15-2216 

Torres-Iraheta v. Lynch 

BIA 

Videla, IJ 

A205 841 858

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

17th day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

Chief Judge, 

ROBERT D. SACK, 

PETER W. HALL,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

WALTER ALBERTO TORRES-IRAHETA, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 15-2216 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Anne Pilsbury, Central American 

Legal Assistance, Brooklyn, N.Y. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Anthony 

P. Nicastro, Acting Assistant 

Director; Tracey N. McDonald, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 
2

Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. 

 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Walter Alberto Torres-Iraheta, a native and 

citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a June 17, 2015, decision 

of the BIA affirming a December 30, 2014, decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Torres-Iraheta’s application 

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Torres-Iraheta, No. 

A205 841 858 (B.I.A. June 17, 2015), aff’g No. A205 841 858 

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 30, 2014). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 

in this case. 

We have reviewed the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Xiu 

Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2008). The 

standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. 

For asylum applications like Torres-Iraheta’s, governed by 

the REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality 

of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on 
3

inconsistencies and omissions in an asylum applicant’s 

statements and evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu 

Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64, 166 n. 3. We “defer . . . to an 

IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could 

make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

at 167. 

In the present case, substantial evidence supports the 

agency’s adverse credibility determination, which is 

dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal. Paul v. 

Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). The agency 

reasonably relied on Torres-Iraheta’s inconsistent testimony 

about the time period when he was threatened; his inability to 

recall the amount of money demanded by the gang; and his initial 

omission of an arrest for sexual assault in his asylum 

application. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 

F.3d at 166 n.3 (inconsistencies and omissions are 

“functionally equivalent” for credibility purposes). The 

agency was not required to credit Torres-Iraheta’s explanations 

that he could not remember when the gang started threatening 

him or how much they asked for, as these are two of the central 

aspects of his extortion-based claim. His claim that he forgot 

about his prior arrest is also not compelling, given the serious 
4

nature of the charges and the fact that he was detained for three 

days. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for 

his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled 

to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Torres-Iraheta’s argument that the agency failed to 

consider the whole record also lacks merit. There is no 

indication that the agency overlooked record evidence rather 

than finding the evidence insufficient to rehabilitate 

Torres-Iraheta’s inconsistent testimony. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e 

presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence 

before him, unless the record compellingly suggests 

otherwise.”); Wei Guang Wang v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 437 

F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the agency need not 

“expressly parse or refute on the record each individual 

argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Torres-Iraheta’s 

argument that the BIA engaged in impermissible fact finding also 

lacks merit. The BIA did not make any factual findings 

inconsistent with the IJ’s, but concluded that the evidence 

Torres-Iraheta pointed to did not undermine the IJ’s factual 
5

findings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (providing that BIA 

reviews IJ’s findings of fact for clear error). 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot 

say that a reasonable fact finder would be compelled to find 

Torres-Iraheta’s claim credible given the inconsistencies and 

omissions relating to important aspects of his claim. Xiu Xia 

Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. 

Because credibility is dispositive, we do not reach the 

agency’s alternate holding that Torres-Iraheta failed to 

establish that he was harmed on account of a protected ground. 

INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule 

courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues 

the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they 

reach.”). 

Finally, we note that Torres-Iraheta’s CAT claim was based 

solely on his fear that he would be imprisoned with gang members 

and tortured by them while awaiting trial on murder charges. 

Torres-Iraheta has now been released from prison, and the 

charges against him have been dismissed. He did not identify 

any other reason that he would be imprisoned in El Salvador. 

We therefore dismiss his CAT claim as moot. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1982). To the extent 

Torres-Iraheta raises new grounds for relief based on events 
6

that postdate the BIA’s decision, he must bring those claims 

before the agency in the first instance. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED, and the pending motion for a stay of removal is DISMISSED 

as moot. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk