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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40073

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LAWRENCE JAMES CROW,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 809

Filed: December 31, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted first degree murder and 

accompanying order imposing fine, modified; order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for 

reduction of sentence, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

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MELANSON, Judge

Lawrence James Crow appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for 

attempted first degree murder and the order imposing a fine under I.C. § 19-5307. Crow also 

appeals from the district court’s order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Crow’s term of imprisonment and the denial of the 

I.C.R. 35 motion, but modify the fine imposed under I.C. § 19-5307.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In July 2010, officers responded to a shooting involving Crow and his ex-girlfriend 

(victim). Crow and the victim dated for approximately six years and separated around one 

month prior to the shooting. Crow and the victim had a child together and, at the time, were 

sharing custody. On the day of the shooting, Crow had custody of the child (at Crow’s mother’s 
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residence) and was to return the child to the victim around noon. The victim observed Crow pull 

into her driveway that day. However, instead of dropping off the child, Crow backed up and left. 

The victim indicated that normally she would have been alone, but that day her mother was at 

her residence. The victim later surmised Crow had seen her mother’s car in the driveway and 

left.

A short time thereafter, the victim drove to Crow’s mother’s residence to pick up the 

child. When the victim arrived, Crow desired to talk about their relationship and the victim 

agreed. While talking on the front porch, the victim realized Crow had been drinking and 

decided to leave. The victim attempted to open the front door to retrieve her child, but found the 

door was locked and so she knocked. Because Crow was acting aggressively, the victim dialed 

911 on her cell phone but did not send the call initially. Crow then drew a handgun from his 

pants and stated to the victim, “If I can’t have you, no one can.” Crow also stated “I got this for 

you” in a threating manner while pointing the gun at the victim. By this time, the front door had 

been unlocked by someone within the house. The victim fled into the house and dialed 911. 

Crow pursued her. Crow again pointed the gun into the victim’s face and chest, and the victim 

pushed the gun away. Crow fired the gun, wounding the victim in the arm.

The victim retreated into a bathroom and locked the door. The victim heard one or two 

additional shots. One of these shots went through the bathroom door, although missing the 

victim. Crow subsequently gained entry into the bathroom. In desperation, the victim began 

hugging Crow, telling him that she would come back to him. Crow loosened his grip on the gun 

and the victim seized it and turned it over to Crow’s sister. Police arrived shortly thereafter.

The state charged Crow with attempted murder in the first degree, I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-

4002, 18-4003(a), 18-4004 and 18-306; domestic battery involving traumatic injury in the 

presence of children, I.C. §§ 18-918(2)(a) and (b) and 18-918(4); use of a firearm in the 

commission of a crime, I.C. § 19-2520; and infliction of great bodily injury, I.C. § 19-2520B. 

Crow agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder and the state agreed to dismiss the 

remaining charge and the enhancements. The district court imposed a unified term of fifteen 

years, with a minimum period of confinement of nine years. The district court also imposed a 

$5000 fine pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307. Crow subsequently filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for 

reduction of sentence and the district court denied the motion. Crow appeals.
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II.

ANALYSIS

A. Fines Imposed for Crimes of Violence

Crow argues the district court erred by imposing a fine of $5000 to operate as a civil 

judgment in favor of the victim. The state argues that this issue is not properly preserved for 

appeal. The state concedes that, if this Court were to reach the merits, the fine was in error. 

However, the state contends the remedy should be to reduce the award to the maximum amount

permitted by statute ($2500).

We initially address the state’s argument that this issue is not properly preserved for 

appeal. Specifically, the state contends that, because Crow did not raise this issue in his I.C.R. 

35 motion, the district court was deprived of an opportunity to correct any alleged error and 

Crow is precluded from raising it in the first instance on appeal. However, I.C. § 19-5307 

provides that “a defendant may appeal a fine created under this section in the same manner as 

any other aspect of a sentence imposed by the court.” This provision allows Crow to challenge

the fine without first having to raise it in an I.C.R. 35 motion for correction of an illegal 

sentence.1

Turning to the underlying issue, I.C. § 19-5307 provides, in pertinent part:

(1) Irrespective of any penalties set forth under state law, and in 

addition thereto, the court, at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed 

necessary by the court, may impose a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars 

($5,000) against any defendant found guilty of any felony listed in subsection (2) 

of this section.

The fine shall operate as a civil judgment against the defendant, and shall 

be entered on behalf of the victim . . . 

Subsection (2) lists murder under I.C. § 18-4001 as one of the qualifying crimes. Idaho Code 

Section 18-306 provides:

Every person who attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or is prevented 

or intercepted in the perpetration thereof, is punishable, where no provision is 

made by law for the punishment of such attempts, as follows:

. . . . 

(4) If the offense so attempted is punishable by a fine, the offender convicted 

of such attempt is punishable by a fine not exceeding one-half (1/2) the largest 

fine which may be imposed upon a conviction of the offense so attempted.

 

1 Crow could have objected or filed a Rule 35 motion challenging the legality of the fine.
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Read together, these two statutes create a maximum fine under I.C. § 19-5307 of $2500 in cases 

of attempted first degree murder. Crow argues that I.C. § 19-5307 is devoid of any language 

regarding attempts and defendants convicted of attempted violent crimes are not subject to fines 

under that section. However, this argument is unavailing because it ignores one of the operative 

statutes at issue here--I.C. § 18-306(4). This statute unequivocally authorizes a fine of up to onehalf of what the completed offense would allow. There is no ambiguity when the two statutes 

are read in conjunction with one another. Therefore, because the district court erred in imposing 

a $5000 fine, we modify that fine to $2500 in accordance with I.C. § 18-306.

B. Sentence Review

Crow argues his sentence is excessive. An appellate review of a sentence is based on an 

abuse of discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 

2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is 

unreasonable and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 

P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be 

unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 

(1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that 

confinement is necessary “to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 

achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a 

given case.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an 

appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct 

an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of 

the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 

P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the 

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

Crow specifically asserts the following mitigating factors demonstrate the district court 

abused its discretion: this was Crow’s first felony offense, Crow was only twenty-two years of 

age at the time of the crime, Crow has strong family support, Crow has a good work history,

Crow was recently diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, Crow suffers from substance abuse 

problems but wants to live a sober life, Crow demonstrated remorse for this crime, and the 

psychological evaluator opined that Crow is not a danger to the general public.
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Despite Crow’s assertion, the record demonstrates the district court considered these

mitigating factors, but was primarily concerned with protection of society, followed then by

punishment and rehabilitation. The district court recognized the premeditated nature of this 

crime. Crow obtained the gun; pointed it at the victim; told the victim it was for her; and stated 

if Crow could not have the victim, no one else could. Crow then shot the victim and also shot 

through the bathroom door where the victim was hiding. In addressing Crow’s mental health 

diagnosis, the district court recognized that without treatment, when confronted with the same 

situation, there is concern that this would happen again. The district court further considered 

Crow’s substance abuse issues and found it troubling that Crow had prior criminal offenses 

involving alcohol and that the current charge arose while Crow was on misdemeanor probation. 

The district court indicated the best place for Crow to receive effective treatment for his mental

health and substance abuse issues was in a confined setting. The district court also considered 

family support and recognized that this would be important when it came to rehabilitative efforts. 

However, as noted above, the focus of the district court was rightfully upon the protection of 

society.

The issue before this Court is not whether the sentence is one that we would have 

imposed, but whether the sentence is plainly excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. 

Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. If reasonable minds might differ as to whether the 

sentence is excessive, we are not free to substitute our view for that of the district court. Id. 

Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused 

its discretion.

C. Rule 35 Motion

Crow asserts the district court erred by failing to reduce his sentence after he presented 

new evidence at his Rule 35 hearing. Crow submitted a number of affidavits, including one from 

his sister indicating she had never previously seen Crow strike the victim and an affidavit from 

the mother of Crow’s other son stating that son needs his father. Crow submitted a report from 

an investigator which indicated the investigator believed Crow was honest and forthright with his 

version of events, took responsibility for his actions, and did not intend to harm the victim at the 

time of the crime. Finally, Crow had completed a parenting class. 

A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 
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23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In 

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of 

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 

motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the 

record, including the new information submitted with Crow’s Rule 35 motion, we conclude no 

abuse of discretion has been shown.

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Crow to a unified term of 

fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of nine years, or in denying Crow’s 

Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. However, the district court erred by imposing a fine in 

excess of the amount permitted under I.C. § 19-5307. Accordingly, we affirm Crow’s judgment 

of conviction and sentence with respect to the term of imprisonment and the order denying 

Crow’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. However, we modify Crow’s judgment of 

conviction and sentence with respect to the fine under I.C. § 19-5307 and modify the 

accompanying order imposing that fine. The district court is hereby directed to enter an 

amended judgment of conviction and sentence and accompanying order consistent with this 

opinion.

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.