REF ID:A59208 

A peg to • • 

Submitted by Headquarters, 50lst Comm Recon Group 

At a Tokyo Air Base, you board a plane 

for Korea. Your destination is the 50lst 

Communications Reconnaissance Group in 

Seoul. As you ascend, the landscape of' 

Japan opens broadly beneath you, measured 

by the steady drone of the engines. 

Snow capped mountains loom and then the 

startling blend of' land into a patched 

quilt of color, and finally the blue sea 

moves under you and the coast of' Japan 

fades back into a swirl of clouds. 

Your first glimpse of Korea reveals 

"mountains covered with mountains." When 

there are no mountains, hills fill the 

vacancy. 

Tile and grasstopped houses assimilate 

together in clusters of villages along 

mountain sides and in the level areas. 

White roads weave and curve around the 

mounds of earth. Time presents a repetition of these scenes until someone 

quietly says, ''We're circling for a landing." The capitol of Korea appears in the 

near distance. Wheels touch the ground; 

you set foot on Korea. 

It is February, and the air hits your 

unprotected face with a dampish cold. 

Mingling around the Kimpo Airfield gate 

are groups of American soldiers. Many are 

bundled in heavy winter clothing, having 

June 1952 

taken the long motor jaunt from the front. 

A phone call brings a jeep from the 

50lst motor pool; you pile · your gear in 

the back, and take your first trip through 

Seoul. You feel the jarring effect of 

hole-potted streets f the jeep dances under 

you. 

Finally you insure the presence of all 

your molars, and watch with curiousity the 

strange-a'P'Pearing assortment of people and 

native clothing. Korean natives, ROK, 

British, French, Canadian, Turkish, and 

American soldiers present an impression of 

united effort. Army vehicles pass in an 

unrelenting stream, bearing markings of 

all branches of the service. Business 

houses look more like antiquated shacks. 

Ancient, wood-slabbed trolley cars rumble 

past, packed with commuters in sardinecanned tradition. 

The jeep turns at a traffic circle and 

follows the robot armed gestures of a 

Korean policewoman. You enter a narrow 

side-street, and watch signs indicating 

British,ROK,and American unit headquarters 

along the route. Finally the jeep turns 

and passes through a stone gateway and you 

have reached ,your destination. WELCOME TO 

KOREA ...• CHO SUN AE SUE HOWAN YONG PAT OAT 

SUM NEE DA RWAN .••• VELCOM ZU KOREA ••••.••• 

BIENVENUE QUI KOREA. 

7 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-29-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

. • 
-· ASA REVIEW - June 19521 PP• 8-91Blk.F ID: A59208 

The War the Ether: • 1n 

THE TANNENBERG STORY 

Eeoufldaublal) 

Heavy, gloomy, the towers of the Tannenberg Monument once towered against the sky 

of East Prussia. Grand and powerful stood 

behind them in those days the spirit of 

General Hindenburg, a symbol, as it were, 

of a force which must necessarily wreck 

anything that endeavors to attack it. The 

Battle of Tannenberg had become, since 

1914, a symbol for the German people. 

lifu.ch has been written and spoken about 

this battle, but only little about that 

which was actually decisive for the course 

of this mighty action. Tannen berg - a 

symbol! Even for the one who knows! For 

it was at the same time a symbol of the 

ease with which small causes can unloose 

great e~fects, of the rapidity with which 

a great success can be achieved, if by 

accident the human inadequacy of wholly 

secondary and insignificant persons on the 

other side opens the way. Tannenberg - a 

symbol of mighty superiority and at the 

same time a symbol of fateful chance. 

The :Battle of Tannenberg was the first 

one in the history of man in which the interception of enemy radio traffic played a 

decisive role. This is all the more remarkable since the intercept service used 

by the Germans at that time was not yet 

systematically organized, and the intercepted radiograms represented many times 

the results of chance occurrences. 

Several years after World War I a series 

of books was published which, among other 

subjects, dealt also with the Battle of 

Tannenberg. The main ones were : Hindenburg's "Aus Meinem Leben," Ludendorff's 

"Erinnerungen, 11 General Danilov's "Russland in Weltkrieg,"and the German Archives 

publication ''Der Weltkrieg 1914-18." In 

the three last - named publications the 

question of intercepting the radiograms of 

the Russian Army before and during the 

battle is 

ly. In the German Archives publication 

the intercepted radiograms of the Russians 

are touched upon briefly; but there are 

many sentences attempting to prove .that 

all the Russian radiograms intercepted at 

that time had no influence whatever on the 

outcome of the battle. 

What are the real facts in the case? 

At 1400 hours 23 August 1914 the new 

head of the German Eighth Army, General 

Von Hindenburg, and his Chief of Staff, 

M:l.Jor General Ludendorff, arrived in M:trienburg and assumed immediate command. 

The Eighth Army, which was to defend East 

Prussia, was composed on that day of an 

Eastern Group (I Reserve Corps, XVII Army 

Corps, and First Cavalry Division) on the 

Nordenburg-Insterburg Line, and a Western 

Group {mostly the XX Army Corps) in the 

region of Tannenberg. The I Army Corps 

was being transported by railroad from the 

Eastern Group via Ma.rienburg to the Western Group. 

The Eastern Group was facing the Rus§.1.an 

First Army (General Rennenka.m!t') consisting 

of the XX, III, IV, and II Army Corps as 

well as five and one-fourth cavalry divisions; the Western Group was facing the 

Russian Second Army (General Samsonov), 

consisting of the VI, XIII, XV, XXIII, and 

I Army Corps, as well as three cavalry 

divisions. The two Russian Armies formed 

an Army Group under General Shilinski. 

The Germans had the following radio 

communications: two heavy radio stations 

in the Army Staff Headquarters; one heavy 

and two light statiCJ'lS in the First Cavalry 

Division, making a total of five mobile 

radio stations for the entire Army. In 

addition there was one radio station each 

discussed; Translated 

lut nowhere 

is it discus89d fulfrom orisinal German materials lty 

Dr. Ray W. Pettensill 

in ttB garrisons of 

bl:jgsl:arg , 

Grau denz, 

and Thorn. 

8 ASA Review 
REF ID:A59208 

The out-fitting of the Russian Army Group 

with radio equipment, and its distribution 

cannot be accurately given; it seems, however, that most of the staff headquarters 

down to the corps staffs were outfitted 

with radio stations. At the outbreak of 

the war there was one radio company each 

in I, II, IX,and XV Army Corps in European 

Russia, as well as in the Caucasian Corps. 

As can be seen from the above, I and XV 

Corps belonged to the Russian Second Army, 

and III Corps to the Russian First Army. 

Each of the companies which had been organized in the years immediatel;y preceding 

the outbreak of the war had at its disposal at least ai.x radio stations. 

General Shilinaki 1 s objective was - according to directives of 13 August - to 

make a decisive attack in.which the First 

Army was to surround the German left wing 

(the Eastern Group) and prevent its retreat 

to Koenigsberg, while the Second Army was 

to advance into East Prussia south of 

Koenigsberg in ordat'to cut off the enemy's 

retreat to the Vistula and attack him in 

the rear. 

The German Army Staff Headquarters obtained information on this objective of 

the Russians through an order which was 

found on a Russian officer who had fallen 

in the battles around Gawaiten on 20 August. This order contained an extract from 

the above-mentioned directive of General 

Shilinski. 

Almost simultaneously with the arrival 

of this order in the German Army Staff 

Headquarters, a Russian radiogram was intercepted which mentioned this attack and 

contained attacking orders for the Russian 

IV Army Corpe (which was attached to the 

First Army). Thia telegram was, therefore, 

a confirmation of the order found on the 

fallen Russian officer. 

Hindenburg now knew that for the present 

Rennenkampf was no menace. Therefore, in 

the course of the day he was able to decide to decrease still further the number 

of troops which were facing the Russian 

First Army and to withdraw the entire XVII 

Army Corps in the direction of the south. 

Hindenburg now went over to the I Army 

Corps. On his way down there, when he was 

passing Ioebau, another interc~ted radiogram of no less importance was handed to 

June 1952 

him. This time the organization and destination of the Russian Second Army were 

completely revealed. This radiogram, also 

in plain text, was dated 0600 hours 25 

August and contained an order of General 

Samsonov to the Russian XIII Army Corps. 

To be sure, this radiogram was somewhat 

garbled. 

The intercS"Pted contents were aa follows: 

"After battling along the front of the 

XV Army Corps the enemy corps retreated on 

24 August in the direction of Osterode. 

According to information ••••. the land 

defense brigade by Gilgenburg ••••• The 

First Army pursues the enemy further, who 

retreats to Koenigsberg-Rastenburg. On 25 

August the Second Army proceeds to the 

Allenatein-Oaterode Line;the ma.in strength 

of the Army Corps occupies: XIII Corpe 

the Gimmendorf-Kurken Line; XV Corps Nadrau-Paulsgut; XXIII Corps Michalken-Gr. 

Gardiene. Boundaries between the Army 

Corps on advance march: Between XIII and 

XV the M:i.achaken-Schwedrich Line; between 

XV and XXIII, the Neidenburg-Wittingwalde 

Line. Then I Corps to remain in District 

5, to protect Army's left flank... • The 

VI Army Corps advances to the region 

Biachofsburg-Rothfliess, to protect the 

right flank. To protect station Rastenburg the 4th Cav. Div., subordinate to VI 

Army Corps, wi 11 remain in Sens burg to 

observe region between the RastenburgBartenstein Line and Seeburg-HeilsbergLine. The 6th and 15th Cav. Div •••• staff 

quarters 2 Amy in Ostrolenka. '' 

When General Von Hindenburg arrived at 

1300 hours on 25 August at the General 

Command Staff of the I Army Corps, he was 

thus also completely informed on the mission of the Russian Second Army for that 

day. It was decided to begin the German 

attack on the following day. On the same 

day at 2030 hours the orders for the army 

to attack on 26 August were released in 

Riesenburg. 

On the evening of 23 August General Von 

Hindenburg's operational plan was essentially complete. The entire Eighth Army 

was to be concentrated for the attack on 

the Russian Second Army. The XX Army 

Corps was already organized,primarily only 

for defense ~urposes. The I Army Corpsbeing transported by railroad - was to be 

stationed to the right of the XX Corps, to 

9 
REF ID:A59208 

attack the left flank of the enemy, and 

then the rear. The principal part of the 

XVII Corpe and the I Reserve Corpe (until 

then in the Eastern Group) were to march 

in a southerly direction and attack the 

right flank of the Russian Second Army. 

The two last-named corps were at that time 

still at a distance of about three days' 

march. Only the cavalry division and a 

small portion of the infantry of the XVII 

Corpe were to remain behind to face the 

Russian Nieman Army. 

How far this plan was capable of being 

carried out depended, on the one hand, on 

General Rennenkampf'e tactics when he discovered the departure of the two German 

Army Corpe and, on the other hand, on the 

ability of the XX Corpe to maintain its 

position until the concentration of the 

Eighth Army. 

On 23 August the battle began along the 

front of the German XX Army Corpe, where 

the Russians started to attack. The Germane at first maintained their positions, 

but - to reserve their strength until actual crisis - retreated somewhat on the 

24th. On this day several radiograms were 

intercepted, which, among other things, 

gave information on the line of march and 

the mission of the Russian XIII Army. 

Thia Corpe was to circle around the left 

flank of the German XX Corpe and appear in 

the rear of the Corps' 37th Infantry Division. 

The Germane succeeded in avoiding this 

encirclement without too great losses oq 

their aide. 

On 25 August they continued with the 

concentration of the Eighth Army troops. 

On this day General Von Hindenburg intended to leave for the front early in the 

morning,meet the head of the I Army Corps, 

General Von Francois, in Montawa, to 

acquaint him with the existing situation. 

Before hie departure from Marienburg a 

radiogram was handed to him which had been 

intercepted in the night of August 24-25. 

This radiogram, which was not enciphered, 

but had been sent in plain text, contained 

(which until then had never happened) a 

complete operational order of General 

Rennenkampf to the IV Army Corps. From 

this intercepted radiogram General Von 

Hindenburg obtained information on the 

future aims of the Russian First Army, 

10 

which up till then had been completely 

unknown to him. Among other things, the 

radiogram stated that the First Army would 

not reach the Gerdauen-Altenburg-Wehlau 

line until 26 August with the southern 

flank (IV Corps) at Gerdauen. Aleo the 

marching goal for the 25th was given, 

which was to be several miles east of the 

above-mentioned line. 

One must admit that it was a piece of 

unusually good fortune for the Germane 

that both these radiograms wereintercepted 

on the morning of 25 August, that is, at a 

time when critical decisions had to be 

made. It seems the more remarkable that 

these two radiograms were the only ones of 

sufficient length, and whose contents 

really were of a deciding factor, which 

were sent in plain text by the Russians, 

and intercepted by the German radio stations from the beginning of the war until 

the middle of September, 1914. 

On 26 and 27 August the I and XX Army 

Corps prepared to attack the left flank of 

the Russian Second Army. The German divisions which had advanced the farthest toward the right (the 5th Land Defense Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Division) met 

with stiff opposition, and for a while the 

situation was critical. On the forenoon 

of the 27th, Russian radiograms were intercepted which disclosed that the Russians 

were expecting reenforcements or perhaps 

had already received them, among others, 

the Third Guard Division from Warsaw 

(which was attached to the XXIII Army 

Corpe). Thie information contributed to 

the fact that General Von Francois (I Army 

Corps) no longer deemed it possible to 

proceed eastward tp Neidenburg 1n order to 

sever the enemy's connections in the rear, 

but decided to turn the att~ck in a southerly and southeasterly direction. 

The left wing of the XX Army Corps, 

which on 26 August had not been drawn into 

the battle to any great e%tent, was attacked by the Russians early in the morning of the 27th. The attack gradually 

spread out more and more toward the north 

and finally reached the German Third Reserve Division, which was on the left of 

the XX Army Corps. A Russian radiogram 

which was intercepted by the Germana now 

gave infQl"IDEl.tion on the attack mission of 

the opposing Russian XV Armf Corps and re-

(Continued on page 34) 

ASA Review 
'• REF ID:A59208 

Vint Hi II Hou sins 

Nearly all the 

completed for the 

for NCO' a at VBFS. 

landscaping has been 

eight-unit row houses 

Five of these buildings, completed in 

1950, lie adjacent to the newly constructed officers quarters • Each has a spacious 

cement terrace off of the front door. The 

entire unit has a cement basement and each 

apartment has an individual gas-fired 

forced warm air furnace. There are ell:; 

rooms;three bedrooms, a kitchen and a combination living and dining room. The 

floors are all hardwood and each kitchen 

has a pleasant forced ventilation. The 

unite have 1080 aqu.al9 feet of 11 ving space. 

Two new 2-atory buildings to house offiwn 

cera and their families were completed at 

VBFS last November and were immediately 

occupied. There are many conveniences 

offered in these structures which have 

fireproof asbestos cement shingles. An L 

shaped utility roan services two apartments. It has a washing machine and 

laundry tuba. The combination living and 

dining room ia large in aize,approximately 

20 feet by 11 feet, and two 11 feet by 14 

feet. The modern kitchen is 7! feet by 14 

feet, and has ample closet room and cabinets. The first floor is of asphalt tile 

and upstairs ia found hardwood. The exterior approaches are of cement and parking area ia found in the rear. 

Large picture windows, which have small 

panes encased in eteel,allow the rays of a 

pleasant Virginia sun to brighten the 

household.Each unit houses eight families. 

• Lj .. g :· :n n ·1 g iii ;· --- ---

] r. 

II 

June 1952 33 

.. 

' 
" 

REF ID:A59208 

AHS Troop•, WAC• March 

A battalion of troops and a company of 

Wacs from Arlington Hall Station were among more than 10,000 marchers who paraded 

down 25 blocks of the Nation's Capital as 

part of the third annual celebration of 

Armed Forces Day, May 17. 

Some 50,000 spectators, including Commander-in-Chief, Harry S. Truman, turned 

out for the 4-mile long parade. 

Arlington Hall's troops marched second 

in the formation, following Ft. Myer's 

Third Infantry "Old Guard". They were 

headed by Battalion Commander, Maj Harry 

F. Clarens, and hie aides, Capt Donald H. 

Harter, Capt TeITy W. Eakin, and Lt Thomas 

W. Reeves. 

The AHS Wacs marched as a part of a Wac 

Battalion composed of military women from 

the Hall, Ft. Myer, Ft. Belvoir and Walter 

Reed. 

AHS PERSONNEL 

Capt Richard H. Davis Jr., AHS Adjutant 

since 10 Nov, 1949, has been reassigned 

with an overseas unit. A native of' Alabama, he enlisted in the Army in 1940, and 

has been awaraed. the Combat Infantry Badge, 

the Bronze Star with one Oak Leaf' Cluster, 

the Purple Heart and overseas and good 

conduct ribbons. 

Cpl R. A. Needham, a Military Policeman, 

was chosen AHS's second Soldier-of'-theMonth by a board of officers. 

Capt Uriah H. Hunter, AHS Chaplain, has 

been reassigned to overseas duty. 

In keeping with the drive to promote the 

cost consciousness economy program at .AHS, 

signs were recently posted on various 

pieces of equi'pment in all sections of the 

post to make both military and civilian 

personnel cognizant of the ta.Jqlayere expense involved in the purchase and replacement of all types of equipment. Typical instances: folding chairs were tagged 

at $2.49; large desks with t;yping compartment, $81.06; typewriters, $127 .60 to 

$221.00. The program clearly pointed out 

the need f'or coat consciousness throughout 

both AHS and ASA. 

War In the Ether 

(Continued f'rom page 10) 

vealed its intention to encircle the German lef't wing. Other radiograms disclosed 

that the Russian XIII Army Corps intended 

to support this attack toward the right of 

the XV Army Corps, and to ~roceed toward 

the rear of the German Third Reserve Division. 

While these encounters were progressing, 

the German XVII Army Corps and the German 

First Rese:r:ve Corps made forced marches toward the battlefield. On 26 August they 

fought with the Russian VI Army Corps at 

Gross-Boessau, which then retreated southward. Simultaneously, a Russian radiogram ~as intercepted from which the German 

Eighth Army Staff Headquarters assumd that 

the Russian II Army Corps, which was at 

Rennenkampf's lef't wing, had beenJ>roCeeding northward from Mauer Iake and was now 

supposed to march in a southerly direction, 

in order to lend Samsonov a hand. 

That the Russian II Army Corps was proceeding northward from Mauer Lake was 

known already beforehand from reports of 

the Loetzen Garrison, but that it was 

supposed to advance in order to support 

the Second Army was news. The German First 

Cavalry Division, which was stationed in 

the region of Schippenbeil, now received 

orders to halt the advance march of' the 

enemy corps along the Rastenburg-Korschen 

Line. 

The German Army's order for 28 August 

was signed by Hindenburg on the evening of 

27 August. Later in the evening information was received that Russian troops from 

the south had aITived in Allenstein. There 

was thus the possibility that the Russian 

troops from the south had arri-vedin Allenstein. There was thus the possibility 

that the Russian XIII Corps was strivi11g 

to reach the north in order to join the 

approaching II Corps • The Army order 

which had just been signed was now imnediately replaced by a new one which, among 

other things, ordered the XVII Corps and 

the I Reserve Corps to Allenstein. 

ASA Review