alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,257,000 
<SECURITIES>                                             0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,793,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                       170,000 
<INVENTORY>                                      6,507,000 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                20,203,000 
<PP&E>                                          30,232,000 
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,616,000 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  55,046,000 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,882,000 
<BONDS>                                                  0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0 
<PREFERRED>                                              0 
<COMMON>                                            42,000 
<OTHER-SE>                                      25,907,000 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    55,046,000 
<SALES>                                         40,858,000 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                40,858,000 
<CGS>                                           35,825,000 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   68,031,000 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,363,000 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   394,000 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 800,000 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (30,033,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0 
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0 
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0 
<CHANGES>                                                0 
<NET-INCOME>                                   (30,033,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (0.88)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.88)
                                               


</TABLE>
# C_2015388EN.01000101.xml

| 21.11.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 388/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.11.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 388/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7736 — Magna/Stadco)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2015/C 388/01)

On 18 November 2015, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7736. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7736. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">75 Fort Washington, LLC, Petitioner-Respondent,<br><br>against<br><br>Alejandro Polanco, Mario Fernandez, "John Doe", Respondents-Appellants.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Respondents appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Phyllis K. Saxe, J.), entered on or about August 22, 2015, which granted petitioner's motion to vacate an order dismissing the holdover petition for nonappearance and denied respondents' cross motion for summary judgment.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Order (Phyllis K. Saxe, J.) entered on or about August 22, 2015, affirmed, with $10 costs.</p><p>Given the strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits, we find no cause to disturb the motion court's discretionary determination to vacate the dismissal order entered upon petitioner's failure to appear. The default was purportedly caused by petitioner's counsel's inadvertent miscalendaring of the scheduled date, which amounted to law office failure (<i>see Chelli v Kelly Group, P.C., </i>63 AD3d 632 [2009]; <i>Dokmecian v ABN AMRO N. Am.</i>, 304 AD2d 445 [2003]), petitioner promptly moved to vacate the default and there was no showing of prejudice. The record simply does not support respondents' claim that petitioner's failure to appear was willful or part of a pattern of delay (<i>see Travelers Ins. Co. v Abelow</i>, 14 AD3d 395 [2005]). As to the merits and turning to the substantive issues advanced in respondents' cross motion, Civil Court correctly noted that several unresolved triable issues exist as to whether respondent Fernandez, the grandson of the deceased rent-stabilized tenant, primarily resided with the tenant of record for two years immediately prior to her death, so as to entitle respondent to succession rights.</p><br>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.<br>I concur I concur I concur<br>Decision Date: November 30, 2016<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
Exhibit
31.2



CERTIFICATION



I,
Jean-Louis Casabonne, certify that:



1.
I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A of hopTo Inc.;



2.
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report.





|/s/
                                                JEAN-LOUIS CASABONNE | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------ | 

Jean-Louis
Casabonne

Chief
Financial Officer

April
29, 2016
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 3.1

                                     (Conformed copy giving effect to all
                                     amendments since the date of this
                                     Amended Certificate of Limited Partnership)


                   AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

                                       OF

                      THE FULCRUM FUND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

              (original Amended Certificate of Limited Partnership
                              filed June 22, 1999)

The undersigned, desiring to form a limited partnership under the Connecticut
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the "Act"), does hereby certify as follows:

I.       The name of the partnership is The Fulcrum Fund Limited Partnership
         (the "Partnership"). It has an office address of Two American Lane,
         Greenwich, Connecticut 06831-8150

II.      The agent for service of process is Kenneth A. Shewer, who has a
         business address of Two American Lane, Greenwich, Connecticut
         06831-8150 and a home address at 112 Gunn Hill Road, New Preston,
         Connecticut 06777.

III.     The name and address of the sole general partner is Kenmar Advisory
         Corp., Two American Lane, Greenwich, Connecticut 06831-8150.

IV.      The Partnership shall dissolve and its affairs wound up on December 31,
         2026 unless sooner terminated under the terms of the Limited
         Partnership Agreement or the Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned general partner has executed this
Certificate of Limited Partnership this 17th day of June, 1996.

GENERAL PARTNER:

KENMAR ADVISORY CORP.



By:  /s/ Esther Eckerling Goodman
     ----------------------------------
     Esther Eckerling Goodman
     Chief Operating Officer and
     Senior Executive Vice President


<PAGE>   2

                  ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT AS STATUTORY AGENT

Kenneth A. Shewer hereby accepts and agrees to his appointment as statutory
agent for service for the Partnership.

Dated:  June 17, 1996


/s/  Kenneth A. Shewer
     -----------------
     Kenneth A. Shewer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6864

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

LARRY ANTONIO SIMMONS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior

District Judge. (2:10-cr-00653-PMD-1; 2:16-cv-00349-PMD)

Submitted: November 17, 2016 Decided: November 22, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit 

Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Antonio Simmons, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Nicholas 

Bianchi, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Larry Antonio Simmons seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Simmons has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">75 Fort Washington, LLC, Petitioner-Respondent,<br><br>against<br><br>Alejandro Polanco, Mario Fernandez, "John Doe", Respondents-Appellants.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Respondents appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Phyllis K. Saxe, J.), entered on or about August 22, 2015, which granted petitioner's motion to vacate an order dismissing the holdover petition for nonappearance and denied respondents' cross motion for summary judgment.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Order (Phyllis K. Saxe, J.) entered on or about August 22, 2015, affirmed, with $10 costs.</p><p>Given the strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits, we find no cause to disturb the motion court's discretionary determination to vacate the dismissal order entered upon petitioner's failure to appear. The default was purportedly caused by petitioner's counsel's inadvertent miscalendaring of the scheduled date, which amounted to law office failure (<i>see Chelli v Kelly Group, P.C., </i>63 AD3d 632 [2009]; <i>Dokmecian v ABN AMRO N. Am.</i>, 304 AD2d 445 [2003]), petitioner promptly moved to vacate the default and there was no showing of prejudice. The record simply does not support respondents' claim that petitioner's failure to appear was willful or part of a pattern of delay (<i>see Travelers Ins. Co. v Abelow</i>, 14 AD3d 395 [2005]). As to the merits and turning to the substantive issues advanced in respondents' cross motion, Civil Court correctly noted that several unresolved triable issues exist as to whether respondent Fernandez, the grandson of the deceased rent-stabilized tenant, primarily resided with the tenant of record for two years immediately prior to her death, so as to entitle respondent to succession rights.</p><p>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.</p><br>I concur I concur I concur<br>Decision Date: November 30, 2016<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
#### Kelley vs. The Town of Fond du Lac.

*Practice in Supreme Oowrt.*

Where the printed abstract of the case shows no error, and the appellant’s counsel has not called the attention of this court to any error appearing in the written bill of exceptions (which is voluminous) — there being no oral argument or brief for the respondent,— the court must affirm the judgment, without itself searching the record for errors.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Fond du Lac*County.

Action for damages caused by a defect in a highway of the defendant town. Plaintiff had a verdict, and judgment thereon ; and defendant appealed from the judgment.

*Priest & Carter,*for respondent.

Lyon, J.

This case was here on a former occasion, and a sufficient statement of facts will be found in the report thereof. 31 Wis., 179. There is in the complaint, however, another *308cause of action, not mentioned in the report, for the loss of another horse by the plaintiff in 1867, by reason of an alleged defect in another highway in the defendant town. We reversed the former judgment (which was for the plaintiff), because of certain erroneous rulings on objections to testimony. The cause has been again tried with a like result, and the de' fendant has again appealed.

A printed abstract of the case has been furnished, but we have no argument or brief on behalf of the defendant. The abstract contains no exceptions to the rulings of the court on objections to testimony, and hence we conclude that no such exceptions are relied on to reverse the judgment. This only leaves for consideration the instructions given to the jury, and those proposed by the defendant and refused. The former are substantially the same which were given on the former trial, and approved by this court on the former appeal. Of the latter, all which the printed abstract shows were material to the case, were given in the general charge.

The bill of exceptions is very voluminous, and we do not deem it our dut}*- to search through it for errors not apparent in such abstract, and which counsel have not taken the trouble to point out to us.

*By the Court.*—Judgment affirmed.
**Southeastern Banking Corporation****Exhibit 99.1**

 

**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted****Pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbannes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Southeastern Banking Corporation on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (“the Report”), I, Alyson G. Beasley, Vice President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbannes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|   | (1)    | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                 |
|   | (2)    | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

 

/s/ ALYSON G. BEASLEY**Alyson G. Beasley, Vice President**

## ***August 14, 2002***
## "{JocS^ A ©^-a^s>« i -e3-(p O

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Secretar y Susa n Kurlan d regardin g ai r

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. W e are please dt o informyo u tha t w e hav e reache dagreemen t with Evergree n Helicopter , Inc. , t o provid e subsidize dai r servic e at

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wa s forwarde dt o you r

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. Whil e th e agreemen t

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. Th e nex t ste p i s for

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. Onc e that i s done , w e wil l draf

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. W e loo k

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. A s i s ou r norma l practice , w e ar e placin g acop y o f thi s lette r

i n Docke t

OST-2009-0260
. Sincerel y yours . 

### A-^-^oy^- ^

] / y_^ - l/ayii.- \ Denni s J
. DeWny ' Chie f EA S an dDomesti c Analysi s
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 30, 2016

No. 04-16-00612-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.L.M.,

From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015PA01559

Honorable Richard Garcia, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant's second motion for extension of time to file brief is hereby GRANTED.

_________________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 30th day of November, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6987

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DELLANDO RECARDO CAMPBELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District 

Judge. (1:14-cr-00058-WMN-1; 1:15-cv-02818-WMN)

Submitted: November 17, 2016 Decided: November 22, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dellando Recardo Campbell, Appellant Pro Se. Kenneth Sutherland 

Clark, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, John Francis Purcell, 

Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Dellando Recardo Campbell seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief 

on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating 

that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate 

both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that 

the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Campbell has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

Campbell’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 JANUARY 26, 2012

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 11-11810

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket Nos. 1:10-cv-21488-KMM,

1:08-cr-20228-KMM-1

ULISES CAO,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent-Appellee.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(January 26, 2012)

Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
The Government properly concedes that, in denying petitioner’s motion to

vacate filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the district erroneously disregarded

Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), when it failed to

address petitioner’s claim that he was denied his Fifth Amendment right to due

process of law because the Government knowingly presented a witness’s perjured

testimony. The district court’s judgement is accordingly vacated and the case is

remanded with the instruction that the district court address the merits of that

claim. 

VACATED and REMANDED.

2