FILED 

NOVEMBER 10, 2016 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent, 

v. 

ISMAEL SOTO-VALDEZ, 

Appellant. 

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No. 33425-2-111 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

KORSMO, J. - Ismael Soto-Valdez appeals his conviction for unlawful possession 

of a controlled substance, oxycodone. The sole substantive issue he raises is one we have 

rejected regularly, and we decline to consider his challenge to the legal financial 

obligations (LFOs) imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

Mr. Soto-Valdez contends that the court erred in giving the standard reasonable 

doubt instruction, challenging this paragraph from instruction 3: 

A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise 

from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as would exist in 

the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and carefully considering 

all of the evidence or lack of evidence. If, from such consideration, you 

have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Clerk's Papers at 28. Neither party objected to the trial court's use of this instruction. 
No. 33425-2-III 

State v. Soto-Valdez 

This language comes from WPIC 4.01, an instruction that the Washington 

Supreme Court has directed that trial courts use. State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 318, 

165 P.3d 1241 (2007). Arguing that the word "truth" is inappropriate, Mr. Soto-Valdez 

contends that this instruction runs afoul of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. 

This argument is one that has a long history of being rejected. See State v. Harras, 

25 Wash. 416,421, 65 P. 774 (1901); State v. Thompson, 13 Wn. App. 1, 5,533 P.2d 395 

(1975). The modern formulation of the argument has repeatedly been rejected in recent 

years. State v. Jenson, 194 Wn. App. 900, 378 P.3d 270 (2016); State v. Osman, 192 Wn. 

App. 355, 375, 366 P.3d 956 (2016); State v. Lizarrago, 191 Wn. App. 530, 567, 364 

P.3d 810 (2015); State v. Kinzle, 181 Wn. App. 774,784,326 P.3d 870 (2014); State v. 

Fedorov, 181 Wn. App. 187,200,324 P.3d 784 (2014). The contention is utterly without 

merit. 

The other argument is a contention that the trial court did not conduct an adequate 

inquiry into Mr. Soto-Valdez's ability to pay before imposing LFOs totaling $4,156. 1 

This issue is based on State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). In Blazina, 

the court ruled that appellate courts have discretionary authority to hear LFO challenges 

raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 833-835. Although Blazina empowers appellate 

1 The judgment and sentence form tallies the total as $3,706. The trial court 

should correct the judgment tally. Mr. Soto-Valdez need not be present. 

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No. 33425-2-111 

State v. Soto-Valdez 

courts to consider LFO challenges where the trial court did not conduct the statutory 

inquiry at sentencing, it is less certain whether that discretionary authority applies to postBlazina sentencings, such as this one, involving an unchallenged, but inadequate, inquiry. 

Assuming that we have such authority, a majority of this panel has decided to not 

exercise it under the facts of this case. Mr. Soto-Valdez admitted he was employable and 

did not plead any impediment to earning a living upon release from custody. The vast 

bulk of the LFOs imposed here are mandatory costs or fines not subject to the inquiry 

required by RCW 10.01.160(3). See State v. Clark, 191 Wn. App. 369, 374-376, 362 

P.3d 309 (2015) (holding fines are not "costs" under the statute). 

The judgment is affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

. 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

?ldhw~,l}: . Siddoway, J. 

Lawrence-Berrey, A.C .. 

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