15638 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 24, 2015 / Notices 

RPV beltline region will not result in 

changes in operation or configuration of 

the facility. The change does not impose 

any new or different requirements or 

eliminate any existing requirements. 

The change is consistent with the 

current safety analysis assumptions and 

current plant operating practice. No new 

accident scenarios, transient precursors, 

failure mechanisms, or limiting single 

failures are introduced as a result of the 

proposed change. Equipment important 

to safety will continue to operate as 

designed. The change does not result in 

any event previously deemed incredible 

being more credible. The change does 

not result in any adverse conditions or 

result in any increase in the challenges 

to safety systems. 

Therefore, this change does not create 

the possibility of a new or different kind 

of accident from an accident previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed exemption involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed exemption does not 

alter safety limits, limiting safety system 

settings, or limiting conditions for 

operation. The setpoints at which 

protective actions are initiated are not 

altered by the change. There are no new 

or significant changes to initial 

conditions contributing to accident 

severity or consequences. The 

exemption will not otherwise affect 

plant protective boundaries, will not 

cause a release of fission products to the 

public, nor will it degrade the 

performance of any other structures, 

systems or components important to 

safety. 

Therefore, the proposed exemption 

does not involve a significant reduction 

in a margin of safety. 

Based on the above evaluation of the 

standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), 

the NRC concludes that the proposed 

exemption involves no significant 

hazards consideration. Accordingly, the 

requirements of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i) are 

met. 

Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(ii– 

iii) 

The proposed exemption does not 

make any changes to the facility, 

equipment at the facility, or to fuel or 

core design. The proposed alternate 

methodology serves the same purpose as 

the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 

50.61 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix G. 

Therefore, the NRC concludes that the 

exemption involves no significant 

change in the types or a significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite, and that 

there is no significant increase in 

individual or cumulative public or 

occupational radiation exposure. 

Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9)(ii–iii) are met. 

Conclusion 

Based on the above, the NRC 

concludes that the proposed exemption 

meets the eligibility criteria for the 

categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9). Therefore, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental 

impact statement or environmental 

assessment need be prepared in 

connection with the NRC’s issuance of 

this exemption. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants the 

licensee an exemption from 10 CFR part 

50, appendix G.II.D(i) and 10 CFR 

50.61(a)(5) requirements, in order to use 

the alternate methodology specified in 

AREVA TR BAW–2308, Revisions 1–A 

and 2–A, in lieu of the existing 

requirement to use CV and drop weightbased methodologies to evaluate the 

initial (unirradiated) RTNDT of the Linde 

80 weld materials in the RPV beltline 

region at ANO, Unit 1. 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day 

of March 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michele G. Evans, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06700 Filed 3–23–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–305; NRC–2015–0068] 

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; 

Kewaunee Power Station 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Exemption; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing an 

exemption from certain power reactor 

liability insurance requirements in 

response to a request from Dominion 

Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or the 

licensee) dated March 20, 2014. This 

exemption would permit the licensee to 

reduce its primary offsite liability 

insurance and withdraw from 

participation in the secondary 

retrospective rating pool for deferred 

premium charges. 

DATES: March 24, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2015–0068 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2015–0068. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced (if it available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

a document is referenced. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Huffman, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 

2046; email: William.Huffman@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) 

facility is a decommissioning power 

reactor located on approximately 900 

acres in Carlton (Kewaunee County), 

Wisconsin, 27 miles southeast of Green 

Bay, Wisconsin. The licensee, DEK, is 

the holder of the KPS Renewed Facility 

Operating License No. DPR–43. The 

license provides, among other things, 

that the facility is subject to all rules, 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 24, 2015 / Notices 15639 

regulations, and orders of the NRC now 

or hereafter in effect. 

By letter dated February 25, 2013 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13058A065), 

DEK submitted a certification to the 

NRC indicating it would permanently 

cease power operations at KPS on May 

7, 2013. On May 7, 2013, DEK 

permanently shut down the KPS reactor. 

On May 14, 2013, DEK certified that it 

had permanently defueled the KPS 

reactor vessel (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13135A209). As a permanently 

shutdown and defueled facility, and in 

accordance with § 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), KPS is no longer authorized to 

operate the reactor or emplace nuclear 

fuel into the reactor vessel. The licensee 

is still authorized to possess and store 

irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is 

currently being stored onsite in a spent 

fuel pool (SFP) and in independent 

spent fuel storage installation dry casks. 

II. Request/Action 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions,’’ DEK has requested an 

exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), by 

letter dated March 20, 2014 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14090A112). The 

exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

would permit the licensee to reduce the 

required level of primary offsite liability 

insurance from $375 million to $100 

million, and would allow DEK to 

withdraw from participation in the 

secondary financial protection (also 

known as the secondary retrospective 

rating pool for deferred premium 

charges). 

The regulation in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

requires each licensee to have and 

maintain financial protection. For a 

single unit reactor site, which has a 

rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts 

electric or more, 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

requires the licensee to maintain $375 

million in primary financial protection. 

In addition, the licensee is required to 

participate in a secondary retrospective 

rating pool (secondary financial 

protection) that commits each licensee 

to additional indemnification for 

damages that may exceed primary 

insurance coverage. Participation in the 

secondary retrospective rating pool 

could potentially subject DEK to 

deferred premium charges up to a 

maximum total deferred premium of 

$121,255,000 with respect to any 

nuclear incident at any operating 

nuclear power plant, and up to a 

maximum annual deferred premium of 

$18,963,000 per incident. 

The licensee states that the risk of an 

offsite radiological release is 

significantly lower at a nuclear power 

reactor that has permanently shut down 

and defueled, when compared to an 

operating power reactor. Similarly, the 

associated risk of offsite liability 

damages that require insurance 

indemnification is commensurately 

lower. Therefore, DEK is requesting an 

exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), to 

permit a reduction in primary offsite 

liability insurance and to withdraw 

from participation in the secondary 

financial protection pool. 

III. Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 140, when 

the exemptions are authorized by law 

and are otherwise in the public interest. 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4) were established to 

require a licensee to maintain sufficient 

insurance to satisfy liability claims by 

members of the public for personal 

injury, property damage, or the legal 

cost associated with lawsuits, as the 

result of a nuclear accident. The 

insurance levels established by this 

regulation were derived from the risks 

and potential consequences of an 

accident at an operating reactor with a 

rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts 

electric (or greater). During normal 

power reactor operations, the forced 

flow of water through the reactor 

coolant system (RCS) removes heat 

generated by the reactor. The RCS, 

operating at high temperatures and 

pressures, transfers this heat through the 

steam generator tubes converting nonradioactive feedwater to steam, which 

then flows to the main turbine generator 

to produce electricity. Many of the 

accident scenarios postulated for 

operating power reactors involve 

failures or malfunctions of systems that 

could affect the fuel in the reactor core, 

which in the most severe postulated 

accidents, would involve the release of 

large quantities of fission products. 

With the permanent cessation of reactor 

operations at KPS and the permanent 

removal of the fuel from the reactor 

core, such accidents are no longer 

possible. The reactor, RCS, and 

supporting systems no longer operate 

and have no function related to the 

storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, 

postulated accidents involving failure or 

malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or 

supporting systems are no longer 

applicable. 

During reactor decommissioning, the 

principal radiological risks are 

associated with the storage of spent fuel 

onsite. In its March 20, 2014, exemption 

request, DEK discusses both designbasis and beyond design-basis events 

involving irradiated fuel stored in the 

SFP. The licensee states that there are 

no possible design-basis events at KPS 

that could result in an offsite 

radiological release exceeding the limits 

established by the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency’s early-phase 

Protective Action Guidelines of 1 rem 

(roentgen equivalent man) at the 

exclusion area boundary. The only 

accident that might lead to a significant 

radiological release at a 

decommissioning reactor is a zirconium 

fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a 

postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond 

design-basis accident scenario that 

involves loss of water inventory from 

the SFP, resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in 

substantial zirconium cladding 

oxidation and fuel damage. The 

probability of a zirconium fire scenario 

is related to the decay heat of the 

irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 

Therefore, the risks from a zirconium 

fire scenario continue to decrease as a 

function of the time that KPS has been 

permanently shut down. 

The licensee provided a detailed 

analysis of the events that could result 

in an offsite radiological release at KPS 

in its January 16, 2014, submittal to the 

NRC (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14029A076). One of these beyond 

design-basis accidents involves a 

complete loss of SFP water inventory, 

where cooling of the spent fuel would 

be primarily accomplished by natural 

circulation of air through the uncovered 

spent fuel assemblies. The licensee’s 

analysis of this accident shows that by 

October 30, 2014, air-cooling of the 

spent fuel assemblies will be sufficient 

to keep the fuel within a safe 

temperature range indefinitely without 

fuel damage or offsite radiological 

release. This is important because the 

Commission has previously authorized 

a lesser amount of liability insurance 

coverage, based on an analysis of the 

zirconium fire risk. In SECY–93–127, 

‘‘Financial Protection Required of 

Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants 

During Decommissioning,’’ dated May 

10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12257A628), the staff outlined a 

policy for reducing required liability 

insurance coverage for 

decommissioning reactors. The 

discussions in SECY–93–127 centered 

primarily on the public health and 

safety risks associated with storing fuel 

in spent fuel pools. In its Staff 

Requirements Memorandum dated July 

13, 1993, the Commission approved a 

policy that would permit reductions in 

commercial liability insurance coverage, 

when a licensee was able to demonstrate 

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15640 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 24, 2015 / Notices 

that the spent fuel could be air-cooled 

if the SFP was drained of water. Upon 

demonstration of this technical 

criterion, the Commission policy 

allowed decommissioning licensees to 

withdraw from participation in the 

secondary insurance protection layer, 

and permitted reductions in the 

required amount of commercial liability 

insurance coverage to $100 million. The 

staff has used this technical criterion to 

grant similar exemptions to other 

decommissioning reactor licensees (e.g., 

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, 

published in the Federal Register on 

January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); and Zion 

Nuclear Power Station, published in the 

Federal Register on December 28, 1999 

(64 FR 72700)). Additional discussions 

of other decommissioning reactor 

licensees that have received exemptions 

to reduce their primary insurance level 

to $100 million is provided in SECY– 

96–256, ‘‘Changes to Financial 

Protection Requirements for 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 

CFR 140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). 

These prior exemptions were based on 

the licensee demonstrating that the SFP 

could be air-cooled, consistent with the 

technical criterion discussed above. 

In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 

Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28, 

2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy 

Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, 

and Emergency Preparedness 

Regulations at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in 

the Spent Fuel Pool,’’ dated June 4, 2001 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626 

and ML011450420, respectively), the 

staff discussed additional information 

concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at 

decommissioning reactors and 

associated implications for offsite 

insurance. Analyzing when the spent 

fuel stored in the SFP is capable of aircooling is one measure that 

demonstrates when the probability of a 

zirconium fire would be exceedingly 

low. However, the staff has more 

recently used an additional analysis that 

would bound an incomplete drain down 

of the SFP water, or some other 

catastrophic event (such as a complete 

drainage of the SFP with rearrangement 

of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the 

addition of rubble to the SFP). The 

analysis postulates that decay heat 

transfer from the spent fuel via 

conduction, convection, or radiation 

would be impeded. This analysis is 

often referred to as an adiabatic heat-up. 

The licensee’s analyses referenced in 

its exemption request demonstrates that 

under conditions where the SFP water 

inventory has drained and only aircooling of the stored irradiated fuel is 

available, there is reasonable assurance 

that after October 2014, the KPS spent 

fuel will remain at temperatures far 

below those associated with a 

significant radiological release. In 

addition, the licensee’s adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that as of 

October 21, 2014, there would be at 

least 10 hours after the loss of all means 

of cooling (both air and/or water), before 

the spent fuel cladding would reach a 

temperature where the potential for a 

significant offsite radiological release 

could occur. The licensee states that for 

this loss of all cooling scenario, 10 

hours is sufficient time for personnel to 

respond with additional resources, 

equipment, and capability to restore 

cooling to the SFP, even after a noncredible, catastrophic event. As 

provided in DEK’s letter dated January 

10, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14016A078), the licensee furnished 

information concerning its makeup 

strategies, in the event of a loss of SFP 

coolant inventory. The multiple 

strategies for providing makeup to the 

SFP include: Using existing plant 

systems for inventory makeup; 

supplying water through hoses to a 

spool piece connection to the existing 

SFP piping; or using a diesel-driven 

portable pump to take suction from Lake 

Michigan and provide makeup or spray 

to the SFP. These strategies will be 

maintained by a license condition. The 

licensee states that the equipment 

needed to perform these actions are 

located onsite, and that the external 

makeup strategy (using a diesel driven 

portable pump) is capable of being 

deployed within 2 hours. The licensee 

also stated that, considering the very 

low-probability of beyond design-basis 

accidents affecting the SFP, these 

diverse strategies provide defense-indepth and time to mitigate and prevent 

a zirconium fire, using makeup or spray 

into the SFP before the onset of 

zirconium cladding rapid oxidation. 

In the safety evaluation of the 

licensee’s request for exemptions from 

certain emergency planning 

requirements dated October 27, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14261A223), 

the NRC staff assessed the DEK accident 

analyses associated with the 

radiological risks from a zirconium fire 

at the permanently shutdown and 

defueled KPS site. The NRC staff has 

confirmed that under conditions where 

cooling air flow can develop, suitably 

conservative calculations indicate that 

by the end of October 2014, the fuel 

would remain at temperatures where the 

cladding would be undamaged for an 

unlimited period. For the very unlikely 

beyond design-basis accident scenario, 

where the SFP coolant inventory is lost 

in such a manner that all methods of 

heat removal from the spent fuel are no 

longer available, there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours from the 

initiation of the accident until the 

cladding reaches a temperature where 

offsite radiological release might occur. 

The staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient 

time to support deployment of 

mitigation equipment, consistent with 

plant conditions, to prevent the 

zirconium cladding from reaching a 

point of rapid oxidation. 

The NRC staff has determined that the 

licensee’s proposed reduction in 

primary offsite liability coverage to a 

level of $100 million, and the licensee’s 

proposed withdrawal from participation 

in the secondary insurance pool for 

offsite financial protection, are 

consistent with the policy established in 

SECY–93–127 and subsequent 

insurance considerations, resulting from 

additional zirconium fire risks, as 

discussed in SECY–00–0145 and SECY– 

01–0100. In addition, the NRC staff 

noted that there is a well-established 

precedent of granting a similar 

exemption to other permanently 

shutdown and defueled power reactors, 

upon demonstration that the criterion of 

the zirconium fire risks from the 

irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of 

negligible concern. 

A. Authorized by Law 

In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the 

Commission may grant exemptions from 

the regulations in 10 CFR part 140, as 

the Commission determines are 

authorized by law. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of the 

licensee’s proposed exemption will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, Section 170, or 

other laws, as amended, which require 

licensees to maintain adequate financial 

protection. Therefore, the exemption is 

authorized by law. 

B. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 140.11 were established to require 

licensees to maintain sufficient offsite 

liability insurance to ensure adequate 

funding for offsite liability claims, 

following an accident at an operating 

reactor. However, the regulation does 

not consider the reduced potential for 

and consequence of nuclear incidents at 

permanently shutdown and 

decommissioning reactors. 

SECY–93–127, SECY–00–0145, and 

SECY–01–0100 provide a basis for 

allowing licensees of decommissioning 

plants to reduce their primary offsite 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 24, 2015 / Notices 15641 

liability insurance and to withdraw 

from participation in the retrospective 

rating pool for deferred premium 

charges. As discussed in these 

documents, once the zirconium fire 

concern is determined to be negligible, 

possible accident scenario risks at 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactors are greatly reduced, when 

compared to operating reactors, and the 

associated potential for offsite financial 

liabilities from an accident are 

commensurately less. The licensee has 

analyzed and the staff has confirmed 

that the possible accidents that could 

result in an offsite radiological risk are 

minimal, thereby justifying the 

proposed reductions in offsite liability 

insurance and withdrawal from 

participation in the secondary 

retrospective rating pool for deferred 

premium charges. 

Additionally, participation in the 

secondary retrospective rating pool 

could be problematic for DEK because 

the licensee would incur financial 

liability, if an extraordinary nuclear 

incident occurred at another nuclear 

power plant. Because KPS is 

permanently shut down, it does not 

produce revenue from electricity 

generation sales to cover such a liability. 

Therefore, such liability, if incurred, 

could significantly affect the financial 

resources available to the facility to 

conduct and complete radiological 

decontamination and decommissioning 

activities. Furthermore, the shared 

financial risk exposure to DEK is greatly 

disproportionate to the radiological risk 

posed by KPS, when compared to 

operating reactors. 

The reduced overall risk to the public 

at decommissioning power plants does 

not warrant DEK to carry full operating 

reactor insurance coverage, after the 

requisite spent fuel cooling period has 

elapsed, following final reactor 

shutdown. The licensee’s proposed 

financial protection limits will maintain 

a level of liability insurance coverage 

commensurate with the risk to the 

public. These changes are consistent 

with previous NRC policy and 

exemptions approved for other 

decommissioning reactors. Thus, the 

underlying purpose of the regulations 

will not be adversely affected by the 

reductions in insurance coverage. 

Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes 

that granting the exemption from 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4) is in the public 

interest. 

C. Environmental Considerations 

The NRC approval of the exemption 

to insurance or indemnity requirements 

belongs to a category of actions that the 

Commission, by rule or regulation, has 

declared to be a categorical exclusion, 

after first finding that the category of 

actions does not individually or 

cumulatively have a significant effect on 

the human environment. Specifically, 

the exemption is categorically excluded 

from further analysis in accordance with 

10 CFR 51.22(c)(25). 

Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting 

of an exemption from the requirements 

of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR 

is a categorical exclusion provided that 

(i) there is no significant hazards 

consideration; (ii) there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite; (iii) there is 

no significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure; (iv) there is no 

significant construction impact; (v) 

there is no significant increase in the 

potential for or consequences from 

radiological accidents; and (vi) the 

requirements from which an exemption 

is sought involve: surety, insurance, or 

indemnity requirements. 

The Director, Division of Operating 

Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, has determined that 

approval of the exemption request 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration because reducing a 

licensee’s offsite liability requirements 

at KPS does not (1) involve a significant 

increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from 

any accident previously evaluated; or 

(3) involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. The exempted 

financial protection regulation is 

unrelated to the operation of KPS. 

Accordingly, there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite, and no 

significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure. The exempted 

regulation is not associated with 

construction, so there is no significant 

construction impact. The exempted 

regulation does not concern the source 

term (i.e., potential amount of radiation 

in an accident), nor mitigation. 

Therefore, there is no significant 

increase in the potential for, or 

consequences of, a radiological 

accident. In addition, there would be no 

significant impacts to biota, water 

resources, historic properties, cultural 

resources, or socioeconomic conditions 

in the region. The requirement for 

offsite liability insurance may be viewed 

as involving surety, insurance, or 

indemnity matters. 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 

environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

approval of this exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

140.8, the exemption is authorized by 

law, and is otherwise in the public 

interest. Therefore, the Commission 

hereby grants DEK exemption from the 

requirement of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to 

permit the licensee to reduce primary 

offsite liability insurance to $100 

million, accompanied by withdrawal 

from participation in the secondary 

insurance pool for offsite liability 

insurance. 

The exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day 

of March, 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michele G. Evans, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06730 Filed 3–23–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG 

CONTROL POLICY 

Paperwork Reduction Act; Proposed 

Collection; Comment Request 

AGENCY: Office of National Drug Control 

Policy. 

ACTION: Notice of Submission to OMB 

and 30-Day Public Comment Period. 

Reinstatement with Change of 

Previously Approved Collection: DrugFree Communities Support Program 

National Evaluation. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. 

L. 104–13, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35), the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP) announces it will submit to 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) an 

information collection request for 

processing under 5 CFR 1320.10. The 

purpose of this notice is to allow for an 

additional 30 days of public comment. 

DATES: Public comments will be 

accepted until April 23, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are 

invited to submit comments regarding 

this proposal. Comments should refer to 

the collection title by name or OMB 

Control Number, and should be sent to: 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES