## RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A - 2719
- 15T2 K.W., Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v. J.W.,
Defendant
- Appellant.

Submitted June 1, 2017

– Decided Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FV
- 15
- 0487
- 16. J.W., appellant pro se. Jef Henninger, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.W. is self

- represented in this proceeding, as he was during trial. He appeals a November 16, 2015 dec ision denying
reconsideration of a September 24, 2015 final restraining order (FRO), issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25
- 17 to
- 35. After consideration of the NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court . " A lthough it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R .1:36
- 3.

J uly 5 , 20172 A - 2719
- 15T2

record , we affirm based on the Family Part judge's cogent and detailed decision rendered orally from the bench. J.W.'s brief focuses on his claim that the suspension of visitation with his children, contingent upon a psychiatric evaluation, is a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He
also chall enges the judge's decision to amend the complaint the day before the trial began . K.W., J.W.'s wife, had filed the complaint in a police station during evening hours, and the court granted her counsel's request to correct dates and add stalking,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12
- 10, as a predicate act to the original harassment charge, N.J.S.A. 2C:33
- 4 . T he complaint was further amended to indicate that the parties ha d a prior history of domestic violence.

J.W. was granted an adjournment as a result of this amendment. Finally, J.W. generally disputes the trial judge's factual findings . It is clear that J.W. mistakenly believes he is appealing the FRO, although it is not listed on his notice of appeal. See R.
2:5
- 1(f)(3)(A) . No timely appeal of the FRO was filed. We will therefore limit our discussion to the reconsideration decision, the only order listed on the notice of appeal. See Campagna v.

Am erican Cyanamid , 337 N.J. Super. 530, 550 (App. Div.), certif.
denied , 168 N.J. 294 (2001).3 A - 2719
- 15T2

During oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, J.W. essentially repeated that K.W. had not "proven" the allegations
of domestic violence. His st a te ment s made clear that he did not
understand that an FRO could result from m e re stalking and harassing conduct, and did not req uire actual physical violence . The judge attempted to explain th is point , as he had during the original FRO hearing . The judge made preliminary findings after the November 10 proceedings : With respect to the motion for

reconsideration of the final restraining order, that motion is denied. And in summary, I specifically remember this trial. I remember how calculating the defendant was with respect to stalking the plaintiff and the various means of observing her, and the different technologies that were ut ilized. As counsel indicated, I placed a detailed decision on the record. The defendant brings up issues that either were or could have been raised in the hearing, and they're . . . without merit as far as I'm concerned. I'll deal with them in mo re detail in the decision I place on the record. Regarding the defendant's application concerning custody and parenting time, that's also denied. Although, I'll note that it appears that he's moving in the right direction, but I will caution him as to

- - he's been placed on notice that any activities

-- he denies being at or near the plaintiff's place of employment. That could be subject of a further application in the FV docket by the plaintiff which will increase his counsel fees, and it may be subjec t to prosecution in4 A - 2719
- 15T2 the FO [sic] docket. Plaintiff is well represented by counsel, and she will follow whatever course of action she sees fit. On November 16, the judge placed additional findings on the
record: So with respect to the defendant's

applic ation for reconsideration of the final restraining order, the defendant had basically wanted to re
- litigate. He said he never beat the plaintiff during the marriage. He indicated that there were filings in the divorce case that we still did things as a f amily after some of the dates alleged in the domestic violence complaint. That he did not suffer from Post
- Traumatic Stress Disorder. He said, we had separate bedrooms. Interestingly enough, he said, I later became hostile in the emails. So, he admits that at a certain point, he was hostile in the emails. And the plaintiff had indicated through counsel the Court's detailed decision on the record, and I specifically remember this trial, and I had fined the defendant the maximum fine. I found the defen dant's conduct extremely controlling, extremely calculating. He was stalking the plaintiff. He had placed listening devices in her car and in her house, and for the reasons that I set forth on the record on September 24th as well as November 10th, his ap plication was and is denied. With respect to the other application for custody and parenting time, he had indicated on November 10th, that he wanted to see his children and was asking the Court for consideration. Plaintiff, thr o ugh counsel, indicates th at the final restraining order on September 24th indicated a road map for the defendant that he has perhaps begun to follow as far as the evaluation and counseling, but has not completed; and further, there was a5 A - 2719
- 15T2 reference made to the fact that he was seen at or near the employment of the plaintiff, despite the fact that he was prohibited from doing so in the final restraining order.
The defendant denied that and I indicated that that wasn't before the Court, but I had indicated to the plaintiff that that , indeed, would be concerning to the Court, and if that conduct, in fact, occurred or continued to occur, she should report it to the appropriate authorities. And I placed the defendant on notice that that type of conduct would not be tolerated. So, due to the fact that the defendant has not completed the counseling that was set forth, that application was denied.
Motions for reconsideration rest within the sound discretion
of the trial court. Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging
Fulfillment , 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). They are granted only when a judge's decision is based on plainly incorrect reasoning , when he or she failed to consider evidence, or when there is a good reason for new information to be taken into
account . Ibid. ; Cummings v. Bahr , 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996). At argument, J.W. merely repea t ed many of the same
st a te ments he made initially, doing nothing more than disagreeing
with the judge 's conclusions. The judge had found K.W.'s testimony at the FRO hearing , and
the document s she moved into evidence , establish ed by a preponderance of the evidence the predicate offenses of stalking
or harassment. See N.T.B. v. D.B.B. , 442 N.J. Super. 205, 2166 A - 2719
- 15T2

(App. Div. 2015) (holding that a plaintiff must establi sh the predicate acts in an FRO by a preponderance of the evidence). J.W. did not refute the proofs at the trial, and offered nothing new during the reconsideration argument.

As J.W. explained during argument on reconsideration, he saw

no need to testif y in his own behalf because when K.W. rested her case, he concluded she had not proven anything. Although J.W. seemed to be saying that he had been psychiatrically evaluated as required by the FRO, the first step towards resuming parenting
time with his c hildren, he did not produce an evaluation . The judge's reasoning i n denying reconsideration was so u nd, based on his earlier finding that K.W. was credible and that the necessary predicate acts of stalking and harassment occurred. Th ey included implanting listening devices in the marital home, and elsewhere, and recording a telephone conversation between K.W. and
her mother. We review a Family Part judge's finding s of fact deferentially, not just because they alone have the opportunity
to see or hear witn esses and observe their demeanor, but because of their specialized training and expertis e. Cesare v. Cesare , 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). Furtherm ore, in the judge' s opinion, the FRO was necessary for K.W.'s protection, thus m eet ing bot h
prongs of Silver v. Silver , 387 N.J. Super. 112, 12 5
- 28 (App. Div. 2006).7 A - 2719
- 15T2

There wa s simply no basis in law or fact for the judge to set aside his decision. The reconsideration standard was not met.

T hus t he judge did not abuse his discretion in denying J.W.'s
motion. See Pitney Bowes , supra , 440 N.J. Super. at 383. J.W.'s points of error are so lacking in merit as to not warrant further discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11
- 3(e)(1)(E) . Affirmed.