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- USCIB: 4/87 

20 

17 August 195:3 

SBORE'f' - SECURITY INFORMATION 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: COMINT Clearance Standards and Procedures. 

1. The enclosed Draft Directive is forwarded for consideration a."t the request of Chairman of the Security Conunittee. 

2. The Executive Secretary considers the enclosure an 

acceptable interim measure from his viewpoint. 

3. The Security Committee is to be compljmented on the 

thorough and expeditious manner in which it has handled this complex problem. 

Enclosura 

Memorand'llm from Chairman SECCOM 

dtd 17 Aug 53, subject as above. 

USCIB': 4/87 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-25-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
Rl3~~66851 9 :SECUIUT"I lf4fflftfVb!i!f'l6!4 

17 August 1953 

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MFNORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

VIA: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

_Subject: COMINT Clearance Standards and Procedures. 

Rererence: USCIB 4/85. 

1. At its Fifth Meeting on 17 July 1953, USCIBEC agreed to 

refer to the Security Committee for further stuay and revision a 

proposed redrart or USCIB Directive No. 5 (USCIB 4/65). 

2. USCIBSECCOM has addressed itself to the problem with a 

view to drafting an up-to-date directive which would serve as an 

interim policy pending eventual preparation of a comprehensive 

COMINT- Security Policy. 

3. Accordingly, the enclosed redraft of USCIB Directive 

No. 5 is forwarded for consideration. The redraft has the 

unanimous agreement of all members of SECCOM except for the last 

sentence or paragraph 4c. The Air Force member could not concur 

with the requirement for a full field or ~ackground investigation 

subsequent to the indoctrination of personnel cleared in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 

FOR THE USCIB SECURITY COMMITTEE: 

Eh closure 

Proposed USCIB Directive #5 

dtd 17 Aug 53. 

s I,'(' f./: l,"l' 1,, .1l 1 ...... l 

P. J. KARL 

LCDR, USN 

Chairman 
SE6R:l!l'!" - MletffiI'l'Y INF0HMA'i'ION 17 August 195.3 

. . . ' .. '... ' . 

PROPOSED UNITED S'fA"rm COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

DIRECTIVE NO. 5 

USCIB S'r:ANDARDS AND PROCEDURE 

FOR CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR COMINT' 

1. Communication Intelligence (COMINT) is the name given to all 

' 

processes involved in, and intelligence information and technical 

material resulting from, the interception and study (a) of foreign 

communications passed by wire, radio, and other e;lectro magnetic 

means (except press;, propaganda, and public broadcasts) and (b) of 

selected foreign communications sent by non-electro magnetic means. 

2. The elements of the procedure for clearing a person ror COMINT 

are, consecutively: 

a. Determination of the "need to know". 

b. Investigation, and evaluation in terms of USCIB clearance 

standards. 

c. Approval for indoctrination. 

d. Indoctrination (and debriefing). 

3. DETERMINATION OF THE ''NEED T.O KNOW". 

a. The "heed to know" exists only when a knowledge of COMINT' 

is essential to a person for·- the perf o:rme.nce of his 

of'f'icial duties. The number of persons cleared f'or CCMINT 

will be held to the essential minimum. 

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SE6Rm' - SiCUiI'l'Y J:NFOOMM'ION 

b. The responsibility for detennining the "need to know" ot 

persons in the performance or duties under the direct cognizance and supervision or a USCIB member department or agency 

rests with that USCIB member department or agency, which 

shall act in full coordination with any other member department or agency concerned with such determination. 

c. The responsibility !or determining the "need to know" or 

civilians under contract and employees and representatives ot 

commercial firms and civilian research institutions which are 

to engage in research, or the design, development, or manu-

!acture or eq~ipment, pertinent to CEMINT' production rests I 

I 

with the USCIB.member department or agency directing the 

project, which sha]l act in full coordination with any other 

member departments or agencies concerned with the project. 

d. The "need to know" ot all other individuals will be determined by USCIB', unless otherwise directed by the Special 

Connnittee for COMINT of the National Security Council. 

e. The "need to know11 or boards, committees, councils and other 

activities of like nature under the exclusive cognizance or 

a USCIB' member department or agency rests with the USCIB' 

member department or agency concerned. The "heed to know'" or 

any other board, committee, council or activity will be determined by USCIB, unlless otherwise directed by the Special 

Committee for COMINT of the National Security Council. 

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SEElcJAITY IPIFORM1•ffl6P>l 

r. No person will be deemed to have a. 1'need to known solely by 

virtue of perfonnance of duties on a board, committee, 

council, or other like activity unless such board, conunittee, 

co':1llcil or activity shall be detennined to have a 1

'heed to 

know" as a whole by competent authority as set forth herein. 

When the "need to know" has been detennined for a board, 

committee, council or other activity prior to designation 

of the members, such board, conunittee, council or other 

activity should, ins·orar as practicable, be composed or 

members already indoctrinated for COMINT. 

4. USCIB INVESTIGATION AND CLEARANCE STANDARDS. 

a. USCIB standards for clearance of a person for COMINT are as 

follows: 

(1) The person shall be of excellent character and discretion, and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States. 

Exceptions to this requirement may be ma.de only as 

agreed by USCIB. A record of waivers granted will be 

maintained by the Executive Secretary, USCIB. 

(2) The person should be a native-born U. S. citizen. I 

The members of his immediate family should be U. s. 

citizens. 

(3) No member of the person's immediate family and no 

person to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be 

bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation 

should be of dubious loyalty to the United States. 

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!EetJftlT'i 1141'01\MATION 

5B0Ri!l':F - 9!9URI'fi" IN!'OltMA:TION 

(4) No member of' the person's immediate family and no 

person to whom he may reasonabzy be supposed to be 

bound by ties of aff"ect.ion, kinship, or obligation 

should be a resident of a foreign country having 

basic or critical national interests opposed to 

those of the U. s. 

(5) Exceptions to any of the foregoing requirements, 

except the first, may be made by the USCIB member of 

a member department or agency but only in case of 

compelling need after every reasonable assurance has 

been obtained that, in the circumstances, the security 

risk involved is negligible~ 

b. To permit evaluation on the basis of the foregoing requirements ea.ch person to be cleared for COMINT shall, prior to 

clearance, be required to f'umish a signed Personal Histor.r 

Statement or other documentation containing information 

essential]Jr similar to that called for in the sample f'orm 

attached hereto as Annex 1, and shall be subjected to a 

thorough investigation which shall incl.ude at least the following: 

(1) Check of the date and place of birth of' the individual. 

( 2) Check of the national files of the FBI al,ld of such 

other investigative agencies as may be pertinent to the 

investigation. 

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SECl:IRIT'f INFORMATl6Frl 

SEiSRB'P - SEiSURf'fY Iff!'OltMlUIUN 

(3) Local agency checks in areas where the individual has 

resided to consist as a minim'LDil in every case or a 

check of the files of the local police, local credit 

agencies, the headquarters of the appropriate major 

subordinate command of the Department of Defense (if 

necessary), and such other agencies as may be pertiment. 

(4) Check of records of the person's military service, if 

any. 

(5) Verification of information provided concerning education and affiliations. 

(6) Interviews with at least three character references, 

and a check made with former employers. 

(7) Interviews with at least two additional character 

re!erences round throu gh the proceding steps in the 

investigation. 

c. Officers of the Armed Forces and of the Foreign Service of 

the United States with more than 10 years' continuou~ 

active commissioned service and civil officials appointed 

by the President and approved by the Senate need not 

necessarily be subject~ to the canp~ete !ormal investigation as outlined above in paragraph 4b. Before the indoctrination or such persons, however, all pertinent records 

readily available in the Washington area will be scrutinized 

with a view to detennining whether any questionable traits 

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have been noted during his entire period ot conunissioned 

service. A full field or background investigation will be 

initiated as soon as practicable. 

d. In each case the responsibility for initiating and conducting the required investigation and :f'or making the evaluation 

based on the foregoing standards for clearance rests with 

the authority which has determined the "need to know". 

However, where the Secretary of Defense or USCIB has determined the "need to know", this responsibility may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to a member department or 

agency tinder his cognizance, or will be delegated by USCIB 

to an appropriate member department or agency, in each 

specific instance. 

e. In emergency, or when there is other compelling need to 

I 

clear a person for COMINT prior to completion of the full 

prescribed investigation, and the responsible authority has 

determined upon such advance clearance (paragraph 5c, hereinafter), such investigative checks as are immediately 

possible shall be made at once, and the full investigation 

and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest 

practicable moment. Interim clearances granted on this 

basis must be held to a minimum. 

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SE:C' 'Rl'fY INFeRMMIOlq ~ 

5. APPROVAL FOR INDOCTRINATION. 

a. The responsibility for approving the indoctrination or a 

person tor COMJNT rests with the authority which has 

determined his "need to know::". When determination. or the 

"need to know" has involved coordination With other 

departments, similar coordination shall precede the decision to approve indoctril!ation. 

b. In a case where the responsibility for approving indoctrination rests with the Secretary of De!ense or with 

USCIB, the organization which has been charged with making 

the required investigation and evaluation (paragraph 4d, 

above) shall furnish to the approving authority the 

following: 

(1) A certification that the person under consideration 

meets; all USCIB clearance standards (or a statement 

to the contrary, with particulars). 

(2) Any reports of the investigation and documents pertinent thereto which the Secretary of Defense or USCIB 

may require in the specific instance. 

c. ll'1 an emergency, or when there is other compelling need, in 

the national interest, to indoctrinate a person for CCMINT 

prior to completion of the full pre~cribed investigation, 

the authority which has determined the "heed to know" may 

approve such prior indoctrination. Indoctrinations granted 

on this basis must be held to a minimum. 

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O:lU;tt:t!il W' SECU~l'fY IP'WORMATIOP'I 

SiieRE!'" - SECmtIT'r flfti'6RM1t'f10N 

6. DIDOCTRINATION AND DEBRIEFING. 

a. Indoctrination is defined as instruction as to the nature 

of Co.MINT and the security regulations and practices which 

govern the handling of CCHINT material and COMINT activities. 

b. Fa.ch person who is to be indoctrinated for C~INT' shall: 

(1) be thoroughly and carefully instruct~ in the 

general nature of' COMINT and the general 

principles of COMINT protection, or 

(2) completely familiarize himself' with the specific 

regulations which govern the dissemination and 

safeguarding of that CCMINT to which he is being 

granted access. 

(3) shall be required to subscribe to an oath of 

secrecy. 

The oath to be administered upon the indoctrination of a 

person for COMINT shall be essentially similar to that of 

the sample form attached as Annex 2. 

c. REINDOCTRINAT10N. It is noted that each member department 

and agency is responsible to asses~ the need for, and conduct, such reindoctrinations as are considered necessary or 

desirable. 

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;j)flGJlU::i l • 

SECORI I t 11~1'0Pt!Vb!cl'l6f4 

9'S6R:EJ¥ Si':SmiI't'Y lHFOR:HA'rIOH 

d. DEBRIEFrnG' is defined as the process of reminding persons 

no longer authorized to have knowledge of COMmT or to 

receive COMINT end products th~t they are still bolllld by 

all security regulations pertaining thereto. When a 

person's "need to known has ceased to exist he shall be 

debarred from further knowledge of COMmT' and shall be 

required to subscribe'to a final oath of secrecy •. The 

oath to be administered upon the debriefing of a person 

who has been indoctrinate~ for COMM' shall be essentially 

similar to that of the sample form attached as Annex 3. 

e. ACCIDENTAL REVELATION OF COMINT INFORMATION. Whenever 

COMM information or CCMmT· end products are accidentally 

revealed to non-indoctrinated persons, immediate action 

shall be taken by the cognizant member department or 

agency to instruct such persons as to the general nature 

of COMINT and to impress upon them their obligation, ·llllder 

U. s. Code 18, Section 798, to maintain absolute silence 

regarding the revelation. 

r. The responsibility for indoctrinating and debriefing a 

person and for administering the oaths of secrecy rests 

with the authority which has determined the individual's 

"need to know". When the Secretary of Defense or USCIB 

has determined the "need to known, this responsibility may 

be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to a member 

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866lo:JRFFY IPW8RMil<'fl01~ 

department or agency under his cognizance or by USCIB to 

an appropriate member department or agency in ea.ch specific 

instance. 

g. F.a.ch USCIB member organization shall maintain current 

records of personnel indoctrinated by it .:f'or COMINT, pursuant to its own determination or "need to known, and shall ' . keep the Executive Secretary, USCIB, info:nned, on a 

quarterly basis, of the total numbers of such personnel. 

The Executive Secretary, USCIB, will maintain a list of 

persons cleared for COMINT pursuant to the determination 

or the "need to known by USCIB. 

h. F.a.ch USCIB member organization will keep the Executive 

Secretary, USCIB, advised o.:f' the names o.:f' any individuals 

not under its exclusive cogni~1μ1ce who have been indoctrinated or debriefed by it for any reason, setting forth 

at the same time the date and authority under which such 

action was taken. 

i. Member departments and agencies or USCIB which receive, 

use or disseminate COMINT final products will maintain a 

written set of regulations for the handling and dissemination thereof, in accordance with the policies of USCIB. 

Each member department and agency will place on file with 

the Executive Secretary, USCIB, a current copy or such 

regulations, together with such changes as may be made 

thereto from time to time. 

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REF ID:A66851 nrof"tn Jr'.'~ 

0Ut1CU1 

!l!Ctlftl'f"!' lf'4f'6RMA:'f'ION 

7. PERIODIC REINVESTIGATIONS. 

Persons cleared for COMINT and retaining that status permanently 

or over a long period of time shall be subjected to such periodic 

reinvestigations as are considered necessary by the USCIB member 

concerned. Such reopened investigations shall be conducted by the 

investigative services available to that member agency. The minimum requirement. for a reopened investigation shall consist of a 

National Agency Check and a review· or an up to date Personal 

History Statement or other similar documentation at not to exceed 

five year intervals. 

8. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING INDOCTRINATION AND DEBRIEFING. 

a. In order to assist in administrative control of duty 

assignments, the following procedures will be observed: 

(1) When an individual of one USCIB' member department or 

agency is supplied to another member department or 

agency for a permanent duty assignment involving 

knowledge or COMINT, the receiving activity will be· 

responsible for the required indoctrination and 

debriefing. The necessairy investigation and evaluation prior to indoctrination may be made in coordination with the parent activity. 

(2) The receiving activity will furnish a copy of the 

executed indoctrination and debriefing oaths to the 

parent activity immediately after their execution. 

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(3) The indoctrination and debriefing of an individual 

supplied to another member department or agency for a 

temporary duty assignment ilivolving knowledge of 

COMINT will be a responsibility of the parent activity. 

(4) When an individual is debriefed and returned to his 

parent activity for further assignment, the activity 

to which he was attached shall make suitable recommendations to the parent ~ctivity in regard to limitations on assignment to duties of a hazardous nature. 

9. EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL IN NON-INDOCTRINATED STATUS 

a. It is desirable that all persons to be employed in the 

CCMINT field, directly or on a contractual basis, by a 

USCIB member department or agency be investigated, evaluated, and indoctrinated in accordance with the standards 

set forth in paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Directive •. However, 

such persons as need not and positively will not have 

knowledge of, or access to, either (1) COMINT codeword 

information, documents and technical materials, or (2) 

activities which involve or produce directly such in~ormation, documents and technical material may, at the discretion of the USCIB member of the department or agency 

concerned, be investigated and instructed according to the 

standards and procedures normally applied by that member 

department or agency for persons requiring access to the 

level or classified information involved. 

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b. The application of the exception described in paragraph 9a 

above shall be held to the necessary minimum. ·Persons 

employed and granted access to classified non-codeword 

information in the COMINT field in accordance with paragraph 9a above shall not be conside~ed as indoctrinated 

for CCMINT. The numbers of such persons, however, shall 

be reported to the Executive Secretary, USCIB, on a 

quarterly basis. 

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