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T<>P SECRET 

OFFICIAL REPORT 

* NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

FIELD COMMANDERS CONFERENCE 

Fart George G. Meade, Maryland 

28 Minh &larougb I April , 1955 

3/,lf ssr 

f~eoN\tJ,ll 

· . . · I . . THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL ' ... • •' I•• • , 

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TOP lleRl!T CONTROL NUMllR 55-1035 

COPY NUMBER /£2 . THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS. 140 PAGl!S . 

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INDEX 

SUBJECT PAGE 

Opening Address ----------------------------------------------- 2 

Decentralization, i;:>ians and Progress -------------------------- 7 , 

Decentralization, Pacific and Far Eastern Areas ---------------15 

Decentralization, European Area -------------------------------17 

Categorization of COMINT --------------------------------------19 

'·~.Alert "Procedures ---------------------------------------------24 

COMINT Commllnications -----------------------------------------32 

Collateral Support to Field COMINT Organizations --------------42 

British Empire COMINT -----------------------------------------47 

Intercept Control Procedures ----------------------------------51 

Plant Installation --------------------------------------------59 

Special.Identification Techniques -----------------------------66 

COMINT End-Product Reporting -----------·-----------------------70 

The TECSUM and Related Technical. Reports ----------------------75 

Operations Capabilities Reports -------------------------------81 

Central Processing Techniques for Facsimile, Scrambler and 

Signal. .Analysis -------------------------------------82 

Technical Support of the Field --------------------------------87 

Logistics Problems --------------------------------------------89 

Training - Problems and Progress ------------------------------91 

NSA overseas Field Research Activity -------------------------105 

Personnel Planning -------------------------------------------111 

Security Matters ---------------------------------------------119 

Cct{(NT Communications Security -------------------------------123 

Cross-Servicing ----------------------------------------------126 

Special Weather ----------------------------------------------127 

COMINT Support to CINCPAC ------------------------------------129 

Explanation of Civilian Intercept Operator Program -----------131 

Closing Address ----------------------------------------------136 

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OP.DmG ADDRESS BY 

LIEUTElW'fT GENERAL RALPH J. CANINE, USA 

DIRECTOR, NATIODL SECURITY AGENCY 

Welcome to Ft. Meade. This is a real milestone for me to bring in 

from the field to our new site commanders ari.d their operating assistants. 

We have looked forward to Ft. Meade for a good many months. I was here 

the day our people started moving in, the day we turned the lights on. 

I spent most of that day wandering around, talking to the GS-5s, 7s and 

9s, asking them what they thought about the new building. Their generic 

comment was uwell, if the permanent buildiDg is as much of an improvement 

over these temporary buildings as the temporary buildings are over those 

wings at the He.11, General, you've got it made." 

We think we are going to have a tremendous plant here; but the walls 

are bulging already. Beople looked askance when we told them about the 

floor space we were going to have when we went to work on the building. 

We need twice as much as we have now. We are going to build up, and it 

is going to be a tremendous plant. I am pleased to get the world-wide 

organization here. I welcome you toda;y and I am glad to see you. 

The Bumber 1 problem that faces any organization.is communications. 

I am talking about communications .between the echelons of any large 

organization. There gets to be a point in the vertical depth of an 

organization in which the simple passing up and down of the orders of the 

top hierarchy, and the desires, recommendations, and reactions of the 

bottom and intermediate echelons, become the most important problem. 

There are two fund.a.mental problems involved in communications. One 

of them is comparatively simple, and to people who wear uniforms or to 

people who don't wear uniforms, but who are involved in·the operation 

of a military organization, it should represent no problem. That is the 

actual doing of what you are told to do when you are told to do it. When 

you are told to do something, the problem is simply just going ahead and 

doing what you are told to do. It is simply the problem of carrying out 

orders, a problem of discipline and training. When orders are issued, 

and they can be verbal or written, the well-trained, disciplined, loyal 

person carries them out without delay and immediately passes on what has 

been given to him. 

We're getting somewhat better at that, but we're a long way from 

perfection, and in this particular cB.se I am an extreme perfectionist. 

I see no excuse, and I mean tb&t literally. I know.ofino explanation 

that can justify failure on the part of the head of any echelon in an 

organization to do what he has been told to do. He has one problem, 

however; he must assume that the semantics of everyone in the organization are identical., that the words mean the same tq the fourth echelon 

down as they did to the fellow who drafted the order. The English 

language poses a real problem. The business of educating and training 

people so that they speak. the same language and use words with the same 

meaning is not an easy one. It is not an impossible one. We can do the 

fantastic, so it isn't impossible. We can solve our troubles in getting 

people to understand the use of the words so that we all use words which 

have essentially the same meaning. 

One of the big advantages of a conference such as this is that we 

take one more step nearer perfection. Bow understand me, I am not always 

a perfectionist. I submit.that we can get pretty close to our goal. A 

conference such as this makesua tremendous step :rorward in attaining as 

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close to perfection as we can get. We have made considerable progress 

in both phases of this communication problem. There is a growing understanding of' words within our world-wide orga.Jii.zation. It is still 

considerably less than what I would like to see. Let's make it one of 

our primary missions this week to make sure that everybody leaves here 

closer to talking the same language than when we came. 

And that leads me into my next point. All of you don't have to bave 

identical views about solving the COMmT problem. It isn't at all necessary to a successful. solution of the problem that ve all have the same 

views. I would suspect you if you did. As a matter of tact, this problem 

of getting communications .intelligence is a very intricate and difficult 

one. 

Differences of opinion are good. When people are asked for their 

opinions, or if they think it is important that somebody know their 

opinions even without being asked, one expects to get honest, considered 

views. In general, there are a good many w8.ys of doing the same thing, 

even in the OOMIN'f business.. There are a good lllBllY' ways of doing most, 

if not all, of ·the operations that go into this COMIDT business, and the 

choice between some of them is a close choice. But ve can't have all 

the horses on the team going in different directions at the same time. 

It is essential t-hat somebody take hold of the reins. The time for 

discussion, the time for airing differences-of vieWpoints, is before 

the team starts. Once underway, the good soldier qui ts even thinking 

about the tuft of :.grass on the other side of the road and keeps on 

heading down the road, pulling his share of the load, doing it along 

the way selected for the team to go. Tb.ere is a time for discussion 

and there is a time for action; when the time for action has come, the 

time for discussion must cease. We can't have unanimity, that "everyhorse-in-the-collar-at-the-same-time" type of operation, if we haven't 

had good conmunication on both facets before discussion stops and action 

begins. 

The team is now on the way. A lot of water has gone over the dam. 

More words have been used - I should have said abused - in this racket--

well, just so many words abused in it· that it is beyond my coiqprehension. 

But we are fairly well along the road, and ve have made considerable 

progress. We have had some detours, we have had some stops, but progress 

has been sure 8nd it has been in the risht ~irection. You people and 

your predecessors over the past folir or five years are the people who 

deserve the credit tor that progress. 

The National Security Agency and the three Service Cryptologic 

Agencies are service organizations. I have never yet seen a KIA tag 

on a dead Kraut which claimed he was killed by a mimeograph machine. 

The number of scalps on the belts of people in this racket are few and 

tar between, that is, bloody scalps where you have done it yourself With 

your own knife. We don't issue orders that put airplanes in the air or 

start guns shooting or battleships floating around. Somebody else does 

that, and the guy who does that is our customer. Anybody in an intelligence organization is running a purely service organization. We are in 

identically the same kind of spot as the truck driver who goes back to 

the pile of ammunition on t~ beach and hauls it u;p to where the men 

serving the guns can get hold of it and put it in the guns. It is one 

of those necessary evils; there is not much glory in it. I am convinced 

that the guy who takes the scalps is the fellow entitled to the gloey. 

When you run a service outfit, you don't run it on rules set by 

yourself. Those rules, and the ultimate type of thing that must come 

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out of the pipeline, are never set by an intelligence character, by me, 

by you, or by anybody in this room. We must run the communications 

intelligence business to serve the people who make decisions. We can 

make decisions in our racket, but we don't make decisions that kill 

Krauts, and the future of the U. S. is in the hands of the people who 

make decisions that kill Krauts. 

This is no tactical exercise we are involved in here. Don't mistake 

me. I am sing;>ly trying to impress upon you that the fellow we must please 

is the commander. Unfortunately, in our racket, we have to work through 

intermediaries too much, and I go back to my opening remarks about 

communications. Very often we don't speak the same J.angua.ge. It is 

nobody's :fault. We just don't speak the same language. We didn't grow 

up on the same street. Some of' us grew up four blocks over and three 

blocks down, some on the street that the streetcar goes down, but we have 

the mission of supporting the commanders. That is our job. It is always 

the support guy's job to give the commander what he wants. Tte commander 

doesn't tell you how to do it, but you have to give him the kind of' fuse 

he wants, in the numbers he wants, where he wants them, and at the time 

he wants them. 

It is the job of the commander to tell the supporting elements what 

he wants. If' he wants them really turned out in a hurry, he ought to 

tell them why. He will get what he wants much quicker, and with a lot 

more understanding, if' he tells that supporting fellow why he wants them. 

Many times it won't be possible, and I used the word "possible" deliberately, to turn over to the commander exactly what he says he needs. 

But if the fellow who is running the service organization knows that a 

particular fuse was demanded, and he can't find that kind of fuse, he 

will come up with the best possible substitute. 

We need to preach a doctrine of education so that we learn why people 

want things, why the commanders want things, and that applies at all echelons. 

Now let me repeat that we are a service organization which gives the commanders what they want or the best possible substitute for it, if what they 

want is not obtainable. 

Let me elaborate for just a moment on what is obtainable. Too often 

people lay requirements on us without knowing the limitations and capabilities of' the over-all communications· intelligence organization. It then 

becomes the duty, the responsibility, of every member of that organization 

to educate the people with whom he is doing business. 

The Number 1 limitation on the capabilities of this organization is 

that the traffic must be on the air. We don't send messages ourselves. 

Somebody must have sent it for us to be able to go into action. In my 

discussion and talks around here with people, that is the most commonly 

misunderstood facet in this whole operation, that we are limited by 

whether somebody puts it on the air. If' they didn't, there isn't a thing 

we can do about it. We can't say, "Hey, put that particular thing on the 

air tomorrow on your next schedule. " It doesn't work that way. Entirely 

too many senior commanders misunderstand that particular point. I am 

reasonably sure that a good many commanders at lower levels misunderstand 

this. It becomes the job of everyone.of us to be sure that, insofar as 

we can influence it, the commanders talk the same language and use words 

with the s~e understanding and the same connotation as we do. You are 

the ones who have to do something about it. The conmia.nder isn't going to 

come around and ask you. I can assure you of that. He has too many other 

responsibilities. But there are a good many other ways in which the 

initiative is yours to push this particular type of education. 

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We do a tremendous amount of word-splitting around here. I don't 

think it makes a bit of difference in many sections of our organization 

and in our prqblems that something shall be done exactly this wa:y, but 

it makes a big difference if things are done uniformly where more than 

one person is involved in the operation. But I pick up the cable book 

in the morning and I see a tremendous number of cables going back and 

forth, with people arguing about what to me seem to be sometimes down 

right silly questions about small points. 

When you sit in on these conferences and you're dealing with somebody you think is going to task, maybe it's a.ll right to battle about 

little words. But the only way this organization can operate is on faith, 

faith that we are all trying to get the same job done. If we haven't got 

it, we don't belong in the organization. It seems unreasonable that we 

do as much word-splitting as I see in the cable book. Now I know what 

you are thinking. You will say I don't know what it's all a.bout. I 

don't, but every once in a while I get a little bit more interested than 

usual and get hold of the final outcome on some of' this word-splitting 

and Gentlemen, I can't see that it·makes a bit of difference. We spend 

hundreds of dollars of Uncle Sam's, yours, and my money on cables back 

and forth arguing about WQrds. I don't mind it so much when it is in the 

discussion stage, but I am not going to tolerate it when it is in the 

action stage. The time for word-splitting has passed then. 

I have the greatest admiration for people who can do a top-notch job 

they don't like and don't believe in. Anybody can do a good job if he 

likes it and thinks that it ought to be done. He doesn't deserve a:ny 

credit. Frankly, he is silqply feeding his own ego. All he is doing is 

getting more ice cream, pink ice cream. 

The fellow who deserves the credit in this world is the fellow who 

gets a job he doesn't like and doesn't believe in, who thinks he is 

doing it wrong, and still does a good job. llow there is the only guy in 

the world who deserves much credit, and I have supreme admiration for 

those people. You separate the sheep from the goats very fast when YQU 

take the fellow who has a fine reputation and is doing a job he likes and 

believes in, and put him to doing things he doesn't like and things he 

thinks are being done wrong. The credit shou1d be p~sed out to the 

fellow who can say "They can't make it too tough on me. I don't care 

whether they think they are harrassing me. They may think they are doing 

it to me, but I'm going to show them that I can do a job when they tell 

me to do it." Now that is the epitome of any organization, in which 

people do what they are told to do when they are told to do it, whether 

they like it, or whether they believe in it or not. 

That will get lots of scalps. Then the day comes around to elect 

a new chief, the tepee smoke-hole will be chock-full of scalps. You will 

find the guys who do what they like to do, in the only way they think the 

thing should be done, in the way they.want to do it, will never get to be 

chiefs. The world just isn't ma.de that way. You have to be put in the 

fire some·times to be tried. And a lot of you are being tried now. A lot 

of you are being forced to do things you don't believe in, that you think 

are wrong. You think the U. S. is going to hell because you have to do 

them. You are sure that the A Bomb over Detroit is much closer because 

you are doing it this way. I have supreme admiration for those guys 

when they turn out a top-notch job, and those are the kind of guys I 

like. Those are the kind of guys I want. Those are the kind of people 

who make the U. S. secure. They are about the only thing between us and 

non-security. 

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We have some people here this morning whom we invited from the 

consumers. My definition of consumers is a little different from what 

it was a moment ago. I am talking about the intelligence characters of 

one type or another. I am glad you are here; I talked part of the time 

to you. The last session this morning is one of these round-tables. I 

prefer that you don't go in and bother them. They might talk about you. 

They might say things you don't lik~. ·I don't want anybody to get mad 

and go home taking their rag dolls With them, so stay out of there. 

We are glad to have you all here. Let's get a lot of work done 

this week. Remember, my motto is, "Do what you are told to do when 

you are told to do it." Thank you. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

Topic 1: Decentra.tization, Plans and Progress 

General Session 

1. Mr. Conley-, NSA-90, introduced Mr. Gietkowski, NSA-063, who presented 

the follo-wing: 

General. CANINE, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: 

DecentraJ.ization is probably the broadest, most significant, and 

at the same time, one of the most complex programs the National CCKINT 

Establishment is engaged in today. 

Iilsofar as management is concerned, decentra.tization is nothing 

new. The Mili ta.ry Establishment has accepted the principle of deeentra.lization. As you lmow, the manual, "JOINT ACTION ARMED FORCES" 

lists the three basic principles for sound organization as: 

"Centralized Direction," "Decentralized Execution," and "Common 

Doctrine." 

Business, too, has accepted the principle of Decentra.tization. 

We see automobiles on our highways bearing stickers "Product of Texas." 

The assembly of Ford automobiles, for example, 'formerly performed 

only at Detroit, is now decentra.tized to various cities throughout the 

United States. 

COMINT, too, is Big Business, and the National COMDJT Establishment is a large corporation. But here the parallels fade, for our 

reasons for decentra.lization are quite different from those of 

industrial. firms. 

Before we discuss reasons for decentra.tization of COMINT processing, let me define some terms. 

COMINT decentralization: CCKINT decentraJ.ization is the assignment to a field unit of responsibility within the National CCl4INT 

Establishment for unique, accurate and timely reporting of a COMINT 

entity, and the performance by that unit of' various Ca.tINT production 

tasks associated with the exploitable CCJUNT problems involved in the 

CCJ.tINT entity. 

DecentraJ.ization :f,s not a dismemberment of CoMilff production and 

reporting activity. It is a sharing of these responsibilities. It 

is aimed at extending forward responsibility for timely production and 

reporting tasks. '!'he National. Center always remains responsible to 

some degree for COMIN'.r entities which are decentraJ.ized. 

Decentra.tization is intended as a means for integrating and fusing 

all u. s. COMINT activity into one flexible and responsive whole, by 

combining the continued technological advancement within the National 

Center with the increasing potential :for a high degree of CCJUNT 

competency in the field. 

Let me clarify the terms "CCIUIT Entity" and "C~INT Problem" as 

used in Decentralization. 

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'!!OP SESBE'! EIHI~ 

86-36/50 USC 3 

3. 3 (h) (2) 

A CGMIN'f Entity is any dis;:..t=:i::.:::!iii!:=·:::s=h=ab=l=e=.....;'f::.;o::::r:.:e::.:i=::....:e:.:o=mm:=an.=i:.;c::.:a:.;t:.:i:.::o~n==s:......_...., 

complex. For example, we have 

A Cc.MINT problem is any operatio:t..· within the entity which involves 

processing and reporting acti~ity sufficient to produce a single, 

type of C~ end-product. For example: \ 

Now, why COMINT decentralization? Is economy our principal. 

objective'? Economy in decentralized operations will be sought, but 

will not al.ways be achieved'. At times, decentralized' operations may 

·cost us more. 

The primary objectives of decentralization are: Early Warning, 

Support to Fiel,~ Commanders, Maintaining Combat Readiness and 

Elimination of thueeessary Duplication. 

The entire National. Defense Establishment places a heavy reliance 

upon CCMINT to provide early warning. How we meet this requirement 

will be the subject of a presentation this afternoon dealing wl:th 

"Alert Procedures." 

COMINT is expected to provide indication.a of enemy intentions, and 

to provide indications of ilmninence of attack or notification of attack. 

The Director has stated that the principal. mission of the National 

COMINT establishment., our main purpose of being, is to provide this 

early warnir.r.g if it is ·at all humanly possible to do so. Since we live 

in an era of super-bombs and of super aircraft capable of carr-,fing such 

weapons super-distances, we must have the earliest possible warning. 

It is for this purpose that we will decentralize to field CCMINT units, 

as close as possible to the source of intercept, any and aJ.l such 

CCMINT entities which might produce Early Wa...-ning in.formation. 

The second objective of decentralization is to pr~vide Direct and 

Immediate Support to our Commanders in the Field. 1'.he provision of 

timely C~IN'l' support to meet requirements set forth i~ the EEI's of 

field commanders is essential. COMINT is often the field commander's 

principal source for intelligence concerning forces which oppose him. 

Accounts of Admiral Kimmel's story of the Pearl Harbor dir.aster serve 

to illustrate this objective. A present day example: Washington and 

field consumers have stated they will need to rely on C<lt1INT: almost 

exclusively for timely intelligence concerning the Formosa Situation. 

A third reason for decentralization is To Maintain Cam.bat 

Readiness • By decentralizing to field COMINT uni ts timely reporting 

responsibilities on targets identical or similar to those they wouldencounter in time of war, we can insure the existence of a sustained, 

high state of readiness for cembat. 

A fourth objective of decentralization is the Avoidance of 

Unnecessary Duplication. This is linked to economy of decentralized 

operations which I mentioned earlier. Every COMINT person, place or 

thing is a precious commodity, particularly in these days of limited 

national defense budgets • 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

We must ina.ke ma.xi.mum use of every available CCHINT resource at 

home and abroad, and the efforts at home and in the :tield must be made 

to complement and supplement each other. 

While every effort will be made_ tO el.iminate umiecessary duplication under the decentralization program, some duplication is not only 

unavoidable, but is necessary, if the primary objectives of decentralization are to be achieved. I will further discuss duplication in 

a few moments. 

The decentralization program today may be viewed as havi.ng gone 

through three distinct phases. . . . ~ 

The first phase might be called "laying the f'oundation." 

This phase began with the establishment of the National. Security 

.Agency and the promulgation of the initial Operations Orders for field 

units.· These operati'ons· orders contained wordings al.l.otting ~nera.l 

· tasks to each unit. One unit was tasked v:l.th en>J..o:l.tation of I \\\\\ 

· The operations orders assigned each field processing center a 

general area of processing responsi.bili ties • This was not deeentrB.11-

za.tion,, however. Daring this period the detailed concept, and policies 

of. decentralization as we know them tod.a.y were not yet drawn. The 

promulgation of missions by means of the operations orders permitted 

definition and rea1igmnent of tasks ~d served to eliminate some 

duplication in field processing. 

During this first period, however, decentraJ.ization was al.ready 

more than a twinkle in the Director's eye. Many of you 'were present at 

our first Field Cammanders Conference he:..J.d same 16 months ago. The 

theme of this conference was the need for the field to become professional in the CClllNT business, and become professional rapidly. This 

statement also applied to the 'National Center 6 And both field and 

National. Center capability for professional C<MD'f work has improved 

since then and is continuing to improve. The National Center assists 

the field in this respect by providing technical s11pport. ' . ·. -. .. . 

Teelmical support.is cheap· since itts a by-product of our operations. We a.re like the :manufacturer who has fmmd ·a market for his 

by-products. We, too, hS.ve reached the point where our by-product 

represents economic gs.in, paying dividends in the field. • 

Another important cornerstone had to be laid before a program for 

decentralization of processini could be approae~d. · This was to find 

a flexible method 'for the decentralization of intercept control. 

Today we know this as Circular· 51-10. ·- · ' If,' 

So, to summarize the first period., we had (1) the promulgation of 

Operations Orders, (2) a·build ... up of.field competency, and (3) the 

institution of a system pennitting decentralization of intercept 

control. 

'fhe second phase·of the'decentraJ.ization program saw the evolution 

of the basic concept and policies for decenti:'alization. We will consider tliese 1n a few moments • ., : ,, ·' ,. ·: · 

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. "' .i . 

FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 .. 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

~s perio~ also s.aw ~ d;eeentra.J..ization to field responsibility 

of problems i~val~ ~~~ 12 ~IN'J; ~ntities. The :first c~ 

entities decen~ized werel ~ lwith ASAE 

assuzn.4ig resp_onsibili:i;ie~ in J,~~ ;!.95· Others followed throu,gbout 

the year. Most of these problems were those for which the field center 

al.read.¥ ~011~~$.-,. a.deqUa.t~ ~p8.bil~~Y,· All told, a total of 15 CCJ.UNT 

entiti:es ~e ~nvql~~ ii! ~ec~~tr~!~at~on to~. These require the emplo~t of appro~1;;ely 190 ~affie ~ysts, 25 Ceypta.nal.ysts and 

110 Lingu.1sts. These figur~s 4~ ~~ :l:nclll.de non-speciaJ.ist personnel. 

- By the end o~ 1954, a. tqi;;~ ~f ll9 persons at the NationaJ. Center 

had been diverted to other tasks 8.fl a res.l:Ai;; ~:f problems decentralized 

to that t:iJne. ~ J~uary e~;q:i_~tions changes, however, have reduced this fi~ to a eqns.~~ra\>le e~nt. We hope this reduction is 

only ~or a t~r.ary period. 

We hav.e ~ entered ~he ~ phase of the Decentralizat:t,on Program which ~ 'W1.ll call the :f~;;.¢ qf' Pl~ed Decentralization. 

As you kn?W, we have recently p~gated a. Decentralization Plan 

which covers a Pf!~9<1 of ~ yeFs. ~~ i>urPose of this Plan is to 

provide a.d.Vance data and inf9~tiOJ\ to the Services for planning 

purposes. w~ have signified 9u;t" inten1:~on of decentralizing specified 

CCMINT problems to specified field 'Wlits at specified times and we have 

set.:forth the Jilinimum. numbers of special.1st personnel required. These 

total some 650 people. 

, Planning for decentriμ:!-zation is di~fieult. It is difficult beeaU&e we·do nqt e911-t;rol tbe plans of ~or,ign cow;ttries, nor their ~ammunicat~ons' proc~~es, no~ t~~ progress of their cryptographers. Thi~ :f'~~t ~ a d~fim'\;f! ~ff'~~t '?D th~ p~ans for, and progress of', 

decentra1ization. Communi~~~i:o~ ~~ch ~e l:)igbly exploitable for 

CCMINT purposes today may be less exploitable tomoITow. For this reason, it is.essential. that~ ~:rr;;~em. ~f decentralization be flexible 

in o~er to meet changing cond.i:."ft~o'.!18· ~s flexibility is difficult to 

achieve, .and.may, at times, have a disruptive influence on CCEINT 

operations in the f~eld. 'fhe pro"t>;Lem ~t be recognized, however, and 

its consequences ac~epted ~f decentralization i~ to succeed. 

The Decentra1ization Plan, too, must be considered subject to 

change. , · 

Shortly after the Plan was completed, changes occurred in Rμssian 

and Chinese communications. These changes may affect the decen:tralizations planned. An,other :f;'ac~:r i:s i!be :i;-ea.djustments of effort taking 

placf! in the Far East ~ a ;-~s~t o,f Formo~a. 

The Decentralization Plan is sll,_bc;>rdinate to current operations, 

and when all the dust set~:i.es,, ~s ~be ~quired in the Plan. 

In order to keep the Pl~ 8.E! c;~eni; as possible, we will review 

and reisslie the P+SA s~-~Y,, ~j~ting ·entries f'or the reasons 

I've mentioned. 

The present Decentrali~at~qn fJ.an is a "Model A," so to speak. 

We wiU have ea opportunity to d.i~~s <J:etails· of this Plan with you 

at t~e regional rQUlld~~ble ~~~~~9ns s~~~~ed on the agenda for 

+ater this morni:m.g~ 

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EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

Let us :now take up the matter of policies and procedures governing 

the Decentralization program. A Circular 'Will be \available in the near 

:f'uture which will set forth in more detail. what I am about to present. 

What will be decentralized? 

Certain criteria have been established which govern the selection 

of CCMINT entities and problems for dec.entralization. Time does not 

permit me to go into these in detail bUt I will mention some of the 

criteria briefly: 

(1) That a requirement for the end-product is included among 

the EEI 0s of the comm.ands you support. 

(2) That your unit can prepare the end-product as efficiently, 

and as fast, or faster, than the National Center. 

(3) That your unit has the capability for complete assumption 

of the task sufficient to meet the minimum reqUirements 

of the field commands you support and of the Waahington 

consumers, as veil as the standards for continuity and accuracy prescribed by the National Center. 

( 4) That ve can make available to you, all, or almost\. aJ.l of 

the raw material. required for the reporting mission. 

(5) That all security factors as set forth in UK.USA agreements 

have been met, and that the 1

teclmiques, material or\equipment required ate not of a nature considered too sensitive 

for forward exploitation. 

Further, normally only' Cc::RIN'? problems of foreign mili ta.ry or 

paramilitary organizations Will be considered for decentralization. 

This does not mean that non-military communications will never be 

decentralized because thete are non-military communications which pass 

information of a military nature. For example, certain carmmmications 

.Normally, no CCRINT problems of a purely research nature will be 

decentralized. For example, one time pad systems, systems involving h :7:' :rysis problems, tmal.ysis of cammmications such 

as and initial diagnosis of' unknown systems. The 

Na; o en r work problems of this nature and will forward 

results of such research to the field for decentralized reporting missions. This is not to say that the field will not engage in research 

of simple hand-ciphers, of cOde and Key recovery of' certain systems,. or 

in analysis of simple callsign systems, frequency rota systems and the 

like.' 

The type of research to be conducted in the field will be that 

which contributes to the decentralized reporting mission and will be 

as determined and specified by the National Center in advance. 

Let me expand on this question of field capability. 

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Normally, we expect your unit to display a capability f'or assumpt:l,on 

of any decentralized reporting mission from within your Service resources 

However, if the assignment of' technicians from the National Genter to you 

on a TDY basis will raise your eapabili ty to an acceptable level, such 

assignment will be considered the rule rather than the exception, and 

the c~ problems will be decentralized. 

We realize there are many factors, over which there is little contx-ol, which may affect your capability. Factors such as rotation of 

personnel, and the long period required to train an analyst. For this 

reason, skilled teebnicia.ns tram. the National Center or from one of the 

other Services will also be assigned on a TDY basis, as necessary to 

maintain capability on problems already decentralized durimg critical 

pm.ods of personnel rotation. We ask you to keep us advised of your 

needs for assistance. 

What operations doe~ the National Center conduct with decentralized 

entities? -

Decentralization of a reporting mission does not mean we cease all 

effort with the C(l(INT entity at the National Center. We have a continuing responsibility for all required long term reportiilg an.d. other re- · search. We al.so have a responsibility for maintaining continuity of the 

CaccNT problems concerned for technical. control and support programs. 

The latter responsibility requires that the National Center be provided 

a copy of the same raw materiaJ. or semi-processed material. you utilize. 

It Will result, l>.DWever, in reduced requirements for the forwarding of 

auch material. by electrical. means . 

When Your ullit assumes decentral.ized responsibilitiei;i, the amount 

and nature of technical support provided you. will change. Since you 

have the capabilH;y for taking over decentral.ized reporting, obviously 

you will not require the same ~egree of' technical. support. · 

Wnat is the role of the NSA Field Activities under decentral.ization? 

The NSA F'leld Acti vl ties will exercise a s·lie'Wardship :f'tmctic'n over decent..~ized problems • They will be responsible for insuring that an 

adequate level of capability exists in the field at aJ.l times • They 

will assist you in ta.king immediate emergency actio~s, should any 

difficulties arise. They will also facilitate the temporary assignment 

of specialist personnel to field units. 

What'ha.ppens when a decentralized COMINT ;problem cb.a.nges in nature or 

in scope? 

At the outset, probably an increase in the fl.ow o:f' technical support 

from the National Center to Your unit. If the change cannot be resolved 

in due course and the problem bas essentiaJ.ly become a research task, 

arrangements "fiill be ma.de to return responsibility for the problem to 

the National Center. 

This leads us into another important facet of the concept of decentraJ.i zation -- JO~ RmPONSIBILrrY~<or JODT OPERATION. This term is 

new but the si.tuation.it covers is not, for this is precisely the status 

of all non-decentraJ.ized COMINT entities worked in the fiel.d today. The 

National Center and the field a.re both conducting reporting on the same 

COM:ENT problems . Why? Because the criteria for decentraJ.iza.tion are not 

yet met. For ex.ample: Your unit may not yet have the e~pabili ty of the 

personnel to take over the problems on a decentraJ.ized basis, (or) We 

,.. r 

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-WO SECRET EIDWcannot make all the raw or semi-processed material available to your unit, 

(or) Sensitive cr;ypta.na1ytic techniques or equipment are utilized to work 

the problems (or) Exploitability of the problem is sporadic. 

JOINT OPERATION describes an element o:f' the n:f'lexibility" we desire 

to achieve in decentralized operations. For example, you have a timely 

reporting mission on a decentralized basis, but suddenly, changes occur 

which necessitate that the National Center assist in reestablishing the 

exploi tabili ty of the entity. The problems then become worked on a 

JOINT OPERATION basis • It is no longer unique field reporting, both 

National Center and the field conduct similar operations with the same 

Ca.1IN'l' entity. 

The degree of duplication under Joint Operation may vary. 

(l) We may have complete, or almost complete, duplication until 

full decentralization takes place. 

(2) We may have complete or partial duplication to recover exploitability o:f problems Within the entity which have 

undergone changes. 

(3) We may have little or no duplication on a Joint Operation 

basis because it is possible to arrange a division of effort 

between the field and the National. Center based on such 

factors as: responsibility tor certain casebook numbers 

(or) cryptographic systems (or) sources of traffic or any 

other identifiable ~lements. 

We must bear in mind that insofar as problems of an area or theatre 

nature are concerned, Cc:MJ:lr.r activity conducted on a Joint Operation 

basis is interim in nature. The g0al. is decentralization, and as I 

mentioned earlier, decentral.ization is not a dismemberment of production 

and reporting -- it is really a sharing of responsibility. 

To summarize, there are only three major differences between CCMINT 

operations which are decentraJ.ized and those in a Joint Operation Status. 

How are problems decentralized'! I refer here to the paperwork and procedures. The instrument -through which decentralization is accomplished 

is the Operations Order Annex. Ea.ch of these directives spells out in 

detail the exact responsibilities being delegated to the field unit. 

These normally inc1ude: responsibility for intercept control, 'l'EXTA 

responsibility, and responsibility for the production of specific, timely 

end-product and technical. reports. 

These directives are prepared in close coordination with technicians 

at the National. Center who are working with the CCMINT problems being 

decentralized. The Amlexes are coordinated With the Service and are 

implemented through the Service Cryptologic Agency headquarters. 

Ailnexes Will aJ.so be promulgated f'or tasks performed on a Joint 

Operations basis. 

When your unit assumes responsibility for a decentralized C<>IIN'f 

processing and reporting task, you enter into a. special relationship 

with the NationaJ. Center and With aJ.1 consumers who receive your product. This includes the so-caJ.led Washington consumers: State 

Department, CIA, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy and 

Department of the Air Force. The CCHIN'f you produce may be received by 

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Mr,. Dulles (eithe~ or both of the Mes-srs Dulles),, perhaps even by the 

President of the United States. You have been certified as capable of 

producing.accurate GOMINT. We do not delay dissemination of this COMINT 

in order to check it, or to republish it. We all look up to you as the 

experts on the decentralized problems. You have the responsibility for 

the entire National COMINT establishment for those COMINT problems 

decentralized to you. 

Gentlemen, this concludes the pres~ntation on. decentralization. 

I ~ealize this has 'been a,_g;rea~ deal to set forth to you in some half 

hour 1 s tiJne. t 1m sure ma.nY o·f· you have que~tions which we will attempt 

to answer. 

Thank you all for your kind attention. 

2. Quest:i,on_a.nd .Answ~r ~e;riod,: 

a.~ Col. Pulling, NSAUK, questioned the phrase "reporting as 

determined and specified in advance" and said he thought some 

reporting could not be specified: and determined in advance. Mr. 

Gietkowski replied that when using that phrase he waa referring to 

those types of reports set forth in the operations order annexes. 

b. Captain Enderlin, COM, as-ked for further clarification of the 

statement 11 decentralization of some problems to the field would result 

in reduction in the amount of electrical forwarding necessary." Answer: 

What was meant was electrieal forwarding. between. the National Center and 

field units, not between field units and field processing headquarters. 

c. A query was raised concerning ''decentralization on a training 

basis. 11 Answer: The proper term is 11 joint operation. 11 From the time 

a field unit puts one person on any given problem it automatically becomes a joint operation between the National. Center and the field unit. 

d. General Canine, at that point, asked to sa:y a few words. He 

said that we must make the decentralization program work. · He stated that 

he believes in it, and we must get the qualified personnel in the field 

who can do it. The Director then said he had a word of we.ming. He 

periodically receives part of the output of NSA, and is reluctant to note 

that sometimes efficiency is measured in terms of square feet of pape:r", 

in groups per da:y, or any other ''absurd yardstick11 • The Director stated 

it is amate'bll"ism to determine how well we do our job by the volume we 

produ-ce. He said we must not measure our success by bringing in someone 

and showing him the amount of dots on a board. He concluded his remarks 

with 11Let 1 s get down t.o ounces! 11 - - - with the implication that we should 

depend more on quaility and l.esssonnquantity. 

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W>P SECRET_ EID'iJ 

MEMORANDUM FUR m--RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 1 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

B. TOPIC NAME: DECENTRALIZATION: ?ACIFIC .AND FAR EASTERN AREAS 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CHAIRMAN: HENRY J. HERCZOG, CHIEF,\FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTION GROUP 

E. HIGIIT..IGHTS: 

1. Discussion centered around the NSA two-year de.centralization plan 

for the Far East area. The views of' the overseas commanders were solicited 

with respect to the specific problems scheduled to be decentralized to their 

respective headquarters •. In general, there was agreement on the problems 

which have been selected for decentraliz·at:ion and on the deadlines which 

have been set for each problem. The comments l!lade by the overseas commanders were considered informal and unofficial; the official views of the 

three Service C!"Y1>tologic Agencies concerning the two-year plan have been 

made known to NSA through official correspondence. 

2. Separate meetings were schedule4 for later in the Conference 'Week 

to discuss the followi~ three specific matters raised during th±s session: 

a. Lt. Col. Mize, Chief, N3A Alaska requested· that cer.tain changes 

ese c anges, w ic concerned the scope of 

e as a e or , an e possible advancement of\the date for decentraj..l.zation of the above pJ;"oblem were discussed at a\later ~eting held 

by r.epresentatives of N3A Alaska, ASA Field Units Branch\ (GN3-:53), Traffic 

.Analysis Support Division (NSA-94),, Special Division (NSA-72), and Field 

Operations Direction Group (NSA-063). A memorandum for the record 

containing the results of' that meeting will be circulated to all conce~ned . 

• 

b. LCDR Thomson, OIC, USN-27 stated that communications between 

USN-27 and USN-39 would have to be improved before USN-27 could assume all 

of its scheduled decentralized tasks. This question was satisfactor;t-ly 

resolved at a speciaJ. meeting held on 1 April. The Economic Division (NSA-75) 

has prepared a report of that meeting for distribution to all concerned. 

c. Colonel Weeks, Commander, 692oth Security Wing indicated that 

in his opinion the 692oth Security Wing could assume more decentralized missions than were included in the two-year plan. It was agreed that\ his views 

on the subject would be· the basis for additional. discussion during\the week. 

F. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RAISED: 

1. The discussion led to the problem of the 

of non-U.S. intercept. In particular, the delays 

timeliness 

in receipt 

I 

in the receipt 

of the traffic 

2. 

ke more time 

3. Discussion took place on the question of TEXTA responsibility. 

It was proposed, and the concensμsappeared to support, that TEXTA responsibility for all decentralized tasks be retained at the National Center, 

vi th the field relying on TEXIN to satisfy local requirements. In this way, 

the field could satisfy local requirement for rapid exchange of targets 

data, while the Natona.1 Center could back the field with comprehensive, 

all source, authoritative date. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

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G. RECOMMENDATIONS PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

1. That NSA examine the curl'.ent si ~aation with resl;>ect to the deli very 04 jia.teriaJ. Yd.th a vaew to inereas-ing the timeliness 

thereof. Cit is understood that certain actions along these lines have 

al-ready been taken.) 

2. That the Office of Exploitation (NSA-90), the Naval Security Group 

and the Field Operaticms Direction Group (NSA-063) explore the possibility 

of tasking USl'J-27 and USN- with increased weekl aiid monthl re ortin 

res onsibilities on the 

3. That all interested elemeat·s of NS.A, at the iI1itiati ve of the 

Field Operations- Dire,ction Gr011p (NsA-o63), ex•ne the proposal relative 

to T'EXTA handling (paragraph F-. 3, above) . 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

• 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 1 

B. TOPIC NAME: DECENTRALIZ~ION: EUROPEAN AREA 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CH.AIRMAN: MR. E. !. GIETKOWSKI, CHIEF, OEERATIONAL CONTROL; SECTION, 

FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTION GROUP 

E. HIGHLIGHTS: 

1. The NSA two-year decentr8.J..ization plan for the Europan area was 

the subject of the discussion. Those present were inyited to.make any 

comments regarding the plan. The comments made by the field commanders 

were considered unofficial. in nature since the official. views of the 

Services concerning the plan a.re being forwarded to NSA through official. 

correspondence. 

2. Lt. Col. Horton, USA, ASAE asked whether ASAE could rely on 

schedules contained in the plan. Reference was to non-counterpart problems now worked by AS.AE and scheduled for Navy and Air Force units. The 

Chairman indicated that some of the Air Force 1 tems would probably be 

rescheduled to conform to availability of AFSS Satellite linguists and 

cryptanalytic personnel, but that the Navy items were firm. Lt. Col. 

Horton further inquired as to procedures for initiating work on new 

problems. The ensuing discussion brought out that consumer EEis should 

be a guide to priorities of any new processing undertaken, that the NSA 

Field Activity should be informed, and that NSA would provide guidance 

where priori ties might be equal . EO 3. :3 (h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50-USC 3605 

3. LCDR Nil"hnli:inTl nno=\stinnPn the need for decentralizing minor 

nroblems such as I 

4. Colonel Clark, US.AF, 69ooth Security Wing, asked what should be 

done when a consumer does not want a COMINT report (reference was to 

Squadron SITREPS), and preferred a report prepared at Group level, even 

though it might be 24 hours later. Mr. Clark, NSAEUR, stated that a much 

greater education of intelligence consumers is required since they generally 

don't know what they want in terms of periodicity. 

5. Colonel Peterson, USA, AS.AF., expressed his belief ~that it was none 

of NSA's business what reports the field produced as long as they met 

consumer requirements . NSA should establish the type of report and not 

tell the field to stop reporting if the consumer requested such a report. 

NSA should not stifle field initiative. NSA ~presentatives indicated 

that it is the aim to give the field responsibility for timely reporting 

and that term reporting is NSA's job. If after adequate timely reporting 

is being accomplished by the field and they have the time and capability 

for doing more, the problem of additional. reporting would be considered. 

It was pointed out that the field should keep NSA informed of any long-term 

reporting they may undertake in order that there not be a duplication of 

effort. 

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F. PROBLEMS RAISED: 

It appears tb.Ei.t there is ~ need fQ~ eaeh field processing center to 

knew where~ iri: terms o~ priori ties,: e~:ch decentrSJ.i·zea problem stamd.s · 

with respeet to aii·0ther problems work~d at tbe field center 

G. RECOMMENDATIONS: 

1. That NBA re-examine the Squa.rdon Dir.ect Reporting program. 

2. That NSA provide guidance, or evo+ve a system, 'Which will contribute to the solution of the "pro·c~ssil'lg priot'ities"- problems mentioned 

in F, above. 

3. That- NSA consider -·the establishment of' a Joint' Service l'ield 

processing center in Europe for Satellite problems~ 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 2 

B. TOPIC NAME: CATEGORIZATION OF COMINT: PURPOSES, STATUS, INTERPRETATIONS 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: GENERAL MEETING 

D. CHAIRMAN: MR. JOHN J. CONNELLY, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF, FIELD OPERATIONS 

DIRECTION GROUP 

E. PRESENTATION: 

The following presentation was made by Mr. Milton s. Zaslow, Chief, 

CUrrent Operations, Plans and Control Group: 

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: 

As you are, I am sure, aware, the categorization of COMINT went into 

effect on 1 January 1955· I should like to discuss some of our mutual 

problems in regard to this, but first I think you would be interested in 

knowing t;i.s much as possible of the background of this action - - why and 

how it got started. The story goes somethinglik.e this: 

At least as early as 1951, senior people in the COMINT business met 

to discuss ways to achieving greater security. They were all concerned 

that the "need to know11 principle was supported by many but followed by 

few, that increasingly large amounts of paper were being passed a.round, and 

all with our highest classification - - TOP SECRET CODEl-TORD. They felt 

that we were perhaps trying to give maximum protection to too much. It 

was their feeling that we should isolate that COMINT which was really the 

most sensitive and :·guard it best, and put the rest of the COMINT in , 

effectively protected categories of lower classification to which there 

would be wider access. Discussions continued, and a new concept then 

appeared. Tb.ere were some who felt that plain text materiaJ. - particularly Russian plain text - was not nearly as sensitive as traffic analytic 

or cryptanalytic results, and not only could our dissemination standards 

be relaxed but we could employ processing people who might ordinarily 

not be clearable for COMINT - - primarily people with foreign backgrounds. 

They argued that the nature of the information from Russian plain text 

was such that its processing required not only complete familiarity with 

the language, but excellent knowledge of some scientific, political or 

economic field. For this purpose, they maintained, specialized persons 

of foreign background were necessary. While there was some agreement in 

principle, there were so many different points of view that a clean-cut 

d§cision was never reaJ.ly made • Against this backdrop, in 1953 representatives of USCIB met with their British counterparts and worked on this 

problem of the principles of security and dissemination. In general., it 

may- be said that the impetus behind this re-appraisal. of our security 

procedures came from the American side, with the British much less 

enthusiastic for the kind of changes we had proposed. Finally, after a 

long series of drafts, redrafts and compromises, the two groups agreed to 

a paper which we now know as the latest revision of Appendix B of the UK.USA 

agreement. 

It is in .Appendix B that we find the legislative basis for categorization. 

Incidentally, the same sort of exercise was carried out with Canada. The 

essentiaJ. point here is that regardless of who originally sponsored any 

particular aspect of categorization, every member of USCIB played a pa.rt 

in its drafting and voted for it. This included the Army, Navy, .Air Force, 

NSA, Secretary of Defense, FBI, State and CIA. 

'"TOP SEe!HBlf- CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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As approved, .Appendix B dealt with the two basic issuea that started 

the revision of the security appendix in the first place, but not in the 

wrw their proponents had anticipated. We find that: 

1. The proposaJ. that we give maximum protection t.o only the most 

sensitive materiaJ. was met by placing, in the main, results_ of aJ.l. cryptanaJ.ysis, the most important traffic analysis and even some plain text 

in the highest category, and 

2. The proposaJ. that we relax both distribution a.nd clearance 

standards for Russian plain text was met by placing it within the category of highest sensitivity. USCIB a1so declared that standards for 

clearing persons for the least sensitive codeword material and most 

sensitive were identicaJ..-- · --

Based upon this policy, the implementing order on Categorization 

(which you know as Circular 50-7) was issued. It describes, in language 

lifted virtually unchanged from the Board papers, what we ho'w have with 

Categorization. Briefly stated, there a.re three categories and two subcategories. Category III contains that COMINT, the protection of which is 

the over-riP.in:g consideration. It is TOP SECRET CODEWORD. In this category we find all cryptanalysis except for operator codes and similar systems, 

most T/ A "fusion" material and any plain text or other material which is 

of particularly h;tgh va1ue or sensitivity. Within this category there 

are two sub~categories, each considered less sensitive than Category III 

but more sensitive than Category II. '0ne is for Special Weather material 

and the other is fer Next is 

Category II which is classified SECRET CODEWORD. Here we find some_ low- 11 

grade crypt materials, most traffic analysis and plain text,! I 

codes, and RFP and MOA results . Last we have Category I which ie rather 

a recent idea. This is COMINT without a codeword and m8i}"be classified 

CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET. (There has been some confusion on 

this point. Some: people were under the impression that aJ.l Category I 

was CONFIDENTIAL. T.hi.s is not so. ) This category was established to 

permit greater operational use of tactical COMINT.. Ri. t now Cate or 

I includes 

and simple T A relating to D F mission 

L-cm;s'.I:gn:mem;r,, -m~m~re§p(irt~aanffiI"""'i'ix reports involving no int~rpreta.tion 

of complex changing systems . · 

You may wonder why it is necessary to spell out the contents of each 

category in such great detail (down/to crypt system s~orttitles), and 

why none of yqu is authorized to take any action in Categorization. It 

must be clearly understood that the procedures have been laid down by USCIB 

anQ. NSA i.s only its agent in t)lis matter. First of all, e.lmo.at all 

Categorization actions must be taken twice . .· In order to place a crypt system 

in Category II, for instance, it must first be declared "suitable" for 

assignment and, subsequent to that, the/actual assignm~nt can be ma.de. In 

addition, a definite series of steps must be taken for each Categorization 

action, an.a. I should like to explain them so that you will understand 

why we cannot expect imnediate results. When any responsible COMINT production unit, eithe.r at NSA or the field, encounters a situation which they 

believe requires/Categorization action, they must immediately notify the 

Technical Director. The Technical Director has been designated as the 

single individual to make the basic determination on Categorization 

because we· .believe them to be matters of the most mature technicaJ. assessment, and these/decisions involve not only evaJ.uation of COMift production 

developments/to .determine proper classification levels, but affect assignment 

of personI1el and deployment of COMINT activities. Once he has made his 

determination, NSA is required to consult with representatives of each 

of'/theUSCIB member departments and agencies. (Ordina,rily this is done 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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with their people resident at Arlington Hall.) Following this consultation, NSA must then cable the British (and in some cases, the Canadians) 

for their concurrence in assignment to the "suitable" list. If they do 

not agree, everything stops. (This has not happened yet and we don't 

anticipate tha.t it will). Onee the British (and this means GCHQ) concur, 

then NSAmust get the formal concurrence of each of the USCIB member 

departments and agencies before it can make the assignment. Here, too, 

if any one does not concur, no action can be ta.ken. If there 1s·unanimous agreement, however, then NSA can make the necessary notifications 

to all units and only then can any action be taken. Natonly mus.t these 

steps be taken when a new system appears, but also every time 'there is 

any permutation of that system. This sj.tuation arises because Categorization actions are tied to specific short titles of cryptographic systems, 

and cryptographic changes are alw~s indicated by nev short title ·notations. 'fb.~- effect' of this)program. is that whenever a cryptosystem which has 

been formally assigned to Category II (and therefore published as SECRET 

CODEWORD) undergoes this sort of change, it must be treated as an entirely 

new system and therefore automatically upgraded to Category III (TOP SECRET 

CODEWORD) • It must remain in this most sensitive category ttmoughout 

the period that all the steps in the entire categorization procedure 

are retraced, and because this involves the many concurrences which have 

been described, this period is of unpredictable duration. We believe that 

this is questionable arrangement for at least two 'reasons: 

a. It negates the stated aim of Appendix B which is that a 

system once downgraded mS\Y not effectively be upgraded, and 

b. It would automatically deprive any Co.MINT user who was 

authorized to receive only Category II COMINT of this information during 

the recategorization process. If the cryptographic change occurred prior 

to or during an emergency, he would be deprived of CaaNT when he most 

needed it. In order to insure an uninterrupted flow of information to 

COMINT recipients, we are recommending to USCIB that it affirm that the 

Director, NSAm~ assign a cryptosystem to the same category assigned to 

the system which it succeeds, when he determines '.that it has not undergone any change which affects the level of cryptanalytic sophistication 

or any other criteria normally applied to assignment of COMINT to categories. 

There are other aspects which are of interest. For instance, (1) 

Both Special Weather COMINT and""'I -..,,,,...-....,,...-..,.........,,......,..,,.......,...__,,--....,...___,,....,,,..-....,,..... 

COMINT are sub-categories of III. We understand that when materials of 

two classifications are used, the product must carry the higher'classifi.: 

cation. In the case of these sub-categories, however, there is no indication that one carries a/higher classification than the other, --what is 

the proper classification of a report containing TOP SECRET BASTE and 

TOP SECRET SAPPY? We are settling this on an ad hoc basis as it arises. 

(2) Another interesting situation which arises in Categorization concerns 

I lwhich is of particularly 

high intelligence vaJ.ue is placed in a less sensitive sub-category of 

Category III, while any other plain text, passed on the same circuit and 

of high intelligence value for the same reason as t}1.el ~is 

placed in the most secure Category (III), higher than t§el I· 

(3) Still another point of interest is that we meyexpect a single item 

to be issued in two categories simulta.n,eously~ For example, if the same 

Category II plain text item is pro~essed by N'SA or GCRQ and a field unit, 

it is possible that opinions xnW v~ a.S to its high intelligence content, 

and one of the three uni~~Jm\Y'issue it as Category III, while the others 

may retain it in Cat~go1! II. (4) Or, material from a particular system 

may be intercept~O.~dconsistep.tly issued in Category II as SECRET CODEWO:aD. A siI1glE! message or group of messages in this system may then be 

acquire~~I:lall operation classified TOP SECRET. These new messa.Ses would 

have.'t:obe Category III (TOP SECRET CODEWORD) because of the source ~~8.Ssi~ication. (5) Still another situation - - as the Categorization 

PL s5·_351so'us.c 3605 • 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 'POP SE911B'! CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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TOP SECRET EIDER 

lace 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

I cite these to indieate that as it is presently operating, 

Categorization has yet to filfill its expressed intent·, which is to enable 

the designation of recipients by categories. It can easily be seen that 

except for the most restricted circumstances, anyone who required COMINT 

could not effectively depend upon only one category to supply his needs. 

It is dOUbtful that a Corps Cormna.nder, for example, could be satisfactorily 

serviced with only Category II CeJIINT. There is reason to believe that 

the users of COMINT are now aware of this . We have not been. informed 

that there a.re any recipients who can receive only one co,deword category .. ·: 

For the same reasons, compa.rtmentation of COMINT production facilities 

along these lines would in many eases decrease our potential to produce 

the best and most current COMil'J!. The distmcti6ns which place COMINT 

into certain categories are not necessa.ri:Ly meaning:f'u.l in the processing 

effort. It can thus be seen that Categorization, a plan essentially 

devised for the convenience of the users, has yet to be applied by them, 

and that 'its major burden is placed on the producers who do not require 

it. I believe that we must weigh the cost of Categorization against the 

advantages it gives the COMINT cormnunity, and base future action on the 

results of that assessment. We mey find that between .category II and III, 

we have a distinction but not .a diff.er.ence. 

Nevertheless, so long as it is in force, we must do everything in our 

power to make categorization work. 

One veI71 desirable aspect of the Categorization scheme is the use 

of Category I, and I should like to discuss that for a moment. We all are 

familiar with the long standing dilemma between seC'U.rity and effective use 

of COMINT· By the device of Category I, we now have a mechanism for more 

widespread. operational use of certain tacticaJ. materials, which could give 

direct assistance to people who have an unmistakable need to know, but 

who should not or need not be Codeword cleared and indoctrinated. We are 

all familiar with ~highly successful Air Force COMINT GCI operation in 

direct support of U.S. fighters in the Korean war. Not only is there 

authorization for this operation if circumstances require it, but because b 

of the Form.cs~ crisrs-si'll11li;i.r authorization has already been given for 

this type of information to be passed in the East Cll.ina area, and this has 

been done. Category I is given the same handling as intelligence materials 

of the same classification, and attention must be given to its proper 

classification. A.lthough it mey be issued as CONFIDEWrIAL, this is not 

the only classifieation. For example, if the Army classified its CISD 

operation in Germany at the SECBET level, then no Category I COMINT from 

that operation may be classified lower than SECRET. Moreover, individual 

items produced which are particularly sensitive and are similar to other 

intelligence materials classified TOP SECRET, should properly be issued as 

TOP SECRET. In general, classification of all Catego:ry I material should 

follow that of ~on-COMINT intelligence materials of the same type. 

Wherever a need arises for this type of information (and it is within our 

capabilities to supply it), we will of course do eve0rything to make COMINT 

as useful as possible. But there are certain cautions which must 'be · considered·. 'Never for~t 't:bat this carries no codeword and recipients 

of this category only must not be indoctrinat.ed. In addition, there a.re 

certain provisions for disguise of this material. Strictly speaking, this 

does not directly concern the COMINF producer in that normally his recipients 

are codeword eleared. However, if Category I is to be used effectively in 

fast-moving situations, it is obvious that COMINT producers can assist the 

intelligence people by issuing their Category I material in such a wey 

that it can be used properly; and at once. For instance, every effort must 

be ma.de to prevent transmission of.Category I COMINT in a manner susceptible 

to interception unless it is disguised as operational instructions. Yet 

'fO:P B!CRET CON'FROL NUMBER 55-l 035 

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on6e it leaves the COMINT producer, there is no Wf13 of :insuring that this 

provision can be effectively ~nforced. 'fh.is requires coordinatton between 

the producer and the user; and it iii essential that this be d:one whenever . 

we anticipate a Category I situation to develop. We have asked our Field 

A:dti'Y.':l.t.y:; Chiefs to look into this problem, and we are greatly interested 

in any plans for possible future use of Category I. 

O.ne last point. We have discovered that 9Cifo of all so-called questions 

of Categorization are actually straight-forward questions of classification. 

While we can equate any category to a single c~sification, they are not 

the same thing. It must be remembered that the codeword is not:.a ~classification but merely a source designator. Moreover, the most important ;:Line 

to be drawn in COMINT iB not between codewords but between all codewo:i-d 

CCMINT (Category III and II) and COMINT without a codeword (Category I). 

When problems of Categorization arise, we will be glad to give whatever 

assistance we can. 

With the exception of the intr~duction of Category I, and the Russian 

plain text sub-category, things are really not much different from what 

they were last year. But we recognize that problems do exist; We want 

to know what they are. Some we ·can solve ourselves. As for others, ·we 

want to bring those "to USCIB and get the necessary changes approved. We 

would like your comments at any time. 

This is the end of my prepared talk, and I think we can probably 

cover quite a bit of ground in the questlflon period. Thank you for your 

attention. 

Fo DISCUSSION: 

Mr. Zaslow's presentation was followed by a question and answer 

period in which several of the salient points in his presentation were .~.l.~;c1~:;~. 

discussed and amplified. No particular recommendations were developed 

but it was evident that the program, as expected, had not been completely 

understood by all concernedo~e presentation and discussion served to 

remove some of misunderstandings which had prev:lously existedo The 

fa.ct that s~ra.1. of the features of the program are still under study 

and review within the UBmIB structure was also communicated to the group. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 3 

B. TOPIC NAME: "ALERT" PROCEDURES 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: GENER.AL ~ING 

D. CHAIRMAN: MR. JOHN J. CONNELLY, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF, FIELD OPERATIONS 

DIRECTION GROUP 

E. PRESENTATION: 

The following presentation was made by CDR George P. McGinnis, USN, 

Chief, Technical Control Section, Field Operations Direction Group: 

The subject of the discussion this morning is Alert Procedures. First, 

let me define an alert- in its narrowest sense, an alert is a. continuation 

of existing procedures but at an accelerated rate. That is to say, during 

an alert, we continue doing everything we normally do, or ~e authorized 

to do, in the intercept and reporting fields, but we do them much more 

rapidly. 

Several people have asked, ''Why mliSt the National COMINT establishment 

have alerts?" The answer is simple, "to provide early warning COMINT information to everybody involved in the defense of' the Nation, whether this be 

a Field Commander or the National Security Council. As an example: General 

Ca.nine has stated, "One of the primary missions of the Nations+ COMINT 

establishment is support to CONAD. 11 Now,· as most of you are aware, CON.AD -

the Continental. Air Defense Command - a join:t command, by the wa:y, is 

charged with. the Air Defense of the U. S. In addition, CON.AD has a 

collateral. duty of supporting the Strategic M..r Command, for the simple , 

reason that it requires up to six hours for SAC to get its bombe~s airborne, and during this period, they a.re highly vulnerable to air attack. 

This, then, is one of the main reasons for reporting alert conditions, 

'but in ad.di ticn, provision for notification of all interested consumers, and 

foreign collabo~ating Agencies has been included. 

The COMINT Alert System has done more than any other one thing to highlight tl?-e National character of the COMINT effort. 

The original. COMINT Alert Circular, Number 53-2, was published in March 

195'+, al though interim instructions had been issued by message almost a year 

earlier. 

The COMINr :Alert Circular received its first ''bath of fire" when the 

SAC-ADC exercise, called CHECKPOINT, was conducted in July 1954. This 

exercise involved a group of SAC bombers making simulated bombing runs- on 

the U.S. It was anticipated that there might be a·~soviet communications 

reaction to this exercise and f'or this reason a large number of COMINT units 

were directed to declarel·, an·:ia.1.ert and report on any Soviet reactions noted. 

As a result of this exercise, much was learned about our al~rt capabilities, but more particularly, much was learned about the deficiencies 

of our alert procedures. It was then decided that an NSA cammi ttee should 

be formed .for the f'ollov.i.ng purposes: 

a. Review all alerts and provide feed-back type information to 

the units involved when it was evident that the unit required additional 

instruction. 

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b . Provide the COMI:tfi' Establishment; with advic_e on proper Alert 

Procedures. This committee, called the ?ROD Alert Committe~, with representatives from the Office of Analysis, the Offi.ce of Exploitation, the 

Office of Collectien, the iield Operations Direction Group, Plans and 

Control Group, and an observer from the Office of Conmrunications, was 

established last July~ 

To date, 13 alerts involving about 80 COMIN'l' units have been lield 

under the terms of Circular 53-2, all of which have been analyzed by the 

Alert Cammi ttee. A total of 48 technical support. documents, each containing many separate i tezns, have been · forward~d to the field by the Alert 

Committee .. , These docμments ea.ch deal. t with a specific alert, and ·~ontained instructional type information believed to be of value to some 

particular unit or uni ts. This Alert technical support program has paid 

big dividends because with each succeeding alert, the number of technical 

errors committed by individual units has decreased td a marked degree·. 

In addition, the Alert Co:gmiittee acted as a coordination body to 

assist the National Security Agency in rewriting Circular 53-2. - This· 

rewrite was completed recently, and the revised circular was published in 

February, 1955- This version corrected at least three major deficiencies 

noted in the earlier version, including the f0llowing: 

First, the revised circular was distributed to all U. s. COMINT units 

whereas its predecessor went only to overseas processing units. We feel 

that it is of utmost importance that al.l COMINT units be permitted to 

declare al.er.ts. I believe all of you will remember the tragic situation 

at Pearl llarbor where the lone radar operator detected the approaching · Japanese aircraft, but was unable to pass the information to anyone who 

would t~e action on it. Is it not entirely possible that a lone D/F 

station on KwajaJ:.ein might intercept a plain language message whi~h would 

advance information on enemy movements? The present circular provides 

the ne.cessary authority,· and prescribes the necessary actions, to permit 

this lone D/F station to alert lbhe entire u. s. ~fense establishment. · 

. . . ( ' 

Second, mi executive agent procedure was establishe~ in each area to 

permit a single COMINT unit to report an alert fo-r that entire area, thus 

obviating the requirement that all th..""ee Services COMINT Upits· report on 

the alert. Under previous procedures, all three Services in each theater 

I frequently went on alert and many of their reports were forwarded to the 

same addressees. This resulted in a l~ge volume of messages from intercept stations of all three Services. Under the executive agent plan, after t~e initial ale.rt declaration, the Chief of the NSA field a~tivfty decides 

which COMINT unit has primary cognizance of the alert and directs that 

unit to forward all r~ports on the alert. All other COMINT,.units in the 

area having any information concerning the alert, whether in the fo;rm of 

raw traffic or end-product, forward it to the executive agent. The:net 

result~ been a tremendous decrease in the number of.reports generated 

by any one alert. 

And third, C9M£NT uni ~s in one theater or area ~e not required to 

forward their alert reports to otheT theater,s.~ess the other theater 

is involved in that alert. On this chart, yicbu will see a typical theater 

COMINT . arrangement. We have an Army, Navy, and Air Force COMINT unit and 

an Army, Navy and Air Force consumer. 'fhe COMINT uni ts are connected 

electrically, the consumers are connected electrically and each COMIN'l' unit 

is connected electrically with his consumer. ·This same arrangement is true 

of other theaters. Now let us assume that the Air Force unit in Theater 

A declares an aJ.e:i::t. He notifies .his consumer a.D:d the other two COMINT 

uni ts who in turn notify their consumer. Under previous procedures, each 

COMINT unit would then address a message te:> COMINT units of his Service 

in other theaters, who in turn would advise their consumers, so that 

within each theater, we have traffic flowing in a sort of circle, and with 

traffi_c. flo~ng between C~w.f units of each service between theaters. 

TOF SES~ CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

The result was a tremendous volume of traffic, much of which is identical 

in text, flowing all over the world. Present _procedures require that a 

unit declaring an al.ert not forward his al.ert declaration message to 

another theater unless the other theater is involved in :the alert. For 

example, suppose a unit in the Far East declares an alert which it believes might involve units in Alaska. The unit woUld, of course, forward 

its alert messages to the Alaskan theater and the C()MINT units in Alaska 

would declare an alert if necessary. Now let us assume, in the course 

of the alert, that the I !"become involved. NSA 

might then decide that European uni ts should be appraised of the situation 

and would forward them the necessary information, or direct them to declare 

an al.ert if necessary. NSAwould, in addition, forward the initial 

alert declaration message and the final alert message to other theaters, 

for information, only, if necessary. 

In addition to the three major items mentioned above, several minor . difficulties were resolved in the current version of the circular, such as: 

a. Permitting flex~bility in the precedence of reports. 

b. Not requiring negative reports. 

c. Designation of Intel.and Tech series, rather than Series l 

and 2. 

To illustrate the normal flow of alert traffic in NSA, let us refer 

to these charts. In the presentation on Decentralization this morning, it 

was stated that the entire National Defense establishment places a heavy 

reliance on COMIET to provide early warning information. Chart 2 has been 

prepared to indicate the routing of the initial declaration message and of 

the Intelligence report. 

Chart 3 shows the routing of Tech (formerly called Series 2) reports. 

NSA declares alerts for problems worked exclusively by this Agency. 

In case NSA does declare an alert, the reports generated would be the 

same as for ·aierts declared by a field unit, except that the Intel and Tech 

reports would be prepared and forwarded by NSA. 

Chart 4 illustrates the alerts declared under Circular 53-2. 

(Editors Note: Cdr McGinnis reviewed ea.ch of the above charts in detail. 

The charts are appended to this memor~dum for the record.) 

Well, so much for the present Alert Procedures -- now let us look at 

what the future may bring. During the past few months, we have received 

from field units, several worthwhile suggestions concerning alerts and 

many of them center around the items indicated on this chart. 

(Editors Note: At .this point, Cdr McGinnis discussed the possibility of 

transferring "B" and 11Y" aJ.erts from NSA Circular 53-2 to NSA 'Circula.z:s 

52-15 and 55-l, respectively.) 

T019 SECltET CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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Fo DISCUSSION: 

CDR McGinnis presentation was followed oy a qttestion and answer 

periodo 

General approval was voiced concerning the alert procedures which 

have been established throughout the COMINT industry. 

Some specific points of discussion follow: 

Col. Weeks, 692oth Seea.rity Wing, recommended against any dismemberment of 'NSA Cireular 53-2. (The possibility of transferring 

same features of Circular 53-2 to other cirealars had been mentioned 

in the presentation.) Ma.,j .. Kellan, 691oth Security Group supparted 

this recommendation.. r 

LCDR Nicholson, Naval Security Group, strongly recommended 

against authorizing all stations to declare an alert. Rather 

LCDR Nicholson contended that any isolated station in possession 

of alert-type information should pass it ap ebannels to be ~valuated 

f'irsto Tb.is recamnendation is not acceptable to NSA. since the 'butlt;.in 

delays of' such a procedure would defect the purpose of the alert program. 

General agreement was reached that some system of brevity ad.dresses 

must be developed to reciuce transmission delays. NSA bad already been 

working on this problem and a solution is expected shortly. 

"1'.'bP SEe:flBI! CO'RTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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~ :1. ~ 1 

----

a n/ : I :' ::\ ~ : /j : } '· • ~ J' 

ALERT TRAFFIC FLOW INTER-THEATER 

THEATRE A THEATRE B 

I 

.... I ........ I 

ARMY· ARMY ARMY ARMY 

COMINT UNIT CONS•ER COMINT UNIT CONSUMER 

1 I I 

~ I ...... 

NAVY NAVY NAVY NAVY 

COMINT UNIT CONSUMER COMINT UNIT CONSUMER 

I 

..... I ....... I 

AIR FORCE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE 

COMINT UNIT CONSUMER COMINT UNIT CONSUMER 

-'!GP SKQimr CONTROL RUMBER 55-1035 

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COM 

90 Duty Officer 

(Meade) 

ALERT FLOW WITHIN ISA 

INITIAL DECLARATION AND INTEL REPORTS 

761 

FBI (A alerts 

only) 

STATE CIA 

764 

IOTE: Distri•ution to CIA and MEADE elements is llJ teletype 

G·2 

163 

OP922Yl I 

AFSSOP I 

• 

781 ! 

7614 I 

I 

'191? SEel\1!11 CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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FLOW WITHIN NSA 

TECH REPORTS 

COM 63 

IOTE: Tech. Reports an not Passed to Consumers. 'feP BEeft!i' CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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'1$1$ 

- ID 

GCHQ, CBN RC, DSB t 

(If They Received 

Intel. Report) r 

Appropriate 90 Div ( s) 

Concerned 

70 (fnfo.F 

- 61 (Info.) I 

Liason Office Concerned 

GAS· 53 AFSSOP-1 
:';: I '• r 1 a"'/ •I 11 "1 ~ l JI l ,i '• ( j 

-----

TfRTS 

ABLE 6920th 27 Aug 54 

3rd RSM 31Aug 54 

I e USN·14 4 Nov 54 

A SAFE " " " BAIER 5 USN·27 " " " 

USN-39 " " " 

USM-3 " " " 

6920th " " " 

USN-27 3 Sep 54 

USN-39 " " " XRAY 4 ASA PAC " " " 

6920th " " " 

YOKE 2 USN-27 6 Feb 55 

ASA FE " " " 

6920th " " " 

TOTAL 13 

ASAE 

6910th 

ASAA 

ASAE 

502 CRG 

6910th 

3rd RSM 

501 CRG 

ASAFE 

6920th 

USN-27 

A SAFE 

6920th 

USN-39 

6 Sep54 

" " " 

31 Dec 54 

" " " 

" " " 

" " " 

3 Jan 55 

13 Jan 55 

7 Nov 54 

.,, " " 

18 Jan 55 

5 Feb 55 

" " " 

18 Aug 54 

'l'6P SBeRB'l' CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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"TOP SECM! EliBRAo Topic lVOo 4 

Bo COMINT Communications 

Co General Meeting 

D. Chairman, Col. John J. Davis, USA, Chief, Plans and Policy Division 

E. Highlights: 

Presentation by Capt. ~thur Enderlin, USN 

Chief, Office of Communications 

General Canine - Gentlemen - Good Morning 

The COMINT Communication problem is never static. It changes with every 

success or failure of our processing efforts: With every shift of responsibility 

for a problem: and especially with every change in the nature of the target. 

For these reasons it is never possible to anticipate our firm requirements 

for COMINT communications in a specific area very far in advance, although we can 

determine with fair accuracy what our total, or world wide, requirements will be. 

Under these conditions we have to learn to roll with the punches: To adapt 

ourselves to changing conditions with a minimum of' strain. Anyone who thinks he 

can make a neat plan and program it out through the next three years is either 

going to be disappointed or he will get ulcers, or both. So our planning must 

always be flexible. 

We have nothing but subjective experience to guide us and to keep us from 

falling into pitfalls so deep we can't dig outselves outo Even so, we will take 

plenty of pitfalls. 

The essential ingredients of a reasonably smooth communication operation are 

therefore a great deal of experience and a great deal of resiliency, plus a 

determination to make it work. 

Yesterday you heard the Director say that decentralization requires, first, 

faith in the decentralization concept; and second, people who can do the · 

decentrali2ed processing. I respectfully submit that there is a third essential 

ingredient to successful decentralization, and that is the ability to communicate 

the results of our faith and decentrali?.ed processing to the people who have to 

have this information right now. 

There is no operational commander in the world who would be happy to learn 

that someone among us has information which is necessary to insure success of his 

operations, b~t which he can;t have because of communication failures. 

We can't lean back and be complacent about this. It is not suf'ficient for 

us to say or to think that communications is somebody else's problem. Maybe 

communications is somebody else's responsibility, but it is our problem, too, 

and we can't afford to sit back and let George do it;• 

When I look around at the tremendous network of communication facilities 

which the Armed Forces provide. for themselves and f'or us, and compare it with the 

communication facilities which the professional communication people provide for 

commercial communication purposes, I cannot fail to observe that the technical 

material of the Services is superior both in advanced design and in quantity. 

Yet it is also a matter at frequent ·observation that we are not as successful in 

Service communication operations as the professionals. Wb.y is this! 

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I believe the answer lies in peopleo You, and I, and everybody else concerned with Service communicat~ens. 

Your true professional communicator puts a little bit of himself into 

every message he handles. He knows what is happening to the message at every 

stage of its journey. He feels within himself' the results of a technfcal or 

personal fault anywhere along the line. He understands t~e consequences of a 

delayed or ~rbled message, and feels a personal responsibility for its cerreet 

handling, not only in his own shop, but through every operation until it is 

delivered. But he is not born with these qualities - he acquires them through 

experience. 

'?hat is the Magic Word - EXPERIENCE. 

In the Services we rely too often upon inexperienceo 

How often have I been told, in Service communication centers, that a certain 

j_ndividua.l is an expert, the man who keeps communications running, the ind.is- · penstl'ble man? And how often have ·r thought, after looking around a little bit, 

that what is said about him is unquestionably true in his own area of' competence, 

but what is actually being revealed to me is that ~show of assurance and 

competence takes on the aspect of superior ability and experience when viewed 

by those who are less experienced, including his superiors. 

I do not intend that you should imply from these remarks that I hold Service 

communicators in contempt. On the contrary, there are as good conununicators in 

the Services as out, and probably more of' them. But how do we use them? 

If you go into any cmmnereial communication center of importance you will 

find that the supervisory personnel, the people who are dealing directly with 

message handling, are old timers of ten or twenty or thirty years experience. 

They don't feel it degrading to be handling messages after all that time - on 

the contrary they are highly respected members of' their teams, and management 

listens carefully to what they have to say. 'fhese people handle messages for a 

living, and live to handle messages. 

In the Services, however, as soon as anybody gets to be any good he gets 

kicked upstairs to shuffle papers and loses all direct touch with what is, after 

all, the only reasons for his existence - that is, the fast and accurate handling 

of communications for commanders. And commanders, who have the most to lose, too 

often do not realize this. 

We have been trying to do something about this in this Agency. We used to 

have fresh caught second Lieutenants and Ensigns for communication wateh officers. ~ey were hard working and bright youngsters but they just didn't lmow. They 

believed anything anybody told them. We have succeeded in upgrading these jobs 

so that now they are filled by two stripers - Captains and Navy Lieutenants. 

It took some doing to convince them that they were not being downgraded, and 

maybe some of them aren't convinced yet, but by golly we do have a better background of general experience in those important supervisory jobs., and they are 

getting better educated every minute of every day, by both their subordinates 

and superiors. 

My education continues, too. Every time I go to a field station or talk to 

other communicators about their problems I learn more. After 38 years in 

communications there is still a lot I donvt know. One of !113' best teachers is 

the Director. He has his own ways of imparting knowledge - good ones, but not 

generally accepted in so-called progressive schools. 

In a few words, then, our principle problem is people, and the solution lies 

with the commanders. The problem is so important that it warrants their mst 

diligent and continuing personal interest. 

'.Io10P SKQREt! CON'.rROL BOMBER 55-1035 

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I do not imply that the problem is easy, or that under Service conditions 

it can ever be completely solved. I do believe that great improvement is 

possible, and I suggest that this problem can be attacked very much like you 

would attack an ice cream cone. 

There really isn't any best place to take the first bite, so just bite 

into it anywhere. After that is carefully chewed and swallowed, each succeeding bite will just naturally fall into proper place. But don't try to swallow 

it whole - if you do you may get indigestion. And don't delay taking that first 

bite, either, or you may wind up with a sticky mess on your hands. 

Commander Skinner will now tell you something about our plans for the future. 

Presentation by CDR John A. Skinner, USN, 

Office of Communications 

Planned World-Wide CCCC Program 

It is my purpose this morning to give you a capsuled picture of the current 

program for the world-wide Centralized COMINT Communications Centers; the 4c•s 

of which you have heard some rumblings and of which you will surely hear a great 

deal more. 

"At the outset it is advisable to review our requirements, in order to 

understand why we are embarking on a program which includes the construction 

of 6 4c 1 s throughout the world at a total estimated cost of $12 million dollars 

for switching and crypto equipment alone. If we briefly review the communications 

needs of the COMINT family, I think that our solution becomes more readily understood; in fact, obyious. 

Our first requirement is to move an increasing volume of traffic, securely, 

by electrical means, back to NSA-Ft Meade, between and within the various threaters 

out to the various field stations to new theater processing centers (when established) and to points of exchange with other countries. The volume of the traffic 

is greater due to the increasing number of intercept positions, while the complexity of the traffic pattern is increasing markedly due to the decentralization 

program and the efforts to provide more and better close support to senior field 

commanders. 

Our second requirement, which has been laid on by the Director, is the 

engineering of a communication system which will deliver intercepted material 

from the intercept site to the desks of one or more analysts in a matter of 

minutes. 

How can we meet each of these requirements? 

By off-line communications? This is a tried and tested system. Message 

texts are almost certainly secure. Tapes are perfect at the time of transmission from the originating station. However, off-line communications without 

traffic flow security is vulnerable to traffic analysis, but far worse from the 

communicator's point of view, are the built-in delays experienced in torn tape 

relay centers and the unconscionably high percentage of re-runs, a form of 

built-in traffic expander. 

Perhaps we can meet these requirements by on-line communications when 

traffic flow security is available, this system is particularly secure from 

traffic analysis, but most especially when it works it provides instantaneous, 

plain-language to plain-language communication from point to point. Its wellknown deficiency is the requirement that all components of the circuit nmst 

work and remain in absolute synchronism. If the radio circuits involved are 

poor or if the equipment not operating at reasonable efficiency, its availability for use may be limited. 

!'er' SEeM:'f CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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TOP SECRET EIDER 

Thus it appears that no currently conceivable off-line system can possibly 

achieve the speed of conmrunications which we require today. On-line communications nm.st be made -tswork in spii,e of the disadvantages with which we are 

fam.ilar o How can we do it 'l 

lo By establishing on-line communications circuits over relatively short 

hauls between the intercept sites and the 4C's and between the processing centers 

and the 4c 1 s. 

2. :By estsblishing on-line communications circuits by radio and cable over 

widely-diverse routes for the longer, more vulnerable, more heavily-used paths 

between the 4C's and :NSA. 

3. By instituting automatic switching in each of the 4C's which will reduce 

relay delays and provide full routing and handling flexibility. 

How will the 4c•s work? By the insertion of standard ACP headings in each 

message and 1>y use of a start of message indicator and routing indicators, the 

switching equipment will perform, aut01Datically, the relay functions previously 

performed by operators in tom-tape centers. 'I'he main features of the equipment 

for the 4c's will be: 

1. The ability to act on a message almost simultaneously with the receipt 

of the message heading. Tb.us, it will be possible to present the heading of 

the message at its destination before the end of the message is transmitted 

from the originating position. 

2o The ability to recognize the six degrees of' military message precedence 

and to handle all messages in a descending order of precedence. 

3. The ability to handle multiple call messages automatically in routing 

line segregation procedures prescribed in ACP 127(B). 

4. '?he compatibility with tom-tape operation, thus allowing piece-meal 

conversion of the COMINT network to automat~c operation as the availability 

of buildings, equipments, and trained manpoifer permits. 

5. The reduction in substantial numbers of personnel required to handle 

a specified volume of COMINT traf'f'ico 

60 ~e provision of suitable alarms which guard against loss or delay of 

traffic. 

What is the plan for the 4c's throughout the world'l As currently planned, 

the US COMIE'f community will enjoy the services of six 4c 1 s, each operated by 

one of the three Services, in-various parts of the worldo (Again employed a 

chart pointing out the 4c 's and s,:ltes which was unseen by the secre.tary) • 

Commented on the use of five full duplex circuits to local intercept sites, 

It would be ridiculous for me "to say that there would be no changes in this 

program, especially in the n:gmber am location of the tributaries to each of the 

4e 1s. Obviously, eyer-night changes in radio links are not feail'1ole but quick 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

'l'M' ffi!lemft' COlf.l!ROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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shifts in the number and routes of wire line circuits are expected. Likewise, on 

short notice, we will be able to modify the routing instructions stored in the 

memory of each 4c automatic switching equipment, thus obviating substantial 

changes in the routing indicators on a world-wide scale. 

In conclusion, in order to make on-line communications work fast enough 

to provide a real improvement over the off-line mode of operation, and to most 

nearly satisfy the communications requirements of the u.s. COMINT family, we 

plan to meld the advantages of each in a COMINT network of on-1.ine circuits and 

centralized COMINT communication centers. 

Major James O. Bolick, Signal Corps, will present a discussion regarding 

the special version of an automatic teletypewriter switching equipment which is 

engineered and built for the NSA permanent site here at Ft Meade. 

Presentation by Major James O. Bolick, USA, 

Office of Communications 

Up to this point the discussion has been primarily concerned with the 

Communications facilities planned to speed the return of traffic from the 

field. 

Now, let us look at the plans we have for getting this traffic into the 

hands of the user once it has arrived here. In other words, facilities to take 

care of internal distribution. These plans have been made with our new 

operations building in mind. Because of the size of this new building it soon 

became apparent that Messenger Distribution was out of the question. We considered pneumatic tubes but we ruled them out as not being flexible enough. 

We are using pneumatic tubes for some special purposes, I might add. We 

thought perhaps high speed facsimile might be the answer and in fact it showed 

great promise but we could not find a manufacturer who could guarantee a 

workable system in time. 

We finally decided that teletype distribution would best suit our needs, 

but we wished to avoid manual teletype distribution because of the personnel 

required to identify the traffic, decide where it was to go and then send it. 

If this human factor could be eliminated we felt that we would have the answer 

to our problems. What we wanted was an automatic distribution device, that would 

receive the incoming traffic, and automatically switch it to the users within 

the main buildingo With these requirements in mind, we invited some of the 

leading manufacturers of switching equipment to give up their proposals and 

recommendations for meeting our requirements. 

Fortunately, for us, we found that the Department of the Army had entered 

into a contract with the Automatic Electric Company of Chicago to supply 

Automatic Switching Equipment for some of their major relay stations. With 

certain modifications this equipment could be converted into a distribution 

system to meet our requirements. The Department of' the Army was willing to 

let us have one of these systems, it is now being modified and it will be 

installed when the new building is ready. 

Now in order for Automatic Distribution to be successful, the system must 

be able to accurately identify the incoming traffic, determine who gets ~t, 

set up the necessary distribution pattern and then deliver the message. In 

other words, incoming traffic must have an indicator that can indicate the 

distribution required on any particular message. For lack of a better name, 

we have called this indicator a "Delivery Distribution Indicator" or DDI:. The 

_DDI will be a group of three letters of the alphabet which will represent from 

one to ten distribution points. The first l.etter of the DDI will pe one of two 

specific letters of the alphabet, the second will be one of ten speci:f'ic 

letters and the third will aiso be: one of ten specific letters. Any given 

message ~Y contain either one or two delivery distribUtion 1indicators. 

If the message requires distribution to more than 10 delivery 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

points, two DDI' s \Till be required.. We cannot deliver to more than 20 distribution 

points on an automatic basis. As far as the field stations are concerned_, this 

DDI will be nothing more than a trigraph inserted in a particular place on a.11 

traffic. 'l'he field stations will be given instructions centaining/the type of 

traffic involved and the DDI or trigraph associated with it. It is our plan that 

a particular DDI will always be associated with a particular type of traffic. 

As an example of how this DDI will.operate with the Automatic Distribution 

system~let us say that the field stations are given instructi····ons to place AB .. C 

otj land that this traffic requires distribution to 

three rf'erent delivery points in the main building.. By means of' a plug board 

at the equipment, this pattern will be set up so that the <Ustribution system 

will send all ABC message to these three particular points. If the situation 

changes so that a fourth delivery point must get all ABC messages the pattern 

will be changed at the plug board and the equipment will now send ABC messages 

to four delivery points instead of' three. If there is a/re-or ni?:ation within 

the Office of Production causin the distributi n attern of 

to change camp e e , ange. L.....,..e.,,...-~s~t~r-::ib;:-u:-::t~ion pattern will be changed at the plug b.oard of the distribution 

system. 'l'b.iS means that the field stations will not be bothered by a constant 

stream of requests to change DDI's •. 

I would like to depart from Automatic Distribution for a moment to tell you 

about an interim distributio?l plan that we r.ave. .We have decided that we will 

not wait until the day that the automatic equipment is ready for operation' to 

begin the use of DDI's. In the near future, we will begin manual teletype 

distribution here in the barracks buildings and/we will use the three letter 

DDI's on this traffic. I would like to emphasize that the operation here in 

the barracks buildings will be manual teletype distribution. Since the volume 

of traffic here does not approach that which we will handle in the new building, 

we feel that we can utilize manual teletype .distribution to an advantage. At 

the same time, this operation will serve as/an excellent proving ground ta get 

everyone accustomed to the idea of placing/DDI 8 s on traffic. Th.is means that 

we will have at least 18 months experience with the D:DI 1 s before we begin 

Automatic Distribution. 

As far as automatic distribution is concerned, field stations will have 

to exercise a great deal of care in placing DDI's on their traffic in order 

to take full advantage of the automatic features of our systemo Let us go 

back to our example that requires the delivery distribution indicator of' ABC 

~ t Now if the operator in the field makes a 

stake and places ABX on a message of this type, then one of two things will 

happen when the message appears at the Automatic Distribution System. "If ABX 

is a good DDI assigned to another type of message then of course the equipment 

will deliver it to the distribution points associated with that particular DDI. 

If' ABX is not an assigned DDI, an alarm condition will occur and the message 

will be diverted to an intercept position. Th.en an operator will be required 

to take the message out of the system, determine who should get it, place the 

proper DDI on it and then introduce it into the automatic distribution system 

again. It can readily be seen that if either of these situations occur, a 

great deal of time and effort must go into getting the message back in its 

proper distribution channel. 

I have emphasized the use of DDI's because they are the very heart of 

our distribution system. I do not mean to imply; however, that the DDI is 

the only information the field stations must place on each message. The DDI 

will be only one item of a spec"ial routing line inserted as the first •• linei', 

of the text. However, all the other items of importance ·'in.·: this ··s:Pe6'ia1·. 

routing line will be fixed; .... and will require no special effort on the part ofj, 

the field stations, except of course, to make sure that the routing J,ine i·sf 

complete and correct. · · 

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-j9P SECRET EID. 

I have touched briefly on some of the aspects of our automatic teletype 

distribution system. I have deliberately stayed away from a more technical 

discussion concerning this subject. For those of you who are interested in 

more details, I will be happy to discuss it with you at yaur co?IV'enience. 

Our next speaker will be Lt. Col. Brock, Air Force. Col. Brock is Chief 

of the NSA Communications Center and he will ~iscuss the Communication Circular 

Program with you. -----Col. Brock----

Presentation by Lt. Col. G. B. Brock, USA 

My topic of' discussion is the 'NSA Circular Program which deals with 

electrical communications. 

We all know the need for reliability and speed in the communications 

business as it pertains to the COMINT field. 

While progress has been made during the past few years in developing 

improved cryptographic and teletypewriter equipment, little effort has been 

made to improve operating procedures, especially those pertinent to ON-LINE 

operations. 

We have been aware of this for some time and we believe our 101 Series 

Circulars will provide the answers to some of our problems. 

First, a little background as to why we need this Circular program: 

Let us approach this from a tactical communications point of view rather 

than the general command and administrative communications system which handles 

any and all types of traffic to any place on the globe, for COMINT traffic 

is related closer to tactical communications than to administrative coiilmunications. 

The Office of Production writes Circulars which tell the intercept 

stations the methods under which they will operate. Getting this intercept 

information back to the Consumer depends on communications; therefore, it 

is very necessary that rules governing this Communication System be concise 

and simple - in order that they may be effective. 

So let's face it - the present JANAPS and ACP's do not cover our ON-LINE 

operation-p. 1 Aside f'rom this - each Service places ·its· own· 1.nt·erpreta.ti:on on 

these Joint publications - and these imterpretations ar~;primarily·ma~ to~ 

benef'it .t~t par~icular Service, be it - Army - Navy ·- or Air Foree. • 

We in NSA have a definite requirement for a common procedure that covers 

Off-Line and particularly, ON-LINE operations with all three Services, so 

that we may relay traffic from Service to Service - and even through 

foreign channels with the minimum delay. 

Foreign governments, types of' equipment and the quality of circuits 

impose restrictions and problems. Now, these problems are not entirely 

solved by ACP 127 Baker or any of the other unified publications. 

Last but not least, we are advancing in technique - the 4c 's and the 

Automatic Distribution System require modifications of present procedures - so we need some actual experience with a procedure that is common to all 

Services - prior to the introduction of' these new techniques. 

We have published one circular and have four others in various stages 

of completion. 

'1'0P S!:CB:E! CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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Circular 101-1, covering the internal message format, has.been-in u~e with 

Services concurrence, since last November. 

Circular 101-2 deals with ON-LINE Net operations and is in the precess of 

being .re-written to include certain changes recormn.ended by the Services and 

Field Units. 

General-instructions for Off-Line operations are covered in Circular iOl-3. 

Circular. 101-4, Message Servicing Proced'Qi'es, will soon be forwarded to Service 

Headquarters and Field Units for comments o ' · · 

Lack of uniform operating procedures - such as - mes~age formats - routing 

methods and transmission instructions were not cause for ~'DY great_conce~n when 

our ON-LINE operations consisted primarily of a gre4J> a£ individual 'stations - few of which relayed other stations' traffico However, as'tlie number of stations 

operating ON-LINE crypto facilities increased, our in-station handli:mg became 

more involved. We assumed that your communicatie.~s people were faced with the 

same problems - possibly to a lesser degree - but still causing.an increase of 

handling time thro"Ughout the various CemCenterso This increase in ~ndling 

time can be attributed partly to increased traffic.volume, but,· in-statiorl 

delays-caused'by incomplete relay instructions - mu.ltip1e transmission requirements - inadequate message servicing procedures, and varied format requirements, place~~ the NSA ComCenter by the Service Cormn.unications Nets, were ~nd.are, 

contributing factors to the over all time lag between the time of receipt of' 

\a message to the time of transmission or delivery ef the me·ssage. A~ ON-IJ:NE 

'operations continued to increase, with resultant increase in handling time, we 

became more and more aware of the need for Uniform Operating Procedures. With 

this end in view, we proceeded to analyze traff'ic·from all three Services·to 

determine which procedures would best meet the· requirements of botp addressee 

and originator and which would cau.Se the least amount of work for both the 

originating and receiving ComCenters. 

/'---...__ 

Considered first, was a message format which could be utilized for both 

ON-LINE-and OFF-LINE operatiens, and which would permit delivery of page copy 

by the receiving eomcenters with no additions or deletions. This problem was 

resolved with the publication of NSA Circular 101-1. 

We believe NBA Circular 101-2 provides our communicators with a comprehensive set of rules which will enable them to process traffic with less work - less delay and less confusion because Of varied in-station practices. 

_NSA Circular 101-2 contains~ operat~ng instructions - outlining procedures for pre-determined routing. By prescribing this method of routing we 

have eliminated many of the time consuming processing steps previously ~equired 

to relay multiple addressed .traffic. We have alse provided a system for : 

routing t~af'fic via alternate ON-LIEE facilities. These ~cedures e~iminate 

many tran~-oceanic transmissions, since designated'stations will automatically 

relay traffic addressed to other stations in the same geographical area, 

including addressees of another Service. In preparing this Circular, and the 

other four, we have tried where possible, to reduce the load of the Communicator 

in the fieldo 

NBA Circular 101-3 is being prepared to guide communicators in the preparation o:f' OFF-LIEE encrypted traffic. The scope will be limited to phases of 

operations not governed by JABAP/ACP publications and will include - fpr 

example - tape storage requirements. We believe this subject matter should 

be covered ~o insure uniformity and to maintain continuity of the Circular 

Series .. 

One of our major problems, :f'rom the using sect,ions standpoint - has. been 

the id~ntification of traffic referred to in service messages - particularly - voluntary re-encryptions. Circular 101-~ has been prepared to'guide communicators in the preparation of service messages - and prescribes rules for the how -

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when - and to whom. Included are instructions pertinent to service messages 

whieh involves the use of 'both ON-LINE and OFF-LINE facilities. Our ON-LINE/ 

OFF-LINE operation is unique and no other pul.511.cation dealing with this type 

operation is available to field units. Circular 101-4 is primarily - a 

document prescribing accepted and proven service procedures. 

Our last circular, still in the preparation stage - is entitled - Communications Facilities Control. We hope t'o come up with general rules 

governing maintenance of circuit performance logs - standard phraseology to 

be used while transmitting in clear text to es~ablish synchronization, and 

general maintenance guides which will enable concerned to obtain maximum utili~ation of our ON-LINE and OFF-LINE facilities. This Circular will - for example - guide facilities control personnel in determining when to 

revert to OFF-LINE operations in the event of failure of 5UCO or other 

ciphering equipment. 

Your connnents on the circulars, fo;rwarded through NSA field activities - have been helpful in their preparation - and where possible and practical, 

recommended changes. will be incorporated prior to implementation. 

We are not attempting a fifth wheel type of Circular program - but, 

with your help, I am sure we can come up with one standard method of 

Communications Procedures that will work across the board ~th simplicity 

and effectiveness. 

'!Of SBem!l'f CO?f.IROL NtlmER 55-1035 

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e TOP SECRET e 

A. Topic No. 4"A" 

B. CCHINT Communications 

C. Round Table 

D. Chairman: Captain Arthur A. Enderlin, USN, Chief, Office of Communications 

E. Highlights: 

1. Discussion of communications problems involving Japan, Philippines, 

and Haw.ii. 

2. Discussion of new trans-Atlantic cables, viz: 

a. American Telephone and Telegraph Company/British Post Office voice 

cable. 

b. American Cable and Radio Corporation telegraph cable (under 

consideration). 

3. Discussion of the problem of standardizing communications procedures. Items particularly emphasized were (1) communications centers 

being confronted with varying U~S. procedures as well as the procedures of 

the Commonwealth countries, (2) the relative merits, with respect to 

headings, of digraphs, routing indicators, and the message indicating group. 

4. Discussion of the CCCC' s including ( l) primary employment for COMINT 

communications, (2) use of the CCCC's by the cryptologic Services, and (3) 

effect on existing communications arrangements on the technical level between 

U.S. cryptologic centers in Europe and U.K. counterparts. 

5. Discussion of courier forwarding including (1) attempts to devise 

means to reduce physical volumes by use of recordings, and (2) possibility 

of reducing material currently airlifted by using surface transportation. 

6. Discussion of 5UCO, usefulness, limitations, and plans for replacement with Cryptoplex. 

F. Particular problems and the actions required to resolve such problems 

are e'Vident in the summarization of discussions contained under Item E above. 

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~p s.ECRET EID •. .. . .. 

Topic lfumber 5 

SubJect: Collateral-Su;pport to Pield COMil'f Organizations 

Round Table Discussion "B" 

Chairman: George B. Brown, Chief', ~chn1.cal Library Division 

This round-table discussion was conducted in three parts, a presen~­

tion on Library support of field. operations, a presentation of operations 

of the Pablications Division and its facilities for support, and a question and answer period. 

a. LIBRARY ACQUISftIOIS. 

(1) LIB is committed to sv;pport of the llBA Field Activities 

through its Agency mission of respoui"bUity for procurement 

action on all publications obtained at cost or obtained cost free ,,. 

from government agencies other than the Departaent of' Defense. 

Pablications procured by LIB are therefore almost exclusively of 

an un.classif'ied nature. 

( 2) To date the unclassified publication needs of the Field 

Activities have fallen into tvo main categories: 

(a) Bilingual, and English language dictionaries 

tJtandsrd to BSA operations. 

(b} Publications of' the International 'felecomnmnicat.ions Union ("Berne Lists" ) • 

(3) Dictiolll(L!l Procurement: LlB considers any request 

:· 

from a Field activity to have top priority. In order that 

requests '1IJB1' b~ 'tiUed immediatel.7 LIB maintains stocks of the 

commonly used. clicticmaries in anticipation of requests for shipment. T:l.1;J.es requested and not normally stocked are given priority 

balldling. Where possible, local purchase is initiated and the 

Dqprest Fund. is used. This failing, LIB tries to select the dealer 

or publisher promising speediest possible deli very. Occasionall.7 

requests are received for items which exist in VerJ limited or no 

~ Sli:SRE!r CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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TOP SECRET EIDER 

. . , 

,, 

' .. " .,1 • ., I 

stock in the tJnited States. Procurement of these items must of 

necessity take: J,.onser._ Field a~tivities ha~ng tu.nds w~ch may . . .. . 

be used for· pur~.~.ef4,- i_~. th~il"._ ~ lee;~ 8.1".e.as would. do ~~ ~ 

procure f~r t~elves :f"oreign ~i~es_pμ.blish.ed in t}leir areas. • ' ' ' ' ,. I- ..: 

(4) Accountabil1..t1 .and Bandling: All books incorporated . ., ' l - " ,\ . .-

into the EA :i,.ibrary are_ vouchered. It is implicit,, :therefore,, p" r r I 0 o , I • 

that all Library material be s41pped fn:>m ~s e,ccount and J I O 

0 

... I •,;- I ....... ~ 

this account o.nq. ,LIB acts on requests !>)nly through the • • • • • ~ < •• 

eoordiaat~ faqilities. of the Field t>perations Direction 'o I.. .. 

Group (BSA-o63). -LIB ~ prep&ires an Arrq ~hipping Document ) ~ .. ' -:. . . . . - . . 

covering each shipment, a ~igne~ c;ow Qf ~eh must be return~d y~ ' I 

- ' , ... 

to LIJ3 as a d.uly·con&ti~ut~ ~redit voucher to the EA' Library 

Account. ·Shipments·. ' ~ • ~ 

'~e '° made'bY. I sea J ~]e~.~ • ~geney 0 t ~anting 'r l 

,air':'~J,. delivery is. cle'1"ly i.ad1~1:ed.·v -" 

( 5) nu Publieatieu ProcureJl18nt ;_ " _LI;B ini t.iates pur~e ~ ·~ ~ 

action on aμ.~ puplicati9ns utili~ed by al+ service intercept 

sta'\;ions •.. ~·~. r~po.nsibi~ty here, is exclusively ~t c;>f .a 1 • J • ~. • ' ., ' • 

pt,Jrchase ehamleL . 'fhe defini ticm of the +eqv.irement ~ the ' . . ' . I •; . - . . 

control of the di~tl1.bution 1~ 'J;he respoD.Sibility qt the Office - ... . .. . . .. .. . •' . 

of Collection., LIB actions are taken only' at vri tten direction • .. Jo • ·~ .! J ' .... 

from that O:ff+ce. ') 

b. :rqmxGN .. J'UBLICA!IGJIS COLLECTION l?BOGaAM OP IAD. ' ... I ' ... ..,. ;, .. ~ ... • 

(~) Because there continues tQ ~ise the ~~esti~ tl¥A1; 

NBA Field ActivitielJ ~end.,sllpP9rt.:to..t~s Beadquar~s ~-tl;le - .. .. .. • ..... J...,' 

procurement c;>f foreign. la.nguage __ pub~~~atioD.S, it 1~ felt that .. •' ~ . .. .. ,,. ... 

. 81\ explan~tio~ of ~ par~cipa~i~n in ~ torel.gn publ~cations , - v ... ' . • 

procur~t pragram of the :qitelligefse Aequisitipn and J)istribu~ 

tion Divisi~n of the DeJ>a:r'~t of S~te woUlcl be helptu;J.. 

· (2) In the ~telligence A,cquisition ~ Distribution (~) 

Division ll1 coajm~tion'With Fereiga Branch of' the PIA ~b~~ 

there is coord;tnated a world-wide foreign i.JU'blica~ions co~ecti<>n: 

~ ~e.~ G.ONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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.,p SE~~ EID.- , ' 

prouam. Foreign Service personnel do the collecting in the 

field. There are f'ive f'ull-time Publications Procurement 

Of'f'icers (PPO's), one each in Berlin., Paris, lbscow, Hongkong, 

and New Delhi. In addition there are part-time PPO's. '!'he 

:ruu. time PPG's and the part-time one in !'okyo select for the 

Washington participants within defined eategories of' requirements as well as till requests f'~r specific titles. Specific 

titles 1118.7 be forwarded :tor action to any of' the other l'oreign 

Service Posts. 

(3) In PI 1953 EA requested participation in this prouam 

and. each rear since has transferred funds to The Department of' 

State to cover coat ot the publlca'tions collected. Funds so trauf'erred in PI 55 total $21,000.oo. Pablieations pertinent to ISA's 

neecls' bave become generously available;· and it is felt that within ft1e framework of' this progE-am the Agency's ibreign j'iblications 

needs are being largely met. !'o date the only cost to llSA is the 

cost of' the publications themselves. Participation in the IAD 

prouam obviates the necessity tor dependence in large measure 

upon RSA Field Activity personnel for publications procurement. 

At the same time, there are the unusual. items, the hard-to-get 

items and rare occasions on which a particular request can beat 

only be met by assistance from the field.; 8lld in these cases 

necessary tba. arrangemez:its either exist or can be made. 

c. PUBl.ICATIOIS DIVISIOIT SUPPOll'! OP PIELD OPIBA'fIOIB . 

(1) There are two· main areas wherein Publications Division 

can be of' assistance, first, in answering specific inquiries, and 

second, in preparing and disseminating reports. 

(2) The Pablications Division COJIU)iles and maintains veey 

extensive and veey detailed tiles covering all countries of the 

world. Source mterial for these f'iles · comes f'rom both COJIDI'! 

and collateral. publicatiou, and they are intensively indexed in 

·such a WQ" tbat information concerning areas, subJecta, personal.-

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ities, organization&, and other matters et concern to analysts 

can be read.:lcy obtained. The t:t,les are ma:i.E.tallJ,ed prilaarily tor 

the u&e ot operating offices and cli.visions under the ~uty 

Director, Production, but are equally available for use in 8.nswering questions from the field. Field 'UDits ~request in.forms.-

tion by cable or by ceurier 1 and replies will be forwarded 

through the B-8 chewae1 s. The me.Jor problem ea~lmtered. by 

this Division in answering f1e1d requests is the detetmination 

·1 '{:.' 

of what is actual.ly wanted. The questions are not }#ecif'ic 

enough. If' requesters state clearly exactly what they want and, 

if' possible, the intended use of the information, the Division 

will be better able to provide all the information required and 

conversely not provide information lack1 ng pertinence to the 

problem. Working aids are being compiled and management 

studies undertaken in. an extemsive etfort to reduce the time 

required to provide service of' this nature. 

( 3) In the t1eld of reports 1 some are prepared on a con-' 

tinuing basis, and others on specific request. For e~le, 

the IBM nm.al lhave been published 

about once a year. lbre f'requent publication is probable. 

This s~ is of obvious in.terest to USB-39 as well as to RSA. 

Irulividual studies are normally done at the request of one of 

the PROD di visioms; however,, similar studies or tabulations 

can be made if reqaired on request f'rom the field. 

d. r>ISCUSSIOl'I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

.EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(1) The discussion centered around two main problems, 

the dissemination of collateral intormation to the field, . and t~ need for standardization of terminology. 

(S.) In summar;y, some field units are get~ no collateral support, others are getting some, but feel that 

a.ddi tional information is available that WC>Uld be ~t use to 

them, while others are getting mre than they can ab,0rb. ' . 

\.._ 

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-t>P SECRET EIDSThere is no standard for determining dissemination on an overall basis as the mission and needs vary. 'fhe responsibility 

ot RSA in this field is not clear in relation to dissemination 

of collateral documents to field stations by their parent 

services. There appears to be a need for surveying the requirements of each headquarters and station, determining what each 

is nov receiving, either from. its parent service, from ISA, 

~or w lateral dissemination in the field; then, establishing 

an automatic dissemination system based on requirements. 

Extension ot arrangements for lateral distribution 1n the 

field, p~nticularly P,~. CIA reports, appears desirable. A 

staff study q:B.L'this whole problem is essential, and one has 

been initiated by the PROD statt. 

(3) Concerning standardizaticm. of terminology, the 

discussion centered on place names. It was pointed out 

that, with coordinates lacking in messages, with the numerous possibilities in transliteration, and with Japanese, 

Chinese, Korean and US maps in use, it was very difficult to 

pinpoint the place or cultural feature mentioned. It was 

reported that a manual was in preparation in PROD that 

should clear up nm.ch of this problem, and that it vould be 

re~ tor the printer "in a few weeks". Field distribution 

will be made. 

(4) There was general agreement that round-table discussions of this type were most useful, and that they .~ilfould be ~\ ~ 

supplemented by mre field trips to give individual station 

personnel regular opportunities to discuss their particular 

problems with Bead.quarters personne1. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. Topic No. 6 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

B. British Empire COMINT 

c. General Meeting 

D. Chairman: Col. John J. Davis, USA, Chief, Plans and Policy Division 

E. Highlights: 

Presentation by Col. Barton s. Pulling, SUSLO, London and NSAUK 

This noon my general topic is British Commonwealth COMINT. I plan to 

cover this subject by explaining to you, with diagrams where appropriate, 

the following facets: 

a. The place GCHQ occupies in the British government; 

b. The reorganization of GCHQ and my views on the reasons for the 

reorganization and its effectiveness; 

c. GCHQ - USLO technical support to U.S. COMINT uni ts in the 

European - Mediterranean area and the co.m;praaises made by both sides in 

order to furnish this support. 

The role of the liaison officer is not always pleasant, but it is invariably 

fascinating and instructing. I'm a little cogwheel between two big wheels. The 

big wheels, for reasons of national prestige, can never"make mistakes. Hence 

any differences in view or interpretation can be laid on to the little wheel. 

My broad, expansive brow speaks more eloquently than words to show that I have 

learned the philosophy of the little wheel. 

Now, I would like to discuss with you the place GCHQ occupies in the 

British Government. We are all familiar with our own national organiz~tion and 

if you make mental parallels as I talk I believe you will find the similarities 

and differences instructive. Probably the most noticeable difference between 

the corridors of Arlington Hall and.those of Oakley Farm is that in Cheltenham 

you will see no uniforms. GCBQ is a civil service organization, administratively 

under the Foreign Office, and its Director has a civil servant's rank with 'P8Y and 

privileges equivalent to that of an Admiral, full General or Air Chief Marshall of 

Her Majesty's Military Services. The picture is made more clear if you study this 

diagram. (#1 - show and explain) Note that the London Signal Intelligence Board 

reports upwards to two seniors. The LSIB is canposed of the following officers: 

The Director General, ·sIGINT - Chairman 

Assistant Under Secretary of the Foreign Office 

Directors of Intelligence and Signals, Admiralty 

Intelligence Officer and Chief Signa:Ls Officer, War Office 

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Intelligence and Signals, Air Ministry 

Director of Security Services {MI-5, equivalent to F.B.I.) 

Director, Joint Intelligence Board 

The Directors of GCHQ and I.CSA 

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Because I had served in both the USAF Security Service and AFSA and had 

participated in the planning which formed both of' those organizations and NSA,. 

I looked forward to my assignment to London as an opportunity to see for myself' 

if' the British did a better job of COMINT organizing. I was especially interested 

in determining if almost complete civil control would solve the organizational 

problems and frictions we in America were faced with. The simple answer/is that 

the British have solved the problems arising out of the controversy between the 

services and the national center and between civil and military contr.ol. There 

is little disputing or haggling about the paramount position of the.Civil director 

of OCHQ. Unfortunately, in solving these two, related control problems. the 

British.have created a couple of others, which I believe are more/horrendous and 

less acceptable to resolution. These are: first, a tradition-bound, eight to 

five, bureaucratic structure, and secondly, a quite indifferent, or at best 

unenthusiastic. attitude on the part of' the services. Collaboration with the 

U.S. , especially the Combined Naval Party, has helped to pep up the British 

center structure, but the influence of the naval party ha:;; been restricted to 

naval reporting and coumnmications. Maybe the Brit.:tsh are right, "timely center" 

being mutually contradictory words. I see no relief in the area of unenthusiastic 

service participation. 

(Chart 3 the first thin that strikes the 

e 

The organization ousee before ou'Went into ef'f'ect more or less, on 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 'fO~ BBCHET CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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'POP 611.llBI 

We now come to what is, to me, the most important portion of my remarlt's 

to you this morning. That is a statistical stu 

My staff is concerned with/starting and 

ow s.c ng as your agents. Please note tlui.t neither U.S. 

producers nor consumers nor international consumers, iike SHAPE, are .included. 

The volume would be three or four times that to be shovn if these three other 

categories were added. 

the 

The second chart {#5) 

scale - which did not c 

but •. 

4 is concerned with 

The final cha.rt (#6) is a recapitulation. There is a possible lesson f'or 

the communicators here; note how the ~e 

can never afford to be caught without more than adequate commu.nicationsso 

unexpected loads like this can.be.assumed without breaking the backs a.nd hearts 

of the Com.Center personnel. 

When I consider how 

I>wonder how 

e. British side. 

L....,,.,,.-.....,..---:-=:""l;""':'--.....,..""':'"""~___,·as· w.eJ.1. On 1;l}e/U.S. s:l:de we have s}lown; on t:ne: 

w o e, a willingnes·s to recogni;ze· British 11Diita.t!ons· ·and g() ha'.l.f-'Wa! to devise 

forms and procedurei:; that will meet the requirements o~ both C()'UJl'tries. It is 

not always easy to>reach agreemeni;and it is o:ftenhinderecibf short-sighted 11 super-patriotsn>on both sides.of the Atlantic:,whoc:a.nsee no advantages f'or 

their nation or>>service unless they persC>J:lSl;lY 9ontrol and run every jot of it. 

I feel that I>am doing more· for my ~9untryif I can devise a scheme whereby 

the United States.get~/8.l.l of ~lJ.ea"VEU.lable intelligence on a subject by working 

with the British than a sc~wh1ch gives us only two-thirds of the intelligence 

by doing it alone. SO!llec:orrespondence from Washington in my files implies that 

my attit:μ:d.e is little short of traitorous. 

::;> 

EO 3.3(h)(2) '' 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 ~ 8ESRB'! CONTROL NUMBER 55-10~5 

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It has been stimulating to talk to you this morning and I am now ready for 

questions. I suggest we take them in the order of my presentation. 

F. The discussion of Col. Pulling's presentation was particularly concerned 

with the following. 

a. Nature and method of operational control exercised by GCHQ. 

b. GCHQ concept of close support and decentralizatiOIJ.. EO 3 _

3 (h)(2 ) 

c. UK method of COMINT dissemim tion I .... __ __. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

d. Relationships between UK CCM[HT consumers and GCHQ. 

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iPP SEGR:ET EIDVMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC lruMBER: 7 

B. TOPIC NAME: INTERCEPT COlrl.'ROL PROCEDURES 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: GENERAL MEETING 

D. CHAIRMAN: MR. 0. R. KIRBY, CHIEF, OFFICE OF COLLECTION 

Mr. Kirby introduced himself as the Chief, Office of Collection 

and stated that the topic for discussion was Intercept Control 

Procedures. He welcomed any questions or canmients on this topic 

after Mr. Boardman had delivered his talk. 

E. PRESENTATION: 

The following presentation was ma.de by Mr. N. Boar~,. Deputy 

Chief, Office of Collection: 

I am very happy to have the opportunity of discussing the topic 

of intercept control with this particular group. In presenting ray 

talk I propose to point out some of the "whys and wherefores," briefly 

review its history and describe some of the more important aspects of 

our present procedures. But first, I would like to define the term 

"intercept control. 11 It is that procedure which is designed to insure 

the most effective utilization of intercept facilities. I'll be 

referring to this definition throughout the rest of ray talk. 

What are some of the "whys and wherefores"? First-SIZE. Bear in 

mind that the US COMINT effort is now wearing long trousers. The direct 

and indirect costs run into millions of dollars annually and we are 

steadily expanding. In tenns of intercept positions in use, we now have 

about 2000 of an estimated or approximate goal of 4000. _These are 

positions in use. In addition, there are thousands of people who 

individually and collectively are contributing their talents and sweat 

to make the US COMINT effort successful. The very size of our effort, 

therefore, makes it imperative that standard intercept control procedures 

be used to obtain the most effective utilization of all our resources, 

including personnel and equipment. 

Secondly-SENSITIVITY. The requirement of the US COMINT effort to 

respond automatically to emergency situations brought on by the cold war 

is perhaps one of our most challenging problems. Because of this 

requirement we alternately act as a cause and effect of US foreign 

policy. We must be prepared to react as soon as .possible to· the requirements of this policy to accomplish our mission successfully. A consistent procedure with built-in flexibility features is essential to 

provide for instantaneous action on any one emergency· without disrupting 

the entire effort. 

Thirdly-SCOPE. The scope of the US C<>iINT effort embraces aJ.l types 

of intelligence derived from radio cormnunications including military, 

naval, air, weather, economic, diplomatic, technological .. You name it--

we have it! To provide for the wide varieties of requirements, the 

nationaJ. COMINT establishment has devised the present inter~ept control 

procedure. This procedure is definitive, le~ving as little to the 

imagination as possible. It is comprehensive; to cover a wide variety 

of situations. It is flexible for emergency conditions and finally it 

is changeable as dictated by the tactical situation. 

'.L'V.t' SECREi'I' CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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Li my tlefinition of intercept control I emphasized the word 

"effective." In one instance it could mean an intercept position 

operating 24 hours per day producing a high volume· or traffic.· In 

another instance "effective·· could mean an intercept position guarding 

a particular frequency or frequencies without copying a single message 

for days, weeks or months. This type of negative information is 

perhaps as valuable as a "slew" of messages. In both instances • 

effective utilization is achieved. 

To recapitulate, US Intercept Control procedures are des~gned to 

achieve the most effective utilization of US C<J4INT resources taking 

into account the size, sensitivity and scope of the US COMINT operations. 

Now, for a brief historical review of intercept_control throughout the years. Back in 1941 in the Army, intercept control was 

exercised chiefly by the intercept operations officer, and his effectiveness was largely measured by the total number of messages copied. 

This sometimes resulted in·as many as 10 copies of the·same message 

arriving at Arlington Hall Station. 

Later on, about 1942-1943, procedures were devised which still 

left a large measure of decision to the intercept operations officer 

but did give him a block of targets arranged in priority order •. This 

meant that coverage was spread more evenly over a larger.number of 

targets in the existing intercept stations. Conversely, the US Navy 

employed a more rigid system which included "cast iron" and "contingent" coverage. --Gast iron coverage meant 'that an operator stayed 

tuned on a particular target to the exclusion of everything else. 

Both of these systems were quite successful inasmuch as COMINT emerged 

from the war· as one of the most important sources of current intelligence availaJ:>le to the US. Remember that during the war a large 

portion of COMINT processing was accomplished in the field. After the 

war, the Army and Navy COMINT organizations joined forces and established joint procedures. In the field of intercept control, the 

procedures adopted attempted to retain the best features of the former 

Army-Navy systems. The result was that certain types of cover, like 

manual Morse, were ·assigned in terms of position conforming somewhat 

to the Navy "cast iron"method, whereas other cover, such as Radio 

Printer and Internation13.l. Commercial Radio, was assigned in order of 

priority. During this period, extending roughly through June of 50, 

processing and control of the US COMINT effort was largely ce~tralized 

in Washington. During this period also, the US Air Force established 

its own independent cryptologic service and joined the US COMINT family 

as a full, red-blooded relative. I feel that the vigor and initiative 

displayed by the Air Force Security Service in getting their operation 

under way has been an outstanding and noteworthy achievement. 

After the invasion of South Korea, processing and control of 

certain COMINT problems were decentralized to the field. This resulted 

in several major Ca.iINT successes which left no doubt in the minds of 

the tactical cormnanders as to the use:fulness and value of our product. 

Because of the lessons learned durtng the Korean War, and because of 

the continuing tenseness in the world situation, General Canine directed 

the continuance of the decentralization policy, and this program is being 

vigorously carried out. It is intended that this policy will enable the 

various field processing centers to support a tacti,cal commander at the 

drop of a hat, or an atom bomb. As in the past, as well as from here on, 

the US COMINT effort is poised, ready for action if and when the time comes. 

This fundamental requirement of readiness underlies all of the operational 

planning and policy of the national COMINT establishment. 

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FinaJ.:ly, a brief review of our present Intercept Control Procedures. 

The three main aspects of our present procedures are: Categorization 

of Cover, Types of Cover, and Flexibility Features. I will discuss each 

of these aspects individual.ly. 

1. Categories of Cover. Why do we have to divide cover into the 

various categories that we do?--A, B, C, D, R, and J. 

Each of us has to give a periodic accounting of our stewardship. 

All of us have either been in the Service or been associated with it. 

We al.l know, for example, that Private Smith has to report to Corporal 

Jones, Capt. Brown has to report to Major White, and that General. Canine 

has to report to the Secretary of Defense. He has to tell Mr. Wilson 

how the US COMINT resources are al.located and how they are utilized. 

Let us review these for a moment: 

Category A - Those positions which are under the control of the 

National COMINT Establishment and provide for the collection of traffic 

of global interest. For example, ICR (International. Commercial. Radio), 

and certain printers. 

Category B - Those ~acilities under the control of the Service 

cryptologic Agencies. 

Category·c - Those facilities under the control of the field 

processing center, for c~os~ support, etc. 

Category D - Those facilities under the control of the intercept 

station' for local flexibility needs. 

Category J - Those positions under the control of the National 

COMINT Establishment, collecting traffic of joint interest to the 

National COMINT Establishment, field processing centers, and the Service 

cryptologic agencies. 

Category R - Those positions under the control of the National 

COMINT-establishment for Research and Development (Technical Search). 

Note that Categories J and R have recently been introduced to 

provide Mr. Wilson with-a more meaningful breakdown. These additional 

Categories will be included in the f orthcaming revision of NSA Circular 

51-10. 

In the final anal.ysis, there are very few NSA-type targets. NSA 

intercept requirements are in accordance with the stated interests of 

the consumer agencies. 

The next chart I have is of general. interest and gives some idea 

of the present intercept situation on a man-hour per day (MBPD) basis. 

These figure1'S have no relationship to instal.led or utilized f'acilities, 

but relate directly to the number of operators who are assigned targets. 

I'll give very general figures on totals of ·operators in terms of 

assigned missions: 3, 000 - Army; Air Force, rough1y 2500; Navy, 1000; 

CIA, roughly 50. We have estimated that Category J has 2/3 to 3/4 of 

the total devoted to Category A. Categories J and R will be introduced 

in a forthcoming revision of NSA Circular 51-10. over all, we have 

roughly over 7000 operators (on the job) who are -employed· in ·these 

categories and otherwise on the intercept missions that we have assigned, 

including Categories A, B, C, D, J and R. 

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Now, 'finally, a brief discussion-of the various types of cov.er 

which are now in effect as the result of our present procedtires. In 

considering types of cover, it is :lmportan'\; ~o realize that there are 

not enough facilities available to cover all known targets, nor do all 

known targets require the same type of cover. For these reasons the 

types of cover shown here have been established. The reason we have 

these types of cover is so we may get the most coverage we can possibly 

get with the existing facilities shown here. I'm sure these are all 

familiar to you. I will review them rather quickly. 

1. Full Cover 

a. 24 hour 

b. Part of day. 

2. Search and Development (Incl.uding General Search)~ These 

positions are mere or less self-explanatory. 

3. Groups. 

a. Blocked (ICR) 

b. Scheduled. 

4.. Rotating (POROOO-) 

fil.· Prior.der.-Rela:tive Priority. 

• 1 - ..L • 

b. Sampling-T/A continuity 

c. Cyclic - A centinuing cycle ·for· crypt continuity. 

d. Split -- A combination of all three. 

5. Alternate 

Adjustments-of Intercept Missions - Flexibility. 

These features apply mainly .to Category A and J cover. Category 

C cover already gives a large measure of authority to local control 

units in the field. 

We have instituted these features to give additional authority to 

station,camn;ianders tQ insure a more effective utilization of intercept 

facil.ities. They recognize certain on-the-spot kn.owl.edge of intercept 

target operation, local receiving conditions, etc. About a year ago 

we found it was necessary to do this for added flexibility at_~he field 

level. -

a. Intermediate intercept control-authorities (6910 Security Group, 

ASAFE, USN-39 ~d so forth) were. given.the aut4ortt-y to:·.transfer or 

exchange assignments among intercept UD.ita under .~eir control. (Some 

people didn't believe me when I to1d them this, but it is true!) 

b. Intercept- sti;t.tions may: 

'' 

(1) Regraup or interchange cyclic, split, and sampling POROCOS 

to obtain the best results from their coverage. 

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(2) Adjust full cover for maximum results. Exception 

Priorder POROCOS may not be changed without prior 

approval of the controlling authority. 

c. Intermediate intercept control authori~ies including stations 

may add to assignments newly developed cases by regrouping or adjusting 

on the sampling or full coverage, as I indicated before, in priority 

order. We still h~ve certain requirements, mostly crypt and T/A-wise, 

and want the maximum coverage from certain cases. We want your 

suggestions for improving these procedures if you feel there are a:n.y 

to be made. 

d.· Adjustments involving periods of greater than 24 hours 

duration will be reported by a priority message. 

What does all this mean? Basically, it means that we are all in 

this together, working for the same boss, doing the same type of job. 

I am sure that by mutual understanding of each other's problem the 

successful completion of the. job will be accomplished mo~e qu~ckly. 

. I would like to emphasize that we welcome all recon:Jlllendations and 

suggestions regarding the intercept control procedures, including the 

intercept assignments themselves. Each message, I can assure you, 

receives the utmost consideration •. 

During my talk I have attempted to show the development of our _ 

intercept control procedures and the reason for their establishment.· 

I would like to sum it up by saying that Intercept Control exists to 

get the job done. - It is not an end in itself, it is the means to an 

end. It is not a total on a chart. It is the initial phase of a 

sequence of operations which ultimately leads to the publication of the 

US COMINT product. The product that may be destined to play the major 

role in safeguarding the security of our nation. · _,--

F. DISCUSSION: 

It was asked if it would be possible for messages to receive more 

prompt attention than they have in the past. Mr. Boardman rep'J:ied that 

he hoped they "had facts and figures 11 so that proper action could be 

taken. "I am sure that we all feel this very deeply. I'm not going to 

blame this on any one thing. We are trying very hard and doing everything we can to improve. It is certainly not standard pr.act;tce... · I · · would like to taJ.k this over with anyone who, perhaps, has a particular 

instance to discuss." 

LCDR Nicholson stated that his station had sent a message to NSA 

saying that in 30 days he would lose so many people; in 10 days he 

notified us again, and finally the actual loss occurred,· resulting in 

a two-week loss of coverage, because no action was taken.· 

Mr. Boardman asked if LCDR Nicholson spoke from the aspect of 

USN-4o, and received a negative answer, that he was speaking from an 

experience of perhaps two years ago. He added that he.- didn't know 

whether the message went direct to NSA or'NSG, but if there was some 

delay in getting the message through, that-probably there would be 

something that should be looked into. LCDR Nicholson stated that the 

same channels were followed as coverage assignments. Mr. Boardman 

assured them that it was not by design that it took so long, that NSA 

certainly treats all messages of that nature as a matter of priority. 

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"I know from experience that it means working at all hours but we have 

people--devoted people-- cognizant of the field problem, most of whom 

a.re former intercept people themselves." 

It was asked what the established channeis were for the Navy an.a 

LT R. A. La.ngdo!J.,USN, (USN-12) said that they went through NSG and 

.dispatched to NSA, that in his personal experience it had taken 13 days 

on~ time. •' • 'I : 

·Mr. :sOardman said that th~ matter'.should b~.looked into ~ft~r.the meeting t_o .. see if a.nytJ:>.ing could be done ·to impr~ve this_ situation. • • "i" • " " 

It was stated froni the floor that with a' de'centraiized, problem, 

Category C position, when a sta~ion drops a position or a· position 

becomes avai~able, it a.:l;.ways seemed to happen that the position dropped 

was a Category C position. The position normally available· ·always 

seems to"be a Category A position. Mr. Boardman answered, "Things are 

not what they seem to be! It ~ seem that way to a person sitting on 

a particular problem, but each decision is made in accordance with 

op'erational necessity. H It was also. disclosed that certain other 

elements in the f.ield also ~el t that . way. · · 

Mr. Kirby said that statistics tend to disprove this and that there 

was constant usage of' both Category C and Category _A. "Loo:tting,at the 

gains in the course of the last 6 or 12 months, you will,find that there 

is an equitable ·distr~but~on •• not all. A, and: not all C; n~· re-9-uctions in 

C or treme~dous'gains in A--some in~reases in both, ~d some reductions 

in both categories of covera:e;e. 

CDR G~ Chiles, USN, USN-39 asked for a discussion of the Intercept· 

Priorities Committee, and was t9ld that this would be discussed late·r. · 

CAPT"Wright asked about an adjustment to be made on the Formosa 

plan to compensate for the shifting of positions. Mr. Boardman told him 

this· could be found in Phase l, and a.greed that.there had been a lot of 

adjustments between USN il and 14. " "I sUggest that we review it by going 

to 'NSA 61, in Room· 1B2; right· here at Fort Meade." · , 

C9L B •. ~· Pulling, USAF, CH, NBA.UK: "I believe· the:r;-e is some 

misunderstanding· on that first chart ••• category·A and Category c 

authority'in the field to shift cover. Authority in the-field· to shift 

cover on Category' A. refers onJ.y to those problems to.be dec~ntrl:i.lized in 

the field. This is certainly controlled by NSA. There is no authority 

in· 51-10. referring'to Category A charts. There may be a later Circular than~ December 1?54. n· 

Mr. Kirby: "I would argue with·you ·on' your understanding of the 

provisions of the Circul.ar. On the basis of local analysis, your 

intermediate authority, on the basis of analysis, you can adjust the 

total, up or down. If.we want 18 hours of cover and the links oper~te 

on a schedule of only 6 holll's a day, you can make the adjustment for it, 

and let NSA know if it is over 24 hours duration. Field headquarters 

means something different to each Service. An intermediate he~quarters 

has the authority to shift coverage assignments back and forth. Granted, 

we make the initial assignments to a station by position. If the 

intermediate control authority feels it can better be handled by ano~er 

station, it does have the authority to ~e the shift." · 

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, .,p SEqtET EID.-~ 

Mr . .Boardman presented the portion of NSA Circular 51-10, Section 

VII, Adjustment of Intercept Assignm.ents, para 1, .. "In order to provide 

increased flexibility and more efficient utilization of intercept 

personnel and equipment, intermediate intercept control authorities 

down to an including intercept stations are authorized to make local. 

assignment.adjustments, irrespective of category within their cognizance. Commanding Officers will exercise caution in implementing this 

program to prevent abuse. " 

Mr. Kirby said that he would l.ike to point out that "this is a 

misunderstanding of what authority actually has been given to the 

outfits out there. I might s~~that there might have been a simpl.er 

procedure. There are times in any organization, NBA or any other, 

when you may get ahead faster by asking permission to do something 

after you have done it.. " 

Mr. H. L. Clark, CH, NSAEUR1 asked about hours of coverage. 

Mr. Boardman stated, "That means that some transmitting stations 

only operate 8 hours a day, some operate 24 hours a day. When we s~ 

. we want ful.l coverage, it means ful.1 coverage of 6 hours if they only 

work 6 hours a day. 

LT COLL. O. Jameson, USAF, 6950 SG: "A;pproximatel.y 10 months ago 

we had about 90 positions ink koJ1 ~t check we 

had approximately 49. I won~er ir there is any .plan to get it back 

up where it belongs? PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) Mr. Kirby: 11That is a very good question. Unfortunately,.! 

don't know if any one here is capable of answering that question. 

Intercept Control people act as a final point of departure; a lot of 

work goes on before that. I suggest you get together with the people 

in 90. These figures on cover on a specific target are the direct 

result, in 9~ of the cases of decisions made by the IPP Committees, 

so if something has been cut it is the result of one -of these cOJDJDittees, the procedure followed in making assignments, cuts, etc." 

Mr. Boardman: "Basically, the intercept priorities procedures 

are laid on by two committees. One is the IPC, which ~ets once a. 

month to recommend any or aJ.l changes which.should be made in·the 

all.ocation of coverage. The IPP' s meet to adjust the cover within 

a block of positions that has been assigned to them._ •. the ·total US 

interce t facil.ities were at one time divided u --so much to 

etc. These committees recommend what categpry should·be 

ecrease or increased. The wbol.e business ia acted on by an IPP. 

They have complete authority to change the intercept assignments 

within their block of cover. There are certain fundamental processes 

that are inherent to our operation. ·we try to adhere to the theory 

of ho.mogeneity--same type of coverage to each station; amount of 

processing, etc." If, for exampl.e, a group of positions becomes avail.-

able at USNm4o, it is pretty sure that they'll go onl I 

Basically, the intercept allocation is cut up like a piece of pie, so 

much for each-~ I. etc." 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

'!"OP BEeR!l!' CON'.l'ROL NOMBER 55-1035 

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Mr. ·Connelly s~i~ he would like t_~ mentian -that the IPC is 

eompo13ed.of NBA peepl~ and the 'inteJ.+igence consumers, Army, Navy, 

Air Force, CIA and tlle FBI. These peopl~ dec1~ if' thei:r preb+e'18 

are getting a fair shake. If' there is· something appar~iitly wrong 

in th~ Air-~FbfdFeover, we hear from COL Renka or Mr. Clark. Th~ 

intell+gence consumer is really passing on how the cover is being ~located. 

COL J. L. Weeks, USAF, 6920th: "I think we have some conf\lsion 

with a decentralized problem as it concerns intercept control and 

prqcessing. It was agreed that 'the revisicm to circular 51-10 

sh0uld indicate quite clearly t.hat the flexibility features of' 

in~~rcept control refer to the complete intercept assi~nt and no~ 

only to a decentralize!l problem." 

I I I, I 

ileP SB0Blff .CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035. 

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MEMOHA.i'l'DUM !i'O..~ THE RECORD 

A. 'i'OPIC NUMBER 8. 

:~. TOP!C NAME: ?LAI"iT INSTALLATIOI~. . ... 

. . 

u. T'J.'PE OF SESSION: GEllf'ERAL MEETIJ:fG~·' ·. 

;J. CPJ~P.KE'.l:l: MR. JOHN A. McINTIRE, OFFICE OF COLLEC'l!IOI1 

l~ ;· PRESEimTlON: 

I f .. ?n going to explain the trends in. tlH: planu.:I.ng rol· s·t;:Lnanrdi-

~~.t.i.vn ~id. improvement ·Of the f::teld station ·z~.Cil:i:~:l.cs. i:chis is· 

~:~.~::aidered a highly desirable project in order that one of the :major 

.\'.c·i:.ors detrimental to the success:f'Ul accomplishment of the 'primary 

· :5 .. ::-eiocl of the cryptologic orga.niza.t1:ons will b~ eliminated or ··· .. t•i.::.au~~d to a,. .. Jr1~n1rilim. It !"1'the.basic~ responsibility of'- the majority 

o.r iridi viduals here to use a.11 means at their command to obtain 

fa.c·tual copies, of those comrminications transmitted by various methods 

by target nations, and in turn. to forward such material to processing 

centers where the intelligence can be derived and submitted to the 

cot1sumers • • .: ••• .,: • • .,"':.:~·,,~· • ,.1•: ... IC .. .;.•:r .. ..,-. •...:_ '"i...· "' 

The.;;-tar.get ·:r..at:iens··~hle "thl:if,.po.t&ti:al tbreat to their cl:d's'e!y · 

·tu.!'..rr.led ulans behir~ the Iron CUrtain, and are using their best tech .. .. ,, .................. _..;.. 

1;.ic;;U, .~e~.~d-resources :Co develop mea."ls for preventing utilization 

of this source of information. Therefore,. we must employ the most ~μalifieP,:-pel'solm:el :and p-roiriO.~'"th~bea•· equipment to keep curretit '"~1.th ·a.eveaoplil.ent.s·· in ·co2mnun-ieat"io~'S' and.· .. devise methods that will con-

~;ii:me to obtain the de.sired d.S.ta.. • • • "'J•lo" .,.., .. ~:•f:'::-.::~·',•,;., .. ;:... ,l~:f • ~• •: I • o • ' "'I 

. Ther.e &.rg·'l1W1Y-''faetor~ ·'ibat.{;a.ff'-ec:~ th~ success or failure at~ 

COMJ:~\·r-.-~·~ · -~·~:vrie¥:~ 0p&ratdr :qwil:J.ty, facilities, : 

oomr.il,mica:cion~. to "\;~ PX'()cessing -centers and so forth. We will con-

:!:'ine '\lils: Pit•·~i:i..t&ti:tm. to the .subject of :facilities, only. 

.• A'!;·~~,~- of··Wof-lct:·wa:r "ll=; i.e&c"'ti(Service was going its ind;ividual 

;ray,.' using JDQ&tl.y · tacilJ:t~es' clas:Sif'1ed ·a.a 'Standard w1 thin that · · ~,.)rvice and cbiefly intell'ested ie CH ~·issions passing various types 

-.: enc~1ered traffic. -~~r{j::C;>~ ... ~,1 :;_.,·,t system of communication is ·. 

~~ill .:t,."l use:. . the targf!t.:nivt.:i:C~'l::: ·hcv.~ progressed in their development 

~d use or have the capability of ,using modes such as SinP.J.e Sideband, 

!•1ul~i.ple."<....and,. as we~·.tiave la"be:ed· it•,, Fl~ible Multiplex. Their 

c~?togr.e.1>hl.c meth.od.s· have a.lab improved, resulting in stringent requirements for abso~ute accuracy in tl:Le intercept copy by our 

anal.ys-ts. T"neref'ore, those sections responsible for providing the 

faciiities to perform th&'•mssion· must select the equipment t:Qat 

reflects the la.test deve~nts from th~ research and design stand .. point, and a n,eid plAn iayau:"tl'"- eSJ.jecl.a.l.ly applicable to the Ca.D:NT 

m:tssion'._ When this is aChieved/ ,'t=he .facilities factor is virtwilly 

e1::nr2.t~d a.s.·~t element. of chanfe in ~he performance of the 

as1:>1emnents. ~ . , , · _; .. 

llur-:4!e tpe pa.st ye~ aSC:trcu.\U··-tnil.s ·1ssued from this Agency 

entitle&,, Mtninu.un St&"1da.rds for Pe:;rwment and semi .. Permanent 

Intercept. Ste:t .. ions. It v~s .intended tl'.a.t this document would ~elineate the minil!IWD- standards for plant facilities in the field, 

·."lo. cOU:l.d be ~sed as- a criteria 1.n ju~ng the adequacy of o. station • 

.\ •. · l.t , 

. ,.. 

'!6P aseHfl COftROL mJMBBR55 .. 1035 

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I~ was distributed.~o the respective Service Headquarters, but not 

forwarded to the fi~ld. Comments and co~~tructive criticism were 

received concern:l,ng the contents of the Circular. Af't-er review and 

study: a revised edi tien has been compiled and will be issued in the 

near :ruture. It is conrsiderea a tribute to the originators of the 

Circ"ular that "bhe majority of the comments were minor and did not 

censtitute a wide difference of' opinion. -

, . Before proceeding further with an 'e.xp1anation of Circular 54-1, 

I-would like to give YoU our ·interpretation of standardization. 

We do not expec.t every station to be exactly the s~e as are some o~ the hou~~~g developments in ~he Ft Meade area. Duplication would 

"tend to defeat the COMINT effort since requirements va:ry from one g~ographica1·1ocation to another .. Instead, it is our· desire that ~ch operations buildi~ be designed to permit :ma..~imum efficiency i~ control and traff~c handling and· that each po~ition within a 

Service be the same acoording·to·type. Eventually; each individual 

type of position such as manual Morse sboul.d be siinila.r in all 

Services with only minor·rearrangements and types of component equipments differing. 

The purpose of-Circular 54 ... 1 was stated thusly: This Circular 

sets forth the policy and procedilres of the Director, National 

Security Agency, gove:rning the establisbment of ininimum standards 

to provide .assists.nee in. ·the .planningjl ·construction, and equipping 

of permanent and: semi· .. permanent ·inter~ept stations,, Please note 

!;he phrase iuto provide: ·assistance" which ref'.lects our desire to do 

exactly that • 

.Furthermore, it means assistance from the time of initial 

establishment of the requirement.for the station until the 

installation is put into operation--not confined to trouble-shooting 

after deficiencies occ'Iμ'. · 

Under "General Instructions" it is stated, "The Military Departments and other Departments or Agencies of the Government authorized. 

t0 participate in the National COMINT effort will ao.here to the 

minimum standards pres.cribed herein in the :f'uture planning, constructing, and equipping.of' permanent a.nd'semi-permanent intercept stations." 

I would like to emphasize the word minimwrt in that statement. OUr 

interpretation :iis, 11 You may add more~ but anything less will be 

una.cceptable. 11 In other words, we do not wish to place any limitation 

on techr:.ical improvements or initiative on the part of ~he Services. 

Other General Instructions are, "Where existing intercept 

facilities fall below minimum standards as prescribed herein, the 

Goyernmental Department or Agency concerned will submit plans to NSA 

indicating how these facilities can be ma.de to conform with minimum 

'S'tanda.rds" and, "AJ.J. fUture cJ:i.anges of existing perma..111ent and semipermanent intercept facilities will be made in conformance with 

standards and criteria prescr:i.bed herein." .It is recognized that 

considerable work, e:f':f'ort, and time are necessary to accomplish 

this review and planning pbaseo I know personally that the Air Force _ Security Service is ma.king rapid progress in achieving the program, and 

tull cooperation has been rendered by the Arrirs" Se~urity Agency and 

uhe Navy. I would ~lso like to state that if there is a.ny assistance 

·~his Agency can provide on thi·s project, we would be glad to do so. 

Section IV of the Circular has the title, "Minimum Facilities 

and Equipment Standards". The first item under this section is 

'!GP SElEH:ifl' CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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antennae, a subject on whi~h books have been ano wil~. be.written, 

but that I must mention only briefly. In theinitial legotia.tions 

and planning for establishing an intercept station, sufficient 

land must be obtained to permit the installation of a basic 

arrangement of specified broad-band antennae cover~ng the target 

area designated in the general coverage mission. In ad.Q.ition, area 

must be provided that ~11 p~ovide space ·for· installation of special 

antennae to fulfill unique reaU:irements that may ~ur. It "is our 

belief that no engineer o ... : group of engineers'' is able to design an 

antenna field that will meet all requirements since the intercept 

problem· is dynamic, and not a ·static operation •. ~le have also 

specifieμ in Circular 54-~ that sufficient mate~ial will be 

authorized to the statfon~ ·to permit: 'erection of a rhonibic 

antenna. and :four simple types of antennae to be utilized a.t the 

discretion of the commanding officer for emergency or experimental 

purposes. However, any changes deemed desirable in the basic 

antenna plan as a result of such experiments will be processed 

through the normal Service channels for approval. _Other investigo.tions being ma.de to improve the efficiency of station operation 

include one that will provide a simple method of checking the 

characteristics·or the antennae to determine faults and need of 

maintenance. 

The 'next item.' is- what I consider the weakest link in the intercept facilities~system, namely the-RF distribution arrangement. It 

is the place where errors,, mostly conmiitted by the J;iuma.n element, 

prevent the peak ~igruii from arriving at the head:p'ho~es of the 

operator. It is the continuing alibi of the operators who cover 

deficiences by stating "They gave me the wrong antenna" or, "They 

have cascad~d so many multicouplers that the signal is too poor to 

copy." These conditions ,ar.e., sometimes true, which brings up the 

point that the men select-ed··-or-authotized-to do the patching at the 

RF racks should be experienced and.reliable and not the eight ball ~ho 

normally, after sna.f.fuing everything else, receives the RF assignment. 

Evaluations of multicouplers are continuing. An. appendix to 

the Antenna Book was issued detailing methods of connecting multicoupler types CU 119 and CU 168. _If such methods are adopted, 

maximum utilization of this equipme~t will be ·achieved. -· We are 

also investigating an Antenna Switching System which appears to 

have very promising features. If t.ests prove it is acceptable, it 

is estimated·that 90 percent of the patching at RF racks will be 

elir.linated. If desired, up to 20 antenna appearances can be provided to the receiver with the operator making the selection of the 

one giving him the strongest signal. The R/D ~evelopment of multicouplers for the VHF range is being'monitored. 

MANUAL MORSE POSITION . ,. 

Console development by Services. 

R-390 Receiver being-delivered 'to the' field. 

Eliminates requirement for freque.ncy meter. 

Test of carbonless paper. 

AUTOMATIC MORSE 

Dual diversity required-. 

FSK converter aqded.to st~nda~d position. 

TOl' tmeftft CONTROL NUMBER 55-1035 

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MsAV D48 High Speed Morse Translator r~actY-'for servtce testing. . . ~ . 

:tt.t.Qdel 28 printers fur~i~hed: ih l;L~q ·~or -high ~e~~~::_ .. - .. . .... ' . 

;RAPIO TELEPHONE .. .. r'. ~ 1, .- ~ I~ ' 1 

:• 

' 

. Develop~e~t of. adequate. re~order for this.,purpose being carried 

on by R/D under high priority.. · · · ' 

.·, ... Standard position design ror DSSB being checked at USM-9. 

llAJ)IO TELEPHONE CONT 

:,' Installation o:f' 2nd_ DSSB at USN-11 being considered • . 

: !< 

RADIO PRINTER POSITIONS 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

~: U~dulator tape re~order;:added to. single channel position ,to back 

μp cert~in types of singl~ c~nnel transmissions • 

.'·. , WFSK" conv.erters reqUir~d for I 

positions and the two-channel prin~t-e_r_p_o_s_i_t~i~o-n_s_. ________________ ,___. 

AFSAV- 39 .Rekeyers bei,ng spei::if'ied fo~ ~tiple;x· posit~ons so ~hat both sides of DFS -can 'be obtained·. . · ' . "' . . ~ : ; . .... ', • t" • 0 ~, • I ' I • ' ' ,/' f ' 

, New concept' fop ·t+s~··ot .. Mo9.e-l- 28 printers .to. ob~ain on-l~ne page ~?PY from printer .pQsitioP.-s... _ . . ,. . 

. }5igh~_Model 28 printers -~o be installed in fie~d as initial 

effort.. Does not eli.¢.na"t?e recording requiremer!-t o~ I I l I '" 1 • 

FACSIMILE.POSITIONS 

A recorder is specified to back up on•line intercept due to . inadequacy of.facsimile equipment to lock in and maintain synchronism 

w:t th transmitting station. · · · ,,_ 

_ Diversity receiving requ:!rement has been deleted as copy may be 

degraded as a.result of diversity switching of the_ receiver. 

- DIRECTION FINDING 

A-study is being condμcted and a Circul.az: wili be issued detailing 

standard siting proc~dures for D/F. · 

RFP 

Mobile'imit being developed. 

F:frst ·~~els of' autanatic deyelop~r ava.ilabl~ for service test • 

.. MOA 

M~' ~ 

. AJ.though the AFSAV D;311 -ar[J a Unit of equipnie'n~, ?s aperated s~tisfaGtor~1y, the resuits-9b~ined from.that method qf operation are 

not· a~ceptable. A new concept fqr the identification of morse operators 

is· under consideration. 

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That concludes the remarks concerning Circular 51+-l, but I 

would like to swnmarize a few facts which are considered vital for 

the efficient establishment and operation of an intercept station. 

These are: 

1. 'rhe results of a site survey should provide the information as specified in the Site Survey Manual and 

the ~erms of Reference concerning ~he project. 

2. l'ISA must furnish the general coverage requirements 

eA"Pected from any specific geographical location. 

3. Continual coordination of plans for a new or augmented intercept station must be effected with the 

Director, NSA, on a current basis. 

4. Sufficient land area must be obtained to permit the 

installation of the number and types of antennas 

to cover the desired targets and to permit flex-

'! ibility in rearrangement or addition of antennas 

to meet changing requirements. 

6. 

7. 

The installation of facilities should be made 

according to.best engineering practices, and meet 

the minimum stand.8.rds presented in NSA Circular 

5h-1. 

Constant surveillance should be maintained over the 

equipments in the stations with obsolete or inadequate 

items rei;)laced as expeditiously as possible. 

Field personnel should be encouraged to forward their 

ideas and opinions for improvement of stations. 

7. DISCUSSION 

CDR Chiles: "What type of input does the morse translator operate 

.from?" 

i.:r. Mcintire: "It is an on-l.ine equipment into which the signal is 

red from the receiver." 

CDR Chiles: "If it could be made to operate on both manual and highspeed morse and from magnetic tape input, then one equipment would 

r:..eet a big requirement. otherwise, we will have to have a number of 

them." 

:':r. Mcintire: "The original intent and purpose of establishing a 

task for the development of a morse translator was to meet the very 

l"equirement you have brought up." 

~ :r . Small: "Will it take a tone input? 11 

!<r. Mcintire: "Yes, it will." 

CPR I~icholson: "I wonder i:f' NSA realizes that if these standards had 

gone into effect two yea.rs ago they would have delayed several. 

?rejects. Also, I wonder if there coul.d not be several levels of 

r.:inimum standards or minimum requirements. I feel that you should 

consider that minimum requirements 50 miles :f'rom the Iron Curtain 

2.re considerably different :f'rom minimum requirements for Ft Meade." 

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·Mr. Mcintire: "As I stated, Circul~ 54-1 is for perm&n.ent and semipermanent in1,?tallations. Circular 54-1 stat-gs that,' ~u znay have a 

unique requirement which would never be-. cover~d ~~ 54\'!J, ... " 

Mr. Kirby: "I feel there is a great need for better guidance in all 

aspects of the U. s. COMINT collection effort. There.have been.some 

outstanding examples of What has happ-ened·because;of lack of standards 

and lack of ·coordinat·ed ·planning,. There has be'en too· mu~h effort wasted 

in crash projects and ·crash productions.: Wha.t we are saying now is, 

'Let's sit down and take a look at·equipment and oper~ting requirements 

and the design for fixed installations so that we can get the best 

idea of what permanent and semi-permanent installations sho~ld be like.• 

The minimum standards promulgated by NSA delineate the minimum 

criteria which must b'e --met for satisfactory COMII~ operations. · Further, 

these standards are based upon normal situations involving the normal 

type of perso~el engaged in the u. s. COMINT operation. I know that 

it is arglied that satisfactory intercept operations have been performed 

with ..t'acilities and conditions o·f° a lower order 1than the specifications 

in the NSA minimμm stan&μ-ds,. I can only agree that there have b'een 

instances in which highly skilled operators have done an excellent job 

with almost no facilities. I would ask however, 'How much better could 

these people have.done., if they .had had.really adequate facilities?' "' I ' • In addition, ori..~:i::ol;>l~s such.as radio .pJ;"inter and other non~morse 

assignments ~equi~~ ~peciaJ. itelllS o.f equipment,. I am firmly convinced 

that we cannot op"erate' satisfactorily with less than the minimum specified~ .. '· -. -• 

The steps i~-·producing. minimum standards to cov~r major aspects 

of the collection ef'fq~ are, I believe, relatively s;mple and straightforward. We feel that we must first look at the types· of transmissions 

in which we are interested.- After determining the characteristics or 

these transmissions we must next establish the requir.~nts of the 

intercept system considering all basic items of equipment necessary to 

permit satisfactory intercept of the desired signals. Finally, we 

mu.st examine the. equipment set-up to determine what operations must 

be performed to operate the equipment, and how many operators are required to perform these-operations at any given time. It is our intent,., 

therefore, to produce minimum standards, or minimum specifications, for 

l. The equipment required for manual morse, various 

radio teletype, radio telephone, a.nd other types 

of· ·positions. 

2 ,· The procedure for · operatin:g _this equip~nt in. each 

type of position. · · 

3 ., _The minimum numbers ·of personnel .requi~ed, at t~e .. intercept position to operate basic 'equ:ti)ment ~ 

accordance :with established procedures~ ·The 

determination of the tot~ personnel requir~ent 

at a ~tation (to provide for leave, military duty, 

rotation, e~c.) will be a responsibility of t~e 

Service cryptologic _a~encies. · ,. • I ~ • 

11 '~,'" ,:••I I•' w' ·.l.~1.•, ... _,.'~ ', ""•.:.~ .. - . !,,wish to make· -it. clea:r::.that NSA standards will specify only the number of' 'opera.tors required at the position a,t any gives. time to operate ti!e 

various types or ~ntercept positions. 

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Since the objective of ~he U. S. CQ!.O:NT collection program is to 

provide useful and ~able liaw materials·.· for further COMIHT proce~sing, 

what we want to do is to provide guidance to the interceptors to help 

them to produce final results that meet analytic requi~ements. 

Too often in the past NSA has not spent enough time determining 

the best procedure to meet collection requirements, and then spelling 

the procedure out in sufficient detail to insure a minimum of misunderstanding. We now propose to clarify requirements and pro-cedures 

in writing. If the i~terceptor uses the equipment which is required, 

und performs the necessary operations, then we can all be assured 

that the results will be more satisfactory. This is the purpose of 

minimum standards." 

Mr. Clark: "There is nothing in the Circular which says that because 

a station doesn 1 t currently meet the minimum stand.ard.s we wjJ.l wash 

it out and not utilize it." 

r.-~r. Kirby: "Minimum standards are a highly desirable thing to 

establish. It gives the establishment something to work for towarc 

improvement. The goal of .reaching minimum standards is, in my 

opinion, a highly desirable one." 

Mr. Small~ .'~l think; that quite a few of us here would like to hear more 

about the RF .switching device." 

t-1r. Mcintire: 

to the Servie s 

11 I am not sure if the information has been distributed 

si ce co lete data hasn't been furnished cur 

development project for a switching ..._---=-~~=--=-----=-=:--~.....-....-~~--' system that would meet the operational need. This resulted in ari 

equipment utilizing multicouplers, the outputs of which feed into the 

switches that are, in turn, remotely controlled by tl:!.e Operator from 

his position. The actual contact is achieved byaplunger in a "T" 

connector activated by a telephone relay." 

Mr. Small: "How many control wire~/are, there?" 

tf.r. Mcintire: "One contrqlcable is all that is necessary, although 

the number of pairs ~yVa.ry. In addition, you would not want to 

give more than f':i,veappearances to the normal manual morse operator. 

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TOPJ:C 9 

SPECIAI~ IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES 

ROUND TABIE DISCUSSION 11A11 

After a few welcoming remarks by' the Chairman, Mr. Norman Boardman, 

Ass 't. Chief, Office of' Collection, the floor was turned over to Lt. 

W. H. Wesper, USN, Chief, NSA-614. Lt. Wesper thanked the European 

participants ~the -recent project 11Moby -Dick" for their cooperation 

and assistance. A chart was passed al'OUnd showing how "well the 

balloons had been tracked. {Four handouts had been prepared and were 

available for retention by all in attendance. These handouts included 

(1) a breakdown of the thirteen existing organized DF Nets showing 

the seventy--seven sites now in operation. (2) ~ Tti8 -present -status or all 

RFP and MOA ~quipnents and their locations. {3) RFP problems in 

production order by- stations and (4) an organization -chart of NSA-614.) 

A report was made on the concept and status of Technical Manag,ment 

Board project No. 15 (DF Standardization). Special emphasis wa• placed 

on the nine circulars which TMB-15 had recommended to be drafted. These 

nine circulars were -enumerated. A report of the two Net splits which had 

been effected late in 1954 was det-ailed. These include the 6920th s. G. 

split into a North and South Net on l October 1954 and the ASAFE split 

into a North and South Ket on 15 December 1954.. A brief report of the 

follow-up actions taken as a -result of the UKfuS Technical Aids Working · 

Party late in 1954 was then given. Details on personnel training 

courses afforded the services b7 NSA on DF and RFP 1fere g±Yen and the 

group was reminded that the Services were not making adequate use of 

the.courses available. Homogeneity- of SIT assignments was touched on. 

Future planning regarding IBM proces'Sing of DBR•s both here and at 

Field Head.quarters, utilizing tape to card methods, was pointed out 

~ 

by the speaker. The current status of the two proposed DF Nets 

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·1 . 

was giveno These included the propos~I .... _____ ___, __ __.IDF · · 

Net and the---------------· IC~Ro G~undwater, USN 

or USN-40 aske~ if there had been aey tho~ht given to the eatablistaent 

or a J .... __ - _________ I,.. The answer given was. nega~ive_ 

but he was assured that his problem wou]4 be given every consid~ration. 

Mr. Groundwater then asked .if the~ were a.ey DF .requi~ments_ for . . -

1------------...1 o He/was told there was not~ Ther~ _is 

DF at but that equipnent was -----------------' 

destined. to -be in the very near tut"qre. ~. ----------' 

Board.man. or NSA-60 inter~pted to state that Mr o G?'9~1f&t~.~ !-s . 

prol:>lem regarding DF as~i.stance ~~ something that could -~ ·discussed 

with._l .....,.._ .... land perhaps come up with something that will .be satisfactoey 

in t.erms or indic~ting a requirement and implementing it ... !(r o _Boardman - . . ~ r 

then asked the cc:mf:er.«Jes, if they· WQuld like a few. minutes of further 

details on.I r 'Upon agreement a brier synopsis of the. project. 

wa$ then given by Lt. Wesper., Major Vo Kellan USAF 9 6910th So G" then 

asked.what cryptologic system would be used on the proposed I I 

• \._ He, was told t~t J>l,ans had not. pirogresse~ t~ a point 

" 

where such details had been tinall.zedo Maj., Kellan. was. told however . ' .. 

that NSA wouJ.dipress for! 

I \...,re informed that Lt. Weeper -llll!i .___ ________________ .... 

Mr. Ackerman. would both be in ~pe late :in April to part,iclpate in 

the l:>roposed Tr1-3ervice Conference being conducted.bY' NSAEUR and would 

pe $.vai.lable then for further questions or intormati9n on. this and 

()ther /subjects. 

Following· Lto Wesper 9 s presentation on Direction _Finding, Mr~ A~kerman, 

N5A=614, spoke on "Th,e Present Status of RFP Equipments in the Field and 

. Present Sta tu" ot the NSA RFP Library o 91 The second portion of the 

f lecture was devoted to bringing those present up to date on what was being 

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done to increase the efficiency of the AFSAV D-17 equipnents, including 

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proposed modifications. EG. 3.3(h)(2) 

It was noted that NSA at the present time is receiving 

The participants were briefed on the status of the AFSAV n ... 37 

and were told that there would be a few models available 

probabq at the end of June 19.5.5. One of the equipnents is sched'!iled for 

the ASA lab, one for NSA' lab and the remaining equipnents for service 

te-sting in the field. The results of the AFSAV D-37 can be cross-matched 

with the film from the AFSAV D-17 o 

The cost of paper film is one-third that of '--~~~~~~~~--' 

WC 420 acetate film (the type being used at present) and will result 

in a savings of appro.ximateq $3501 000 per yearo 

Col. R. C. Huggins, USA o, ASAFE asked if there were &D7 plans for the 

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expansion ot I .... --------~ The question was answered by stating 

that It was 

further explained how USM-.3 has been successful in a combined SIT 

ettort. 

A second question was asked pertaining to the prerequisites of a 

person being trained in RFP. The answer. was, 0A background in T/A and 

radio intercept; was desirable but not mandatoey. 0 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 10 

B. TOPIC NAME: COONT END-PRODUCT REPORTING 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CHAIRMAN: MR. WILLIAM HUNT 

E. HIGHLIGlfrS: 

1. The round table discussions opened with Mr. Bunt, NSA-065, outlining some of NBA' s basic principles of COMINT End-Product Reporting. He 

outlined briefly the guidance given by DIRNSA during his opening remarks 

to the conference delegates. This guidance referred specifically to the 

goals NSA should strive for in the long term planning. The Director urged 

COMINT.producers to produce meaningful COMINT which would assist Military 

Commanders and get away from volumes of statistics to the maximum practical 

extent. It was recognized that NSA produces COMINT information for further 

evaluation by consumers and in such a situation the NSA end-product pas,ses 

through a middle man pefore going to the Commander who uses this material 

directly. Mr. Hunt informed the delegates that DIRNSA views w1 th concern 

the unnecessary amount of technical information and T/A techniques which 

are included in NSA end-product reports. He indicated that action would 

be taken to reduce this unnecessary technical information. 

2. The following basic principles of COMilft reporting were outlined: 

a. Exploitable COMINr: Timeliness 

CQ.fiNT must be provided on a timely basis if it is to be 

exploited by commanders for tactical operations. It must be provided in 

a manner-that will permit ready utilization of the material. A low~r 

degree of professional accuracy o~ completeness is acceptable in order to 

achieve the element of timeliness. 

b. Strategic COMINT: 

Strategic· COMINT is also valuable to military commanders. In 

this category falls the target information, enemy intentions, enemy economic stability, communications, etc. In this nuclear age when aircraft 

achieve and exceed the speed of sound the "strategic" should not lag the 

exploitable except to the extent acceptable to produce all-source detailed 

analysis of the enemy targets. 

c. Echelons of' Reporting: 

For economic reasons the resources of NSA must be very carefully apportioned in order to meet the requirements of consumers at all 

levels Le., field theater and ZI. This requires that all echelons must 

produce COMINT in a format and in such detail as to satisfy all consumers 

without the need for regurgitation of'the original material. Further, it 

was pointed out that while field unit~- should support their authorized 

military commander, they should not attempt to do the consumer's work by 

unnecessary correlation, compilation etc., even though the field processing 

unit considers it has the capability to do this. NSA reserves the right 

to decide how the facilities and manpower engaged in COMIM production 

world-wide will be tasked and apportioned in order to produce the maximum 

C.OMINT efficiency tor the U. S. 

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d. Spot Reports: 

In regard to spot reports, it is difficult to give a precise d.efini~ion of a spot as each reporting authority wo~d differ, in varying· 

degrees, on the material to be contained in a spot. However, NSA encourages reporting by spots a;ny item considered significant and whose final 

receipt by consumers is important. It was stated that an error on the 

side of reporting spots was preferable to erring on the side of delaying 

what may be valuable information to the consumer. An acceptable definition of'. a spot report was outlined as 11Any COM!NT development whose significance may have an immediate affect on military operations and/or 

any item wh~ch a commander requir~s reported to him expeditiously~ 11 

e. Technical Information in End-Product Reports: 

Technical information in COMINT reports must be more rigidly 

controlled. USCIB Directive #4 contains ~ statement to this effect. 

Attention was again drawn to previous statements by the Director on the 

necessity to control volumes of unnecessary technical data going to consumers andespecially publishing T/A techniques in end-product. Consumers 

had originally been engaged in evaluating COMINT against other sources of 

intelligence, but as other sources of intelligence became more scarce 

consumers became engaged in evaluating COMINT by evaluating T/A techniques 

to arrive at a Co.MINT validity. The responsibility of NSA for placing a 

veJ.idi ty on COMINT is very clear and. it is urged .that all producing ulli ts 

should ma.ke every effort to safeguard T/A techr_iiques and data. .An 'i'-Cceptable definition for technical information is ''Any information wh~ch does 

not enable consumers to evaluate a story against other sources of intelligence or provide continuity on unit activity and is primarily a communications intelligence pr.eduction technique." 

f. NOFORN Material.: 

In view of the various activities of United States Forces 

throughout the world and in view of U. S. 'military committments, which on 

occasion are not necessarily known to foreign powers, COMINT reporting in 

these areas is very' involved. This problem results f'rom setviee collateral 

being available to COMINT producers for fusion with enemy c0mmunications 

reactions to US activities. Further, the raw mater.ial from which COMINT 

reactions to U. S. activities is derived is exchangeable with foreign 

powers by specific agreement. However, it is possible to a.void any difficulty if certain procedures are adopted. ~sically, it is possible to 

make available to certain foreign powers react:i.ons to U. S • .mili'tary activities When these reactions are based exclusively on analysis Of enemy. 

communications material which is exchangeable with these foreign powers 

by specific agreement. No mention must be made of the identity .. or .. sμspect.ed 

identity of the nation or units involved in such activity. Supplementary 

reports may be ma.de to authorized consumers as·appropriate in a restricted 

report series, filling in the collateral details or COMINT details which 

could only be derived from fusion of Col:)..ateral and COMINT. · 

g. Cross-servicin'g: 

While cross-servicing has only recently come into existence, 

the results so far are encouraging. We have seen excellent demonstrations recently in the Far East where, regardless of the service producing 

the material, the.end-product has.been made available to the. commanders 

who require it. A lot more· has to be done in this field and the ultimate 

goal is to have indiyidual services produce and disseminate their end-product as ~equired to their cqunterpart service, which in turn will make 

this material available to its commanders without the necessity of regurgitating it into another report. 

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3. O;pen Discussions - General 

During open discussions on reporting Col. Weeks, Commander 6920th 

Security Wing, stated that he would welcome an NSA critique on reporting 

from his organization, pointing out the errors and suggesting how to , 

improve the. product. NBA poin~d out that this was currently being done 

(to a limited , degree) by wires to individual uni ts when major errors were 

noted. • 

a. Technical Information: 

On the subject of technical information in reports, some field 

personnel point~d out the d:ffficulty of controlling technical information 

when consumers wore two hats, i.e., a technical representative and an 

intelligence consumer. Col. Pulling, · NSAUK, suggested that this problem 

was more ·a.cute in the ZI than in the field. Normally field consumers did 

not insist on technical details to any great extent. He went on to say 

that it was difficult to be in a position of servicing a consumer and yet 

not get requests for statistics and details. He suggested that it was not 

-possible to resolve this problem at this time and at this meeting. It 

should, however, be resolved sooner or later. Mr. Zs.slow of NSA-062, 

suggested that, on occasion, statistical. reporting was necessary and consumers who require suc:q. 'reports should get them. He suggested that COMIN.r 

producers who saw volumes of unnecessary and unrequested statistics and 

technical information in their end-product reports should conclude that 

they were producing bad r~ports and should take action to correct it. He 

turther pointed out the security aspects of wide dissemination of techi:i.ica.l 

techniques and data and urged closer contacts with consumers to find out 

what they wanted and give them the material in an acceptable form. Col. 

Weeks stated that, since there was little intelligence other than COMIN'f, 

and since it is an intelligence officer who places the commander's require-

·ment on the processing unit, a process of education or just plain flat 

refU.saJ. to supply technical information is the only·way to combat this pro..:-

blem. - a stand inust be taken sooner or later. Mr. Buf'fbam of NSA-062, 

stated that there was no question about giving technical data to consumers 

where ·a bonafide requirement existed. LCDR Thompson of USN-39 stated that 

NBA al.so 'wanted certain technical details in end-product reports. Ml'. 

Hunt.stated that technical; channels existed for field processing units to 

forward techilical data to NSA and there was no reason why,technica.l data 

shoUld be, in end-product reports. Col. Peterson of ASAE took the position 

that certa::t.n technical detail!:! were intelligence items and as such should 

be reported. These included callsign changes etc. Col. Weeks suggested 

that the meaning of the callsign change would be more appropriate to report 

than the change itself. Col. Peterson went on to say that it was the 

commanders responsibility to interpret the intelligence information and 

generally the commander was anxious to have the producers' opinion of the 

item - he would be foolish if he didn"1 ti The second point made by Col. 

Peterson was that the emphasis on reduction of volumes of paper applied 

more to NSA internally ( ZI) than to field uni ts. Another point made by Col. 

Peterson referred to the generally accepted philosophy of NSA in preparing 

reports by field processing units to satisfy all other echelons of· consumers. He considered this bad philosophy, becau$e in his opinion his 

immediate consumers may have varying_ requir.ements for the same basic information and may require this information packaged in different ways. He 

considered that NSA should package the COMINT in different ways for the 

consumers, since it was NSA's business to support them, and, ~ince they 

have legitimate requirements for it, he considered this was not duplication. 

Mr.. Hunt stated that while NS.A agreed to meet consumer requirements to the 

best of its ability, there were no add.;tional personnel being made available to the COMINT industry and found it diff'icuit to understand how we 

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could go on providing several consumers with the same be.sic information in different ways and still say it was not duplication. ~e was 

su;rprised there was not more support for general and broad formats to 

meet a.11 consumers needs. Col. Peterson agreed to the principle of broad ~ormats but stated that the precise format should be prescribed by the 

consumer. 

b. NOFORN Dissemination: 

The Chairman invited comments from field commanders on the 

N'OFORN dissemination (see para 2 f above) • Col. Pulling, NSA.UK, commented 

that very often material was marked NOFOBN which should be made available 

to the British in COMINT or other channels. He suggested that NOFORN was 

often used to prevent material from going to S~E. He mentioned the 

existence of an agreement, entitled the "Burns Templer11 agreement which 

dealt with the exchange of' intelligence between'us and UK. Mr. BUff'ham 

of NSA-o62 stated t~t NBA has no pr.oblem in d,eterming whether an item is 

NOFORN or not.. T~s prob,;l.em generally ~rises in the field. When a COM!l.'1r 

unit.gets a piece of information from' one of the US collateral sources~· ' 

they must a~ that time determine whetper this information is exchangeable, 

"with British Commonwealth nations with whom the US collaborates. Col. 

Pulling suggested that the problem may even be, "Is the information ·NOFOBN 

or tJS/UK Eyes Only?" He stated that possibly a resume of the Bums-Templer 

agreement may be helpful. LCDR Thompson suggested that perhaps some 

people were putting on NOFORN when in effect they wanted to give an item 

restricted· distribution. CDR Chiles of UBN-39 pointed out that during 

alert declarations etc., there was not much time to check exchangeability 

of collateral. Other comments and suggestions for labelling disputable 

collateral continued without any worthwhile points being made. 

c. The round table discussion concluded at the expiration of 

allotted time. 

4. Conclusions and Recommendations: 

a. The round-table discussion did mu~h'to la.y some basic principles before the delegates.. These principles a.re _old arid establi~hed and · should provide goals to attain in the future. 

b. In regard to the use of te~hxlical info~tion in end-product 

reports the conferees w+th few exceptions agreed that it was not desirable 

to put technical material in reports except to the extent practicable for 

understanding the report content. All agreed, however, that there was 

s6metimes a very fine line between technical and intelligence information. 

Again, there appeared unanimous agreement tl;lat COMmT is now the only source 

of intelligence in some areas, and practically the only source in others. 

Accordingly, consumers are mainly involved in evaluating COMINT against 

COMINT and hence the requirement for technical details. Field representatives indicate that the problem is less acute in the field, where consumers 

do not maintain large intelligenc;e shops. The general opinion appears to 

'be that there is insufficient guidance both in NSA (ZI) and at field processing centers on the subject of technical information in end-product 

reports. · 

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It is recomnended that a firm NSA policy on the use of technical information be established and promulgat§d. · 

c. The NOFORN problem, while it originates by the field so 

classifying material, is magnified when the question arises regarding dissemination of this material by NSA to collaborating centers. 

COMINT reports resulting from fusion of enemy communications reactions 

with NOFORN US operational collateral presents no problem when the 

enemy reaction is not sufficient to make a story. "14' is only when 

enemy communications reaction tells a story and the raw traffic is 

exchangeable With foreign collaborating centers that the fused reports containing US sensitive collateral is difficult to conceal. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR TEE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 11 

B. TOPIC NAME: THE TECSUM .AND RELATED TECHNICAL REPORTS 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: . ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CHAIRMAN: JAMES W. PEARSON, CHIEF, STAFF TEC~ICAL GROUP, 

OFFICE OF COLLECTION: 

E. HIGHLIGHTS: 

I. Prepared handouts relating to the subject topic were distributed to 

members comprising the round table, and the session was called to 

order by the Chairman promptly at the scheduled time 1015, 30 March 

1955° 

II. The Chairman announced that aside from the principal item on the 

agenda for discussion, for which handouts had been distributed, there 

was one additional item which probably would be of interest to the 

table. The ehairman then proposed that this particular item be 

recognized and disposed of before proceeding to the main topic 

discussion. 

III. There being no objection voiced, the Chairman then invited the 

principal representing ASA to expand on the item which had been 

suggested by ASA concerning 

11Technical Formats: Desirability of forwarding samples of 

technical formats to the field for comment prior to 

implementation" • 

In general the ASA principal replied that ASA and its organizational 

elements in the field have a definite interest in what comprises the 

content of technical reports which are forwarded by the field to 

NSA in response to requirements placed on the field by NSA Circular 

or other authorized series • The ASA principal then recommended that 

NSA adopt the practice of forwarding to the field, prior to implementation, samples of technical formats for which NSA determines 

it has a requirement. The purpose of this recommendation was twofold: (1) o~en-times the field, by virtue of close operational 

touch with given technical situations, is favorably situated to 

suggest modification to the NSA proposed format which could go even 

further toward satisfying the NSA requirement, and; (2) depending 

upon the scope of effect the sudden introduction of a new technical 

requirement would have on a given field unit in terms of personnel 

man-hours, and facilities/equipment utilization, field review of a 

technical report format prior to implementation would enable parent 

cryptologic agencies and respective field units to plan and arrenge 

to meet such a new requirement in an orderly fashion. 

At the conclusion of the ASA principal' s remarks the Chairman 

solicited discussion. Ttiere being no table response, the Chairman 

assumed tacit consent on the part of other principals assembled. 

The Chairman expressed thanks to the ASA principal for his.explanation and responded to the recommendation generally as follows: 

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'1'01' SE6fM TOP SECRET 

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 

SUBJECT: Report of Chairman, Round Table Discussion "A", Topic ll, NSA Field 

Commanders Conference, 30 March 1955 

- - - -- - - - --- - ----- - - - -------- - - -- -- ---- - -

E. High1ights of the Session 

III. (cont'd) 

The adoption of a policy of review of technical report formats by 

field units prior to ilJi>lementation for the plll'poses outlined in 

the ASA principal's expl.a.na.tion does not seem to be unreasonable; 

undoubtedly this can be done whenever conditions and circumstances 

permit. It is estimated that the govei:ru.ng factor in each case Will 

be that of "time". In any event this proposal will be presented to 

the appropriate PROD authority for consideration and implementation 

where practicable.-

IV. The ASA principal acknowledged the response by the· chair and the chairman 

then directed the attention of the tabl.e to the·me.in topic at band,-"TECSUM 

and Related Reports 11 • As a point of departUre the Chairman deemed it ap- - propriate to.,define '!ECSUM principles and TASUM principles and he announced, 

that for the benefit qf the large number of persons in attendance who were 

.not princip&ls of the table but who were entitled to a complete rundown by 

virtue of their interest, he would read aloud from the prepared handout. 

Principals were invited to take notes in preparation for discussion to 

follow. The Chairman then presented the main topic to the table as follows. 

V. TECSUM and Related Technical Reports 

a. TECSUM Principles 

Need for the TECSUM 

l. A TECSUM properly prePared and forwarded on a timely basis is the 

most effective means of enabling the next echelon of analysts to 

fulfill their responsibilities in the overall reporting program. 

' 

It eliminates the necessity for receipt by electrical transmission 

of large volumes of traffic and results in the production ·of original reports and comments on reports from field units much sooner 

than would otherWise be possible. A TECSUM can- also save considerable time in the preparation of studies :and reports since it eliminates much of the preliminary work and presents an orderly arrangement of data in a concise but comprehensive useful form. It can, 

therefore, be used directly fn such analytic functions as the establishment ofl 

I and other '-:-:--------=------"":":""""=""""--.--.-..,,..,,.~---------..---....... .-----------------~ items of possible intelligence s1gnificance. 

Effect of pecentralization on TECSUM Requirements 

' -

2. Since decentralization of a comnunications entity changes the 

emphasis· of reporting responsibilities, the requirement for receipt of' a TECSUM will. be reduced. Receipt of a TECSUM, if' one is 

still .prepared to meet field processing center requirements, will 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORB 

SUBJECT: Report of Chairman, Round Table Discussion "A", Topic 11, NSA Field 

Comna.nders Conference, 30 March 1955 

------------------------------------------

E·. High1ightS of' the Session 

. . ·:V:. 

a. TECSUM Principles 

2. Effect of Decentralization on TECSUM Requirements {cont'd) 

continue to be desirable. If, however, a TECSUM is discontinued a~ a result of decentralization, other speci-al reports must be devised to provide required technical data and significant details 

of lower echelon analysis.· 

b. TASUM Principles 

General 

1. The -';l'ASUM is that vehicle which provides to NSA a more f'ihished 

techiiical product from a field processing center or field processing unit upon whose technical proficiency NSA is willing to rely to 

the point where more detailed and specific reports, such as TECSUM's, 

etc., are not required electrically by the National Center. Decentralization of a problem to a given field unit normally' produces 

these conditions. 

Need for the TASUM 

2. The TASUM will include, in most cases, the substantial analysis 

background of end-product issued by the processing unit, as well 

as the continuing analytic developments which do not necessarily 

result in end-product, in order that NSA and the technical COMINT 

community can maintain an awareness of the analysis carried on by 

the field. Frequency of submission, distribution, and formats 

will vary according to the problem and the unit doing the analysis. 

Formats 

3. Since the problems decentralized are so diverse both in nature of 

the problems themselves, and in the degree of solution and continuity attained on these problems, it automatically follows that 

the formats will also be as diverse as the problems themselves and 

that the requirements for TASUM' s will vary according to the complexity and state of problem solution. 

Format Flexibility 

4. As a general operating principle, it is desirable to ad.opt a 

standardized format for problems which have a homogeneous technical 

approach and a common state of development. On the other hand, 

however, a TASUM format may be nothing more than a technical wire 

or StU>plement to an intelligence report (depending on the problem) 

with adequate cross-reference to the corresponding subject. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Report of Chairman, Round Table Discussion "A", Topic ll, NSA Field 

Commanders Conference, 30 March 1955 

------------------------------------------

~. Highlights of the Session 

V. TECSUM and ·Related Technical Reports 

b. TASUM Principles 

Frequency of TASUM Submission 

5 . On some problems, technical developments are rare while on others 

some new developments are always occurring. It will be seen that 

the necessity for TASUM submission on the former. will be less 

frequent than on the latter. It is stressed, however, that the 

regular submission of a TASUM does not relieve a processing unit 

of the responsibility for report;;ing immediately, by special message, to appropriate authority{ies), technical details of any 

particularly significant activity or inactivity discovered in the 

study of intercept traffic. . 

-, 

Requirement by NSA for other Field-produced Reports 

6. Where more detailed and specific reports (TECSUM's, etc.) are required~ the field~ from the source of intercept, and, 

therefore, are already available, NSA may ask for copies of such 

:i:-eports {usually by bag) • Such a request, however, will never 

constitute an NSA requirement for the continued production of 

such reports. 

VI. O;pen Discussion Period 

1. Question: 3rd RPM Principal-: At present we are required to forward 

an electrical copy of the TECSUM with follow-up of 3-4 copies by bag. 

Can you do reproduction down here? 

Answer: Chairman: NBA will investigate and unless there is some 

overriding requirement with which the chair is not familiar the present 

requirement on you will be modified. It is suggested this be discussed 'further in conferee time with NSA-93 people. 

2. Question: ASAE Principal: What happens when NSA requires TECSUM by 

bag but field processing unit does not need it or use it at all? 

Answer: Chairman: In instances where there is only partial decentralization of an entity it ma.y very well be that NSA will require a 

TECSUM to cover the non-decentralized problems within that entity. 

Moreover, it is_possible that long range projects or studies at NSA 

will require submission of TECSUMs. In any event, if such cases now 

exist, NSA will be happy to investigate and re-evaluate the NSA requirement. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Report of Chairman, Round Table Discussion "A11 , Topic 11, NSA Field 

Comnanders Conference, 30 March 1955 

E.. Highlights of the Session 

VI. Open Discussion Period 

3. Question: 6950th Principal: In a situation where NSA receives 

either a T.ASUM or a TECSUM from the field on a given problem of 

an entity which has been decentralized, why does NSA still require · the raw traffic? 

Answer: Chief, Field Operations Direction Group: Under decentralization NSA never completely ceases work on an entity •. The field is 

limited in the amount of time it has at its disposal, whereas NSA 

can afford to spend lengthier periods of time on any aspect. 

Additional~, because of the cryptanalytic effort carried on at the 

Natio~ Center there can never be any.substitute for raw traffic; 

however, once particular systems are solved and decentralized to 

the field it is possible that NSA would not require traffic on 

those systems - each instance would require specific treatment 

and ruling. Finally, traffic exchange agreements with collaborating centers require that NSA have available sufficient copies of 

specified traffic to honor.those agreements. 

4. At this point a rather general discussion developed on topics which 

lined up closer on the side of Decentralization Concept than on the 

Table Subject of TECSUMs and Related Reports. 

5. Question: Nav Sec Gru Nelm Principal: About Decentralization as 

such; just what is it? Is there not a possibility that Decentralization is a misnomer inasmuch as all that NSA is doing is to 

delegate responsibility to the field for reports, but still requires 

that everything be sent back to NSA. Exactly to what extent will 

a field unit work in the case of decentralization? 

Answer: Combination of Response from the Chairman, the Chief, 

Field Operations Direction Group, and the Deputy Chief, Office of 

Exploitation:· Decentralization can be effected in at least two 

w~s. Where it has been determined that a field unit has the 

capability to cope with an entire entity, delegation of responsibllity for the entity will ensue. On the other hand if capability exists only to the extent that certain problems within 

that entity should be worked, then only partial.. decentralization 

will ensue. 

In the event of complete decentralization of an entity to the 

field, NSAwill rely on the field unit concerned for timely 

exploitation of the problem. In these cases NSA's concern with 

the entity at that point is chiefly that of longer term research 

and study, technical support and technical control. 

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'f'OP SEOHEl'l' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Report of Chairman, Round Table Discussion "A", Topic 11, NSA Field 

Commanders Conference, 30 March 1955 

E. Highlights of the Session 

VII. The Chairman then invited the table to direct tts attention ·once again to 

the subject for discussion, inquiring speci:f'icaiJ.y whether there were 

questions concerning any aspects of' the principles of 'IBCSUM and TASUM as 

described in the prepared handouts. 

Immediate response from the table not forthcoming, the Chairman called 

upon NSA principals to expand on certain aspects of statements contained 

in handouts. Generally these expansions were as follows. 

1. TASUM Formats and Frequency of Submission 

A TASUM is nothing more than bringing up 'to da.te developments on a 

problem in order that the next processing echelon up the line can be 

kept abreast of the status of the problem:61 It is not a fixed report; 

it is, however, a professional vehicle for getting across pertinent 

technic,μ developments observed over a span of time. This span of 

time may vary; if the technical situation of a problem is a chB.nging 

one, the TASUM may be required daily, electrically, and in detail. 

If everything is static, a weekly report may be all that is necessary 

and may only contain two or three lines. Keep ·in mind that ·a TASUM 

is not a fixed format and that therefore it is subject to change from 

problem to problem. 

2. For your information NSA Washington will not dictate what the field 

processing unit Will require from subordinate elements in the nature 

of' technical background for work in progress. However, NSA might well 

prescribe the TASUM format it desires to get from the processing unit 

in turn • 

. l. Reco:mmendations 

I. It is recommended that the Field Operations Direction Group determine the 

practicality of ma.king available to the field (and respective parent 

cryptologic agencies) SSJll>les of technical formats for comment prior to 

implementation (ref'. para D, II, III, of this repozi;) • 

. ., ... 

~ ''1, ••• ~·.1;' ~1:1~~: 

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l)j '~(!l11~fJ; 01• I• l ()•}~j C ':~·-,-c ',\J 1 ~ 

,. 

,, 

., 

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MEMORANOOM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 12 

B. TOPIC NAME: OPER.AfiONS CAPABILITIES REPORTS 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CHAIRMAN: MR. JOHN J. CONNELLY, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF, FIELD OPERATIONS 

DIRECTION GROUP 

E. HIGHLIGHTS: 

The NSA representatives stated that NSA Circular 54-3, which establishes the requirement for Operations Capabilities Reports, was undergoing revision and would shortly be reissued. Lt. Colonel Harpster, USAFSS, 

stated that the USAFSS had earlier forw~ded recommendations for additional. 

entries in the circuJ.ar and if these had been included in the revision, 

the USAFSS was satisfied, since it already considered the circular to be 

a fine document. The NSA representatives assured Lt. Colonel Harpster that 

the recommendation~ had been included. 

Considerable discussion was generated, principally by various ASA 

representatives, both as to the propriety of NSA requiring this type information and of' requiring 1 t directly from the field uni ts. Concerning the 

first point, the NSA representatives touched on both the Director, NBA' s 

responsibilities·in the COMIRC business and on the fact that the Technical. 

·Management Boa.rd (on which ASA bas representation) plS\Y'ed a :@a:jor role in 

developing the Operati'ons Capability Report~ Concerning the second- point, 

the NSA representatives promised a reexamination of the requirement for 

direct forwarding from the field, but would give no assurance at that 

time that the requirement would be rescinded. 

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A. TOPIC NUMBER: 13 

B. TOPIC NAME: CENTRAL PROCESSING TECHNIQUES FOR I AND SIGNAL ANALYSIS ..... _______ _, 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND TABLE 

D. CHAIRMAN: MR. O. R. KIBBY, CHIEF, OFFICE OF COLLECTION 

E. PRESENTATION: MR. 0. R. KIRBY 

'A:f't~r 'the.!p~e.sentation:-the following .dfscussion· took 1place ': · · ' ' ·~~I ' I ' ' \I• I I : 

Capt. Godwin: The intercept tape comes into the cryptanalysts 

who look at the tape as it comes in and file it. They pick out certain 

tapes that they want to process end send them out to us. We are not 

logging or accounting for the audio tapes as they come in. Once the 

tape comes to us we perform purely a processing function. We do not 

go into the analysis of the signal itself. We merely process it on 

page capy or in the manner most suitable for the cryptanalysts. 

a e represen a ves. 

Col. Pulling: When you are talking about audio tapes I take it 

that you get them page printed and the cryptanalyst works from the page 

print. Is that the process? 

Mr. Kirby: Yes it is. I feel that some explanation of the reasons 

for magnetic tape recording might be useful at this point. 

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E03.3(h)(2) 

When the I !we/ had no/ mea.D.~ wbatsoever 

for providing equipment suitable for f'ield o eration wbi.ch would give 

us page print with a r resentation of' the We wanted 

to record and to pr.eserve 

the We also wanted to bring 

the recordings back and to reproduce them under controlled \laboratory 

conditions for max:i.m'Um accurate end results. 

'l'o perm.it simultaneous page printing of' both sides of' the link, we 

modified some of our own Model 28 printers so that two printers would 

step together continuously during the play back operation. 

The actual processing therefore /Consists of reproducing the \.canned 

signal and producing a page print for both sides of' the link siJQ.ul.-

ta.neously. We get very accurate representation on page print of\ what 

actually happened on the original. transmission. · 

CPR Childs: If thel 

M:r. Kirby: No. 

CDR Childs• 

M:r. Kirby: This is a. good point to bring up. We had no equipment originally to do the job of' on-line processing in the field. 

we had equipment that required continuous attention and considerable 

maintenance to keep it operating. We did not have a system which we 

felt we could recommend. for field use however. I do not think we want 

to undertake this type of job with anything less than modified Model 

28 printers which W'ill stand up as well as the unmodified printer. 

I would likeito explain here that we are now planning fora.nonline page printing program in the field. We believe that the system 

which has been.worked out here is satisfactory for field use. PROD 

and R/D have evolved two relatively simple modifications which will 

permit the installation of model 28 on-line printing at field intercept stations. 

'Jlhe 9ihjectives of' the on-line printing program as it pertains to 

.__...,,.........,.. _ __. lis to secure for the analysts, a printed version of all transmissions. At the moment we must duplicate hour for hour, the time 

spent. at the station in recording the transmission. After this central 

processing reproduction is completed, the analysts mu.st then study the 

page prints and decide what they want to use, and what should be filed 

a.way. By presenting the a.naly-st with an index of what is on the magnetic 

tape they can reduce the amount of central processing of actual. tapes. 

Please note that we will require back up recording of the page print 

using magnetic tape. 

Mr .. Segal: As Mr. Kirby just pointed out we are going to embark 

on a new Model 28 program. Before I explain anything about the program, 

I would.like to give a little idea of some of the present intercept 

difficulties. In the field we have different types of' printers, depending on the Service. That is one of the things ve -would like to get 

away f'rom. We want to get a standard printer that will be fairly easy 

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to maintain and which will provide a degree of accuracy. We bad arrived 

at the conclusion that with the Model 28 with a. few modificat::l.ons ve 

can implement an on-line printing program which will elimina.t'e the 

requirement for central processing on a mass production basis, and 111,8.lte 

the inf'ormation more accurate and at the same time available for more 

timely processing and dissemination of' the information. Direct print.ing 

at the intercept position. will provide material in a form .1fhich it is 

more easily exploitable in the field and here at NSA. 

When technical a.nd intelligence material. comes intoNSA it has to 

be processed in our processing division end then it goes to the using 

groups • Under the present system there bas bee:ri considerable delay 

prior to the information being disseminated both within l!ISA and in the 

f'ield. We hope to eliminate this del.ay by the use of'/the Model. 28. 

It will also rend.er a more usable product since it will give us an 

accurate time-space relationship. It will also let .us know what is 

going on on both sides of' the transmission between the control. and the 

out-station. It will render direct page print for /USe f'or TA personnel / 

in the f'iel.d. ( 

Mr. Schmidt: In the field stations where ve have to make page 

print we imtend to use standard umnodified t>rinters for on-line•radio 

printer systems,\ 

we set-this system. up with one master/and one slave. When the 

master reaches the end of' the line it sends the automatic carriage 

return and line feed not onl.y to itself' but to the other machineo 

'!'hey both go back together so that the l!nes are always the seine on both 

printer. 

The modification eliminates al.l of the :functions. Instead of' performing the normal f\mctions like the/carriage return and line feed, 

we Just print a character. we have i.n effect a f'ulJ. 32 characters • 

The other type of mod.if'icationtba.t we are getting in.to is the 

modification for th~ !It is a little ditf'erent problem 

because it is a synchronous system.. It uses only one channel.. 'l'o 

indicate whether the character in that chamlel is clear text or cipher, 

the synchronizing bauds are reversed: .. 

Up to now, the Mod.el 28 with the synchronous motor would give a 

standard fixed speed. This is not too good for field installation. 

Tb.ere is now a series-governed motor a.vailabl.e. The trouble with this 

series-governed motor is that in order to change the spe~d ,.ou have to 

adjust the governer, turn it on, measure the speed, turn it off, read.Just the governor and repeat the process. This is not satisfactory 

tor adjusting for speed changes in the as it 

takes too long. 

We have been working with the Telet;ype Corporation on a small 

variable speed motor which is continually ad.justabl.e · from outside the 

case of the printer. You don't have to open up the printer at all. 

We al.so expect to ba.ve a speed indicat"fng--device consisting of a small 

ac generator coupled to the motor shaft itself. A plug-in meter· reads 

in RPM. 

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The mod.els will probably come out with three sets of gears, 60, 

75, en.a.;1,1,QO WPM. They will maintain speed adjus·~ment wi thiri l~ for 

100 hours. 

The other type will be for search operations where you will be running across different speeds of signals which you want to match. You 

have all the various international speeds. There you will have a different adjusting spring governor. It won't give you quite the accuracy 

."but you will be able to cover roughly about 4o words a minute up to 

115 words a minute. 

Lt. Gaschk: Who is going to give us these printers? 

PL 86-36/50 US 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Mr. Schmidt: You will have to refer to scmebody else on tbat. 

Lt. Gaschk: Our chief' ai:i1r:i.s to provide the best possible .copy 

on the We us~d to have as many as 3 positions backup on each position for a given· station in. order to achieve the best 

possible copy. 

I know how necessary it is to get perfect copy. I wish to put 

this thought 1B your minds, that perhaps on certain links it would be 

reasonable to back them up with 2 positions at a given station, or where 

the adjacent positions are at closely related st19:tions i.n the same area 

you can give yourself 2 shots at a time so as to get a composite picture. I know that you do produce page copy !rom it. Perhaps that is 

the answer. Perhaps the magnetic tape does/giva that back-upo OW 

experience has been such as to indicate that providing for back-up would 

be a good idea. 

Mr. Kirby: That is perfectly trae. We don 1t have the coverage 

capability at this point to permit duplica-:Oion in coverage. 

Mr. Segal: Right n.ow the Services a.re not suff'icie~tly lush with 

personnel that we could afford to do this across the boa.rd. Duplicate 

cover I p-ouid have to be on very selective links 

aad. very f'ew 1irikS at 'tfuit. 

Mr. Brownstein: I would just like to point out a couple of things 

that we are doing on the l.ong range probl.em. We intend to get at the 

problem of increased accuracy of' copy, recognizing that it is rarely 

possible to get multiple coverage on the same stationo One approach 

to the probleni. is approach! ltake a recording 

and play it over 3 times on the same demultiplexing equipment. Om.l.y 

when the 3 copies agree/does the crypta.n.alyst make use of the material. 

The other approach which we have started and which is new to us, is to 

get some idea of the garble rate o You know ahead of time that the 

single cbamlel cycle/it is going to repeat itself' all the time. Certain 

patterns are always adhered to. These can be examined and if there are 

a:ny deviations from standard in the stated :patterns they can be identified as garbles. 

For nmltiplex signal.s an examination of the frequency and amplitude of each/baud can give an indication of' the quality of "the traffic. 

In ad.di tion, ve have some work under contract which will carry this 

idea somewhat further. There are only 2 reasonable things to do o 

When you/aemod.ulate or demultiplex a s~gnal you identify it with a 

particular baud, mark or space.. It is possible by the use of correlation 

techniques to speci.:f'y with what degree of certainty somethi::lg is mark 

o-r space. We hope in time to be able to provide the cryptanalyst with 

am indication of the probable accuracy for every character. 

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Lt. Gaschk: Are you bringing that out to the f;telQ. for field testing? 

Mr. Brownstein: Eventually we intend to. However\ there is a long 

way to go before we put the ideas in the form of equipment. 

Mr. Malone: Can the modification of' the Model !28 be\.accomplished 

as a field change or will it require completely new equipment? 

Mr. Schmidt: I wouldn't say that it couldn't be done in the field 

but we a.re working with Teletype right now to make it a standard modification. It will, in ~ff'ect, come directly from them. 

Col. Pulli~g: What is I land\ how\ do you indicate l:!.ne feed and carri~a-g_e_r-et .... ur-n"""'?,....--------

We deliberately drop out all functions such as line feed, carriage 

return, letters and figures. '!'he machine doesn't shift. It just spaces 

and prints. When one of these functions comes up we print a special 

character instead. 

M:.-. Kirby: This is essentially what has been called! 

\\ 

Mr·. Neill: On RFP shots which have been taken on f 

is there a:ny indication of clear text radiation? ---------

We have not 

found a:ny similar thing here. 

There a.re some other usef'ul. things that came out of the associated 

study, however because of time limitations I don't want to get into 

them here. 

Col. Pulling: The I 

I I wonder if there 

to give i;ne 1_;v.u.1.1rary U.S. views. 

is anyone present wno is in posii;ion 

Mr. Kirby: I would say that it is a matter who you talk to within NBA 

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-ecoNFIDENTIAL ,.._.__ 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

TOPIC NUMBER: 14 

TOPIC TITLE: TECHNICAL SUPPORT OF THE FIELD 

TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

CHAIRMAN: MR. B. R. BEBB, TECHNICAL CONTROL SECTION, FIELD OPERATIONS 

DIRECTION GROUP 

HIGHLIGHTS: 

In his opening remarks the chairman stressed that the extremely 

limited time available for discussion made it important that the latter be 

confined to broad field support problems and principles. He then suggested 

as one possibly very fertile avenue of discussion the growing concept of a 

need for expansion, both at NSA and in the field, in the direction of a 

less formal, more specifically directed type of support, such as that 

exemplified by the NSA technical support letters. That NSA is attaching 

increasing importance to the fu:ture potentially greater value of such 

informal tailored media, over the more formal mass-produced types of 

technical reports, is illustrated, it was pointed out, by the fact that 

other PROD elements are now participating in this program which was 

pdd.neered by NSA-90. 

At it.his juncture the NSA-90 representative, Mr. James Pearson, was 

recognized. He explained the true purpose of the support letter and the 

NSA view that the maintenance of its content at a sufficiently high 

standard of quality as to make it of real value to the field unit for 

which designed was directly dependent upon that unit's responses via a 

counterpart medium, namely a reverse technical support letter. He 

emphasized further that it was the NSA conviction that next to the personal 

visits between NSA and field analysts that are accomplished through TDY 

trips, the technical. support letter exchanges afford the best avenue for 

a sound analyst-to-analyst working relationship. , ~ -' 

The chairman then briefly outlined how NSA-o63 had up to the present 

undertaken informally to encourage field participation in a reverse technical 

support letter program, rather than formalize a requirement for participation 

through a circular that might endanger the intended spirit and purpose of the 

reverse letter and detract from its informa".I.. nature. 

Captain W. A. Wright, Chief NSAP/C, noted that in the course of his 

efforts to promote field participation in his area he had found acceptance of 

the principle as sound, but rejection of the mechanics as extremely difficult 

to achieve. The chief reasons given for the latter, he explained, were, (1) 

that the field analysts were already so overloaded with functions directiy 

related to the collection and production of COMINT that they had no time to 

devote to the preparation of ·reverse technical support letters, and (2) that 

the procedure was in conflict with service command prerogatives and correspondence procedures. 

The USN-39 representative, CDR G. Chiles, USN, indicated his opposition 

to a requirement for informal reverse support from his station for reasons 

practically identical to those advanced by unit· commanders in Captain Wright's 

theater. He suggested that:it would be time consuming for a commander to 

monitor and edit informal letters from unit analysts to NSA to insure that 

faultfinding 'With local operations didn't appear in them, and that correct 

language usage was observed. CDR Chiles indicated further that NSA-39 is 

completely satisfied with the technical support received from NSA, and that 

aJ.l requirements for informal support exchanges with the latter are met 

firsthand thvough the frequent personal visits between USN-39 and NSAFE 

analysts. 1•1 \ 

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The chairman acknowledged the value of such vis~ts, but pointed out 

that prime responsibility for the support of field units rests with the 

National Senter, and that mu.ch continuity can be lost to analysts here\if 

they IIl'.lst rely on the relBiY, through the NSA field activity technicians, 

mf what is remembered by the latter of all technical verbal exchanges at. 

the many units they regularly visit. 

Major v. Kellan, representing the 691oth Security Group, stated that 

the Air Force had long since indorsed the principle of reverse technical 

support and queried the chairman as to whether items in that category were 

not being regularly received by NSA from Air Force field units. Replyi~g 

in the affirmative, the chairman expressed NSA's appreciation for the active 

and enthusiastic participation of Air Force uni ts. He advised Major Kellan, 

however, that the recently issued CIOPs 8-7 and 8-8 had caused some concern 

in the Agency because they req~ired that AFSS units combine reverse weekly 

technical notes and support letter material in one document. This would 

It was observed by Major J.E. Macirynski, USAF, 3d RSM, that it had 

been the experience of his analysts that the' elapsed time between informal 

hard copy exchanges is so great that the problems dealt with in their 

letters often cease to be of current interest by the time replies are 

received. In this same connectdlon someone made the point that where a 

report is required, a man with information to submit would be apt to withhold 

it nntil he could submit it with the report, thereby causing the information 

to lose its timeliness. 

Mr. Harry L. Clark, Chief NSAEUR, stated that hfus1-obs·ervations had oonvinced him that everyone concerned is in agreement as to the soundness of 

the principle of reverse technical support, and he expressed tpe opinion that 

if this is true, NSA should not delBiY further in issuing a circular requirement for reverse technical. suppo?:t letters from all field units. He felt 

quite strongly, however, that the requirement should be that they be 

submitted as often as necessary, rather than with any such frequent regularity 

as weekly or semi-monthly. 

The chairman then asked the principals at the discussion whether there 

was any strong unanimity of opinion, either in favor of or in opposition to, 

an NSA circular requirement for reverse technical support letters. The response appeared to indicate a majority in opposition, with the ASAE and USN-39 

representatives particularly outspoken. No official NSA commitment was ma.de 

as to whether such a circular would be issued. 

No other major tecbnicaJ. support problems were brought up by any of the 

principals at the meeting, and it is believed that the foregoing represents 

a ;i)laj.ori ~y of the contributions to the discussion. 

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c. TYPE OF GJ~SIOii: :r;.omID-TJ'.BI..E 

n. cnrm.:.·.-:: r:or.r.rs c. rmo:::r 

E. IIIG~~T.IGHT:J OF TI.J~ fii'.:GGIOlT 

l~ Gc~~crnJ_ - The ~1.1attern o:L the discuso:fon wa.o est~;i.lJJ.inhcd t"'.t the 

outoet by an inquil7 con(.!crnin~ cq_u:lpnent which had been ship11ed b:· :;:;_·. to 

the US.'\J.i' 6930 SECUHI'lY GTIOUP. '11he discuos ion thereafter concerned the 

ava.ilal:>ility, and/or tecting otatus of certain pieces of equiprr.ent 1n :·?1·0-

duction and in research a.nd development. 

2. Specific - The more important of the specific subjects dicc1~::;scd 

are SUIID'llB.rbed as follows : _) 

a. R-220 Receiver - Inquiry on availability of this rece.iver 

revealed that production of this item is very limited\d.ue 

principally to the fact that it is still being tested, even 

though production has been initiated. 

I 

b. The ~UCO Program - This program was discussed as reJnte~ to 

the difficulty of obtainin s are arts for the e uinmcnt. 

NSA' s policy on spare parts gener~lly 

w that the Services will procure :;).nd ct,oc .. ~ 

their own, and provide for this procurement at the ti1;;e ti.1c 

basic equipments are being produced. 

c. Model 28 Printer - Adoption; of the Model 28 Printers "oy the 

Services generally was discussed from a funding aopect. 

HSA indicated that every assistance would be furnished to 

the Services in their efi'orts to obtain the necessar'r ft:::iC..n. ' ~ The value of the Model 28 Printer from an opera.tiona.1 standpoint was c~.abora,ted on by one of the PROD conferees with 

implied, agreement by the conferees tnat fcrr interceDt μ~r~ooc3 

this picllce of gear we.s superior to that presently in use. 

d. NSA Catalog - The publication of the USA Catalog was diocu:;ocd 

briefly by the Chairman and it was pointed out that a.n ci':::ort 

would be .,ma.de to identify those unique items that ~TS.'\ ~~ould 

procure tor the Services in the future. A questiop 'me ·~1occtl 

on the cross-reference of i terns- appearing in the I!SA Ca Jee.lo::; 

to the new general cataloging system. This, it was incl:i.co.tcd 

was planned. 

e. Six-Part Intercept Pa.per - An inquiry wa~ made on pons:iJ;;.e 

use of carbonless paper for intercept purposes. The c:'!D.ir;::=.n 

indicated that the possible use cf this paper wan c~uer 

investiaation by IIBA, and the Services would be advisee.: 

of the results. In fact, a quantity would be sent to fj.clcl 

stations for test. 

J. Several other items of equipment were discussed but for the 

r.1oot po.rt the discussion revolved about operational rather than lo~istico 

considero.tionc. 

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. 1• • l'ROBI.Ji!MS THAT CAME TO LIGHT 

J.. One of the problems advanced by the Chairman concerns the 

difficulty attendant upon gettina equipment to the field rapidly enough 

to meet unexpected situations that develop on a. era.sh basis. It was 

pointed out that although this could be overcome by more iealistic 

planning, that this was n9t the complete answer. It was pointed out 

by one of the conferees that closer coordination should be effected 

between NSA and field activities. One incident was adverted to but 

apparently there were extenuating circumstances. 

2. There were no other major problems discussed, and no 

concrete 1olution to the problem presented by the Chairman could be 

.foreseen by the conferees in the.absence of specific details concerning 

procedures followed to meet crash situations. 

G. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

nothing specific was recommended. It was generally conceded 

that coordination of logistics matters could.be effected with a greater 

degree of efficiency by all concerned. The Chairma.n\stresse~ the fact 

that NSA was prepared to assist field coJJJDB,nders witli all of these 

logistics problems,, and invited comments and recommendations on 

pertinent logistics problems that may possibly be resolved by NSA 

Washington. 

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e CONFIDENTIAL e 

'roPIC NUMBER 16 

TRAINING - PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 

GENERAL MEETING 

CHAIRMAN: Mr. s. L. Patterson 

Chief, TNG Division 

SPEAKER: Dr. Sydney Jaffe 

Asst. Chief, TNG Division 

Some day another message like the "Winds Message" may for a few 

seconds flash through the air. If' and when it comes, we want to 

get it. We want to understand it and we want to be able to act on 

it. The difference between getting that message, or missing it, 

could be, as I needn°t tell you, tbe difference between survival and 

ar.nihilation for a lot of people. 

When the message comes, if' it comes, what is our cha.nee of 

finding it? The answer to that depends, I know, on a succession of 

complex factors, but finally all of tbese complexities end up on 

the shoulders of' one man - the man on the set, the set that is supposed to be on the transmitter sending the message. If' he misses 

the message, chances are it is missed forever. 

Who is this man likely to be on whom we put this respo:csibility? 

Is he likely to be an interceptor of long experience, thoroughly 

trained to do his job and happy to be doing it? Or is he likely to 

"oe some nineteen year old boy, not long away from the farm or the 

city street, Just out of' a school that tried to teach him something 

he found deadly dull, and his mind f'ull of nothing but how soon he 

can get home again? I think that the way things are today, the 

chances are much better that this boy is the one on whom we are 

placing our trust. 

Now, most of the time at this conference has been, and will 

continue to be, devoted to difficult problems of' technique and 

procedure. 

I think it may not be amiss to devote at least a short period 

out of this week to focus our attention on this problem - the prob- , 

lem of how we train our young operator and how we can provide him 

with leaders fully capable of giving him the guidance and support 

he needs. 

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From everything tbat bas been said here so far, and from wbat 

we all know about our problems, I think the fact emerges, tbat, 

quite literally, the success of our mission rests on tbe success of 

our training programs. All of our plotting and planning Will be 

to no avail unless we can provide and maintain a force of men wbo 

are capable o'f doing our job. 

This concern is 1 of course, not unique to us in the cryptologic 

enterprise. We share with all segments of tbe military and civilian 

establishments the need to have available a corps of bigbly trained 

and effective men who can not only carry out our responsibilities 

in peace-time, but who are being prepared for the even greater 

tasks tbat will face -us if we ever go to war again. It is a problem 

we share, certainly, but in our case the problem seems especially 

acute. It is especially acute because for the most part we must have 

men trained to a degree of competence not required in many other 

operations. In our case, mre than in mst, mediocrity can be 

suicidal. And what complicates the situation still mre, the skills 

in which we need experts can very often not be found in the civilian 

world, nor will they be in many cases of much use to men when they 

leave the Service. 

The problem of keeping a really elite corps on a war footing 

faces us today - in an era when the Armed Services as a whole are 

extremely worried about how to attract and hold competent people. 

You are probably familiar with the work of the "Ad Hoc Committee' 

on the future of Military Service as a career tbat will attract 

and retain capable Career Personnel n· .. the Womble Committee. As 

another indication of the degree to which this problem concerns us, 

Admiral Carney recently wrote an article for "Armed Forces Management" entitled "MaldDg Navy Career Attractive in Face of Disheartening Obstacles." The obstacles are indeed dishea.rteningo In any 

case, we have only to read the newspapers to realize the extent of 

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the difficulties we face. The number of men coming into the Services 

is being reduced. The tour of duty for some enlisted n:.en has already 

been cut. Even officers are available in many cases for periods of 

less than two years. The re -enlistment rate is tragically low. And 

there is talk now of some system of universal training which would 

keep men in uniform for only a few months • 

The picture is a discouraging one f'or a Service tbat must., if 

it is to function, have at its disposal a force not just of people, 

but of skilled technicians and experienced professionals. 

The solution to this problem must be sought on many fronts by 

all who are in any way concerned with the management and mainte::r.ance 

of the Armed Services. But certainly one of the fronts on whicr. ·.re 

can make useful progress is that of the selection, training ar..d 

assignment of what manpower we can lay our bands on. 

Some of the problems of personnel plannir.g and utilization will 

be discussed later in this conference. I want to devote my tir:.e, to 

a consideration of what improved philosophies and techniques of 

training can do to help us function in spite of the unfortUDate 

:manpower situation that faces us, and even to make substantial contributions to improving it. 

It might be useful at this juncture to recall the relationship 

tP.at exists between NSA and the Services with respect to training 

in the field of COMINT. I will not quote the exact language or the 

fou.."ld.ing pcpers, but in essence this is wbat they provide: 

1. The Service Cryptologic Agencies are responsible not 

only for procuring, organizing and equipping their own COMINT uni ts 

but for training thera as well. There is clear recognition of the 

fact that training is a function of comni.and., and no disposition to 

r2lieve the cornn;and.er of any of this responnibility. 

2. The Director, NSA, is to provide technical guidance 

and support for COMINT training conducted by the Military Departreents. 

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3, In order to insure necessary levels of tecbnical 

competence, he is to establish minimum standards for such train4. He is to conduct for the Services such specialized 

and advanced COl-iINT training as is found necessary. 

Like all other bare statements of law, these provisions have 

been interpreted in the best light of the people concerned, flesh 

has been put on the bones 1 operating arrangements have been effected 

and policies have been evolved. 

out of the association between NSA and the Services created by 

the founding documents 1 have evolved certain policies which ba.ve 

been, f'or the past eighteen months or more, governing the training 

efforts of all members of the COMINT community. I would like to 

review the major items, and then to tell you some ot the positive 

steps that have been taken to give practical effect to them. These 

policies, I would like to empba.size, grew largely out of' the training conference of December 1953 in which representatives of NSA and 

the Services participated. 

1. Inasmuch as ioost enlisted men will not be available beyond their first enlistment, they should be trained, insofar as 

possible 1 to do only the job we expect them to do. They should be 

sent into the field just as soon as possible so that we can get 

Ir.a.."{imum use out of them while we have them. We can contribute to 

this end by pin-pointing the training in every way possible. We 

should eliminate many of the "nice-to-know" subjects, and concentrate 

on the "need-to-know" materiaJ_. It would be nice for the Morse 

operator to be an electronic engineer, but h~ can certainly get on, 

and stay on a target, without knowing each electron by its first 

name. 

2. It is a corollary of' this proposition that no school 

should imagine it can so :prepare every man that he can step into a 

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field station and forthwith carry his weight as a technician. The 

schools should train only up to a certain point; it must be left 

to the Commander of every field installation to provide a suitable 

program of apprenticeship training designed to prepare the student 

to carry out the specific duties of bis stationo Stations bave 

their own ground-rules, and methods of operation, tmy bave different 

missions and even different equipment. The student, trained in a 

general school, must be care:full.y led into this new situation. Now, 

:m:>st stations have, in fact, been for years conducting some form of' 

apprenticeship training designed to lead their men from the student 

into the effective operator stage. We are trying to contribute to 

the improvement of these apprenticeship programs by giving them official recognition so that a commander will not be ta~ked on the basis 

of the presence of men who are not yet effective. Guidance from NSA 

with respect to this program is contained in BSA Circular No. 41-4, 

am in Apprenticeship Training Standards. I. am pleased to note that 

the Navy, anticipating the NSA circular, is developing an excellent 

apprenticeship program. 

3. Application of these procedures 1 of specializing school 

training and providing apprenticeship training periods, can be successful only it the first enlistment man is properly supervised in 

the field. Proper supervision pre-supposes a corps of NC0°s and 

officers who are capable not only by reason of their ability as 

comnanders, as leaders, b.ut by reason of technical skill, of directing the efforts of' the great body of technicians we need in our business. I won°t go so far as to say about the cryptologic service tlla.t 

it is (as one of the cbaracters of the Caine Mutiny said about the 

Navy) an instrument devised by geniuses· to be run by idiots, but certainly as long as it is to be manned largely by novices 1 t must be 

led by men ot experience am Wisdom. 

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4o To this em we must recognize tbat a really effective 

training program can be built o~ on the foundation of a carefully 

"' planned career structure, one that recognizes t~ realities of the 

COMINT operations /1 that provides for an orderly progression through 

phases ot learning and experience and responsibility for officers 

and enlisted mea alike,, and tbat encourages our best m:ui.,to stay in 

the Service. In abort,, we must encourage our mea.,to the continuous 

increase Of their technical 8M leadership Skills I and provide them 

with every means possibl.e to accomplish this objective. The Technical. Management :Board: has been working on a project to give guidal)ce 

to tbe Services on tbe problem of revising the COMCNT career stru.cture. The Services have in general. con.curred With the Board 0s 

recommeniations, and we hope that subsequent actions will lead to 

solutions of t~ ma.DY problems involvedo 

To sum up /1 we believe that there are four major policies which 

govern our plamd.:ns: 

1. That school training should be pinpointed to the requirements of ti. field operatioao 

2. That station collllllllnas must provide carefully p~d 

apprenticeship training programs. 

3. That efticers and career enlistment :men 111DSt be given 

advanced tra1D1ng 1D their specialties. 

4. That adequate career am promotion opportunities 

should be created, closely tied to increase in technical. profictency. 

I think that if' these policies are carried out with dispatch, 

w1 th determination and W1 th Wisdom, we will improve our chances of 

accomplishing the difficult ~ks that lie before us with the inadequate supply of mapotfer and material available to us, and we may 

even, by these same :mea:asa do something positive about encouraging 

mre good men to stay with us. 

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Now, so much for policies. I said that these ideas were subscribed to by representatives of NSA and tbe Services soDI! 18 mnths 

ago. Have we, NSA and the Services together, made any progress toward impro'Ving what we all adm:1 tted was a tar from satisfactory 

situation in that time'l I think we have am even though you my 

be well aware of what has been done, it -my not be without value 

to review tbe mst significant actions. 

I spoke a moment ago about the obligation laid on EA by the 

f ound1Dg papers to prescribe minimum stam.ards for Service training 

in order to ensure the technical com,petence of the men in our 

service. We have interpreted this directive as requiring us first 

to re-examine the skills that are needed by technicians in every 

field of endeavor; then to determine to wbat extent these skills 

might best be taught in the Service schools and to what extent such 

skills should further be cultivated in apprenticeship periods at 

field stations; and finally to interpret these findings to the 

Services in the f'orm ot Training and Apprenticeship Standards. 

These standards bave taken the form of fairly detailed statements 

• 

of the subjects to be taught and the approximate amount of time 

believed necessary to cover them. The standards, after they have 

been carefully checked with the best available opinion in NSA and 

the Services, are issued to the Services in provisiona1 form. When 

the Services• co11111ents have been considered, the standards are then 

issued in final form. The process of complying With these standards 

is in varying states in each of the Services, owing to local conditiODSo 

While we believe that as large a measure of standardization 

is desirable in training practices, we cannot fail to recognize 

that conditions peculiar to the individual Services Will continue 

to make complete staJJda.rdization impossible tor some time to 

come. 

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A number of standards have been issued in final form, others 

are in various pre-publication stages. These will be issued as 

soon as the long process of investigation, coordination and review 

has been effected. 

As I said earlier, it was the intent of' the powers tbat created 

NBA that the Services should be responsible for training their own 

forces • But they also recognized that in many cases, NSA could and 

should render guidance and assistance to the Services in the interest 

of keeping the training responsive to operational requirements, discovering ways of ~..a.king economies in training programs through pooling resources, and in every way possible giving support to Service 

training efforts. 

In the past year or so, we have placed major emphas~s on providing such support to the intercept training activities. I think 

you may be interested in some of' the paJ:'.'ticular programs that have 

been carried on. • 

First, the area of radiotelephone intercept: There has been 

universal agreement that improvement is required in this department. 

Operators arriving in the field, it is frequently reported, have 

been ill-prepared to assume the duties expected of' them in spite of 

a long period of' training in the ZI. There has obviously been a 

need for something better in the way of' training. Although something 

better seems to be required for all languages in which radiotelephone 

transmissions are being intercepted, we tackled the Russian problem 

f'irsto 

Until about a year ago, each Service had a different way of' 

preparing operators. 

The Navy 0s operators received twenty-six weeks of communications training at Imperial Beach, followed by six weeks of' 

langtiage instruction at NSA. Transcribers were officers who graduated from a nine-month Russian course at Anacostia. 

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e CONFll)ENTIAL 9-

In the Army, both operators and transcribers bad twelve 

months of general language training at Monterey. Graduates of 

this course might go to the ASA School for further training, son:.e 

came to NSA, son:e went to both places and some to r.either. 

The Air Force sent both operators and transcri"cers to n 3h:-

rr~nth language cour5e and then to a five-week specialized R/~ 

training course. This program seen:ed to give tr.e best results in'1 

some vays • 

E~erging from this training jumble, several facts stood o~t: 

(1) Some men were being over-trained in language end sorr:.e undertrained in R/T intercept techniques; (2) some tY?ec of training 

·:rere over-specialized and others much too general; (3) except \"or 

the Air Force program, the training was not geared to produce a 

Rusnian R/T s~ecialist. 

In an atteJr!Pt to.produce a reasonably uniform program dcsi,sned 

to create operators who could, with a minimum or apprenticeship 

training carry tl!eir weight at a set, we took ~~he :tollowing acticr:~ 

Training 0£ an R/T operator was divided into two phases: the 

firct phase to be a six-months language course Nith erz.p~..a.sis on ear 

training and general military vocabulary. For this purpose the six-

:r:ontl~s Air Force course at the Army Language Scr.:.001 was utilized. 

Certain changes vere me.de in the course to pre~nt over-specialization at this otage. Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel e.re n~ 

enrolled in this course. In addition, a six-month course vre.s 

established at the Navy Language School because the PJ.S could not 

take care of all the Navy students. 

Upon graduation from this pba.se, Army and Navy persor.nel re -

port to NSA for three-months additional training. During this 

phase, the men study R/T intercept. They are exposed, insofar as 

it is possible in a classroom, to situations simulati!lti those they 

will meet in the field. They work with equipment as sil'l".ilar as we 

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can get to what they will find.; they practice tuning in sigDSJ.s 

under bad conditions; they listen to 98 live" tapes that were recorded in the field and process them as they will do later 1mder 

actual field conditions. 

We hope that this intensives tailor-made course Will give you 

operators who can do the Job you expect of them after a minimum 

of apprentice trainillg at their duty stations. We will watch it, 

and we hope your operations officers Will watch it, aDd tell us 

wbat should be done to improve ito In the near future, this course 

will be mved to the ASA School at Fort Devens. We will then turn 

our attention to the Chinese R/T problem. 

In the field of non-Morse intercept, certain changes have 

taken place in the past year or so which give promise of inproving 

the quality of the men assigned to this duty, and consequently the 

quality of the traffic they make available to the analyst. 

Until quite recently9 the Arrrq alone maintained a formal trainiDg program in this field. In the early part of 1954, the Air Force 

establisbed a scbool of its own at March .AFB in California. These 

scbools have been developing a constantly improving curriculum. 

Last fall, representatives of EA, the Air Force a.Id the Navy met 

at March Field to lay pl.ans for Navy participation in the Air Force 

School. The plans that developed from this conference were an 

excellent example of bow the strengths of each individual Service 

can be combined in the interest of the whole national. effort. 

Combining the assets of both Services should give them real help 

in carrying out their respective missions. 

The first Navy students will enter the school at March Field 

in ApriL Now,!I all three Services are in a position to carry out 

effective training programs for non-Morse operators. 

But tbe training of basic operators, however carefully performed, is not enough to assure that we Will bave effective operations. 

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9 CONFIDENTtA-LltPL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

I referred earlier to the urgent necessity of providing professional 

guidance and supervision to the basic operator. Even the best schooltrained operator will not be able to function\ long, or effectively, 

unless his supervisors are in a position to direct bis activities and 

help him improve his operations. With the des:l..re to ensure the:.t we 

have senior NC0°s prepared to act in this capacity, NSA has established 

at Vint Hill Farms Station, with the close collaboration of ASA, an 

advanced Non-Morse Intercept Operators school. We attach special 

significance to this school since it is the first advanced course 

for NC0 8 s in the cryptologic fieldo We hope that it will set a 

pattern, and will encourage the development of similar programs in 

other specialties. The course as now designed will last for six 

months. St\llents will be field-experienced career NC0 9 s in the 

upper grades. The subject matter will be directed toward the student 0 s professional development and will concentrate on the production 

of specialists well-rounded in all aspects of' non-Morse\ intercept" 

"[t includes many subjects not ordinarily included in non\:"'Morse courses, 

such as Elements of Electricity, Signal Analysis, Use of Special 

Identification Teclmiques, etc.. We hope that this program, and others 

like it, will help not only to provide you with a better staff', but 

to persuade more men to stay in a Service which promises them such 

opportunities for professional growth and advancement. 

Clo-:;el.y allied to the problem of improving the ability of the 

operator to find his target and to get a f'aith:t'ul record of wb.at he 

hears, is that of providing support by the traf'f'ic analyst. This 

problem is especially acute in the case o~ I operations • As you know, 1 t is of'ten very dif:f'icul.t to identify the 

stations being m:>nitored. Frequently no callsigns are used, and the 

traffic must be studied very carefully in order to ma.ke the identification. This burden is too much for the inexperienced basic operator to carry; he must be supported by men trained to do on-the-spot 

analysis. 

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'"'"'.;. .. 

.-:: CONFIDENTIAL PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

There have been no traffic analysis courses which gave sutf'icient attention to this radioprinter problem. In order to give some 

help in this field, NSA bas prepared a Printer T/A course to be 

given at our school in Washington. The first class will meet on 

4 April. In addi ti.on to training o~ J 

and in methods of 1ink identification.JI the students will be given a 

rudimentary lmowledge of' ._I __ _.tan introduction to the operation 

of a printer intercept operation at Station 1 9 and instruction in 

the operations at NSA am the relations between operations in the 

field and in Washington. 

Finally, I would like to say a word about some other programs 

that are being operated here in Washington for men and officers of 

a11 the Services. 

First~ For some time we bave been planning to invite key 

instructors in the Service Schools to come to NSA in order to see 

at first band developments here in their special fields. The purpose of this move obviously is to help keep school trainingJI as far 

as possible, reflective of the actual operational. situation. 

Second: As you undoubtedly know9 we have in operation now 

two courses designed to broaden the knowledge about the cryptologic 

business of field grade officers. We have a f'our-mntb course 

which consists largely of an intensive tour of all the staff and 

operating elements of the AgencyJI and a ten-month course which adds 

six-months of rotating operational assignmentsJI plus a tour of 

field installations. The former course is operated almost entirely 

for Majors and Lt Colonels ot the Cryptologic Services; the latter 

al.mst entirely for Lt Colonels and Colonels who 8.re being assigned 

to NSA1 but the Services have quotas from time to time in this course 

to use as they desire. 

I think that we in EA have been able to make some contributions 

to the cause of Service training tbrough the programs I have been 

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describing. But I would like to allude however briefly to another 

way in which we can give support to Service activities: That is, 

by providing training materials. You are probably aware of the fact 

that the first textbook on tra:f'f'ic analysis of which we can be proud 

now is being prepared f'or printing. It should be published and in 

your hands this fall. In the field of' crypta.na.lysis, a nev, revised, 

improved edition of Mr. Friedman's "Military Cryptanalytics, Part I" 

has been printed 1D. tentative form. It too has just been prepared 

f'or final printing and will be available to your schools and field 

stations in a few months. It Will be accompanied by a se·i. of problerr.s 

and a course designed for individual or group study. We :ti.ave i:i 

prospect an entire set of textbooks in cryptanalysis which will take 

several years to complete. But if' you are patient am we sta.y unatomized long enough you will bave them. 

In another field, we are turning out textbooks of all kinda in 

a multitude of' languages. Some of' tbese have no iJlllJEdiate prospect 

of being used, but we are trying to insure ourselves against being 

caught short in any area from which a blow might concei vabl.y come. 

There will soon be made available a set of tapes on which all 

known conmunications signals bave been recorded. Tbis tape library 

will be accompanied by a book describing the signals • Copies of the . 

manual am the tapes will be made available to field stations, vhere 

they should give· real assistance in the identification of signals unfamiliar to the operator. 

Finally, I would refer to the accessions list of training materials which we publish from time to time. This list contains documents which we create ourselves or that you have developed, and which 

we think may be of' interest to other members of the COMINT coJillI!Ulli ty. 

You may request these documents under conditions indicated in the 

listing. We urge you to keep us informed of your publications and 

training programs so we_ can help you individually and collect:i.vely. 

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In sumnary, we believe that a successful training program must 

. be a balanced one. We may liken it to a four-legged table: shorten 

any one and things slide off. The four legs of our program are: 

adequate training for the basic tecl:mician, the apprentice in the 

field, the advanced enlisted technician and supervisor, and the 

officer. Unless all of these people a.re properly prepared we will 

not be able to do our job as we want to do it. 

We believe that if the policies and programs I have referred to 

are carried out by all of us, in NSA alld the Se~ces, with intelligence and energy we will make great contributions to the success of' 

our mission. 

One last word. 

I Will freely a.dmit tbat we do not have today all the answers 

to all the questions that you can ask, or even that we can ask, 

about how we can best carry on the vital training programs we need 

in our business. But we must continue to ask questions and seek 

answers. There is still much to be done. None of us can rest 

until we create a permanent corps of specialists, dedicated to the 

cryptologic mission and fully qualified to perform in a professional 

mnner the task assigned to us. 

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A. Topic No. 17 

B. NBA Overseas Field Research Activity 

C • General Meeting 

D. Chairman: Colonel John J. Davis, USA, Chief', Plans and Policy Division 

E. Highlights: 

Presentation by Mr. A. H. Hausman 

BSA OVERSEAS FIELD BFSEARCH ACTIVI'fI 

I. Ilft'RODUCTION 

'fhe subject of' my talk this morning is the NBA OVerseas Field Research 

Activity. Before describing this activity, I would first like to provide you 

with a little of' the background of R/D's previous experience in the field. I 

would then like to describe the inadequacy of this.effort and outline a plan 

to you, which we hope will enable the potential. wbtch we in R/D have, particularly through contacts with the best engineering firms and government labs in 

the country, to contribute to theeffort Which the services are now making in 

the field. ' ·· . 

We in R/D have had experience with research activities in the field in the 

pa.st, but these experiences have been confined to stations in the United States. 

With the formation of' AFSA, about 1950, we had, and still have, facilities at 

two Navy Field Research Stations in the ZI. These stations are located at 

Cheltenham, Maryland, USN-22, about 20 miles outside of' Washington, and the 

other at Skaggs Island, California, USN-26, about 4o miles outside of' San 

Francisco. At Skaggs, we in R/D exercise control of a component of the main 

intercept station; the remainder of the station being engaged in a normal 

intercept operation. 

The research functions at Cbel tenham and Skaggs are the same and may be 

described under two headings: 

Under one heading we have a number of experimental positions which enable 

us to take to the field experimental equipments and techniques which are under 

development in our laboratories and try them out at the stations. We can make 

changes in our experimental systems on the spot, if it is possible; otherwise 

we can bring the equipments back to the laboratory in Washington, make the 

changes, and take the equipments back out to the field again. There is, 

incidentally, a amall COlJ\'POnent at both of these stations which is engaged in 

the actual development of' some of' the equipment which we in R/D as a whole 

are working on. 

The other function perf'ormed at both stations is what we call "technical 

search". i'he term "technical. search" refers to a special. program for the 

discovery of unidentified signals, systems, or emissions from which intelligence cannot be extracted by the use of existing operational intercept equipment utilized in routine fashion. This category includes Ciphoey, Cifax, Noise 

Ccmmuni.cations, and other signals not identified as to type, purpose or source. 

As f'or our strength in these operations, the Navy Security Group has provided at Cheltenham approximately 90 men. This is considered to be f'ull strength 

f'or our operation. The group is broken up into approximately 6o intercept 

operators and 30 maintenance personnel. At Skaggs Island, the Navy has provided for us with approximately 30 people; 20 intercept operators and 10 

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maintenance personnel. We anticipate, in FY 57, an increase in our requirements at Skaggs to 90 men, as we now have at Cheltenham. 

Looking back over our past history, it is evident that we in R/D have 

largely failed to lend the support to you people in-the problems which you 

face in the'field. We have analyzed the situation and have come to the conclusion that, fundamentally, the reason for our failure is that we, the 

engineers, at all levels, are too far removed, when working here in Washington, 

from the actual problems overseas. We believe that if we can find the mechanism by which we can take many of our engineers to the actual problems, then 

we will have in large part avoided, in the future, the failures we have 

experienced in the past. We have selected the Overseas Research Activity as 

our mechanism for bringing R/D closer to the field. 

Now there are a number of technical problems which can be more profitably 

explored by R/D in an Overseas Field Research Activity than can be explored 

in the Field Research Activity here in the United States. These problems are 

concerned with those target signals which cannot be observed satisfactorily 

at our stations in the ZI. Some of these targets are in the '\i.igh frequency 

portion of the spectrum, some in the Very High Frequency, or VkF portion, and 

some in UHF portion. By going overseas on these proble~ , we in R/D will be 

enabled to perform two functions: one, the· evaluation of experimental equipment and techniques under actual field conditions, making such changes and 

modifications as are practicable-..1211 the spot, and two, we will be enablea:··to 

perform the technical search for, and the analysis of, new and unusual communications signals. 

II. DESCRIPl'ION OF TBE OPERATION 

I would now like to describe for you how we expect this field rese~ch 

activity to operate overseas. Some of\'fOU here know something of this program, 

as we have already begun to go into operation in the European theatre. Nevertheless, I believe it would be well to go over the entire operation, even 

though much of what I say may be redundant to some of you. 

Before we became specific in our program, we talked to many -people here 

in NSA, both in R/D and in PROD. We talked with people in the Cryptologic 

Services here in the states, and we made a trip to Europe to talk with people 

in the field. As a result, we found that there were six or seven basic questions which continually arose with the people with whom we talked. In general 

these questions were concerned with: one, the authority and the mechanism, 

within the NSA-Cryptologic Service relationship, which would be employed to 

authorize the program and two, with the details ·of the program. With regard 

to details, we were asked such specific questions as "To which particular 

station would we go with these field research activities?" "How would these 

positions be controlled? 11 "How would these positions be supported, both 

logistically and technically?" "What is the timing of this operation? 11 • 

I will try to answer these questions as my method of describing to you this 

overseas field research program. 

Let us take as our first question, 11Previously, why did the NSA Field 

Intercept Deployment Plan not list B/D type positions as specific requirements on the Services?". The answer to this question is that, in the past, 

NSA requirements for Research and Development Activities have been made 

known to the services onanannual basis as a service support function. Therefore, no R/D positions were identifiable in the original intercept requirements 

submitted to the Secretary o'f: Defense. In the future, however, NSA research:, 

requirements along with operational intercept requirements will be submitted 

to the Secretary of Defense for approval. As a corollary to this question 

then you may well ~sk,"Until the R/D type positions are included in the NSA 

Intercept Deployment Plan, how will the services be permitted to undertake 

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this project in the field?" The answer to this question is that, in order 

to permit this R/D program to proceed1 and. further 1 .to preclude the necessity 

for annual programming tor support requirements 1 the .Dire·ctor of NSA is now 

effecting Change No. 1 to the IDP. The Director has this authority under 

paragraph 2X of the NSA IDP, which provides for precisely such situatiofls as 

we are now facing. Now of course a change in the IDP is onl-y partially an 

answero A change in the IDP is more a legalistic action than anything else. 

Being very practical about it, NSA PROD has lifted, and will lift as a 

temporary measure, operational mission assignments at selected stations in 

order to make available the space and the people necessary to accomplish this 

R/D mission. 

You may now ask, 11What will be required of the Station Commanders in terms 

of space and personnel at R/D positions overseas?" On the average1 we expect 

to as~, at fixed stations, for no more than approximately 250 to 300 sqo fto 

of floor space and approximately 3 men, usually two intercept operators and 

one maintenance man. Our van operations will normally require 3 to 8 people, 

a mixture of intercept operators and :maintenance m.en1 and only one van. In 

the case of ASA, the K-53 van is considered typical, and in the case of the 

AFSS one of their maintenance vans would be typical. 

Natural questions now might be1 "How will these positions be controlled?" 11How will the reporting of the operation be conducted?" The answer here is 

that both operational and technical control will be exercised by NSA R/D. We 

have an officer in our R/D group who holds the position of "Officer-in-Charge 

of R/D Field Research Activities". He represents the controlling element for 

R/D. He exercises this control in two wayso First1 non-routine operational 

control is conducted through the same element in PROD which exercises nonroutine operational control on PROD matters. The question of priority of 

assignments, NSA (PROD) vs NSA (R/D), is thus settled in NSA; and in this way 

the Services Commanders a.re assured of only one channel between NSA and the 

Services. Routine operational control and technical control involve mainly 

the tasking of the R/D position on matters which do not require the field 

commander to take any action out of the ordinary. This control is effected, 

as describ~d in NSA Circular 50-21 in precisely the same way that PROD 

effects their routine operational and technical control - to wit, from the 

Officer-in-Charge, Field Research Activities directly to the Station Cammander1 

with carbon copies to the interested parties. The reporting and mailing of 

material collected during this R/D operation will be done in the same manner, 

in principle, as on PROD activities. This is described in NSA Circular 51-ll. 

However; due to the nature of the B/D task, the particular reports required 

will depend on the task assigned to a particular unit, and hence no standard 

reporting formula can be given.- It should be noted here that technical questions or problems a.rising in the field as a -task progresses., are forwarded 

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directly back to the 0-in-C, Field Research ~ctivities, using the same procedures 

as R/D uses in exercising technical control. 

Now let us take up the question of support. "Row will these units be supported in the field, both logistically and technically?" Logistically, we will 

ask the services for standard equipments, precisely as PROD a~ks the services 

for standard equipment· However, there will be much tha.t is non-standard :fn 

an R/D position, and when involved with such non-standard equipments,, we in 

R/D will supply and support these equipments. If we should wish to modify a 

standard equipment, we in R/D will supply and support this modified equipment. 

The accountability for R/D supplied equipments Yli.ll be carried by R/D under 

an R:'D task, in precisely the same manner in which we account for other 

equipments in our laboratory. 

Technical support, in an R/D sense, is something quite apart from technical support as is usually denoted in a PROD sense. We propose to provide the 

R/D type of technical support to these positions by having engineers from our 

labs make periodic and frequent trips to the field to work along side the 

personnel on the problem. Sometimes the personnel supplied by R/D wi],.;l- be 

civilians, sometimes they will be military. Sometimes theyvw:tll ~8'$t""s· 

sometimes they will be enlisted men. Sometimes our people wlll be in the 

field for a few weeks, sometimes for a few months. We hope however, to 

keep a close enough contact to avoid periods where the continuously changing 

R/D requirements are not fully explained. I'd like to .make note of the fact, 

at this point, that we are now preparing papers for one of our R/D men' to be 

transferred to Europe and attached to l'SAE. He will serve either a 1 or 2 

year tour of duty and be relieved by another of our technical representatives. 

While on the subject of personnel~ we are hopeful that the R/D tasks assigned to the various stations will be sufficiently interesting to attract 

the attention of the best intercept operators and maintenance men. If so, this 

development work may contribute in a sma.11 way to the efforts the field commanders make to stimulate the interest of the personnel attached to the station. 

Now, we propose to provide an additional support to this operation in the 

field through two rather unusual fiDB.ncing arrangements. ·: 

At the present time these arrangements are With regard to the European 

theater but we hope to follow them in the Far East. The arrangements are as 

follows: First, we have what we call "Confidential Funds" These funds are 

made available to NSAE who in turn is authorized to provide cash to selected 

individuals. Some of these individuals are R/D engineers in the theater at 

the time, and some are service _personnel attached to the particular stations 

in which they are doing this R/D work. NSAE may g1 ve them sums of money 

ranging up to $loo, at a time, on a hand receipt. The individuals can then 

use this money to purchase in the theater those small parts, components, or 

even services, necessary to get their job done. The second fiscal arrangene nt 

which we have concerns the purchase in the theater of equipments availab1e 

on the local econ These would be items enerall cost in exce t 

$100. 

This then leaves us with the question o~ "When will all this came to pass?" 

To begin with, ·we are already 1n ope:t"e.tion at Bremerhaven, and we are already 

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in operation atl l Arrangements are now being ma.de for tm 

operation at Hof and we expect to ship equipment within the coming week. We 

expect to have this equipment installed and in operation sometime in May. 

The ASA Border Unit will come under R/D operation and technical control approximately 15 June of this year. 

In the Far East, we expect to have the installations at WB.ka.ni and the 

installation at Kami-Seya· in operation by late fall of this year. 

III. PROGRESS REPORT 

I would now like to take a few moments to describe a little of the nrogress which has alread.v been :made at the I 

\and, second, to determine what the technical require- '-----.-------.....-..--:-------:--::-----~ ments are which must be met to enable us to satisfactorily collect this tra:f'fic. 

We are working very closely Vith both NBA (PROD) and ASA trying to gear this 

program so that we can as quickly as possible turn over to PROD and to the 

services a normal intercept collection problem. 

IV. CONCLUSIONS 

Up to this point in my talk, I have given you some of the background of 

the field research activity in the ZI. I have tried to describe why we in 

R/D have failed to be as effective as we could, in the past. I have tried 

to describe how we belie~ the Overseas Field Research program will pperate 

to improve our effectiven~ss in helping you with yaur technical field problems. I have gi-ven you a very brief report on what we have achieved to 

date and perhaps -now I can give you some idea of wha~ may expect in the 

near future from this program. We expect to go into as mentioned 

previously, this May and bring with us ... ~gpiel lequipm.ent. Actually we are bringine; ;tn us an experimental intercept system; 

we have a number of ant:~J:')~ idea-s we would like to try out, -these include 

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cularly from air to ground i1;ltercept; we are bringing receivers which are 

more sensitive than anything else which has heretofore been tried out :i,n the 

f'ield; we are bringing with us some panoramic receivers, which we hope 'Will 

perform quite well in this operation. These panoramic receivers display all 

of the activitr in a given portion of theEPE:ctrum at one time. For exa.l'llple, 

in the case of I 

....... ~~~~~~~~~~~~--..,......~~,,...,...........,...~~---.,........,....,,.........,,....~ ......... ---.....----- of the spectrum, an intercept operator would be enabled to quickly locate the 

frequency channels where there may be activity. He would then manually··.·· .. tune 

his receiver, or receivers, to guard these channels. This is actually a first 

step toward the development of an automatic search and lock-in intercept system 

for operations against aperiodic transmissions. 

IncidentaJ.ly, this is a good point at which to bring in the ad.vantages 

to be gained by doing this developmental work in the field where we have 

experienced operators who can compare the way they are doing their job today 

with the methods we are proposing to bring to them tomorrow. We can getthat 

evaluation right on the spo~d attempt to make corrections in our procedures 

to better conform to that which the field personnel consider to~~()pe!"ationally 

desirable. . ... ······························································································································· P .. ·• ... L 86-36/50 U EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Now a~ I, we expect to follow the noise monitoring position with an experimental flexible multiplex intercept position. We have 

a number of ideas on improving this particular intercept system and we would 

like to bring our equipment out and set it up on the target and see how well 

it perform5··: If successf'"ul we feel we can cut down the normal delay time which 

we face in moving from an R/D development to a normal operation in the field. 

Finally, we expect to introduce a strengthened technical search progr~ 

into the European theater covering not only the high frequency portion of.the 

spectrum, and below, but even more important, the VHF/UHF portion of the 

spectrum and above. 

As far as the Far East is concerned, the program out there is behind 

perhaps 6 to 9 months the program in Europe. It is expected the Far East 

program will pretty much follow the same pattern as in Europe. I I 

we will do a similar type of VHF work. However, we are going to be in a 

little different environment, For one thing, our signals are propagated 

over water in the Far East whereas in the European Theater they are propagated over land. 

In the high frequency portion of the spectrum we are most interested 

in the technical search aspect at the present time; this includes,. as a natural 

part of the technicaJ. search operation~ a noise listening position. We will 

undoubtedly do some analysis of jammers in the Far East as we are now doing 

in the European theater. 

What one may expect of this field research program a year and a half or 

so from now is very hard to say. We consider this to be primarily a pilot 

program at the present time. We have already learned a considerable amount 

encourageo. oy i;nis. we teer to a very great eXtent, it brings many of our 

engineering people in the laboratory mu.ch cioser to the field. It gives us 

a much better appreciation of your problems, and we hope that we will soon 

be in a better position to support your operations. 

F. The discussion of Mr~ Bausman's presentation was concerned with the 

capabilities of the equipments employed. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER 18 

B. TOPIC NAME PERSONNEL PLANNING 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: GENERAL MEETING 

D. CH.AIBMAN CAPTAIN J. S. HOLTWICK, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR 

OPERATIONS 

E. PRESENTATION 

The following presentation was delivered by Colonel Duncan Sinclair, USA, 

Chief, Personnel Division: 

INTRODUCTION -

General Canine, Ladies and Gentlemen. I don't know how many of you are 

intimately concerned with personnel but I daresay that sooner or later each 

and everyone of the problems which you have been discussing here this week 

depend in one way or another on the availability or utilization of personnel. 

Consequently, it seems appropriate to extend into the personnel field General 

Canine's remarks of the opening session regarding communications. There may 

be no irmnediate solution for the five problems which I shall lay before you 

this morning, but if we all can recognize them and continually work at them, 

success will eventually be achieved. 

As you know, at NSA we are authorized 10,713 people of which 7,388 are 

civilians. So long as we comply with applicable directives, we enjoy comparatively complete freedom in the hiring, assignment, training, promotion, and 

separation of civilian workers, and our ability to resupply ourselves with 

the necessary civilian skills is dependent largely on their availability in 

the labor market and on the salaries which the law allows. But w1 th our 3 ,,325-

mili tary people, it's a far more difficult problem. Here we face, not only 

the peculiarities of three different services, but also long lead-time between 

request and receipt. Since the military personnel situation is more difficult, 

but especially since many of you who are assembled here represent the service 

cryptologic agencies from or through whom all NBA military replacements must 

come, the five problems which I shall discuss are limited to military personnel. 

I assume you will carry them away with you and work vi th us toward their 

ultimate solution. 

PROBLEM NO. l - MANNING NSA AT 100% OF AlJ.L'HORIZED STRENGTH 

Problem No. l concerns keeping NSA at 10~ of authorized strength by all 

three services, a situation which history has ~t to see. As of 28 February 1955, NSA was short 153 in authorized commissioned and warrant officer 

strength and 102 in authorized enlisted strength. While you may feel that 

these are not serious shortages, I hasten to point out that they should not 

exist at all, as I shall demonstrate later. 

This 100% strength problem has three parts. Part Able involves the 

prescribed NSA tour of three years which, with a few agreed exceptions, applies 

to all military personnel coming to NSA. You can see that if' all 3,325 military 

men stayed with NSA for three years, we would suffer an annual tum-over of 

l,lo8 or 33 l/'3'fo. In actual. fact, d~ing calendar 1954 we lost 1,644 officers 

and men, a tum-over of 4~? This high tum-over is due in part to the 

practice of enlisting soldiers for only three years. Naturally by the time 

basic and cryptologic training have been completed, the new soldier comes 

to NBA with considerabl~.'less than three years' remaining service and we are 

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PROBLEM NO. 1 (continued) 

faced with the Robson's choice of accepting him for a short tour or going 

without. Until the service departments all graduate to enlistments of' four 

or more years, the best solution is to fill NSA with oversef'C'! returnees who 

have re-enlisted or ZI professionals who don't require so much preliminary 

training. To achieve stability and full strength, we welcome any suggestion 

which will eliminate the assignment to NSA of soldiers who are on their :first 

enlistment in favor of the man who is entering his second or subsequent hitch 

(or cruise, as they say in the Navy). 

Another reason for the excessive tum-over is the extremely low intake in 

all three services of regular officers. The result is that practically all 

lieutenant and ensign billets are held by ROTC graduates or Reserves who have 

been called to active duty usually for two years. Again NSA has its choice of 

accepting these or none. This high turnover among junior officers is bad 

enough in itself, but the really serious damage lies in the fact that al.most no 

young regulars are getting cryptologic experience and the professionalism 

which exists today will die on the vine unless new blood enters at the bottom. 

I am happy to say that ASA has pounded the Department of the Army into 

cormn.encing this year with an annual infusion of young regtilar officers. 

During calendar year 1955 a total of 50 regular off'icers will be assigned to 

ASA, some of' whom will be welcomed into NSA. A similar arrangement seems to 

me a must for NSG and .AFSS. 

Part Baker of the 100% strength problem has to do with personnel programs, 

and for these I draw your attention to this diagram. As you know, the Department of Defense is executive agent for the National Security Council where 

COMINT is concerned. Within DOD, NSA is charged with the execution and direction of the COMINT effort, Under DOD are the three service departments and 

within each service department is the service cryptologic agency which is the 

personnel procurer for NSA. Notice that while you in the cryptologic agencies 

are on the receiving end of operational orders emanating from NSA, NSA is on 

the receiving end where personnel is concerned. It is true that NSA regula- -~­

tions require the crypt agencies to submit to NSA their plans and programs but 

too o:rten they are received too late, and too o:rten we find too late that 

there have been revisions or adjustments. As for service department programs, 

if we see them at all, it is after the fact. We've gotten b~tter in the past 

year at ferreting out personnel programs and keeping abreast of what's in 

store for us. Rather than to use the command channels to force prompter 

information of' changes in personnel programs, we'd prefer to have you keep 

us posted to date, even calling on us to go to bat for you when you discover 

that your service department is considering programs which may hurt you and 

us and consequently the COMINT effort. 

Part Charlie of the laoli strength question concerns a lack of appreciation 

of the origin of NSA's strength authorization. Unless they are continually 

reminded, people tend to forget that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have fixed the 

contrivution of each service to NSA at 355 officers and 753 enlisted men. These 

strength authorizations are not subject to manipulation by the service departments 

although your own strength is. Each service, whether directly or through you, 

by JCS direction, owes us 355 officers and 753 enlisted men. If your particular service has chosen to include NSA authorizations within your total, 

then it would appear that you have the responsibil~ty of filling the NSA 

authorizations completely. This is why I mentioned earlier that present 

shortages should not exist at all. 

Summing up Problem No. 1, in order to bring the NBA military complement 

up to l~ of authorized strength and maintain it there, there must be: 

- More effort to reduce turnover by assigning people who will stay for 

three years, 

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PROBLEM 1 (continued) 

- Better information of your own and your service department personnel 

programs, 

- More emphasis on the inflexibility of the present NSA strength 

authorizations. 

PROBLEM NO. 2 - WHAT HAPPENS TO THE MILITARY MAN WHEN HE REPORTS TO NBA 

Problem No. 2 is a brief description of the policies followed at NSA 

in the reception and assignment of officers and men reporting to NSA. 

At the outset, let me say that we are qUite concerned with the numbers 

of officers and enlisted men who commit themselves to housing in the Washington 

area before they have reported to NSA to discover what their specific assignment will be. In spite of all our efforts to broadcast this caution, men 

are finding themselves assigned to duty at one of the four locations NSA 

now operates which may be many miles from their housing and which may result 

in severe personal or financial hardship. This has become a significant 

morale problem since the relocation of part of our operations to Fort Meade, 

and will continue to be a problem until our entire effort is moved to this 

post. 

As most of you know, NSA now operates at four locations: Arlington Hall 

Station in Virginia; Naval Security Station on Nebraska Avenue in Northwest 

Washington; the NSA School in Temporary "R" Building near the Capitol; and 

here at Fort Meade. The distance between AHS and Fort Meade is about 30 

miles and takes approximately 50 minutes driving time. It is about the same 

from NSS to Fort Meade. Commercial transportation to Fort Meade is very 

limited. Commuting from some areas around Washington to AHS, NSS or the 

School may take up to two hours or more by commercial transportation. 

It is important therefore, that personnel leavlng your commands for duty 

with NSA be cautioned against committing themselves for housing until they 

have reported to NSA and received firm assignments. The length of time involved 

in ma.king a firm assignment will vary with individual circumstances. Perhaps 

the best way to illustrate this point is to describe the steps a man must 

take in reporting and receiving his assignment. 

1. Each man reports to his service administrative command. His official 

records, pay, etc • , are taken up by that command. 

2. The man then reports to NBA Military Personnel Branch at NSS. He 

is interviewed, his clearance status is verified, his badge picture is taken, 

and he submits a PHS. At this time he will recieve a firm or tentative 

assigmnent. Typical reasons which result in only a tentative assignment are 

an incomplete clearance, training in NSA School the performance in which 

determines final assignment, or further interviews by operating Chiefs. 

3. All personnel with no previous NSA experience are assigned to a 

one week orientation course at the lll"SA School. Exceptions a.re made in the 

case of certain senior officers for which special orientation tours are 

usually provided. If the person is cleared and requires no specialized 

training at the school, he reports to his duty section at tne end of the 

orientation course. 

4. Men pending clearance or those placed in special courses at the 

school may remain there for varying periods, depending on completion of the 

course or clearance or both. Every effort is made to give the man a firm 

duty station location as soon as possible. There are few cases that go 

beyond the one week orientation period before such information can be provided. 

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PROBI.:.<.M NO. 2 - ( continued) 

I urge you to relay this information to your personnel officers and to 

insure that men leaving your command for duty with NSA are properly ad.vised. 

Do not limit this advice to the married ones. Bachelors have a way of taking 

leave enroute and showing up in Washington with a brand new wife. 

I suspect that many men coming to NSA wonder what kind of a job they will 

get. With the exception of those provided on "by name" requests, military 

personnel ordered to NSA for duty by their service are supplied against this 

Agency's stated requirements, identified by grade and skill. Since the career 

plans of the three services do not at this time provide adequately for all the 

skills required by NSA and by the cryptologic effort on the whole, we must use 

the identification systems now in existence. Each of the services have a 

different numerical system of identifying skills: MOS, SUJCO, AFSC. In stating 

our requirements to the supporting services we endeavor to use the skill label 

which specifically identifies the requirement if one exists. When the requirement 

cannot be so identified we must use the nearest specialty code which the 

particular service provides, or one which provides a suitable background for 

the NSA job. 

The man reporting to NSA is identified by his service specialty code and 

will usually have been provided by his service to fill a requirement in either 

his primary or secondary skill. 

Within the job requirements of NSA we make every effort to place each 

individual where he can be utilized. most effectively. With exception of those 

few (usually senior) officers whose assignments are determined prior to reporting, each new arrival is interviewed to confirm his specialty code and determine 

if he has any unique skill or eJq>erience that would make him better qualified 

for one billet as compared to another. 

Occasionally there are factors which result in assigning a man to duties 

which are either outside his primary skill area or are only indirectly related. 

We have accepted men from the service to fill authorizations in a different 

skill from their specialty because the service has been unable to provide 

sufficient men of the proper specialty. These men are retrained on the job and 

in the NSA School. Al.so, because of the long··pipeline, which for NSA ranges 

from 6 to 24 months, changl.ng job requirements sometimes finds us with men 

arriving to fill a requirement that no longer exists. We are doing everything 

we can to eliminate these situations and stabilize our military requirements. 

However, the factors are sometimes beyond our direct control. Improvement in 

the cryptologic career plans of the three services will in turn reduce the 

nl.lll'lber of exceptions. ,Increased liaison and coordination with service headquarters for personnel programming will also benefit all concerned. 

A specific difficulty which continually faces us in NSA is the assignment 

of intercept operators. As you will all agree, it is a constant struggle to 

develop sufficient nl.lll'lbers of qualified and experienced intercept operators. 

With large nl.lll'lbers of overseas billets and few in the ZI for these people, 

the services, particularly USAFSS, has been forced to release qualified career 

intercept operators for duty outside of the CClr1INT field. These men are o~en 

not recoverable. Others who would become career men do not re-enlist because 

they do not relish the prospect of requalifying in a different specialty. We 

in NSA feel that part of a successful security service career plan nrust 

necessarily include a secondary skill for intercept operators which will permit 

them to be effectively utilized in ZI,head.quarters billets. It is felt that 

one of the logical sources of analytical personnel is the intercept operator. 

Some of them may develop skills in T/A, C/A or language. When their ZI tour is 

completed, they can then go back to field billets better qualified to be an 

operator or supervisor. The Navy Security Group has long followed the practice 

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PROBLEM NO. 2 - (continued) 

of developipg traffic analysts from intercept operators. ASA does not have an 

acute problem of this nature at the present time but it is a potential problem. 

We have recently made arrangements with the USAF Sec'lll'ity Service to accept 

intercept operators for retraining in related fields. This approach is consistent with uniform cryptologic career plans for the three services which are now 

under development and which I shall mention within a few·minutes. 

Summing up this problem, NSA does 1 ts utmost to assign all incoming 

people in accordance with their indicated skills and skill levels, and for 

the Lord's sake, tell your people not to sign up for a house lllltil they have 

signed in and received the assignment which will.determine their geographic 

duty location. 

PROBLEM NO. 3 - STABILIZATION OF REQUIRDlENTS 

My third problem deals with the steps we a.re taking to stabilize the 

persozmel requirements which NSA places upon the tbree ceyptologic agencies. 

Realizing that such stabilization is a prime contribution to sound service 

prograzmning, the Personnel Div:l:sion in October 1953 embarked on what we call 

the Occupational AnaJ.ysis Program. While this program was aimed primarily at 

the civilian aspect of' the Agency it was felt that through. this program much 

could be done to stabilize and properly classify military positions. 

The Occupational Analysis Program develops Job structures to include 

all jobs necessary to accomplish the mission of the Agency. This development 

involves the Joint participation of representatives from the operating areas 

and the Personnel Division in meetings which are convened tor the purpose of 

arriving at a common understanding of related functions and levels of difficulty. 

These related functions are grouped into categories and job surveys are 

conducted by category rather than by organizational segment. On the job sheet 

which is prepared for each level within ea.ch category, not o:D.ly the civilian 

grade and titl.e is placed, but aJ.so the military specia.lties and levels of the 

three services. · 

From this program, Job requirements are deve1oped for military personnel 

and information is obtained for the preparation of Agency training courses, 

for the evaluation of service training courses in related fields and for the 

enrollment of Agency military personnel in different training courses. We 

have developed data which supports requests for new military job codes or for 

the revision of existing codes to cover the special.ty fields of the Agency. 

We are identifying jobs that can be used for military rotation in the cryptologic 

field and Jobs which can become a part of the m:ili tary career -ladders of each 

service. 

In order to further stabilize NSA military jobs, the Personnel Di vision 

care:f'ul.l.y reviews all requests from the operating areas for changes in military 

requirements. First, for the necessity of the skill, and secondly, as to 

whether operating officials are asking for the correct skill. Whenever necessary, 

a military classifier conducts a military audit to determine the skill required. 

Prior to making any change, the pipe-line is checked to determine if a bod;y' 

is enroute to fill the billet that is lm.dergoing change, and a turther check 

is made to determine whether there is someone in training to till this· requirement. While a. change in emphasis is the primary cause for a. change in personnel 

requirements, I do wish to emphasize that there is a thorough investigation 

before a change is made, and that we are working even now on a new internal 

device which shows promise ot :f'tlrther stabilization of NSA military requirements. 

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PROBI..'PM NO. 4 - CRYPTOLOGIC CAREER PLANNING 

The fourth problem concerns cryptologic career planning which has been 

going on for sometime under the direction of the NSA Technical Management 

Boa.rd. This is no unil.ateral NSA project, but one which has ·included full 

participation by your representatives from the. start. The purpose of' this 

project is to develop a framework Within which individual service cryptologic 

career plans can be deve1oped, so that service career structures will be based 

on conmon technical fundamentals. 

Since operational differences and variations in the structure of your 

commands have a major effect on a study of this kind, guidance must be broad .. -. ; 

and sufficientl.y flexib1e to meet special situations within your service. 

Accordingly, it was not considered practicaJ. to develop detailed career progression, but rather to categorize basic specialties and groups of specialties 

on which career structures could be based. 

When the present po1icies and procedures governing applicable phases of 

personnel. and training in your organizations were reviewed, significant 

differences were noted. But since the three cryptologic organizations have 

more similarities than dissimilarities, a standz.rized approach to those aspects 

of career planning which are peculiar to ceyptologic organizations appears 

feasible and appropriate. The different categories of cryptologic specialties 

afford a minimum standard for the services to utilize in developing cryptologic 

career pl.anS based on organizational needs and in consonance with parent 

service requirements. 

The enlisted career structure has been divided into four branches: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Co1lection Branch: 

Morse Intercept 

Non-Morse Intercept 

Voice Intercept 

Morse Monitor 

Non-Morse Monitor 

Direction Finding 

Radio Finger Printing 

Anal;r!iS Branch 

CA 

TA 

Ma.chine Aids 

RFP Analyst 

COMINT Analyst 

COMINT Linguist 

Weather Analyst 

Maintenance Branch 

Machine Aids 

Teletype 

Crypto Equipment 

Intercept Equipment 

( 4) eryptologic Service Branch 

Crypto-distribution and any other service :f'unctions deemed 

desirable by your organizations. 

The grouping of' specialties in each branch is based on categories of common 

skill. 

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PROBLEM NO. 4 - (continued) 

With respect to officer personnel, three distinct types were categorized: 

(1) The Cryptologic Career Specialist who is essentially the 

graduate level specialist who would duplicate the skills 

usually found in civilian personnel but because of potential 

requirements for such specialties outside the ZI, military 

personnel would be required. 

(2) The Cryptologic Career Generalist who would make up the 

"ha.rd core" of the cryptologic officers. 

( 3) The Non-Cryptologic Officer who would rotate between general 

service assignment and assignment with the cryptologic 

organizations. 

With your cooperation, the ultimate development of this project will 

not only help in equalizing the grade vs skill levels in your organizations 

but will aJ.so assist in resolving the problems encountered in assignment, 

rotation, grade advancement, cross-over into other cryptologic specialties and 

last but not least, your re-enlistment problems. We feel certain that the 

availability of a valid long-range career plan, indicating paths of 

advancement and training, is a recognized and valuable means of providing 

an incentive to .!:!! mili ta.ry personnel to continue their mill ta.ry careers. 

PROBLEM NO. 5 - MILITARY CONVERSIONS 

Having just mentioned re-enlistment, I move now to the f'i~h and final 

problem, a short discussion of the business of offering civilian positions in 

NSA to ex-military cr;yptologists. 

It has been alleged that NBA materially increases the problems of the 

three services, in maintaining a strong military cryptologic career group, 

through an apparent policy of encouraging experienced military personnel to 

accept ci vi.lien positions with NBA in lieu of continued mili ta.ry service. 

I have no doubt that each service represented here can cite cases illustrating 

instances which apparently support this allegation. 

However, I will state firmly that at no time has it been the policy of 

NSA to actively solicit or otherwise encourage military personnel to leave 

the services for NSA. Our policy in the past has been to hire only those 

experienced cryptologic personne1 who desire such errq>lo;yment after they have 

decided to leave the military service. 

As a matter of record, RSA has not hired any really significant numbers 

of military cryptologic personnel. During the year ending March 1955, we 

employed some 145 military conversions while at the same time we lost some 56 

experienced cryptologic personnel. to the military services. Of' the 145 personne1 

hired during this period, in excess of 2/3 had less than six yea.rs military 

service and probably could not have been considered career military personnel. 

Many of these individuals in addition were reserve officers who were being 

relieved involuntarily from active duty. Furthermore, with minor exceptions 

the 145 figure includes only those military personnel who converted to civilian 

status from local mili te.ry assignments. Those cryptologic mill ta.ry personne1 

not assigned to NSA who applied for a job after discharge and were accepted a.re 

not readily identifiable from any other recent veteran looking for a job. In 

any event, such cases are not the result of any NSA recruiting activity. 

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PROm.BM NO. 5 - (continued) 

From the above figures I think it can be seen that NSA inroads on career 

military personnel are negligible in proportion to the to'!;al numbers of military 

personnel in the cryptologic effort. But let 1 s look backward for just a moment. 

For the past several years NSA has been almost continual.1y in the position 

of expanding its civilian component. Almost without exception each supervisor 

in NSA has had numerous vacancies that he could not immediately fill. Under 

this condition I think it is conceivable that ambitious supervisors, as 

individuals and despite NSA policy, would attempt to persuade military personnel 

associated with their organizations of the benefits and advantages of' a civilian 

career in NSA. Since re-enlistment rates throughout the services have been low, 

there is a far better than even chance that service personnel thus persuaded 

would otherwise have been completely lost to the cryptologic effort. 

Now for a look at our present and future civilian strength situation. We 

expect to reach a f'ully manned position by 1 September of this year. As this 

day draws nearer, NSA will become more and more selective in considering all 

applicants for employment, especiall.y in the higher grades which seem so 

attractive to the prospect! ve military converter. The point is simply this: 

Very soon the number of available jobs will be determined by attrition, (which 

is very low) and there will be little hiring at the higher grades. The time 

has come to spread the word among the military :fellows who are thinking of 

civilian jobs at NSA that the prospects are getting slimmer. 

As a general policy, NSA is primarily concerned with maintaining as 

many experienced personnel within the cryptologic effort as possible. This 

applies to both civilian and military personnel. Bearing in mind that service 

re-enlistment rates ~re running between 10 to 30 percent, there is still a 

very considerable group of bona fide ex-service personnel in whom NSA is 

interested in offering employment. 

Our policy, then, can be simply stated as follows: 

(1)_ We are not intentionly in competition with the services for 

the emplo;yment of experienced military personnel. 

(2) We will continue to offer employment, to the extent that 

vacancies exist, to all qualified and experienced military 

personnel who, of their own volition, determine to leave the 

services for a civilian career. 

We will cooperate with the services in this problem by avoiding any 

active solicitation or encouragement of military personnel to accept 

civilian employment. We will avoid undue public! ty among active service 

personnel of civilian job opportunities. In turn we ask the cooperation 

of the military services in reconnnending to us for employment, those qualified 

and experienced personnel who have decided to conclude their service careers. 

CONCLUSION 

Summing up in reverse order, the problem of military conversions 

will pretty well disappear as NSA reaches its authorized civilian strength 

this coming summer. Uniform cryptologic career planning is well under way, 

and the question of stabilized military requirements is prominent in our 

minds. As for replacements coming to :NSA, I repeat again: - Warn them not 

to get tangl.ed up in a house until they know where they are going to work. 

Finally, toward an improved strength situation, there must be a reduction in 

turnover, better information of service personnel programs, and closer 

attention to the strength authorization which has been established by the 

Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff and is binding on each service. 

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ecoNFIDENTIAL e 

K3.MORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. 'I'OPIC NUMBER 19 

B. 'I'OPIC NAME SECURITY HA'ITERS 

C. TYPE OF SESSION GEI~F.JU1L MEETING 

D. Cl~AIRM .. l\N DWIGET !::: • .f\.Gl\E\.' 1 CAPT, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 

:&'OR ADl·~INIS'.mATIOI·! 

E. SUMMl\RY OF PREC2';HTf\TION: BY MR. S. WESLEY REYNOLDS, CHIEF, SECURITY 

DIVISION 

The protection of communications intelligence is of prime concern to 

all. The Security Division, NSA, is aware of the need for strong security 

in the COMI~"T field and seeks every opportunity to impress others with the 

need to constantly bear in mind the necessity for strong and effective 

security. 

Recently the Chief of the Security Division had an opportunit;; to 

observe so:r.;.e aspects of security in a few field installations. The rn.J.ssion 

was primarily concerned with personnel security; however, a few physical 

security ite1:is were worthy of mention. '£he lack of uniformity in the field. 

of physical security was noted, an exarriple of which being guards were observed in one antenna field while their absence was noted in others. It 

would appear :tr guards were necessary in one antenna field, there should be 

a need for them in others or, conversely: if they were unnecessary in one, 

it would be a waste of manpower to have them in others. The lack of uniformity in handling, transmitting, and accountability of classified codeword material was noted, indicating a need for devising a uniform regulat:i.on 

which would provide effective secur:i. t,y and, at the se.r:'le ti~e, not hamstr5.ne; 

operations. Security rules a.no. re&rulat,.;_ons must be realistic and provide 

good security e..nd must not be pror.mlgated i~erely to f'ix respor~sibili ties. 

The problem of' devising a uniform regulation has been re'f'errecl to t'he Technical 1.:anage;v.ent. Board.. 

It was observed that the Conmanders are occasionally embarrassed as a 

result of not receJ.·ring notii'icat~.on of the clearance status of visitors to 

their :i .. nstallo.t:;.ons. It appear8 that. the :i.nfcrmatio)'.l i.s not being passe<J. 

dmm throus;h conanand channels to t:ne :i.nstallatj.on cor.imanders. This places 

the insta:llation commander :~n the dilernrna. of either folloWing sound securi t;;r 

practices and refusing access, or :perm:t ttinB access. In the first :Lnst.ance. 

time is wasted and it creates an embarrassing position. v:i.s-A.-vis '~~·.e visitors 

and the commanc1er, while on the other ho.nd to permit entries is asking the 

commander to take an undue risk. 

The Security Division of NSA feels that insu:f:ficient emphasis has been 

placed upon personnel security. It is logical io presume that foreign intelligence agencies are interested in penetrating our operations. There are three 

·methods for foreign intelligence agencies to collect information: infiltration, defection, and collecting bits and pieces of information such as 

can be obtaineC: through loose talk. ln such a sensitive operation as the 

production of corril~unications intelljgence, it must be a~su.~ed that foreign 

intelligence agencies have successfv.J..J..y penetrated our operations or we 

possess individuals who are logice.l targets for defection. It is NSA 

Security Division's theory tha.t affirmative action must be taken to reveal 

a successful penetration or to separate those individuals who might be considered logical targets for defection. A vigorous personnel security program 

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Summary (continued) 

has been instituted at NSA. This program includes a strong security education program, close liaison with the counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies, an investigative staff to conduct administrative type 

investigations and to conduct interrogations, and a counterintelligence 

research program. 

During the recent trip of the Chief of the Security Division, a number 

of problems were noted which indicated a need for a strong personnel security 

supervision program in the field. These problems include the "shacking" 

problem; association with individuals of loose morals; perversion; criminal 

activities; alcoholism; emotional instability; and potential capture by 

unfriendly forces. It was the observation of the Chief of the Security Divisi.on, NSA, that a more effective security education program should be instigated in field stations, these programs designed to be applicable to local 

situations. There is a great need for more effective liaison with the service counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies. There is a definite 

need that the cryptologic services in the field be staffed with qualified 

investigators capable of conducting investigations, interrogations, and 

who are qualified to conduct counterintelligence research. 

It was recommended that there be established in the organization of the 

field units a position offull-time security ofl'icer whose staff would be 

implemented by trained investigators in accordance with the size of the unit. 

It was pointed out that the mere creation of a position was insufficient and 

that it would be essential the position be filled with a professional security 

officer. 

The Chief of the Security Division, NSA, concluded that personnel security can no longer be disregarded. We cannot rely solely on a statement "the 

individual is cleared" but must take affirmative action to make certain that 

our units are not penetrated and also to eliminate from our units those 

individuals who are logical targets for defection. 

F. COMMENTS ON DISCUSSION PERIOD: 

A question was asked relative to the problem facing Commanders on 

receiving visitors without proper notification of clearance status. The 

question was whether or not a Commander should permit access to a visitor 

whom he has known for a long period of time and is aware that the visitor ~1as cleared and indoctrinated. It was pointed out by the leader of the 

discussion that it was believed that whether or not an individual should 

or should not be permitted access was the Commander's prerogative and that 

it was believed NSA's policy would be to back up the Commander on whatever 

decision he made. It was pointed out, however, that the best solution to 

thls entire problem would be to evolve an operating procedure whereby in 

every instance the Co~.mander would be advised in advance of the visitor's 

clearance status. 

A question was raised requesting further discussion on the opinion 

of the Chief ~f the Security Division, NSA, as to what might be done about 

the problem of "shacking up" in the field. The Chief of the Security Division, NSA, indicated that he was aware of the problem and of the apparent 

incongruity of withdrawing a ma.n's clearance when he marries a foreign 

woman, yet no action to withdraw his clearance is taken when he lives with 

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m. scussion Period (continued) 

her in an illicit relationship. It was pointed out that all must remember 

that for an individual to have access to COMINT he must be of excellent 

character and discretion and unquestioned loyalty, and living with a woman 

in an illicit relationship reflects adversely on an individual's character 

and discretion. It was pointed out that the Commanders must bear in mind 

at all times that if a rr.an becomes involved with the wrong people, either 

the association must be discontinued or he must be separated :from access 

before a serious compromise occurs. It was pointed out that the Commanders 

are in a position to contact the local counterintelligence or local service 

crintlnal investigative agencies in order to find out something regarding 

the background of any particular woman in his area. It was further indicated that the problem is recognized and an effort will be made to study 

it and attempt to furnish a guide to the field Conmia.nders. 

A question was asked whether the mere fact that an individual is 

a logical target for foreign intelligence agents was sufficient reason for 

release. The Chief of the Security Division, NSA, indicated that any 

security officer who receives inforra.a.tion that an individual is a logical 

ta~get 8.!ld a likely victim of foreign intelligence agencies most certainly 

must take action. It was pointed out that .an individual who had been considered to be a logical target and likely victim would undoubtedly fail to 

meet the cleara~ce standards for access to COMINT as set forth in USCIB 

No. 5 and, in all probability, would be subject to termination under Execut~ve Order 10450. 

It was noted that the Chief of the Security Division, NSA, had in 

the past indicated the necessity for controlling the action of personnel 

under any field unit, as well as the fact that each unit should have an officer 

or man whose full time would concern security. It was also stated that the 

Chief of the Security Division, NSA, had noted that liaison with various 

service investigative units is sometimes difficult. The question was asked 

as to whether or not NSA intended to implement the staffs of the field activities by assigning professional security officers to the field activities 

who had pre·/ious investigative experience. The Chief of the Security Division, NSA, indicated that this suggestion had not been extensively studied 

at that time. However, General Canine is fear:ful that if' security personnel 

are placed on the staffs of NSA field activities there might be a tendency 

on the part of local Conmi.anders to turn over their security responsibilities 

to the HSA security people. It was indicated that General Ca.nine does not 

desire to discharge the security responsibility of the field Connna..~der. A 

coll'lment was made by one Co1r.ma.nder that he had had to call, on one 9ccasion, 

on the counterintelligence agencies and received very prompt service. The 

Chief of the Security Division, NSA, indicated that the counterintelligence 

agencies of the respective services are well qualified and, :from his personal 

experience, most cooperative. However, the counterintelligence agencies are 

bound by a delimitations agreement which limits the investigative jurisdiction 

by the CIC of the Army, ONI of the Navy, and OSI of the Air Force. He :pointed 

out that by this agreement the Army, for instance, is prohibited from investigating Air Force or Naval personnel. Hence, if one of the Field Cow.manders 

requests a counterintelligence agency to institute an investigation contrary 

to its jurisdiction, it would appear to be an undue request. The Chief of' 

the Security Division, NSA, stated that, from his personal experience, fre- q~ently the counterintelligence agencies pass information to and institute _ investigations for :~one of~.tbe·~;ot.her. Dtj.1:l:ta.ry services purely on the basis of 

friendship and in the interest of cooperation. He stated that it is his 

opinion that liaison could be perfected in all of these instances whereby a 

closer working.relationship would exist between the Field Commanders and the 

counterintelligence agencies. 

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Discussion Period (continued) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3:~{h)(2) 

A question w.a.s asked as to what chance an individual would have of 

being falsely blaclmla.iled by manufactured evidence. The Chief of ~he 

Security Division, NSA, indicated that he did not believe there was much 

chance of this since there were too many other individuals who might be 

blackmailed without the necessity of manufactured evidence. Further, that 

if the security education program was effective, an individual under such 

circumstances cou1d reasonably be presumed to make the facts known to the 

proper authorities. 

A question was asked as to what has been or can be done regarding 

the large number of .p~ople who have been cleared tor access to CCMINT who 

no longer are associated with any of the government agencies which would 

require that they have access. The Chief of the Security Division, NSA, 

indicated that considerable thought has been given to this problem. He 

pointed out that the name of every individual who has been cleared tor CCMINI' 

is ma.de available to the FBI who, in turn, cross-indexes this information in 

their tiles. If', in the course of their investigations of espionage or subversive activities, an indiVlhdual's name becomes known to them, they check 

their files as a matter of' course. The FBI files will indicate that the 

individual had been cleared f'or CCJUNT, at which'time NSA would be immed~ 

iately notified by the FBI. It was acknowledged that this may not be complete 

coverage bu"& it would be impossible to place a f'ul.1-time surveillance on 

everyone who had ever had access to C<Ja:NT. It was :f'urther pointed out 

that e:f'torts are being made to take another step along these lines by informing the Passport Division of the State Department or the names of individuals 

who had been cleared or evecyl>ody who no longer required clearance so that 

if' such an individual applied for a passport, NSA would beJput on notice and 

enabled to take whatever action possible to either eliminate or discourage 

the foreign travel. 

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e TOP SECRET e 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER 20 

B. CCIIINI' CCJ.00.JNICATIONS SECURITY 

C. ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CHAIRMAN: MR. ·C. C. CCRRY1 CHIEF, OFFICE OF COMSEC DOCTRINE 

E. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SESSION: 

l. The Chairman introduced Col. K. I. Datta, deputy to Col. F. E. Herrelko, 

who attended the meeting in Col. Herrelko's place. ' 

2. Mr. Corry then summarized the accomplishments since the last Conference, 

and outlined :f'uture plans. He began by pointing out that uscm has, during the 

past eighteen months or more, taken a greater interest in the communications 

security of CCMINT. In February 1954, a USCIB Directive (CIBD No. 9) was 

issued requiring NSA to establish minimum atalida.rds for CCMIN'.r Ca.mEC, and 

establishing procedures for reporting COMSEC violations involving CCICINT. 

Brief'ly, the procedure requires a .report to BSA by the CQ1l11118.Dder of the station 

where the violation occurred; NSA then summarizes the report and forwards it to 

USCIB. 

3. The Chairman stated that, since the last Conference, NSA had: 1,,. ., ,' .. ;_ ... : 

a. Prepared periodic lists of all cryptosystem• authorized 

for use in COMINT conmnnications. 

b. Published a manual (AFSAG 1262-1) which describes all the 

on-line terminal arrangements authorized for COMINT eomrm1nications. 

c. Established and had approved by USCIB "Security Criteria 

for the Transmission of COMINT by Electrical Means" (minimum standards). 

d. Adopted a device which is designed to prevent inadvertent 

plain language transmissions and monoal.phabetic substitution in one-time 

tape operation. All stations have been supplied with the device (the Torn 

Tape Stop Mechanism), and all, with rare exceptions, are now in use. 

e. Prepared, with the help of ASA, NSG and AFSS, a detailed 

questionnaire on CCIUNT communications security. It is designed to provide 

the stations with a CCMSEC cheek list, as wall ·as to provide NSA with 

speci:f"ic information on certain items o:f' special C~C interest. 

4. Mr. Corry stated that, in addition, NSA is: 

a. Preparing minimum standards for CGfSEC training programs. 

b. Working on a modification which is designed to improve the 

eryptoseeurity of the ASAM 2-1. The modif'ication kits which are now in 

production will be ready for distribution in a :f'ew days. 

c. Investigating a modification designed to prevent inadvertent 

plain language transmissions from the keyboard in on-line teletypewriter 

operation. 

d. artering the services of NSA personnel to visit field stations, 

on request, tor the purpose o:f' providing assistance in solving local problems. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

5. Mr. E. 3. McGettrick, COMSEC Consultant, wh.o had recently made 

a visit to 16 stations in the Far East, then spoke briefly on his trip. 

He pointed out that the visits were not inspections, .but a means of 

exchanging information. Ee stated that, from a Cot.fSEC viewpoint, the 

Navy stations in the Far East and Pacific areas were uniformly excellent, 

as were the Army stations. At Air Force Stations, the personnel were 

very Willing to learn, but the stations suffered t'roni greater shortage 

of experienced personnel than Army and Navy and a la.ck of top quality 

equipment. He reported the following general complaints: 

a. Apparent failure on the pa.rt of the Head.quarters and NSA to 

re~ay advance information to the field. 

b. Excessive paper work required in reporting what a.re locally 

considered to be minor security violations. 

With reference to the second complaint, Mr. McGettrick stated that many 

reports were based on formal investigations, which were not an NSA, but 

a Service requirement. Re mentioned that many valuable suggestions were 

received such as one by the Comm.unications Officer atl L viz., that 

a 10-day reserve supply of tapes be sent to USN-11, USN-39, and possibly 

USN-27. This would serve to connect these ste.tions directly with NSA 

in case a complete outage of 5 UOOs atl I should occur, but 

communications remain possible. He stated that this suggestion was under 

consideration and would probably be acted on. He concluded with the statement 

that the training program at Air Force station USA-57 was superior to any 

other program he had seen, and that the customary advance planning of 

COMSEC arrangements for Army stations would improve the general COMSEC situation 

if more generally applied. 

6. The meeting was then opened to questions and discussion. 

7. In response to his inquiry, Lt. Col. Mize, USA, ASAAL, was 

informed that the AFSAM 7 is ap-proved for C<JaNT use and that Hqs, ASA, 

has requested systems for such· use. \ 

8. In the course of a discussion on radiation from the ASAM 2-1, 

copper screening was suggested as an interference radiation reducer. Mr. 

Corry pointed out that some progress had been ma.de toward solution of 

the radiation problem, but it was by no means solved. Studies, however, 

were continuing, and all available resources were being devoted to solution. 

He stated that the AFSAZ 7319, which is in the service test stage now, 

does not completely eliminate radiation, but helps considerably. The conferees 

were inf.armed that they could see this equipment in operation in the Fort Meade 

NSA Communications Center. In response to an inquiry as to whether or not 

the .AFSAZ 7319 had been cleared and approved for Service use, Mr. Corry 

stated that it had not as yet, that each Service must conduct service tests 

and accept new equipments before they are "approved". 

9. L/CDR Langdon, USN-12, observed that, with regard to the problem 

of preventing keyboard transmission, untrained operators who get "carried 

away" with setting up operation on on-line circuits a.re the greatest 

hazard. The lack of time available for training is an additional problem. 

He stated his belief that adoption and promulgation of standard accepted 

phraseology for use by operators in clearing garbles and regaining 

synchrony would serve to e1iminate most errors of this type. It was 

stated that an NSA circular prescribing such phraseology was now in an 

advanced stage and should be distributed soon. A few other roblems at 

USN-12 were discussed, such as the limitation 

Solutions to both problems a.re coming in the near f'uture. 

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Hi5hlights (continued) 

10. Mr. Wolfand, ASA, inquired as to the purpose of AFSAK 2822 and 

whether there was a continuing requirement for the system. In reply, it 

was stated that AFSAK 2822 was set up originally at the request of the 

Services as a Joint COMINT system to be held by all stations producing 

COMINT; that the requirement still remains, according to the latest 

available information; and that AFSAK 2822 cannot as yet be replaced 

with an AFSAM 7 system until the Navy has equipment that can intercommuni·cate 

with the AFSAM 7. 

11. In response to a query as to whether the NSA guidance program 

had improved the communications security of COMINT during the past year, 

Mr. Corry stated that, statistically, there has not been much improvement. 

He pointed out, however, that statistics probably do not present the 

true situation; and that the improved reporting procedures, etc., have 

produced more reports, but do not necessarily prove that errors have 

increased. He stated further that it may be two or three years before 

any actual degree of improvement can be known. 

12. He stated, in response to a final question, that, in the interest of 

COMSEC 5mprovement, present emphasis should be placed on operator trainine 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 21 

B. TOPIC NAME: CROSS-SERVICING 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CHAIRMAN: HARRY L. CLARK, CHIEF, NSAEUR 

E. HIGHLIGHTS: 

1. The chairman ·opened the discussion by reading a precis of' Circular 

53-5 which deals with the exchange of COMINT end-products. No difficulties 

were being experienced in the field as a result of the implementation of the 

Circular. Captain Lehman, NAVSECGRUPAC, indicated that the overlapping 

between the two NSA Field Activities in the area NSAPAC and NSAFE could 

lead to difficulty in effecting a COMINT exchange bet~een the COMINT units 

in the Far East. It was agreed that this situation should be watched, but 

that the danger was slight and the diffmculty by no means insurmountable. 

2. It was pointed out to the overseas commanders that a compami<im 

Circular which will deal with the exchange of technical information was 

now in preparation. Colonel Peterson, Chief, ASA Europe indicated that technical cross-servicing was often quite non-routine in nature and required 

advance preparation and planning. In particular, Colonel Peterson,wa.s· 

desirous that he be permitted to refer ~o his parent headquarters any crossservicing requirements which he was unable to f'ulfill from within his own 

resources. It was explained that this could be done, that the non-routine 

character of certain cross-servicing requirements was recognized, and 

that the field untts were encouraged to comment in each instance on their 

capacity to undertake cross-servicing commitments. 

3. The role of the NSA Field Activities in facili till.ting COMINT exchanges 

was touched upon, and in particular it was pointed out thatttiose offices 

had considerable latitude in releasing NSA-controlled facilities in their 

respective areas to meet compelling cross-servicing requi+ements for 

temporary periods. 

4. Mention was made of the list of NSA-produced end-products which 

was being prepared for USED£0M. It was agreed that this list, when complete, 

should also be sent to the other major cozmnands overseas, especially to 

CINCPAC, CINCFE and CINCAL. 

5. A comment by LCDR Nicholson, NAVSECGRUNELM, indicated that the 

distribution lists appended to Circular 53-5 were inaccurate. It was 

explained that those lists were being revised and would be reissued as soon 

as all three Services had indicated the precise commands to which they 

wanted cross-servicing to be extended. 

F. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RAISED: NONE 

G. RECOMMENDATIONS: 

1. That the PROD Reporting Group· (NSA-065) insure that a list of NSAproduced end-products is made available to every major command overseas, 

through the NSA Field Activity in the area. 

2. That the Field Operations Direction Group (NSA-063) expedite the 

reissue of the distribution lists for Circular 53-5. 

3. That NSAPAC and NSAFE work out joint procedures for the cross-area 

exchange of COMINT end-product and technical information in the Far East. It is 

understood that NSAPAC and NSAFE have already ta.ken a number of actions in this 

regard. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 15 April 1955 

a. Topic Number 22 

b. Special Weather 

c. Round Table Session: Chairman; CDR W.B.Louthen,USN, 

Acting Chief, Weather Division 

d. Highlights and Problems: // EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

.( i) A brief discussion was given by CDB Louthen (Acting NSA-95) on 

the present status of COMINT weather and the planning in this 

field. 

(2) Col. Pulling (NSAUK) rai•ed the question of the :t:uture mission 

of FU/LANT. considering.the fact that the Russian Hydromet 

broadcast! lbas become clear. · 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

Col. Towler (CO, 695oth Sec. Gp.) and Col. Pulling recommended 

that FU/LANT be amalgamated into the 6950th Security Group, in 

a manner somewhat similar to the amalgamation of FU/PAC into 

the 6920th Security Wing, in order to simplify administrative 

control procedures with respect to personnel and Special Weather Intelligence dissemination. 

Col. Pulling recommended that the new SWILO billet, now on the 

NSAEUR staff, be assigned to the 6900th Security Wing to enable 

the incumbent to carry out necessary coordination matters in 

both Europe and UK. 

Col. Pulling strongly recommended re-establishment of a common 

crypto-system between the Air Force and Navy for SWI dissemination. 

e. Recommended Actions: 

(2) Col. Pulling recommended that the FU/LANT mission not be 

changed and that the previously enciphered Russian Hydromet 

weather continue to be intercepted and disseminated so that the 

FU/LAN11' is in a state of readiness if the h.ydromet goes enciphered in the future. It is the current intent to continue 

intercept and dissemination of this data until such time as 

the Services are able to obtain intercept, disseminate, and 

interpret (with regard to location of new reporting station 

and ability to read certain weather brevity codes included in 

this data) on a cgm.pletely non-COMINT basis. At that ti.me, 

intercept coverage is to be put on some form of rotating coverage of these particular hydromet collective broadcasts and as 

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much coverage as possible be shifted to hydromet feeder links 

which have ~ot been exploited to any great extent in the past. 

This action will retain the FU/LANT capability fer hydr0met 

exploitatien if the necessity arises in the future. 

(3) Any action on this recommendation will be dependent on: 

(a) Total mission assigned FU/LANT after 

hydromet problem stabilizes. 

the Russian E0~.3(h)(2) 

PL 86..:36/50 USC 3605 

(b) .___I ______ _____.I 

(c) Future relationship of FU/LANT with the weather effort 

on the continent (to be CG>Grdinated by SWILO, NSAEUR). 

(4) In view of the fact that this billet is for the purpose of exploiting ~by-product" weather take on the continent from all 

three services, it is· felt that this can best be accomplished 

under NSA aegis. 

(5) Discussion indicated that the different service crypto-systems 

were adopted because of the differences in space and circuit 

time limitatiens between the Air Force and Navy. However, this 

matter will be discussed with the Services again. 

• ,~ r 1 I : I ' .' '- 1 ,{ J , .' 1

1 : 1 ~· 

~ L,) I '1 

'I , , , l;, I .._ 1 ') , o ~ ~" 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 24 

B. TOPIC NAME:: COMINT SUPPORI' TO CINCPAC 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION 

D. CHAIRMAN: CAPTAIN WESLEY A. WRIGHT, USN, CHIEF, NSAPAC 

E. HIGHLIGHTS: 

1. The Chairman opened the discuss.ion by outlining the command 

structure in the CINCPAC area and sketching the history of actions taken 

thus far to improve COMINT support to CINCPAC. The Chairman indicated that 

although there had been considerable improvement in COMINT support, a great 

deal remained to be done. One of the principle difficulties was in the poor 

timeliness of COMINT information received witlhin the CINCPAC area, and the 

Chairman ascribed this difficulty in large part to the inadequate communications throughout the area. It was explained that active steps were 

being taken to remedy the existing situation. 

2. In cbimection with the question of timeliness, considerable discussion took place on the type of :lbrward echelon which CINCPAC may establish. 

(Mention had earlier been made bf the possibility. of a CINCPAC ''ADVANCE'' 

headquarters on Formosa.) Capt Wright pointed out that nhe only definite 

information concerned the establishment of a joint operations center on 

For.mesa which would include a combined intelligence center; it was not known 

whether or not the latter would be permitted to receive COMINT material. 

Capt Wright further indicated that the whole problem of a forward headquarters 

would be discussed at a conference to be held in Taipeh in April. 

3. In response to a query from Col IG.ocko, AFSS, the mission and functions of the "interpretive" units to be established in Ha~aii were G.iscussed 

in broad terms. (This question was then discussed with Colonel IG.ocko and 

Captain Wright in much greater detail at a later meeting.) In brief, it was 

explained that the Army and Air Force interpretive units would function on 

their respective problems in p.lte..C.i;aely the same way as the NaVY .Advance 

Exploitation Unit(Al!IU)I I They would receive all COMINT end-ppoduct 

information produced in the Far East, plus all technical information on which 

the end-product was based. They will receive Eind answer queries from their 

respective commanders, will receive COMINT requirements from those commanders, 

and will conduct liaison with their counterpart Service COMINT units elsewhere 

in the Far East to insure an adequate response to the requirements of those 

commanders. 

4. Considerable discussion took place on the question of logistic support 

to the COMINT .uni ts on Formosa. General Reichelderfer, Chief, .ASA, was particularly disturb.ed by the existing situation and urged that maximum support be 

given to his/headquarters in remedying that situation. Colonel Davis, Chief, 

NSA Plans and Policy Divismon, indicated that NSAwas willing to support .ASA 

in this connection to any extent deemed necessary. 

5. The flow of traffic and end-products from the COMINT units on Formosa 

was discussed brief~y. It was understood that both units would do .such iocal 

processing of their own take as was required for fi~st-insta.nce reporting 1 

purposes . (At this point, too, the question was aga:iln .'raised as to just what · 

command or commands in the Formosa area would require the close support capable 

of being provided by the Formosa units.} Mr. Mitchell, PROD Plans and jC.i;mtr.9..l 

Group (NSA-062), outlined the plans for processing and for traffic flow as 

reflected in the NSA Emergency Plan for Formosa. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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6. Much time was devoted to the subject of increased COMINT facilities 

in the Philippines. While no agreement WE!-$-re~ched on the ext~nt of expansion which should be planned for the Phili-ppines, it was ·generally agreed that 

the matter should be studied in complete detail,.. In this conp:e·ct:i.on, the 

paucity of intercept facilities in the Philippines was highlighted by the stated 

requirements of both the Military Division {NSA-91) f9r Chinese Communist 4th 

Field Army traffic, and the Asiatic Division (NSA-74) for Viet Minh traffic, 

both of which are copiable from the Philippines and both of which produce infor-

.mation of great interest to CINCPAC. . . 

7. · Col:onel Weeks, Cormnander, 6920tli Security Wi·ng 'indicated that he was 

prepared to ·augment the AFSS facility on Formosa to the extent of some ten 

to twelve positions f"rom within ·his existing resources, if permission for 

expansion of that facility were granted. All concerned agreed that the 

urgency of the existing situation in Formosa warranted an attempt to secure a~thorizati~n for an'increase-in the·Air Force ~acility in Formosa. 

F. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RAISED: 

1. The inadequacy of existing communications in the ·Far East area, 

particularly where support to u.s; eomman!ls involved with Formosa is concerned. 

2. The limited knowledge available to the COMINT community as a whole 

on the precise cOlJBlland{s) to be served by the U.S. units on-Formosa. 

3. The inadequacy· of existing logistic support arrangements for the 

COMINT units on Formosa. 

4. The need for increased intercept facilities in' the 'Philippines. '. 

5. The need for augmenting the AFSS facility on Formosa. 

G. RECOMMENDATIONS: 

Considerable study has been and is bei~g given·to the problem of 

improved COMINT support throughout the Far East. With respect ,rto the specifi~ 

problems· pointed up during this session, cognizant- elements of NSA and of the 

t:tl:hree Services have already moved to take remedial· action. What remains to 

1be·done would appear to fall into the following three .areas'of consideration. 

· 1. A continuing attempt to improve and expand the- communications 

facilities available to the COMINT family in the·· Far East. . . 

· .2. A detailed review of existing COMINT operations in the Far East 

with the aim of developing a plan for increased effort in the Philippines. 

3. A continuing attempt ·to secure such operational planning data 

from the Pacific comm.ands as is necessary·to assist in COMINT planning for 

that area. . . . 

\ 

/ 

1· 

( 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

A. TOPIC NUMBER: 26 

B. TOPIC NAME: EXPLANATION OF CIVIl.I.AN INTERCEPT OPERATOR PROGRAM 

C. TYPE OF SESSION: GENERAL MEETING 

D. CHAIRMAN: CDR FRANK V. MASON, USN, PLANS AND POLICY DIVISION 

E. PRESENTATION: 

l. In presentation of the subject, Mr. R. Terrell, Office of Collection, 

explained the major facets of the Civilian Intercept Operator Program as 

follows: 

a. Scope. 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

, . 

\ 

(4) 

Civilian spaces established are designed to supplement 

military spaces in existing stations of Jr.SA, AFSS, and 

NSG and are drawn from presently programmed military 

intercept operator spaces. 

A specialists group set up w1 thin NSA will perform 

primarily troubleshooter missions on new transmission 

problems, assist where necessary in Services' training 

of their personnel in installation and operation of 

new equipment, and carry out complex experimental tasks. 

Civilian spaces are to be established within NSAResea.rcb 

and Developmental field research units to augment the 

mili~. personnel. 

Initially, 100 spaces are.attached to Jr.SA by the Director 

to implement a pilot project comprised of some twenty 

positions which, if successf'ul., will be expanded to a 

degree requiring adjustments in the number of personnel 

and grade structure. Jr.SA implements the pilot operations 

with civilian personnel allocated by NSA~ as indicated below: 

(a) N3A Europe. 

l Herzo Base, Germany (8606 DU). Calls for twenty-nine 

(29) operators primarily skilled in morse intercept. 

However, to provide for testing and other intercept 

specialties in the pilot program, up to 20 percent 

of this number m~ be specialists in MOA, RFP, DF, 

and/or voice intercept. 

2 Baumholder, Ge:rmany (8911 DU). A total of twentyone (21) operators, the majority of whom are multiplex printer skilled, will work at this station. 

Twenty percent of 1bese ~ be specialists in MOA, 

RFP, DF, and/or voice intercept. 

(b) NJA Far East. 

1 Okinawa (8603 DU). Thirty-five (35) operators will 

be integrated into the operations of the station. 

Except for the twenty percent of this number which 

will specialize in MOA, RFP, DF and/or voice intercept, these operators will be primarily morse intercept skilled. 

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2 Kyoto (8610 DU). Pilot operations here call for 

fifteen (15) operators. Primary function of this 

element is miltiplex printer copy. Twenty 

percent may be specia1ists in MOA, RFP, DF, and/ 

or voice intercept. 

b. Objectives. 

(1) To provide better continuity and familiarity with COMINT 

intercept operations through utilization of an expansible 

permanent corps of skilled professions.ls created to 

alleviate the detriment to effort now encountered from 

the high attrition in the military ranks. 

( 2) To materially improve the quality of intercept materiaJ. 

available for analysis. 

(3) To effect economy in funds and personnel. (It is believed 

that for each 100 civilian intercept operator increment 

established, requirements for military operators can be 

decreased by 125 persons.) 

( 4) To establish a career program attracti..e to qualified 

COMINT trained military personnel who do not elect to 

continue military service. 

c. Planning and Establishment of Policy. 

(1) In mid-1954, the Director ha.cl his Staff take active ateps 

to effect the research and coordination necessary to 

devemop a plan for establishment of a civilian intercept 

operator component supplementary,to the militS.ry intercept 

programs of the f?erv~ces. This plan was duly created and on 

12 November 1954, the Secretary of Defense approved the concept of operation of the Civilian Intercept Operator Program 

to be undertaken within the Department of Denfese. As 

indicated in paragraph 2a above, PSA is vested with the 

responsibility for proceeding with the pilot project 

implementing this program. 

(2) Within NSA, responsibility for the control and monitoring 

of this program is delegated to the Office of Collection 

which is primarily concerned with the selection, standardization, and utilization of intercept facilities. Personnel 

assigned within that Office to regulate the Civi11an 

Intercept Operator Program will: 

(a) Act as an administrative control point. 

(b) Make regular end systematic audit of the effectiveness 

of the Program. 

(c) .Appraise the growth and achievements of the civilian 

intercept operator component and identify its future 

training needs. 

(d) Insure that improvements necessary to the program 

are effected. 

( e) Develop a career ladder for operators integrated 

into the Program. 

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d. Personnel. During the pilot operation, it can be expected 

that the Civilian Intercept Opetator Progr8JJ1 Will encounter personnel and 

administrative problems similar to t~ose now encountered by the Services, 

but unique to this particular activity. Wherever such exist, they will be 

resolved along guidelines that follow: 

(1) Training. No initial. long training period should obtain 

inasmuch as the operators will be qualified and experienced 

at employment. Specialized training will be administered 

within NSA. Type of pre-tour orientation to be.given by 

PROD will be determined by the operator's pending field 

assignment. · 

(2) Administrative Control. The status of the civilian 

operatdr is analogous to that of NSA employees attached 

for duty at ASA installations. Personnel actions such 

as procurement, classification, assignment, and payment 

will be performed by NSA in consultation with Army.Security 

Agency. Detailed instructions relating to payroll records 

maintenance and submission of civilian personnel reports 

by the Chief, ASAE and station commanders concerned, will 

be provided by the Director, NSA. 

(3) Control at Operating Level. .Actions such as specific job 

assignments, duty schedules, performance ratings, and disciplinary measures will be controlled at this level by 

Chief, ASAE, through the station comna.nders concerned, in 

accordance with pertinent ASA and NSA directives. 

(4) Rotation. Civilian opera.tors returning from overseas 

stations remain assigned to NSA-60 and may be detailed to 

other elements of PROD for duty or further specialized 

training while awaiting next overseas tour of duty. Operators' stay in the Zone of Interior will be for a minimum 

of one year before returning to field stations. The minimtjm overseas tour will be twenty-four months. Employees 

resigning prior to completion of a two year tour shall be 

required to fund transportation to the ZI at their own 

expense. 

e. Funds and Logistic Support. 

(1) All expenses relating to the pilot operation will be defrayed by the Director. This includes salaries, pay differentials, allowances and travel pay of civilian employees and 

their dependents. 

(2) The Service Cryptologic Agency will be responsible for 

providing the necessary equipment and maintenance facilities. 

Other logi~tic support will be provided as mutually agreed 

between NBA and the Service Cryptologic Agency concerned. 

f, Evaluation and Follow-up. At the close of FY-1956, a full 

evaluation of.._ the1 ~l!Elsults of the pilot operation will be made to determine the 

feasibility of establishing a permanent civilian operators program on an 

operational basis. To provide data on which. to base this evaluation, NSA will 

conduct a continuing survey of the quality of traffic intercepted and/or 

processed by the pilot program operators. In addition, the theater and 

station commanders concerned will report on the progress of the program as 

may be required by criteria and instructions published by the Director. 

2. During the conference period iI!D?ledia.tely following Mr. Terrel's 

presentation, certain considerations having bearing on the matter at band 

came to light. Discussions that attended the more significant of these follow: 

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a. Limitation on Length of Overseas Tour of Duty. 

(1) A question arose as to whether the two year limit proposed 

for totμ" during the pilot operation is to be maximum for the fully implemented 

program. 

(2) This was explained as being sufficient for the pilot program but that it should not be construed as being unalterable . ~ather, it is 

felt that as the operation proves itself, a limit of up to four years mey 

be provided. However, this latter limit should not be exceeded. It is 

designed to prevent loss of perspective which might result from too extended 

a tour overseas. 

b. Lateral Transfer in Overseas Areas. 'fo a question as to 

permissibility for lateral transfer of an operator within the overseas area 

without returning to NSA, answer given indicated that lateral transfer in the 

U.S. had been permitted. It did not, however, indicate whetl'e r such action 

would be allowed overseas. 

c. Role of the NSA Field Activity. Questions relating to the 

role of the NSA field activity in the implementation of the Civilian Intercept Operator Program were answered as folJ.ows: 

(1) The NSA field activity mey be called upon to assist the 

Cryptologic Agency theater headquarters in its solution of problems of an 

administrative nature which mey be referred to the latter by NSA. 

(2) The Civilian operators will not be considered as belonging 

to the Cryptologic Agency. They are assigned for duty with PSA and ordered 

to the overseas headquarters of that Agency. They m,is t be ma.de to realize 

that they are working for that headquarters and that they should, therefore, 

go there with their problems rather than to the NSA field acitiw~: concerned. 

d. Establishment of an All-civilian Unit. Operators are being 

deployed for utilization in several military stations rather than putting 

them all in a civilian unit inasmuch as it is felt that by this approach, 

more value to the over-all COMINT effort mey be realized. It is recognized 

that a completely civilian unit would produce excellent results, ~owever, 

the purpose of this program is to infuse the military effort with the knowhow that these skilled professionals will possess, and to attract fully 

qualified candidates for future operations from among those operators 

depart:dmg the military service. 

e. Control of Civilian Operators in Overseas Theaters. Civilian 

operators shall be subject to the same considerations which govern the 

military in overseas areas. They will receive no preferential treatment. 

Their position descriptions call .for performance of any"duties which the 

station commander may assign additional to their technical specialities. 

f. Possible Conflict on Dissension Resulting from Disparity 

Between Grades of Civilian. and Military Operator. It is recognized that 

some misunderstanding ma\Y result from the necessity for co-working lower 

military grades and GS-5 and GS-6 ratings. The preponderance of' low grades 

in military operator ranks resuJ.ts from the rapid turnover. GS-9 or GS-11 

ratings ma\Y be placed either at the head of a section or as an assistant 

to military supervisors. Any feelings of misunderstanding which mey be 

engendered by this integration of effort and by obvious disparity in PS\Y 

scales for identical jobs IDS\Y be alleviated by assigning the more difficult 

operational tasks to the skilJ.ed professional., the ciYilian operator. This 

approach should stimulate the military operator to better performance and 

a.n eventual reward by upgrade. The effort must be integrated. Separation 

of the civilian from the soldier operator will engender a competition that 

is not wanted, inasmuch as the civilian will certainly out-perform the 

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military operatorjl.st out qf school, and thereby, injure the program. 

This program, properly administered by the commander concerned, should 

pose no imponderables. The way to its successful accomplishment is 

through proper leadership on the part of commanders concerned. 

g. Effect of this Program upon Reenlistments. This was taken 

into consideration in formulation of the plan. The overall plan was 

approved by the Secretary of Defense - this is only a trial project. 

Reenlistments may be affected by this program. However, every effort 

will be made to avoid conflict with the reenlistment campaigns of the 

Services. Emphasis will be placed on hiring reservists and retired 

personnel who may be qualified before consideration is given to operators scheduled for release from the Service. 

b. Procurement at overseas Station&. It is planned to hire men 

at overseas stations, bringing the majority to the ZI for orientation and 

return to overseas duty, with a few remaining overseas after discharge. 

The first action is preferable. It would preclude necessity for returning 

the operator to NSA at the end of his two year tour for clearance testing. 

It is better for the newly hired operator to return and flow back to the 

overseas area through normal personnel channels. 

i . Eventual Integration of Navy and Air Force in Program. 

If the program (pilot operation) is successfui we can anticipate a time 

when the civilian operator will replace military billets. However, the 

present objective is to supplement the military effort. Conversion to 

civilian billets poses a loss of five for every four converted. This 

deficit should be offset by increased efficiency. 

3. The matters discussed above do not present problems hazardous 

to successful accomplishment of this Program. The concept of operations 

approved by the Secretary of Defense furnishes guidelines ad.equate to 

realization of the objectives. Connnon sense inte.rpretation and administration of the task will, through the medium of good leadership, 

enable this ·Program to progress to the end desired with a minimum of 

discomfort to all concerned. 

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CLOSING .ADDRESS BY 

LIEtJTENANT GENERAL RALPH J. CANINE, UBA 

DIROO'IDR, NATIONAL SECUBITY AGENCY 

Well, Gentlemen, you will get as much out of one of these meetings 

as you put into it, if you keep an open mind. I have talked to a good 

many people here and I have ma.de a point to find out some of their 

reactions. I find some doubt among people I meet about decentralization. 

When I say "decentralization," I am no semanticist. I hired a couple to 

keep me straight when they can. They have a rough time. I used the 

word "decentrali zation'l, the first time I started tel.king to anybody 

about it, and I presume that for want of a better term, that word was 

ad.opted as the name for the process that we have been and are going 

through, of getting work done on problems as close to the point of 

contact as we can. It may not be a very good word. _I am convinced that 

not all of us define it al.ike. Let me tell you what I think about it 

and what my people think about it. Maybe they didn • t think about it 

that way at noon today, but that is the way they think about it now. 

I don't think we can run the COMINT business from Washington. I 

think the COMINT business has to be decentralized. I think we ought to 

process the communications of the target, the communications complex, as 

close to the point of intercept as we can, for the simple reason that it 

is a lot easier to transmit back and out and forward the comparatively 

small groupage of end product as compared with the tremendous groupage 

of intercepted raw traffic. 

I am sure the communicators would buy the thesis of processing as 

close to the point of intercept as possible if nobody else would. It so 

happens there are a good many other reasons for it. That is fundamentally 

what I mean by decentralization. I don't remember that I very clearly 

thought who was going to do what and to whom. I probably didn't. I 8J1!. 

not so sure I have yet. I don't think it makes a bit of difference. I 

don't think it makes much difference so long as somebody does the work. 

It is rather obvious to me from talking to the people from the field, 

in talking to some of my own people stationed here in Washington, that 

it hasn't been all sweetness and light. I expect about half the trouble 

has been from well-meaning but·ignorant people here in Washington and wellmeaning but ignorant people out in the boondocks. I hope, in your 

discussions this past week between groups of well-meaning people who want 

to get on with the work of the world, that you have ironed out most of 

your difficulties. If, you/haven't, I want to kn.ow about it. I am 

convinced the only hope of achieving rapid reporting or immediate reporting, 

is in decentralization. 

If the present system isn't what we need, after we have tried it and 

given it a fair pilo't run, let's get something else. I hold no particular 

brief for any single way of getting something don~. There are a dozen ways 

a thing can be done, usually. It doesn't make much difference how you do 

i:t if you want to do it. It isn't how they are going to be done but whether 

you want to get them done. I am convinced we have back here in Washington 

a good many well-meaning and dedicated individual.a who have been unnecessarily 

harrassing you people. I understand thoroughly. I don't have to know 

anything about the COMINT business, and I know all about it, to have to 

come to that conclusion. All I need to kn.ow is human nature. 

When I finally told the people after listening to a lot of tal.k about 

decentralization, "OK, you have had your day in court. Now start tomorrow 

and do it," nobody wanted to do it. Nobody wanted to do it then. It was 

a good thing, but you had to wait until you were ready to do it. You had 

to wait until we were ·ready here. We had to wait until you were ready in 

the field. We had to wait until Gabriel tooted his horn or just after, 

maybe before. That wouldn't be possible - just after. The first f!}J.Y says 

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"I am all ready. We are all set, boys. Let's put it into effect." As he 

said those words, you would have heard that faint last echo of the bugle. 

So I said, "Start going tomorrow." I am prepared to accept a considerable 

reduction in accuracy, in efficiency and in everything else to get the show 

on the road, and we will improve it a.f'ter we start. 

Now I know exactly what happened. We have a lot of dedicated people 

around here. We have some of the most erudite people COMINT-wise that exi~t anywhere and we have some dedicated people from the standpoint of 

conscience. We have a lot of people who didn't agree with what I said. 

They thought the only way it could be done was to keep a tight rein on 

;v.ou people; a.nd the only way to really keep the US f'rom going to the 

Russians today, or the day a.f'ter the A bomb hits, was for them to stick 

and keep their noses in your business. I am reasonably sure I am sa.f'e 

in saying this, that you shouldn't have been surprised. Some of the 

people who have talked the most and loudest about this in this past week 

have si>ent considerable time around here. You know these guys. It wouldn't 

have made a bit of' difference if' we were running the atomic energy business 

or running General Electric or anything else, people are the same. Just 

the mere fact they are in the COMINT busine·ss doesn't make them a bit 

different. 

I will not tolerate a shotgun approach in trying to find out who the 

guys a.re who have been unnecessarily needling you~ They didn't lmow what 

I knew, that you were much m.Ore erudite than they thought you were. They 

didn't know how completely competent you were. I. have b,een out a.nd seen 

you a.nd you guys do pretty well. They were not convinced I meant what I 

said about taking it on the chin from the consumer, to have, to have our 

product decrease in accuracy. I don't mind that a bit. I am perfectly 

willing to have it so long as the bell has not rung. Tb.is is the time to 

experiment. I am perfectly willing to take chances now so I don't have 

to take them later on. I would hate to have to start decentralization after 

the shooting war starts, and we would have to. 

What are we going to do? We are going to keep decentralization - my 

kind of decentralization. I don't care what you call it so long as you 

let me call it that. We will make progress just as fast as we can eliminate 

individual friction between my Indians and yours. Tb.ere are no Indians in 

here today.· I mean that exactly, and I won't let the people here make this 

shotgun approach, and I suggest strongly to you that you don't shotgun it 

a.nd set up some silly method of checking everything in order to find and 

cure one tenth <J:f' the people, one quarter of' them, maybe one half'. What 

you need to do is to find the individuals Joe Dokes or Corporal Dumb John, 

whoever they are, the guys who are still unreconstructed rebels, and reconstruct them one way or another. We don 1 t need the water cure. You can 

fire them if' you can't reconstruct them. 

But let's not shotgun this thing. Let's make it work and let's find 

out who the people are who need to be educated and let's educate them today. 

Do I make myself' reasonably clear about it 'l We a.re going to keep on, unless 

we find out it is not the way to do it and there is a better way to serve 

our customers in the field and here in Washington. In that coDD.ection, I 

trust there has been no inhibition put on free expression of ideas here in 

this conference. I trust there will never be any inhibitions or prohibitions 

or any attempt to muzzle a.n;Ybody. I am reasonably sure the people who talked 

to me weren't muzzled. 

The only way you find out what we here in Washington think is by having 

us tell Y<JU. The only way we find out here in Washington what you think is 

to have you tell us.. 

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We want and need comments and expect to get them on our operations. 

You can't improve them any other way. We don't Imow all there is to know 

about everything. I strongl.y' suspect that neither do you. I eoul.d be wrong, 

but I suspect it. It is only by an interchange o:f' ideas among o:Pen-minded 

men who want to get the work of' the world done that you can do anything that 

has to be done, and Gentlemen, you can do anything that has to be done. 

Now, another thing. I don't believe in the "tail wagging the dog." I 

don• t believe, when I want to do something, in having my Communicator, 

my Personnel fellow, my Logistics fellow, or my Bead.quarters Commande.ut 

come in and say, "John, you can't do that." That isn't what I hired him 

for. I hired them to come in and say, "General, this is the way you can 

do it." 

I think we should design the best possible COMINT program for the US 

and then support 1 t. I mean that emphatically, and then support it. You 

don't win wars by do:tng what your G-4 says you can do. You win wars by 

telling your G-4, "I am going to do this," and then he supports it. I 

have been· a G-4, and I know a. little bit of something about it. We need 

a plan to take on enemy co:rmnunications. I think we have to work as a 

team. I think, if you tell this fellow, "Knock down that f!P..Y when the 

ball is passed,' that he ought to go and mock him down and not worry 

a bit about what the other ten guys are going to do. His No. 1 requirement 

is to knock that one ~Y down. After he sees that he is securely on the - ground, and he can be sure of that if' he has his ~eet in his face, then 

he should start worrying about helping somebody else. 

I don't think you can let everybody decide what he is going to do. 

You know what would happen? If' we let everybody decide what he was going 

to do in this COMINT business, there would be a tremendous amount that is 

not done. It just follows, boys. You don't have to be in the COMINT 

business to make that statement. It is essential that everything be 

covered, that somebody make that decision here in the US, or in the 

Th.eater, after it has been decided that he neeaa to know about it. 

We have made an attempt in the staff' at NSA to apportion the work 

of the world. I doubt if' it is perfect. I wouldn't say it was. I know 

very well it isn • t perfect. I am sure it can be improved, but I might 

as well state here and now so there is no argument about the logic of the 

thing, I reserve the right· to change it. I reserve the right to be sure 

that everything is covered. 

If you haven't got enough work to do out in the boondocks at Point A 

or Point Q or anywhere else" that COMINT people are stationed and have a.n 

operation in effect, if you have a great deal of time hanging on your hands, 

if you are so over· staffed that your guys are running around saying "I'm 

all out of' work," well, let your bosses know first and then tell me. I will 

get something out there for you to do. There are a lot of places I am 

sure are undermanned. Maibe the distribution of' bodies is wrong. 

I take a. very dim view of people deciding for themselves that they 

have time to do something else. I don't think we have any justification 

for doing it in one COMDJT station in the world. You lmow that all the 

requirements are laid on the whole COMINT community and no one station 

coDllll8.llder is in a position, Gentlemen, to decide if' he has more time to 

to things or what he ought to do. I say that without fear of' being 

contradicated. I can't imagine the COMINT business of' the US going on 

unplanned. 

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Now let's keep it planned. If' you have more time on your hands than 

you know what to do with, I am sure if' you will ask your Cryptologic Agency 

bqss that he will say, "I know what to do." I am completely certain they 

have more work than they know what to do with. They will be only too 

happy to reassign some of these extra people somewhere so they can cover 

a piece of pie that is not now being covered. 

The COMINT business requires that somebody cut up the pie and make 

.sure that all the initial cuts are issued to somebody. Then somebody 

cuts those first pieces into smaller pieces, end you don't get much of 

a bite unless it is a heck of a big pie. 

We also have to have a reasonable amount of unif'ormi ty in how we do 

things and how we put out our end result. I know I have had you ask me, 

"My guys a.re putting this out on purple paper end this ~ wants it on 

pink. Why can't I give it to him?" To you he is the most important ~ 

in the world. If you iidn' t think he was I wouldn't want you working 

in the COMINT business. But it so happens, Gentlemen, that very little 

of our pr~duct goes to only one guy. There may have been some occasions 

when only one person. in the world among the COMINT receivers got something. 

I don't remember. It seems to me, every time I look at distribution lists, 

you have·taken the Army, Navy, and. Air Force Registers enlil Jus); goe down 

through them. Now maYbe just one ~ in tlae whole outfit was interested 

in it, or you are just padding the list. I don't -mow. At the present 

time it see.ms we are.sending our product to too many people. I assume 

that when.we put that kind of distribution on it, somebody has said he 

was interested in it. If he hasn't, take his n8.me off. If you can cut 

it down, I don't much care what color paper it goes on. You can get some 

Reynolds wrap end send it to him if you want to, but again you have the 

problem of making sure when you de~ide on the color of' the paper, the least 

number of people are going to get it. 

You have the problem of format and what goes into the various places 

in the format that meets the greatest common denominator. If you have 

some individual customer and you have plenty af time end a lot of these 

extra people around that you are talking about, you give him a special. 

But you must get oe out that meets the requirements of the greatest 

number. You don't duplicate what you have already given your ind.1 viduil 

customer, but if the format didn't include two items that he wants, send 

him a spot. 

Let's do the best we can for· them. Now I don't know what has been 

said about the_ consumers a.round here. Like Gen Bassett, I am concerned 

always about the eonsumer. I don't know what your definition of a consumer 

is. My definition of a consumer is the ~ who can order airpl.8.nes into 

the air, require cannon balls to be shot, or the Missouri out of mothballs, 

someboaY who can take command. I am vitally concerned about· whether we 

pre.serving th.E!m and serving them well and, within our capabilities and 

limitations, giving them what they want~ I am not at all sure sometimes, 

because they have something else to c!o besides becoming experts in the 

COMIE'l business, that they know how to lay requirements on us. I think 

it is our job to educate them. 

I think I know more about the limitations end capabilities of the 

COMINT business than anybody outside of the COMIN'f l;>usiness. I opened 

this· session by saying this was a service orguizatioa; I am going to 

elose it, by saying that this is a service organization~ r'don't expect 

to kill any more Krauts. I expect, to wind up m,,y career in service. It's 

a poor way for an artillery man to end up, but apparently that is the way 

I am g0ing to do it~ I want· to do a· good job of it. 

I ' I 

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I ex-.Pect the COMINT business of the US, insofar as I can influence 

it, to serve the commanders to the best of our ability and give them 

as close to what they think they want, as it is within our capability 

of doing. I charge you, each and every one of you, whether you are 

here in Washington or on the tip of Hokkaido, and points in between both 

ways around, with doing exactly that. I hope you have found out precisely 

how to do it this week. 

I will end by saying this one thing, that we can do anything we want 

to do. It is not knowledge that controls how much is done in this world. 

It is will. Now let's have a lot of will to get along with the work of 

the world and quit arguing about it. 

I am glad you came here. I will see some of you starting week after 

next and the rest of you I hope to see in the Fall. In the meantime, let's 

do a job for the US. Thank you. 

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