UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4312

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

RICARDO REYNSO REBOLLAR, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., District Judge. (3:15-cr-00020-RJC-2) 

Submitted: November 15, 2016 Decided: November 29, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Stacey A. Phipps, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, 

North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Ricardo Reynso Rebollar pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2012). The district 

court calculated Rebollar’s Guidelines range under the 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2014) at 168 to 210 months’ 

imprisonment and sentenced Rebollar to 168 months’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal, but raising as issues for review 

whether the district court reversibly erred in accepting 

Rebollar’s guilty plea, whether the district court abused its 

discretion in imposing sentence, and whether trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance. Rebollar was informed of his 

right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done 

so. The Government elected not to file a brief and does not 

seek to enforce the appeal waiver in Rebollar’s plea agreement.* 

We affirm. 

 * Because the Government fails to assert the waiver as a bar 

to the appeal, we may consider the issues raised by counsel and 

conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to Anders. 

United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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Because Rebollar did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, the acceptance of his guilty plea is 

reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Williams, 

811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). To demonstrate plain error, 

a defendant must show: (1) there was error; (2) the error was 

plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). In the guilty 

plea context, a defendant meets his burden to establish that a 

plain error affected his substantial rights by showing a 

reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but 

for the district court’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 omissions. United 

States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Our review of the transcript of the guilty plea hearing 

leads us to conclude that the magistrate judge’s omissions under 

Rule 11 did not affect Rebollar’s substantial rights. 

Additionally, the transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing 

hearings reveal that the magistrate judge and district court 

ensured that the plea was supported by an independent basis in 

fact and that Rebollar entered the plea knowingly and 

voluntarily with an understanding of the consequences. 

Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the district court’s 

acceptance of Rebollar’s guilty plea. See United States v. 

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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Turning to Rebollar’s 168-month sentence, we review it for 

reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007); United 

States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015). In doing 

so, we first examine the sentence for procedural error, which 

includes “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing 

to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, 

selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or 

failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Lymas, 

781 F.3d at 111-12 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). We then 

review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] 

into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 51. Any sentence within or below a properly calculated 

Guidelines range is presumptively substantively reasonable. 

United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). 

Such a presumption can only be rebutted by a showing that the 

sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) 

factors. Id. 

In this case, the district court did not reversibly err in 

calculating the Guidelines range and properly heard argument 

from counsel and allocution from Rebollar. The court explained 

that the within-Guidelines sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment 

was warranted in light of the nature and seriousness of 
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Rebollar’s offense conduct, to promote respect for the law, to 

provide just punishment, to afford adequate deterrence, to 

protect the public, and to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(C), (6). Rebollar

does not offer any grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal 

that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in sentencing Rebollar. 

With respect to ineffective assistance of counsel, unless 

an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face 

of the record, ineffective assistance claims generally are not 

addressed on direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 

424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Because the record does not 

conclusively establish ineffective assistance by Rebollar’s 

trial counsel, we deem this claim inappropriate for resolution 

on direct appeal. See United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 

216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

remainder of the record in this case and have found no 

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district 

court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform 

Rebollar, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court 

of the United States for further review. If Rebollar requests 

that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a 
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petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court 

for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion 

must state that a copy thereof was served on Rebollar. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED