the new rule is announced. I t contends that
our decision in Grimes is a new judicial ruling beca use no earlier case had required
trial courts to include the cons equences of a postrelease-contr ol violation in the sentencing entry in order to properly impose postrelease contro l, and the court was neither construing a statute for the first time nor overruling prior caselaw. According to the state, the court of appeals deviated from thes e principles when it applied Grimes to Harper’s already final case based on the court’s view that the failure to comply with Grimes rendered the postrelease-control sanction void. The state’s second position is that c ontrary to the holding of the Tenth District, the failure to include the consequen ces of a violation of postrelea se control in theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 sentencing entry does not make t he postrelease-control sanction void. The state
notes that there is no statute th at imposes that requirement on trial courts and that
errors in the manner in which t he trial court imposes postrelea se control are not jurisdictional errors. And even if the omission of consequence s language in this case fits within this court’s ju risprudence on void sentences, then the state urges that we should overrule those cases and hold that errors in imp osing postrelease control do not render any part of a defendant’s sentence void. {¶ 13} Harper asserts that this appeal should be dismissed as improvid ently allowed. He explains that the issues presented are moot becaus e the court of appeals affirmed the trial cour t’s denial of his motion to vaca te his postrelease control as void, and he had ful ly served his postrelease contro l before we accepted the appeal. He also maintains that the trial court’s failure t o include the consequences of a postrelease-cont rol violation in the sentenci ng entry could be considered merely a clerical error that could have been correct ed with a nunc pro tunc order “without having made any reference to the Grimes opinion whatsoever.” {¶ 14} On the merits of this case, Harper argues that the court of app eals correctly rejected the state’s argument that Grimes does not apply retroactively. He
contends that Grimes did not announce a new judicial ruling because this court’s caselaw had already required the consequences of a postrelease- control violation to be included in the sentencing entry. But even if Grimes announced a new rule, he asserts that it applies retroactively to cases that were final because this court was interpreting a statute and explaining what it has always meant since its enactment. He also urges that once he had claimed that a new decision from this court had established that his postreleas e-control sanction was void, the court of appeals was obligated to apply that decisi on to his case, even if it was de cided after his original conviction and direct appeal. Harpe r contends that the state’s argument relating to void sentences amounts to an impr oper request for an advisory o pinion, because although the court of appeals relied on Grimes in finding the sentencing entry to beJanuary Term, 2020

7 defective, it nonetheless held t hat his postrelease-control san ction was not void. He cautions the court against deciding whether to overrule its voi d-sentence jurisprudence when doing so is not necessary to resolve this ca se, the issue is not properly before the court, and it has not been fully briefed by the parties. {¶ 15} We decline to dismiss this case as moot. As the state points o ut, Harper’s unfavorable termination from his postrelease control i s a collateral consequence of his violation. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(D)(1), that designation must be considered by a court if he is convicted of other crime s in the future. {¶ 16} We also find, contrary to the argument of Harper, that the stat e’s second proposition of law—that “[t] he absence of ‘consequences’ language in a sentencing entry as required by State v. Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio2927, does not render the sentence voi d”—is properly before us. {¶ 17} The Tenth District Court of Appeals distilled the question befo re it as “whether the trial court’s journal entry sufficiently and la wfully incorporated notice of post-release control.” 2018-Ohio-2529, 115 N.E.3d 84 0, ¶ 10. As the state properly recognizes, the appellate court then determined that the trial court’s entry addressed only one of the Grimes requirements, the applicable years of mandatory post-release control, id . at ¶ 11-12, and then, citing Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, observed that “the fa ilure to properly impose post-release control rende rs a sentence void in relevant part and therefore open to challenge at any time, irrespective of finality or othe r principles of res judicata,” id . at ¶ 15. In conclusion, the appellate c ourt held:

Supreme Court of Ohio precedent renders judgment entries partially void if post-release control is not appropriately imp osed and consequently enables the rel evant parts of such entries to be challenged at any time. Because challenge may occur at any tim e concerning this issue, and because the judgment entry in this c aseS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 imposes the appropriate term of m andatory post-release control but
does not at all mention the cons equences to the offender for vi olating post-release control, we remand * * * for the issuance of a nun c pro tunc entry that complies with Grimes

.

Id . at ¶ 20. {¶ 18} A defendant’s ability to challenge an entry at any time is the very essence of an entry being void, not voidable. See Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017- Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 35 (DeWine, J., concurring in ju dgment only). If the entry were merely voidable, res judicata would apply. See State v. Simpkins , 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 30. Ther efore, the appellate court di d hold the judgment entry below void. {¶ 19} Lastly, because we can resolve this case by deciding the state’ s second proposition of law regarding whether the failure to incl ude the consequences of violating postrelease control in the sentencing entry render s the postreleasecontrol sanction void, we decline to consider the state’s first proposition of law as
to whether Grimes applies retroactively. Law and Analysis {¶ 20} We agree with the state that “the void-sentence doctrine starts from the premise that there are two types of sentencing errors: Erro rs that make the sentence void, and errors that ma ke the sentence merely voidabl e.” {¶ 21} More than 150 years ago, Justice Swan, writing for the court in Ex parte Shaw , confronted the question whethe r the trial court’s failure to impose a statutorily mandated three-year term of imprisonment for the offense of horsestealing “render[ed] the sentence void, and the commitment of t he relator unlawful?” 7 Ohio St. 81, 82 (1857). Instead of the required three years, the trial court had imposed a one-year pris on term. The court answered t hat question easily:January Term, 2020

9 The question is one simp ly of jurisdiction. The court had jurisdiction over the offense and its punishment. It had authority to pronounce sentence; and while in the legitimate exercise of its power, committed a manifest erro r and
mistake in the award of the num ber of years of the punishment. The sentence was not void, but erroneous.

Id . The court noted that the writ of error is “for the correctio n of irregularities and errors in proceedings which result in conviction and in sentenc es.” Shaw at 82. On the other hand, the writ of habeas corpus is available “if the court has sentenced the
relator for an offense over whi ch, by law, it had no jurisdicti on whatever, so that the proceedings and sentence were manifestly coram non judice , and void, the imprisonment following such void sentence would have been unlaw ful.” Id . The
offender in Shaw had been “detained by virtue of the judgment of a court, possessing general jurisdic tion in criminal cases .” (Emphasis added.) Id

. Therefore, his sentence was not void, and he was not entitled t o the writ of habeas

corpus. {¶ 22} In 1967, more than a century after Shaw , we applied the same rule: “a judgment of conviction is voi d if rendered by a court having either no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or no jurisdiction of the subj ect matter, i.e., jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime for which he wa s convicted.” State v. Perry , 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 178, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). “Conversely, where a judgment of conviction is rendere d by a court having jurisdicti on over the person of the defendant and jurisdicti on of the subject matter, such j udgment is not void, and the cause of action merged therein becomes res judicata as between the state
and the defendant.” Id . at 178-179. {¶ 23} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or sta tutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of ca se. Pratts v. Hurley ,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34. “It is a ‘condition precedent to the court’s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclama tion by that court is void.’ ” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting
State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster , 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). “A court’s subject-matter jurisd iction is determined without re gard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta , 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. Rathe r, the focus is on whether the forum itself is compe tent to hear the controversy. See 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure , Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) (“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial authority amon g different courts”). {¶ 24} Article IV, Section 4(A) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]here shall be a court of common pleas and such divisions th ereof as may be established by law serving each county of the state,” and Artic le IV, Section 4(B) establishes that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions th ereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” As we explained in State v. Aalim , “Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution grants exclusive authority to the General Assembly to allocate certain subject matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of speci fied divisions of the courts of common pleas.” 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 8 3 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 2. {¶ 25} The General Assembly exercised that power in enacting R.C. 2931.03, which provides that “[t]he court of common pleas has o riginal jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses t he exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested i n courts inferior to the court of common pleas.” Accordingly, “[j]urisdiction ove r all crimes and offenses is ve sted in the court of common pleas, general division, unl ess such jurisdiction specif ically and exclusively is vested in other divisions of the court of common pleas or in the lowerJanuary Term, 2020

11 courts.” State ex rel. McMinn v. Whitfield , 27 Ohio St.3d 4, 5, 500 N.E.2d 875 (1986). We have therefore recognized that pursuant to R.C. 293 1.03, “a common pleas court has subject-matter ju risdiction over felony cases.” Smith v. Sheldon , 157 Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8. {¶ 26} “ ‘Once a tribunal has jurisdic tion over both the subject matte r of an action and the parties to it, “ * * * the right to hear and dete rmine is perfect; and the decision of every question therea fter arising is but the exerci se of the jurisdiction thus conferred * * *.” ’ ” (Ellipses in Pizza .) Pratts , 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004- Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford , 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton , 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 (1854). And when a specific action is within a co urt’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction re nders the court’s judgment voidable, not void. Id . at ¶ 12, 21. Generally, a voidable judgment may only be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal. See State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 28. {¶ 27} By outlining the history of our jurisprudence and the “modern expansion” of the void-sentence doctrine, the state demonstrate s that our caselaw has not always limited the understa nding of void judgments to t hose that are entered by a court lacking subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. Ra ther, we have
concluded that the traditional view of void judgments “does not adequately address the constitutional infirmities of a sentence imposed without st atutory authority.”
Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 20. Our voidsentence jurisprudence arose out of a respect for the separatio n of powers in our tripartite system of government and our recognition that the Ge neral Assembly alone has the authority to define offenses and prescribe the pu nishment for
violations. State v. Williams , 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 22.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 {¶ 28} Our caselaw provided a remedy for the failure to impose a statu torily mandated term in the sentence: “[a]ny attempt by a court to dis regard statutory requirements when imposing a sentence renders the attempted sen tence a nullity or
void.” State v. Beasley , 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). In Beasley , the trial court had imposed only a fine on the offender when th e statute mandated a 2-to-15-year prison term. We held that “the trial court exceed ed its authority and this sentence must be considered void,” id ., and because jeopardy did not attach to the void sentence, “the trial court’s correction of a statutori ly incorrect sentence did not violate appellant’s right t o be free from double jeopardy,” id . at 76. {¶ 29} Beasley remained largely an outlier until it gained new life as we grappled with trial courts’ failure to adhere to the General As sembly’s specific statutory requirements for impos ing postrelease control. In State v. Jordan , we held that the trial court’s failure to comply with its statutory dut y to provide notice of postrelease control at the sente ncing hearing rendered the resu lting sentence “contrary to law” and “void.” 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-608 5, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23. We also concluded that the trial court’s duty to co mply with the notice provisions “is the same as any other statutorily mandated term of a sentence.” Id

. at ¶ 26. {¶ 30} Although Jordan was a direct appeal and not a collateral attack, cases following Jordan adhered to the view that the failure to properly impose postrelease control rendered the sentence void and permitted it to be corrected at any time prior to the expiration of the journalized sentence. E.g ., State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski , 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 28; Simpkins , 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, at ¶ 6; State v.
Boswell , 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, ¶ 8. {¶ 31} Because we treated a void sentence as if no sentence had been entered, we held that a void sentence could only be corrected w ith a de novo sentencing hearing on any offense for which postrelease control was not properlyJanuary Term, 2020

13 imposed. State v. Bezak , 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, syllabus, overruled in part , Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 36. As a logical consequence, offenders began to argue that an appeal from a void sentence was itself a nullity because of the lack of a final appealable order and, therefore, that an appeal from a de novo sentencing hearing to properly impose postrelease control constituted “ ‘[the] fir st direct appeal’ in which [the offender] may raise any and all issues relating to h is conviction.”
Fischer at ¶ 4, quoting State v. Fischer , 181 Ohio App.3d 758, 2009-Ohio-1491, 910 N.E.2d 1083, ¶ 4. We rejected that argument in Fischer , overruling Bezak , id

. at ¶ 36, and holding that although a postrelease-control sancti on is void if not properly imposed, id . at paragraph one of the syllabus, the “determination of guilt
and the lawful elements of the [original] sentence” were noneth eless valid and remained subject to res judicata, id . at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 32} In State v. Singleton , we acknowledged “the General Assembly’s authority to alter our caselaw’s characterization of a sentence lacking postrelease control as a nullity and to provide a mechanism to correct the procedural defect by adding postrelease control at any time before the defendant is released from prison.” 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 26. We s uggested that the legislature had displaced our void-sentence jurisprudence a nd provided that statutory remedy when it passed Am.Sub.H.B. No. 137, 151 Ohio L aws, Part IV, 7622, 7659-7661, which, among other changes, enacted R.C. 2929. 191, effective July 11, 2006. See Singleton at ¶ 25. We held that “[f]or criminal sentences imposed on and after July 11, 2006, in which a trial court fail ed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall apply the procedures se t forth in R.C.
2929.191.” Id. at paragraph two of the sylla bus. Nonetheless, we have contin ued to permit collateral attacks on sentences imposed on or after J uly 11, 2006. E.g.,
Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 2 (sen tenceS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 entered in 2011); State v. Johnson , 155 Ohio St.3d 441, 2018-Ohio-4957, 122 N.E.3d 126, ¶ 2 (sentence entered in 2013). {¶ 33} In Fischer , we also proclaimed that our void-sentence jurisprudence
was “limited to a discrete vein of cases: those in which a cour t does not properly impose a statutorily mandated per iod of postrelease control.” 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 31. But rather than conta in it to cases involving postrelease control, we have expanded it to other sen tencing errors—i.e., the failure to include a mandatory driver’s license suspension in the sentence, State

v. Harris , 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, paragraph one of the syllabus; the failure to include a mandatory fine in the se ntence, State v. Moore , 135 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-5479, 985 N.E.2d 432, syllabus; a nd the failure to merge counts found by the court to be allied offenses of simila r import, Williams , 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, at ¶ 28. {¶ 34} Our void-sentence jurisprudence has resulted in seemingly endle ss litigation asking us to determine which sentencing errors must be raised on direct appeal and which may be raised a t any time. And we have not ma naged to contain
it to “a discrete vein of cases.” It is therefore time for thi s court to reevaluate the basic premise of our void-sentence jurisprudence and the remedy for the failure to properly impose postrelease control. {¶ 35} Neither Beasley nor Jordan nor their progeny have persuasively explained why a sentencing erro r implicating the separation-of- powers doctrine renders any part of the sentence void ab initio, as we have lon g recognized that other failures to comply with statutory mandates make a sentenc e merely voidable,
not void. Carmelo v. Maxwell , 173 Ohio St. 569, 570, 184 N.E.2d 405 (1962) (“even if a sentence is given for a definite term (contrary to the provisions of [former R.C. 5145.01, Sub.H.B. 180, Section 1, 129 Ohio Laws, 1 193, 1194]), such fact does not void the sentence”); Stahl v. Currey , 135 Ohio St. 253, 20 N.E.2d 529 (1939) (sentence imposed by a justice of the peace who exceeded statutoryJanuary Term, 2020

15 authority was voidable); In re Winslow , 91 Ohio St. 328, 330, 110 N.E. 539 (1915) (“If the court in sentencing [Winslow] did not act under [the b urglary] statute, but sentenced him under another statute, which for the purposes of this case may be conceded to have been invalid, th e sentence was erroneous and v oidable but not void”); Ex parte Van Hagan , 25 Ohio St. 426, 432 (1874) (“The punishment inflicted by the sentence, in excess of that prescribed by the law in force, was erroneous and voidable, but not absolutely void”). {¶ 36} As seen in the lineage of our caselaw, the same year we decided
Jordan , we explained in Pratts that “[a]lthough R.C. 2945.06 mandates the use of a three-judge panel when a defendant is charged with a death-pe nalty offense and waives the right to a jury, the failure to convene such a panel does not divest a court of subject-matter jurisdiction so t hat a judgment rendered by a single judge is void ab initio.” 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 24. Rather, we held that the failure to adhere to the statute’s requirement s “constitutes an error in the court’s exercise of juri sdiction over a particular case, for which there is an adequate remedy at law b y way of direct appeal.” Id

. {¶ 37} The current state of our void-se ntence jurisprudence also runs counter to the doctrine of res j udicata and disrupts the finali ty of judgments of conviction. We have recognized th at “ ‘ “[p]ublic policy dicta tes that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.” ’ ” State v. Szefcyk , 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), quoting Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931). This pu blic policy is
reflected in the doctrine of res judicata, which “promotes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventi ng endless relitigation of an i ssue on which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to b e heard.” State v.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 Saxon , 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18. Bu t contrary to these time-honored p rinciples, our void-sentence jurispruden ce has invited continued relitigation of the validity of a sentence—sometimes more than a decade after sentencing, e.g ., State v. Billiter , 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 6. {¶ 38} We do not reach today’s decision lightly. We acknowledge that the doctrine of stare decisis dictates adherence to prior judicial decisions. “ Stare decisis, however, was not intended ‘to effect a “petrifying rigidity,” but to assure the justice that flows from certainty and stability. If, inste ad, adherence to precedent offers not justice but unfairness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its right to survive, and no principle constrains us to f ollow it.’ ” Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr. , 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438, 628 N.E.2d 46 (1994), quoting Bing v. Thunig , 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957). {¶ 39} For more than 15 years, we have attempted to manage, distinguis h,
and hold the line of our “discrete vein of cases” to no avail. Our void-sentence jurisprudence attempted to bring clarity, but instead has sown doubt over the finality of criminal sentences and confused litigants and juris ts alike. Continued adherence to this jurispruden ce for errors in the imposition of postrelease control excepts a narrow class of our cases from established, fundament al principles of law without providing any sound basis for departing from those prin ciples. We conclude that this is no longer t enable and agree with the stat e and amicus curiae the Ohio Attorney General that now is the time to realign our v oid-sentence jurisprudence. {¶ 40} For all of the reasons stated a bove, we overrule our precedent to the
extent that it holds that the fa ilure to properly impose postre lease control in the sentence renders that portion of a defendant’s sentence void. We do this not because we reject the precept that courts lack authority to sub stitute a different sentence for that provided by statute, but because noncomplianc e with requirementsJanuary Term, 2020

17 for imposing postrelease control is best remedied the same way as other trial and sentencing errors—through timely objections at sentencing and a n appeal of the

sentence. {¶ 41} In this case, Harper was indicted on two counts of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and 2911.02(A)(3), which are se cond- and thirddegree felonies, respectively, pursuant to R.C. 2911.02(B). It was therefore within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas court to ac cept his plea of guilty and sentence him. Any error in imposing the postrelease-contro l sanction in his sentence was an error in the exercise of the trial court’s juri sdiction that could have been objected to at trial and that may have been reversible err or on direct appeal. However, such an error did not render any part of Harper’s sent ence void. And because Harper could have raised his argument that the trial co urt failed to properly impose postrelease control on appeal, it is now barred by the d octrine of res judicata. State v. Were , 120 Ohio St.3d 85, 2008-Ohio-5277, 896 N.E.2d 699, ¶ 7; Szefcyk , 77 Ohio St.3d at 95, 671 N.E.2d 233.
Conclusion {¶ 42} A sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction o ver the subject-matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over th e accused. When the sentencing court has jurisdicti on to act, sentencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the se ntence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal. {¶ 43} Having realigned our jurispr udence with the traditional understanding of void and voidabl e sentences, we caution prosec uting attorneys, defense counsel, and pro se defe ndants throughout this state th at they are now on notice that any claim that the trial court has failed to proper ly impose postrelease control in the sentence must be brought on appeal from the judg ment of conviction or the sentence will be subject to res judicata. See R.C. 2953.02 (providing forS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 appeals in criminal cases); 2954.08 (providing for prosecution and defense appeals of felony sentences); 2945.67 (pr oviding when the prosecution m ay appeal). {¶ 44} Accordingly, we reverse the judg ment of the Tenth District Cour t of Appeals to the extent that it remanded the case to the trial co urt to correct the entry imposing postrelease control. Judgment accordingly.

T RAPP , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., concurs in judgment only.

F ISCHER , J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.

M ARY J ANE T RAPP , J., of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting for

F RENCH , J.

_________________ F ISCHER , J., concurring in judgment only. {¶ 45} Although I generally agree with t he analysis set forth in the m ajority opinion regarding the need to realign our jurisprudence with th e traditional understanding of void and voidable sentences, I would defer add ressing that issue until it has been presented in a case free of the significant p rocedural defects present here. Thus, I respectfully concur in judgment only.
I. This is not the ideal case in which to consid er the continu ed viability of the void-sentence doctrine {¶ 46} As noted in the majority opinion, appellee, Andre D. Harper, ta kes the position that this court should not decide whether to overr ule our void-sentence doctrine when doing so is not necessary to resolve the case, as the issue has neither been properly presented to this court nor fully briefed by the parties. Majority opinion at ¶ 14. I find this argume nt to be compelling in this case. {¶ 47} More significantly, appellant, the state of Ohio, did not raise a facial challenge to the void-sentence doctrine below before filing its jurisdictional appeal. “A first principle of appellate j urisdiction is that a party or dinarily may not presentJanuary Term, 2020

19 an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5156, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v.
Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). It has been noted that “ ‘the most measured sense of judi cial restraint confines this court to passing upon only those issues developed below.’ ” State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt. , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5157, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in ju dgment only in part), quoting Fulmer v. Insura Property & Cas. Co. , 94 Ohio St.3d 85, 100, 760 N.E.2d 392 (2002) (Cook, J., dissenting). Thus, in cases in which par ties have failed to raise certain issues before the court of appeals, “[o]ur review should * * * be confined to the issue actually litigated by the parties and dec ided by the court of appeals in the first instance.” Id. at ¶ 36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in part). {¶ 48} The parties’ decision not to rais e the viability of the void-se ntence doctrine prior to the appeal to this court thus presents a sign ificant procedural hurdle to our consideration of the issue addressed by the majority in this case. Given the great importance of that issue, I would wait to address it unti l we have a more suitable case in which we can give it our full consideration un fettered by any arguable procedural concerns. Notably, this court has ordered briefing in other pending cases involving issues rel ated to the void-sentence doc trine. See State v.
Henderson , 155 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2019-Ohio-1421, 120 N.E.3d 867; State v.
Hudson , 156 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2019-Ohio-2780, 125 N.E.3d 947. Because we consider cases involving the voi d-sentence doctrine relatively frequently, I believe it would be more prude nt to address this i ssue in a more fittin g case. {¶ 49} Since I would not reach the issue regarding the continued viabi lity of the void-sentence doctrine, I would proceed to consider the issues raised by the state in this appeal.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 II. The absence of “c onsequences” language does not render a s entence void {¶ 50} With its second proposition of law, the state asks this court t o hold that a trial court’s failure to include in a sentencing entry l anguage about the consequences of violating the conditions of postrelease control , as required by State
v. Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 1, does n ot render a sentence void. I would adopt this proposition of law and, on that basis, reverse the portion of the Tenth Distric t’s decision finding error and remanding the case to the trial court to correct the entry with a nunc pro tunc entry in compliance with

Grimes

. {¶ 51} The state correctly acknowledges that the void-sentence doctrin e was premised on the notion that “a sentence that is not in acco rdance with statutorily mandated terms is void.” State v. Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010- Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 8. In other words, “ ‘[a]ny attem pt by a court to disregard statutory requirement s * * * renders the attempted se ntence a nullity or void.’ ” (Ellipsis sic.) Id. at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley , 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). Accordingly, this court has held that certa in failures by trial courts to comply with statutory requirements, even those beyond the context of postrelease control, constitute errors that render the sentence void. See State v.

Harris , 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, paragraph one of the syllabus (mandatory drive r’s-license suspensions); State v. Moore , 135 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-5479, 985 N.E.2d 432, syllabus (mandatory fines); Beasley at 75 (statutorily-required minimum prison sentence). {¶ 52} In contrast to those cases, whic h involved a trial court’s fail ure to follow statutory requirements, t here is no statutory requiremen t mandating that trial courts set forth in the sentencing entry the consequences of vi olating postrelease control. Rather, that requirement was imposed solely by this c ourt in Grimes

. Because there is no statutory re quirement to include “consequen ces” language, there is no concern about the trial court imposing a sentence w ithout statutoryJanuary Term, 2020

21 authority when not including t hat language, and thus no concern about a trial court violating its “statutory duty” by imposing a sentence unauthori zed by statute, see State v. Jordan , 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23 (hold ing that a trial court’s failure to fulfill its statutory duty of p roviding notice of postrelease control at sentencin g renders the sentence void). {¶ 53} This court has stated its intention to limit the void-sentence doctrine to only cases in which a trial court violates a sentencing stat ute, see Fischer at ¶ 8-9, and it should not expand the doctrine in this case. Bec ause a court that fails to comply with the Grimes “consequences” requirement does not act without statutory authority, a senten ce imposing postrelease control wi thout setting forth the consequences for violating postrelease control in the sente ncing entry is not void but, rather, is voidable and subject to correction on dire ct appeal. {¶ 54} I accordingly would hold that the absence of “consequences” language in a sentencing entry as required by Grimes does not render a sentence void. Because I would reverse the portion of the court of appe als’ judgment finding error and remanding the case to t he trial court to correct the entry in accordance
with Grimes , I would decline to address the state’s first proposition of l aw in this appeal.
III. Conclusion {¶ 55} I would defer considering whethe r we will continue to adhere to the void-sentence doctrine until that issue has been presented in a case in which we can give it our full consideration unf ettered by any arguable proce dural concerns. In considering the issues raised by the state in this appeal, I wo uld hold that the absence of “consequences” language as required in Grimes does not render a sentence void. I accordingly concur only in the court’s judgme nt.

_________________ Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Pros ecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 Yeura R. Venters, Franklin Count y Public Defender, and George M

. Schumann, Assistant Public D efender, for appellee. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicit or, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Zachery P. K eller and Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitors, ur ging reversal for amicus curi ae Attorney General
Dave Yost. Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. J arrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curi ae Lucas County
Prosecutor Julia R. Bates.

_________________