[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12543

Non-Argument Calendar

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IRVING A. HARNED, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FULTON COUNTY CLERK OF THE COURT’S OFFICE, 

FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03476-ELR

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12543

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Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, andGRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Irving Harned, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of his action for failure to state a claim against the Fulton 

County Clerk of the Court’s Office (Clerk’s Office) and the Fulton 

County District Attorney’s Office (DA’s Office) under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. On appeal, Mr. Harned alleges that his constitutional rights

to due process and equal protection were violated when the Clerk’s 

Office prevented him from filing a motion in an earlier case and

when the DA’s Office declined to prosecute Piedmont Healthcare

as part of an alleged conspiracy. He argues that, contrary to the 

district court’s determination, the Clerk’s Office is a legal entity 

subject to suit and that its employees are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

After careful review, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Harned’s claims against the Clerk’s Office and its employees and conclude that any arguments as to the claim against 

the DA’s Office have been abandoned.

I

On October 15, 2018, Mr. Harned filed a pro se action in the 

Superior Court of Fulton County. He sued Piedmont and other

medical providers over medical treatment received in 2016. On December 10, 2018, the Superior Court entered an orderrequiring Mr.

Harned “to obtain permission from the Court before filing a civil 

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23-12543 Opinion of the Court 3

lawsuit, subpoena, criminal filing and/or application for arrest warrant relating to the subject matter” of the case. The Superior Court 

dismissed the action in April of 2019.

On October 25, 2021, Mr. Harned, proceeding pro se again,

filed a separate action in the Superior Court against the Georgia 

Attorney General. This action violated the earlier court order restricting Mr. Harned’s ability to file, among other things, complaints related to the alleged conspiracy to protect Piedmont from 

liability. In February of 2022, the Superior Court dismissed the action against the Georgia Attorney General without prejudice. Mr. 

Harned alleges that, on August 26, 2022, he attempted to file a motion to set aside the Superior Court’s latest order but was prevented 

from doing so when employees of the Clerk’s Office misinterpreted the filing restriction order from his previous case. 

On August 29, 2022, Mr. Harned filed the pro se action underlying this appeal in the Northern District of Georgia. Mr. 

Harned brought two claims pursuant to § 1983, one against the 

Clerk’s Office, including its employees in their individual capacities, 

and another against the DA’s Office. Mr. Harned alleged that his

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the 

Clerk’s Office allegedly prevented him from filing a motion to set 

aside the dismissal of his action against the Attorney General, and 

the DA’s Office allegedly refused to prosecute Piedmont.

The district court dismissed the action and imposed additional filing restrictions, including a Rule 11 bond. First, the district 

court ruled that Mr. Harned had failed to state a claim against the

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Clerk’s Office because the Office is not an entity subject to suit.

Second, the district court explained that Mr. Harned’s claims 

against employees of the Clerk’s Office were barred by absolute, 

quasi-judicial immunity. Third, the district court concluded that 

any claims against the DA’s Office, or its employees, were similarly 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity. Mr. 

Harned now appeals.

II

On appeal, we consider only whether the district court correctly dismissed Mr. Harned’s claim against the Clerk’s Office and 

its employees. Specifically, we address (1) whether the Clerk’s Office is an entity capable of being sued and (2) whether employees

at the Clerk’s Office enjoy absolute, quasi-judicial immunity when 

sued in their individual capacities. As for Mr. Harned’s claim against 

the DA’s Office, any arguments have been abandoned.

A

We review a district court’s dismissal of a claim pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. See Almanza v. 

United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 2017). To survive 

a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility 

standard requires that the “factual content [pled] allow the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citations omitted). We accept the factual

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allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in Mr. 

Harned’s favor. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.

B

We begin by addressing whether the Clerk’s Office is an entity subject to suit. For all parties who are not individuals or corporations, the “[c]apacity to sue or be sued” in federal court is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 17(b).

Georgia law recognizes three classes of legal entities subject 

to suit: “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); 

and (3) such quasiartificial persons as the law recognizes as being 

capable to sue.” Cravey v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass’n, 105 S.E.2d 

497, 500 (Ga. 1958) (citations omitted). Importantly, under Georgia

law, “there is no legal provision that designates a trial court clerk’s 

office as either a person or corporation capable of being sued.”

Seibert v. Alexander, 829 S.E.2d 473, 477 (Ga. App. 2019). Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that a clerk’s office

“has no legal status” and “cannot be a legal party to litigation.” Id.

A court therefore “correctly dismisse[s] [a] case as against the 

clerk’s office on the basis that it is not a legal entity subject to suit.” 

Id.

Because Mr. Harned cannot sue the Clerk’s Office, we need 

not consider the merits of his § 1983 claim against the Office.

C

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We next address whether the employees of the Clerk’s Office enjoy absolute, quasi-judicial immunity when sued in their individual capacities. Though Mr. Harned did not name any employees individually as defendants, most of his allegations were directed 

toward Ms. Cathelene Robinson in her role as the Superior Court 

Clerk of Fulton County. To the extent that Mr. Harned attempts to 

assert claims against Ms. Robinson and any other employees, we 

agree with the district court that absolute quasi-judicial immunity

bars these claims.

Mr. Harned argues that he was deprived of his constitutional

rights when a Clerk’s Office employee allegedly prevented him 

from filing a motion to set aside a court order dismissing his case 

against the Georgia Attorney General. He asserts that, in doing so, 

the employee misinterpreted the terms of the earlier filing restriction order which covered civil lawsuits, subpoenas, criminal filings, and applications for arrest warrants, but not motions. He further claims that the order was not in effect at the time of his attempted filing.

Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Harned, his claims against the employees still fail as a matter of law. We have held that “nonjudicial 

officials are encompassed by a judge’s absolute immunity when 

their official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial 

process.” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation 

and internal quotations omitted). See also Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 

1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Officials who perform 

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judicial . . . functions traditionally have been afforded absolute immunity from suit.”) (citations omitted). This “absolute quasi-judicial immunity derives from absolute judicial immunity” and is determined “through a functional analysis of the actions taken by the 

official in relation to the judicial process.” Roland, 19 F.3d at 555

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Like judges, 

these officials must be acting within the scope of their authority”

to receive immunity. Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Ms. Robinson and the other employees of the Clerk’s 

Office were acting “within the scope of their authority” when they 

allegedly misinterpreted the court order and refused to file Mr. 

Harned’s motion. “Enforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding.” Id. (citation omitted). 

See also Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 

1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[F]iling a complaint or petition is a basic and 

integral part of the judicial process . . . [and] [t]he clerk of court 

and deputy clerk are the officials through whom such filing is 

done.”); Valdez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1288 (10th 

Cir. 1989) (collecting cases on the issue). The alleged conduct here

is therefore “encompassed by a judge’s absolute immunity.” Roland, 

19 F.3d at 555 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And 

because the Supreme Court has told us that a “judge is absolutely 

immune from liability for his judicial acts even . . . [when] grave 

procedural errors” result, Ms. Robinson and the other employees 

at the Clerk’s Office are immune from Mr. Harned’s claim even if 

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they mistakenly declined to file his motion. See Stump v. Sparkman, 

435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). 

IV

We have “long held that an appellant abandons a claim when 

he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.” 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 

2014). “Issues not raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited and 

will not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances.” Anthony 

v. Georgia, 69 F.4th 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). See 

also United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 379 (2020) (holding 

that only “extraordinary circumstances” may justify a departure 

from the principle of party representation). This rule is deeply embedded in our case law and applies to represented parties and pro se 

litigants alike. See, e.g., Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are 

deemed abandoned.”) (citations omitted).

With these principles in mind, we consider whether Mr. 

Harned abandoned arguments concerning his claim against the 

DA’s Office by not raising them in his initial brief on appeal. As a 

general principle, “we rely on the parties to frame the issues for 

decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters 

the parties present.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243

(2008). We depart from that principle only “when extraordinary 

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circumstances so warrant.” Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 471, 

(2012). See also Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 379 (holding that only 

“extraordinary circumstances” may justify departure from the 

principle of party representation).

Here, Mr. Harned failed to brief any arguments regarding 

his claim against the DA’s office. And “[n]o extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant [such] consideration, because a refusal to 

consider [Mr. Harned’s claim] would not result in a miscarriage of 

justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern.” 

Anthony, 69 F.4th at 808.

V

We affirm the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Harned’s 

claims against the Clerk’s Office and its employees and against the 

DA’s Office.

AFFIRMED.

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