COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-15-00287-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF S.M.-R., A 

CHILD 

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FROM THE 231ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 231-556936-14 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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 Pro se appellant D.M. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s “Final Order 

Establishing the Parent-Child Relationship” between her daughter S.M.-R. 

(Stacy) and appellee J.R. (Father).2 In three points, Mother contends that the 

trial court erred by granting Father’s request to change Stacy’s name to include 

his surname, by limiting Father’s payment of retroactive child support, and by 

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 

2To protect the child’s anonymity, we use an alias. See Tex. R. App. P. 

9.8, 9.9(a)(3); In re S.B.S., 282 S.W.3d 711, 712 n.1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, 

pet. denied). 
2 

ordering her to pay “attorney’s fees” (or not requiring Father to pay attorney’s 

fees). We affirm. 

Background Facts 

 In May 2014, the State, represented by the Office of the Attorney General, 

filed a petition to establish the parent-child relationship between Stacy and 

Father.3 The State asked the trial court to adjudicate Father’s parentage of 

Stacy, to appoint “appropriate conservators” of Stacy, and to order Father to pay 

current and retroactive child support. The State also asked the trial court to order 

Father to pay the costs of the suit. Stacy had lived with Mother since birth, and 

Father had not previously paid child support. 

 At first, Father answered with a general denial. He later filed a 

counterpetition in which he conceded that he is Stacy’s father and asked the trial 

court to appoint him as a managing conservator with the right to designate her 

primary residence. 

 In October 2014, the trial court signed a temporary order. The court found 

that Father is Stacy’s father, appointed Mother and Father as her joint managing 

conservators, gave Mother the exclusive right to designate her primary 

residence, gave each parent periods of possession, and ordered Father to pay 

$202 per month in child support beginning on November 1, 2014. 

 3Mother gave birth to Stacy in May 2011, so Stacy was approximately 

three years old when the State filed its petition. 
3 

 In November 2014, appearing pro se, Mother filed a motion for the trial 

court to modify the temporary order. Among other requests, she asked to be 

named Stacy’s sole managing conservator. The record does not contain any 

ruling on Mother’s modification motion. 

 In August 2015, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Following that 

hearing, the court signed a Final Order Establishing the Parent-Child 

Relationship. In the order, the trial court changed Stacy’s surname so that it 

contained a hyphenated combination of Mother’s and Father’s surnames. The 

court appointed Mother and Father as Stacy’s joint managing conservators and 

gave Mother the right to designate her primary residence. The court ordered 

Father to pay $351 per month4 in current child support beginning on 

September 1, 2015 and to pay $4,570 in retroactive child support (at a rate of 

$70 per month) for the period of January 1, 2013 to November 1, 2014 (the date 

that Father began paying child support under the temporary order).5 The court 

ordered Mother and Father to each pay half of the court costs associated with the 

 4The trial court found that Father’s net monthly resources equaled $1,755 

and required him to pay 20% of those resources—$351—as child support. 

5The order does not set forth reasons why the trial court chose January 1, 

2013 as the starting date for retroactive child support or how the trial court 

arrived at the figure of $4,570. But the record of the final hearing reflects that the 

trial court arrived at the $4,570 sum by adding fifteen months at $214 dollars per 

month (a total of $3,210) to four months at $340 per month (a total of $1,360). 

The State explained that the $214 figure equaled minimum wage and was 

applied to months in which Father was unemployed while the $340 figure applied 

to months in which he was employed. 
4 

suit, but the court did not explicitly require either party to pay attorney’s fees. 

Mother brought this appeal. 

Name Change 

 In her first point, Mother contends that the trial court erred by changing 

Stacy’s surname to include a hyphenated combination of Mother’s and Father’s 

surnames rather than Mother’s surname only. We review a trial court’s ruling on 

a parent’s request to change the name of a child for an abuse of discretion. 

Anderson v. Dainard, 478 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, 

no pet.); In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. 

denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or 

unreasonable manner or if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or 

principles. Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 150. Our analysis on whether the trial court 

abused its discretion employs a two-pronged inquiry: “(1) whether the trial court 

had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion[,] and (2) whether 

the trial court erred in its application of discretion.” Id. Merely because a trial 

court may decide a matter within its discretion in a different manner than an 

appellate court would in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an 

abuse of discretion has occurred. Found. Assessment, Inc. v. O’Connor, 426 

S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). An abuse of 

discretion does not occur when some evidence of substantive and probative 

character supports the trial court’s decision. H.E.B., L.L.C. v. Ardinger, 369 

S.W.3d 496, 520 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). 
5 

 The family code states that in an order adjudicating parentage, on “request 

of a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that the name of the 

child be changed.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.636(e) (West Supp. 2016). 

Another part of the family code states that a trial court may change the name of a 

child if the change is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 45.004(a)(1) (West 2014); 

see also id. § 153.002 (West 2014) (“The best interest of the child shall always 

be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of 

conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”). 

 The good cause requirement of section 160.636(e) tacitly includes the 

best-interest-of-the-child requirement of section 45.004(a)(1); indeed, “the best 

interest of a child will . . . be considered good cause for changing the child’s 

name.” Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 151 n.1 (quoting In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d 77, 

81 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)); In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 

891, 895 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen reviewing the decision 

of a trial court to determine whether good cause was shown for changing a 

child’s name in a proceeding to establish paternity under chapter 160, we 

conclude that the trial court must then also consider whether the change is in the 

best interest of the child.”). “The child’s best interest is the determinative issue; 

the interests of the parents are irrelevant.” Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 151; see 

H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 83. Our sister courts have used the following nonexclusive factors to discern the best interest of a child in comparing the child’s 

original name to a proposed name: 
6 

 (1) the name that would best avoid anxiety, embarrassment, 

inconvenience, confusion, or disruption for the child, which may 

include consideration of parental misconduct and the degree of 

community respect (or disrespect) associated with the name; 

 (2) the name that would best help the child’s associational 

identity within a family unit, which may include whether a change in 

name would positively or negatively affect the bond between the 

child and either parent or the parents’ families; 

 (3) assurances by the parent whose surname the child will 

bear that the parent will not change his or her surname at a later 

time; 

 (4) the length of time the child has used one surname and the 

level of identity the child has with the surname; 

 (5) the child’s preference, along with the age and maturity of 

the child; and 

 (6) whether either parent is motivated by concerns other than 

the child’s best interest—for example, an attempt to alienate the 

child from the other parent. 

Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 151 (citing In re A.E.M., 455 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)); see H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 84; see also 

In re T.G.-S.L., No. 02-12-00391-CV, 2013 WL 43738, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth Jan. 4, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reciting some the factors stated in 

Anderson). 

 Father testified that he wanted Stacy’s name changed because he 

“believe[d]” that doing so was important. Later, he testified that he wanted 

Mother’s surname to be stricken from Stacy’s surname even though Stacy had 

lived the first four years of her life with Mother. He explained, “I’m still the father, 

and the father’s last name -- in the way I was brought up -- should be the last 
7 

name of the child that is his.” When asked whether any reason other than his 

tradition supported the change, Father said, “[I]f she’s on my insurance, it makes 

it easier for me so I don’t have to go and prove that this is my child . . . . [I]t 

makes it more easy flowing.” Father also testified that incorporating both 

parents’ last names could help Stacy facilitate a bond with them, although he 

acknowledged that it would not “bother [Stacy] if [his] name stayed off of her 

name.” 

 When Mother was asked why she opposed a name change, she testified, 

[Stacy] is four-and-a-half. She already knows how to spell her 

name, write her name. She knows what her name is. The confusion 

we’re having right now is when she goes over to [Father’s] house, 

they call her [by his surname]. So she comes home saying, my last 

name is [Father’s surname]. 

 It’s more confusing on her than anything for her to try to figure 

out who she is, and so the objection for the name change is it’s in 

the best interest of her to keep it how it is so it’s not confusing. 

 Under this evidence and the remaining evidence in the record, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the name 

change. Although Father’s testimony about the reason he was seeking a name 

change initially focused on his own interests in preserving tradition,6 he later 

emphasized goals that served Stacy’s best interests, including avoiding 

 6Tradition alone is an insufficient reason to change a child’s name. H.S.B., 

401 S.W.3d at 86 (“Chalifoux’s testimony about tradition was no evidence of best 

interest. Tradition, standing alone, cannot justify changing a child’s name.”); In re 

R.E.G., No. 13-08-00335-CV, 2009 WL 3778014, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi Nov. 12, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[N]either custom and tradition, 

nor a parent’s interest and desire, override the best interest of the child.”). 
8 

obstacles in securing her insurance and helping her bond with both parents. 

Cf. Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 153 (“[I]t was not an abuse of discretion to 

determine that it was in A.A.A.’s best interest to change her surname in order to 

facilitate the formation of a father-daughter bond . . . .”). Furthermore, the trial 

court could have reasonably found that the confusion about Stacy’s identity that 

Mother described could be alleviated by her bearing a surname containing both 

Mother’s and Father’s surnames and therefore associating her identity with both 

of them. Cf. R.E.G., 2009 WL 3778014, at *5 (“The court’s ordered name 

change of “Garcia-Padilla” allows the child to identify equally with two family units 

that are deeply concerned about his best interests.”). Finally, the trial court could 

have reasonably found that incorporating Father’s surname into Stacy’s surname 

could encourage his participation in her upbringing, which had been limited in the 

first few years of her life. 

 Although the evidence that the trial court received conflicted on this issue, 

because there is some evidence of substantive and probative character showing 

that there was good cause for the name change and that the name change was 

in Stacy’s best interest, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

granting the name change. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 45.004(a)(1), 

160.636(e); H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 88; Ardinger, 369 S.W.3d at 520; see also 

Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 726–27 (affirming a trial court’s name change of a child 

when there were disputed factors supporting both the mother’s and father’s 

surnames). We overrule Mother’s first point. 
9 

Retroactive Child Support 

 In her second point, Mother argues that the trial court erred by ordering 

Father’s retroactive child support obligation to begin on January 1, 2013 rather 

than requiring the obligation to run from an earlier date. Mother contends that 

the trial court should have been a “mere scrivener” when assessing the 

retroactive child support obligation.7 She asserts, “The Texas Family Code has 

eliminated discretionary judgment from child support proceedings.” 

 “A trial court’s order setting or modifying child support will not be disturbed 

on appeal unless the complaining party can demonstrate a clear abuse of 

discretion. The court also enjoys broad discretion in determining the amount of 

retroactive child support, if any, to be ordered . . . .” In re J.M.W., 470 S.W.3d 

544, 549 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citations omitted); see 

also Rocha v. Villarreal, 766 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no 

writ) (“[I]t is imperative that the trial judge have broad discretion to decide 

whether all of the facts and circumstances necessitate and justify a retroactive 

award of support.”). 

 7When determining a child support arrearage, a trial court acts as a “mere 

scrivener,” but an arrearage—unpaid support previously ordered—is distinct from 

retroactive child support. See Lewis v. Lewis, 853 S.W.2d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); see also In re K.M.J., No. 02-09-00303-CV, 

2011 WL 3525439, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (“[T]he trial court, acting as a mere scrivener, mechanically tallies the 

arrearage amount.”). 
10 

 On a finding of parentage, a trial court may order retroactive child support 

“as provided by [c]hapter 154” of the family code. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 160.636(g). In ordering the retroactive child support, the court “shall use” the 

guidelines included in chapter 154. Id. § 160.636(h). Section 154.131, entitled 

“Retroactive Child Support,” includes the following provisions: 

 (a) The child support guidelines are intended to guide the 

court in determining the amount of retroactive child support, if any, to 

be ordered. 

 (b) In ordering retroactive child support, the court shall 

consider the net resources of the obligor during the relevant time 

period and whether: 

 (1) the mother of the child had made any previous 

attempts to notify the obligor of his paternity or probable 

paternity; 

 (2) the obligor had knowledge of his paternity or 

probable paternity; 

 (3) the order of retroactive child support will 

impose an undue financial hardship on the obligor or the 

obligor’s family; and 

 (4) the obligor has provided actual support or 

other necessaries before the filing of the action. 

 (c) It is presumed that a court order limiting the amount of 

retroactive child support to an amount that does not exceed the total 

amount of support that would have been due for the four years 

preceding the date the petition seeking support was filed is 

reasonable and in the best interest of the child. 

 (d) The presumption created under this section may be 

rebutted by evidence that the obligor: 

 (1) knew or should have known that the obligor 

was the father of the child for whom support is sought; 

and 
11 

 (2) sought to avoid the establishment of a support 

obligation to the child. 

 (e) An order under this section limiting the amount of 

retroactive support does not constitute a variance from the 

guidelines requiring the court to make specific findings under 

Section 154.130. 

Id. § 154.131(a)–(e) (West 2014). 

 The State argues that the presumption created by subsection (c) applies 

here because the trial court’s award of retroactive child support does not exceed 

the total amount of support that would have been due for four years before the 

State filed its parentage petition. Id. § 154.131(c). In her brief, Mother does not 

discuss the presumption (or cite section 154.131 at all) or argue that the 

evidence presented in the trial court rebuts the presumption. Father contends 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the retroactive period for 

child support because the court could have considered his initial lack of certainty 

that Stacy was his child and Mother’s delay in obtaining a DNA test that proved 

his parentage of Stacy. Mother similarly does not address these assertions that 

appear to have motivated the trial court’s decision.8

 8In the process of announcing its decision on retroactive child support, the 

trial court stated, 

 I find that, Dad, you should have done something about it 

sooner. 

 Mom, you should have made it happen, as well. 

 . . . . 
12 

 Instead, Mother’s principal discernable argument on this point is that the 

trial court had no discretion in the amount of retroactive child support ordered. 

This contention is incorrect.9 See J.M.W., 470 S.W.3d at 549; see also In re J.H., 

264 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“The statutory language 

vests the trial court with discretion to award retroactive support and the amount 

of that support.”); In re J.C.K., 143 S.W.3d 131, 141 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no 

pet.) (“Section 154.131 vests a trial court with discretion to determine whether to 

award retroactive child support and the amount of that support.”). And Father’s 

argument—that the trial court could have used evidence concerning his lack of 

certainty of his parentage and Mother’s delay in establishing his parentage as 

factors in setting the amount—is correct. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 154.131(b)(1)–(2). Because Mother does not analyze the evidence under 

those factors or challenge the trial court’s exercise of discretion under them, and 

 

 [Y]ou also had a duty to try and do something about it, and 

you didn’t do anything about it. 

 So what I’m trying to do here, guys, I’m just trying to get y’all in 

the middle, and that’s where the child support’s coming from. 

9Mother also contends that there is “no evidence to support the subsumed 

finding that [Father] was not working for 3 years since the time of [Stacy’s] birth.” 

[Emphasis added.] She appears to argue that the trial court’s decision to make 

the child support retroactive only to January 1, 2013 indicates such an implicit 

finding. As explained above, however, the trial court appeared to base its 

decision on other considerations; we cannot agree with Mother that the trial court 

made any “subsumed finding” about Father’s three-year work history. The trial 

court did base part of the award of retroactive support on a finding that Father 

had been unemployed for a period of fifteen months, and Father’s testimony 

directly supports that finding. 
13 

because at least some evidence of probative character supports the trial court’s 

decision, we overrule her second point. See J.M.W., 470 S.W.3d at 549. 

Attorney’s Fees 

 The entirety of Mother’s argument on her third point reads, “This case was 

filed by the Attorney General to determine paternity[;] therefore[,] [attorney’s] fees 

incurred by the Appellant[10] should be paid by the Appellee.” It is unclear from 

this statement whether Mother contends that the State or Father, each of which 

are appellees, should pay her “attorney’s fees.” Although she does not cite any 

authority in her argument of her third point, an earlier section of her brief, in 

which she first states the content of her points, includes a citation to In re R.V.M., 

530 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1975, no writ). There, the court 

noted that a provision in the family code authorized the award of reasonable 

attorney’s fees in child support cases, and the court upheld an award of 

attorney’s fees against the father in a paternity suit. Id. Thus, we construe 

Mother’s point as a contention that the trial court should have ordered Father to 

pay her attorney’s fees. 

 Other than her “Motion to Modify Temporary Orders,” the record does not 

contain any pleadings filed by Mother. In that motion, Mother did not request an 

award of attorney’s fees. The trial court’s judgment does not require any party to 

pay another party’s attorney’s fees. 

 10We note that appellant appeared pro se in the trial court, just as she does 

on appeal. 
14 

 A trial court may award attorney’s fees in a suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 106.002(a) (West 2014). But because the 

record does not establish that Mother ever requested an award of attorney’s 

fees, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by not awarding them. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Klaver v. Klaver, 764 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 1989, no writ); see also In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2005, pet. denied). We overrule Mother’s third point.11

Conclusion 

 Having overruled Mother’s three points, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

/s/ Terrie Livingston 

TERRIE LIVINGSTON 

CHIEF JUSTICE 

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and SUDDERTH, JJ. 

DAUPHINOT, J., filed a dissenting and concurring opinion. 

DELIVERED: November 23, 2016 

 11The State asserts in its brief that “Mother cannot be compelled to pay 

court costs under Texas Family Code section 231.211.” See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 231.211 (West 2014). Mother’s third point concerns attorney’s fees, not 

costs.