Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Scott L. Barnhart

Brooke Smith

Keffer Barnhart, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Venus G. Graves,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

82A04-1509-CR-1309

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Kelli Fink, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

82C01-1412-F4-5251

May, Judge.

[1] Venus G. Graves appeals the denial of her motion to suppress the evidence 

collected from her after a police officer stopped her outside a Target store. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 2 of 8

Because the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the brief investigatory 

stop, we affirm and remand for further proceedings. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 13, 2014, Jason Martin was working as a security officer at a 

Target in Evansville, Indiana. He was at the front of the store when two 

women, later identified as Graves and Valerie Nelson, entered the store. 

Martin recognized the women because they had shoplifted alcohol from the 

store in the past month. Martin retreated to the security room to watch the 

women’s movements with the store’s video surveillance. From the security 

cameras, Martin saw Nelson walking toward the alcohol aisle, but he could not 

immediately locate Graves. Martin saw Nelson place two bottles of alcohol in 

her purse. Martin called 9-1-1 and reported he had two women in his store who 

had shoplifted together on a prior occasion and one of them had just placed two 

bottles of alcohol in her purse. Martin relayed descriptions of the two women 

to the operator. Martin continued watching and saw the two women meet and 

then separate again to continue shopping.

[3] Officer Nick Sammet of the Evansville Police Department was dispatched to 

the store for a “theft in progress.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 21.) He parked his cruiser 

along the sidewalk just outside the entrance to the store and waited for one of 

the women to exit. He testified:

The information I had from dispatch was that there were two 

black females in the store, they gave two different clothing 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 3 of 8

descriptions, said that they had concealed alcohol, and that they 

had separated, and one of them was beginning to exit the store. 

(Id. at 22.) Because Graves matched the descriptions he had received, Officer 

Sammet “decided to basically stop her and determine if she was involved.” (Id. 

at 23.) He approached Graves and

asked her if she knew why I was stopping her, I asked her to step 

to the side out of the road, which she did, she started to walk 

over to the sidewalk area of the front of the store. I asked her if 

she had anything on her, and as I started to ask her that, she 

started putting her hands in her pockets, and I noticed that she 

started dropping items from the ground or from her pockets to 

the ground even after I asked her to remove her hands. She just 

continually kept putting her hands in and out of her pockets. . . . 

[S]he continually reached in her pockets and pulled more items 

out after I had told her to get her hands out of her pockets. . . . 

She wasn’t throwing [the items] or tossing them, but it was just 

pulling her hand out and dropping whatever she grabbed.

(Id. at 25-26.) The dropped items included “lots of jewelry,” (id. at 26), which 

Officer Sammet collected, and then he walked Graves back into the Target store 

to determine whether the jewelry had been stolen from the store. After loss 

prevention workers determined the jewelry matched that available in the store, 

Officer Sammet placed Graves under arrest for theft and, incident to that arrest, 

searched her purse for additional items stolen from Target. In her purse, he 

found two clear bags, one containing a white substance and one containing a 

green leafy substance. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 4 of 8

[4] The State charged Graves with Level 4 felony dealing in cocaine,1 Level 6 

felony theft,2 and Class A misdemeanor possession of a synthetic drug.3

 Graves 

filed a motion to suppress the evidence collected from her when Officer 

Sammet stopped her. After a hearing, the trial court denied her motion. 

Graves moved for the court to stay proceedings and to certify its denial for 

interlocutory appeal. The trial court certified its order, and the appellate court 

granted permission for Graves to file an interlocutory appeal. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] We review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to 

suppress deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light 

most favorable to the ruling, but we will also consider any 

substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. 

We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous, and we will not reweigh the evidence. When the trial 

court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress concerns the 

constitutionality of a search or seizure, however, it presents a 

question of law, and we address that question de novo.

Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 

 

1 Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1 (2014).

2 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) (2014). 

3 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.5(c). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 5 of 8

Fourth Amendment

[6] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens 

against unreasonable searches and seizures by generally prohibiting them from 

occurring without a warrant supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. To deter State actors from violating that prohibition, evidence obtained in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment generally is not admissible in a prosecution 

of the citizen whose right was violated. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 

2013). The State has the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of evidence 

collected during a seizure or search. Id. 

[7] One exception to that general prohibition against warrantless search or seizure

is the Terry stop, which permits an officer to stop and briefly detain someone for 

investigation if the articulable facts known to the officer create a reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 367 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The officer need not have 

probable cause to conduct such a stop, but there must be objective facts to 

justify thinking the citizen “stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal 

activity.” Id. (quoting Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009)). 

Reasonable suspicion must be based on more than “hunches.” Clark, 994 

N.E.2d at 263. 

The totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be 

taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining 

officers must have a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. In 

assessing the whole picture, we must examine the facts as known 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 6 of 8

to the officer at the moment of the stop. We review findings of 

reasonable suspicion de novo. This is necessarily a fact-sensitive 

inquiry.

Id. at 264 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 

[8] At the moment Officer Sammet approached Graves, he had received 

information she had entered the store with a second woman, Nelson, with 

whom, on a prior occasion, Graves reportedly had shoplifted alcohol. He had 

received information Nelson had, on this occasion, placed bottles of alcohol 

into her purse, but had not yet left the store. He also received information the 

women had separated inside the store and Target employees were unsure 

whether or not Graves had any stolen merchandise on her person as she left the 

store because they had not been able to find her on the security cameras at all 

times. 

[9] While those facts would not have produced probable cause for Officer Sammet 

to place Graves under arrest at that moment, they did not need to produce 

probable cause. See, e.g., Mayfield v. State, 402 N.E.2d 1301, 1306 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1980) (“A police officer does not need to have probable cause to arrest in order 

to make an investigatory stop.”), reh’g denied. Instead, Officer Sammet needed a 

particularized and objective basis to suspect Graves was part of the criminal 

activity that was “afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. It was reasonable for Officer 

Sammet to momentarily freeze the situation to investigate Graves’ connection 

to the theft that Nelson was in the process of committing. See Mack v. State, 177 

Ind. App. 537, 542-3, 380 N.E.2d 592, 596 (1978) (where car matched 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 7 of 8

description of car spotted in vicinity of a theft and the occupants “may have 

been involved” in the theft, investigatory stop of car was permissible under the 

Fourth Amendment). The trial court did not err by declaring the evidence was 

admissible under the Fourth Amendment. 

Article One, Section 11

[10] Article One, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall 

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 

seized.

[11] When an investigatory stop occurs, a citizen’s right to that constitutional 

protection is implicated. State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind. 2011). 

Nevertheless, a citizen’s right to move about freely is not “absolute,” as we 

must balance each person’s right to be free from interference against the public 

interest in investigating crimes and protecting itself. Id. 

When a defendant raises a Section 11 claim, the State must show 

the police conduct “was reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances.” We consider three factors when evaluating 

reasonableness: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or 

knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of 

intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the 

citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement 

needs.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1509-CR-1309| November 28, 2016 Page 8 of 8

Robinson, 5 N.E.3d 368 (internal citations omitted). 

[12] Officer Sammet stopped Graves momentarily to assess whether she was 

involved in the shoplifting in progress by Nelson, with whom Graves arrived at 

the store and with whom Graves had shoplifted less than one month earlier. 

That brief stop was not so great an intrusion as to be unreasonable in light of 

Nelson’s ongoing crime and Graves’ connection to Nelson. See, e.g., J.J. v. 

State, 58 N.E.3d 1002, 1005-6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (investigatory stop 

reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 when officers knew juveniles leaving 

scene of verbal altercation with another group of juveniles may return to fight). 

Conclusion

[13] Officer Sammet had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop 

under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the stop

was reasonable under Section 11 of Article 1 of the Indiana Constitution. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Graves’ motion to suppress 

and remand for further proceedings.

[14] Affirmed and remanded.

Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.