IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

CRAIG VICTOR COLEMAN,

Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0419

Filed November 22, 2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. CR20123419001

The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General

Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix

By Mariette Ambri, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson

Counsel for Appellee

Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public Defender

By Michael J. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Presiding Judge Howard authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Espinosa and Judge Staring concurred.

H O W A R D, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Following a jury trial, Craig Coleman was convicted of 

unlawful imprisonment of a minor under fifteen, aggravated assault 

of a minor under fifteen, assault, and burglary. On appeal, he 

argues the trial court violated his equal protection and substantive

due process rights by requiring him to register pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 13-3821(A)(1) absent a jury finding the unlawful imprisonment 

was sexually motivated. Because we find no constitutional 

violation, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to 

upholding the jury verdicts. State v. Haverstick, 234 Ariz. 161, ¶ 2, 

318 P.3d 877, 880 (App. 2014). In September 2012, C.B. was holding 

her three-year-old daughter, H.T., when Coleman entered her 

backyard, “grabbed the baby’s arm” and tried to pull her away from

C.B. Coleman punched C.B. in the face, causing her to fall down and 

on top of H.T. He punched C.B. again and then ran away.

¶3 Coleman was charged with kidnapping and aggravated 

assault as to H.T., aggravated assault causing temporary and

substantial disfigurement as to C.B., and burglary. A jury found 

him guilty of unlawful imprisonment of a minor under fifteen as a 

lesser-included offense of kidnapping, but found the state did not 

prove it was committed with sexual motivation beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The jury also found him guilty of aggravated assault of a 

minor under fifteen, of assault of C.B. as a lesser-included offense of 

the aggravated assault, and of burglary.

¶4 The trial court sentenced Coleman to concurrent prison 

terms, the longest of which is 2.5 years. It also ordered him to 
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

3

register pursuant to § 13-3821(A)(1) for a period of ten years. 

§ 13-3821(A)(1), (M). We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1) and 13-4033(A).

Discussion

¶5 Coleman argues the trial court’s order that he register 

pursuant to § 13-3821 violates his substantive due process and equal 

protection rights under the United States and Arizona constitutions. 

He reasons that subjecting him to § 13-3821’s registration 

requirements and labeling him a “sex offender” when sexual 

conduct is not an element of unlawful imprisonment and the jury 

failed to find the crime was sexually motivated is not rationally 

related to the legislature’s purpose in establishing the registry.

¶6 Coleman raised his equal protection argument below, 

thus preserving it for review, but forfeited any review of whether his 

substantive due process rights have been violated except for 

fundamental, prejudicial error.

1 See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 

¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005); see also State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 4, 

175 P.3d 682, 683 (App. 2008) (“objection on one ground does not 

preserve the issue on another ground”). However, under either 

standard of review, Coleman must first establish error occurred. 

See State v. Katzorke, 167 Ariz. 599, 600, 810 P.2d 597, 598 (App. 1990)

(violation of equal protection reversible error); see also State v. Avila, 

 

1 The state asks us to ignore Coleman’s substantive due 

process argument as not raised below, and contends that addressing 

it would turn this court into the “court of first resort for 

[constitutional] claims.” Our supreme court, however, has 

established that appellate courts will consider constitutional claims 

raised for the first time on appeal, but our review is limited to 

determining whether fundamental, prejudicial error occurred. 

See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). 

Because Coleman has argued that requiring him to register 

constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, we will review his claim 

accordingly. See State v. Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349, ¶ 17, 

185 P.3d 135, 140 (App. 2008) (review for fundamental, prejudicial 

error waived if not argued).
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

4

217 Ariz. 97, ¶ 9, 170 P.3d 706, 708 (App. 2007) (under fundamental 

error review, defendant must establish error occurred). We review 

issues of constitutional law de novo. State v. Ramsey, 211 Ariz. 529, 

¶ 5, 124 P.3d 756, 759 (App. 2005).

¶7 The equal protection guarantees of the Arizona and 

United States constitutions “are essentially the same” and require 

similarly situated people be treated alike. State v. Lowery, 230 Ariz. 

536, ¶ 13, 287 P.3d 830, 835 (App. 2012), quoting State v. Bonnewell,

196 Ariz. 592, ¶ 15, 2 P.3d 682, 686 (App. 1999); see also U.S. Const. 

amend. XIV, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 13. These guarantees do not 

prohibit all classifications, however, but only those which are 

“unreasonable.” Lowery, 230 Ariz. 536, ¶ 13, 287 P.3d at 835.

¶8 Substantive due process ensures that the government’s 

actions are fundamentally fair, “regardless of the fairness of the 

procedures used to implement them.” Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 

293, ¶ 66, 987 P.2d 779, 800 (App. 1999), quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 

494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 

Ariz. Const. art. II, § 4; Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 

7-8 (2003) (statutory registration requirements question of 

“substantive, not procedural, due process”). It thus “prevents the 

government from engaging in arbitrary, wrongful actions.” Martin, 

195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 66, 987 P.2d at 800. “It precludes conduct that 

‘shocks the conscience’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the 

concept of ordered liberty.’” Id., quoting United States v. Salerno, 

481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).

¶9 Our review of equal protection and substantive due 

process claims are “conceptually” similar, with the level of scrutiny 

dependent upon the classification or right at issue. Governale v. 

Lieberman, 226 Ariz. 443, ¶ 13, 250 P.3d 220, 225 (App. 2011); see also 

State v. Russo, 219 Ariz. 223, ¶ 5, 196 P.3d 826, 828 (App. 2008). 

Coleman concedes he is not a member of a suspect class and no 

fundamental right2 is at issue, and therefore “we will uphold the 

 

2 Because Coleman conceded no fundamental right was 

involved, he may not be entitled to any further fundamental error 

review as to any substantive due process violation. Nevertheless, 
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

5

statute so long as it is ‘rationally related to a legitimate government 

purpose.’” State v. Panos, 239 Ariz. 116, ¶ 8, 366 P.3d 1006, 1008-09 

(App. 2016), quoting State v. Navarro, 201 Ariz. 292, ¶ 25, 34 P.3d 971, 

977 (App. 2001). Rational basis review “is a paradigm of judicial 

restraint.” F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). 

And, in an equal protection review, the statute is presumed valid “if 

the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 

legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 

473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Coleman must show “beyond a reasonable 

doubt [the statute is] wholly unrelated to any legitimate legislative 

goal.” Martin, 195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 52, 987 P.2d at 796.

¶10 Coleman argues that requiring him to register is not 

rationally related to the goal of regulating sex offenders. But only 

under a strict scrutiny review would we need, first, to determine 

whether the legislature’s specific purpose was exclusively to protect 

communities from known sex offenders and, second, whether

requiring those convicted of unlawful imprisonment of a minor 

absent a finding of sexual motivation is narrowly tailored to that 

purpose. Id. ¶ 51. In a rational basis review, we need only consider 

whether the requirement is rationally related to “any legitimate 

legislative goal.” Id. ¶ 52 (emphasis added); see also Lowery, 230 Ariz. 

536, ¶ 15, 287 P.3d at 835 (in rational basis review, court may 

“consider either the legislature’s stated goal or any hypothetical 

basis for its action”).

¶11 Section 13-3821(A) prescribes which offenses require 

registration, the majority of which are sex-related. In 1998, the 

legislature amended § 13-3821(A) and added unlawful imprisonment

and kidnapping of a minor by a non-parent to the list of offenses

requiring registration. 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 291, § 2. It did not 

require a finding of sexual motivation. § 13-3821(A). Unlawful 

imprisonment requires the state to show the defendant “knowingly” 

restrained another person. A.R.S. § 13-1303(A). Thus, by the plain 

terms of § 13-3821(A)(1), a defendant convicted of unlawful 

imprisonment of a minor when the defendant is not the minor’s 

 

because the state did not argue this concession precluded review, 

and we find no error in any event, we do not decide this issue.
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

6

parent is required to register without any showing of a sexual 

component. 

¶12 The legislature’s only statement on the 1998 amendment 

was that it was meant to “[b]ring Arizona’s sex offender registration 

and community notification laws into compliance with . . . the 

federal Jacob Wetterling Act” (JWA). Senate Fact Sheet, S.B. 1333, 

43rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (July 7, 1998). We thus turn to the 

Congressional history of the JWA. See People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 

415, 425 (Ill. 2007) (“If Congress had a reasonable basis for requiring 

child abductors to register, it necessarily follows that legislation 

intended to bring New York into compliance with [the JWA] shares 

that basis.”), quoting People v. Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 457 (Sup. Ct. 

2006) (second alteration in Johnson).

¶13 When Congress was considering the JWA, one 

representative stated the law was necessary “because of the high 

rate of recidivism in persons who have committed crimes against 

children, and it is not just sex crimes against children but all crimes 

against children. The recidivism rate is probably higher in this area 

of our criminal justice system or in violations of the criminal code.” 

139 Cong. Rec. H10319-02 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of 

Rep. Sensenbrenner). He noted that “time is of the essence” when a 

child is abducted, and a registry would enable law enforcement “to 

track down known child offenders to see if they were involved in an 

abduction or another crime against a child.” Id. And a House 

Report cites a Department of Justice study estimating that “[t]wothirds of the cases of non-family child abduction reported to police 

involve sexual assault.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-392 (1993).

¶14 The purpose of the JWA was thus “to protect [children 

and their families] from child abductors and molesters” and provide 

law enforcement “a resource for investigating child abduction and 

molestation cases.” 140 Cong. Rec. H8968-01 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 

1994) (statement of Rep. Ramstad). Consequently, requiring all nonparents convicted of unlawful imprisonment of a minor to register,

even if the crime was not sexually motivated, is rationally related to 

the legislative goal of protecting minors from abduction and 

potential sexual harm. See State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 177, 829 P.2d 

1217, 1223 (1992) (§ 13-3821 rationally related to aiding law 
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

7

enforcement’s investigative work); see also Lowery, 230 Ariz. 536, ¶ 17, 

287 P.3d at 542 (§ 13-3821 rationally related to legitimate state 

interest in protecting communities); Martin, 195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 61, 987 

P.2d at 798 (state has “significant interest in protecting its citizens 

from” dangerous individuals).

¶15 Coleman argues, however, the statute unfairly requires 

some defendants convicted of offenses without a sexual component 

or motivation to register, while others are not required to register. 

But Congress clearly found kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment 

of a child by a non-parent, in particular, had high risks of recidivism 

and an increased risk of future sexual harm to children. Thus, the 

choice to limit unlawful imprisonment and kidnapping of a minor 

by a non-parent as offenses requiring registration is neither arbitrary 

nor irrational. See Panos, 239 Ariz. 116, ¶ 9, 366 P.3d at 1009. On the 

contrary, it demonstrates the legislature’s intent to limit the 

registration requirements to those offenses with high rates of 

recidivism and a high risk of sexual harm to children. Because the 

classification is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest, it 

does not offend equal protection guarantees. See City of Cleburne, 

Tex., 473 U.S. at 439.

¶16 As support for his position that no rational basis exists 

for the registration requirement here, Coleman cites three out-ofstate cases 3 in which courts found that requiring defendants 

convicted of either unlawful imprisonment or kidnapping of a 

 

3Coleman additionally cites Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1340 

n.1 (11th Cir. 2005), which stated “[w]hen a person is convicted of 

kidnapping, false imprisonment, or luring or enticing a child into a 

dwelling or conveyance, there must be a sexual component shown 

in addition to the predicate offense before designating that person as 

a sex offender.” That statement, however, was merely dicta in a 

footnote and the court cited only Raines v. State, 805 So. 2d 999, 1003 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), for that proposition. Because the Eleventh 

Circuit relied on a case which we disagree with for reasons 

explained below, and engaged in no substantive analysis of either 

equal protection or substantive due process concerns as they relate 

to this case, we decline to address it.
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

8

minor, without any showing of a sexual element or motivation, 

violated guarantees of equal protection or substantive due process. 

See Raines v. State, 805 So. 2d 999, 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 

(defining “sexual offender” to include defendants “convicted of false 

imprisonment” and requiring defendant to register where “it is clear 

that the predicate crime is totally devoid of a sexual component” 

violates equal protection rights because not rationally related to 

state’s “interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders”); 

see also State v. Small, 833 N.E.2d 774, 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) 

(“absent evidence that [defendant] committed the kidnapping of the 

minor victim with sexual motivation, denominating defendant a 

‘sexually oriented offender’ is not rationally related to a legitimate 

state interest” of “alert[ing] citizenry to the presence of sex offenders 

within their midst” and thus violates substantive due process); 

ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, ¶ 25 (N.M. 

Ct. App. 2006) (city’s stated purpose of statutes requiring 

registration of persons convicted of “sex offenses,” “which is the 

‘protection of the victims and potential victims of sex offenders’ is 

not furthered by the inclusion of crimes that are not sexually 

motivated” and defendants’ equal protection and substantive due 

process rights violated).

¶17 The most notable distinction between those cases and 

this one is that the registration statutes of those states utilize sexrelated language to define either who must register or the offenses 

requiring registration. See Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(h)(a)(I) (defining 

those convicted of offenses requiring registration as “[s]exual 

offender”); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. 2950.01(A) (defining offense 

requiring registration as “[s]exually oriented offense”); N.M. Stat. 

Ann. § 29-11A-3(H), (I) (defining those who must register as “sex 

offender” and offense requiring registration as “sex offense”). 

Although Arizona’s article 3 is denominated “Registration of Sex 

Offenders and Offender Monitoring,” none of the statutes in the 

article categorically define the offenses or those required to register 

in any such terms. See §§ 13-3821 through 13-3829; see also A.R.S. 

§ 1-212 (“headings to sections . . . do not constitute part of the law”).

¶18 Coleman’s argument, and reliance on these cases, 

therefore asks this court to read a limitation—a finding of sexual 
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

9

motivation—into the statute which is not present on its face, 

something we will not do. See Cicoria v. Cole, 222 Ariz. 428, ¶ 15, 

215 P.3d 402, 405 (App. 2009). Section 13-3821 is titled generally 

“Persons required to register,” and includes three offenses which are 

not necessarily sex-related: kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment 

of a minor by a non-parent, and “[u]nlawful age misrepresentation.” 

§ 13-3821(A)(1), (2), (20). The plain language of the statute therefore 

contradicts Coleman’s interpretation and instead demonstrates the 

legislature, in fact, intended to require all those convicted of certain 

non-sex-related offenses to register. 

¶19 Given the high risk that sexual assault occurs during 

the commission of unlawful imprisonment of a minor and its high 

rates of recidivism, the legislature could “have rationally decided 

that, on balance, it is important to warn the public and law 

enforcement about those criminals, like [Coleman], who falsely 

imprison a minor, regardless of whether the State can prove a sexual 

component.” 4 State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, ¶ 31 (Wis. 2010).

“[E]nsuring [Arizona’s] registration scheme is not under-inclusive” 

is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting its 

communities and aiding law enforcement. Lowery, 230 Ariz. 536, 

¶ 17, 287 P.3d at 542; see also Noble, 171 Ariz. at 177, 829 P.2d at 1223; 

see also Washburn v. Pima County, 206 Ariz. 571, ¶ 28, 81 P.3d 1030, 

1039 (App. 2003) (“A perfect fit is not required; a statute that has a 

rational basis will not be overturned ‘merely because it is not made 

with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some 

inequality.’”), quoting Big D Constr. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 

163 Ariz. 560, 566, 789 P.2d 1061, 1067 (1990). 

¶20 Furthermore, assuming arguendo that being required to 

register has labeled Coleman a “sex offender,” the legislature could 

have concluded that label was appropriate regardless of a proven 

sexual motivation. Based on the Congressional history, the 

legislature could have found that “child abductions are often 

 

4We note, however, that although the jury did not find sexual 

motivation beyond a reasonable doubt, there was testimony that, 

preceding the altercation, Coleman had said “I want to f--- your little 

girl.”
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

10

precursors to sexual offenses.” Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, ¶¶ 30, 32. Or 

“that sexual assault occurs in many cases where there is no direct 

evidence of it—in cases where the victim is killed, or remains 

missing, or is unable or unwilling to recount his or her ordeal.” 

People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (N.Y. 2009).

¶21 Similarly, it could have found that a defendant who 

abducted a child intended to sexually assault that child, but was 

prevented by intervening circumstances, such as his arrest or the 

child’s escape. Or “that a child cut off from the safety of everyday 

surroundings is vulnerable to sexual abuse even if the offender’s 

sexual desires are not the motive of the crime.” Id. at 1153-54. Thus, 

even if the effect was to label Coleman a sex offender, it was 

rational for the legislature to classify him as such. See id. at 1154.

¶22 The majority of courts confronted with this same issue 

have concluded, as do we, that the registration requirement at issue 

here does not run afoul of substantive due process or equal 

protection guarantees. See, e.g., Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 829-30 

(Ga. 2010) (registration requirement for defendant’s conviction of 

false imprisonment of a minor did not violate substantive due 

process); Johnson, 870 N.E.2d at 426 (holding that the inclusion of 

“aggravated kidnapping of a minor by a nonparent” in sex offender 

registration act not violative of substantive due process “regardless 

of whether [the offender’s] conduct was sexually motivated”); 

Moffitt v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 247, 255-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) 

(requirement of registration for certain offenses against minors, 

regardless of a sexual component, did not offend substantive due 

process); Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1153-54 (neither substantive due 

process nor equal protection violated by requiring those convicted of 

unlawful imprisonment or kidnapping of minor to register as sex 

offenders); Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, ¶ 36 (requiring defendant to 

register as a sex offender following his conviction for false 

imprisonment of a minor rationally related to government interest in 

protecting public and did not violate defendant’s right to due 

process or equal protection); People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307, 356 

(Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (inclusion of false imprisonment on sex 

offender registration statute not violation of substantive due 

process). We agree with the reasoning of those decisions. 
STATE v. COLEMAN

Opinion of the Court

11

¶23 Accordingly, we conclude that requiring Coleman to 

register based on his conviction for unlawful imprisonment of a 

minor who is not his child without a finding that it was committed 

with sexual motivation does not violate either equal protection 

guarantees or substantive due process. It does not shock our 

conscience or interfere with rights that are implicit in the concept of 

ordered liberty. Martin, 195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 66, 987 P.2d at 800. The trial 

court thus did not err in ordering Coleman to register pursuant to 

§ 13-3821(A)(1).

Disposition

¶24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Coleman’s 

convictions, sentences, and order to register.