Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-938 | March 3, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

David Pannell

Greencastle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Natalie F. Weiss

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

David Pannell,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Bessie E. Leonard,

Appellee-Defendant.

March 3, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PL-938

Appeal from the LaPorte Superior 

Court

The Honorable Richard R. 

Stalbrink, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

46D02-1801-PL-111

Darden, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-938 | March 3, 2020 Page 2 of 7

Statement of the Case

[1] David Pannell appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from 

judgment. We affirm.

Issue

[2] Pannell raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred in

denying his motion.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] This case began on January 24, 2018, when Pannell filed a civil complaint 

against Bessie E. Leonard. Pannell, who was incarcerated at a correctional 

facility, claimed that Leonard, an employee of the facility’s law library, had 

unfairly deprived him of access to the library. Pannell further alleged that the 

deprivation of access resulted in the dismissal of his then-pending appeal in 

another case, thereby violating his right to due process of law under the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

[4] On February 6, 2018, Pannell amended his civil complaint but did not add any 

other claims. On March 5, 2018, Leonard filed a notice of removal, informing 

the trial court that she would ask the federal district court to adjudicate 

Pannell’s federal constitutional claim. Leonard also filed a notice of removal 

with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana

(“district court”), under Case Number 3:18-cv-164.
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[5] On March 6, 2018, the federal district court issued an order dismissing 

Pannell’s federal claim, with prejudice. The federal judge determined Pannell 

could not litigate in the district court because “he is a restricted filer.” 

Appellant’s App. Vol II, p. 18. However, the federal district court further noted 

Pannell was not precluded from litigating state-law claims in Indiana’s state 

courts. Accordingly, the federal district court remanded “the remaining State 

claims” to the trial court. Id.

[6] On April 6, 2018, Leonard filed in the state trial court a motion to dismiss 

Pannell’s civil complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. Leonard argued that Pannell had not alleged any state claims in his 

complaint, and as a result there was nothing left for the trial court to adjudicate. 

On April 20, the trial court granted Leonard’s motion, without prejudice.

[7] On May 16, 2018, Pannell filed with the trial court an amended civil complaint. 

He presented the same Fourteenth Amendment U.S. Constitutional claim he 

had raised in his prior versions of the complaint, specifically alleging that 

Leonard had unfairly deprived him of access to the courts. On May 30, 2018, 

Leonard moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On June 7, 

2018, the trial court granted Leonard’s motion and dismissed the complaint,

with prejudice.

[8] Pannell appealed the dismissal order. A panel of this Court affirmed the trial 

court’s judgment, concluding in part that the Court would not review the 
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federal district court’s dismissal of his complaint. Pannell v. Leonard, Case No. 

18A-PL-1684 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019) (“Pannell I”).

[9] On April 11, 2019, Pannell filed with the trial court a “Motion for Relief of 

Void Judgment Pursuant to Ind. TR 60(B)(4).” Appellant’s App. p. 41. He 

argued that the federal district court’s dismissal order was void and that the trial 

court should have adjudicated his constitutional claim. On April 15, 2019, the 

trial court denied Pannell’s motion. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Pannell argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 

for relief from judgment and should have adjudicated his Fourteenth 

Amendment federal claim. In general, we review a ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B)

motion for relief from judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. 

Breneman v. Slusher, 768 N.E.2d 451, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. 

However, where, as here, a litigant in essence claims a trial court order is void 

under Trial Rule 60(B)(6),

1

our review is de novo “because either the judgment 

is void or it is valid,” and there is “no discretion on the part of the trial court.” 

1

Pannell cited Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(4) in the title of his motion for relief from judgment, but that 

subsection governs “entry of default or judgment by default” against a party “without actual knowledge.” By 

contrast, Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) governs void judgments. Pannell may have confused Indiana Trial 

Rule 60(B)(4) with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(B)(4), which also governs void judgments. In any 

event, focusing on the substance of Pannell’s arguments, we will address his challenge as if he had cited

Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6).
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Hotmix & Bituminous Equipment, Inc. v. Hardrock Equipment Corp., 719 N.E.2d 

824, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[11] Before we turn to the merits of Pannell’s claim, Leonard argues that the claim is 

barred by the law of the case doctrine. That doctrine provides that an appellate 

court’s determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the appellate 

court in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the 

same facts. Terex-Telelect, Inc. v. Wade, 59 N.E.3d 298, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), 

trans. denied. The purpose of the doctrine is to minimize unnecessary repeated 

litigation of legal issues once they have been resolved by an appellate court. Id. 

“Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of all issues decided 

‘directly or by implication in a prior decision.’” Id. (quoting Luhnow v. Horn, 

760 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

[12] The law of the case doctrine is a “discretionary rule of practice.” Certain Ne.

Annexation Area Landowners v. City of Fort Wayne, 622 N.E.2d 548, 549 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1993), trans. denied. A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its 

own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts 

should be loath to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Id.

[13] In his motion for relief from judgment, Pannell argued the federal district 

court’s order dismissing his Fourteenth Amendment claim was void because 

that court failed to properly apply the precedent that governed him as a 

restricted filer. Pannell had challenged the validity of the federal district court’s 

ruling in Pannell I, and a panel of this Court rejected his same arguments. He 
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may not attempt to relitigate the issue now. See Certain Ne. Annexation Area 

Landowners, 622 N.E.2d at 550-51 (challenge to validity of certain signatures on 

a petition was barred by law of the case; the validity of the signatures as a whole 

had been raised and addressed in a prior appeal).

[14] Even if the law of the case doctrine did not bar Pannell’s claim that the federal 

district court’s judgment is void, the claim is nonetheless without merit. “A 

void judgment is a nullity, and typically occurs where the court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.” 22B Stephen E. Arthur, Indiana 

Practice § 60.2, p. 665-66 (2019) (footnote omitted). Throughout this litigation, 

Pannell has never alleged that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction over 

him or the subject matter of his claims. Instead, he claims that the federal 

district court “failed to follow” federal appellate precedent. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 42.

[15] Pannell had an opportunity to appeal the federal district court’s decision, and 

he may not convert his claim of mere error into a claim that the decision was 

void for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Warner v. Young Am. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 

164 Ind. App. 140, 148-49, 326 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1975) (rejecting allegation that 

judgment was void because plaintiff lacked capacity to sue; defendant could 

have raised that defense during litigation but chose not to do so, and could not 

repackage the defense as a jurisdictional issue post-judgment). The trial court 

did not err in denying Pannell’s motion to set aside the judgment.
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Conclusion

[16] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[17] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.