NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

COREY DEAN TARPLEY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0811

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2014-127321-001

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Terry M. Crist, III

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Consuelo M. Ohanesian

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. TARPLEY

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Corey Dean Tarpley appeals his conviction and sentence for 

sale or transportation of narcotic drugs. For the following reasons, we 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Acting on information that a person was selling crack 

cocaine in the parking lot of a hotel, two undercover police detectives

made contact with Tarpley. One detective followed Tarpley to a hotel 

room, where he purchased crack cocaine for $50. Approximately three 

weeks later, the detectives again contacted Tarpley in the same hotel 

parking lot. On that date, they purchased a gun from Tarpley.1 

¶3 Tarpley was indicted on one count of sale or transportation 

of narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony, and one count of misconduct involving 

weapons, a class 4 felony. The superior court severed the counts for trial 

and later dismissed the misconduct involving weapons charge by 

stipulation of the parties. 

¶4 The jury found Tarpley guilty of sale or transportation of 

narcotic drugs and found that he committed the offense for pecuniary 

gain. The court determined Tarpley had two historical prior felony 

convictions and sentenced him to a mitigated term of 10.5 years’ 

imprisonment. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-703(C), (J). 

¶5 Tarpley timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4033(A). 

 

1 The superior court precluded evidence at trial that the item

purchased was a gun. 
STATE v. TARPLEY

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

I. Batson2 Challenge

¶6 Tarpley first challenges the denial of his Batson challenge to 

the State’s use of a peremptory strike to remove an African-American man 

from the jury panel. We will affirm the superior court’s ruling unless it 

was clearly erroneous, as a Batson determination is based “largely upon an 

assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.” State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 10, 

¶ 22 (2010). A three-step analysis applies to Batson challenges: 

First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that 

the strike was racially discriminatory. If such a showing is 

made, the burden then switches to the prosecutor to give a 

race-neutral explanation for the strike. Finally, if the 

prosecution offers a facially neutral basis for the strike, the 

trial court must determine whether “the defendant has 

established purposeful discrimination.”

State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 401, ¶ 53 (2006) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 

476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).

¶7 The following exchange occurred between the court and the 

prospective juror (“Juror 1”) after the court asked whether any panel 

member or their close relatives or friends had been arrested, charged, or 

convicted of any crime other than a minor traffic offense:

THE COURT: . . . Juror number one, was it you or a family 

member or friend who got -- had some charges?

JUROR: It was a friend.

. . . 

THE COURT: Okay. And what were . . . the charges against 

the friend or the arrest? What was he arrested for?

JUROR: She. She was arrested for transportation of drugs. 

She was falsely accused of. She got out of, got out of it.

THE COURT: Okay. So she, your friend, was charged with 

transporting drugs or selling drugs?

 

2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
STATE v. TARPLEY

Decision of the Court

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JUROR: Yes, yes.

THE COURT: And she was ultimately -- were the charges 

dismissed, or what happened? 

JUROR: Yes, they were dismissed.

THE COURT: The charges were dismissed. Okay. And you 

-- I have you down as someone who believes that . . . you as 

a juror in this case, would impact your deliberations.

Do you feel like she was treated badly?

JUROR: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Okay. And, sir, there’s certainly nothing 

wrong with that.

Let me ask you this: Is that something that you might hold 

against the State in this case or the other party for any 

reason?

JUROR: It’s hard to say.

THE COURT: Hard to say. Can you tell me -- can you 

confidently tell me that you could put aside your friend’s 

experience or your relationship with your friend, and that 

you could put those things aside and decide this case based 

solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom and 

the law as given to you by the court?

JUROR: I can try.

THE COURT: Okay. And that’s . . . fair. But you say you’d 

try. So sounds like you’re not confident; is that fair?

JUROR: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And I don’t --

JUROR: -- put my differences aside --

THE COURT: I’m sorry. I didn’t hear that. 
STATE v. TARPLEY

Decision of the Court

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Before I hear from you again, sir, I, I don’t mean to pick on 

you. And I appreciate you’re trying to be candid with me 

here. And remember, there’s no right or wrong answer. 

So what was it you were trying to tell me?

JUROR: I could put my, try to put my differences aside for 

this case.

THE COURT: Okay. Are you confident you could do that?

JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir.

The State moved to strike Juror 1 for cause. Tarpley objected, arguing the 

juror had been rehabilitated. The court denied the State’s motion. 

¶8 The State thereafter used a peremptory strike as to Juror 1, 

and Tarpley raised a Batson challenge. The court found that Tarpley had 

made a prima facie showing of discrimination and asked the State to 

respond. The prosecutor voiced concern about Juror 1’s ability to be fair 

and impartial. He argued Juror 1 initially indicated he would hold his 

friend’s experience “against the State,” then “hemmed and hawed for 

some time” before ultimately agreeing he could be fair and impartial. The 

State also expressed concern that Juror 1 had not responded to any other 

questions posed by the court, which the prosecutor avowed was “another 

reason that I use often to strike people.” The court denied the Batson 

challenge, finding the State had articulated a race-neutral explanation and 

that, although Juror 1 was ultimately rehabilitated, it was not without “a 

lot of hesitation on his part.” The court observed that “[k]eeping him on 

the jury was not a slam dunk in terms of the rehabilitation.” 

¶9 The superior court did not err. Juror 1 expressed uncertainty 

when asked whether he would hold his friend’s experience against the 

State and again when asked if he could judge the case based solely on the 

evidence presented and the law as instructed by the court. He also 

corrected himself when stating, “I could put my, try to put my differences 

aside for this case.” (Emphasis added.) The court asked if he was 

confident he could “do that,” to which the juror responded, “Yes.” Read 

in context, it is unclear whether the juror simply meant he was confident 

he could try to put his differences aside. 
STATE v. TARPLEY

Decision of the Court

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¶10 Tarpley concedes that “[o]n their face, without further 

analysis, the State’s reasons for striking [the juror] appear to be raceneutral,” but nevertheless draws comparisons between Juror 1 and others 

on the panel who were not stricken when the State exercised its 

peremptory strikes. Batson, though, does not require “a comparison 

between the jurors who are excused from a panel and all of the other 

prospective jurors remaining on the panel.” State v. Castillo, 156 Ariz. 323, 

325 (App. 1987). Moreover, the court noted that the difference between 

jurors who were not stricken and Juror 1 was “Juror number 1 was on the 

fence. And there was significant hesitation on his part.” The court also 

observed that, “if I were an attorney, I would be concerned about that.” 

¶11 Under the circumstances presented, the superior court did 

not err by denying Tarpley’s Batson challenge. 

II. Prior Convictions

¶12 Tarpley also contends the State failed to “follow the proper 

procedure for establishing a prior conviction.” We review a trial court’s 

determination that a prior conviction constitutes a historical prior felony 

conviction de novo as a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Derello, 199 

Ariz. 435, 437, ¶ 8 (App. 2001).

¶13 According to Tarpley, “[t]he proper procedure for 

establishing a prior conviction is for the state to submit a certified copy of 

the conviction and establish that the defendant is the person to whom the 

document refers.” But that in fact occurred here. 

¶14 Officer Dodd testified that he took Tarpley’s fingerprints, 

which were introduced as Exhibit 1. Officer Dodd then requested a 

comparison of those fingerprints to Tarpley’s criminal records. Hillary 

Sellmeyer conducted the comparison. Sellmeyer testified she compared

the Exhibit 1 prints to “the ten-print record and the priors document” 

from Exhibit 2 (the “penitentiary package” or “pen pack”), and they

matched. The certified documents in Exhibit 2 included Tarpley’s

fingerprints, full name, and date of birth. 

¶15 Based on the evidence presented, the superior court properly 

found the existence of two prior felony convictions. See State v. Solis, 236 

Ariz. 242, 248, ¶ 21 (App. 2014) (“[P]en packs alone may be sufficient to 

prove prior convictions.”). 
STATE v. TARPLEY

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm Tarpley’s conviction and sentence.