alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.2

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Forms S-3 (Nos. 333-86823 and 333-91983) and on Forms S-8 (Nos.
333-24027; 333-86753 and 333-87095) of IMRglobal Corp. (formerly Information
Management Resources, Inc.) of our report dated February 13, 1998, except for
certain information in Note 13 for which the date is March 9, 1998, relating to
the consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 1997,
which appears in this Form 10-K.


PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP



Tampa, Florida
March 28, 2000
Document

Exhibit 10.3

SECOND AMENDMENT OF INVESTORS’ RIGHTS AGREEMENT 
This Second Amendment of Investors’ Rights Agreement (this “Second Amendment”) is made as of August 26, 2015, and amends the Investors’ Rights Agreement, dated January 30, 2015, among NerdWallet, Inc. (the “Company”) and the other parties thereto (the “Agreement”), as amended on June 19, 2015.
Under Section 3.1(a) of the Agreement, the Company shall deliver to each Major Investor within one hundred twenty (120) days (the “Delivery Period”) after the end of each fiscal year of the Company: a balance sheet as of the end of such year; statements of income and of cash flows for such year; and a statement of stockholders’ equity as of the end of such year, all such financial statements audited and certified by independent public accountants of nationally recognized standing selected by the Company.
Under Section 6.6 of the Agreement, any term of the Agreement may be amended with the written consent of the Company and the holders of a majority of the Registrable Securities then outstanding.
1.    The Company and the undersigned have amended the Agreement to extend the Delivery Period to August 31, 2015 on June 19, 2015 pursuant to Section 3.1(a) of the Agreement and hereby desires to further amend the Agreement to extend the Delivery Period from August 31, 2015 to September 30, 2015.
Except as expressly amended by this Second Amendment, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.
Capitalized terms used in this Second Amendment and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning given in the Agreement.
[signature page follows]








This Second Amendment is executed and delivered as of the date first written above.
    NERDWALLET, INC.
									
	By:	/s/ Tim Chen
	Name:	Tim Chen
	Title:	CEO


INSTITUTIONAL VENTURE PARTNERS XIV, L.P.
    By:  Institutional Venture Management XIV LLC
    Its:  General Partner
									
	By:	/s/ Jules Maltz
	Name:	Jules Maltz
	Title:	Managing Director
Exhibit
10.4.4


 


THIRD
AMENDMENT TO MANAGEMENT SERVICES AGREEMENT


 


Reference
is made to the Management Services Agreement (as amended from time to time, the “Agreement”; capitalized terms used
but not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the Agreement), dated as of May 12, 2018, by and between PAVmed Inc., a Delaware
corporation (“PAVmed”) and Lucid Diagnostics Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Customer”).


 


WHEREAS,
as set forth in Section 3(b) of the Agreement, the parties have considered in good faith an adjustment to the Service Fee and hereby
wish to amend the Agreement to reflect such adjustment as set forth herein.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual agreements hereinafter set forth, and for other good and valuable consideration,
the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows:


 


1.
Amendment. The first sentence of Section 3(a) of the Agreement is hereby amended by replacing “$90,000” with “$190,000”
having previously been amended on June 5, 2019 from “$20,000 to “$90,000”.


 


2.
Terms of Agreement. Except as expressly set forth in this amendment, the terms of the Agreement remain unchanged and in full force
and effect.


 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this agreement as of July 1, 2020.


 





	AGREED
    AND ACCEPTED BY:	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	PAVmed
    Inc.	 	Lucid
    Diagnostics Inc.
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	/s/
    Lishan Aklog, MD	 	 	/s/
    Lishan Aklog, MD
	Name:	Lishan
    Aklog, MD	 	Name:	Lishan
    Aklog, MD
	Title:	Chairman
    & CEO	 	Title:	Executive
    Chairman
# C_2015168EN.01000101.xml

| 22.5.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 168/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.5.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 168/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7591 — 3i Group/Oiltanking GmbH/Oiltanking Ghent/Oiltanking Terneuzen)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2015/C 168/01)

On 13 May 2015, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7591. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7591. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
N OTE : This o rder is non precedential.


# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
STACY ALLEN TAYLOR, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES, Respondent

- Appellee.

______________________

2014

- 5110

______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:14

- cv

- 00 393

- EDK , Judge Elaine Kaplan.

______________________

ON MOTION

______________________

P ER C URIAM

.

O R D E R

Stacy Allen Taylor, a n incarcerated pro se litigant

, challenges the dismissal of his complaint as frivolous under 19 U.S.C . § 1915(e)(2) (B)(i) by the United States Court of Federal Claims. Because we agree that the complaint was frivolous, we grant the government’s motion to summarily affirm. Case: 14-5110 Document: 13 Page: 1 Filed: 08/05/2014TAYLOR v. US 2

Taylor’s complaint alleg es that he entered into an agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency to assist its agents in collecting various information and assets in exchange for witness protection and full immun ity. His complaint requests that the court direct the government to turn over evidence showing corruption and wrongdoing by the CIA and honor the agre ement’s obligations to pay Taylor a recurring monthly salary

. After granting Taylor leave to proceed in forma pauperis , t he United States Court of Federal Claims screened the suit and dism issed the complaint

. A district court is required to dismi ss a frivolous complaint from a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis

. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

. Frivolous complaints include those in which the factual allegations asserted are so unbelievable that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing to determine their veracity

. See Neitzke v. Wi lliams , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) ( frivolous claims include those that describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios” ); Gladney v. Pendleton Correctional Facility , 302 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 2002); cf. Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States , 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ( A frivolous claim is one “ whose disposition is obvious.”).

That description fits this case. Taylor’s complaint alleg es a tale of international intrigue involving the Irish Republican Army

, the CIA’s sale of decommissioned Russian nuclear warheads to Iran and North Korea , an d CIA agents exchanging long

- range missiles for American and French prisoners. Because the Court of Federal Claim s correctly deter min ed that Taylor’s complaint was frivolous , we grant the motion to summarily affirm. See Joshua v. United States , 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 199 4) (Summary affirmance “is appropriate, inter alia , when the position of one party is so clearly correct as a matt er of law that no substantial question regarding the outcome of the appeal exists.”). Case: 14-5110 Document: 13 Page: 2 Filed: 08/05/2014TAYLOR v. US 3

Accordingly,

I T I S O RDERED T HAT : (1) The motion for summary affirmance is granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.

F OR THE C OURT

/s/ Daniel E. O’Toole Daniel E. O’Toole Clerk of Court

s19 Case: 14-5110 Document: 13 Page: 3 Filed: 08/05/2014
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED SEPTEMBER 28, 2016

NO. 03-16-00646-CR

Donald Palacio, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 21ST DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND BOURLAND

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction signed by the district court. Having reviewed 

the record, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Therefore, the Court 

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay 

costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
**Exhibit
      23.1**





**Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**





The
        Board
        of Directors
 Delta
        Financial Corporation
 Woodbury,
        New York
  We
        hereby
        consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
        on Form
        S-3 (Nos. 333-127675) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-15835, 333-88290 and 333-130269)
        of
        Delta Financial Corporation of our reports dated March 9, 2007, relating
        to the
        consolidated financial statements, and
        the
        effectiveness of Delta
        Financial Corporation ’s
        internal control over financial reporting ,
        which
        appear in this Form 10-K.


New
        York,
        New York
 March
        9,
        2007
EXHIBIT 13.2





CERTIFICATION




PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I, Tanir Horn, as Chief Financial Officer of On Track Innovations Ltd. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




(1)           the accompanying annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2012 as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)           the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated: April 30, 2013
By:
/s/ Tanir HornTanir HornChief Financial Officer of the Company
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Project No. 14635-000, Project No. 7155-000]

Take notice that the docket number for the original license proceeding for the Gouverneur Hydroelectric Project is P-14635. Several documents regarding this proceeding were filed under P-7155, which is an older and closed proceeding for this site. The docket numbers for these documents were changed in the Commission's eLibrary to the correct docket number, P-14635. All future filings regarding the original license proceeding for the Gouverneur Hydroelectric Project should use docket number P-14635.

For further information, please contact Jody Callihan at (202) 502-8278.

Dated: March 17, 2015.

Kimberly D. Bose,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2015-06635 Filed 3-23-15; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-7325

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT DEMON TAYLOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:07-cr-01285-RBH-1; 4:16-cv-02906-RBH)

Submitted: November 17, 2016 Decided: November 22, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Demon Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Bradley Parham, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Robert Demon Taylor seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate 

of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate 

of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable 

jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that

Taylor has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Taylor’s notice of appeal and 

informal brief as an application to file a second or successive 

§ 2255 motion. United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th 
3

Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive 

§ 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either:

(1) newly discovered evidence that . . . would be 

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that no reasonable factfinder would have found the 

movant guilty of the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive 

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 

was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Taylor’s claims do not satisfy either of 

these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a 

successive § 2255 motion.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed November 23, 2016.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D15-1451

Lower Tribunal No. 10-64050

________________

Sharon L. Rollins,

Appellant,

vs.

Marilyn M. Dickerson and Misti R. Delgado,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice

Butchko, Judge.

Billbrough & Marks and Geoffrey B. Marks, for appellant.

Kubicki Draper and Sharon C. Degnan (Fort Lauderdale), for appellees.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and SCALES, JJ.

EMAS, J.
Sharon L. Rollins, the plaintiff below, appeals from a final judgment in her

favor and a subsequent order of the trial court denying her motion for additur and,

alternatively, for new trial. We affirm, holding that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion for new trial, as the alleged errors upon which the

motion was premised are either unmeritorious or were not properly preserved. See

Roth v. Cohen, 941 So. 2d 496, 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that an issue

“must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to

be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered

preserved”) (quoting Archer v. State, 613 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993)). Had

Rollins’ trial counsel made a specific, proper and contemporaneous objection,

thereby giving the trial court adequate notice of the nature and impact of the

alleged error, the trial court would have had the opportunity to fashion an

appropriate remedy to ameliorate any error and cure the resulting prejudice which

Rollins raises for the first time on appeal.

We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Rollins’ motion for additur. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 707 So. 2d 1110 (Fla.

1998); Carnival Corp. v. Amato, 840 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Kmart

Corp. v. Bracho, 776 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So.

2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

Affirmed.

2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30807 Summary Calendar

SHANE DANTONI, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; ET AL., Defendants, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; GARY CALICO, Individually and in his capacity as an Officer of the New Orleans Police Department; FRED FATH, Individually and in his capacity as an Officer of the New Orleans Police Department; LIONEL HAYNES, Individually and in his official capacity as an Officer of the New Orleans Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 96-CV-3083

- - - - - - - - - - February 16, 1998 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Shane Dantoni appeals the summary-judgment dismissal of his civil rights claims against the City of New Orleans (the “City”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for use of excessive force byNo. 97-30807 -2-

** Dantoni’s lawsuit also included several state-law causes of action. Because he does not raise the issue of the dismissal of these claims on appeal, we decline to address them. Baker v. Putnal , 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir. 1996). Officer Gary Calico during the course of his arrest in March 1996. ** Dantoni argues that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing his lawsuit after concluding that he had failed to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the existence of a municipal policy which caused Officer Calico to violate his civil rights. We have reviewed the briefs and the record and affirm for essentially the same reasons stated by the magistrate judge.
See Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown , 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1386-90 (1997).
AFFIRMED.
#### The Newhall-House Stock Company vs. The Flint & Pere Marquette Railway Company.

*(1) Variance. (2) Nonjoinder.*

1. A variance between the contract pleaded and that proven, by which the appellant was not misled, is disregarded here.

2. Nonjoinder of a proper defendant can be taken advantage of only by answer in abatement.

APPEAL from the County Court of *Milwaukee*County.

Action for rent. The complaint was, in substance, that on or about May 1,1878, plaintiff leased to defendant one-half of an office, known as “Office No. 5,” in the Newhall House block, in the city of Milwaukee for the term of one year, at the annual rent of $325; that defendant agreed to pay said rent in equal portions on the first day of each month, the first payment to be made on the first of June; and that, after demand, it had failed to pay the rent which became due on the first days of July, August and September, 1878, amounting to $81.25, for which amount, with interest, etc., judgment was demanded.

The answer contained a general denial, and an averment that the tenancy was by the month, and not by the year.

The county court found as facts, that on the first day of May, 1878, plaintiff leased to defendant and one S. M. Ogden said office No. 5, for the term of one year from that date, at the annual rent of $650, to be paid in equal portions on the first day of each month, the first payment to be made on the first of June; and that a portion of the rent which became due on the first days of July, August and September, 1878, respectively, amounting in all to $81.25, had not been paid; and that there was due plaintiff from defendant, including interest to the date of the decision, $83.12.

From a judgment for plaintiff in accordance with these findings, the defendant appealed.

*517Tbe cause was submitted on tbe brief of *E. Mariner*for tbe appellant, and that of *Dixon da Noyes*for the respondent.

EyaN, 0. J.

Tbe only exceptions taken are to tbe findings of tbe court below.

In support of these tbe point is made here, that there was a variance between tbe contract pleaded and tbe contract proved. It was not pretended in tbe court below that the appellant was misled to its prejudice, and tbe variance must be disregarded here. E. S., sec. 2669; *Russell v. Loomis,*43 Wis., 545; *Delaplaine v. Turnley,*44 Wis., 31.

Another point relied on here is tbe nonjoinder of a proper defendant. This avails nothing on answer in bar. It could be taken advantage of only by answer in abatement. *Markoe v.*Seaver, 2 Wis., 148; *Dutcher v. Dutcher,*39 Wis., 651; *Plath v. Braunsdorff,*40 Wis., 107; *Supervisors v. Van Stralen,*45 Wis., 675.

*By the Court.*— Tbe judgment of tbe court below is affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40543 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus KEVIN BRIAN FAVORS, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. C-97-CR-295-1

- - - - - - - - - - April 15, 1999 Before JONES, SMITH, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Kevin Favors appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution of crack cocaine. He argues that the Government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed the 12.4 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him as relevant conduct and that the substance was in fact crack cocaine. After reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we hold that the district court did not err in attributing the additional 12.4 grams of crack cocaine to Favors as relevant conduct. See United States v. Bryant , 991 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1993).No. -2-
AFFIRMED.